

WITNESS TO TRUTH:

Report of the
Sierra Leone
Truth & Reconciliation
Commission

VOL 1


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
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ISBN 9988 -8097-6-X

Published by Graphic Packaging Ltd. GCGL
Printed and Bound at GPL Press, Accra, Ghana.


The Truth and Reconciliation Comision Report was presented to President
Ahmed Tijan Kabbah, President of sierra Leone on 5th October 2004


Bishop Joseph Christian Humper
Chairman



Hon. Justice Laura Marcus Jones
Deputy Chairperson


Mrs. Ajaratou Satang Jow


Professor John Kamara


Ms. Yasmin Louise Sooka


Professor William Schabas


Mr. Sylvanus Torto

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
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AAAS/SHR	–	American Association for the Advancement of Science/Human Rights Programme
ABA/CEELI	–	American Bar Association/Central and East European Law Initiative
ACC	–	Anti Corruption Commission
ACHPR	–	African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights
ACRWC	–	African Covenant on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
ADMS	–	Alluvial Diamond Mining Scheme
AFL	–	Armed Forces of Liberia
AFRC	–	Armed Forces Revolutionary Council
APC	–	All Peoples Congress
AZAPO	–	Azanian Peoples Organisation
BBC	–	British Broadcasting Corporation
CBR	–	Community Based Rehabilitation
CCM	–	Country Coordinating Mechanism
CCP	–	Commission for the Consolidation of Peace
CDF	–	Civil Defence Forces
CEDAW	–	Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women
CEIP	–	Community Education Investment Programme
CFN	–	Children’s Forum Network
CGG	–	Campaign for Good Governance
CMC	–	Ceasefire Monitoring Committee
CMO	–	Chief Military Observer
CMRRD	–	Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development
COMAHS	–	College of Medicine and Allied Health Sciences
CPA	–	Child Protection Agency
CRC	–	Convention on the Rights of the Child
CREPS	–	Complementary Rapid Education for Primary Schools
CSM	–	Civil Society Movement
CWC	–	Child Welfare Committee
DDR	–	Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DFID	–	Department for International Development
EBIM	–	Elections Before Independence Movement
ECOMOG	–	ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group
ECOWAS	–	Economic Community of West African States
EO	–	Executive Outcomes
FAWE	–	Federation of African Women Educationalists
FBC	–	Fourah Bay College
FGM	–	Female Genital Mutilation
GDO	–	Gold and Diamond Office
GGDO	–	Government Gold and Diamond Office
GoSL	–	Government of Sierra Leone
GSG	–	Gurkhas Security Group
GTZ	–	Gemeinschaft Technischer Zusammenarbeit (German Institute for Technical Cooperation)
HIPC	–	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative
HRC	–	Human Rights Commission

HRD	–	Belgium High Diamond Council
HRDAG	–	Human Rights Data Analysis Group
HRIMS	–	Human Rights Information Management System
ICC	–	International Criminal Court
ICCPR	–	International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICECSR	–	International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
ICRC	–	International Committee of the Red Cross
ICS	–	Institute of Commonwealth Studies
ICTJ	–	International Centre for Transitional Justice
ICTR	–	International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY	–	International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
IDP	–	Internally Displaced Person
IHRLG/Law Group	–	International Human Rights Law Group
ILO	–	International Labour Organisation
IMC	–	International Medical Corps
IMU	–	Information Management Unit
INEC	–	Independent National Electoral Commission
IPAM	–	Institute of Public Administration and Management
IRC	–	Inter Religious Council
ISPO	–	International Society for Prosthetics and Orthotics
ISU	–	Internal Security Unit
JLSC	–	Judicial Legal Service Commission
JMC	–	Joint Monitoring Committee
KCP	–	Kimberly Certification Process
KPU	–	Kono Progressive Union
LAWCLA	–	Lawyers Centre for Legal Assistance
LUDF	–	Liberian United Defence Force
MADA	–	Ministry of Agriculture and Development Assistance
MEST	–	Ministry of Education, Science and Technology
MOCKY	–	Movement of Kono Youths
MOLHCPE	–	Ministry of Lands, Housing, Country Planning and Environment
MoU	–	Memorandum of Understanding
MILOBS	–	Military Observers
MRD	–	Movement for the Restoration of Democracy
MSF	–	Médecins sans Frontières
MSWGCA	–	Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs
NAC	–	National Aids Council
NaCSA	–	National Commission for Social Action
NACWAC	–	National Commission for War Affected Children
NAS	–	National Aids Secretariat
NATAG	–	Nigerian Armed Forces Training Group
NCCSL	–	National Council of the Colony of Sierra Leone
NCDDR	–	National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
NCDHR	–	National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights
NCRRR	–	National Commission for Reconstruction, Resettlement and Rehabilitation
NCSL	–	National Council of Sierra Leone
NCSLW	–	National Council of Sierra Leone Women

NDP	–	National Democratic Party
NDMC	–	National Diamond Mining Company
NEC	–	National Electoral Commission
NFHR	–	National Forum for Human Rights
NGO	–	Non Governmental Organisation
NIBATT	–	Nigerian Battalion
NIGCON	–	Nigerian Contingent
NPFL	–	National Patriotic Front of Liberia
NPRC	–	National Provisional Ruling Council
NRC	–	National Reformation Council
NRC	–	Norwegian Refugee Council
NRS	–	National Recovery Strategy
OAU	–	Organisation of African Unity
OHCHR	–	Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OSD	–	Operational Support Division
PAE	–	(Agency for) Plants, Animals and the Environment
PANA	–	Pan African News Agency
PANAFU	–	Pan African Union Organisation
PCMH	–	Princess Christian Maternity Hospital
PEPU	–	Protectorate Education Progressive Union
PETS	–	Public Expenditure Tracking Survey
PHR	–	Physicians for Human Rights
PMMC	–	Precious Metals Mining Company
PNP	–	Peoples National Party
PP	–	Peoples Party
PRIDE	–	Post Conflict Reintegration Initiative for Development and Empowerment
PRSP	–	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
RREP	–	Rapid Response Education Project
RUF	–	Revolutionary United Front
RUFP	–	Revolutionary United Front Party
RSLAF	–	Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces
RSLMF	–	Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces
RVF	–	Rectal Vaginal Fistula
SAPA	–	Social Action for Poverty Alleviation
SBU	–	Small Boys Unit
SGU	–	Small Girls Unit
SHARP	–	Sierra Leone Aids Response Project
SLA	–	Sierra Leone Army
SLAMM-CDF	–	Sierra Leone Action Movement for the CDF
SLBS	–	Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service
SLENA	–	Sierra Leone News Agency
SLPIM	–	Sierra Leone Peoples Independence Movement
SLPMB	–	Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board
SLPP	–	Sierra Leone Peoples Party
SLRRP	–	Sierra Leone Rural Reintegration Project
SLST	–	Sierra Leone Selection Trust
SLTU	–	Sierra Leone Teachers Union
SOFA	–	Status of Forces Agreement

SOS	–	Sierra Leone Organisation Society
SRSG	–	Special Representative of the Secretary General
SSD	–	Special Security Division
STI	–	Sexually Transmitted Infection
TRC	–	Truth and Reconciliation Commission
UDP	–	United Democratic Party
ULIMO	–	United Liberation Movement
UN	–	United Nations
UNAMSIL	–	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNDP	–	United Nations Development Programme
UNDPKO	–	United Nations Department for Peace keeping Operations
UNESCO	–	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation
UNHCR	–	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	–	United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIFEM	–	United Nations Fund for Women
UNOCHA	–	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Activities
UNOMSIL	–	United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNSC	–	United Nations Security Council
UPP	–	United Progressive Party
USAID	–	United States Agency for International Development
VVF	–	Vesico Vaginal Fistula
WHO	–	World Health Organisation



Foreword by Bishop J. C. Humper — Chairman of the Commission

Foreword

The establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (the Commission) in Sierra Leone after eleven years of bitter civil conflict was appropriate, necessary and indeed, highly significant for the healing of a traumatised nation. The Report is all-inclusive in that it does not only expose perpetrators and identify victims but also serves as a mirror through which all Sierra Leoneans can and, indeed, are encouraged to examine their own roles in the conflict.

The Commission was a product of the Lomé Peace Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). The work of the Commission has laid the foundation for reconciliation and healing for all of those affected by the civil war. Victims and perpetrators are beginning to find a common ground on which to stand, live and develop the country together in peace and harmony.

The Report of the Commission (the Report) calls for introspection and a retrospective examination of the political, historical, economical, social and moral activities of both the state and the nation. While particular attention has been paid to the plight of victims, the motives and perspectives of those who committed terrible atrocities were intensively explored.

The Commission endeavoured in its report to address the questions: “Why Sierra Leone?” “What went wrong?” “What needs to change?” “How will we effect the change?” The Report is intended to enable Sierra Leoneans to understand the conflict and to come to grips with the problems which gave rise to it, many of which continue to plague Sierra Leone today. In this way, the Commission hopes the Report will serve as a roadmap towards the building of a new society in which all Sierra Leoneans can walk unafraid with pride and dignity.

The Commission's findings force us as a nation to confront the past. They reinforce the belief that the past cannot, indeed must not, be forgotten. Forgetting or ignoring the past means we cannot learn its lessons and are at greater risk of repeating it. Through attributing responsibility for the different causes of the conflict, and the many violations of human rights committed throughout it, we create accountability and state unequivocally that we reject impunity. With this knowledge and understanding we vow to build a society that will be able to prevent such causes and violations from recurring.

The Commission's recommendations touch on every aspect of the life of our nation. They will go a long way towards promoting restorative justice in Sierra Leone. The recommendations do not only deal with the technical and policy measures required to build a peaceful and stable future, they also call for a fundamental change in the attitudes of Sierra Leoneans. With common resolve and commitment on the part of every citizen and the ongoing support of the international community, we can say that the prospects for sustained peace and the development of Sierra Leone are indeed bright.

Our ultimate goal of peace and reconciliation will be reached if all living within its borders sincerely respect the human rights of all, without exception. We must reaffirm our resolve to live in a nation where justice reigns, where nobody is above the law, where unity and tolerance is the order of the day, where genuine democracy thrives, and where love and concern for each other and our country is paramount. True reconciliation requires real consideration for the total well being of all our citizens – including children,

youth and women. All citizens must have a genuine stake in society in order for there to be a lasting peace in Sierra Leone.

Reconciliation is strengthened through acknowledgment and forgiveness. Those who have confronted the past will have no problem in acknowledging their roles in the conflict and expressing remorse for such roles. True statesmen and leaders will also act accordingly for they will recognise the powerful healing and unifying force such acts will have on the nation. Those who have confronted the past will be able to forgive others for the wrongs committed against them. Where the act of forgiveness is genuine it does not matter whether the perpetrator declines to express remorse. Learning to forgive those who have wronged us is the first step we can take towards healing our traumatised nation.


These are my hopes for our people in Sierra Leone. As we read the pages of this Report let us do so with an open mind for the voices of thousands of Sierra Leoneans are contained in its volumes. These voices call upon all of us never to permit intolerance and brutality to afflict our Sierra Leone again. We are called upon to live in such a way that we can truly say “never again”. The future prosperity of our children and indeed future generations depend on how we conduct ourselves. We must meet this challenge.

I wish to acknowledge and pay tribute to the many organisations and individuals that made possible the fulfilment of the Commission’s mandate. Firstly, I wish to express my deep appreciation to several donor countries that supplied financial support: the European Commission, the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Norway, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Germany, Canada, Ireland, Sweden, France and Luxembourg. I wish to pay tribute to Mrs. Mary Robinson, the former United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, whose vision ensured the realisation of this Commission. Several persons in the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights played key roles in establishing and supporting the Commission, including Mr. Jan Cedergren, former Chief of Activities and Programmes Branch, Ms. Tokunbo Ige, African Team Coordinator, and Mr. Martin Ejidike, the Desk Officer for Sierra Leone. The Commission received valuable administrative and logistical support from United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). In particular, I would like to thank the members of the Human Rights Section and of the Media and Public Education Department of UNAMSIL for their unwavering support for the Commission’s work. I extend my appreciation to the President of Sierra Leone, Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah and the Government of Sierra Leone for their committed support to the on-going and long-term truth and reconciliation process.

Several organisations, both within and outside Sierra Leone, played significant roles in promoting the work of the Commission. Within Sierra Leone such organisations included the Campaign for Good Governance, the National Forum for Human Rights, the print and broadcast media and the Inter Religious Council. The Truth and Reconciliation Working Group served as a useful liaison between the Commission and the NGO community. UNICEF provided support to the Commission and enabled it to publish the Children’s Version of the Report. The Commission wishes to thank Saudamini Siegrist for her dedication in compiling the Children’s Version. UNIFEM supplied advice and resources to assist the Commission to address the role of women in the conflict. WITNESS produced a video version of the Report and the Commission wishes to express its gratitude to Gillian Caldwell, Louis Spitzer and Tijanie Bah. The International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) supplied valuable support and input, and the Commission wishes to thank in particular Marieke Wierda who was always available for advice and counsel. The ICTJ provided consultants to the Commission and also supplied financial support for and the National Vision for Sierra Leone.


Finally I would like to pay tribute to the Commissioners and staff of the TRC. The Commissioners, Hon. Justice Laura Marcus-Jones, Mr. Sylvanus Torto, Professor John Kamara, Ms. Yasmin Louise Sooka, Professor William Schabas and Madam Ajaratou Satang Jow who took time out of their busy schedules to ensure the success of the Commission. In particular I would like to pay tribute to Mr Ozonnia Ojielo, the Head of Information Management Unit, who played an instrumental role in the establishment and management of the Commission, and in the production of this report.

As I commend this Report to my fellow Sierra Leoneans, I solicit the cooperation of the national government and the international community to do everything humanly possible to implement the Commission's recommendations. The recommendations represent the hopes of our children and youth as well as the yet unspoken hopes of future generations. We have a real opportunity to unlock the potential and talents of all Sierra Leoneans. We must seize this opportunity. Thus, to all peace loving people, I commend to you this Report of the Commission.



Bishop Joseph Christian Humper
Chairman

Commissioners



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4

1. Bishop Joseph
Christian Humper
- **Chairman**
2. Hon Justice Laura
Marcus-Jones
- **Deputy
Chairperson**
3. Professor William
Schabas
4. Ms Yasmin Louise
Sooka
5. Mr Sylvanus Torto
6. Madam Ajaratu
Satang Jow
7. Professor John
Kamara

TRC



Commissioners at a public hearing

Introduction

1. After years of brutal conflict in Sierra Leone, there existed a need to confront the past. The nation wanted to know what precipitated the wave of vengeance and mayhem that swept across the country. How was it that the people of Sierra Leone came to turn on each other with such ferocity? Why did so many abandon traditions of community and peaceful co-existence? Why were long held and cherished customs and taboos so wantonly discarded? It is only through generating such understanding that the horrors of the past can effectively be prevented from occurring again. Knowledge and understanding are the most powerful deterrents against conflict and war.
2. The Commission accordingly recommends the widest possible dissemination of its Report and its different versions, including the Children's¹ Video² and Pictorial³ versions. The Commission encourages the production of popular versions and summaries in different local languages. Dissemination committees should be organized to distribute the Report at the national and local levels. In particular, the Commission encourages the use of the Report and its different versions to promote dialogue and debate in workshops and other events around the country. The contents of the Report should be incorporated into education programmes from primary to tertiary level. The full Report and its appendixes will be made available on the internet.
3. Those who negotiated the Lomé Peace Agreement recognized that Sierra Leoneans as a nation had a need to express and acknowledge the suffering which took place, a need to relate their stories and experiences, a need to know who was behind the atrocities, a need to explain and contextualize decisions and conduct, a need to reconcile with former enemies, a need to begin personal and national healing and a need to build accountability in order to deal with impunity. The Lomé Peace Agreement required Sierra Leone to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission to meet these different needs. The Sierra Leone Parliament made provision for such a commission in early 2000 by virtue of the Truth and Reconciliation Act, 2000 (the Act). The chapter of this Report entitled "Mandate" sets out in detail the mandate of the Commission as provided for by the Act, including the context of the establishment of the Commission.⁴
4. Various principles and concepts that underpinned and guided the work of the Commission. These included the concepts of truth and truth telling. The Commission also addressed the concepts of a 'just war', 'just means' as well as who constituted a 'victim' and 'perpetrator'. The views of the Commission on these core concepts are set out in the chapter entitled "Concepts".⁵

¹ Produced in collaboration with UNICEF. The Children's Version was written with the assistance of children.

² Produced by WITNESS, in collaboration with the Commission. The Video Version has been produced in English and Krio. It provides a visual account of the Commission's Report.

³ Produced with the support of the International Center for Transitional Justice.

⁴ Chapter 1, Volume 1.

⁵ Chapter 3, Volume 1. For the Commission's views on the concepts of reconciliation and reparations see the chapters entitled 'Reconciliation' at Chapter 7, Volume 3B, and 'Reparations Programme' at Chapter 3, Volume 2.

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Mr Oluyemi Adeniji, SRSG (left) and Mr Bacre Ndiaye, Special Representative of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights at the inauguration of the Commission on July 5, 2002

Getting Started

5. Establishing the truth and achieving reconciliation is an ambitious project for any country struggling to overcome the bitterness of strife and war. This was particularly the case for Sierra Leone. The country was devastated by nearly a decade of civil war. Sierra Leone had become one of the poorest countries in the world. It took several years to establish the Commission. During this period, further disturbances broke out in parts of the country, which prompted the Government of Sierra Leone and the international community to take the initiative of establishing a Special Court for Sierra Leone. The Special Court was tasked with prosecuting those who bore the greatest responsibility for serious violations of human rights. All these factors impacted on the work of the Commission.
6. The Commission was supported in its efforts to raise funds through the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). In view of the Commission's short timeframe, donors were skeptical about its capacity to realize its mandate. The Commission encountered difficulties in reaching its original funding target of \$9.9 million. The Commission's requirements were later realigned to meet the funding prospects while maintaining a credible institution. It became clear from the outset that the establishment of the Commission was beset with problems. This further complicated the Commission's ability to raise sufficient funding. Less than half the funds pledged eventually found their way to the Commission.
7. Internal difficulties saw the Commission effectively losing the first 6 months of its existence. These early difficulties led to a crisis of credibility that in turn exacerbated the Commission's funding crisis. The Commission acknowledges the fact that a measure of internal mismanagement contributed to the many problems experienced by the Commission, not only during the start-up phase but also throughout the life of the Commission. The background to the setting up of the Commission is contained in the chapter entitled "Setting up the Commission".⁶ A full account of the management and operations of the Commission is set out in the chapter entitled "Management and Operational Report".⁷
8. The Commission had to tailor its approach and processes to the constraints it faced. The Commission established two units, namely the Information Management Unit, which included the functions of investigation and research, and the Legal and Reconciliation Unit, which was largely responsible for spearheading the Commission's reconciliation activities. The Commission's activities were divided into three main phases: statement taking, hearings and report writing. The approach adopted by the Commission to advance its mandate is set out in the chapter, "Methodology and Process".⁸

Themes and Historical Record

9. Early in its life, the Commission identified certain key themes upon which it would focus its energies during its research and investigation. These themes were:

⁶ Chapter 2, Volume 1.

⁷ Chapter 4, Volume 1.

⁸ Chapter 5, Volume 1.

- Historical Antecedents to the Conflict
- Governance
- Military and Political History of the Conflict
- Nature of the Conflict
- Mineral Resources in the Conflict
- External Actors in the Conflict
- Women and the Armed Conflict
- Children and the Armed Conflict
- Youths and the Armed Conflict
- The TRC and the Special Court for Sierra Leone
- National Vision for Sierra Leone

Each theme is reflected as a chapter in this report.

10. The first objective of the Commission, as established by the Act, was to create an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone. The Parliament of Sierra Leone recognized that such a record would form the basis for the task of preventing the recurrence of violence.⁹ Several of the themes focused on by the Commission comprise the historical record of the conflict. The Commission does not claim to have produced the complete or exhaustive historical record of the conflict. The Commission is however satisfied that it has provided an essential version of the armed conflict, which includes an account of its main events and how it started. At times, this story accords with popular views of the conflict. At other times, the Commission's record of the conflict departs from popular history and debunks certain myths and untruths about the conflict.

Causes of the Conflict

11. While there were many factors, both internal and external, that explain the cause of the civil war, the Commission came to the conclusion that it was years of bad governance, endemic corruption and the denial of basic human rights that created the deplorable conditions that made conflict inevitable. Successive regimes became increasingly impervious to the wishes and needs of the majority. Instead of implementing positive and progressive policies, each regime perpetuated the ills and self-serving machinations left behind by its predecessor. By the start of the conflict, the nation had been stripped of its dignity. Institutional collapse reduced the vast majority of people into a state of deprivation. Government accountability was non-existent. Political expression and dissent had been crushed. Democracy and the rule of law were dead. By 1991, Sierra Leone was a deeply divided society and full of the potential for violence. It required only the slightest spark for this violence to be ignited. The Commission traced the roots of these lapses through the post-independence period and into the colonial period in the chapters entitled "Historical Antecedents to the Conflict"¹⁰ and "Governance".¹¹
12. The Commission highlights its finding that many of the causes of conflict that prompted thousands of young people to join the war have still not been

⁹ Statement of Objects and Reasons, which was attached to the Bill when it was enacted by Parliament.

¹⁰ Chapter 1, Volume 3A.

¹¹ Chapter 2, Volume 3A. See also 'Causes of the Conflict' in Chapter 2, Volume 2.

adequately addressed.¹² The Commission makes recommendations to strengthen the judiciary and the rule of law, as well as Parliament and the electoral system. The Commission proposes the introduction of a new transparent regime in which citizens will have reasonable access to government information, where senior public officials disclose their financial interests and where government informs people down to the community level of what amounts are being spent on services and amenities.¹³

The Story of the Conflict

13. The core of the historical record is to be found in the chapter titled “Military and Political History of the Conflict”.¹⁴ This chapter endeavours to tell the story of the conflict by charting its key events and dynamics in the military and political spheres. It begins by tracing the immediate causes of the conflict and the convergence of factors that led to the outbreak of hostilities. Thereafter, for the purposes of analysis, the chapter is divided into three distinct components, which are referred to by the Commission as “Phases I, II and III.” Each ‘phase’ assumed a slightly different character, although the common underpinning was the ongoing commission of violations by all warring factions. Phase One is titled “Conventional ‘Target’ Warfare” and covers the period from the outbreak of the conflict until 13th November 1993. Phase Two is titled “Guerrilla Warfare” and covers the period from 13 November 1993 until 2 March 1997. Phase Three is titled “Power Struggles and Peace Efforts” and covers the period from 2 March 1997 until the end of the conflict on 18 January 2002.
14. The story of the war reveals how Sierra Leoneans were denied their humanity and underscores the need for the creation of a human rights culture in Sierra Leone. A rights culture is one in which there is knowledge and recognition of the basic rights to which all human beings are entitled as well as a sense of responsibility to build it. A rights culture demands that we respect each other’s human rights, without exception. Among its recommendations to protect human rights the Commission recommends the immediate release of all those held in safe custody detention and that such detention never be resorted to again. The Commission also recommends significant changes to the legal regime governing public emergencies.¹⁵

Nature of the Conflict

15. The Sierra Leonean poet, Mahomed Sekoya, wrote:

“I saw abomination between man and woman, man and man, woman and woman, adults and children. Yes I saw.”¹⁶

Sierra Leone saw some of the most horrific and cruel atrocities committed by people against each other. In the chapter, “Nature of the Conflict”, the Commission endeavoured to provide the context in which abuses such as amputations, sexual abuse and slavery and forced cannibalism took place.¹⁷

¹² Chapter 2, Volume 2.

¹³ Chapter 3, Volume 2.

¹⁴ Chapter 3, Volume 3A.

¹⁵ Chapter 3, Volume 2.

¹⁶ Extract from the poem “I Saw”. Mahomed Sekoya is a contributor to the National Vision for Sierra Leone, a project of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

¹⁷ Chapter 4, Volume 3A.

This chapter explores the nature of the violations committed and the essentially self-destructive character of the conflict.

16. The overwhelming majority of atrocities were committed by Sierra Leoneans against Sierra Leoneans. All the fighting factions targeted civilians. The Commission found the leadership of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) and the Civil Defense Forces (CDF) to be responsible for either authorising or instigating human rights violations against civilians; alternatively for failing to stop such practices or to speak out against them. Sierra Leone was systematically plundered and looted by all factions in the conflict. The Commission found the RUF to have been responsible for the largest number of human rights violations in the conflict. The reader is referred to Chapter One in Volume 4 (the Appendix) of this report for a detailed explanation of how the Commission's database represents the abuses experienced during the war in Sierra Leone.

Mineral Resources and the Armed Conflict

17. There is a view commonly held, both within and outside Sierra Leone, that the Sierra Leone conflict was a war fought over diamonds. This is only partly true. The Commission found that the civil war in Sierra Leone was not simply a struggle for mineral resources. There were other factors that laid the grounds for the war which would have taken place even without the existence of diamonds in the country. The Commission concluded that the exploitation of diamonds was not the cause of the conflict in Sierra Leone; rather it was an element that fuelled the conflict. The Commission explains in its chapter, "Mineral Resources in the Conflict", how diamonds were used by most of the armed factions to finance and support their war efforts.¹⁸

External Actors and the Armed Conflict

18. Although the Sierra Leone war was one primarily fought by Sierra Leoneans, external parties played influential roles in intensifying the conflict. In the chapter, "External Actors in the Armed Conflict"¹⁹ the Commission explores the roles of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), Charles Taylor and Libya in bringing bloody conflict to Sierra Leone. The Commission calls on Liberia to make symbolic reparations to Sierra Leone and calls on Libya to make financial contributions to the War Victims Fund.
19. The Commission also considers the different roles of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), the United Liberation Movement for Democracy (ULIMO), mercenary groups such as Executive Outcomes and Sandline, the United Kingdom, the United Nations and the rest of the international community. The Commission laments the fact that the international community, apart from the ECOWAS states, declined to intervene in the unfolding human catastrophe in Sierra Leone until at a very late stage. The Commission calls on the international community to stay the course in helping to rebuild Sierra Leone.

¹⁸ Chapter 1, Volume 3B.

¹⁹ Chapter 2, Volume 3B.

TRC



His Excellency Ahmad Tejan Kabbah; President of Sierra Leone at the inauguration of the Commission on 5 July 2002

Women and the Armed Conflict

20. Women and girls became targets for abuse in the brutal conflict in Sierra Leone. They suffered abductions and exploitation at the hands of their abductors. Their vulnerability was exploited in order to dehumanize them. Women and girls were raped, forced into sexual slavery and endured acts of sexual violence. Many suffered mutilations, torture and a host of other cruel and inhumane acts.
21. The chapter titled, "Women and the Armed Conflict", sets out the violations suffered by women and considers the current position of women in Sierra Leone.²⁰ The Commission makes specific recommendations to redress the marginalization of women in the political and social life of Sierra Leone, including a minimum percentage of women to be represented in public office and as candidates in national and local government elections.²¹

Children and the Armed Conflict

22. The Commission's enabling Act required it to give special attention to the experiences of children in the armed conflict.²² Children were singled out for some of the most brutal violations of human rights recorded in any conflict. The Sierra Leonean conflict was characterised by the pernicious strategy employed by most of the factions in forcing children into combat. The Commission found it most disturbing that children were the main victims in the following violations: drugging²³, forced recruitment, rape, and sexual assault. The Commission found that children between the ages of 10 to 14 were specifically targeted for forced recruitment, rape, and sexual slavery.²⁴ Children were also forced, often under the threat of death, to commit a range of atrocities.
23. The Commission paid particular attention to identifying and exposing individuals and factions responsible for the violation and abuse of the rights of children.²⁵ The story of children in the Sierra Leone conflict is told in the chapter entitled "Children and the Armed Conflict".²⁶ Never again should the children of Sierra Leone be subjected to brutality.

Youths and the Armed Conflict

24. The last twenty years of Sierra Leone's history is, in large part, the story of Sierra Leone's youths. Youths were the driving force behind the resistance to one party state rule in the 1980s. As students, journalists, workers and activists, they exposed injustices and the bankruptcy of the ruling elite's ideology. They also bore the brunt of the state's repressive backlash. During the conflict, youths formed the bulk of the fighting forces in all the factions.

²⁰ Chapter 3, Volume 3B.

²¹ See Recommendations, Chapter 3, Volume 2.

²² Section 6(2)(b), Truth and Reconciliation Act, 2000.

²³ The forced consumption of drugs.

²⁴ For more detail, see the chapter entitled "Children and the Armed Conflict", Chapter 4 Volume 3B.

²⁵ See the following chapters: Children and the Armed Conflict, Military and Political History of the Conflict, Nature of the Conflict, and Findings.

²⁶ Chapter 4, Volume 3B.

25. Many of the dire conditions that gave rise to the conflict in 1991 remain in 2004. As in the late 1980s, many young adults continue to occupy urban ghettos where they languish in a twilight zone of unemployment and despair. The Commission found that the youth in Sierra Leone were and continue to be excluded from meaningful participation in the political process. The Commission recommends the creation of a Youth Commission and a minimum percentage of youth to be represented as candidates in national and local government elections.²⁷ The role of the youth in Sierra Leone's civil war is set out in the chapter entitled "Youths and the Armed Conflict".²⁸

Transitional Justice in Sierra Leone

26. The Commission worked alongside an international criminal tribunal, the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Most truth commissions have operated as an alternative to criminal prosecution. Given the pardon and amnesty provisions of the Lomé Peace Agreement, the Commission was proposed as an alternative to criminal justice in order to establish accountability for the atrocities that had been committed during the conflict. The Special Court was created after the abandonment of the amnesty provisions (or certain of them) following breaches of the Lomé Peace Agreement by elements within the RUF.
27. The Sierra Leonean case has brought into focus the different roles of truth and reconciliation commissions and international tribunals and the potential pitfalls that may arise when they operate simultaneously. While the relationship between the Commission and the Special Court was mostly cordial, it did falter following the refusal of the Special Court to permit the Commission to hold public hearings with the detainees held in its custody. In the view of the Commission, this decision of the Special Court did not sufficiently take into account the respective roles of the two bodies. The relationship between the two bodies is described in detail in the chapter, "The TRC and the Special Court".²⁹ The Commission makes specific recommendations aimed at addressing some of the difficulties that it encountered in this context. These may be of value to future transitional justice initiatives.
28. The Commission holds that the right to the truth is inalienable. This right should be upheld both in national and international law. It is the exploration of the wider truth through broad-based participation that permits a nation to examine itself honestly and to take effective measures to prevent a repetition of the past.

Reconciliation

29. The Commission recognizes that reconciliation is a long-term process that must occur at national, community, and individual levels. Being a process, it will take time and will need to continue even beyond the present generation. The Commission places no preconditions on the realisation of reconciliation. Reconciliation is an ongoing process that must be nurtured and promoted.
30. Reconciliation is about relationships and how to change them. Relationships of hatred, anger, frustration, alienation or indifference need to be changed into

²⁷ See Recommendations, Chapter 3, Volume 2.

²⁸ Chapter 5, Volume 3B.

²⁹ Chapter 6, Volume 3B.

relationships of respect, co-operation and trust. Reconciliation aims at restoring the social fabric within families, communities and the nation.

31. The reconciliation process is not finished when people peacefully co-exist. Reconciliation needs to go further: people need to understand that the only future they have is a common one and that the only way forward towards development is by working together. *Working together* requires more than tolerance and respect. It requires consultation, debate and agreement, an understanding of the fact that common interests can be in conflict with personal interests and that co-operation requires compromise.
32. The Commission's report on its own reconciliation activities and its guidelines for future action is set out in the chapter "Reconciliation".³⁰ Among the recommendations the Commission proposes to advance reconciliation is the establishment of a national reconciliation day to be held every year on 18th January, which is the day that the war was officially declared to be over in 2002 with the symbolic destruction of 3000 weapons at Lungi. The Commission offers guidelines that will facilitate reconciliation. However, it is ultimately up to all Sierra Leoneans to engage in imaginative acts that will serve the cause of reconciliation and healing at all levels.

Findings

33. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act enjoined the Commission to make findings in relation to the causes, nature and extent of violations and abuses in respect of the armed conflict in Sierra Leone.³¹ In particular, the Commission was mandated to deliberate on the question of whether such violations and abuses were the result of deliberate planning, policy or authorisation by any government, group or individual.
34. The "Findings" chapter³² summarises the main findings of the Commission.³³ The detailed conclusions are to be found in the different chapters of the report. The main findings are preceded by primary findings. The primary findings are the central or most important findings made by the Commission. At the end of each section addressing the role played by a particular government, faction or group, the names and positions of persons found to have been its key office-holders are listed. In circumstances where a finding pertained to the actions of the government, faction or group in question, those office-holders were by implication held responsible.
35. The Commission by necessity devoted its energies to building the totality of the story of the conflict. Although specific cases were investigated, these were events that either served to illustrate the greater story or incidents that in themselves defined the nature and course of the conflict.
36. The "Findings" chapter sets out the conclusions and findings of the Commission in relation to the following topics and themes:
 - Causes of the Conflict
 - Nature and Characteristics of the Conflict

³⁰ Chapter 7, Volume 3B.

³¹ Section 6(1) read with s6(2)(a).

³² Chapter 2, Volume 2.

³³ As required by Section 15(2).

- Perpetrator Responsibility
- Military and Political History (includes individual and faction specific-findings)
- External Actors
- The Judiciary, the Rule of Law and the Promotion of Human Rights
- Youth
- Children
- Women
- Mineral Resources
- TRC and the Special Court for Sierra Leone

37. The Commission commenced its primary findings with the conclusion that the conflict and the independence period preceding it represented the most shameful years of Sierra Leone's history. These periods reflected an extraordinary failure of leadership on the part of many of those involved in government, public life and civil society. No enlightened and visionary leaders emerged to steer the country away from the slide into chaos and bloody civil war.

Recommendations

38. The Commission is required to make recommendations concerning reforms and measures, whether legal, political, administrative or otherwise, needed to achieve the object of the Commission; namely preventing the repetition of violations or abuses suffered, addressing impunity, responding to the needs of victims and promoting healing and reconciliation.³⁴
39. The proposed measures contained in the Recommendations chapter are designed to facilitate the building of a new Sierra Leone based on the values of human dignity, tolerance and respect for the rights of all persons. In particular, the recommendations are intended to help create an open and vibrant democracy in which all are treated as equal before the law.
40. The legacies of dehumanization, hatred and fear must be confronted on the basis that there is a need for tolerance, not prejudice; a need for acknowledgment, not recrimination; a need for reparation, not retribution; a need for community, not victimisation; a need for understanding, not suspicion; and a need for reconstruction, not greed.
41. The Act requires that the Government shall faithfully and timeously implement the recommendations of the report that are directed to state bodies and encourage or facilitate the implementation of any recommendations that may be directed to others.³⁵ The Government of Sierra Leone is therefore required to take all reasonable steps within its means to implement the recommendations. Such steps should be taken promptly and without unreasonable delay.
42. The Act further requires that the Government shall, upon the publication of the report of the Commission, establish a Follow-up Committee to monitor the implementation of the recommendations of the Commission and to facilitate

³⁴ Section 15(2).

³⁵ Section 17.

their implementation.³⁶ The effect of the law is to invite the closest scrutiny of the Government's response to the recommendations made by the Commission, not only by the Follow-up Committee, but also by civil society.

43. In the light of the mandatory obligation imposed on the Government, the Commission has been mindful of its heavy responsibility to make recommendations that are indeed capable of being implemented. In making its recommendations the Commission has been slow to enter the arena of governmental discretion with regard to what government programmes should be initiated and how they should be implemented. The Commission opted to focus on recommendations that serve to establish and safeguard rights, principles and values consistent with its mandate.
44. In order to give practical effect to its approach, the Commission divided its recommendations into three categories, namely "Imperative", "Work Towards" and "Seriously Consider". "Imperative" recommendations are those which fall strictly within the faithful and timeous obligations as required by the Act. Such recommendations tend to be those that establish and uphold rights and values and ought to be implemented immediately or as soon as possible. The "Work Towards" recommendations tend to be those that require in-depth planning and the marshalling of resources in order to ensure their fulfillment. Government is expected to put in place the building blocks to make the ultimate fulfillment of the recommendation possible and to do so within a reasonable time period. In the "Seriously Consider" category, while the Government is expected to thoroughly evaluate the recommendation, it is under no obligation to implement the recommendation.
45. The Commission provides specific guidelines to the Follow-up Committee with respect to the monitoring required in the three categories of recommendations. The Commission, at times, calls on institutions that do not form part of the Executive or Legislative arm of government, non-governmental bodies, and members of the international community to implement certain recommendations. In these circumstances, the Commission "calls on" the body in question to implement the recommendation. For ease of reference, the Recommendations chapter ends with tables in which every recommendation made by the Commission is reflected under columns representing the different categories of recommendations.
46. The recommendations cover the following areas and themes: the Protection of Human Rights, Establishing the Rule of Law, the Security Services, Promoting Good Governance, Fighting Corruption, Youth, Women, Children, External Actors, Mineral Resources, The Commission and the Special Court, Reparations, Reconciliation, National Vision for Sierra Leone, Archiving, Dissemination of The Commission's Report, and the Follow-Up Committee.
47. The Commission's recommendations are based on the findings it reached. The introduction to the Recommendations chapter highlights the Commission's central or core recommendations. These include:
 - The call upon leaders at all levels to commit themselves to new principles of committed leadership;
 - A call on all those in the public sector to usher in a new culture of ethics and service to fight the scourge of corruption which saps the life-force of

³⁶ Section 18(1).

- Sierra Leone;
- The enshrining of the right to human dignity and the abolition of the death penalty;
- The upholding of the freedom of expression which is the lifeblood of a vibrant democracy;
- The introduction of a common and equitable citizenship which will promote a new patriotism and devotion to Sierra Leone;
- Recommendations to strengthen democracy, the rule of law and institutions of accountability;
- New principles of National Security, which reflect the will of Sierra Leoneans to live in peace and harmony;
- Recommendations to bring government and service delivery to people throughout Sierra Leone.

Reparations Programme

48. The Commission's enabling Act required it to make recommendations concerning the measures needed to respond to the needs of victims.³⁷ The proposed measures are contained in the Reparations Chapter.³⁸
49. The Commission proposes that the Reparations programme be co-ordinated by the National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA). It is envisaged that NaCSA as the "Implementing Body" entrusted with governing the Special Fund for War Victims, will ensure the decentralisation of programmes in conjunction with different Ministries. It is proposed further that NaCSA be assisted by an Advisory Committee. The Commission recommends that the proposed National Human Rights Commission perform the role of the Advisory Committee.
50. The Commission's recommended measures deal with the needs of victims in the following areas: health, pensions, education, skills training and micro credit, community reparations and symbolic reparations. The Commission also makes recommendations to redress the wrongs suffered by those who were politically persecuted while they held public office.
51. The Commission decided to propose a programme to address and respond to the specific needs of victims, rather than recommending cash handouts. With regard to certain categories of victims, such as amputees, war wounded and victims of sexual violence, the Commission recommends that they be given free physical (and where necessary, mental) healthcare for the rest of their lives or to the extent that their injury or disability demands. The Commission recommends that a monthly pension be paid to all adult amputees, other war wounded who experienced a 50% or more reduction in earning capacity as a result of their injury, and victims of sexual violence. The amounts of such pensions should be determined by NaCSA.
52. The Commission recommends that there should be free education until senior secondary level for specific groups affected by the conflict. Those eligible should include children who are amputees, other war wounded, and victims of sexual violence; children who were abducted or conscripted; orphans of the war; and children of amputees, other war wounded who experienced a 50%

³⁷ Section 15(2).

³⁸ Chapter 4, Volume 2.

reduction in earning capacity as a result of their injuries, and victims of sexual violence.³⁹

National Vision for Sierra Leone

*We will drag ourselves out of this poverty zone
And we'll care for our own, our Sierra Leone
We will raise up our hearts and our voices as one*⁴⁰

53. The Commission looked to the past in order to tell the story of the civil war and to make recommendations to prevent a repetition of conflict. The Commission also looked to the future for the purpose of describing the kind of future post-conflict society that the recommendations were designed to achieve. The Commission called on Sierra Leoneans to tell the Commission what future society they envisaged for their country.
54. The Commission was overwhelmed by the effort, time and resources that so many Sierra Leoneans devoted to preparing their contributions. Among the contributors were adults and children of different backgrounds, religions and regions, artists and laymen, amputees, ex-combatants and prisoners. The contributions include written and recorded essays, slogans, plays and poems; paintings, etchings and drawings; sculptures, wood carvings, installations and even a sea-worthy boat. The contributions form part of the national heritage of Sierra Leone.
55. While most contributors worked separately, a number of common themes and forms emerged. Although the Commission asked Sierra Leoneans to speak about the future; the majority of contributions received addressed the future by making reference to the past. The contributions speak of struggle and hope. They point to the need for basic respect and tolerance among all human beings. Some of the contributions set out prerequisites for a future peaceful and prosperous Sierra Leone, while others point to the severe problems facing Sierra Leone. They serve as signposts for the future; signposts that we ignore at our peril.
56. The National Vision⁴¹ has provided an exciting opportunity for individual Sierra Leoneans to contribute their ideas and talents to the process of peace and reconciliation. Through the National Vision, Sierra Leoneans of all ages and backgrounds may claim their own citizenship space in the new Sierra Leone and make their contributions to the country's cultural and national heritage. Most of all, the contributions show what Sierra Leone can be. They show the enormous potential that exists – potential that must be harnessed positively and productively. In the words of one contributor, Wurie Mamadu Tamba Barrie:

“The inspiration is let's sprint, if we can't sprint, let's run, if we can't run, let's walk, if we also can't walk, then let's crawl, but in any way possible, let's keep on moving”.

³⁹ Only certain aspects of the reparations programme are highlighted here. For the full programme, including qualifications, see the Reparations Programme chapter.

⁴⁰ Extract from “My Vision, My Home, My Sierra Leone” by Ustina More

⁴¹ Chapter 8, Volume 3B.

CHAPTER ONE

The mandate of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission

TRC

**Tru at
fo tok
but na im
nomo go
bring pis**

Produced by the TRC Steering Committee with support
from the International Human Rights Law Group

CHAPTER ONE

The Mandate of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission

The Legislative Framework

1. Truth and Reconciliation Commissions had been established in many countries following periods of protracted internal conflict, and were widely believed to provide an important mechanism for transitional justice. Generally, they have been presented as an alternative to judicial prosecution for atrocities, especially in cases where political exigencies made this unlikely or impossible. In the case of Sierra Leone, this was quite explicit. The creation of the Commission was provided for in the Lomé Peace Agreement of 7 July 1999. Article IX of the Lomé Peace Agreement provided a pardon and amnesty for participants in the conflict. The Commission was therefore viewed as the principal means of providing a degree of accountability for human rights abuses committed during the conflict.
2. It is worthy of note that the Abidjan Peace Agreement of 30 November 1996, which initially offered the hope of an end to the conflict but which did not succeed, for reasons detailed elsewhere in this Report, made no provision for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission or for any similar process. Yet article 14 of the Abidjan Agreement granted an amnesty to members of the Revolutionary United Front, allegedly so as '[t]o consolidate the peace and promote the cause of national reconciliation'.

Legal Framework for Mandate

3. Article VI(2) of the Lomé Peace Agreement described the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as one of several 'structures for national reconciliation and the consolidation of peace'. Article XXVI of the Lomé Peace Agreement reads as follows:

ARTICLE XXVI

HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS

1. *A Truth and Reconciliation Commission shall be established to address impunity, break the cycle of violence, provide a forum for both the victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to tell their story, get a clear picture of the past in order to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation.*

2. *In the spirit of national reconciliation, the Commission shall deal with the question of human rights violations since the beginning of the Sierra Leonean conflict in 1991. This Commission shall, among other things, recommend measures to be taken for the rehabilitation of victims of human rights violations.*

3. *Membership of the Commission shall be drawn from a cross-section of Sierra Leonean society with the participation and some technical support of the International Community. This Commission shall be established within 90 days after the signing of the present Agreement and shall, not later than 12 months after the commencement of its work, submit its report to the Government for immediate implementation of its recommendations.*

4. The *Truth and Reconciliation, 2000* ('the Act') was adopted on 22 February 2000. However, it was, strictly speaking, only 'established' on 5 July 2002, when the seven Commissioners appointed by the President were formally sworn in during a public ceremony. The word 'mandate' is used three times in the Act, in the context of references to 'fulfilment of the Commission's mandate' (sections 8(1)(b) and c), 9(1)), but nowhere is there any attempt to explain or define what the mandate actually consists of. Section 6(1) refers to the 'object for which the Commission is established' and section 6(2)c) speaks of 'fulfilment of the object of the Commission', suggesting that the expression 'object' may be synonymous with 'mandate'. The Act is associated with an explanatory 'Memorandum of Object and Reasons', which was attached to the Bill presented to Parliament. Section 15(2) refers to the need 'to achieve the object of the Commission'. The Act also contains references to the 'functions of the Commission'. Part III of the Act, which includes the sections within which the 'mandate' and 'object' of the Commission are referred to, is entitled 'Functions of the Commission'.
5. For the purposes of this discussion, there does not seem to be any useful or meaningful distinction between 'mandate', 'object' and 'functions' of the Commission. It is not possible to glean any significant nuance in Parliamentary intent from the use of these three terms. They are all components of the 'mandate' of the Commission.
6. Section 6 of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000 sets out the 'object' of the Commission:

6. (1) *The object for which the Commission is established is to create an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, from the beginning of the Conflict in 1991 to the signing*

of the Lome Peace Agreement; to address impunity, to respond to the needs of the victims, to promote healing and reconciliation and to prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), it shall be the function of the Commission -

(a) to investigate and report on the causes, nature and extent of the violations and abuses referred to in subsection (1) to the fullest degree possible, including their antecedents, the context in which the violations and abuses occurred, the question of, whether those violations and abuses were the result of deliberate planning, policy or authorisation by any government, group or individual, and the role of both internal and external factors in the conflict;

(b) to work to help restore the human dignity of victims and promote reconciliation by providing an opportunity for victims to give an account of the violations and abuses suffered and for perpetrators to relate their experiences, and by creating a climate which fosters constructive interchange between victims and perpetrators, giving special attention to the subject of sexual abuses and to the experiences of children within the armed conflict; and

(c) to do all such things as may contribute to the fulfilment of the object of the Commission.

7. Section 7(1) of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000 discusses the 'functions' of the Commission, which it says 'shall include the following three components':

undertaking investigation and research into key events, causes, patterns of abuse or violation and the parties responsible;

holding sessions, some of which may be public, to hear from the victims and perpetrators of any abuses or violations of from other interested parties; and

taking individual statements and gathering additional information with regard to the matters referred to in paragraphs (a) or (b).

8. Section 7(2) of the Act lists several features of the Commission's operations:

seeking assistance from traditional and religious leaders to facilitate its public sessions and in resolving local conflicts arising from past violations or abuses or in support of healing and reconciliation;

provision of information to the Commission on a confidential basis;

taking into account the interests of victims and witnesses when inviting them to give statements, including the security and other concerns of those who may wish to recount their stories in public;

implementation of special procedures to address the needs of such particular victims as children or those who have suffered sexual abuses as well as in working with child perpetrators of abuses or violations;

decision-making by consensus, to the extent possible;

provision of information or recommendations to or regarding the Special Fund for War Victims provided for in Article XXIV of the Lome Peace Agreement, or other assistance.

9. Section 8 of the Act sets out the powers of the Commission.
10. Indications as to the 'mandate' of the Commission are also provided for in Part V of the Act, which deals with the 'Report and Recommendations'. *The Report is to summarise the findings of the Commission and to 'make recommendations concerning the reforms and other measures, whether legal, political, administrative or otherwise, needed to achieve the object of the Commission, namely the object of providing impartial historical record, preventing the repetition of the violations or abuses suffered, addressing impunity, responding to the needs of victims and promoting healing and reconciliation'.*
11. The Memorandum of Objects and Reasons is not, strictly speaking, part of the enacted legislation creating the Commission. Nevertheless, as an attachment to the Bill presented to Parliament, it is of considerable significance for the interpretation of provisions of the Act that was eventually adopted. It provides useful guidance as to Parliamentary intent at the time the legislation was enacted. Several phrases in the Memorandum of Objects and Reasons are of particular relevance, notably the reference to the proceedings of the Commission 'as a catharsis for constructive interchange between the victims and perpetrators of human rights violations and abuses', and the intent that the Commission 'compile 'a clear picture of the past''. Also of interest is the suggestion that clause 6 of the Act refers to 'the principal function of the Commission' as being 'to create an impartial historical record of events in question as the basis for the task of preventing their recurrence'. In fact, section 6 of the Act lists five distinct 'objects' of the Commission, and suggests no hierarchy between them. The Memorandum of Objects and Reasons provides a helpful perspective for the interpretation of the various components of section 6 of the Act. Here is the text in full:

MEMORANDUM OF OBJECTS AND REASONS

The object of this Bill is to establish the Truth and Reconciliation Commission proposed by Article XXVI of the Lome Peace Agreement as part of the process of healing the wounds of the armed conflict which began in 1991. By clause 2 of the Bill, the Commission is being established as a body corporate.

Section 1 of Article XXVI of the Peace Agreement envisaged the proceedings of the Commission as a catharsis for constructive interchange between the victims and perpetrators of human rights violations and abuses and from this catharsis the Commission is to compile 'a clear picture of the past'. Accordingly, by clause 6, the principal function of the Commission is to create an impartial historical record of events in question as the basis for the task of preventing their recurrence.

To best ensure the Commission's independence and impartiality, the members of the Commission are to be appointed after a selection process involving both national and international expertise as stipulated in the Schedule to the Bill and involving a Selection Panel on which all the protagonists to the conflict and other interested parties are represented; (clause 3). By clause 5, the Commission shall operate for one year preceded by a period of three months during which the Commission is to carry out all the ground work necessary for its effectiveness when operations begin. For good cause shown, the term of the Commission may be extended by the President by statutory instrument for a period of six months.

Under clause 12, the Commission is required to raise the funds to finance its operations from both governmental and international non-governmental sources to which it is required to submit quarterly reports to account for the moneys donated (clause 13). Under clause 15, the Commission reports to the President who will then arrange to send copies of the report to the U.N. and Parliament. By clause 18, the Government is required to set up a follow-up Committee to monitor and stimulate the progress of the implementation of the Commission's findings. Under clause 19, the President is required to dissolve the Commission by notice in a statutory instrument not later than three months after the submission of the Commission's report.

12. *In the words of the President, at the swearing in ceremony of the Commissioners held on 5 July 2002, in Freetown, 'the Commission will investigate and report on the causes, nature and extent of the violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law during the conflict. Of course it will create an impartial historical record of the atrocities perpetrated against innocent civilians during a ten-year period of the war. However, it is absolutely necessary that we look beyond those functions, and see the work of the TRC as a therapeutic process. It was a brutal war. It caused grievous physical and emotional damage for thousands of our compatriots. It also created divisions between families, and among neighbours and friends. To a large extent the conflict also fractured the body politic of the nation. Well, the guns may be silent, but the trauma of the war lingers on. We have a great deal of healing to do. This is why the TRC is, and should also be seen, as an instrument of national reconciliation, and another means of strengthening the peace.'*

The Context of Establishment of the Commission

13. The Commission is one of the accountability mechanisms established to deal with the human rights abuses that occurred during the armed conflict. Sierra Leone's transition from armed conflict to peace came about as a result of a peaceful negotiated settlement of the conflict between the government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front, with the signing of the Lomé Peace Accord on 7 July 1999. The process began in the aftermath of the January 1999 invasion of Freetown. The Government of Sierra Leone proposed that the Abidjan Peace Accord should serve as a basis for negotiations. In his address to the nation, on 7 February 1999, President Kabbah called upon the nation and civil society groups to consult and build consensus around the Abidjan Peace Accord in that regard.
14. Civil society groups supported the Government's proposals for peace talks. However, while endorsing in general terms the government's decision to use the Abidjan Peace Accord as the basis for future dialogue with the rebels, the Human Rights Committee expressed reservation with regard to certain articles in the Abidjan Peace Accord, particularly Article 14, which appears to confer blanket immunity on all perpetrators of human rights violations in Sierra Leone. The Committee was of the view that while it was important to look forward rather than to the past during this critical peace process, the disturbing cycle of impunity in Sierra Leone could not be broken unless there was some form of censure or punishment to some perpetrators of gross abuses of human rights in the country.

*'Accordingly therefore, the Committee proposed the creation of a Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission in Sierra Leone which will, inter alia, enable the country to cope with the aftermath of the crisis by hearing the truth directly from perpetrators of gross human rights violations, help survivors of violations cope with their trauma, and recommend judicial prosecutions for some of the worst perpetrators of the violations. This Commission will be an independent structure comprising personalities of unimpeachable moral probity.'*¹

15. In preparations for the meeting in Lomé, the Sierra Leonean government also held a consultative conference on peace building on 12 April 1999. Members of civil society, students, various professional bodies as well as politicians were present at this attempt to build consensus around the content of a future peace agreement. The conference adopted a number of positions including a blanket amnesty clause. The consultative conference did not include an accountability mechanism as a component of the proposed negotiations. Nevertheless, the conference was also clearly opposed to power sharing between the democratically elected government and the RUF-AFRC. A communiqué to that effect and the summary consensus was given to the team that went to Lomé for the negotiations. Commenting on the Government's position in Lomé, Hon

¹ Paragraph 3 of Recommendations adopted by the Human Rights Committee on February 19, 1999 regarding the Sierra Leonean Peace Process. Human Rights Committee is a coalition of international and local human rights NGOs. Interview with Joseph Rahall, Chairman, National Forum for Human Rights, a coalition of Local Human Rights and Development Organisations. See also Interview with John Caulker, Executive Director, Forum of Conscience and Chairman of Truth and Reconciliation Commission Working Group, Freetown 16 December 2003.

Solomon Berewa, leader of the government delegation, has pointed out that the Government went to Lomé with two positions on which to negotiate:

- A) that there should be peace at all costs and
- B) the Constitution of the Republic of Sierra Leone should remain intact.²

16. In its desire to have human rights issues addressed as part of the peace process, civil society through the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) facilitated the visit of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson, to Sierra Leone in June 1999. The essence of the visit was to lend the support of her office to the dialogue of peaceful negotiation, and also to add to the momentum gathered for the need to address human rights violations as well as the building of a culture of respect for human rights. During her visit, the Government, human rights, NGOs represented by the National Forum for Human Rights and the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights,³ signed a human rights manifesto in which the parties agreed, among other things, that a truth and reconciliation commission should be established as an accountability mechanism to deal with the abuses which had occurred during the conflict.⁴
17. It was evident that the RUF would not agree to peace if there was no amnesty.⁵

*In the words of Solomon Berewa: 'We needed to have an agreement with the RUF on having permanent cessation of hostilities. The need for a Peace Agreement at the time became obvious from the panicky reaction of Sierra Leoneans to a threat issued in Lome by Corporal Foday Sankoh that he would call off the talks. I had to make a radio broadcast from Lomé to assure the Sierra Leone public that there was every probability that the Peace Agreement would be concluded. This assurance was necessary to put the population somehow at ease. Most importantly, the RUF would have refused to sign the Agreement if the Government of Sierra Leone had insisted on including in it a provision for judicial action against the RUF and had excluded the amnesty provision from the Agreement.'*⁶

He described the TRC as a 'balm' to heal the deep wounds of the Sierra Leonean society that have been occasioned by the conflict.⁷ It

² Interview with H E Solomon Berewa, Vice President of Sierra Leone. Freetown, 11th October 2003.

³ The National Forum is a Federation of Local Human Rights NGOs and Development Organisations.

⁴ See Article 4 of the Human Rights Manifesto.

⁵ Berewa, Solomon: 'Addressing Impunity using divergent Approaches: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court' Truth and Reconciliation in Sierra Leone a Compilation of Articles on the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, UNAMSIL, Freetown 2001; Interview with H E Solomon Berewa, Vice President of Sierra Leone. Freetown, 11th October 2003; see also testimony of H.E. Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, TRC Public Hearing, 5th August 2003 where he explained why his government granted amnesty to the RUF.

⁶ Interview with H E Solomon Berewa, Vice President of Sierra Leone. Freetown, 11th October 2003; see also Berewa Solomon: 'Addressing Impunity using divergent Approaches: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court' Truth and Reconciliation in Sierra Leone a Compilation of Articles on the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, UNAMSIL, Freetown 2001

⁷ Berewa Solomon, 'Addressing Impunity using Divergent Approaches: The truth and Reconciliation Commission and the special Court', in Truth and Reconciliation in Sierra

should be noted that the Lomé Peace Agreement granted amnesty or pardon not only to the RUF combatants, but to all '*combatants and collaborators*', with specific reference to those of the RUF, ex-AFRC, ex-SLA or CDF. Thus – and in contrast with the Abidjan Agreement, which granted amnesty only to the RUF – the political leaders at Lomé appear to have amnestied themselves as well as their adversaries.

18. It can be said that the philosophy of the Lomé Peace Agreement is to hold perpetrators accountable to the truth and restore the dignity of victims by way of truth telling as opposed to trials and prosecutions. Although there might be technical arguments about the scope of the amnesty in the Lomé Peace Agreement, the Commission could realistically expect that its constituency – victims and perpetrators alike – would be immune from criminal prosecution for all practical purposes. In this respect, its mandate was therefore significantly different from that of other similar commissions, such as the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, where the threat of prosecution hovered over the TRC proceedings, and where amnesty was used to induce cooperation with the TRC process.
19. The philosophy of the Lomé Agreement was modified somewhat in 2000, when the Government of Sierra Leone called upon the United Nations to establish a tribunal. In a letter dated 12 June 2000, President Kabbah asked the United Nations Security Council '*to initiate a process whereby the United Nations would resolve on the setting up of a special court for Sierra Leone. The purpose of such a court is to try and bring to credible justice those members of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and their accomplices responsible for committing crimes against the people of Sierra Leone and for the taking of United Nations peacekeepers as hostages.*'
20. The letter noted that, in the Lomé Peace Agreement, the Government of Sierra Leone had agreed to a total amnesty as 'a price' for peace, adding that the RUF had subsequently 'reneged' on the Lomé Peace Agreement. Although President Kabbah's letter did not make clear whether the Government of Sierra Leone contemplated prosecutions for pre-Lomé offences, thereby repudiating the amnesty provision in that agreement, this subsequently became clear. On 16 January 2002, the Government of Sierra Leone reached agreement with the United Nations for the establishment of a Special Court with jurisdiction over pre-Lomé offences, irrespective of amnesty or pardon. The agreement was subsequently endorsed by Parliament in March 2002, when it adopted The Special Court Agreement, 2002, Ratification Act, 2002.
21. In May 2002, the Government of Sierra Leone proceeded with the establishment of the Commission. The seven commissioners were named by President Kabbah and duly sworn into office in July 2002. The Government subsequently provided financial assistance to the Commission. Accordingly, the Commission was born under a bit of a cloud, generated by the ambiguity surrounding the attitude to be taken to the Lomé Peace Agreement and its underlying philosophy. Clearly, both the Government of Sierra Leone and Parliament had repudiated at least one element of the Lomé Peace Agreement, in the recognition of the legitimacy of prosecution for at least part of the period

Leone, *A compilation of Articles on the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission*, UNAMSIL, Freetown, 2001. Pg. 55. Also available at www.sierra-leone.org/trc.html (last visited 01/12/03)

of the conflict (the temporary jurisdiction of the Special Court begins with the adoption of the Abidjan Agreement, on 30 November 1996).

22. It is important to consider to what extent these subsequent developments influenced the mandate of the Commission, if at all. The Commission might have viewed the creation of the Special Court as a factor that transformed its own *raison d'être*. Faced with prosecution of some perpetrators, the Commission might then have seen fit to recommend that immunity from prosecution be granted in exchange for cooperation with the truth and reconciliation process, as was the case in South Africa. Alternatively, it might have sought a close and synergistic relationship with the Court, operating to some extent as a pre-trial investigative body, somewhat along the lines of commissions in Timor Leste and Peru.
23. In fact, the Commission, although it recognized and was forced to contend with the practical consequences of parallel prosecutions, did not view these subsequent developments as having any effect whatsoever upon its mandate. The Commission's attitude towards and its relationship with the Special Court for Sierra Leone are fully discussed elsewhere in this report. For the purposes of the discussion here, it should be sufficient to note that the Commission has viewed its mandate as being derived from the Lomé Peace Agreement and the legislation adopted in February 2000, irrespective of the subsequent change in philosophy of the Government of Sierra Leone and of Parliament. Parliament was, of course, always free to do so, if it had believed that adjustments to the Commission's mandate were required, in the light of the establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the, at least, partial repudiation of the covenants reached in Lomé.

Creation of an Impartial Historical Record

24. The statutory definition of the 'object' of the Commission, in section 6(1), consists of an enumeration of five distinct elements. But these are separated by a semi-colon into two groups. The first comprises only one element, '*to create an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, from the beginning of the Conflict in 1991 to the signing of the Lome Peace Agreement*'. The second comprises the other four: to address impunity, to respond to the needs of the victims, to promote healing and reconciliation and to prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered. No ranking or hierarchy is established in the legislation among the five elements or the two groups. But the Statement of Objects and Reasons, which was attached to the Bill when it was enacted by Parliament, says that '*the principal function of the Commission is to create an impartial historical record of events in question as the basis for the task of preventing their recurrence*'. There can therefore be no doubt that the creation of an impartial historical record lies at the core of the Commission's mandate.
25. On the other hand, the Lomé Peace Agreement implies somewhat different priorities: 'A Truth and Reconciliation Commission shall be established to address impunity, break the cycle of violence, provide a forum for both the victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to tell their story, get a clear picture of the past in order to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation.' Here, the only implication of the mission of the Commission as historian is the

rather colloquial suggestion that it 'get a clear picture of the past'. The incontestable conclusion is that the historical component of the Commission's mandate was strengthened by Parliament, and that it is of central importance to the fulfilment of its solemn mission.

26. Given the resources available to the Commission, in terms of professional researchers and investigators, not to mention its very short lifespan, Parliament was surely ambitious in thinking that the Commission could create anything resembling a comprehensive historical record of the conflict in Sierra Leone. In any event, the proximity of the events to the writing of the historical record makes any aspiration to a thorough study troublesome and possibly unrealistic. While it may be illusory to think that bodies like truth commissions can establish a complete historical record, they can nevertheless discredit and debunk certain lies about conflicts. If they can accomplish only this, their work may contribute validly to the rebuilding of a stable social environment on the ruins of conflict and war.
27. There is no shortage of examples of this historical mission being fulfilled by quasi-judicial bodies, like truth commissions, and judicial ones, like courts. The Nuremberg tribunal, for example, which was convened within months of the end of the Second World War and which rendered its judgment less than a year later, clarified much of the historical truth about Nazi atrocities. To take a more contemporary example, a recent judgment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia notes that the institution was established by the United Nations Security Council so that 'the truth about the possible commission of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide [would] be determined, thereby establishing an accurate, accessible historical record. The Security Council hoped such a historical record would prevent a cycle of revenge killings and future acts of aggression.'⁸
28. It is to be hoped that this report will clarify and resolve debates about the conflict. Possibly the Special Court for Sierra Leone will find that the impartial historical record established by the Commission is of value in its own proceedings.⁹

The historical record is based upon a variety of sources, including testimony in public hearings, private interviews and the examination of documents and other sources. Where available and relevant, existing historical accounts of the conflict and the period that preceded it have been consulted.

29. Although this surely goes without saying, the Act specifies that the historical record is to be 'impartial'. In any case, 'truth', including 'historical truth', must by definition be impartial. A 'partial' truth is no truth at all, merely the distorted version of events tailored to suit one of the parties. In this regard, the selection of Commissioners and the process of arriving at decisions and determinations

⁸ Prosecutor v. Momir Nikolic (Case no. . IT-02-60/1-S), Sentencing Judgment, 2 December 2003, para. 60 (references omitted).

⁹ In this respect, see the remarks of President Goeffrey Robertson in *Prosecutor v. Norman* (Case no. SCSL-2003-08-PT), Decision on Appeal by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone ('TRC' or 'The Commission') and Chief Samuel Hinga Norman JP Against the Decision of His Lordship, Mr Justice Bankole Thompson Delivered on 30 October 2003 to Deny the TRC's Request to Hold a Public Hearing with Chief Samuel Hinga Norman JP, 28 November 2003, para. 7. According to Judge Robertson, the TRC Report 'might provide considerable assistance to the Court and to all parties as an authoritative account of the background to the war'.

were crucial to its work. The Act envisioned a Commission composed of four nationals and three non-nationals to enhance the credibility of this process. The three non-nationals were selected by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, whose integrity is beyond question. The nationals were chosen as part of a transparent selection process overseen by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations to Sierra Leone. Commissioners were provided with terms and conditions of employment, as well as various legal immunities and protections, to further assure their independence and impartiality.

'Violations and Abuses'

30. The concept of 'violations and abuses' (or 'abuses and violations') lies at the core of the TRC's mandate. Section 6(1) of the Act focuses the content of the historical record on 'violations and abuses'. The concept of 'violations and abuses' re-appears in other subsections of section 6. Thus, subsection 6(2)(a) says that without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), *'the function of the Commission' shall be 'to investigate and report on the causes, nature and extent of the violations and abuses referred to in subsection (1) to the fullest degree possible, including their antecedents, the context in which the violations and abuses occurred, the question of whether those violations and abuses were the result of deliberate planning, policy or authorisation by any government, group or individual, and the role of both internal and external factors in the conflict'*.
31. Furthermore, it is also among *'the functions'* of the Commission, according to subsection 6(2)(b), *'to work to help restore the human dignity of victims and promote reconciliation by providing an opportunity for victims to give an account of the violations and abuses suffered and for perpetrators to relate their experiences, and by creating a climate which fosters constructive interchange between victims and perpetrators, giving special attention to the subject of sexual abuses and to the experiences of children within the armed conflict'*.
32. Section 7 also refers to this concept of *'violations or abuse'*. Accordingly, in subsection 1, the *'operating procedures and mode of work'* of the TRC are to include *'investigation and research into key events, causes, patterns of abuses or violation and the parties responsible'*, holding public and non-public sessions *'to hear from the victims and perpetrators of any abuses or violations or from other interested parties'*, and *taking of individual statements and gathering of additional information with regard to these matters'*.
33. Section 7 also refers to the concept of *'past violations or abuse'* and to *'child perpetrators of abuses or violations'*. The Report of the Commission, in accordance with section 15, is to include recommendations directed to *'preventing the repetition of the violations or abuses suffered'*.
34. The 'Memorandum of Objects and Reasons', which is attached to the TRC Act, notes that the Peace Agreement *'envisaged the proceedings of the Commission as a catharsis for constructive interchange between the victims and perpetrators of human rights violations and abuses'*.
35. It should be noted that, in the Lomé Agreement, the references (art. XXVI) are to *'human rights violations'*, and not to *'violations and abuses'*. The word

'abuse' appears nowhere in the Lomé agreement. Thus, Parliament somewhat enlarged the scope of the TRC from what had been originally contemplated in the Lomé Peace Agreement.

36. The mandate of the South African TRC – a model familiar to the Parliament of Sierra Leone when it created the Commission - spoke only of 'gross violations'.¹⁰ This is clearly a much narrower concept than 'violations and abuses'. According to Priscilla Hayner, the South African TRC was criticised for this narrow perspective, in that this presented a 'compromised truth' that excluded a large number of victims from the Commission's scope.¹¹
37. The TRC Act does not define what constitute violations and abuses with regard to international human rights law and international humanitarian law. The term 'violations and abuses' does not appear to have any recognised technical meaning within either human rights law or international humanitarian law. Obviously, there is a literal meaning of the two terms which should require no further explanation.
38. Of some interest within the field of international human rights law is the frequent use of the term 'abuse' in a very recent instrument, the *Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa*, adopted in July 2003. It uses the term 'abuse' in several provisions (articles 5(d), 12(1)(c), 12(1)(d), 13(m), 22(b), 23(b)). The context suggests that the term is used particularly with reference to acts committed by individuals against other individuals, rather than by States.¹²
39. There does exist within human rights and international humanitarian law a number of more specific terms to describe certain types of violation or abuse. These include: breaches, grave breaches, serious violations, gross and systematic violations, and so on. For example, in 2000, when the United Nations Human Rights Committee found that Sierra Leone had violated the *Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* for proceeding with twelve executions on 19 October 1998 despite an interim measures request from the Committee that it stay the executions pending consideration of a petition, the Committee described this as a 'grave breach' of the *Optional Protocol*.¹³ In fact, nowhere does the *Optional Protocol* speak of 'grave breaches', referring instead to 'violation'; the *Covenant* itself refers cautiously to 'not fulfilling' and 'not giving effect to' obligations.

¹⁰ 3(1) a. of the South African TRC Act provides: 'Establish as complete a picture as possible of the causes, nature, and extent of the gross violations of human rights which were committed during the period from 1 March 1960 to the cut-off date, including the antecedents circumstances, factors and context of such violations, as well as the perspectives of the victims and motives and perspectives of the conducting investigations and holding hearings.'

¹¹ Priscilla B. Hayner, *Unspeakable Truths, Facing the Challenge of Truth Commissions*, (Routledge: New York & London, 2002), pp. 74-75.

¹² The same expression appears in an earlier instrument, the *Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women*, GA Res. 48/104, art. 2(a) and (b). The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action of 1993 also refers to 'gender-specific abuses' and 'human rights abuses particular to women' (para. 42), 'abuse of children' (para. 48).

¹³ *Mansaraj et al., Tamba et al., Sesay et al. v. Sierra Leone* (Nos. 839/1998; 840/1998 and 841/1998), 16 July 2001, UN Doc. CCPR/C/72/D/840/1998, para. 6.2.

40. Within international humanitarian law, reference is made to ‘violation’ of the *Geneva Conventions*¹⁴ as well as to the more serious concept of ‘grave breach’ of the *Conventions*.¹⁵ The *Hague Convention* of 1907 refers both to ‘abuse’¹⁶ and to ‘violation’¹⁷ in its provisions. It is of some interest to note that the mandate of the Special Court for Sierra Leone is limited to ‘serious violations of international humanitarian law’.
41. Human rights and international humanitarian law treaties are meant to bind sovereign states to various obligations. In principle, an individual cannot ‘violate’ a human rights treaty, as this is a form of contract or undertaking between sovereign states. Nevertheless, the *African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights*, for example, establishes a list of ‘duties’ that apply to ‘every individual’. Some violations of international humanitarian law, known colloquially as ‘war crimes’, are in effect – but by exception – applicable directly to individuals.
42. Under certain circumstances, a State may be held responsible for acts or omissions that constitute violations or abuses of human rights when committed by an individual or group under its control, or over which it has some responsibility. A State is expected to exercise due diligence in preventing individuals from violating the human rights of other individuals. The term ‘*horizontal violations of human rights*’ is used in this context. An example would be the duty upon State authorities to ensure that a prisoner under their care is not victim of abuse by other prisoners.
43. There is a growing body of law to support the idea of the involvement of ‘non-state actors’ in violations or abuses of human rights. ‘Non-state actors’, be they individuals, groups or organisations, are neither parties to international human rights or international humanitarian law treaties nor are they, as a general rule, bound by national constitutions. Nevertheless, it may be possible to impute certain violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law to them.
44. This would indeed seem to be the implication of the *Act*, with the reference to ‘perpetrators of human rights *violations and abuses*’ in the Memorandum of Objects and Reasons. That individuals and not only states or state-like bodies are contemplated is confirmed by the reference to ‘child perpetrators of *abuses or violations*’. This is also suggested by section 6(2)(a), which asks ‘whether those violations and abuses were the result of deliberate planning, policy or authorisation by any government, group or individual’.
45. Individual perpetrators may be both natural persons and corporate bodies, such as transnational companies or corporations. But this leads to other difficulties. For example, let us consider the case of a transnational mining company operating in Sierra Leone but whose head office is in another country, say, South Africa. Although described colloquially as ‘transnational’, the company will in fact have the nationality of the State where it has its head office. Can South Africa be blamed for human rights violations committed by the company

¹⁴ e.g., *Geneva Convention (IV) Relative to the Protection of Civilians*, (1950) 75 U.N.T.S. 287, art. 149.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, art. 146.

¹⁶ *Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague IV)*, 3 Martens Nouveau Recueil (3d) 461, art. 33.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, arts. 40, 41.

in Sierra Leone, for failing to regulate the activities of its company, in the same way that it might be blamed for human rights violations committed by the company in South Africa itself? Objections to the imputation of such liability may come not only from South Africa, but from Sierra Leone itself. Sierra Leone might consider attempts by South Africa to regulate the behaviour of South Africans within Sierra Leone as an infringement on the latter's sovereignty. Yet the TRC might well conclude that violations and abuses of human rights were committed in Sierra Leone not only by the hypothetical South African mining company, but also by both Sierra Leone and South Africa for failing to regulate it.

46. In the light of the reference to 'violations and abuses', the Commission has decided that its mandate is a very broad one. It is not limited by use of adjectives such as 'gross' or 'serious'. The addition of the term 'abuses', which may be taken to encompass human rights violations committed by individuals rather than States or governments, enlarges rather than restricts the mandate. Accordingly, the Commission's mandate is not confined to violations of human rights that might constitute crimes, under either national or international law, nor is it limited to violations committed by States or governments.

'Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law'

47. According to section 6(1) of the Act, the 'violations and abuses' must be of 'human rights and international humanitarian law'. This is a reference to two distinct, although related, bodies of international law. The distinct scope of each body of law, as well as the relationship between the two, shall be considered in turn.
48. 'Human rights' is a term used to describe a broad spectrum of rights that may belong to individuals, groups (such as ethnic and religious minorities) and 'peoples'. Human rights are those basic standards *inherent* to the human being without which a person cannot live in dignity. Human rights are *entitlements*, which every human being possesses by virtue of his or her humanity. Guarantees of human rights are expressed in both international and national law.
49. The 1991 Constitution of Sierra Leone devotes a lengthy section, Chapter III, to 'human rights and fundamental freedoms'. The formulation is awkward and unduly complex, making it inaccessible to the average citizen. Many of the provisions are devoted more to exceptions to human rights than to their affirmation. There is an exhaustive provision dealing with the use of emergency powers and the suspension of constitutional protections. The language is consistent with that in the constitutions of many other former British colonies, and reflects an historic unease of English lawmakers with the constitutional entrenchment of fundamental rights. For the purposes of the TRC's work, there is no significance in the distinction between 'human rights' and 'fundamental freedoms'; both terms can be subsumed within the expression 'human rights'.
50. The Lomé Peace Agreement attempts a definition of the term 'human rights' that is probably more helpful than that of the 1991 Constitution in this respect. It makes a useful reference to international legal sources, such as the Universal Declaration of Human rights and the African Charter of Human and Peoples'

Rights. The list of fundamental rights is not an exhaustive one, and serves merely to provide examples.

ARTICLE XXIV

GUARANTEE AND PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

1. *The basic civil and political liberties recognized by the Sierra Leone legal system and contained in the declarations and principles of Human Rights adopted by the UN and OAU, especially the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, shall be fully protected and promoted within Sierra Leonean society.*

2. *These include the right to life and liberty, freedom from torture, the right to a fair trial, freedom of conscience, expression and association, and the right to take part in the governance of ones country.*

51. The sources of international human rights law are in treaties, bodies of principles and customary international law. The Government of Sierra Leone is legally bound by many of the most important international human rights law treaties, by virtue of its ratification or accession. This is the case with such instruments as the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, the *International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights*, the *Convention on the Rights of the Child* and the *African Charter of Human and Peoples' Rights*. But Sierra Leone is also subject to various other standard-setting instruments of which the most important is the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1948.
52. Human rights are sometimes classified into civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. They range from rights which contemplate the core values of human dignity, like the right to life and the prohibition of torture, to the right to housing and medical care. Efforts to separate human rights into categories of 'civil and political' as opposed to 'economic and social', which have characterised human rights law in the past and which reflected geo-political conflicts, have been rejected in favour of a more holistic approach sometimes described as 'indivisibility' of human rights. Thus, human rights are acknowledged as being universal, interrelated, indivisible and interdependent. The preamble to the *African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights* states '*that it is henceforth essential to pay a particular attention to the right to development and that civil and political rights cannot be dissociated from economic, social and cultural rights in their conception as well as the universality and that the satisfaction of economic, social and cultural rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political rights*'. The *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* contains civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, and makes no distinction between them. In any event, human rights violations and abuses will often have both civil or political and economic, social and cultural dimensions. Moreover, certain specific rights, such as the right to a fair trial, which are usually categorised as 'civil', have an economic dimension too. Indeed, although wartime atrocities usually involve the 'core' human rights, like the right to life and the protection against cruel and inhuman treatment, the conflict in Sierra Leone may also have involved, and have been caused by,

violations of such economic and social rights as the right to food, to housing and to medical care.

53. It might be argued that the human rights dimension of the Commission's mandate is narrower than has been proposed above, and that it should be defined essentially with respect to the Constitution of Sierra Leone and the human rights treaties ratified by Sierra Leone. This might suggest a somewhat narrower approach. However, the Commission's mandate extends well beyond an examination of the compliance of the Government of Sierra Leone with its legal obligations. The Act requires the Commission to consider a range of non-state actors, including armed groups, as well as 'external factors', which may even involve consideration of the role of foreign governments and international organisations. Thus section 6(2) of the Act refers to '*the question of whether those violations and abuses were the result of deliberate planning, policy authorisation by any government*'. For these reasons, it would be incorrect for the Commission to confine its examination of human rights to those that find expression in the Constitution of Sierra Leone and those international instruments to which Sierra Leone is a party.
54. For the purposes of its work, the Commission decided to adopt a broad view of the concept of human rights, using as its touchstones the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* and the *African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights*. It does not confine its approach to the legal obligations imposed upon the government of Sierra Leone by international or national law. Violations of economic, social and cultural rights as well as of civil and political rights have been examined, as well as other categories of rights such as the right to development and the right to peace.
55. The conclusion that a broad approach to human rights is required, also finds support in the reference in the TRC Act which mandates the Commission to pay '*special attention to the subject of sexual abuses and to the experiences of children within the armed conflict*'. Such issues might not be subsumed within a mandate focussed only on the 'core' civil and political rights listed in article XXIV of the Lomé Peace Agreement or the Constitution. To supplement the basic international human rights instruments referred to in the preceding paragraph, the Commission has sought guidance from specialised instruments in the area of the rights of women and children, such as the *Convention on the Rights of the Child*, the *African Convention on the Rights and Welfare of the Child*, the *Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women*, the *Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa* and various United Nations and African Union declarations concerning sexual abuse of children and violence against women.
56. Section 6(1) of the Act also instructs the Commission to prepare an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of 'international humanitarian law'. The term 'international humanitarian law' has been described as a 'more recent and comprehensive' term for what in the past was referred to as the 'international law of armed conflict', or even earlier, the 'law of war'. According to the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, in the authoritative statement on the subject, the term 'international humanitarian law' emerged 'as a result of the influence of human rights doctrines on the law of armed conflict'.¹⁸

¹⁸ *Prosecutor v. Tadic* (Case no. IT-94-1-AR72), Decision on the Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, 2 October 1995, para. 87.

57. In principle, 'international humanitarian law' applies only during armed conflict, as opposed to human rights law, which applies during peacetime as well as wartime. According to the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, '*an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organised armed groups or between such groups within a State. International humanitarian law applies from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment, international humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring States or, in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, whether or not actual combat takes place there.*'¹⁹ With regard to its work the Commission has assumed the existence of armed conflict throughout the time frame defined in section 6(1) of the Act. It seems appropriate to consider that international humanitarian law continued to apply within Sierra Leone subsequent to the Lomé Peace Agreement and probably until 18 January 2002, when the conflict was officially declared to have come to an end.
58. The norms and principles of international humanitarian law have been codified in several quite complex international treaties, of which the 1949 *Geneva Conventions* and their two *Additional Protocols* stand at the centre. To a large extent, these principles are similar to those contained in the main human rights treaties, with the important distinction that the international humanitarian law instruments apply only during armed conflict. Given that the mandate of the Commission is concerned essentially with violations and abuses related to the conflict, the relevance and application of international humanitarian law can be taken as a given. Sierra Leone is a party to the main international humanitarian law treaties. But for the same reasons discussed above with respect to international human rights instruments, whether or not Sierra Leone is legally bound by a particular treaty or body of norms does not define the mandate of the Commission, given that it is to report on violations and abuses committed by non-State actors as well as by the Government of Sierra Leone and other governments.
59. 'International humanitarian law' makes an important distinction between international armed conflict and non-international armed conflict. This is explained by the historic reluctance of States to assume the same obligations with respect to civil wars, and their treatment of rebel armed groups, as they would undertake in the case of war with another State. For example, under the applicable treaties there is no concept of 'prisoner of war' in an internal armed conflict. Clearly, most of the conflict in Sierra Leone was of an internal nature. As a result, a somewhat more limited set of international humanitarian legal norms and standards applies than would have been the case had the conflict been international in nature. In practice, however, the distinction may not be all that important. The fundamental principles of international humanitarian law are much the same, whether the conflict is international or non-international. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has attempted to summarise these principles as follows:
- a. Persons *hors de combat* and those who do not take a direct part in hostilities are entitled to respect for their lives and their moral and

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, para. 70.

- physical integrity. They shall in all circumstances be protected and treated humanely without any adverse distinction.
- b. It is forbidden to kill or injure an enemy who surrenders or who is hors de combat.
 - c. The wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for by the party to the conflict which has them in its power. Protection also covers medical personnel, establishments, transports, and equipment. The emblem of the red cross or the red crescent is the sign of such protection and must be respected.
 - d. Captured combatants and civilians under the authority of an adverse party are entitled to respect for their lives, dignity, personal rights, and convictions. They shall be protected against all acts of violence and reprisals. They shall have the right to correspond with their families and to receive relief.
 - e. Everyone shall be entitled to benefit from fundamental judicial guarantees. No one shall be held responsible for an act he has not committed. No one shall be subjected to physical or mental torture, corporal punishment, or cruel or degrading treatment.
 - f. Parties to a conflict and members of their armed forces do not have an unlimited choice of methods of warfare of a nature to cause unnecessary losses or excessive suffering.
 - g. Parties to a conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population and combatants in order to spare the civilian population and property. Neither the civilian population as such nor civilian persons shall be the object of attack. Attacks shall be directed solely against military objectives.²⁰
60. The mandates of the Commission and the Special Court for Sierra Leone overlap somewhat, as they are both to address issues of 'international humanitarian law'. In the case of the Commission, its attention is directed to 'violations and abuses', whereas the Special Court's jurisdiction is confined to 'serious violations' of 'international humanitarian law'.²¹ The concept of 'serious violations of international humanitarian law' is a technical one whose definition has been developed in judgments and decisions of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. It should be pointed out that the Special Court does not have jurisdiction over all 'serious violations of international humanitarian law', but only those listed in articles 4 and 5 of the Statute. The jurisdiction is limited principally to crimes committed within internal armed conflict. In addition, the Court has jurisdiction over three crimes that may be committed in international armed conflict, namely indiscriminate attacks on civilians, attacks on United Nations personnel and installations, and recruitment and use of child soldiers. Consequently, a broad range of serious violations of international humanitarian law, to the extent these are committed in international armed conflict, do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Special Court. For example, while the Special Court has jurisdiction over the 'serious violation' of 'intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population', it does not have jurisdiction over the 'serious violation' of 'intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects'. Such serious violations of international humanitarian law when committed in international armed conflict are not, in contrast, excluded from the work of the Commission.

²⁰ Basic Rules of the Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols (ICRC, 1987) (hereinafter, ICRC Basic Rules' as cited in Kittichaisaree Kriangsak: *International Criminal Law*, Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 129-130.

²¹ Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 1(1).

61. The concept of 'violations and abuses' of 'international humanitarian law' is also considerably broader than that of 'serious violations' (the term used in the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone), or, more colloquially, 'war crimes'. Criminality attaches to certain serious violations of international humanitarian law (of which the authoritative list appears in article 8 of the *Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court*; there are a few war crimes that are not listed in the *Rome Statute*, so the enumeration should not be taken as an exhaustive one). Nevertheless, many violations and abuses of international humanitarian law do not incur individual criminal liability. In this regard, the Commission's mandate is very significantly broader than that of the Special Court.
62. An illustration may be helpful to show how these distinctions were of relevance to the work of the Commission. The participation of mercenaries in the conflict (Gurkhas, Sandline, Executive Outcomes) has been widely documented. The use of mercenaries is not a 'war crime', and as such it is clearly outside the jurisdictional purview of the Special Court. But the use of mercenaries is condemned by international declarations and treaties, and is clearly discouraged by the relevant international humanitarian law instruments.²² It may arguably be described as an 'abuse' of 'international humanitarian law', but perhaps one that is confined to international armed conflict. The use of mercenaries would not therefore seem to fall within the remit of the Special Court, but it is a matter that can be fully examined by the Commission (at the very least, to the extent that it is determined that an international armed conflict exists).

'Related to the Armed Conflict in Sierra Leone'

63. Section 6(1) of the Act limits the scope of the impartial historical record to be prepared by the Commission to those violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law that are 'related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone'. In other words, not all violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law fall within the ambit of the work of the Commission. This reference has consequences in terms of the time frame and territory addressed by the Commission, as well as the actual substance of the violations and abuses.
64. With respect to the time frame considered by the Commission, more specific language addresses this aspect of the mandate and will be dealt with later in this chapter. With respect to the territory to be considered, it is significant that section 6(1) does not confine the work of the Commission to the geographic boundaries of Sierra Leone. Moreover, section 6(2)(a) of the *Act* requires the Commission to consider '*the role of both internal and external factors in the conflict*'. In this respect, a useful comparison can be made with the jurisdiction of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which is confined to the 'territory of Sierra Leone'.²³ Violations or abuses committed outside the territory of Sierra Leone are relevant to the work of the Commission, to the extent that they are '*related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone*'. The report, and particularly the historical narrative, refers to many violations and abuses committed elsewhere in Africa,

²² *Protocol Additional I to the 1949 Geneva Conventions and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts*, (1979) 1125 U.N.T.S. 3, art. 47.

²³ Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, art. 1.

and even on other continents. Those countries that border upon Sierra Leone are especially relevant to the impartial historical record. Some of them contributed to the violations and abuses. Other countries and international organizations also bear some responsibility. All of this is germane to the work of the Commission.

65. The reference to a relationship to the armed conflict also has a substantive limitation on the mandate of the Commission. Obviously, not all violations of human rights committed within Sierra Leone during the 1990s can be considered to be '*related to the armed conflict*'. For example, the practice of female genital mutilation is and has for many years been widespread within Sierra Leone. It continued to be practiced during the period of the conflict. The *Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa* refers to female genital mutilation as a harmful practice which violates the rights of women and which must be prohibited (art. 5(b)). It is probably unreasonable, however, to refer to female genital mutilation as a human rights violation or abuse that was '*related to the armed conflict*'. Nevertheless, it might well be argued that the practice of female genital mutilation contributed to a context of oppression and marginalisation of women that was manifested in violations and abuses that were unquestionably related to the armed conflict, such as gang rapes and sexual slavery.
66. In other words, the line between violations and abuses in general and those related to the armed conflict is not always an easy one to trace. It therefore seemed safe for the Commission to presume that violations and abuses committed in this period within Sierra Leone probably have some sort of relationship with the armed conflict. At the onset of the Commission's work, statement takers were instructed to record information of violations and abuses that might not initially appear to be related to the armed conflict. Subsequently, any doubtful allegations have been considered by the Commission, and either included or excluded on a case by case basis.
67. Human rights law applies in both peacetime and wartime, whereas international humanitarian law's application is confined to wartime alone, as a general rule. The two bodies of law are largely complementary. There is some authority for the proposition that international humanitarian law represents a kind of special law (or *lex specialis*) that in effect takes the place of human rights law during armed conflict. However, the international human rights conventions clearly contemplate their application during wartime, subject to the possibility that certain rights are limited or suspended because of the emergency situation.
68. International humanitarian law has always represented a compromise between the protection of the rights of non-combatant civilians and the requirements of military necessity. It recognizes that, under some circumstances, civilian lives may be taken where this is necessary for the attainment of military objectives, subject to the criterion of proportionality. But, under human rights law, there is virtually no situation where the killing of an innocent civilian can be tolerated. If the view were to be adopted that human rights law is, in a sense, superseded by the special rules of international humanitarian law, the Commission would be required to be considerably more tolerant of the killing and injury of innocent civilians than were in the case where the two bodies of law are viewed as providing two complementary but distinct levels of protection. In practice, given the nature of the conflict in Sierra Leone and the low level of humanitarian principles followed by the combatants, there were no situations where the Commission might be required to address a potential conflict between conduct

authorized by international humanitarian law yet prohibited by international human rights law.

The Time Frame

69. According to section 6(1) of the Act, the Commission is to provide an historical record *'from the beginning of the Conflict in 1991 to the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement'*. With specific reference to the historical record, the Commission is instructed to examine the antecedents of the conflict (s. 6(2)(a)).
70. This reference to the time frame of the conflict applies to the first element of the 'object' in section 6(1), and not to the second. In other words, although the 'historical record' of the Commission is time-limited, there is nothing in section 6(1) to prevent the Commission from looking back prior to 1991 and forward beyond the Lomé Agreement in terms of the responsibility to address impunity, to respond to the needs of the victims, to promote healing and reconciliation and to prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered. Aside from being justifiable on a literal reading of section 6(1), this interpretation is reasonable and helpful. Indeed, it would be futile for the Commission to attempt *"to address impunity, to respond to the needs of the victims, to promote healing and reconciliation and to prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered"* while remaining blind or indifferent to events since the Lomé Peace Agreement. In this sense, the Commission does not have any temporal jurisdiction, in contrast, for example, with the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
71. For all of these reasons, the Commission has not felt itself to be particularly constrained by the time frame set out in section 6(1). The reference to the outbreak of the conflict in 1991 and to the Lomé Agreement serves to define 'the conflict', and the Commission's mandate is to consider the 'conflict'. It could not do this in an accurate and faithful manner if it were to begin mechanically with 23 March 1991 and to conclude in an equally mechanical manner with 7 July 1999.

To Address Impunity

72. The second limb of the 'object' of the Commission consists of four elements, the first being 'to address impunity'. Article XXVI of the Lomé Agreement listed this as the first of the functions of the proposed the TRC. The reference to impunity is somewhat enigmatic, given that the Lomé Agreement, in granting pardon and amnesty to the perpetrators of human rights and international humanitarian law violations and abuses, constitutes one of the more striking grants of impunity in recent history. The paradox of the Lomé Agreement, and of the Truth and Reconciliation Act 2000 that was adopted to give effect to certain of its provisions, is that it both enshrines impunity and seeks to address it.
73. According to one of the world's experts on the subject, Louis Joinet, who was the Special Rapporteur of the United Sub-Commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, *"Impunity" means the impossibility, de jure or de facto, of bringing the perpetrators of human rights violations to account - whether in criminal, civil, administrative or disciplinary proceedings - since they are not subject to any inquiry that might lead to their being accused, arrested, tried and, if found guilty, convicted, and to reparations being made to their*

victims'.²⁴ Louis Joinet devised a 'Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights Through Action to Combat Impunity'.²⁵ These served as an extremely useful set of guidelines for the Commission in the interpretation of its mandate to address impunity.

74. The principles developed by Louis Joinet are grouped into three categories: the victims' right to know; the victims' right to justice; and the victims' right to reparations. The Commission can make significant contributions in all three of these areas.
75. According to Joinet, the right to know comprises what he calls '*the inalienable right to the truth*'. He says: '*Every people has the inalienable right to know the truth about past events and about the circumstances and reasons which led, through the consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights, to the perpetration of aberrant crimes. Full and effective exercise of the right to the truth is essential to avoid any recurrence of such acts in the future.*'
76. This 'right to the truth' includes a duty to remember: "*A people's knowledge of the history of their oppression is part of their heritage and, as such, shall be preserved by appropriate measures in fulfilment of the State's duty to remember. Such measures shall be aimed at preserving the collective memory from extinction and, in particular, at guarding against the development of revisionist and negationist arguments.*" Joinet also specifically recognises the right of victims to know, their families and dear ones to know the circumstances of violations and, if death or disappearance is the result, the fate of the victim.
77. In the context of the right to the truth, Joinet recognises the special role of 'extrajudicial commissions of inquiry', of which truth and reconciliation commissions are certainly the most significant manifestations. Here, then, the mandate and functions of the Commission fits squarely within the perspective outlined by Louis Joinet for combating impunity. It is with this component of the struggle against impunity that truth and reconciliation commissions excel. Indeed, they can generally respond to the needs of truth-seeking better than the alternatives, such as criminal prosecutions.
78. With respect to the second category, 'the victims' right to justice', the Commission cannot make as significant a contribution. According to Joinet, the right to justice

'implies that any victim can assert his rights and receive a fair and effective remedy, including seeing that his oppressor stands trial and obtaining reparations. There can be no just and lasting reconciliation without an effective response to the need for justice; as a factor in reconciliation, forgiveness, a private act, implies that the victim must know the perpetrator of the violations and that the latter has been able to show repentance. If forgiveness is to be granted, it must first have been sought.'

This may be overstating the point. There are valid examples of post-conflict societies where victims were denied access to traditional justice mechanisms, and yet where reconciliation is indeed possible, such as Mozambique and

²⁴ 'Question of the impunity of perpetrators of human rights violations (civil and political), Final report prepared by Mr. Joinet pursuant to Sub-Commission decision 1996/119, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20.

²⁵ *Ibid.*

South Africa. Justice is not always a reliable option, if only because the perpetrators are dead or cannot be identified, and those responsible may be indigent and unable to provide compensation. If criminal or civil justice is seen as a *sine qua non*, inevitably many will be frustrated and disappointed.

79. With respect to amnesty, Joinet declares bluntly: '*Amnesty cannot be accorded to perpetrators before the victims have obtained justice by means of an effective remedy.*' This view is widespread in international justice circles. But amnesty cannot always be excluded. Sometimes it may simply be an unavoidable political reality, dictated by the need to bring an end to conflict. To be sure, many amnesties given to tyrants in recent decades are vulnerable to severe criticism. But it is too absolute to rule them out altogether.
80. In terms of addressing impunity in the context of this 'right to justice', the Lomé Agreement is unquestionably deficient. The amnesty was criticised by the United Nations, and left bitterness among many Sierra Leoneans who believed that terrible crimes were to go unpunished. The Commission is without power to change this situation. It can, however, within its mandate, make observations and recommendations about the wisdom of the amnesty provision in the Lomé Agreement, of the objection formulated at the time by the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Sierra Leone, and of the subsequent initiatives that rescinded the legal effect of the amnesty and established the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Just as the Commission may address the 'right to truth' component of the struggle against impunity better than the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the contrary may be the case with respect to the 'right to justice' component. The Special Court responds, but only to a limited extent, given the limitations on its own mandate and its resources. The findings of the TRC in this respect are discussed in the Findings Chapter.
81. The third category is the 'right to reparation'. Louis Joinet sees this as being composed of a number of elements, namely restitution (seeking to restore the victim to his or her previous situation), compensation (for physical or mental injury, including lost opportunities, physical damage, defamation and legal aid costs), and rehabilitation (medical care, including psychological and psychiatric treatment). In this area, too, the Commission has much to contribute, although it is not authorised to actually adjudicate or award reparations in any specific form. According to section 7(6) of the Act, the Commission is empowered to '*provide information or recommendations to or regarding the Special Fund for War Victims provided for in Article XXIV of the Lomé Peace Agreement, or otherwise assist the Fund in any manner the Commission considers appropriate but the Commission shall not exercise any control over the operations or disbursements of that Fund*'. The Commission is also instructed to make recommendations '*concerning the reforms and other measures, whether legal, political, administrative or otherwise, needed to achieve the object of the Commission, namely the object of providing impartial historical record, preventing the repetition of the violations or abuses suffered, addressing impunity, responding to the needs of victims and promoting healing and reconciliation*' (s. 15(2)). The Government is required by the Act to implement these recommendations. Many of the Commission's recommendations are intended to give effect to the 'right to reparation'. This matter is addressed in detail in the Recommendations Chapter.

Promoting Healing and Reconciliation

82. In addition to enabling the Commission to prepare an impartial historical record of the conflict, its principal activities – statement-taking and hearings – provided the people of Sierra Leone with a forum for private and public acts of reconciliation. These included public confrontations between victim and perpetrator that led to various expressions of contrition and a desire on both sides to put the past behind them. These concretely vindicated the interpretation given to section 6 and to its mandate in general by the Commission.
83. The setting up of district support committees and the partnership of the Commission with the Inter-Religious Council to continue working on reconciliation up to late 2004 are expressions of the Commission's interpretation of this component of the mandate.
84. Article XXVI of the Lomé Peace Agreement of 7 July 1999 obliges the Commission to, *'among other things, recommend measures to be taken for the rehabilitation of victims of human rights violations'*. While the Commission's enabling legislation did not explicitly mention the term 'reparations', the Commission has considered the matter within the context of the portion of its mandate instructing it to *'promote healing and reconciliation'*.

Preventing a Repetition of Violations and Abuses Suffered

85. The mandate of the Commission is focussed on both the past and on the future. Obviously, the historical dimension of its work looks to the past. But, in instructing the Commission to consider the question of prevention of a repetition of violations and abuses, Parliament has given it an authorisation to peer into the future.
86. For this reason, the Commission has made a large number of recommendations that target institutional and other reforms. Many recommendations are directed to the government for administrative action, and to Parliament which must repeal certain legislation and introduce new measures. In many cases, these recommendations are deemed mandatory by the Commission. The TRC Act 2000 directs that the Commission's recommendations be implemented. In order to ensure this implementation, the Act provides for the establishment of a follow-up committee, which is to report on government compliance with the recommendations of the Commission.
87. Prevention of a repetition also involves a change in the way the people of Sierra Leone behave with each other, on individual and collective levels. It also concerns their attitude towards themselves, to their own country and to their public institutions. The Commission has taken up this aspect of its mandate through a project called the National Vision for Sierra Leone. The National Vision attempted to provide Sierra Leoneans with a platform to reflect on the conflict and to describe the future society they wish to see in Sierra Leone.

CHAPTER TWO

Setting up the Commission

TRC

**Learn from
Yesterday
for a better
Tomorrow**

Produced by the TRC Steering Committee with support
from the International Human Rights Law Group

CHAPTER TWO

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Introduction

1. During the discussions on the Sierra Leone Human Rights Manifesto adopted by civil society in June 1999, the then UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mrs Mary Robinson, undertook to provide appropriate technical assistance for the establishment of the Commission. In a letter of 15 July, 1999 accepting the offer of assistance by the High Commissioner, President Kabbah pledged the unqualified support of his Government to the process of reconciliation.
2. Since the Lomé Peace Agreement¹ granted a blanket amnesty, under Sierra Leonean law, for violations committed by the armed factions, civil society at various conferences within and outside Sierra Leone insisted that the enabling law of the truth commission should contain provisions for the grant of reparations for victims of the conflict and a mechanism to deal with their anguish. Following a conference in September 1999, civil society set up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission Working Group under the auspices of the National Forum for Human Rights. Prominent amongst the recommendations at the conference was that the Commission should consist of both national and international commissioners. It was believed that international commissioners, free of parochial interests, would bring a fresh perspective to the Commission.
3. Pursuant to the commitment made at the declaration of the Human Rights Manifesto, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) developed a project to support the establishment of the Commission. This could not be immediately implemented due to the resumption of armed conflict in Sierra Leone in May 2000. Following a reassessment of the operational environment in September 2000, a revised project was developed in March 2001.
4. The observance of the Ceasefire Agreement signed in Abuja, Nigeria in November 2000 and the commencement of disarmament in May 2001 among the armed factions increased the momentum for the establishment of the Commission. Furthermore, the Security Council in resolution 1346 adopted on 30 March 2001, encouraged the Government of Sierra Leone, together with the Secretary General of the United Nations, the High Commissioner for Human Rights and other relevant international actors, to expedite the establishment of the Commission.
5. Between July and December 1999, OHCHR organised a number of consultations with civil society and representatives of Government and the RUF where the preliminary issues related to the establishment of the Commission were canvassed. In December 1999 OHCHR submitted for the consideration of the Government and civil society the draft terms of reference for the Commission.

¹ For the full text of the Lomé Peace Agreement, see the Appendix section of this report.

TRC



Mr Oluyemi Adeniji, former Special Representative of the UN Secretary General was the Selection Coordinator for the nomination of Commissioners.

6. On 29 December 1999, OHCHR through UNAMSIL forwarded a draft statute on the Commission to the Government with the understanding that it represented technical assistance and did not impede the sovereign right of Sierra Leone to determine the exact nature of the law to be adopted.
7. The Government prepared a bill which substantially reflected the recommendations contained in the draft statute.² On 22nd November 2000, the Parliament of Sierra Leone unanimously passed into law the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act.³
8. At the time of adoption of the Bill, OHCHR representatives were in the country consulting with Government and civil society on the preparation of a detailed plan of activities for supporting the Commission. The plan included support for the selection process of commissioners, a strategic framework for a public awareness programme, research on traditional methods of conflict resolution and conflict management, a project to identify violations and abuses committed during the conflict and to '*map*' the key incidents; and a project to establish an interim secretariat for the commission.

Preparatory Activities before the Establishment of the Commission

9. Following the enactment of the TRC Act, OHCHR began the implementation of a technical co-operation project entitled, "Support to the Preparatory Phase of the Sierra Leone TRC" to assist the establishment of the Commission. The project covered the following areas:
 - a. Public information/education campaign;
 - b. Mapping of the conflict i.e. compilation of information regarding key defining events within the period of jurisdiction of the Commission;
 - c. Research on the traditional methods of conflict resolution and reconciliation among the different cultural groups in Sierra Leone;
 - d. Selection of Commissioners, and;
 - e. Preliminary identification of the facility requirements of the Commission, for instance, the form of the secretariat required including staffing and logistic requirements;
 - f. Provision of a forum for the clarification of the relationship between the TRC and the Special Court authorised to be established by Resolution 1315(2000) of the United Nations Security Council;
 - g. Provision of technical support in developing mechanisms for the commission to fulfil its additional mandate regarding juvenile offenders;
 - h. Provision of assistance to the commission during the three months preparatory period immediately following its inauguration as provided for in Article 5(2) of the TRC Act which states that during this preparatory period, the Commission "will undertake all tasks necessary to ensure that it is able to work effectively from the commencement of its operations."

² Richard Bennett, Op. Cit.

³For the full text of the TRC Act, see the Appendix Section of this Report.

a. Projects on Public Education and Sensitisation.

10. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights provided a grant to the International Human Rights Law Group (“the Law Group”) to start a campaign of public education and awareness about the Commission. The campaign used several media including radio, television, songs, drama and posters, among others, to create awareness and momentum for the establishment of the Commission. The Law Group partnered with Sierra Leonean civil society groups in implementing the campaign.⁴ OHCHR also provided financial support to a number of Sierra Leonean civil society organisations to conduct sensitization programmes on the Commission. These included the National Forum for Human Rights and the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights. Other NGOs including the Forum of Conscience sought and obtained independent funding with which they engaged in substantial public education programmes on the Commission.

b. The Mapping Project

11. The final project sponsored by OHCHR, provided for a preliminary investigation into the human rights violation and abuses that occurred during the conflict. This was to enable the Commission to understand the trends and patterns in the conflict and in the violations and abuses that occurred. With this information, the Commission was expected to have a structured way of carrying out its statement taking exercise, as well as identify window cases for investigations and map the key issues on which to conduct research. A Sierra Leonean NGO, Campaign for Good Governance, executed the project, under the technical supervision of an OHCHR consultant.

c. Project on Traditional Methods of Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation

12. The OHCHR, approved a third project on traditional methods of conflict resolution and reconciliation. A Sierra Leonean NGO, Manifesto 99, implemented the project. The aim of the project was to provide guidelines to the Commission on how to integrate the traditional institutions and processes into its work. It was necessary for the Commission to understand how the different ethnic groups in Sierra Leone dealt with crime, punishment and reconciliation and how these attitudes could be utilised by the Commission to promote accountability and reconciliation in the country.
13. While Christianity and Islam are the main religions in Sierra Leone, a large number of people are traditionalists, with differing secret societies. Major decisions affecting local communities are sometimes taken in the sacred secret society bushes (groves/shrines). Many crimes and transgressions such as rape are culturally addressed. Sierra Leone is 70% illiterate⁵. The research argued that the bulk of the population, being illiterate, can relate to the Commission much more easily from a cultural context.
14. Since traditional beliefs play a major role in the lives of Sierra Leoneans, it suggested that the processes involved in the Commission should be

⁴ A full report on the public education programme managed by the Law Group is contained in the Methodology Chapter of this Report.

⁵ UNDP Human Development Report, 2002

responsive to the diverse traditional beliefs and customs of the fourteen tribal groups in the country.⁶

d. Selection of Commissioners

15. The Commission's Act provided for seven commissioners, four Sierra Leoneans representing the diversity of the country and three international commissioners. An elaborate process for the appointment of the Commissioners was approved by the Act. The four Sierra Leonean Commissioners were selected through a process managed by the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) who was the Selection Coordinator.
16. Sierra Leoneans from all over the world put forward nominations of suitable persons. The Selection Coordinator, with the assistance of an Advisory Board and after broad consultation with a cross section of Sierra Leonean society and with the High Commissioner for Human Rights, drew up a shortlist of finalists from 65 nominees. Each of the finalists was interviewed by a Selection Panel of six persons representing the President, the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council, the Inter Religious Council, the National Forum for Human Rights and the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights as set out in the Lome Peace Agreement. The Selection Panel then ranked and provided comments on each of the finalists to the Selection Coordinator who recommended four of them for appointment to the Commission by the President.
17. Suggestions for the international members of the Commission were submitted directly to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, or to the Selection Coordinator, who forwarded them to the High Commissioner. The High Commissioner for Human Rights recommended three persons as international commissioners for appointment to the Commission. Their names were first submitted to the Selection Panel for comments and finally submitted to the President for appointment. The selection process was concluded in March 2002.

e. Preliminary Identification of the Facility Requirements of the Commission

18. The OHCHR had received assurances from UNAMSIL that it would provide all necessary technical and logistical support to the Commission. Upon the establishment of the Interim Secretariat, UNAMSIL provided two offices and one desktop computer and printer to the Interim Secretariat. The Interim Secretariat operated out of the UNAMSIL facilities until late in April 2002, when it moved to rented temporary premises in Freetown. While the Secretariat was located at UNAMSIL, the Interim Secretariat had access to all UNAMSIL facilities including telephones, the internet, workstations and use of the mail room.

⁶ See Manifesto 99, "Traditional Methods of Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation of Possible Complementary Value to the Proposed Truth and Reconciliation Commission". July 2002.

f. Provide a Forum for the Clarification of the Relationship Between the Commission and the Special Court.

19. An agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations saw the creation of a Special Court to try those who had committed breaches of the Lomé Peace Agreement and international humanitarian law. The UN Secretary General's Report to the UN Security Council⁷ suggested a relationship and cooperation agreement between the proposed Special Court and the Commission. In a second report to the UN Security Council, the UN Secretary-General urged that the Special Court and the Commission should operate in a complementary and mutually supportive manner, fully respectful of their distinct but related functions.
20. OHCHR felt it was part of its responsibility to assist in clarifying the relationship between the two bodies. In November 2000, it organised an international workshop in Freetown in collaboration with UNAMSIL on the issue. The workshop recommended the establishment of a consultative process to work out the relationship between the Commission and the Special Court.⁸ In 2001, the Secretary-General reported that UNAMSIL and OHCHR would be preparing 'general guidelines' for the relationship between the two bodies.⁹
21. In December 2001, OHCHR and the Office of Legal Affairs of the United Nations Headquarters, New York, organised an experts meeting on the Commission and the Special Court in New York. The meeting agreed on a number of basic principles without suggesting any guidelines for a relationship. It also did not suggest any modality for cooperation but called for an agreement institutionalizing cooperation between the Commission and the Special Court, and, where appropriate, in their respective rules of procedure.¹⁰

g. Provide technical support in developing mechanisms for the Commission to fulfil its additional mandate regarding juvenile offenders

22. The OHCHR initiative in this area focused on the research study on traditional methods of conflict resolution and reconciliation, which was expected to provide the Commission with input on how various groups in Sierra Leone approached juvenile crime. Additionally, UNICEF, in 2001, organised a consultation on the participation of children in the Commission. The report of that consultation was a comprehensive study on how the Commission could partner with UNICEF and the child protection agencies in facilitating the participation of children in the Commission and ensuring that their rights were protected in the process.

⁷ UN Doc. S/2000/915 issued on 4 October 2000

⁸ UN Doc. E/CN.4/2001/35, p.13, paragraph 41

⁹ 'Eleventh Report of the Secretary General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone'; UN Doc. S/2001/857; at paragraph 47.

¹⁰ S/2001/40, paragraph 9. See also S/2000/1234.

TRC



Some members of civil society organisations in Sierra Leone. Front row left, Joe Pemagbi Jr of the International Human Rights Law Group; Rev. Bob Kande of the Special Court Working Group (middle) and Mr. John Caulker of the Truth and Reconciliation Working Group.

h. Provide assistance to the Commission during the preparatory period.

23. The TRC Act provided that the Commission was to have a preparatory period of three months and an operational period of 12 months subject to extension for another six months. It was widely accepted that the three months preparatory period would be insufficient for the Commission to deal with all the issues prior to opening its doors. OHCHR therefore supported the establishment of an Interim Secretariat, which was to prepare the ground for the launch of the Commission and allow it time during the preparatory period to focus on the substantive aspects of its work. The Interim Secretariat was established in the period immediately preceding the conclusion of the selection process in March 2002. To ensure the full support of government institutions its head was recommended by the Government of Sierra Leone and remunerated by OHCHR.

THE INTERIM SECRETARIAT

24. The terms of reference of the Interim Secretariat included:
- a. Assisting in the determination, location and establishment of office premises for the Commission in Freetown.
 - b. Establishing a data base for the Commission.
 - c. Establishing logistical needs such as communications, transport, computers, power supply and security.
 - d. Establishing a financial management system, including a Trust fund for the Commission.
 - e. Negotiating support and assistance that may be provided to the Commission by UNAMSIL, the GOSL, and other bodies.
 - f. Identifying suitable regional offices for the Commission subject to the approval of the Commissioners and other decentralisation issues.
 - g. Organising, designing and developing skills transfer for national staff of the Interim secretariat.
 - h. Conducting a national public awareness campaign with the support of contracted parties.
 - i. Developing policy and preparing briefing materials issues such as the relationship with the Special Court, women's issues, children's issues, traditional methods of reconciliation and witness protection.
25. The Interim Secretariat was established on 25th March 2002 with the appointment of an Interim Executive Secretary. Three international consultants were recruited as technical advisers for the three departments in the Interim Secretariat: administration and programming, policy and operations respectively. They supported the work of six Sierra Leonean consultants who were responsible for the six operational units namely: Media and Public Education; Reconciliation and Witness Protection; Research, Investigation; Legal Affairs and Finance.
26. Problems arose almost immediately in the Interim Secretariat with the recruitment of the six national consultants. No clear guidelines or minimum standards of qualification for recruitment were published by the Interim Executive Secretary, neither were the positions advertised. No interview board was set up to interview prospective candidates. The only candidate who appeared for an interview was found unsuitable by the advisers, but was nevertheless employed as a consultant. The rest of the consultants were simply

appointed by the Interim Executive Secretary to their positions. The process of recruiting the consultants created dissension within the Interim Secretariat.

EVALUATING THE INTERIM SECRETARIAT

a. Location and establishment of office premises.

27. The Interim Secretariat was housed in a rented building in the city centre with inadequate office space and parking. The Interim Secretariat was unable to finalise agreement with the Government on the provision of an appropriate office accommodation for the Commission. The Commission eventually settled on the old Brookfields Hotel and persuaded the Government to make the building available. The Government also agreed to renovate the complex. The Commission was only able to move into its permanent home long after the commencement of its operational activities.

b. Establishing a database for the Commission.

28. Preliminary contacts had been made with the American Association for the Advancement of Science to assist the Commission in the design and construction of its database. However by the time the Commission began its operations; it did not have an operational database. The database was established in January 2003.

c. Establishing other logistical needs such as communications, transport, computers, power supply and security.

29. The strategic action plan identified all the logistic needs of the Commission and charged the management of the Interim Secretariat with responsibility for facilitating their procurement. The Interim Secretariat received technical support from UNAMSIL with computers, a telephone network linked to the UNAMSIL exchange and hand-held radios. The Interim Secretariat, through UNDP, placed orders for the supply of three four wheel jeeps and one saloon car. These vehicles were not delivered until September 2002. The Interim Secretariat also contracted a security company to provide services to the Commission.

d. Establishing a financial management system, including a Trust Fund for the Commission.

30. The Administration and Logistics Consultant created an adequate financial management system for the Interim Secretariat. This dealt with procurement processes, inventory procedures and financial controls. UNDP provided financial management and oversight services for the Commission.

e. Identifying suitable regional offices for the Commission, subject to the approval of the Commissioners and other decentralisation issues.

31. The Interim Secretariat did not receive any offers of office space in the regions from the Government. Much of the public infrastructure in the regions was destroyed and even Government institutions experienced difficulties finding office space. Efforts were made to identify suitable office accommodation in the three regional capitals.

f. Organising, designing and developing skills transfer for national staff of the Interim Secretariat

32. The Interim Secretariat organised two workshops before the launch of the Commission. The first was the strategic planning workshop while the second was a training programme in conflict resolution and reconciliation.

g. Conducting a national public awareness campaign with the eventual support from contracted parties.

33. A sensitisation programme was launched throughout the country which included a range of training programmes and media activities.
34. The Interim Secretariat was not able to fund the sensitisation campaign. It had to rely on the efforts of the civil society groups who had obtained funding from sources such as the OHCHR, to carry out sensitisation and public education. Regrettably, these were one-off grants and were not renewed once they expired and the programme could not be sustained.

h. Compiling international and national documents for the Commission (the beginning of a resource centre)

35. The Interim Secretariat hired a research consultant from the Fourah Bay College of the University of Sierra Leone whose responsibilities included establishing a research agenda for the Commission as well as establishing a resource centre on transitional justice and on the Sierra Leone conflict. By the launch of the Commission little progress had been made which placed the research staff at considerable disadvantage. The staff had to rely on electronic resources or materials that were brought in from outside the country.

i. Implementing preparatory activities including preliminary investigations

36. OHCHR had provided funding to a Sierra Leonean NGO, Campaign for Good Governance, to carry out a preliminary investigation to establish initial evidence from key events. This activity commenced in March, 2002 and concluded by July, 2002. The Interim Secretariat worked closely with the NGO in monitoring the progress of the investigation and providing direction on the areas in focus. Regular presentations on progress were organised by the Interim Secretariat and, by the time the project was concluded more than 1,300 testimonies had been collected from victims.
37. OHCHR also commissioned another research project on traditional methods of conflict resolution and reconciliation.¹¹ The Interim Secretariat provided monitoring and oversight of this project. However the project was not concluded as some of its key personnel prematurely left the project before completion. The research report presented to the Interim Secretariat was poor and of little use to the Commission.

¹¹ See research report by Manifesto 99 on "Traditional Methods of Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation of Complementary value to the proposed Truth and Reconciliation Commission", July 2002.

TRC



Leaders of Civil Society Organisations in Sierra Leone

j. Developing policy and preparing briefing materials for the Commissioners

38. These functions were poorly handled by the Interim Secretariat. Few briefing documents were made available to the Commissioners prior to the launch of the TRC. The Operations Department managed to prepare some briefing and policy materials including an operational plan for the substantive phases of the Commission's activities.

Managing the Administrative Crisis

39. The launch of the Commission was supposed to herald the commencement of its three months Preparatory Phase. During the Preparatory Phase, the Commission was to engage in the following activities:
- a. Procurement of office space,
 - b. Preparing a budget and securing funds,
 - c. Hiring of staff both national and international,
 - d. Adopting procedures on methodology,
 - e. Designing and undertaking a public education campaign,
 - f. Undertaking preliminary background research,
 - g. Designing and putting in place a database,
 - h. Collecting supporting materials for its investigation,
 - i. Holding training workshops for Commissioners and staff,
 - j. Review of materials prepared during the Interim Secretariat phase, including the reports of the commissioned research projects.¹²
40. The operations of the Interim Secretariat suffered due to the poor management skills which impacted negatively on the first six months of the Commission's operations. The Commission found itself in the midst of an unfolding administrative crisis.
41. The first issue that the Commission had to deal with was a budget. The Commissioners were shocked to discover that it had no funds to operate with. An indicative budget of \$9.9 million was prepared by OHCHR and UNAMSIL. In February, 2002, an appeal for funding was launched on the basis of this budget. OHCHR which was coordinating the fundraising for the Commission was experiencing donor resistance due to the size of the budget and advised the Interim Secretariat to review it. Subsequently, the indicative budget was considered by the commissioners and revised downwards to \$6.5 million in July, 2002. The Commission requested OHCHR to continue to fundraise for its operations. Faced with continued scepticism by donors and a considerable shortfall in funding relating in part to earlier difficulties in the Commission, the budget was further revised downwards in March 2003 to \$4.7 million.
42. Delays in the finalisation of the budget slowed down the release funds made available through OHCHR due to its internal project approval processes. The Commission now had an agreed budget but no monies could be released until the Project Review Committee of OHCHR had approved the budget. OHCHR facilitated the early consideration of the budget by its PRC and the budget was approved within six weeks. However, it meant that six weeks into its life the Commission was unable to spend any money.

¹² See S.5(3) of the TRC Act, 2000.

43. Staff members became polarised between those who supported the Interim Secretariat and those who did not. The Commissioners were not being supported in a systematic manner. There were no minutes of Commission meetings prepared even months after the meetings had taken place. Activities in which Commissioners were to participate were ad-hoc and not planned ahead of time. As the Interim Secretariat was to be subsumed into the Commission, the Commissioners sought to deal with the crisis by requesting a personnel audit by UNDP to determine the suitability of staff prior to their absorption. The result of the audit indicated that most of the staff members were unqualified and not suitable for the positions they were occupying. It recommended the immediate disengagement of the unqualified staff and a re-designation of the surplus staff or their disengagement as well. Their positions were to be advertised and a transparent recruitment process was embarked upon.
44. Regrettably, the Commission was unable to implement the report of the staff audit. All the unqualified staff stayed on in their positions, while UNDP stopped the payment of their salaries until the conclusion of the Preparatory Phase. Following the inability of the Commission to deal with the managerial crisis, the international staff left. It took the direct intervention of OHCHR in consultation with the Government of Sierra Leone to restore the Commission's operations in October 2002.
45. In a very scathing analysis of the Commission's first six months of operations, the International Crisis Group concluded that the Commission had permitted an impression to develop in the public eye that it lacked leadership and was unprepared for the challenges that lay before it. It hoped that the Commission would take measures to restore public confidence and speedily begin to implement its activities, which were already running behind schedule.

THE PREPARATORY PHASE OF ACTIVITIES

a. Procurement of office space

46. The Government made available to the Commission, the sum of \$90,000 for the renovation of the Brookfield Hotel premises which had been thoroughly vandalized by members of the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) who had occupied it since 1999. On 9 March, 2003, the Vice President, Hon. Solomon Berewa, formally opened the new premises at a colourful ceremony.

b. Hiring of staff

47. With the departure of the international staff and the termination of the contract of the Interim Executive Secretary, the Commission had no remaining staff. An emergency measure was quickly agreed to between the Commission, OHCHR, UNDP and the Human Rights Section of UNAMSIL. This was to establish a Caretaker Committee, which was to provide secretarial services to the Commission pending the recruitment of permanent staff. Recruitment of staff commenced during the operational phase of the Commission's work and is dealt with elsewhere in this report.

c. Designing and undertaking a public education campaign

48. By the end of July 2002, the Commission had commenced a weekly briefing session for the media and members of the public. These sessions were to continue throughout the Commission's lifespan.
49. People outside Freetown, particularly in the provinces, wanted to feel part of the process and engage directly with the Commissioners. In September, 2002, the Commission started its 'Barray (Town Hall) Phase' of activities. During that period which lasted until November 2002, the Commission visited each of the twelve districts and the Western Area. A Commissioner, accompanied by volunteer staff, spent an average of one week in each district, holding meetings and interacting with civil, community, chieftaincy and faith organisations.
50. During these visits, the Commission discussed the setting up of support structures for the Commission. These structures were to support all aspects of the work of the Commission, including statement-taking, hearings, providing psycho-social and mental health counsellors, healers and interpreters. They were also to identify focal points for the Commission in each district. Finally, the Commissioners explained the operations, methods and procedures of the Commission including the relationship with the Special Court, and issues such as reparations and confidentiality.
51. The Barray Phase had mixed success. In some districts, active district officers had taken the time to sensitise their communities for the arrival of the Commissioners and succeeded in organizing well attended meetings. In other districts, some of the district officers did not bother to receive the Commissioners or to notify chiefs and the people about their arrival. In such cases, the Commissioners from house to house in different villages summoning people to assemble at the town barray. Following these experiences, the Commission paid district officers to send runners to communities that were to be visited during the week, to prepare them for the arrival of the Commissioners.
52. The trips were poorly planned. They occurred when the Commission did not have any staff members and had to rely on volunteers. The Commission put too much faith in the ability of the Ministry of Local Government to mobilize the district officers and the chiefs. None of the district administrations had any transport to send people ahead to notify the communities. Some of the district officers were still operating out of Freetown or the regional capitals and in a number of cases actually arrived at the same time as the Commissioners at the district headquarters.
53. The visits brought home to the Commissioners the magnitude of the problems the Commission would be dealing with. For many people, this was the first time that an institution associated with the Government had visited them and their communities. It conveyed a message that the Commission cared and was willing to come to them as it implemented its processes. The visits also consolidated the sensitisation campaigns being carried out by NGOs on the work of the Commission.
54. The Commission also established a collaborative partnership with the Women's Task Force on the Commission, a network of women's NGOs that included FAWE and the Women's Forum. It sought to create partnerships with other

relevant stakeholders such as UNICEF, Centre for the Victims of Torture, The Amputees Association, and NGOs working with combatants. A number of meetings were held with the Inter-Religious Council to solicit the partnership of the faith community and with a view to organizing an international workshop on the role of religion in reconciliation. The workshop was held in January 2003.

d. Designing and putting in place a database

55. In January 2003, the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) dispatched two consultants in order to set up the database. One of the consultants was then recruited to manage the database on a full time basis.

e. Collecting supporting materials for its investigations and prioritising its work

56. The OHCHR "Mapping project" carried out by the Campaign for Good Governance had commenced in March 2002. The mapping report revealed patterns and trends in the violations that occurred as well as the geographical spread of the violations. The project implementers organised several briefings for Commissioners and staff, where they received substantive input on how they should proceed with their investigations and research. The Commission identified 40 window cases for investigation pending the completion of the Commission's statement-taking exercise.

f. Training for Commissioners and staff

57. The administrative crisis adversely affected training plans for the Commissioners and staff. During the briefings after their inauguration, the Commissioners had participated in a one-day programme on strategic planning and team building organised by the operations department. Regrettably, there was no follow up to this programme. The International Centre for Transitional Justice organised a one-day 'experience-sharing' session for the Commissioners, to compare how the Sierra Leone experience differed from other truth commissions.

g. Conclusion

58. The administrative crisis cost the Commission six months of operational time and it struggled to make up for this lost time. It abridged programmes and sought creative short-cuts to mainstream its activities and restore confidence in the Commission. The crisis created a perception problem that plagued subsequent fund-raising efforts.

MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE OF THE COMMISSION

59. The initial operational plan developed by OHCHR recommended the establishment of six departments namely: reconciliation and protection; administration and programming; research; public information and education; legal; and investigations. It also proposed the establishment of regional offices in each of the three regions. The commissioners would be responsible for providing policy guidance while implantation rested with a management committee headed by an Executive Secretary and the departmental heads. The proposed departments were subsequently revised following discussions with

the commissioners. The departments were reduced to four namely: legal and reconciliation; administration and programming; information management; public information and education.

- a. **Legal and Reconciliation:** Responsible for providing the Commission with legal opinion and advice on its operations as well as on issues of international human rights law. Responsible for the reconciliation mandate by developing strategies for reconciliation and healing while taking into consideration existing traditional methods of conflict resolution and reconciliation. It would also be responsible for the design and implementation of strategies for the protection of witnesses and victims where necessary.
 - b. **Administration and Programming:** This unit would be responsible for administrative functions as they related to personnel, finance, information technology, donor reporting and funding.
 - c. **Information Management: With two sub-units namely: Research and Investigations:** The Commission decided on the merger of research, investigations and data process departments into an information management unit. The Research unit would be responsible for research and data collection. It would supervise the conduct of extensive research into the background and causes of the conflict as well as the collation of statements from victims and witnesses. The Investigation unit was charged with following up all relevant information that come into the possession of the Commission as well as investigating trends and patterns in the violations and abuses.
 - d. **Public Information and Education:** The unit would be responsible for coordinating all public information activities of the Commission and work closely with the Ministry of Information, UNAMSIL Public Information Section and UN agencies in disseminating the Commission's activities and ensuring public involvement in them.
60. The revision of the organizational structure of the Commission also translated into a downward revision of its personnel requirements.
61. The Commission was to have full-fledged offices in the three regional capitals, each headed by a regional administrative officer. There was to be a full complement of staff. The regional offices were to supervise statement-takers and coders and entry clerks who were to enter the statements on mini databases in the regions. The mini databases would have a remote link to the main office in Freetown where the central database would be situated. The Head Office would access all the statements in the regional offices and build a comprehensive database of violations and abuses. However, due to a shortage of funds, this plan was amended by the Commission to provide for only a regional coordinator in the respective regions. The regional coordinator would be responsible for supervising the statement taking teams in the various districts.
62. While the Commissioners travelled in the districts they facilitated the establishment of district support committees. The Commission had hoped that these committees would act as the catalysts in leading civil society organisation involvement in the districts.

THE CARETAKER COMMITTEE OF THE COMMISSION

63. Between September and November 2002, the Commission did not have any staff members. In consultation with the Government, the Commission, UNDP and UNAMSIL, the OHCHR established a Caretaker Committee to manage the Secretariat of the Commission pending the recruitment of substantive personnel. The mandate of the Committee was to support the commencement of statement-taking and supervise the recruitment of personnel for the Commission. The Caretaker Committee was composed of the chairman of the Commission, one Commissioner, and representatives of the Human Rights Section of UNAMSIL and of UNDP.
64. A skeletal staff composed of an office manager, and two of the departed international staff members, the operations adviser and the administration and logistics adviser, supported the committee.
65. The Caretaker Committee issued advertisements both locally and internationally, for positions in the Commission. Interviews were conducted either directly with candidates present or remotely by telephone. Reports of interviews were discussed by the Caretaker Committee which forwarded its recommendations to the Commission. The full Commission considered the recommendations and approved the recruitment of staff. Between November 2002 and February 2003, the Caretaker Committee conducted interviews for most of the positions in the Commission. Recruits began to assume their positions from the end of January 2003 until late in March, 2004 when the majority of the newly recruited staff members finally assumed duty.
66. The Caretaker Committee was largely successful in steering the Commission through a very difficult time in its operations. The mandate of the Caretaker Committee and the role of the Office Manager lapsed with the appointment of a substantive Executive Secretary by the Secretariat of the Commission.

Conclusion

67. Most of the Commission's staff arrived in March 2003, just as the Commission was completing its statement-taking programme and getting ready for hearings which were to commence on 14th April 2003.
68. The Commission had managed to weather the storm that threatened to tear it apart and moved quickly to consolidate its activities, with a view to restoring donor and stakeholder confidence in its activities. Much credit is due to the staff members of the Commission who managed to complete the main objectives of the truth and reconciliation process through adversity and against the backdrop of many setbacks.

APPENDIX ONE

STAFF OF THE COMMISSION

Executive Secretary:

1. Yasmin Jusu Sheriff - Interim Executive Secretary (25th March 2002 to 19th October 2002)
2. Malika Akrouf – Office Manager, Caretaker Committee (9th November 2002 to 17th February 2003)
3. Frank Kargbo – Executive Secretary (17th February 2003 to 31st December 2003).
4. M. Ozonnia Ojielo – Officer in Charge (1st January 2004 to 31st August 2004).

Staff Members

1. Abu Joseph
2. Adekara Daniel
3. Ahmid Noella
4. Alghali Olu
5. Alie Joe
6. Alie, Lakoh
7. Allen Paul James
8. Amadu Jenneh
9. Amara Emmanuel
10. Anthony, Fanta Naomi
11. Apori-Nkansah Lydia
12. Bah Isatu
13. Bah Mariama
14. Bah Tijanie
15. Bangura, Abdul Karim
16. Bangura O. Ahmed
17. Bangura, Amy
18. Bangura, Anita
19. Bangura, Fatmata G.
20. Bangura Henry
21. Bangura Inggrid
22. Bangura Mabinty
23. Bangura Mohammed
24. Bangura, Mohammed Saalam
25. Bangura, Rosemary
26. Bangura Yabu
27. Barrie, Jogo
28. Bassie Massah
29. Benya Desmond
30. Bockarie, Sannoh
31. Bocharie, Daisy
32. Brown Charlris
33. Bockarie Buanie, Konyon
34. Bundu L T Augustine
35. Bureh, Catherine
36. Carew, Alfred
37. Carew Mohammed
38. Casey Greg

39. Ceasear Chinsia Ethleen
40. Charm Abdulai
41. Charm Isatu
42. Dr. Coker Eugenia
43. Cole Cordelia
44. Cole Cordelia Davies
45. Cole Hashim Tejane
46. Conibere Richard
47. Conte, Thomas
48. Conteh Kadie
49. Conteh Wusha
50. Dabo, Sarah
51. Cauda Christian
52. Ms. Davies Ursula
53. Dixon Robert
54. Finoh Tamba
55. Fitzmahan Maureen
56. Fofana, Mohammed
57. Fofana Osman
58. Rev. Forna Usman
59. Fornie Maada
60. Fullah Abdul
61. Ganda Mary Rose
62. Gandi, Joseph Tamba
63. Gbla Abubakar
64. Gborie Kasay Sahr
65. Ms. George, Augusta Jamiatu
66. Masie Bah Gibril
67. Goba Sylvia
68. Hanciles Osmond
69. Humper Thomas
70. Hussan Javed
71. Jalloh Foday
72. Jalloh, Alimamy Foday
73. Jalloh Kaday
74. Jalloh Mariama
75. Jimmy Martin
76. John Princetta
77. Johnson Charles
78. Jusu Marian
79. Kabba Alie Madi
80. Kai Aminata Foday
81. KaiCombey, Victor
82. Kailie, Thomas
83. Kaima, Arnold
84. Kain Gladys
85. Kaindaneh Florence
86. Kakay Ibrahim
87. Kallon Mohammed
88. Kamanda, Mohammed
89. Kamara, Abdul
90. Kamara, Adbulai
91. Kamara Abu Baker

92. Kamara Allie
93. Kamara Augustine
94. Kamara, Catherine J
95. Kamara Foday
96. Ms. Kamara, Hajia Mariama
97. Kamara Hassan
98. Kamara Ibrahim Sorie
99. Ms. Kamara, Isatu
100. Kamara, Michael S.
101. Kamara Mustapha
102. Kamara Abdul Rowland
103. Kanu, Mabinty Lucy
104. Kargbo, Alie
105. Kargbo, John
106. Kargbo, Peacemaker
107. Karimu Emmanuel
108. Kebbi Florence
109. Kellie, Kumba Judith
110. King Franklin
111. Koi Edwin
112. Ms. Koroma Ada Ann
113. Koroma Allieu V
114. Koroma Amidu
115. Koroma Daniel B.
116. Koroma Dauda
117. Koroma, John B.
118. Koroma Kussan
119. Mr. Koroma Momoh
120. Koroma, Moses
121. Koroma Osman
122. Koroma Philip
123. Koroma, Syl
124. Koroma Umaru
125. Kowa Johannes R
126. Kposowa Abdul
127. Lake Ralph
128. Lax Ilan
129. Ms. Lewis, Elisabeth
130. Ms. Maddy Elfrida
131. Mahoi, Ajaratu
132. Mansaray, James
133. Mansaray, Prince Philip
134. Mansaray Salif
135. Manye Bondu
136. Marah, Nene
137. Marah Samba
138. Mbawa Henry
139. Moiwa Safea
140. Mariatu Mustafa
156. Nallo Alex
157. Ngevubar, Aisatu
158. Ngombu Augustine
159. Nicol Valerie

160. M. Ojielo Ozonnia
161. Olivant Justina
162. Owusu Edwina
163. Peacock Maude
164. Pessima Michael
165. Rogers, Sarah
166. Sah, Konde A.
167. Sah, Martin R.
168. Saidu Cecilia
169. Samba, Alice
170. Samura Kadie
171. Samura Margret
172. Samurah Alhaji
173. Sandi, Alice
174. Sandi, Hawa
175. Sandi Philip
176. Sankoh, Abdulai
177. Sankoh Kadiatu
178. Schotsmans Martien
179. Sei Mohammed
180. Sesay, Abdul Rhaman
181. Sesay, Daniel B. K.C.
182. Sesay Denis
183. Sesay, Foday D. .M.,
184. Sesay Adbul Hakim
185. Sesay, Isata
186. Sesay, Kanku.
187. Sesay Kiphu B
188. Sesay Mohammed
189. Shyllon Reuben
190. Silah Abdul Karim
191. Simpson James Gavin
192. Smith Eddy
193. Smith Eva
194. Smith, Rose-Marie
195. Songo, Muniru
196. Swaray, Hawa
197. Taylor Sophie Amadu
198. Thomas Christine
199. Thompson Jesse Thompson
200. Thompson-Shaw Josephine
201. Turay Francis
202. Turay Unisa
203. Wright Rita
204. Valcarcel Princess
205. Varney Howard
206. Wihelm Alberta
210. Williams Donella
211. Wright Aisha Nancy
212. Wvede-Obahor Nwanne
213. Yilla Alhassan
214. Yillah, Nabieu Yayah
215. Yopoi, Juma

216. Zoe Dugal

Consultants

1. Annor Nimako
2. Allotey Ohui
3. Aragones Patricia
4. Asher Jana
5. Dr. Ball Patrick
6. Betts Wendy
7. Cibelli Kristen
8. Gaima Emmanuel
9. Handicap International
10. Hughes Charlie
11. King Jamesina
12. Professor Kofi Kumado
13. Luseni Dennis
14. Murungi Betty
15. Seigrist Saudamini
16. Sesay Mohammed Gibril
17. Triolo Anthony
18. Theuermann Bert
19. Udentia Jude
20. Williams Yada
21. Dr. Abdullah Ibrahim


Interns

1. Abulaye Joseph
2. Barnicle Jeremy
3. Barrow Marrie
4. Conteh Kadie
5. Christodoulou Artemis

Artemis Christodoulou, a PhD student from Yale University, was an intern at the Commission during 2003. In May 2004, she returned to Sierra Leone to promote the National Vision for Sierra Leone. While returning to Freetown from Makeni, she was seriously hurt in a car accident. At the time of writing, Ms Christodoulou remains in a coma with severe brain damage. The Commission pays tribute to the selfless dedication that Ms Christodoulou gave to the people of Sierra Leone. Her work on amputations, memorials and the National Vision for Sierra Leone has advanced the cause of peace and reconciliation in Sierra Leone.

6. Darkwa Linda
7. Flattau Isaac
8. Hewett Dawn Yamane
9. Kamara Joseph
10. Mahoney Christopher
11. Verelst Sabastian
12. Sandon Shogilev
13. Vibeke Norgaard
14. Zervos Anthea

**APPENDIX TWO
ORGANOGRAM OF THE COMMISSION**



APPENDIX THREE

COMPONENTS OF THE STRATEGIC PLAN

The following were some of the components of the strategic action plan:

Mission Statement:

To develop a menu of operational strategies, create an enabling environment and lay the foundation for the successful implementation of the TRC as a unique Sierra Leonean experience

Vision:

To create a flexible, pro-active, accessible team committed to the establishment of a functional and successful TRC by the 5th July 2002 when the Commission was to be inaugurated.

Values: The values, which were set out as underpinning the work of the Interim Secretariat, included the following:

- a. Training for all staff
- b. To be gender and child sensitive
- c. Encourage life long learning
- d. To be ambassadors of reconciliation
- e. Show respect and dignity to and be aware of the 'victims'
- f. Respect for each other and demonstrate team spirit
- g. Human Rights knowledge and the basis for such rights
- h. To be hands-on and pro-active managers
- i. Be rooted and integrated in the community
- j. Transparency, honesty and accountability

The strategic action plan also focussed on how to transform the terms of reference of the Interim Secretariat into achievable targets. Some of the most important goals identified include the following:

- a. Partnership with the Government in securing an appropriate office accommodation.
- b. Appropriate human resources in the Commission through screening, recruitment, training, supervision, assessment, job descriptions and terms of reference.
- c. Financial management through review of the TRC budget, effective financial system, engaging in fund raising for the Commission, private sector supplies, donations and fund raising services.
- d. An administrative framework including recruitment procedures, resource material inventory procedures and control, administrative regulations, reporting requirements (internal and external), leases and contracts and evaluation and assessment.
- e. Partnership with members of the international community through exchange of letters, a work plan for assistance from UNAMSIL, finalise a memorandum of understanding, create framework for receiving logistics assistance.
- f. Training for Interim Secretariat and Commission staff.
- g. Design security plan (information and materials, physical security, witness security, protection of evidence).
- h. Design and implement a national public awareness campaign at zero cost, since OHCHR funding for public education has been given to NGO partners:

identify partners and what they can offer/contribute, press conferences and briefings, visits to schools and institutions, radio/TV magazine programmes, other activities including songs, drama, poetry, logo, stories, jingles, sponsored walks, flags and booklets. It also included the preparation of a media and NGO strategy for the Commission.

- i. Development of a resource centre and collection of documents from different sources including UNAMSIL, embassies, NGOs, ECOMOG, Sierra Leone Police, Sierra Leone Army, Media (local and international), etc.

CHAPTER THREE

Concepts

TRC

Truth
hurts but
war
hurts more

Produced by the TRC Steering Committee with support
from the International Human Rights Law Group

CHAPTER THREE

Concepts

Introduction

1. Truth and reconciliation commissions have, in recent years, become well-recognised as valuable and effective mechanisms in societies emerging from conflict. They help to ensure accountability for human rights violations, they clarify the historical record and put myths and lies about the past to rest, and they assist in giving a vision for the future. They are not a cure-all, but they can make a positive contribution when their work and activities are married with the dynamism of a civil society anxious for social transformation. This chapter addresses the principal concepts that underpinned and guided the work of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and which are not specifically dealt with elsewhere in the Report. Concepts dealt with in the chapter include truth and truth telling, just war and just means, victims and perpetrators.
2. The Commission operated in a public and transparent fashion. Commissioners were appointed following a process of public consultation, in which all concerned citizens were invited to submit their names or the names of others as potential candidates. All major protagonists in the conflict were represented in the selection process and gave their consent to the eventual composition of the Commission. The staff members of the Commission were employed following public advertisement and interviews. The funds of the Commission were administered by the United Nations Development Programme office in Freetown, and audited by thoroughly independent accountants. The Commission has regularly reported on its activities, and has constantly called upon the people of Sierra Leone to participate to the fullest extent possible. The work of the Commission has been bolstered in a multitude of respects by civil society, and more specifically by non-governmental organisations (NGOs), both national and international. Funding for the Commission came from several donor countries, the Government of Sierra Leone and from individuals.
3. The underlying principles of the Commission were set out in the 'Memorandum of Objects and Reasons', which was attached to the Truth and Reconciliation Act 2000, the legal instrument responsible for the creation of the Commission. The Memorandum explains that the Commission was 'proposed by Article XXVI of the Lomé Peace Agreement as part of the process of healing the wounds of the armed conflict which began in 1991'. Furthermore, '[s]ection 1 of Article XXVI of the Peace Agreement envisaged the proceedings of the Commission as a catharsis for constructive interchange between the victims and perpetrators of human rights violations and abuses and from this catharsis the Commission is to compile 'a clear picture of the past'. Accordingly, by clause 6, the principal function of the Commission is to create an impartial historical record of events in question as the basis for the task of preventing their recurrence.'¹

¹ Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000, Memorandum of Objects and Reasons.

4. The Lomé Peace Agreement itself declared that one of the purposes of the Commission was exactly to 'get a clear picture of the past in order to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation'.²

Truth and truth-telling

5. What the 'Memorandum of Objects and Reasons' does not highlight is the fact that the Commission was created out of a tension between two contradictory intentions, on the one hand an impetus to forget the past and to forgive past violations of human rights, and another calling for the truth of the past to be determined and acknowledged. The controversial premise upon which the Lomé Peace Agreement was predicated is the pardon and amnesty set out in Article IX. The justification appears in the provision itself: 'In order to bring lasting peace to Sierra Leone...' and 'To consolidate the peace and promote the cause of national reconciliation'.
6. International law has acknowledged the validity of granting amnesty to combatants when a conflict comes to an end. In the case of Sierra Leone, as the Commission was told on more than one occasion by participants in the Lomé negotiations, amnesty presented itself as an essential condition if fighting was to stop and peace allowed to break out. The Commission has determined that serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law took place on all sides in the conflict, so there can be no doubt that all of the participants in the Lomé negotiations in fact benefited from the amnesty. It cannot, in other words, be reduced to a one-sided concession.
7. However, in recent decades, the dangers of granting full amnesty for human rights violations have been increasingly appreciated. Amnesty overrides the interests of individual victims, who are also entitled to see their personal concerns addressed and balanced against those of society as a whole. International law refuses to accept the validity of amnesty for the most serious crimes of international concern, namely genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. These categories correspond in an approximate sense with the concept of gross and systematic violations of human rights. Even the practical justification for amnesty is called into question: it may not deliver the long-term peace that it promises. If the amnesty is granted in a way that ignores the past, it may sow the seeds for future conflict, and serve as a justification for future generations to settle scores that were left unresolved when the conflict came to an end.
8. All of these concerns meant that the grant of pardon and amnesty in article IX of the Lomé Peace Agreement had to be accompanied with other mechanisms and values that seek to remember and account for the past, and to respond to the needs of victims. It is out of this dialectic that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission was conceived. Truth and truth-telling, and the need to recognise and acknowledge the past, lie at the heart of this.

² Lomé Peace Agreement, art. XXVI(1).

An 'inalienable right to truth'

9. In one of the seminal documents of the United Nations on the issue of impunity for human rights violations, Special Rapporteur Louis Joinet has spoken of the inalienable right to truth: 'Every people has the inalienable right to know the truth about past events and about the circumstances and reasons which led, through the consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights, to the perpetration of aberrant crimes. Full and effective exercise of the right to the truth is essential to avoid any recurrence of such acts in the future.' Further, he explains: 'This is not simply the right of any individual victim or his nearest and dearest to know what happened, a right to the truth. The right to know is also a collective right, drawing upon history to prevent violations from recurring in the future. Its corollary is a "duty to remember" on the part of the State: to be forearmed against the perversions of history that go under the names of revisionism or negationism, for the history of its oppression is part of a people's national heritage and as such must be preserved. These, then, are the main objectives of the right to know as a collective right.'³
10. Truth commissions have largely come about in recent years to give effect to what Joinet called 'the inalienable right to truth'. There is a belief that truth can be established through mechanisms other than criminal trials which may, in the past, have been considered to be the ideal way to get at the truth. Where amnesty has been granted – this is the case of Sierra Leone, or where effective prosecution is difficult or impossible because of resource issues, or because perpetrators cannot be brought to trial, truth commissions offer a valuable alternative. But trials have their own shortcomings in establishing the truth, and the flexibility of truth commissions may in fact better suit them to this task of establishing and enforcing the 'inalienable right to truth'.⁴
11. The Special Court is also in search of the truth, but the Court's truth will necessarily be limited to the criminal responsibility of the accused. Moreover, the Court will only draw a picture of the criminal responsibility of those that 'bear the greatest responsibility'. The Special Court and the TRC have essentially different, although complementary, roles to play. Whereas the TRC cannot replace judicial investigations into the criminal responsibility of those that bear the greatest responsibility, the Special Court is not as well-suited for a broader inquiry into the causes, nature and circumstances of the conflict.
12. As Pedro Nikken, former president of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, has written: 'There is no doubt that the discovery of the Truth, which is the responsibility of independent persons, destroys that element which, while not useful in itself for eradicating impunity, fulfils at least a dual function. First, it is useful for society to learn, objectively, what happened in its midst, which translates into a sort of collective catharsis. And second, it contributes to creating a collective conscience as to the need to impede the repetition of similar acts and shows those who are capable of doing so that even if they may escape the action of justice, they are not immune from being publicly recognized as the persons responsible for very grave attacks against other human rights. In this regard, even though [truth commissions] do not constitute

³ Question of the impunity of perpetrators of human rights violations (civil and political), Final report prepared by Mr. Joinet pursuant to Sub-Commission decision 1996/119, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20, para. 17.

⁴ See the chapter TRC and the Special Court.

punitive mechanisms, they may perform a preventive function that is highly useful in a process of building peace and the transition to democracy.⁵

13. A major challenge is ensuring that the search for the 'truth' or the 'truth' itself does not obscure this 'preventative function'. There are a few important cautions:
 1. The truth must be known;
 2. The truth must be complete;
 3. The truth must be officially proclaimed and publicly exposed.

14. The 'inalienable right to truth' is closely related to the 'right to an effective remedy' for violations of human rights. The right to an effective remedy is firmly entrenched in all major international law instruments.⁶ 'Establishing the truth' has been recognised as an essential part of the right to an effective remedy, as it is a crucial aspect of the guarantee of non-repetition of the original violation or abuse. This link between 'knowing what has happened' and 'avoiding the recurrence of violations in the future' has been repeatedly confirmed.⁷ Very illustrative in this respect is the innovative case law of the Inter-American human rights institutions, borne in the long and painful history of conflict in South and Central America.

15. In the case of *Ellacuria v. El Salvador*, the Inter-American Commission for Human Rights presented the right to know the truth as a direct remedy in itself, based on Article 1.1 of the Inter-American Convention providing that 'a State party is obligated to guarantee the full and free exercise of the rights recognized by the Convention'. In the opinion of the Inter-American Commission, ensuring rights for the future requires a society to learn from the abuses of the past. States must inform their citizens about the truth. This right to know the truth has two components: an individual right applying to the victim and family members and a general societal right. With respect to the public right, the Inter-American Commission said: 'Every society has the inalienable right to know the truth about what has occurred, as well as the reasons and

⁵ Paragraph 149.

⁶ Examples are Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) and Article 2 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (1966). All the major human rights instruments including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (article 2.3), the American Convention on Human Rights (article 29) and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (article 13) all guarantee the right to an "effective" remedy or recourse after a violation has occurred.

⁷ See for instance the "Proposed Basic Principles and Guidelines" attached to the Final Report submitted by Mr. Theo van Boven, Special Rapporteur, to the UN Commission on Human Rights, *Study concerning the right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms*, dated 2 July 1993 (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8) and more recently the "Basic Principles and Guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law", annex to the Final Report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. Cherif Bassiouni, to the UN Commission on Human Rights, *The right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms*, dated 18 January 2000 (E/CN.4/2000/62). Also very relevant in this respect is the Revised final report prepared by Mr. Joinet on the *Question of the impunity of perpetrators of human rights violations (civil and political)*, presented to the UN Commission on Human Rights on 2 October 1997 (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1). Both the UN Human Rights Committee and the European Court of Human Rights also recognize a positive duty of States to investigate human rights violations.

circumstances in which those crimes came to be committed, so as to avoid repetition of such events in the future.’⁸

16. These principles were developed further by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in the case of *Romero v. El Salvador*⁹. The Commission referred again to the dual character of the right: ‘The right to the truth is a collective right that enables society to have access to information essential to the development of democracies. At the same time, it is a private right of the next-of-kin of victims that makes possible one form of reparation, especially where amnesty laws are applied.’ Elaborating on society’s right to be duly informed, the Commission stated that it had held before that:

Independently of the problem of proving guilt, which in every case must be determined individually and with due process guarantees, by a pre existing court which applies the law in force at the time the crime was committed, one of the first matters that the Commission feels obliged to give its opinion on in this regard is the need to investigate the human rights violations committed prior to the establishment of the democratic government.... Every society has the inalienable right to know the truth about past events, as well as the motives and circumstances in which aberrant crimes came to be committed, in order to prevent repetition of such acts in the future. Moreover, the family members of the victims are entitled to information as to what happened to their relatives.... Such access to the truth presupposes freedom of speech....¹⁰

The Inter-American Commission concluded that the ‘right that all persons and society have to know the full, complete, and public truth as to the events transpired, their specific circumstances, and who participated in them is part of the right to reparation for human rights violations, with respect to satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition. The right of a society to have full knowledge of its past is not only a mode of reparation and clarification of what has happened, but is also aimed at preventing future violations.’¹¹

17. An important aspect of the right to an effective remedy is the duty that international human rights law imposes upon States to investigate human rights violations and abuses. For example, the European Court of Human Rights has held that the right to an effective remedy (article 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights) guarantees both the availability of an effective domestic remedy to be exercised at the initiative of complainants and, in the event of very serious allegations, the carrying out of a full investigation by public authorities.¹² In *McCann v. United Kingdom*,¹³ the Court said that ‘[t]he obligation to protect the right to life under [article 2], read in conjunction with the State’s general duty under [a]rticle 1 of the Convention to “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] Convention”, requires by implication that there should be some form of effective official investigation when individuals have been killed as a result of the use of force by, inter alia, agents of the State’.¹⁴ In *Tanrikulu v. Turkey*, despite insufficient evidence to implicate the Turkish government in a victim’s death, the European

⁸ *Ellacuria v. El Salvador*, Case No. 10 488, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.L/V/II.106, do. 3 rev. (1999).

⁹ *Romero y Galdamez v. El Salvador*, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.L/V/II.106.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, paragraph 146.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, paragraph 148.

¹² *Aksoy v. Turkey*, 26 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2260 (1996); *Mentes v. Turkey*, 59 Eur. Ct. H.R. 2689 (1997).

¹³ *McCann v. United Kingdom*, 324 Eur. Cr. H.R. (1995)

¹⁴ *Ibid.* p. 161

Court said that the duty to investigate was not confined to cases where it had been established that the killing was caused by an agent of the State. The fact that the authorities were informed of the murder established a right to an effective investigation.¹⁵

18. The same interpretation, by which the fundamental right to a remedy includes an entitlement to know the truth, through investigation, appears in the case law of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. In *Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras*, the Inter-American Court held that the State is required to investigate every context involving a violation of the rights enshrined in the American Convention on Human Rights, even if the perpetrator is a private person. The 'effective search for the truth' must be assumed by the State itself and is not dependent on victims' initiatives. The Court also demanded an effective investigation despite the existence of difficult conditions within the country.¹⁶ Even where there are amnesty laws, the Inter-American Court has declared that the State is still obliged to use the means at its disposal to inform the relatives of the fate of the victims, and the location of their remains, if they have been killed.¹⁷
19. The United Nations Human Rights Commission has spoken of this right to an investigation to establish the truth in cases of forced disappearance. According to the Committee, 'state parties should also take specific and effective measures to prevent the disappearance of individuals and establish effective facilities and procedures to investigate thoroughly, by an appropriate and impartial body, cases of missing and disappeared persons in circumstances which may involve a violation of the right to life'.¹⁸ It has also said that complaints of torture and inhuman treatment 'must be investigated promptly and impartially by competent authorities so as to make the remedy effective'.¹⁹

Categories of truth

20. The Commission has had to address different types of truth. The Canadian writer Michael Ignatief, has stated that 'all a Truth Commission can achieve is to reduce the number of lies that can be circulated unchallenged in public discourse. In Argentina, its work has made it impossible to claim, for example that the military did not throw half-dead victims in the sea from helicopters. In Chile, it is no longer permissible to assert in public that the Pinochet regime did not dispatch thousand of entirely innocent people'.²⁰ In South Africa, no one can now claim that the apartheid state was not a criminal state who unleashed violence and death squads on its own citizens who opposed the state and dissented from it.
21. The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which is in many respects the model for so many other similar institutions, including the Commission, dealt in its report with four different kinds of truth: factual or

¹⁵ *Tanrikulu v. Turkey*, 1999-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 459 (1999)

¹⁶ *Velásquez Rodríguez Case*, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., ser. C, no 4, P91 (July 19 1988), available at <http://www.corteidh.or.cr>.

¹⁷ *Barrios Altos Case*, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. Ser. C. no 75P41 (March 14 2001)

¹⁸ *Laureano v. Peru*, U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm. 56th Sess. P8.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/56/D/540/1993 (1996)

¹⁹ *Rodríguez v. Uruguay*, UN. GAOR, Hum. Rts Committee, 51th sess. P12.3, UN Doc.

CCPR/C/51/D/322/1988 (1994).

²⁰ 'Articles of Faith', *Index on Censorship* (5) 1996, p. 113.

forensic truth; personal and narrative truth; social truth; healing and restorative truth. The list is probably not exhaustive.

22. *Factual or forensic truth.* One of South Africa's great human rights jurists, Albie Sachs, has called this 'microscopic truth'. It is akin to a version of events that is accepted after all the facts have been examined and can be supported by evidence. It involves bringing the facts to light. In this respect, the Commission was mandated by legislation to provide an impartial record into the violations and abuses of human rights and humanitarian law that were committed during the conflict. It was provided with robust powers of investigation, including the authority to summon witnesses and compel testimony, and to conduct searches and to take custody of documents and other material evidence.
23. Though not a court in the traditional strict sense, these powers of the Commission are akin to those available to traditional methods of justice, including criminal justice. The Commission used them, although sparingly, because as a general rule Sierra Leoneans were committed to the truth-seeking process and as a result they cooperated fully. But on occasion it was as a result of the threat to use these powers that witnesses appeared before the Commission, that official documents were provided, and that access was gained to premises normally closed to the public and to human rights investigators from NGOs and the United Nations.
24. In this area, the factual findings by the Commission complete a partial portrait of the conflict that has been provided in the past by journalists, by United Nations reports, and by the studies of various individual researchers and NGOs. This is, without doubt, the most thorough account of the conflict that has been produced. It is based on thousands of interviews, independent research, study of documents, and statistical analysis of a comprehensive database. And it is, as the Truth and Reconciliation Act 2000 requires, a truly *independent* account. Fact-finding has been approached empirically, without any preconceived notions about the 'truth' being sought. The approach of the Commission has been to investigate the truth according to an accepted methodology, and then to 'let the chips fall where they may'.
25. *Personal and narrative truth.* This is a witness's personal truth which he or she tells either in a statement or at a hearing. This is what he or she believes and should be respected. Often, the individual accounts did not initially appear to contribute significantly to the more general 'impartial historical record' that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000 requires of the Commission. But over time, the sheer volume of these accounts provided a complex, multi-layered vision of the conflict. This truth is not the history of battles, military leaders and political parties, but rather a series of personal stories and accounts, telling a tale of the suffering, the pain and of the immense dignity of the common people of Sierra Leone. It is, perhaps more than anything else, a vision of the truth that describes the fundamental humanity of the people of this country.
26. The personal and narrative truth which the Commission has endeavoured to capture faithfully is inadequately presented in the present report of the Commission. It is simply impossible, in a document the length of the Commission's report, to provide a fair account of the complexity of the personal truths that make up the story of the conflict. But the materials remain largely available, in the archives of the Commission. Many of them have been transcribed. A full videographic record of the public hearings of the

Commission was taken and can be accessed by the public and researchers. The individual statements that were taken by the Commission have been coded and analysed in a data base to facilitate their consultation. We are confident that these resources will be drawn upon for years, possibly decades and even generations to come.

27. *Social truth.* This may come the closest to what the Truth and Reconciliation Commission is expected to establish. It is the truth established after interaction and dialogue that will be accepted by all after the myths and the lies have been discredited and disproven. In order to determine this 'social truth', the Commission endeavoured to provide a forum where the parties to the conflict, and the various components of civil society, including faith communities, political parties, the country's principal institutions, and various constituencies such as women, youth and children, could come together for debate and exchange. Even informally, out of this process a form of consensus has emerged about the nature of the conflict. The dynamics that were established between the participants in this process may provide a basis for future understanding and relationships.
28. *Healing and restorative truth.* This truth is necessary for the nation to cope with its pain. It is the truth of what happened. It involves an acknowledgement of people's pain and suffering by the nation. There were many opportunities for participants in the conflict to acknowledge the truth of what had happened and, in many cases, what they had themselves done to others. A significant number took full advantage of this opportunity. Their admissions and acknowledgement contribute without doubt to this 'healing and restorative truth'.
29. On occasion after occasion, and often during the public hearings, victims and perpetrators confronted each other, sometimes agreeing and sometimes disagreeing about the 'facts' of their encounters during the conflict. Out of this process a vision of the truth emerged that enables these members of Sierra Leonean society to deal with the past and, in a sense, put it behind them. The 'healing and restorative truth' in many respects, provides the foundation upon which the other wing of the mandate of the Commission, namely the quest for reconciliation can be built.

The relationship between reparation, truth and reconciliation

30. As a consequence of their victimisation, people often find themselves in a condition which is not conducive to forgiveness and reconciliation. The vast majority of them live in abject poverty, some having to endure the loss of limbs and others shunned because of their personal experiences such as rape and sexual slavery. Their dependency and social exclusion are constant reminders of the suffering they have endured. Faced almost on a daily basis by those who have harmed them, it is difficult to find within themselves the capacity to forgive. The humiliation of being dependent on the charity of others and often having to beg in order to live re-victimizes the victims, leaving conditions under which thoughts of revenge fester and grow. A reparations programme will assist those whose lives have been most devastated to move beyond the position they are in currently as a consequence of the war. The cycle of suffering must be broken.

31. One of the objectives of the Commission is to foster reconciliation in the country. A reconciliation which is based on a common understanding of the past and which allows both victims and perpetrators to find the space to live side by side in a spirit of tolerance and respect. Truth and reparation are key components of reconciliation. In most transitional societies, the political realities of the day force compromises on new governments which result in the rights of victims being compromised. Victims are required to forgive and to forgo opportunities to seek redress and punishment for wrongs done to them. They bear the brunt of these political compromises. In such societies truth telling and reparations become even more important.
32. Jose Zalaquett, a member of the Chilean Truth and Reconciliation Commission, has explained this in the following way:

To provide for measures of reparation and prevention, it must be clearly known what should be repaired and prevented. Further, society cannot simply block out a chapter of its history; it cannot deny the facts of its past, however differently these may be interpreted. Inevitably the void would be filled with lies or with conflicting, confusing versions of the past. A nation's unity depends on a shared identity, which in turn depends largely on a shared memory. The truth also brings a measure of healthy social catharsis and helps to prevent the past from reoccurring.²¹
33. If the Commission had not intended to pursue a reparation policy for victims, truth-telling without reparation could conceivably be perceived by the victims to be an incomplete process in which they have revealed their pain and suffering without any mechanism being put in place to deal with the consequences of that pain. Similarly, reparations without truth-telling could be perceived by the beneficiaries as an attempt to buy their silence. Restorative justice requires not only truth telling but reparations which will strengthen the reconciliation process.
34. Reparations are an important instrument to achieving this goal. A sincere commitment from the Government to the execution of the proposed Reparations Programme would give a clear sign to the victims that the State and their fellow citizens are serious in their efforts to re-establish relations of equality and respect.²² Acknowledging the wrongdoing done to victims, engaging with those victimized and disempowered will lead to members of society having a renewed faith in the democratic process. This leads to the restoration of civic trust and a sense of ownership for the nation, attributes necessary if Sierra Leone is to take its rightful place in the community of nations.

²¹ J. Zalaquett, "extract from the Matthew O. Tobriner Lecture. Balancing Ethical Imperatives and Political constraints: The Dilemma of New Democracies Confronting Past Human Rights Violations" 1992, 43 Hastings L.J. 1425, 1433.

²² Pablo De Greiff, "The Role of Reparations in Transition to Democracy", paper written for the International Center for Transitional Justice, New York, pp. 18-21 (forthcoming in "Repairing the Past").

Just war and just means

35. In the course of its work, the Commission frequently encountered those who consider that the justification for the conflict – on all sides - needed to be taken into account in assessing the existence and seriousness of alleged violations of human rights and international humanitarian law principles. For example, the Commission has often been told that the violations and abuses of human rights and humanitarian law for which the Civil Defense Forces (CDF) bears responsibility are in some sense less important than the violations attributable to the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), because the CDF was endeavouring to resist the rebels, a cause perceived by most to be just.
36. This argument is tantamount to saying that because a cause might have been just, the means used to pursue it are irrelevant. In other words, the ends justify the means. But this reasoning is not compatible with the normative framework of the Commission, which is to examine violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law. Violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law can be neither justified nor excused on the grounds that they are in some way responding to violations and abuses by the other side in a conflict.
37. At the outset, it seems important to state that the Commission is not called upon to assess the justness of the conflict itself. It may be argued by some that those who initiated the attempts to overthrow the Momoh regime were justified in taking up arms. The preamble of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* states: 'Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the Rule of Law.' Accordingly, human rights law seems to acknowledge that in extreme conditions, there is a 'right of rebellion'. It does not encourage rebellion, nor does it sanction *coups d'état*. Human rights law assumes that rights will be pursued using legal means and in a rule of law framework. The *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* declares that the will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government, and that it shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections. Governmental change, in principle, is to be effected at the ballot box. Sometimes, however, after long years of dictatorship, this aspiration may seem unlikely or even impossible. The Commission need not determine whether the conditions mentioned in the preamble of the *Universal Declaration of Human Rights* for the right of rebellion were indeed fulfilled. But, as this Report explains elsewhere, there is little doubt that the words 'tyranny' and 'oppression', and the failure to protect human rights by the Rule of Law, were appropriate descriptions of Sierra Leone in March 1991.
38. On the other hand, international human rights law also acknowledges the right of States to restrict and even suspend certain fundamental rights under certain circumstances. The *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, in article 4, allows such suspension '[i]n time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation...' Few would quarrel with the applicability of this provision to the situation in Sierra Leone during the decade-long war. Nevertheless, certain fundamental rights and freedoms cannot be suspended even in time of war. These core rights, which are sacrosanct, include the right to life, the prohibition of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, and the right to protection against discrimination. Many acts committed by the

Government and by forces loyal to it cannot be excused on the grounds that the State was dealing with a public emergency.

39. If human rights law seems to leave a small amount of room for taking into account the justice of the cause being defended by the alleged perpetrator, international humanitarian law is essentially indifferent to the question altogether. International humanitarian law looks at the participants in an armed conflict without regard to whether or not the cause is legitimate. Its only concern is with the legality of the means and methods of warfare, and with the protection of vulnerable groups, especially civilians. Whether we are speaking of rebels or pro-Government forces, neither side can invoke the alleged justice of its cause as a defence to inhuman acts perpetrated by its combatants and collaborators.
40. The Commission need not examine the justness of the rebellion to overthrow the government in 1991, in order to fulfil its mandate, which is to address violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law. Nor does it consider that those who fought to defend a democratically elected regime, from 1996 onwards were justified in using any means necessary to ensure that those chosen by the people actually governed the country.
41. Finally, a word should be said about the impermissibility of reprisals. Reprisals are undertaken in order to punish those who breach the rules of humanitarian law during armed conflict. In the past, international humanitarian law may have tolerated reprisals, but the permissibility has been constantly restricted over the years. It is now well established that under no circumstances may reprisals be committed against civilians, or against combatants who have laid down their arms and been taken prisoner. Even if they may be allowed *among* genuine combatants, they can only be used to the strict extent necessary, in order to compel the other side to stop its violations of the laws of armed conflict.

Victims

42. The Commission adopts the definition of a victim that is now generally accepted in international law,

A person is a 'victim' where as a result of acts or omissions that constitute a violation of international human rights and humanitarian law norms, that person, individually or collectively, suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss, or impairment of that person's fundamental legal rights. A 'victim' may also be a dependant or a member of the immediate family or household of the direct victim as well as a person who, in intervening to assist a victim or prevent the occurrence of further violations, has suffered physical, mental or economic harm.²³

²³ The right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, Final report of the Special Rapporteur, Mr. M. Cherif Bassiouni, submitted in accordance with Commission resolution 1999/33, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/62, para. 8.

Perpetrators

43. The term 'perpetrator' is widely used in international human rights law to describe individuals who are responsible for violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. Accordingly, the United Nation's Sub-Commission on the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights, in mandating Louis Joinet to examine the question of impunity, spoke of the 'Question of the impunity of perpetrators of human rights violations'.²⁴ A distinction is made here with the State itself, which is also responsible for human rights violations under international law.
44. Historically, human rights law addressed itself essentially to violations committed by the State. The rights of the individual were viewed in this context. The development of the concept of 'perpetrators' indicates a desire to focus on individuals who bear personal responsibility for human rights violations and abuses.
45. Perpetrators may be public officials or members of quasi-governmental or private armed groups with any kind of link to the State, or of non-governmental armed movements having the status of belligerents. Perpetrators may be the direct offenders, or they may be accomplices. Often, the accomplice is actually the person with greater responsibility for violations, because it is the accomplice who, from a leadership position, directs and encourages the violations, even if he or she does not personally commit the atrocity. At the same time, the fact that the perpetrator of violations acted on the orders of his Government or of a superior does not exempt him or her from criminal or other responsibility.

²⁴

UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1997/20/Rev.1.

CHAPTER FOUR

Management and
Operational Report

TRC

**Save
Sierra Leone
From
another war.
Reconcile now,
the TRC
Can help**

Produced by the TRC Steering Committee with support
from the International Human Rights Law Group

CHAPTER FOUR

Management and Operational Report

1. Section 7 of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000 outlined the methods the Commission should use to realise its objectives. They include the following:

Undertaking investigations and research into key events, causes, patterns of abuse or violation and the parties responsible;

Holding sessions, some of which may be public, to hear from the victims and perpetrators of any abuses or violations or from other interested parties; and

Taking individual statements and gathering additional information with regard to the matters being investigated or researched.

2. The Act provided for an operational period of twelve months within which the Commission was to achieve its objectives, with the possibility of a six months extension.
3. This chapter will review the management of these operations by the Commission, after the dissolution of the Interim Secretariat, from the statement taking (December 2002 to March 2003), investigations and hearings (April to August 2003) to the report writing (August 2003 to March 2004) and will outline the challenges faced by the Commission and the lessons learned.

The Operational Plan

4. The Project Document on the Commission, prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Geneva, envisaged an operational period of three major phases, namely: deployment, investigation and reporting, each lasting for four months. The staff requirements of the Commission were to be calibrated with the specific requirements of each operational period. The Commission was to retain a core staff of 28 while another 70 were to be recruited on short-term basis, not exceeding 6 months, depending on need.
5. According to the project document, during the deployment stage, the Commission would send staff to various localities to collect information and to review already existing testimonies. The Commission deployed 14 teams of 5 persons each to the 12 districts and 2 teams to the Western Area (which was split into Freetown East and West respectively) to collect information. The work of the teams were coordinated by regional coordinators based in each of the regional headquarter towns. Activities during this phase included the public dissemination of information on the mandate, organisation and basic structure of the Commission, from the village through to the chiefdom, district and national levels, collection and revisiting of testimonies from field investigation, collecting and collating information.

6. During the investigation stage, the project document envisaged the conduct of in-depth investigations, analysis and systematisation of the information with a view to verifying their authenticity. This would include detailed investigations of testimonies and cross checking information on human rights abuse and violations. Once the district teams had received voluntary statements, reviewed testimonies, investigations would be carried out to authenticate the violations and abuses. The Commission was also to identify and investigate the “window” or representative cases that would form the bedrock of the report. Other activities envisaged during this phase would include public hearings, reconciliation procedures and identification of the main elements of the final report.
7. The project document proposed that during the reporting stage (divided into systematisation and analysis; and final report stages), the Commission would start finalizing the content of the report, reviewing its consistency, drafting its conclusions and recommendations, organizing its archives, classifying documentation in accordance with the mandate and preparing for the presentation of the Report to the President of Sierra Leone. The systemisation and analysis stages were to require substantial interpretative and advocacy work, necessitating the creation of thematic teams to prepare the final report. Reconciliation activities were to take place at all stages of the work of the Commission, and range from local ward, village and town activities to national programmes. At the final Report writing stage, a much smaller team would be required to assist the Commissioners in reviewing the consistency of the Report, drafting its conclusions, classifying documentation in accordance with the mandate etc.
8. The Secretariat of the Commission was to function in a decentralized manner, with a network of offices at the 13 operational districts, coordinated and linked to the headquarters in Freetown through the regional offices in the Northern, Eastern and Southern provinces. The district offices were to be based in already existing offices of NGOs, consistent with the policy thrust of the Commission to support and link up with existing local structures.
9. An operational plan was developed providing for the commencement of statement taking on 4 December 2002 to 31 March 2003, while investigations and hearings would commence on 7 April 2003. The report writing would start on 1 August and would be completed before the end of the twelve months life span on 3 October 2003. The Report would then be submitted to the President of Sierra Leone later in October 2003.

Statement Taking

10. The Commission had to recruit, train and deploy 73 statement takers within a three-week deadline so that statement taking could start on 4 December 2002. The process for recruiting and training the statement takers has already been discussed elsewhere in this Report.¹

¹ See Chapter 5 of this Report: Methodology and Process

11. The training programmes were conducted in Kenema and Freetown. A major constraint was time. The Commission approved the revised operational plan on 12 November 2002. The statement taking positions had to be advertised, applicants interviewed and recruited. There was therefore only a three-week period between recruitment, training of the statement takers and their deployment.
12. The Commission faced four key challenges during the pilot phase of the statement taking. The first was the lack of staff. The two international staff members were supported by an administration and logistics officer, an accounts officer and an office assistant to supervise the 73 statement takers. The staff had to assume multiple roles to get the statement taking off the ground.
13. The second challenge facing the statement taking process was funding. UNDP was the clearinghouse for disbursing funds to the Commission and it was charged with ensuring that disbursements were in accordance with UN procurement procedures. While this process is suitable for ongoing UN programmes, it was problematic for a short-term intervention such as a truth commission, where funding needs could not be predicted with certainty. Matters were complicated by the fact that until April 2003 minor purchases had to be approved by UNDP. Delays occurred frequently in the release of funds and affected many of the activities that were scheduled to take place.
14. The third challenge was the recruitment of statement takers. Guidelines had been established for their recruitment. The Commission did not have the luxury of time to engage in an elaborate recruitment process. During the consultations the Commissioners had in all the districts between September and November 2002, the people had wanted assurances that the Commission would emphasise local ownership and participation through recruiting people to work in their respective communities. They believed that this would give confidence to prospective statement givers that those who would take their statements had the requisite sensitivity to customs and local mores. The project document on the Commission had stipulated that statement takers be recruited from NGOs and civil society organisations in the respective districts.
15. As provided for in the project proposal, the Commission relied largely on NGOs which were members of the Human Rights Committee established by UNAMSIL. It also relied on the UNAMSIL Human Rights Officers in the districts to make recommendations of potential candidates. The Commission recruited most of the statement takers who had worked for the Campaign for Good Governance in the "Mapping Project"² and some of those who participated in the research project on the conflict.³ Because of the limited time for training, the Commission conducted follow up training programmes to deal with lapses in performance.

² The preliminary investigation into the human rights abuses and violations that occurred in the conflict commissioned by OHCHR

³ Research project into the "Antecedents of the Rebel War in Sierra Leone", University Research Bureau, University of Sierra Leone" July 2002.

16. Finally, the Commission encountered tremendous logistical constraints. The Commission had contracted a car rental company to provide four wheel drive vehicles for the statement takers in the districts. Each district team reported problems with the vehicles or the drivers assigned to them. Due to the frequency of breakdowns, the Commission terminated the vehicle hire contract and diversified the range of suppliers. Items such as audio recorders and tapes were difficult to come by. The Commission was unable to procure digital video cameras for the use of the statement takers until the last month of statement taking.
17. These challenges persisted to certain degrees throughout the statement taking phase of activities. New and permanent staff began to arrive from early February, well into the statement taking exercise.
18. The Commission could not ignore the thousands of Sierra Leoneans outside the country in the statement taking exercise. It partnered with the UNHCHR in arranging for visits to refugees camps and other locations within the sub region by Commissioners and staff. UNHCR facilitated a visit to the refugee camps in Guinea by a commissioner and one staff member. This sensitisation visit was followed by the deployment of a statement taker in Guinea. The statement taker trained some of the refugees in statement taking, and together with them, took statements from many of the refugees. UNHCR paid all the accommodation and local travel costs of the statement taker.
19. The Commission attempted to partner with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Freetown in reaching out to Sierra Leoneans in different parts of the world, especially those in Europe and North America. The Commission had placed the statement taking protocol in a private website popular to Sierra Leoneans – www.sierra-leone.org. Sierra Leoneans could visit the site, and download the statement. After filling the form he/she was then required to send it to the nearest Sierra Leonean high commission or embassy, which would then send it to the commission under diplomatic cover, to ensure that the confidentiality requirements were complied with. Regrettably, the Commission did not receive a single statement through this process.
20. The Commission sent missions to countries in West Africa to interact with Sierra Leoneans and encourage them to make statements. It relied on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to liaise with the respective host ministries and make facilities available to the Commission upon arrival. Regrettably the Ministry failed to notify the Sierra Leonean missions in these countries about the arrival of the Commissioners. The teams were forced to make their own local travel and other arrangements upon arrival.
21. The Commission had made adequate preparations for the security of the statement takers, including having the police service designate a liaison officer who could be contacted at any time of the day. Statement takers liaised with the police divisions in all the communities they visited. Apart from isolated cases of threats made by a few uniformed soldiers in the Eastern part of Freetown, the statement taking was conducted without incident. The chiefs and community elders were very cooperative and some of them mobilised their community members to make statements to the Commission.

22. There was limited storage space within the Commission's offices. Statements were locked up in safes and drawers pending the establishment of a database for the Commission. The coding and entry of the statements into the database continued well into the report writing phase. The Commission had to rely on the entries in the statement taking forms as most statement takers were unable to transcribe the audiotapes of their statements. Hundreds of hours of audiotapes remain waiting to be transcribed. This shortcoming seriously impacted on the ability of the researchers, investigators and report drafters to complete their tasks.
23. The database was not established until well into the statement taking exercise. This late start meant that much of the statement taking process was denied the benefits of informed feedback from the ongoing analysis of the information.

Recruitment of Staff

24. This was a problematic process for the Commission. The process of recruitment which began in November 2002 was concluded in February 2003. The recruitment was concluded with the hiring of a new executive secretary in mid February 2003. A lesson learnt from the recruitment exercise was the importance of personal interviews. Some people spoke quite well at their telephone interviews but turned out to be unsuitable for the position. A key lesson is the need to conclude the hiring of the key staff before operational activities begin.
25. The Commission did not move into its permanent offices until February 2003, one month before the end of statement taking. Most of the staff that had been recruited had no offices or equipment. They had to share computers and other office facilities.

Investigations

26. The "Mapping Report" was to serve as preliminary identification of key investigation activities for the Commission. The report was concluded in July 2002. There was not a single investigator in the employment of the Commission at that time, and up till February 2003. With the revision of the operational plan in November 2002, the investigation objectives also had to be revised. It was no longer feasible to investigate as many of the individual cases for corroboration. Furthermore, not all of the window cases would be investigated.
27. Ordinarily, investigations would be a prelude to the hearings, enabling the Commission to unearth all necessary information and materials as would make the hearings meaningful. With a revised operational plan that had specific time frames for all activities, this was no longer feasible. The investigators were only recruited in March 2003. It was not possible to tie investigations to the hearings. The investigations would simply feed into the research and underpin the report writing, especially in relation to accountability and responsibility for the violations.

28. There were to have been two international investigators. Only one had been recruited by February 2003. The post of second investigator was scrapped due to funding constraints.
29. The investigators encountered logistical constraints. They had no computers until late in April 2003. It was difficult to find vehicles that could endure the road conditions for a sustained period of time. A vehicle breakdown would mean sending a repair team from Freetown or a second vehicle while another team would leave for the provinces to retrieve the first one. This impacted on the time for the completion of scheduled investigations.
30. Some of the investigations required travel outside Sierra Leone, to Liberia, Nigeria and Guinea to investigate the roles of the NPFL and the Nigerian armed forces, and the Guinean connection to illegal arms trade with the RUF during the conflict. However there were no resources to send investigators outside the country and the plans were shelved.
31. There was some reluctance on the part of some witnesses in cooperating with the Commission's investigators. This was most notable in the Southern and Eastern provinces, the heartland of the Kamajor militia. Many people took offence that the Commission was asking questions about the movement, when they claimed they had defended democracy. Many refused to cooperate with the investigators and during the hearings would not answer questions about the internal management and operations of the Kamajors.
32. There were seven investigators in all including the head of the sub-unit. While the TRC Act did not require the Commission to investigate each statement made by a statement giver for purposes of determining their qualification for compensation or for any other remedy, the Commission would have benefited with more investigators. One option not explored by the Commission was reaching out to supporting governments, who could have seconded investigators to the Commission at the cost of the home governments. This would have allowed the commission to conclude its work within the time available while developing the skills base of the Sierra Leonean colleagues.

Research

33. Research was conducted simultaneously with investigations. Researchers were recruited in February 2003 while the head of the sub-unit arrived the following month. The first task the team faced was to prepare for the hearings. This included selection of witnesses for hearings, locating of witnesses, arranging to have them present during the hearings, and having counsellors brief them about what to expect. These activities took the whole of March and April 2003. The team also had to prepare briefing notes for the Commissioners and staff participating in the hearings.
34. The database developed by the Commission to capture statements about violations and abuses proved inadequate for purposes of hearings. Using the selection criteria for hearings already discussed in this report,⁴ the team had to

⁴ See the chapter on Methodology and Process in this Volume

develop summaries of the testimonies provided by the statement givers. It was also necessary to provide the alleged perpetrators with an opportunity to tell their own stories, and where they wished and the victims were willing, to meet with the victims and pursue options for reconciliation.

35. The hearings team developed a mini database to capture the selected statements for hearings. This meant that the team had to manually trawl through the thousands of statements using the selection criteria to identify statements suitable for hearings. These were then entered into the mini database, and efforts made to contact the statement givers. While databases are established to capture “who did what to whom, when, where, why and how,” they could certainly do more. If the database used by the Commission had a bigger section for narratives and captured those well, and the design of the forms for capturing the statistics had allowed for the inclusion of human interest angles and not just numbers and statistics, the Commission would have been able to quickly identify and select cases for hearings and saved a lot of time in addition.
36. In May 2003, the Commission organised the first research conference where the thematic themes were created and researchers assigned specific research topics. Further research conferences took place after the hearings in August and September 2003 with the participation of the Commissioners. The amount of information collected during the statement taking and from other sources was enormous. With only eight researchers, it became obvious that the October deadline for the submission of the report to the president of Sierra Leone was overly ambitious.

Hearings

37. The commencement of hearings had to be postponed by one week to 14 April 2003 to allow the Commission to make adequate logistical arrangements. The first challenge the Commission faced was to receive submissions from institutions, organisations and members of the public. As early as December 2002, the Commission had written to a select group of people from diverse institutions and backgrounds seeking submissions. From March 2003 that the first submissions began trickling in.
38. Many role-players invited to hearings did not appear or request a re-scheduling of their appearances, despite being notified well in advance of the dates and times for the hearings. The Commission had to issue subpoenas against five serving ministers and leaders of government institutions, including the Attorney General, and the chairman and secretary of the ruling political party. All this happened despite the president’s public admonition to all public officials at the commencement of hearings to cooperate with the Commission, and in spite of the fact that the TRC Act made it mandatory for all public institutions to respond to the Commission’s summons. The former head of state, Capt. Valentine Strasser who had ignored the Commission’s invitation on several occasions was also subpoenaed and compelled to testify.
39. The Commission made every effort to have the broadest possible representation at the hearings, in particular at the thematic, event specific and institutional hearings. Only the SLPP and the APC participated in all the

hearings to which political parties were invited. Although the RUPF had suffered institutional collapse, Secretary General, Mr. Jonathan Kposowa did attend and make submissions at some of the hearings.

40. Up until the hearings, the Commission did not have any equipment in its Media and Public Education Unit. The Commission had been hiring media equipment for all its public activities. For the hearings, the Commission had to procure its own equipment to minimise the cost and ensure that the right type of equipment were always available. The equipment enabled the Commission to partner with the state and private media to broadcast its hearings live, both in Freetown and in the districts via radio stations. The State television service, SLBS broadcasted a forty five minute summary of the day's proceedings each evening.
41. In the Commission's view, most of its activities were not sufficiently covered by the state media, particularly during the preparatory phase and early in the operational phase of activities. Scores of video tapes lie at the Commission's offices unaired by the state television service, which is the only TV station in the country.
42. The operational plan provided for daily hearings in Freetown for the first two weeks and then alternate weekly hearings in Freetown on thematic issues with weekly hearings in the districts. The Commissioners split up into two groups for purposes of hearings in the districts so that two district hearings could take place simultaneously. Each team departed Freetown on a Sunday for a district and spent the next five days conducting hearings in the district. The team would return to Freetown the following Saturday for another week of hearings in the city starting on the Monday.
43. There were a number of constraints to organising hearings in the districts. Hearings could only take place at district headquarters despite the commission's desire to conduct hearings in as many communities as possible, in particular, in those communities that suffered greatly during the conflict. In many of the communities, the infrastructure that could support the hearings such as community halls or school buildings had been destroyed. Accommodation facilities for the Commissioners and staff were also not available and opportunities for catering and other services such as water supply were minimal.
44. In the districts, the Commission used school halls, community and faith based facilities for the public hearings. Apart from the provincial capitals, there were limited hotel facilities in the districts. The paramount chiefs, traditional leaders, officers of government including the provincial ministers and UNAMSIL assisted the Commission in providing accommodation facilities. Many of them made their homes available to the Commissioners and staff at no cost. The military contingents, in particular, the Pakistani and the Nigerian contingents in many of the districts were generous in providing sleeping tents and catering facilities within their camps for the Commissioners and staff.
45. There was a staff support complement of 25 people for each hearings team. The Commissioners had to travel with all the facilities they would need as these

could not be obtained in the districts. They included bottled water, tables, chairs, lights, batteries, printers and generators.

46. Accessing witnesses proved problematic both in Freetown and in the provinces. Many of the witnesses had changed addresses. Some of them gave their statements when they were still displaced from their homes. Some had returned to their home communities or moved on. Others no longer wished to testify. Some were afraid that there could be repercussions to their testimony such as retaliation. The Commission was engaged in a daily process of seeking and replacing witnesses and looking for new ones.
47. Even where the witnesses were willing, bringing them to the hearings venue was another challenge. In Freetown, this was relatively easy. In the provinces, some of the witnesses lived eighty or more miles away from the district headquarters. Because the Commission arrived at the district usually a day before the commencement of hearings, it was not possible to bring the witnesses there earlier.
48. The terrain in most of the districts is rugged, made worse by the impassability of the roads due to several years of neglect occasioned by the war. On many occasions, vehicles sent out to bring witnesses broke down on the way. On occasion, the Commission had to abandon broken down vehicles in the districts because repair facilities could only be obtained in Freetown or at the provincial headquarter towns. Communication with the Commission headquarters in Freetown was impossible because most of the districts did not have telephone services.
49. Public attendance at the hearings in Freetown was poor. Apart from the opening ceremony and the hearings of high profile persons, attendance was low. It is possible that the live broadcast of the hearings on radio made attendance unnecessary for a majority of the people. The hearings recorded full houses when the Commission conducted public hearings on women and children. The Commission's appreciation goes to the members of its research staff on women and children, and to UNICEF, UNIFEM, the CFN, Voice of Children's Radio, the CPAs and other agencies which came together to make those hearings memorable.
50. Public attendance at the district hearings was significantly higher. In most of the districts, hundreds of people attended the hearings. The average daily attendance was more than 100 people. In districts with broadcast facilities, people showed up at the hearing venues clutching their radio sets to their ears, listening to the live broadcast and at the same time, being direct participants in the proceedings unfolding before them.
51. The hearings programme was a very punishing schedule that allowed the Commissioners very little time to review their notes and make full preparations for the hearings. It was embarked upon because the Commission was still uncertain that it would find the funding for an extension of its time frame. It therefore raced to complete everything before October 2003.

The Memorandum of Understanding and the Joint Implementation Committee

52. To formalise the support of the international community to the Commission, especially in relation to the management of the funds and for the provision of other support by UN agencies in Sierra Leone, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was entered into between the Commission, the Government of Sierra Leone, OHCHR, UNDP and UNAMSIL. The MoU outlined responsibilities of the each of the signatories.
53. The Government of Sierra Leone would assist the Commission in acquiring offices as appropriate in Freetown and in the three regional headquarters. The Government was required to do all within its powers to facilitate the operations and functioning of the Commission and to allocate funds for its operations. The government provided office accommodation for the Commission in Freetown and the funds for the renovation of the premises. After the grant of a six month extension to the Commission, the government provided funding to pay the salaries of Sierra Leonean Commissioners and national staff members to enable them to archive the Commission's materials.
54. UNAMSIL was required to facilitate the movement and transportation of Commissioners and staff on scheduled helicopter flights on space availability basis. OHCHR was required to provide technical assistance to the Commission and assist it in the raising of funds to support its activities and operations.
55. The MoU provided that the funds raised by OHCHR shall be transferred to UNDP Freetown to be utilised for the sole purpose of meeting the costs of the Commission as set out in the project document and the costs of support services. UNDP Freetown would in accordance with the United Nations Financial Regulations and Rules administer the funds. All procurement arrangements were to be entered into in accordance with the provisions of such regulations and rules.
56. OHCHR's monitoring of its funding under the MoU would be effected through a local Joint Implementation Committee comprising of three representatives from the local donor community of UN Members States, one representative each from UNAMSIL, UNDP and OHCHR. The Committee was to be established in Freetown to ensure that the funds were utilised exclusively for the purposes of the Commission.
57. The Joint Implementation Committee was to meet once every three months to assess the status of implementation of the activities and to review the narrative and financial report for submission to OHCHR. The Joint Implementation Committee could not be constituted until July 2003 when it held its first meeting. After that meeting, no further meetings were held until the Commission completed its work
58. Finally, UNDP in addition to its assistance in the financial management was to provide technical support to the Commission in staff recruitment, placement and grading. Following this provision, all Commissioners and staff were issues with Special Service Agreement contracts by UNDP.

Report Writing

59. One of the challenges the Commission grappled with was whether it should publish a brief report of about 200 pages so as to meet the timeframe for the completion of its work. The Commission concluded that it would be doing injustice to its mandate and the people of Sierra Leone if it published a brief report. In the first place, most of the issues at the root of Sierra Leone's decline and which led to the conflict could not be thoroughly examined in a report of such length. Furthermore, Sierra Leone was still a divided country which required a thorough examination of the issues.
60. The Commission acknowledged that a commitment to canvassing all the issues in the report would require time. This would necessitate an extension of the time frame for the Commission. The Commission also needed to make up for the six months it lost during its start up phase. The government granted the Commission a six months extension commencing from October 2003.
61. While drafts of the various themes constituting the report had been produced by the end of December 2003, they were not in a publishable state. The Commission and OHCHR agreed on a remedial measure which would spill over into the New Year. A Report Rewriting Committee was established in January 2004 composed of the Head of the Information Management Unit and four other consultants, to rewrite the entire report.
62. It was further agreed that the Commission as a formal body would be wound up on 31st December 2003. All the remaining staff members of the Commission would be disengaged except essential staff to assist the consultants in rewriting the report. The Rewriting Committee would work on the drafts of the report and present a re-written report for the consideration and approval of the Commissioners in the New Year.
63. The consideration and approval of the report began on 1st March 2004 and was concluded on the 17th of the month. Early on, the Commissioners strove for consensus on the report. While there were sharp disagreements on a number of issues, the final report is the product of consensus building among commissioners.

Concluding Activities of the Commission

64. The concluding activities of the Commission included work on archiving its materials, conducting an audit of its financial management and the printing and dissemination of the report. The Commission had hired the services of a team of consultants from the University of Sierra Leone to archive the materials it had acquired. OHCHR had pledged to support the process by recruiting a consultant to assist in digitising the materials. While the materials have been archived, and are presently housed at the University of Sierra Leone on an interim basis pending the establishment of the Human Rights Commission, the final custodian of all the materials, the digitising is yet to take place. Digitising will help to protect the materials and prevent wear and tear. The Commission hopes that the materials will be digitised within the shortest possible time.

65. In accordance with the MoU, that an audit of the Commission's financial management be conducted before the conclusion of its activities, the Commission hired the firm of KPMG to conduct an audit inquiry from the establishment of the Interim Secretariat on 1st April 2002 to the winding up of its administrative structure on 31st December 2003.
66. The auditors raised a number of queries for the response of the Commissioners.⁵ It found the management of the Commission lax in complying with the procedures on a range of issues including procurement, recruitment and financial reporting. Its conclusions were that there was poor supervision of the financial management by the Commissioners.
67. The printing of the report was the final activity that engaged the Commission before it concluded its work. A number of options had been explored including printing the report in Europe, South Africa and Nigeria. The Commission settled for Ghana.
68. The Commission was remiss in not establishing a website. While the Commission had hired an IT manager who had designed a website for the Commission, the establishment of the website was not concluded before his services were terminated. Negotiations were subsequently begun with the Open Society Institute for West Africa (OSIWA) towards establishing a website for the Commission. OSIWA would recruit a consultant who would maintain the site pending final handover of the site to the Human Rights Commission.
69. The Commission was further remiss in not concluding arrangements for the dissemination for its report. Civil society partners of the Commission had been engaged in long term planning on disseminating the report. In partnership with the Human Rights Section of UNAMSIL a number of preliminary meetings had taken place to outline a dissemination strategy and plan. UNICEF also wished to use the report as an advocacy tool for its programmes and had engaged in meetings with staff of the Commission on the plans for the dissemination of the report. The Commission however failed to accept or support the offers of dissemination made by such groups and as a result no arrangements for dissemination were in place at the time of the report's publication.
70. The NGO WITNESS which received independent funding to produce the video version of the report, created a dissemination fund to assist civil society in Sierra Leone disseminate the video report. The fund includes support for TV and VCR sets and broadcast equipment so that the NGOs can engage in public education activities throughout the country. The Commission accepted an offer by WITNESS to piggyback the report dissemination on the back of the video distribution.

⁵ The audit report is attached as an appendix to this chapter of the report.

FINANCIAL REPORT

71. The preliminary budget on the Commission was \$9,998,091 million. It was produced in February 2002 by OHCHR with input from the Budget and Human Rights sections of UNAMSIL. The budget was a provisional one that was to be considered and modified where necessary by the Commissioners.
72. An appeal was launched by the High Commissioner for Human Rights on the 21st February 2002. The possible six month extension of the Commission was not considered in the preparation of the budgetary estimates. In its resolution 1370 (2001) of 18 September 2001 and 1400 (2002) of 28 March 2002, the Security Council had urged donors to commit funds to the Commission. The Commission on Human Rights had also requested assistance to the truth and reconciliation process in Sierra Leone in its resolution 2002/20 adopted at its 58th session. These calls were reiterated by a Presidential Statement issued by the Security Council after its informal consultations on Sierra Leone on 22 May 2002 in which the Council urged donors to contribute generously and provide urgently needed funds to the Commission.
73. Following the appeal, an informal donors briefing was organised by OHCHR on the 25th February 2002. The majority of the donors in attendance displayed a keen interest in the activities of the Commission despite concerns about the limited time available to implement a large number of activities. However no firm commitments were received from the donors.
74. Another donors briefing was organised by OHCHR on 5th June 2002. The donors strongly urged a reconfiguration of the budget with indications of what could be done with minimal funds. The general consensus among the donors was that the budget was over ambitious. They recommended a revision of the budget since it was unlikely that OHCHR would raise the US\$ 9.9 million required under the budget. As at that date, only the United Kingdom had made available some funds for activities related to the Commission, amounting to US\$ 502,873. Other donors indicated their interest in contributing, but had not made pledges in writing. This was one month prior to the launch of the Commission.
75. The Commission revised the budget to \$6,587,668.00. The budget was realigned to meet the operational exigencies at that time. Despite the revision of the budget in 2003, pledges received amounted to only US\$ 3.7 million by the middle of the year. In his appeal, the High Commissioner lamented that the continued operations of the Commission required that donors respond to its funding requirements.

Highlights of the revised budget

76. Considerable efforts were made to reduce the budgetary requirements of the Commission whilst at the same time maintaining a credible proposal which reflected the minimum requirements for an optimal and effective Commission. Changes were made in a number of areas.

Composition of staff

77. Reductions were made in the total number of staff from 135 to 98 (that is, 18 international and 80 national staff) and in the number of full-time staff. This brought down the total staff costs to US\$ 3,131,766 from US\$ 5,958,183. These reductions impacted on travel, recruitment, health insurance, office space and communication equipment.
78. The initial requirements for 188 field staff for four months was substituted with a proposal for 74 field staff to be sub-contracted through local NGOs to assist with data collection and collation. The remuneration for the staff during the period of their work was provided by the Commission and the concerned NGOs on a cost-sharing basis. The cost-sharing arrangement not only reduced costs but also provided for the training and skill development of staff affiliated to local groups.
79. The initial provision of consultants to allow the Commission to recruit expertise in specialized areas where it may be deficient was eliminated. The proposed cumulative remuneration for local staff was reduced to 38% (US\$ 1,160,798) of the original estimate (US\$ 3,084,050) through a reduction in salaries. The initial salary estimate based on the local consultancy scale was substituted with the common salary scale for local staff developed by UNDP Freetown.

Operational structure of the Commission

80. The operational units of the Commission were reduced by merging the legal and reconciliation units and submerging the research and investigation units as sub-units under a new information management unit (IMU). The IMU would be responsible for organising and implementing the process of collecting, collating and analysing information. In the revised format, instead of six operational units there would be four such units (i.e. administration and programming; public information and education; legal and reconciliation; and information management).

Subcontract services

81. The cost of rental, maintenance and utilities for premises was reduced by eliminating the provision for rental of a villa for Commissioners and three provincial offices since the Government was expected to provide these facilities. The cost of rental of vehicles increased to cover the expenses incurred during the deployment phase and due to the reduction in the number of vehicles to be purchased.
82. The cost of contractual services increased because an additional provision was made for forensic investigation (US\$ 30,000), security of documents and protection including communication software with encryption capabilities, information backup devices and information technology security expertise. The provision for forensic expertise will provide the Commission with the required expertise to follow-up on the recommendations of a forensic team commissioned by OHCHR to conduct a preliminary assessment of mass graves and execution sites in Sierra Leone.

83. Public information production costs increased due to the inclusion of expenses relating to the maintenance of portable recorders and satellite receivers to be used during the public sittings of the Commission.

Seminars

84. An additional provision of US\$ 14,000 was made for seminars during the preparatory period to support strategic planning, policy development and capacity building workshops for staff of the Commission and their implementing partners in crucial areas such as research methods, data analysis, investigation methods, information verification, gender sensitivity and psycho-social and other support structures. These activities were not carried out because of the administrative crisis in the Commission.

Procurement

85. With a reduction in the number of staff, the procurement requirements were cut in terms of the number of vehicles, office equipment, data processing and communications equipment and miscellaneous equipment and generators. The number of vehicles was reduced by two thirds bringing the total cost to US\$ 178,825 from US\$ 428,950. UNAMSIL made available to the Commission the use of its shuttle, taxi-despatch and scheduled helicopter services to the Commission at no additional costs.
86. Equipment maintenance, spare parts, supplies and communications increased because of the inclusion of the costs for mobile telephone services to augment the existing and largely inefficient fixed-net telephone services.

Miscellaneous

87. The provision for miscellaneous services increased because the budgeted adopted a 5 per cent flat rate of total expenses in addition to staff medical costs and bank charges as opposed to the previous fixed miscellaneous rate of US\$ 100,000 in addition to other costs including bank charges, medical costs and official hospitality.

The statutory preparatory period

88. An additional provision was made for the sum of US\$ 297,654 to support the operational requirements of the Commission during the statutory preparatory period. This provision deviated from the earlier proposal which provided for personnel only on the assumption that most of the work of the Commission during this period would be in its Freetown office. The additional provision responded to the objectives of the Commission to immediately commence implementation of its policies and anticipate some of its future activities.
89. The budget suffered one more revision in 2003 to \$4,167,033 for its operational activities. Many of the activities proposed in the amended budget could not be implemented. The activities had to be redesigned to meet the funding available.

Conclusion

90. The planning of the budget of the Commission was on the optimistic expectation that the international community would provide the funding required for all activities. This proved to be an unrealistic expectation. The final budget was a bare bones budget. The Commission struggled to implement its activities as a result of inadequacy of funding and because of delays experienced in the releasing of funds. Nonetheless the Commission is satisfied that it was able to carry out important activities such as statement taking, public hearings, research and investigations which enabled it to deliver a credible final report to the people of Sierra Leone. This was accomplished largely due to the dedication and tireless efforts of the staff and Commissioners.

APPENDEXES

APPENDIX ONE: DONORS TO THE COMMISSION

1. Canada
2. European Commission
3. France
4. Germany
5. Ireland
6. Luxembourg
7. Netherlands
8. Norway
9. Sweden
10. Switzerland
11. United kingdom
12. United States of America

APPENDIX TWO: THE AUDIT REPORT



*The Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Financial and Systems Audit
for the twenty-one months period ended 31 December 2003*

I. Introduction and Terms of Reference

Introduction and Background

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was established by an Act of Parliament on 2 March 2000 after a decade of armed conflicts in Sierra Leone, and the Lomé Peace Agreement on July 7 1999. The Lomé Agreement was part of the other mechanisms put in place for the consolidation of peace in Sierra Leone. The Commission started an interim phase in February and March 2002 and then entered into a preparatory period in June 2002 and an operational period which was to start in October of the same year but which actually commenced in March 2003.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission had the mandate to create an impartial historical record of violations of human rights and humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, to address impurity; to respond to the needs of victims; to promote healing and reconciliation and to prevent a repetition of the violation and abuses suffered.

The Commission is funded by Donor countries through appeals made by the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and also received a Grant of about Le 428 million from the Government of Sierra Leone.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission is an independent organisation comprised of seven Commissioners (four Sierra Leoneans and three foreign nationals), who are responsible for overseeing a work force of approximately sixty (60) permanent staff and forty five (45) temporary contract workers. All but 14 of the staff are nationals of Sierra Leone.

The Commission's operational period started on 5 October 2002 and is scheduled to end on 4 October 2003, however the act allows a six months extension in the event that the Commission needs more time to conduct its affairs. The Commission is also expected to submit a final report of its work to the President of the Government of Sierra Leone, at the end of its operations.

Terms of Reference

Our terms of reference were discussed at the start of the engagement and the following were interpreted to be the key requirements of the audit:

- to audit the enterprise in accordance with International Auditing Standards so as to express an opinion on the financial affairs of the Commission.

To ascertain that:

- the accounts and financial statements have been kept and prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles;



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- the accounts are in compliance with Part IV of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act;
- to recommend for disallowance of any item of expenditure which is contrary to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act;
- to confirm that expenditure is incurred with regard to economy, efficiency and effectiveness;
- to ascertain that all the assets of the company have been taken on charge and properly safeguarded;
- to submit the audit report i.e. management letter and audit opinion to the Government and other contributors to the fund of the Commission.



2. Methodology

We conducted a financial and systems audit of the Commission's financial affairs for the twenty one months ended 31 December 2003, in two visits, one visit in July/August 2003 and the final visit in December 2003 / January 2004. The audit was carried out in accordance with International Standards on Auditing. Those standards require that we:

- plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable assurance about whether the financial statements are free from material misstatement;
- examine on a test basis evidence supporting the amounts and disclosures used and estimates made by the secretariat management;
- review internal controls and the control environment within which the management operates.

The following individual components of internal control were examined during our interim visit:

1. review of the control environment;
2. management's integrity, operating style and independent review;
3. the organisation structure;
4. the extent of management's delegation of responsibility and authority within the organisation;
5. design of personnel policies to ensure the competence of staff.

In addition we reviewed the following specific areas:

- treasury functions and financial management issues;
- property, plant and equipment and effectiveness of safeguard controls over their uses;
- effective use of the Commission's resources;
- implementation of decisions taken in management meetings;
- compliance with the Memorandum of Understanding with UNDP.



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During the final visit, we followed up on matters which were raised during the interim visit to obtain assurances that the lapses identified have been corrected and that they did not lead to loss of resources.

We also compiled the Financial Report of the Commission for the twenty-one months period ended 31 December 2003 and with the available resources at the period end.

The outcome of our review has been included in the body of this report.

The drafts of the various reports (both interim and final) were discussed with the Secretariat. Their comments were obtained and included in the report. Later on the Commissioners provided their own comments on the report. For completeness we have included both comments in this final document and indicated whose comments they were.

The interim report issued on this assignment has also been included as an annex to this report.

3. Executive Summary

This section of the report summarises the salient issues highlighted during the course of the financial and systems audit of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for the twenty-one months period ended 31 December 2003, details of which are included in the main body of the report.

The Commission expended \$ 4,080,242 from funds received from the United Nations Office in Geneva, through the UNDP Office in Sierra Leone and Le 689,337,045 received from the Government of Sierra Leone, UNDP and others.

Organisation Structure

The administrative and financial functions were being carried out by the Commissioners instead of the Secretariat. This resulted in inadequate segregation of duties, a vital arm of internal controls. It was therefore not possible for the Commissioners to independently review the financial and administrative functions of the organisation as a whole.

Budget and Accounting Functions

The Commission did not comply with Section 13(2) of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000 as it failed to prepare quarterly statement of accounts to indicate monthly expenditure, and provide data for proper budgetary control. The above would have assisted the Commission in ensuring economic and efficient use of its resources.

Budget Utilisation

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000 required that the funds of the Commission should be utilised only on the basis of the budget prepared under Section 5(3) of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000 and accordingly shall keep proper books of account and other records in relation to the operations of the Commission. Funds were generally used on budget lines not previously provided for, albeit with authorisation from OHCHR and at times funds for budget lines already exhausted were provided by reallocating the budget from lines with apparent surplus. This may mean overspending in some budget lines or under-budgeting in others in the first instance.

Vehicle Hire

The Commission still had about 13 vehicles on hire, even though the use of these was limited when the Commission entered the report-writing phase in September 2003. An amount of approximately \$ 34,000 per month was being spent by the Commission on car hire.



Cash Management

Bank reconciliation statements were not being prepared and reviewed by independent personnel. We noted that almost all expenditure from the petty cashbook were not supported with any form of third party documentation. Generally controls over cash management at the Commission appeared weak.

Filing and Archiving

There was no proper filing and archiving system at the Commission. This led us to move into the UNDP office to compile financial documents before commencing our final audit review.

Final visit December 2003/ January 2004

No new issues arose during our visit in December 2003 and January 2004. We however reviewed the status of previous findings and have included that as section 12 to this report.

4. Review of the Memorandum of Understanding

As part of the requirements for the audit we reviewed the Memorandum of Understanding signed between the Government of Sierra Leone, The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, the office of the United Nations High Commission of Human Rights, the UNDP in Sierra Leone and UNAMSIL. The purpose of the review was to obtain a professional understanding of the document to enable us determine compliance with the various covenants in the memorandum.

There was compliance by all parties with the exception of the following:

- (i) The Commission did not take advantage of the tax exemptions provided by the Government of Sierra Leone. This resulted in inefficiencies in procurement which in turn led to financial losses by the Commission.
- (ii) the UNDP as managers of the funds did not review the procurement procedures to ensure full compliance with United Nation Financial Regulations and Rules. The amount contracted by the Commission and paid for by UNDP in respect of car hire was above the market price.
- (iii) there was no evidence that a Joint Implementation Committee to ensure that funds are utilised exclusive for the purpose of the activities of the TRC was set up. If it was set up properly and was meeting in accordance with its mandates the lapses mention in (i) and (ii) above may have been avoided.
- (iv) the UNDP should have supported the TRC in staff recruitment, placement, and grading through a Committee. It would appear that the UNDP took over the whole process of recruiting etc., to the extent that the TRC does not have copies of contract documents for its staff. At a latter stage coders and transcribers were recruited by the TRC without reference to the Committee. As a result this category of staff was not issued special service agreement contract by UNDP.

Secretariat's comments

This claim could have been correct if the Commission had time to place in orders and wait for shipment. The Commission had a mandate of 18 months to accomplish its tasks; this period was not only short but was rather interrupted by some problems that developed during the preparatory phase. The operational phase that was due to have started in October was delayed till November. In view of this fact the Commission had less time at its disposal and hence could not place orders for supply of items from overseas suppliers. However, the supply of some items was crossed-checked with overseas suppliers, but delivery time and cost did not make them competitive.



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UN procedures on procurement centers around the concept of competitive bidding that is the raising of three proforma invoices for the purchase of items worth more than two thousand dollars (US\$2,000). This information is then displayed on a matrix using average weighted method to show the supplier with the most competitive price.

5. Strategic Management

5.1 Organisation Structure

Observation

The secretariat is supposed to be responsible for administrative and financial management whilst the Commissioners should be implementing the Project. The Commissioners were managing the bank account without any input from the secretariat. The Commissioners were also engaged in the day-to-day administrative matters as well as recruitment and termination of employees.

Implication

As a result there is inadequate segregation of duties, which is a vital arm of internal controls. The responsibilities and powers of the secretariat are being duplicated. This also leaves supervisory and accountability roles intertwined and with no clear distinction. Consequently in the event of anomalies there will be no one to take direct responsibility for these.

Recommendation

We recommend that in the implementation of future project of this nature the secretariat be duly empowered to carry out its administrative and financial functions. We also recommend that the TRC accounts be maintained by the secretariat as well as all finance and administrative functions such as recruitment and termination till the end of the Commission. These functions could then be monitored by the Commissioners to ensure completeness and accuracy of reporting by oversight review.

Benefit

The Commissioners and the secretariat will be able to direct the activities of the Commission in a focused manner. It would also be in a position to achieve the target it has set itself in areas of service delivery.

Where the secretariat is granted the authority to manage the administrative and finance functions of the organisation, the Commissioners will then have the opportunity to carry out a periodic review of performance.

Secretariat's comments

We would advise that you distinguish GOSL input from that of the OHCHR. While the Government of Sierra Leone funds are managed by the Commission, OHCHR funds are managed by UNDP. Budgetary allocations are regulated in Geneva and managed by UNDP. The Secretariat makes requests as and when it needs funds through the UNDP. All payments are prepared and issued by UNDP. The Secretariat is not a signatory to any of the accounts. The Government accounts

are solely managed by the Commissioners. The Chairman or his Deputy and another Commissioner are signatories to the accounts. We however note your recommendations and are aware that these issues need to be fully addressed.

Commissioners' comments

No Commissioner has been engaged in performing daily Administrative duties of the Commission's secretariat. Commissioners have on very few occasions had the responsibility of deliberating on administrative issues brought before them by either the Executive Secretary or aggrieved staff for arbitration in cases of disputes.

For example, after the Public Hearings, the Commission also in accordance with directives from OHCHR Geneva, had to drastically reduce her personnel to cut costs by retaining only staff required for the report writing stage of the Commission. When the above was done, one or two staff especially international felt very aggrieved by the termination of their contracts, which were to end 31 October instead of July or August 31, 2003. The Commission had to listen to the grievances and thus ended up endorsing the termination of the contracts, though prematurely of some national and international staff as the financial exigencies of the Commission demanded. This action was made imperative by the dwindling financial resources of the Commission.

5.2 Budget and Accounting Functions

Observation

Section 13(2) of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000 stipulates that the commission shall keep proper books of account and other records in relation to the operations of the Commission and shall prepare quarterly a statement of accounts in a form designed to:

- indicate monthly expenditure;
- provide data for up to date budget control based on the management information system of the Commission; and
- ensure correct use of funds of the Commission;

The above provision was not complied with as no quarterly statement of accounts was prepared.

Implication

As the above provisions of the Act was not complied with, the financial and accounting affairs of the Commission was therefore not subject to any proper monitoring mechanism and constant reviews which may impact on the integrity of the system.



Recommendation

We recommend that the provision of legislations be complied with. This will enhance proper reporting and monitoring mechanisms over the funds of any similar Commission on a timely basis.

Benefit

Proper book of accounts will be maintained which will aid supervision and assist in making decisions, with financial implications.

Secretariat's comments

While this is correct, the Secretariat is handicapped because of its inability to fully take charge of these funds. How can the Finance Officer get such statements from the banks when the accounts are in the charge of the UNDP and the Commissioners? Ideally and as recommended by you, the Secretariat ought to be in full charge of all funds meant for the Commission, supervised by both UNDP and the Commission. We also recommend that the present Finance Unit be strengthened possibly with an Assistant if the unit is expected to carry out any additional tasks.

Commissioners' comments

All financial transactions of the Commission are done in accordance with the UN financial rules and regulations as provided in Section 5 (3) of the TRC Act 2000. This service is supervised by the UNDP, which is also involved in all Commission financial transactions.

The Commission had developed a financial information management system that adequately provides information on monthly and quarterly basis.

KPMG's further comments

Keeping proper books of account does not only imply taking custody of cash and bank accounts. Details of expenditure made on behalf of TRC by UNDP should be maintained at TRC and used to prepare a complete set of accounts.

6. Budget Utilisation

Observation

Section 13 of the Act stipulates that the funds of the Commission shall be utilised only on the basis of the budget prepared under Sub section 5(3).

Although an approved budget exists, expenditure was not fully in compliance with the amounts approved. Funds were moved across approved budget lines from areas of surplus to fund areas of deficit especially for staff cost.

Implication

This may imply that the budget preparation is not carefully done, as a result of the Commission not being able to articulate its support requirements.

There is the risk that unrealistic budgets may have also been presented to donors.

It is also possible that the commission is overstaffed i.e. has employed more personnel than budgeted for in each period and also funds may not have been utilised economically and efficiently.

Recommendation

We recommend that realistic budgets are prepared based on properly articulated needs.

We also recommend that as the Commission enters the report writing phase a work force of 110 may not be realistic, as most of their functions have become redundant from our assessment of the various job descriptions. Funds should also be used efficiently and economically.

Benefit

Proper budget preparation and budgetary control will ensure efficient use of funds.

Secretariat's comments

It is correct that we move across budget lines. This is particularly due to the perennial funding difficulties of the Commission. On the advice of the OHCHR in Geneva, the managers of the budget, we are advised to move particularly slow lines in the budget. It is true that unrealistic budgets have been presented. This is due to the inability of the OHCHR to mobilise adequate funds for the operation of the Commission. The original budget was USD 6.5m but this had been revised to USD 4.5m while the work plan has remained the same.

We are presently urging the government to help with some additional funds to meet the above funding gap.

7. Vehicle Hire

Observation

The Commission entered the report writing phase in September 2003 and as such trips up country for statement taking are infrequent. Although this is the case, the Commission still had about 13 cars on hire which cost an average of \$ 34,000 a month.

Our concerns are:

- i. We have not been able to determine who the users of the vehicles are.
- ii. The average amount of US\$ 2,000 a month per car appears excessive given the state of the vehicles and the normal market price for car hire in Sierra Leone.

Implication

The economic and efficient utilisation of the funds of the Commission is again in question.

Recommendation

We recommend that the total number of hired vehicles be reduced and the official Truth and Reconciliation Commission vehicles utilised. We understand that the remuneration and DSA given to staff covers their transportation.

Benefit

This will ensure that the resources of the commission are judiciously utilised.

Secretariat's comments

The number of vehicles on hire at a particular time relates to the volume of work of the Commission. While you are correct that the Commission had completed its hearings phase and that the number of vehicles should have been reduced, we hasten to report that the number was reduced from 25 to 10 vehicles in July 2003. This figure does not include the Commission's 3 vehicles. Also the Commission has not completed its missions in the provinces. Presently the research, investigation and reconciliation units are regularly up the provincial centers identifying mass graves and perpetrators who have only recently agreed to cooperate with the Commission. We had recently ventured to rent vehicles as and when required but to our surprise the charges are astronomical. Daily charges range from USD80 to USD125. The current rate paid per month is therefore reasonable. We have successfully revised the rate of USD1,800 per month with effect from September. We plan to reduce the current rented fleet as we wind up the activities in the coming months. Currently we have 6 rented vehicles and these will be reduced to 3 at the end of the current month. If there is urgent need for additional vehicles not exceeding one month, we shall bring in a vehicle or 2 for the particular exercise.

8. Cash Management

Observation

1. The bank cash book and petty cash book are not properly maintained;
2. Controls over the management of cash are inadequate as there is no evidence of independent review or supervision of the finance functions of this department;
3. Petty cash transactions are not supported with any form of third party documentation (bills, receipts etc).

Implication

Some receipts and payments may have been omitted. Poor controls over cash may lead to losses in the Commission.

Recommendation

Cash control is of prime importance, receipts and payments should be recorded promptly and accurately.

Our recommendations are:

1. Bank reconciliation statements should be prepared at least monthly, and reviewed by an independent personnel;
2. All expenditures from the petty cash should require a voucher signed by a responsible official other than the person who has custody of the petty cash;
3. The level and location of cash floats should be clearly determined;
4. Vouchers together with the attachments should be produced before the cheque is signed for reimbursement;
5. Periodically the petty cash and bank cash book should be reconciled by an independent person.

Benefit

This will result in effective monitoring and recording of cash and bank balances, as a continual build up of reconciling items is avoided and improving controls over bank balances.

Secretariat's comments

Bank reconciliation is a routine task, which as stated earlier, will mean that we are given the authority to manage the accounts in the various banks. Regarding petty cash we concede that we have not been vigilant in the compilation of vouchers and receipts, in view of the nature and volume of the expenditures. For instance almost all requests are for items that are obtained in the local market places and during the district hearings incidental requests are made that require urgent attention. Also



until recently claimants are mainly service providers for instance electricians, plumbers or cleaners who are called in to carry out such menial jobs. Invariably some of them do not have proper receipts. We however note this and measures are now in place to address this anomaly. We have also decided that in view of the fact that the Commission activities are coming to an end, we have agreed to suspend petty cash accounts with immediate effect.

Bank reconciliation statements have been prepared for the Government contribution to the Commission.

There is nothing like cash been kept at the office of the Finance Officer. The Commission's cash is been managed by UNDP. The Government contribution to the Commission was only meant for the renovation of the office block although these funds proved to be helpful when the Commission got caught up in financial difficulties.

Please note that the Executive Secretary or the Chief of Administration and Programming signed all expenditures from the petty cash.

Commissioners' comments

It is however common knowledge to all Commissioners that the Chairman and one other Commissioner serve as signatories to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission local account in Freetown. The erstwhile Interim Executive Secretary served as signatory 'B' to the account. This arrangement is to ensure accountability on the expenditure of the fund. The Commission inadvertently did not continue with this arrangement when the current Executive Secretary came on board.

Thus apart from the above arrangement, no Commissioner is in any way even aware of not to mention been involve in the financial transactions of the Commission by any means.

9. Fixed Assets

We physically verified some of the fixed assets purchased by the Commission. These assets are listed in appendix I.

We were unable to identify the assets listed in appendix II.

The \$ 516,221 spent on fixed assets agree with the records maintained at the TRC. However in the listing, there are certain expenditure which although relate to maintaining the fixed assets, and bringing them to their present state and conditions, are not in themselves fixed assets and will not be physically verified.

These include:

Date	Description	Cost \$
July 2003	Data processing and Communication equipment	1,061.11
July 2003	Improvement cost, spare parts, supplies equipment	11,056.82
August 2003	Vehicle maintenance, fuel insurance, spare parts	1,255.65
August 2003	Data processing and Communication equipment	21,216.67
August 2003	Improvement cost, spare parts, supplies equipment	13,556.79
September 2003	Procurement of vehicles	764.44
September 2003	Improvement cost, spare parts, supplies equipment	333.33
October 2003	Procurement of vehicles	9,640.64
October 2003	Office furniture	360.00
October 2003	Data processing and Communication equipment	1,527.22
October 2003	Improvement cost, spare parts, supplies equipment	8,506.53
November 2003	Vehicle maintenance, fuel insurance, spare parts	5,922.67
November 2003	Data Processing and Communication equipment	7,173.63
November 2003	Improvement cost, spare parts, supplies equipment	7,731.60
December 2003	Vehicle maintenance, fuel insurance, spare parts	3,291.43
December 2003	Improvement cost, spare parts, supplies equipment	9,443.89
October 2002	Vehicle maintenance, fuel insurance, spare parts	12,951.99
		<u>115,794.41</u>



The summary of the assets purchased is:

	S
Appendix I - Assets that were physically verified	388,464.60
Appendix II - Assets that were not physically verified	11,962.43
Non capital expenditure on fixed assets	115,794.41
Total assets purchased by the Commission	516,221.44

Subsequent to our verification some already verified assets were reported missing or damaged by the Secretariat as follows:

Damaged

One Airconditioner

Missing

Two Airconditioners

We have not been able to review any documentation relating to the lost or damaged items. We therefore had to rely on representation made by the Secretariat staff. We believe however that damaged items should be retained in its form and handed over as part of the assets. They should not be disposed of before handing over.

10. Filing and Archiving

Observation

The Commission does not have a proper filing and archiving system and this impedes the speedy flow of information.

Copies of the supporting documents for payments submitted to UNDP are mostly not maintained by TRC, information relating to staff are not filed in any order, and as a result we had cause to change location for our field work and became involved in compiling records for the TRC prior to audit.

Implication

It will be difficult to trace documents or even notice if they are missing. The risk of omission of transactions is high.

Reporting and decision making will be flawed if information provided is incomplete or inconsistent.

Recommendation

We recommend that the Commission put all of these records in proper filing order for ease of reference and reporting.

Benefit

Proper maintenance of records and enhanced management decision based on available information.

Secretariat's comments

In order to address this anomaly, the Commission has engaged a Documentalist and hopefully in a few weeks the problems of filing and archiving will be addressed. We are presently undertaking compilation and copying all documents in the UNDP to update our files and archives. The Commission's filing is now in good shape.



11. Final Resources

At the end of the Commission the following resources were available:

Cash at Sierra Leone Commercial Bank	Le 8,260,864
Cash held by UNDP on behalf of TRC	USD 11,480
Fixed Assets- As listed in the appendices	

12. Summary of Matters Previously Raised

- Key:** X - Issue still to be resolved
 P - Issue in the process of being resolved/situation improving
 Y - Matters resolved

- 1) Organisation Structure
- 2) Staff Contracts
- 3) Budget and Accounting functions
- 4) Fixed Assets
- 5) Budget utilisation
- 6) Vehicle Hire
- 7) Cash Management
- 8) Filing and Archiving

No.	Matters Previously Raised	Status	Comments
1.	<p>Organisation Structure</p> <p>The administrative and financial functions were being carried out by the Commissioners instead of the Secretariat.</p>	X	The Commissioners have retained control over the Government contributions to the Commission leaving the OHCHR funds to be managed by both the Secretariat and the UNDP.
2.	<p>Staff Contracts</p> <p>There were fifty- six Staff members with no contracts document.</p>	Y	The Commission retained contract documents for all staff during the extension period. We were able to sight contract documents for the staff earlier reported to be without contract, at the UNDP office.
3.	<p>Budget and Accounting Functions</p> <p>The Commission did not comply with section (13(2)) of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000 as it failed to prepare quarterly statement of accounts to indicate monthly expenditure, and provide data for proper</p>	P	The Budget officer maintains cash and petty cash books, which capture expenditure. There are no third parties supporting documentation for petty cash expenditure. It was also noted that petty cash payments were made to

No.	Matters Previously Raised	Status	Comments
	This will enhance proper reporting and monitoring mechanisms over the funds of the commission.		Security Agency, purchase of spare parts for generator, DV Cassette and tape recorders amongst others with no form of documentation available (like proforma invoice receipts etc).
4.	Budget Utilisation Funds of the commission should be utilised only on the basis of the budget prepared under Section 5(3) of the Truth and Reconciliation Act 2000 and accordingly proper books of account and other records in relation to the operations of the Commission should be kept.	X	Realistic budgets were not prepared, as there were recurring deficit for some budget lines.
5.	Fixed Assets Several assets of the commission could not be physically verified during the interim audit. Also the fixed register maintained did not include the costs of some of the assets and some assets were denoted not supplied.	P	Some assets are still missing (unverified).
6.	Vehicle Hire The commission hired about 13 vehicles, even though the use of these is quite limited, as the Commission has now entered the report writing stage.	P	The hired vehicles have been returned and the official Truth and Reconciliation Commission vehicles would be handed over as part of fixed assets.
7.	Cash Management Bank reconciliation statements were not prepared and reviewed by independent personnel. We noted that almost all expenditure from petty cash were not supported with any form of third party documentation. Generally controls over cash management at the commission appear weak.	P	The Budget officer prepares quarterly and monthly expenditure reports, which indicates monthly expenditure incurred by the commission, but there are no evidence of proper supervision.



No.	Matters Previously Raised	Status	Comments
8.	Filing and Archiving The Commission does not have a proper filing and archiving system and this impedes the speedy flow of information.	X	The Commission should ensure that proper filing of records must be in place as part of the handed over package.

13. Expenditure financed by UNDP from funds received from OHCHR in Geneva,

Funding received by UNDP from OHCHR in Geneva, on behalf of TRC.

Date	OBMO ID No.	For the fifteen months to 30 June 2003 \$	For the six months to 31 December 2003 \$	For the twenty-one months to 31 December 2003 \$
Brought forward		-	543,933	
12.03.02	15226	102,000		102,000
14.05.02	15757	230,000		230,000
30.07.02	16350	112,000		112,000
04.09.02	16664	627,000		627,000
31.12.02	17704	109,900		109,900
13.03.03	18425	1,008,050		1,008,050
05.05.03	21045	182,850		182,850
28.05.03	21298	119,480		119,480
13.06.03	21298	334,189		334,189
07.07.03	22026	254,592		254,592
04.08.03	22300		269,313	269,313
09.09.03	22718		742,348	742,348
		3,080,061	1,555,594	4,091,722
Staff costs		1,482,071	835,395	2,317,466
Travel		104,605	228,377	332,982
Rental, Cleaning, Security, Repairs and Maintenance		344,079	200,139	544,218
Public Information Costs		119,605	8,058	127,663
Training and Seminars		48,496	24,340	72,836
Furniture and Equipments		399,093	117,128	516,221
Miscellaneous		38,179	130,678	168,857
		2,536,128	1,544,114	4,080,242
Amount held by UNDP on behalf of TRC		543,933	11,480	11,480

14. Fund Accountability Statement

Funding received from the Government of Sierra Leone and other Donors on behalf of TRC.

	For the fifteen months to 30 June 2003 Le	For the six months to 31 December 2003 Le	For the twenty-one months to 31 December 2003 Le
Resources			
Balance brought forward		20,612,365	
Government of SL	428,219,403	-	428,219,403
UNDP	198,031,262	26,987,500	225,018,762
Donations and others	15,841,944	500,000	16,341,944
UNDP petty cash	11,250,000	16,767,800	28,017,800
Total resources	653,342,609	64,867,665	697,597,909
Expenditure			
Rehabilitation of Secretariat	278,757,325	9,051,182	287,808,507
Salaries and staff costs	283,232,047	29,450,800	312,682,847
Office running costs	70,740,872	16,102,319	86,843,191
Refund to UNDP	-	2,002,500	2,002,500
Total expenditure	632,730,244	56,606,801	689,337,045
Cash and Bank Balance	20,612,365	8,260,864	8,260,864

APPENDIX THREE: THE REVISED BUDGETS

Assistance to the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission

Estimated budget in US\$

Revision 1 (March 2002)

DESCRIPTION	TOTAL		Preparatory period (3 months)		2002/2003 (12 months)	
	US\$	US\$	US\$	US\$	US\$	US\$
PERSONNEL						
19 International staff	1,433,620		183,833		1,249,787	
116 National staff	3,084,050		160,810		2,923,240	
sub-total international/national staff	4,517,670		344,643		4,173,027	
Consultants (3 consultants for two months)	61,533				61,533	
Field staff (188 staff for 4 months)	1,207,480				1,207,480	
Official travel	13,900				13,900	
Local travel of staff	10,000				10,000	
Travel on appointment and separation	129,600				129,600	
Overtime	18,000				18,000	
Component sub-total	5,958,183		344,643		5,613,540	
SUBCONTRACT						
Premises rental, maintenance & utilities	525,439				525,439	
Equipment rental	33,600				33,600	
Security services	60,000				60,000	
Audit services	36,330				36,330	
Contractual services	73,500				73,500	

Cleaning services	16,200		16,200
Public information production costs	56,000		56,000
Component sub-total	801,069	-	801,069
TRAINING	45,850	-	45,850
PROCUREMENT			
Office furniture/equipment	371,565		371,565
Data processing & communication equipment	635,263		635,263
Equipment maintenance, spare parts, supplies & communications	228,463		228,463
Procurement of vehicles	428,950		428,950
Vehicles maintenance, fuel, insurance, spare parts	105,248		105,248
Procurement of miscellaneous and security equipment	54,100		54,100
Procurement of miscellaneous supplies	12,000		12,000
Component sub-total	1,835,589	-	1,835,589
MISCELLANEOUS	207,200	-	207,200
PROJECT TOTAL	8,847,891	344,643	8,503,248
<hr/>			
<i>Programme support costs (13%)</i>	<i>1,150,200</i>	<i>44,800</i>	<i>1,105,400</i>
<hr/>			
GRAND TOTAL	9,998,091	389,443	9,608,648

Assistance to the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission

Estimated budget in US\$
Revision II (August 2002)

DESCRIPTION	TOTAL	Preparatory period (Three months)	2002/2003 (12 months)
	US\$	US\$	US\$
PERSONNEL			
7 Commissioners (4 national, 3 international)	840,000	168,000	672,000
15 international staff	727,208	78,000	649,208
76 national staff	680,798	91,008	589,790
74 field staff	148,000	-	148,000
sub-total staff	2,396,006	337,008	2,058,998
DSA (international staff)	593,460	75,600	517,860
Official travel	23,900	-	23,900
Travel on appointment and separation	118,400	32,000	86,400
Component sub-total	3,131,766	444,608	2,687,158
SUBCONTRACT			
Premises rental, maintenance & utilities	443,911	84,072	359,839
Equipment rental	210,600	9,000	201,600
Security services	60,000	-	60,000
Contractual services	146,500	43,000	103,500
Cleaning services	18,600	2,400	16,200
Public information production costs	67,600	-	67,600
Component sub-total	947,211	138,472	808,739
TRAINING	45,850	-	45,850

SEMINARS	14,000	14,000	-
PROCUREMENT			
Office furniture/equipment	278,764	35,622	243,142
Data processing & communication equipment	518,100	58,300	459,800
Equipment maintenance, spare parts, supplies & communications	273,497	32,950	240,547
Procurement of vehicles	178,825	-	178,825
Vehicles maintenance, fuel, insurance, spare parts	102,519	4,310	98,209
Miscellaneous and security equipment	29,100	7,000	22,100
Miscellaneous supplies	12,000	-	12,000
Component sub-total	1,392,805	138,182	1,254,623
MISCELLANEOUS	298,163	7,000	291,163
PROJECT TOTAL	5,829,795	742,262	5,087,533
<i>Programme support costs (13%)</i>	757,873	96,494	661,379
GRAND TOTAL	6,587,668	838,756	5,748,912

Assistance to the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission
 Estimated budget and expenditures in US\$
 Revision III (May 2003)

DESCRIPTION	Original budget	Revised Budget	Expenditure/Obligations	Expected Expenditure
	July 2002 - Oct 2003	July 2002 Oct 2003	July 2002 - March 2003	April 2003 - October 2003
	US\$	US\$	US\$	US\$
PERSONNEL				
7 Commissioners (4 national, 3 international)	840,000			392,000
13 international staff	727,208			336,000
28 national staff	680,798	1,698,521	741,300	177,921
35 temporary staff	-			18,000
74 field staff	148,000			33,300
sub-total staff	2,396,006	1,698,521	741,300	957,221
DSA (international staff)	593,460	559,030	239,700	319,330
Travel on appointment and separation	23,900			
Official Travel	118,400	166,740	5,000	161,740
Component sub-total	3,131,766	2,424,291	986,000	1,438,291
SUBCONTRACT				
Premises rental, maintenance & utilities	443,911	239,450	179,600	59,850
Equipment rental/Local Transportation	210,600	510,300	270,300	240,000
Security services	60,000	22,500	5,000	17,500
Contractual services	146,500	81,718	18,250	63,468
Cleaning services	18,600	16,850	8,100	8,750
Public information production costs	67,600	69,500	69,500	
Component sub-total	947,211	940,318	550,750	389,568
TRAINING				
	45,850	35,000	35,000	

SEMINARS	14,000	37,000	14,000	23,000
PROCUREMENT				
Office furniture/equipment	278,764	97,200	82,700	14,500
Data processing & communication equipment	518,100	200,250	37,700	162,550
Equipment maintenance, spare parts, supplies & communications	273,497	16,500	6,000	10,500
Procurement of vehicles	178,825	-		
Vehicles maintenance, fuel, insurance, spare parts	102,519	102,293		102,293
Miscellaneous and security equipment	29,100	7,000	7,000	
Miscellaneous supplies	12,000	60,800	25,800	35,000
Component sub-total	1,392,805	484,043	159,200	324,843
MISCELLANEOUS	298,163	35,000		35,000
PROJECT TOTAL	5,829,795	3,955,652	1,744,950	2,210,702
Programme support costs (13%)	757,873	514,235	226,844	287,391
GRAND TOTAL	6,587,668	4,469,887	1,971,794	2,498,093

Assistance to the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission

Requirements for the period Jan - March 2004 in US\$

DESCRIPTION	Budget Jan 2004 - March 2004 US\$
PERSONNEL	
7 Commissioners (4 national, 3 international)	28,000
International consultants	34,000
National staff	33,978
DSA/MSA	24,150
Travel	30,500
Component sub-total	150,628
Contractual services, vehicles & utilities	4,000
Auditing	28,000
Stationary and office supplies	8,000
Maintenance of office equipment	4,000
Public information, printing and production costs	166,000
CD rom version of the report	20,000
Distribution costs	5,000
Miscellaneous	30,000
PROJECT TOTAL	415,628
<i>Programme support costs (13%)</i>	<i>54,032</i>
GRAND TOTAL	469,660

CHAPTER FIVE

Methodology and Processes

TRC

Disarm your

Mind!

Tell the

Truth to

the TRC

Produced by the TRC Steering Committee with support
from the International Human Rights Law Group

CHAPTER FIVE

Methodology and Processes

Introduction

1. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act of 2000 (the Act or the TRC Act) charged the Commission with the sole authority to determine its operating procedures and mode of work, especially with regard to conducting investigations, research, statement taking and hearings. To engage in these activities as well as to produce an impartial Final Report, the Commission developed a philosophical and procedural framework, which ensured that the appropriate rigour and fairness standards were complied with in all aspects of its work. The policies and procedures that guided the Commission's work are discussed below in detail.

Policies

Women and Children

2. Section 6(2) of the TRC Act stipulates that the Commission should give special attention to the subject of sexual abuse and to the experiences of children in the armed conflict. Section 7(4) of the Act enjoins the Commission to implement special procedures to address the needs of victims such as children, those who have suffered sexual abuse and child perpetrators of abuses or violations.
3. During the conflict, women and children were the victims of the most brutal violations and abuses. It was necessary that they participated in all the activities of the Commission to ensure that their voices were heard. There was no single body or group representing victims' interests in Sierra Leone. There are instead various institutions and agencies, both local and international, providing services to women and children victims of the war. Many of these agencies existed long before the TRC was established and have been documenting violations and abuses, providing psychosocial support services and carrying out school enrolment and training programmes for women and children. The Commission worked closely with many such organisations. Furthermore, in 2001, UNICEF organised a consultation on the participation of children in the work of the Commission. That consultation supported the participation of children in the work of the Commission and outlined a number of measures to ensure the protection of participating children.
4. The Commission entered into agreements with key partner organisations for the provision of technical support. A Project Co-ordination Agreement was signed in November 2002 between the Commission and United Nations Fund for Women (UNIFEM). This partnership with UNIFEM was intended to ensure that gender-based violence was properly accounted for during the Commission's work. It also served to encourage the fullest possible participation from women's groups in Sierra Leone in the work of the Commission.

5. A second framework agreement was signed between the Commission, UNICEF and some Child Protection Agencies to provide the Commission with technical assistance to during statement taking and hearings in which children were participating.
6. The framework agreements entered into by the Commission with UNIFEM and UNICEF respectively are discussed in detail in the relevant sections of this report. As a public institution, the Commission felt that it was necessary to develop further policies to underpin its work with women and children, often after consultations with civil society and other stakeholders. Some of these policies are outlined below.

General policy

7. The Commission paid specific attention to the security and well-being of the children who appeared before it. Furthermore the Commission acted in a gender-sensitive manner by ensuring that women were well represented on its staff and by reaching out to women so that they could participate fully in all of its phases and processes.

Policies relating to statement taking and hearings

8. The Commission took testimonies from women and girls with an emphasis on the gender-specific nature of the violations and abuses they suffered. The Commission ensured that all its staff members were sensitive in their dealings with gender-based violence and that its statement takers, in particular, were properly briefed and trained. In conjunction with experts in gender-based violence, the Commission drew up a set of guidelines for dealing with victims of sexual violence in the statement-taking programme.¹
9. All the children who appeared in hearings did so in closed or confidential sessions. The Commission organised special public hearings on children and sexual violence to bring the issues around their experiences to the centre of public discourse. The physical and psychological security of children participating in the Commission's activities was paramount.²

Policies relating to report writing

10. The Commission ensured that gender-based violations and abuses were properly investigated and given extensive attention in its final report. The partnership with UNIFEM was to result in a dedicated chapter on the experiences of women. The Commission kept disaggregated data in respect of gender-based violence. The Commission also requested submissions and recommendations from institutions working with women and girls and those focussed on sexual violence issues. These materials would enable the Commission to formulate recommendations on the issues most pertinent to women and girls.

¹ More detail on the training of statement takers can be found in the Processes section later in this chapter.

² Special measures to protect children were implemented in collaboration with UNICEF and the Child Protection Agency Network. More detail on such measures can be found in the sections on statement taking and hearings in this chapter.

11. The Commission included in its Final Report a special section on children, along with a range of recommendations specifically designed to address the needs of children. The Commission also produced a child-friendly report with the support of UNICEF.³

Statement Taking⁴

12. In Sierra Leone, violations and abuses were committed on a wide scale and by all the factions in the conflict. It was not possible for the Commission to investigate all the violations and abuses that were committed during the civil war. Consequently the statement taking exercise aimed at representing the general spread of human rights violation and abuses. This enabled the Commission to obtain a sample of violations and abuses that occurred, such that “many people could relate to the narratives and the experiences told by those who testified before the Commission”.⁵

Media and Civil Society Participation

13. A TRC process is by nature a public process. Its success depends on public participation. The Commission organised its public interactions according to several principles. The most important of which was the need for public ownership and participation in the Commission’s activities and processes, as emphasised in both the Lome Peace Accord and the TRC Act. The media was an important tool in that respect.
14. Based on this philosophy of public ownership and participation, the Commission relied extensively on civil society to carry out the public education and sensitisation of its activities. The Commission developed partnerships with Sierra Leonean civil society organisations for public education on the different phases of its work. The implementation of the recommendations and in particular the reparations programme will depend in large measure on how civil society engages the government and other state institutions.
15. The media policy of the Commission was designed to ensure that:
 - a. The Commission was accessible to the public at all times. It also conducted many open processes that allowed the public to be aware of the activities.
 - b. Public education about the TRC process was a joint responsibility that the Commission shared with its civil society partners.
 - c. The radio, being the most popular means of communication in Sierra Leone, was utilised as much as possible for sensitisation and public education. Radio is often the only way in which remote communities are connected to the rest of the country. The level of illiteracy prevented the print media from reaching out to the general population.

³ More detail on the children’s version of the report can be found later in this chapter and in the chapter on Children in Volume Three B of this report.

⁴ Throughout this chapter, the term Statement Taker refers to a TRC employee who recorded statements on behalf of the Commission. The term Statement Giver refers to a victim, perpetrator or witness who made a statement to the Commission.

⁵ See Lax, Ilan; “Strategies and Methodologies for Finding the Truth”, A compilation of Articles on the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission; Human Rights Section, UNAMSIL, Freetown; December 2001; at page 75.

16. Following the principle of popular ownership of the TRC process, a National Vision campaign was organised to invite Sierra Leoneans to construct their images of a future Sierra Leone in the form of scholarly and artistic submissions. The National Vision for Sierra Leone will give impetus to the Commission's recommendations.

Reconciliation

17. Civil society had been doing much work on reconciliation prior to the start of the Commission. Through the efforts of UNICEF and the Child protection Agencies a number of child combatants were settled back into their communities after the performance of traditional ceremonies. Communities performed traditional cleansing ceremonies and other rituals. The faith community was also very strong in promoting reconciliation in the communities. The Commission wished to build on these efforts and encourage them. Within the time frame available to the Commission, it would not be able to actively engage in reconciliation activities all over the country.
18. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, (OHCHR) in Geneva, had commissioned a preliminary study on traditional methods of reconciliation and conflict resolution in Sierra Leone by a local NGO, Manifesto 99. The report of that study indicated the tremendous roles chiefs, elders and religious institutions could play in facilitating and promoting reconciliation in the communities. The challenge before the Commission was how to mobilise these institutions and bring them together under one umbrella to strengthen the potential for reconciliation in the communities. The Truth and Reconciliation Act also enjoined the Commission to seek assistance from chiefs and religious leaders in promoting reconciliation.
19. After a number of visits to all the districts in the country and widespread consultations with chiefs, civil society representatives, religious leaders and members of community organisations, between August and November 2002, the Commission decided to establish district support committees. These committees would be composed of members of civil society in the district, including chiefs, religious leaders and members of the armed factions. The aim was to replicate these committees in the chiefdoms. The work of the district support committees was to facilitate the Commission's engagement with people in the districts during statement taking, hearings and reconciliation activities. The Commission would refer any conflicts or potential conflicts to a district support committee. It was recognised by all relevant stakeholders that the Commission could not visit every community to organise hearings or facilitate the resolution of any existing disputes. These committees would have the responsibility for further engaging in "community palava management sessions" at their respective "barrays". At these sessions, each community would decide what it considered most important to engage in to promote reconciliation and it would be the work of these committees to support that effort.

Issues of Confidentiality

20. According to the TRC Act, “at the discretion of the Commission, any person shall be permitted to provide information to the Commission on a confidential basis and the Commission shall not be compelled to disclose any information given to it in confidence.”⁶ This provision allowed witnesses to testify confidentially, at the discretion of the Commission. Also, it protected the Commission from having to reveal the information it collected to third parties.
21. In relation to confidential testimony, the Act further states that the Commission was to “take into account the interests of victims and witnesses when inviting them to give statements, including the security and other concerns of those who may wish to recount their stories in public.”⁷ The Commission could conduct interviews and hearings in private, when it considered it necessary.
22. In designing its policy on confidentiality, the Commission had three major concerns: fulfilling its truth seeking purpose, ensuring the security of witnesses, and addressing its healing mandate. Truth seeking entails that the information collected from witnesses is used for investigation and will appear in the Final Report. Security and healing considerations require the Commission to take into account the personal history of each witness. For instance, some witnesses may wish their information to remain confidential in order to avoid persecution by perpetrators. Some witnesses might require confidentiality because of fear of rejection by their communities.
23. The Commission had to consider the impact of the Special Court on the willingness of perpetrators to come forward. Some perpetrators were afraid of either being indicted by the Court or being called as witnesses to testify against their former commanders. By extending confidentiality to them, the Commission hoped to convince them to reveal valuable information that would enable the Commission construct the truth about the conflict.
24. Where the statement giver had requested confidentiality, his or her name as well as any details permitting the identification of the statement giver, were not to be captured in the database or the Commission’s Final Report. The Commission would use the information without reference to the identity of the witness.
25. The TRC Act also states that: “the Commission may implement special procedures to address the needs of such particular victims as children or those who have suffered sexual abuses, as well as in working with child perpetrators of abuses or violations.”⁸ The Commission decided that child statement givers would be granted confidentiality automatically, without having to request it and those children would only appear in closed hearings. Children are vulnerable and the Commission felt it was its duty to extend a special protection to them. Women victims of sexual abuse were also encouraged to appear in closed hearings.

⁶ See Section 7(3) of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000.

⁷ See Section 7(4) of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000.

⁸ See Section 7(4) of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000.

26. The agreement entered into by the Commission with UNICEF and the Child Protection Agencies was to ensure that children had the full protections at all stages of their participation in the work of the Commission. Child protection agencies oversaw the process of children testifying before the Commission. The participation of these agencies in statement taking offered assurance, comfort and security to the children. Counselling and psychosocial assistance was on hand for children. It was important that the children's emotional and physical well-being was assured at every stage of their participation in the work of the Commission.

Research and Investigations

27. Section 6 (2) (a) and (b) of the TRC Act stipulates that the Commission should “investigate and report on the causes, nature and extent of the violations and abuses [...] by undertaking investigations and research into the key events, causes, patterns of abuse or violation and the parties responsible”. The first issue was to identify the key events, causes to the conflict and parties involved.
28. The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Geneva, commissioned a preliminary investigation into the violations and abuses perpetrated in the conflict, to provide background information to the Commission as it determined its research and investigation priorities. The project was contracted by OHCHR to a consultant working with the Campaign for Good Governance (CGG), a Sierra Leonean NGO. The project consisted of a statement-taking exercise in which 1,316 statements were collected throughout the country. In addition, several interviews were conducted with selected individuals who provided in-depth insights into the conflict and reasons behind the violations committed. The report into this ‘Mapping Project’ was a comprehensive preliminary assessment of the nature and extent of the violations committed.⁹ The report was used by the Commission to determine the categories of violations to be used in its database and to attain an overview of the key events of the conflict. ‘Window cases’ for investigation were partly derived from the information provided by the CGG report.¹⁰
29. The Ford Foundation provided financial support for a preliminary research on the “Antecedents of the Rebel War” by the Research and Publication Bureau the Fourah Bay College, University of Sierra Leone for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. This research provided the Commission with background information on the district and local dynamics and historical antecedents of the conflict. The report assisted the Commission in developing some of the themes that constituted its research agenda.

⁹ Many of the preliminary conclusions reached in the CGG Mapping Project were subsequently borne out by the more expansive studies undertaken by the TRC. For instance, the CGG report attributed the majority of violations to the RUF faction, a conclusion which was subsequently validated by statistical analysis of the statements collected for the TRC. More detail can be found in the Findings chapter in Volume Two of this report.

¹⁰ A full list of ‘window cases’ used by the TRC can be found in the section on Investigations later in this chapter.

30. In understanding and analysing the conflict, the Commission deemed it necessary to devise a periodisation of the conflict that adequately reflected its main phases. To the extent that the greatest preponderance of key events in the military and political history of the conflict, not to mention the overwhelmingly majority of violations and abuses stemming from them, were driven by the combatants of the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, it was considered appropriate that the periodisation should reflect the evolving character of the conflict as it was prosecuted by that faction. The phases determined by the Commission for its own purposes were as follows:
- *Phase I: Conventional Target Warfare:* from immediate antecedents until 13 November 1993.
 - *Phase II: Guerrilla Warfare:* from 13 November 1993 until 2 March 1997.
 - *Phase III: Power Struggles and Peace Efforts:* from 2 March 1997 until the conclusion of the conflict on 18 January 2002.

Research

31. Themes of research were designed in accordance with the Commission's mandate, as set out in Section 6 (2) of the TRC Act. The Commission decided on twelve research themes, each of which has contributed one chapter to either Volume Three A or Volume Three B of this Report. The themes address the antecedents and causes of the conflict, the context in which the violations and abuses occurred and the question as to whether those violations and abuses were the result of deliberate planning, policy or authorisation by any government, group or individual. Themes were also devoted to women, children and youth, as well as the role of external actors in the conflict.

Primary and secondary sources

32. The Commission used both primary and secondary sources to write its Report. Primary sources are the statements, testimonies given at hearings, unpublished material received from different sources in particular, the Office of the Attorney General and Minister of Justice and the Criminal Investigation Department of the Sierra Leone Police Services, submissions and interviews conducted by researchers and investigators. All of these materials have enabled the Commission conduct a comprehensive documentation of human rights violations in the country. Secondary sources used are reports from international and national organisations, books, articles from journals and other publications. Primacy was given to original sources in order to capture and integrate the experiences of the people of Sierra Leone.

Investigations

33. The methodology chosen for investigations was to focus on a selection of 'window cases'. The Commission decided to identify patterns and peculiarities in the conflict that enabled the roles played by all relevant actors to be highlighted. The window cases had to be representative of the different experiences, group affiliations and human rights violations that the Commission would report on. The investigations were designed to complement the research activities of the Commission by providing specific information on the important events and junctures in the conflict.

34. There are thousands of incidents and personal experiences that could warrant classification as window cases, but the Commission based its selection on the following criteria:
- The nature of human rights abuses and violations experienced in different Regions and Districts;
 - The range of victims and/ or perpetrators, including state and non-state actors, who suffered and/ or participated in such abuses and violations;
 - The various ethnic groupings of victims and/ or perpetrators;
 - The significance of particular incidents or events within the broader context of the conflict;
 - The impact of particular incidents, events or actors on a significant number of people or on the course of the conflict; and
 - Particular dynamics or types of behaviour among the fighting factions that required to be explained, either because of their systematic nature or because they figure prominently in the public consciousness of the conflict.

35. According to these criteria, the Commission was able to identify a total of sixteen window cases during the course of its investigations. Each window case is described briefly below:

The events at Bomaru

36. Bomaru is the town in Eastern Sierra Leone where violent conflict first started. The Commission found it necessary to document exactly what happened in the first few days of the conflict in order to understand the parties and their involvement in the conflict. This investigation also focused on the origins, the training and the incursion into Sierra Leone of the RUF.

Transformation of the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) into a fully-fledged fighting force and the establishment of Base Zero

37. This inquiry looked at the formation of the CDF and the establishment of Base Zero, reputed to be the main headquarters and training station for the Kamajors. Allegations of human sacrifice and cannibalism, as well as large-scale human rights abuses including summary executions, had to be investigated to offer deeper understanding of the CDF and its operations.

The NPRC executions of December 1992

38. It was alleged by the NPRC regime that a coup had been attempted against the government on 28 December 1992. On the basis of this allegation, 29 persons were arrested and executed. A large segment of the Sierra Leonean public had always doubted the veracity of the NPRC's allegation that a coup was attempted. There were also persistent claims that those executed were not given a fair trial. This became an important window case for investigating the human rights situation under the NPRC government.

TRC



President Kabbah arriving to declare open the commencement of public hearings by the Commission

The destruction of Koribundo

39. The CDF was alleged to have destroyed the town of Koribundo in 1998 because the townspeople allegedly supported a detachment of AFRC soldiers based there during the AFRC junta regime. Very senior officers of the CDF were alleged to have visited the town and told the people that the town was being destroyed as punishment for their perceived support of the AFRC.

The role of mercenaries in the conflict and the role of ULIMO

40. This investigation sought to determine at what points external parties got involved in the conflict. It also focused on the nature and impact of the involvement of mercenaries. These two window cases provided a lens for highlighting the military activities of non-Sierra Leonean actors in the conflict.

The role of the Special Security Division (SSD) in the conflict

41. The paramilitary wing of the police, known as the SSD, was charged with maintaining public order. It became a tool of abuse and manipulation by politicians and eventually got sucked into the war, fighting as one of the pro-government forces. The transmutation of the SSD and the lessons that flow from its involvement in the war made it an important window case.

Mass graves

42. The Commission sent investigators to several Districts in Sierra Leone in order to identify mass graves. These missions were not meant to produce an exhaustive survey of mass graves in the country. The goal was rather to give Sierra Leoneans a sense of the human loss in the conflict in different parts of the country, along with existing or potential measures to protect these sites, including the construction of memorials in remembrance of the dead.

The role of ECOMOG

43. ECOMOG entered Sierra Leone to provide general security as a peacekeeping force. ECOMOG got sucked into the conflict and fought on behalf of the government. It eventually became the only conventional military force in the service of the government. This inquiry investigates how this anomalous situation came to pass.

The invasion of Freetown on 6 January 1999

44. The 1999 invasion of Freetown is the event that finally forced the world to acknowledge the atrocities against civilians in Sierra Leone. It catalysed international intervention. There had been socially accepted truths about who was responsible for attacking and defending the city. It was necessary to uncover the plenitude of actors, experiences and dynamics behind an invasion that occurred when ECOMOG was said to be in full control of Freetown.

The role of the media in the conflict, especially Radio 98.1 FM

45. Media organs became tools of propaganda during the conflict. At a time when the elected government was in exile, one of its major challenges was how to keep up the morale of the populace and counter the propaganda of the AFRC regime through the state media. This inquiry focused on whether certain branches of the media exacerbated the conflict through their reporting and commentary.

The Westside Boys' hostage taking of 11 British army officers and one Sierra Leonean army officer in August 2000

46. This incident dramatised the fragile nature of the peace agreement signed at Lomé on 7 July 1999 and questioned the commitment of elements of the AFRC to sustaining the peace. It also raised questions about the capacity and willingness of the international community to respond to the challenges posed by the precarious peace that existed in the country.

The hostage taking of UN Peace Keepers in May 2000 and the demonstrations of 6 to 8 May 2000

47. These two, virtually concurrent events seriously undermined the Lomé Peace Agreement. There has been a widely accepted social truth about the events of May 2000 as they unfolded in Freetown and in the Provinces. It was necessary to establish whether this social truth matched the facts.

The Detentions, Treason Trials and Executions of 1998

48. This window case interrogated the weaknesses and challenges facing the judiciary during its most trying moments in the conflict. How did the judiciary respond to pressures from the ruling elite in the face of widespread public sentiments for victor's justice? Did the detentions, trials and executions of 1998 deviate from accepted judicial and procedural protections?

Corroboration Issues

49. Statement takers were asked to corroborate material information received in the statements. For instance, if a statement giver mentioned witnesses, victims or perpetrators who were part of the events described in the narrative, statement takers were required to try to find the named persons and corroborate the information given. If the named persons resided in another District, they were to request the District Co-ordinator there to ensure that follow-up interviews were conducted. Statement takers were also tasked to collect any supporting document that statement givers wished to bring to the attention of the Commission. They were to make a special note if they identified a site of interest, such as a massacre or torture site, or a mass grave. This information was subsequently used for further investigations.
50. The Commission also used its official database as a tool for corroboration. Events were coded according to location, time and the actors involved. Common links between the statements could therefore be identified and several accounts of the same event could be examined together.

51. In practice, several problems arose with regard to corroboration. Many statement givers who mentioned the names of witnesses did not know their whereabouts. Full details about witnesses were often missing. For instance, people who were abducted together by armed factions often hardly knew each other and were only bound by their common experiences. Many witnesses had moved, sometimes from displaced camps back to their communities. Time constraints prevented the conduct of extensive corroboration activities.

Report writing

52. The major product of a truth and reconciliation commission's inquiry is its Final Report. The Commission's mandate included the creation of an impartial historical record. This required the Commission to be independent from all the actors in the contested history, including government and all political parties. The Commission had to demonstrate that with regard to the perpetration of violations, irrespective of who committed them, it had examined all violations and commented on them in the same balanced way.
53. In order to create an authoritative account of the history of the conflict, the Commission had to cover the full breadth of violations carried out during different time periods. It was not enough to look only at violations of civil and political rights; it was also necessary to focus on the structural nature of economic dispossession insofar as they constitute causes of conflict.
54. The project document produced by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Geneva envisaged the creation of six departments including research. The Commission decided that research could not be separated from investigations. Research and investigations are not ends in themselves. Rather, they are means for producing the final Report of the Commission. They feed and reinforce each other. The Commission decided to create an operational unit that would collate all information available to the Commission, be responsible for analysing them, and integrating them into the final Report. An Information Management Unit was created to supervise the research, investigations and data management units of the Commission. This would be the channel for processing information received by the Commission and passing them on to the Commissioners. This unit would also be responsible for producing the final Report of the Commission.
55. The project document on the Commission assumed that the staff would be responsible for producing the final Report and that the Commissioners would also participate in the production of the Report. The project document had anticipated a scaling down of the staff component of the Commission as certain phases in the work of the Commission were finalised.
56. The final decision on what went into the Report rested with the Commissioners. The Commissioners were tasked with ensuring that the final Report accords with the injunction in the TRC Act to produce an impartial historical record.

Internal Decision-Making Processes and Consultations

57. The report writing personnel included researchers, investigators, data analysis staff, unit heads and Commissioners. They were divided into thematic groups for each of the research themes. Each group had to create a management plan with detailed timeframes for the achievement of research and investigation objectives. The narrative and the analysis of each research theme was discussed in monthly plenary meetings organised by the Information Management Unit and at thematic group meetings that took place on a regular basis.
58. With the conclusion of hearings on 5th August 2003, a report writing workshop and a conference involving all the Commissioners and staff was held at the Sierra Guest House from 26th to 30th August 2003. The Commission grappled with the question of what its report was meant to achieve and the philosophical approach it would take in relation to the final Report. Volumes and size were also deliberated on. The objectives and format of each of the chapters were discussed and agreed upon.
59. At the report writing conference, which took place at Lakka Beach, from 30th August to 3rd September 2003, each of the themes constituting the final Report was unpacked to deal with issues such as meaning; context; content; resources; impact; time frame and outcome. The Commission grappled with the question of how to reflect its mandate in the final report and the peculiarities of its experience relative to the literature on the operational work of truth commissions. Other important issues that engaged the Commission at the conference included the question of reparations and how to deal with the accountability and responsibility of perpetrators. The discussions were open and free flowing. While the final responsibility for the conclusions rested with the Commissioners, they sought the views of the staff on what would be appropriate, fair and legal.
60. Where appropriate, the Commission invited relevant stakeholders to make presentations on relevant issues and on what would be appropriate recommendations. In this connection, the Commission invited a number of ministers to discuss possible recommendations in relation to the work of their ministries. The Commission also held extensive discussions with the leadership of the security forces. Many of the submissions received by the Commission dealt with reform of the security institutions. Civil society made substantial inputs into the recommendations, and in particular the reparations programme.
61. An extensive amount of time was devoted to deliberations on findings and recommendations. Workshops were held throughout November and December 2003 between Commissioners, senior staff and the researcher responsible for each chapter. Researchers proposed findings and recommendations based on the work they had done and in consultation with their thematic groups. Based on the feedback received during the meetings, each researcher conducted further research or provided further justification for the proposed conclusions. This process continued until the Commissioners were satisfied that all the issues had been analysed including the role of the different actors, and that the conclusions derived from the narrative represented an objective analysis of the issues.

Accountability and Naming of Names

62. The issue of naming individual perpetrators is always controversial. Truth commissions have used several approaches depending on their resources, the specific context and their different mandates.
63. In the Sierra Leonean context, the major arguments in favour of the naming of individual perpetrators were:¹¹
- a. *The need for accountability, especially considering the amnesty clause under the Lomé Peace Agreement.* Truth commissions usually address impunity as part of their mandates. This becomes paramount when, as in the case of Sierra Leone, there was a general amnesty provision that prevented perpetrators from being prosecuted. The naming of names was seen as a way of attributing responsibility for human rights abuses and violations committed.
 - b. *The need to address the victims' healing.* The TRC Act required the Commission to pay special attention to the needs of victims. Naming perpetrators provides acknowledgement for the victims' suffering and recognition of the wrongs that have been done to them.
 - c. *Accuracy of the historical record.* Attributing responsibilities for human rights violations and abuses committed enhances the accuracy of the understanding of the conflict. In the case of Sierra Leone, the role of many perpetrators is poorly known and myths have been created around them.
64. However, there were arguments against the naming of names. These included:
- a. *Lack of resources.* The strongest argument was the lack of time and human resources to engage in the investigations necessary for naming perpetrators. The process of naming perpetrators would include notifying them of the allegations against them, providing all necessary proof and giving them sufficient time to respond.
 - b. *The danger to appear arbitrary.* Due to its limited life span, the Commission could not engage in considerable investigation of every aspect of the conflict. While conclusions can still be extracted from the evidence collected, the naming of individual perpetrators requires extensive and conclusive evidence on every allegation. While the Commission possessed strong evidence against certain individuals, it would have been unable to name others. It therefore ran the risk of being perceived as partial.
65. Several perpetrators appeared in public hearings and were named or identified in their communities by victims or witnesses. The Commission gave them the opportunity to respond publicly to these allegations. Many victims were able to identify their perpetrators. Where the perpetrators were named in the victims' narratives, the Commission sought to corroborate specific allegations.

¹¹ See "Issues of accountability and naming names in the final TRC report"; briefing paper submitted to the TRC by the International Center for Transitional Justice; 27 October 2003.

66. In presenting the narrative of the conflict, the Commission made several findings concerning the responsibility of the respective factions and certain individuals. These findings were based on empirical evidence linking the perpetrators to the violations. Where the evidence was inconclusive, the Commission declined to make a finding. Most of the Commission's findings were made against the armed factions that participated in the conflict rather than against individual perpetrators. However, where the information at the disposal of the Commission pointed conclusively to the role of an individual in the conflict the person in question was named. The Commission published the names of all the leaders of the respective factions in its Findings chapter.¹² The Commission holds all these leaders accountable for the violations and abuses that were committed by members of their respective factions.

Organisation of the Report

67. There were two competing perspectives before the Commission on how to organise the final Report. One perspective was to write a report of 200 pages or less which would summarise the narrative and present the Commission's conclusions and findings. This was an attractive option considering the resource constraints under which the Commission operated. The Commission rejected this option for a number of reasons.
68. The Commission felt that a brief report would do injustice to the range of issues that account for the conflict in Sierra Leone. While a number of issues triggered the conflict, there were clear structural issues dating back to the time of colonialism. If these issues were not addressed in detail, the Commission would not have met its broad ranging mandate. The individual, factional and institutional fluidities assist an understanding of the dynamics of the war. Without this nuanced interpretation, the real history may have been lost in a summary. A nuanced interpretation required that the narrative be discussed in depth, including the roles and experiences of people, institutions and the respective factions.
69. The Commission recognised that a truth commission report speaks to different targets and audiences. Some may be interested in a statistical summary while others want a simplified version of what happened. The Commission accordingly decided that its report would be published in several volumes. The Commission collected thousands of hours of video testimony as it travelled around the country engaging the people of Sierra Leone. Selected footage has been incorporated into a groundbreaking video version of the report. The Commission entered into a partnership with WITNESS, an international NGO based in New York to produce the video report. The video version of the Report will be an important tool for purposes of public education in relation to the report and its recommendations.
70. In recognition of the limited time it had for its operational work, the Commission decided that many of its materials should be made available to the public as a basis for encouraging further research and inquiry. It was decided that all the public testimony and submissions should be published in an appendix volume. Since these documents ran to some 3,000 pages in total, the Commission decided that the testimonies and submissions should be published in electronic format only, on a CD-Rom accompanying this report.

¹² See the Findings chapter in Volume Two of this report.

71. At a technical meeting on “Children and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone” convened in June 2001 by UNICEF, the National Forum for Human Rights and UNAMSIL Human Rights Section, it was resolved that the Commission should publish a simplified version of the Commission’s Report for children. During the Commission’s thematic hearings on children, the Children’s Forum Network (CFN) called on the Commission to produce “a child-friendly version of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Report, which could be used by teachers and children’s organisations, such as the Children’s Forum Network, to disseminate the findings and recommendations of the Commission to the children of Sierra Leone.”¹³ The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000 further required the Commission to pay special attention to the needs and experiences of children during the armed conflict. The Commission was accordingly mindful of the need to involve children in all aspects of its work.
72. Building upon its partnership with UNICEF and the CPAs, the Commission decided to create a “child-friendly version” of its report. It sought and received technical assistance from UNICEF and the Child Protection Unit of UNAMSIL, which assisted the Commission’s staff in the writing of the child-friendly version. The members of the Children’s Forum Network also collaborated with the Commission in the writing of the Report. At a Children’s Parliament convened in Freetown by the Ministry of Gender, Women and Children’s Affairs in Freetown in December 2003, the Commission made a presentation to the representatives who had assembled from all over the country on the key philosophical and conceptual issues around the child-friendly version. The Commission received substantive input from the Children’s Parliament on how to make the report attractive to children and the kinds of issues they would wish to see discussed.
73. The publication of a child-friendly report is the first such initiative by a truth commission. The Commission was imbued with a sense of history in undertaking this significant exercise. It was important that the report be accessible to children and that the contents not traumatise them. The Commission is satisfied that its partnership with UNICEF, UNAMSIL and the CPAs in this undertaking has led to the production of an outstanding report that will prove to be an important educational tool for children in Sierra Leone.

¹³ See Children’s Forum Network; Submission to the Thematic Hearings on Children by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission; YWCA Hall, Freetown; 16 June 2003.

Processes

74. The following section discusses the processes in which the Commission engaged in the course of its work. These included public education and media relations, statement taking, hearings and the creation of a database.

Public Education and Media Relations

The Interim Phase of the Commission

75. In August 1999, a coalition of human rights NGOs, professional groups and development organisations was created under the direction of the National Forum for Human Rights (NFHR). The coalition was named the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Working Group,¹⁴ with Forum of Conscience as the focal point. The purpose of the Working Group was to involve Sierra Leonean civil society in the TRC process and to ensure that civil society's concerns would be addressed in the design of the TRC Act and in the ways in which the Commission was going to undertake its task.
76. The events of May 2000 put a hold on the establishment of the TRC. In November 2000 and June 2001, NFHR and UNAMSIL Human Rights Section organised two conferences on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to put the Commission back on the agenda of civil society.
77. The TRC Working Group received funding from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Geneva to conduct sensitisation and public education campaigns on the TRC. Its central purpose was to prepare the ground for the establishment of the Commission. Despite some problems between the Working Group and OHCHR due to perceived poor management on the part of the Working Group, the following activities were undertaken:
- a. A national consultation on attitudes towards the TRC process, organised in Freetown in July 2000;
 - b. Different workshops and sensitisation activities throughout the country to galvanise public interest and involvement in the setting up of the TRC;
 - c. Several radio and television programmes broadcast in Freetown and in the Provinces for purposes of public education, with members of the Working Group sitting in as panellists; and
 - d. Starting in March 2001, the publication of a monthly magazine named "The Truth Bulletin", aimed at educating the public on the developments in the TRC and its processes.
78. NFHR subsequently received separate funding from UNAMSIL to conduct training for chiefs and NGOs in the provincial areas. The National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights (NCDHR) received funding from the OHCHR to produce a booklet on the TRC and to translate it into several local languages.

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¹⁴ The TRC Working Group was later renamed the Truth and Reconciliation Working Group, in recognition of the hope that its work should continue beyond the lifespan of the Commission itself.

¹⁵ See 'Evaluation of Sierra Leone Working Group on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission', Report by Brandon Hamber Consulting, commissioned under Article 19; 8 January 2001.

79. OHCHR provided funding to the International Human Rights Law Group to conduct an assessment of the requirements of an effective sensitisation and public information campaign on the TRC process.
80. Following consultations by the International Human Rights Law Group (“the Law Group”) and Sierra Leonean civil society, a Steering Committee was created that included representatives of the TRC Working Group, the Inter-Religious Council, the Law Group itself, NFHR, NCDHR and the Human Rights Section of UNAMSIL, to serve as the implementing mechanism for the Law Group project.
81. The outcome of the Law Group consultation was a consensus on the way forward. It was decided to build a framework for the TRC sensitisation campaign. A four-day workshop was organised from 7 to 10 August 2001 and was attended by 15 human rights activists representing key organisations involved in promoting the TRC process. Participants developed a unified approach to sensitisation on the TRC, emphasising consistent messages and a framework for community meetings. Activities were planned in four areas: radio and television; print media; community sensitisation; and sensitisation of critical stakeholders. Focal points were designated for each area and a coalition was created for the sensitisation campaign that included the National Forum for Human Rights, the Inter-Religious Council, the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights and UNAMSIL.

Supporting implementation of the TRC sensitisation campaign

82. The Steering Committee provided training to implementing organisations which were encouraged to submit project proposals to the Steering Committee. These projects included:
 - a. General sensitisation: public awareness and education;
 - b. Targeted sensitisation: specially designed programmes aimed at particular audiences such as combatants and ex-combatants, refugees, women and children; and
 - c. Critical stakeholders: in-depth programmes aimed at ensuring understanding and support from traditional, community, and religious leaders, DDR, humanitarian organisations and media providers.

Enhanced co-ordination of sensitisation efforts

83. The Steering Committee was to co-ordinate sensitisation activities by all parties involved in the campaign, including private media, NGOs, government institutions and people involved in the disarmament and reintegration activities, ensuring that all these parties sent a clear and consistent message on the TRC.
84. Due to management problems, the Steering Committee could not implement the projects identified in its operational plan. The Committee was revitalised with the setting up of the Interim Secretariat of the TRC in late March 2002. The Interim Secretariat facilitated several meetings where the contentious issues to effective sensitisation activities were ironed out. Numerous sensitisation and public education activities were carried out, such as radio programmes, publication of literature on the TRC, training programmes for

local chiefs and the appointment of co-ordinators for each of the districts whose role was to conduct sensitisation and organise public meetings on the TRC throughout their respective districts.

85. The Law Group assisted in the formation of a Women's Task Force, a coalition of women's groups, which advocated for the creation of an enabling environment for the participation of women in both the TRC and the Special Court processes.
86. The Interim Secretariat visited all the districts in June 2002. The purpose of these visits was to identify local partners for the Commission and discuss collaboration on sensitisation with the district co-ordinators and other stakeholders in the districts and to monitor the activities undertaken by the members of the Steering Committee.
87. The Law Group project was to have ended in late 2001. It was carried over into 2002 because of the problems already identified. In essence, while there was an Interim Secretariat for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, it didn't have any funds to engage in public education and sensitisation activities. Rather it had to depend on civil society initiatives to inform the public about the work of the Interim Secretariat and of the Commission, in the first few months following the establishment of the Commission. The initial successes of the Law Group and other interventions were not sustained. In the absence of continued funding, these organisations could not continue their programmes. This was at a time when the Commission had begun to outline its objectives and what it intended to do during its preparatory phase.

The Preparatory Phase of the Commission

88. Public education during the Preparatory Phase work focused on explaining its mandate and role, the kinds of processes involved in a truth and reconciliation commission, the areas of participation of the public and how the Commission was different from the Special Court, which had also been established by this time.
89. The Steering Committee organised weekly radio and television programmes on SLBS Radio and television. A skit was also produced and broadcast on SLBS radio and television in Freetown and Bo. The Steering Committee developed TRC slogans, which were produced in posters and leaflets and printed in the local newspapers. A weekly 30-minute programme on the TRC was commenced at Radio UNAMSIL. Following public demand, this was extended to an hour-long live magazine programme, with a repeat broadcast during the week. This scheduling continued throughout the lifespan of the Commission.
90. The Commission engaged in scheduled meetings with a range of institutions and groups, including the Ministry of Information. These meetings were ongoing throughout the preparatory phase. A number of media organisations like Radio UNAMSIL, the SLBS, Radio Democracy, the Talking Drum Studio and a host of newspapers also dedicated programmes and news to the Commission.

91. Regular media and NGO briefings were organised at the Commission's offices to keep the public informed of its activities. These briefings also allowed the Commission to respond to public concerns or inquiries.
92. The Commission faced many challenges in conducting effective public sensitisation. The establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone raised the fears of many witnesses concerned about the relationship between the TRC and the Special Court. Commission staff had to go to great lengths to explain to ex-combatants that the two institutions were independent of one another, that they would not share information and that testifying before the TRC would not lead to being called by the Special Court to give testimony.¹⁶
93. The Commission initiated many workshops and information sessions to educate people on the benefits of the truth seeking process and the role the TRC could play in helping people recover from their suffering.
94. The Barray Phase was a weeklong awareness-raising exercise in each district carried out in November 2002.¹⁷ Each Commissioner was assigned to visit a number of districts and / or the Western Area. The objective of these visits was to introduce the Commission, its policies and procedures to the public and to undertake the following tasks:
 - a. Create a support structure for the Commission in each district by convening meetings of representatives of chiefs, local structures, religious groups and NGOs, and receive public input on the reconciliation procedures the Commission intended to implement;
 - b. Identify focal points such as reputable NGOs that could serve as focal points for the Commission in each district. The focal point would co-ordinate the activities of the support structure and possibly provide the team leader for the statement taking teams; and
 - c. Explain the operations, methods and procedures of the Commission for statement taking and hearings, as well as announcing the views of the Commission on other areas of potential concern, such as reparations, relationship with the Special Court, confidentiality, issues of justice and impunity.
95. Commissioners visited a range of people and institutions in each district, including the Senior District Officers (the public administrators in charge of the respective districts), Chiefs, Town Officials, provincial ministers and secretaries, NGOs and religious groups. Town meetings were held. A final meeting for the district was then held at the district headquarters to which representatives came from all over the district. At this final meeting a District Support Committee was established to which the relevant institutions nominated representatives.
96. Overall, the visits were not well planned. Too many visits were crammed into a short time period because the Commission did not have the resources for extended stays in the districts. This resulted in lost opportunities to meet a wide range of people and limited the impact of the effort.

¹⁶ More detail on the challenges posed by the co-existence of the Special Court can be found in the chapter on the TRC and the Special Court for Sierra Leone in Volume Three B of this report.

¹⁷ A 'barray' is a gathering place in the centre of a community, roughly equivalent to a town hall.

97. In most of the districts, the District Support Committees were filled with volunteers from civil society organisations, many of whom lacked the financial resources to commit to the work of the Committees. These Committees were supposed to provide the support structure for the Commission's activities, including statement taking and hearings. However, lack of funding and poor management impinged on the work of the Committees and no real work was accomplished. In addition, the Committees were supposed to be co-ordinated by the Interim Secretariat of the Commission, but a staffing crisis prevented the Secretariat from accomplishing this task. These support structures had to be re-established during the hearings phase.

The Deployment Phase of the Commission

Statement Taking

98. Jingles and slots for radio and television were produced and aired on SLBS. The skits and jingles contained appropriate messages mobilizing people to come out and give statements to the statements takers. Posters with appropriate messages were also produced and distributed nationwide through the Commission's NGO partners and community-based organisations. Slogans produced by the TRC Steering Committee were used extensively.
99. Sensitisation during the statement-taking phase focused on explaining the role of statement takers, the procedure for statement taking and the fact that all statements were to be made on a purely voluntary basis. The statement takers themselves handled the bulk of the sensitisation, apart from the radio programmes and advertisements. Each trip to a village or a town would start with a visit to the Chief and elders to explain the role of the Commission and the purpose and process of statement taking. When an agreement was reached with the Chief, statement takers would address the village or town population and begin taking individual statements.

Hearings

100. A memorandum of understanding was signed between the Commission and the Ministry of Information concerning airing of the Commission's programmes. On the basis of this agreement, the Opening Ceremony of the hearings in Freetown was aired live on SLBS radio and television. It was also broadcast live on Radio UNAMSIL. Other hearings in Freetown and the district headquarter towns were broadcast live on Radio UNAMSIL and SLBS radio. The Talking Drum Studios recorded hearings in Freetown and the districts. On selected nights of public hearings, SLBS broadcast a 45-minute television highlights programme featuring footage of the proceedings.

TRC



Commission staff participate in the National Reconciliation Procession through the streets of Freetown on 6 August 2003.

The Report Writing Phase

101. Sensitisation during the Report Writing Phase started with the Commission's 18th media briefing, held on Wednesday 17 September 2003. Discussion programmes were arranged on radio and television to sensitise the public on the report-writing phase of the Commission's work. During this phase, most of the Commission's activities were closed to the public. It was necessary to keep the TRC and its work in the public mind, so that people would be aware of the measures being taken by the Commission to complete its mandate
102. A workshop was organised by UNIFEM and the Commission with the participation of civil society organisations and women from the provinces to garner input from them on the recommendations that the Commission should make on women. A conference on reparations was organised by the TRC Working Group to make suggestions for recommendations to the Commission. The International Centre for Transitional Justice and the International Human Rights Law Group also facilitated a series of civil society consultations on the possible recommendations that the Commission should make. The outcome document was formally presented by civil society to the Commission at a public briefing organised by the Commission in December 2003.

The National Vision for Sierra Leone

103. Towards the end of its mandate, the Commission launched a National Vision Campaign calling for contributions from the people of Sierra Leone on their ideas and inspirations on the future of their country. The campaign was advertised in print and electronic media.
104. The following guidelines were published for contributions:
 - a. Describe the kind of society the contributor would like to live in;
 - b. Suggest how to make Sierra Leone a better place to live in;
 - c. Set out the contributor's hopes and aspirations for Sierra Leone;
 - d. Where the contributor would like to see Sierra Leone in 5 or 10 years;
 - e. Devise slogans for a national vision;
 - f. Supply poems, songs, paintings and photographs that symbolise the new Sierra Leone;
 - g. Provide anything creative that inspires peace and unity - and pride in being Sierra Leonean; and
 - h. Supply anything creative that symbolises the future of Sierra Leone.
105. Hundreds of contributions were received. They were divided into categories, including visual art forms, written contributions and theatre. Prizes were awarded to the most original contributions based on their visionary content, aesthetics, creativity and effort.
106. An exhibition of the contributions was formally launched at the National Stadium in December 2003. Subsequently, the exhibition was put on display in Freetown at the National Museum. The exhibit was viewed by hundreds of Sierra Leoneans, including President Kabbah and a number of government Ministers.

Statement Taking

107. The first component of the operational phase of the Commission was the statement taking exercise. The TRC Act states that the Commission should take individual statements as part of its information gathering exercise.¹⁸ The purpose was to reach out to every part of Sierra Leone to capture the experiences of the population, including specific groups such as women, children and amputees.
108. The Commission started its statement-taking phase on 4 December 2002 at Bomaru, Kailahun District, where the first attack of the conflict had been reported on 23 March 1991. The statement taking exercise officially lasted for four months, until 31 March 2003. At the formal end of the exercise, 7706 statements had been collected.

The Statement Form

109. The statement taking form had four major sections: victims, witnesses, perpetrators and those who wished to give a statement on behalf of someone else. Separate sections were required because the nature of the questions varied from one group of statement givers to the other. For example, in the perpetrator section, the Commission needed to ask the statement giver about the command structure of the armed faction he or she belonged to.
110. Several consultations were held with civil society organisation on the design of the form, to ensure that it was user friendly and contained all the relevant questions to which the Commission needed to collect answers. Groups consulted included Pride, Campaign for Good Governance, Manifesto 99, the National Forum for Human Rights, Caritas Makeni, several women's groups and UNIFEM.
111. After these consultations, Commissioners and staff reviewed the draft form and designed the final product. The statement form was composed of eight sections, designed to provide information on basic issues around the mandate of the Commission (including its confidentiality provisions) and to record the personal details of the statement giver and the narrative he or she told the statement giver.
112. The statement form is reproduced in its entirety as an appendix to this chapter. The statement form was printed in English, but the testimonies were recorded in any language chosen by the statement giver and subsequently translated into English by the statement taker.

Categorisation

113. The Commission categorised statement givers into victims, witnesses, perpetrators and those making statements on behalf of others. The rationale behind the categorisation was to make the information collected more accessible for the subsequent selection of cases for hearings and for the Commission's longer-term investigation and research activities.

¹⁸ See Section 7 (1) (c) of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000.

114. Statement givers were entitled to fill more than one section of the form if they considered themselves to belong to more than one category. Indeed, many people in Sierra Leone were victims, perpetrators and witnesses at the same time. An example is the case of a child soldier. If the child was forcibly enlisted, he was a victim. On the other hand, after his forced recruitment, he was likely to have committed human rights violations during his time as a combatant, thus qualifying him as a perpetrator. Furthermore, the child soldier was likely to have been a witness to atrocities committed by others.

The Hiring of Statement Takers

115. In addition to suggestions on reformulation of the draft statement form, NGOs and partners provided the Commission with suggestions on how to conduct the statement-taking exercise and especially on how to encourage people to make statements. Statement taking was conducted on the basis of the following inputs:
- a. Sensitisation should occur prior to the commencement of statement taking in order to increase awareness among the general population. Sensitisation should include: explanation of the differences between the TRC and the Special Court; reassurance for ex-combatants that the two bodies were completely independent of one another and would not share information; and the purposes of the TRC, which included creating an impartial historical record and making recommendations to the government and other institutions;
 - b. The Commission should hire at least two women as statement takers in each district to take statements from women victims of sexual abuse. The hiring policy was to reflect gender balance among the statement takers. This policy was largely fulfilled, except in Kambia District, where only one woman applied to be a statement taker;
 - c. Statement takers should be hired from the district in which they lived and should take statements for the Commission in their home districts. Statement takers should be well known in the community, in order for people to feel comfortable speaking to them. They should speak the local languages of the district, in order to give confidence to statement givers and to protect the confidentiality of their testimony by reducing the need to resort to interpreters;
 - d. Statement takers should be trained to explain carefully to statement givers what confidentiality means and allow statement givers to request confidentiality based on an informed choice; and
 - e. All statements from children should be declared confidential.
116. Three Regional Co-ordinators were hired for each of the three provinces. They were to supervise statement taking in their respective provinces. Five statement takers were appointed for each district, one of whom would act as the District Co-ordinator. The role of the District Co-ordinator was to supervise the daily taking of statements by developing a work and deployment plan, as well as managing the resources provided by the Commission. Resources supplied included a 4x4 vehicle, audio and video recorders. Co-ordinators were required to liaise with the police and the Chiefs in each district to make communities aware of their presence and ensure the safety of their teams.

Training and Deployment

117. Prior to deployment, District Co-ordinators and Statement takers received a three-day training workshop. The first training took place in Kenema for statement takers from the Eastern and Southern regions from 26 to 28 November 2002. The second one took place in Freetown for the Northern region and the Western Area from 30 November to 2 December 2002. Commission staff, UNAMSIL and NGO partners conducted the training programmes.
118. The training was divided into three modules. The first module addressed the mandate and functions of the Commission. The second module provided an understanding of human rights issues, interviewing techniques, confidentiality and corroboration issues, and how to use the Commission's statement form. The third module was composed of special interview techniques for specific groups: women and girls, victim of sexual violence, children and ex-combatants. Specific instruction was given on how to deal with post-traumatic stress experience by interviewees. All the modules included exercises and interactive role-playing. Statement takers were instructed to use the one on one interview technique. Statement takers were provided with a Manual for guidance and reference (see appendix section).
119. At the end of the training, the teams were deployed for a pilot phase of statement taking which took place from 4 to 20 December 2002. This was followed by a review session from 7 to 9 January 2003. After analysing the problems and challenges faced in the pilot phase, modifications were made to the statement form and statement taking resumed. The second period extended from 9 January to 31 March 2003.
120. The statement form was accessible on the Internet for Sierra Leoneans living abroad. The Commission also engaged in statement taking in neighbouring countries to reach out to Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea, Ghana, Gambia and Nigeria. During the exercise, 46 statements were collected from Guinea, 59 from The Gambia and 70 from Nigeria (making a total of 175). Since there was a high concentration of refugees from Sierra Leone in refugee camps in Guinea, the Commission sent a District Co-ordinator who spent two months on the ground. UNHCR Sierra Leone, through its office in Guinea, provided logistical support for this exercise.

On-going Monitoring and Assessment

121. In order to ensure quality, evaluate performance, identify problems and implement remedial measures, the Commission engaged in on-going reviews, assessments and monitoring of the statement taking process. Commission officials made several field trips to monitor the work of statement takers. Meetings with Regional Co-ordinators, District Co-ordinators, Statement takers, Commissioners and NGO partners were held on a regular basis to assess the logistical and substantive problems encountered on the ground. Those attending the meetings reported problems with logistics, difficulty using the statement form and the need for more sensitisation.

122. A second evaluation conducted early in February 2003 showed significant improvement in the quality of the narratives recorded. Some problems were identified which included: statement takers were not asking enough details about the perpetrators and the armed factions they belonged to; and more details were needed concerning the actual circumstances of the interview itself. The Commission needed to know why some interviews were stopped before the end. Did the statement giver decide to stop? Did security concerns require the statement taker to interrupt it? These problems were addressed in subsequent meetings with the statement takers. The Head of Information Management also travelled to all the districts to meet statement taking teams and address problems specific to each district.
123. Perpetrators were reticent to talk to the Commission for various reasons. The main reasons articulated were the fear of being indicted by the Special Court or being called as a witness by the Court and the fear of reprisals from their communities. To remedy the problem, a sensitisation project targeted at ex-combatants was carried out by the local NGO, PRIDE, with funding from the International Centre for Transitional Justice. The project lasted for three weeks in March 2003. During the sensitisation, PRIDE employees accompanied by statement takers travelled to areas with high concentrations of ex-combatants. They conducted sensitisation sessions with ex-combatants, which were immediately followed by statement taking. The Commission felt strongly that an accurate narrative of the conflict could not be developed if ex-combatants refused to participate in the statement taking process.
124. In order to address the low level of statements given by members of the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF), Campaign for Good Governance (CGG), another Sierra Leonean NGO, organised awareness-raising campaigns in March 2003 for soldiers in various regions of the country. Commissioners and senior staff, together with representatives of CGG, travelled to many military installations. The purpose was to give more detailed information on the TRC and its processes to the military and their dependents in order to facilitate their participation. Copies of the TRC Act and leaflets featuring questions and answers on the TRC were distributed. The CGG also assisted in the airing of jingles on statement taking on various radio stations in Freetown and in the provinces in March 2003.
125. Although the TRC obtained full co-operation from the RSLAF authorities, the number of statements given by members of the military remained low. However, some military personnel gave testimony during the hearings and others participated in confidential interview sessions with the Commission.
126. The Commission also collaborated with UNICEF and the Child Protection Agencies (CPAs). A Framework for Co-operation was developed which led to social workers of the CPAs identifying children to make statements to the Commission.¹⁹ Following the development of this framework, another training programme was carried out for statement takers in the three regional headquarter towns and in Freetown on how to take statements from children, and to introduce the statement takers to the social workers from the CPAs.

¹⁹ More detail on the role of CPAs in assisting children who gave testimony to the Commission can be found in the section on Procedures for Hearings later in this chapter.

127. The framework agreement on children yielded mixed results. The level of co-operation between statement takers and social workers varied from district to district. In addition, a variety of practical problems emerged. For instance, children who were not recommended by social workers approached statement takers in order to make statements. In a number of cases, the statement takers decided to take the statements and contacted the social workers afterwards to conduct follow-up assessments on the children. In other cases, lack of time and other resources prevented social workers from referring a sufficient number of children, forcing statement takers to identify children themselves to ensure that the voices of children were adequately represented in the Commission's overall proceedings.
128. The last group that did not initially wish to collaborate with the Commission was the amputees. They insisted that their participation was subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions by the government. These conditions included the provision of housing, a monthly allowance in cash, rice allocations, education for their children, a reintegration allowance, medical treatment and assistance with transport.
129. The War Affected Amputee Association of the Aberdeen Road Camp, Freetown, issued a press statement in which they explained the reasons for their non-cooperation:
- “We understand that there is a provision in the Lomé Peace Accord for War Affected Amputees in this country. At this while, we have been waiting to see the implementation of this provision in the Lomé Peace Accord. We have had no statement from the Government and our living conditions are becoming very appalling. We want to draw the attention of those concerned and the Government of Sierra Leone, that a bill be passed which could be accepted as a law for better care for amputees. Otherwise, we are not prepared to talk to TRC. Finally, if these problems are not addressed, no amputee will appear before the TRC.”²⁰
130. The Commission made considerable efforts to address these problems. A number of meetings took place between the Amputee Association and senior staff of the Commission. A meeting was organised by the TRC Working Group in February 2003 between representatives of the Amputee Association and the Commission, where all the issues relating to their participation were addressed. The amputees were sensitised to the fact that the Commission did not have a budget of its own to fulfil any of their demands. Furthermore, the Commission reiterated its independence from the government. The Commission sought to emphasise that participation in its proceedings would give amputees a forum to explain their plight and to make an input to the recommendations and reparations proposals.
131. These meetings resulted in an agreement between the Amputees Association and the Commission on 15 March 2003. Two members of the organisation were recruited as assistant statement takers, to take statements from amputees.

²⁰ Press Statement issued by the War Affected Amputee Association of the Aberdeen Road Camp, Freetown, December 2002.

132. Statement taking in the Amputee Camp in Freetown started on 19 March 2003. Joint sensitisation campaigns took place from 3 to 6 April 2003 in Bo, Kenema, Kono, Makeni and Masiaka. TRC staff and representatives of the Amputee Association of Freetown worked together to encourage amputees to give statements to the Commission. Sensitisation exercises were followed immediately by statement taking in the amputee camps in these locations.
133. Amputees and war wounded victims testified during hearings in all the districts of the country. The Amputees Association and the War Wounded Association both participated in the thematic hearings on reparations and reconciliation, making recommendations on how their concerns should be addressed in the Commission's final Report. The Amputees Association and the War Wounded Association participated actively in other Commission activities, such as the National Reconciliation March on 6 August 2003 and in the national and district workshops on reconciliation.²¹ Their local representatives were elected to the District Reconciliation Committees in many of the districts.
134. The Commission was uncertain as to whether women would be willing to testify about sexual violence and rape. A number of publications had referred to the "closed" nature of Sierra Leone's traditional societies and concluded that women would not be willing to testify about their experiences for fear of stigmatisation by their communities. To the Commission's surprise and satisfaction, women testified in large numbers and in great detail about their experiences. While women were advised that they could request to give their statements to a female statement taker, many of them declared that they did not mind talking to male statement takers. Such testimonies enabled the Commission to fully incorporate the experiences of women into its work.

Conclusion of Statement Taking

135. The statement-taking teams managed to cover the overwhelming majority of chiefdoms in what turned out to be a largely successful exercise. Nevertheless, logistical and time constraints impacted on the reach of the statement taking teams. The statement takers had to work under very tight time schedules and often under very difficult conditions.
136. Fewer than ten statements were collected from each of the following chiefdoms: Paki Masabong in Bombali District; Benducha, Kwamebai Krim, Nongoba Bullom and Dema in Bonthe District; Penguia and Kissi Tongi in Kailahun District; Gbane Kandor and Toli in Kono District; and Kagboro and Timdel in Moyamba District.
137. Nine chiefdoms out of the 149 in the Provinces were not covered at all by the initial statement taking teams (Kissi Teng and Kissi Kama in Kailahun District; Mambolo and Braiama in Kambia District; Gorama Mende in Kenema District; Neya in Koinadugu District; Mafindor in Kono District; Sanda Magblonthor in Port Loko District; and Mano Sakrim in Pujehun District). The reasons mainly pertained to accessibility. The chiefdoms in Kambia District are riverine and the Commission could not secure transport for its statement taking team because of time constraints. The chiefdoms in Kailahun, Koinadugu and Pujehun Districts are border areas with Liberia. The precarious security situation in those locations prevented the statement taking teams from visiting them.

²¹ More detail on the national and district workshops can be found in the chapter on Reconciliation in Volume Three B of this report.


138. Of the total of 7,706 statements collected, 36% were collected from women and 5% from children. Statements were recorded in 15 different languages, with the major ones being Mende (40%), Krio (39%) and Temne (12%).²²

Data Processing

139. The TRC made use of the Human Rights Information Management System (HRIMS). This system is designed to perform the following functions:
- To document the complete list of statements gathered by the Commission;
 - To index the statements enabling researchers and investigators to access statements according to their own specific criteria, such as those that made mention of diamonds or those that named a certain perpetrator; and
 - To allow a statistical analysis of the statements in order to identify trends and patterns. Examples of analytical questions included ascertaining the typical age of a forced recruit or identifying the faction that targeted children to the greatest degree.

The Data Processing Pipeline

140. The data processing system comprised four basic steps. It was called a 'pipeline' because, for every statement, each step had to be completed before proceeding to the next.
141. The data processing steps are as follows:



Step 1 – Collection of Statements.

Step 2 – Classification and Coding: The statements were analysed by coders to identify the victims, perpetrators and violations. This information was recorded on paper forms.

Step 3 – Database Entry and Cleaning: The set of forms generated by each statement were inputted into the database. As mistakes were inevitable, each entry was double-checked. For example, if the forms indicated that a victim was killed twice then this anomaly was corrected. Persons and violations that were described more than once were merged to ensure that the numbers of abuses were not exaggerated.

²² These figures are derived from queries of the TRC database. Please note that the percentage figure for child statement givers is based on a count of those whose year of birth was after 1985.

Step 4 – Generating Analytical Reports: The information was extracted from the database in a form that could be used by a statistician. Graphs and statistics were used to answer research questions. These results were used to produce the statistical report included in the Appendices and the statistical information reflected in other chapters of the Commission's report.

Classification and Coding

142. Classification and Coding was the second step in the data processing pipeline. Classification ensured that the database fitted the Sierra Leonean context. The classified violations had to be representative of those that typically occurred during the conflict. Once the classification system was complete, the coding proceeded.

Vocabularies

143. The classification system consisted of a number of "vocabularies". A vocabulary, sometimes referred to as a "thesaurus" or "taxonomy", is a controlled list of items. For example the "Sex" vocabulary has items "Male", "Female" and "Unknown". The vocabulary listing locations was arranged hierarchically. Each region contained a number of districts, each district contained a number of chiefdoms and, finally, chiefdoms contained towns and villages. Depending on the vocabulary the number of items varies: hence, there are only three items under the "Sex" list, while there are more than 4000 items for the "Locations" list. Coding is so named because each vocabulary item has an associated code. For example, the "Institutions" vocabulary contained a list of armed factions – the Revolutionary United Front has the code "arm/ruf" and the Sierra Leonean Army has the code, "arm/sla". For brevity's sake, it was these codes that were reflected on the coding forms.
144. By using a vocabulary, the facts within the narrative were reduced to a distinct and countable set of values. This allowed the free text narrative to be represented in the database and enabled the quantifying and statistical study of the data. The vocabularies and database are structured such that their use did not misrepresent or discard information in the narrative. Without the use of vocabularies, patterns within the data based on variables such as location, gender and ethnicity would not have been identified. Ultimately it was possible to illustrate the magnitude, trends and patterns of human rights violations.
145. The vocabularies were created and tested by the American Association for the Advancement of Science in March and April of 2002.²³ To ensure that the vocabularies were appropriate, a variety of sources were used. Sources included input from local experts and the examination of maps (supplied by the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs), as well as statements gathered by the TRC during its preparatory phase of December 2002.

²³ The American Association for the Advancement of Science - Science and Human Rights Program (AAAS/SHR) provided funding and a field consultant to conduct this testing. The International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) provided additional funding for this purpose.

Classifying and coding the violations

146. Care had to be taken to ensure that the item lists were complete and that they avoided ambiguity or overlap between possible selections. Given the large range of abuses perpetrated against victims, it was necessary to devise categories that covered a range of perpetrator behaviours. Without such categories, the list of violations would be unwieldy and it would be difficult to ensure that each abuse in the statement fitted into only one violation category. The Commission used a boundary condition to indicate what behaviour was considered to be a violation. For example, the assault violation boundary condition covered beating, kicking, punching, whipping, stabbing and dropping victims from a height.
147. It was noted that a victim could suffer most violations more than once, with the obvious exception of killing. Therefore a counting rule was required to ensure that the coders would count violation repetitions consistently.
148. Consider a victim who is being punched by one perpetrator. A second perpetrator then joins the attack, repeatedly kicking the victim. This event could be interpreted as either one assault by two perpetrators or, alternatively, as two assaults. With a counting rule that states that one sustained period of abuse counts as one violation, the example would count as one violation.
149. The example below illustrates the TRC assault violation with the associated boundary condition and counting rule:

Description/ Boundary Condition	An assault consists of physical harm inflicted on a victim by punching, kicking, and/ or striking with an object or objects over a period of time. Also whipping, lashing, stabbing and shooting a victim. Committed by persons on the list of perpetrators. Assault is sufficient to cause bruising, bleeding and internal injury. Also includes dropping a child or pushing / shoving resulting in injury. Excludes incidental injuries such as those caused by a stray bullet.
Counting Rule	1 Continuous Assault = 1 Violation

150. Ultimately the use of boundary conditions and counting rules ensured that the coding of a violation was relatively objective.

Coding

151. Human rights data is initially generated as a 'free text' narrative. Within the narrative there may be mention of various violations, the places they occurred, when they happened and who was involved as a perpetrator or victim. Additional background facts about the various role players may be included such as their ethnicity, religion and occupation.

152. The coding exercise for the TRC captured essentially “who did what to whom, when and where”. The “who” is the perpetrator. The “what” is the violation committed by the perpetrator. The “whom” is the victim who suffered the violation. The “when” is the date of the violation and the “where” is the location of the violation.

Coding Model

153. The model adopted by the TRC was based on that proposed by Dr. Patrick Ball in his book entitled ‘Who did What to Whom?’.²⁴ It is a model proven to produce accurate statistical results. It has been used extensively by other truth commissions and human rights documentation projects, including the truth commissions in Haiti, Guatemala, South Africa and, most recently, in Peru. The model used by the TRC allows for the following complex situations:
- a. Many victims: the statement giver may describe violations that happened to one or many victims. The statement giver may himself be a victim. The list of victims may further include his friends, relatives, community members or even groups of strangers. The statement giver may, for example, discuss his own detention and subsequent torture in addition to his wife’s killing or the abduction of his son.
 - b. Many violations: each of the victims described in a particular statement may have suffered several violations. For example, the statement giver’s son may have been beaten and forced to work for his captors after his initial abduction. Violations may be isolated or can happen as part of a broader incident in which a sequence of abuses occurs.
 - c. Many perpetrators: several perpetrators may have committed each of the violations described in the statement. Furthermore, each of the identified perpetrators in the narrative may have been responsible for several violations. In other cases, though a perpetrator may not have directly committed a violation, the statement may identify him as the person who ordered the violation. Alternatively, where the names or nicknames of the perpetrators are not known, it may be possible to determine at least the responsible faction.
 - d. Many roles: an actor is a broad term for a person or group described by the statement. An actor can, at different times, be both a victim and a perpetrator. For example, the statement giver’s son was a victim when he was abducted, beaten and forced to do hard labour, but was a perpetrator when he committed violations after his captors trained him to fight.
 - e. Many facets: some details describing the profile of an actor can change over time – for example their age and occupation. A statement can contain several separate incidents in different years, with some actors involved in more than one incident.

²⁴ See Ball, Patrick; “Who Did What to Whom? – Planning and Implementing a Large-Scale Human Rights Data Project” (1996); published by AAAS: Washington, DC, USA.

154. The forms used by the TRC reflected the chosen coding model. Source and summary forms provided basic details such as the statement number, the date it was coded and a summary of the content. Person forms described each of the actors named in the statement. Group forms were used for groups of unnamed victims described in the statement. Incident forms were used to split the statement into distinct, isolated events. Incident forms also allowed persons to be identified as having authorised or ordered an incident.
155. Act forms are used to describe violations, including when and where they occurred and the responsible faction(s). Each act took place as part of an incident. Actors on both the person and group forms could be assigned as victims. Actors on the person forms could be assigned as perpetrators. Biography forms were used if a statement described more than one incident and reflected the changing circumstances of an actor, such as his age or occupation.

Coding Completeness

156. The coding exercise allowed for partial or incomplete information. A system for coding 'partial dates' allowed for a situation where the statement give knew only the month or year when the abuse occurred. For example the coded date '00/05/91' is the month of May in the year 1991 – the day is unspecified. This system of partial dates could also be applied to dates of birth.
157. Where the precise town or village where an event occurred was unknown, the coder attempted to indicate the chiefdom or district where such information was available.
158. Some background details, such as weapons used by the perpetrators or relationships between actors, were captured in a special 'remarks' section of the coding form.

Staffing

159. The Commission initially employed a team of 25 coders in March 2003. They worked until November 2003 and were responsible for the coding of over 9000 statements. They worked with all the statements gathered by the TRC, as well as those collected for the CGG mapping project.
160. Training of the coders took one week. Each trainee was provided with copies of the vocabularies, and a manual explaining the coding procedure. The training involved seminars, statement coding exercises, coding form evaluations, discussion groups and peer review sessions.
161. It was important that the work of the coders was consistent and reliable. For example, where two coders work with the same statement form they should identify the same victims and violations. The coders were given regular tests in which they were handed the same statement to code. The results were compared using a measure known as the 'overall proportion of agreement'. If the measure was 70%, this indicated that the coders would identify the same victims and violations 70% of the time. Experience has shown that it is realistic to attain measures above 80%. Initially the test was conducted every two days. One week after the training was completed, the 80% target was attained. Thereafter the tests were conducted on a monthly basis.

162. Since coding entails reading about a large number of atrocities, the coders also attended a workshop on vicarious trauma and methods of coping with such trauma.

Database Entry and Cleaning

163. Data Entry and Cleaning was the third stage of the data processing pipeline. In this step the coded forms were entered into the database system, where human rights violations data could be safely stored. Once a significant amount of information had been entered into the database, preliminary analysis began.

System Principles

164. Security was a major concern in setting up the computer network. The database contains names, addresses and contact details of statement givers. Furthermore, the statements often named those alleged to be responsible for abuses. The secrecy of such information had to be maintained, particularly since many statements had been given in the strictest of confidence.
165. As a general principle, the system used 'open source' software. Commercial software products are costly and sometimes contain "backdoors" that make it possible to gain entry to a computer system. In contrast, 'open source' software is free and tends to be more secure.
166. The following security measures were adopted by the TRC:
- The majority of the computers were 'client machines', meaning that they connected to and updated the database but did not store any violations information on their own hard-drives. All client machines were kept in one data processing room that was locked when not in use.
 - One primary machine, the database server, stored the database of human rights violations. The database server, statements and coding forms were all held inside a reinforced 'strong room'.
 - A network connected the client machines to the database server. The network was isolated so that no database-related machine could share information with other TRC computers or the Internet. Database output was printed and given only to those who required it.
 - All computers were protected by passwords. Each data entry clerk was assigned a unique user name so that changes to the database could be logged and audited if necessary.
 - Backups of the database were taken regularly to protect against fire and theft. This precaution included off-site backups that were sent abroad by secure means.

Hardware

167. The TRC used nine computers in total, combining those borrowed from UNAMSIL with those purchased by the IT Manager. All were desktop machines with 17" screens. Each was configured with a static IP address and was networked via a router to the database server. The server machine was provided by UNAMSIL. During the final months of the TRC's work, the server machine was returned and replaced by a more conventional desktop.
168. Some delays in establishing the network meant that each client machine maintained its own database for a short time. Once the network was established these disparate databases were merged onto the central server.

Software

169. The Human Rights Data Analysis Group (HRDAG) within the American Association for the Advancement of Science and Human Rights Programs (AAAS/HRP) provided the database and client software. The chosen system, 'Analyzer', is open source software specifically designed for the storage and processing of human rights violations data.²⁵ HRDAG was able to apply modifications to the software specifically to meet the requirements of the TRC.
170. All computers ran the operating system known as 'Red Hat Linux'. Originally Red-Hat 8 was used, later upgraded to Red-Hat 9. The server used the PostgreSQL Database Management System (DBMS) to store the data. The client programs for interacting with the database were written in Java script.
171. The data entry work was a relatively straightforward procedure. The database interface presented a series of forms. These corresponded to the various coding forms. All values on the coding forms were inputted into the database.

Data Cleaning and Quality Assurance

172. The coding work involved sustained periods of concentration, often dealing with complicated statements involving numerous actors and violations. The data entry work was repetitive. Due to the nature of the work it was understandable that, occasionally, the coders and data entry workers would make mistakes, such as those set out below:
 - a. Data Entry: After adding a violation, occasionally a data entry clerk would forget to add the victim or perpetrator, instead proceeding directly to the next violation. This oversight was easily solved, by producing a list of violations with missing victims or perpetrators, recovering the relevant coding forms and entering the missing information.
 - b. Coding: When working with a complex statement, a coder sometimes entered the wrong victim or perpetrator of an act. Such problems tended to be more difficult to fix, because it was necessary to re-read the whole statement and check all the coding thoroughly.

²⁵ More detail on the 'Analyzer' software can be found at the following Internet address:
http://www.hrdag.org/resources/data_software.shtml.

173. Some of the more elaborate accuracy checks on statements included:
- To ensure that the violations were geographically feasible. For example, in the first year of the conflict, the fighting was largely confined to Bo, Kenema, Pujehun and Kailahun Districts. Some statements reported abuses outside these areas. The statements were checked for location and date and corrected as appropriate.
 - To observe the lineage of ethnicity (through the father). In cases where the ethnicity of the father or a sibling was known, this ethnicity was applied to relatives as appropriate.
 - Where a violation had more than one perpetrator faction, to establish whether those factions collaborated to commit the act. If a statement implied collaboration between factions, it was checked to see if this combination of factions was consistent with known conflict trends.
174. The coding exercise aimed to reproduce the quantifiable content of the statements in a faithful manner. Corrections did not deviate from this principle.

Staffing

175. Initially five data entry workers were recruited in early May 2003. Training took two days under the direction of the Data Processing Officer. To ensure that the work would be completed on time, this team was expanded to eight people in October 2003. The data entry work was completed by the end of November 2003. The majority of the data cleaning and quality control was also completed during this period. Thereafter coders and data entry workers were employed occasionally to assist with remaining data entry and coding corrections. Correction work was completed by mid-February 2004.
176. In total 7700 statements were entered into the database. This covered all the statements collected by the TRC, both in Sierra Leone and internationally. Regrettably there was insufficient time to input the statements from the CGG Mapping Project, although they had been coded.

Data Matching and Judgement

177. The coded statements were entered into a 'Source Layer' in the database. In other words the database contains each item of information in isolation. To avoid the duplication of incidents mentioned in more than one statement the Commission employed a 'judgement process' to match the duplicate actors and violations. The matched data was stored separately in the database in a 'Judgement Layer'. An audit trail between the Source and Judgement layers ensured that matches were linked back to their origin in the statements. The Judgement Layer was used to compile the final statistical results.

The Judgement Process

178. In preparation of the judgement process, deliberations were held to establish what information was considered sufficient to assume that two actors or violations matched. Matching was conducted in two stages.
179. First, actors were matched based on details such as name, date of birth, ethnicity and, where appropriate, time and place of death. This was done by displaying the complete list of victims and repeatedly ordering the data by different variables so that potential matches would appear in adjacent rows.
180. Second, violation matching was applied to the matched actors. For example, supposing that two actors had been matched, the violations each actor suffered would be matched to determine whether they had any information such as time or place in common. Violation matching was largely automated.
181. A team from the Human Rights Data Analysis Group (HRDAG) of the Benetech Initiative (Palo Alto, California, USA) conducted the judgement process with the support of the American Bar Association, Central and East European Law Initiative (ABA/CEELI). The matching exercise took three weeks to complete.

Final Data

182. In total, raw information given to the TRC included 30,638 victims who suffered 64,297 violations. However, many of these victims were anonymous and their details could not be confirmed. The anonymous victims were removed, leaving 16,281 victims. In this group, some victims and their violations were reported to the TRC in more than one statement. When these duplicates were identified, the number was reduced to 15,143 victims who suffered 40,703 violations. This set was given an additional review, and a further 148 additional duplicate victims and their violations were identified. The final data therefore reflected 14,995 victims who suffered a total of 40,242 violations. This set of data was passed on for statistical analysis.

Analytical Reporting

183. Analytical Reporting is the fourth and final stage of the data processing pipeline. The aim was to produce a statistical analysis of the magnitude and trends of violations during the course of the conflict. Whilst some initial analysis was conducted with Source Layer information, the final analysis used to compile information in the TRC report was done with matched data from the 'Judgement Layer' described above.
184. In addition to its quantitative outputs, the database provided a comprehensive index of violations and their associated victims and perpetrators. This information assisted in the qualitative work undertaken by the Commission's researchers.

Qualitative Research

185. To enable the database to support qualitative research work, the TRC Data Processing Officer built a 'reporting interface'. This tool was made available to the Commission's researchers and investigators so that they could query the database directly and generate simple reports showing the data they needed.
186. The reports displayed statement details, statement lists and lists of names. Researchers and investigators could input particular criteria into the reporting interface and generate lists of statements that matched those criteria. For example, before embarking on their missions to identify mass graves in a particular district, the investigators generated lists of statements involving killing violations with multiple victims in that district.
187. The most frequent use of this reporting system was in helping to identify violations against specific types of victim. The system was also used to extract poignant quotes and victim testimony for use in various chapters of the report.
188. In addition, researchers could search the statement summaries and remarks sections to identify specific words or phrases. These searches could generate a variety of interesting insights. In one instance, a search for statements mentioning the word 'diamond' revealed that the most frequently reported violation linked to diamonds was the extortion of diamonds from dealers and miners.

Initial Quantitative Research

189. All statistical work was done using 'flat files' extracted from the database. Each flat file was a comprehensive list of every violation against every victim along with all associated information, including:
 - Facets of the victim such as age, sex and ethnicity;
 - The violation, when it occurred and where it happened; and
 - The responsible faction or factions.
190. Prior to the judgement process it was possible to carry out some preliminary statistical work. Though these results were not used in the final report, the work was vital in gaining an understanding of the conflict and the factors influencing the violations. Typically graphs were produced to consider various key variables in relation to each other, such as:
 - Comparing age and sex of victims for each violation suggested that sexual slavery and forced recruitment violations were most frequent for children between the ages of 10 and 14 years old
 - Examining the prevalence of each violation through time, it became clear that amputations commenced considerably later than most other abuses
191. More specific graphing exercises were undertaken to test specific theories or concerns raised by the researchers. For example, the theory that the Kamajors faction had targeted victims of Northern origin was initially tested with the graphing application.

192. The preliminary graphing work was done by the Data Processing Manager and was completed by the end of November 2003. An initial report was presented to the Commissioners during the pilot phase.

Analytical Reporting

193. Reporting work was divided into two parts. The first part aimed to answer specific questions posed by the researchers. The second part was a refined version of the first, which produced a statistical chapter for inclusion in the TRC's final report. Both were completed with the assistance of a statistician and the HRDAG team provided as part of the ABA/CEELI's assistance to the TRC. Graphs, tables and other statistics were all produced using statistical software packages such as 'R' and 'Stata'.

Hearings

194. The second main component of the operational phase of the Commission was the conduct of hearings. Witnesses and experts were invited to testify before the Commission on their experiences of the conflict. A training session was organised for Commissioners and Commission staff by UNIFEM in March 2003. The training was aimed at giving a gender-balanced perspective to the hearings to prepare Commissioners and staff on how to deal with the gender issues that would arise during the hearings.
195. One of the goals of the hearings was to give victims an opportunity to relate their experiences. For many of them, it was the first time they had talked about what happened to them. The hearings enabled the Commission to catalyse a public debate about such issues as the causes of the conflict, the role of institutions and what needs to be done to transform Sierra Leone. The hearing phase started on 14 April 2003 and was concluded on 5 August 2003. Although attendance was somewhat sparse at the initial hearings in Freetown, audience numbers increased steadily, with large crowds gathering especially in the districts where most of the atrocities took place.

Types of hearings

196. One week in each district was devoted to public hearings for individual statement givers. Victims, witnesses and perpetrators came forward to give testimony on their experiences or roles in the conflict and to answer questions from the Commissioners and staff. The public hearings were held in the district headquarter towns, in appropriate venues such as school buildings or community centres.
197. Each set of district hearings included one day of closed hearings. These hearings were designed to allow children and victims of sexual abuse to testify in a private setting. Closed hearings were also arranged for alleged perpetrators or ex-combatants who were reluctant to speak before the public for security or other reasons.

198. The Commission also held a series of thematic, institutional and event-specific hearings in Freetown. These sessions were held in public and featured submissions and testimony from Government ministers, political parties, UN agencies, local and international NGOs, civil society institutions and other experts. The following subjects were addressed during these hearings:

- Governance in Sierra Leone, including the extent of participation in political processes and respect for human rights
- The role of civil society and immigrant communities
- Management of mineral resources
- Issues of corruption
- Women and girls²⁶
- Children and youths
- Militias and armed groups
- The role of external groupings and international actors
- The Sierra Leone Armed Forces and Police
- The civil service
- The judiciary, the legal profession and the rule of law
- The role of the media
- Promoting reconciliation and national reintegration

199. Hearings were also conducted on the following specific events:

- The NPRC 'coup trials' and executions of December 1992
- The AFRC coup of 25 May 1997
- The SLPP detentions, trials and executions of 1998
- The destruction of Koribundo
- The attack on Freetown in January 1999
- The taking of UN peacekeepers as hostages in May 2000

Selection of cases for hearings

200. Witnesses for hearings were initially selected from among those who made statements during the statement-taking phase. Statements were put forward for hearings according to the following criteria:

- Indication that the statement giver wished to appear in a hearing;
- Ensuring that a representative balance was achieved with regard to region, ethnic group, age group, political affiliation and gender of statement givers;
- Ensuring that a representative balance was achieved with regard to the range of violations that occurred in the conflict and the range of perpetrator factions;
- Fair and equal exposure for violations that were committed by, in the presence of, or with the knowledge of a faction leader or other key role player;
- Proper hearing for statement givers who had information about the administrative and military command structures, internal policing, policy making and sources of authority within the combatant groups; and
- Ensuring public acknowledgement of massacres, mass killings and other systematic violations through first-hand testimony at hearings.

²⁶ The Commission wishes to acknowledge the expertise of UNIFEM in providing guidance and assistance to women's groups in the preparation of their submissions for the TRC Thematic Hearings on Women and Girls.

201. After the initial selection of statements for hearings, District Co-ordinators and statement takers travelled across their districts to contact the relevant statement givers and schedule their appearances. Logistics and other constraints prevented the teams from locating all the witnesses selected. However, the publicity generated in the districts by the holding of hearings brought a whole range of new witnesses who had not given statements during the statement-taking phase and who wanted to testify in public. They were invited to make statements and, in appropriate cases, some of them testified.

Procedures for Hearings

202. The Commission published a set of guidelines on Hearings Procedures, which outlined the rules and processes to be followed, including the role of legal representatives of the parties. A truth commission hearing is a quasi-judicial process. While the Commission did not want to turn itself into a court of law, it was necessary that fair procedures be accorded to all persons appearing before it.
203. Prior to public hearings, the Commission's counsellors briefed individual witnesses on what they might expect from the experience. All witnesses were also debriefed after the hearings. Witnesses were encouraged to bring along a family member or a friend to provide emotional support during the hearings. Witnesses were able to testify in the language of their choice, with interpreters translating their testimonies into English, or into Krio or into the prevailing language in the district.
204. The seating arrangement for the podium party in public hearings resembled a semi-circle, with the witness facing the audience, sitting in the middle between the Commissioners and the leaders of evidence. The witness sat with a family member or friend, or with a counsellor provided by the Commission to offer psychosocial and emotional support. Everybody sat at the same floor level. All of these measures were designed to make TRC witnesses feel secure, relaxed and confident to tell their stories.
205. The presiding Commissioner at each hearing administered an oath to every witness before he or she proceeded to give testimony. After the testimony, the Commissioners and leaders of evidence asked questions of the witness. Finally, the witness was invited to ask the Commissioners questions if they so desired and to make suggestions for the Commission's recommendations.
206. When witnesses mentioned the names of perpetrators, Commission staff made all reasonable efforts to locate alleged perpetrators and invited them to make statements or to participate in a hearing and relay their own version of events. If the whereabouts of a particular perpetrator were not known, a public announcement was made at the hearing venues and letters written to their last known addresses to invite them to contact the Commission and respond to the testimony given about them. Victims were not asked directly by the Commission to forgive their perpetrators. However when victims expressed willingness to meet their perpetrators – and the perpetrators agreed – private meetings were organised by the Commission.

207. The Commission worked together with the Sierra Leone Police Force, the RSLAF and UNAMSIL to ensure the safety of witnesses during the hearings, as well as the security of TRC personnel and equipment. Red Cross volunteers and medical personnel from the district hospitals were also present at every hearing.
208. Only female Commissioners and staff members attended the closed hearings for victims of sexual violence. The dignity of such victims had to be respected and the trauma of their experiences appreciated. The electronic recording of their testimonies was done in such a way as to avoid their being identified. Counsellors were present during the hearings to offer emotional support.
209. The Commission advised women victims of sexual violence who indicated interest in appearing before the Commission to opt for a closed hearing. Nevertheless, some women insisted on appearing before the Commission in public. In such cases, the Commission undertook great efforts to explain to the women the possible consequences of such an appearance and sought to know if they had consulted their family members. Thus only in exceptional circumstances did victims of sexual violence give any testimony in public.
210. Further to the Framework for Co-operation established during statement taking between the Commission and the CPAs, an agreement was reached on the participation of children in hearings. The Commission provided a list of potential child witnesses. The CPAs conducted the necessary vulnerability and safety assessments and consulted with the children and their families. If approval was obtained, the children were prepared for a hearing. A social worker was always present at a child hearing, sitting next to the child and offering any emotional or other support required. After the hearing, the social worker conducted further visits to the child, to ensure no adverse consequences from his or her participation.

The use of subpoenas

211. Where individuals or organisations were unwilling to co-operate with the Commission in the fulfilment of its mandate, the Commission was compelled to resort to its powers of subpoena, as set out section 8(1) of the TRC Act. These powers were used very sparingly, since the spirit of co-operation was generally positive. The Commission preferred, wherever possible, to encourage full, voluntary participation from everyone.

Archiving of the Commission's Materials

212. As the Commission was winding up its activities, decisions had to be taken on the archiving and public accessibility of its source materials. The Commission resolved to make as much material as possible available to the public to encourage further research, debate and public education.
213. The Commission decided that the statements and transcripts from hearings that were not confidential should ultimately be made available to the public. A procedure for accessing these materials was also approved by the Commission. The Commission has recommended that its non-confidential materials be digitised and made available on a CD-Rom of 'Appendices' that will accompany the final report.

APENDICES

APPENDIX ONE: MANUAL FOR STATEMENT-TAKERS

MANUAL FOR STATEMENT TAKERS

The purpose of this document is to guide statement-takers in their work. It explains the Commission's mandate and functions, and offers some guidance regarding the appropriate way to take a statement. The term 'statement-taker' refers to the person who receives and records the statement on behalf of the Commission. The term 'statement-giver' refers to the person telling his/her story to the Commission.

1. What is the Commission, its mandate and functions?

The Commission is an independent organisation whose mandate is to create an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, from the beginning of the conflict in 1991 to the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement on 7 July 1999. The Commission has the mandate to address impunity and to respond to the needs of the victims of the conflict in Sierra Leone. The Commission has also been established to prevent a repetition of the conflict.

The general function of the Commission is to investigate and report on the causes, nature and extent of the human rights violations and abuses, and on the context in which these violations and abuses occurred. It also has to report on whether or not the human rights violations and abuses were the result of deliberate planning, policy or authorisation by any government, group or individual. The Commission will investigate and report on the role played by both internal and external factors in the conflict. In this respect, it will investigate the role that foreign individuals, groups or governments might have played in the conflict in Sierra Leone.

During its statement-taking phase, the Commission has to provide an opportunity to victims to give an account of the human rights violations and abuses they have suffered in order to assist them restore their dignity and to promote reconciliation. It also has to provide an opportunity to perpetrators to relate their experiences and to create a forum within which victims and perpetrators can speak to each other. Statement-takers will therefore collect statements from both victims and perpetrators in the conflict.

The Commission will give special attention to the needs of child victims, to those who have suffered sexual abuses and to children who were perpetrators in the conflict.

The Commission has no money of its own to give to victims. On the other hand, it will, in its Final Report, make recommendations to the government of Sierra Leone. There is a place in the statement form for victims, perpetrators and witnesses to indicate to the Commission the recommendations that they would like it to make.

2. What is the difference between the Commission and the Special Court, and what is their relationship?

The Commission and the Special Court are two independent organisations who have started their work at the same time. The Special Court is a court of law, and will therefore try people who have responsibilities in the conflict in Sierra Leone. But the mandate of the Special Court is to try those who bear the greatest responsibilities in the conflict, that is, not more than 25 people in all (?).

The Commission is not a court of law. It will not prosecute anybody and will not apply any sentence to any perpetrator in the conflict. The purpose of the Commission is to give an opportunity to victims, perpetrators and witnesses to the conflict to speak about their experiences. It will not limit itself to those who bear the greatest responsibilities. The Commission is for everybody; it is to seek truth and promote reconciliation.

The Commission and the Special Court both have the mandate to address impunity, but by different means. They are complementary organisations, but are totally independent from one another. That is to say that the Commission will not disclose any information collected in its statement-taking phase to the Special Court.

3. Understanding of human rights violations and abuses

Human rights law applies in times of conflict as well as in times of peace. "Human rights" is a term used to describe a broad spectrum of rights that may belong to individuals, groups (such as ethnic and religious minorities) and "peoples". Human rights are sometimes classified into civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. They range from rights which contemplate the core values of human dignity, like the right to life and the prohibition of torture, to the right to housing and medical care.

The Commission is interested in all of these categories. Although wartime atrocities usually involve the "core" human rights, like the right to life and the protection against cruel and inhuman treatment, the conflict in Sierra Leone may also have involved, and have been caused by, violations of such economic and social rights as the right to food, to housing and to medical care. The Commission takes a broad approach to the term human rights.

A list of human rights is provided in annex 1. This list should be regarded as a sample of human rights and therefore, it is not exhaustive. Statement-takers should be careful in excluding any type of right that is not included in the list. The Commission wishes not to exclude anyone who thinks he/she has suffered a human rights abuse or violation.

4. Understanding of violations of international humanitarian law

International humanitarian law applies in times of armed conflict. These are the laws of war, found in documents like the Geneva Convention. They protect civilians, non-combatants like wounded soldiers and prisoners, and even combatants, against inhuman abuses.

5. Differences between victims, perpetrators and witnesses

The Commission considers four categories of statement givers. The statement-taker will have to determine in which of the four categories each person belongs. The categories are made according to the role played in the conflict.

Victims: This category regroups statement-givers who have suffered a human rights violation or abuse or a violation of international humanitarian law during the conflict. Those statement-givers will tell the statement-takers about what they suffered.

Perpetrators: This category is for statement givers who have themselves committed human rights violations or abuses or violations of international humanitarian law during the conflict. Those statement-givers will tell the statement-takers about what they inflicted to other people.

Witnesses: The Commission also provides for people who have seen human rights violations or abuses or violations of international humanitarian law committed during the conflict. These are the people who have witnessed an incident and want to tell the Commission about it.

Person making a statement on behalf of someone else: This category includes the statement-givers who want to tell the story of a victim family member, relative or friend who is not able to speak to the Commission himself, either because of emotional, mental or physical problems (including death).

The statement form contains a section for all of the categories, namely one for victims, one for perpetrators, one for direct witnesses and one for people making a statement on behalf of a family member, a relative or a friend.

It is crucial for the statement-takers to understand that the statement-giver can belong to more than one category.

Indeed, many people in Sierra Leone are victims, perpetrators and witnesses at the same time. As an example, let's consider the case of a child soldier. If the child was recruited involuntarily, he can be considered as a victim. On the other hand, after his forced enrolment, he is likely to have committed himself human rights violations or abuses or violations of international humanitarian law during his time as a combatant. That makes him a perpetrator as well. Furthermore, this same child soldier is likely to have been a witness to atrocities committed by others; he is therefore also a witness. The statement-takers will then have to fill in three of the statement form sections, one for each role that the statement-giver has played in the conflict.

6. **Issues of confidentiality and self-incrimination**

Confidentiality:

The issues of confidentiality and self-incrimination must not be confused. Confidentiality means that no name or information leading to the identification of a statement giver will be published in the Final Report of the Commission. It is important to note that by making a statement to the Commission, the name and the details of the statement the person makes may appear in the Final Report of the Commission. Perpetrators whom the statement-giver names may also be informed of any allegations that the statement-giver makes, unless the statement-giver specifically requests that any information he/she gives to the Commission be regarded as confidential. The statement-giver may also require that the Commission does not disclose his/her name or details which may make it possible to identify him/her. In this instance, the statement-giver will need to request that the Commission extends this kind of protection to him/her by telling his/her statement-taker. When making the statement, statement-givers will have to inform their statement-taker that they want to request confidentiality from the Commission.

Self-incrimination:

The right to avoid self-incrimination means that a person's testimony at the Commission cannot be used against that person in any court of law, including the Special Court. During the statement-taking phase, perpetrators giving a statement will have to provide the Commission with details related to the human rights violations and/or abuses they committed. These details will not, under any circumstance, be used to prosecute them. The right to avoid self-incrimination is part of the law and is granted automatically to all statement givers (they do not have to request it).

7. **How to take a statement¹**

A. General rules of statement taking

Confidence

Statement-takers should always keep in mind that giving a statement may be a difficult and even painful experience for the person giving the statement. Indeed, it will force the statement-giver to relive his/her experience: the human rights violations suffered, witnessed or committed. Feelings of fear, sadness or guilt may resurface during the statement-giving. It is therefore crucial that the statement-taker be attentive and compassionate. The statement-giver must feel that his/her experience is of interest to the statement taker. The statement-giver must be allowed to take breaks when tired or when overwhelmed by emotions.

The statement-taker should always avoid appearing to be judging the statement-giver, disapproving his/her conduct or disbelieving the information given. Overall, the statement taker should appear as neutral as possible, while at the same time show compassion for the statement-giver's suffering.

The statement form

The statement-taker will have to explain the different sections of the statement form to the person giving the statement. The statement-taker should first explain the Commission's role and functions, briefly if the statement-giver seems already aware, more in depth if the statement-giver does not seem familiar with it. Then, the statement-taker will read and explain the rules of confidentiality and make sure that the statement-giver understands them, by insisting that he/she may ask questions in order to clarify these issues. The statement-giver must sign the declaration at the bottom of the page, indicating that he/she understands and agrees to the conditions outlined.

The statement-taker has then to fill up the section on his/her own personal details and sign it. He/she will then read the section on personal details of the statement-giver and complete the questions. The statement-giver has to sign the declaration at the end of this section to indicate that the information provided is accurate and true.

At this point, the statement-taker will ask the statement-giver what kind of statement he/she wishes to give to the Commission. That is to say, does the statement-giver wish to tell the Commission about human rights violations and abuses he/she suffered, witnessed, committed or that a relative suffered? The corresponding section is to be completed by the statement-taker. If the statement-giver considers himself/herself as belonging to more than one category, each corresponding section will be completed in turn.

Each section comprises several questions. The statement-taker has to ensure that the statement-giver understands perfectly each question and allow the statement-giver to ask for clarification at any time. At the end of a section, the statement-taker reads the declaration and asks the statement-giver to sign his/her statement, indicating that the information provided is accurate and true to the best knowledge of the statement-giver.

The narrative

Each section of the form asks for the statement-giver to tell his/her story. Although the statement-taker should let the statement-giver speak as freely as possible, some clarification questions might become necessary. For example, clarification questions regarding the number of persons present during the incident, the actions of a specific person, etc., may be useful.

The statement-taker must avoid asking leading questions at all times. A leading question may present a temptation for the statement-giver to answer what he/she thinks that the statement-taker wants to hear rather than the truth.

It is important to note that extra pages have been added to the statement form to allow the statement-taker to take extra notes regarding any of the questions. Therefore, statement-takers should never interrupt a statement-giver because of a lack of space in the form to record answers. Statement-takers will need to identify any extra page used with the number of the section and question to which it belongs.

The recording of statements

Some statement-takers will be asked by the Commission to record statements using an audio tape recorder or a camera. This equipment should never be hidden from the statement-giver and the statement-taker should always request the permission of the statement-giver to use it. It must be explained carefully to the statement-giver that his/her name will not be recorded on the tape. The statement-taker must never photograph the face of the statement-giver, in order to preserve confidentiality and to protect the statement-giver.

If the statement-giver does not feel comfortable with the use of a taper recorder or a camera, the statement-taker should not insist on using it. If the use of an audio tape recorder is not permitted by the statement-giver, the statement-taker will have to rely on taking notes by hand.

Translation issues

1. Translation of the statement form:

The statement is in English. It will be the responsibility of the statement-taker to translate the questions for statement-givers that do not speak English. Two conditions are necessary: 1) the statement-taker must understand the questions perfectly and 2) he/she must speak the language of the statement giver well enough to be able to translate the questions clearly. If this is not the case, the statement-taker will have to rely on the use of an interpreter (this will be covered below).

When translating the questions, the statement-taker should use simple words and short sentences, in order to make sure that the meaning of the question is not lost during translation. He/she must also make sure that the statement-giver understands the questions perfectly and that there is no confusion. A good strategy is to ask the statement-giver if the question is clear, and repeat the question using different words if necessary. Again, the statement-taker must refrain from asking leading questions at all time.

It is up to the statement-taker to decide if he/she prefers to take notes in English or in the language used by the statement-giver. In the latter case, it will be the responsibility of the statement-taker to translate the answers in English after the statement-taking.

2. The use of interpreters:

In the case where an interpreter is necessary, the statement-taker should have a meeting with the person chosen before the statement-taking. They should review the statement form together and the statement-taker should ensure that the interpreter understands all questions. The interpreter must be instructed to relay the questions exactly, without using words or expressions that may be confusing to the statement-giver. The interpreter must let the statement taker know immediately if the statement-giver does not seem to understand a question, in order to let the statement-taker rephrase the question.

B. Taking a statement from special groups

Victims of torture

Statement-takers must be very careful when taking a statement from a victim of torture. The retraumatization of the victim must be avoided as much as possible. The statement-taker needs to be prepared to deal with the emotions that the victim will necessarily experience while telling his/her story. The statement-taker should always be compassionate and attentive to the victim, and allow him/her to take breaks when the emotions seem too painful.

Women victims of sexual abuse or rape

In most countries around the world, sexual abuse and rape are socially attached to feelings of shame. According to some cultural values, women victims of sexual abuse or rape feel guilty about their experience and may be reluctant to speak about it. It is therefore highly important that the statement taker establish trust with the statement-giver and avoid asking for embarrassing details when these details are not indispensable to the telling of the story. The statement-giver should not be pushed to relate details that she does not feel comfortable revealing. The Commission will allow for women victims of sexual abuse or rape to request that a female statement taker take their statement.

Children

Very special care must be used when taking a statement from a child. Children have been implicated in the conflict in Sierra Leone in many ways: most child perpetrators are also victims, because most of them have been abducted and enrolled against their will into the warring factions. In that regard, statement-takers must always look compassionate and avoid judging the child. They must be very attentive to the needs of the child and avoid pushing by asking for answers that the child does not want to provide. The child should be allowed to ask for breaks or to stop the statement taking at any time. Breaks should be planned by the statement takers even if the child does not ask for it.

The statement-taker must explain the form very carefully to the child, using simple language to avoid confusion. The statement-taker needs to keep in mind that children may not understand the formulation of a question that has been designed for adults and that rephrasing questions might be useful. The child should also be allowed to be accompanied by a family member or a friend if he/she feels the need for it.

Perpetrators

When taking a statement from a perpetrator, the most important thing for statement-takers is to avoid judging the statement giver, whatever the violations committed. Statement-takers must be prepared to deal with feelings of guilt and anger during the statement-taking. Finally, statement-takers must keep in mind that a lot of perpetrators to the conflict in Sierra Leone are also victims as well.

Appendix Two: List of Human Rights

The following simplified list, derived from the Universal Declaration and the African Charter, is proposed for the guidance of statement-takers:

Discrimination on grounds of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, disability
Right to life
Right to be free from violence
Slavery
Torture
Cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
Wrongful arrest or detention
Right to a fair trial
Right to privacy
Protection of home and family
Freedom of movement
Right to nationality
Right to marry and have a family without discrimination
Right to property
Freedom of religion
Freedom of speech
Right to receive information
Freedom of association
Freedom of peaceful assembly (meetings)
Right to vote and to democratic government
Right to work
Right to decent working conditions
Right to equal pay for equal work
Right to join trade unions
Reasonable limitation of working hours and periodic paid holidays
Right to food, clothing, housing and medical care
Right to education
Right to participate in the cultural life of the community
Protection against ill-treatment of children and the elderly
Right to a healthy environment
Right not to be forced to enroll or participate in an armed conflict?

APENDIX THREE STATEMENT-TAKING PROTOCOL

Number : _____

THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
SIERRA LEONE

STATEMENT

Block A, Brookfields Hotel, Jomo Kenyatta Rd., Freetown.

THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Object of the Commission as set out in Section 6 (1) of the TRC Act of 2000

The Commission is established for the object of:
Creating an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, from the beginning of the conflict in 1991 to the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement on 7 July 1999;
Addressing impunity;
Responding to the needs of victims;
Preventing a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered.

The function of the Commission as set out in the Act is:

1. To investigate and report on the causes, nature and extent of the human rights violations and abuses, and on the context in which these violations and abuses occurred;

To report on whether or not the human rights violations and abuses were the result of deliberate planning, policy or authorisation by any government, group or individual;

To investigate and report on the role played by both internal and external factors in the conflict.
2. To provide an opportunity to victims to give an account of the human rights violations and abuses they have suffered in order to assist them restore their dignity and to promote reconciliation;

To provide an opportunity to perpetrators to relate their experiences and to create a forum within which victims and perpetrators can speak to each other;
3. The Commission is to give special attention to the needs of child victims, to those who have suffered sexual abuses and to children who were perpetrators in the conflict.

Making a statement to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission

The Truth and Reconciliation Act 2000, envisages that a number of different people and institutions will make statements to the Commission. These will include victims, witnesses, perpetrators, political parties, civil society institutions and interested parties. The Commission sets out below those categories of people who may be interested in making either a statement or submission to the Commission.

1. Those who have suffered violations

You may make a statement to the Commission in the following circumstances:

- If you have suffered a human rights violation or abuse or a violation or abuse in terms of international humanitarian law during the conflict period in Sierra Leone which you wish to share with the Commission;
- If you have a relative or a friend who has suffered a human rights violation or abuse or a violation or abuse of international humanitarian law and they are not able to make the statement themselves because they are dead or missing or not in an emotional frame of mind to do so themselves and you wish to share this information with the Commission;
- If you have witnessed a human rights violation or abuse or a violation or abuse of international humanitarian rights law and you wish to share this information with the Commission.

2. Those who have committed violations and abuses

You may also make a statement to the Commission if you have committed or been responsible for the commission of a human rights violation or abuse or a violation or abuse of international humanitarian rights law and you wish to share this information with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission;

3. Those who have knowledge of the commission of violations and abuses

If you are an ex-combatant, a policeman, a soldier and you wish to inform the Commission of violations and abuses you have witnessed being perpetrated, you may also make a statement to the Commission sharing your experiences.

If you have witnessed a human rights violation or abuse or a violation or abuse of international humanitarian rights law and you wish to share this information with the Commission.

3. Political Parties, civil society institutions and interested parties (including governmental institutions and agencies)

The Commission will be requesting that political parties, civil society institutions and interested parties make submissions to it on their knowledge of the violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law which has taken place. The Commission intends particularly to address the issue of whether these violations and abuses were the result of deliberate planning, policy or authorization by any government, group or individual as well as the role of both internal and external factors in the conflict.

Confidentiality

Should you wish to give information to the Commission on a confidential basis, the Commission will ensure that such information is never used by it in such a way as to permit your identification, either directly or indirectly. The Commission will never disclose a statement given to it after confidentiality has been requested. You must exercise this request by signing this form in the appropriate place on page 5. If you wish to give some information on a

confidential basis, but are willing to provide other information without requesting confidentiality, please use two separate sheets, indicating the information that is confidential on one of them and signing the request for confidentiality.

Confidentiality is the prerogative of the Commission. The Commission has decided to extend this protection to all who require it.

It is important to note that the Commission will not be sharing any information with the Special Court. No information given to the Commission on a confidential basis will be provided to the Special Court.

Public Hearings

The Commission will be holding public hearings for victims, perpetrators and witnesses. Please inform the Statement-Taker whether you will be willing to appear at a Public hearing to share your experiences publicly if you are invited.

Special Hearing Procedures

The Commission is cognizant of the fact that many victims and witnesses may not feel secure in making statements or giving their testimony in public. The Commission has the power in terms of the Act to implement special procedures to protect victims and witnesses and in particular women and children. The Commission will also implement special procedures to address the needs of those who have suffered sexual abuse. Special Procedures will also take into account the needs of Child perpetrators.

Telling the truth

Truth telling is important for the Commission. It is your duty to tell the truth. Only in this way can the Commission accomplish its goals of genuine reconciliation. If you intentionally provide misleading or false information to the Commission, you are liable to trial by the High Court of Sierra Leone for contempt of court, and may be punished with fine or imprisonment.

Please sign this declaration at the end of this page as proof of the fact that you have read and understand what has been stated above. You may ask the Statement-Taker to explain this section to you.

Declaration

I, _____ affirm:

That I have read this section and understand its contents insofar as they pertain to me; or the Statement-Taker has explained this section to me and I confirm that I understand the contents thereof insofar as they pertain to me.

Signature or thumbprint

Dated at _____ (Chiefdom and District) on this the _____ day of _____ 2003

Please sign the following section as well if you wish the information you give to the Commission to be treated as confidential

Declaration by Those Wishing to Give Confidential Information

I _____ affirm that I request that the Commission treat the information I am giving as confidential. I understand that the Commission will not use the information that I provide in such a way as to permit me to be identified.

Signature or thumbprint

Dated at _____ (Chiefdom and District) on this _____ day of _____ 2003

Section 1: Section for Statement-Taker

The Statement-Taker is an employee of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission authorised to complete this form.

This section should be completed by the Statement-Taker and refer to his/her particulars.

1. Particulars of Statement-Taker

Name of statement-taker: _____

2. Areas of responsibility for Statement-Taker

Please circle the number of the region which you are responsible for taking statement from:

1. Western Area 1
2. Western Area 2
3. Northern Region
4. Southern Region
5. Eastern Region

Please circle the number of the district you are responsible for:

1. Kailahun
2. Kenema
3. Kono
4. Bombali
5. Kambia
6. Koinadugu
7. Port Loko
8. Tonkolili
9. Bo
10. Bonthe
11. Pujehun
12. Moyamba
13. Western Area 1
14. Western Area 2

3. Please fill in the name of the town/place/chiefdom where this statement has been

taken: _____

4. Please fill in the language in which this interview was conducted: _____

Section 2: Personal Details of the Statement-Giver

The Statement-Giver is the person who tells his/her story to the Commission.

A. Personal details:

1. Family name: _____
2. First name: _____
3. Other names: _____
*Alias, combat name, nickname.
4. Date of birth: _____
5. Age at incident _____
6. Ethnic group: _____
7. National Identity / Passport (where available): _____
8. Place of birth: _____
9. Nationality: _____
10. Occupation/Education level: _____
11. Marital Status: _____
12. Sex: _____

B. Contact details:

1. Where can you be contacted in the future:
2. Address: _____

3. Telephone : _____
4. Mobile: _____
5. Fax number: _____

Family member or relative where you may be contacted:

1. Name and Address: _____

2. Telephone: _____
3. Mobile: _____
4. Fax number: _____

Other (person with whom a message can be left):

C. Please indicate whether the statement is about violations and abuses suffered by
(please circle):

1. You personally
2. A family member, a relative, a friend or someone known to you
3. Another person known or unknown to you

D. Is the information you will be providing the Commission confidential? YES NO

General instructions for the Statement-Giver

1. If this statement is about you and the human rights violations and abuses you have personally experienced or suffered, please complete section 3.
2. If this statement is made by you on behalf of a family member, a relative or a friend, who have experienced human rights violations and abuses, please complete section 4.
3. If this statement is about human rights violations and abuses you have witnessed, please complete section 5. In the case of mass victims, please give the Commission estimates of the numbers of people, their sexes, ages and any other relevant information that could enable the Commission disaggregate the information.
4. If this statement is about human rights violations and abuses you have carried out, please complete section 6.

Please attach any photographs, medical records or certificates that may assist the Commission understand your story.

1.2 Please provide the statement taker with details as to the date, places and circumstances of the human rights violations and abuses you have suffered.

1.3 Do you think that you were specifically targeted or singled out?

YES NO

If yes, please explain why you believe that you were targeted or singled out.

2. Perpetrator information

2.1 Do you know the identity of the person / persons or group who committed the violations and/or abuses? Did he/they call themselves by any aliases or names?

YES NO

2.2 Did they belong to one of the groups or factions indicated below and, if yes, which one (please circle)?

- UN Peacekeepers Police RUF AFRC SLA
- ECOMOG NPRC APC Govt. SLPP Govt. The Peoples Army
- CDF: Kamajors Donsos Gbethes Tamaboros Kapras
- Executive Outcomes Gurkhas Civilian Collaborator to any of these groups

Others: _____

Further details: _____

2.3 Is there any particular detail that you remember about the perpetrator(s) (for example, physical details such as scars, clothes, names, insignia or languages spoken)?

2.4 Do you know the region or district where the perpetrator(s) came from?

2.5 Could you identify him/her/them if you saw them again?

YES NO

2.6 Please provide the current whereabouts and address of the perpetrator(s), if known to you.

2.7 Which language was spoken by the perpetrator(s)?

2.8 Do you know to which ethnic group the perpetrator(s) belonged?

2.9 Male or female: _____

3. Political affiliation / organisation that you belong to

3.1 At the time of the violation / abuse, were you a member of any organisation, faction or group?

YES NO

3.2 If you were a member of an organisation, please indicate if it was one of the following:

1. Community 2. Political grouping or party 3. Military
4. Police 5. Other

3.3 Please detail the name of the organisation, the dates of your membership and the position(s) you held:

Name of organisation: _____

Dates of membership: _____

Position(s) held: _____

3.4 Were you sick, injured, captured or surrendered at the time of the violation?

YES

NO

4. Witness details

4.1 Did anybody witness the violations and abuses you suffered?

YES

NO

4.2 If there is a witness or witnesses who saw what happened, please provide the Commission with the following details:

Name of witness / witnesses: _____

Contact address(es): _____

Telephone / mobile number: _____

4.3 Would they be willing to make a statement to the Commission about what they saw?

YES

NO

DON'T KNOW

5. Other victims in the same incident

5.1 Are you able to confirm that other people have suffered human rights violations and/or abuses with you, in the same incident?

YES

NO

If yes, please provide the following details to the Commission (please use additional sheets if necessary):

Family name: _____

First name: _____

Other names: _____

*Alias, combat name, nickname.

Ethnic group: _____

Relationship with you: _____

*For example: spouse, child, neighbour, etc.

Address: _____

Telephone / Mobile: _____

Occupation: _____

Please fill in Sections 4 and/or 5 of this booklet for those other violations that you witnessed or know about.

6. Consequences of the human rights violations and abuses suffered

6.1 Did you sustain any physical or mental injury, damage or loss as a result of the human rights violation or abuse?

YES

NO

If yes, please describe the nature of the physical or mental injury, damage or loss sustained:

6.2 Did you receive medical treatment and/or counselling or participate in a traditional healing/cleansing process?

YES

NO

If yes, please provide details:

6.3 What is the current status of your health?

6.4 Have you received any compensation for the loss or damage you sustained?

YES

NO

6.5 What impact did the human rights violation or abuse have on you, eg are you disabled, have you lost your home, etc.?

6.6 How do you currently support yourself?

6.7 Family details (please circle)

A. Marital Status: Single Married Divorced Widowed

B. Children: Yes No If yes, how many: ____

C. Names of children: _____

D. Names of other dependants: _____

E. Accommodation:

Details: _____

7. Appearance at hearings

7.1 Are you willing to testify at a public hearing?

YES

NO

2.3 Did you witness the event or incident personally or were you informed by someone else of what happened (please circle)?

I witnessed it myself

Someone else told me

If someone else related the event to you, please provide the following details about this person:

Name: _____

Address: _____

Occupation: _____

Date when you were informed: _____

If there were several victims, please give the Commission an estimate of their number, sexes and ages.

3. Perpetrator(s) details

3.1 Do you know the identity of the person(s) who committed the violation and/or abuse?

YES

NO

3.2 Could you identify him/her/them if you saw them again?

YES

NO

Please tell the Commission about the perpetrator(s):

Name(s): _____

Ethnic group: _____

Other names: _____

*For example: combat name, nickname, alias, etc.

Combat unit / faction / other: _____

Rank: _____

Region from which perpetrator(s) came from: _____

Language spoken: _____

Address (if known): _____

Current whereabouts (if known): _____

Any other detail: _____

4. Consequences of the human rights violations and abuses suffered

4.1 Did the victim sustain any physical or mental injury, damage or loss as a result of the human rights violation or abuse suffered?

YES

NO

If yes, please describe the nature of the physical or mental injury, damage or loss sustained:

4.2 Did the victim receive medical treatment and/or counselling?

YES

NO

If yes, please provide details:

4.3 What is the current status of the victim's health?

4.4 Have the victim(s) received any compensation for the loss or damage he/she sustained?

YES

NO

4.5 What impact did the human rights violations or abuses have on the victim, eg is he/she disabled, have he/she lost their home, is the victim dead, etc.?

Ethnic group: _____
Combat unit / faction: _____
Rank(s): _____
Age: _____
Sex: _____
Region the perpetrator(s) is from: _____
Language spoken by the perpetrator(s): _____
Ethnic group: _____

3.2 Could you identify him/her/them if you saw them again?

YES NO

3.3 Please provide the current whereabouts and address of the perpetrator(s), if known to you.

4. Consequences for the victim(s)

4.1 Do you know what consequences the victim(s) has experienced following the human rights violations or abuses he/she/they suffered?

YES NO

If yes, please describe what these consequences are to the best of your knowledge (for example: death, physical or mental injury, loss of home, etc.):

1.2 Please give details as to the date and place of the human rights violations and abuses:

1.3 Did you act as an individual or as part of a group? _____

1.4 How old were you at the time you committed the violation?

1.5 Were you a civilian at the time you committed the violation and/or abuse?

YES

NO

1.6 Did they belong to one of the groups or factions indicated below and, if yes, which one (please circle)?

UN Peacekeepers Police

RUF

AFRC

SLA

ECOMOG NPRC

APC Govt

SLPP Govt.

Peoples Army

CDF: Kamajors Donsos Gbethes Tamaboros

Executive Outcomes

Gurkhas

Civilian Collaborator to any of these groups

Others: _____

Further details: _____

1.7 Please provide details of all the different groups you may have belonged to and the dates of your belonging:

1.7 Are you currently employed?

YES NO

If yes, please provide the details: _____

1.8 What are your educational training and qualifications?

2. Command information

2.1 Were you acting under orders to commit the human rights violations and/or abuses?

YES NO

If you were acting under orders, please provide the Commission with the following details:

Please indicate who ordered you to commit the violations/abuses.

If you had refused to carry out the instructions given, what would have happened to you?

Have you ever refused to carry out the orders or instructions of a superior officer or a commander?

YES

NO

If you have, please give details of the circumstances as well as what happened when you refused.

Who was your commander or immediate superior officer?

3. Victim(s) information

3.1 Did you know the identity of your victim(s)?

YES

NO

If yes, please provide the Commission with the following details:

Name of victim(s): _____

Ethnic group: _____

Age: _____

Region or district they were from: _____

Male(s) or female(s): _____

3.2 What was the reason or motive for the human rights violations or abuses?

3.3 What were the consequences for the victim(s) of the human rights violation or abuse?

3.4 Are you willing to meet with your victim(s) if the Commission is able to facilitate such a meeting?

YES

NO

3.5 What are you willing to do in order to make it up to your victim(s)?

Accept responsibility and offer apology _____

Pay reparations _____

Participate in rebuilding _____

Other (please specify) _____

3.6 What is your reason or motivation for making a statement to the Commission?

4. Consequences:

4.1 What are the consequences of your experience to you?

Personal: _____

Familial: _____

Employment prospects: _____

Physical and emotional well-being: _____

4.2 Did you participate in any of the disarmament, re-integration or cleansing programmes or ceremonies?

YES

NO

If yes, please provide details:

4.3 Did you receive any assistance from any structure or body?

YES

NO

Please provide the details of any assistance received:

Body or structure: _____

Training: _____

Education: _____

Financial assistance: _____

Medication: _____

Emotional support: _____

4.4 Please tell the Commission how you currently support yourself:

4.5 Please provide details of dependants, if any: _____

5. Appearance at public hearings

5.1 Are you willing to testify at a public hearing?

YES

NO

5.2 Are you going to mention names in your testimony? The person you name may be informed and may wish to defend

APPENDIX FOUR

HEARING PROCEDURES PROCESS OF HEARINGS BY THE COMMISSION

GOALS OF THE HEARINGS

The primary goal of the hearings is to cater to the needs of victims. The hearings will also enable the Commission to collect information about the experiences of all the people during the conflict with a view to promoting social harmony and reconciliation.

OBJECTIVES OF THE HEARINGS

1. To provide witnesses with an opportunity to tell their stories either publicly or in private and help relieve their grief or recognise their feeling of remorse through providing them a platform that validates their experience and offers official acknowledgement of the wrongs done to or by them.
2. To create an opportunity for the country to be engaged in a dialogue with itself about what went wrong and what needs to change.
3. To provide information that may promote future accountability.
4. To educate the public on the patterns of abuse, the social environment in which violations and abuses took place, institutional complicity, and the actions and omissions of different actors, local and international.
5. To engage and mobilise civil society in the journey to reconciliation through embodying an open, dialogic and participatory process as an ethos for conflict resolution and democratisation in the country
6. To make recommendations towards charting a roadmap for development and sustainable peace in Sierra Leone.
7. To promote community and individual healing for victims, witnesses and perpetrators and the rehabilitation of victims through public recognition of their

suffering (and in the case of community reconciliation procedures, the reintegration of individuals back into their communities.)

8. To provide public education on human rights particularly the human and other costs of human rights violations.
9. To promote reconciliation through truth telling.

PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE HEARINGS

1. Respect for diversity: The Commission respects the participants' rights to narrate the facts or events in an atmosphere of respect to their identity and without discrimination on gender, social, political, religious or cultural grounds. Participants will have the right to express themselves in their own language, for which there will be interpretation services provided.
2. No hierarchy: cases selected by the Commission for the hearings will be illustrative of the totality of abuses and violations committed with the aim of achieving dignity for the victim and creating an impartial historical record.
3. Emotional and social sustainability. Participants will have the right to be accompanied by their immediate family as well as by members of the local community. They will be protected from harassment and lack of respect which are likely to increase the emotional impact of giving public testimony.
4. Respect for all witnesses. All persons who appear at the hearings are witnesses for the Commission they therefore deserve respect. Nobody will be denied the possibility of providing his/her account of the events within the framework of the Commission's processes, either through statement taking and investigations or testimony at hearings.
5. The voluntary participation of all witnesses will be encouraged at all times. The use of subpoena to attend a hearing will be a last resort in appropriate cases.
6. The security of witnesses appearing at the hearings is important to the Commission. The Commission may in the interest of the witness decline to invite a witness to a public hearing, or take the witness's testimony in private.

TYPES OF HEARINGS

The Commission shall organise four types of hearings:

1. Individual witness hearings. Individuals are requested during statement taking whether they would be willing to attend and give testimony at hearings.
2. Thematic hearings. This is designed to produce a social analysis that describes and explains the past in relation to a number of identified themes. Such hearings will allow the Commission to address patterns of abuse and broader social analysis regarding the enabling background conditions.
3. Event-specific hearings. The Commission hopes to consider whether particular events served an especially catalytic role in the history of human rights abuse in Sierra Leone.
4. Institutional hearings. The Commission wishes to consider whether there were specific civil society institutions or state structures that warrant particular scrutiny for their role in inflicting, legitimising or ignoring abuses. Were there sectors of society which benefited from abusive structures? Were there other institutions that were targeted unfairly? Institutional hearings will therefore provide the Commission with an opportunity to address areas where broader institutional reform and policy change may be needed.

PRE HEARING PROCEDURES

1. Selection of Witnesses

- a. Witnesses to testify in the public or closed hearings are those who have given statements to the Commission.
- b. For thematic, institutional or event specific hearings, the Commission may invite any witness to testify (whether or not the witness has made a statement), if in the opinion of the Commission, the interests of truth finding and the mandate of the Commission will be best served by receiving testimony from the witness.

2. The criteria for selecting cases for hearings are as follows:

- a. Representative cases
 - I. Regarding different kinds of constituencies – diversity in relation to a whole range of factors, including region, ethnic group, political affiliation, gender, social status, class, age, military/civilian etc.
 - II. Different kinds of violations – the range of violations that have taken place in Sierra Leone's history. It is also desired to offer a full picture of the kind of repression suffered by victims so as to flag areas for institutional reform/retraining. This is also important to address violations that elucidate the broader socio-political environment that enabled human rights violations.
 - III. Different localities –to maximize national outreach, hearings will be held in every district and in a range of settings: schools, meeting rooms in faith institutions, community centres, halls etc.
- b. Where the violation was committed by, in the presence and/or knowledge of any one perceived as a key player/leader in the conflict.
- c. The statement mentions the following institutions APC Govt; NPRC Govt; RUF; ECOMOG; SLPP Govt; AFRC; People's Army; Guinean Armed Forces; Identified Mercenaries; Security Firms (Executive Outcomes, Sandline), UN Peacekeepers.
- d. The statement giver has information about the administrative/military command structure, internal policing, policy making, local authorities within the combatant groups.
- e. The statement mentions a mass killing (below 50 deaths) or a massacre (above 50 deaths).

- f. The statement refers to an international arms/drugs/diamond transaction.

3. Witness preparation prior to hearings:

- a. Those witnesses who will give testimony shall be given advance notice regarding the process and dates to reconfirm their interest in participating in hearings.
- b. A pre hearing interview will be held with a staff member of the Commission to help the witness prepare effective presentations on the facts and the meaning attributable to those facts
- c. At those briefings, witnesses would be given information on the hearings procedures and the position of the witness during the hearing. They will also be told what they might expect from participation in the hearings from media coverage to the psychological impact of testifying about painful events. Post hearings actions and support will also be discussed, such as the consequences if any, for the perpetrators they identify and the Commission's anticipated timeline for report writing.

4. Witness protection.

The Commission shall provide witness protection if it is determined that a witness is potentially at risk because of public testimony. If the potential risk is greater than the witness protection services the Commission can offer, the Commission will discourage the witness from testifying.

HEARING PROCEDURES

1. **Welcome**

- a. The Presiding Commissioner will invite prayers and/or religious songs before the start of the day's proceedings. The Commissioner will welcome all present, in particular the witnesses for attending the hearings.
- b. The Commissioner will explain the programme for the entire week or duration of hearings in the locality. He/she would also explain the procedures for hearings, including issues such as clapping, shouting or booing people; address any potential false expectations on the part of the people (such as ordering reparations; opportunities for testimony; investigation of all cases, etc); the availability of counsellors and the holding of closed sessions. Those wishing to make statements during the course of the hearings would be directed to the venue for doing so. It must be noted that the hearing is a solemn occasion deserving of rectitude. Those who want to participate in any processes to mark the end of hearings or who signify their desire to reconcile and engage in the rebuilding of their relationships or communities would be invited indicate to staff of the Commission.
- c. Each day's proceedings will be ended by reading a roll call of all those who have died and were mentioned in the course of the day's session, and observing a minute's silence in their honour.

2. **Status of witnesses**

Every person testifying at the hearing is a witness for the Commission including those against whom allegations have been made.

3. Oath

- a. All testimony shall be under oath. The Commissioner presiding shall administer the oath to the witness in the language he/she understands.
- b. All non-staff of the Commission, such as interpreters, who will be temporarily employed by the Commission during the hearings shall also be administered an oath before they begin to render service at the venue of the hearing.

4. Breaks

- a. The Commission will order breaks where it deems it necessary to do so, including such circumstances as where the witness is finding it difficult to continue with the testimony; is distraught and needs to compose him/herself, or for lunch etc. Witnesses also have a right to request breaks.
- b. The day's session however will not be adjourned on the grounds that the witness is in an emotional state, unless the witness requests the adjournment. The expression of emotion is encouraged by the Commission.

5. Orders

The Commission may make any orders as it deems fit in the course of the day's deliberations. Such orders may include ordering the attendance of any person who had been mentioned in the course of the proceedings, ordering a witness or his/her legal representative to produce any document or person at an agreed date and hearing venue. It may also issue subpoenas for any documents or persons to attend a subsequent session of the hearings. The order would be in writing and read out by the presiding Commissioner. Every opportunity for a witness or person to participate voluntarily in the hearings will however be explored.

6. Documents

Documents and other secondary evidence may be tendered at a hearing. Such documents will be registered with a number or such particulars as to enable it/them to be identified in the future.

7. Participation of Counsel

Where a witness is accompanied by a legal representative, the counsel shall be permitted to ask questions of the witness after the Commission has finished questioning the witness. The counsel is a legal representative for the witness and not of the Commission. The prerogative to first question the witness therefore rests with the Commission.

8. Naming Names

Witnesses may in any proceedings mention the names of the person/s or institutions allegedly responsible for or that participated in the violation of their or someone else's rights. Where this information is available to the Commission before the proceedings, the Commission will endeavour as much as possible to notify the alleged perpetrator and arrange with them on possible dates to give their own side of the story. Where this is not possible, at the conclusion of the witness's testimony, the Commission will announce (if the address of the perpetrator is known) that the perpetrator would be contacted and all efforts will be made by staff of the Commission to contact the person (and where the address is not known) that the alleged perpetrator is invited to contact the Commission for the purposes of telling their side of the story. They may in the alternative send a written submission to the Commission.

9. Confrontation between witnesses

- a. Any person who has been mentioned by a witness as allegedly being responsible for the abuse or violation of a witness' or someone else's rights shall have the right at the same or subsequent proceeding to rebut the story as told by the witness. The Commission shall not however allow a situation whereby the witnesses confront themselves with a view to rebutting or interrogating each other's story, neither

shall the legal representative of one witness be allowed to question another witness even if the witness consents to it.

- b. Where after both sides have told their stories and, both sides are willing to pursue reconciliation, the relevant personnel within the Commission shall hold separate discussions with the parties and at the appropriate time bring them together in promotion of their mutual desire to reconcile. The Commission shall at all times encourage and facilitate the involvement of NGOs, communities, civic, chieftaincy and other institutions and groups in arranging or facilitating reconciliation between people, communities or groups in the conflict.
- c. All persons who wish to testify at a hearing session in connection with any matter shall not be at the session where the matter is being considered until they have been called to testify. The Commission will ensure that before the commencement of any matter, all witnesses in the matter are advised to be out of hearing range. The Commission may waive this requirement in victim hearings.

10. Noise, disturbance, clapping etc.

There shall be general silence at the venues of all hearings. All participants are required to respect the solemnity of the proceedings. The presiding commissioner may order any person in breach of this requirement to leave the premises.

11. Conclusion

- a. At the end of the week of hearings in a district or location, the presiding commissioner shall do a careful summary of the testimony that has been led and inform the audience of what would happen to the information collected. The steps leading to the report of the commission will be laid out clearly for the audience.
- b. The Commission will encourage (and where necessary, participate in discussions within the communities on the erection of monuments and memorials for the victims of the conflict in the community and/or district.

CLOSED HEARINGS

The Commission shall organise closed hearings and adopt such other measures as it deems fit that enable it to respond to the two important aspects of its mandate that require it to “capture the experiences of women and children, and where the interests of the witness so dictate.

Special measures for hearings shall include:

- a. Witnesses may provide testimony in a closed room with only their voices broadcast into the public hearing rooms.
- b. The witness can be briefed to take out all identifiers from their testimony (name, address, location, violation), or
- c. A protective screen may be placed between the witness and the audience with a separate door for entry and exit.
- d. The testimony may be recorded on a prior occasion and then played during the public hearing and the video shot in such a way as not to reveal the identity of the witness.

The closed hearing is designed to respond to the cultural sensibilities of the community and the best interests of the witness. Circumstances in which a closed hearing may be advised include:

- e. Where the violation is of a sexual nature.
- f. If the re-entry of the witness into the community after the testimony will be jeopardized.
- g. Where there is a threat level to the security of the witness
- h. Where the witness is a child at time of testimony.
- i. Where the testimony may jeopardize the witness’ ongoing reintegration/re-absorption in the community.

Where the testimony relates to a sexual violation, the following procedure shall be followed:

- a. The witness shall be interviewed by female commissioners only. All male commissioners and other male staff shall be excused from the hearing.
- b. Where there is no female commissioner present, this fact should be communicated to the witness and the witness shall be notified of her right to give the testimony at another location and time where a female commissioner would be present.
- c. The witness reserves the right to waive the requirement of clause (a) above, and give her testimony in the presence of male commissioners and/or staff.

Process for closed hearing

1. The Commission will stop any information from the closed hearing to be known to the public.
2. The Commission will ensure that the identity of the witness is not revealed.
3. The Commission will ensure that the record of proceedings is kept in such a way, which continues to protect the witness.
4. The closed hearing shall be held in an appropriate room/space different from the location for the public hearings.
5. The Commission shall arrange for special attendants such as counsellors, psychosocial or child welfare workers to sit with the witness during the testimony.

ISSUES OF PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS FOR PERPETRATORS

1. Hearings involving perpetrators shall be governed by the following considerations:

The hearing will further understanding of the reason or motivation behind the actions of the perpetrators,


- a. The hearing has the objective of reconstructing the truth vis a vis victims,
- b. The perpetrator will be encouraged as much as possible to participate voluntarily in the hearings,
- c. The Commission will use its subpoena powers if the hearings will achieve (a) and (b) above.

2. Where perpetrators have been/would be named in a hearing, the Commission will ensure that:

- a. Reasonable and good faith efforts are made in locating them and giving them prior notice that they will be/have been named. This would include advertising in newspapers or electronic media, and specifying a reasonable number of days during which they are expected to respond.
- b. Provision will be made for the perpetrators to attend the session, offer a response and/or submit a written statement.
- c. Provision is made for perpetrators to bring legal counsel or have legal counsel available for the indigent (depending on availability of resources). The Commission will not allow legal counsel to speak for the perpetrators.
- d. The Commission will avoid legalised procedures that may compromise its mandate and mission.
- e. The Commission will not compel alleged perpetrators to answer questions.

EXTERNAL ACTORS

1. Consultation. There will be ongoing consultation with different sectors of civil society to maximize public participation and input. Hearings will generally be planned in collaboration with civil society institutions.
2. Media: The media will be permitted to offer full coverage of public hearings, with translation support that ensures that those hearings will be transmitted to communities in all parts of Sierra Leone.
3. The media may be provided information only on the subject matter to be heard so that it could prepare appropriately.
4. The Commission will draw the attention of the media on sensitivity for journalists covering human rights issues, particularly regarding the respect of witnesses, the important role the media can play in using its coverage to catalyse public debate and interest about the historical patterns of human rights violations, the factors that enhance abuse of power, the complicity of different institutions, the space for dissent etc., and will encourage training on these issues.
5. The Commission will establish its own accreditation scheme for media practitioners.
6. A special section of the public hearing room shall be designated as a press gallery.



WITNESS TO TRUTH:

Report of the
Sierra Leone
Truth & Reconciliation
Commission

VOL 2

VOLUME TWO

Report of the Sierra Leone Truth & Reconciliation Commission


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
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ISBN 9988 -8097-6-X

Published by Graphic Packaging Ltd. GCGL
Printed and Bound at GPL Press, Accra, Ghana.


The Truth and Reconciliation Comision Report was presented to President
Ahmed Tijan Kabbah, President of sierra Leone on 5th October 2004


Bishop Joseph Christian Humper
Chairman



Hon. Justice Laura Marcus Jones
Deputy Chairperson


Mrs. Ajaratou Satang Jow


Professor John Kamara


Ms. Yasmin Louise Sooka


Professor William Schabas


Mr. Sylvanus Torto

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CHAPTER ONE

Executive Summary

TRC

**Tru at
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Produced by the TRC Steering Committee with support
from the International Human Rights Law Group

CHAPTER ONE

Executive Summary

This Executive Summary provides a cursory overview of the Report and its principal areas of analysis. Substantive detail is contained in the chapters that comprise the remainder of the Report. It is particularly important to read the Executive Summary in conjunction with the Findings and Recommendations chapters. The Commission hopes those who read the Executive Summary will take the time also to read the rest of the Report. Only by so doing can a comprehensive understanding be obtained of one of the terrible human tragedies that unfolded in the last decade of the twentieth century.

Introduction

1. On 23 March 1991, armed conflict broke out in Sierra Leone – a country on the coast of West Africa made up of just 4.5 million people – when forces crossed the border from Liberia into the town of Bomaru near the eastern frontier. An organisation styling itself the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) claimed responsibility for the incursion, with the declared objective being to overthrow the corrupt and tyrannical government of Joseph Saidu Momoh and the All People's Congress (APC), which had ruled Sierra Leone since 1968.
2. The events in Bomaru that day heralded the beginning of a decade of violence that devastated the country. As the conflict exploded into appalling brutality against civilians, the world recoiled in horror at the tactics used by the RUF, its allies and opponents. Reports emerged of indiscriminate amputations, abductions of women and children, recruitment of children as combatants, rape, sexual slavery, cannibalism, gratuitous killings and wanton destruction of villages and towns. This was a war measured not so much in battles and confrontations between combatants as in attacks upon civilian populations. Its awesome climax was the destruction of much of Freetown in January 1999.
3. The war finally shuddered to a negotiated conclusion, reached at Lomé, the capital of nearby Togo, in July 1999. Although the Lomé Peace Agreement did not end the fighting entirely, it began a process that brought a fragile peace to the country. The subsequent presence of a sizeable United Nations peacekeeping force, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), did much to ensure that conflict would not be renewed and that the components of a lasting peace, notably disarmament and demobilisation, would be effected.
4. Article XXVI of the Lomé Peace Agreement provided for the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The mandate of the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC or Commission) was then set out in several sections of the enabling legislation, the TRC Act, adopted in 2000 by the Parliament of Sierra Leone. According to Section 6(1) of the TRC Act:

[T]he object for which the Commission is established is to create an impartial historical record of violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, from the beginning of the conflict in 1991 to the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement; to address impunity, to respond to the needs

of the victims, to promote healing and reconciliation and to prevent a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered.

5. In response to its mandate and in order to create an impartial historical record, the Commission examined the following areas:
 - the historical antecedents to the conflict and other events that defined or shaped the evolution of the Sierra Leonean state;
 - the causes of conflict, with a particular focus on issues of governance;
 - the story of the conflict, including its military and political dynamics, its nature and characteristics, the role of external actors and factors that fuelled it, such as the exploitation of mineral resources;
 - the impact of the conflict on specific groups, particularly on women, children and youths;
 - the relationship between the TRC and the Special Court for Sierra Leone; and
 - efforts that can be made to help Sierra Leone reconcile with its past, including the prospect of a reparations programme and the development of a National Vision for Sierra Leone.
6. In making its findings and preparing its Report, the Commission took into account information gathered through a variety of means. Primary sources included: testimonies given by victims, witnesses and perpetrators at the Commission's hearings and during its statement-taking phase; the outcomes of investigation and research conducted by the Commission's staff; and the statistical or quantitative analysis derived from the Commission's database of human rights violations.

Historical Antecedents to the Conflict

7. How did a peace-loving nation become engulfed, seemingly overnight, in horror? What events occurred in the history of the country to make this conflict possible? Explanations put forward have varied from 'bad governance' and 'the history of the post-colonial period in Sierra Leone' to 'the urge to acquire the country's diamond wealth' and the roles of Libya or the Liberian faction leader Charles Taylor.¹ The international community initially dismissed the war as just another example of tribal conflict in Africa; another failed state imploding in the context of environmental degradation and acute economic crisis.²
8. In order to "compile a clear picture of the past"³ the Commission devoted considerable resources towards examining the pre-conflict history of the country. These efforts were intended to locate causes of conflict in Sierra Leone's past,

¹ Charles Taylor led the faction called the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), which launched an insurgency in Liberia in December 1989. Taylor warned in a BBC radio interview in 1990 that Sierra Leone would "taste the bitterness of war" because of the country's membership and backing of the West African Intervention Force (ECOMOG) that was attacking his bases in Liberia.

² See Kaplan R., 'The Coming Anarchy'; *Atlantic Monthly*, February 1994. Also see Clapham C., 'Sierra Leone: The Global-Local Politics of State Collapse and Attempted Reconstruction'; Failed States Conference, Florence, 10-14 April 2001.

³ This objective is contained in Section 1 of the Lomé Peace Agreement, as expounded in the 'Memorandum of Objects and Reasons', attached to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Bill when it was tabled before Parliament in February 2000 by the then Attorney-General and Minister of Justice, Solomon Berewa.

place the conflict within its proper historical context and offer explanations for what went wrong.

9. The Commission identified social trends that spawned division and confrontation between the various groups that make up Sierra Leone. It picked out fault lines and key events that created the structural conditions for conflict. It highlighted decisions on the part of the political elite that were designed to strengthen their grip on power at the expense of common benefit, progress and ultimately peace.
10. Central to the Commission's study of history was the social and political interaction among Sierra Leone's constituent groups. The nature and extent of such interaction – often negative and limited – influenced people's perceptions of the state in which they lived and their own places within it. These perceptions in turn presented the greatest challenge to the concepts of nationhood and citizenship. They undermined the positive sense of national identity needed to build a strong and unified independent nation.
11. The Commission examined the colonial period and the first few years of independence together under the section entitled 'The Historical Evolution of the Sierra Leonean State'. In this section, four distinct phases proved crucial to understanding the roots of the conflict and some of the challenges that the country still faces today:
 - The Colony and the Protectorate. Rather than constructing a unified Sierra Leonean state, the colonial government effectively created two nations in the same land. The colonial capital Freetown, known as the Colony, and the much larger area of provincial territory, known as the Protectorate, were developed separately and unequally. The colonial government formalised the common law practised in the Colony yet neglected the development of customary law in the Protectorate, thus producing two separate legal systems that persist to the present day. The impact of colonial policies and practices, including those relating to citizenship, ownership of land, land tenure rights and conflict of laws, was far-reaching. People in the Colony enjoyed vastly superior social, political and economic development and access to vital resources such as education. The divide between the two entities bred deep ethnic and regional resentment and destabilised the traditional system of Chieftaincy.
 - The Era of Party Politics. In 1947, a new Constitution was proposed in order to prepare Sierra Leone for independence. This Constitution amalgamated the Colony and the Protectorate into a single political entity, but divided their elite representatives into opposing factions, each dedicated to protecting the interests of its own people. In due course these factions formed themselves into narrow, regionally based political parties with little or no national agenda. Party politics became the greatest obstacle to national cohesion and identity. Party allegiance was just as divisive as ethnicity, class or regional prejudice in the battle over who should succeed the British. On the cusp of independence in 1961, the ten-year-old Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) was joined in the political arena by the All People's Congress (APC), which would become its main rival in contesting elections.

- The Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) in Power. The SLPP majority party formed the first post-colonial government in 1961. The 1962 elections then revealed the depths of ethnic and regional polarisation in Sierra Leone and the superficiality of the ideological differences between the opposing parties. The SLPP retained power by winning most of its seats in the South and East of the country, which were predominantly populated by Mende people. The SLPP government was therefore labelled as a Mende government. This image polarised public opinion in the country, introduced notions of cronyism in many state institutions and laid the foundations for military involvement in politics. The period had terrible, albeit foreseeable consequences on the unity of the young state and served to deepen existing cleavages.
 - The 1967 Elections and their Aftermath. The elections of 1967 were scarred by bitter power struggles based on ethnicity, personality and party affiliation. Although the APC won the most seats, the leadership of the SLPP stoutly refused to concede defeat. The resultant standoff signalled a watershed in the political fortunes of the country and ultimately led to the destruction of the multi-party system. The head of the Army sabotaged the swearing-in of the APC Prime Minister and declared martial law. When it became apparent that this move was engineered to favour the SLPP leadership, junior-ranking soldiers staged a coup. The consequent period of military rule served to narrow the political space in Sierra Leone and compelled others to seek alternative routes to power that did not depend on free and fair elections. It set the scene for multiple further coup attempts in the following decades.
12. In the second section of the chapter, the Commission focussed on the prolonged period in power of the All People's Congress (APC). The APC government used concerns about internal security as a pretext to stifle the nascent democratic culture. All the institutions of the state were subjected to strict party control and Siaka Stevens, the new President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, adopted an increasingly authoritarian approach.
 13. Under the APC, central government sustained itself through corruption, nepotism and the plundering of state assets. These practices were replicated at regional and local levels, where Chieftaincy became synonymous with power, patronage and control of resources. When Sierra Leone adopted a one-party constitution in 1978, any semblance of accountability or effective opposition had already been eliminated. Historical trends like economic decay and fragmentation of the national spirit were exacerbated under the one-party system and became key causes of the conflict.
 14. Neither the SLPP nor the APC made any genuine effort to attend to the debasement of the post-independence politics and economy of the country. On the contrary, history speaks of a systemic failure, whereby all the members of the political elite belonged to the same failing system. While they claimed to be ideologically different, in reality the two parties shared a brand of politics that was all about power and the benefits it conferred. Tragically these characteristics persist today in Sierra Leone.

15. The final section of this chapter traces past dynamics at District level in order to help explain the manner in which the war unfolded across the nation. There were undercurrents of conflict in many areas, from the border Districts that served as 'gateways' for the fighting forces, to the strategically located 'heartland' Districts that initially supported the insurgency to overthrow the APC. At local level as at national level, many of the answers as to why and how this conflict happened are to be found in its historical antecedents.

Governance

16. The Commission heard submissions from a variety of authoritative sources that the war in Sierra Leone was largely the result of failures in governance and institutional processes in the country.⁴ Successive governments diminished the state's capacity to meet such critical challenges as the security and livelihood of its citizens, let alone to provide for democratic participation in decision-making processes. The Commission shares the view that unsound governance provided a context conducive for the interplay of poverty, marginalisation, greed and grievances that caused and sustained the conflict. The Commission hopes its treatment of issues of governance – by identifying past distortions, evaluating the adequacy of current remedies and making recommendations to fill the gaps – will enhance efforts towards national recovery, stability and reconciliation.
17. The instruments of proper governance include laws, institutions, due processes and humane practices that lead to such desired ends as security, justice, enhanced livelihoods and democratic participation. The perceptions adduced by the Commission during its hearings indicate that Sierra Leoneans yearn for a principled system of governance. They want a system that upholds the rule of law over the rule of strong patrons and protects the people from the abuse of rulers through a system of checks and balances. They wish to see horizontal and vertical accountability through the effective operation of such institutions as the judiciary, the auditor general's office, the electoral commission, the media and civil society.
18. The Commission looked at the record of each of the post-independence governments on the following critical 'indicators': separation of powers; decentralisation; political participation; independence of the judiciary; the rule of law; and the existence and effective operation of oversight bodies and institutions of accountability. The Commission analysed approximations towards or deviations from proper governance on two levels. First, it reviewed the basic legal documents of the land, such as Constitutions and the evolving body of laws, to assess whether 'indicators' of proper governance were enshrined and guaranteed. Second, it assessed the manifestation of these 'indicators' in practice.
19. The Commission concluded that all the administrations of the post-independence period contributed to the structural and proximate contexts that led to the conflict in 1991. The duality of the country's administrative and judicial structures made them vulnerable to manipulation, which the regimes of Sir Milton Margai, Sir Albert Margai and Dr. Siaka Stevens duly utilised to their respective advantages.

⁴ See United Nations Development Programme (UNDP); Submission to the Commission on the Causes of the Conflict, 7 May 2003, pages 7-11. See also Mrs. Olayinka Creighton-Randall, Campaign for Good Governance; Submission to the Commission, 5 May 2003, pages 1-3. See also UNAMSIL; Submission to the Commission, 1 March 2003, pages 2-5.

In the provincial areas, for example, local courts and Chieftaincy structures were used to clamp down on opposition activities and to entrench the authority of whichever traditional ruling houses were allied to the party in power. Meanwhile the continual assault on the rule of law weakened the capacities of state institutions to perform. The judiciary was subordinated to the executive, parliament did little more than 'rubber-stamp', the civil service became a redundant state machine and the Army and police force became vectors of violence against the very people they were established to protect. Non-state bodies that ought to ensure accountability – like media houses or civil society groups – were thoroughly co-opted. Opposition political parties were suppressed and eventually banned by President Stevens' One Party Constitution of 1978.

20. The successor to Stevens, President J. S. Momoh, attempted to decelerate the economic and political decline through the promulgation of an economic state of emergency and a multi-party constitution. These measures were, however, managed in a dictatorial and abusive fashion, which rendered them 'too little, too late' to salvage the situation. Against this backdrop, Sierra Leoneans became increasingly disgruntled and aggrieved with the malaise in governance and their inability to do anything to alleviate it. Many citizens, particularly the poor, marginalised youths of the provinces, became open to radical means of effecting change: they would readily answer the call to arms when the so-called 'revolution' began to enter the country in 1991.
21. Today, proper governance is still an imperative, unfulfilled objective in Sierra Leone. Corruption remains rampant and no culture of tolerance or inclusion in political discourse has yet emerged. Many ex-combatants testified that the conditions that caused them to join the conflict persist in the country and, if given the opportunity, they would fight again. Yet, distressingly, the Commission did not detect any sense of urgency among public officials to respond to the myriad challenges facing the country. Indeed, the perception within civil society and the international community is that all efforts at designing and implementing meaningful intervention programmes, such as the National Recovery Strategy, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) or 'Vision 2025', are driven by donors rather than the national government. This is lamentable.
22. The state is an abstract concept to most Sierra Leoneans and central government has made itself largely irrelevant to their daily lives. In order to correct this deficit in engagement, an overhaul in the culture of governance is required. The executive needs to prove that it is different from its predecessors in the post-independence period. It needs to demonstrate ownership, leadership, imagination and determination in developing and implementing programmes for change. Strong and independent monitoring institutions must hold the government accountable in this exercise. Only then will Sierra Leoneans believe that the necessary lessons have been learnt from the decades of rotten governance that culminated in the tragedy of conflict.

The Military and Political History of the Conflict

23. The Commission recounts the story of the eleven-year conflict by charting its key events and dynamics in the military and political spheres. A description of the factors that led to the outbreak of hostilities is followed by a detailed accounting of the conflict itself, divided into three distinct 'phases'. Phase I (Conventional 'Target' Warfare: 1991-93) covers the early period defined by inter-factional fighting and the capture of territory. Phase II ('Guerrilla' Warfare: 1994-97) describes the shifts in tactics as attacks spread through the country. Phase III (Power Struggles and Peace Efforts: 1997-2000) reviews various military and political alliances, moves towards peace and the resumption of hostilities, before the conflict was finally declared over in 2002. Although each 'phase' assumed a slightly different character, they all shared one devastating characteristic: gross violations of human rights and international humanitarian law by all warring factions.
24. In the pre-conflict stage, the innumerable failings in governance caused Sierra Leonean activists to seek alternative outlets for expression of their dissent and dissatisfaction with the one-party system. In the late 1980s, a small group of would-be revolutionaries formed a nascent programme for change, which included the idea of undertaking 'self-defence' training in Libya. The original 'revolutionary' programme never materialised in the form it was intended to take. It was supplanted by a deviant, militant agenda spearheaded by Foday Sankoh, who elicited support from foreign contacts, notably Charles Taylor, and conceived a plan to organise and lead an armed insurgency into Sierra Leone. Sankoh assembled and trained in Liberia a force comprising 385 commandos, who became the 'vanguards' of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Taylor authorised nearly 2,000 of his own men from the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) to become 'Special Forces' and operate jointly with the RUF in Sierra Leone. Shortly after dawn on 23 March 1991, a band of fighters from Taylor's NPFL struck the town of Bomaru, Kailahun District. This attack sparked a conflict that was unprecedented in its intensity and nature.
25. Phase I describes the initial 'war on two fronts' and the inclusion of civilian settlements within the scope of NPFL and RUF assaults. It assesses the role of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) and the APC Government's failure properly to supply it at the outset of the conflict, which contributed to the April 1992 coup forming the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). It explains how an expanded Army then gained ascendancy over a divided insurgent force in 1993, reducing the RUF to a confined area of forest territory on the Liberian border. Nevertheless, there came no decisive thrust from pro-Government forces to end the conflict.
26. Phase II began when the RUF launched a 'guerrilla' strategy, becoming less visible, less predictable, less consistent and less distinguishable. It expanded the scope and coverage of combat operations into every District of Sierra Leone. An RUF trademark was to carry out 'false flag' attacks dressed in full SLA military uniforms. This tactic, combined with increased human rights violations by soldiers, led to the breakdown in trust between the civilian population and the SLA. A 'Palace Coup' saw a change in the leadership of the NPRC and eventually secured a transition to democratic elections in 1996. Although marred by violence, the elections ushered in a new Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) Government headed by President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. The Abidjan Peace Talks of 1996 were a false dawn and the SLPP Government endorsement of the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) as an arm of the state security apparatus further

antagonised the SLA. This phase ended in a collapsed peace process, violence with ethnic undertones by the CDF of the South and East, known as the Kamajors, and an embittered Army looking to exploit a volatile security situation.

27. Phase III started with the bloody military coup of May 1997 and the appointment of Major Johnny Paul Koroma as Head of State. It heralded a large-scale shift in allegiance away from the SLA to a 'new' fighting force known as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC). The AFRC forged a military and political alliance with the RUF, creating the 'People's Army', a band of brutal and systematic violators of human rights. President Kabbah established a War Council in Exile in Guinea, while Deputy Minister of Defence Chief Samuel Hinga Norman mobilised a vast but untrained force of Kamajors to oppose the AFRC military junta. In February 1998, a forceful intervention was led by West African 'peacekeeping' troops under the banner of ECOMOG, dividing the country along starkly factional lines. ECOMOG was the surrogate national Army in all but name, but its defence of strategic areas would prove disgracefully weak. The State of Public Emergency declared by the reinstated SLPP government encompassed four years and numerous illegal acts carried out on the premise of pursuing 'justice'. 24 SLA soldiers were executed by the state in 1998, which had a telling impact on the ongoing conflict. An AFRC-led wave of atrocities against the civilian population swept through the North of the country and met with no robust government response. The descent of the AFRC-led attackers onto Freetown in January 1999 wreaked havoc and horror in the city, constituting the nadir of the third phase.
28. The Lomé Peace Agreement of 7 July 1999 was cast as a solution to the conflict with two components: military resolution, through the disarmament of combatants; and political settlement, by implementing a power-sharing arrangement. In reality neither the RUF nor the Government complied in full with its terms. The RUF combatant displayed particular contempt for the ethos of the peace process and their hostage taking of several hundred UNAMSIL peacekeepers was unjustifiable. In May 2000, the state security apparatus carried out decisive enforcement actions through its so-called 'Peace Task Force', a squad of armed vigilantes from various factions tasked to raid, arrest and detain anyone associated with the RUF. As part of its analysis, the Commission notes that many of those rounded up in May 2000 remain in prison today. In the Commission's view, this ongoing detention is tantamount to a continuation of the conflict itself. It is corrosive to the prospect of national reconciliation and testifies to the continuing struggle for justice in Sierra Leone.

Nature of the Conflict

29. In compiling its chapter on the nature of the conflict, the Commission used quantitative and qualitative analytical techniques to shed further light on particular patterns and trends. Areas of analysis included the types and frequencies of the violations committed, the profiles of the perpetrators, the identities and demographics of their victims and any evidence of targeting. The Commission examined sixteen specific categories of violations, although within each of these the scope of analysis was broad. For example, acts of rape were considered in multiple contexts, including abduction, sexual slavery, during attacks on villages, or when the victim was encountered at a checkpoint or in the bush.

30. Some violations, such as amputations and forced displacement, were discussed separately in their own right. Others were divided into three overarching categories, as follows: 1) violations perpetrated in the context of abduction and outside abduction; 2) mistreatment violations; and 3) economic violations. The violations discussed under these categories include killings; forced recruitment; cannibalism or forced cannibalism; forced labour, assault, physical torture and rape; arbitrary detention; looting and extortion; and destruction of property.
31. From the Commission's review emerged the devastating impact of this conflict. It destroyed individual lives, families and communities, people's belief systems and cultural heritages. Traditional and community meeting spaces and institutions were demolished and desecrated. People were forced to commit sacrilege against symbols of their religion or faith. Certain groups like property owners, chiefs, figures of traditional authority and representatives of government institutions were targeted on the basis of revenge, economic appropriation and because of their ethnicity.
32. The link between the conflict and ethnicity lies in the way in which certain factions turned ethnicity into an instrument of prejudice and violence against perceived opponents or those who did not 'belong'. People of Northern origin were found to have been targeted in the Southern and Eastern regions during the latter part of the war. The Kamajors committed disproportionate levels of violations against such ethnic groups as the Temne, Koranko, Loko, Limba and Yalunka. Other reported instances of 'targeting' included RUF violations against, variously, the Lebanese, Fullahs, Mandingos, Nigerians and Marakas.
33. Understanding the violations committed during the war requires an understanding of those who perpetrated them. Those affiliated to the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) carried out the majority of violations and abuses over the conflict as a whole. The RUF pioneered the concept of forced recruitment, including the enlistment of child combatants. It also bears overwhelming responsibility for the widespread use of drugs by its members, which precipitated spates of crazed violence and compounded the prevailing general sense of oppression and hopelessness.
34. While most of the violations and abuses were attributed to the RUF, other significant perpetrators included the AFRC and the CDF. The second highest institutional count was attributed to the AFRC, whose fighters most notably committed atrocities on a massive scale in the Northern region and in Kono District. The AFRC demonstrated a 'specialisation' in the practice of amputations in the period from 1998 to 1999.
35. Of the various groups that comprised the CDF, the Kamajors received the most scrutiny, as they were responsible for almost all the CDF violations reported after 1996. Forced cannibalism is attributed only to the Kamajors. A defining characteristic of the CDF became its ceremony of 'initiation', described to the Commission by many witnesses as entailing physical and psychological torture as well as other gross abuses of human rights.

36. Perhaps most notably, the Commission identified some characteristics and tendencies that spanned across all factions in the conflict. There existed an astonishing factional fluidity among the different militias and armed groups. Overtly and covertly, gradually and suddenly, fighters switched sides or established new units on a scale unprecedented in any other conflict. Another common feature was the almost identical composition of the ground forces: impressionable, disgruntled young men eager for an opportunity to assert themselves, either to ensure that no harm was done to their own people, to fight against perceived injustice, or for personal and group aggrandisement.

Mineral Resources

37. The management of state resources is central to the quality of governance in any country. This is particularly the case in Sierra Leone, which despite its huge mineral resources (primarily, extensive alluvial and kimberlitic diamond deposits, bauxite, rutile, iron and gold) has remained one of the poorest countries in the world.⁵ Since Sierra Leone's economy depends essentially on revenues from its mineral resources, the Commission deemed it important to examine how mineral resources were used by successive governments, how they may have contributed to the war and the extent to which combat groups exploited them to sustain and replenish their activities.
38. There is a widely held belief in the western world that the conflict in Sierra Leone was initiated and perpetuated because of diamonds, the country's most important mineral resource. According to this version, the RUF, backed by Charles Taylor and the NPFL, initiated an armed rebellion in Sierra Leone to gain control of its diamond resources. In the years following the initial attack, it is alleged, the proceeds from an illicit diamond trade enabled the RUF to finance its war effort through the purchase of weapons abroad.
39. In the Commission's view, this version of the conflict is simplistic. It fails to capture numerous complexities, the reasons for the decay of the state in Sierra Leone and the role minerals played prior to and during the conflict. It also does not reflect what unfolded on the ground in Sierra Leone. There were multiple causes of the conflict and reasons for the involvement of Liberian and other foreign actors. Although it is true that the RUF partly financed its war effort through diamond trafficking, diamonds did not yield significant revenues for the movement before 1997.
40. Simply put, diamonds were both an indirect cause of the war in Sierra Leone and a fuelling factor. As an indirect cause, the misapplication of the diamond resources in a country with a practically 'single-product' economy (diamonds) created huge disparities in the socio-economic conditions of people. While the elite and their business cohorts in the diamond industry enjoyed grandeur and affluence, poor people living in deprived communities rued how the collective common wealth had been appropriated by a few in the name of the many.

⁵ Sierra Leone has ranked last out of more than 170 countries on the UNDP Human Development Index for the last three successive years from 2002 to 2004.

41. From the outset of the post-independence period, those in power plundered the state and its resources, putting self-enrichment before any form of real development or accountability. Political power became a means to economic wealth and the predatory accumulation of the ruling elite led to the acquisition of state offices and resources for personal gain. This led to the 'functional contraction' of Sierra Leonean leadership, as it could no longer provide services to the people.⁶ The dispossessed and disenfranchised masses quickly began to ask questions as to the role and mission of their new political elite.
42. Successive post-colonial governments mismanaged the diamond industry and placed its effective control in the hands of outsiders in a way that has not benefited the Sierra Leone economy. A culture of diamond smuggling and embezzlement has been entrenched among key members of the political elite. Meanwhile, labour conditions in the mines are appalling, with many children still being used as miners.
43. During the conflict, diamonds were highly coveted because they yielded tremendous revenues, which enabled armed factions to procure arms and ammunition. Possession of arms conferred power on the factions, allowing them to control large areas of the country and thus further exploit resources for economic purposes. The desire to capture more territory for exploitation subsequently became a major motivating factor for the armed groups and their commanders, triggering intense fighting in resource-rich parts of the country and fuelling the conflict in areas already engulfed by it.
44. The international diamond industry was largely indifferent to the origin of 'conflict diamonds', even when reports of atrocities relating to the conflict in Sierra Leone were widely disseminated in the global media. This indifference enabled the illicit trade in Sierra Leonean diamonds to flourish and thereby encouraged the prolongation of the conflict.
45. Although the government of Sierra Leone has recently made progress in tackling diamond smuggling, largely due to the international introduction of the new Kimberley Certification Process (KCP), the problem is nowhere near to being eradicated. The KCP has two major weaknesses: there is no global mechanism to monitor each member's national certification system and countries with no diamond resources have been accepted as members.

External Actors

46. Although the armed conflict in Sierra Leone was not a war imposed from outside, the Commission did identify substantial involvement from external actors. There were essentially two main parties to the conflict in Sierra Leone: the government and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF). Each of the external actors that took part in the conflict was affiliated in some way to one of these two entities.
47. External support either to the government or to the RUF came from nation states, regional organisations, international organisations and non-state actors such as private security firms.

⁶ See Kandeh, J.; 'Political Economy of Democratisation'; unpublished manuscript, at page 3.

48. Countries that provided unilateral support included Libya, Liberia, Guinea, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Côte d'Ivoire and the United Kingdom. Regional intervention came from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), while a large multilateral intervention was rendered latterly by the United Nations. 'Mercenary' groups involved in the conflict included the Ghurkhas Security Group, Sandline International and Executive Outcomes. The United Liberation Movement of Liberia (ULIMO), which began when a group of Liberians living in refugee camps and other parts of Sierra Leone were organised into a fighting force to assist the government, also evolved into a significant player. A variety of international humanitarian organisations delivered medical assistance and food aid throughout the war, including the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Médecins sans Frontières (MSF).
49. The involvement of the United Nations can be traced back to December 1994, when it sent its first exploratory mission to Sierra Leone. However, the subsequent presence of a UN Special Envoy to Sierra Leone did not abate the fighting and the commission of atrocities against civilians. In July 1998, the UN Security Council established the UN Observer Mission to Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) to monitor the security situation and to advise on the disarmament and demobilisation of former combatants. This Mission never achieved full strength and is remembered more for its lack of impact. On 22 October 1999, the UN Security Council authorised the establishment of the UN Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), which contributed significantly to the achievement of stability and rebuilding of the nation following the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement in July 1999.

Women

50. Women and girls became the targets in the brutal conflict in Sierra Leone. They suffered abduction and brutality at the hands of their perpetrators. Their vulnerability was deliberately exploited in order to dehumanise them. Women and girls were raped, forced into sexual slavery and endured other acts of sexual violence, including mutilations, torture and a host of other cruel and inhumane treatment. They were taken from their homes and villages by force. Refusal to comply with their captors often met with death. For those fortunate enough to escape, displacement invariably followed, either in exile or in camps inside or outside the country. They were not safe even in these camps, as humanitarian workers meant to protect them also violated their rights. Women and girls were compelled to barter their bodies in order to access aid to which they were rightfully entitled. Girls as young as 12 were forced to pay for aid with sex in order to gain assistance for their families.
51. The Commission was enjoined by statute to give special attention to the needs of women and girls, particularly with regard to sexual violence. Why was so much violence perpetrated against women? Did the origins lie in the cultural and traditional history of Sierra Leone? Did the fact that women endured such a lowly status in the socio-political life make them easy targets? Is it because men perceived females to be mere chattels symbolising male honour that made women the deliberate target of an enemy determined to destroy the honour of the other?

52. In seeking answers, the Commission reviewed the multiple roles of women in the armed conflict, recognising that women often took on the role of perpetrator and / or collaborator usually out of conviction and / or the need to survive. The Commission assessed the impact of the conflict on women, notions of honour and the breakdown of the traditional extended African family structures and social fabric. It looked at the extent to which women's issues were addressed by disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration efforts; their level of access to education and the impact of the practice of early and forced marriages on the education of girls; and areas in which women suffer discrimination (both under common and customary laws), including marriage, divorce, inheritance, property rights, domestic violence and political participation. Overall, this chapter captures the gender-specific experiences of women and girls at a political, legal, health and social welfare level. The Commission noted the significant role women played in making peace, along with the fact that they are starting to feature more prominently in the public life of Sierra Leone.
53. The main armed groups accused of perpetrating sexual violence against women and girls during the conflict were the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), the Civil Defence Forces (CDF), the Westside Boys and the Sierra Leone Army (SLA).
54. While peace has returned to Sierra Leone, many of the wounds of war still remain open. Women and girls bear the scars of their horrible experiences. Many have borne children as a result of rape and sexual slavery. These mothers are shunned and punished by society for giving birth to 'rebel' children.
55. The Commission believes that it is only when the legal and socio-political system treats women as equals to men, giving them full access to economic opportunities and enabling them to participate freely in both public and private life, that they will realise their full potential. Developing accountability mechanisms for those who perpetrate gender crimes is a necessary part of this evolution in order to ensure that women are not dehumanised. An opportunity exists in the post-conflict period to address the plight of women and girls in Sierra Leone and improve their quality of life. The Government should give effect to the provisions of the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) and of the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) on the Rights of Women in Africa.

Children

56. Like women, children were violated and abused by all of the armed factions involved in the Sierra Leonean conflict. They suffered abductions, forced recruitment, sexual slavery and rape, amputations, mutilations, displacement, drugging and torture. Children were also forced to become perpetrators and were compelled to violate the rights of others. Thousands of children were killed during the conflict in Sierra Leone. In addition, the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children Affairs (MSWGCA) estimates that more than 15,000 children suffered separation from their families and communities during the eleven-year war. This resulted in their becoming refugees in countries like Liberia, Guinea, Gambia, Côte d'Ivoire and Nigeria. In addition, many became internally displaced persons. Children were used as fighters and forced labour by the armed groups. Although the RUF was the first to abduct and forcibly enlist children as soldiers and porters, all the armed factions recruited children and deployed them to such ends.

57. The Lomé Peace Agreement provides that the government of Sierra Leone shall accord particular attention to the issue of child soldiers and that the special needs of children should be addressed in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process. In addition, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act directed the Commission to give special attention to the experiences of children in the armed conflict.
58. The Commission examined the experiences of children prior to the conflict in the economic, social and political spheres. It dealt with issues of education, health, law, tradition and customs and how they impact on the rights of children. It also examined the impact of the armed conflict on children and their experiences at the hands of different armed groups. The status of children following the conflict was considered together with measures taken by state and non-state actors in responding to their needs.
59. While the full impact of the conflict has yet to be measured, children have been affected at all levels of their development, in particular their education and health. During the conflict, children in Sierra Leone were denied their childhood. A major area of concern is the child-headed household, a direct result of children having lost parents or guardians in the war. The breakdown in family and community structures and the loss of social values have affected children materially and psycho-socially. These effects are enduring and far-reaching. A number of ex-combatant children are still bearing the brunt of their forced participation in the war. Their families and communities have in many cases rejected them because of their former affiliations. Girls especially have experienced both derision and rejection because they were forced to become 'bush wives' or sexual slaves.
60. The Commission has found that the abduction of children and their forcible recruitment as child soldiers constitutes a grave violation of international law for which the leadership of all factions must be held accountable. In addition, the Commission is of the view that the Child Rights Bill needs to be passed into law as a matter of urgency.

Youth

61. Forty-five percent of Sierra Leone's estimated population of 4.5 million are youths, falling within the age bracket of 18 to 35 years. Members of this age group were major perpetrators and victims of violations and abuses during the conflict. The Commission examined the nature, causes and extent of the acts perpetrated and suffered by youths; the impact of these acts on them; and the current interventions geared towards addressing the youth question in Sierra Leone.
62. During the years of APC one-party rule, youths constituted the only viable opposition to the government. The 1970s and 1980s saw an emergence of radical groups and study clubs on university campuses, galvanising students to stage demonstrations against the APC. Acts of dissent and disobedience by students at Fourah Bay College in 1985 led to the expulsion of their perceived leaders, some of whom sought to complete their studies in Ghana. Gradually, contacts and ties from both Sierra Leone and Ghana were developed with the Revolutionary Council of Libya and a nascent movement geared towards revolutionary change in Sierra Leone took root.

63. When the Sierra Leonean delegation to Libya became divided by internal ideological and strategic differences, Foday Sankoh exploited the vacuum in leadership and devised a plan for his own, more militant revolutionary project. While in Libya, Sankoh met Charles Taylor and the two men formed an alliance. Sankoh would help Taylor 'liberate' Liberia, after which he would be provided with support to launch an insurgency in Sierra Leone.
64. Sierra Leonean youths were recruited (either by force or by persuasion) from Liberia, Ivory Coast and parts of Sierra Leone for the rebellion in 1991. Upon entry into Sierra Leone, the RUF was essentially dominated by youths who were less educated and less ideologically conscious than their predecessors in the Sierra Leonean 'revolutionary' groups of the 1980s. Sunk in the abyss of unemployment and despair, the prospect of joining the RUF offered a viable alternative to many youths; for others, it was not a choice as they were forcibly abducted into the ranks of an armed group. In both cases, the conflict had a marginalising effect, as youths were alienated from their communities when forced to commit atrocities against their own people. The conflict further compounded their prior plight and has had negative consequences on their overall development, in particular vis-à-vis educational opportunities. A whole generation lost its childhood and youth. Many young people have lost all stabilising ties and emotional support due to the death of, or rejection by, their families.
65. In an effort to address the problems facing youth in Sierra Leone, the Ministry of Youth and Sports was established in 2002. One of the efforts undertaken by the ministry was the publishing of the National Youth Policy, approved and launched by the government in July 2003. The policy ought to be translated into projects, which can be undertaken by NGOs and youth agencies. This well-intentioned initiative is constrained, however, by a dearth of financial resources and of well-trained people experienced in working with youth.
66. Another programme to assist the youths of Sierra Leone was the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR) Programme. NCDDR was established in July 1998 to disarm and demobilise combatants and to support their reintegration into society through the learning of trade skills. Unfortunately, the poor state of the country's economy is hindering the translation of these skills into means of sustaining a livelihood. In addition, many ex-combatants have left their programmes inadequately trained.

The TRC and the Special Court for Sierra Leone

67. The Commission worked alongside an international criminal tribunal, the Special Court for Sierra Leone. The Special Court was tasked with prosecuting those persons who bore the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996. The Special Court impacted upon the work of the Commission. The simultaneous operation of the two bodies brought into sharp focus their different roles. It also highlighted the need for harmonisation and an operational model designed to mitigate inherent tensions and avoid potential pitfalls in future instances where a TRC and criminal court work are supposed to work in tandem.

68. Most truth commissions have operated as an alternative to criminal prosecution. Given the pardon and amnesty provisions of the Lomé Peace Agreement, the Sierra Leone TRC was proposed as a substitute for criminal justice in order to establish accountability for the atrocities that had been committed during the conflict. The creation of the Special Court stemmed from President Kabbah's request to the UN Security Council to establish a special tribunal to bring prosecutions against members of the RUF and its allies, following the hostage taking of hundreds of UN peacekeepers and the resumption of violence in 2000.
69. The Special Court was created, however, by abandoning certain amnesty provisions reached at Lomé, on the basis that certain elements within the RUF had breached the Lomé Peace Agreement. In the Commission's view, the international community has signalled to combatants in future wars that peace agreements containing amnesty clauses ought not to be trusted and, in so doing, has undermined the legitimacy of such national and regional peace initiatives.
70. Although the relationship between the Commission and the Special Court was mostly cordial, tensions arose following the refusal of the Special Court to permit the Commission to hold public hearings with the detainees held in its custody. The President of the Appeals Chamber denied the hearings because of their public character and because they would appear to mete out justice by reaching findings of fact, which was, according to Judge Robertson, the 'special duty' of the Special Court. The decision rejected the right of the detainees to testify in an open and transparent manner before the TRC and denied the right of the Sierra Leonean people to see the process of truth and reconciliation done in relation to the detainees. The Commission disagrees with Judge Robertson's conclusion and considers that it does not sufficiently take into account the special role and contribution of truth commissions in building accountability and in the search for peace and reconciliation.
71. Operational difficulties between the mechanisms arose out of their different approaches to addressing impunity and because they also share many objectives. Both institutions seek truth about a conflict, although in different forms; both attempt to assign responsibilities for atrocities; both work with similar bodies of law; both are aimed at establishing peace and preventing future conflict. Where there is no harmonisation of their objectives, a criminal justice body will have largely punitive and retributive aims, whereas a truth and reconciliation body will have largely restorative and healing objectives. Where the two bodies operate simultaneously in an ad hoc fashion, conflict between such objectives is likely and public confusion is inevitable.
72. Harmonisation of objectives means that each of the transitional institutions should not operate in a manner that is incompatible with the aims and objectives of the other. It requires the development of a framework, which allows the pursuit by each body of its objectives in a manner that is respectful of the other's mandate and which ultimately leads to the same goals of achieving justice and peace.
73. The Commission holds that the right to the truth is inalienable. This right should be upheld in terms of national and international law. It is the reaching of the wider truth through broad-based participation that permits a nation to examine itself honestly and to take effective measures to prevent a repetition of the past.

Reconciliation

74. The Commission recognises that the term reconciliation evolves from a notion of restorative justice. A system based on restorative justice focuses on restoring relations, as far as possible, between victims and perpetrators and between perpetrators and the communities to which they belong. Helping to restore relations between these various actors is a long-term process that entails a number of measures. These measures include accountability, acknowledgment, truth telling and reparations. To be effective, reconciliation must occur at the national, community and individual levels.
75. National reconciliation begins by creating the conditions for an immediate cessation of the armed conflict and the return of the country to peace. The state and other stakeholders must then work towards the prevention of new conflict, which is dependent on a number of factors: the improvement of the socio-economic living conditions of the people; good governance; strong and functional oversight institutions; and the implementation of a reparations programme. The Commission believes the leadership of Sierra Leone must make more of an effort to promote reconciliation at the national level, particularly as national reconciliation is a long-term project. The government must commit itself to the process of reconciliation and it can do this by ensuring that the recommendations made by the Commission are carried out.
76. Community reconciliation entails restoring relations between the community and the perpetrator. It is fostered by understanding and sharing experiences and by creating the conditions for community acceptance of the particular wrong or wrongs done. Like national reconciliation, community reconciliation is a long-term project. The Commission noted that some chiefs have been discredited for perpetrating violations and many did not appear before the Commission. In order for community reconciliation to foster, it is essential that chiefs commit themselves to the process.
77. Individual reconciliation requires that the victim and perpetrator meet. It is not imperative either for the victim to forgive the perpetrator or for the perpetrator to express remorse.
78. In attempting to restore relations between victims and perpetrators, as well as between perpetrators and their communities, the Commission has been guided by the mandate of the TRC. The mandate called upon the Commission to base its reconciliation activities on the country's own culture, tradition, and values. For this reason, religious and other traditional leaders were to be used as much as possible in the process. The TRC was also mandated to use existing structures as much as possible so as not to 'reinvent the wheel'. Recognising the short life-span of the Commission, provisions were made for the continuation of reconciliation activities after the closure of the Secretariat. In 2003, District Reconciliation Committees were established in partnership with the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone in order to continue the Commission's long-term activities on reconciliation.
79. The Commission's activities on reconciliation have been varied. They have often begun with sensitisation activities, targeted at specific groups of victims and perpetrators to encourage them to partake in reconciliation activities. They have included reconciliation ceremonies (bringing together victims and perpetrators or perpetrators with their communities) and memorial ceremonies (naming victims who died during the conflict and establishing monuments or memorials).

Towards the end of its operations, the Commission also organised a large-scale National Reconciliation March (with participants from the various political parties, the police, Army and war-affected groups) and a series of workshops and consultations with civil society, involving discussion of factors that help and impede reconciliation.

Reparations

80. Section 15(2) of the TRC Act mandates the Commission to make recommendations to help: 1) prevent repetition of the violations or abuses suffered; 2) respond to the needs of the victims; and 3) promote healing and reconciliation. To achieve these objectives, the Commission recommended the implementation of a reparations programme for Sierra Leone. The specific purpose of a reparations programme is to provide redress to the victims of human rights violations. The needs of the victims can be used to determine what benefits they should be accorded in such a programme.
81. Reparations are the primary responsibility of the government. The government must ensure the implementation of a reparations programme. It is an accepted principle of international law that states may be held liable for human rights violations committed either by them or their agents. A violation of international human rights law or international humanitarian law imposes a duty on a state to afford adequate reparations. The state may also be responsible in certain circumstances for providing reparations for violations by non-state actors. In addition, the 1991 Constitution of Sierra Leone mandates the provision of redress for the violation of fundamental human rights.
82. In devising its recommendations on reparations, the Commission took into account the resources available to the state to ensure that its recommendations would be feasible. This determination proved problematic given the inability of the Commission to determine the potential universe of victims eligible for specific benefits under its programme.
83. For a victim of the conflict to be eligible for reparations, the Commission determined that the event or injury in question had to have occurred between 23 March 1991 and 1 March 2002.
84. In determining the categories of beneficiaries for the reparations programme, the Commission first considered those victims who have become vulnerable as a result of having suffered human rights violations. Subject to practical limitations relating to state resources, the Commission recommends that the following list of victims be considered beneficiaries of the reparations programme: amputees and other war wounded, victims of sexual violence, children and war widows. Each category should be carefully defined to fit specific parameters and conditions. For example, child beneficiaries should include those who, as a result of the conflict, suffered physical injuries or psychological harm, were abducted or forcibly conscripted, lost parents as a consequence of a violation as described in the Report or were born out of sexual violence and whose mother is single. In certain cases, the benefits of particular reparations measures may also confer upon various categories of 'indirect beneficiaries', such as wives and children of the eligible victims.

85. In determining what reparations should be accorded to victims, the Commission relied on the needs expressed by victims, as well as on extensive research and consultations with a large number of international organisations and NGOs with relevant experience. The Commission's recommended measures deal with the needs of victims in the following areas: health; pensions; education; skills training and micro-credit; community reparations; and symbolic reparations.
86. The Government of Sierra Leone should carry out symbolic measures of reparations that encompass the entire universe of victims of the conflict.
87. The Commission proposes that the reparations programme be co-ordinated by the National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA), which would also serve as the implementing body for the programme and be entrusted with administering the Special Fund for War Victims. NaCSA should work closely with different ministries in ensuring the decentralisation of reparations programmes. A dedicated Advisory Committee should assist NaCSA in its task.
88. The ability of reparations to foster reconciliation need not be underscored. A reparations programme has the potential to assist those victims whose lives have been most devastated to move beyond the position they are currently in as a consequence of the conflict. Providing victims with the assistance they urgently need also serves to restore their dignity which, in turn, helps foster the conditions necessary for reconciliation.

National Vision for Sierra Leone

89. The Commission looked not only to the past but also to the future, in order to describe the society that its recommendations were designed to achieve. This strategy required the Commission to get a sense of the expectations, hopes and aspirations of the people of Sierra Leone. Instituted by the Commission as a complementary project to reconciliation, the National Vision for Sierra Leone (National Vision) invited the public to supply individual 'visions' for a future 'roadmap' for Sierra Leone.
90. The collection of 'visions' began in September 2003 with a call for contributions. During the following two months hundreds of contributions poured in. Among the contributors were men, women and children of all ages, reflecting a wide variety of social and educational backgrounds. They included ex-combatants, artists and artisans, teachers, students and prisoners. The contributions included written and recorded essays, slogans, plays, poems and songs; paintings, etchings and drawings; sculptures, installations and a boat. Common themes included references to the country's violent past, justice, peace, unity and love.
91. The contributions were displayed in the National Vision Exhibit, launched in December 2003, and remained on display at the National Museum in Freetown until May 2004. Over 400 people attended the launch and several thousand have visited the Exhibit in various locations since.
92. The National Vision has been praised by the Government of Sierra Leone, receiving a personal endorsement from President Kabbah, who also attended a televised tour of the Exhibit. It has also been endorsed and praised by a variety of international figures, including Archbishop Desmond Tutu of South Africa.

93. Through the National Vision, Sierra Leoneans of all ages and backgrounds have claimed their own civic space in the new Sierra Leone and made their contributions to the country's cultural and national heritage. The National Vision for Sierra Leone uniquely and effectively complements Vision 2025. Vision 2025 is a government policy document that outlines implementing strategies for the development of Sierra Leone over the next 21 years. As the National Vision for Sierra Leone serves as a non-partisan, intergenerational forum for dialogue, it raises awareness around the existence of such dialogue and encourages individual Sierra Leoneans, especially the youth, to participate in this dialogue. The National Vision has great potential to serve as a vehicle for continuing popular input into Vision 2025.
94. The Commission decided that the momentum generated by the National Vision should be nurtured even after the closure of the Commission. The Commission accordingly recommended that the National Vision should become a permanent open, interactive civic space for all stakeholders in Sierra Leone to engage in dialogue through artistic and scholarly expression on political, moral and social issues relating to the past, present and future.
95. The National Vision for Sierra Leone must remain true to the founding principles underlying the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. As such, all future National Vision activities must serve the preservation of peace, strive for unity and promote healing and reconciliation. In order to achieve these objectives the National Vision must remain independent and non-partisan.
96. The National Vision has emphasised the significance of each individual contributor to Sierra Leone. The work of building a new and better Sierra Leone belongs to every stakeholder in Sierra Leone. The individuals who have lent their hopes and dreams for Sierra Leone are vehicles for change.

Conclusion

97. Building a lasting peace in Sierra Leone can only begin with a comprehensive knowledge and understanding of the country's past. The past holds many lessons that will aid in forging a politically and economically healthy Sierra Leone. Knowledge and understanding are the most powerful deterrents to the recurrence of conflict as Sierra Leone strives to give meaning to the sentiments of 'never again'. In closing, therefore, the Commission reiterates its call to readers to take the time to study and widely discuss with others as many of the other volumes and chapters of the Report as possible.

CHAPTER TWO

Findings

TRC

**Learn from
Yesterday
for a better
Tomorrow**

Produced by the TRC Steering Committee with support
from the International Human Rights Law Group

CHAPTER TWO

Findings

Introduction

1. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000 (“the Act”) enjoined the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (“the TRC” or “the Commission”) to make findings in relation to the causes, nature and extent of violations and abuses during the armed conflict in Sierra Leone.¹ In particular, the Commission was mandated to deliberate on the question of whether such violations and abuses were the result of deliberate planning, policy or authorisation by any government, group or individual. The Act required investigation into the roles of internal and external factions in the conflict.²
2. This chapter summarises the main findings of the Commission.³ The detailed findings of the Commission are to be found in the different chapters of the report. The main findings are preceded by primary findings. The primary findings are the central or most important findings made by the Commission.
3. In the course of its proceedings, the Commission amassed a large amount of evidence and information from public and closed hearings, interviews, investigations and research. Based upon the totality of this information, the Commission has made findings concerning the roles played in the conflict by governments, groups, factions and individuals.
4. At the end of each section addressing the role played by a particular government, faction or group, the names and positions of persons found to have been its key office-holders are listed. In circumstances where a finding related to the actions of the government, faction or group in question, those office-holders were by implication held responsible.
5. In certain circumstances, findings were also made in respect of individuals. These circumstances included:
 - Where the individual in question had sufficient opportunity during a hearing or interview to respond to an allegation; or where the individual was supplied with written questions and could have responded in writing; and
 - Where the Commission was satisfied that the information or evidence at its disposal pointed overwhelmingly to a certain conclusion.
6. The Commission made findings in respect of groups and individuals after careful deliberation. Following months of research and investigation, staff members placed their research conclusions before the Commissioners in a series of workshops. These conclusions were interrogated and debated by the Commissioners.

¹ Section 6(1) read with Section 6(2)(a) of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000.

² Section 6(2)(a)(i) of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000.

³ As required by Section 15(2) of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000.

7. The standard of proof employed was not that used by criminal courts of law, namely proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The Commission did not make findings on questions of innocence or guilt. It made factual findings in relation to responsibility and accountability. The standard of proof utilised by the Commission was therefore more akin to the preponderance or balance of probabilities.
8. The Commission, by necessity, devoted its energies to building the totality of the story of the conflict. Although specific cases were investigated, these were events that either served to illustrate the greater story or incidents that, in themselves, defined the nature and course of the conflict.
9. The Findings chapter is perhaps more properly described as a summation of the main conclusions⁴ that emerged from the process of establishing the “factual or forensic truth”⁵ of the conflict. At times this summation accords with some of the “personal or narrative truths”, namely the truth as understood or related by individual participants, victims and witnesses.⁶ The findings also, at times, accord with the “social truth” or that truth that is generally accepted by large segments of the population.⁷
10. At other times, the conclusions to be found in the Findings chapter depart fundamentally from the different narrative truths and formerly accepted social or popular truths. In so doing, the findings of the Commission have debunked certain popular “truths” and may contribute to the creation of a new social truth of the Sierra Leone conflict.
11. The Findings chapter commences with the Primary Findings of the Commission. The chapter then sets out the conclusions and findings of the Commission in relation to the following topics and themes:
 - a. Causes of the Conflict
 - b. Nature and Characteristics of the Conflict
 - c. Perpetrator Responsibility
 - d. Military and Political History of the Conflict
 - i. Revolutionary United Front (RUF)
 - ii. Sierra Leone Army (SLA)
 - iii. National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC)
 - iv. Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC)
 - v. Sierra Leone People’s Party Government (SLPP)
 - vi. Civil Defence Forces (CDF)
 - e. External Actors
 - i. Libya
 - ii. Charles Taylor and the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)
 - iii. United Liberation Movement for Democracy (ULIMO)
 - iv. Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and ECOWAS Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)

⁴ The terms “findings” and “conclusions” are used interchangeably in this chapter.

⁵ These are conclusions based on an empirical fact-finding approach. See Chapter Three of Volume One for a comprehensive definition of the factual truth and Chapter Five of Volume One for details on the fact-finding approach adopted by the Commission.

⁶ See Chapter Three of Volume One for a detailed discussion on personal or narrative truth.

⁷ See Chapter Three of Volume One for a detailed discussion on social truth.

- v. United Kingdom
- vi. Executive Outcomes
- vii. United Nations and the International Community
- f. The Judiciary, the Rule of Law and the Promotion of Human Rights
- g. Youth
- h. Children
- i. Women
- j. Mineral Resources
- k. TRC and the Special Court for Sierra Leone

PRIMARY FINDINGS

12. The Commission finds that the conflict and the post-independence period preceding it represent the most shameful years of Sierra Leone's history. These periods reflect an extraordinary failure of leadership on the part of all those involved in government, public life and civil society.
13. The Commission finds that the central cause of the war was endemic greed, corruption and nepotism that deprived the nation of its dignity and reduced most people to a state of poverty.
14. Successive political elites⁸ plundered the nation's assets, including its mineral riches, at the expense of the national good.
15. Government accountability was non-existent. Institutions meant to uphold human rights, such as the courts and civil society, were thoroughly co-opted by the executive.
16. This context provided ripe breeding grounds for opportunists who unleashed a wave of violence and mayhem that was to sweep through the country.
17. Many Sierra Leoneans, particularly the youth, lost all sense of hope in the future. Youths became easy prey for unscrupulous forces who exploited their disenchantment to wreak vengeance against the ruling elite.
18. The Commission holds the political elite of successive regimes in the post-independence period responsible for creating the conditions for conflict.
19. The Commission finds that the seeds of discontent of the late 1980s and early 1990s can be traced to the colonial strategies of divide and rule and the subversion of traditional systems by the colonial power and successive governments.
20. War in Sierra Leone was waged largely by Sierra Leoneans against Sierra Leoneans. All factions specifically targeted civilians.
21. The Sierra Leone civil war was characterised by indiscriminate violence. It broke long-standing rules, defiled cherished traditions, sullied human respect and tore apart the very fabric of society.

⁸ The term 'political elite' is used to describe the elite across the spectrum including the business elite and those occupying positions of power and influence in the public and private sectors.

22. While the majority of victims were adult males, perpetrators singled out women and children for some of the most brutal violations of human rights recorded in any conflict.
23. Children aged between ten and 14 years were especially targeted for forced recruitment. Girls between the ages of ten and 14 were targeted for rape and for abuse as sexual slaves.⁹
24. Women and girls were raped, forced into sexual slavery, tortured and suffered cruel and inhumane acts.
25. Forced displacements, abductions, arbitrary detentions and killings were the most common violations.¹⁰
26. The Commission holds all the armed groups involved in the conflict responsible for systematically plundering and looting Sierra Leone.
27. The Commission finds the leadership of the RUF, the AFRC, the SLA and the CDF to be responsible for either authorising or instigating human rights violations against civilians; alternatively for failing to stop such practices or to speak out against them; and for failing to acknowledge the atrocities committed by their followers or members.
28. The Commission holds the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and the RUF responsible for planning and executing military operations against the state of Sierra Leone. In particular, the Commission finds that the leaders of these organisations, Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh, played pivotal roles in bringing bloody conflict to Sierra Leone.
29. The Commission found the RUF to have been responsible for the largest number of human rights violations in the conflict.
30. The AFRC committed the second highest rate of violations.
31. The SLA and the CDF were attributed, respectively, with the third and fourth highest institutional counts of violations.
32. The Commission finds that the governments in power at the time of the outbreak of violence in 1991 and during the conflict period neglected to take adequate steps to protect the nation from the aggressive actions of foreign and rebel forces.
33. The Commission finds that the SLPP Government must bear responsibility for the excesses committed by the CDF. The Government failed to stop and address the Commission of human rights violations against civilians and initiates even when knowledge of such violations was brought to its attention.

⁹ In violations reported to the Commission, the exact age of the victim at the onset of the violation is recorded for 54.8% (22,041 out of 40,242 victims) of them. Of these, 4.5% (985 out of 22,041) have the age of the victim recorded as under 10 years old, and 9.5% (2,104 out of 22,041) have the age of the victim recorded as under 13 years old.

¹⁰ This statement is based on the testimonies submitted to the Commission; see the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report for an explanation of how the Commission's database represents the abuses experienced during the war in Sierra Leone.

34. The Commission finds that successive governments abused the death penalty to eliminate political opponents. The Commission finds the continued existence of the death penalty on the statute books of Sierra Leone to be an affront to a civilised society based on respect for human life.
35. The Commission finds that successive regimes in Sierra Leone misused emergency powers to suppress political dissent. The persistent use of so-called “Safe Custody” detention is unlawful and represents gross contempt for the rule of law by the present Government of Sierra Leone.
36. The Commission finds that contrary to popular belief, the exploitation of diamonds did not cause the conflict in Sierra Leone. Nevertheless, different fighting factions did target diamondiferous areas for the purposes of gathering mineral wealth to support their war efforts.
37. The Commission finds that many of the causes of the conflict that prompted thousands of young people to join the war have still not been adequately addressed. High among these factors are elitist politics, rampant corruption, nepotism, and bad governance in general. They are potential causes of conflict, if they remain unaddressed.¹¹
38. The Commission holds that the right to the truth is inalienable. This right should be upheld in terms of national and international law. It is the reaching of the wider truth through broad-based participation that permits a nation to examine itself honestly and to take effective measures to prevent a repetition of the past.

FINDINGS ON THE CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT

39. The causes of the Sierra Leone conflict were many and diverse. Some historical antecedents to the conflict can be traced back to the colonial period,¹² while others are found by examining the post-independence years, in particular, the years preceding the outbreak of violence in 1991.
40. Key themes highlighted by the Commission were the pervasive corruption and the dire failings in governance that characterised all the regimes of the pre-conflict years.¹³ These factors produced the conditions that made Sierra Leone ripe for violent conflict.
41. This section also sets out findings in relation to those developments that constituted the immediate antecedents to the start of conflict.

¹¹ A study has revealed that around half of civil wars occur in countries that have had another internal conflict during the previous ten years. As reported in *The Economist*, 24 April 2004 at page 84. More detail can be found at the website: www.economist.com/copenhagenconsensus.

¹² See the chapter on Historical Antecedents to the Conflict in Volume Three A.

¹³ See the chapter on Governance in Volume Three A.

Primary findings

42. Prior to 1991, successive regimes became increasingly impervious to the wishes and needs of the majority. Instead of implementing positive and progressive policies, each regime perpetuated the ills and self-serving machinations left behind by its predecessor.
43. A number of internal factors accumulated, which made armed rebellion an increasingly attractive option for many disaffected Sierra Leoneans. These factors included unrestrained greed, corruption and bad governance.
44. Institutional collapse reduced the vast majority of people to a state of deprivation. Government accountability was non-existent. Political expression and dissent had been crushed. Democracy and the rule of law were dead.
45. By 1991, Sierra Leone was a deeply divided society, full of the potential for violence. It required only the slightest spark for this violence to be ignited.

Main findings

The Colonial Period

46. The Commission finds that the Colonial power in Sierra Leone deliberately created two nations in the same land, one in the colony and the other in the protectorate. The impact of the separate development policies had far-reaching consequences, particularly in the fields of education, access to resources and in the social and political development of the two regions. The policies of the Colonial government led to the preferential development of the Colony at the expense of the Protectorate.
47. The Commission finds that the Colonial government manipulated the Chieftaincy system and, in so doing, undermined its legitimacy. The Chiefs became mere surrogates of the colonial government. They owed their loyalty to their colonial masters rather than to the people they were meant to serve.
48. The Commission finds that the policies of the Colonial government created a dual legal system that affected the colony and the protectorate differently. This impacted negatively on those in the protectorate who had to contend with the arbitrary and capricious application of customary law by the Chiefs. This created much resentment amongst the residents of the protectorate.

The Post-Independence Period

49. The Commission finds that, by the early 1990s, greed, corruption and bad governance had led to institutional collapse, through the weakening of the Army, the police, the judiciary and the civil service. The entire economy was undermined by grave mismanagement.
50. Selfish leadership bred resentment, poverty and a deplorable lack of access to key services. Notwithstanding the riches endowed to Sierra Leone in the form of diamonds and other mineral resources, the bulk of the population remained impoverished. Indeed, many of the poor were becoming poorer.

51. These social ills began with a collective failure to subscribe to notions of the common good. In many instances, the rich perceived the poor to be worthless, while the poor perceived the rich to be unworthy.
52. A culture of grabbing and intolerance for the rights of others became entrenched in Sierra Leone. People were systematically deprived of their dignity.
53. The political elite in successive regimes excluded society-at-large from meaningful participation in decision-making. Key stakeholders in society, including students, youths, and the populace of the Provinces, were marginalised by the political elite. Ultimately, these marginalised groups played a central role in initiating and fuelling the armed conflict.
54. The Commission finds in particular that the term of government under the All People's Congress (APC), particularly during the reign of President Siaka Stevens (1969 – 1985), was one that suppressed any semblance of opposition. The creation of a one-party state effectively neutralised all checks and balances on the exercise of executive power. The one-party state systematically closed down avenues for open debate and democratic activity.
55. By the time of the conflict, successive regimes had rendered the country devoid of governmental accountability. Institutions such as the judiciary and civil society had become mere pawns in the hands of the executive. Parliament proved itself to be a servile agent of the executive, lacking courage and determination to resist tyranny.
56. The Commission finds that all institutions of oversight must accept responsibility for the effective entrenchment of dictatorship and bad governance that laid the grounds for war.
57. There were no significant acts of resistance to the excesses of the system. Civil society was largely co-opted into the very same system. Organs or agents of the APC Government quickly crushed the few who did stand up to totalitarianism. In short, there were no real restraints on the executive. The rule of law was well and truly dead. Those in power became a law unto themselves.
58. The signs of the impending human catastrophe were plain to see. The Provinces had been almost totally sidelined through the centralisation of political and economic power in Freetown. Local government was in demise across the country. Chiefs and traditional structures did little more than the bidding of the power base in Freetown. Regions and ethnic groups were polarised by the contrasting treatments they were afforded.
59. It had become commonplace for elections to be rigged. Elections were associated with campaigns of intimidation and violence often carried out by thugs who were employed by party bosses and given drugs to fuel their waywardness.
60. Historically, the conduct of the political elite, while in power was largely the same, regardless of which political party was in power. Corruption in the judiciary and public sector was rife. The people had lost all faith in the ruling class to act with integrity and to deliver basic services to the nation.

61. Successive political regimes abused their authority over the security forces and unleashed them against their political opponents in the name of national security. Soldiers and police officers were reduced to playing roles as agents of destabilisation. The Commission finds that the military overthrow of the APC government in 1967 sowed the seeds for future military coups of successive governments.
62. By the time of the outbreak of war, the army had become dangerously under resourced after years of neglect, when government devoted its resources to internal security for purposes of extinguishing political opposition.
63. The Commission finds that divisions along ethnic and regional lines characterised the post-colonial period. Successive regimes favoured certain ethnic groups over others with regard to appointments in cabinet, the civil service and army.
64. Sierra Leoneans owed loyalty to their respective ethnic group rather than to the nation. They became captive to different systems of patronage. The basis for political, social and economic mobility was dependent on allegiance to a “pa” (benefactor) rather than effort based on merit.
65. By the end of the 1980s, Sierra Leone had become a deeply fragmented country, marked by an almost total lack of national identity. Notions of citizenship and patriotism had become meaningless concepts.
66. The Commission finds that the innumerable failings in governance caused Sierra Leonean activists to seek alternative outlets for expression of their dissent and dissatisfaction. The exclusionist actions of the APC led to a complete loss of faith in the political system and ultimately gave rise to a general belief that only a revolutionary movement could bring about change.
67. The Commission finds that those in leadership in government, public life and civil society failed the people of Sierra Leone. The period between independence and the start of the conflict represents a colossal failure of leadership at all levels of public life. No enlightened and visionary leaders emerged to steer the country away from the slide into chaos and bloody civil war.
68. The Commission holds the political elite of successive regimes in the post-independence period responsible for creating the conditions for conflict in Sierra Leone. The governments headed by Sir Milton Margai, Sir Albert Margai, Colonel A. T. Juxon-Smith, Siaka Probyn Stevens and General Joseph Saidu Momoh all bear a share of this responsibility. These leaders together with the entire political elite collectively placed their personal and political interests above those of the nation.

The immediate antecedents to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone

69. Outbreak of armed conflict was made inevitable by events unfolding in Liberia. A series of events took place on Liberian territory in 1990 and 1991 that culminated in the formulation of a joint agenda on the part of Charles Taylor and Foday Sankoh. The Commission finds that they planned to instigate a war in Sierra Leone.
70. The launch of a renewed insurgency by Charles Taylor's National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) against the Government of Liberia in December 1989 was an integral antecedent to the conflict in Sierra Leone.
71. The Commission finds that Charles Taylor played an influential role in bringing war to Sierra Leone. Taylor provided the organisational oversight of both the NPFL and the RUF factions during the period preceding the conflict.
72. Foday Sankoh assembled and trained a force comprising 385 commandos at Camp Namma in Liberia. The Commission finds that Sankoh's training programme was geared to no other purpose but the launching of an armed insurgency in Sierra Leone with this force.
73. The High Command of the Sierra Leone Army failed to put in place sufficiently robust measures to deter, prevent or contain attacks in the border area with Liberia.
74. The Commission finds that there were concrete plans for joint military operations by the RUF and NPFL in existence before 23 March 1991. These plans sparked a conflict that was unprecedented in its intensity, its nature and its characteristics.

FINDINGS ON THE NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CONFLICT

Primary Findings

75. The war was waged largely by Sierra Leoneans against Sierra Leoneans.
76. All factions specifically targeted civilians.
77. While the majority of victims were adult males, perpetrators singled out women and children for some of the most brutal violations of human rights recorded in any conflict. In a few cases, the children victimised were below ten years of age.
78. Forced displacements, abductions, arbitrary detentions, and killings were the most common violations.
79. Sierra Leone was systematically plundered and looted by all factions in the conflict. The war has left Sierra Leone in a state of infrastructural disrepair.

Main Findings

Self-destructive character of the conflict

80. Notwithstanding the participation of thousands of fighters from other countries in the war, the overwhelming majority of atrocities were committed by Sierra Leoneans against Sierra Leoneans. The conflict was essentially self-destructive in character.

Age and gender profile of the victims

81. Most of the violations reported to the Commission were committed against adult males (59.6%, or 6816 violations out of 11,429).¹⁴ Of the victims reported to the Commission for whom age and sex are known, 66.5% (7,603 out of 11,429 victims) are male while 33.5% (3,826 out of 11,429 victims) are female. Female victims reported to the Commission comprised 31.9% of adult victims (3,186 out of 10,002 victims) but made up 44.9% (640 out of 1,427) of the child victims.¹⁵
82. Most of the violations in the Commission's database were committed against adults, but an alarming high proportion was committed against children. Sixty-six percent of the victims in the Commission's database are male. Female victims in the Commission's database comprised 30.9% of adult victims but made up nearly half of all child victims.

Targeting of Civilians

83. Civilians accounted for a large number of deaths at the hands of each of the fighting factions.¹⁶
84. The Commission finds that civilians, as individuals and in groups, were often the direct targets of participant militias and armed groups rather than merely the unfortunate victims of "collateral damage". Combatant groups executed brutal campaigns of terror against civilians in order to enforce their military and political agendas. Civilians became the "objects" of political or factional allegiance. They were victimised indiscriminately to send a message to "the enemy".
85. The Commission finds that all participant militias and armed groups not only disrespected the international laws and conventions of war, but also intentionally flouted the laws and customs that traditionally have lent structure to Sierra Leonean communities, culture and society.

¹⁴ There were 14,995 victims reported to the Commission, but the age category and sex are known for only 11,429 of them. More detail can be found in the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

¹⁵ The age category of the victim is known for 33,196 of the 40,242 violations reported to the Commission; 13.6% of the violations (4,513 out of 33,196) were committed against children 17 years of age or younger.

¹⁶ The majority of the 4,514 deaths reported to the Commission were civilian deaths.

Nature of Violations

86. *Forced displacement* accounted for 19.8% (7,983 out of 40,242) of the violations reported to the Commission. More forced displacements were reported than any other violation. The Commission found that a typical, recurring pattern of experience was for victims to flee from their homes in fear of their lives, leaving attackers in their wake. These attackers would often systematically loot and destroy whatever property had been left behind.
87. *Abductions* were the second most common violation reported to the Commission followed by *arbitrary detention*. The total reported violations and percentages are shown in the table below.

Violation Type	Count	Percentage
Forced Displacement	7983	19.8
Abduction	5968	14.8
Arbitrary Detention	4835	12.0
Killing	4514	11.2
Destruction of Property	3404	8.5
Assault / Beating	3246	8.1
Looting of Goods	3044	7.6
Physical Torture	2051	5.1
Forced Labour	1834	4.6
Extortion	1273	3.2
Rape	626	1.6
Sexual Abuse	486	1.2
Amputation	378	0.9
Forced Recruitment	331	0.8
Sexual Slavery	191	0.5
Drugging	59	0.2
Forced Cannibalism	19	0.1
Total	40, 242	100.2

88. Within the context of the violations reported in statements to the Commission, *rape* and *sexual slavery* were committed exclusively against *females*, while 89.1% (293 out of 331) of *forced recruitments* were committed against *males*.

Targeting of Children

89. The Commission finds that children were specifically targeted during the conflict. In particular, the Commission finds statistical patterns that are consistent with the hypothesis that children between the ages of 10 and 14 were specifically targeted for *forced recruitment*, *rape*, and *sexual slavery*.¹⁷ Twenty-five percent of the victims reported to the Commission across these three violations were young children: 11 years of age or younger in respect of forced recruitment; 13 years or below in respect of those raped; 12 years or younger in respect of those forced into sexual slavery.

¹⁷ More detail can be found in the chapter on Children in Volume Three B.

90. The Commission finds the RUF, the AFRC and the SLA (when it operated with the AFRC) to be the primary organisations that committed violations against children. Of the violations known to the Commission with a victim with known age and alleged to have been committed by the RUF, 15.4% (3,090 out of 20,125 violations) were against children.¹⁸ The corresponding statistic for the AFRC (including the SLA when it operated with the AFRC) was 10.7% (603 out of 5,610 violations). The leaderships of these factions are held responsible for permitting the commission of gross human rights violations against children. There are no mitigating factors to justify such inhuman and cruel conduct.

Looting of the Nation

91. Sierra Leone was systematically plundered during the conflict period. Looting violations were rife and constant throughout the period of fighting. Property owners and those with assets, such as motor cars and large numbers of livestock, were deliberately targeted by each of the fighting factions, as they sought to accumulate wealth for themselves.
92. The Commission finds that the targeting by the RUF of the affluent and the attacking of commercial operations crippled the economy.
93. Combatants from each of the factions enriched themselves through tactics universally known as “pay yourself”. They would force captives to act as “human caravans” to carry away their loot.
94. Combatants from all the factions in the Sierra Leone civil war are held responsible for looting and pillaging the country. The Commission holds the leadership elements of all factions responsible for either authorising or failing to stop the dispossession of the people.

Characterisation of the Fighting Forces

95. The majority of the fighting forces were composed of the young, the disgruntled, the unemployed and the poor.
96. The Commission has identified an astonishing “factional fluidity” among the different militias and armed groups that prosecuted the war. Both overtly and covertly, gradually and suddenly, fighters switched sides or established new “units”. These “chameleonic tendencies” spanned across all factions without exception.
97. The factional fluidity that defined this conflict was drawn into its sharpest focus in the latter stages of the conflict. Many of the early members of the RUF on its Southern Front in the Pujehun District reappeared as Kamajors under the banner of the CDF after 1997. Theirs was not so much a switching of sides as the identification of a new vehicle on which to purvey their notions of empowerment as civil militiamen.

¹⁸ More detail can be found in the chapter on Children in Volume Three B.

Other Characteristics of the Conflict

98. Chiefs, Speakers, elders and other social, cultural and religious figureheads were singled out for humiliation and brutal maltreatment by combatants of the NPFL and the RUF.
99. The conflict was often used as a vehicle for carrying out pre-existing grudges, grievances and vendettas.
100. Acts of summary justice were often directed or encouraged by other civilians. These were mostly isolated incidents motivated by unresolved personal feuds and other localised dynamics in the particular deployment areas where they took place. Residents pointed fingers at other members of their communities with whom they had a history of civil strife. ECOMOG or SLA soldiers, RUF fighters or CDF militiamen then executed the alleged wrongdoer without substantiating the accusation.
101. Persons in positions of leadership or responsibility at times made malicious statements regarding other ethnic groups in order to promote their strategic objectives. This heightened ethnic tensions.

The Nature of Particular Violations

102. There was widespread voluntary and recreational use of drugs by members of the militias and armed groups. However, there were also many violations of forced ingestion of drugs and alcohol, particularly by members of the RUF against those they had abducted or forcibly enlisted.
103. The Commission finds that amputations were not a constant or underpinning feature to the prosecution of the war, but rather came in the form of campaigns. Amputations were carried out by members of the RUF, the CDF, the AFRC and the SLA in its earlier incarnations.
104. The Commission recorded violations committed by all combatant factions in which captives or villagers were forced to eat the flesh and body parts of human corpses. This violation also manifested itself in the forced drinking of (one's own or another's) blood, and the forced eating of one's own body parts. It served to dehumanise the victim and to create grave psychological damage.
105. The Kamajors, who constituted the CDF of the Southern and Eastern Regions, demonstrated a tendency towards the subjection of their victims to forced cannibalism.

FINDINGS ON PERPETRATOR RESPONSIBILITY

Primary Findings

106. The RUF was the primary violator of human rights in the conflict. The AFRC was responsible for the second largest number of violations.¹⁹ The Sierra Leone Army (SLA)²⁰ was the third biggest violator, followed by the Civil Defence Forces (CDF).²¹

Main Findings

107. The Commission finds that the RUF was responsible for more violations than any other faction during the period 1991 to 2000: 60.5% (24,353 out of 40,242) of all violations were attributed to the RUF. Furthermore, the RUF committed more violations than any other group during every individual year between 1991 and 2000.²²
108. The AFRC was responsible for the second largest number of violations during the period 1991 to 2000. Some 9.8% (3,950 out of 40,242 violations) of all allegations made in statements to the Commission were attributed to the AFRC.
109. The Sierra Leone Army (SLA) was responsible for the third largest number of violations during the same period. Some 6.8% (2,724 out of 40,242) of the allegations made in the statements were levelled at the SLA.
110. 6% (2,419 out of 40,242) of violations alleged by the statement-makers are attributed to the CDF, and 1.5% of violations alleged by the statement-makers are attributed jointly to the SLA and AFRC during the second quarter of 1997.
111. Other groups such as ECOMOG, the Special Security Division (SSD) of the Sierra Leone Police and the Guinean Armed Forces (GAF) account for less than 1% each of the recorded violations. 5.0% of the recorded violations are considered to have unknown perpetrators.
112. The total number of reported violations by year and alleged perpetrator identity are set out in the table overleaf.

¹⁹ It should be noted that there was significant "transferability" of combatants between the AFRC and the RUF in the latter stages of the war. The AFRC only came into being in 1997.

²⁰ There was some confusion in the identification of SLA and AFRC perpetrators from 1997 onwards. More detail can be found in the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

²¹ All of these conclusions on perpetrator responsibility are based on the testimonies and statements submitted to the Commission.

²² A further 9.7% of violations were attributed to "rebels". For a discussion of this category, see the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

Number of violations reported to the TRC according to year and alleged perpetrator identity²³

Year	RUF	SLA	AFRC	CDF
1991	4,055	597	0	29
1992	1,241	222	0	24
1993	758	197	0	9
1994	2,550	368	0	93
1995	3,822	469	0	191
1996	1,231	172	0	180
1997	926	51	325	602
1998	2,686	0	1,943	473
1999	2,639	0	1,312	352
2000	831	110	0	78

FINDINGS IN RESPECT OF THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE CONFLICT

113. The next section covers the findings made in respect of the military and political history of the conflict. These findings are organised per faction. Findings of responsibility are made in relation to the role played by each faction and, in certain circumstances, with respect to individual leaders, commanders, combatants and other role-players.
114. The factions included in this study are the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), the Government of the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP Government) and the Civil Defence Forces (CDF).

²³ A number of violations which were reported to the Commission but which could not be dated have been omitted from this table.

THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT OF SIERRA LEONE (RUF)

Primary Findings

115. The RUF and its supporters were responsible for the greatest number of human rights violations during the conflict period.
116. Although the RUF may have reflected prevailing discontent and revolutionary fervour existing in Sierra Leone at the start of the conflict, it soon lost its claim to be a peoples' movement. From the beginning, the RUF's war was a war of terror. While its political objectives evolved over time, the RUF never ceased or lessened its attack on the lives and properties of the people of Sierra Leone.
117. The RUF's terror tactics included the widespread abduction of children and their forced enlistment into the RUF movement under threat of death; massacres of entire communities and the targeting of traditional figureheads and influential persons; campaigns of amputations; public and brutal executions; and the destruction and looting of property.
118. The RUF carried out widespread rapes and acts of sexual violence against women and girls.

Main Findings

Characteristics of the RUF faction as it evolved over the course of the conflict

119. The Commission finds that the RUF comprised a highly unconventional fighting force. Their members were recruited in troubled circumstances, many of them under false pretences, duress, or threats to their lives.
120. The Commission finds that large parts of the RUF fighting force that evolved in Pujehun District in the early years bore the character of a civil militia movement. This anomaly was attributable to the enlistment into the RUF ranks of a pre-existing civil militia called the "Joso" Group, who were the remnants of the force that had led the 1982 Ndorgboryosoi rebellion against the APC.
121. The strained relationship between the RUF and the NPFL, from the outset, speaks of an insurgent force that was deeply divided. The Commission finds that many members of the RUF held completely distinct and partly conflicting agendas from their counterparts in the NPFL. In both Kailahun and Pujehun Districts, RUF members engaged in hostile actions against the NPFL. Divergence and confrontation between the two insurgent factions resulted in several targeted killings of each other's leadership cadre.
122. The Commission finds that the majority of killings of key RUF commanders between 1991 and 1993 were attributable not to battlefield casualties, but to lethal manifestations of acrimony, rivalry and personal vendettas.

123. The RUF became a totally amorphous movement after the arrest of its leader Foday Sankoh in Nigeria in March 1997. Its command structure was decapitated and it opened the way for opportunists to assert their claims to leadership in his place. The result was calamitous for the prospects of engaging the RUF movement in further peace initiatives.
124. When the movement became the Revolutionary United Front Party (RUF), it split into two, the political and combatant wings. The tension and stresses between both groups made it impossible for the RUF to genuinely engage in consolidating the peace.

RUF Strategies and Tactics of War

o Conventional "Target" Warfare ("Phase I", 1991 -1993)

125. The RUF was responsible for the launch of an armed insurgency in Sierra Leone. The mode of insurgency was the culmination of detailed advance planning undertaken jointly by Foday Sankoh and Charles Taylor. The RUF mounted a full-scale incursion from Liberia into both the Kailahun and Pujehun Districts, almost simultaneously.
126. The Commission finds that, for the duration of Phase I of the conflict,²⁴ from 1991 to 1993, the combatant factions used strategies of conventional "target" warfare. Until the end of 1993, the conflict retained the character of a war on two fronts.
127. The Commission finds that the RUF deliberately included civilian settlements within the scope of offensive operations and holds the orchestrators, planners and commanders of these operations responsible for grave and systematic breaches of international humanitarian law. In particular, Charles Taylor, the leader of the NPFL, and Foday Sankoh, the leader of the RUF, are found to have ordered such operations as part of their joint strategy of conventional "target" warfare.
128. The Commission holds the leadership of the NPFL and the RUF responsible for precipitating systematic forced displacement through their attacks on "targets". The category of forced displacement accounted for more violations than any other act carried out by the warring factions in Phase I of the conflict.
129. The RUF and its NPFL partner vigorously pursued opportunities for self-enrichment in the towns they entered. The insurgents thereby intensified the rate of violations they committed against the populations of the Kailahun and Pujehun Districts.
130. The RUF was responsible for the first sustained assault on Koidu Town, Kono District, from October 1992 until February 1993. This assault resulted in a spate of violations against local residents including the killing of Chiefs, government officials, businesspersons and members of the Lebanese community.

²⁴ The reference to "Phase I" is a reflection of terminology employed by the Commission for the purposes of analysing the conflict. For explanation and elaboration on the Phases of the Conflict, please refer to Chapter Three of Volume Three A on the Military and Political History of the Conflict.

131. The Commission finds that the RUF's attack on Koidu Town in 1992 represented the first of many occasions on which RUF missions targeted at areas rich in strategic resources resulted in the substantial loss of human life and destruction of property.
- *"Guerrilla" Warfare ("Phase II", 1993 - 1997)*
132. The Commission finds that the RUF overhauled its tactical approach to the war at the end of 1993 and launched a fresh strategy based on "guerrilla" warfare. The RUF was solely responsible for a far higher rate of violations and abuses in Phase II than in either the earlier or the later years of the conflict.
133. In particular, the Commission finds that the RUF perpetrated a systematic campaign of abductions on an unprecedented level in Phase II. The prime targets of RUF abduction were boys and young men who were forcibly recruited into the combatant cadre, as well as young girls who were raped and sexually enslaved by existing fighters. Almost every abductee was also forced into carrying loads for the RUF, often over long distances. The RUF carried out widespread rapes and acts of sexual violence in every community it entered.
134. The two tactical pillars on which the RUF guerrilla campaign was built were ambushes and "hit and run attacks". In advance of ambushes, RUF commanders would whip up tension and aggression in their combatants. This manifested itself in intense brutality when they were released into action. Hence RUF ambush teams committed horrendous acts of civilian killings, sexual violence, mutilation and destruction of property.
135. Violations and abuses followed two principal sub-patterns within "hit and run attacks". "Hits" became gradually less discriminate in their targeting and transpired to inflict gross human rights violations on numerous civilian communities. Violations typically included killings on sight, detentions of civilians (often *en masse* in cramped conditions), beatings of captives and incidents of rape and gang rape.
136. In the "run", or flight from a target, the RUF systematically accrued "resources" for its sustenance as a guerrilla fighting force. Hence the RUF habitually captured civilians and took them unwillingly from their communities, often torturing them and forcing them into carrying pillaged properties. These captures were the bedrocks upon which the violations of forced recruitment and sexual slavery increased substantially.
137. The RUF was able to expand the scope and coverage of its operations so broadly that it had carved out a presence in every one of Sierra Leone's twelve provincial Districts by 1995. The Commission finds that the RUF was responsible for the majority of violations and abuses carried out in every single one of these Districts. Among the atrocities attributable to the RUF during this period are several massacres of entire resident populations of townships in each of the Provinces of the country.

138. The Commission finds that the RUF carried out a host of attacks in the Central and Southern territories of Sierra Leone dressed in full SLA military uniforms. In many cases the RUF successfully deceived the local population that the Army was responsible for its attacks. Whilst widely and diversely practised, the Commission finds that such a mode of “false flag” attacks became a particular trademark of the troops commanded by the RUF’s erstwhile Battlefield Commander Mohamed Tarawallie (alias “Zino” or “CO Mohamed”).
139. The Commission holds the RUF responsible for the majority of the violence against civilians that accompanied the General and Presidential Elections of 1996. In particular, the RUF launched “Operation Stop Elections”²⁵ against the civilian population as a deliberate ploy to undermine the expression of democratic will by the people of Sierra Leone who participated.

RUF Tactics of Enlistment: Abductions and Forced Recruitment

140. The Commission finds that the RUF pioneered the policy of forced recruitment in the conflict. The RUF bore a marked proclivity towards abduction, abuse and training of civilians for the purpose of creating commandos. It was the first armed group to practise forced recruitment and was responsible for the vast majority of the forced recruitment violations recorded by the Commission.
141. In addition, the Commission finds that many young men joined the RUF voluntarily because they were disaffected. This trend demonstrates the centrality of bad governance, corruption, all forms of discrimination and the marginalisation of certain sectors of society among the causes of conflict in Sierra Leone. Historical ills and injustices had prepared the ground for someone of Foday Sankoh’s manipulative ability to canvass among the people and find scores of would-be RUF commandos who could be brought on board with relatively little persuasion.
142. The Commission finds that, by including young boys among his vanguard trainees at Camp Namma in the early 1990s, Sankoh set a trend of wanton violation of the rights of children that would recur and perpetuate throughout the following eleven years of conflict in Sierra Leone.
143. The Commission finds that insurgent factions forced thousands of civilians to join them. Sometimes, people’s normal lives and levels of tolerance were systematically worn away until they had no choice but to join the RUF. More commonly, though, youths and children were recruited by explicit force that included coercing them at gunpoint, sending them to training bases and turning them into combatants, known as “junior commandos”.
144. The Commission holds the RUF responsible for the majority of violations involving forced recruitment of children.²⁶ The forcible recruitment of children less than 18 years old is a gross violation of international law.

²⁵ More detail on the nature of this operation is contained below in the findings on Amputations.

²⁶ Of the 168 forced recruitment violations against children recorded in the Commission’s database, the RUF is alleged to have committed 128, or 76.2%, of them.

Particular Responsibilities among RUF Ground Commanders

145. The Commission finds that the RUF Battlefield Commander from 1994 to 1996, Mohamed Tarawallie (alias “Zino” or “CO Mohamed”), bears a larger share of responsibility than any other individual combatant for the spread of RUF attacks into the Northern Province of Sierra Leone from 1994 onwards. Tarawallie carved a niche for himself as the commander in charge of “expanding” the RUF’s areas of operations and leading attacks on Government installations of perceived strategic importance.
146. The Commission furthermore regards Tarawallie as responsible for the policy of “false flag” operations. This policy sowed considerable mayhem and bitter distrust of the SLA. Tarawallie was the main and most frequent perpetrator of attacks in which the whole troop under his command wore full SLA uniforms.
147. Sam Bockarie (alias “Mosquito”) rose to prominence as both a Battlefield Commander of lethal prowess and a deviant of unknown quantity in Phase II of the war. He frequently disobeyed orders and committed human rights abuses with total abandon.
148. Dennis Mingo (alias “Superman”) is also held responsible for a multiplicity of violations and abuses in Phase II. He was one of the foremost perpetrators of abduction-related crimes against children, including forced recruitment and forced drugging.
149. Among those commanders who recruited child combatants for the RUF were “vanguard” commanders including Komba Gbondema, Monica Pearson and Rashid Sandi, who undertook training on the RUF base known as “Camp Charlie”. These commanders were never disciplined for their wanton mistreatment of children.

Amputations

150. The Commission finds that the RUF was responsible for more amputations than any other faction during the conflict in Sierra Leone.²⁷ During 1996, the RUF’s “Operation Stop Elections” entailed the chopping off of hands and arms as a symbol of preventing people from voting.
151. In the RUF, a significant proportion of those who wielded the “implement of amputation” and actually performed the cutting of the limb in question were children. Many of the testimonies collected by the Commission indicate that the perpetrators themselves were acting under strictly enforced orders or other forms of compulsion. Children were instructed that they would be killed if they did not follow orders from their commanders.

²⁷ The RUF is alleged to have committed 154 of the 387 amputations (39.8%) recorded in the Commission’s database. The perpetrator group alleged to have committed the next-highest number of amputations recorded in the Commission’s database is the AFRC, with 108 of the 387 amputations (27.1%).

Other Characteristics

152. Indiscipline was rife among the fighting forces of the RUF and it was a cause of some of the worst violations and abuses committed by cadres of the RUF movement.
153. The Commission finds that the RUF bears a considerable degree of responsibility for the destruction of the symbols and institutions of authority in Sierra Leone. The RUF replaced traditional role players, including Chiefs and elders, with totally inappropriate authority figures, such as “Town Commanders”.
154. The Commission finds that the RUF carried out a purposive ploy to attract the attention of the international community by abducting civilian foreign nationals and holding them hostage in violation of international humanitarian law.

Internal Acrimony and Power Struggles within the RUF

155. The Commission holds Foday Sankoh and Sam Bockarie (alias “Mosquito”) responsible for the torture and summary executions of up to 40 RUF members in the Kailahun District in 1993. This set of executions eliminated some of Sankoh’s most envied personal rivals within the movement, including the erstwhile second-in-command Rashid Mansaray.
156. The Commission holds Gibril Massaquoi responsible for the torture and summary executions of up to 25 RUF members in the Pujehun District in 1993. This set of executions eliminated some of the most popular and credible commanders in the RUF’s First Battalion, including the erstwhile Battalion Commander Patrick Lamin. It was the aim of Massaquoi and a core of his Mende henchmen to localise and reshape the leadership of the movement on the Southern Front. It was targeted particularly against vanguards, many of whom were of Northern descent.
157. Following the arrest and detention of Foday Sankoh in Nigeria, the leadership of the RUF movement was seized by Sam Bockarie (alias “Mosquito”). The Commission finds that the notion of authority in the RUF thereafter was connected inexorably with brutality. A process of competition for control and management of the movement and its resources ensued. The levels of violations against civilians increased in almost direct proportion.

Breach of the Abidjan Ceasefire

158. The ceasefire declared to provide a stable backdrop to the Peace Talks in Abidjan was flouted by both the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone.

RUF Involvement in the Political and Military Implementation of the Lomé Peace Agreement

159. The Commission finds that, by the time of the negotiations at Lomé and beyond, Foday Sankoh no longer enjoyed sole and unfettered authority over all arms of the RUF movement. To a great extent, the RUF had become divided into two distinct entities with two distinct agendas. The “political wing” was largely loyal to Sankoh, but its members did not command constituencies of sufficient size or significance to dictate the direction of the whole faction. The RUF “combatant cadre” was far more volatile and threatening.
160. The Commission finds that the RUF combatant cadre perceived that the dividends of the Peace Agreement were concentrated in the hands of their “political” leadership, while the concessions associated with disarmament and demobilisation were all “military” sacrifices that had to be made by the combatant cadre. A major shortcoming on the part of the RUF faction leaders was that they failed to engender confidence and faith among the RUF combatant cadre that Lomé was a fair and impartial process.
161. The RUF’s participation in the implementation of the Lomé Agreement drove a wedge between members of its political wing and the RUF combatant cadre. RUF monitors in the Joint Monitoring Commission and the Ceasefire Monitoring Committee were often subjected to harassment and physical abuse by members of their own faction.
162. The Commission finds that the RUF combatant cadre did not comply with the terms of the disarmament programme. Its commanders encouraged and engaged in persistent breaches of the peace. They displayed a particular disregard for the status of the peacekeepers. Commanders such as Komba Gbondema, Morris Kallon, Issa Sesay and Augustine Bao displayed utter contempt for the ethos of the peace process in their areas of control. Foday Sankoh was outwardly fiercely protective of “his boys” in the field and shares the responsibility with them for numerous attacks between October 1999 and April 2000.

RUF Violation of the Lomé Peace Agreement in Taking Peacekeepers Hostage

163. The hostage-taking of about 500 UNAMSIL military personnel in the early days of May 2000 was the gravest violation carried out by the RUF combatant cadre during the disarmament phase. These widespread and unprovoked abductions constituted a grave breach of the conditions of the Lomé ceasefire. There can be no justification for the use of armed force against observers and support staff whose neutrality and safety were imperative to the successful implementation of the Lomé Peace Agreement.
164. The Commission finds that the hostilities against UNAMSIL peacekeepers, which culminated in their abductions, were initiated and commanded at the instance of Morris Kallon and Augustine Bao of the RUF.

165. Foday Sankoh never ordered the responsible parties to release the peacekeepers. Nor did he issue a decisive public statement condemning the hostage-taking. Sankoh deceived his fellow signatories to the Lomé Peace Agreement by purporting to resolve the hostage-taking crisis. In the process, he further endangered the lives of the peacekeepers. He squandered any semblance of trustworthiness he previously had as a partner in peace due to his lack of rectitude. Cumulatively, Foday Sankoh served to aggravate the deteriorating security situation in Sierra Leone. He effectively invited enforcement action against the RUF.
166. Sankoh's "Special Assistant", Gibril Massaquoi, personally fuelled the tensions surrounding the UNAMSIL hostage-taking crisis. He was a central part of the chain of command of the RUF. He was duplicitous in his presentation of the RUF position to the outside world. Massaquoi bears an individual share of the responsibility for the deterioration in the security situation in Sierra Leone.
167. The RUF as an organisation inflicted irreparable discredit upon itself during the hostage-taking episode. The public, the Parliament, the President and the RUF's other partners in the peace process held a common viewpoint that the RUF had exhausted all its chances.

Violent Action of RUF Commandos Acting as Security on 8 May 2000

168. The Commission finds that 24 (twenty-four) members of Foday Sankoh's personal security detail were arrested and detained arbitrarily at the behest of Johnny Paul Koroma, former Head of State during the AFRC regime, on 7 May 2000. These arrests severely depleted Sankoh's protective unit.
169. The Commission finds that on 8 May 2000, during the demonstration at Foday Sankoh's Spur Road Lodge compound, RUF combatants returned fire in response to shots fired by the West Side Boys and CDF elements within the crowd. In so doing, they fired several rounds of automatic weapons fire and at least one RPG in the direction of the crowd of demonstrators. The RUF killed at least ten civilians among the crowd and injured several others.

Names of RUF Leadership

170. Ranks and areas of deployment were malleable and ever changing in the RUF movement. The insurgent group calling itself the RUF that entered the country in 1991 was largely comprised of NPFL commandos (as described in the chapter on Military and Political History in Volume Three A) and would change in character on numerous occasions. Moreover, many of the RUF's original office-holders were killed in the early years of the conflict. It is therefore unrealistic to speak of a permanent hierarchy in the RUF.
171. While certain individuals held effective command responsibility at certain times over certain combatants, the Commission found it difficult to discern any consistent and centralised vertical structure of leadership. The leadership of the movement was further complicated after the RUF formed its alliance with the AFRC, when the latter seized power in a coup on 25 May 1997.

172. The names listed below as RUF office-holders are divided, as far as possible, into coherent categories. The order in which office-holders are listed reflects seniority at the time when they held the positions in question. Promotions, demotions and re-alignments within the RUF were found to be too numerous to list in their entirety. It has also proved too onerous in some cases to enumerate every nominal position held by a particular individual, or, to reflect properly the role or roles played by that individual. The naming of an individual hereunder should nevertheless signify that individual's high-level involvement in the operations of the RUF.

The RUF High Command

The RUF High Command was predominantly comprised of battlefield combatants and other frontline operatives.

Leader and Commander-in-Chief

Foday Saybana Sankoh

Original RUF Battle Group Commanders

John Kargbo / Rashid Mansaray

Original RUF First Battalion Commander

Patrick Lamin

Battlefront Commander and Battle Group Commander (after 1992)

Mohamed Tarawallie (alias "Zino")

Member of the RUF elite "Special Forces" and Influential Ground Commander

Abu Kanu

Member of the RUF elite "Special Forces" and Influential Ground Commander

Mike Lamin

Battlefield Commander (1992 to 1997) / Battle Group Commander and RUF / "People's Army" Chief of Defence Staff (post-May 1997)

Sam Bockarie (alias "Mosquito")

Influential Ground Commander and

"Special Assistant" to the RUF Leader and Commander-in-Chief

Gibril Massaquoi

Battlefield Commander (1997 to 2001) and

Interim Leader of the RUF (after Foday Sankoh's arrest in May 2000)

Issa Hassan Sesay

Senior RUF Battalion Commanders and Influential Ground Commanders

Dennis Mingo (alias “Superman”)

Peter Borbor Vandy

Morris Kallon (alias “Birlai Karim”)

Komba Gbondema (alias “Monamie”)

Boston Flomoh (alias “Rambo”)

Momoh Rogers

Isaac Mongor

Abubakarr Jalloh (alias “Bai Bureh”)

Monica Pearson

Sheriff Parker (alias “Base Marine”)

Commander of RUF Internal Defence Unit (IDU)

Augustine Ato Bao

The RUF Administrative Cadre

Classification and commandship under “G-numbers” was used in the RUF to denote different responsibilities within the main administrative cadre of the movement; the original Sierra Leonean incumbents of these administrative positions were found by the Commission to have remained influential figures of leadership in the RUF throughout the conflict.

G-1 / GSO-1 / Training and “Recruitment”

Moigboi Moigande Kosia

G-2 / Internal Defence Unit

Patrick Beinda

G-3 / Adjutant General

Jonathan Kposowa

G-4 / Arms and Ammunition

Joseph Brown

G-5 / Civilian Liaison

Prince Taylor

Chairman of the RUF War Council

Solomon Y. B. Rogers

RUF Spokespersons and Miscellaneous Figures of Seniority and / or Influence (at various points in the evolution of the RUF movement)

Eldred Collins

Omrie Golley

Philip Palmer

Ibrahim H. Deen-Jalloh

Alimamy Sankoh

THE SIERRA LEONE ARMY (SLA)

Primary Findings

173. The Commission finds that, during the period of conflict, the SLA failed the people of Sierra Leone. The SLA was unable to defend Sierra Leone and its people from the armed insurrection and the program of terror launched by the RUF and other factions.
174. The Commission finds that the SLA was unprofessional and ill-disciplined. The leadership of the SLA undermined the war effort through many corrupt practices, which caused dissatisfaction and rebellion to swell among the junior ranks.
175. On many occasions, the SLA acted against the Sierra Leonean people – the very people it was meant to defend. Soldiers perpetrated extensive human rights violations against the civilian population. A large number of soldiers collaborated with the RUF and later the AFRC. At times, troops masqueraded as rebel fighters while attacking convoys and villages in order to loot and steal.
176. Army officers and soldiers twice seized power from the people and, in so doing, unleashed violence and chaos on the nation.

Main findings

The APC Legacy of Deficiencies in the SLA

177. The Commission finds that the APC demonstrated a grave abandonment of the basic needs of the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF), to the extent that the country was devoid of an operational Army when it needed one most in 1991. There was such an extreme paucity of numbers in the Army that its existence was nothing more than perfunctory.
178. The Commission finds that the APC had a preoccupation with internal security and chose to strengthen the paramilitary wing of the police, the Special Security Division (SSD), in almost inverse proportion to the Army. The preference for the SSD had a naturally debilitating effect on the RSLMF and, in particular, on its readiness for an attack from outside the country.

Failing to Defend against the Threat and the Outbreak of War

179. In view of the fact that neighbouring Liberia was engulfed in conflict, the Government and the SLA were astoundingly remiss in failing seriously to address the incapacitated state of the sparse deployments in the East and South of the country. This omission ultimately left the porous border with Liberia susceptible to an armed incursion.
180. The Commission finds that the APC Government and SLA failed to act upon intelligence information in their possession pertaining to the training of a potential incursion force by Foday Sankoh in Liberia. The Commission finds that neither the Government nor the Sierra Leone Army took the initial incursions into Sierra Leonean territory seriously enough. This neglect contributed in large measure to the escalation of a conflict that would ultimately devastate the entire country.

181. The Commission finds that the APC administration proved itself to be inept in the prosecution of the war in its first year. The failure properly to supply the front line with rations and reinforcements was a tremendous source of disgruntlement among SLA troops as they endeavoured to repel the insurgency.

Corruption by Senior Officers

182. The Commission finds that senior officers of the SLA diverted much logistical support intended for the war effort for their own personal gain. In so doing, they not only severely undermined the defence of the country but their corruption precipitated a great deal of dissatisfaction on the part of junior soldiers and those at the war front. This dissatisfaction would ultimately germinate into rebellion on the part of the junior ranks who gave vent to their frustrations by seizing power on two occasions.
183. Rice allocations, which have historical significance for the families of military personnel, were subverted and abused by senior officers. This contributed to the distrust among the junior officers for their seniors and strengthened their resolve to seize power.

Retaliatory Actions against Civilians

184. Soldiers of the SLA undertook retaliatory actions, including summary killings, against members of the civilian population, whom they suspected of having assisted or supported the insurgents. On occasions they did so with undue abandon or inappropriate feelings of vengeance against persons they perceived to be “rebels” or “collaborators”. Many soldiers were driven to such acts by an urge to avenge the deaths of fallen comrades at the hands of the insurgents.

Violations in Response to RUF Guerrilla Tactics

185. The Commission finds that the SLA committed numerous violations of human rights in its withering efforts to repel the RUF’s campaign of guerrilla warfare.
186. The Commission finds that many soldiers failed to respond in a measured fashion to the exigencies they faced at the warfront. Many of the acts carried out by the SLA fit into a particular pattern of abuse, whereby soldiers detained, tortured or killed people they suspected to be “rebels” or “collaborators”. Their acts of summary justice were also partly representative of a wider trend, whereby armed combatants of all factions acted hastily and violently to eliminate an “enemy” whom they did not know for certain was an enemy.

Distrust between the SLA and the Civilian Population

187. The Commission finds that trust between the SLA and the civilian population completely broke down in the years between 1994 and 1996.

188. A small but significant number of Army officers and private soldiers engaged in connivance with the RUF to plunder resources out of ambushes and raids on civilian convoys and settlements during the phase of guerrilla warfare. They did so for entirely unscrupulous reasons. They pursued their own self-enrichment and betrayed the state they were enlisted to serve.
189. Captain Tom Nyuma, who held various positions of political and military status during his service in the SLA, was foremost among the officers who put his personal interests ahead of his constitutional duties.
190. Two factors combined to undermine the reputation of the Army in the eyes of civilians: the opportunistic and vindictive acts of a minority of soldiers who flouted their constitutional duties; and the devastating effectiveness of the RUF's tactic of carrying out attacks on civilians in the guise of SLA soldiers. As a result, the Army as an institution was distrusted and, in many instances, maligned. The unforeseen outcome of this tarring with a broad brush was to turn many of the soldiers who had served their country assiduously into potential threats to national security.

The Election Process in 1996

191. In addition to their collective failure to provide security against RUF attacks, some SLA soldiers engaged in acts of violence during the election process in 1996. These soldiers brought tremendous discredit to the Army as an institution and further entrenched the suspicion and animosity towards the SLA that existed in many sections of the civilian population.

Characteristics of the SLA as it Evolved over the Course of the Conflict

192. On two occasions, in 1992 and 1997, elements within the SLA acted unconstitutionally by seizing power from civilian governments, thereby fuelling the conflict and committing widespread human rights violations.
193. Through its recruitment drive that began in 1992, the NPRC burdened itself with an unmanageably large and unorthodox Army. Entry standards were in practice abandoned and the new soldiers were of a far lower calibre.
194. Poor regulation opened the way for persons of malicious intent, including members of the RUF, to enter the Armed Forces.
195. The NPRC recruitment intake and its accompanying disregard for the quality of human resources served to exacerbate the overall lack of common understanding and common purpose in the SLA.
196. While acting in concert at times with the RUF, many members of the SLA engaged in some of the worst atrocities against the people of Sierra Leone. At other times, soldiers masqueraded as rebel fighters, while attacking convoys and villages in order to loot and steal.
197. The Commission finds that Sierra Leonean soldiers' loyalties were transient and they were malleable to the political agenda of those in power.

198. The coup leaders of 25 May 1997 carried a sizeable proportion of the SLA with them, leading to a large-scale shift in allegiance away from the state and towards a “new” fighting force known as the AFRC. This factional identity was obscured by the alliance with the RUF, but nevertheless remained distinct for most of its members.
199. Erstwhile soldiers of the SLA carried out the most egregious acts of atrocity during the third phase under the factional guise of the AFRC. They acted largely in their individual capacities in doing so and were motivated by an alarming degree of power-hungryness.
200. When the AFRC junta was ousted forcibly from political office by the intervention of ECOMOG, the institution was wiped out but the factional identity persisted for its soldiers. Sierra Leonean soldiers were also stripped of their constitutional status as a national Army on account of their actions. The Commission finds that the disbandment of the Army precipitated resentment and frustration on the part of AFRC soldiers, which in turn led to the further commission of grave violations against civilians.
201. In the wake of the devastating events in Freetown in January 1999, soldiers coalesced afresh around commanders with whom they had become allied or associated during the fighting. The most notable new sub-faction to emerge out of this trend was the splinter group known as the West Side Boys.
202. The Commission finds the West Side Boys to have been one of the more ruthless offshoots of the SLA. They committed some of the most serious violations of human rights and displayed no respect for human life. They had no principled political allegiance. They acted both against and for the Government. The West Side Boys played a leading role in the invasion of Freetown on 6 January 1999, which visited mayhem and devastation on the city and its occupants. They were also deployed by Johnny Paul Koroma to murder and apprehend RUF members on and around 8 May 2000.

Names of SLA Leadership

203. The Sierra Leone Army, or SLA, underwent a series of reincarnations during the eleven-year period of conflict. As the findings above indicate, the composition, character and conduct of the SLA were liable to unpredictable and dramatic shifts. Such was the extent of this continuous institutional upheaval that not only the personnel, but also the numbers of senior office-holders and the titles of their positions were changed multiple times.
204. It would thus be unrealistic to trace responsibility to a particular military *office* or *rank* in the expectation that such a position would be filled by a succession of individuals who could be held accountable for the acts of the SLA under successive governing regimes. Instead, it should be broadly understood that two people holding very different titles years apart might actually have fulfilled the same *de facto* roles.
205. The Commission does not attempt here to capture the ever-changing relationship between senior military office-holders and their political masters. The level to which the former group exercised genuine control over the affairs of the SLA was naturally dependent on the administration holding political power at the time. In this regard, however, the numerous fluctuations in

hierarchy, loyalty and efficacy in the relationship are properly explained in the chapter on the Military and Political History of the Conflict.

206. For the sake of simplicity, the list of SLA leadership has been divided into five chronological segments, corresponding with the changes in government during the conflict. Three of these segments are shown below, denoted by the name of the relevant ruling administration and the dates for which that administration was in power. The two remaining segments of leadership are addressed separately beneath the findings on the NPRC (April 1992 to March 1996) and the AFRC (May 1997 to March 1998) respectively.

SLA Leadership under the All People's Congress (APC)

March 1991 to April 1992

Head of State, Minister of Defence and Commander-in-Chief
General J. S. Momoh

SLA Force Commander
Brigadier M. L. Tarawallie

SLA Deputy Force Commander
Colonel Thoronka

SLA Leadership under the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP)

March 1996 to May 1997

President of the Republic / Minister of Defence / Commander-in-Chief
Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah

Deputy Minister of Defence
Chief Samuel Hinga Norman JP

Chief of Defence Staff
Brigadier Hassan K. Conteh

Chief of Army Staff
Colonel James Max-Kanga

'SLA' Leadership under the restored SLPP Government

March 1998 to May 2002 (transition / re-training after ECOMOG intervention)

President of the Republic / Minister of Defence / Commander-in-Chief
Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah

Deputy Minister of Defence
Chief Samuel Hinga Norman JP

Chief of Defence Staff (original, 1998 to 2000)
General Maxwell M. Khobe

Deputy CDS (original, instituted to replace Chief of Army Staff, 1998 to 2000)
Chief of Defence Staff (replacement, 2000 to 2002 and beyond)
Colonel (later Major-General) Tom S. Carew

THE NATIONAL PROVISIONAL RULING COUNCIL (NPRC)

Primary Findings

207. The NPRC junta was responsible for the extra-judicial executions of many innocent civilians throughout the country on the grounds that they were suspected of being rebels. In December 1992, the NPRC junta executed 26 persons without due process of law and in flagrant violation of international standards. The NPRC was also responsible for carrying out acts of torture on many detainees.
208. The unilateral declaration of a ceasefire by the NPRC in December 1993 was a terrible blunder and permitted the RUF to regain ascendancy. The decision probably had the effect of prolonging the war.

Main Findings

209. The Commission finds that the APC Government's mishandling of the war and, in particular, its mismanagement of the Army, demonstrated by its failure to pay salaries and issue food rations, was a direct cause of the 1992 coup d'état.
210. The overthrow of the APC Government on 29 April 1992 was a pre-conceived coup, in which the modalities were planned but the implementation was improvised. The Commission finds that the coup-makers lent sufficient forethought to the operation for it to be described as a deliberate attempt to unseat the incumbent President. The NPRC came to power through a relatively bloodless coup.
211. The Commission finds that the military coup that created the NPRC and elevated Captain Valentine E. M. Strasser to Head of State was nevertheless an unconstitutional seizure of power by several junior-ranking officers of the SLA. It ultimately contributed to a pattern of lawlessness and impunity in Sierra Leone in the period following 29 April 1992.

Management of the War Effort

212. The Commission holds the leadership of the NPRC responsible for the rash and reactionary overall management of the war effort between April 1992 and early 1996.
213. The NPRC had mixed success in its efforts at structural engineering in the SLA. Its procurement of logistics and heavy expenditure spoke of irresponsible largesse. While its enlistment of a foreign private security firm, namely Executive Outcomes, was helpful to the war effort in the short term, in the long run it had a negative impact on the economy of the country. Indeed the Government of Sierra Leone is still paying off its debts to the sponsors of the mercenary outfit.
214. The NPRC's recruitment drive that began in 1992 attracted predominantly young men from the margins of society. On the whole, the recruits joined the Army for the wrong reasons: mostly because of idleness, disaffection with their previous surroundings and misplaced bravado. None of these characteristics boded well for the future direction of the conflict.

215. The NPRC never managed to unify its Army under a single, coherent command structure. The recruits of 1992 formed another distinct faction in an already divided force.
216. The NPRC High command demonstrated a reactionary attitude towards complaints made against its commanders in the field. If a commander was found to be engaging in some kind of unlawful or unscrupulous activity, he would merely be switched and replaced. This was a weak measure that shirked the NPRC's responsibilities to curb human rights violations.
217. There was very little continuity in command under the NPRC. Civilians had no particular conception of who was in charge in their area at any given time. The NPRC's strategies disrupted the effectiveness of the command structure and led to a far higher degree of indiscipline.

Extra-judicial Killings, Torture and Intimidation

218. The Commission finds that forces deployed by the NPRC junta were responsible for the extra-judicial executions of many innocent civilians on the grounds that they were suspected of being rebels or rebel collaborators.
219. In particular, the Commission finds that the SLA, supported by civil militia men and women from the Koinadugu District known as Tamaboros, committed numerous excesses as it attempted to dislodge the RUF from Kono District in late 1992 and early 1993. Among the officers who carried out torture practices on captured rebel suspects was Colonel K. I. S. Kamara.
220. The Commission finds that the NPRC regime was responsible in December 1992 for the execution of 26 persons, including a former Inspector-General of Police and a former Brigade Commander for the Eastern Province, without due process of law and in flagrant violation of international standards. The NPRC's attempt to justify these executions retrospectively by decree, on the basis that the 26 were alleged coup plotters, was an unlawful abuse of executive power.
221. In particular, the Commission finds that the Deputy Chairman of the NPRC, Captain Solomon A. J. Musa, was personally responsible for acts of torture on detainees and those who were subsequently put to death.
222. The Commission finds further that the NPRC Government authorised a campaign of intimidation and human rights violations against certain individuals in public office who were related to or associated with those who were executed. One of them was Major Lucy Kanu, who was unlawfully dismissed from the Army in 1993. She was targeted because her husband was one of the alleged coup plotters of December 1992.

Eventual Demise of the NPRC amidst Internal Power Struggles

223. Towards the end of its period in Government, the NPRC administration became mired in internal power struggles. The Commission finds that the "Palace Coup" that replaced Valentine Strasser with Julius Maada Bio was a calculated effort on Bio's part to wrest power from a Head of State he thought did not have the best interests of the country at heart. Bio became the greatest individual influence in securing the transition from NPRC military rule into democratic elections.

Names of NPRC Leadership

224. The NPRC was formed in the wake of the coup that overthrew the APC Government on 29 April 1992. Although the coup-makers were relatively junior officers of the Sierra Leone Army, they formed a regime that was moderate and mixed by the standards of a military junta.
225. The NPRC is best characterised as a hybrid administration, since it depended on the symbiosis between civilian and military office-holders from its outset. The NPRC underwent several shifts and reshuffles in the composition of its collective leadership between 1992 and 1996, as well as a “Palace Coup” in January 1996, which saw the Chairman of the NPRC removed and replaced by rivals from within the faction.
226. Each of the shifts and reshuffles changed the balance of leadership of the NPRC between military and civilian office-holders, sometimes subtly, sometimes dramatically. In terms of command over the troops of the SLA on the ground, there is little doubt that *de facto* leadership lay in the hands of the military officers who had seized power in the first place.
227. Nevertheless, by the end of the NPRC’s four-year tenure, the civilian component of its leadership had strengthened itself politically to a degree sufficient to ease the soldiers out of office. The civilian politicians within the ranks of the NPRC saw themselves as the natural successors to the NPRC’s military rulers and were instrumental in paving the way for multi-party elections, in which many of them subsequently participated.
228. The list below reflects the balance between military and civilian office-holders in the leadership of the NPRC. It names those individuals who were found to have played prominent leadership roles at various points during the NPRC’s period in power, both militarily and politically.

The NPRC High Command / Supreme Council of State

The NPRC High Command was largely comprised of the coup makers of 29 April 1992 and those civilians who joined them to form successive administrations. The designations listed below indicate the office(s) occupied by the particular individual in the NPRC Supreme Council of State whilst the NPRC was in power. Ranks assigned to the soldiers in question are the official SLA ranks they had attained up to the point of the coup.

*Chairman of the NPRC Supreme Council of State / Head of State /
Commander-in-Chief / Secretary for Defence (1992 to 1996)*
Captain Valentine E. M. Strasser

*Chairman of the NPRC Supreme Council of State / Head of State /
Commander-in-Chief / Secretary for Defence (January to March 1996)
(previously Vice Chairman and erstwhile Chief of Army Staff)*
Lieutenant Julius Maada Bio

The NPRC High Command / Supreme Council of State (continued)

*Vice Chairman of the NPRC Supreme Council
Deputy Head of State (until 1995)*

Lieutenant Solomon A. J. Musa

*Member of the NPRC Supreme Council of State /
Secretary of State for the Eastern Province /
later General Staff Officer (GSO) of the Sierra Leone Army*

Lieutenant Tom Nyuma

*Member of the NPRC Supreme Council of State
later Chief of Military Intelligence Branch (MIB)*

Lieutenant Charlie Mbayoh

*Member of the NPRC Supreme Council of State
later Director of Defence Information*

Lieutenant Karefa Kargbo

*Member of the NPRC Supreme Council of State /
Under-Secretary of State for Defence*

Lieutenant Komba Mondoh

Chief Security Officer to the NPRC Chairman

Captain Amara Kwegor

*Member of the NPRC Supreme Council of State /
Secretary of State for the Southern Province /
later Chief of Internal Security in the Sierra Leone Army*

Lieutenant Idriss H. Kamara

Chief of Army Staff

Brigadier Kellie H. Conteh

*Secretary-General of the NPRC /
previously NPRC Chief Secretary of State*

John Benjamin

Secretary of State for Finance

John A. Karimu

*Secretary of State for Information, Broadcasting and Culture /
previously Attorney-General under the NPRC*

Arnold Bishop Gooding

Secretary of State for Development and Economic Planning

Victor O. Brandon

Secretary of State for Transport and Communications

Hindolo Trye

The NPRC National Advisory Council

The NPRC National Advisory Council comprised political functionaries and civilian administrators from various sectors of society. Their names are only included here insofar as the persons in question played a key leadership role in directing the path of the transition from the NPRC's military junta back to civilian rule, and beyond.

Chairman of the NPRC National Advisory Council
Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah

Secretary of the NPRC National Advisory Council
Solomon Berewa

*Representative to the NPRC National Advisory Council
from the Sierra Leone Bar Association*
George Banda Thomas

THE ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL (AFRC)

Primary Findings

229. The SLA officers and soldiers who made up the AFRC betrayed the trust of the people. Instead of serving and protecting them, the soldiers of the AFRC unconstitutionally seized power and unleashed a reign of lawlessness and violence on the people.
230. When these rogue troops were forced out of Freetown in 1998, they viciously attacked defenceless civilians and destroyed everything in their path. They were responsible for a similar rampage through the Northern Provinces.
231. The Commission finds the AFRC to be primarily responsible for the large-scale loss of life, amputations and destruction of property that swept through Freetown in January 1999.
232. The Commission finds that the leadership and membership of the AFRC displayed a particularly ruthless disregard for human life and limb.

Main Findings

Military Coup

233. The military coup that elevated Major Johnny Paul Koroma to Head of State was an unconstitutional seizure of power by several junior-ranking soldiers of the SLA. It precipitated a reign of lawlessness and violent suppression of opposition in Sierra Leone in the period from 25 May 1997 until 12 February 1998.

234. The central difference between the actions of the AFRC coup-makers of 25 May 1997 and those of their predecessors in the NPRC was that the AFRC group was more concerned with the pursuit of personal gain, while the actions of the NPRC group were largely viewed as an advancement of the national interest. The recklessness of the AFRC group was rightly condemned by the people of Sierra Leone.

Faltering Alliance between the AFRC and the RUF

235. The AFRC's alliance with the RUF proved to be unworkable. The alliance strengthened people's perceptions that the Sierra Leone Army had long been in collusion with the RUF.
236. The Commission finds that as the AFRC and RUF factions split and began independently to engage the Government of Sierra Leone in armed conflict, they unleashed unprecedented levels of abuse on the people of Sierra Leone.

"People's Army"

237. The flaws in the High Command of the "People's Army" meant that there was no effective regulatory structure to restrain or discipline the ground commanders of the AFRC and the RUF.
238. The Commission finds that the officers who held state functions under the military rule of the AFRC acted with utter impunity. They looted civilians' properties throughout Freetown and in towns in the Provinces. They beat up and summarily killed both soldiers and civilians.

Abuses of Individual and Collective Power by Members of the AFRC

239. In certain instances during the conflict period, the soldiers of the AFRC were deployed as agents of someone else's agenda, precisely because they were known to be malleable and unscrupulous by those who directed them. The Commission finds that Johnny Paul Koroma was the man most responsible for the violations and abuses carried out by the AFRC soldiers: first as the Head of State in the AFRC junta government; and later in his personal capacity as the Chairman of the ill-fated Commission for the Consolidation of Peace.
240. The AFRC was a brutal and systematic violator of human rights whilst in office. The AFRC used the arms of the state to suppress freedom of expression and association, notably during its clampdown on the student demonstrations of 18 August 1997. Members of the AFRC engaged in the mass rape of student nurses at the College of Nursing in Freetown.
241. The AFRC plundered the resources of the state. Its management of Sierra Leone's mineral resources was irresponsible and motivated by personal profit.

Callous Disregard for Human Life and Limb after the AFRC was ousted from Power

242. The Commission finds that the AFRC soldiers viewed civilians with contempt because they regarded civilian life as the hallmark of what their enemies stood for. By deliberately disrupting and destroying civilian life, the AFRC soldiers saw themselves as striking at the foundations of civilian Government. These perceptions were the cause of unprecedented levels of all categories of violations in the year immediately after the AFRC was unseated from power. They harboured a vengeful and callous disregard for human life and limb.
243. The AFRC and RUF factions, both separately and in tandem with one another, visited a sustained and unprecedented level of human rights abuse on the populace of the North and North-East of Sierra Leone in 1998. The two organisations were not in fact acting in concert at the level of their respective High Commands. Rather, AFRC soldiers launched and led the assault through the North of the country and were joined only later by certain combatants from the RUF on a separate flank.
244. The Commission finds that Solomon A. J. Musa, popularly known as SAJ Musa, was the undisputed leader of and directional influence on the faction of approximately 2,000 combatants who perpetrated a sustained campaign of abuses against civilians throughout the Northern Province of Sierra Leone. The combatants under Musa's command were largely drawn from the former AFRC but included a contingent of RUF among their ranks.
245. In particular, the Commission finds that the SAJ Musa group conducted targeted attacks on townships or villages from which they had originally been dislodged or chased out by ECOMOG, to avenge their earlier defeats. The group engaged in widespread looting and destruction of houses.
246. The Commission finds that the AFRC embarked on a programme of amputations from 1998 to 1999. The Commission finds that 44.7% (85 out of 190) of the amputations recorded during this period were the responsibility of the AFRC. Abductions also reached levels of unparalleled intensity in the months that immediately preceded the invasion of Freetown.
247. AFRC thugs practiced a deliberate policy of using abductees to muster numerical bulk when conducting attacks. Abductees were subjected to a wretched existence of degrading physical and psychological abuse coupled with incessant compulsion to march onwards to the targets of their captors. The AFRC's abduction policy created an impression in the minds of its battlefield adversaries that the AFRC-led forces were larger in number than was actually the case.

Invasion of Freetown

248. The ultimate objective of SAJ Musa's group of combatants – itself a reflection of Musa's apparent personal ambition until his death on 23 December 1998 – was to invade the capital city of Freetown, to overthrow the constitutional Government of Sierra Leone and to reinstate a form of military junta to power.

249. Additional motivations for the men who led the attacks of late 1998 and early 1999 were recognition and revenge. The AFRC soldiers wrought extreme violence because of their barely containable fury that they had been stripped of their military status and their access to the trappings of power. They were on a mission to avenge the perceived unjust executions of 24 of their colleagues and to rescue from prison the many soldiers who remained in detention.
250. The Commission finds that the invasion of Freetown on 6 January 1999 was the culmination of a destructive rampage through much of the Northern Province by a combatant group led by and comprised predominantly of former AFRC soldiers.
251. The main troop that attacked Freetown on 6 January 1999 was inordinately well equipped by the standards of the Sierra Leone conflict. It possessed artillery pieces and other heavy weaponry that had been imported illegally and stealthily for the purposes of launching a new attack on the seat of Government.
252. A pernicious and cowardly tactic used by the invaders of Freetown was to dissolve themselves into an indistinguishable mass comprised mostly of abducted civilians. It constituted a flagrant violation of international humanitarian law, known as the use of “human shields”.²⁸ The combatants were “protected” from counter-attack as they entered Freetown by the cover of the non-combatants around them.
253. Upon arrival in Freetown in January 1999, the AFRC group bore the primary responsibility for the unprecedented scale and intensity of violations and abuses committed against civilians during the assault on the city. The Commission finds further that the AFRC group destroyed significant numbers of properties in the city and stormed the Pademba Road Prison, releasing several thousand inmates, including persons who themselves went on to participate in further urban warfare in the city.

Marginalisation of the AFRC in the Lomé Peace Process

254. The AFRC faction was deliberately left out from participating in the Lomé Peace Talks at the insistence of the RUF. Accordingly, its terms and conditions for peace were not addressed in the resultant Lomé Agreement. The AFRC High Command had advocated strongly for Johnny Paul Koroma’s participation in the Lomé Peace Talks, but these efforts were in vain. The AFRC therefore did not have a stake in the implementation of the peace agreement. The marginalisation of the AFRC at Lomé endangered the prospects of successfully implementing the Lomé Peace Agreement.
255. As the implementation of Lomé unfolded, the majority of AFRC commanders declared their loyalty to Johnny Paul Koroma and set out to oppose the RUF. They acted obstructively against parties who sought to advance the implementation of the Peace Agreement, including taking hostages from the RUF sensitisation team. The AFRC demonstrated no commitment to peace.

²⁸ In the case of *Prosecutor v. Aleksovski* (Case No: IT-95-14/1-T, Judgment of 25 June 1999), at paragraph 229, the Trial Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) found the use of “human shields” to be a violation of human dignity prohibited by common article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions.

Names of AFRC Leadership

256. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) was formed in the wake of the coup that overthrew the SLPP Government on 25 May 1997. The formation of the AFRC gave rise to a new and distinct factional identity for the coup-makers and their supporters. This identity encompassed many serving soldiers of the SLA, as well as their key civilian accomplices.
257. The *de facto* leadership of the AFRC was drawn largely from the coup-making group, which originally comprised seventeen men – fourteen junior non-commissioned Army officers, a former officer of the SSD paramilitary police unit and two civilians. This leadership was chaired by a slightly more senior military officer who was freed from prison on the day of the coup, and bolstered in vital areas by the presence of established Army figureheads, some of whom had also been office-holders during the reign of the NPRC.
258. The Commission has recognised that the AFRC factional identity persisted considerably beyond the month of February 1998, when the AFRC Ruling Council was ousted from power. After February 1998, the AFRC leadership underwent a shift in style from political office-holding to military commandship.
259. The commanders of the AFRC went on to form the core of the group that rampaged through the North of Sierra Leone in late 1998 and attacked Freetown in January 1999.
260. It should be noted further that the renegade faction known as the West Side Boys was essentially a reincarnation of the surviving AFRC leadership, comprising influential ground commanders who stayed in the bush.
261. The list below names those individuals who were found to have played prominent leadership roles throughout the evolution of the AFRC.

The AFRC High Command / Supreme Council

The High Command was largely comprised of the Instigators of the Coup of 25 May 1997 and those with whom they found common purpose to lead them; designations given above each name indicate the office(s) occupied by the particular individual in the AFRC Supreme Council whilst the AFRC was in power. Ranks assigned to the soldiers in question are the official SLA ranks they had attained up to the point of the coup.

*Chairman of the AFRC, Head of State and
Commander-in-Chief of the People's Army*
Major Johnny Paul Koroma

*AFRC Chief Secretary of State / Secretary for Mineral Resources
Influential Ground Commander of the AFRC (post-February 1998)*
Captain Solomon A. J. Musa

The AFRC High Command / Supreme Council (continued)

Secretary-General of the AFRC
Colonel A. K. Sesay

AFRC Chief of Defence Staff
Colonel S. F. Y. Koroma

AFRC Public Liaison Officer 1 (PLO 1) assigned to cover the Ministerial briefs of Mineral Resources, Transport and Communications, Lands, Housing and Country Planning and Environment
Staff Sergeant Abu Sankoh (alias “Zagallo”)

AFRC Public Liaison Officer 2 (PLO 2) assigned to cover the Ministerial briefs of Works and Labour, Telecommunications (Sierratel), Customs and Excise and Postal Services
Staff Sergeant Alex Tamba Brima (alias “Gullit”)

AFRC Public Liaison Officer (PLO 3) assigned to cover the Ministerial briefs of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Energy and Power, Lotto and Income Tax
Staff Sergeant Ibrahim Kamara (alias “Bazzy”)

Chief Security Officer attached to the AFRC Chairman
Staff Sergeant Moses Kabia (alias “Rambo”)

Secretary of State attached to the Office of the AFRC Chairman
Major Victor L. King

Under Secretary of State for Mineral Resources
Captain Paul Thomas

Member of the AFRC Supreme Council
Lance Corporal Tamba Gborie

Member of the AFRC Supreme Council
Lance Corporal Santigie Borbor Kanu (alias “Five Five”)

Member of the AFRC Supreme Council
Lance Corporal Foday Kallay

Member of the AFRC Supreme Council
Staff Sergeant Brima Kamara

Member of the AFRC Supreme Council
Staff Sergeant Sulaiman Turay

Member of the AFRC Supreme Council
Lance Corporal Momoh Bangura

The AFRC High Command / Supreme Council (continued)

Member of the AFRC Supreme Council
Lance Corporal Papa Bangura (alias “Batuta”)

Member of the AFRC Supreme Council
Lance Corporal George Adams

Member of the AFRC Supreme Council
Warrant Officer II Franklyn Conteh

Member of the AFRC Supreme Council
Warrant Officer II Sammy Kargbo

(Civilian) Member of the AFRC Supreme Council
Mr. Ibrahim Bioh Sesay (alias “Bioh”)

(Civilian) Member of the AFRC Supreme Council
Mr. Abdul M. Sesay

(Civilian) Member of the AFRC Supreme Council
Mr. Hector Bob-Lahai

Other Prominent Leaders within the AFRC Faction

Comprising those who did not form part of the original contingent that overthrew the SLPP Government on 25 May 1997, nor who occupied positions of seniority on the AFRC Supreme Council, but who nevertheless had powers of directional influence or commandship in the faction at one time or another)

AFRC Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Alimamy Pallo Bangura

*AFRC Public Relations Officer (PRO) / Spokesman /
later Under-Secretary of State for Information*
Allieu B. Kamara

Influential Ground Commander of AFRC / West Side Boys
Hassan Bangura (alias “Bomblast” or “Papa”)

Operations Officer (Army)
Lieutenant Akim Turay

Operations Officer (Military Police)
Captain Emil Dumbuya

Miscellaneous AFRC “Special Envoys”
Omrie Golley
Steve Bio
Ibrahim Bah

THE SIERRA LEONE PEOPLE'S PARTY GOVERNMENT (SLPP GOVERNMENT)

Primary Findings

262. The SLPP Government of the conflict era was a government under siege. It came to power amidst a bloody civil war and was consumed with defending the people from attack and finding ways to end the war.
263. The actions of the SLPP Government were meant to bring the war to an end. However, some of its actions were ill-conceived and, thereby, led to violations and abuses of the rights of Sierra Leoneans.
264. The Commission finds that the leadership of Government had knowledge of CDF violations and abuses and, to the extent that such leaders were in the chain of command, they are held responsible.
265. The Commission finds the SLPP Government responsible for carrying out the arbitrary arrest and detention of a large number of citizens in violation of their constitutional rights from 1998 onwards. Many of these arrests and detentions, as well as the prosecutions and trials of this period were politically motivated, representing a denial of basic rights. The Commission finds that the Court Martial of 37 soldiers of the SLA during 1998, resulting in the execution of 24 of them, was conducted in contravention of international human rights standards.
266. The Commission finds the ongoing incarceration of sixteen persons in "protective custody" detention since June 2000 to be unlawful and a flagrant denial of those persons' basic human rights.

Main Findings

Complacency upon Taking up the Reins of Government

267. The newly-instated SLPP Government did not rise to the challenge required for the management of the war effort in 1996. It failed to heed the lessons of its predecessors or to address the emergent threats to state security that existed within the SLA. In several respects, the Government served to entrench the endemic disaffection of the conventional security forces.

Responsibility in the Breakdown of the Abidjan Peace Accord

268. The Government miscalculated its negotiation strategy at the Abidjan Peace Talks of 1996. It displayed diplomatic naivety in making several key military concessions to the RUF whilst demonstrating an over-reliance on the goodwill of the international community for implementation of the spirit of the consequent Peace Accord.
269. The ceasefire declared to provide a stable backdrop to the Peace Talks in Abidjan was flouted by both the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF.

270. The SLPP Government authorised a prolonged and systematic campaign of attacks on the RUF's jungle bases. The attacks were carried out by Kamajors and infantry troops of the SLA, supported by Guinean Armed Forces and helicopter gunships controlled by Executive Outcomes.

Mismanagement of the State Security Apparatus in the SLPP's First Year in Office

271. The SLPP Government was remiss in allowing such a high degree of ambiguity to develop around the dual role of Chief Sam Hinga Norman as Deputy Minister of Defence and National Co-ordinator of the Civil Defence Forces (CDF). Most soldiers perceived Hinga Norman's role as being highly partisan in favour of the CDF. The failure on the part of the executive to address these negative perceptions in the military contributed significantly to the military coup of 25 May 1997.
272. The downsizing of the Army and the commensurate reduction in rice rations by the SLPP Government was badly handled. At a time when transparency and trust should have been at a premium, the Government practised neither. Failure accurately to diagnose the symptoms of discontent among the soldiers of its national Army was a recurring blight on the authority of the Government. It was a costly failure for the security of the nation as a whole.
273. The Commission finds that President Kabbah misjudged the seriousness of at least two warnings of alleged coup plots from those in his military High Command. The implicated persons in these alleged plots subsequently proved themselves to be genuine threats. The President's failure to address the concerns of his Deputy Minister of Defence, Chief Sam Hinga Norman, on 16 May 1997 resulted in the coup that ultimately unseated the President and caused untold suffering for the citizens of the country.

Fuelling the Conflict

274. The Commission finds that certain public statements made by high-ranking members of the SLPP Government, among them Vice President Dr. Albert Joe Demby and Deputy Defence Minister Chief Sam Hinga Norman, fuelled a sense of alienation and prejudice among members of Army deployments in the South and East of the country. Specifically, these statements indicated that the defence of certain towns and villages would not be entrusted to the military but rather to militia units of Kamajors.
275. The statements by Government representatives also lent themselves to misinterpretation by the Kamajors. In many instances the Kamajors used these statements as a justification to mount attacks on military positions in the Southern Province, as well as at selected strategic points in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. Many such attacks by the Kamajors caused violations against civilians by one or both sides in the process.

Management of State Security Apparatus in Exile and Beyond

276. The disagreements and mutual distrust between President Kabbah and Chief Sam Hinga Norman on the management of the war effort impacted negatively on the collective Movement to Restore Democracy.
277. The “War Council in Exile” established by President Kabbah struggled to assert its mandate. Indeed, the War Council’s efficacy depended largely on the extent to which its directions converged with Hinga Norman’s own views.
278. Nonetheless, the Commission finds that the War Council and the President were fully and timeously apprised of events that were taking place on the ground in Sierra Leone during their period in exile. They did not act to stop the violations being carried out by CDF elements nor did they speak out against them. As such, they are held responsible for the acts of their agents on the ground.
279. The failure of the pro-Government forces to halt the AFRC advance on Freetown in January 1999 represents a blunder on the part of the Government of Sierra Leone and ECOMOG. Both parties had multiple prior warnings of the impending disaster. Their joint neglect and poor analysis of the situation culminated in the wanton destruction of Freetown by bands of thugs and hooligans.

Propaganda by Radio Democracy 98.1 FM

280. The Sierra Leone Government in exile, with support from the British Government, set up the radio station 98.1 FM at Lungi to counteract propaganda from the AFRC-controlled SLBS radio station. The radio station did much to lift the morale of the public and generate resistance against the military junta.
281. The Commission finds that at times broadcasts by Radio Democracy 98.1 FM were inflammatory and created the context for mob justice, in which human rights violations and abuses were carried out against civilians who were alleged, often wrongly, to have collaborated with the AFRC.
282. The Commission finds that messages contained in broadcasts by Radio Democracy served to enrage and exacerbate the brutal backlash carried out by the group led by the AFRC warlord, SAJ Musa. AFRC commanders ordered their men to commit heinous violations and abuses against civilians, including amputations, to avenge the propaganda directed against them.

Knowledge of CDF Atrocities

283. The Commission finds that the SLPP Government was aware of human rights violations and abuses carried out by the CDF, through the role of its Deputy Defence Minister, Chief Sam Hinga Norman, who served as CDF National Co-ordinator, and through members of the CDF War Council at Base Zero. The Government was further kept informed through its Security Committee briefings and through reports received from ECOMOG. Nevertheless the Government failed to take steps to stop such violations and abuses. The Commission, accordingly, holds the Government responsible for the violations and abuses of human rights committed by the CDF.

Arbitrary Detentions and Prosecutions

284. The Commission finds that the rounding up and detention of over 3, 000 (three thousand) citizens in the wake of the ECOMOG intervention of February 1998 constituted a mass violation of human rights.
285. The Government of Sierra Leone deployed a “catch-all” strategy to round up all persons associated with the AFRC regime, however loosely, and to imprison them arbitrarily without charge. Many civilians were detained for no other reason than the fact that they retained their jobs as civil servants under the AFRC regime.
286. Mrs. Sylvia Blyden, a civil servant who had served the nation for some thirty years, was detained in February 1998 for nine months without charge. She was held on the strength of untested allegations against her. The Commission finds that the Government's policy of detention inflicted terrible suffering on the citizens of Sierra Leone and their families and contravened their human rights.
287. An “AFRC collaborator” was generally understood to be someone who supported or sustained the junta in power. Accusations of “collaboration” often became a premise upon which human rights abuses were carried out.
288. The then Attorney General and Minister of Justice, Solomon Berewa, set out the policy of the Government towards collaborators in a letter entitled “Present Position relating to the Collaborators of the AFRC Junta” on 13 March 1998. The use of language in this letter was dangerously ambiguous. It was open to wide interpretation and consequently led to abuses and violations on the ground. Mr. Berewa criminalised acts of “collaboration” with the AFRC and sought to have all persons falling into the category of “collaborators” detained in the custody of the state. This new category was not codified in law but it led to the detention of thousands of Sierra Leoneans.
289. The Commission finds that the arrests, detentions, prosecutions and trials that followed the establishment of this Government policy were politically motivated and culminated in numerous human rights violations and abuses. The Commission finds that the departure from recognised legal and constitutional standards was the result of deliberate planning and authorisation by the Government of Sierra Leone. While the Government's objective – to reassert its political ascendancy and send out a strong message that coup plotters would not be tolerated – was just, the means used were not. The Commission finds that the means employed were unconstitutional and resulted in human rights violations and abuses.
290. A pattern of summary executions, torture, floggings, beatings and arbitrary detentions was recorded by the Commission in the period after the restoration of the SLPP Government. This pattern encompasses acts that were carried out by both private actors and agents of the state.

Mob Justice

291. The Commission finds that the mob justice prevalent during the transitional period between the ECOMOG intervention of 12 February 1998 and the restoration of President Kabbah on 10 March 1998 was not sufficiently quelled or controlled. Many civilians were executed arbitrarily on allegations of so-called “collaboration” while many others were beaten up, harassed or molested on similar grounds. A clear message or other assertion of control by the Government or ECOMOG may have prevented such violations.

Prison Conditions and Torture

292. The Commission finds that conditions of detention at Pademba Road Prison in the period between February 1998 and 6 January 1999 were deplorable and in breach of multiple provisions of both the Sierra Leone Constitution and applicable human rights instruments, including the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. These prison conditions have not changed at the time of writing this report and need the urgent attention of the Government.
293. The Commission received testimony of substantial allegations of torture being practised against inmates of Pademba Road Prison, in flagrant breach of the Constitution, even under a regime of Emergency Powers. These testimonies came from multiple witnesses whose periods in detention were distinct and for separate reasons. They lead the Commission to find that the Government of Sierra Leone has systematically violated the Sierra Leone Constitution *and* human rights instruments including the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
294. At the very least, the Government has failed repeatedly to discharge its legal obligation to conduct rigorous investigations into all allegations of torture against agents of the State to ascertain the veracity of such allegations.

Role of the Attorney General and the Minister of Justice

295. The Commission finds that the erstwhile Attorney General and Minister of Justice, Solomon Berewa, played a particularly conspicuous role in the conduct of both the civilian and military trials of 1998. As Attorney General, Mr. Berewa exercised his discretionary power of prosecution in an arbitrary fashion. Furthermore, Mr. Berewa sat on the Mercy Committee whose role it was to advise the President on the issuance of pardons for the 34 condemned soldiers. The Commission finds that Mr. Berewa held an inappropriate amount of power in deciding the fate of the persons he had himself selected for trial.

Court Martial of 37 Soldiers

296. The Court Martial of 37 soldiers of the SLA, which concluded with 34 guilty verdicts and three acquittals on Monday 12 October 1998, did not allow for the right of the accused to appeal, the right to an effective defence, or the right to be fully informed of the charges. The Commission finds that the trial was conducted in contravention of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

The SLPP Government's Role in the Peace Process and the Failures of Power Sharing

297. The appointment by the President of the former head of the AFRC, Johnny Paul Koroma, to the position of Chairman of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP) was meant to bring the AFRC into the peace process. The Commission finds the appointment to have been a strategic miscalculation. It jeopardised the success of the CCP, alienated the RUF and served to reward a soldier who had committed treason and plunged the country into a ruinous nine months of military rule by the AFRC.
298. The Government did not fulfil several undertakings made in the Lomé Peace Agreement. The positions foreseen for the RUF in parastatals, diplomatic missions and other public bodies did not materialise. The promises to bestow equal status upon RUF office holders were not honoured. The Commission finds that the spirit of power sharing intended by the Lomé Peace Agreement was not promoted by the Government.

Further Mismanagement of the State Security Apparatus in the Post-Lomé Period

299. The Government of Sierra Leone and the moral guarantors of the Lomé Peace Agreement were negligent in that they failed to prevent the high proliferation of weapons to occur around the key players in the peace process. The failure to impose appropriate conditions on the retention of arms supplies at the Lodges of Johnny Paul Koroma and Foday Sankoh, at Juba Hill and Spur Road respectively, was a fatal blunder in the transition to peace. These residences became inevitable flashpoints for the eruption of armed violence.
300. Johnny Paul Koroma's credentials as Chairman of the CCP, an important peace-building institution, were seriously undermined by his assembly of a unit of armed West Side Boys around him at his Juba Hill Lodge in Freetown.
301. The Commission finds that the West Side Boys presented an immediate and ever-present danger to the successful transition to peace. They precipitated fear and suspicion among the residents of Freetown. Johnny Paul Koroma acted as the *de facto* ground commander of this private army of hardened fighters known for their propensity for excess and brutality.

Abuse of the State Security Apparatus to Attack the RUF

302. The "Peace Rally" organised by Johnny Paul Koroma at the National Stadium on Sunday 7 May 2000 was not a gathering geared towards peaceful ends. Those present included members of the West Side Boys, the SLA, the CDF and the SSD of the Sierra Leone Police. The Commission finds that Koroma mobilised these factions on the premise of defending the nation but with the real purpose of attacking the RUF.
303. Johnny Paul Koroma assembled a conglomerate armed group comprising West Side Boys, SLA soldiers, Kamajors and SSD policemen to carry out military operations against the RUF. The Commission finds that the name assigned to this group, "Peace Task Force", was a misnomer. It was rather a force of armed vigilantes tasked to raid, arrest and detain members of the RUF.

State Security Action between 6 May and 8 May 2000

304. The Commission finds that, while the Government was consumed by desperation for peace, it seriously erred in the incorporation of brutal warlords into its state security apparatus during May 2000.
305. The Commission finds the decision by Government to accommodate the West Side Boys as state security agents to be extremely negligent. The effective creation of a new unit of paramilitary police under Johnny Paul Koroma was a wanton subversion of the rule of law. It effectively allowed a band of brutal warlords to take the law into their own hands and take over the responsibility for maintaining the peace for civilians they had wantonly attacked during the 6 January 1999 invasion of Freetown.
306. The West Side Boys acted upon the instructions of Johnny Paul Koroma in their engagement as part of the "Peace Task Force" between 6 and 8 May 2000. They carried out Koroma's instructions as to the targets and mode of their operations.
307. The Commission finds that the West Side Boys, acting in their capacity as government agents, conducted a series of targeted armed raids on residences inhabited by RUF members and their families in Freetown between 6 and 8 May 2000. The victims of these raids included Ministers and Deputy Ministers appointed by the RUF to the power-sharing Government. The West Side Boys committed a host of violations and abuses in these raids. They systematically looted and vandalised the properties they attacked, and they arrested and detained a number of captives arbitrarily.
308. Many of those arrested and detained by the West Side Boys were subsequently kept in prison in the custody of the state, under the "Protective Custody" category created by the Public Emergency Regulations of 1998. The President alone may authorise the detention of any person under this category.
309. The Commission holds the West Side Boys and Johnny Paul Koroma responsible for the violent sexual abuse and murder of the RUF Deputy Minister for Transport and Communications, Susan Lahai. The Government's failure to account for the sudden disappearance of one of its key office-holders was a shameful act of neglect. The Commission finds that the Government must accept a measure of responsibility for the brutal murder of Ms. Lahai.

Arrests on 7 May 2000 and the Denial of Justice

310. Johnny Paul Koroma unilaterally ordered the arrests and detentions of at least 24 members of the RUF on 7 May 2000. The Commission finds that Johnny Paul Koroma did not have the legal authority to order these arrests and detentions. From the point of their arrests, these men were held in detention facilities administered by the state. No justification for the arrests was given to any one of the men. The Commission holds these arrests and detentions at Koroma's behest to be unlawful.
311. The Commission finds that there has been no transparency whatsoever in the disposal of "justice" against the 24 men arrested on 7 May 2000. Some of them have been repeatedly subjected to torture. They stand as living examples of the abuse of the justice system that persists in Sierra Leone.

312. At least nine of the 24 men arrested on 7 May 2000 remain in detention at the time of writing this report. Their continued detention without trial despite the private and public assurances of the President that they would be released has undermined the cause of reconciliation in Sierra Leone.

The Events of 8 May 2000

313. The Commission finds that while the demonstration organised by parliamentarians and the Civil Society Movement on 8 May 2000 was well intentioned, it was infiltrated by subversive elements led by Johnny Paul Koroma. There were advance warnings given to the Government about the likelihood of unrest. However, nothing was done to prevent the occasion from descending into a violent tumult.
314. The events of 8 May 2000 at the Spur Road Lodge of Foday Sankoh testify to a failure to communicate and co-ordinate effectively between arms of the state security apparatus and the internationally-mandated UNAMSIL security force. The disparate armed groups that converged on Sankoh's residence endangered the lives of the UNAMSIL peacekeepers by attacking the Lodge.
315. Armed soldiers and West Side Boys co-mingled with the crowd of demonstrators who advanced on Foday Sankoh's Spur Road Lodge on 8 May 2000. The soldiers fired on Sankoh's compound from within the crowd of demonstrators. They exposed the civilians around them to grave danger by failing to allow distinction between military and civilian targets.
316. Approximately 40 (forty) persons were killed in the inter-factional violence that ensued around Foday Sankoh's Spur Road Lodge on 8 May 2000. Almost all of them were killed by gunshots or rocket-propelled grenades fired between the RUF, the West Side Boys, the Kamajors and other security forces. The Commission finds that the information made available publicly by state authorities in relation to the deaths and injuries that resulted from this incident was substantially incomplete.
317. West Side Boys and soldiers of the SLA unleashed automatic weapons fire and at least one rocket propelled grenade at Foday Sankoh's Spur Road Lodge on 8 May 2000. The West Side Boys killed many civilians in and around the compound of the Lodge.
318. The Commission finds that the inclusion of the West Side Boys as part of the state security forces during this period was highly irresponsible.

Arrests and Detentions in the Custody of the State as a Consequence of the Security Operations of May 2000

319. In the month of May 2000, mostly from 7 May to 17 May 2000, the Government of Sierra Leone authorised the arrests and detentions of at least 180 persons who were suspected to be members of the RUF. Beyond a minority of cases in which suspected membership of the RUF was put forward as a justification, no further explanation of the reasons for arrest was given to any one of the detainees. No legal basis for the arrests has been presented to the Commission.

320. The Commission finds that the state security forces, which included the West Side Boys and the CDF, deployed a “catch all” strategy to round up all persons associated with the RUF, however loosely, and to imprison them arbitrarily without charge. Many civilians were detained for no other reason than the fact that they resided with a member of the RUF or that they had performed domestic chores for a member of the RUF.
321. The majority of those arrested in May 2000 remain in the custody of the state at the time of writing this report. None of them has yet been put on trial. The continued and unlawful detention of these persons represents contempt for the rule of law and is in violation of international law.
322. The Commission regards all those persons whose detention is devoid of legal basis as political prisoners. The Commission finds that the Government of Sierra Leone currently holds over 150 political prisoners in Freetown Central Prison, Pademba Road.
323. The Commission finds that these persons have been subjected to torture and inhuman and degrading treatment while in state custody. At least 21 RUF prisoners have died in state custody. The Commission holds the Government responsible for the gross neglect of these prisoners.
324. Detainees have been denied their human rights with regard to their conditions of detention. Protracted periods of solitary confinement and transfers to alternative detention facilities in undisclosed locations have been imposed on many of them. The Commission finds the Government to be accountable for this litany of human rights violations against detainees in its custody.

Retention of “Safe Custody” Detention and Problems with the Justice System

325. There are currently at least 16 (sixteen) persons detained in the custody of the state under the category of “safe custody”. The 16 individuals whose names were given to the Commission in this regard are all rank-holding members of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) or the Sierra Leone Border Guards (SLBG). Their detention is unlawful. The retention of “safe custody” as a category of detention is a stain on the rule of law in Sierra Leone.
326. The Commission finds that various institutions in the Government of Sierra Leone proved to be uncooperative and unhelpful to the Commission in its efforts to establish the full extent of human rights abuses that persist in the justice system to the present day. Some requests by the Commission to the Prisons Department were met with petty obstructionism.

Names of SLPP Government Leadership

327. The Government formed by the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP) was recognised as the constitutional government of the Republic of Sierra Leone from March 1996 until the end of the conflict and beyond. The Commission regards the SLPP Government as having comprised the ultimate leadership of the various factions that fought in the name of its restoration or preservation at any given time. In line with the general fluidity of allegiance that characterised the conflict, factions that at one time may have been distinct from, or even opposed to, the SLPP Government, came under its leadership at other times.

328. Under international human rights law, the Government is strictly responsible for violations resulting from the acts of its organs or agents and those of any persons acting under its control. The Government is also responsible for its own failure to prevent or take appropriate action in response to such violations.
329. The list of office-holders given hereunder is intended to reflect the positions held by the named individuals for most or all of the duration of successive Cabinets of the SLPP Government between 1996 and 2002, including the instrumental Cabinet-in-Exile, from 25 May 1997 to 10 March 1998.
330. The list is not intended to be a comprehensive or complete breakdown of all the office-holders in those successive Cabinets. It names only those individuals who were found to have played a significant part in leading the acts and making the decisions attributed to the SLPP Government in this report.

The Senior Cabinet Members of the SLPP Government

The following list predominantly contains persons who served all or at least most of the five Cabinets formed between 1996 and 2002.

President of the Republic and Minister of Defence
Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah

Vice President
Dr. Albert Joe Demby

Deputy Minister of Defence
Chief Samuel Hinga Norman JP

Attorney-General and Minister of Justice
Solomon Berewa

Minister of Foreign Affairs
(previously Tourism and Culture / later Social Welfare, etc.)
Shirley Gbujama

Minister of Presidential Affairs and the Public Service
(later Foreign Affairs)
Momodu Koroma

Permanent Representative to the United Nations and Adviser to the President
(later Finance, Development and Economic Planning)
Dr. James O. C. Jonah

Minister for Mineral Resources (later Transport and Communications)
Dr. Prince A. Harding

Minister of Transport and Communications
(previously Deputy of Finance)
Momoh Pujeh

Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and the Environment (National Resources)
Dr. Harry Will

The Senior Cabinet Members of the SLPP Government (continued)

Minister of Information, Communications, Tourism and Culture
Dr. Julius Spencer

*Minister of Internal Affairs and Local Government
(Minister of Safety and Security)*
Charles Margai

Leader of the House of Parliament
S. B. Marrah

Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Co-operation
Dr. Sama Banya

Deputy Minister of Trade (previously Deputy Minister of Finance)
Mohamed B. Daramy

Deputy Minister of Health, etc. (later Resident Minister South)
Foday M. D. Sesay

THE CIVIL DEFENCE FORCES (CDF)

Primary Findings

331. The Commission finds that civilians and successive governing administrations felt that they could no longer rely upon the SLA for their effective defence in the face of relentless attacks by the RUF. The Commission finds further that the distrust and suspicion harboured by the civilian population towards the military was a central factor in the emergence and institutionalisation of the CDF as an alternative protective mechanism.
332. The Commission concludes that the CDF played a vital role in defending the nation from the predatory actions of rebel forces and renegade troops. However, the Commission finds that the CDF was itself responsible for considerable violations and abuses of human rights. Many of these violations and abuses were carried out with the full knowledge of the leadership of the CDF, which failed or omitted to intervene to stop the violations.
333. Lack of oversight saw CDF fighters mete out arbitrary and summary justice to suspected RUF collaborators. Most CDF fighters were poorly trained and ill-disciplined, which resulted in the commission of human rights violations and abuses.
334. The Commission finds that the initiation rituals of the CDF were perverted and subverted by unscrupulous initiators. Initiations resulted in acts of human sacrifice and cannibalism, which constitute grave violations of human rights.
335. The CDF was successful in keeping out the RUF from large parts of the Southern and Eastern Regions. In the course of doing that, the CDF committed gross violations and abuses on the peoples of both regions.

Main Findings

Enmity between the Arms of the State Security Apparatus under the SLPP Government

336. The CDF units of the Southern and Eastern Provinces pitted themselves against the SLA under the newly-instated SLPP Government. Particularly in Kenema District, Kamajors engaged in systematic and targeted attacks on soldiers in an attempt to take over the Army's role as the protector of civilian lives and property. Kamajors carried out multiple acts of torture and killings against soldiers. In many cases, corpses of soldiers were dismembered and parts of them eaten. Kamajors also committed similar violations and abuses against civilians whom they perceived to be affiliated to the Army.
337. High-ranking members of the Government failed to quell clashes between the SLA and the CDF, both of which were arms of the state security apparatus, and were responsible for inciting enmity between the two factions.
338. The Government followed an inadvisable policy of incarcerating several hundred soldiers without trial for their perceived involvement in the clashes with the Kamajors. The Kamajors, meanwhile, were not held to account. This inconsistency of treatment between the two parties was an example of the defective management of the state security apparatus.
339. The clashes between soldiers and Kamajors in the Kenema District represented the first significant and overt manifestations of an ethnic dimension to the Sierra Leone conflict. The Kamajors, who were exclusively Mende indigenes of the District, singled out soldiers and civilians of Northern descent for particularly malicious treatment. High profile members of non-Mende tribes, including Chiefs, were killed in this period of violence.

The Initiators of the Kamajor Society

340. The Commission finds that personal greed and ambition as well as avarice dictated the initiation policy of the Kamajor High Priest, Allieu Kondewah. Kondewah and the other Initiators made a considerable amount of money by charging their new recruits a fee to enter the Kamajor Society. Collectively, under the direction and following the example of their High Priest, the Initiators extorted and exploited the membership of the Kamajor movement in a seemingly insatiable pursuit of their own self-enrichment.
341. Kondewah's introduction of new "phases" of initiation was a particularly shameless ploy to accrue further financial gain.
342. The benefits bestowed upon Kamajors by their participation in initiation ceremonies were fictional. Initiation did not protect the subject from harm nor endow him with superhuman ability.
343. The Commission finds that initiation gave rise to ever-more irresponsible conduct on the part of those who underwent it. It artificially enhanced notions of the Kamajors' human limits and as such was a cynical and dangerous form of psychological manipulation. As a direct result of their participation in initiations, many Kamajors thought that they could not be killed by bullets.

A proportion of warfront casualties incurred by the Kamajors was attributable to the misplaced gusto with which their combatants went into battle.

344. The Commission finds that the Initiators of the CDF and their apprentices brought the whole concept of civil defence into disrepute. They deliberately targeted the social and cultural fabric of the nation. They subverted the sacred and long-standing traditions of initiation and rites of passage that exist peacefully in Sierra Leone. They engaged in destruction and exploitation under the false pretences of a “secret society”.
345. The Initiators of the CDF forced men who joined the Kamajors to eat human body parts during the initiation ceremony. Organs, tissue, blood and flesh from the bodies of dead persons were used in Kamajor ceremonies of initiation. Civilians from communities surrounding the initiation site and even would-be recruits were in many instances killed for the express purposes of “sacrificing them to the cause”.
346. The Initiators of the CDF also carried out or ordered varying degrees of violence and intimidation against those they enlisted. They tortured and killed initiates. They attempted to exonerate themselves from due culpability by referring to illusory whims from higher beings, through dreams and “divine” messages.
347. For every violation or abuse that took place during an initiation ceremony into the Kamajor Society, the Initiators bear the responsibility.

Lack of Control and Oversight

348. The Commission finds that ambiguity in the institutional character of the CDF precipitated a persistent lack of coherence, cohesion and co-ordination in its operations, which led to the commission of many human rights violations and abuses in the enforcement of what the massed ranks saw as the “law”.
349. The lack of effective oversight over the National Co-ordinator, the High Priest and the ground commanders of the CDF ultimately led to grave human rights violations being committed.
350. In particular, the mandate that was given to Kamajors to monitor the movements of the populace at strategic gateways and checkpoints was poorly defined and effectively licensed those charged with security to dispense summary justice against perceived miscreants, “strangers” and “collaborators”.
351. While power and leadership was highly centralised in the CDF, effective control of the fighting forces was vested in the commanding officers at the lower level.

The Responsibility of the War Council at Base Zero

352. The War Council at Base Zero was composed of Chiefs and elders of high moral standing in the communities from which they were drawn. It was formed in an effort to instil some restraint and moderation into the Kamajor movement. It was a colossal failure.

353. Despite direct exposure to the deplorable acts that occurred at Base Zero, the members of the War Council at Base Zero shirked their moral responsibilities to intervene. They did nothing to prevent the mayhem that unfolded around them. In fact, by staying in a movement that had become a systematic violator of human rights, the members of the War Council lent legitimacy and their implicit endorsement to the atrocities committed by the Kamajors.
354. The Commission finds that the members of the War Council bear moral responsibility for the escalating excesses of the Kamajors, which culminated in human rights violations and abuses.

The Kamajors' "Operation Black December"

355. The Kamajors carried out "Operation Black December" in late 1997 and early 1998. It was purposely designed to debilitate the strongholds of the AFRC junta in the Southern and Eastern Provinces. In the process, it caused immense suffering to the civilian populations of many communities in these Provinces. It also led to massive and systematic human rights abuses including summary killings, torture and looting at checkpoints established by the Kamajors.
356. "Operation Black December" was endorsed by the Government in Exile as an integral part of its interventionary initiatives to disrupt and then dislodge the AFRC junta. Chief Hinga Norman acted with the full and express support of the President and the War Council in Exile in ordering the operation to take place. The Commission finds that the Government must take responsibility for the systematic violations and abuses of human rights carried out in its name by the Kamajors during this operation.

Regionalism and Ethnic Prejudice in the CDF

357. The Districts of the South and South-East were unambiguously classifiable as heartlands of the Kamajor movement. The Kamajors targeted inhabitants of these areas along ethnic lines. Persons of Northern origin were singled out disproportionately for violations and abuses after 1998.
358. The Kamajors were intensely protective of their territories and their movement against perceived infiltration by Northerners. They held the prejudice that Northerners might be inclined to display allegiance to the leadership of the AFRC junta, largely because Johnny Paul Koroma was a member of the Limba ethnic group, which originates from the North. The CDF High Command mirrored the suspicions of its Kamajor fighters on the ground. There was deep distrust based on regionalism and ethnicity at the heart of the CDF.
359. Chief Hinga Norman repeatedly rejected the petitions of the CDF's Northern Commander, M. S. Dumbuya, for supplies of logistics. Hinga Norman maintained a blanket refusal to release arms and ammunitions to the North. Consequently, the CDF units in the North were unable to reinforce strategic towns like Makeni, Lunsar and Masiaka. These towns consequently fell to AFRC-led troops without stout resistance from the CDF. The atrocities committed during this onslaught are a stain on the conscience of the CDF.

360. The Commission finds that the invasion of Freetown could have been forestalled, if the Government had mobilised and equipped a strong Northern CDF. However, there was a resolute refusal to do this for fear that once it was equipped, a large section of the Northern CDF would “desert” and join the enemy. Unfounded suspicions based on regionalism and ethnic prejudice were thus put ahead of the security of the city of Freetown.

Involvement of the CDF in the Events of 8 May 2000

361. The President authorised Chief Samuel Hinga Norman to undertake a large-scale mobilisation of members of the Civil Defence Forces in Freetown on 8 May 2000. Kamajors were thus deployed as a supplement to existing arms of the state security apparatus. Kamajors carried out multiple violations during their deployment on 8 May 2000, including killing civilians, plundering vehicles and properties and torturing captives. Kamajors carried out arrests of persons subsequently detained in state facilities as “Protective Custody” prisoners. The Kamajors, together with other militant elements, initiated the attack on Foday Sankoh’s residence on 8 May 2000 and used the occasion for large-scale attack and abuse of perceived RUF sympathisers.

Names of CDF Leadership

362. In the Civil Defence Forces, there was something of a disparate structure of leadership and command. The Commission found that units of militiamen were generally commanded in the vicinity of their communities by local ‘strongmen’ or warlords who held a high degree of responsibility for the acts of those under them.
363. The four categories of leadership in the lists below represent the positions found by the Commission to possess the greatest authority within the national CDF organisation. They are all applicable to the period after May 1997, when the SLPP Government was overthrown. In response to the seizure of power by the AFRC at that time, the CDF realigned its structures, expanded its membership and significantly enhanced its military operations. The overwhelming majority of the names listed below were members of the Kamajor Society, although such membership was not a prerequisite to hold a command position within the CDF.

The CDF High Command

The High Command was partly comprised of the CDF National Co-ordinating Committee. Designations on that Committee are given where relevant.

Commander-in-Chief of Pro-Government Forces, including the CDF
Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, President and Minister of Defence

National Co-ordinator of the CDF
Chief Samuel Hinga Norman JP, Deputy Minister of Defence

Chairman of the CDF National Co-ordinating Committee
Honourable Richard E. S. Lagawo

The CDF High Command (continued)

CDF National Public Relations Officer (PRO)
Charles Moiwo

CDF National Director of War
Moinina Fofanah

Deputy National Director of War
Mohamed O. Musa

CDF National Director of Operations
Joseph Ansumana Sam Koroma

Deputy National Director of Operations
Albert Jusu Nallo

Commander of the Northern CDF
Michael S. Dumbuya

CDF National Director of Logistics
Francis Mustapha Lumeh

CDF National Director of Personnel
Andrew Harding

Regional Co-ordinator of the CDF (Southern Province)
Alhaji Daramy Rogers

Regional Co-ordinator of the CDF (Eastern Province)
George Jambawai

Commander of the CDF in the Pujehun District
Eddie Massallay

Commander of the CDF in the Kenema District
Arthur Koroma

Senior CDF Battalion Commanders and Ground Commanders
Alhaji Sheriff
Rufus M. Collier
Sidia Mansaray
Joe Temide
Morray Jusu
Lahai George
Alhaji Hassan Feika
Al-Hassan W. Jalloh
Joe Nunie

The Initiating Cadre of the CDF

Members of the Initiating Cadre were directly aligned with the CDF High Command. They were responsible for orchestrating and commanding military operations as well as preparing the members of the Kamajor Society for battle by conducting 'initiations'.

The High Priest / Chief Initiator of the Kamajor Society
King Dr. Allieu Kondewah

Other Senior Initiators within the Kamajor Movement
Kamoh Dr. Lahai Bangura
Kamoh Brima Bangura
Mama Munde
Kamoh Alie Sesay
Kamoh Dr. Mohamed Mansaray

The CDF National War Council-in-Exile

The War Council was directly aligned with the CDF High Command. Where relevant, the designation given in brackets is the office-holder's post in the SLPP Government's Cabinet in Exile, which had been retained from President Kabbah's reshuffle of 21 November 1996.

Chairman R. E. S. Lagawo (*Chief Adviser to the President*)
Dr. Prince Harding (*Minister of Mineral Resources*)
Shirley Gbujama (*Minister of Foreign Affairs*)
Momoh Pujeh (*Deputy Minister of Finance*)
Dr. Harry Will (*Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and the Environment*)
Momodu Koroma (*Minister of Presidential Affairs*)
S. B. Marrah (*Leader of the House*)
T. K. Vandi (*SLPP party stalwart*)
Charles Margai (*SLPP party stalwart*)
Foday M. D. Sesay (*Deputy Minister of Health and Sanitation*)
Mohamed B. Daramy (*Deputy Minister of Finance*)

The CDF War Council at Base Zero

This second War Council was created at the behest of certain members of the CDF High Command, but not directly aligned to all of its members. Where relevant, the designation given is the office-holder's position within the CDF War Council itself.

Chairman of the War Council
Paramount Chief J. W. Quee

Vice Chairman / Representative for Bonthe District
Paramount Chief C. W. Tucker

The CDF War Council at Base Zero (continued)

Resident Paramount Chief at Base Zero (Yawbeko Chiefdom)
Paramount Chief J. D. Muana

Member / Representative for Kenema District
Chief Vandi Soka

Member / Representative for Moyamba District
Robert F. Kombe-Kajue

Member / Representative for Bo District
Ibrahim F.M. Kanneh

Member / Representative for the Northern Province
M. S. Dumbuya

Executive Officer / Member / Representative for Pujehun District
Francis Mustapha Lumeh

Executive Officer / Member
Alhaji Daramy Rogers

Executive Officer / Member
Mohammed O. Musa

Executive Officer / Member
George Jambawai

Logistics Officer/ Representative for Bonthe District
Francis Gormoh

Executive Officer / Member
Joseph A.S. Koroma

Executive Officer / Member
Rufus M. Collier

Store Keeper at Base Zero
Jajah Kamara

FINDINGS IN RESPECT OF EXTERNAL ACTORS

Primary Findings

364. Libya provided guerrilla warfare training to a small number of Sierra Leonean dissidents. The Government of Libya also provided some financial support to the RUF. The Commission finds that Libya contributed in a small but significant way to the conflict that engulfed Sierra Leone.
365. The Commission finds that Charles Taylor deployed about 2,000 (two thousand) fighters from his NPFL into Sierra Leone in 1991. The Commission finds further that Taylor was primarily responsible for initiating the conflict in the manner in which it began.
366. The Commission finds the NPFL to have been a particularly brutal and pernicious organisation. The NPFL faction was responsible for most of the early human rights atrocities committed against civilians.
367. In the early years of the conflict, Sierra Leone was largely abandoned by the international community. ECOWAS was the only international body that was willing to intervene in the Sierra Leonean conflict. However, it did not have the resources to properly support its peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone.
368. The Commission finds that the inability of ECOMOG to sustain its intervention beyond Freetown in 1998 contributed to the prolonging of the conflict. The AFRC invasion of Freetown in January 1999 was poorly handled by ECOMOG. Some ECOMOG soldiers engaged in human rights violations during its defence of Freetown. These included the summary executions of suspected AFRC and RUF fighters and collaborators.
369. The Commission finds that Sierra Leoneans are justified in their view that they were abandoned by the United Kingdom in their hour of need. When British troops did intervene towards the end of the 11-year conflict, they effectively dispatched resistance encountered from rebel forces. The Commission finds it regrettable that the United Kingdom waited some ten years before she intervened.
370. The Commission finds that ULIMO was more interested in waging war against the NPFL in Liberia than resisting the RUF in Sierra Leone. Arms, ammunitions and other logistical support supplied to ULIMO by the Government of Sierra Leone were mostly used in the conflict in Liberia.
371. While the use of mercenaries in conflicts should not be encouraged under any circumstances, the Commission finds that the South African private security firm, Executive Outcomes (EO), was efficient in combating the RUF during the conflict. The hiring of mercenaries led to the Government of the day mortgaging the nation's assets.
372. The Commission finds that the United Nations (UN) and the international community abandoned Sierra Leone in its greatest hour of need during the early 1990s. Lack of foresight by the UN and the international community resulted in the hastily prepared and ill-conceived Abidjan Peace Accord in 1996.

373. The United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) was never able to fulfil its mission. UN Peacekeepers who were deployed to Sierra Leone in 1999 and 2000 were ineffectual and disorganised. The kidnap of the UN peacekeepers led to a huge loss of faith in the UN on the part of the population.
374. The Commission finds that the UN subsequently demonstrated its commitment to peace in Sierra Leone through the deployment of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). The provision of a large and well-resourced peacekeeping force together with a range of technical and developmental support has ensured stability in post-conflict Sierra Leone.

Main Findings

LIBYA

375. The Government of Libya instituted a programme of revolutionary training for a small number of Sierra Leonean dissidents as part of its wider international initiative to equip potential insurgents with the means to launch “liberation” movements in their own countries. Crucially, the training included a guerrilla warfare component; it also introduced Sierra Leonean participants, among them Foday Sankoh, to other revolutionaries from the West African sub-region and beyond, among them Charles Taylor.
376. Furthermore, the Commission finds that the RUF benefited from financial support from Libya through its People’s Revolutionary Council.
377. The Commission finds that Libya contributed in a limited but significant manner to the chaos and mayhem that engulfed Sierra Leone.

CHARLES TAYLOR AND THE NATIONAL PATRIOTIC FRONT OF LIBERIA (NPFL)

378. The NPFL war in Liberia impacted profoundly on Sierra Leoneans living in Liberia. Sierra Leoneans were deliberately targeted and maltreated by NPFL fighters. After the intervention of a West African force – ECOMOG – into the Liberian conflict, Charles Taylor issued an arbitrary order to his NPFL troops to arrest and to detain all nationals of ECOWAS states, including Sierra Leone, on the territories under his control. In the process, Taylor was responsible for the arbitrary incarceration of hundreds of Sierra Leonean nationals.
379. The Commission finds that Charles Taylor deployed about 2,000 fighters from his NPFL into Sierra Leone in March and April of 1991. This NPFL contingent, known as “Special Forces”, led the original armed incursion and acted upon the orders of Charles Taylor.
380. Nearly all of the NPFL “Special Forces” fighters in Sierra Leone were of Liberian nationality, with possibly a maximum of 100 (one hundred) nationals from third countries among their number. There were commanders as well as fighters from Burkina Faso (commonly called “Burkinabes”) and the Ivory Coast, in addition to individual or small groups of combatants from The Gambia, Nigeria, Guinea and Togo.

381. Command responsibility for the military operations of the NPFL – and thus for the bulk of the operations carried out by the combined incursion force between March 1991 and September 1992 – was vested in the hands of key “Special Forces” commanders including James Karnwhine (alias “Pa Jim”), Samuel Tuah (alias “Samtuah”), Benjamin Yaeten, Charles Timba, Dupoe Mekazohn (“General Dupoe”), James Wolonfa, John Wuseh, “Action” Jackson, CO “Bosco” and Anthony Meku-Nagbe (alias “CO Dry Pepper”). These men were loyal and answerable to Charles Taylor and received instructions from him through their own conduits.
382. The majority of violations attributed to the RUF in the period between March 1991 and September 1992 were in fact the acts of commandos fighting on behalf of the NPFL. In the Commission’s view the NPFL faction, under the indisputable overall command of Charles Taylor, was chiefly responsible for the bulk of the abuse inflicted on the civilian populations of Pujehun and Kailahun Districts, in particular, during this period. The Commission finds further that the NPFL component of the initial incursion force that subsequently entered Sierra Leone outnumbered the RUF “vanguards” by at least four to one. The Commission finds that the NPFL forces were primarily responsible for the initial peak in brutality against civilians and, especially, against traditional and state authorities that were the hallmark of the first year of the conflict.
383. The Commission holds the NPFL faction responsible for concerted campaigns of indiscriminate violence against the civilian population of the Kailahun District, between February and August 1992. Scores of RUF personnel, both among the “vanguards” and the “junior commandos” categories, were singled out for violations and abuses of their human rights, including torture and summary killings, at the hands of their NPFL compatriots.
384. The Commission finds that the role of the NPFL extended beyond that of direct responsibility for systematic violations and abuses. The NPFL continued to provide support to the RUF in diverse ways for the rest of the conflict period.
385. Between 1991 and 1997 Liberia was incapable of policing its borders with Sierra Leone. The porous border situation promoted the free flow of arms and logistical support for the insurgents from Liberia into Sierra Leone and the flow of looted items and illicit diamonds from Sierra Leone into Liberia. When Charles Taylor became President of Liberia in 1997, Liberia permitted herself to be used as a conduit for the transfer of arms and ammunitions to the RUF in Sierra Leone.
386. The Commission finds that cannibalism was practised on the territory of Sierra Leone by NPFL fighters. The extent of the brutality of NPFL forces, as well as some of its extreme practices such as cannibalism, even alienated members of its partner fighting faction, the RUF.

THE UNITED LIBERATION MOVEMENT FOR DEMOCRACY IN LIBERIA (ULIMO)

387. The Commission finds that ULIMO was more interested in waging war against the NPFL in Liberia than in resisting the RUF in Sierra Leone. Arms, ammunitions and other logistical support supplied to ULIMO by the Government of Sierra Leone were mostly used in the conflict in Liberia. By the end of 1992, most ULIMO fighters had crossed over into Liberia in order to carry out their fight against Charles Taylor and the NPFL.

THE ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES (ECOWAS) AND THE ECOWAS CEASEFIRE MONITORING GROUP (ECOMOG)

388. In the early years of the conflict, Sierra Leone was largely abandoned by the international community. ECOWAS was the only international body that was willing to intervene in the Sierra Leonean conflict.
389. The Commission finds that the global geopolitics prevailing at the time of the conflict affected the response of the international community. The fact that the leader of one of the prominent intervening parties in ECOWAS, namely the Nigerian Head of State, General Sani Abacha, was a military dictator deterred the international community from intervening in the Sierra Leone conflict. The Commission finds it regrettable that the international community chose not to respond to the plight of Sierra Leone because it disagreed with the role played by the leader of one of the intervening parties in his own home country.
390. Due to the poor economic status of its member countries, ECOWAS did not have sufficient resources, soldiers and funds for its peacekeeping missions in the sub-region. Nigeria, during the reign of General Sani Abacha, was the only country in the sub-region that was willing to commit large numbers of troops and resources to the peace keeping missions of ECOWAS in the region.

The Legacies of the ECOMOG Intervention to Oust the AFRC

391. The Commission finds that ECOMOG permitted the unimpeded flight of the ousted AFRC and RUF (the “People’s Army”) out of Freetown into the North of the country. The reason the junta was able to secure “free passage” was because ECOMOG intentionally left open a “corridor” of escape around the Freetown Peninsula. While this decision was taken to prevent further civilian casualties in the Freetown area, it freed the combined forces of the “People’s Army” from direct military confrontation with ECOMOG. It also allowed the AFRC and the RUF to regroup in the expansive and rugged territories of the North and North-East, which precipitated a renewed series of bloody confrontations in Sierra Leone.
392. While the mandate of the Nigerian-led force was specifically confined to that of a ceasefire monitoring group, ECOMOG increasingly came to play the role of the government’s defence force. It took instructions and directions from the executive of the Sierra Leone Government and some of its military officers issued orders and commands on behalf of the Government.

The Commission finds that in all but name, ECOMOG was the surrogate national army from the point of its arrival in February 1998. ECOMOG was therefore not able to play the role of neutral arbiter in the conflict.

393. ECOMOG faced an enemy that was unpredictable and unrestrained by the conventional parameters of warfare between armies. ECOMOG soldiers were further disadvantaged by their lack of topographical knowledge. ECOMOG dispersed itself too thinly on the ground after liberating areas of the North of the country following its intervention in February 1998.
394. Between 1998 and 1999, ECOMOG suffered command and control problems. The Commission finds that all these factors weakened their defence of strategic areas of the country in the face of advances by the AFRC and RUF.
395. The AFRC invasion of Freetown in January 1999 was poorly handled by ECOMOG. Co-ordination of the defence of the city was severely lacking. The approaches to the city were feebly defended making it easy for the AFRC to force the battle to the streets of Freetown.
396. ECOMOG was constrained to avoid firing on civilians “embedded” as human shields within enemy ranks and in many cases had to retreat, to avoid civilian casualties.
397. Some ECOMOG soldiers engaged in human rights violations during the defence of the city. The Commission finds that ECOMOG soldiers committed summary executions of civilians, mostly in Freetown, while repelling the invasion of January 1999. These executions were directed largely at persons accused of being “collaborators”. With mounting losses, many of the ECOMOG soldiers lashed out to avenge the deaths of personal friends and colleagues. Many of those killed by ECOMOG were pointed out by Sierra Leonean civilians as “collaborators”.
398. The Commission finds that it was ECOMOG that ultimately prevented the RUF from occupying the entire country. Sierra Leone owes a debt of gratitude to those that comprised the ECOMOG peacekeeping forces, in particular, the Nigerian troops who comprised the majority of the force.

THE UNITED KINGDOM

399. The United Kingdom and Sierra Leone have a long-standing historical relationship. Sierra Leone was a British colony. Sierra Leoneans expected the United Kingdom to intervene promptly in the conflict in order to bring peace. Such intervention only materialised towards the end of the 11-year long conflict. The Commission finds that Sierra Leoneans are justified in their view that they were abandoned by the United Kingdom in their hour of need.
400. The Conakry Peace Talks of October 1997 were supported by the British High Commissioner to Sierra Leone. The Commission finds that the United Kingdom could have ensured the compliance of the AFRC junta if it had backed the Conakry Agreement with the potential threat of force. Instead of direct intervention, elements in the British government encouraged Sandline International, a private security firm and non-state entity, to supply arms and ammunitions to the loyal forces of the exiled government of President Kabbah.

401. Since 2000, Britain has provided sustained military and other strategic assistance towards ending the conflict and maintaining the peace. British forces were successful in 2000 in neutralising the menace posed by the rogue soldiers who comprised the West Side Boys. The presence of British troops has contributed to deterring further hostility by the RUF and its allies.

EXECUTIVE OUTCOMES

402. The Commission finds that the South African private security firm, Executive Outcomes, was efficient in combating the RUF during the conflict. Although numbering only 250 combatants, the Executive Outcomes fighting force was able to push back the rebel incursions in less than a year.
403. Executive Outcomes engaged the RUF on several occasions; however the Commission's database has not recorded a single allegation of any human rights violation against the mercenaries. The Commission however notes that a large number of civilians were killed when Executive Outcome helicopter gunships attacked RUF jungle bases between 1995 and 1996.
404. While the use of mercenaries in conflicts should be condemned, the Commission notes that when the Sierra Leonean Government contracted with Executive Outcomes it was in a desperate state of affairs.
405. The Commission finds that the Government, under considerable pressure from the international community, made strategic concessions in the Abidjan Peace Accord without the requiring same of the RUF. One such concession was the early termination of the contract with Executive Outcomes. This premature termination opened the door for the RUF forces, who soon regained ascendancy. The cancelling of the contract also saddled the country with substantial financial obligations.²⁹

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

406. The Commission finds that the United Nations (UN) and the international community abandoned Sierra Leone in its greatest hour of need during the early 1990s. The United Nations only took real notice of the situation in 1994 when it sent an exploratory mission to the country.
407. Prior to the conflict members of the international community feted and celebrated successive oppressive governments and turned a blind eye to Sierra Leone's internal situation, which was sowing the seeds of civil war. The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) even invited President Siaka Stevens to chair the body and host its flagship conference in 1980.
408. Lack of foresight by the UN and the international community resulted in the hastily prepared and ill-conceived Abidjan Peace Accord in 1996. This Accord did not make any meaningful contribution to the peace process.

²⁹ Executive Outcomes invoked penalty clauses pertaining to early termination in its contract with the Government of Sierra Leone.

409. The UN misread the prevailing situation in Sierra Leone in 1997. Only 720 (seven hundred and twenty) United Nations observers were provided to monitor the ceasefire agreement. The original United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL) was never able to fulfil its mission. Its presence in Sierra Leone did nothing to prevent the military coup in May 1997.
410. United Nations Peacekeepers who were deployed to Sierra Leone in 1999 and 2000 had a poor understanding of the situation and could not respond timeously to the challenges with which they were faced. RUF fighters had little problem in taking more than 500 UN peacekeepers hostage. The kidnap of the UN peacekeepers led to a huge loss of faith in the UN and its capacity to sustain the peace.
411. The Commission finds that the mandate given to the United Nations peacekeepers at the initial stage of their intervention was insufficient to address the crisis effectively. UNOMSIL peacekeepers were deployed in Sierra Leone in 1999 operated under a Chapter Six mandate of the UN Charter. Under this chapter, the use of force is not authorised. The RUF was quick to exploit this gaping vulnerability when it took UN peacekeepers hostage in May 2000.
412. To the UN's credit, its peacekeepers did not vacate the country despite the hostage-taking episode. The resolve of the UN to stay on ensured the maintenance of peace. The UN Security Council changed the mandate of the peacekeepers from Chapter Six to Chapter Seven, which made provision for self-defence. The UN illustrated its commitment to peace in Sierra Leone by providing a large and well-resourced peacekeeping force and supplying a range of technical and developmental support. The Commission finds that the policies implemented by the UN in Sierra Leone were progressive and have set the standard for peacekeeping missions in other conflict-affected countries.
413. The Commission finds that the international community has responded positively to the devastation in post-conflict Sierra Leone with significant governmental and non-governmental support.

FINDINGS IN RESPECT OF THE JUDICIARY, THE RULE OF LAW AND THE PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Primary Findings

414. Lawyers and jurists in Sierra Leone have failed to stand up to the systematic violation of the rights of the people.
415. Successive governments have used the death penalty to eliminate political opponents. The Commission believes that there is no place for the death penalty in a civilised society based on respect for human life.
416. Successive regimes used emergency powers to suppress political dissent.
417. The use of so-called "safe custody" detention is illegal and represents gross contempt for the rule of law.

418. Corruption is rife at all levels of the judiciary. There is little or no meaningful access to the courts for the majority of Sierra Leoneans.
419. The Office of the Attorney General has not been and is not free of political interference from the executive arm of government.

Main Findings

The Role of Lawyers and Judges

420. The Commission finds that lawyers and judges in Sierra Leone have failed to stand up to state tyranny. They have failed to give any meaningful content to the rule of law.
421. Lawyers should be the first line of defence whenever the human rights of the people are transgressed. This has not happened in Sierra Leone. Indeed lawyers – through their collective inaction – have contributed substantially to the massive abuse of human rights before, during and after the war.
422. The conspicuous failure, on the part of lawyers and judges, to speak up on behalf of Sierra Leoneans held in illegal detention for more than four years in Pademba Road Prison is a terrible indictment.

The Death Penalty

423. The death penalty is provided for in the laws of Sierra Leone for various offences including treason and mutiny. Successive governments have used the death penalty to eliminate political opponents.³⁰ The right of appeal against the decisions of court-martials was removed in 1971.³¹ Several soldiers were tried and executed under this provision between 1971 and November 1998.³²
424. President Kabbah and his government proceeded with the executions of 24 soldiers in 1998, ignoring an appeal from the United Nations Human Rights Committee not to proceed with the executions. The executions were subsequently declared to have violated both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights³³ and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.³⁴ The Commission endorses these findings against the Sierra Leone Government by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights.

³⁰ Examples include Mohamed Sorie Fornah, Ibrahim Bash-Taqi and others during the days of President Siaka Stevens (APC); Francis Minah, G. M. T. KaiKai and others during the era of President Joseph Momoh (APC); and Bambay Kamara, James Yayah Kanu and others in December 1992 during the reign of the National Provincial Ruling Council (NPRC).

³¹ Section 129 in Act No.5 of 1971 was the provision that removed this right. It read: "The decisions of a court-martial shall not be questioned in any court of law." This provision was repealed in 2000 through the Armed Forces of the Republic of Sierra Leone (Amendment) Act 2000.

³² Most recently, Colonel James Max-Kanga and 23 others were executed in October 1998 after a court-martial involving 37 members of the Sierra Leone Army.

³³ See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); 999 U.N.T.S. 171; entered into force on 23 March 1976. The Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone ratified the ICCPR on 23 November 1996.

³⁴ See African [Banjul] Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights; OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 rev. 5, 21 I.L.M. 58 (1982); adopted on 27 June 1981; entered into force on 21 October 1986.

425. The death penalty once implemented is irrevocable. Miscarriages of justice are commonplace in Sierra Leone. No subsequent act of pardon or compensation can remedy a wrongful execution.

Abuse of Emergency Powers

426. The Commission finds that state of emergency powers have proven to be a mighty weapon in the hands of successive governments and have been used to silence opposition, suppress activism and clamp down on political dissent.
427. President Siaka Stevens used emergency powers to silence widespread opposition in 1971 by banning the vocal and burgeoning National Democratic Party (NDP) of Dr. John Karefa-Smart. Stevens also abused emergency powers to suppress student protest and to stop nation-wide strikes by the labour movement.
428. President Momoh took matters to the bizarre by declaring a so-called “State of Economic Emergency” in 1987, which licensed his officials to abuse the property rights of the people.
429. While the declaration of a state of emergency in 1998 by President Kabbah may have been justified to deal with the lawlessness of the time, it also provided the pretext for the arbitrary rounding up and detention of hundreds of Sierra Leoneans accused of “collaboration” with the AFRC junta.

“Safe Custody” Detention

430. The Commission finds that “safe custody” detention has been used to detain political opponents of the government and to quell political dissent.
431. No law authorises the continued detention of persons in “safe custody” or “protective custody” detention. The Public Emergency Regulations of 1998, under which the President was authorised to order the detention of persons in protective custody, were lifted in 2002. The continued detention of several persons in “safe custody” detention is unlawful and in contravention of the Sierra Leone Constitution. Their detention is in clear violation of the rule of law.
432. The Commission finds that the continued practice of “safe custody” detention brings the Government of Sierra Leone into disrepute. There is no place for “safe custody” detention in a just and democratic society. The Commission regrets that civil society and the many representatives of the international community in Sierra Leone have failed to protest the use of “safe custody” detention and have failed to utilise the writ of *habeas corpus* in respect of those persons held under this category.

The Judiciary

433. The Commission finds that the judiciary is understaffed and underpaid. Poor remuneration causes many of the best legal minds to decline appointments to the bench.
434. Powerful members of society are able at times to select judges to hear cases. This practice has brought the judicial process into disrepute.

435. The judicial appointment process has been abused by successive governments. Several politically-motivated appointments have been made by each of the post-independence governments. These abuses have severely compromised the independence of the judiciary.
436. The lack of civil society representation on the Judicial and Legal Service Commission undermines the independence of that important body.
437. The lack of security of tenure of judges during the rule of the APC regime permitted the government of the day to interfere at will with the judiciary. The independence of the judiciary was systematically destroyed. The current practice of employing retired judges on a "contract basis" also compromises their independence.
438. The removal of all measures of financial autonomy from the judiciary by the APC regime in the 1970s served to impoverish the administration of justice. Impoverishment remains the state of affairs in the judiciary. Without budgetary independence, the judiciary has been unable to determine its priorities or to plan for an efficient system of justice delivery.
439. The majority of people in Sierra Leone do not have meaningful access to the courts. This renders the rights enshrined by the Constitution largely empty. The outbreak of war caused almost all judges, magistrates, law officers and private practitioners to flee from the provinces. For several years during the war, there were only two places in the provinces – Bo and Port Loko – that had magistrates' courts operating. Many people resorted to extra-judicial methods to solve their problems.
440. Access to affordable legal representation in Sierra Leone is a serious problem. Most Sierra Leoneans are unable to pay for the services of solicitors. As a result many people are forced to languish in prison cells and police lock-ups for inordinately long periods.
441. Corruption is a perennial problem in the judiciary. It pervades all levels of the judiciary.

Office of the Attorney General

442. The Office of the Attorney General lost its independence and the perception of impartiality when it was fused with the office of the Minister of Justice by virtue of the 1978 Constitution. The Commission finds it regrettable that this state of affairs was confirmed by the 1991 Constitution and indeed persists today. Under this legal regime, the discretion of the Attorney General cannot be free from political influence.

Citizenship

443. The Commission finds that the laws in relation to citizenship, which restrict the ability of persons who are not of Negro African descent to become citizens, are racially discriminatory and inappropriate for a developing and democratic society.³⁵ The Commission finds further that such laws promote disunity and capital flight.

³⁵ See Part III of The Sierra Leone Citizenship (Amendment) Act 1976.

FINDINGS IN RESPECT OF YOUTH

Primary Findings

444. The Commission finds that the youth in Sierra Leone have been excluded from any meaningful participation in the political process.
445. The political exclusion of the youth prompted some of them to assert themselves forcefully into the political process.
446. The Commission finds that marginal and disaffected youth, both rural and urban, made up the vast majority of the fighting forces in the RUF, CDF and the expanded SLA.
447. The Commission finds that many youths became both victims and perpetrators in the war. Many were abducted and forced to engage in horrific atrocities under threat of death, often after being compelled to consume a concoction of drugs. They will carry the psychological scars of their experiences for the rest of their lives.
448. The Commission holds the entire leadership of the different factions, and in particular the leadership of the RUF, responsible for masterminding these pernicious and brutal strategies, or alternatively for failing to stop such practices.
449. The Commission finds that some of the causes of the conflict that prompted many young people to go to war – namely elitist politics, rampant corruption, nepotism and bad governance – are not being adequately addressed.
450. The Commission finds that the proliferation of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in post-conflict Sierra Leone has not resulted in the creation of meaningful capacity amongst the youth.

Main Findings

Political and Economic Exclusion

451. The Commission finds that the youth were excluded from any meaningful participation in the political process from the late 1960s through to the outbreak of war in 1991. The exclusion of the youth from the political process occurred through the stifling of dissent and the freedom of expression, the creation of a one-party state and the total domination of the political scene by the APC.
452. The APC made use of marginalised youth to engage in political violence against its opponents and such youth became increasingly captive to handouts from their political masters.
453. The gradual decline of the economy and the drop in the standard of living contributed immensely to an increase in the number of school dropouts and the high rate of unemployment among the youth. Unemployment led many youths to the “pote” (local slang for the “ghetto”) and they became active participants in the drug culture.

454. The political exclusion of the youth prompted some of them to assert themselves forcefully into the political process. College students emerged as the only real opposition to the one-party dominance. Students engaged with marginal youths to debate “revolution”, which eventually led to the recruitment and training of some young revolutionaries in Libya between 1987 and 1989.

Involvement of Youth in the War

455. The Commission finds that marginalised and disaffected youth, both rural and urban, made up the vast majority of the fighting forces in the RUF, CDF and the expanded SLA. Many unemployed youth who previously had no means of survival saw the war as a welcome opportunity through which to amass wealth and transform their status.
456. The Commission finds that the vast majority of those who were recruited into the expanded SLA were marginalised youths from the urban areas. Most of those abducted or forcibly recruited into the RUF were from the rural areas and the bulk of youth recruited into the CDF were also from the rural areas.
457. The Commission finds that many youths became both victims and perpetrators in the war. Those who were abducted and forced to engage in violence, under threat of death, were victims. They then became perpetrators, when carrying out human rights violations against civilians. This was often done after being compelled to consume a concoction of drugs. While perpetrating the most horrific atrocities under the influence of drugs, it can be said that these youths were victims at the same time. They will carry the psychological scars of their experiences for the rest of their lives. The Commission holds the entire leadership of the RUF responsible for masterminding these pernicious and brutal strategies, or alternatively for failing to stop such practices.
458. In the end, the war not only affected marginalised youth; it also affected mainstream youth. This was largely due to the breakdown of the family, the collapse of educational institutions, the lack of jobs and the fact that the fighting occurred in almost every part of the country.

Youth and Post-Conflict Sierra Leone

459. Despite the important strides made by the government since the conclusion of the war, the condition of the youth in Sierra Leone continues to be problematic. A significant number of young people have expressed frustration and concern that the circumstances that resulted in the war have not been meaningfully addressed. A failure to address these shortcomings will have serious repercussions for Sierra Leone.
460. The Commission finds that many youths who missed out on schooling during the war are no longer in a position to continue with their education. This is due to the high cost of education and because many of them consider themselves to be too old to return to school. The 1990s constituted a wasted decade for these youth.

461. The Commission finds that the economy was destroyed during the eleven years of civil conflict. While the government is trying to rebuild the infrastructure and set the economy back on track, most young people cannot find employment. Many young people lack the skills that would make them employable in the job market. However, even graduates have difficulty in finding work in Sierra Leone.
462. The Commission finds that during the war many youths graduated from using marijuana to using harder forms of narcotics, such as cocaine and heroine. Many young people are now addicted to these harder, more damaging drugs. Youths who might otherwise have become college graduates and professionals now occupy a twilight world where they spend idle days and resort to thievery and drug dealing to eke out a living.
463. The Commission finds that lack of funds and personnel are hampering the programme of the Ministry of Youth and Sports. It therefore cannot fulfil the responsibilities for which it was created.

FINDINGS IN RESPECT OF CHILDREN

Primary Findings³⁶

464. The Sierra Leonean conflict, perhaps more than any other conflict, was characterised by the brutal strategy, employed by most of the armed factions, of forcing children into combat. The Commission finds that, during the conflict, all the armed groups pursued a policy of deliberately targeting children.³⁷
465. The Commission finds that the abduction and forced recruitment of children was in clear contravention of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its optional protocols. The Commission holds the leadership of the RUF, CDF, AFRC and SLA accountable for gross violations of the human rights of children.
466. The Commission finds that successive governments in Sierra Leone permitted and condoned the practice of recruiting child soldiers into the national army and the auxiliary forces during the period of the conflict.
467. The rights of children were violated in many ways. Children were abducted, forcibly recruited to fight for the faction that abducted them, compelled to kill or be killed. Children were tortured and maimed. They were forced into slave labour, suffered rape, sexual slavery and other forms of sexual abuse. Girls between the ages of 10 and 14 were particularly targeted for abuse.
468. The Commission finds that children were not only victims, but also became perpetrators in the conflict. They were forced to perpetrate the most unspeakable violations, including rape, torture and sexual abuse. In their roles as perpetrators, many children have been "conditioned" into accepting violence as the norm. Perpetrating violence became a means of survival.

³⁶ Further findings on the experiences of children can be found in the earlier section entitled 'Findings on the Nature and Characteristics of the Conflict'.

³⁷ More detail can be found in the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

469. The Commission finds that all fighting factions exploited the vulnerability of children and in so doing brutalised them. Children have entered adulthood deeply scarred by their traumatic experiences and their feelings of guilt.
470. The Commission finds that all the armed groups pursued a policy of deliberately abducting girls with the intention of raping and sexual violating them, forcing them into sexual and domestic slavery, torturing them, forcibly impregnating them and mutilating them. The Commission holds the leadership of all fighting factions responsible for planning and authorising such brutal strategies.
471. The Commission finds that there can be no role in warfare for children. Those responsible for the acts of abduction, forced recruitment, sexual enslavement and the related acts of torture, forced labour and forced drugging to which children were subjected must stand to account.
472. The Commission finds that the Government of Sierra Leone has been tardy in passing the Children's Bill into law.

Main Findings

Findings against the RUF in respect of children

473. The Commission finds that the RUF was the primary violator of the rights of children in contravention of international law and international humanitarian law. The Commission finds the RUF responsible for the deliberate and unfettered abuse of children in its most egregious manifestations during the Sierra Leone conflict.
474. The Commission finds the RUF to have pioneered the practice of abducting children for the express purpose of forcibly recruiting them as child soldiers in the Sierra Leone conflict. The Commission finds that this was a deliberate strategy on the part of the RUF leadership.
475. The Commission finds that the RUF was primarily responsible for the abduction of girls.³⁸ RUF combatants, with the blessing and authorisation of the leadership, raped abducted girls and forced them into sexual slavery. Abducted girls were also subjected to a host of other sexual violations.
476. The Commission finds that the RUF was the organisation primarily responsible for violations perpetrated against children such as amputation, mutilation, forced drugging, forced labour, torture, cruel and inhuman punishment and assault.
477. The Commission finds the leadership of the RUF responsible for planning, authorising and implementing the strategies that led to the commission of violations against children. The Commission holds the leadership of the RUF accountable for committing brutal and senseless violations against the children of Sierra Leone.

³⁸ The RUF is responsible for 73.7% (289 out of 392) of the abduction violations against girls younger than 18 years old (where age is known) reported to the Commission.

Findings against the CDF in respect of children

478. The Commission finds that the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) were responsible for recruiting children for the purpose of compelling them to become soldiers in the conflict. The Commission finds that this practice was in clear contravention of international human rights law and international humanitarian law.
479. The Commission finds that during the conflict in Sierra Leone the CDF carried out a deliberate strategy of perpetrating rape, sexual slavery and other sexual violations on girls. The Commission finds in particular that girls and women identified as relatives or associates of the opposing forces were specifically targeted by the CDF for such violations. The Commission finds such acts to be in clear contravention of international law and holds the leadership of the CDF responsible for the sexual violations carried out by members and combatants of the CDF faction.
480. The Commission finds the CDF responsible for the perpetration of a host of other brutal violations against children. These include forced drugging, forced cannibalism, torture and assault. The Commission finds the leadership of the CDF accountable for these violent and pernicious strategies deployed against children.
481. The Government of Sierra Leone was advised and made aware of the violations and abuses committed by the CDF against children. The Commission finds that the Government failed to stop and prevent such violations. Moreover the Commission finds that the Government neglected to take action against those in the CDF responsible for the commission of these violations and, in particular, those in the leadership responsible for such strategies.

Findings against the SLA in respect of children

482. The Commission finds that the practice of recruiting child soldiers into the SLA can be traced back to President Momoh's rule. The Commission finds that the largest number of children recruited into the SLA occurred during the period of the NPRC regime.
483. Under the NPRC junta, the SLA pursued the practice of abducting children with the express intention of forcibly recruiting them into the Army. The Commission finds this practice to constitute a clear breach of international law.
484. The Commission finds that during the period of the conflict significant elements within the SLA pursued a tactic of raping and sexually violating girls in contravention of international law. The Commission finds that the leadership of the SLA condoned the sexual violations carried out by soldiers.
485. The Commission finds that SLA soldiers were responsible for violations on children such as torture, amputations, mutilations and assaults. The Commission finds that the leadership of the SLA failed to take adequate steps to stop and prevent the commission of gross violations of human rights against children.

Findings against the AFRC in respect of children

486. The Commission finds the AFRC responsible for the abduction and forcible recruitment of children as child soldiers in clear contravention of international law. The Commission finds the leadership of the AFRC responsible for the strategy that led to these violations.
487. The Commission finds that the AFRC pursued a deliberate strategy of abducting girls during the invasion of Freetown in January 1999. AFRC combatants abducted girls in order to rape them, hold them in sexual slavery and to perpetrate sexual violations against them.
488. The Commission finds that the AFRC was responsible for the amputation, mutilation, forced labour, forced drugging, torture, cruel and inhuman treatment and assault of children during the conflict in Sierra Leone. The Commission finds that the leadership of the AFRC not only permitted those under their command to carry out these violations, but also engaged in the commission of these violations themselves.

Health

489. The Commission finds that the conflict in Sierra Leone impacted negatively on the physical and mental health of children. In particular, the health of girls has been adversely affected by the high incidence of rape and sexual violence, which has particularly compromised their reproductive systems. Sexual abuse of girls during the conflict has left some of them not only HIV positive, but also suffering from other sexually transmitted infections (STIs).

Education

490. The Commission finds that children and youth in Sierra Leone have been severely disadvantaged by the lack of access to free education at primary level and affordable secondary education. The Commission finds that the lack of access to education has the potential to exclude the majority of children and youth in Sierra Leone from reaching their full potential and enabling them to take their rightful place in society.

Sexual exploitation and trafficking of children

491. The Commission finds that the conflict in Sierra Leone has promoted and encouraged the sexual exploitation and trafficking of children and youth.
492. The Commission finds that the presence of peacekeepers in Sierra Leone has contributed substantially to the problem. The Commission recognises that the UN Mission in Sierra Leone has probably enacted the most progressive measures in UN peacekeeping history in order to deal with this problem.

Street children

493. The Commission finds that the conflict in Sierra Leone has created a new phenomenon, that of children living on the streets. Many of these children were abducted, suffered forced recruitment and sexual slavery. They have not been able to return home. These children and youth live in abject poverty and are compelled to beg or to sell themselves for sex in order to survive.

Institutions dealing with children

494. The Commission finds that, while there are a number of governmental and non-governmental institutions concerned with children in Sierra Leone, these institutions lack a clear strategic plan with clearly identified goals and indicators. The Commission also finds that there is an over-reliance on donor agencies to plan and implement what should be government-led programs.
495. The Commission finds that the lack of strategy on the part of these institutions has resulted in a lack of focus, an uncoordinated approach and a plethora of non-governmental organisations carrying out similar programmes. The Commission has found that no leadership exists at governmental level to co-ordinate these much-needed programmes.

FINDINGS IN RESPECT OF WOMEN

Primary findings

496. The Commission finds that, during the conflict in Sierra Leone, all armed groups perpetrated human rights violations against women and girls. Women and girls were targeted for rape and sexual slavery.
497. Violations committed against women included killings, rape, sexual violence, sexual slavery, slave labour, abductions, assaults, amputations, forced pregnancy, detention, torture, enforced sterilisation, trafficking, mutilations, enforced cannibalism, displacement and economic violations such as looting, extortion, theft and the destruction of property.
498. The Commission finds further that many humanitarian workers, who were meant to protect and assist women, exploited the extreme vulnerability of women and violated their rights by compelling them to barter their bodies in order to access aid and survive.
499. Retarding the recovery of women is the fact that they lack adequate access to productive assets including land, credit, training and technology.
500. The Commission finds that the Government of Sierra Leone failed in its duty to protect women and girls from abuse during and after the conflict.
501. Before, during and after the conflict, women have been largely excluded from meaningful decision making in the political arena.

Main Findings

Findings against the RUF in respect of women

502. The Commission finds that the RUF was the primary perpetrator of human rights violations against women and girls. The RUF was responsible for targeting women and girls, abducting them with the express intention of exploiting their vulnerability.

503. The RUF pursued a deliberate strategy of violating women by raping them and perpetrating acts of sexual violence against them. RUF combatants used women and girls (particularly those between the ages of 10 and 14) as sexual and domestic slaves and tortured them in a myriad of different ways. Women and girls were killed, assaulted and suffered cruel and inhuman acts at the hands of RUF fighters.

Findings against the AFRC in respect of women

504. The Commission finds that the AFRC pursued a deliberate strategy of targeting girls and women with the specific intention of violating them by abducting them, raping them and perpetrating acts of sexual violence against them.
505. The AFRC pursued a strategy of violating women and girls by using them as sexual and domestic slaves and tortured them in a variety of ways. Women and girls were killed, assaulted and suffered cruel and inhuman acts at the hands of AFRC fighters.
506. The Commission finds that the AFRC planned, authorised and executed a strategy to target women and girls during the invasion of Freetown in January 1999. AFRC combatants targeted women and girls with the express intention of abducting them, raping and sexually violating them and pursuing a range of other human rights violations against them.
507. The Commission finds that the leadership of the AFRC failed to express remorse or regret or to acknowledge responsibility for the violations carried out by AFRC fighters under their command.

Findings against the CDF in respect of women

508. The Commission finds that the CDF, particularly in the latter period of the conflict, abducted civilian women and girls whom they believed to be associated to or in collaboration with the RUF and the AFRC.
509. The Commission finds that the CDF detained women and girls and kept them under the most cruel and inhuman conditions with the intention of violating them by raping them and exploiting them as sexual slaves.
510. The Commission finds the conduct of CDF members particularly reprehensible given that the CDF was established to protect the civilian population. The Commission finds that the leadership of the CDF failed to express remorse or acknowledge responsibility for the violations carried out by those under their command.

Findings against the SLA in respect of women

511. The Commission finds that the SLA, which was responsible for protecting the civilian population, abducted women and girls, particularly those believed to belong to the RUF or believed to have collaborated with the RUF / AFRC. Women and girls were detained under conditions of extreme cruelty with the deliberate intention of raping them and perpetrating other acts of sexual violence upon them.

Findings against the West Side Boys in respect of women

512. The Commission finds the West Side Boys responsible for abducting women and girls, holding them against their will, forcing them into marriage, raping them, using them as sexual slaves and perpetrating a range of brutal and inhuman acts upon them.

Violations perpetrated against women and girls

o Abduction and Forced Recruitment

513. The Commission finds that all of the armed groups pursued a deliberate strategy of targeting young girls between the ages of 10 and 14. Women and girls were abducted for the purposes of keeping them under their control, exercising rights of ownership over them, exploiting their vulnerability, coercing them into becoming combatants and using them as sexual slaves and as forced labour.

514. The RUF was the organisation primarily responsible for the abduction of women and girls.³⁹

o Rape

515. The Commission finds that the RUF and the AFRC deliberately embarked on systematic strategies to abduct and rape women and girls between the ages of ten and 14 years.

516. The Commission finds that the systematic raping of women was intended to humiliate, defile and violate women, their families and communities. The practice of systematic rape sowed terror among the local population and debased societal norms and customs.

o Sexual slavery

517. The Commission finds that the RUF and the AFRC were the major perpetrators of sexual slavery and forced marriages of women and young girls.⁴⁰

o "Enforced sterilisation"⁴¹

518. The Commission finds the RUF and the AFRC primarily responsible for perpetrating the violation of "enforced sterilisation" for no reason other than to torture and inflict cruel and inhuman treatment on women.

³⁹ Of the 2,058 abductions of women and girls reported to the Commission, 1,362 (66.2%) are attributed to the RUF.

⁴⁰ Of the 189 allegations of sexual slavery of women and girls reported to the Commission, 137 of them (72.5%) are attributed to the RUF and 22 (11.6%) are attributed to the AFRC.

⁴¹ The practice of disembowelling pregnant women with the intention of removing the foetus constitutes 'enforced sterilisation' in terms of international human rights law.

- Mutilation
519. The Commission finds that the RUF and the AFRC were responsible for the extensive mutilation of women and young girls. These groups are held responsible for the carving of the initials of their factions onto the chests of women and girls, as well as other abductees, with the deliberate intention of permanently disfiguring them and to discourage them from escaping.
- Forced detention
520. The Commission finds that all the armed groups pursued a strategy of detaining women and girls whom they believed to be relatives and supporters of the opposing forces, with the intention of violating them and punishing them for their perceived association with “enemy” forces.
- Forced displacement
521. The Commission finds that all the armed perpetrator groupings and in particular the RUF violated the rights of women and girls by forcing them to flee from their homes and to abandon all their possessions.⁴² This caused women not only economic loss but also the loss of security and enormous trauma.
522. The Commission finds that women made up approximately 36.8% (2,941 out of 7,983) of the displaced population in the conflict. Many women and girls who were forced to migrate and those that became internally displaced have still not been reintegrated back into their communities.
523. Most internally displaced persons, including refugee women, live in extremely tenuous economic circumstances, while at the same time attempting to provide for their families.
- Forced labour and “enslavement”
524. The Commission finds that all the armed perpetrator groups coerced women and girls under their control into doing forced labour.
525. International law recognises the crime against humanity of “enslavement”, which includes the exercise of the power of ownership over one or more persons, such as purchasing, selling, lending or bartering such a person or persons, or by imposing on them a deprivation of liberty. The armed perpetrator groups are found to have committed this crime against humanity to the extent that it was conducted as part of a widespread or systematic attack.
- Assault and Torture
526. The Commission finds that women and girls were assaulted, tortured and subjected to cruel and inhuman treatment by all the armed perpetrator groups, with the deliberate intention of inflicting serious mental and physical suffering or injury on them.

⁴² Of the 2,941 forced displacement violations against women and girls where the perpetrator is known, 1,860 (63.2%) are attributed to the RUF.

527. The Commission finds that all the factions pursued a deliberate strategy of perpetrating torture on women and girls perceived to be associated with the “enemy”, by inflicting or threatening to inflict sexual violence, other acts of violence and cruel and inhuman acts upon them or on persons close to them.
- o *Forced drugging*
528. The Commission finds all the factions, particularly the RUF, responsible for the forced ingestion of drugs and alcohol by women and girls. This tactic was carried out with the deliberate intention of causing its victims to lose control, both mentally and physically, and to exploit their vulnerability.
529. Many women and girl abductees and former combatants remain addicted to drugs today. This has impacted negatively on the rehabilitation and reintegration of these ex-combatants into society.
- o *Other Atrocities*
530. In addition to atrocities associated with the exploitation of women’s sexuality and vulnerability, women and girls were not exempted from the full range of atrocities suffered by men.
531. Thousands of women and girls were killed and had their limbs amputated. Women and girls were subjected to forced cannibalism. Women had their property and possessions looted by members of all armed groups, thereby depriving them and their families of food, clothing, money and assets.⁴³

Women as combatants and perpetrators

532. The Commission finds that while most women were compelled to become combatants and collaborators in order to survive, a number of them chose voluntarily to take up these roles. Some women joined the war because they believed in the cause of the armed revolution or the defence of the country.
533. The Commission finds that collaboration with an armed faction is often a mechanism that women employ to survive and to improve the situation for themselves and their families. Ethnic allegiances, as well as personal and private loyalties also explained why women took sides.
534. The Commission finds that Sierra Leonean society has stigmatised women and girls who were combatants in the conflict. Stigmatisation has resulted in women and girls concealing their experiences. Many women are unwilling to acknowledge that they need help to deal with the consequences of their roles in the conflict.
535. The Commission finds that many women have suffered “double victimisation”. First they were compelled against their will to join the fighting factions and today they are victimised by society for having played a combative role in the conflict. They are treated with hostility and suspicion for “breaching” both gender and sex roles. Non-disclosure is a survival mechanism that may prevent ostracism. Many female ex-combatants live in perpetual fear of being recognised and isolated because of their roles in the conflict.

⁴³ Women victims accounted for one quarter to one third of the violations reported to the Commission in all the categories of abuse listed in this paragraph.

Disarmament and Reintegration

536. The Commission finds that men and boys were favoured over women and girls in the disarmament and reintegration processes. Little effort was made to recognise the experiences of women in the war. Most former female combatants and those who played a supporting role in the war were not able to access the necessary assistance to reintegrate into their communities.

Abuse by humanitarian workers

537. The Commission finds it particularly disturbing that many cases of abuse by humanitarian workers on women and children have occurred in Sierra Leone. Aid workers who were supposed to render humanitarian aid to women abused their power by exploiting the vulnerability of those under their care.
538. The Commission finds that women and girls were forced to barter their bodies to humanitarian workers in exchange for aid.

Political and Economic Exclusion

539. A culture of exclusion and marginalisation in the management of economic and political affairs in Sierra Leone existed before and during the civil conflict. It persists today. Women have been excluded in practice and in fact from decision-making.
540. Women are largely absent from the structures of government and traditional forums that are critical in formulating policies. They are excluded in the processes involving security sector reform and other post-conflict and peace building measures undertaken by the State.
541. The exclusion of women resonates across the various divides – cultural, religious, economic and domestic. The political exclusion of women leaves Sierra Leone out of step with much of the world.

Effects of the Conflict on the Health of Women

542. Women and girls suffered adverse effects to their health as a result of the conflict. The health concerns of women were exacerbated by the destruction of health facilities. Many women still do not have access to basic health services. The absence of qualified health professionals including doctors, surgeons, psychologists and psychiatrists compounds the problem.
543. Sexual violence experienced by women during the conflict has had lasting negative effects on their reproductive health. Rape and sexual violence were rife, which caused a massive rise in the incidence of HIV / AIDS and sexually transmitted infections (STIs). This is of immediate concern to the survivors.

Lack of Access to Resources

544. Retarding their recovery is the fact that women lack adequate access to productive assets including land, credit, training and technology. Women, with limited access to formal sector employment, resort mainly to food production and petty trading activities with very low earning potential.

545. Women face discrimination in education, employment, in the social and economic setting and in the family. The law (both customary and statutory) discriminates against women and girls. In addition, the law does not adequately protect women against violence.
546. Compounding the situation is the high rate of illiteracy among women, which stands at 89% for rural women by the last available figures.⁴⁴ Most women are unskilled and cannot obtain formal sector employment.

Widowed Women

547. Many women were widowed as result of the war. Consequently, they have encountered numerous problems in relation to ownership of property, inheritance and access to land.
548. They also face discrimination due to their status as widows. The practice of Widow Inheritance⁴⁵ is rife among some communities in the country.

Elderly Women

549. The war has undermined the social status of elderly women. The breakdown of social and cultural values that would have ensured protection for these women places them in a precarious position. They are largely destitute and unemployable.

Discrimination

550. Women and girls in Sierra Leone before, during and after the conflict have been subjected to entrenched structural discrimination by practice, custom and law. These discriminatory practices remain unchanged today.
551. Within the context of the conflict, women and girls were not only exposed to higher levels of gender-based violence than in peace time, but they were also discriminated against with regard to provision of services. This situation has not improved, even long after the cessation of conflict. Women survivors continue to suffer the same marginalisation.
552. Women comprise the largest category of persons without formal education in Sierra Leone. Illiteracy rates stand at 89% for the rural female population by the latest available figures.⁴⁶ Structural and cultural discrimination, early marriage and other harmful traditional practices impede the access of women to education and economic advancement.

⁴⁴ See the Analytical Report on the 1985 Census produced by the Central Statistics Office.

⁴⁵ 'Widow Inheritance' describes the practice of a male relative of the deceased assuming the estate and managing the affairs of the widow.

⁴⁶ See the Analytical Report on the 1985 Census produced by the Central Statistics Office.

FINDINGS IN RESPECT OF MINERAL RESOURCES

Primary Findings

553. The Commission finds that the exploitation of diamonds did not cause the conflict in Sierra Leone, but different fighting factions did target diamond areas for purposes of supporting their war efforts.
554. The Commission finds that countries in the Mano River Union permitted their territories to be used as conduits for the smuggling of diamonds extracted from Sierra Leone. The political elites of these countries benefited enormously from the diamond resources smuggled out of Sierra Leone.
555. The Commission finds that the RUF, AFRC and CDF were primarily responsible for targeting diamond areas. The Commission finds that the RUF and AFRC employed abduction and forced labour for their mining activities, including the use of child labour.
556. Successive governments of Sierra Leone have never had effective control over the diamond industry. While the present government of Sierra Leone has made significant progress in regulating the industry, much still needs to be done.
557. During the conflict period, the global diamond industry deliberately chose not to determine the origin of diamonds, thereby promoting the trade in “conflict diamonds”, which, in turn, prolonged local wars.

Main Findings

Exploitation of Diamonds prior to the Conflict

558. The Commission finds that countries in the Mano River Union permitted their territories to be used as a conduit for the smuggling of diamonds extracted from Sierra Leone. The political elites of these countries benefited enormously from the diamond resources smuggled out of Sierra Leone.
559. The Commission finds that the political elite and those in power appropriated the bulk of the mineral resources of Sierra Leone for their private accumulation, thereby denying the people the much-needed resources for development.

A Fuelling Factor

560. The Commission finds that the exploitation of diamonds was not the cause of the conflict in Sierra Leone, but rather fuelled the conflict as diamonds were used by most of the fighting factions to finance and support their war efforts.
561. The RUF was mining diamonds and using them for the procurement of supplies, arms and ammunition throughout the war, but mainly between 1998 and 2001. During this latter period, the RUF’s diamond-mining activities were actively supported by Charles Taylor and other individuals in Liberia, including government officials.

562. In particular, the sale of “conflict diamonds” contributed to the procurement of small arms and the proliferation of these arms in Sierra Leone and the region.

Targeting of Diamondiferous Areas

563. Those areas of the country rich in diamonds and other mineral resources were systematically targeted by the warring groups, especially the RUF, the AFRC and the CDF. The targeting of these areas led to the commission of extensive human rights violations on civilians and the displacement of large numbers of people. Community life in these areas was significantly disrupted.
564. Individuals such as miners, diamond dealers and Lebanese businesspersons were targeted for their perceived wealth. They were often killed and their properties looted and destroyed. The theft of diamonds from such individuals was often accompanied by torture and beatings.

Mismanagement of the Diamond Industry

565. The Commission finds that successive post-colonial governments of Sierra Leone mismanaged the diamond industry and placed its effective control in the hands of a few elite individuals and groups in a manner that did not benefit the economy of Sierra Leone.
566. The Commission finds the APC government responsible for abdicating its responsibility by handing effective control of the diamond industry to companies that siphoned the income from these resources to other countries. This transfer of control significantly reduced state revenues from diamond mining. The people of Sierra Leone were thus denied the benefits of the country’s rich mineral resources.
567. The Commission finds that the NPRC government was extremely irresponsible in handing concessions to mine diamonds and gold to mercenary groups such as Executive Outcomes and the Ghurkhas.
568. The Commission finds that the state has never had effective control of the diamond industry prior to and during the conflict period. Although the current government has put in place the mechanisms of control for the diamond and mineral industry, implementation and management are lacking.
569. Corruption among public officials is still rife in Sierra Leone, with many people holding mining licenses under other people’s names. The Commission finds that the potential for abuse in the mining industry remains as long as government and public officials retain mining licences.

Forced Labour and Labour Conditions

570. The Commission finds that the RUF and the AFRC employed abduction and forced labour for their mining activities, including the use of child labour.
571. Appalling labour conditions have characterised mining operations in Sierra Leone during and after the conflict. Children are still used as miners. Poverty is rampant amidst the glittering wealth of the diamond fields.

Role of the Global Diamond Industry

572. The Commission finds that, during the conflict period, the global diamond industry had little or no control over the origin of diamonds that were sold worldwide.
573. The international diamond industry was largely indifferent to the origin of “conflict diamonds”, even at a time when reports of atrocities relating to the conflict in Sierra Leone were widely disseminated in the global media. These lapses significantly promoted the trade in illicit “conflict diamonds” and thereby encouraged the prolonging of local wars, including the conflict in Sierra Leone.
574. Although the government has made significant progress in tackling diamond smuggling, largely due to the introduction of the certification process, smuggling is far from being eradicated.
575. The Commission finds that a major weakness in the certification process for the trade of diamonds is the fact that the country of actual origin of the diamonds cannot always be identified. This shortcoming promotes the illegal trade of “conflict diamonds” and allows such diamonds to be sold freely in the diamond markets of the world.
576. The Commission finds that while the Kimberly Process has gone a long way to addressing problems in the global diamond industry, the Government of Sierra Leone has failed to implement effective controls and checks at the local level.

FINDINGS IN RESPECT OF THE TRC AND THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE

Primary Findings

577. The Commission finds that the amnesty clause in the Lomé Peace Agreement was well intentioned and meant to secure peace. The Commission finds that in repudiating the amnesty clause in the Lomé Peace Agreement, both the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone have sent an unfortunate message to combatants in future wars that they cannot trust peace agreements that contain amnesty clauses.
578. The Commission finds that insufficient consideration was given to the laying down of guidelines for the simultaneous conduct of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court in Sierra Leone. In particular, the Commission finds that the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone should have enshrined the right of detainees and prisoners in the custody of the Special Court to participate in the truth and reconciliation process.
579. The failure to establish policy which would set out clearly the nature of the relationship between the two bodies had led to a great deal of confusion in the minds of the public. As a result, many Sierra Leoneans stayed away from the Commission for fear that their information may be turned over to the Special Court.

580. The Commission finds that the “Practice Direction” formulated by the Registry of the Special Court to regulate contact between the Commission itself and the detainees in the custody of the Special Court did not adequately consider the spirit and purpose of the Commission’s mandate.
581. The Commission finds that the decision by the Special Court for Sierra Leone to deny its detainees the right to appear before the Commission and the nation in an open and transparent manner denied the right of Sierra Leoneans to see the process of truth and reconciliation done in relation to the detainees.
582. The Commission holds that the right to the truth is inalienable. This right should be upheld in terms of national and international law. It is the reaching of the wider truth through broad-based participation that permits a nation to examine itself honestly and to take effective measures to prevent a repetition of the past.

Main Findings

Amnesty

583. The Lomé Peace Agreement granted an amnesty in order to end the hostilities in Sierra Leone and to secure the commitment of all parties to the peace process. Given the reality of the conflict that plagued Sierra Leone in July of 1999, the Commission views the amnesty granted as necessary in the circumstances that prevailed at the time.
584. The amnesty provision at Article IX of the Lomé Peace Agreement clearly applies to “all combatants and collaborators”, not just those of the RUF. The Commission finds that it is unwise and legally unsound to suggest that one party to an agreement could, by its subsequent actions, deprive individuals belonging to other groups of the benefit of amnesty.
585. The Commission finds that the handwritten disclaimer made by the United Nations to the Lomé Peace Agreement, stating that the amnesty provisions shall not apply to certain international crimes, may have sent a message to combatants and leaders of armed factions that the amnesty provided by the Lomé Peace Agreement was not a secure amnesty.
586. The Commission finds that both the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF committed breaches of the Lomé Peace Agreement, which culminated in its collapse in May 2000. The Commission finds that in repudiating the amnesty clause in the Lomé Peace Agreement, both the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone may have sent an unfortunate message to combatants in future wars that they cannot trust peace agreements that contain amnesty clauses. The Commission subscribes to the general proposition that there will be circumstances where a trade of peace for amnesty represents the least bad of the available alternatives.

Unique Framework of Transitional Justice

587. Sierra Leone, with its two institutions of transitional justice in operation at the same time – that is, the TRC and the Special Court – had the opportunity to offer the world a unique framework in moving from conflict to peace. Sadly, this opportunity was not seized. The two bodies had little contact and when they intersected at the operational level, the relationship was a troubled one.

A Failure to Define the Relationship

588. The Commission finds that the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone, who were responsible for the Special Court initiative and were the authors of its founding instruments, might have given more consideration to the laying down of guidelines for the simultaneous operation of the two institutions.
589. In particular, the Commission finds that the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone should have enshrined the right of detainees and prisoners in the custody of the Special Court to participate in the truth and reconciliation process.
590. The Commission finds that the two institutions themselves might have given more consideration to an arrangement or a memorandum of understanding to regulate their relationship.

Confusion in the Minds of the Public

591. The failure to demarcate clearly the roles and functions of the two bodies, together with the highly uncertain nature of the relationship between them, led to a great deal of confusion in the minds of the public.
592. The Commission finds that many Sierra Leoneans who might have wished to participate in the truth-telling process stayed away for fear that their information may be turned over to the Special Court. This was particularly the case with regard to perpetrators. The Commission's ability to create a forum of exchange between victims and perpetrators was retarded by the presence of the Special Court.

Access to Detainees in the Custody of the Special Court

593. The Commission finds that the "Practice Direction"⁴⁷ formulated by the Registry of the Special Court to regulate contact between the Commission and the detainees did not adequately consider the spirit and purpose behind the Commission's mandate. The "Practice Direction" purported to authorise a Special Court judge to approve whether the Commission may interview a detainee in pursuance of its mandate.
594. In addition, the "Practice Direction" purported to authorise a judge to decide whether a detainee could exercise his right to appear before the Commission. By removing the decision from the detainees, the Special Court effectively proscribed their rights under the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act.

⁴⁷ The Practice Direction referred to in the ensuing paragraphs was issued by the Registrar of the Special Court on 9 September 2003 and amended on 4 October 2003.

595. The “Practice Direction” had no regard for the rights of the Commission to hear testimony in confidence,⁴⁸ to conduct interviews in private,⁴⁹ or to hold records of such interviews on a confidential basis.⁵⁰ The stipulation in the “Practice Direction” that interviews would be monitored within earshot and that recordings of confidential interviews would be made and lodged with the Registry violated the right of an accused not to incriminate himself.⁵¹

Insufficient Appreciation of Urgency

596. The Commission finds that the Special Court failed to treat the hearings applications from the Commission and the detainees with any urgency, despite the fact that the applications were pleaded before the Special Court time and again with “special urgency”.

The Detainees and the People of Sierra Leone

597. The Commission was effectively blocked by the Special Court from holding any public hearings or confidential interviews with the detainees. The decision to deny Chief Sam Hinga Norman and the other detainees their right to appear before the Commission represents an impairment of basic rights, not only to the detainees but also to the people of Sierra Leone. In practice, the decision of the President of the Special Court on appeal:
- a. rejected the right of the detainees to testify in an open and transparent manner before the Commission;
 - b. denied the detainees their freedom of expression and their right to appear publicly before the Commission; and
 - c. denied the right of the Sierra Leonean people to see the detainees participate in the truth and reconciliation process.

A Right to Know the Truth

598. The Commission finds that the established practice of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone has led to the recognition in national law of a *de facto* right to testify before the TRC.
599. In the light of developments in post-conflict societies in the late 20th and early 21st centuries relating to past human rights violations, there exists on the part of victims a right to know the truth. Truth Commissions have been established in several countries around the world to meet that recognised obligation. The Commission finds that there is considerable weight to the argument that establishing the “truth” is an essential component of the universally recognised “right to an effective remedy”.

⁴⁸ Provided for by Section 3 of the Truth and Reconciliation Act 2000.

⁴⁹ Provided for by Section 8(1)(c) of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000.

⁵⁰ Provided for by Section 7(3) of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000.

⁵¹ This stipulation arose from paragraphs 4(b), 4(c) and 7 of the “Practice Direction”, as amended on 4 October 2003. Any party to the proceedings would be entitled to apply to the Trial Judge for disclosure of the transcript of the taped interview or hearing.

Courts Do Not Reach the Wider Truth

600. Criminal prosecutions deliver justice on specifically framed charges by attempting to meet the burden of proof on each element of the charge. Courts are arenas for deciding whether the burden of proof has been met on the specific elements of the charge.
601. Accordingly, courts are limited in their ability to reach the broader truth. Indeed, where violations of human rights have become endemic, individual prosecutions of just a handful of alleged perpetrators are unlikely to reveal the full knowledge of the cruelty and extent of the violations.⁵² Truth Commissions, by contrast, are designed and set up specifically for that purpose.

Reaching the Truth and Addressing Impunity

602. Truth and Reconciliation Commissions represent one of the most viable means of securing a sustainable peace. Such commissions can strengthen the peace through the establishment of an impartial historical record of the conflict and the creation of a public understanding of the past that draws upon broad based participation.
603. It is only when the full truth (or as close to the full truth as possible) is placed squarely before the public that society can examine itself honestly and robustly. It is this cathartic exercise on the part of the nation that permits it to take genuine measures to prevent the repetition of the horrors of the past.

⁵² See the Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in the case of *Monseñor Oscar Arnulfo Romero and Galdamez v. El Salvador*, Report No. 37/00 of 13 April 2000.

CHAPTER THREE

Recommendations

TRC

Truth
hurts but
war
hurts more

Produced by the TRC Steering Committee with support
from the International Human Rights Law Group

CHAPTER THREE

Recommendations

I pray never to see again what I saw in my beloved Sierra Leone.

Extract from the poem “I Saw” by Mohamed Sekoya¹

Introduction

1. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000 (“the Act”) requires the Commission to make recommendations concerning the reforms and measures, whether legal, political, administrative or otherwise, needed to achieve the object of the Commission; namely, providing an impartial historical record, preventing the repetition of violations or abuses suffered, addressing impunity, responding to the needs of victims and promoting healing and reconciliation.²
2. The recommendations contained in this chapter are designed to facilitate the building of a new Sierra Leone based on the values of human dignity, tolerance and respect for the rights of all persons. In particular, the recommendations are intended to help create an open and vibrant democracy in which all are treated as equal before the law.
3. The Commission is of the view that the adoption of its recommendations will assist the people of Sierra Leone to rise above the bitter conflicts of the past, which caused unspeakable violations of human rights and left a legacy of dehumanisation, hatred and fear.
4. These legacies must be confronted on the basis that there is a need for tolerance, not for prejudice; a need for acknowledgment and accountability, not for recrimination; a need for reparation, not for retribution; a need for community, not for victimisation; a need for understanding, not for suspicion; and a need for reconstruction, not for greed.

Unique Legal Framework

5. The Act requires that Government shall faithfully and timeously implement the recommendations of the report that are directed to state bodies and encourage or facilitate the implementation of any recommendations that may be directed to others.³
6. The Act further requires that the Government shall, upon the publication of the report of the Commission, establish a committee or other body including representatives of the Moral Guarantors of the Lomé Peace Agreement (“the Follow-Up Committee”) to monitor and facilitate the implementation of the recommendations of the Commission.

¹ Poem submitted to the National Vision for Sierra Leone, a project of the TRC.

² Section 15(2) of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000.

³ Section 17 of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000.

7. Few enabling statutes of other truth and reconciliation commissions have contained a provision compelling the governing authority to implement the Commission's recommendations. Nor are we aware of any similar provision requiring the establishment of a monitoring committee to hold Government to account.
8. The Parliament of Sierra Leone enacted such provisions against the backdrop of a society devastated by bloody conflict and economic decay. The intention behind sections 17 and 18 of the Act must have been nothing less than the most serious endeavour to address the fundamental ills facing Sierra Leone. The effect of the law is to invite the closest scrutiny of the Government's response to the recommendations made by the Commission.
9. The categorical nature of the law is immensely significant. The only qualifications in the provision requiring the Government to implement the Commission's recommendations are contained in the words "faithfully and timeously implement." We interpret these words to mean that the Government is required to take all reasonable steps within its means to implement the recommendations; and that such steps should be taken promptly and without unreasonable delay.
10. Acting faithfully means acting seriously and acting with resolve. It means that the Government is obliged to do all that is within its power and resources to carry out the recommendations.
11. Determining what is "timeous" or a "reasonable period" will depend on all the prevailing circumstances. But it implies that the government must direct its immediate attention to implementation.
12. Assessing faithful and timeous performance will involve a careful and measured analysis of what was possible and realistic in the light of all relevant factors.

Approach of the Commission

13. In the light of the peremptory requirement imposed on the Government, the Commission has been mindful of its heavy responsibility to make recommendations that are indeed capable of being implemented. In so doing, the Commission has itself considered what it deems to be "possible and realistic". This means taking into account the resources and capacity available to the government. Accordingly, the Commission has refrained from overwhelming the Government with recommendations. This would be a meaningless exercise. It is not the role of the Commission to address every ill and shortcoming in society. The recommendations are confined to those that are aimed at preventing the repetition of the conflict, addressing impunity, responding to the needs of victims and the promoting of healing and reconciliation.

14. In making its recommendations the Commission has been reluctant to enter the arena of governmental discretion with regard to what government programmes should be initiated and how they should be implemented.⁴ The Government is already in possession of many reports filled with recommendations that urge it to resource its ministries and line functions; to pay its staff better; to build capacity and put in place various mechanisms; and to raise public awareness of various issues. Simply repeating such recommendations will not be helpful to the Government or Sierra Leone.
15. The Commission has rather opted to focus on recommendations that serve to establish and safeguard certain rights, principles and values, consistent with its mandate, which is focussed upon violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law. These rights and values are those that have not as yet been established in Sierra Leone or are under serious threat. The Commission views the implementation of its recommendations as the starting point to prevent the repetition of conflict.

FRAMEWORK FOR RECOMMENDATIONS AND THE ROLE OF THE FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE

16. In order to give practical effect to the approach outlined above, the Commission has divided its recommendations into three main categories, namely “Imperative”, “Work Towards” and “Seriously Consider”.

“Imperative” Recommendations

17. In certain instances, the Commission will state that a recommendation is imperative and ought to be implemented immediately or as soon as possible. In the view of the Commission such recommendations fall strictly within the peremptory obligation as stated in the Act. The Government is required to implement these recommendations “faithfully and timeously”.
18. These recommendations tend to be those that establish and uphold rights and values.
19. The Commission proposes that Parliament enact an “omnibus bill” to address those imperative recommendations that may be implemented by mere repeal of existing legislation or parts thereof. The Commission calls for such a law to be enacted without delay.
20. The Follow-Up Committee should *monitor closely and regularly* the implementation of “imperative” recommendations.

⁴ The main exception to this relates to the needs of victims, which requires the introduction of certain programmes.

“Work Towards” Recommendations

- 21. In other instances, the Commission recommends that the Government “work towards” the fulfilment of a recommendation. This category is titled the “Work Towards” category. In this category, the Government is expected to put in place the building blocks to make the ultimate fulfilment of the recommendation possible. No time stipulation is made although the Commission nonetheless expects recommendations in this category to be implemented within a reasonable time period.
- 22. These recommendations tend to be those that require in-depth planning and the marshalling of resources in order to ensure their fulfilment.
- 23. The Follow-up Committee is required to maintain *ongoing monitoring* of Government’s performance in respect of its implementation of these recommendations.

“Seriously Consider” Recommendations

- 24. Finally, the Commission makes recommendations for the serious consideration of Government. In the “Serious Consideration” category, while the Government is expected to thoroughly evaluate the recommendation, it is under no obligation to implement the recommendation.
- 25. Recommendations in this category are not necessarily any less important than those contained in the “Imperative” and “Work Towards” categories. The Commission does, however, recognise that the funds and skills base available to the Sierra Leone state are limited and that there will be recommendations that fall outside the two essential categories.
- 26. The Follow-Up Committee is required to provide *occasional* monitoring of the Government’s decision-making in respect of these recommendations.
- 27. The categories of recommendations are reflected in the following table:

Category	Implementation	Time	Follow-Up Committee
“Imperative”	Required	Immediate or as soon as possible	Frequent and close scrutiny
“Work towards”	Put in place building blocks	Less stringent, but still within a reasonable time	Ongoing monitoring
“Seriously Consider”	Seriously evaluate	None	Occasional monitoring

- 28. Unless specifically stated all recommendations are directed to the attention of the Government of Sierra Leone, along with its various organs and agencies.

“Calls on” Recommendations

29. The Commission makes several recommendations directed at bodies that do not fall within the ambit of Section 15 of the Act. These are institutions that do not form part of the Executive or Legislative arms of government or that are non-governmental bodies or members of the international community. In these circumstances, the Commission “calls on” the body in question to implement the recommendation.

Role of Civil Society in Monitoring

30. While the role of the Follow-up Committee with regard to the monitoring required in respect of each category of recommendations is specifically set out, the Commission urges civil society organisations and activists to apply equal vigour in monitoring the performance of government and its agencies in the implementation of the recommendations.

THE RECOMMENDATIONS

31. The Commission has prioritised the recommendations to address the underlying causes of the conflict. In addition, certain of its recommendations are directed at remedying particular wrongs committed against specific groups, such as women and children. The civil war created several vulnerable groups such as the war-wounded, amputees, the sexually abused and war widows. Specific recommendations are made in relation to these vulnerable groups. The Commission’s recommendations on reparations, which follow this chapter, put forward measures to redress violations suffered by these groups.

Findings and Recommendations

32. The Commission’s recommendations are based on the findings it reached. The central findings of the Commission and associated recommendations are highlighted hereunder.
33. The Commission, as its first primary finding, found that the conflict represented an extraordinary failure of leadership on the part of all those involved in government, public life and civil society. No enlightened and visionary leaders emerged to steer the country away from the slide into chaos and bloody civil war. For this reason the Commission highlights its recommendations under the Governance section. In particular, the Commission calls upon leaders at all levels of Sierra Leone society to commit themselves to the principles of leadership contained under the sub-heading “Committed Leadership”.
34. The Commission found that the central cause of the war was endemic greed, corruption and nepotism that deprived the nation of its dignity and reduced most people into a state of poverty. The recommendations under the headings “Promoting Good Governance” and “Combating Corruption” are accordingly highlighted. The Commission calls on all of those involved in the public sector to usher in a new culture of ethics and service and to fight the scourge of corruption which saps the life-force of Sierra Leone.⁵

⁵ See the section entitled “A Culture of Ethics and Service” under the heading “Promoting Good Governance” later in this chapter.

35. The Commission identified a need for individual and national restoration of dignity and the establishment of a new rights culture in Sierra Leone; a rights culture in which all Sierra Leoneans respect each other's human rights, without exception. Under the heading "Protection of Human Rights", the Commission recommends the enshrining of the right to human dignity in the Constitution and the upholding of the right to human life.⁶
36. The Commission found that a factor that contributed to causing the conflict was the suppression of political expression and dissent. The Commission in its recommendations emphasises that freedom of expression is the lifeblood of a democracy. A culture of public debate and tolerance of dissenting ideas is the sign of a vibrant and healthy democracy.⁷
37. The Commission calls for a new and equitable citizenship in Sierra Leone. A common or equitable citizenship is likely to promote a new patriotism and devotion to Sierra Leone. This new citizenship demands a new culture of mutual respect, understanding and tolerance by Sierra Leoneans for all Sierra Leoneans and other peoples.⁸
38. The Commission proposes that Sierra Leone should consider the creation of a new Constitution, which should be the product of a wide and thorough consultative and participatory programme. Such a constitution must lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which every citizen is equally protected by the law. It must free the potential of every Sierra Leonean. A Sierra Leone that is united around clear constitutional rights, values and principles has a promising future.⁹
39. The Commission found that, prior to the start of the conflict, government accountability was non-existent. It concluded that democracy and the rule of law were dead. The Commission accordingly makes recommendations to strengthen democracy and institutions of accountability. In particular, the Commission highlights its recommendations in respect of the independence of the judiciary,¹⁰ the role of parliament¹¹ and the holding of free and fair elections.¹²
40. The Commission found that successive political regimes abused their authority over the security forces and unleashed them against their political opponents in the name of national security. Soldiers and police officers were reduced to playing roles as agents of destabilisation. The Commission accordingly highlights its recommendations that new principles of National Security, which reflect the will of Sierra Leoneans to live in peace and harmony, be enshrined in the Constitution.¹³

⁶ See "Human Dignity" and "Human Life" under the heading "Protection of Human Rights".

⁷ See "Freedom of Expression" under the heading "Protection of Human Rights".

⁸ See "Citizenship" under the heading "Protection of Human Rights".

⁹ See "The Constitution" under the heading "Protection of Human Rights".

¹⁰ See "Independence of the Judiciary" under the heading "Establishing the Rule of Law".

¹¹ See "Role of Parliament" under the heading "Promoting Good Governance".

¹² See "Free and Fair Elections" under the heading "Promoting Good Governance".

¹³ See "Principles of National Security" under the heading "The Security Services".

41. The Commission found that prior to the conflict the Provinces had become totally excluded by the centralisation of political and economic power in Freetown. Local government was in demise across the country. The Commission emphasises its recommendations to bring government and service delivery to people throughout Sierra Leone. The Government must be seen to be establishing infrastructure and delivering health, education, justice and security services in all Provinces.¹⁴
42. The Commission found that the political elite in successive regimes excluded society-at-large from meaningful participation in decision-making, in particular youths and women. The Commission highlights its recommendations to increase the level of representation for youths and women in representative politics, in cabinet and government.¹⁵

Organisation of Recommendations

43. The chapter is organised under the following headings and sub-headings:
- **THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS**
Human Dignity, Human Life, Arbitrary Detention, Emergency Powers, Freedom of Expression, Citizenship, Corporal Punishment, Promoting a Human Rights Culture, Human Rights Commission, The Role of the Judiciary in Protecting and Advancing Human Rights, Customary Law and Human Rights, International Human Rights Obligations, the Constitution
 - **ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW**
Independence of the Judiciary, Judicial Autonomy, Judicial Appointments, Tenure of Office, Keeping Judges Accountable, Prosecuting Authority, Local Courts, Access to the Courts, Legal Activism and the Sierra Leone Bar Association, Legal Resources Centre, Simplification of Rules and Procedures, Approaching the Courts, Justice Delayed, Law Reform Commission, Court Infrastructure and Equipment
 - **THE SECURITY SERVICES**
Principles of National Security, Sierra Leone Army, Operational Support Division, Conditions of Service
 - **PROMOTING GOOD GOVERNANCE**
Committed Leadership, A Culture of Ethics and Service, Freedom of Information, Free and Fair Elections, Role of Parliament, Just Administrative Action, Bringing Government and Service Delivery to the People, Chieftaincy, Lustration¹⁶

¹⁴ See “Bringing Government and Service Delivery to the People” under the heading “Promoting Good Governance”.

¹⁵ See “Political Representation” under the heading “Youth”; and “Political Participation and Access to Power” under the heading “Women”.

¹⁶ “Lustration” means the disbarment of officials of a previous regime from public office on the basis of violations and abuses of human rights committed by them.

- **FIGHTING CORRUPTION**
Disclosure of Assets, Independent Corruption Prosecutions, United Front against Corruption, Civil Society, Business, Government, Donor Community
- **YOUTH**
National Mobilisation, National Youth Commission, Political Representation
- **WOMEN**
Women Affected by the Armed Conflict, Domestic Violence, Sexual Violence, Sexual Offences under Customary Law, Police, Prosecutors and Judicial Officers, Discrimination against Women, Minimum Age of Marriage of Girls, Skills Training and Economic Empowerment, War Widows, Education, Access to Justice, HIV/ AIDS, Gender Commission, Political Participation and Access to Power, Developing Leadership, Achieving Equality, The Most Vulnerable
- **CHILDREN**
Child Rights Bill, School Education, Age of Majority, Adoptions, Fostering and Guardianship, Early Marriages, Sexual Offences against Children, Laws on the Employment of Children
- **EXTERNAL ACTORS**
Promotion of Regional Integration and Unity, Preventing War in the Mano River Basin, Peace Agreements, Military Intervention and Peacekeeping, Mercenaries, Tracing the Assets of Charles Taylor and the NPFL, Tracing RUF Assets in Other Countries, Relationship with the United Kingdom, The Withdrawal of UNAMSIL from Sierra Leone, Post-Conflict Aid
- **MINERAL RESOURCES**
Accounting for the Spending of Diamond Proceeds, Preventing the Smuggling of Diamonds, The Kimberly Process, Corruption in the Diamond Industry, Child Labour, Labour Conditions, Community Empowerment
- **THE TRC AND THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE**
Future Post-Conflict Arrangements, Staffing of Future Post-Conflict Bodies, Building the National Justice System, Amnesties
- **REPARATIONS**
Health, Pensions, Education, Skills Training and Micro-Credit/ Micro-Projects, Community Reparations, Symbolic Reparations, Implementation
- **RECONCILIATION**
Guiding Principles, Reconciliation Activities
- **NATIONAL VISION FOR SIERRA LEONE**
The Vision Going Forward, Guiding Principles
- **ARCHIVING OF COMMISSION DOCUMENTATION**
Confidential and Restricted Information, Regulating Access

- **DISSEMINATION OF THE TRC REPORT**
Widest Possible Dissemination, Education, Popular Versions and the Internet
 - **FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE**
Human Rights Commission and Civil Society, Reporting
44. For ease of reference the chapter ends with “Recommendations Tables” in which every recommendation made by the Commission is reflected in columns representing the different categories of recommendations.

THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS

*In the new years to come
We would strive to live side-by-side in our rebirth
Jumping in the glowing sun, seeing the seas from the hill tops from behind the palm trees
Saying “Kunafa burma” – Never again.*

Extract from the poem “On my Rebirth” by Paul James Allen¹⁷

45. Under this heading, the Commission seeks to promote the creation of a human rights culture in Sierra Leone. A rights culture is one in which there is knowledge and recognition of the basic rights to which all human beings are entitled. A rights culture demands that we respect each other’s human rights, without exception.

Human Dignity

46. Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected.
47. The conflict constituted a denial of humanity to all Sierra Leoneans. Thousands upon thousands of victims were subjected to inhuman brutality. Humans were treated as non-humans. Human life was disrespected. Sierra Leone must reject this violent and cruel past.
48. The Commission identifies a need for individual and national restoration of dignity. This requires individual and collective action. Each and every Sierra Leonean bears responsibility for this. There can be no lapses in the responsibility of respecting and upholding the fundamental human rights of all in Sierra Leone. This responsibility endures forever.
49. A failure to respect the rights of others stems ultimately from a failure to respect oneself. Self-respect or self-dignity is not possible when one undermines or destroys the dignity of others. Those who maintain their dignity, notwithstanding conditions of extreme poverty and deprivation, set examples for us all. We need look no further than the ghettos of Freetown or the villages of the Provinces for such examples.

¹⁷ Poem submitted to the National Vision for Sierra Leone, a project of the TRC.

50. Human life without dignity is substantially impaired. Respect for human dignity means not treating fellow human beings in a demeaning way. It means not subjecting any human to cruel, degrading or inhumane treatment. Respecting human dignity ultimately means respecting the life of each and every human being.
51. Every person has the right to live as a human being and to experience life as part of a community and the nation. The new Sierra Leone must recognise and cherish the individual value of all persons, regardless of their differences. It is up to all Sierra Leoneans to give meaningful content to the right to human dignity.
52. The Commission recommends, as its first imperative recommendation, that the right to human dignity be enshrined as a fundamental right in the Constitution of Sierra Leone 1991 ("the Constitution").¹⁸

Human Life

53. Respect for human dignity and human rights must begin with respect for human life. Everyone has the right to life. A society that accords the highest respect for human life is unlikely to turn on itself.
54. The Commission recommends the abolition of the death penalty and the immediate repeal by Parliament of all laws authorising the use of capital punishment.
55. The Commission recommends that section 16(1) of the Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1991 (the Constitution) be amended to incorporate the principle that the right to life is inviolable. The new section 16(1) should enshrine the right that every human being shall be entitled to respect for his or her life and the integrity of his or her person. It should state that no person shall be punishable by death.
56. The recommendation is imperative and should be implemented without any delay.¹⁹ The Commission further recommends the introduction of a moratorium on all judicially sanctioned executions pending the Constitutional amendment.²⁰ Any pending death sentences should be immediately commuted by the President.

¹⁸ Human dignity is referred to in sections 8 (Social Objectives) and 13 (Duties of the Citizen) of Chapter II of the Constitution. Section 8(2)(b) enjoins the State to treat citizens with dignity. However, as per section 14 of the Constitution, none of the principles contained in Chapter II confer any legal rights nor are they enforceable by the courts.

¹⁹ The abolition of the death penalty also warrants an amendment to section 17 of the Constitution.

²⁰ This is in line with the African Commission on Human Rights and Peoples' Rights resolution on the death penalty adopted at the 26th Ordinary Session in November in Kigali, Rwanda.

57. This recommendation is made in the context of Sierra Leone's recent history. The conflict period resulted in the demeaning of human life and dignity. The state must now set the example by demonstrating that it places the highest value on all human life. The abolition of the death penalty will mark an important and symbolic departure from the past to the future.²¹
58. Respect for human life and dignity does not only mean a prohibition on the taking of the lives of others. It also means protecting all persons from violence and harm, whether this be on the streets or in the home. A duty rests on the State to provide adequate security to all Sierra Leoneans.

Arbitrary Detention

59. The deprivation of liberty is a serious infringement of human rights. It is, however, legitimate when sanctioned by rules and laws which accord with principles of fairness and due process. Arbitrary arrest and detention without trial cannot be tolerated in a just and democratic society.
60. There are several persons detained under "safe custody detention" in clear violation of international law. No provision in Sierra Leonean law provides for such detention. In these circumstances the rule by law has been replaced by the rule of decree.
61. Several of the detainees have been held in detention without charge or trial since 2000. The detention of such persons constitutes a gross and unjustifiable violation of their human rights. The Commission recommends the immediate release of all persons held in "safe custody detention". The Commission further recommends that such detention never be resorted to again.
62. It is not possible to engage in a serious discourse on human rights and the rule of law in Sierra Leone, while such violations of human rights persist.
63. These recommendations are imperative.

Emergency Powers

64. The imposition of emergency powers inevitably results in the denial of human rights. Emergency provisions have been used to silence political opponents who posed challenges to different regimes. The resort to emergency powers to deal with political opposition is a sign of failure on the part of the government to govern effectively.

²¹ There is a clear trend worldwide and across Africa towards the abolition of the death penalty. Worldwide an average of three countries a year abolishes capital punishment. 123 countries have abolished capital punishment, while only 71 retain it. About half of the countries in Africa no longer execute convicted prisoners. Between 1994 and 2004, the number of countries in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and Mauritania that have legally abolished the death penalty or have not carried out executions has risen from one to ten. Only Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone have carried out executions in the last decade. (Source: Amnesty International, Index: AFR 01/010/2004, 10 May 2004).

65. Emergency powers should be used only as a last resort to deal with a genuine state of emergency in which the life of the nation is actually threatened by war, insurrection, natural disaster or other public emergency; and emergency powers are required to restore peace and order.
66. The current Constitution of Sierra Leone devotes more space to taking away the rights of citizens than to ensuring their respect. Section 29, which provides for public emergencies, is the best example of this.
67. The United Nations Human Rights Committee has attempted to prepare guidelines for the use of states of emergencies. The Committee declares that even in a state of emergency:
- “All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person. Furthermore, during a state of emergency, judicial remedies must be available so that citizens can contest the legality of special measures, including detention.”²²
68. The Commission recommends that all emergency measures must be subject to judicial review by the Courts of Sierra Leone. Any superior court of record should be able to decide on the validity of a declaration of a state of emergency and any extension of a declaration of a state of emergency. No clause should be permitted to stand, which prevents the courts from reviewing any measure taken in terms of a public emergency. No law made under a public emergency should permit the indemnifying of the state or any person, in respect of any unlawful act. These recommendations require the partial repeal of sections 29(4) and (6) of the Constitution.
69. A state of emergency must be effective only prospectively. Parliament should be permitted to extend a declaration of a state of emergency for no more than three months at a time. This will require an amendment to section 29(13) of the Constitution.
70. The President is given wide powers under sections 29(5) and (6) to make regulations and take measures during a period of public emergency that may have the effect of suspending all fundamental human rights. Clauses authorising such powers should be removed from the Constitution.
71. Laws or regulations made in terms of a public emergency should be consistent with Sierra Leone’s obligations under international law that apply to states of emergency. This requirement should be enshrined in section 29 of the Constitution.

²² See General Comment No. 29, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/Rev.6.

72. Laws and regulations made under a public emergency should deviate from the protection of fundamental human rights and freedoms²³ only to the extent that the deviation is strictly required by the emergency. The Commission makes specific recommendations as to which rights should not be derogated or deviated from in the table below. Column 4 of the table below sets out those portions of the rights that the Commission recommends should not be derogated from. Such rights are sometimes referred to as “non-derogable” rights. These recommendations require the amendment of sections 29(5) and 29 (6) of the Constitution.

Section Number	Right, or Obligation of the State	Section Title	Extent to which the right is protected in a public emergency
	Human Dignity		Entirely
16	Life	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protection of right to life 	Entirely
17, 18, 20 and 23	Freedom and Security of the Person	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protection from arbitrary arrest or detention • Protection of freedom of movement • Protection from inhuman treatment • Provision to secure protection of the law 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not to be tortured in any way; and • Not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way. • Everyone arrested has the right... <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ To remain silent; and ○ To be informed promptly... <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ of the right to remain silent; and ▪ of the consequences of not remaining silent; ○ Not to be compelled to make any confession or admission that could be used in evidence against him or herself; • Everyone who is detained has the right <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ To challenge the lawfulness of the detention before a court and, if the detention is unlawful, to be released; • Every accused person has a right to a fair trial.

²³ Fundamental human rights and freedoms are set out in Chapter III of the 1991 Constitution.

Section Number	Right, or Obligation of the State	Section Title	Extent to which the right is protected in a public emergency
	Protection of Children		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not to be used directly in armed conflict, and to be protected in times of armed conflict. • To be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation; • To be protected from exploitative labour practices; • Not to be detained except as a measure of last resort, the child may be detained only for the shortest appropriate period of time, and has the right to be <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ○ Kept separately from detained persons over the age of 18 years; and ○ Treated in a manner, and kept in conditions, that takes account of the child's age.
19	Slavery, servitude and forced labour	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protection from slavery and forced labour 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • With respect to slavery and servitude
27	Equality	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Protection from discrimination 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • With respect to unfair discrimination on the grounds of race, ethnic or social origin, sex, religion or language.

73. In addition to the protection afforded to persons detained under a public emergency in terms of section 17 of the Constitution, the Commission makes the following recommendations for the further protection of detainees:

- A notice must be published in the Government Gazette shortly after the detention (but at least within five days of the detention), stating the detainee's name and place of detention and referring to the emergency measure in terms of which the person was detained.

- The detainee must be allowed to choose and be visited at any reasonable time by a medical practitioner and a legal representative.
- The Tribunal referred to in section 17 of the Constitution must review the detention as soon as reasonably possible, but no later than 10 days after the detention, and must be empowered to release the detainee, unless it is necessary to continue the detention to restore peace and order.
- A detainee not released by the Tribunal should be able to apply to a court for a further review of the detention at any time after 10 days have passed since the previous review, and the court must release the detainee, unless it finds that it is still necessary to continue the detention to restore peace and order.
- The detainee must be allowed to appear in person before any court considering the detention, to be represented by a legal practitioner at those hearings, and to make representations against continued detention.
- The state must present written reasons to the court to justify the continued detention of the detainee, and must give a copy of those reasons to the detainee at least two days before the court reviews the detention.
- If a court releases a detainee, that person may not be detained again on the same grounds unless the state first shows to a court good cause for re-detaining that person.

74. These recommendations are imperative.

Freedom of Expression

75. Freedom of expression is the lifeblood of a democracy. A culture of public debate and tolerance for dissenting ideas is the sign of a vibrant and healthy democracy. Restrictions on the freedom of expression represent a fearful State; it reflects a State that has no confidence in its ability to promote and disseminate its doctrines in the marketplace of ideas.
76. A free press ranks alongside an independent judiciary as one of the most important counter forces to the excesses of both the public and private sectors. The media should be free of political patronage. The degree to which the media is independent is the degree to which it can perform an effective public watchdog function on the conduct of public officials and powerful individuals in society. Laws establishing "freedom of expression" require support and enforcement from the courts. Without an independent judiciary, press freedom cannot be maintained.
77. The use of sedition and defamation proceedings under the criminal law does not bode well for freedom of expression in Sierra Leone. These provisions are the leftovers of a long gone colonial era. In many countries, laws on sedition and criminal libel have been either formally or effectively abandoned.²⁴ The only circumstances in which criminal sanctions on free speech can be justified is where an intention to incite violence or lawless conduct has been demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt and where there is a real risk that violence will ensue.

²⁴ For example, in 2001, Ghana's parliament unanimously repealed the country's criminal libel and sedition laws, including clauses governing sedition and defamation of the members of the government, officials and their associates.

78. The Commission recommends that criminal sanctions in the sphere of expression should be avoided.²⁵ The civil law, which permits the issue of injunctions restraining the publication of defamatory material and actions for damages arising from defamatory publication, is sufficient to protect individuals from unfounded allegations.
79. The Commission recommends that the laws creating the offences of seditious and criminal libel should be repealed. Conduct aimed at inciting violence or lawless conduct is dealt with elsewhere in the criminal laws of Sierra Leone. Until the laws are repealed, the Commission recommends a moratorium on all existing or pending prosecutions for sedition and criminal libel. These recommendations are imperative.
80. The Commission calls on the members of the media in Sierra Leone to carry out thorough investigations before publishing stories. Newspapers should be offering informed comment on matters of national and international concern. Some newspapers are in danger of becoming little more than scandal sheets, relying on provocative and, at times, dishonest headlines to promote sales. Reports that are inaccurate or even untrue seriously undermine the cause of freedom of expression. Journalists who take bribes and allow their newspapers to be used for party political ends or for the settling of personal scores abuse the freedom of the press. Such journalists are not fit to be members of the independent press.
81. The Commission calls on the Sierra Leone Association of Journalists and the Media Commission to be more proactive in monitoring standards of journalism practiced in Sierra Leone and to establish mechanisms for effective self-regulation. These organisations can do much to advance a culture of human rights in Sierra Leone.

Citizenship

²⁵ In a “friend of the court” brief submitted on 6 May 2004, the Open Society Justice Initiative urged the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to seize an historic opportunity to advance freedom of expression by outlawing criminal defamation. The brief notes a growing consensus worldwide that criminal defamation statutes hinder free expression. “A society cannot be free if its citizens must avoid criticism of public officials out of fear of criminal prosecution,” the brief argues. The case involved two Costa Rican publishers who had been found guilty of criminal defamation. The Inter-American Commission has already found that Costa Rican law violates the American Convention on Human Rights by criminalising publications on matters of public interest, such as the conduct of public officials.

82. The Sierra Leone Citizenship Act of 1973 discriminates in favour of persons who are of “Negro African descent” and whose father or grandfather (as opposed to mother or grandmother) was born in Sierra Leone. Thus a person born in Sierra Leone (after 19 April 1971) who is not a person of Negro African descent and whose father or grandfather was not born in Sierra Leone is not entitled to Sierra Leonean citizenship by birth.²⁶ The provisions are both racist and sexist.
83. According to Part II of the Sierra Leone Citizenship Act, only persons who are of “Negro African descent” may apply for Sierra Leonean citizenship. This law is racist.
84. The mixture of various groups with different skills can be the engine room of a vibrant democratic society. It is desirable that Sierra Leone evolves into a more pluralist society, welcoming persons of all ethnic origins. Racist legislation is a perpetuation of the philosophy that justified the slave trade and colonialism, and should be unthinkable in an African democracy that has emerged from the continent’s oppressive past.
85. Citizenship should be acquired by birth, descent or naturalisation. Race and gender must not be a consideration in the acquisition of citizenship. The Sierra Leone Citizenship Act should be amended accordingly. This is an imperative recommendation.
86. All citizens should be equally entitled to the rights, privileges and benefits of citizenship. They should be equally subject to the duties and responsibilities of citizenship. These principles should be enshrined in the Constitution of Sierra Leone. This is an imperative recommendation.
87. The Commission is of the view that the changes effected under these recommendations will mark the beginnings of a new culture of citizenship in Sierra Leone. A common or equitable citizenship is likely to promote a new patriotism and devotion to Sierra Leone. This new citizenship demands a new culture of mutual respect, understanding and tolerance by Sierra Leoneans for all Sierra Leoneans and other peoples.

Corporal Punishment

88. Every person has the right not to be treated or punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way. In particular every child has the right to be protected from maltreatment, neglect, abuse or degradation.
89. Children suffered gross physical abuse at the hands of adults in the Sierra Leonean conflict. Children are still subject to institutional physical abuse through the use of corporal punishment at schools and in homes. The government school system that arose in the days of colonial rule adopted nineteenth-century British traditions of school discipline, including that of beating children.

²⁶ Part II of the Sierra Leone Citizenship Act, 1973

90. Corporal punishment is inflicted with the intention of causing physical pain and humiliation. The use of beatings for purposes of correcting behaviour in schools legitimises violence as a means to control behaviour more generally. This message goes out to both children and adults. The message says that hurting others is acceptable behaviour. The consequence of corporal punishment is to encourage physical aggression throughout society.
91. Many children are left with physical and psychological scars as a result of corporal punishment. For some children, physical scars and disabilities remain a life-long reminder of the educational system's brutality. Children are entitled to receive education in an environment of freedom and dignity, free from fear.
92. Children are the future of Sierra Leone. There is no justification for permitting another generation of children to be subjected to brutality, whether this is in the name of education or ideology. The Commission recommends the outlawing of corporal punishment against children, whether this be in schools or the home. This is an imperative recommendation.
93. The criminal law of Sierra Leone should be amended so as to declare that it shall not be a defence to a charge of assault to say force was used against a child for the purposes of discipline. This is an imperative recommendation.

Promoting a Human Rights Culture

94. Several submissions made to the Commission urged it to recommend that human rights and peace studies should be introduced into the curriculum at schools. The Commission agrees. The teaching of tolerance and understanding should start as early as possible in the education of children.
95. Sierra Leone, known in recent times for its unspeakable atrocities and untold suffering, can become known for its compassion and respect for human rights. It should become a centre of dialogue on tolerance and the preservation of peace.
96. The Commission recommends the development of a compulsory programme of human rights education into schools at the primary, secondary and higher levels of education. Human rights education should become part of the formal curriculum and be examinable. Appropriate human rights and peace programmes should be compulsory for the training of recruits into the army, police and judicial service. The Government should work towards the fulfilment of these recommendations.
97. Public education about the law is one of the most effective means of creating a culture of rights. Street Law is a programme involving law students in the participatory teaching of law to the general public at the community level.²⁷ Law students are taught communication skills they will need to teach others, including the running of mock trials.²⁸ Another objective is to provide public education about the law to as wide an audience as possible - including school children and prisoners. Easy to use textbooks can be published on subjects

²⁷ It was developed in the United States and has been popularised by Street Law, Inc., based in Washington D.C.

²⁸ One principal idea behind Street Law is to teach law students some of the practical aspects of the law, not just the theory.

where there is the most pressing need for legal literacy.²⁹ The Commission calls upon the international community to support the introduction of Street Law into Sierra Leone.³⁰

²⁹ Texts published in different countries cover constitutional rights, the court system, criminal procedure, consumer law, family law, labour law, conflict resolution and participation in public life.

³⁰ The Commission notes that the Fourah Bay College Human Rights Clinic conducts classes on human rights issues in secondary schools.

Human Rights Commission

98. A Human Rights Commission (HRC) can serve as both a watchdog and a visible route through which people can access their rights. Such a commission can help create a national culture of human rights through its advocacy, research and legal functions. Above all it must monitor and assess the observance of human rights throughout the country. Individuals who claim that their human rights have been violated should be able to submit complaints for investigation.
99. A Human Rights Commission must have the power to take steps to secure appropriate redress where human rights have been violated.³¹ It should have the authority to require relevant organs of state to provide the Commission with information on the measures that they have taken towards the realisation of rights.³² The powers and mandate of the HRC should accord with guidelines set out in the Paris Principles.³³
100. While the HRC should be accountable to Parliament and not to the executive arm of government it can provide advice and support to government on human rights matters. Currently no institution has the expertise and mandate to advise the three branches of the State on how to effectively meet international obligations by incorporating human rights concepts into laws, policies and day-to-day activities. A Human Rights Commission can monitor legislation before Parliament. It can monitor how the government enforces constitutionally guaranteed political, civil, social, economic and cultural rights.
101. The Lomé Peace Accord required the establishment of an "autonomous quasi-judicial National Human Rights Commission"³⁴ within 90 days after the signing of the Accord. Such a Commission is still not in place.

³¹ This requires that the body be in a position to subpoena witnesses and conduct interviews.

³² Many Human Rights Commissions, apart from monitoring the upholding of fundamental human rights, also monitor the provision of housing, health care, food, water, social security, education and the protection of the environment.

³³ In 1992, the U.N. Commission on Human Rights endorsed a set of internationally recognized principles concerning the status, powers and functioning of national human rights institutions. The U.N. Principles relating to the Status of National Institutions, known as the Paris Principles, which were subsequently endorsed by the U.N. General Assembly in 1993, set out the basic guidelines recommended by the U.N. in the establishment of a national human rights institution. The U.N. defines a national human rights institution as a government body established under the constitution or by law, whose functions are specifically designed to promote and protect human rights. The Paris Principles stress, as fundamental features designed to contribute to independence, the need for: a founding constitutional or legislative statute; as broad a mandate as possible; an independent appointments procedure, with terms of office specified by law; a pluralistic and representative composition; independence from the executive branch; and adequate funding. Such institutions should be able to take up any human rights matter at their own initiative, at the suggestion of government, and at the request of "any petitioner."

³⁴ Article XXV.

102. The Commissioners should be selected on the basis of institutional representation. Government, after consultation with civil society and other stakeholders, should determine the institutions that should nominate commissioners. Members of the institutions should then choose their respective institutional representatives. The chosen commissioners should appoint one of their number as the chairperson of the Commission. The institutions should ensure that the selected Commissioners are the product of a transparent nomination process based on the will of the majority of their members.

103. These recommendations are imperative.

The Role of the Judiciary in Protecting and Advancing Human Rights

104. The Commission calls on the judiciary not to permit laws or practices to stand which are contrary to justice or which undermine the rights to liberty, equality and justice. Clauses that oust the jurisdiction of the courts in matters pertaining to fundamental human rights should be declared illegal.

105. When interpreting any legislation and when developing the common law or customary law the judiciary should promote the spirit and purpose of Chapter III of the Constitution, the Recognition and Protection of Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms of the Individual. The Commission calls on the judiciary to uphold the values that underlie an open and democratic society. These values include human dignity, equality and freedom.

106. While the Supreme Court should remain the final arbiter of all constitutional matters, serious consideration should be given to extending constitutional jurisdiction³⁵ to the other courts making up the Judicature, namely the High Courts of Justice and the Court of Appeal. This will contribute to the development of a more vibrant constitutional jurisprudence in Sierra Leone. This will require an amendment to section 124 of the Constitution.

Customary Law and Human Rights

107. While the institution, status and role of traditional rules and custom should be respected they must be subject to the Constitution. Some elements of customary law and Islamic Law contradict basic human rights.³⁶ A girl is considered to be marriageable, for example, once her breasts have developed, her menses have started, and she has been initiated. This could mean that a girl as young as 12 is put up for marriage.³⁷ The consent of the bride to marriage is not required. Only the consent of the bride's family is needed.³⁸

³⁵ As set out in section 124(1) a. and b. of the Constitution. These powers are the enforcement or interpretation of any provision of the Constitution and where any question arises as to whether an enactment was made in excess of legal power.

³⁶ For the purposes of this chapter all references to "customary law" include Islamic Law.

³⁷ See Dr. Joko Smart, "Sierra Leone Customary Family Law", at page 152.

³⁸ See Dr. Joko Smart, "Sierra Leone Customary Family Law", at page 152.

108. To the extent that customary law is inconsistent with Chapter III of the Constitution, courts should be empowered to declare it unconstitutional. This recommendation requires the repeal of sections 27(4)(d) and (e) of the Constitution which exempts certain areas of the law such as adoption, marriage and divorce from protection against discrimination. This is an imperative recommendation.
109. A serious problem is the inconsistency in local court decisions dealing with customary law. This has led to a great deal of uncertainty as to what customary law says. This problem is not unrelated to the fact that customary law remains un-codified in Sierra Leone. The Commission recommends that customary law be codified. Codifying customary law is a massive task as customs vary from tribe to tribe and district to district. Nonetheless, the Commission recommends that Government work towards the fulfilment of this important objective.
110. When codifying customary law, the Commission recommends that the drafters pay particular attention to those aspects of customary law that offend basic human rights. Such laws should not become part of an enforceable code of customary law. However, the reform of customary law should be undertaken creatively and democratically. The process of reform should commence with the people it will affect, such as women and peasant farmers at chiefdom level. They should be consulted on how they would like to see customary law changed.
111. The Commission recommends that the government, through the Law Commission, begins a national dialogue on the codification of customary law with special emphasis on the rights of women and children. The ultimate aim must be to bring customary and Islamic law in line with the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women.

International Human Rights Obligations

112. Sierra Leone is a party to the seven major international human rights treaties within the United Nations system.³⁹
113. The principal enforcement mechanism in each of the seven main conventions is an obligation upon States to submit periodic reports on their compliance. Although it is not alone, Sierra Leone would appear to be among the worst in its consistent failure to submit these periodic reports.
114. It appears that Sierra Leone produced its last report under the International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination in 1973. The Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in its most recent annual report lamented Sierra Leone's apparent indifference to its international obligation in this respect.⁴⁰ Sierra Leone's initial report to the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women was due on 11 November 1989

³⁹ The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention for the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment and the International Convention on the Protection of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.

⁴⁰ UN Doc. CERD/C/58/Misc.27.

and has not yet been produced.⁴¹ Its initial report to the Human Rights Committee was due on 22 November 1997, and has not yet been produced.⁴² Its initial report to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights was also due on 22 November 1997, but is overdue.⁴³ Sierra Leone submitted an initial report to the Committee on the Rights of the Child, in June 1996,⁴⁴ which was discussed by the Committee in 2000. A subsequent report was due on 1 September 1997, and has not yet been produced. Its initial report to the Committee Against Torture was due on 24 May 2002, and has not been produced.⁴⁵ In all, Sierra Leone has a total of 24 (twenty-four) reports that are due according to the treaties and that it has not submitted.

115. An alarming gap in Sierra Leone's participation in international human rights treaties is its failure to ratify the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, which was adopted by the United Nations in 1948. Sierra Leone has also failed to cooperate with United Nations human rights officials, such as the Special Rapporteur on Extra-judicial, Summary and Arbitrary Executions, which is a special procedure of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights.⁴⁶
116. While it is commendable that Sierra Leone has undertaken the obligations by ratifying or acceding to all seven of the principal United Nations human rights treaties, and several of the other international human rights instruments, this would seem to be little more than a mere formality, if we are to judge by its failure to submit reports.
117. The Commission recommends that the Government of Sierra Leone take these obligations more seriously. It should not be difficult to obtain technical assistance for the preparation of the overdue reports, either from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights or from international human rights NGOs. The Commission also recommends that Sierra Leone promptly ratify or accede to the international human rights treaties that it has not yet accepted.⁴⁷
118. Finally, Sierra Leone should put in place procedures and mechanisms within the relevant government ministries to ensure that any petitions directed against it to the Human Rights Commission, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, and similar bodies, are answered promptly and faithfully, and that requests for information from the Special Rapporteurs of the United Nations and the African Commission are treated seriously and with respect.
119. These are imperative recommendations.

⁴¹ UN Doc. A/56/38, at page 140.

⁴² UN Doc. A/57/40, at page 159.

⁴³ UN Doc. E/2003/22, at page 108.

⁴⁴ UN Doc. CRC/C/3/Add.43.

⁴⁵ UN Doc. A/57/44, at page 93.

⁴⁶ UN Doc. E/CN.4/2001/9, paragraphs 16 and 21.

⁴⁷ The Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, aimed at the abolition of the death penalty, the Optional Protocol to CEDAW, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC-OP-AC) on the involvement of children in armed conflict, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC-OP-SC) on the sale of children, child prostitution and child pornography, the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, the Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR) on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights, the Protocol to the ACHPR on the Rights of Women in Africa, and the Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

The Constitution

120. A constitution ought to be the foundation and basis of the society desired by the people. It should reflect their common aspirations and minimum safeguards. The 1991 Constitution that is currently in force was not the product of a wide participatory process.
121. The lack of participation by society is reflected in the 1991 Constitution. Chapter III of the Constitution is extremely elaborate and detailed, undermining clarity and the force of the text. There are numerous "claw-back clauses", by which a right is announced in one provision, but curtailed in the next. A bill of rights should be comprehensible and framed in straightforward terms. A bill of rights should provide an enumeration of the basic principles on which society is based, accessible to the citizen, instead of losing itself in details and exceptions. Some fundamental rights to which Sierra Leone is bound by international law do not figure at all, such as the right to education, which is recognised in articles 13 and 14 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
122. It would be desirable to reformulate the fundamental rights provisions of the Constitution, not only by shortening them and making them simple and accessible, but also by ensuring their compatibility with Sierra Leone's international obligations. The Constitution should declare that the country's international obligations with regard to the protection of human rights are incorporated in the Constitution and subject to direct application by the courts.
123. The Commission is of the considered view that it is an appropriate time for Sierra Leone to formulate a new Constitution. The Commission accordingly recommends that Parliament seriously consider the creation of a new constitution for Sierra Leone.
124. A constitution that is the product of a thorough consultative and participatory programme will provide a historic bridge between the divided and violent past and a future based on peace, unity, social justice and economic development. Such a constitution must lay the foundations for a democratic and open society in which every citizen is equally protected by the law. It must free the potential of every Sierra Leonean.
125. The Constitution is the most important document in Sierra Leone. It must do more than set out the rights of individuals and the powers of the State. It should be the collection of ideas and aspirations that holds the country together. A Sierra Leone that is united around clear constitutional rights, values and principles has a promising future. These rights, values and principles will provide the signposts to guide Sierra Leone's people through a future that is filled with many obstacles and challenges.
126. The decision to build a new Constitution and to act in accordance thereof requires the taking of a long-term view by Sierra Leone's Parliament and its people. It requires arduous work, the fruits of which will not necessarily be enjoyed by this generation. This generation, which experienced the worst of times, will however leave a gift for future generations. There can be no better legacy to bequeath than the construction of the foundations of society that provide lasting peace and prosperity.

127. This recommendation is made for the serious consideration of the Sierra Leonean Parliament. Constitution making is a long-term programme. The recommendation is not to be construed as permitting the delay or holding back of other imperative recommendations that require amendments to the 1991 Constitution.

ESTABLISHING THE RULE OF LAW

All Sierra Leoneans must be equal before the law. And the laws this time must be like a cloth, it must be made to fit the people that it is meant to serve.

Extract from the essay "My Vision, Hope and Aspiration for Sierra Leone"
by Augustine Lavai-Tiva Bundu⁴⁸

128. In a true democracy there is no compromise on the supremacy of the Constitution and the rule of law.
129. The rule of law is the expectation of equality of treatment under objective and accessible rules. Discretionary governmental power should be subject to control by the courts. Courts should apply the same law to all regardless of their standing in society. In short, the rule of law says that nobody is above the law.
130. Inequitable law, separate court systems, lack of access to courts, few lawyers, and a confusion of administrative and judicial roles all conspired to prevent the application of the rule of law in Sierra Leone. Courts rarely protected human rights or policed administrative irregularity.
131. The starting point in establishing the rule of law is the creation of an independent, impartial and autonomous judiciary.

Independence of the Judiciary

132. A judiciary must be independent, if it is to stand between the powerful and powerless. Judges must be independent if they are to dispense impartial justice. An independent and impartial judiciary holds a central place in the realisation of a just, honest, open and accountable government. The judiciary can play its role only when it has the power to enforce rulings and it has efficient organisation.
133. Judicial independence ultimately depends on the will of the individuals in the three branches of state to adhere to the Constitution. Those in the executive and legislature must be committed to the independence, impartiality and the supremacy of the judiciary in its role as adjudicator. Whether the judiciary is adequately resourced and whether the other branches of government obey and implement the rulings of the courts are factors against which the extent of this commitment will be assessed.

⁴⁸ Essay submitted to the National Vision for Sierra Leone, a project of the TRC.

134. Judicial officers themselves, above all others, have to be committed to the building of an independent and impartial judiciary. This requires judges to possess courage and integrity. The success of the rule of law in Sierra Leone ultimately depends on the calibre of people involved in the judiciary.⁴⁹ The Commission calls upon all judicial officers and those involved in the administration of justice to act with integrity at all times and to dispense justice without fear or favour.

Judicial Autonomy

135. The judiciary should have financial and administrative autonomy. Budgetary independence means that the budget should be separately presented and managed. The judiciary itself is best placed to do the planning for an efficient justice delivery system.
136. The Commission recommends that Government should work towards the creation of an independent judiciary. This includes providing the judiciary with budgetary independence or self-accounting status.

Judicial Appointments

137. The most blatant means used by an executive to influence the courts is the practice of appointing as many of its supporters or sympathisers as possible to the courts.
138. The way in which judges are appointed and subsequently promoted is essential to their independence. Judges must not be appointed for political reasons, but only for reasons of competence and political neutrality. The public must have confidence that judges are chosen on merit and for their integrity, not as a reward for party service or as a tactic by the executive to ensure a friendly face on the bench.
139. The need for the judiciary to reflect broadly the ethnic and gender composition of Sierra Leone must be considered when judicial officers are appointed.
140. Civil organisations should be brought into the appointment process. Debates on appointments, outside of political and judicial circles, should be encouraged in the media and among academics. The appointment process should consider experience and performance, vision and judicial philosophy of the nominees.
141. There is a need to broaden representation on the Judicial and Legal Service Commission (JLSC), which appoints judges. In addition to the existing representation, there ought to be representation from parliament and the law teaching profession. At least one teacher of law designated by teachers of law at Sierra Leonean universities; and at least three members of Parliament, one of whom must be a member of the official opposition, ought to be represented on the JLSC.

⁴⁹The Chief Justice of Sri Lanka, Mr. Justice Samarakoom, noted at the 1983 meeting of Commonwealth Law Ministers that: "Independence is a question of the individual, and all the law can do is merely help him to be independent. So when you consider the independence of any judiciary, remember [that] if you do not get an independent man, all the laws and all the provisions in the Constitution cannot make him be independent."

142. The Commission recommends further that the representation of the organised bar be increased. At least four practicing lawyers nominated from within the organised bar to represent the profession should be appointed to the JLSC.
143. The recommendation to broaden the representation of the JLSC to include the sectors suggested is imperative.

Tenure of Office

144. If judges are not confident that their tenure of office and their remuneration are secure, their independence will be threatened. Judges should not be removable by executive action. It is generally desirable that judges must retire when they reach the retirement age. This reduces the scope for the executive to favour handpicked judges whom they find sympathetic and also reduces the temptation, on the part of the judge, to curry executive "approval" for re-appointment.
145. The practice of employing retired judges on contract should cease. The Commission recommends that the retirement age of judges should be extended to seventy, without the possibility of extension. Government should work towards the fulfilment of this recommendation.
146. The Commission notes the perennial problem that poor remuneration causes many of the best legal minds to decline appointments to the bench. The Commission takes further notice of the efforts undertaken to address this problem. In the light of these efforts the Commission makes no particular recommendation in this regard, but observes that there are few (or no) countries in the world where judges are able to earn as much as their colleagues in private practice.⁵⁰
147. Leading members of the bar are normally appointed judges after they have accumulated considerable years of experience. An appointment to the bench is an opportunity not only to serve Sierra Leone but also to help shape a future society. The Commission calls upon experienced lawyers in Sierra Leone, and indeed experienced Sierra Leonean lawyers practicing law abroad, to respond to this important challenge.⁵¹

Keeping Judges Accountable

148. The Judicial and Legal Service Commission is empowered by the 1991 Constitution to dismiss and discipline persons exercising judicial functions. This authority has never been used effectively.
149. It is recommended that an independent disciplinary committee be set up within the Judicial and Legal Service Commission to investigate complaints of corruption and malpractice made against judges, magistrates, bailiffs, registrars and other court personnel. This body should sit on a regular basis and report to and make recommendations to the full JLSC.

⁵⁰ Such a comparison must of course only be made between the incomes of judges and the incomes of the leading members of the profession.

⁵¹ According to an article in the *Concord Times* of 22 January 2004, the Chief Justice, Dr. Abdulai Timbo stated that not a single application had been received for eight judicial vacancies to serve in the provinces.

150. It is recommended that a binding and enforceable Code of Conduct be drafted and enacted for members of the bench (including Magistrates). Such a Code should lay out the guidelines and governing principles of acceptable professional behaviour. It should foster the highest standards of honour and integrity.
151. These are imperative recommendations.

Prosecuting Authority

152. The prosecuting authority must exercise its functions without fear, favour or prejudice. The rule of law requires that prosecutions on behalf of the state be conducted fairly and reasonably. The decision to prosecute or not must not be motivated by improper and political considerations, but by the public interest and the need for justice.
153. The Attorney General acts as the "guardian of the public interest" and has extensive powers with regard to the initiation, prosecution and discontinuance of criminal proceedings. The Attorney General must also provide legal advice on matters of public administration and government to the executive.⁵² Clearly, the Attorney General must exercise his or her functions impartially and be free from political influences. While the Office of the Attorney General and that of the Ministry of Justice remains merged the incumbent can never be expected to act independently.
154. The Commission recommends the separation of the offices of the Attorney General and the Minister of Justice. The Attorney General should be the Chief Law Officer of the state and should enjoy security of tenure of office. The implementation of this recommendation will require an amendment to the Constitution. Government should work towards the fulfilment of this recommendation.

Local Courts

155. The various peoples of Sierra Leone have always had systems and principles for dispute resolution. But the basic institutional framework of the current customary legal system is a product of colonialism; established by the Protectorate Ordinance of 1896. What were then called "Courts of Native Chiefs" or "Native Courts" are now called "Local Courts."⁵³
156. Under the colonial strategy of indirect rule, chiefs were used as instruments of the colonial administration. Chiefs were made immune to the checks and balances of traditional institutions and accountable instead only to the colonial state. Within the jurisdiction set for it by the protectorate, customary law was both made and enforced by the chiefs. They used it to carry out colonial demands such as tax collection and, often, to carry out their own exploitation by way of fines, coerced labour, and arbitrary decisions.⁵⁴

⁵² The Attorney General is also expected to ensure to the full extent of his or her authority that government takes place within a framework of law; that government and official agencies adhere to international human rights standards; and scrutinise new or proposed legislation.

⁵³ See the Local Courts Act 1964.

⁵⁴ See Arthur Abraham, *Mende Government and Politics under Colonial Rule* (Freetown: Sierra Leone University Press, 1978), p. 304-05.

Sierra Leone's present-day customary legal system should be viewed in the light of the rural de-democratisation that was wrought by indirect rule.⁵⁵

157. The Ministry of Local Government presently supervises local courts.⁵⁶ The executive arm of government should not set matters such as codes of conduct for court officials. The Commission recommends that the Judicial and Legal Services Commission incorporate the local courts into the judiciary, which is headed by the Chief Justice and supervised.
158. The *Local Courts Act* provides for the work of local courts to be supervised by judicial advisers, or customary law officers. Such officers are empowered to advise local courts in matters of law, train local court personnel⁵⁷ and even exercise the right of judicial review over decisions of local courts. Very few such officials have been posted in the districts since the 1980s.⁵⁸ In effect the districts were left to their own devices.
159. Customary Law Officers are presently part of the Law Officers Department and appointed by the Attorney General. They should be under the judiciary as specified in section 141(2) of the Constitution. This section states that the Judicial and Legal Services Commission should appoint Customary Law Officers.
160. The Commission recommends that suitably qualified judicial/ customary law officers be appointed for each of the twelve districts. These officers should organise training programmes for local court officers.
161. In line with the Commission's recommendation that the local courts be integrated into the judiciary, the power of judicial review should be removed from customary law officers once the integration has taken place. Currently, the District Officers also have the power of review over decisions of the Local Courts. In keeping with the principle of separation of powers the, Commission recommends that the power of judicial review be removed from District Officers.
162. Local Court chairmen are paid 30,000 Leones per month (about 11 US Dollars.). This creates a strong structural incentive for corruption. Allegations abound that many local court chairmen use excessive and baseless fines to supplement their incomes. The Commission recommends that Government work towards the incremental improvement of the remuneration of Local Court officials.
163. The Commission recommends that the Government work towards the fulfilment of these recommendations.

⁵⁵ See Mahmood Mamdani; "Citizen and Subject"; Princeton University Press, Princeton; 1996. Mamdani demonstrates at length the way that the colonial strategy of indirect rule worked to democratise rural Africa. He argues that confronting this legacy of indirect rule is key to reducing conflict and strengthening democracy on the continent.

⁵⁶ See Section 2 of the Local Courts Act of 1974.

⁵⁷ At the time of writing this report, Local Court officials have not been trained since 1982.

⁵⁸ During the 1990s, a single judicial adviser or customary law officer serviced all three provinces.

Access to the Courts

164. If the majority of Sierra Leoneans have no real access to the courts, then the rights enshrined by the Constitution are meaningless. Legal representation is one of the most important means of enforcing rights.
165. Section 23 of the Constitution guarantees the right of access, by all, to the courts. Only those accused persons charged with capital offences such as murder, treason and robbery with aggravation are entitled to legal representation under the current legal aid regime. The 1991 Constitution mandates Parliament to make provisions for the rendering of financial assistance to indigent citizens of Sierra Leone whose rights have been infringed.⁵⁹ Parliament has not made any such provisions.
166. The Commission notes that an effective legal aid system will be enormously expensive to establish and maintain. The Commission is reluctant to make recommendations requiring massive expenditure when there are economical (albeit less ambitious) options, to explore.
167. Government should consider making a condition in the granting of scholarships to law students that they be required to work in an institution offering free legal services to indigent clients for at least one year after their call to the Bar.
168. The establishment of legal aid clinics at universities and colleges and under the auspices of the law departments can fill in some of the gaps in the government-funded system of legal aid. In each clinic, a qualified lawyer should supervise between 10 and 20 law students. The Commission calls upon universities and colleges to consider the establishment of legal aid clinics.⁶⁰ The Commission calls upon Fourah Bay College to make service in the law school's legal aid clinic part of the curriculum for all law students.
169. The Commission recommends that the Government work towards the establishment of public defender offices in the main centres of the country.⁶¹ Senior law students can also be used as public defenders in criminal matters. This would provide indigent accused with some defence and provide the students with practical training experience. The law governing rights of appearance in courts should be amended in order to permit senior law students to participate in public defender programmes.

Legal Activism and the Sierra Leone Bar Association

170. Lack of courage on the part of lawyers and judges over the years paved the way for the desecration of the constitution, the perpetuation of injustice and the pillaging of the country's wealth.

⁵⁹ See Section 28(5)(a) of the Constitution of Sierra Leone 1991.

⁶⁰ There is currently only one law school in Sierra Leone, namely the law school at Fourah Bay College. The law school does have a legal aid clinic and its students work with the Lawyers' Centre for Legal Assistance (LAWCLA).

⁶¹ Public defenders ought to be independent from the prosecution arm of the Ministry of Justice, so as not to compromise their services.

171. The organised bar is in a good position to be a powerful watchdog and should add its voice in protest, when human rights are abused and the rule of law is threatened. The Commission calls upon lawyers to stand up to injustice.⁶²
172. The Commission calls on the Sierra Leone Bar Association to require its members to offer their services regularly on a *pro bono* basis.⁶³ A particular onus rests on the Bar Association to provide legal representation for indigent accused in trials involving serious offences, where significant periods of imprisonment are at stake.
173. To the extent that members are already, on an individual basis, offering such services, the Commission commends them. But it is clear that the provision of pro bono services is inadequate. Lawyers are able to pursue a lucrative profession, but they have duties that accompany this, including that of furnishing services to the indigent.
174. The Commission calls upon the Sierra Leone Bar Association to become the guardians of the protection of the Rule of Law and the human rights of Sierra Leoneans. The Bar Association should require that its members receive mandatory continuing education in human rights law and related subjects.
175. A binding and enforceable code of ethical conduct should be promptly drafted and adopted for members of the Bar (legal professionals). The Bar Association should enforce such a code. Strict sanctions, including loss of the right to practice, should be enforced against all members of the profession in cases of infringement.

Legal Resources Centre

176. The Commission calls on private lawyers to establish a legal resources centre that can litigate test cases before the courts.⁶⁴ Test cases are cases that focus on problems experienced by large numbers of people and can impact on whole communities or the entire country. They often result in a change of the law.
177. A sustainable public interest legal organisation with full time lawyers is able to plan its work strategically. It can set up intermediaries between lawyers and clients in the form of field-workers and paralegals. The Commission calls upon the international community to support the establishment and running of such a centre.⁶⁵

⁶² Lawyers and activists would do well to take heed of the words of the late Pastor Martin Niemöller who in the mid- twentieth century stated: "In Germany, they first came for the communists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a communist. Then they came for the Jews, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Jew. Then they came for the trade unionists, and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a trade unionist. Then they came for the Catholics and I didn't speak up because I wasn't a Catholic. Then they came for me -- and by that time there was nobody left to speak up."

⁶³ This is already a compulsory requirement in many Bar Associations around the world.

⁶⁴ Examples of legal assistance organisations that have been successful in providing meaningful access to the courts include the Legal Assistance Centre (Namibia), the Legal Resources Centre (South Africa), the Legal Resources Foundation (Zambia), the Legal Resources Foundation (Zimbabwe), Legal Mozambique Dos Direitos Humanos (Mozambique), Centre for Advice and Education on Rights (Malawi), Legal Services Centre (Zanzibar), Legal and Human Rights Centre (Tanzania), Legal Aid Project of the Law Society of Uganda, Ditshwanelo (Botswana).

⁶⁵ The Lawyers' Centre for Legal Assistance (LAWCLA) could perhaps be transformed into a fully-fledged legal resources centre.

Simplification of Rules and Procedures

178. Access to justice can also be achieved through a simplification of legal rules so that they may be understood and used by anyone. Alternative conflict resolution methods should be promoted. Traditional and customary methods of mediation and conflict resolution have proven to be useful at resolving issues in many communities.
179. The adversarial procedure may not be absolutely necessary in all matters such as small claims and family disputes. Alternative forms of dispute resolution and settlement, such as mediation and arbitration, should be required, or provided as an option, before resort is made to the courts.
180. The Commission recommends that the Government consider the feasibility of introducing alternative forms of dispute settlement.

Approaching the Courts

181. Courts ought to relax the traditional procedures for instituting proceedings for relief. Unsophisticated and indigent petitioners ought to be able to approach the courts by a variety of means, such as the addressing of letters to judges.
182. The Commission calls on the judiciary to take a pro-active approach to the protection of human rights.

Justice Delayed

183. Delays in the delivery of both criminal and civil justice threaten to cripple the administration of justice in Sierra Leone. The use of judicial time must be maximised. Those factors that create the idle use of time should be eliminated. The creation of an efficient case flow management system, the proper scheduling of cases and an increase in judicial sitting hours will enable the judiciary to work at greater capacity. In order to encourage longer sitting hours, courts must be adequately resourced and made comfortable.⁶⁶ Judges are often late for hearings and at times do not even appear because the courts do not have enough vehicles to transport them.
184. Flexibility of use of judicial personnel should also be considered.⁶⁷ A single structure of trial courts, created through the merging of courts, would make for flexibility in the use of judicial personnel.
185. In the adversarial system, judges have played a passive role in the control of proceedings, unless moved at the instance of one of the parties. There is a growing awareness that, if cases are to move faster, courts must become more involved in the speeding up of the process. They should monitor case development, require parties to report progress and set down time scales.
186. The Commission urges Government and the judiciary to consider these recommendations for purposes of addressing the backlog in the delivery of justice.

⁶⁶ This requires attending to such issues as furnishing, ventilation and lighting.

⁶⁷ In The Gambia, section 17(8) of the *Courts Act* enables a judge of the Supreme Court to preside in any subordinate court. Also in The Gambia, several provisions in the *Criminal Procedure Code*, which are regarded as causing delays, have been removed.

Court Infrastructure and Equipment

187. Adequate court facilities are essential to the proper administration of justice. Overcrowded courthouses lead to under-performance and congestion.
188. Use of court buildings ought to be maximised and running costs minimised.⁶⁸ Courts can be used as continuing education lecture halls after court hours. In smaller communities, they can also be used as community halls.
189. The Commission takes note of the progress made in the refurbishment of the main courthouse in Freetown and the construction of courts in some districts. The Commission recommends that the Government work towards the establishment of more courthouses in Freetown and the Provinces.
190. The use of computers by courts for case management and the storage and retrieval of information has proven to be cost effective in many countries. The provision of computers with access to the Internet to Judges will also facilitate legal research. Several Supreme and Constitutional Courts around the world publish the full texts of their judgments online, which can be downloaded free of charge.⁶⁹
191. Provision of books and library facilities are important components in the administration of justice, but often neglected. The quality of justice dispensed must suffer, if books are not readily available. The Commission calls on international legal organisations and members of the international community to donate legal texts and law reports⁷⁰ emanating from their respective countries to Court libraries and law libraries in Sierra Leone.

Law Reform Commission

192. Many of Sierra Leone's laws were adopted from England. Some laws on the statute books date back as far as the 17th century.⁷¹ While the British have long amended or repealed these laws, they remain in force in Sierra Leone.

⁶⁸ Running costs can be minimised through reducing the consumption of energy. Design of courts, indeed all public buildings, should emphasise natural ventilation and natural lighting. Simplicity and efficiency of design, such as single story courts will release funds for essentials such as furniture, equipment and books.

⁶⁹ These courts include the High Court and Supreme Court of Zambia, Nigerian Supreme Court, the Constitutional Court of South Africa, the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa, the U.S. Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of Canada, the High Court of Australia, and the European Court of Human Rights. Decisions from Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda are online through the website: lawafrica.com. *Quicklaw*, a Canadian legal database, has an arrangement with the Canadian Bar Association whereby judges worldwide who provide their judgments get free access.

⁷⁰ Such legal texts and law reports could be donated in either hard copy or electronic versions, or both. Law reports should be updated on a regular basis as part of the donation.

⁷¹ Section 74 of the Courts Act made a number of pre-1880 English laws applicable to Sierra Leone. Examples include: the Statute of Frauds, 1677; the Wills Act, 1837; and the Common Law Procedure Act 1852.

193. Several areas of the law are out of step with modern developments. Such legislation ought to be amended, repealed and where appropriate completely rewritten. Examples of the law, which cry out for reform, are the criminal procedure laws, including provisions governing bail, laws dealing with the protection of women and children⁷² and land tenure.
194. Without law reform, the Rule of Law is greatly hampered because new challenges cannot be addressed satisfactorily. In an increasingly globalised world, lack of law reform can negatively impact on the investment climate. Penalties for breach of the law may become so meaningless as to encourage impunity.
195. A Law Reform Commission ought to research all branches of the law in order to make recommendations for the development, improvement and modernisation of the law. A Law Reform Commission that is effective ensures the renewal of the law on a continuous basis. Many of the recommendations being made by the Commission require law reform, and, so, it is essential, if these are to be implemented effectively, that a genuinely functional law reform commission should exist.
196. Successive governments have neglected the Law Reform Commission. The Law Reform Commission needs full time staff, including researchers. It requires adequate premises and a library. The Commission recommends that the government should work towards equipping the Law Reform Commission so that it may discharge its responsibilities effectively.

THE SECURITY SERVICES

*There's no place like home, like Sierra Leone,
Where a man in a uniform, thin to the bone,
Stops a man in the street and in god-fearing groan
Begs for cash or for bread or for transport back home*

Extract from the poem "My Vision, My Home, My Sierra Leone" by Ustina More⁷³

197. The Commission has found that the security forces, the army and police, failed the people of Sierra Leone during their time of greatest crisis. Significant elements within these forces desecrated the Constitution and acted against the wishes of the people. Successive political regimes abused their authority over the security forces and unleashed them against their political opponents in the name of national security.
198. Sierra Leoneans have a right to security forces that are professional, disciplined and representative of all the people.

⁷² By way of example, the maximum provided for child maintenance is a paltry Le 400 per week.

⁷³ Poem submitted to the National Vision for Sierra Leone, a project of the TRC.

Principles of National Security

199. The Commission is of the view that new principles governing national security ought to be adopted in Sierra Leone. Those in power must never again use national security as an excuse to deploy security forces for political ends. These principles are as follows:
- National security must reflect the commitment of Sierra Leoneans, as individuals and as a nation, to live in peace and harmony and to be free from fear.
 - The Sierra Leone Army must be the only lawful military force in Sierra Leone.⁷⁴ There should be no other military or paramilitary force, under the guise of any institution, including the police.⁷⁵
 - No member of any security service should be permitted to obey a manifestly illegal order. Obedience to a manifestly unlawful order should never be a defence to a crime.
 - Neither the security services as a whole, nor any of their members, may, in the performance of their duties, act against a political party's legitimate interest or promote the interest of any political party.
 - No Sierra Leonean should participate in armed conflict internationally, except as provided for in terms of the Constitution or national legislation.⁷⁶
 - The use of armed force in Sierra Leone must be deployed in strict accordance with the Constitution.
200. The Commission recommends that the National Security principles be enshrined in the Constitution. This is an imperative recommendation.

The Sierra Leone Army

201. The Army, which prior to the civil war and during the conflict sunk to the depths of disobedience and degeneracy, is now expected to rise to unprecedented levels of professionalism. Much has to be done to restore the faith and confidence of the people of Sierra Leone in the Army.
202. This responsibility of restoring faith in the Army rests not only with the leadership of the military, but also with each and every soldier. This responsibility must be reflected in the day-to-day conduct of all SLA soldiers. Serving in the Army should be regarded as a privilege. Those soldiers who are unable to conduct themselves professionally and to respect the Constitution at all times are not fit to serve their country.

⁷⁴ Section 166 of the Constitution prohibits the raising of any private armed force.

⁷⁵ This principle would naturally not apply to United Nations and other internationally sanctioned Peacekeeping Forces.

⁷⁶ This principle would not preclude Sierra Leoneans who become citizens or residents of other countries from serving in the lawfully constituted armies of such countries.

Operational Support Division

203. The Inspector General of the Sierra Leone Police⁷⁷ in his submission to the Commission pointed out that the paramilitary force formed in the police under the Siaka Stevens regime became an “instrument of tyranny and suppression”.⁷⁸ A paramilitary force of sorts exists in the police today in the form of the Operational Support Division (OSD). The proposed National Security Principles enjoin the Government to ensure that no paramilitary force exists outside of the Sierra Leone Army. The existence of such a force within the police is contrary to the proposed National Security Principles.

Conditions of Service

204. Inspector General Kamara of the Sierra Leone Police informed the Commission that the net monthly salary of a police constable is equivalent to one sack of rice, one sack of onions and a few loaves of bread. The rent allowance for police officers amounts to 1,000 Leones per month. Kamara pointed out that a bottle of Coca Cola costs more than that. As a result, police officers “sleep rough”, often camping on the floors of houses of friends and family.
205. The Commission recognises that providing professional policing in these circumstances is extremely difficult. The temptation for policemen and women to engage in actions of “pay yourself” must be overwhelming. However, simply stating that the Government must improve the income of the police may prove to be an empty gesture, at least in the foreseeable future. Indeed the Government hardly needs to be told of the deplorable conditions in the security services.
206. Policemen and women who nonetheless perform their duties with integrity and courage represent the calibre of people needed to build this country. For such policemen and women, working in the police is not just a job. It represents a real commitment to protect and to serve the people of Sierra Leone. The Commission salutes these members. These men and women will make the police a force for good.

PROMOTING GOOD GOVERNANCE

I want to see a Sierra Leone that is free of the broken bottles that cut us into pieces. Broken bottles like tribalism, nepotism, favouritism, and sectionalism ...

Extract from the essay “My National Vision for Sierra Leone” by Chinsia E. Caesar⁷⁹

207. Years of lapses in governance and unrestrained corruption⁸⁰ produced the deplorable conditions that set the scene for bitter civil war in Sierra Leone. There is no option but to address bad governance and corruption head on. It would not be an overstatement to say that the survival of the nation depends on the success of society in confronting these issues.

⁷⁷ Brima Acha Kamara, BA MA

⁷⁸ Submission dated 23 July 2003. The first paramilitary force was the Internal Security Division (ISD), which was followed by the Special Security Division (SSD).

⁷⁹ Essay submitted to the National Vision for Sierra Leone, a project of the TRC.

⁸⁰ Corruption is dealt with in the following section under the heading “Fighting Corruption”.

208. Governance is commonly described as the practices and institutions through which authority is exercised for the common good. This includes the process by which those in authority are elected, appointed and monitored; and the capacity of the government to effectively manage its resources for the good of all.
209. Government effectiveness is a measure of the quality of the delivery of public services, the competence of civil servants and the independence of the civil service from political pressures.⁸¹ Poor governance is the mismanagement of public assets and resources. It results in the denial of the delivery of effective public services to the people. Bad governance is the breeding ground for corruption.
210. Successful governance and indeed the effective combating of corruption are largely dependent on strong and committed public leadership; the availability of information; and collective action on the part of civil society.

Committed Leadership

211. It is the example set by the national leadership that sets the tone for the entire public administration and indeed for people at large. The self-seeking machinations of successive ruling elites set the worst of examples. They permitted Sierra Leone's slide into chaos and conflict. In the view of the Commission, this cycle has not been broken.
212. Trust in government leads to respect for the political system. Respect for the political system ensures stability. Stability is a precondition for development in all sectors of society. Trust in government has to be earned by government and, in particular, by the leaders of government.
213. Sierra Leone needs leaders of the highest calibre at all levels. Leaders who are selfless, not self-serving. Such leaders will be remembered and acknowledged by succeeding generations.
214. Committed leadership means many things. It means acting with integrity, understanding and compassion. It involves hard work and self-sacrifice. Committed leaders are those who have no desire to live their lives at the expense of others. These qualities enable such leaders to develop the foresight and wisdom needed to build communities and to build the country.
215. Committed leadership should not just take place at the national level. Such leadership should take place in homes, the streets, workplaces, barracks, schools, colleges, associations and sport fields. Committed leaders change lives for the better, regardless of where they find themselves.
216. The Commission calls upon the national leadership of Sierra Leone and all those in positions of authority and influence to set the highest of standards in their public and private conduct. The Commission calls upon these individuals to place the interests of Sierra Leone and its people above their own.

⁸¹ In July 2003, the World Bank released the results of a comparative study conducted to measure the quality of governance worldwide between 1996 and 2002. The study found that in Sierra Leone some gains had been made in respect of political stability, political rights and the control of corruption. However, the research reflected a disturbing decline with regard to perceptions of government effectiveness, regulatory quality and adherence to the rule of law. More detail can be found at the website: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/kkz2002/sc_chart.asp.

A Culture of Ethics and Service

217. There appears to be an expectation that those who enter the civil service will use their positions to enrich themselves and their extended families. A culture of entitlement within the civil service has become entrenched. This malignant culture must be stopped.
218. The civil servant who sits and chats all day destroys the civil service. The bureaucrat who uses his or her position to secure deals for himself or herself, his or her friends and family acts as a parasite draining the country of resources. The head of department who employs his or her friends and family rather than candidates of merit crushes the spirit of public service. The Commission calls on all civil servants to faithfully and diligently serve the people of Sierra Leone.
219. Sierra Leone needs a culture of ethics and service to prevail in the civil service. There is not a single reference to the word "ethics" in the Constitution. There should be. The Commission recommends that the Constitution of Sierra Leone require all those who are employed in the service of the State to act ethically. In particular, the Constitution should enjoin public servants not to act in any way that is inconsistent with their office, or expose themselves to any situation involving the risk of a conflict between their official responsibilities and private interests.
220. Members of the executive and those in positions of seniority such as judges and heads of parastatals are expected to comply with a higher ethical standard. The Constitution should require Parliament to publish a code of ethics⁸² prescribing standards and rules aimed at promoting accountable government with which senior members of the Executive and others holding positions of public authority must comply in performing their official responsibilities.⁸³
221. Ethics regulations should be simple, sensible and straightforward. The code must be understandable to every official without a lawyer.⁸⁴
222. The Constitution should further require Parliament to provide by law that a person who has been dismissed or removed from office by reason of a breach of the code of ethics shall be disqualified from holding any other public office, whether appointed or elected, either generally or for a prescribed period.
223. A constituted body with capacity should investigate alleged breaches of such a code of ethics.
224. These are imperative recommendations.

⁸² Referred to in section 233 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda as the "Leadership Code of Conduct".

⁸³ This would be in addition to codes of conduct that apply to the whole public administration.

⁸⁴ These attributes should be the hallmarks of all laws.

Freedom of Information

225. Information empowers. It is for this reason that repressive governments are secretive.
226. Access to information is an important tool for public oversight. If citizens are able to scrutinise government information, they can discipline public officials at the ballot box. They can also use the information for legal challenges and the lobbying of decision makers.
227. Governments are more effective, when they listen to business and citizens and work with them in deciding and implementing policy. Building a viable country requires openness and transparency. This in turn requires that the freedoms of expression and association should be respected at all times. These freedoms are however, meaningless without access to public information.
228. The government must not only publish statutes, regulations and rules, but also the proceedings of all legislative bodies. Judges must report their decisions and reasons in order to render the judiciary accountable. The Commission accepts the principle that government information should be available to the public. There is a duty on the part of the Government to inform.⁸⁵
229. The Commission recommends that the Government work towards the enactment of Freedom of Information legislation and the creation of the necessary apparatus to administer such a legal regime. The purpose of such legislation would be to provide a right of access to information in records under the control of government.
230. The Commission accepts that there are necessary exceptions to the right of access, but that these should be limited and specific. Decisions on the disclosure of government information should be reviewed independently of government.
231. The Commission acknowledges that the setting in place of a Freedom of Information regime is a major undertaking, which necessarily requires an incremental approach. The Follow-Up Committee, while taking this into account, should insist on incremental targets being met.

Free and Fair Elections

232. Free, fair and regular elections are central to democracy. Elections in Sierra Leone have been characterised by violence, intimidation and electoral fraud. These elections subverted democracy. Elections in Sierra Leone must never again be marred by fear and deception.
233. Elections must be effective and well run if democracy is to be consolidated in Sierra Leone. The electoral authority, the National Electoral Commission (NEC), bears the main responsibility in building public confidence in the democratic process. This Commission must be independent and impartial. The Commissioners of the NEC must be individuals with impeccable

⁸⁵ In many former British colonies, including Sierra Leone, the old Official Secrets Act is still in place. Such laws obstruct access to information by preventing officials from passing information to the public through media.

credentials. They must enjoy the respect and confidence of all stakeholders. In the performance of its functions, the Electoral Commission must be insulated from executive interference.

234. Candidates in elections should not be beholden to a narrow group of people. For this reason, candidates and political parties ought to be required to disclose the sources of funds and the amounts of money they raise and spend. The NEC should make such information freely available. Appropriate limits on contributions by individuals and groups to candidates and parties should be placed. These limits should be set following open and transparent consultations with political parties and civil society organisations.
235. No political party should be favoured over another by any organ of state. This particularly applies to the state controlled broadcast media. All political parties should be given an equal amount of time, including primetime, on state controlled television and radio.
236. These recommendations should be addressed by the National Electoral Commission. Where necessary, the Government should facilitate the necessary legislation. The recommendations are imperative.
237. Civil society organisations have a particularly crucial role to play in building confidence in democracy through the close monitoring of the electoral process. The Commission calls on civil society to safeguard democracy by highlighting instances of electoral fraud, monitoring campaign financing and spending and exposing any abuse of state resources for party political purposes.
238. Civil society groups should form a countrywide coalition to monitor general elections. Such a coalition can ask all prospective candidates to publicly subscribe to an integrity pledge. Candidates can also be asked to renounce all forms of electoral intimidation. In particular, such a coalition should closely monitor the work of the NEC to ensure independent and impartial conduct on the part of the electoral authority. The State also needs to be monitored to prevent the abuse of state agencies, such as the police and army, for political ends.
239. The media has an important informative role to play through making available accurate information on potential public office holders. The public must be informed of areas of potential conflict of interests in public office and election manifestoes. If this is done responsibly the media can help to build a culture of accountability.

The Role of Parliament

240. Parliament, as the principal law-making body in Sierra Leone, has a special responsibility to check abuse by the executive branch. Since independence, however, Parliament has shown itself to be a servile agent of the executive, lacking courage and determination to resist tyranny and to ensure respect for democracy and human rights in Sierra Leone.
241. In 1966, Parliament passed the first reading for the passage of Sierra Leone to a one-party state. In 1978, Parliament failed to oppose the introduction of the one-party state. Parliament must accept responsibility for the effective entrenchment of dictatorship and bad governance that laid the grounds for war.

242. Parliament and its committee on justice affairs should be closely scrutinising the work of the judiciary and the administration of justice. Individual members of the legislature are well placed to direct questions to the relevant Ministers on the progress of reforms. Parliament should be closely monitoring human rights in Sierra Leone. Questions should be raised with regard to human rights violations and the failure of governmental organs to investigate and prosecute such abuses.
243. Parliament must pursue the best interests of the electorate. Parliamentarians should be available to hear complaints from their constituents at all times. They should open offices in their constituencies so as to be accessible to the public. The Commission calls upon Members of Parliament to provide real and active representation to the people of Sierra Leone.

Just Administrative Action

244. Citizens are often captive to the whims of bureaucrats when attempting to access public services. Sadly, some of these officials conduct themselves in an arbitrary and corrupt way. In most cases, citizens have no recourse against such decisions.
245. Administrative action⁸⁶ means any decision (or failure to take a decision) by an official or organ of state exercising a public power, which affects the rights of any person.⁸⁷ People should have a right to a just administrative action. Just administrative action is administrative action that is lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair. Where a person's rights are adversely affected he or she ought to be entitled to written reasons in order to assist the complainant to take the matter further.
246. Public administration cannot be said to be open and accountable, unless it substantially accords with the principle of just administrative action. The Commission recommends that government at all levels should work towards the fulfilment of this objective.
247. The Commission recommends that the provision of just administrative action should be enshrined in the Constitution as a governmental objective that all administrative levels of government must work towards. This is an imperative recommendation.

Bringing Government and Service Delivery to the People

248. For many years, successive governments have failed dismally to meet the basic needs of most Sierra Leoneans, particularly those outside of Freetown. The present Government and future governments must be seen to be establishing infrastructure and delivering health, education, justice and security services in all Provinces.

⁸⁶ An example of administrative action is the decision of an official to refuse to grant a business license.

⁸⁷ Administrative action would not include the exercise of powers by the cabinet, councils, the judiciary and the Attorney General. Other constitutional and legal provisions govern the exercise of power by these entities.

249. Even before the start of the civil war, public service delivery had ground to a halt in much of the country. The war devastated public infrastructure and almost totally emasculated government's ability to deliver services to the people. Most Sierra Leoneans do not have access to clean water or consistent power supply.
250. Sierra Leone is one of several developing countries that spent more on military than on education (and health when compared individually) between 1999 and 2000.⁸⁸ Sierra Leone spent 3.6% of its GDP on the military and only 1% on education.⁸⁹ During 2002 goods and services expenditures⁹⁰ were estimated at Le158.5 billion or 9.6% of GDP.⁹¹ Security related outlays accounted for 36 percent of the goods and services expenditure.⁹² Sierra Leone's 2003 budget allocated Le42.6 billion to the military, Le44.2 billion to education, and Le34 billion to the health sector.⁹³
251. While the Government is required to strengthen and restructure the security sector after years of neglect, war and particularly as UNAMSIL proceeds with its phased withdrawal, military spending should be curbed in the longer term. Heavy spending on the military means that there is less money available for public health, education, and poverty reduction. Longer-term security for Sierra Leone rests in the development of the potential of its people.
252. The Commission commends efforts made by the Government and certain international agencies to decentralise government. Such efforts will bring government closer to the people. They will also permit greater participation in the democratic process. Hopefully, these efforts will result in improved delivery of public services.
253. The Commission recognises that this exercise is an enormous undertaking and makes no particular recommendations as to how it should happen. That expertise rests with those involved in the programme. The Commission recommends that the Government consider certain core principles when building local government and reviving institutions such as District Councils.
254. Local government must be democratic. The primary aim of local government must be to enable the progressive social and economic development of local communities and to ensure access to essential services that are affordable. New local government must be premised on the active engagement of communities in the affairs of the local structure, including planning, service delivery and performance assessment. Local councils must use their resources in the best interests of the local community. Services should be provided in a financially sustainable manner. Local government must give members of the local community full and accurate information about the level and standard of services they are entitled to receive.
255. The Commission recommends that these principles of local government should be enshrined in the Constitution. This is an imperative recommendation.

⁸⁸ See United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report, 2003.

⁸⁹ See United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Human Development Report, 2003.

⁹⁰ "Goods and services expenditures" refer to non-salary, non-interest recurrent expenditures.

⁹¹ Paragraph 21, Government of Sierra Leone Budget and Statement of Economic and Financial Policies for the Financial Year 2003; delivered by Mr J. B. Dauda, on 29 November 2002. More detail can be found at the website: www.statehouse-sl.org/gov-budget-2003.html.

⁹² Government Budget for the Financial Year 2003, *Ibid*.

⁹³ Paragraphs 44 to 48, Government Budget for the Financial Year 2003, *Ibid*.

Chieftaincy

256. New chieftaincies created by the colonial power after the Hut Tax War were deeply resented by the long-standing hereditary ruling houses. In the post-independence period, chieftaincies were corrupted by their co-option and politicisation by successive central governments. Chiefs lost sight of their traditional roles and neglected their duties to their subjects.
257. The Commission calls for the return of Chiefs to their traditional roles and functions. Their first and primary loyalty must be to their subjects, not to party political bosses. The Commission accordingly recommends the decoupling of Chiefs from party politics. Their legal responsibilities and authority should be closely examined to ensure that these accord with their traditional roles. This recommendation is made for the serious consideration of Government.
258. The Commission calls for a national dialogue on the restoration of the Chiefs to their symbolic and traditional roles.

Lustration

259. The Commission seriously considered whether to recommend lustration in the public service and the security forces. Lustration would involve the purging from these institutions of all public officials, soldiers and police members tainted by the fact that they committed human rights violations or engaged in corrupt acts in the past. After much reflection, the Commission decided not to recommend lustration.
260. Sierra Leone's peace is built on the back of a negotiated settlement. The pursuit of national unity, peace and the reconstruction of society requires reconciliation between the people of Sierra Leone.
261. The Commission is of the view that lustration, in the context of post-conflict Sierra Leone, has the potential to be enormously divisive. Besides being unworkable at a practical level, there is the real potential that the process will be abused for political ends and used for purposes of settling scores and pursuing vendettas. This would seriously undermine the prospects for national reconciliation.
262. Public organisations, by necessity, have to be forward-looking. Nonetheless, such organisations are required to be vigilant in monitoring the conduct and behaviour of their members, within and outside the workplace, to determine their fitness for duty. Individuals who display or revert to miscreant behaviour should be dealt with firmly and expeditiously, according to fair labour rules. In appropriate cases, disciplinary action should include dismissal.

FIGHTING CORRUPTION

*And you big-boy Corruption
We say No! – Pack and go...
About face turn
Please go*

Extract from the poem “We Say No” by Rebecca Edmond⁹⁴

263. Corruption is conventionally defined as the exercise of public power for private gain. Corruption results in the diversion or siphoning off of public funds and resources. As a result public services are denied to the intended beneficiary, the people. It is a wrong committed against each and every Sierra Leonean. Corruption constitutes a crime against the people.
264. The Commission has found that endemic corruption was a central factor that produced the dire conditions that made civil war inevitable. Sierra Leone remains in the grip of pervasive corruption, which, if not arrested, will sap the country of its life force and lay the grounds for further conflict.
265. The threat of corruption is manifested in many evil forms, namely greed, bribery, embezzlement, abuse of power, self-serving deals by public officials, extortion, favouritism and nepotism.
266. Examples abound. The teacher who compels students to take “extra lessons” in order to obtain a pass mark destroys the spirit of learning and instils in the youth a culture of grabbing. The university professor who overlooks work of merit until he is “compensated” obliterates the notion of excellence in higher education. The police officer who concocts charges and then extorts money from the “suspect” for the dropping of the charges sabotages law and order in Sierra Leone.
267. Real economic development is not possible, when corruption and bad governance are the order of the day. They result in the massive reduction of the national cake. Both local and international investments go elsewhere. The inability to provide basic services and infrastructure to the people inevitably results in civil disorder. In short, corruption and failings in governance are a recipe for national calamity.
268. On a cautionary note, the Commission observes that anti-corruption campaigns in many countries are often superficial and rarely tackle the real issues. They are launched with much publicity and are then followed by mere token actions. The anti-corruption slogans remain rhetorical.⁹⁵
269. Daddy Saj, the popular Sierra Leonean artist who sang the hit song “Corruption”, points out in the chorus line, “E Do So”, that everybody is doing it. This statement has been acknowledged as something of a national truism. The hard truth is that there are few people in Sierra Leone who are not involved in one form of corruption or another. How seriously the song’s refrain is taken remains to be seen. The Commission hopes that Sierra Leoneans will not be dancing to the same tune in years to come.

⁹⁴ Poem submitted to the National Vision for Sierra Leone, a project of the TRC.

⁹⁵ See the Global Corruption Report 2003, available at the website: www.globalcorruptionreport.org

270. The effective implementation of the recommendations made under the preceding heading of "Promoting Good Governance" will be a powerful weapon in the fight against corruption. The Commission commends the steps taken so far by the Government to address corruption in Sierra Leone, in particular, the establishment of the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC). The campaign against corruption should be broadened and intensified. It should start with those at the top.

Disclosure of Assets

271. A government that is serious about accountability and combating corruption will be serious about transparency. In particular those in government holding positions of responsibility will be transparent about their own dealings, both public and private. Such leaders will have nothing to hide.
272. Sierra Leoneans have become accustomed to those in authority using their positions and information entrusted to them to enrich themselves. The Commission is persuaded that the best way to stamp out this malevolent tradition is to put in place monitoring mechanisms and to take action when self-enrichment occurs.
273. Those in powerful public positions should be required to register their financial interests, when assuming office. They should also disclose their financial interests⁹⁶ acquired after their assumption of office, including those of their spouses and dependents. This must be done on an annual basis. Most of this information should be open to the public.⁹⁷ Those who should be subject to this requirement include all members of cabinet, Parliament, judges, heads of parastatals, general managers in the civil service and parastatals and members of District and City Councils.⁹⁸
274. Clear and strict penalties should be imposed for failure to comply with the duty to disclose. These should include: suspension from office, forfeiture of part or the whole of remuneration, public reprimand, and dismissal from office.⁹⁹
275. A constituted body (or bodies) with capacity must maintain registers of financial interests. Such an organisation must be able to verify the disclosures and check for any potential or actual conflict of interests.
276. These recommendations are imperative.

⁹⁶ Including any gifts, sponsored foreign travel, pensions, hospitality and other benefits of a material nature received by them.

⁹⁷ The confidential part of the register should include details about the monetary value of the interests and all details about spouses and dependent children. The public section of the records should be easily accessible. Some countries such as the Philippines make all disclosures available for public scrutiny.

⁹⁸ Such provisions are common worldwide. See by way of example section 213 of Constitution of Malawi (Act 1 of 1997), section 233(2)(a) of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda and sections 96 and 136 of the Republic of South Africa. In Botswana and the Philippines, all public officials, irrespective of their ranking, are required to submit disclosures.

⁹⁹ In the United States non-compliance with financial disclosure laws carries penalties which include imprisonment of up to one year and fines of up to US\$50 000. In the Philippines, offenders face up to 5 years imprisonment.

Independent Corruption Prosecutions

277. The Attorney General has been criticised for rendering the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) ineffective by not acting on its recommendations.¹⁰⁰ The Attorney General's office is understaffed and under-resourced. The Commission recognises that this is largely due to the fact that experienced lawyers are unwilling to take up appointments because of poor remuneration. The Commission notes that the Attorney General's office is somewhat compromised, at least at the level of public perception, by its ties to the Executive. This perception is reinforced by the fact that the Attorney General is also a serving cabinet minister.
278. There is global trend towards the closer collaboration of investigators and prosecutors in the combating of specialised crime, such as corruption.¹⁰¹ This is particularly the case where the crime in question is of a complex nature and where the criminal conduct in question has become endemic. An effective anti-corruption agency will have appropriate powers of investigation, prosecution and prevention.
279. Prosecution of corruption cases should be free of any scope for political interference. The Commission recommends that the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) should be permitted to pursue its own prosecutions in the name of the Republic of Sierra Leone. The Commission recommends that the ACC Act 2000 should be amended to include a provision deeming prosecutions undertaken by the ACC to be in the name of the Republic.
280. The Commission recognises that currently the ACC does not have the capacity to prosecute its own cases. The Commission recommends that the Government and the international community work towards building this capacity and locating such capability within the ACC.

Public Knowledge

281. A government that is serious about harnessing the support of the public in the fight against corruption will provide the public with as much relevant information as possible. Where the public is aware of what is allocated from the public coffers for specific services and amenities it can engage in effective monitoring and scrutiny.¹⁰²
282. Out of every dollar Uganda allocated to education in 1995, just 20 cents reached the country's schools. The rest was lost to local patronage politics. After discovering that it was losing 80% of its education spending to corruption, the Ugandan government started publishing the amounts due to each school in the local newspapers. With this information, local teachers and parents made sure that as much as 80% of the allocated funds actually reached the schools.¹⁰³ The Commission recommends that the Government should work towards the publication of all relevant amounts allocated to the provision of

¹⁰⁰ In June 2002, the ACC's Deputy Commissioner complained that three-quarters of the 57 cases submitted to the Attorney General since the establishment of the Commission in January 2001 had not been acted upon. *Global Corruption Report 2003*, p219

¹⁰¹ See Independent Anti-Corruption Agencies at <http://www.transparency.org/sourcebook/11.html>

¹⁰² See the section below titled "Civil Society".

¹⁰³ See the article "Fighting corruption", published in *The Economist* on 29 April 2004. More detail can be found at the website: www.economist.com/copenhagenconsensus.

services and amenities. Such publication should aim to provide the amounts allocated to specific services at local and community level.

283. Civil servants, at times, attempt to supplement their income by arbitrarily levying charges against citizens. This is made possible where citizens are uncertain as to what they are entitled to. At points of contact with the public, the Commission recommends the erection of signboards (and other means) which clearly set out the service the public is entitled to; whether there are charges; and, if so, the specific amounts. The Commission recommends that Government should work towards the fulfilment of this recommendation throughout the country.

Exposing Corruption

284. Corruption is often exposed, when individuals within government come forward with information. The Commission is of the view that all those who work in the public service and the judiciary have a duty to expose and root out corruption. Where public officials have knowledge of corruption and do not come forward with such information, they are, for all intents and purposes, accomplices in the corrupt act.
285. Individuals who come forward with information about corruption are sometimes referred to as “whistle-blowers”. In order to successfully act against corruption, whistle blowing ought to be encouraged. Such individuals are invariably victimised when they expose corruption. They are penalised and, at times, they lose their jobs and even face physical harm. It takes courage to expose corruption.
286. Some public officials claim that they are unable to disclose details about corruption because of confidentiality provisions and state secret laws that bind them to secrecy. Such provisions cannot be used to cover up crimes. No court or tribunal should entertain such criminal proceedings, where it is clear that the accused is a whistle blower. Where there are potential anomalies in the law, the Government is enjoined to amend the law accordingly. This is an imperative recommendation.
287. The Commission recommends that Government leaders publicly announce that the victimisation of whistle-blowers will not be tolerated. The Commission recommends that the Government provide legal protection to whistle-blowers who provide information that leads to the exposure of corrupt activities. It should be a criminal offence to engage in reprisals against whistle-blowers. This is an imperative recommendation.

A United Front against Corruption

288. The Commission calls on government, business and civil society to come together to form a potent force against corruption.¹⁰⁴ Each sector has a critical role to play in stopping the spread of corruption.
289. Those leading the fight in each sector should hold an annual anti-corruption or national integrity summit to assess progress and to strategise the way forward.¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁴ This could happen under the umbrella of the Anti-Corruption Commission Coalition of the ACC.

¹⁰⁵ The summit could be complemented by an annual anti-corruption day, involving as many interested organisations as possible.

Civil Society

290. Civil society has a crucial role to play in monitoring and reporting on cases of misconduct and corruption in the public sector. In particular, independent monitors should be assessing the performance of anti-corruption bodies and the measures they have instituted. Non-governmental groups should be engaged in ongoing advocacy and research. There is much that can be done.
291. “Citizens’ Charters” detailing the dos and don’ts that private individuals should follow to prevent corruption and promote integrity ought to be widely distributed.¹⁰⁶ Such charters will set out conduct on the part of citizens that tends to promote corruption and which should be stopped. It will also set out activities that citizens can engage in to curtail corruption. Citizen groups ought to declare adherence to such charters.
292. Concerned citizen groups should come together to promote integrity in public service delivery in their areas.¹⁰⁷ These groups can lobby for reform, where corruption is rife or where local service delivery is failing. Activists and journalists can develop “Report Cards” to score levels of corruption in public utilities and departments. The Report Cards can also be used to assess the performance and standards of service provided by public utilities and government departments.¹⁰⁸ The publication of the results of these Report Cards can help curb corruption and spur public officials to perform better.
293. Civil society should be closely monitoring the privatisation of public assets and procurement processes. Activists could lobby for the implementation of Integrity Pacts or voluntary agreements underwritten by parties to a contract involving public resources.¹⁰⁹ These agreements, which involve independent scrutiny, are meant to ensure transparency and honesty in contracts or bids involving public funds.
294. In Sierra Leone, the private economy is highly reliant on the public sector for business. Inflating government contract prices is not uncommon. This is done in order to provide for “kickbacks” that have to be paid and to take into account the fact that Government invariably pays late. Civil society monitoring could include a “Prices and Purchases” programme, which involves the collection and publication of information for the purpose of comparing prices of goods and services purchased by government entities.¹¹⁰ Such a programme will expose the practice of inflating contract prices. Government will be forced to explain why they are overspending on items.

¹⁰⁶ Transparency Mauritius popularised such a document titled “The Citizens’ Charter”. More detail can be found at the website: www.transparencymauritius.net.mu.

¹⁰⁷ In Bangladesh, a network of Committees of Concerned Citizens campaigned for the formation of “Islands of Integrity” to ensure ethical conduct in local service delivery.

¹⁰⁸ An example is Report Card system developed by the Public Affairs Centre, Bangalore, India. More detail can be found at the website: www.pacindia.org.

¹⁰⁹ Transparencia por Colombia has been implementing Integrity pacts since 1999. More detail can be found at the website: www.transparenciacolombia.org.co. Nepalese groups have also achieved success using Integrity Pacts.

¹¹⁰ A programme of this nature was used to good effect in Colombia. More detail can be found at the website: www.veeduridistrital.gov.co.

295. Members of civil sector groups in Sierra Leone have been referred to as those “on the waiting list;” that is waiting to get into government. Such persons can never be expected to perform their role of zealously scrutinising public conduct. They will never want to offend government. Sierra Leone does not need individuals who simply join non-governmental groups as a stepping-stone to something better. Sierra Leone needs civil society activists who are committed to their country.
296. If local non-governmental organisations are serious about their role in representing civil society and monitoring public excesses then they must be watchdogs, not lapdogs. The Commission calls upon non-governmental organisations and civil society to become active watchdogs in the fight against corruption.

Business

297. Local and international businesses are important partners in the fight against corruption. Much corruption happens only because there are willing accomplices in the business world. Organised business has no choice but to confront corruption within its own ranks.
298. The Commission calls upon the business sector to develop its own Code of Corporate Governance in order to build a culture of ethical conduct.
299. Around the world, businesses assist in the reduction of crime and corruption by sharing information with each other and law enforcement agencies. This should happen in Sierra Leone.

Government

300. Apart from initiatives to introduce transparent government as described above, the government can do much to limit the corrupt activities of many of its employees. There are certain areas in the public service, where corruption is rife because of the opportunities they present for enrichment. These areas include procurement, the privatisation process and transportation. The Commission calls on the government to pay particular attention to these areas. Much can be done to close down the opportunities for corruption. Making these processes scrupulously open and transparent is the starting point.
301. Weaknesses in public administration fundamentals permit corruption to flourish. Instituting basic financial management tools and introducing systems for proper filing and record-keeping will go a long way towards closing the doors on opportunities for self enrichment.

The Donor Community

302. The donor community places corruption high on its agenda. The donor community needs to become more vigilant in the monitoring of the non-governmental organisations, government ministries and public agencies it supports.

303. Beneficiary organisations and ministries that display the same mismanagement and the same corrupt tendencies, year in and year out, should not qualify for continued donor support. Aid agencies tend to hold back from acting against individuals, particularly senior individuals who are responsible for corrupt practices. Donor groups should insist on firm action against corrupt individuals in beneficiary organisations, when the evidence is presented. Failing to do so serves to promote the very behaviour the agencies are attempting to stop.

YOUTH

“PRODUCTIVE YOUTH BUILD BETTER NATION”

Slogan from the Combat Camp Youth Committee¹¹¹

304. Youths¹¹² were the driving force behind the resistance to one-party state rule in the 1980s. As students, journalists, workers and activists they exposed injustices and the bankruptcy of the ruling elite’s ideology. They also bore the brunt of the state’s repressive backlash. During the conflict, youths formed the bulk of the fighting forces in all the factions. The last twenty years of Sierra Leone’s history are, in reality, the story of Sierra Leone’s youths.
305. Many of the dire conditions that gave rise to the conflict in 1991 remain in 2004. As in the late 1980s, many young adults continue to occupy urban ghettos where they languish in a twilight zone of unemployment and despair.

National Mobilisation

306. The civil war has aggravated matters for the youth. After ten years of war, thousands of young men and women have been denied a normal education and indeed a normal life. Their childhood and youth have been squandered by years of brutal civil conflict. Many young Sierra Leoneans have lost the basic opportunities in life that young people around the world take for granted. These young people constitute Sierra Leone’s lost generation. The Commission recommends that the youth question be viewed as a national emergency that demands national mobilisation. This is an imperative recommendation.
307. The Commission has detected a certain energy and resolve among many of the youths with which it has interacted in hearings, reconciliation programmes and the National Vision for Sierra Leone. This resolve is reflected in the desire to overcome the difficulties and traumas of the past and to forge a new and proud Sierra Leone. The Commission has detected this resolve among university students, professionals, young men and women in Government and among the unemployed in the ghettos. This energy must be harnessed and channelled towards productive ends. The future of Sierra Leone depends on this.

¹¹¹ Slogan submitted to the National Vision for Sierra Leone, a project of the TRC.

¹¹² For the purposes of this report the age category of youths extends from 18 to 35 years. Recommendations on “Children” are dealt with under a separate heading later in this chapter. The 18-35 category adopted by the Commission is in line with the age category employed by the Sierra Leone Ministry of Youth. The Youth Ministry has extended the age limit of youth because it regards the period of the conflict as “lost years” for many youths.

National Youth Commission

308. The Commission recommends that Government work towards the transformation of the youth portfolio of the Ministry of Youth and Sports into a National Youth Commission. Such a Commission should be located in the Office of the President. The mission of a National Youth Commission would be to address the youth question as a fundamental priority in post-war reconstruction. Currently, the Youth Ministry is constrained by an overburdened civil service bureaucracy that prevents it from carrying out its basic tasks and functions. At present the Ministry is unable to finance its programmes in the provinces. In short, the Ministry of Youth does not have the means to address the youth question.
309. A National Youth Commission would be empowered by its ability to raise funds locally and internationally. It would be able to work meaningfully with fundraising agencies, while co-ordinating and streamlining the activities of the NGOs working in this field. A National Youth Commission ought to be responsible for the implementation of the Youth Policy as well as the National Youth Plan. The effective implementation of the Youth Policy and National Youth Plan would address the specific issues facing the youth as set out in the findings of the Commission.
310. A National Youth Commission could spearhead public-private partnerships involving youth in different sectors including tourism, agriculture, fisheries, housing and mining. Industrial sites and service centres could be earmarked for initiatives aimed at providing employment opportunities for youth. The National Youth Commission could facilitate investment in such schemes and encourage worker – owner schemes which would give young workers a stake in the initiative. Over a period of time, youthful workers could become co-owners and investors in such companies. The Commission recommends that the Government of Sierra Leone work towards the fulfilment of these recommendations.
311. The Commission recommends that, every year, a “State of the Youth” report be tabled before Parliament. Pending the creation of the National Youth Commission, this should be the responsibility of Ministry of Youth and Sports. Such a report should provide an overview of the state of the youth in Sierra Leone for the preceding year. It should set out a detailed assessment of all efforts and programmes to develop the youth in the public, non-governmental and private sectors. Progress should be measured against a set of agreed indicators. This recommendation is made for the serious consideration of Government.

Political Representation

312. The denial of a meaningful political voice to the youth has had devastating consequences for Sierra Leone. More avenues for the youth to express themselves and to realise their potential need to be created. Political space should be opened up so that the youth can become involved in governance and in the decision-making process. Youths must have a stake in governance.

313. The Commission recommends that all political parties be required to ensure that at least 10% of their candidates for all public elections are youths.¹¹³ This includes national elections, local government and district council elections. Legislation should be enacted to make this a legal requirement. The National Electoral Commission should be required to enforce this minimum representation. Such a stipulation will require all political parties to nurture and develop meaningful participation of the youth. This is an imperative recommendation.
314. Engagement in electoral politics should be accompanied by political responsibility. In this regard the Commission endorses the programme launched by the Ministry of Youth and Sports to cultivate political responsibility among the youth. This programme envisages the creation of elected Chiefdom Youth Committees that would send representatives to a District Youth Committee. The District Committee would act as a clearing-house for youth activities and projects. District Youth Committees would send representatives to Regional Youth Committees, which would set the agenda for a National Youth Conference. The Regional Committees would send representatives to the National Youth Conference that would elect members to a National Youth Committee.
315. Such an initiative would structure youth participation in public affairs and provide a training ground for tomorrow's leaders. The Commission supports this initiative and calls on Government to set in place the necessary legislative framework to make it work. The Commission also calls on Government and the donor community to resource this important programme.

WOMEN

I hope to see a Sierra Leone offering equal opportunities for boys and girls from the cradle to the grave. ... In particular, I want to see a country where girls are not left out but are encouraged to reach the highest peak of their potential.

Extract from the essay "My National Vision for Sierra Leone" by Chinsia E. Caesar¹¹⁴

316. Women and girls were the deliberate targets of sexual violence and rape by all the armed groups during the conflict. Women continue to be victims of gender-based violence. The Commission has noted the submissions made by women's groups, which point to the failure of successive governments to protect women and girls during the conflict and post-conflict periods.
317. The Commission recommends that the President, as the "Father of the Nation" and as the Head of State, should acknowledge the harm suffered by women and girls during the conflict in Sierra Leone and offer an unequivocal apology to them on behalf of the government and preceding governments in Sierra Leone. This is an imperative recommendation.

¹¹³ The definition of youths here is again young adults between the ages of 18 and 35 years.

¹¹⁴ Essay submitted to the National Vision for Sierra Leone, a project of the TRC.

318. The Commission calls on the leadership of all political parties to acknowledge the harm suffered by women and girls during the conflict in Sierra Leone and to offer an unequivocal apology to them on behalf of their particular political parties.
319. Women and girls in Sierra Leone continue to suffer historic structural inequality on account of their gender. Gender inequality is entrenched in all spheres of social, political and economic life by discriminatory laws, customs, traditions and practices.
320. The Commission notes that the State has not yet taken the necessary steps to eradicate structural inequality against women that still pervades Sierra Leonean society. Discriminatory laws and customs in the areas of marriage, divorce, land rights, inheritance and the administration of estates remain major obstacles to the transformation of women's lives.
321. The Commission's recommendations to address structural inequality encompass law reform, access to justice, the abolition of discriminatory customary law and practices, the building of institutional capacity and the establishment of educational programmes to counter attitudes and norms which lead to the oppression of women. The Commission views education, health, economic empowerment and political participation as priority areas for the progressive development of women in Sierra Leone.
322. The Commission has identified war widows, aged women, girl mothers, and victims of displacement and female ex-combatants as particularly vulnerable groups. The recommendations attempt to address the specific needs of these victims.

Women affected by the Armed Conflict

323. Women were subjected to systematic abuse during the conflict. Violations perpetrated against women included torture, rape, sexual abuse, and sexual slavery, trafficking, enslavement, abductions, amputations, forced pregnancy, forced labour and detentions.
324. Never again should women in Sierra Leone be subjected to brutality. Every man and boy in Sierra Leone owes a duty to respect women and girls and to protect them from abuse at all times.
325. The Commission calls on communities to make special efforts to encourage acceptance of the survivors of rape and sexual violence as they reintegrate into society. The physical and emotional well being of the women victims of rape and their children born as a result of rapes should be protected.¹¹⁵
326. The Commission notes that women who have been sexually violated during the conflict period deliberately avoid being identified, as they fear stigmatisation. The Commission notes that assisting them with long-term mental and physical injuries depends on making services accessible.

¹¹⁵ The health needs of women victims of the conflict are addressed in the chapter on Reparations, at Chapter Four of Volume Three A of this report.

327. The Commission recommends that a directory be established by the Ministry of Social Welfare and Gender Affairs in conjunction with UNIFEM, the World Health Organisation and other stakeholders which should contain a list of donor agencies and service providers assisting women together with their contact details both in the provinces and Freetown. The emphasis should be on where women can obtain information and access assistance. The launch of the directory should be accompanied by a media campaign. The Ministry of Social Welfare and Gender Affairs should work towards the implementation of this recommendation.

Domestic Violence

328. Domestic violence against women intensified during the civil war and endures in the post-conflict period. The Commission notes that the laws of Sierra Leone relating to the prosecution of domestic violence are inadequate and offer little protection to women and girls. The Commission recommends that Government work towards the enactment of specific legislation to address domestic violence. Such laws should facilitate the prosecution of offenders and empower women to access protection orders.
329. Women and girls experience great difficulty in pressing charges in respect of rape and sexual violence as police and judicial officers are reluctant to investigate and prosecute such cases. The Commission recommends that the Ministry of Social Welfare and Gender in conjunction with UNIFEM and the Gender Desk of the police work towards the creation of an educational programme for the police, prosecutors and judicial officers raising awareness of issues of gender, educating and training them in the investigation and prosecution of gender-based crimes and sensitising them on how to deal properly with complainants.

Sexual Violence

330. Women and girls in Sierra Leone continue to be the victims of sexual violence. The Commission notes that the national laws of Sierra Leone are inadequate to deal with the prosecution of crimes of sexual violence, including rape, sexual harassment and other forms of sexual abuse. The current rules of procedure and evidence in respect of crimes of sexual violence are not only discriminatory but are also offensive to women and girls.
331. The Commission recommends that a directory be created, which includes all the information existing in regard to the various skills programmes and the providers of such services. The release of such a directory should be accompanied by a media campaign, which will lead to more women learning of the programmes being offered.¹¹⁶
332. Women and girls who are sexually violated rarely lay complaints, as the current environment is not conducive to doing so. This has led to a culture of impunity in respect of crimes of a sexual nature.

¹¹⁶ The Ministry of Social Welfare and Gender Affairs should consider the creation of one network to co-ordinate all organisations working with women and the issuance of one directory setting out all their services – which could be updated annually.

333. In order to address these inadequacies, the Commission recommends that laws that link the prosecution of sexual offences to the moral character of a complainant should be repealed.¹¹⁷ This is an imperative recommendation.
334. The Commission recommends that the government work towards the harmonisation of the national laws of Sierra Leone with the provisions contained in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in regard to the evidentiary burden, rules of procedure and evidence in respect of crimes of sexual violence.¹¹⁸

Sexual Offences under Customary Law

335. Customary laws and practices in respect of sexual offences are deeply discriminatory against women and girls and have contributed to a culture of impunity over a long period of time.
336. The Commission is disturbed to note that, under customary law, the consent of a minor for sex is not required. Furthermore, crimes of rape and sexual violence are usually settled directly between the violator and the parents or guardians of the girl-child without the victim having any say in the matter. Families usually settle crimes of rape and sexual violence by accepting monetary compensation or by the offender being compelled to enter into marriage with the minor victim.
337. The Commission recommends that the Government should launch a campaign to end the practice under the customary law of compelling women and girls who have been raped to enter into marriage with the offender. This is an imperative recommendation.
338. The Commission calls on community leaders to discourage the practice of accepting monetary compensation for the crimes of rape and sexual violence as an alternative to reporting the cases for criminal prosecution. Communities should be encouraged to pursue prosecutions for offenders of sex crimes.
339. The Commission recommends that the Ministry of Social Welfare and Gender Affairs, in conjunction with UNIFEM, should work towards a national campaign, together with other agencies, to raise awareness about the culture of silence that pervades the issue of rape and sexual violence and encourage the abolition of customary practices which impact negatively on the rights of women.
340. The Commission recommends that the Government work towards the harmonisation of the customary law with the common law and that to ensure laws dealing with the protection of women, particularly in regard to domestic violence and crimes of sexual violence, accord with international human rights standards.

¹¹⁷ See the Protection of Women and Girls Act 1960, which can be found at Chapter 30 of the Laws of Sierra Leone of 1960.

¹¹⁸ ICC –ASP/1/3. See also Rule 98 of the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia and Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court.

Discrimination against Women

341. Women and girls in Sierra Leone, before, during and after the conflict, were subjected to discrimination by practice, custom and law. There is no basis to justify the discrimination that women have endured in Sierra Leone. The legal apparatus that entrenches discrimination against women must be dismantled. The Commission recommends the repeal of all statutory and customary laws that discriminate against women.
342. Laws that should be repealed include those provisions that discriminate against women in relation to marriage, the administration of estates, inheritance, and divorce and property ownership. This recommendation requires the repeal of sections 26(4)(d) and (e) of the Constitution, which permit discrimination against women in these areas and on the grounds of customary law. Constitutional provisions that authorise discrimination on the basis of gender have no place in a modern democratic society based on equality and respect for human dignity.
343. The Commission recommends that Sierra Leone ratify the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women. The Protocol enjoins signatories to address “Harmful Practices” against women. Harmful Practices are defined as all behaviour, attitudes and practices which negatively affect the fundamental rights of women and girls, such as their right to life, health, dignity, education and physical integrity.
344. The Commission recommends that the Government take steps to immediately implement its obligations under the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women¹¹⁹ and to ensure that gender is taken into account in all legislation and policy.
345. The Commission recommends that all aspects of customary law¹²⁰ as well as practices which discriminate against women in the realm of inheritance, land ownership, marriage, divorce and the administration of estates be abolished by Parliament.
346. These recommendations are imperative.

Political Participation and Access to Power

347. Women have been excluded from decision-making in Sierra Leone. Women are largely absent in the structures of government and traditional forums that are critical in formulating policies.
348. The Commission is persuaded that simply calling for the opening up of the political space for women is not sufficient. If Sierra Leone is serious about giving a meaningful voice to women in representative politics, then more serious efforts have to be made to achieve this end.

¹¹⁹ The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), adopted in 1979 by the UN General Assembly and ratified by Sierra Leone on 11 November 1998. See the website: www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw.

¹²⁰ The expression “customary law is intended to include Islamic or “Mohamedan” Law.

349. The Commission recommends that political parties be required to ensure that at least 30% of their candidates for public elections are women. This includes national elections, local government and district council elections. Legislation should be enacted to make this a legal requirement. The National Electoral Commission should be required to enforce this minimum representation. Such a stipulation will require all political parties to nurture and develop meaningful participation of women. This is an imperative recommendation.
350. The Commission further recommends that Government and Parliament work towards achieving 50/50 gender parity in representative politics (Parliament, District Council and Local Government) within the next 10 years.
351. The Commission recommends that the Government work towards achieving a representation of at least 30% women in cabinet and other political posts. Government should also work towards incrementally achieving 50/50 gender parity in cabinet and political posts within the next 10 years.
352. The Commission notes the lack of young women in positions of leadership and calls on the government, UNIFEM and the NGO sector to establish leadership programmes for women in both the provinces and Freetown to ensure that there is a new generation of women with sufficient skills to participate in public life.

Skills training and Economic Empowerment

353. Women lack adequate access to productive assets including land, credit, training and technology. For these reasons, they are largely consigned to food production and petty trading with very low earnings.
354. The Commission notes that many women ex-combatants were not able to participate in the skills training programmes provided on demobilisation. The Commission also notes the proliferation of skills training programmes in the country run by various international and local organisations. The Commission recommends that, to ensure that women are able to access the skills training programmes that are being offered by the various agencies, the Ministry of Social Welfare and Gender Affairs should establish a network of service providers and agencies offering the various skills training programmes and ensure that services are decentralised and that women in the provinces are able to access them.
355. The Commission notes that a major obstacle for many of the women who have gone through skills training programmes is the absence of suitable opportunities to practise their skills as well as the lack of accessible markets. The Commission recommends that the Ministry of Social Welfare and Gender Affairs, in conjunction with UNIFEM, explore opportunities for women to utilise the skills acquired and market opportunities, where their items can be sold.
356. The Commission recommends that micro-credit schemes should target women ex-combatants, internally displaced women, female heads of households and war widows. Those providing micro-credit should be encouraged to incorporate a basic business management course into the provision of micro-credit.
357. These recommendations are for the serious consideration of Government.

Education

358. Women comprise the largest category of persons without formal education in Sierra Leone. Women have, in effect, been under-educated. This bias against women must be redressed.
359. Steps should be taken to promote the enrolment of girls in schools and other training institutions. The Commission recommends that the Government work towards providing free and compulsory education to girls up to and including the level of senior secondary school.
360. The practice of expelling girls who become pregnant from educational institutions is discriminatory and archaic. This is an imperative recommendation.
361. The Commission recommends that the Ministry of Education in conjunction with the Ministry of Social Welfare and Gender Affairs and UNIFEM consider the establishment of adult education programmes for women in which basic literacy and numeric skills can be taught.

Access to Justice

362. The Commission notes that women do not enjoy adequate access to legal aid. The Commission calls on the Fourah Bay University Legal Aid Clinic, together with LAWCLA and the Bar Council, to consider initiating a specific focus on domestic and sexual violence against women as well as issues pertaining to inheritance, land and marriage.

HIV / AIDS

363. The Commission notes the high prevalence of the HIV / AIDS among the population of Sierra Leone as well as the high number of women infected. The Commission also notes that women married into polygamous marriages are exposed to a higher risk of sexually transmitted diseases because of their husband's multiple partners.
364. The Commission recommends that the Ministry of Social Welfare and Gender Affairs, in conjunction with UNIFEM and the NGO sector, work towards the launching of an education programme, which addresses both men and women on safe sex practices.

Gender Commission

365. The Commission is of the view that gender issues do not receive sufficient attention within the Ministry of Social Welfare and Gender Affairs. The Commission recommends that the Government seriously consider the removal of the gender portfolio from the Ministry of Social welfare and the creation of a gender commission.
366. The Gender Commission should be representative of all sectors of Sierra Leone society. The Gender Commission should co-ordinate and drive all issues pertaining to the advancement of women in Sierra Leone.

The Most Vulnerable

367. War widows, aged women, girl mothers, victims of displacement and female ex-combatants are among the most vulnerable groups in Sierra Leone today. The Commission urges the government and relief agencies to pay particular attention to their needs.
368. The government should provide psychosocial support and reproductive health services to women affected by conflict. These services should be provided free to those who have experienced physical trauma, torture and sexual violence.¹²¹ Government should work towards the early fulfilment of this recommendation.

War Widows

369. War widows experienced serious hardships as result of the killing of their husbands. In post conflict Sierra Leone, they are further disadvantaged by the loss of their husbands. Tradition and custom prevents many of them from owning property, accessing land and inheriting from their husbands.
370. In certain ethnic groups, they are passed on as property to the husband's next eldest brother or closest male relative who inherits from their deceased husbands. The Commission recommends the repeal of all laws, customs and practices that discriminate against widows and which prevent land being owned or held by them.¹²²
371. The Commission recommends that the repeal of such laws and customs should be accompanied by sensitisation programmes for society, particularly in the provinces, which seek to deal with the negative perceptions of how widows should be treated.
372. The Commission calls on the *Bondu* societies¹²³ to serve as mechanisms for change and that they should use their influence in communities to improve the quality of life for widows and elderly women.

Female Ex-combatants

373. Now that the formal disarmament and reintegration programmes are complete, the Commission calls on communities to continue with the accepting back of former girl and women soldiers into their villages and neighbourhoods. Communities should do this with compassion. The same applies to the many women who were displaced by the conflict and have not as yet returned to their communities.

¹²¹ See the chapter on Reparations, at Chapter Four of Volume Three A of this report for detailed recommendations to address the health, psychological and social needs of war victims.

¹²² The Commission has made the imperative recommendation that all laws and customs that discriminate against women should be repealed. This recommendation includes the repeal of provisions on Sierra Leone's statute books, which undermine the inheritance and property rights of women.

¹²³ *Bondu* societies are secret societies for women. They assist women in household and domestic management and play an important role in the socialisation of girls and women into community life.

374. Many girl and women ex-combatants did not benefit from the disarmament programmes. The Commission calls on relief agencies to continue to assist these women with skills training and their rehabilitation back into society. Similar support should be given to non-combatant women who were internally displaced by the civil war and who found themselves economically and socially marginalised.

Elderly Women

375. A large number of elderly women have been rendered destitute and unemployable by the conflict. The war was accompanied by the breakdown of social and cultural values that would normally have ensured protection and support for elderly women. These women have been largely abandoned by society. They now live on the margins of society. Elderly women should be treated with dignity.
376. The Commission recommends that Government establish old people's homes in all the main urban centres and ensure that elderly women have access to land in rural areas. The Commission further recommends that Government attend to the social and medical needs of elderly women. The Government should work towards the fulfilment of these recommendations.

CHILDREN

*I heard the cry of "Salone pikin" being conscripted
"Salone pikin" raped, killed
Were they not forced to drink in human skulls?
Oh "Salone Pikin"
Where is your future?
Sweet Salone*

Extract from the poem "Salone Pikin" by Emmanuel Bryma Momoh¹²⁴

377. The Commission has found that in the Sierra Leone conflict children¹²⁵ were singled out for some of the most brutal violations of human rights recorded in any conflict. The children targeted were sometimes even below ten years of age.
378. The Commission found it most disturbing that children were the main victims in the following violations: drugging;¹²⁶ forced recruitment; rape; and sexual assault. The Commission also notes that children were compelled to participate in the war as child soldiers and were forced to commit a range of atrocities.
379. Never again should the children of Sierra Leone be subjected to brutality.

¹²⁴ Poem submitted to the National Vision for Sierra Leone, a project of the TRC.

¹²⁵ For the purposes of this report children are considered to be those persons below the age of 18 (eighteen) years.

¹²⁶ "Drugging" refers to the forced consumption of drugs.

Child Rights Bill

380. The Commission notes that the laws and customs relating to children are confusing and require codification to ensure that they are clear and not utilised in an arbitrary manner.
381. The Commission recommends that the Child Rights Bill, incorporating the provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child be passed into legislation as a matter of urgency.¹²⁷
382. The Commission recommends that the Law Commission commence a review of all legislation with a view to determining whether the rights of children have been taken into account and, in particular, whether such legislation is in accord with the Convention of the Rights of the Child and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.
383. These are imperative recommendations.

School Education

384. The Commission recommends that primary school education be compulsory for all children. It should be an offence not to send children to primary school. This is an imperative recommendation.
385. The Commission notes that primary school education is supposedly made available free of charge to all children. The Commission recommends that no "hidden charges" or "chalk fees" be levied against parents. Free primary school education must mean free in every sense of the word. The Government should work towards the fulfilment of this recommendation.
386. The Commission recommends that the Government should work towards the creation of incentives to encourage children of school going age to attend secondary school.

Age of Majority

387. The Commission recommends that Parliament enact legislation making 18 the age of majority bringing it into line with the voting age of 18 already provided for in the Constitution.¹²⁸
388. This is an imperative recommendation.

¹²⁷ Sierra Leone is a party to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and to the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.

¹²⁸ Article 1 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child defines a child as "every human being below the age of eighteen unless, under the law applicable to the child, majority is attained earlier."

Adoptions, Fostering and Guardianship

389. In Sierra Leone, adoptions are governed by a dual system of laws and custom. The effects of adoption under customary law are different from those under the common law system. In addition, the Adoption Act does not recognise adoptions carried out under customary law. In effect, practices that have existed under customary law for a number of years do not have any effect in law. A further problem is the practice of fostering which involves a child becoming the ward of a person regarded as a guardian. The guardian or foster parent has custody of the child but in the absence of a law specifically providing for this process, the rights of guardians are tenuous.
390. The Commission recommends that the Government of Sierra Leone urgently review the Adoption laws to incorporate the practice of guardianship and fostering which exists in the common law and in practice.
391. After the war, thousands of children were orphaned. This led to the establishment of orphanages and foster homes in the country. However, most of these facilities are private enterprises not regulated by law. In order to avoid abuse and trafficking in children, it is important to regulate this new industry and to ensure that the rights and responsibilities of the proprietors are regulated so that the best interests of the child are protected and donor funds are properly accounted for.
392. The Commission recommends that the Government enact legislation to regulate the establishment of orphanages both private and public in order to ensure that the rights of children are protected.
393. Government should work towards the fulfilment of these recommendations.

Early marriages

394. The absence of a minimum age for marriage of girls in Sierra Leone has impacted negatively on the development of young girls. Under customary law, girls under the age of ten may be given away in marriage. In order to address this problem, the Commission recommends that legislation be enacted abolishing this practice and that a minimum age for marriage be established at eighteen.¹²⁹
395. The Commission recommends that the Government enact legislation making it a criminal offence to permit, authorise and assist in the marriage of children under 18 years of age. This is an imperative recommendation.
396. The enactment of legislation should be accompanied by an education campaign, which highlights the negative aspects of marriages of children, in particular girls under the age of 18. The Government should work towards the implementation of this recommendation.
397. The Commission calls on the Ministry of Social Welfare and Gender Affairs and civil society to monitor this issue particularly in the Northern provinces and take steps to prosecute those who violate such a law.

¹²⁹ 18 (eighteen) years old has been determined as the appropriate age for marriage by the CEDAW committee, in terms of general recommendation 21 of the CEDAW committee.

Sexual Offences against children¹³⁰

398. The Commission recommends that the Government should enact legislation that would make it a criminal offence to have sexual relations with a child under the age of 16. Sex with a child under the age of 16 should constitute the offence of statutory rape. This is an imperative recommendation.

Laws on the employment of children

399. The Commission recommends that the government review the practice of employing children under the age of 18 on a full-time basis. Children who are employed should work under conditions that are humane and which comply with international human rights standards.¹³¹
400. The Government should work towards the fulfilment of this recommendation.

Trafficking of Children

401. Sierra Leone was one of three nations in sub-Saharan Africa that received a "Tier Three" or least favourable ranking in the US Department of State's annual "Trafficking in Persons Report"¹³² (Trafficking Report) for failing to make reasonable attempts to end the exploitation of minors. The report said that the Government of Sierra Leone recognises that trafficking is a problem, but has not made substantial efforts to prevent it.
402. The Trafficking Report indicated that child trafficking is a particularly challenging problem in Africa because of the practice of "fostering" or "placement" of children. Under this traditional system, children are sent to live with relatives or other trusted individuals, and are given schooling or learn a trade. Yet in many cases, the child is trafficked into a situation of forced domestic servitude, street vending, or sexual exploitation. UNICEF estimates that as many as 200,000 children in West and Central Africa alone are smuggled across national borders every year to provide what amounts to forced labour in neighbouring countries. Countless others are sold or traded within their own countries.
403. Trafficked children are virtual prisoners in their workplace, denied education, health care, or contact with their families and deprived even of adequate food, clothing, and rest. Frequent targets of physical and sexual abuse, trafficked children succumb to injuries, illness, and sexually transmitted diseases. Open border policies established by the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) to promote free trade have made it easier for international traffickers to ply their trade.¹³³

¹³⁰ See also the recommendations in respect of "Sexual Violence and Domestic Violence" under the heading "Women".

¹³¹ See also the recommendations in respect of "Child Labour" under "Mineral Resources".

¹³² The US Department of State's "Trafficking in Persons Report" was released in June 2004. More detail can be found at the website: <http://usinfo.state.gov/gi/Archive/2004/Jun/17-838848.html>.

¹³³ More detail can be found at: <http://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/traffick/homepage.htm>.

404. The current laws of Sierra Leone do little to stop the trafficking of children. In addition, the lack of access to adequate health care, education and opportunities for vocational training for children contributes to exacerbating sexual exploitation and the potential for children to be trafficked out of the country. The Commission recommends that the Law Commission draft a law criminalising trafficking and the sexual exploitation of children. This law should accord with the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography. Such a law should be enacted as soon as possible. The Commission recommends further that the Government of Sierra Leone becomes a signatory to the Optional Protocol. These are imperative recommendations.
405. The Commission calls upon the member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to take concerted action to implement the Political Declaration and Action Plan against trafficking in human beings, especially women and children. The Action Plan commits the ECOWAS countries to take specific steps, such as launching public awareness campaigns to alert potential victims to methods used by traffickers; creating special police units to combat trafficking; and training police, customs, and immigration officials to catch and prosecute traffickers and to protect the rights of victims.

Recreational Centres

406. The armed conflict exposed the children of Sierra Leone to violence of an unprecedented nature. The violence has left them emotionally scarred. It robbed them of the opportunity to enjoy childhood and the art of playing.
407. Opportunities to play are scarce for children affected by conflict and poverty. This scarcity must be addressed because play occupies and strengthens both mind and body. Play gives children the opportunity to be children. Without that opportunity, children and communities cannot thrive. The Commission commends the work of organisations such as Right To Play for their promotion of sports and physical education in Sierra Leone.
408. The Commission recommends that the government and children's agencies seriously consider the establishment of recreation centres throughout the country where children can be exposed to sports and to the art of play.

Children's Forum Network

409. The children of Sierra Leone have not had a meaningful role and voice in the social, political and economic life of Sierra Leone despite the fact that they were compelled to adopt adult roles during the conflict. The establishment of the Children's Forum Network (CFN), an advocacy group run by children, enabled the Commission to hear and listen to the voices of Sierra Leone's children telling about their experiences in the civil war.
410. The Commission recommends that the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs work towards providing facilities and resources for the Children's Forum Network to operate at national, provincial and local levels. The Commission recommends that the Ministry pay particular attention to supporting the CFN in the northern, eastern and southern parts of the country.

EXTERNAL ACTORS

*I saw the United Nations peacekeeping forces and I was happy
Yes I saw*

Extract from the poem "I Saw" by Mohamed Sekoya¹³⁴

Promotion of Regional Integration and Unity

411. The Commission commends the current efforts of ECOWAS and the African Union in promoting sub-regional and regional integration and unity. Such efforts will make it difficult for a country to promote unrest and armed conflict in a neighbouring country or provide resources to insurgents in another country.
412. The Commission calls on the governments of Libya, Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso to publicly acknowledge their roles in promoting and financing the RUF. These countries should publicly commit themselves to the principles of regional cooperation enshrined in the founding documents of the African Union and ECOWAS.
413. In particular, the Commission calls upon the government of Libya, in recognition of the training and financial support it supplied to the insurgents, to provide monetary support to the War Victims Fund and to support reconciliation initiatives within Sierra Leone.

Preventing War in the Mano River Basin

414. The Commission calls on the Government of Liberia to publicly acknowledge the role of its predecessor in promoting war and armed conflict in Sierra Leone. The Government of Liberia should consider an act of symbolic reparation to Sierra Leone and its people. This could be in the form of an event or the erection of a monument in Sierra Leone to the memory of all those who died in the conflict.
415. The Commission recommends that the Government of Sierra Leone work with the Governments of Liberia and Guinea to ensure adequate security along the common borders in order to prevent the flow of small arms¹³⁵ and light weapons.¹³⁶
416. In the longer term, the Commission recommends that the laws regulating firearms and explosives in the three countries be harmonised in order to achieve a common licensing procedure and penal code.
417. Diamonds were a major resource fought over by the armed factions during the war. The Commission recommends that the Governments of the Mano River Basin should commit themselves to effective mechanisms for controlling the smuggling of diamonds along their common borders.

¹³⁴ Poem submitted to the National Vision for Sierra Leone, a project of the TRC.

¹³⁵ "Small arms" include revolvers and self-loading pistols, rifles and carbines, assault rifles, sub-machine guns, and light machine guns.

¹³⁶ "Light weapons" include heavy machine guns, hand-held under-barrel and mounted grenade launchers, portable anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns, recoilless rifles, portable launchers of anti-tank and anti-aircraft missile systems, and mortars of less than 100mm calibre.

418. The governments of the Mano River Basin should work towards the fulfilment of these recommendations.

Peace Agreements

419. The Commission acknowledges the desire by the international community to bring conflicts to an end and quickly restore peace in countries savaged by conflict. This desire should not result in quick-fix solutions in which countries are rushed into concluding peace agreements. The Commission believes that the international community forced the Abidjan Peace Agreement on the government of Sierra Leone. Rather than bringing peace, this ill-conceived agreement facilitated the escalation of the conflict.

Military Intervention and Peacekeeping

420. The conflict in Sierra Leone lasted so long because the international community ignored it. The lack of response promoted the perception that Sierra Leone, like other parts of Africa embroiled in conflict, was not sufficiently important. A well-organised military intervention is by far the quickest and most cost-effective means of limiting and stopping violence. The Commission calls on the international community never again to ignore internal armed conflict on the basis that the country in question does not hold any strategic value.
421. The Commission calls on the UN and AU to strengthen the capacity of ECOWAS for peacekeeping in conflict situations. Such increased capacity will enable ECOWAS to effectively intervene in internal armed conflicts.
422. The Commission calls on ECOWAS to quickly implement the ECOWAS Protocol on early warning and conflict prevention¹³⁷. This will prepare members of the international community for potential conflicts within the sub-region and, hopefully, catalyse effective and timeous regional and international response to the conflicts.
423. Some ECOMOG Peacekeepers committed human rights violations while in Sierra Leone. The Commission recommends that part of the capacity building of ECOWAS peacekeepers should include training on human rights issues. The Commission recommends further that ECOMOG soldiers accused of having committed human rights violations during the Sierra Leone conflict should be investigated. Those soldiers found to be responsible for human rights violations should be excluded from future peacekeeping missions.
424. The Commission calls on countries within the sub region not to allow their territories to be used as staging grounds for attacks on other countries. They should also not allow their territories to be used for mobilising resources to attack other countries. Military interventions are only justified when carried out for peacekeeping purposes and when done under the auspices of the United Nations, the African Union or ECOWAS. The Commission calls on all governments in the Mano River Basin region to jointly and publicly make such an undertaking to the people of the region.

¹³⁷ See the Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security, signed in Lomé on 10 December 1999.

425. Most of the initial United Nations Peacekeeping troops who arrived in Sierra Leone were wholly unprepared for what was awaiting them on the ground. The Commission recommends that there should be adequate preparation of peacekeeping troops. Such preparation should include a good understanding of local conditions and current developments.
426. The Commission acknowledges the determination of the United Nations and the international community to stay the course in Sierra Leone. In many respects, the UN Mission in Sierra Leone has set the standard for future peacekeeping missions. Staying the course has allowed for the gradual consolidation of governmental authority.

Mercenaries

427. The UN and the member states of ECOWAS should take effective action to prevent the movement of mercenaries and soldiers of fortune within the sub-region. The fact that Sierra Leonean fighters have taken part in the internal armed conflicts of Liberia and Cote d'Ivoire should be of serious concern to all. For more than two decades, many young men and women, within the Mano River Basin, have known no occupation other than fighting and violence. Countries within this zone should cooperate with each other to initiate effective economic programmes that target the youth in order to provide them with viable and peaceful means of survival.
428. The Commission recommends that the UN re-commit itself to eliminating mercenaries in inter or intra state conflicts and enforcing the provisions of the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and Training of Mercenaries adopted by the United Nations on 4 December 1989. Mercenaries are soldiers of fortune who prosper with the escalation of conflict. They are threats to peace.

Tracing the Assets of Charles Taylor and the NPFL

429. Charles Taylor and the NPFL benefited enormously from the diamond resources procured by the RUF. The Commission recommends that the Governments of Sierra Leone, Liberia and the International Community spare no efforts to trace the material and financial assets of Charles Taylor and the NPFL and to take measures to recover such assets.
430. Any recovered assets or parts of them should, subject to negotiations with the government of Liberia, become part of the War Victims Fund proposed under the Lomé Peace Agreement and used for financing the comprehensive reparations programme recommended by the Commission.

Tracing RUF Assets in Other Countries

431. The Commission recommends that the Government of Sierra Leone elicit the support of the UN in tracing all assets acquired by the RUF in other countries including bank accounts and other assets.
432. The Commission calls on the Governments of Cote d'Ivoire, Liberia, Burkina Faso and Libya to publicly commit to assisting the Government of Sierra Leone in this endeavour. When any such assets have been identified the Government of Sierra Leone should take all reasonable means to recover the assets and ensure that they become part of the War Victims Fund.

Relationship with the United Kingdom

433. Sierra Leoneans celebrate their historic relationship with the United Kingdom. The Commission acknowledges the commitment of the Government of the United Kingdom to a ten-year development partnership being implemented by the Department for International Development (DFID). The Commission calls on the United Kingdom to pursue this partnership with renewed vigour. The partnership is crucial to consolidating the peace, economic transformation and the reconstruction of Sierra Leone.

The Withdrawal of UNAMSIL from Sierra Leone

434. The withdrawal of the bulk of the United Nations Mission to Sierra Leone will have certain consequences for the country. While there is constant monitoring of the security situation, which appears to be stable, little consideration has been given to the economic and social consequences of the removal of thousands of foreign troops and aid workers. There can be little doubt that the arrival of the United Nations and other foreign agencies provided a major boost to local economies in Freetown and elsewhere in Sierra Leone. The withdrawal of UNAMSIL may have profound effects on the local economy, which may impact on the country more generally.
435. The Commission calls on UNAMSIL to investigate the nature and extent of the economic impact of the UN intervention in Sierra Leone. In particular UNAMSIL should investigate the economic and social ramifications of the withdrawal of the UN and related organisations from Sierra Leone and make recommendations on how to lessen the effect of any economic loss.

Post-conflict Aid

436. The Commission calls on the international community to continue with its aid programmes in Sierra Leone. A study has revealed that the effect of boosting aid in post-conflict countries by 2% of GDP per year for five years, in the middle of the decade after the war ends, will reap considerable rewards and go a long way in preventing a relapse into war.¹³⁸
437. The Commission recognises that, overseas development assistance and debt relief is crucial to Sierra Leone's recovery in the short to medium term. However, in the longer term, foreign direct investment in the productive assets of the country is required. The Commission recognises further that foreign private sector investment and capital inflows are unlikely to happen until the rule of law is firmly entrenched in Sierra Leone and acceptable standards of public and corporate governance are established. The Commission calls on the international community to help Sierra Leone to address these issues and to take the necessary steps to make the country an attractive location for both domestic and foreign investment.
438. The Commission commends the efforts of the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) to consolidate peace, democracy and sound economic management on the African continent. The Commission also commends the decision of the Government of Sierra Leone to submit to the AU Peer Review Mechanism during the AU summit in Addis Ababa in July 2004.

¹³⁸ See the article "The Price of Peace", published in *The Economist* on 24 April 2004. More detail can be found at the website: www.economist.com/copenhagenconsensus.

MINERAL RESOURCES

*We'll seek those who can lead us without undertones,
Who can stop all our diamonds from turning to stone.*

Extract from the poem "My Vision, My Home, My Sierra Leone" by Ustina More¹³⁹

Accounting for the Spending of Diamond Proceeds

439. Natural resources, in the form of diamonds and gold, can spark or fuel internal strife. If people are aware what the State earns from the exploitation of mineral resources and exactly how such proceeds are spent there may be less impetus to try and seize these profits. The Commission recommends that the Government of Sierra Leone publish a regular and detailed account of how it spends the proceeds it generates from diamonds.
440. In particular, the Commission recommends that regular reports be published to inform people how the revenues generated through the Community Development Programme tax are disbursed at community level.¹⁴⁰
441. The Commission recommends that the bidding process for all mineral exploitation licenses be scrupulously fair and transparent.
442. These are imperative recommendations.

Preventing the Smuggling of Diamonds

443. Sierra Leone must confront rampant smuggling if it to sustain development.¹⁴¹ The smuggling of diamonds is an ongoing problem in Sierra Leone. Poor regulation and implementation of preventative measures have spawned the smuggling of diamonds, which in turn deprives Sierra Leone of much needed revenues for development.
444. Mines Monitoring Officers constitute the front line in the war against diamond smuggling. Currently there are too few officers. They are under resourced and not well trained. The Ministry of Mineral Resources should provide Mines Monitoring Officers with the necessary means to carry out their duties effectively. Their transportation and communication facilities should be improved. The number of officers should be augmented so they may cover the territory more efficiently. They should receive ongoing training.
445. Mines Monitoring Officers face great temptation to engage in corruption. Their remuneration should be reviewed in order to reduce the incentive to partake in graft.

¹³⁹ Poem submitted to the National Vision for Sierra Leone, a project of the TRC.

¹⁴⁰ See "Community Empowerment" for a further recommendation on the "Community Development Programme". In terms of this programme, a percentage of the tax from diamond mining goes directly to the chiefdoms. The fund is managed by the local Paramount Chief and is supposed to be used for community development.

¹⁴¹ See the USAID report entitled "Sierra Leone: Conflict diamonds", a progress report on diamond policy and development programmes; 30 March 2001, at page 3.

446. Border control should be tightened. Border patrols should be stepped up in order to provide a visible deterrent to smuggling.
447. The most unregulated aspect of diamond exploitation is at the dealership level. Dealers sponsor miners through the “supporter system”. Much abuse takes place at this level. Not all of these supported miners are licensed. Once a diamond is received at a dealer’s office, it is often claimed to have been produced by a supported licensed miner and “officially” sold to the dealer. A diamond dealer declared to the Commission during a closed hearing that he was able to “legalise any diamond and then sell it.”¹⁴²
448. Although dealers may not export diamonds without an export license, they do deal in diamonds within the country without declaring such sales to the Government Gold and Diamond Office (GGDO). Such buyers include foreign speculators and unscrupulous merchants. These middlemen then smuggle the diamonds out of the country.
449. Miners should therefore be encouraged to sell their diamonds directly to the authorised exporters. The Government should further consider the abolition of the class of dealers. The Commission recommends that all buying and selling of diamonds, within Sierra Leone, should take place under the auspices of the Government Gold and Diamond Office. Parliament should enact a law prohibiting the dealing in diamonds locally outside of the GGDO. Consideration should be given to converting the GGDO into a public limited liability company, which should accord with the highest standards of corporate governance.
450. These recommendations are for the serious consideration of the Ministry of Mineral Resources.

The Kimberley Process

451. The Commission commends the Kimberley Process¹⁴³ for the creation in October 2003 of a peer review system to monitor the implementation of the international Certification Scheme.¹⁴⁴ If fully implemented, the peer review measures will go a long way to ensure that conflict diamonds do not enter the legitimate trade.
452. The Commission notes the progress made to date in the implementation of the peer review system.¹⁴⁵ The Commission notes however that not all members of the Kimberley Process have as yet implemented adequate monitoring of their respective certification systems. The Commission calls on the members of the Kimberley Process to implement monitoring systems and to invite independent monitoring by outside bodies.

¹⁴² TRC Closed Hearing involving a diamond dealer; TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 20 May 2003.

¹⁴³ The Kimberley Process was established in 2000 by southern African diamond-producing countries. The process is designed to eliminate the use of rough diamonds to finance armed conflict and to protect the legitimate diamond industry, upon which many countries depend.

¹⁴⁴ The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, adopted on 1 January 2003.

¹⁴⁵ Important progress has been made with respect to the implementation of the peer review system, which includes the submission of annual reports on implementation, voluntary review visits to participants and the deployment of review missions in cases where there are credible indications of significant non-compliance. The Process has so far conducted review visits to the United Arab Emirates and Israel in 2004. It has also conducted review missions to the Central African Republic and the Republic of Congo during 2004 due to indications of non-compliance. More than half of the 43 members of the Kimberley Process have expressed interest in receiving similar visits.

453. The Commission calls on international NGOs and diamond industry officials to closely scrutinise the implementation of such monitoring systems in order to ensure full compliance with the Kimberley Process.
454. The Commission calls on all participants in the Kimberly Process to invite voluntary review visits in terms of the peer review system.¹⁴⁶ In particular, the Commission calls on the governments of Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea to invite review visits. During such reviews, regional linkages in the diamond trade should be closely examined.
455. The Kimberley Process is made up of countries that produce rough diamonds and those that simply trade in rough diamonds. Some Kimberly Process participants are only a conduit for the movement and trade in rough diamonds.¹⁴⁷ The Commission is concerned that some Kimberley Process Participants may issue certificates for rough diamonds that have not been produced within their own country, or that have been imported in a manner inconsistent with the Kimberley Process.¹⁴⁸
456. The Commission commends the establishment by the Kimberly Process in April 2003 of a Participation Committee to ensure that participants and applicants meet the organisation's minimum standards. The Commission calls on the Kimberly Process to ensure that participants in the Kimberley Process export only rough diamonds that they either legitimately produced or legitimately imported from another Kimberley Process participant.
457. The Commission calls on the Kimberley Process to exclude all countries that are not fully complying with the requirements of the certification scheme, including those that fail to establish internal control mechanisms from the diamond trade.
458. Given the role that conflict diamonds have played in fuelling armed conflict in West Africa, the Commission calls on all participant states in the region to apply particular vigilance in ensuring that the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme is strictly enforced.

Corruption in the Diamond Industry

459. The Commission recommends that law enforcement authorities examine closely the issuance of mining, dealing or exporting licences to relatives and associates of public officials. The object of such inquiries would be to investigate whether family members and close associates are simply acting as nominees and agents for public officials. The Commission recommends that the Anti-Corruption Commission should perform this role. This is an imperative recommendation.

¹⁴⁶ The mandate of the review teams is to undertake a professional and impartial inspection of national implementation. Each team is composed of five experts, three from Participant Governments, one from industry and one from civil society.

¹⁴⁷ This includes some of the most important countries in the diamond trade including Belgium, United Kingdom and the United States.

¹⁴⁸ This is the allegation against the Republic of Congo that is currently being investigated by the Kimberley Process.

460. The Ministry of Mineral Resources should publish the names of all mining-related licence-holders on an annual basis. Publication of the names would introduce transparency into the industry. It would also assist the government to track down agents or nominees of public officials through members of the public alerting the authorities with relevant information. This is an imperative recommendation.
461. The Commission recommends that the Ministry of Mineral Resources should work towards conducting a full review of the role played by chiefs in the granting of mining licences.

Child Labour

462. While child labour is widespread and takes different forms in Sierra Leone, the phenomenon of child miners in the diamond mines, in particular in the Kono and Tongo Fields areas, requires special attention and political action.¹⁴⁹ It is estimated that up to 10,000 children between the ages of 6 to 18 are working in the diamond mines of Sierra Leone.¹⁵⁰ There are no clearly defined child labour standards in Sierra Leone with regard to age limits, or a common understanding of what constitutes 'child mining'.¹⁵¹ Sierra Leone is a party to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child and to the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.¹⁵² The Government stated, in 2002, that it had ratified the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention 182 on the Prohibition of the Worst Forms of Child Labour of 1999.¹⁵³ However, the

¹⁴⁹ World Vision undertook a study in 2002 on children in mining activities in Kono, based on interviews with child miners, parents and mine supporters. According to their findings, most of the child miners (who are between 6-18, and 90% boys) are in the mines with the consent of their parents/guardians, often even with their encouragement. Among them is a high percentage of returned refugee or internally displaced children. There are also a considerable number of child ex-combatants working with their former commanders. Many of the children are of school-going age and receive neither formal education nor skills training. More than 80% of interviewed children in the mines are directly involved in mining activities (digging, shovelling of gravel, toting of gravel, washing of gravel). More than 40% said that they only received very limited benefits for their work.

¹⁵⁰ UNAMSIL Child Protection Advisor's note for 2004 Government of Sierra Leone Mining Policy and Child Miners meeting, 22 January 2004.

¹⁵¹ There are reports, which state that the official minimum age for employment is 18, with the possibility for children between 12-18 to work in certain non-hazardous occupations with parental consent.¹⁵¹ (See US Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices – 2002, Sierra Leone). However, existing labour legislation seems to provide lower levels of protection: under the 'Employers and Employed Act' (Chapter 212 of the Laws of Sierra Leone), children under 15 shall not work in any public or private industrial undertaking; boys under 16 shall not work underground in mines, while girls and women in general shall not be allowed to work in mines below ground.

¹⁵² According to *Article 32 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child* every child, i.e. person below the age of 18, shall be protected from economic exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or interfere with the child's education, or to be harmful to the child's health, or development. States shall therefore set minimum age(s) of employment and appropriate regulations. Similarly, *Article 15 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child* calls on States to protect children (18) from all forms of economic exploitation and from performing any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child's physical, mental, spiritual, moral, or social development.

¹⁵³ Under the *ILO Convention 182 on the Prohibition of the Worst Forms of Child Labour*, States have an obligation to take immediate and effective measures to secure the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour. This includes work of children below 18 'which, by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm the health, safety and morals of children' (ILO C182, Article 3). The types of work covered under this prohibition shall be determined by national laws or regulations and periodically reviewed (Article 4).

ILO has not yet received the instrument of ratification. Sierra Leone has not ratified ILO Convention 138 on the Minimum Age of Employment. The Commission recommends that Sierra Leone confirm its ratification of ILO Convention 182 and that it should ratify ILO Convention 138 and implement the provisions under the Conventions. These are imperative recommendations.

463. The Commission notes that different proposals have been made in the ongoing drafting of a comprehensive “Children’s Act” for the minimum legal age of child labour, in particular that 15 shall be the minimum age of employment¹⁵⁴. The Commission also supports the inclusion in the draft of a prohibition of any exploitative child labour, i.e. labour, which deprives any child under the age of 18 of his or her health, education or development.¹⁵⁵
464. The Commission commends the recent initiative of the Ministry of Mineral Resources, which requires Mining Licence-Holders to complete a form stating the names and age of labourers and to make a declaration that no labourer engaged in mining is below the age of 18.¹⁵⁶ A violation could lead to suspension and/ or cancellation of the mining license. The Commission also notes that the Attorney General has instructed the Sierra Leone Police to arrest any alluvial diamond miner who employs children in the diamond mines.¹⁵⁷ The Commission recommends that Licence-holders should have their licences permanently revoked if they are found to be employing children.¹⁵⁸ This is an imperative recommendation.
465. In early 2004, the Government adopted a “Core Mining Policy” in which it undertook to “develop and strictly enforce regulations to prevent the employment of children in mining activities”. The Commission recommends that the Government promulgate such regulations as a matter of urgency. Government should also develop the appropriate enforcement mechanisms. These are imperative recommendations.
466. Effective monitoring, by government authorities and civil society, is required to tackle the scourge of child labour in the diamond mines. The main responsibility for enforcing the child labour standards should remain with the Government and its different organs – the Sierra Leone Police, the Mine Wardens and the Ministry of Social Welfare. Child Protection Agencies should play a supportive role by conducting “spot check” visits to mining sites to ensure that no children are employed. The Ministry of Mineral Resources, the Child Protection Agency network and the Ministry of Social Welfare should work towards the fulfilment of these recommendations.
467. Sensitisation needs to be carried out with families and care-givers to stress the importance of education for the future of their children. Family poverty that brings children to the mines should be tackled by creating alternative sources of income for families currently reliant on the proceeds of child labour. The Government should work towards the fulfilment of these recommendations.

¹⁵⁴ See the draft “Child Rights Act” of 2002, Section 27.

¹⁵⁵ See the draft “Children’s Act” of 1998, Section 87.

¹⁵⁶ See Schedule A - Form 19; The Mines and Mineral Act, Tributor Declaration, Artisanal / Small-scale Mining Licence.

¹⁵⁷ See *Awoko* Newspaper, Freetown, 30 September 2003. No cases of arrests or prosecutions have been reported at the time of writing this report.

¹⁵⁸ “Children” denotes persons under 18 (eighteen) years of age.

468. The Commission commends the efforts of NGOs such as World Vision, UNICEF and the National Commission for War-Affected Children to enrol child miners in school and skills training programmes. More needs to be done. The Commission reiterates its recommendations, made under the “Children” heading, that the government should provide free and compulsory basic education for all children.

Labour conditions

469. Labour laws protecting the rights of miners should be strictly enforced. Particular attention should be paid to enforcing the legal limit on the hours miners may work per week and day. A sensitisation campaign should be organised to inform miners about their rights. The Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Mineral Resources should work towards the fulfilment of these recommendations.

Community empowerment

470. Article VII, clause 6, of the Lomé Peace Agreement requires the Government of Sierra Leone to devote all the proceeds generated from gold and diamonds exclusively for the social development and economic advancement of the people of Sierra Leone. It reads:

“The proceeds from the transactions of gold and diamonds shall be public monies which shall enter a special Treasury account to be spent exclusively on the development of the people of Sierra Leone, with appropriations for public education, public health, infrastructural development, and compensation for incapacitated war victims as well as post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction. Priority spending shall go to rural areas.”

The Commission calls on the Government to implement this clause of the Lomé Peace Agreement.

471. A higher percentage of the export tax on diamonds should be made available to local communities through the Community Development Programme. The government should monitor this programme more carefully to avoid mismanagement of funds.
472. Miners should be supplied with information and training on how to assess the quality and monetary value of diamonds. Micro credit projects should also be implemented to enable local miners to acquire the necessary capital to finance their own activities without having to resort to the services of “mine supporters”.¹⁵⁹
473. These recommendations are for the serious consideration of Government.

¹⁵⁹ “Mine supporters” or mine owners support miners by leasing the land that is mined and feeding the miners.

THE TRC AND THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE

Future Post-Conflict Arrangements

474. In future post-conflict societies, there may be compelling reasons to justify the establishment of a body to engender truth and reconciliation. Alternatively, there may be strong grounds to support the creation of a body to address impunity and bring retributive justice. There may even be good cause to have both bodies working side by side.
475. The Commission makes no recommendation on which particular model ought to be adopted. This will naturally depend on the prevailing circumstances and a range of other factors. The Commission does, however, issue certain cautionary advisements in the event that the parallel option should be adopted. The Commission's recommendations for this eventuality are as follows:
- a. There ought to be recognition from the outset that there is a primary objective shared by both organisations, namely that the processes of both institutions must ultimately lead to the goal of building lasting peace and stability. In the pursuit of this objective, both bodies are equal partners.
 - b. A model should be developed that is sensitive to local conditions and which harmonises the objectives of the two bodies in a symbiotic fashion.¹⁶⁰
 - c. A consensus, on matters of important principle, should be reached between the organisations. This consensus should be reflected in a written agreement, which the institutions must regard as binding.
 - d. It may be necessary that matters of fundamental principle should not only be part of an agreement, but enshrined in law, to provide enforceable protection.
 - e. Matters of fundamental principle should establish the basic rights of individuals in relation to each body in different circumstances. In particular, the right of detainees and prisoners, in the custody of a justice body, to participate in the truth and reconciliation process should be enshrined in law.
 - f. Conflict of law issues should be settled upfront. In order to avoid potential primacy disputes and jurisdictional overlaps, consideration should be given to the enactment of an overarching law, recognised nationally and internationally, that sets out the jurisdiction and mandate of both bodies and deals with issues of joint application.
 - g. Provision should be made for a binding dispute resolution. The arbiter should not be one or the other complementary body.

¹⁶⁰ See the discussion contained under the heading "Conclusions" in the chapter on "TRC and the Special Court for Sierra Leone" in Volume Three B of this report.

476. The Commission recommends that future international criminal tribunals make provision for the “use immunity” of testimony provided to a truth and reconciliation commission.¹⁶¹

Staffing of Future Post-Conflict Bodies

477. In the appointment of foreign personnel to staff sensitive post-conflict organisations, great care must be taken to ensure that members undergo sensitisation not only to local conditions but also to the delicate balances that must be maintained in post-conflict endeavours. Such training should engender a good understanding of the history and nature of transitional justice, the history of the country and region in question, and the respect required for local people, customs and traditions.

Building the National Justice System

478. In future post-conflict transitional justice arrangements, the international community and national governments should seriously consider a major investment in the national justice system instead of, or in addition to establishing international tribunals to investigate and prosecute violations of human rights.
479. Foreign jurists, prosecutors, investigators and defence lawyers could be seconded to the national courts and the national prosecution service. This option would be better suited to strengthening domestic skills and capacity. It would have a potentially lasting impact on local justice institutions.

Amnesties

480. The Commission has found that the withdrawal of amnesty following the breaking of the Lomé Peace Accord, which resulted in the prosecution of individuals who had nothing to do with the breach and who were protected by the amnesty, was unwise and legally unsound.
481. The Commission is mindful of the fact that parties to a peace agreement should not be permitted to breach its provisions with impunity. The Commission recommends that future peace agreements that include an amnesty should contain a clause that specifically revokes the protection of amnesty in respect of the party or individuals responsible for breaching the agreement.

¹⁶¹ For further detail on this recommendation, see the discussion contained under the heading “Use Immunity of Information provided to the Commission” in the chapter on “TRC and the Special Court for Sierra Leone” in Volume Three B of this report.

REPARATIONS

*MY SIERRA LEONE, your children are crying to see you restored
The short-sighted think it impossible
We have taken the stride to right all the wrongs*

Extract from the poem "My Sierra Leone?"
By the RUF Prisoners at Pademba Road Prison¹⁶²

482. The Commission's enabling Act required it to make recommendations concerning the measures needed to respond to the needs of victims.¹⁶³ The full proposed measures are contained in the Reparations Chapter, which directly follows the Recommendations Chapter. A summary of these measures is contained hereunder.
483. The Commission proposes that the Reparations programme should be co-ordinated by the National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA). It is envisaged that NaCSA, as the "Implementing Body" entrusted with governing the Special Fund for War Victims, will ensure the decentralisation of programmes in conjunction with different Ministries. It is proposed further that NaCSA should be assisted by an Advisory Committee. The Commission recommends that the National Human Rights Commission perform the role of the Advisory Committee.
484. The Commission's recommended measures deal with the needs of victims in the following areas: health, pensions, education, skills training and micro credit, community reparations and symbolic reparations.

Health

485. The aim of the recommended health care programme is to encourage victims of the conflict to seek medical treatment by removing the prohibitively high costs of treatment. This should be facilitated by strengthening government provision of services across the country and by developing centres of expertise in each district. In the short-term, the programme should be initiated by identifying medical centres with expertise in the needs of a particular condition, and by providing transportation to such centres (the referral system). In addition, a system of prioritisation should be implemented. Internationally trained physicians should be recruited to temporarily fill positions. The Commission recommends that the Ministry of Health and Sanitation should oversee all areas of health-related reparations.
486. In relation to war victims who are amputees, the Commission recommends that they be given free physical healthcare for the rest of their lives. Wives who were married to such persons, at the time the injury occurred, should be eligible for free primary health care.¹⁶⁴ Children of the eligible adult amputees who are under 18 should be eligible for free primary health care.

¹⁶² Poem submitted to the National Vision for Sierra Leone, a project of the TRC.

¹⁶³ See Section 15(2) of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000.

¹⁶⁴ Where the amputee victim was the wife and the breadwinner for her family at the time of the injury then the husband and children should benefit accordingly.

487. The Commission recommends that the government provide war victims who are amputees with free prosthetic and orthotic devices. Technicians who are able to maintain and repair such devices should be trained. The amputees should be provided with free rehabilitation services, including training in use and maintenance of prosthetic devices. They should also receive free physiotherapy and occupational therapy.
488. Other war wounded¹⁶⁵ should receive medical support to the degree their injury or disability demands. Other war wounded must be assessed by a government or NGO doctor in order to determine their eligibility. Wives who were married to other war wounded persons, at the time the injury occurred, should be eligible for free primary health care.¹⁶⁶ Children of the eligible adult other war wounded who are under 18 should be eligible for free primary health care. Such wives and children should only be eligible if the victim experienced a 50% or more reduction in earning capacity as a result of the injury. Once the other war wounded victims have fully recovered from their injuries, the benefits recommended for the wives and children should cease. A grace period may be considered at the discretion of the health authorities.
489. Adult and child victims of sexual violence sustained during the conflict should be eligible for free physical health care including free fistula surgery, where necessary. Adult victims of sexual violence should be eligible for health care depending on the severity of their injury. Child victims of sexual violence should be eligible for health care until 18 years of age unless their injury sustained requires care past the age of 18. All beneficiaries must be assessed by a government or NGO doctor to determine their eligibility. Provision of free primary health care for dependent children and spouses should cease once the victims of sexual violence have fully recovered. The Commission recommends free testing (accompanied by counselling) for HIV/ AIDs and other STIs for all victims of sexual violence and free treatment for those testing positive.
490. The government should provide assistance to organisations providing scar removal surgery for branded children.
491. The government should expand its provision of mental healthcare treatment for victims by supporting existing programmes, training counsellors and ensuring that all districts have access to such services.

¹⁶⁵ "Other War Wounded" are defined as victims who have become temporarily or permanently physically disabled, either totally or partially, as a consequence of a violation or abuse other than amputation. Examples may be victims who received lacerations, who lost body parts other than their limbs (such as fingers, ears, lips and toes), or have gunshot wounds, bullets or shell fragments in their bodies in so far as they are totally or partially disabled as a consequence of a human rights violation.

¹⁶⁶ Where the "other war wounded" victim was the wife who was the breadwinner for her family at the time of the injury then the husband and children should benefit accordingly.

Pensions

492. The Commission recommends that a monthly pension be paid to all adult amputees; other war wounded who experienced a 50% or more reduction in earning capacity as a result of their injury and victims of sexual violence. The amounts should be determined by NaCSA. NaCSA will be required to balance the needs of the victims with what government can afford. In doing so, NaCSA must take into consideration the basic living scale for Sierra Leone as set by the United Nations Development Programme. NaCSA should also take into account the amounts provided to ex-combatants on a monthly basis under the NCDDR programme and the pensions received by the war wounded SLA soldiers. The Ministry of Finance, in particular, the Accountant General's Department, should be entrusted with coordinating the distribution of pension payments.

Education

493. In addition to its general recommendation that free education should be provided to all children at the basic level, there should be free education until senior secondary level for specific groups affected by the conflict. Those eligible include children who are amputees, other war wounded, and victims of sexual violence; children who were abducted or conscripted; orphans of the war; and children of amputees, other war wounded who experienced a 50% reduction in earning capacity as a result of their injuries, and victims of sexual violence.
494. Existing programmes such as the Community Education Investment Programme (CEIP) and the Complimentary Rapid Education for Primary Schools (CREPS) programme should be made available for all eligible children. Priority should be given to all permanently disabled children and victims of sexual violence (both adult and children) for scholarships to secondary and tertiary schools. The government should expand on existing education and teacher training programmes, with incentives for qualified teachers in remote areas. The Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology should be entrusted with overseeing all reparations relating to education.

Skills Training and Micro-Credit / Micro-Projects

495. The Commission recommends that skills training programmes should be provided for amputees, other war-wounded, victims of sexual violence, and war widows. On the successful completion of these programmes a business management course for running a small business should be run for the beneficiaries. Where feasible and appropriate, micro-credit or micro-projects should be provided to those who successfully complete all programmes.
496. The Ministry of Labour should be entrusted with overseeing all reparations in the area of skills-training while NaCSA should oversee all reparations in the area of micro-credit and micro-projects.

Community Reparations

497. Community reparations seek to rehabilitate areas most affected by the war through the provision of capital and technical assistance.
498. The government should consider the assessments conducted by various organisations such as the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), the United Kingdom's Department for International Development (DFID), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the Sierra Leone Rural Reintegration Project (SLRRP) regarding the need for infrastructure in areas most affected by the war. Communities and groups concerned should then be consulted to assess what they need by way of community reparations. The consultation should be conducted by the District Recovery Committees as well as any other body identified by the Implementing Body, NaCSA. The Ministry of Development and Economic Planning and the Ministry of Local Government should work in concert with each other to coordinate all activities pertaining to community reparations.

Symbolic Reparations

499. Symbolic reparations provide continued public acknowledgment of the past and address the need on the part of victims for remembrance. The Commission recommends the holding of commemoration ceremonies, symbolic reburials for victims of war by traditional and religious leaders. The Commission encourages these forms of expression and solidarity.¹⁶⁷
500. Memorials serve as lenses or prisms through which to see the past, present and future. Memorialising is a social and political act that encompasses not just the memorial itself, but also the process of creating the memorial, the creation of the memorial and the continued engagement with the memorial. Through the process of examining the past and present and preparing for the future, memorials create a public space for lasting dialogue.
501. Incorporation of stakeholders into the creation of a memorial is essential. The consultation with stakeholders, especially victims and communities, in the process of "memorialisation" creates a forum for the exchange of views.
502. Memorials are catalysts for interaction because they have the potential to bring victims and perpetrators together. Memorials do not have to be costly. Examples of memorials include the establishment of a monument, the renaming of a building or location, and the transformation of a site of conflict and violence into a useful building or space for the community.
503. The Commission recommends that at the least, the government should build one national war memorial. The Commission encourages local communities to explore their own means of creating public spaces for memory and dialogue.

¹⁶⁷ A more detailed discussion of this subject can be found in the presentation on "Memorials and Transitional Justice" by Artemis Christodoulou, produced as an Appendix to this Report.

Implementation

504. The Commission recommends that NaCSA's mandate be extended beyond 2008, but that it should complete the implementation of the reparations programme within a period of six years. The Commission recognises that certain programmes, such as pensions and medical care, will need to continue throughout the lives of certain beneficiaries. The Special Fund for War Victims should be established within three months of the publication of the Commission's Report.
505. The Commission recognises that substantial funding and resources are required for the successful implementation of the proposed reparations programme. It is unlikely that the Government will be able to underwrite the entire programme. NaCSA should collaborate with the government and the international community in order to identify and obtain possible sources of additional funding.
506. Possible sources include any additional revenues generated through the exploitation of mineral resources as provided for in article 7 of the Lomé Peace Accord; a once off tax on local and foreign corporate entities operating in Sierra Leone; and the pursuit of the recovery of assets and funds illegally removed from Sierra Leone during the conflict. With regard to labour-intensive projects, NaCSA may wish to explore the use of voluntary labour for those who wish to engage in national service for their country.
507. The Commission recommends that the Government work towards the full implementation of the reparations programme.

Political Persecution of those in Public Office

508. The Commission found that certain regimes, during the conflict period, victimised a large number of individuals who held public office on suspicion that they were "collaborators" or on the basis that they were associated or related to perceived "collaborators" or "the enemy". In many instances such persons suffered summary dismissal and, in other cases, such individuals were detained for long periods.
509. The Commission found that the NPRC regime unlawfully dismissed Major Lucy Kanu from the Army in 1993 simply because her husband was one of the alleged coup plotters of December 1992. The Commission recommends that the good name of Major Lucy Kanu be restored; that she be recalled to the Army and formally retired with effect from 1 August 2003;¹⁶⁸ and paid her lost benefits.

¹⁶⁸ 1 August 2003 was the date agreed between the Commission and the then Chief of Defence Staff, Major-General Tom Carew, for Major Lucy Kanu's formal retirement. Carew and all officers of the RSLAF who testified to the Commission on Major Kanu's petition admitted that she was dismissed in error and recommended her recall to the Army.

510. The authorities detained Mrs. Sylvia Blyden, a civil servant who had served the nation for some thirty years, in February 1998 for nine months without charge. She was held on the strength of untested allegations against her. The Commission recommends that the wrongs suffered by such individuals be redressed. In particular the Commission recommends that their good names be formally restored. The Human Rights Commission (HRC) should be tasked with investigating all cases of political persecution of public office-holders with a view to restoring people's good names where necessary, by way of a public finding. All those in the public sector who suffered political persecution during the conflict period should be able to approach the HRC for such relief.
511. The Commission recommends that the HRC investigate each case of political persecution on its merits. Where appropriate the HRC should recommend to the Government the restoration of lost benefits occasioned as a result of political persecution; or an award that the HRC deems appropriate in the circumstances.
512. The HRC and the Government should work towards the fulfilment of these recommendations.

RECONCILIATION

*Beneath forest trees
Lay my country covered with leaves
Trampled on by decades of misrule...
My country became a den
But I dreamt that at dawn
Peace and love cleared the gun
Propelled by unity, focus and forgiveness
Sierra Leone will again lie in the garden of bliss*

Extract from the poem "My Country" by Mohamed Turay¹⁶⁹

*Now is the time to make Sierra Leone
Bury the hatchet ...
And put your pains to gain
Because none is free from blame
Then and only then will you make Sierra Leone*

Extract from the poem "Who will make Sierra Leone?"
By the RUF Prisoners at Pademba Road Prison¹⁷⁰

513. The Commission recognises that reconciliation is a long-term process that must occur at the national, community and individual levels.¹⁷¹ The Commission places no preconditions on the realisation of reconciliation. Reconciliation is an ongoing process that must be nurtured and promoted. The Commission offers guidelines that will facilitate reconciliation. However, it is ultimately up to all Sierra Leoneans to engage in imaginative acts that will serve the cause of reconciliation and healing at all levels.

¹⁶⁹ Poem submitted to the National Vision for Sierra Leone, a project of the TRC.

¹⁷⁰ Poem submitted to the National Vision for Sierra Leone, a project of the TRC.

¹⁷¹ See the chapter on "Reconciliation" in Volume Three B for more detailed recommendations.

514. In the long term, the Commission recognises that national reconciliation ought to rest on certain fundamentals. These include the improvement of the socio-economic living conditions of the people; good governance; strong and functional oversight institutions; the creation of a respected and professional security force; and the implementation of a reparations programme that takes into account the needs of the victims of the conflict.
515. The Commission also recognises that there are certain steps that will facilitate the reaching of national reconciliation. These steps include: truth telling; reconciliation between victims and perpetrators as well as the perpetrator with his or her community; the provision of adequate physical security; and the implementation of a reparations programme.

Guiding Principles

516. The Commission recommends that reconciliation activities should adhere to certain guiding principles. First and foremost, reconciliation activities should be initiated in consultation with all relevant stakeholders.
517. Victims must be included in the process. In particular, special efforts should be made to include the victims of sexual violence, bush wives, child ex-combatants, and victims with visible physical disabilities such as amputees and the war wounded.
518. The Commission recommends certain activities that can help to foster the reconciliation process. These activities include:
- apologies by all actors involved in the conflict;
 - a national peace day;
 - dissemination of the TRC report;
 - traditional and religious activities;
 - social and recreational activities;
 - trauma counselling; and
 - Government support for the continuation of activities of the District Reconciliation and Support Committees set up by the TRC and the Inter-Religious Council.
519. In order for the reconciliation process to be advanced, it must enjoy the committed support from all actors involved: the Government, other public officials, communities, victims, and perpetrators.
520. Acknowledgement of wrongdoing, recognition of suffering, and the apologising to victims ought to be made by national and political leaders, government representatives and other stakeholders in the national reconciliation process. The Commission also calls on leaders at all levels, down to chiefdom level to account to their communities and to take the lead in advancing reconciliation.
521. Reconciliation should take place within the Security Forces and, in particular, the RSL Armed Forces, which has integrated ex-combatants from different former fighting forces into their ranks. Reconciliation should also take place between the armed forces and the civilian population. Many civilians perceive the armed forces to have betrayed the country during its time of need. The Security Forces should work towards the fulfilment of this recommendation.

Reconciliation Activities

522. The Commission recommends that the Government and other organisations seriously consider the initiation of the following activities that can promote reconciliation:

- Symbolic activities¹⁷² such as the establishment of monuments on mass graves.
- A national peace day during which reconciliation and solidarity with those who suffered during the war is promoted. This should be a national holiday. Activities on this day should take place at all levels, from community level to the national level. The Commission suggests that this be the 18th of January, which is the day on which the war was officially declared to be over in 2002 with the symbolic burning of 3000 weapons at Lungi.
- The Commission encourages victims and ex-combatants, as well as other members from the community, to come together in joint projects for the development of their communities. Such projects can be symbolic in nature and can include activities that improve the lives of people such as the clearing of land for the creation of peace parks; the removal of rubbish and litter that is prevalent almost everywhere in urban Sierra Leone; the repairing of roads and the like.
- The Commission encourages traditional activities to reintegrate victims and ex-combatants into communities and to restore the social fabric in the community. Such activities can include traditional dances, pouring of libation, cleansing ceremonies, and cleansing of the bush.
- The Commission encourages religious activities, such as the organisation of commemoration ceremonies for the victims of the war, symbolic reburials for those victims who are missing or who have not been buried according to religious and traditional customs and common prayers.
- The Commission encourages sports games and sporting competitions, involving victims, ex-combatants as well as other members from the community.
- The Commission encourages social and recreational activities, in which victims, ex-combatants as well as other members from the communities can meet at events such as feasts, peace carnivals, and traditional hunting.
- The Commission encourages artistic activities in which victims, ex-combatants, as well as other members of the community can express themselves through drama, music, song, story telling, art, poetry in order to promote tolerance, respect, and non-violent means of conflict resolution.¹⁷³
- The Commission recommends that the District Reconciliation Support Committees, recently set up in every district by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Inter Religious Council in order to promote reconciliation activities in all chiefdoms, be supported to continue their work.

¹⁷² For other symbolic activities, see recommendations on reparations programme.

¹⁷³ See the chapter: "National Vision for Sierra Leone".

523. The Commission recommends that in the spirit of reconciliation, the Government of Sierra Leone should request the Security Council of the United Nations to lift the travel ban imposed on all RUF members.¹⁷⁴

NATIONAL VISION FOR SIERRA LEONE

*We will drag ourselves out of this poverty zone
And we'll care for our own, our Sierra Leone
We will raise up our hearts and our voices as one
And we'll move ourselves forward with some National Vision*

Extract from the poem "My Vision, My Home, My Sierra Leone" by Ustina More¹⁷⁵

524. The Commission looked to the past in order to tell the story of the civil war and to make recommendations to prevent a repetition of conflict. The Commission also looked to the future for the purpose of describing the kind of post-conflict society that the recommendations were designed to achieve. The Commission invited Sierra Leoneans to tell it about the kind of society they envisaged for their country.
525. The Commission was overwhelmed by the effort, time and resources that so many Sierra Leoneans devoted to preparing their contributions. Among the contributors were adults and children of many different backgrounds, religions and regions; artists and laymen; amputees, ex-combatants and prisoners. The contributions included written and recorded essays, slogans, plays and poems; paintings, etchings and drawings; sculptures, wood carvings and installations. The contributions form part of the national heritage of Sierra Leone.

The Vision Going Forward

526. The Commission recommends to Government and civil society stakeholders that the National Vision should become a permanent, open, interactive civic space for all stakeholders in Sierra Leone to engage in dialogue through artistic and scholarly expression on political, moral and social issues of the past, present and future.
527. To ensure maximum exposure for the National Vision contributions, the Commission recommends:
- *Establishing a Permanent Home:* The Exhibits should be housed in an appropriate, permanent location that will be an active and interactive site of workshops for different interest groups (women, children, political leaders, etc.) around issues addressed in the contributions.
 - *Arranging a National Tour:* To ensure the visible accessibility of the Exhibits to as many Sierra Leoneans as possible, the National Vision should travel outside of the capital. The National Tour should bring the exhibit to selected cities and towns in all provinces, where workshops could be held and the continued submission of contributions could be encouraged.

¹⁷⁴ The UN Security Council imposed the travel ban under UNSC-Resolution 1132 of 1997.

¹⁷⁵ Poem submitted to the National Vision for Sierra Leone, a project of the TRC.

- *Arranging an International Tour:* An international tour would raise awareness about Sierra Leone and the issues discussed in the contributions and encourage others to consider applying this paradigm of a National Vision to their own contexts. It would further bring international exposure to the wealth of creative talent in Sierra Leone.
 - *Publication of a book:* This book would include photographs of the contributions, biographies of the contributors, and essays by different leaders on reconciliation, national healing and related topics.
528. In order to realise these objectives the Commission recommends that the National Vision fall under the wing of its successor body, the proposed National Human Rights Commission (HRC) or, alternatively, that the National Vision work in close collaboration with the HRC. Pending the formation of the HRC, the Commission recommends that civil society and the Government commit themselves to keeping the National Vision alive and to establishing a provisional vehicle or structure under which its activities can continue.
529. The Commission accordingly recommends the establishment of an independent Trust to oversee the activities of the project. The Trust should have independent trustees and be representative of the different sectors of Sierra Leonean society.

Guiding Principles

530. The Commission urges that the National Vision for Sierra Leone, as a TRC project, must remain true to the founding principles underlying the Commission's work. As such, all future National Vision activities must:
- Serve the preservation of peace, strive for unity and promote healing and reconciliation.
 - Remain independent and non-partisan. The National Vision should always represent the collective visions of its contributors. It should never become the vision of a particular NGO or the vision of the Government or any particular interest group.
531. The Commission calls on its successor body or any provisional National Vision structure to take steps to ensure that the works of the contributors:
- are respected;
 - are properly preserved;
 - receive maximum public exposure;
 - are used to further the causes set out in the founding principles; and
 - are not used to further any political or commercial interests.¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁶ These principles would not prohibit the sale of prints of Vision contributions for purposes of reinvesting the proceeds in the furtherance of National Vision activities.

ARCHIVING OF COMMISSION DOCUMENTATION

532. The Commission recommends that the National Human Rights Commission (HRC) should become the official custodian of all Commission documentation and materials. Pending the creation of the HRC, the Commission's documents should be held at the National Archives.

Confidential and Restricted Information

533. The Commission recommends that Parliament refrain from passing legislation authorising access by criminal justice mechanisms, either directly or indirectly, to information in the archives of the Commission that was provided on a confidential basis.
534. The identities of child combatants and victims of rape and sexual violence, supplied to the Commission on a confidential basis, should never be disclosed. No archival materials that reveal the identities of such persons should be released.
535. The Commission recommends that, along with any conditions imposed on any researcher or person accessing confidential information, he or she must be required to sign a sworn statement declaring that confidentiality will be upheld. A criminal penalty of a fine and or imprisonment should be imposed for any breach of the confidentiality requirements.
536. These are imperative recommendations.

Regulating Access

537. The HRC, and pending its creation, the National Archives, should regulate access to the Commission archives within the parameters outlined above. Persons requiring access should be required to set out the purpose for which they require access to the materials. A committee of the HRC and pending its formation, the National Archives, should consider each application on its merits to ensure that the conditions referred to in these recommendations are complied with.
538. The Commission recommends that the HRC continue with the indexing of the statements and information in order to determine which portions of the statements are confidential and embargoed, and to organise the statements in such a way that future research is possible.
539. The HRC and, pending its establishment, the National Archives, should designate an appropriate facility within its premises, where the materials may be inspected and where appropriate, copied. No original materials should be removed from the HRC or National Archives.
540. The Commission recommends that the HRC work towards converting the statements and information it had gathered into digitised form. This will reduce the amount of space required to store the information, assist with information management and also preserve the information indefinitely.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁷ By digitised form, we mean that each page of each paper statement will have a digital "snapshot" stored electronically, not that the information will be captured in text form.

541. The Commission recommends that the rest of its assets be transferred to the HRC. The Commission encourages the HRC to use its materials for educational purposes and to facilitate the educational use of the materials by other organisations.

DISSEMINATION OF THE TRC REPORT

*MY SIERRA LEONE, a new chapter and era has opened with
Awareness at every door
We must not let go
Because we've known the causes of our woes
It keeps us conscious and awake at all times
With the past we know the present and combined we make the future
Our mistakes have opened the doors of discoveries and our
Discoveries must lead to recoveries*

Extract from the poem "Who will make Sierra Leone?"
By the RUF Prisoners at Pademba Road Prison¹⁷⁸

542. The Commission regards it as crucial that Sierra Leoneans develop an understanding of the conflict, including its causes and its consequences for the country. Knowledge and understanding promote foresight. Knowledge and understanding are the most powerful forces against the repetition of conflict.

Widest Possible Dissemination

543. The Commission recommends the widest possible dissemination of its Report. The Commission calls upon the government and civil society to facilitate the accessibility of the report to all people, literate and illiterate, in local languages.
544. The Commission encourages the formation of dissemination committees to organise the distribution of the report at national and local level. In particular, the Commission encourages the use of the Report and its different versions to promote dialogue and debate. The Video¹⁷⁹ and Children's versions of the Report should be used in workshops around the country in order that people may learn more about the Report of the Commission.

Education, Popular Versions and the Internet

545. The Commission recommends that the contents of its report be incorporated into the education programmes in all schools, from primary to tertiary level. The Children's version¹⁸⁰ of the Report can be used as tool of education at the primary school level.
546. The Commission encourages the production of popular versions and summaries of its Report. These should be produced in consultation with the Human Rights Commission, when it is established.

¹⁷⁸ Poem submitted to the National Vision for Sierra Leone, a project of the TRC.

¹⁷⁹ The video version of the TRC report, entitled "Witness to Truth", was produced by WITNESS, the New York-based human rights NGO (www.witness.org), in collaboration with the Commission.

¹⁸⁰ The Children's version of the TRC report was produced with the assistance of UNICEF.

547. The Commission recommends that the full contents of the Report and its appendixes should be made available on the Internet. A website should be established to host the Report, which should be properly maintained. The Commission calls on local and international organisations involved in online human rights education to support such a project.

FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE

548. The Truth and Reconciliation Act, 2000 (the Act) requires that the Government shall, upon the publication of the report of the Commission, establish a committee or other body, including representatives of the Moral Guarantors of the Lomé Peace Agreement (“the Follow-up Committee”) to monitor the implementation of the recommendations of the Commission and to facilitate their implementation.¹⁸¹
549. The Commission has set out, in the introduction to this chapter, the particular monitoring role it recommends for the Follow-Up Committee.

Human Rights Commission and Civil Society

550. The Commission recommends that the HRC should be appointed by the Government to fulfil the role of the Follow-Up Committee. The HRC should keep the bodies referred to in the Lomé Peace Agreement apprised, on a regular basis, of its activities by way of written reports and, where necessary, oral presentations.
551. The Commission recommends that, at least, four representatives of civil society should be represented on the Follow-Up Committee, one of whom should represent women and one other should represent the youth.

Reporting

552. The Act requires the Government, during the period of eighteen months or such longer or shorter period after the establishment of the Follow-up Committee, as that Committee shall determine, provide quarterly reports to the Follow-up Committee, summarising the steps it has taken towards the implementation of the recommendations of the Commission.¹⁸²
553. The Act requires the Follow-up Committee to publish the reports of the Government and submit quarterly reports to the public, evaluating the efforts of the Government and the efforts of any other person or body concerned to implement the recommendations of the Commission.¹⁸³
554. The Commission recommends that the Follow-Up Committee should issue an annual report reflecting the level of performance in the Government’s implementation of the Commission’s recommendations. This report must be made public at the time of delivery to the Government and the Moral Guarantors.

¹⁸¹ See Section 18(1) of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000.

¹⁸² See Section 18(2) of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000.

¹⁸³ See Section 18(3) of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000.

RECOMMENDATIONS TABLES

“The inspiration is let’s sprint; if we can’t sprint, let’s run; if we can’t run, let’s walk; if we also can’t walk, then let’s crawl; but in any way possible let’s keep on moving”

Extract from an essay by Wurie Mamadu Tamba Barrie¹⁸⁴

PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS			
Imperative	Work Towards	Serious Consideration	Calls On
Enshrine human dignity as a fundamental right in the Constitution.	Compulsory human rights education in schools, army, police and judicial services.	Creation of a new constitution for Sierra Leone.	Judiciary to adopt rights and values based approach to constitutional interpretation.
Abolish the death penalty. Commute pending death sentences.	Codify Customary Law. Codification to be in accordance with Constitution and international obligations.	Extend constitutional jurisdiction to other courts.	Judiciary not to permit unjust laws and practices to stand.
Release of persons held in Safe Custody detention. Never again resort to Safe Custody detention.		Outlawing of corporal punishment throughout Sierra Leonean society.	International Community to support a Street Law programme in Sierra Leone.
No ouster of Courts’ jurisdiction in Public Emergencies. Certain rights are not derogable in Emergencies. Various measures for the protection of detainees.			Media to thoroughly investigate stories before publication.

¹⁸⁴ Essay submitted to the National Vision for Sierra Leone, a project of the TRC.

Imperative	Work Towards	Serious Consideration	Calls On
Avoid criminal sanctions in sphere of expression. Limit criminal sanction to conduct aimed at inciting violence and lawlessness.			Sierra Leone Association of Journalists and Media Commission to be more active in monitoring of standards of journalism.
Race and gender must not be a consideration in the acquisition of citizenship.			
Outlaw use of corporal punishment in schools and homes.			
Repeal sections 27(4)(d) and (e) of the Constitution which permits discrimination against women.			
Creation of National Human Rights Commission (HRC). Public and open nomination process for Commissioners.			
Ratify or accede to international human rights treaties that Sierra Leone has not yet accepted. Submit outstanding reports under its International Human Rights Obligations.			

ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RULE OF LAW			
Imperative	Work Towards	Serious Consideration	Calls On
Broaden representation on Judicial Services Commission. Increase representation of the Bar.	Creation of an autonomous judiciary with budgetary independence.	Introduction of alternative forms of dispute resolution and settlement.	Judicial officers to act with integrity and dispense justice without fear or favour.
Binding Code of Conduct for judges and magistrates.	Separation of the offices of the Attorney General and the Minister of Justice.	Various recommendations to address the backlog in the delivery of justice.	The Judiciary to take a pro-active approach to the protection of human rights.
	Extend retirement age of judges to seventy.	Condition in scholarships for law students that on qualification a year of community service be performed.	Experienced Sierra Leonean lawyers to respond to the call to serve on the bench.
	Judicial / Customary law officers to be appointed in each district.		Lawyers and the organised Bar to stand up to injustice. Bar Association to become the guardians of the Rule of Law and human rights in Sierra Leone.
	Local courts to be incorporated into the judicial system. Powers of judicial review to be removed from non-judicial officers.		Bar Association to require its members to provide <i>pro bono</i> services.
	Incremental improvement of remuneration of Local Court officials.		Bar Association to introduce a binding and enforceable code of ethics for members of Bar.

Imperative	Work Towards	Serious Consideration	Calls On
	Establishment of public defender offices in all main centres.		Fourah Bay College to incorporate service in the Legal Aid Clinic as part of the curriculum for law students.
	Properly resource the Law Reform Commission.		International Community to support creation and running of a legal resources centre.
	Establishment of more court houses in Freetown and the Provinces.		Members of the international community to donate law reports and legal texts from their respective countries to court and law libraries.

SECURITY SERVICES

Imperative	Work Towards	Serious Consideration	Calls On
Adopt new principles of National Security and enshrine them in the Constitution.		Disband the Operational Support Division (OSD).	All soldiers bear responsibility to restore faith and confidence of the nation in the Army.
No member of any security service to be permitted to obey a manifestly illegal order.			Members of the police to serve with integrity.
Security Services in performance of duties not to act against political party's legitimate interest; or promote a political party.			

PROMOTING GOOD GOVERNANCE

Imperative	Work Towards	Serious Consideration	Calls On
Constitution to enjoin public servants not to act in any way inconsistent with their office.	Freedom of Information legislation and creation of necessary administrative apparatus.	Return of Chiefs to traditional roles and functions. National dialogue on restoration of chiefs to traditional role.	National leadership to set highest standards and place national interests above their own.
Parliament to promulgate code of ethics for senior members of executive and leading public sector officials.	All levels of public administration to accord with principle of just administrative action.		Civil Servants to faithfully and diligently serve the people of Sierra Leone.
Officials dismissed for a breach of ethics to be disqualified from holding any public office.	Local government and District Councils to accord with certain core principles.		National Electoral Commission to build public confidence in the democratic process.
Alleged breaches of ethics to be investigated by a constituted body with capacity.			Civil society to highlight electoral fraud, monitor campaign financing, and expose abuse of state resources for party political purposes.
Just administrative action to be enshrined as a governmental objective in the Constitution.			Parliamentarians to provide real and active representation to the people of Sierra Leone.
Candidates and political parties to disclose money raised and sources thereof.			Parliamentarians to open offices in their constituencies so as to be accessible to the public.
Appropriate limits to be placed on contributions to political campaigns.			Parliamentary Committees to consult regularly with civil society

Imperative	Work Towards	Serious Consideration	Calls On
No political party to be favoured over another by any organ of state.			The media to help build a culture of accountability.
Principles of Local Government to be enshrined in the Constitution.			National Dialogue on the return of chiefs to their traditional roles and functions.
FIGHTING CORRUPTION			
Imperative	Work Towards	Serious Consideration	Calls On
Disclosure of financial interests for senior public officials. Clear and strict penalties for failure to comply.	Government to display at points of contact with public the entitlements of citizens and details of any charges.		Government, business and civil society to hold an annual integrity summit.
Government to publicly announce that the victimisation of whistle blowers will not be tolerated.	Publish relevant amounts allocated to provide services and amenities at local and community levels.		Civil society groups to engage in ongoing advocacy and research; and to scrutinise public conduct zealously.
Provide legal protection to whistle blowers who expose corruption. It should be a criminal offence to engage in reprisals against whistle blowers.	Permit independent prosecution of corruption cases by the Anti Corruption Commission. Build prosecutorial capacity.		Business to develop Code of Corporate Governance and share information with law enforcement agencies.
Amend laws to prevent secrecy and confidentiality provisions from stopping exposure of corruption.			Donors to insist on firm action against individuals in beneficiary groups who are involved in corruption.
Prosecution of corruption cases should be free from political interference.			Donors to withdraw support from government bodies and NGOs failing to address corruption or mismanagement.

Imperative	Work Towards	Serious Consideration	Calls On
Procurement, tenders, bids, privatisation to be scrupulously open and transparent.			
YOUTH			
Imperative	Work Towards	Serious Consideration	Calls On
Youth question to be viewed as a national emergency that demands national mobilisation.	Transformation of Ministry of Youth and Sports into a National Youth Commission.	A “State of the Youth” report to be tabled each year before Parliament.	Government and donor community to support Ministry of Youth programmes to cultivate political responsibility in youth and to establish chiefdom, district, and regional and national youth committees.
All political parties required to ensure that at least 10% of their candidates for all public elections are youths.			
WOMEN			
Imperative	Work Towards	Serious Consideration	Calls On
Government and factions to conflict to issue a full and frank apology to women for abuses sustained in the war.	Enactment of legislation to address domestic violence.	Provide women with micro-credit along with focussed skills training.	Communities to accept rape and sexual violence victims and their children back into society.
Repeal all statutory and customary laws discriminatory against women, including provisions that prevent their inheritance and land access.	Establish training programme for police, prosecutors and judiciary to assist them to deal with gender-based crime.	Removal of Gender portfolio from Ministry of Social Welfare and the creation of a Gender Commission.	Men to respect women and to protect them from abuse at all times.

Imperative	Work Towards	Serious Consideration	Calls On
Sierra Leone to ratify the Protocol to the African Charter on the Rights of Women.	Harmonise the national laws dealing with crimes of sexual violence with the provisions of the Rome Statute.	Adult education programmes to teach literacy and numeric skills to women.	Communities to act with compassion in accepting female ex-combatants and displaced persons back into society.
All political parties to be required to ensure that at least 30% of their candidates for all public elections are women.	Provide free and compulsory education for girls up to senior secondary level.		Relief agencies to assist with rehabilitation and skills training for female ex-combatants and displaced persons who did not benefit from formal programmes.
Repeal provision in Protection of Women and Girls Act which links the prosecution of sexual offences to the 'moral character' of the complainant.	Provide psychosocial support and reproductive health services to women affected by the conflict.		Fourah Bay Legal Aid Clinic, LAWCLA and Bar Council to focus on domestic and sexual violence against women.
Launch a campaign to end practice of customary law compelling victim of rape to marry the offender	National Campaign to break the silence that pervades rape and sexual violence.		Community leaders to encourage the prosecution of rapists.
Abolish practice of expelling pregnant girls from school	Achieve 50/50 gender parity in representative politics within next ten years.		UNIFEM and NGOs to establish leadership programmes for women.
	Representation of at least 30% women in cabinet and political posts.		Bondu societies to serve as mechanisms for change.
	Achieve 50/50 gender parity in cabinet and political posts within next ten years.		

Imperative	Work Towards	Serious Consideration	Calls On
	Implement educational programmes that promote safe sex practices.		
	Establish directory of service providers assisting women.		
	Establish old peoples' homes in main urban centres and attend to the social and medical needs of elderly women.		
CHILDREN			
Imperative	Work Towards	Serious Consideration	Calls On
Child's Rights Bill to be enacted into law	Removal of all hidden or 'chalk' fees for primary school education.	Government and agencies to establish recreation centres throughout the country where children can be exposed to sports and the art of play.	Employers who employ children to provide working conditions that are humane.
Law Commission to review legislation to ascertain whether laws accord with Convention of the Rights of the Child.	Provide incentives to encourage children to attend the secondary school level.		Member states of ECOWAS to implement the Political Declaration and Action Plan against trafficking in human beings, especially children
New law to criminalise not sending a child to primary school. Make 18 the age of majority.	Enact legislation that brings the procedural and evidentiary rules relating to the prosecution of sexual violence in line with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Rome Statute.		

Imperative	Work Towards	Serious Consideration	Calls On
Law Commission to draft a law criminalising trafficking and the sexual exploitation of children.	Review the practice of employing children under the age of 18 on a full-time basis.		
Sierra Leone to sign the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography.	Review the adoption laws to incorporate the practice of guardianship and fostering.		
	Enact legislation to regulate the establishment of orphanages both private and public.		
	Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs to support the Children's Forum Network to operate at national and local level, especially in the Provinces.		
EXTERNAL ACTORS			
Imperative	Work Towards	Serious Consideration	Calls On
	Work with the Government of Liberia to control flow of small arms and light weapons along common border.	Commit to programme objectives of NEPAD.	Government s of Libya, Cote d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso to publicly acknowledge their roles in financing the RUF.
	Harmonise laws regulating firearms and explosives in Sierra Leone and Liberia.		Libya to provide financial support to the War Victims Fund.

Imperative	Work Towards	Serious Consideration	Calls On
			Government of Liberia to consider an act of symbolic reparation to people of Sierra Leone.
			International community to never again ignore internal armed conflict because country has little or no strategic value.
			International community to raise peacekeeping capacity of ECOWAS.
			ECOMOG soldiers found responsible for human rights violations to be excluded from peacekeeping missions in future.
			ECOWAS protocol on early warning and conflict prevention to be implemented; all countries in sub region not to allow territories to be used to launch incursions into other countries.
			UN peacekeepers to have good understanding of local conditions.
			International community and ECOWAS to prevent movements of mercenaries and enforce International Convention against mercenaries.

Imperative	Work Towards	Serious Consideration	Calls On
			Trace assets of Charles Taylor, NPFL and RUF that were illegally removed from Sierra Leone. Recovered assets to become part of War Victims Fund.
			United Kingdom to pursue with vigour its development partnership with Sierra Leone.
			UNAMSIL to investigate the economic ramifications of its withdrawal from Sierra Leone.
			International Community to continue with its aid programmes.

MINERAL RESOURCES

Imperative	Work Towards	Serious Consideration	Calls On
Publish a regular and detailed account of how government spends proceeds generated from diamonds.	Child Protection Agencies to conduct spot checks on mining sites to ensure that children are not employed.	Increase border patrols to deter smuggling.	Members of the Kimberley Process to implement monitoring systems and to invite independent monitoring by outside bodies.
Bidding process for mineral exploitation licenses should be fair and transparent.	Sensitisation of families to stress importance of education for children. Alternative sources of income for families should be investigated.	Miners to be encouraged to sell diamonds directly to authorised exporters. Abolishment of dealership class. All diamond buying and selling to be under control of GGDO.	International NGOs and diamond industry officials to closely scrutinise the implementation of Certification Scheme.

Imperative	Work Towards	Serious Consideration	Calls On
Authorities to closely examine issue of mining licenses to relatives and associates of public officials.	Miners to be informed of their labour rights.	A higher percentage of the export tax on diamonds to be made available to local communities through the Community Development Programme.	Governments of Sierra Leone, Liberia and Guinea to invite voluntary review visits of the Kimberly Process.
Ministry of Mineral Resources to publish names of holders all mining related licenses on an annual basis.	Ministry of Mineral Resources to conduct a review of the role played by chiefs in the granting of mining licenses.	Miners to be supplied with information and training on how to assess the quality and monetary value of diamonds.	Kimberly Process to ensure that participants export only rough diamonds that they legitimately produce or legitimately import from another Kimberly Process participant.
Sierra Leone to confirm its ratification of ILO Convention 182 and to ratify ILO Convention 138 dealing with child labour.		Micro credit projects to be implemented to enable miners to acquire capital to finance their own activities.	Kimberley Process to exclude countries that are not complying with the requirements of the Certification Scheme, including those that fail to establish internal control mechanisms.
Mining License holders to have their licenses permanently revoked if found to be employing children.			States in West Africa to apply particular vigilance to ensure that the Kimberly Process Certification Scheme is strictly enforced.
Government to promulgate regulations to prevent the employment of children in mining activities			Government of Sierra Leone to implement Article VII, clause 6 of the Lomé Agreement.

THE TRC AND THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE			
Imperative	Work Towards	Serious Consideration	Calls On
			International community to harmonise objectives of future transitional justice bodies that operate at the same time.
			Matters of fundamental principle to be agreed upon and enshrined in law.
			Conflicts of law to be settled upfront.
			Provision for binding dispute resolution. Arbitrator to be a third party.
			Provision to be made for “use immunity” of witness testimony supplied to TRC.
			Foreign personnel of post-conflict bodies to receive sensitisation on local conditions.
			Staff not to move between in-country post-conflict organisations.
			International community and governments to consider major investments in national justice systems.
			Future peace accords providing amnesty to include a clause revoking amnesty for party in breach of accord.

REPARATIONS¹⁸⁵			
Imperative	Work Towards	Serious Consideration	Calls On
	Creation of referral and prioritisation systems for victims requiring medical care.	Reparations programme to be co-ordinated by NaCSA.	
	Amputees to receive free physical healthcare for rest of their lives.		
	War wounded and amputees to receive free prosthetic / orthotic devices; and free physiotherapy and occupational therapy.		
	Other war wounded to receive medical support to the degree their injuries or disability demands.		
	Victims of sexual violence to be eligible for free physical health care including fistula surgery.		
	Existing mental health programmes to be supported and expanded.		
	Support for organisations providing scar removal surgery for branded children.		

¹⁸⁵ This table provides merely an outline of the proposed Reparations Programme. As the recommendations are sometimes qualified, the full text of the recommendations should be consulted. Chapter Four on Reparations provides detailed explanations for each recommendation.

Imperative	Work Towards	Serious Consideration	Calls On
	A monthly pension (amount to be recommended by NaCSA) to be paid to amputees, war wounded and sexual violence victims who experienced a 50% or more reduction in earning capacity.		
	Free education up to senior secondary level to be supplied to specific children groups affected by the conflict.		
	Skills training programmes for amputees, other war wounded, sexual violence victims and war widows.		
	Consultations with various organisations regarding need for Community Reparations.		
	Symbolic reparations including commemoration events, symbolic reburials and memorials.		
	HRC to investigate the political persecution of those in public office. Where appropriate, a public finding to be made restoring the good names of those persecuted.		

Imperative	Work Towards	Serious Consideration	Calls On
	Where appropriate, the HRC to recommend restoration of lost benefits to public officials who were victims of political persecution.		
RECONCILIATION			
Imperative	Work Towards	Serious Consideration	Calls On
	Reconciliation within security forces and between armed forces and civilian population.	Reconciliation activities to be initiated in consultation with all relevant stakeholders.	National and political leadership to acknowledge wrongdoing, recognise suffering and apologise to victims.
		National Peace Day to be held every year on 18 January.	Leaders at all levels down to chieftdom to account to communities and take lead in reconciliation.
		Support to be given to the District Reconciliation Committees established in each district by the TRC.	Victims and ex-combatants to come together in joint development projects and other events.
		Symbolic activities such as the building of monuments on mass graves.	Communities to hold traditional activities to reintegrate victims and ex-combatants.
			Religious leaders to hold commemoration ceremonies for victims of war.

NATIONAL VISION FOR SIERRA LEONE			
Imperative	Work Towards	Serious Consideration	Calls On
		The National Vision to fall under the wing of the Human Rights Commission.	All stakeholders to ensure that the National Vision becomes a permanent and interactive civic space.
			Stakeholders to organise national and international tours and a publication of the contributions.
			Stakeholders to establish provisional body to oversee Vision activities.
			HRC or provisional body to ensure that the Vision remains independent; that its activities serve the causes of peace and unity; that contributions are respected and preserved and are not used for political or commercial interests.
ARCHIVING OF COMMISSION DOCUMENTATION			
Imperative	Work Towards	Serious Consideration	Calls On
HRC to become official custodian of TRC documentation. Pending the creation of the HRC the archives to be held at the National Archives.	HRC to continue with indexing of statements and information.		

Imperative	Work Towards	Serious Consideration	Calls On
No law to be passed authorising access by justice mechanisms to confidential information held by the archives.	HRC to establish facility where materials may be inspected and consulted.		
Confidential materials relating to child combatants and sexual violence victims not to be released.	HRC to convert statements and information into digital form.		
Conditions and procedures for access to confidential information and general archives.			
No original TRC materials to be removed from National Archives/ HRC.			
DISSEMINATION OF THE TRC REPORT			
Imperative	Work Towards	Serious Consideration	Calls On
		Incorporate contents of the Report into the education curricula of schools, colleges and universities.	Government and civil society to organise the widest possible dissemination of the Report.
			Stakeholders to form dissemination committees to organise distribution at national and local level.
			Stakeholders to use Report and its different versions to promote dialogue and debate.

Imperative	Work Towards	Serious Consideration	Calls On
			Stakeholders to produce summaries and popular versions of the TRC Report.
			Local and international NGOs to collaborate on hosting full contents of the TRC Report on the Internet.
FOLLOW-UP COMMITTEE			
Imperative	Work Towards	Serious Consideration	Calls On
Establishment of Follow-up Committee in terms of the Act and the Lomé Peace Accord.		The HRC to be appointed to perform the role of the Follow-up Committee.	
At least four representatives of civil society should serve on the Follow-up Committee. One to represent women and one to represent youth.			
Follow-up Committee to issue quarterly updates and one annual report.			

CHAPTER FOUR

Reparations

TRC

**Save
Sierra Leone
From
another war.
Reconcile now,
the TRC
Can help**

Produced by the TRC Steering Committee with support
from the International Human Rights Law Group

CHAPTER FOUR

Reparations

Introduction

1. The Commission, in interpreting its mandate in respect of victims, was guided by the provisions of the Lomé Peace Agreement of 7 July 1999 and its enabling legislation, the TRC Act of 22 February 2000.
2. Article XXVI of the Lomé Peace Agreement obliges the Commission to, “among other things, recommend measures to be taken for the rehabilitation of victims of human rights violations.”
3. Article XXIX of the Lomé Peace Agreement refers to the establishment of a Special Fund for War Victims for the rehabilitation of war victims. Section 7(6) of the TRC Act calls upon the Commission to make recommendations for the Special War Fund for Victims.
4. Section 15(2) of the TRC Act mandates the Commission to make recommendations concerning the reforms and other measures, whether legal, political, administrative or otherwise, needed to achieve the object of the Commission. This object includes:
 - *preventing the repetition of the violations or abuses suffered;*
 - *responding to the needs of the victims; and*
 - *promoting healing and reconciliation.*

Section 6(2)(b) of the TRC Act also requires the Commission to:

- *work to help restore the human dignity of victims and promote reconciliation.*
5. The TRC Act did not explicitly use the term “reparations.” Instead, the Commission was instructed to “address the needs of the victims,” and “restore the human dignity of victims” as well as “promote healing and reconciliation.” A reparations programme that the government can implement will go a long way to address the needs of the victims of the conflict. Such a programme encompasses a broader sense of justice that goes beyond individual satisfaction and includes recognition for the harm suffered, as well as a sense of civic trust and social solidarity.¹ The Commission’s recommendations, which constitute the reparations programme, serve to fulfil this obligation as set out in the enabling legislation.

¹ Pablo De Greiff, “The Role of Reparations in Transition to Democracy,” Forthcoming in *Repairing the Past*, a publication by the International Center for Transitional Justice. New York, p. 8

TRC



An amputee testifies at a public hearing of the Commission.

6. In designing a reparations programme for the victims of the Sierra Leonean conflict, the Commission had to take into account a number of factors. It would have been gratifying if all victims of the conflict could benefit from a reparations programme but such a programme would be totally impossible for the country to implement. The Commission therefore had to determine who would benefit from a reparations programme. The Commission determined the category of beneficiaries by considering those victims who were particularly vulnerable because of the human rights violations they had suffered and the harm that they continued to live with.
7. The Commission then considered the current needs of those victims in order to determine what benefits to accord them in a reparations programme. In determining the specific recommendations, the Commission considered whether the state would be able to implement the recommendations given the available resources. The Commission was also guided by its mandate and decided that the potential list of victims should be kept open in order to ensure the widest possible access to the reparations programme by victims.
8. In the following paragraphs, the Commission provides the legal basis (both domestic and international law) for reparations; explains how reparations can foster reconciliation; elaborates the guiding principles that inform the reparations programme; lists the categories of eligible beneficiaries; and makes recommendations on the benefits to be accorded to the beneficiaries as well as to how effectively implement the reparations programme.

Reparations in Domestic and International Law

9. The purpose of a reparations programme is to provide redress and accord a measure of social justice to victims of human rights violations. Under international law, victims can obtain redress either through political means such as reparations programmes or pursue legal recourse through the civil courts. However, as in many post-conflict societies, it is not possible to prosecute perpetrators or seek civil damages through the courts.
10. In transitional societies, it is extremely difficult to pursue prosecutions and civil claims for damages. Often new governments are forced by the reality of the circumstances they find themselves in to broker amnesty deals as part of the peace process. Additionally, many perpetrators are nameless and unidentifiable. The evidentiary burden for the state and victims is impossible and so prosecutions remain an empty elusive reality, real in name only and not possible. Transitional states are compelled to find alternatives as well as other mechanisms to deal with accountability and to provide justice for victims. This is certainly true for Sierra Leone.
11. In Sierra Leone, effective redress is simply not available through the courts. The justice system currently does not have the capacity to deal with the massive violations committed during the conflict. Large parts of the country do not have functioning courts and access to formal justice is difficult to obtain. Moreover, the judiciary suffers from a perceived lack of credibility and lacks public confidence. Therefore, the possibility for victims to seek redress through the civil courts for the violations committed against them is not a reality in Sierra Leone. In the last decade, reparations programmes established through truth seeking mechanisms have become the only measure of redress for victims of violations arising out of civil conflicts.

12. The right to seek redress is enshrined both in Sierra Leone's domestic law and in international law. Under domestic law, references will be made to the provisions of the 1991 Sierra Leone Constitution. Under international law, the Commission focused its attention on the obligation of the state to provide reparations to victims of human rights abuses.

Domestic Law

13. Chapter III of the 1991 Constitution of Sierra Leone provides a list of fundamental human rights and freedoms to which every Sierra Leonean is entitled. Those fundamental human rights and freedoms that were violated during the war include the protection of right to life, protection from arbitrary arrest or detention, protection from slavery and forced labour, and protection from inhuman treatment.
14. Section 28(1) of the 1991 Constitution of Sierra Leone allows victims of fundamental human rights abuses to seek "redress" before the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone.
15. The Lomé Peace Agreement, in particular, Article XXIX and the TRC Act refer specifically to the obligation of the government to establish measures for the rehabilitation of war victims.

International Law

16. It is an accepted principle in international law that states may be held liable for human rights violations committed either by them or by their agents. The breach of its international obligations imposes a duty on a State to afford adequate reparation.² A "breach of an international obligation" includes the violation of international human rights law or international humanitarian law.
17. Further, several international human rights instruments impose on States the duty to provide the individual with "an effective remedy", "effective protection and remedies", "redress and an enforceable right to fair and adequate compensation". Examples include Article 8 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 2.3 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 14 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment and Articles 7 and 21 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. The Conventions and Charter have all been ratified by Sierra Leone.
18. A study conducted by Theo Van Boven, who was appointed by the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention and Protection of Minorities in 1989 to explore what remedies could accompany violations of human rights, concluded that gross violations of human rights are by their nature irreparable and that any remedy or redress will fail to be proportional to the grave injury inflicted, particularly when the violations have been committed on a massive scale.³ He was of the view that

² As early as 1928 the Permanent Court of International Justice issued a decision to this effect in the Chorzow Factory case ("Case concerning the Factory at Chorzow (Merits), P.C.I.J. Series A, No. 17, 13 September 1928). The principle is further reflected in the "Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts," adopted by the International Law Commission of the United Nations and commended to the attention of States by the UN General Assembly. (A/RES/56/83, 28 January 2002).

³ Professor Van Boven published a preliminary report on reparations for gross violations of human rights in 1990 and finalized his report in 1993, annexing draft principles on restitution,

remedies must therefore focus on the restoration of rights and the accountability of wrongdoers, as it is "an imperative norm of justice that the responsibility of perpetrators is clearly established and that the rights of victims are sustained to the fullest possible extent".⁴ Van Boven went on to say that the revelation of the truth is a fundamental requirement of justice.⁵

19. The "Draft Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law", submitted by Special Rapporteur M.C. Bassiouni to the UN Commission on Human Rights,⁶ is indicative of the current status of international law of the right to redress of victims of such violations. According to the Draft Basic Principles and Guidelines, every State has the obligation to respect, ensure respect for and enforce international human rights and humanitarian law norms. This obligation includes the duty to afford appropriate remedies to victims and provide for or facilitate reparations to victims.
20. The Draft Basic Principles further indicate that remedies for violations of international human rights and humanitarian law include reparations for harm suffered. It is also stated that a State shall provide reparations to victims for its acts or omissions constituting violations of international human rights and humanitarian law norms.
21. The Commission took the view that the State has a legal obligation to provide reparations for violations committed by both state actors and private actors. The Commission is of the opinion that all victims should be treated equally, fairly, and justly. Given the nature of the conflict in Sierra Leone, it was not always possible to identify the perpetrators or the group they belonged to. States have the obligation to guarantee the enjoyment of human rights and to ensure that human rights violators are brought to justice and that reparations are made to victims.⁷

compensation, and rehabilitation. The final report was sent to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights for consideration at its 1994 session.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Ibid. In 1996, Van Boven submitted a revised set of proposed basic guidelines on remedies which is published by the Sub Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, E/CN./Sub.2/1996/17. In 1998, the UN Commission for Human Rights called for the appointment of another expert to prepare a final draft for its 1999 session with the intention that these principles would be submitted to the United Nations General Assembly for adoption. Subsequent to the publication of the Commission's final report, the United Nations authorized a further study on the subject of reparations. On the 18 January 2000, a working group headed by Professor M. Cherif Bassiouni, drew up a report which incorporated the UN "Draft Principles and Guidelines on the right to Remedy and Reparations for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law."

⁶ M.C. Bassiouni, "*The right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms*," final report of the Special Rapporteur M.C. Bassiouni submitted to the UN Commission on Human Rights on 18 January 2000, incorporating the "*Draft Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law*." (E/CN.4/2000/62). At the time of the writing of the Commission's Final Report a new version of these "Principles and Guidelines" is being discussed.

⁷ The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission are among the institutions that have held a similar view. For the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, see the "Velasquez Rodriguez Case," judgment of 29 July 1988, Series C, No. 4 (1988), in particular paragraphs 166 and 174. For the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, see its final report, Vol. IX, pp. 149-150.

States do not only have an obligation to respect human rights themselves; they are also obliged "to ensure compliance with international obligations by private persons and an obligation to prevent violations. If governments fail to apply due diligence in responding adequately to, or in structurally preventing human rights violations, they are legally and morally responsible."⁸

Defining Concepts

Reparations

22. In its simplest form, reparations can be defined as the provision of redress to victims of human rights abuses. Reparations can take many forms including rehabilitation; restitution; compensation; establishing the truth; the restoration of dignity; and improving the quality of life of those who have suffered harm. The guarantee of non-repetition has become increasingly important for those who have lived through successive periods of conflict. Reparations that strive to accomplish these objectives can be made through material or symbolic gestures, to individuals or collectively. While a number of principles on reparations have emerged from the work of Van Boven and Bassiouni as to what constitutes "reparations", the Commission considered these principles as "guides" in devising this reparations programme. The context and the economic reality that Sierra Leone finds itself in was a major factor that the Commission had to take into account.
23. The reparations programme proposed by the Commission will largely focus on the rehabilitation of the victims through the distribution of service packages and symbolic measures which acknowledge the past and the harm done to victims and gives victims the opportunity to move on. Of utmost importance was the need to balance the needs of victims and the state's responsibility to them, and the development agenda of the country in which every citizen is entitled to participate and benefit from. In developing an appropriate programme, the Commission was careful not to create new classes of victims or to exacerbate the divisions between citizens living in the same communities. In the context of Sierra Leone, compensation and restitution must be a unifying factor and should not be used to further divide the population.
24. Rehabilitation is defined as the provision of social service support such as medical and psychological care which can be facilitated through the delivery of social service packages to address the real needs of the victim. Concentrating on rehabilitative measures would respond to the acute needs of the victims and improve their future quality of life.

⁸ T. van Boven, "Study Concerning the right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms," Final report submitted by Special Rapporteur van Boven to the UN Commission on Human Rights on 2 July 1993 (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8), page 16, paragraph 41.

TRC



The Amputee Theatre Group performs a song about reconciliation during the opening of TRC public hearings in Freetown on 14 April 2003.

25. The provision of social service packages help to promote the development of existing governmental institutions, thereby addressing not only the needs of the victim, but the community at large in the long-term. This is particularly important in a context such as Sierra Leone where almost every citizen is a victim of the war.
26. Symbolic reparations comprise non-material measures to show respect for the victims. They are a clear expression of recognition for the harm suffered. Symbolic reparations can preserve the memory of what happened during the conflict and most importantly, serve as a reminder that society must not allow this to happen again. Exhumations, proper burials, the laying of tombstones, national memorial services, the pouring of libations, the carrying out of traditional ceremonies and the erection of appropriate memorials may go a long way to restoring the dignity of victims and facilitating healing and reconciliation.

Victims

27. The Commission adopted the definition of a victim generally accepted in international law:

A person is a 'victim' where as a result of acts or omissions that constitute a violation of international human rights and humanitarian law norms, that person, individually or collectively, suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering, economic loss, or impairment of that person's fundamental legal rights. A 'victim' may also be a dependant or a member of the immediate family or household of the direct victim as well as a person who, in intervening to assist a victim or prevent the occurrence of further violations, has suffered physical, mental or economic harm.⁹

28. The Commission prioritised the victims who will benefit from specific measures of the reparation programme using 'vulnerability' as the basis. The Commission acknowledges the impossibility of compensating victims in proportion to the harm they have suffered, and does not by this categorisation prioritise suffering and harm. The Commission is of the opinion that victims not included in the reparations programme can benefit from the general recovery programmes of the government.


The Needs of the Victims and the Ability of a Reparations Programme to Meet those Needs

29. Victims were subjected to various forms of human rights abuses. These abuses have left many of the victims in urgent need of assistance in order for them to continue with their lives. In thousands of statements, the victims, identified their needs to the Commission. In addition, the Commission conducted extensive research consulting a large number of international organizations and NGOs to assess the concrete needs of victims and how best they could be met. Consultations were also organised with various victim organisations, and they provided further insight into the measures that should be taken for their real needs to be addressed.

⁹ Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Violations of International Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law, p. 6.

30. The Commission received a total of 7707 statements in the course of its work. A random sampling of these statements stratified by districts reflects the needs identified by the statement givers as most urgent in order to deal with the harm they suffered during the conflict.

Figure 1¹⁰



31. The table above clearly reveals that for most of the victims socio economic rights issues such as education and health were of primary concern. They regard these services as important for their families, their communities, and society as a whole.
32. While the Commission recognized that basic social services should be universally provided, there are particularly vulnerable victims whose needs require prioritisation. For example, although all female victims of sexual violence may require basic gynaecological services at the primary health level, some victims may require additional assistance such as surgery in order to repair the damage that had been caused as a result of rape or any other sexual violation committed against them. Presently, some victims cannot access the additional benefits or assistance they require for reasons that include the high costs associated with medical treatment and accessibility. In identifying the specific types of assistance required by the victims, and by setting out a clear plan for implementation, the Commission has established the parameters by which the government can acknowledge the unique nature of the harm suffered by this category of victims and the need to redress that harm.

¹⁰ The total does not equal 100 since respondents indicated more than one type of assistance or redress.

33. The victims who came before the Commission expressed the view that addressing their needs should be the obligation of the government. Government participation is a central component of a reparations programme. What distinguishes a reparations programme from a general recovery programme is that 1) in a reparations programme, the harm done to victims is acknowledged and 2) government involvement constitutes an acknowledgment that the violations were committed and that they deserve to be attended to, thereby going some way to restoring the citizen-state relationship. Government's adoption of the reparations programme is a necessary condition if the programme is to have any reparative effect on the victims. This responsibility of the government cannot be ceded or delegated to other potential sources of assistance, such as the international community.

The Potential of Reparations to Foster Reconciliation

Acknowledgement of Victims

34. Articles 15(2) and 6(2) (b) of the TRC Act, require that the Commission foster reconciliation in the country. National reconciliation is based on a common determination not to repeat the past and to allow both victims and perpetrators to live side by side in a spirit of tolerance and respect.
35. In most transitional societies, political realities force compromises on new governments, which result in the rights of victims being compromised. Victims are deprived of opportunities to seek legal redress and punishment for wrongs done to them. They bear the brunt of these political compromises. In such societies, a reparations programme assumes particular importance as it allows the state to deal with large numbers of victims. In this way reconciliation can begin.
36. Programmes have already been implemented on the rehabilitation and inclusion of perpetrators into society, necessary elements of a successful transition. These programmes, such as the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Programme (DDR), helped to assist ex-combatants some of whom were perpetrators of atrocities. As a consequence of the war, these ex-combatants have been alienated from their respective communities. They need opportunities for education and skills acquisition as well as gainful employment to foster self-esteem, economic growth and provide them with a sense of ownership and participation. However, the establishment of programmes to assist ex-combatants created an onus on the Government to replicate these efforts on behalf of victims.
37. Most of the victims who appeared before the Commission expressed a widely held perception that the state had taken better care of the ex-combatants rather than the victims of the conflict. This perception has the potential to hinder reconciliation between victims and perpetrators.
38. Gibrilla Dumbuya, a victim, testified at a public hearing on 9 June 2003 in Moyamba District. He related his experiences during the time that his village, Magbenka, was controlled by the RUF. He talked about the arbitrary killing of civilians, the burning of houses and, the loss of his child. After his testimony, Mr. Dumbuya was asked whether he had any questions for the Commission. He replied:

Yes, what puzzles me is that the perpetrators are cared for and those of us who are victims are left out. What will happen to us in the future?

39. The implementation of a reparations programme will respond to the concerns expressed by the victims. It allows the Government to acknowledge the plight of victims and their suffering. This will reduce the perception that perpetrators are better cared for than victims.

Truth-Telling and Reparations

40. Truth telling and reparations are key components of reconciliation. Jose Zalaquet, a former member of the Chilean Truth and Reconciliation Commission stresses this:

To provide for measures of reparation and prevention, it must be clearly known what should be prevented. Further, society cannot simply block out a chapter of its history; it cannot deny the facts of its past, however differently these may be interpreted. Inevitably, the void would be filled with lies or with conflicting, confusing versions of the past. A nation's unity depends on a shared identity, which in turn depends largely on a shared memory. The truth also brings a measure of healthy social catharsis and help to prevent the past from reoccurring.¹¹

41. Truth telling without reparations could be perceived by the victims as an incomplete process in which they revealed their pain and suffering without any mechanism in place to deal with the consequences of that pain or to substantially alter the material circumstances of their lives. In that regard, the Commission concurs with the view expressed by the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission that without adequate reparation and rehabilitation measures, there can be no healing or reconciliation.¹²

The Potential of Reparations to Restore the Dignity of Victims

42. The conflict caused many innocent people to fall victim to the cruellest violations of fundamental human rights. As a consequence, victims often find themselves in a condition which is not conducive to living with dignity. Most have been reduced to living in poverty, some having to endure the loss of limbs and others shunned because of their personal experiences such as rape and sexual slavery. Their dependency and social exclusion are constant reminders of the suffering they went through.

¹¹ J. Zalaquett, Extract from the Matthew O. Tobriner Lecture. "Balancing Ethical Imperatives and Political Constraints: The Dilemma of New Democracies Confronting Past Human Rights Violations." 1992. 43 Hastings Law Journal, p. 1425 and 1433.

¹² The Truth and Reconciliation Commission for South Africa, Final Report, Volume 5, Chapter 5, p. 170.

TRC

TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION PUBLIC HEARINGS 2003



The Commission's interpreter (left) and counsellor (right) accompany a witness on the podium during a public hearing.

43. Some are faced almost continuously with those who have harmed them in their own communities, their presence serving as a constant reminder of the violation suffered. Moving on beyond this state is impossible given the economic and social conditions that victims find themselves in and their dependence on handouts. The humiliation of being dependent on the charity of others and often having to beg in order to live re-victimizes victims, leaving lasting scars and wounds that may fester thoughts of bitterness and anger. This may constitute the seeds of future violence. A reparations programme has the potential to restore the dignity of victims whose lives have been most devastated to move beyond the position they are currently in as a consequence of the war. The restoration of the dignity of victims can help to create the conditions necessary for reconciliation.
44. The testimony of Adama Koroma, at a hearing in Makeni on 26 May 2003, is illustrative of how a reparations programme can assist victims. In 1998, Adama Koroma's village was attacked. She ran into the bush and managed to reach another village. During her attempted escape, she was caught by the rebels along with 26 other people. One of her hands was amputated while the other was permanently damaged. Her husband's hands and ears were also amputated and he later died because of the amputation. Adama was later found by ECOMOG soldiers and brought to Freetown. She has four children. At the end of her testimony, when she was given the opportunity to ask questions the Commission she said:

Adama Koroma: We the amputees, how are we in this world now? I am not speaking for myself here. The government should not leave our case behind. It is not for us, it is for our children. If my child grows up and asks me who chopped off my hand, I will say these people did it to me. That will bring the war again. If you say peace should come, we the amputees should bring the peace. I can't be struggling and say that I am living in peace. That is why our case should be pushed forward. If our problem is left behind, the war will not end. We the amputees, we all have children.

Bishop Humper: What kind of recommendation will you want to make so that we can incorporate it in our report?

Adama Koroma: This is all I have to say. We have no hands. We should be assisted. If we are assisted we will have a peace of mind. All our children can think for themselves now. They ask us who chopped our hands and feet. We have to make our children reconcile their minds.

45. Tamba Finnoh, in his testimony on 14 April 2003, expressed the sentiments of many victims on forgiveness, when asked to make recommendations to the Commission:

Bishop Humper: If you were to make a recommendation to this Commission for consideration, what type of recommendation would you want to make?

Tamba Finnoh: The first thing I want to recommend is that most of us are willing to forgive, but to sustain this forgiveness, you can all see that we have lost our dignity because we used to be fit to fend for ourselves but this is not so anymore. That has caused most of us to become beggars in the streets So I will recommend to the Commission that they should put mechanisms in place, which will ensure that there are provisions for us, which will be sustainable and not something that we can eat in a single day; something that will be sustainable maybe as long as we are alive and even for our children. This is one of the recommendations I will make.

46. In addition to the views of victims on how reparations can foster reconciliation, many NGOs expressed similar views. A representative from CARE, an NGO working in Sierra Leone, expressed the following view on reconciliation:

For reconciliation to be durable the TRC itself should ensure that a sustainable package of compensation is developed and implemented while it lasts, and the Special Fund is strengthened to support those who have been crippled.¹³

The Link between Reparations and the Restoration of Civic Trust

47. Witnesses before the Commission and representatives of institutions that made submissions to the Commission expressed the view that the lack of good governance was a major factor leading to the conflict. A recurring theme was that of ongoing corruption, nepotism, the mismanagement of state resources and the total loss of confidence and trust in institutions meant to enhance democratic values in the period before and during the conflict. There is a fear that this situation will continue in the future.
48. The witnesses expressed discontent over the fact that those public institutions designed to defend the interests of the people were only serving the interests of those constituting them. A decade-long conflict, in which many groups of people have been victimised, marginalized and brutalised, has only aggravated such feelings. There is very little trust in leadership. Many people also indicated

¹³ Submission to the TRC. May 2003

their fear of being victimised if they criticize them openly. This breakdown in the relationship between citizen and state does not bode well for the future. People's spirits have been broken by the horrors they endured during the conflict. The leaders should urgently address this lack of trust, for it can only be a source of further strife and unrest.

49. Reparations are an important instrument in achieving the restoration of civic trust. A sincere commitment from the Government to the execution of the proposed reparations programme will give a clear sign to the victims that the State and their fellow citizens are serious in their efforts to help establish relations of equality between citizens and the State.¹⁴ Acknowledging the wrongs done to victims by engaging with those who are victimised and disempowered may lead to a renewed faith in the democratic process. This leads to the restoration of civic trust and a sense of ownership in the nation, attributes which are necessary if Sierra Leone is to take its rightful place in the community of nations.

The Link between Reparations and Social Solidarity

50. Rebuilding a society requires a new social solidarity, arising from the empathy characteristic of someone who is willing and able to imagine himself or herself in the place of another. This must be built on a common understanding of the relevance of learning from the past, while allowing for different nuances. This new society can only be built on the acknowledgement and recognition by the nation of what went wrong, and particularly the suffering caused to victims, and what is needed to repair it. Acknowledging that reparations are a national responsibility generates social solidarity.
51. Reparations show that the particular society, formerly characterized by division, takes an interest in those who have suffered most from the consequences of the breakdown.¹⁵ This is exactly what a democracy is supposed to do. It must take into account the interests of all, especially its weakest members. This way a new social fabric can be woven and old divisions overcome. This is a crucial step towards peaceful coexistence and the avoidance of repetition of violent conflict.

Principles that Inform the Reparations Programme

52. In devising recommendations that address the needs of victims as well as those recommendations that deal specifically with the implementation of the programme; the Commission was guided by various principles. The Commission took the decision to make the programme feasible and practical. The section that follows explains the considerations and the rationale behind the commission's recommendation on reparations. The order in which the principles are stated does not reflect a hierarchy.

¹⁴ De Greiff, pp. 18-21.

¹⁵ Ibid., p. 21.

Guiding Principles Regarding Victim Eligibility

53. Many, if not all of the people of Sierra Leone suffered during the war. Some suffered directly from various kinds of violations mentioned in this report. Others witnessed these violations or indirectly suffered from them. In this way, all Sierra Leoneans are survivors. The Commission hereby explicitly acknowledges the suffering of all these people, Sierra Leonean and others, during the war.
54. The Commission decided not to follow the example of the South-African Truth Commission by limiting the beneficiaries of the Reparations Programme to those victims who co-operated with it. The Commission is fully aware of the fact that the limited time span allowed for taking statements and conducting hearings, as well as other logistical constraints, did not allow it to reach out to every victim who may have wanted to tell their story to the Commission. Limiting reparations to only those who partook in the Commission process would arbitrarily preclude a large proportion of victims from being recognised by this reparations programme. Since the work of the Commission is focused on victims, such an arbitrary distinction cannot be made. Also, making such a distinction is not likely to contribute to reconciliation, which is one of the goals of the reparations programme. On the contrary, it may serve to create new divisions.
55. Citizens and non-citizens of Sierra Leone suffered during the conflict. The Commission did not want to make a distinction between victims on the basis of their nationality. A victim does not need to be a Sierra Leonean to qualify for this programme.
56. Nonetheless, not all victims can be beneficiaries of the reparations programme or aspects of it. While all victims of the conflict will be beneficiaries of the symbolic measures outlined in the programme, the Commission sought to prioritise certain categories of victims who will be eligible to benefit in the form of service packages. Whereas many people in Sierra Leone wish to see all of their needs met, it is unrealistic to think that this can be done by the reparations programme recommended by the Commission. In making the decision to limit access to certain measures of the reparations programme, the Commission was guided by practical considerations, mainly the inability of the state to provide for the needs of all the victims given the limited resources available. The decision to accord benefits to certain victims does not reflect a judgment on the intensity or significance of the suffering of different victims, but is based on pragmatic grounds.
57. The Commission determined the categories of beneficiaries who should benefit from the reparations programme by considering those victims who were particularly vulnerable to suffering human rights violations. Most Sierra Leoneans agree that amputees, war wounded, women who suffered sexual abuse, children and war widows would constitute special categories of victims who are in dire need of urgent care. The Commission also considered those victims who are in urgent need of a particular type of assistance to address their current needs, even if this only serves to put them on an equal footing with a larger category of victims. The reparations programme aims at contributing to the rehabilitation of those victims, even if complete rehabilitation is not possible.

58. Based on the rationale described above, the Commission recommends the following groups of victims as beneficiaries of the specific measures of the reparations programme: (1) amputees; (2) other war wounded (defined under the section describing the various categories of beneficiaries); (3) children; and (4) victims of sexual violence. Due to their particular vulnerability either before or after the commission of the violation, many of the victims in each of these categories of beneficiaries suffered from multiple human rights violations. For example, a victim of sexual violence may also have been abducted, tortured, and abused or subjected to a variety of other types of inhumane acts.
59. In including the amputees, the other war wounded, and victims of sexual violence as beneficiaries of this programme, the Commission considered the fact that many of them who fall in either one of the categories have enduring physical handicaps as a result of which they suffered cumulative harm both physically and mentally. Many are unable to reintegrate into their communities of origin, cannot sustain themselves or their families, and are unable to tend to their medical conditions because of the high costs associated with treatment.
60. No clear government policy exists in respect of the disabled, amputees, war wounded and those who suffered sexual violence. Further, most of the assistance available to these groups has come from national and international NGOs. There is an urgent need for government intervention to help in the provision of more sustainable assistance.
61. There is a high degree of consensus in the country that amputees, other war wounded, those who suffered sexual violence and children victimized through the war should be prioritised as victims in need of particular care and assistance given the enduring effects of the violations they suffered.
62. In including children and victims of sexual violence as beneficiaries of specific measures of this reparations programme, the Commission relies directly on its mandate. Article 6.2 of the TRC Act explicitly states,
- To work to help to restore the human dignity of victims and promote reconciliation by providing an opportunity for victims to give an account of violations and abuses suffered and for perpetrators to relate their experiences, and by creating a climate which fosters constructive interchange between victims and perpetrators, giving special attention to the subject of sexual abuses and to the experiences of children within the armed conflict.*
63. Whereas many of the recommendations of the Commission refer to all the children in Sierra Leone, the Commission is nevertheless convinced that some specific reparations measures need to be taken in respect of those categories of children that suffered during the war or that still suffer from the consequences of the war such as abducted children, forcibly conscripted children, and orphans. The Commission places particular focus on restoring lost educational opportunities for children.
64. Although the mandate does not specifically refer to women, the Commission interpreted the provision that refers to "the subjects of sexual abuses" to refer mainly to women. It is undeniable that women were subjected to all forms of sexual violence and are in need of assistance to address many of the consequences that resulted from the violations committed against them. Many of the victims of sexual violence require medical attention so that they can carry

on with their day to day activities. The Commission wanted to include those female victims that have not received enough attention from existing programmes, such as victims of sexual violence and bush wives.

65. In addition to providing redress to the direct victims of human rights violations, the Commission wanted to address the needs of indirect victims as well. Indirect victims are defined as the dependents or relatives of the direct victim. The Commission decided to include war widows, those women whose husbands had died as a consequence of a human rights violation during the course of the war, as beneficiaries of specific measures of this reparations programme. For some of these war widows, their husbands were the breadwinners of the family. As a consequence of their husband's death, many of these women struggle to provide for themselves and their family. Recognising the difficulties they endure, the Commission made recommendations for them in the reparations programme.
66. Although gender equality is a guiding principle of this programme, the Commission did not consider it a contradiction with this principle to exclude widowers and husbands of female amputees and other war wounded from the programme. It is generally accepted that husbands and widowers are often the bread-winners of their family and are therefore economically independent.
67. The Commission limited the number of victims who can benefit from certain measures of the programme based on a certain percentage of potential income lost as a result of the violation committed against a victim. The Commission did not want to accord the same benefits to a victim who lost his or her limbs, (thus causing a high degree of disability and a greater potential for lost income as a consequence of a violation, for example), with a victim who lost a finger as a result of a violation and may be able to sustain himself or herself. In order to avoid a sense of arbitrariness in determining the percentages for the reduction in earning capacity, the Commission referred to the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1955, in particular, the Second Schedule of the Act.¹⁶ A certain percentage is assigned to each violation in the schedule that constitutes the potential loss of income for that victim. For example, the loss of an arm constitutes a 70% reduction in earning capacity.
68. The Commission determined that for certain benefits to be accorded to victims, the violation committed against the victim must constitute a 50% or more reduction in earning capacity. This can be the result of one injury or an aggregate of injuries that total or exceed the 50% benchmark. In making the decision to use the reduction of earning capacity as a cut-off point for some of the measures in the reparations programme, the Commission was influenced by the practices employed by the Inter-American Court for Human Rights and the German Holocaust reparations scheme.¹⁷ It is also important to note that while the Commission has chosen to employ this practice, it did not constitute a judgment on the harm suffered by a particular victim. The provision of benefits is not proportional to the harm suffered nor can the harm suffered by a victim be satisfactorily quantified.

¹⁶ Although the Act has been subsequently amended in 1969 and 1971, the provisions that were used for the purposes of the reparations programme have not been amended since 1955.

¹⁷ Under the German Holocaust reparations scheme, for example, claimants needed to prove that their persecution caused health problems that led to at least a 30% reduction in their earning capacity. Doctors often relied on tables for quantifying the damage, loss of an eye constituted a 30% reduction and loss of arm constituted a 50% reduction in earning capacity.

69. The Commission did not make a distinction between civilians and ex-combatants for the purpose of their eligibility as beneficiaries of the reparations programme. A reparations programme is not based on a person's past actions but rather on what violations have been suffered by him or her. However, ex-combatants have already benefited from several programmes, in particular the substantive programme for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) developed by the NCDDR and UNAMSIL. However, restoring the balance between benefits already assigned to ex-combatants and reparations for the victims is one of the main public expectations that the reparations programme will seek to meet.
70. Although ex-combatants were not excluded per se, the Commission strove to avoid providing double benefits to victims. No one civilian or ex-combatant should be allowed to benefit from the reparations programme if they had already benefited from the same programme or measure under another initiative. For example, a war wounded SLA soldier who received compensation from the government should not be eligible for a pension in the context of this programme. However, this principle needs to be applied with some flexibility: a person having received medical attention or trauma counselling might need more assistance, and each individual should be assessed on the merits of his or her case.

Guiding Principles for Reparations

71. In devising recommendations on the reparations programme, the Commission was faced with two options: either recommending individual reparations payments or devising a programme based on social service packages. The Commission chose a programme that would centre on the provision of social service packages based on the following reasons:
- In the testimonies provided to the Commission, the victims overwhelmingly asked for assistance or redress in the form of social services rather than individual cash payments. The Commission therefore is not being unduly prescriptive towards the victims since it is a choice based on their expressed desires.
 - Recommending individual cash payments would go beyond the available resources of the state to provide such payments to the individual beneficiaries. To make this programme as feasible and practical as possible, the Commission made recommendations that build on existing structures in addressing the needs of the victims. The Commission found merit in the argument of the South African Truth Commission regarding the evolution of victim's needs over time. However, any amount awarded as an individual reparations payment would probably only serve the immediate needs of the victims. Any recommendation enshrined in a service package offered more opportunity for sustainable assistance than a one-time cash payment.
 - The Commission finds that in the particular circumstances of poverty prevalent in Sierra Leone, individual cash payments may lead to additional division and strife as opposed to the sense of social solidarity that the reparations programme is meant to foster.

72. In determining which types of social services to provide to the beneficiaries of the programme, the Commission relied on the needs expressed both by the victims themselves and by the organizations working with them. The recommendations were therefore based on consultations undertaken during the statement-taking phase, the hearings, and from submissions received by the Commission.
73. The Commission also wanted to address those needs that had been rarely or poorly expressed by victims themselves, due to the nature of the abuses suffered, but which were identified by experts working in the field. For example, trauma counselling as provided through psycho-social support, is often not recognised as a need by some victims, since many may not be familiar with the condition of trauma.
74. The Commission was mindful of the programmes and benefits available to ex-combatants and war-wounded SLA soldiers. Sectors of assistance provided to the ex-combatants under the NCDDR programme included vocational training, formal education, agricultural activities, public works and job placement, monthly allowances for a limited period of time, and a children's programme with provisions for educational opportunities.¹⁸ War-wounded SLA soldiers have received assistance in the form of pensions, a one-lump sum, a training course, and as of November 2003, provisions were being developed for medical support for certain individuals.¹⁹
75. In making recommendations on health, education, skills training, and pensions for the beneficiaries of this programme, the Commission reviewed existing programmes implemented in these fields, which currently provide the social services included in the reparations programme. The Commission assessed the capacity of both governmental and non-governmental institutions to carry out the recommendations prescribed in the reparations programme. The assessment took into account factors such as the number of skilled professionals, the existence of physical structures such as health units and schools existed, the mandates of the organizations conducting the particular service, and the resources available to implement the recommendations. In some cases, the Commission offered specific recommendations in order to improve service delivery so that the programme could be properly executed.
76. The Commission also took into account how other truth commissions around the world devised their recommendations on reparations. For example, for both health care reparations and pensions, the Commission drew inspiration from both the Chilean and Peruvian Truth Commissions.
77. Developing programmes for specific categories of people carries the risk of creating new stigma, whereas some of the victims already suffer from stigmatisation. Avoiding new stigma or reinforcement of existing stigma was one principle behind the development of this programme. The Commission wanted to reduce existing stigma as much as possible and considers the development of programmes to increase awareness and understanding of the specific needs of victims as a necessary measure in reducing their suffering.

¹⁸ Presentation on the DDR Programme April 2002-July 2003 at the Fourth State of the Nation Symposium, 5 August 2003, pp. 4-5.

¹⁹ Restricted Document provided by the Directorate of Defense Personnel, Ministry of Defense, 18 November 2003.

78. To ensure sustainability, the programme focused on the reduction of dependency and the empowerment of victims. Restoring the human dignity of a victim means helping him or her to become a fully participating citizen of society again. Having an income may contribute significantly to the feeling of recovered dignity. Therefore, many of the reparations measures recommended by the Commission focus on education, skills training, micro-credit, entrepreneurship, and employment. Empowering victims to take responsibility for themselves is the only way to make them and their families economically autonomous and ultimately independent of life-long state support programmes.
79. Another basic principle was the rehabilitation and reintegration of victims in their original communities as far as is possible. The Commission recommends that where possible and desirable, victims need to be reintegrated in their own communities. However, the Commission realises that reintegration may be very difficult for some in the short-term. With time, sensitisation, and economic independence, this may be achievable in the long-term.
80. While the views of victims shaped these recommendations, the victims should continue to play an integral role in the formulation of reparations policy. Since the purpose of the reparations programme is to help restore what was taken from them and to improve their quality of life, victims should have a say in the process wherever possible. Their participation has therefore been built into the recommendations for community and symbolic reparations.
81. The elaboration of a reparations programme by the Commission has been hampered by the lack of data on the number of potential beneficiaries who may be eligible to benefit from the reparations programme. In addition, there is no precise information available on the number of victims who have already benefited from any of the existing programmes. This may hamper the implementation of the recommendations. The Implementing Body should therefore have some discretion in making the recommendations operational once concrete information becomes available regarding the potential universe of beneficiaries. In suggesting the discretion, the Commission wanted to balance the need to ensure that benefits are available to all potential beneficiaries with the available resources of the government to provide for the benefits recommended by the programme.

Guiding Principles Regarding Implementation of the Reparations Programme

82. Reparations is primarily the responsibility of the government. A clear commitment from the President, Parliament, political actors and the rest of the country is required. The implementation of a reparations programme by the government will restore civic trust in government institutions. Government needs to take up this responsibility, because international donors will not continue to contribute forever. Some of the reparations measures recommended can be implemented within the time span of a few years, but others require a commitment for the life-time of the beneficiary.
83. In line with the guiding principle of feasibility and sustainability, many of the proposal reparations measures can fit into existing programmes that are currently being implemented by donor agencies and NGOs. However, because government participation is crucial to any reparations programme, the government is obliged to assist those existing institutions in faithfully executing the recommendations made.

84. In keeping with the principle of feasibility, the Commission made recommendations for the implementation of activities in the short and long term. Those recommendations, which the government could implement within its existing programmes or through allocation of its resources, should be implemented in the short term. The short-term recommendations should be implemented within a year. Certain measures may take more time to be implemented. These measures should be implemented in the mid to long-term. Mid to long-term recommendations should be implemented within the next 3-6 years.
85. The need for accessibility to the reparations measures requires decentralisation of the programme. Much effort will have to be made to ensure that programmes are available in the provinces, not just in Freetown.
86. The accessibility of the programme is closely related to the procedures for the registration of the beneficiaries. There is a risk that victims who are entitled to reparations may not be registered, while others may try to abuse the programme through acquiring undeserved benefits. Registration and identification of beneficiaries needs to be done with utmost care. Instead of creating new procedures and bodies, the Commission recommends that the Implementing Body draw as much as possible on pre-existing structures which have already proven their administrative effectiveness. At the community level, traditional chiefs, religious leaders, NGOs and Community Based Organisations (CBOs) with a focus on women and youth organisations should be involved in the registration and identification of beneficiaries. These social structures should also be involved in the implementation of the programme.

Categories of Beneficiaries and Eligibility Requirements

87. For a person to be eligible for reparations, the event or injury sustained had to have occurred between 23 March 1991 and 1 March 2002.²⁰
88. The reparations programme is available to citizens and non-citizens of Sierra Leone who sustained injuries during the time specified as a consequence of a violation committed against them.
89. The following categories of victims are recommended as beneficiaries of the programme.

Amputees

90. Amputees are defined as war-wounded victims who lost their upper or lower limbs as a result of the conflict.
91. Since many of the recommendations on amputees refer to the reduction of earning capacity as a prerequisite to qualify for certain benefits, the Commission refers to the Second Schedule of the Workmen's Compensation Act of 1955. According to the schedule, a specified level of reduction in earning capacity has to be attained before a claimant can qualify for benefits. The commission has fixed this benchmark at 50% for amputees.

²⁰ The day the state of emergency was lifted.

Other War-Wounded

92. 'Other War-Wounded' are defined as victims who have become temporarily or permanently physically disabled, either totally or partially, as a consequence of the conflict, other than through an amputation. Examples may be victims who received lacerations, who lost body parts other than their limbs, such as fingers, ears, lips and toes, or have gunshot wounds; bullets or shell fragments in their bodies in so far as they are totally or partially disabled.
93. Due to the broad nature of violations committed against the 'other war-wounded' and because the Commission has limited certain benefits of the programme based on the percentage of lost income as a consequence of a violation, the Commission refers to the Second Schedule of the Worker's Compensation Act. Included below are excerpts from the Act which highlight those violations applicable to the other war-wounded along with the corresponding percentage indicating the loss of potential income.

Fingers and Thumbs:

60%:	loss of four fingers and thumb of one hand;
35%:	loss of four fingers; and loss of one thumb
10%:	loss of index finger;
6%:	loss of middle finger;
5%:	loss of ring finger; and
4%:	loss of little finger.

Toes:

15%:	loss of toes.
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Eyes:

100%:	total loss of sight;
30%:	removal of eye from socket; and
30%:	loss of sight.

Ears

50%:	loss of both ears; and
7%:	loss of one ear

94. For those violations not listed in the schedule, the Commission recommends that the Implementing Body, with the assistance of the Ministry of Health and Sanitation, consult various medical experts who can determine the reduction in earning capacity as a result of any violation committed against a victim who falls under the category of "other war-wounded." The Implementing Body should seek the approval of at least two-thirds of the members of the Advisory Board²¹ before any addendum is added to the Second Schedule for the purposes of this reparations programme.

²¹ The duty of the Advisory Board is mentioned in paragraph 218.

Victims of Sexual Violence

95. Victims of sexual violence are defined as those women and girls who were subjected to such acts as rape, sexual slavery, mutilation of genital parts or breasts, and forced marriage. To the extent boys and men suffered from sexual violence, they will also be beneficiaries of this programme.
96. The Commission decided not to apply the reduction of earning capacity test to victims of sexual violence because many victims who fall into this category suffer a tremendous amount of stigma. Many victims of sexual violence are rejected by their own communities and families and because of this, many victims find it difficult to sustain themselves, regardless of the injury they have sustained as a result of a violation committed against them.

Children

97. Eligible children for this Reparations Programme are subdivided into five categories:
 - Children who suffered from physical injury, such as amputees, other war-wounded or victims of sexual violence.
 - Children whose parents were killed as a consequence of any abuse or violation as described in this report.
 - Children born out of an act of sexual violence and whose mother is single.
 - Children who suffer from psychological harm.
 - War-Wounded children.
 - Children are eligible for reparations if they were 18 years of age or younger by 1 March 2002.
98. Children are excluded from the reduction in earning capacity test based on the fact that all reparations for children centre around health or educational benefits, for which it is not necessary to determine reduced earning capacity.

War Widows

99. Women whose husbands were killed as a consequence of any abuse or violation and who, as a result, have become the primary breadwinners for their families.

Recommendations

100. The Commission made recommendations on the following areas: health care, pensions, education, skills-training and micro-credit/projects, community and symbolic reparations.
101. Government participation is vital to the success of any reparations programme. For this reason, reference is made throughout this report calling for government assistance. Government assistance, requires the government to finance the measures prescribed in the programme. It may also entail: (a) the government continuing a service where an organization or body does not have the capacity or the mandate to maintain its activities; and/or (b) the government seeking outside financial or donor support for any given measure mentioned in the programme.

102. Government should consult those NGOs and international organizations that are already providing assistance to the victims in order to assess what role it could play in coordinating and assisting these organizations to carry out their programmes. It should assess the duration of these activities be prepared to take them over when the donor community no longer provides the service.

SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS

Health Care for Individual Beneficiaries

Information Considered by the Commission

103. The conflict in Sierra Leone had deleterious consequences on the physical and mental health of its people. It caused major disruptions to the health system in terms of damage to physical infrastructure, loss of skilled professionals, and other valuable resources to the health sector.
104. In devising its recommendations on health care, the Commission took into account the current structure of the health care system in Sierra Leone. The Ministry of Health and Sanitation is responsible for setting up a health care policy and ensuring that various health agencies work in accordance with the policy. The health care system operates at three levels. Primary level care is exclusively for minor illnesses administered through Primary Health Units (PHU). There are currently over 750 primary health units in Sierra Leone. Secondary level care is administered through district hospitals. There is at least one hospital in each district. The Ministry of Health and Sanitation recently decentralized its services. Each district hospital was allocated its own budget. At the tertiary level, there are specialized medical facilities such as 1 mental hospital, 1 tuberculosis clinic, and 1 children's hospital.
105. In making its recommendations on health related reparations, the Commission has taken into account the shortage of trained medical professionals. There are approximately 250-300 doctors in Sierra Leone with half of them working in Freetown.
106. Although international NGOs continue to play an instrumental role in providing physical and mental health care, most people in the country are faced with the burden of having to pay for medical care. As a result of the high costs, many people do not seek medical treatment. According to the Report of the Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS), the inability to pay for medical services and drugs was cited as the number one reason why people in rural communities do not visit hospitals when they are in need of care.²²
107. In a special coding exercise of 300 statements in the Commission's database, more than half of the respondents indicated that the status of their health is either fair or in poor condition²³ arising from the violations they suffered.

²² Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) July- December 2001, p. 14.

²³ For the purposes of the coding exercise, a victim who considered their health to be in fair condition as a consequence of their violation was defined as someone with a major illness or disability and their health affects their daily life. A victim who considered their health to be in poor condition as a consequence of their violation was defined as someone whose health is so badly

Nearly two-thirds (67%) of the respondents who require medical attention or counselling have not received any medical assistance. Approximately 11% consider themselves disabled as a consequence of their violation.

108. The recommended health care programme will encourage victims to seek medical treatment through removing the high costs of treatment. This should be facilitated by strengthening government's provision of services across the country and by developing centres of expertise in each district. In the short-term, the programme should be initiated by identifying medical centres with expertise in the needs of a particular condition, and providing transportation to such centres (the referral system). A system of prioritisation should also be implemented. Internationally trained physicians should be recruited to temporarily fill positions.

Physical Health Care for Amputees

Amputees and the Provision of Free Physical Health Care

109. Amputees suffer from various conditions that affect their livelihood. These conditions include phantom sensation²⁴, fistulae and various other infections. Amputees endure an enormous amount of suffering from their injuries and will require medical care for the rest of their lives. The Commission recommends that all amputees be provided with free physical health care for the duration of their lives. The provision of free physical health care should also include surgery where necessary in terms of their specific needs.
110. The Commission recommends that the immediate family members of amputees such as wives and children under the age of 18 should also be eligible to receive free physical health care.
111. The Commission recommends that the physical health care be made available at primary health units, district hospitals, and tertiary care units. Given that it is unlikely in the immediate future that access to physical health care will be available at all hospitals and care units, the Commission recommends that those in need who are eligible to receive this service should be referred to the appropriate centre for assistance. This will require that in the short term the government strengthen the referral system between medical centres within the country so that the medical needs of the amputees can be met.
112. The Commission recommends that the Connaught Hospital in Freetown serve as the coordinating centre for all medical services relating to amputees. The Commission also recommends that the government establish referral centres in all four regions of the country for the coordination of health services for amputees. The Ministry of Health should identify those health institutions which are able to provide the required services and ensure that where institutions do not have the available services, the amputees are aware of where services are being offered and that victims can be transported to those institutions offering the services.

affected that they cannot carry on with their daily activities which include working and caring for their families.

²⁴ Phantom sensation is any sensation or pain originating from a residual limb and can range from tingling sensations to severe, sharp, stabbing pain that can only be controlled via professional pain management.

Amputees and the Provision of Free Prosthetic and Orthotic Devices

113. The Commission recommends the provision of free prosthetic and orthotic devices to those amputees who have not yet received one but who require and desire such assistance. Prosthetic and orthotic devices should include upper and lower artificial limbs as well as other assisting devices such as wheelchairs, crutches, orthopaedic shoes, splinters, etc.
114. The Commission recommends that the government play a coordination role in assisting amputees to access those organizations and bodies that provide prosthetic and orthotic devices.
115. The Commission recommends that the government assist the organisations and bodies that train prosthetic and orthotic technicians in the fabrication of upper and lower limb prostheses. Currently, technicians are operating without formal training. The government should support a sustainable process of training according to the standards set by the International Society for Prosthetics and Orthotics (ISPO) at Categories I, II, and III.²⁵
116. The number of prosthetic and orthotic trainers in the short and medium term should accord with the recommendations made by the Ministry of Health and Sanitation in the National Strategy for the Development of Prosthetics and Orthotics Services issued in March 2002.
117. In the long-term, the government should assist those organizations and bodies that currently train prosthetic and orthotic technicians in accordance with the standard set by the World Health Organisation (WHO) regarding the number of technicians' required (1 trainer per 500 persons in need of devices).
118. The Commission recommends that the government offer incentives to qualified trained prosthetic and orthotic technicians in order to retain them in Sierra Leone.

Amputees and the Provision of Free Rehabilitation Services

119. The Commission recommends the provision of free rehabilitation services to the amputees, including training on the use, repair, and maintenance of the prosthetic, as well as physiotherapy and occupational therapy to enhance the functionality and autonomy of the amputees.
120. The Commission recommends that the government assist the existing rehabilitation centres established by organisations and bodies that provide rehabilitation services, such as Handicap International. In the long-term, the Commission recommends that the government establish rehabilitation centres in each of the district hospitals, with priority given to the district hospitals in the Northern Region where few rehabilitation services are currently available.

²⁵ Category I is the most advanced category of the three. It involves 3-4 years of formal structured training leading to a university degree. The proper term for a Category I professional is prosthetist/orthotist.

Category II involves 3 years of formal structured training, lower than degree level. The proper term for a Category II professional is orthopedic technologist.

Category III is the most basic category of the three. It involves formal structured or on-the-job training.

121. Recognising the limited number of rehabilitation centres that are currently available in the country, the Commission recommends that the government strengthen the referral system between the district hospitals and the rehabilitation centres.
122. The Murray Town Rehabilitation Centre in Freetown should serve as the National Referral Centre (NRC) for all rehabilitation services in the country. In the long-term, referral centres should be established in each of the three regions of the country.
123. The Commission recommends that the government support the implementation of community-based rehabilitation (CBR) activities. CBR programmes can provide information to the service providers about the need for orthopaedic devices in the communities as well as coordinating follow-up meetings after the fitting of orthoses / prostheses is carried out. CBR workers can raise awareness among the local population about disability issues and about the existence of prosthetic and orthotic services at the provincial and national level.
124. The Commission recommends that the government assist the organisations and bodies that train physical therapists, such as the joint programme between Handicap International and the College of Medicine and Allied Health Sciences (COMAHS). The number of trained therapists should be in accordance with the standard set by the WHO as mentioned above (1 per 500 persons in need).
125. The Commission also recommends that the government offer incentives to qualified trained physical therapists in order to retain them in Sierra Leone.

Physical Health Care for “Other War Wounded”

126. The Commission recommends the provision of free primary, secondary and tertiary physical health care for all eligible “other war wounded”, to the degree their injury or disability demands. The provision of free physical health care also includes surgery for those in need.
127. The Commission recommends that children who fit the category “other war wounded” be provided with free physical health care until 18 years of age except if the injury sustained requires care past the age of 18.
128. The Commission also recommends that the wives and children under 18 years of age of the eligible adult “other war-wounded,” if the victim experienced a 50% or more reduction in earning capacity as a result of the violation committed against them, be provided with free physical health care as long as the direct beneficiary of this programme is continuing to benefit from the provision of free health care.
129. The beneficiary must be assessed by a government doctor to determine eligibility.
130. The Commission recommends that “other war wounded” beneficiaries and his or her dependents be given a three month grace period from when they are no longer eligible to be recipients of a particular health benefit to when all services permanently cease to be administered.

131. The Commission recommends that the health care be made available at primary health units, district hospitals, and tertiary health units. However, in the short term, recognising that many health centres are limited in the care they provide, the Commission recommends that the government strengthen the referral system between hospitals within the country so that the medical needs of the “other war- wounded” can be met.
132. The Commission recommends that Connaught Hospital in Freetown serve as the coordinating centre for all medical needs relating to the category of “other war wounded.” In the long term, the government should establish referral centres in all the district hospitals for the coordination of health services for the “other war wounded.”
133. For those “other war -wounded” in need of rehabilitation, the Commission recommends the provision of physiotherapy and occupational therapy. Regarding the need for rehabilitation centres and physical therapists, the Commission refers to its recommendations for amputees.

Physical Health Care for Victims of Sexual Violence

Victims of Sexual Violence and the Provision of Free Physical Health Care

134. Victims of sexual violence suffer from various medical conditions. Such conditions include a prolapsed uterus, scarring, sexually transmitted diseases, amenorrhoea, vaginal destruction, foot drop²⁶, difficulties conceiving or carrying a child full-term, as well as experiencing complications during birth. Therefore, the Commission recommends the provision of free primary, secondary, and tertiary physical health care for adult and child victims of sexual violence, on an as needed basis, depending on the degree of their injury.
135. The Commission recommends that child victims of sexual violence be provided with free physical health care until 18 years of age except if the injury sustained requires care past the age of 18.
136. The Commission also recommends that children of victims of sexual violence who are under 18, and the wives of eligible male victim of sexual violence, be eligible for the provision of free physical health care as long as the direct beneficiary of the programme is continuing to benefit from the provision of free health care.
137. The beneficiary must be assessed by a government doctor to determine eligibility.
138. The Commission recommends that victims of sexual violence and his or her dependents be given at a three month grace period from when they are no longer eligible to be recipients of a particular health benefit to when all services permanently cease to be administered.

²⁶ For a description of some of these conditions, please refer to the chapter on women.

139. The Commission recommends that the health care be made available at primary health units, district hospitals, and tertiary health units. However, in the short-term, recognizing that many health centres may not be able to provide the care that is needed, the Commission recommends that the government strengthen the referral system between hospitals in the area of reproductive and women's health and to the Princess Christian Maternity Hospital (PCMH) hospital in Freetown where fistula surgery is being performed, so that the medical needs of the victims of sexual violence can be met.

Victims of Sexual Violence and the Provision of Free Fistula Surgery

140. The provision of free physical health care also includes surgery for those in need, especially for those victims who suffer from vesico-vaginal fistula (or VVF, a rupture between the bladder and the vagina) and recto-vaginal fistula (or RVF, a rupture between the rectum and the vagina).
141. The Commission recommends that the government assist the efforts being made by organisations and bodies in equipping the PCMH hospital in Freetown with the tools necessary to perform VVF and RVF surgeries.
142. The Commission recommends that the government make provision for the deployment of additional qualified international surgeons to Sierra Leone on a fixed-term basis to perform fistula surgery.
143. The Commission recommends that the government assist the organisations and bodies in the establishment of a Fistula Repair and Training Centre in Freetown, where additional surgeries can be performed and national surgeons can be trained.
144. The Commission recommends that the government offer incentives to surgeons and other medically trained professionals in order to retain them in the country.

Victims of Sexual Violence and the Provision of HIV/AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Infection (STI) Testing and Treatment

145. In devising its recommendations on HIV/AIDS and STI Testing and Treatment, the Commission considered the initiatives already in place in Sierra Leone. In 2002, President Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah launched the Sierra Leone AIDS Response Project (SHARP).²⁷ SHARP is a four-year initiative with approximately USD \$15 million in funding from the World Bank.²⁸ There are four main components to SHARP: capacity building activities, funding to the health sector, funding to other non-health line ministries, and a community and civil society initiative.²⁹

²⁷ Report of a Comprehensive Assessment of the HIV/AIDS Situation in Sierra Leone and the National Response, January 21-February 3, 2003, p. 17.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

146. SHARP established the National AIDS Council (NAC) which is chaired by the President.³⁰ The NAC oversees all activities of the National AIDS Secretariat (NAS) which has responsibility for all nation-wide programmes.³¹ 141. As a consequence of the acts of sexual violence and the high prevalence of sexually transmitted diseases, the Commission recommends the provision of free HIV/AIDS testing as well as testing for STIs for all victims of sexual violence. Currently, free testing is offered at tertiary health units and in every district hospital. However, testing is not available at primary health units. As a short-term goal, the Commission recommends that the government strengthen the referral system between the tertiary and district health units that provide free testing with the primary health units that do not provide this service.
147. In the long term, in order to increase the number of medical facilities that provide HIV/AIDS testing, the Commission recommends the provision of free testing at primary health units across the country.
148. The Commission recognizes the need for trained counsellors in all facilities that provide HIV/AIDS testing. Those who wish to be tested for HIV/AIDS testing must receive counselling before, during, and after the test has been administered. Counselling is necessary to sensitise the patient about what the test actually entails and how to cope with the results of the test. Currently, there are approximately 2 HIV/AIDS counsellors per district. The Commission recommends that the government assist the organizations and bodies that currently provide training for HIV/AIDS counsellors, such as the HIV/AIDS Response Group (a joint programme between the National HIV/AIDS Secretariat and the Ministry of Health and Sanitation).
149. As a short-term goal, the government should strive to increase the number of trained counsellors per district. As a long-term goal, the National HIV/AIDS Secretariat estimates that 50 qualified Counsellors are needed in each district.
150. The Commission recommends the provision of free medical treatment for those victims of sexual violence who test positive for the HIV/AIDS virus or any other STI. The provision of free treatment includes medication for those in need; in particular medicines/drugs to treat sexually transmitted viruses and anti-retroviral medication. This service should also be available to family members of the victim.
151. The Commission recognizes the limited number of facilities that currently provide medical care for victims who are living with a sexually transmitted disease. The Commission recommends that the government assist the medical health centres that provide care for those affected by a sexually transmitted disease, such as the Farm Care Clinic in Freetown and the Shepherd's Hospice.
152. The Commission recognizes the limited number of physicians who provide treatment to victims of sexual violence afflicted with sexually transmitted diseases. There are currently 4 qualified trained physicians in this field. In the short-term, the Commission recommends that the government deploy a limited number of qualified trained physicians to Sierra Leone on a fixed term basis to handle any case that may arise as a result of the testing.

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

153. In the long-term, the Commission recommends that the government train national physicians in treating HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases. It is recommended that there be 2 trained physicians in each district.
154. The Commission recommends that the government offer incentives to qualified trained medical professionals in the field of HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted diseases to retain them in Sierra Leone.

Physical Health Care for Children

155. The Commission commends the efforts to assist children branded with scars. The International Medical Corps (IMC) in collaboration with UNICEF and USAID developed a special scar removal surgical programme.³² The programme started at Lungi Hospital and by March 2002, 82 of the 93 children recommended for the programme had had their scars surgically removed.³³
156. In addition to the recommendations on health care for amputees, other war-wounded and victims of sexual violence, which apply to children as well, the Commission recommends that the government assist the organisations and bodies that provide scar removal surgery for those children who still have letters branded by the fighting forces on various parts of their body. Letters such as RUF, AFRC, and EX SLA were engraved on the forehead, chest, arms, or back of many children. These physical scars have affected the children psychologically and in many cases, prevented their successful reintegration with families and communities.
157. The Commission recommends that the government strengthen its referral system to those hospitals that provide this kind of surgery in order to ensure that all eligible children are able to receive the service.
158. The Commission recommends that the government extend an invitation to those international surgeons and other relevant medical staff who have performed these services in the past to spend some time in Sierra Leone and carry out further surgery on those who require it.

Mental Health Care (Counselling and Psycho-social Support)

159. The Commission recommends the provision of free counselling and psycho-social support for all victims mentioned above as beneficiaries of this programme, as well as for their dependants if needed. The beneficiary is entitled to both individual and group counselling. The Commission recommends that the government coordinates and assists those organisations and bodies that provide counselling as well as those that provide training for counsellors, such as religious organisations, NGOs and international organisations. Examples include the joint training programme of Handicap International and the Institute of Public Administration and Management (IPAM), Freetown to recruit potential counsellors from among members of the community and to train them to deal with victims/ survivors of the conflict. The Commission also recommends that there be certified, trained counsellors available in each district hospital.

³² Child Protection Programme Document published by UNICEF, p. 6.

³³ UNICEF submission to the TRC, p. 10.

160. In the long-term, the Commission recommends that the government establish a mental health care facility in each of the districts, staffed with additional trained counsellors and eventually 1 psychiatrist per district.
161. The government include additional courses in the area of counselling in the curriculum of medical and nursing training schools.
162. Regarding amputees and other war wounded, the Commission recommends that counselling services be provided at the existing rehabilitation centres if such services do not currently exist and at all rehabilitation centres in the long-term.
163. Considering the stigmatisation that many victims of sexual violence suffer, the Commission recommends that trauma counselling be available in all medical facilities that currently treat women, such as the reproductive health centres and the PCMH hospital, where the fistula surgeries are being performed.
164. The Commission recommends that the government assist programmes providing trauma counselling services specifically for women. These programmes include the Rainbo Centre and the Sexual Assault Referral Centres set up by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) Gender Based Violence Programme.
165. The Commission recommends that the government assist the Child Protection Agencies and the Child Welfare Committees to provide additional trauma counselling to children in all the chiefdoms.
166. The Commission recommends that the Ministry of Health and Sanitation be entrusted with overseeing the reparations programme in the area of health.
167. The Commission also recommends that the post of Director of Mental Health Services be established within the Ministry of Health to oversee all activities relating to mental health and that the Director work in concert with the Ministry of Social Welfare on the implementation.

Pensions for Individual Beneficiaries

168. Recognizing that some of the victims are disabled to the point where they cannot sustain themselves or their families, the Commission recommends that a monthly pension be paid to all adult amputees, the adult 'other war wounded' who experienced a 50% or more reduction in earning capacity as a result of the violations committed against them, and adult victims of sexual violence.
169. The Commission recommends that the amount of the monthly pension be determined by the Implementing Body responsible for the reparations programme. The Implementing Body should consider the standard of living, the amount provided to ex-combatants on a monthly basis under the NCDDR programme, and the amount that the war-wounded SLA soldiers received from the government. Based on these considerations, the amount awarded to any beneficiary should not be lower than Le 60,000 per month.
170. The Commission recommends that the amount of the monthly pension that each beneficiary receives be directly linked to the reduction in earning capacity.

171. The Commission also recommends that the amount of the pension be adjusted over time according to the rate of inflation.
172. The Commission recommends that the Ministry of Finance, in particular, the Accountant General's Department, be entrusted with coordinating all reparations in the area of pensions.

Education for Individual Beneficiaries

Information Considered by the Commission

173. There are numerous governmental policies regarding children and the provision of education. In 2001, the government introduced the universal free primary education policy in all state-owned and assisted schools. In addition, the Ministry of Education has made three important policy decisions, namely to waive schools fees for girls in all national examinations, to eliminate schools fees at the primary school level, and to offer scholarships for girls going into junior secondary school.
174. In devising its recommendations on education, the Commission took into account various factors. According to estimates provided by the World Bank, the number of students enrolling in schools far exceeds the number of spaces available to accommodate them. In addition, the number of schools damaged during the war remains high. According to the World Bank, as much as 35% of classrooms need to be reconstructed, while 52% need to be either repaired or rehabilitated.³⁴ Therefore any recommendation made by the Commission had to consider the spaces available in the schools to accommodate those child victims who can benefit from the educational provisions of this programme. The government has already begun to address this issue. The World Bank Rehabilitation of Basic Education Project aims at rehabilitating 140 primary and 60 secondary schools during 2002-2006.³⁵ The new phase of the EC/SLRRP project aims at rehabilitating more than 400 classrooms over the period 2002-2004.³⁶
175. Another consideration taken into account by the Commission was the number of qualified trained teachers in Sierra Leone. Since the end of the conflict, the problem of getting teachers to return to newly accessible areas, and attracting and retaining newly qualified teachers, has been an enormous challenge. Factors affecting the return of teachers are the lack of accommodation, transportation, and low remuneration. In some districts such as Kailahun, it is estimated that only 30% of the teachers have returned to their schools or teaching posts.³⁷ This is despite the fact that in 1996, the government introduced the Remote Area Allowance as an incentive for teachers to teach in less accessible, mostly remote locations.³⁸ In addition, the World Bank reports that one-half of the teaching force is unqualified, with only 6% of teacher's holding Bachelor of Arts degrees.³⁹ Initiatives have been taken to train the large number of unqualified teachers. These initiatives include the Sabaabu Rehabilitation of Basic Education Project.

³⁴ World Bank Rehabilitation of Basic Education Project, p. 7.

³⁵ National Recovery Strategy for Sierra Leone, p. 39.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ National Recovery Strategy, p. 36.

³⁸ World Bank Rehabilitation of Basic Education Project, p. 9.

³⁹ Ibid., p. 9.

176. The Commission also took into consideration the number of educational initiatives that have been implemented to assist children affected by the war. These initiatives include the Complementary Rapid Education Programme for Schools (CREPS) Programme, the Community Education Investment Programme (CEIP), and the Rapid Response Education Programme (RREP) Programme. However, problems exist with some of the programmes. In 2003, the CREPS programme suffered delays. Just 185 of the planned 625 classes were established and only 6,680 children were reached out of a targeted 25,000.⁴⁰

Recommendations Regarding Education

177. Regarding education, the Commission refers to its general recommendation to provide free education at the basic level for all children.
178. In addition to the general recommendation, the Commission recommends that free education be provided until senior secondary school level to the following eligible children:
- Children who are amputees, 'other war-wounded' or victims of sexual violence;
 - Children who suffered abduction or forced conscription;
 - Orphans;
 - Children of amputees, other war wounded if their parents experienced a 50% or more reduction in earning capacity as a result of the violation committed against them, and victims of sexual violence; and
 - Those children who have been through the DDR programme and are undergoing schooling or other training from that programme are excluded from this list.
179. The Commission recommends that the government assist and expand the existing programmes, such as the Community Education Investment Programme (CEIP) and Complementary Rapid Education for Primary Schools (CREPS), for those above-mentioned categories of children who qualify for these programmes.
180. The Commission recommends that the government assist teacher training programmes, such as the Sabaabu Rehabilitation of Basic Education Programme, in order to increase the number of qualified trained teachers in Sierra Leone.
181. The government should continue to offer incentives to qualified teachers in the remote areas of Sierra Leone in order to retain them in areas where there are shortages.
182. The Commission recommends that the government prioritises the education of all permanently disabled victims and all victims of sexual violence, adults as well as children.
183. The Commission recommends that the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology be entrusted with the coordination of all reparations in the area of education.

⁴⁰ Confidential Source, Freetown, December 2003

Skills Training, Micro-credit and Micro-projects for Individual or Collective Groups of Beneficiaries

Information Considered by the Commission

184. The financial sector in Sierra Leone was destroyed as a result of the protracted war. Returnees from the war lacked the capital necessary to restart any business activities. Providing financial services to the victims of the conflict will help many of them generate an income and become financially independent.
185. The Commission also took into account the various micro-credit programmes by the government and NGO's that have been made available to many victims of the conflict. In mid-2001, the government financially supported the Social Action for Poverty Alleviation (SAPA) micro-credit chiefdom programme.⁴¹ The government also provided financial support to a micro-credit programme for ex-combatants administered through NDRRR, now known as NaCSA (National Commission for Social Action).⁴² Micro-credit programmes administered through NGOs include the Association for Rural Development, the American Refugee Committee, GTZ, Christian Children's Fund, and so on.
186. The Commission recognises the limited number of formal financial institutions that can provide micro-credit.⁴³ Because of this, many Sierra Leoneans have engaged in informal mechanisms to gain credit, such as the *esusu* (the traditional rotating savings and credit associations).⁴⁴ Despite the limited number of institutions, some steps were taken by the government to rectify the situation. The government requested the World Bank to conduct a broad analysis of the sector.
187. The Commission noted that numerous NGOs such as Cause Canada and the Forum for African Women's Educationalists (FAWE) provided many of the victims with skills training. However, many of the skills training programmes focused on a limited number of skills such as soap making, gara tie-dyeing and tailoring.

Recommendations Regarding Skills Training and Micro-Credit/Micro-Projects

188. Skills' training is a means of providing the beneficiaries with an opportunity to become economically independent, one of the stated goals of the reparations programme. The Commission recommends that the government assist organizations and bodies that provide skills training to expand their efforts to all amputees, 'other war wounded', victims of sexual violence, widows, and children.

⁴¹ Mayada El-Zoghbi, "Microfinance Policy Review Sierra Leone" submitted in June 2002 to the Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP) World Bank.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 7-8.

⁴³ American Refugee Committee, International Sierra Leone Programme, "Finance Salone Business Plan 2002-2007." October 1, 2002, p. 3.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*

189. The Commission recommends that the government conduct an assessment of the market in order to provide skills training in accordance with the needs of the market.
190. The Commission recommends that the skills training programme include a small-scale business management training course.
191. The Commission recommends that micro-credit or micro-projects be provided to those beneficiaries upon successful completion of the skills training programme, or to collective groups of such beneficiaries. Micro-credit may be provided in the form of Financial Service Associations (commonly known as *esusu*). The decision to provide micro-credit over micro-projects and vice-versa for the individual beneficiaries and collective groups should be left to the Implementing Body of the Reparations Programme to decide.
192. The Commission recommends that the government assist the organisations and bodies that provide micro-credit programmes and micro-projects.
193. The Commission recommends that all amputees, as well as the 'other war wounded' who experienced a more than 50% reduction in earning capacity as a result of their violation, and victims of sexual violence may elect one family member to partake in this programme in lieu of themselves.
194. The Commission recommends that the Ministry of Labour be entrusted with the coordination of all reparations in the area of skills-training, and micro-credits.

Symbolic Reparations

195. While the aforementioned forms of reparation address the tangible needs of victims, symbolic reparations, as the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission noted, 'emphasise the importance of placing individual reparations within a wider and social and political context.'
196. Symbolic reparations provide continued public acknowledgement of the past and address the demand and need on the part of victims for remembrance. Remembrance lies at the centre of a network of themes important to survivors of mass atrocity and human rights abuses, such as truth-seeking, prevention of future abuses, reconciliation, and reparations.

Public Apology

197. The Commission recommends that individuals, groups, bodies and organisations who bear any responsibility for the abuses and violations committed during the war, be encouraged to apologise publicly. The Commission further recommends that the government acknowledge the suffering Sierra Leoneans went through during the conflict and unreservedly apologise to the people for all actions and inactions of all governments since 1961.

Memorials

198. Memorials help define and construct a shared notion of the collective experience, imagination, and self-definition of a people. The Commission wants to emphasize that memorials are catalysts for interaction. As such, the success of a memorial cannot be measured by financial investments. Memorials are made by the people who engage with them and they engage with each other as a result of them.
199. The Commission recommends that at least one National War Memorial be established in memory of the victims of the war. The Commission also recommends the establishment of memorials in different parts of the country. The decision on the National War Memorial should be taken after consultation with the population. It is important to remember that memorials may take different forms. Examples include the establishment of monuments, the renaming of buildings or locations, the transformation of victim's sites into useful buildings for the community, etc.
200. The Commission recommends that victims and their communities should be consulted on the establishment and placement of appropriate memorials. The District Reconciliation Support Committees and other community structures should be involved in the consultation processes.

Commemoration Ceremonies and Dates

201. The Commission recommends that traditional and religious leaders organise commemoration ceremonies for the victims of the war, as well as symbolic reburials for those victims who haven't been buried according to religious and traditional customs.
202. The Commission recommends that the government declare a National Reconciliation Day in order to honour the victims of the conflict. The Commission recommends that the government should organise and support various commemoration activities all over the country on that day. The Commission recommends that the 18 January, the day President Kabbah declared the conflict over in 2002, be commemorated as the National Reconciliation Day.

Dissemination of the Reparations Programme

203. The Commission recommends that the reparations programme be disseminated publicly on a large scale and translated into local languages.

Mass Graves and Reburials⁴⁵

204. The Commission recommends the identification of mass graves in which victims of the conflict were buried. The victims should be consulted on what should be done with the mass graves.

⁴⁵ More detail can be found in the Mass Graves report produced as an Appendix to this report.

Line Ministry Entrusted with Symbolic Reparations

205. The Commission recommends that the Monuments and Relics Commission be entrusted with the coordination of the symbolic reparations.

Community Reparations

206. Considering the scale of material destruction caused by the war all over the country and the fact that certain regions were destroyed more than the others, the Commission recommends that the government work out a programme for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of those areas. Community reparations contribute to the reconstruction and consolidation of institutions in communities that were the hardest hit during the conflict and make them whole again through the provision of capital and technical assistance. In devising such a programme, the Commission recommends that the government follow the guidelines listed below.
207. The government should consider the outcome of the assessments by different bodies and organisations, such as the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), National Commission for Social Action, Department for International Development (DFID), Sierra Leonean Rural Reintegration Project (SLRRP), and others on the level of destruction of infrastructure in districts and what work remains to be completed or initiated in some cases.
208. The programme should be worked out in close consultation with the communities and groups concerned, especially women and youth groups. The Commission recommends that the consultation also include the District Reconciliation Support Committees⁴⁶ and the District Recovery Committees along with other local bodies and organisations identified by the Implementing Body.
209. The Commission recommends that the Ministry of Development and Economic Planning and the Ministry of Local Government work in concert with each other to coordinate all activities pertaining to community reparations.

⁴⁶ The District Reconciliation Support Committees were established by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Inter-Religious Council (IRC-SL).

Implementing Body and Special Fund for War Victims

Determining the Implementing Body

210. In recommending an Implementing Body for the reparations programme, the Commission is of the opinion that it would not be cost effective to recommend the establishment of a new institution given the government's limited resources. In recommending an already existing governmental body, the Commission was guided by the following criteria:
- The mandate of the institution or body to ensure that it is in line with the recommendations being made in this programme. An institution already dealing with war-affected communities and victims would be the most appropriate implementer of the reparations programme.
 - Experience with implementing or overseeing programmes similar in nature to the ones being recommended in this programme. Given that the reparations programme relies heavily on existing programmes, an institution with broad based knowledge and familiarity with programmes already implemented in Sierra Leone would be in the best position to implement the recommendations proposed by the Commission.
 - Experience with governing or managing a fund. Given that one of the roles of the Implementing Body will be to govern the Special Fund for War Victims, any experience in this field would be particularly useful.
211. Based on the above criteria, the Commission recommends the National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA) as the Implementing Body for the reparations programme.
212. The National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA) was specifically established by the Government of Sierra Leone to tackle the devastation caused by the war. The current mandate of the Commission includes to:
- a. oversee the planning, programming, coordination, supervision, and monitoring of all humanitarian, resettlement, rehabilitation, and reconstruction work as a consequence of the war;
 - b. co-ordinate the activities of all non-governmental organizations engaged in these activities;
 - c. ensure that all activities are in conformity with the National Reconstruction, Resettlement, and Rehabilitation Programme of the Government; and
 - d. design an operational and procedural framework that will be credible and flexible enough to facilitate effective collaboration and coordination among government departments and other partners. NaCSA's aim is to rehabilitate war-affected communities by providing services in the areas of agriculture, education, community infrastructure, health, sensitisation, and resettlement.⁴⁷

⁴⁷ NaCSA submission to the TRC, 25 July 2003, pages 1 - 2.

213. NaCSA was preferred by the Commission as the implementing body because it is an existing governmental institution with a specific mandate to rehabilitate war-affected communities. NaCSA is currently providing services to these communities in the areas of education, community infrastructure, health, sensitisation, resettlement, and agriculture. These are all areas that are covered by this reparations programme.
214. In addition, because the Reparations Programme relies extensively on existing programmes, NaCSA is the only government agency that is aware of all these programmes in the country and has a working relationship with many of the actors and ministries involved. NaCSA is also the chair of the Regional Inter-Agency Forum.

Specific Recommendations Regarding the Implementing Body

215. The Commission recommends that NaCSA's mandate be extended beyond 2008 in order for all aspects of this Reparations Programme to be implemented. The mandate should be extended for activities relating to the reparations programme and for the sub-unit that will manage.
216. The Commission recommends that a sub-unit be created within NaCSA to deal specifically with the implementation of the programme, to coordinate all activities relating to the programme, and to govern the Special Fund for War Victims as provided for in Article XXIV of the Lomé Peace Agreement.
217. The sub-unit should establish an office in every district for the purpose of decentralising the implementation of the reparations programme.
218. The Commission recommends that an Advisory Committee be created to assist and oversee the actions of the Implementing Body. The Advisory Committee should be composed of members from the government, the line ministries, civil society, victim's organisations, and the international community.

The Role of the Implementing Body


219. The role of the Implementing Body is to oversee the implementation of the reparations programme. The Implementing Body is to coordinate and oversee the activities of the line ministries to ensure that all aspects of the reparations programme are implemented.
220. The Implementing Body is entrusted with governing the Special Fund for War Victims.
221. In certain circumstances where the Commission felt that it did not have the ability or the information to make a specific recommendation, such as the amount of the monthly pension, the Commission called upon the Implementing Body to conduct an assessment to determine such information.

222. Because the potential universe of beneficiaries is unknown, the Commission entrusts the Implementing Body with amending any of the recommendations mentioned in this Programme once further information is available. However, before any recommendation is amended, the Implementing Body must obtain the unanimous consent of the members of the Advisory Board to the proposed amendment.

Structure of the Reparations Programme

223. The structure of the programme recognises that line ministries are assigned to each social service sector. The role of the line ministry is to ensure the implementation of the recommendations directed to the sector. For example, the Ministry of Health and Sanitation will oversee all aspects of health related reparations. The Implementing Body of the reparations programme, the National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA), will oversee the activities of the line ministries in relation to the reparations programme and govern the Special Fund for War Victims. NaCSA should establish offices in each district of the country to ensure the decentralization of services. The proposed structure of the reparations programme is laid out in the following diagram:

Diagram Outlining the Structure of the Commission's Reparations Programme



Specific Recommendations Regarding the Special Fund for War Victims

224. According to Section 7(6) of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act, the Commission may provide information or recommendations to or regarding the Special Fund for War Victims provided for in Article XXIX of the Lomé Peace Agreement, or otherwise assist that Fund in any manner the Commission considers appropriate but the Commission shall not exercise any control over the operations or disbursements of that Fund.
225. The Commission recommends that the Special Fund for War Victims be established no later than three months after the handover of this report.
226. The Commission recommends the creation of a Fund Raising Board to solicit and collect funds for the Special Fund for War Victims in order to allow the secretariat to implement the Reparations Programme. Additionally, the Commission recommends that the Fund Raising Board be composed of respected Sierra Leoneans and friends of Sierra Leone. The Fund Raising Board should report to the Advisory Committee on all its activities.
227. The Commission recommends that contributions, financial or otherwise, should be provided through some of the following means:
- a. Government
 - The prioritisation of reparations within the government's budget
 - The revenue generated from mineral resources according to Article VII of the Lomé Peace Agreement
 - Debt-relief-for-reparations-scheme
 - b. A reparations or peace tax
 - c. Donor support
 - d. Seized assets from convicted persons. The Commission recognises the role of internal and external actors who profited from the conflict. Where any prosecutions or civil action are taken to recover some of these profits, any monies or assets recovered should be paid into the Special Fund for War Victims
 - e. Commission recognises that perpetrators can assist in the rebuilding process. The Commission recommends that 'In kind contributions' from ex-combatants who are willing and able to perform 'free labour' for the benefit of communities and the wider society should be encouraged. However the Commission wishes to guard against the possibility that people might be compelled to do this and emphasises that this should be entirely voluntary
 - f. Funds from 'other legal sources' which become available
228. The Commission recommends that NaCSA make annual public reports on its activities and on the financial status of the Fund to Parliament.

Registration of Beneficiaries

229. The Commission recommends that the procedures for the registration of potential beneficiaries of the Reparations Programme be based on the following considerations:
- a. That the programme needs to be easily accessible to the beneficiaries, especially those who live in remote areas, those who do not belong to victim's organizations, and those beneficiaries not living in resettlement camps.
 - b. Local leaders and civil society organisations, especially women and youth organisations, should be used as much as possible in the identification and registration of potential beneficiaries of this programme.
 - c. The privacy of individuals, especially victims of sexual violence.
 - d. The need for sensitisation before any programme is administered.
230. The Commission recommends that the Implementing Body use the database compiled by the Commission to help identify some of the potential beneficiaries of the programme. The Implementing Body may also rely on other information being compiled about victims of the conflict. However, under no circumstance may the Government or the Implementing Body delay the implementation of this programme until such information becomes available.
231. Regarding areas of the country with high concentrations of victims of sexual violence, the Commission recommends that the Implementing Body deploy as many female staff members as possible to ensure the privacy and convenience of women who wish to identify themselves as victims.
232. The Commission recommends that all beneficiaries of the reparations programme be given a form of identification to enable easy access to services.

Time Frame

233. The Commission recommends that the sub-unit within NaCSA that will implement the programme, as well as the Special Fund for War Victims, be established within three months of the handover of the Commission's Report to the President.
234. The Commission recommends that the implementation of the most urgent reparations starts within 6 months after the handover of its report to the President of Sierra Leone.
235. The Commission recommends that priority be given to those reparations that directly affect the survival and livelihood of the beneficiaries. The Commission recommends that the time frame for the implementation of the reparations programme not exceed 6 years, except those aspects that need to continue throughout the lives of the beneficiaries such as pension and medical care.
236. The Commission recommends the establishment of an independent victims' oversight group for each of these programmes to monitor the implementation of the recommendations.

CHAPTER FIVE

List of Victims

TRC

Disarm your

Mind!

Tell the

Truth to

the TRC

Produced by the TRC Steering Committee with support
from the International Human Rights Law Group

CHAPTER FIVE

List of Victims

Victim Lists

1. The Commission has compiled two lists of victims based on the statements it collected. In line with the requirement in its mandate to pay specific attention to the experiences of women and children, the Commission has devoted its first list to victims of sexual violence and forced conscription. In total 1,012 victims of these violations were named in TRC statements. The Commission's second list excludes those in the first, giving the names of the persons who suffered all other violations recorded in the conflict. In total this second list contains 11,991 victims named in TRC statements.
2. The Commission took great care when compiling its lists of victims. The Commission undertook work to ensure that names are spelled correctly and that the age of a victim is the same age given in the statement. The Commission has also endeavoured to ensure that the year and the location in which the abuse began are accurate.
3. One problem in compiling lists of victims is that more than one statement may describe the same event. As a result, an individual might be listed more than once. The Commission expended considerable effort to remove duplicate names and to ensure that the named individuals are distinct.
4. The Commission apologises without reservation for any mistakes it has made in compiling these lists of victims.
5. The Commission hopes that these lists will stand as an acknowledgement of those who suffered in the war and as a poignant reminder of the vital need to ensure that the events described herein never happen again.

Victims of Sexual Violence and Forced Conscription

6. The entries in this list contain the initials of the victims, their gender and their age where known. Each entry is followed by the year and district in which the victim was first abused and a description of the violations perpetrated against that victim. The amount of information given has been deliberately limited to preserve the privacy of the victims. The age given is the victim's age at the time when the victim was first abused, but not necessarily the age at which the victim suffered all of the listed violations.

A._ (Female) - 1995 in Moyamba - Displaced. Raped.
A._ (Female) - 1997 in Bonthe - Abducted and detained. Assaulted, tortured and raped.
A._ (Female) - 1999 in Tonkolili - Sexually enslaved.
A._ (Female) - 1998 in Bombali - Raped.
A._ (Female) - 2000 in Kambia - Abducted. Raped.
A._ (Female) - 1996 in Moyamba - Tortured and raped.
A._ (Female) - 1999 - Extorted. Abducted. Assaulted and raped. Killed.
A._ (Female) - Abducted and detained. Raped.

A._ (Female) age 13 - 1991 in Pujehun - Assaulted and raped.
 A._ (Male) age 22 - 1994 in Kenema - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.
 B._ (Female) - 1995 in Port Loko - Property looted. Assaulted and raped. Killed.
 B._ (Female) - 1991 in Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted. Raped.
 B._ (Female) - 1994 in Kenema - Abducted. Raped.
 B._ (Female) age 23 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Assaulted, stripped and raped.
 B._ (Male) age 26 - 1991 in Pujehun - Property destroyed. Forcibly conscripted. Tortured.
 B._ (Male) age 39 - 1991 in Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forcibly conscripted. Assaulted and limb amputated.
 C._ (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Raped.
 D._ (Male) - 1999 in Bo District - Extorted. Forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.
 F._ (Female) - 1999 in Bombali - Raped.
 F._ (Female) - 1995 in Moyamba - Sexually enslaved.
 F._ (Female) - 1999 in Bombali - Sexually enslaved. Killed.
 F._ (Female) - 1994 in Tonkolili - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 F._ (Female) - 1999 in Tonkolili - Sexually enslaved.
 F._ (Female) - 1999 in Tonkolili - Extorted. Forced to labour and sexually enslaved. Stripped.
 F._ (Female) - 1994 in Bo District - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 F._ (Female) - 1994 in Kenema - Displaced. Assaulted and raped.
 F._ (Female) - 1995 in Moyamba - Raped.
 F._ (Female) - 1999 in Port Loko - Abducted. Raped.
 F._ (Male) - 1998 in Bombali - Forcibly conscripted.
 F._ (Female) age 12 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 G._ (Female) - 1995 in Moyamba - Forced to labour and sexually enslaved. Assaulted.
 H._ (Female) - 1997 in Moyamba - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 H._ (Female) - 1995 in Bo District - Raped.
 H._ (Female) - Sexually enslaved.
 H._ (Female) - Sexually enslaved.
 H._ (Female) - 1991 in Bo District - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 H._ (Female) age 45 - 1995 in Tonkolili - Abducted and detained. Tortured and raped.
 I._ (Female) - 1995 in Kailahun - Sexually enslaved.
 I._ (Female) - 1995 - Abducted. Raped.
 J._ (Female) - 1995 in Bonthe - Forced to labour and sexually enslaved.
 J._ (Female) - 1995 in Bo District - Raped.
 J._ (Female) - 1995 in Kailahun - Sexually enslaved.
 J._ (Female) - 1995 in Moyamba - Displaced. Raped.
 J._ (Female) - 1995 in Moyamba - Displaced. Raped.
 J._ (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Raped.
 J._ (Female) - 1999 - Raped.
 J._ (Female) age 19 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Assaulted, stripped and raped.
 K._ (Female) - 1994 in Tonkolili - Raped.
 K._ (Female) - Raped.
 K._ (Female) - 1994 in Kenema - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.
 K._ (Female) - 1999 in Tonkolili - Extorted. Forced to labour. Raped.
 K._ (Female) - 1998 in Bombali - Raped.
 K._ (Female) - 1998 in Kono - Stripped and raped.
 M._ (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted, detained and drugged. Raped.
 M._ (Female) - 1994 in Kenema - Displaced. Forced to labour. Raped.
 M._ (Female) - 1992 in Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 M._ (Female) - 1991 - Property looted. Abducted and detained. Raped.
 M._ (Female) - Raped.
 M._ (Female) - Sexually enslaved.
 M._ (Female) - 1994 in Kailahun - Forcibly conscripted. Killed.
 M._ (Female) - 1991 in Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 M._ (Female) - 1998 in Bombali - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured and raped.
 M._ (Female) - 1999 in Tonkolili - Sexually enslaved.

M._ (Male) - 1998 in Tonkolili - Forcibly conscripted. Killed.
 M._ (Female) - 1991 in Pujehun - Raped.
 M._ (Male) age 20 - 1994 in Kenema - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.
 N._ (Female) - 1991 in Kailahun - Raped.
 O._ (Female) - 1998 in Kailahun - Raped.
 S._ (Male) - Forcibly conscripted.
 S._ (Female) - Forced to labour. Raped.
 S._ (Female) - 1997 in Koinadugu - Sexually enslaved.
 S._ (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Raped.
 S._ (Female) - 1991 in Pujehun - Raped.
 S._ (Female) - 1999 in Bombali - Raped. Killed.
 S._ (Female) - 1998 in Koinadugu - Raped. Killed.
 S._ (Female) age 13 - 1991 in Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted. Raped.
 T._ (Female) - 1991 - Assaulted and raped.
 T._ (Male) - 2000 in Kono - Forcibly conscripted.
 W._ (Female) - 1995 in Kono - Raped. Killed.
 Y._ (Female) - 1992 in Bo District - Forcibly conscripted.
 Y._ (Male) - 1998 in Bombali - Forcibly conscripted.
 Y._ (Female) - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 _A (Male) - 1991 in Kailahun - Forcibly conscripted.
 _A (Female) age 47 - 1992 in Kenema - Displaced. Abducted. Raped.
 A.A (Female) - 1995 in Moyamba - Sexually enslaved. Assaulted.
 A.A (Male) age 13 - 1991 in Kailahun - Forcibly conscripted.
 A.A (Female) age 13 - 1999 in Western Area - Forced to labour. Assaulted, tortured and raped.
 A.A (Female) age 18 - 1997 in Kenema - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Tortured and raped.
 A.A (Male) age 20 - 1994 in Bo District - Property looted. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.
 F.A (Female) age 10 - 1995 in Kono - Sexually enslaved. Tortured.
 F.A (Female) age 16 - Forced to labour. Assaulted, tortured and raped.
 F.A (Female) age 20 - 1991 in Kailahun - Displaced. Forced to labour and sexually enslaved. Assaulted.
 H.A (Female) age 27 - 1995 - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and raped.
 J.A (Male) - 1996 in Kailahun - Forcibly conscripted.
 J.A (Female) age 14 - 1994 in Kono - Displaced. Raped.
 J.A (Female) age 14 - 1995 in Kenema - Forced to labour and sexually enslaved.
 J.A (Female) age 16 - 1996 in Kailahun - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Limb amputated.
 J.A (Female) age 16 - 1998 - Forced to labour. Raped.
 J.A (Female) age 29 - 1993 in Bo District - Property destroyed. Abducted. Raped.
 K.A (Male) age 13 - 2000 in Kono - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Tortured.
 K.A (Female) age 25 - 1993 in Pujehun - Property destroyed. Forced to labour. Raped.
 L.A (Male) age 73 - 1991 in Pujehun - Displaced. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Tortured.
 M.A (Male) - Forcibly conscripted.
 M.A (Male) age 15 - Forcibly conscripted.
 S.A (Female) age 14 - 1998 in Kenema - Sexually enslaved. Tortured.
 S.A (Female) age 21 - 1992 in Kailahun - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted, tortured and raped.
 S.A (Female) age 25 - 1997 in Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Raped.
 S.A (Female) age 35 - 1995 - Raped.
 T.A (Female) - 1991 in Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Raped.
 U.A (Female) - 1996 in Bonthe - Abducted. Assaulted and raped.
 U.A (Female) age 12 - 1992 in Tonkolili - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Raped.
 U.A (Female) age 20 - 2000 in Kono - Forced to labour. Raped.
 Y.A age 15 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Sexually enslaved.
 _B (Female) age 11 - 1991 in Kailahun - Raped.
 _B (Female) age 30 - 1998 in Kono - Abducted. Raped. Killed.
 A.B (Male) - 1997 in Kailahun - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.
 A.B (Female) - 1998 in Bombali - Abducted and detained. Raped.

A.B (Female) - 1992 in Kono - Detained. Raped.
 A.B (Female) - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and raped.
 A.B (Female) age 9 - 1992 in Bombali - Forcibly conscripted and drugged. Tortured and raped.
 A.B (Male) age 13 - 2000 in Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.
 A.B (Male) age 16 - 2000 in Kono - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.
 A.B (Female) age 21 - Raped.
 A.B (Female) age 33 - 1999 in Port Loko - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour and sexually enslaved.
 A.B (Female) age 57 - 1997 in Port Loko - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted and raped.
 A.B (Male) age 60 - 1997 in Bombali - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Tortured.
 B.B (Female) - 1991 in Kailahun - Forced to labour. Assaulted, stripped and raped.
 B.B (Female) - Raped.
 B.B (Male) age 18 - 1998 in Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forcibly conscripted.
 C.B (Male) - 1995 in Moyamba - Forcibly conscripted.
 C.B (Female) age 14 - 1995 in Bo District - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured and raped.
 D.B (Male) age 21 - 1998 in Tonkolili - Property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.
 E.B (Female) age 10 - 1994 in Kenema - Displaced. Forced to labour, forcibly conscripted and drugged. Assaulted and raped.
 E.B (Female) age 30 - 1991 in Kailahun - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Raped.
 F.B (Female) - 1997 - Raped.
 F.B (Female) - 1998 in Kono - Raped. Killed.
 F.B (Female) - 1998 in Kono - Forced to labour. Tortured and raped.
 F.B (Male) age 8 - 1999 in Kono - Forcibly conscripted.
 F.B (Female) age 11 - 2000 in Kono - Displaced. Sexually enslaved.
 F.B (Female) age 12 - Extorted. Sexually enslaved.
 F.B (Female) age 12 - 1998 in Pujehun - Displaced. Sexually enslaved.
 F.B (Male) age 12 - Displaced. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.
 F.B (Female) age 15 - Forced to labour. Assaulted and raped.
 F.B (Male) age 16 - 1997 in Bombali - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.
 F.B (Female) age 22 - 1992 in Kono - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Raped.
 F.B (Female) age 32 - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 F.B (Female) age 44 - 1996 in Port Loko - Extorted and property destroyed. Sexually enslaved.
 G.B (Male) age 25 - 1991 in Kailahun - Displaced and property destroyed. Forcibly conscripted. Assaulted and tortured.
 H.B (Female) - Raped.
 H.B (Female) age 9 - 1999 in Western Area - Forced to labour and sexually enslaved.
 H.B (Female) age 19 - 1992 in Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Raped.
 I.B (Female) - 2000 in Kambia - Raped.
 I.B (Female) age 12 - Displaced. Sexually enslaved. Tortured.
 I.B (Female) age 12 - 1999 - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and raped.
 I.B (Female) age 15 - 1998 in Bombali - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 I.B (Male) age 22 - 1998 in Kono - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forcibly conscripted and drugged. Assaulted.
 I.B (Female) age 30 - 1999 in Bombali - Property destroyed. Forced to labour. Raped.
 J.B (Male) - Forcibly conscripted.
 J.B (Female) - Property destroyed. Abducted. Tortured and raped.
 J.B (Male) age 20 - 1994 in Bo District - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Tortured.
 J.B (Male) age 22 - 1996 in Kenema - Displaced. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.
 J.B (Male) age 22 - 1994 in Tonkolili - Displaced. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.
 J.B (Female) age 22 - Displaced. Forced to labour and sexually enslaved. Stripped.
 J.B (Female) age 29 - 1998 in Kailahun - Displaced. Sexually enslaved. Tortured.
 K.B (Female) age 8 - 1991 in Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour and sexually enslaved.
 K.B (Male) age 10 - 1996 in Kono - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Tortured.
 K.B (Female) age 11 - 1995 - Displaced. Forced to labour. Raped.
 K.B (Female) age 11 - 1998 - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted and raped.

K.B (Female) age 14 - 1999 - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 K.B (Male) age 34 - 1995 in Kono - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.
 L.B (Female) - 1997 in Bombali - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Raped.
 M.B (Female) - 1998 in Kailahun - Displaced. Sexually enslaved.
 M.B (Female) - 1995 in Moyamba - Raped.
 M.B (Male) age 12 - 1998 in Tonkolili - Forced to labour, forcibly conscripted and drugged. Tortured.
 M.B (Male) age 13 - 1998 - Displaced. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Assaulted and tortured.
 M.B (Female) age 13 - Raped.
 M.B (Female) age 16 - 1991 in Western Area - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted, tortured and raped.
 M.B (Female) age 16 - 1998 in Bombali - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Raped.
 M.B (Female) age 18 - 1998 in Kailahun - Forcibly conscripted and sexually enslaved. Assaulted and tortured.
 M.B (Male) age 24 - 1998 in Kambia - Forcibly conscripted.
 M.B (Female) age 34 - 1997 in Kailahun - Sexually enslaved. Assaulted and tortured.
 M.B (Female) age 38 - Displaced. Forced to labour and sexually enslaved. Assaulted.
 M.B (Male) age 48 - 1991 in Kailahun - Forcibly conscripted.
 N.B (Female) - 1997 in Western Area - Abducted. Raped.
 N.B (Female) age 25 - Displaced. Raped.
 N.B (Female) age 30 - 1997 in Moyamba - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and raped.
 P.B (Male) - 1991 in Kailahun - Forcibly conscripted. Stripped.
 R.B (Female) - 1995 in Kono - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Raped.
 R.B (Female) age 13 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted. Raped.
 R.B (Female) age 24 - 1997 - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted and raped.
 S.B (Female) - 1995 in Port Loko - Raped. Killed.
 S.B (Female) - 1995 in Moyamba - Displaced. Sexually enslaved.
 S.B (Female) - 1994 in Kono - Displaced and property looted. Sexually enslaved.
 S.B (Female) - Sexually enslaved.
 S.B (Female) - 1999 in Bombali - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Raped.
 S.B (Male) age 13 - 1996 in Kailahun - Displaced. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.
 S.B (Female) age 22 - 1999 in Western Area - Sexually enslaved. Tortured.
 S.B (Male) age 35 - 1992 in Kailahun - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.
 S.B (Female) age 35 - 1997 in Western Area - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Abducted and detained. Tortured, raped and limb amputated.
 T.B (Female) - 1998 in Western Area - Extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted, stripped and raped.
 T.B (Female) age 13 - 1995 in Bonthe - Displaced. Sexually enslaved. Assaulted and tortured.
 U.B (Male) age 12 - 1998 in Port Loko - Displaced. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.
 U.B (Female) age 31 - 1999 in Bombali - Abducted and detained. Raped. Killed.
 Y.B (Female) age 11 - 2000 - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Raped.
 _C (Female) age 26 - 1997 in Port Loko - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted and sexually enslaved. Tortured.
 A.C (Female) - 1999 in Bombali - Abducted. Raped.
 A.C (Male) - 1999 in Kambia - Extorted. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.
 A.C (Female) - 1994 in Bo District - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and raped.
 A.C (Female) age 9 - 1994 in Tonkolili - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Raped.
 A.C (Female) age 20 - 1994 in Port Loko - Displaced. Forced to labour. Raped.
 F.C (Female) age 11 - 1999 in Tonkolili - Raped. Killed.
 F.C (Female) age 13 - 1998 in Koinadugu - Forced to labour. Raped.
 F.C (Female) age 28 - 1998 in Moyamba - Displaced and property looted. Raped.
 F.C (Female) age 46 - 1999 - Displaced. Raped.
 H.C (Female) - 2000 - Displaced. Forced to labour. Raped.
 H.C (Female) age 9 - 1998 in Kono - Abducted. Tortured and raped.
 I.C (Female) - Tortured and raped.
 I.C (Male) age 7 - 1997 in Koinadugu - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted and drugged.
 K.C (Female) age 13 - 1999 in Bombali - Abducted and detained. Raped.

L.C (Male) age 35 - 1991 in Bonthe - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.

M.C (Female) - 1994 in Bo District - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and raped.

M.C (Female) age 11 - 1998 - Sexually enslaved.

M.C (Male) age 14 - 1998 in Tonkolili - Displaced. Forced to labour, forcibly conscripted and drugged. Assaulted.

M.C (Male) age 22 - 1997 - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted. Tortured.

S.C (Female) - 1998 - Displaced. Assaulted and raped.

S.C (Female) age 10 - 1998 in Kono - Raped.

S.C (Female) age 15 - 1995 in Moyamba - Sexually enslaved and drugged.

S.C (Male) age 17 - 2000 in Koinadugu - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.

S.C (Male) age 33 - Forcibly conscripted.

T.C (Female) - 1999 in Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed. Detained. Assaulted and raped. Killed.

T.C (Male) age 10 - 1999 in Kono - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted.

A.D (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Raped.

A.D (Female) - 1995 - Raped. Killed.

A.D (Female) age 34 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Assaulted, stripped and raped.

A.D (Male) age 35 - 1995 in Bonthe - Extorted and property looted. Forcibly conscripted.

B.D (Female) age 10 - 1998 in Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Raped.

F.D (Female) - 1991 in Kailahun - Assaulted and raped.

F.D (Female) - Raped.

I.D (Male) - 1991 in Kailahun - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.

J.D (Male) age 7 - 1997 in Bo District - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.

K.D (Female) - 1994 in Koinadugu - Abducted and detained. Raped.

K.D (Female) age 12 - 1999 in Bombali - Displaced. Abducted. Assaulted and raped.

K.D (Female) age 17 - 1995 in Kambia - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and raped.

M.D (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Raped.

M.D (Male) age 16 - 1998 in Bombali - Displaced. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.

M.D (Female) age 24 - 1996 in Bo District - Displaced. Sexually enslaved.

Y.D (Female) age 32 - 1998 in Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and raped.

C.E (Male) - 1995 in Kenema - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.

J.E (Male) - 1995 in Kenema - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.

A.F (Male) age 23 - 1994 in Bombali - Displaced and extorted. Forcibly conscripted. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.

A.F (Female) age 30 - 1995 - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and raped.

A.F (Female) age 33 - 1997 in Western Area - Property looted. Raped.

A.F (Female) age 36 - 1991 in Pujehun - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and raped.

A.F (Male) age 69 - 1999 in Tonkolili - Property looted and destroyed. Forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.

B.F (Female) - 1995 in Bo District - Forcibly conscripted.

B.F (Female) age 15 - 1991 in Pujehun - Sexually enslaved.

F.F (Female) age 11 - 2000 in Kono - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted. Raped.

F.F (Female) age 14 - 1999 in Koinadugu - Forced to labour. Assaulted, tortured and raped.

F.F (Female) age 17 - 1995 in Tonkolili - Displaced. Forced to labour and sexually enslaved. Assaulted.

H.F (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Property looted. Raped.

H.F (Female) age 11 - 1997 in Bombali - Displaced. Forced to labour and sexually enslaved. Tortured and stripped.

H.F (Female) age 13 - 1999 in Bombali - Abducted. Raped.

I.F (Female) - 1995 in Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and raped.

I.F (Male) age 10 - 1998 - Forcibly conscripted.

I.F (Male) age 23 - 1991 in Kenema - Property looted. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.

J.F (Male) - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.

J.F (Male) - 1991 in Kailahun - Forcibly conscripted.

J.F (Male) age 12 - 1999 in Bombali - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.

J.F (Male) age 14 - 1995 in Moyamba - Displaced. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.

J.F (Male) age 28 - 1995 in Moyamba - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.
 K.F (Male) age 7 - 1994 in Kono - Forcibly conscripted. Tortured.
 L.F (Female) age 21 - 1995 in Western Area - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Raped.
 M.F (Male) - 1991 - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.
 M.F (Female) - 1995 in Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and raped.
 M.F (Male) age 12 - 1991 in Pujehun - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.
 M.F (Female) age 13 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 M.F (Female) age 25 - 1998 in Koinadugu - Forced to labour and sexually enslaved.
 M.F (Male) age 30 - Forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.
 M.F (Female) age 31 - 1996 in Tonkolili - Property looted. Forced to labour and sexually enslaved.
 M.F (Female) age 69 - 1999 in Port Loko - Displaced. Assaulted and raped.
 S.F (Female) - 1994 - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted, tortured and raped.
 S.F (Female) age 12 - 1992 in Pujehun - Displaced. Forced to labour and sexually enslaved.
 S.F (Female) age 13 - 1993 in Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Stripped and raped.
 S.F (Female) age 36 - 1997 in Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and raped.
 T.F (Female) age 21 - 1991 in Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Raped.
 Y.F (Female) age 13 - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and raped.
 _G (Female) - Raped.
 A.G (Female) age 9 - 2000 in Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour and sexually enslaved. Assaulted.
 A.G (Female) age 13 - Displaced. Sexually enslaved.
 B.G (Female) age 16 - 1991 in Kailahun - Assaulted, tortured and raped.
 B.G (Female) age 16 - 1991 in Bonthe - Displaced. Forced to labour, forcibly conscripted and sexually enslaved.
 C.G (Female) age 24 - 1992 in Bo District - Property looted and destroyed. Sexually enslaved.
 D.G (Male) - Forcibly conscripted.
 E.G (Male) age 10 - 1999 in Tonkolili - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted.
 F.G (Female) age 14 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 H.G (Female) - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced. Sexually enslaved.
 J.G (Female) - 1993 in Kailahun - Raped.
 K.G (Female) - Sexually enslaved.
 K.G (Female) - 1994 in Bo District - Displaced. Sexually enslaved.
 K.G (Male) age 57 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.
 L.G (Male) - 1991 - Forcibly conscripted.
 M.G (Male) - 1993 in Bo District - Forcibly conscripted and drugged.
 M.G (Male) - 1994 in Kono - Forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.
 M.G (Female) age 25 - 1997 in Kailahun - Forced to labour. Tortured and raped.
 M.G (Male) age 67 - 1991 in Pujehun - Property destroyed. Forcibly conscripted. Tortured.
 R.G (Female) age 10 - 1994 in Bo District - Displaced. Sexually enslaved.
 S.G (Male) - 1995 in Moyamba - Forcibly conscripted.
 S.G (Female) age 22 - 1995 in Kono - Forced to labour. Assaulted and raped. Killed.
 S.G (Male) age 40 - 1995 in Moyamba - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Tortured.
 Y.G (Female) age 21 - 1995 in Moyamba - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Raped.
 K.H (Female) - 1995 in Kenema - Abducted. Raped.
 M.H (Female) age 19 - 1995 in Moyamba - Forced to labour and sexually enslaved. Assaulted.
 V.H (Female) age 23 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured and raped.
 T.I (Female) - Extorted. Raped.
 Y.I (Female) age 31 - 1998 in Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Raped.
 _J (Female) - 1995 in Moyamba - Raped.
 A.J (Male) - 1991 in Kailahun - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.
 A.J (Male) - 1997 - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted.
 A.J (Female) - 1991 in Kailahun - Forced to labour. Raped.
 A.J (Male) age 10 - 1991 in Kailahun - Displaced. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.
 A.J (Female) age 23 - 1995 - Displaced and extorted. Sexually enslaved. Tortured.

E.J (Male) age 7 - 1991 in Western Area - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted. Tortured.

F.J (Female) - 1997 in Kono - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Raped.

F.J (Female) age 8 - 1999 in Koinadugu - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted, tortured and raped.

F.J (Female) age 12 - 1995 in Bo District - Forcibly conscripted and sexually enslaved.

F.J (Female) age 13 - 1998 in Koinadugu - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted, stripped and raped.

F.J (Male) age 14 - 1995 in Moyamba - Forcibly conscripted and drugged. Forced to participate in an act of cannibalism.

F.J (Male) age 16 - 1999 in Kono - Forcibly conscripted.

F.J (Female) age 22 - 1998 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Raped.

F.J (Female) age 24 - 1998 in Kono - Abducted and detained. Raped.

F.J (Female) age 24 - 1995 in Bonthe - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Raped.

F.J (Female) age 25 - 1999 in Bombali - Property destroyed. Forced to labour. Raped.

H.J (Female) - 1996 - Raped.

H.J (Female) age 14 - Displaced. Raped.

H.J (Female) age 55 - 1998 - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted, tortured and raped.

I.J (Female) age 22 - 1995 in Kono - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and raped.

J.J (Female) - Raped.

J.J (Female) age 26 - Property looted. Forced to labour. Raped.

K.J (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted. Raped.

K.J (Female) age 14 - 1992 in Kailahun - Forced to labour. Tortured and raped.

K.J (Female) age 22 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted. Raped.

L.J (Female) age 25 - 1995 in Bo District - Abducted. Raped.

M.J (Male) - 1991 in Kailahun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forcibly conscripted. Killed.

M.J (Male) - 1999 in Kambia - Forcibly conscripted.

M.J (Female) - 1998 in Koinadugu - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Raped.

M.J (Male) - 1998 in Kono - Property looted. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.

M.J (Male) age 11 - 1998 in Kambia - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Tortured.

M.J (Male) age 12 - 2000 in Kambia - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.

M.J (Female) age 13 - 1995 in Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Raped.

M.J (Female) age 16 - 1995 - Displaced. Abducted. Assaulted, tortured and raped.

M.J (Female) age 18 - 1999 - Abducted. Assaulted and raped.

M.J (Female) age 20 - 1995 in Kenema - Raped.

N.J (Female) age 15 - 1998 in Bo District - Forced to labour. Assaulted and raped.

N.J (Female) age 28 - 1998 in Kailahun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Sexually enslaved.

P.J (Male) age 7 - 1993 in Kailahun - Forcibly conscripted. Tortured.

P.J (Male) age 13 - 1992 - Forcibly conscripted.

S.J (Female) - 1992 in Bo District - Displaced. Forced to labour, sexually enslaved and drugged. Assaulted.

S.J (Female) age 12 - 1998 - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted. Assaulted and raped.

S.J (Female) age 15 - 1998 in Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour. Raped.

S.J (Female) age 15 - 1992 - Extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted and raped.

S.J (Female) age 20 - 1997 in Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Raped.

S.J (Female) age 44 - 1997 in Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted and raped.

S.J (Male) age 45 - 1998 - Forcibly conscripted. Limb amputated.

U.J (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Assaulted and raped.

_K (Female) - 1999 in Kambia - Forcibly conscripted.

_K (Female) - 1993 - Property looted. Forced to labour and sexually enslaved. Assaulted and tortured.

_K (Female) - 1993 in Pujehun - Property looted. Abducted and detained. Raped.

_K (Female) age 19 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Raped.

_K (Female) age 25 - 1991 in Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Raped.

_K (Female) age 34 - 1991 in Kenema - Forcibly conscripted.

A.K (Female) - 1996 in Bo District - Displaced. Forced to labour. Raped.

A.K (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted, tortured and raped. Killed.

A.K (Male) - 1995 in Kambia - Forcibly conscripted and drugged.

A.K (Female) - 1999 in Kono - Sexually enslaved.

A.K (Female) - 1999 - Property looted. Raped. Killed.

A.K (Female) - 1997 in Bombali - Displaced. Abducted. Tortured and raped.

A.K (Female) - 1998 in Kailahun - Raped.

A.K (Female) - 1998 in Tonkolili - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Raped.

A.K (Female) - 1998 in Bombali - Sexually enslaved.

A.K (Female) - 1998 in Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Raped.

A.K (Female) - 1999 in Port Loko - Raped.

A.K (Female) - 1998 in Bombali - Displaced. Sexually enslaved.

A.K (Female) - 1995 in Bo District - Abducted. Tortured and raped.

A.K (Male) age 9 - 1999 in Western Area - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Tortured.

A.K (Male) age 10 - 1996 in Moyamba - Forced to labour, forcibly conscripted and drugged.

A.K (Male) age 10 - 2000 - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.

A.K (Male) age 11 - 1998 in Kono - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted.

A.K (Female) age 11 - 1994 in Bombali - Sexually enslaved.

A.K (Female) age 12 - 1998 in Bombali - Displaced. Forced to labour and sexually enslaved.

A.K (Female) age 12 - 1999 in Tonkolili - Extorted. Forced to labour. Raped.

A.K (Male) age 12 - 1999 in Kambia - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted and drugged.

A.K (Male) age 13 - 1991 in Kambia - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.

A.K (Male) age 13 - 1998 in Bombali - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.

A.K (Male) age 14 - 1996 in Bombali - Forcibly conscripted.

A.K (Male) age 14 - 1998 in Bombali - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Tortured.

A.K (Female) age 16 - 1999 in Port Loko - Sexually enslaved.

A.K (Female) age 16 - 1998 in Bombali - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Raped.

A.K (Male) age 17 - 1999 in Bombali - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.

A.K (Male) age 17 - 1997 in Port Loko - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted.

A.K (Male) age 18 - 1998 in Moyamba - Property destroyed. Forcibly conscripted and drugged. Assaulted.

A.K (Female) age 18 - Abducted and detained. Raped.

A.K (Male) age 19 - 1999 in Bombali - Forcibly conscripted.

A.K (Male) age 19 - 1995 in Kailahun - Displaced. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Assaulted and tortured.

A.K (Male) age 23 - 2000 in Kambia - Forcibly conscripted.

A.K (Male) age 26 - 1998 in Koinadugu - Property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.

A.K (Female) age 26 - 1999 in Port Loko - Extorted. Forced to labour. Tortured and raped.

A.K (Female) age 29 - 1999 in Port Loko - Raped.

A.K (Male) age 61 - 1993 in Tonkolili - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Tortured.

B.K (Female) - 1998 in Kono - Abducted and detained. Tortured and raped.

B.K (Female) - 1994 in Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Raped.

B.K (Male) - 1991 in Kailahun - Displaced. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.

B.K (Male) - 1998 - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.

B.K (Female) age 7 - 1991 in Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Raped.

B.K (Female) age 10 - 1993 in Kailahun - Sexually enslaved.

B.K (Female) age 10 - Displaced. Raped.

B.K (Female) age 20 - 1998 - Abducted and detained. Assaulted, tortured and raped.

B.K (Female) age 28 - 1991 in Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Raped.

B.K (Female) age 40 - 1999 in Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted and raped.

B.K (Female) age 59 - 1999 in Port Loko - Property destroyed. Abducted. Raped.

D.K (Female) - 1992 in Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted. Assaulted and raped.

D.K (Female) - 1999 in Port Loko - Forced to labour. Raped and limb amputated.

D.K (Female) age 17 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Tortured, stripped and raped.
 E.K (Male) - 1996 in Moyamba - Forced to labour, forcibly conscripted and drugged.
 E.K (Female) - 1998 in Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Raped.
 E.K (Female) age 12 - 2000 in Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Raped.
 E.K (Female) age 14 - Displaced. Sexually enslaved. Assaulted and tortured.
 E.K (Female) age 27 - 1998 in Koinadugu - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 F.K (Female) - 2000 in Kambia - Displaced. Forced to labour. Raped.
 F.K (Male) - 1995 in Kambia - Forcibly conscripted and drugged.
 F.K (Female) - 1999 in Kambia - Forced to labour and sexually enslaved.
 F.K (Female) - 1995 in Bo District - Forcibly conscripted.
 F.K (Female) - Abducted. Assaulted and raped.
 F.K (Female) - 1998 in Bombali - Displaced. Abducted. Raped.
 F.K (Female) - 1998 in Bo District - Abducted. Raped.
 F.K (Female) - 1991 - Sexually enslaved.
 F.K (Female) - 1998 - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Raped.
 F.K (Female) - 1995 in Moyamba - Displaced and extorted. Sexually enslaved. Stripped.
 F.K (Female) - 1998 in Koinadugu - Abducted. Assaulted and raped.
 F.K (Male) age 7 - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Tortured.
 F.K (Male) age 7 - Displaced. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Assaulted and tortured.
 F.K (Female) age 8 - Forced to labour. Raped.
 F.K (Female) age 8 - 1991 in Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and raped.
 F.K (Female) age 8 - 1996 - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 F.K (Female) age 8 - 1991 in Kailahun - Forcibly conscripted and sexually enslaved.
 F.K (Female) age 10 - 1994 in Kailahun - Forced to labour. Assaulted and raped.
 F.K (Female) age 10 - 1998 in Bombali - Forced to labour and sexually enslaved.
 F.K (Female) age 10 - 1997 in Kono - Abducted. Raped.
 F.K (Female) age 11 - 1997 in Port Loko - Forced to labour and sexually enslaved.
 F.K (Female) age 12 - 1999 in Tonkolili - Forced to labour. Assaulted, tortured and raped.
 F.K (Female) age 13 - Forcibly conscripted. Killed.
 F.K (Female) age 14 - 1998 in Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured and raped.
 F.K (Female) age 14 - 1994 in Bo District - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 F.K (Male) age 17 - 1991 in Kailahun - Extorted. Forcibly conscripted. Assaulted and tortured.
 F.K (Female) age 18 - 1991 in Kailahun - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted and raped.
 F.K (Male) age 18 - 1991 in Kailahun - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted.
 F.K (Female) age 19 - 1999 in Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted. Raped.
 F.K (Female) age 20 - 1998 - Abducted. Raped.
 F.K (Female) age 23 - 1998 in Tonkolili - Abducted and detained. Tortured and raped.
 F.K (Female) age 27 - 1997 in Koinadugu - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted, tortured and raped.
 F.K (Female) age 35 - 1998 in Port Loko - Property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted and raped.
 F.K (Female) age 35 - 1994 in Bo District - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and raped.
 F.K (Female) age 38 - 1998 in Kono - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and raped.
 F.K (Female) age 40 - 1991 in Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Raped.
 G.K (Male) - Property destroyed. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.
 G.K (Female) - 1991 in Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Raped.
 H.K (Female) - 2000 in Koinadugu - Assaulted and raped.
 H.K (Male) - 1994 - Forcibly conscripted.
 H.K (Male) - 1998 in Bombali - Forcibly conscripted.
 H.K (Female) - 1992 in Kailahun - Raped.
 H.K (Female) age 10 - 1998 - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and raped.
 H.K (Female) age 11 - 1999 in Bombali - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 H.K (Female) age 12 - 1991 - Raped.
 H.K (Female) age 15 - 1991 in Bo District - Displaced. Stripped and raped.
 H.K (Female) age 18 - Sexually enslaved. Assaulted and tortured.
 H.K (Female) age 18 - 1991 in Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and raped.

H.K (Female) age 39 - 1991 in Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Raped.

I.K (Female) - 1996 in Moyamba - Displaced. Sexually enslaved. Assaulted and tortured.

I.K (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Property looted. Forced to labour and sexually enslaved. Tortured and stripped. Killed.

I.K (Female) - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and raped.

I.K (Female) - 1998 in Port Loko - Abducted. Raped.

I.K (Male) age 8 - 1996 - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.

I.K (Male) age 13 - 1998 in Kono - Forcibly conscripted.

I.K (Female) age 15 - 1997 in Koinadugu - Forced to labour. Raped.

I.K (Female) age 15 - 1997 in Kambia - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and raped.

I.K (Male) age 19 - 1991 - Forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.

I.K (Female) age 19 - 1991 in Pujehun - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour and sexually enslaved.

I.K (Male) age 19 - 1993 in Kono - Property looted. Forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.

I.K (Female) age 22 - 1996 in Moyamba - Abducted. Raped.

I.K (Female) age 23 - 1999 - Displaced and extorted. Sexually enslaved. Tortured.

I.K (Female) age 24 - 1997 in Kono - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted.

I.K (Female) age 39 - 1999 in Kambia - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted, tortured and raped.

J.K (Male) - Forcibly conscripted.

J.K (Female) - 1997 in Pujehun - Raped.

J.K (Female) - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Raped.

J.K (Female) age 13 - 1994 in Bo District - Displaced. Abducted. Raped.

J.K (Male) age 14 - Forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.

J.K (Female) age 19 - 1994 in Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour and sexually enslaved. Assaulted.

J.K (Female) age 19 - 1992 in Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Raped.

J.K (Female) age 22 - 1998 in Bombali - Displaced. Raped.

J.K (Female) age 25 - 1991 in Pujehun - Raped.

J.K (Male) age 26 - 1993 - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Tortured.

J.K (Female) age 29 - 1991 - Displaced. Forced to labour and sexually enslaved. Tortured and stripped.

J.K (Male) age 29 - 1998 in Kenema - Displaced. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Assaulted and tortured.

K.K (Female) - 1995 in Moyamba - Forced to labour and sexually enslaved.

K.K (Female) - Displaced. Sexually enslaved. Tortured.

K.K (Female) - 1998 - Sexually enslaved.

K.K (Female) - Abducted and detained. Raped.

K.K (Female) - 1991 in Pujehun - Raped.

K.K (Female) - 1997 in Bombali - Abducted and detained. Raped.

K.K (Female) - 1998 - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Tortured and raped.

K.K (Female) - 1997 in Bombali - Displaced. Raped. Killed.

K.K (Female) - 1992 in Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted. Assaulted and raped.

K.K (Male) age 7 - 1995 - Forcibly conscripted.

K.K (Male) age 8 - 1995 in Western Area - Forcibly conscripted and drugged. Tortured and forced to participate in an act of cannibalism.

K.K (Male) age 9 - 1999 in Western Area - Forcibly conscripted and drugged. Tortured.

K.K (Female) age 11 - 1998 in Kono - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Raped.

K.K (Female) age 12 - 1999 in Kambia - Abducted and detained. Raped.

K.K (Female) age 14 - 1997 in Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour and sexually enslaved.

K.K (Female) age 14 - 1991 - Displaced. Raped.

K.K (Female) age 15 - 1999 - Raped.

K.K (Female) age 19 - 1994 in Koinadugu - Displaced. Sexually enslaved.

K.K (Female) age 20 - 1999 in Koinadugu - Property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted and raped.

K.K (Female) age 20 - 1999 - Displaced. Forced to labour. Raped.

K.K (Female) age 21 - 1999 in Port Loko - Displaced. Forced to labour, sexually enslaved and drugged. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.

K.K (Male) age 31 - 1996 in Kailahun - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.

K.K (Female) age 36 - 2000 in Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Raped.

L.K (Female) - 1998 in Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and raped.
 L.K (Male) - 1998 in Bombali - Forcibly conscripted.
 L.K (Male) - 1991 in Kailahun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forcibly conscripted. Killed.
 L.K (Male) - 1995 in Moyamba - Forcibly conscripted.
 L.K (Female) - 1995 in Moyamba - Tortured and raped.
 L.K (Female) age 10 - Sexually enslaved.
 L.K (Male) age 13 - 1998 in Kailahun - Extorted. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.
 L.K (Male) age 21 - 1991 - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted.
 L.K (Female) age 22 - 1991 in Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and raped.
 L.K (Male) age 28 - 1991 in Kailahun - Forcibly conscripted. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.
 M.K (Female) - 1992 in Kailahun - Raped.
 M.K (Female) - 1999 in Moyamba - Abducted and detained. Tortured and raped. Killed.
 M.K (Female) - 1991 in Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 M.K (Male) - Forcibly conscripted. Killed.
 M.K (Female) - 1992 in Kono - Property destroyed. Forced to labour. Tortured and raped.
 M.K (Female) - 1991 in Kono - Displaced. Assaulted, tortured and raped.
 M.K (Female) - 2000 in Kambia - Forced to labour. Raped.
 M.K (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 M.K (Male) - 1995 in Kambia - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted and drugged.
 M.K (Female) - 1999 in Port Loko - Forced to labour. Raped.
 M.K (Male) - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted.
 M.K (Female) - 1999 in Kono - Extorted. Sexually enslaved.
 M.K (Female) - Raped.
 M.K (Male) - 1998 in Bombali - Forcibly conscripted.
 M.K (Female) - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 M.K (Male) - 1999 - Forcibly conscripted.
 M.K (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Raped.
 M.K (Female) - 1999 in Bombali - Displaced and property looted. Abducted. Raped.
 M.K (Male) - 1994 in Kono - Forcibly conscripted. Killed.
 M.K (Female) age 8 - 1994 - Forcibly conscripted and sexually enslaved. Stripped.
 M.K (Female) age 8 - 1991 in Pujehun - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 M.K (Female) age 8 - 1996 in Tonkolili - Displaced. Sexually enslaved.
 M.K (Male) age 10 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted.
 M.K (Male) age 10 - 1995 in Kailahun - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.
 M.K (Female) age 10 - 1994 in Kono - Forced to labour. Raped.
 M.K (Male) age 11 - 1998 in Bombali - Forcibly conscripted. Tortured.
 M.K (Female) age 11 - 1998 in Bombali - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Raped.
 M.K (Male) age 12 - 1991 in Kailahun - Displaced. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.
 M.K (Male) age 12 - 1998 in Bombali - Displaced. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Tortured.
 M.K (Male) age 12 - 1994 in Kenema - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.
 M.K (Female) age 14 - 1998 in Kono - Sexually enslaved. Assaulted.
 M.K (Female) age 15 - 1998 in Koinadugu - Forced to labour. Assaulted and raped.
 M.K (Male) age 15 - 1999 in Port Loko - Displaced. Forced to labour, forcibly conscripted and drugged. Assaulted.
 M.K (Female) age 17 - Displaced. Sexually enslaved.
 M.K (Male) age 17 - 1998 in Port Loko - Forcibly conscripted.
 M.K (Female) age 18 - 1991 in Kailahun - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and raped.
 M.K (Female) age 20 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 M.K (Female) age 21 - 1998 in Port Loko - Forced to labour. Tortured and raped.
 M.K (Male) age 23 - 1996 in Bo District - Forcibly conscripted.
 M.K (Female) age 24 - 1998 in Bombali - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Raped.
 M.K (Female) age 24 - 1991 in Pujehun - Displaced. Forced to labour. Raped.
 M.K (Female) age 29 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Assaulted, tortured and raped.
 M.K (Female) age 36 - 1997 in Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted. Raped.
 M.K (Male) age 39 - 1998 in Kambia - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted. Tortured.

M.K (Female) age 44 - 1996 in Moyamba - Tortured, stripped and raped.
 M.K (Male) age 47 - 1997 in Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Assaulted and tortured.
 M.K (Male) age 52 - 1999 in Kambia - Extorted and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.
 M.K (Female) age 52 - 1997 in Moyamba - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted and raped.
 M.K (Female) age 59 - 1999 in Port Loko - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Raped.
 M.K (Female) age 60 - 1993 in Kenema - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 N.K (Female) - 1998 in Kailahun - Raped.
 N.K (Female) - 1999 in Bombali - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 N.K (Male) age 8 - 1994 in Bo District - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Tortured.
 N.K (Female) age 21 - 1999 in Kambia - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 O.K (Male) age 14 - 1995 in Kambia - Forcibly conscripted and drugged.
 O.K (Male) age 20 - 1994 in Koinadugu - Property looted and destroyed. Forcibly conscripted.
 O.K (Male) age 30 - 1999 in Kono - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Killed.
 P.K (Female) age 12 - 1997 in Kailahun - Sexually enslaved.
 P.K (Male) age 15 - 1995 in Moyamba - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.
 P.K (Male) age 19 - 1999 in Kono - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.
 R.K (Female) - 1999 in Moyamba - Abducted. Raped.
 R.K (Female) - 1994 in Tonkolili - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Raped.
 R.K (Female) age 14 - 1997 - Abducted. Raped.
 R.K (Female) age 16 - Displaced. Abducted. Raped.
 S.K (Male) - 1995 in Moyamba - Property looted. Forcibly conscripted. Tortured.
 S.K (Female) - 1992 in Kono - Sexually enslaved.
 S.K (Female) - 1999 in Port Loko - Displaced and property looted. Sexually enslaved.
 S.K (Female) - 1998 in Bombali - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 S.K (Female) - 1999 - Property looted. Assaulted, stripped and raped.
 S.K (Female) - 1998 in Bombali - Raped.
 S.K (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Abducted. Raped.
 S.K (Male) - 1992 - Forcibly conscripted.
 S.K (Male) age 9 - 1995 in Moyamba - Displaced. Forced to labour, forcibly conscripted and drugged.
 S.K (Male) age 10 - 1995 in Kambia - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted and drugged.
 S.K (Male) age 10 - 1999 - Forcibly conscripted and drugged.
 S.K (Female) age 12 - 1995 in Kambia - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 S.K (Male) age 12 - 1999 - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.
 S.K (Female) age 15 - 2000 - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 S.K (Female) age 18 - 1998 - Displaced. Forced to labour and sexually enslaved. Assaulted.
 S.K (Female) age 18 - Displaced and property destroyed. Raped.
 S.K (Male) age 20 - 1991 in Moyamba - Forcibly conscripted and drugged.
 S.K (Female) age 21 - 1991 in Kenema - Abducted. Raped.
 S.K (Female) age 23 - 1992 in Kono - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted and raped.
 S.K (Female) age 26 - 1996 - Property looted. Forced to labour. Raped.
 S.K (Female) age 29 - 1999 in Port Loko - Displaced. Sexually enslaved.
 S.K (Male) age 30 - 1991 - Forcibly conscripted. Tortured.
 S.K (Female) age 30 - 1993 in Pujehun - Property looted. Abducted and detained. Raped.
 S.K (Male) age 31 - 1991 in Bonthe - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted.
 S.K (Female) age 34 - Forcibly conscripted.
 T.K (Female) age 13 - 1998 in Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Raped.
 U.K (Female) age 13 - 1999 in Tonkolili - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted and raped.
 U.K (Female) age 15 - 2000 - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and raped.
 V.K (Male) age 29 - 1991 in Kailahun - Forcibly conscripted.
 W.K (Female) - Sexually enslaved.
 W.K (Female) age 24 - 1999 - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 Y.K (Female) - 1992 in Kono - Displaced and property looted. Sexually enslaved.
 Y.K (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Raped.
 Y.K (Female) - 1992 in Western Area - Displaced. Forced to labour and sexually enslaved. Assaulted and

tortured.

Y.K (Female) - 1998 in Koinadugu - Forced to labour and sexually enslaved.

Y.K (Female) - 1994 in Koinadugu - Raped.

Y.K (Female) - 1999 in Bombali - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Raped.

Y.K (Female) - 1991 in Pujehun - Raped.

Y.K (Female) age 10 - 1995 in Port Loko - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and raped.

Y.K (Female) age 18 - 1998 in Kailahun - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted. Tortured, stripped and raped.

Y.K (Female) age 35 - 1999 in Tonkolili - Sexually enslaved.

Z.K (Female) - Forced to labour and sexually enslaved.

Z.K (Female) age 12 - 1999 in Kambia - Forced to labour. Tortured and raped.

Z.K (Female) age 12 - 1999 in Bombali - Forced to labour, forcibly conscripted and sexually enslaved.

_.L (Female) age 25 - 1992 in Kailahun - Displaced. Raped.

A.L (Female) age 14 - 1994 in Kenema - Sexually enslaved. Assaulted.

F.L (Male) - 1993 - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted.

F.L (Female) age 15 - 1995 in Bonthe - Displaced. Sexually enslaved.

F.L (Female) age 15 - 1998 in Kono - Displaced. Sexually enslaved. Tortured.

H.L (Female) age 20 - 1995 in Bonthe - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour and sexually enslaved. Assaulted and stripped.

J.L (Female) age 29 - 1995 - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured and raped. Killed.

J.L (Male) age 42 - 1995 in Bo District - Displaced and property looted. Forcibly conscripted.

K.L (Female) age 13 - 2000 in Kono - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted. Raped.

M.L (Female) age 25 - 1995 in Kenema - Property looted. Sexually enslaved.

M.L (Female) age 25 - 1998 in Kailahun - Displaced and property looted. Detained. Assaulted, tortured, stripped and raped.

M.L (Male) age 60 - 1991 in Kailahun - Displaced and property destroyed. Forcibly conscripted. Assaulted and tortured.

S.L (Female) age 14 - Displaced. Forced to labour and sexually enslaved. Assaulted and tortured.

T.L (Male) age 13 - 1998 in Kono - Forcibly conscripted.

V.L (Male) age 11 - 1991 in Kenema - Displaced. Forced to labour, forcibly conscripted and drugged.

Y.L (Female) age 22 - 1994 in Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour. Raped.

_.M (Female) - 1998 in Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Raped.

_.M (Female) - 1994 in Bo District - Property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted, tortured and raped.

_.M (Female) - Displaced. Sexually enslaved.

A.M (Female) - 1995 - Property looted. Forced to labour. Raped.

A.M - 1999 in Koinadugu - Sexually enslaved.

A.M (Male) age 7 - Forcibly conscripted.

A.M (Male) age 8 - Forcibly conscripted and drugged. Assaulted.

A.M (Female) age 10 - 1994 in Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Raped.

A.M (Female) age 11 - 1995 in Kenema - Sexually enslaved.

A.M (Female) age 12 - 1999 in Pujehun - Forced to labour and sexually enslaved. Tortured.

A.M (Male) age 12 - 1995 in Kailahun - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted.

A.M (Female) age 13 - 1998 in Kono - Displaced. Raped.

A.M (Female) age 14 - 1998 in Koinadugu - Displaced. Forced to labour, forcibly conscripted, sexually enslaved and drugged.

A.M (Female) age 15 - 1998 in Bombali - Forced to labour. Raped.

A.M (Male) age 16 - 1994 in Pujehun - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.

A.M (Female) age 18 - 1996 in Kenema - Displaced. Raped.

A.M (Female) age 21 - 1998 in Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed. Forcibly conscripted and sexually enslaved.

A.M (Female) age 24 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Assaulted, stripped and raped.

A.M (Male) age 30 - 1998 - Displaced. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Tortured.

A.M (Female) age 31 - 1999 in Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Raped.

A.M (Female) age 48 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Assaulted and raped.

B.M (Female) - 1998 - Raped. Killed.

B.M (Female) - 1991 in Kailahun - Property looted. Sexually enslaved.

B.M (Male) age 9 - 1995 in Bonthe - Forcibly conscripted.
 B.M (Female) age 11 - Forced to labour. Assaulted and raped.
 B.M (Male) age 22 - 1991 in Kailahun - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.
 B.M (Female) age 23 - 1998 in Bombali - Property destroyed. Sexually enslaved. Assaulted.
 B.M (Male) age 39 - 1998 - Extorted. Forcibly conscripted. Tortured.
 B.M (Male) age 52 - 1991 in Kenema - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.
 D.M (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Raped. Killed.
 D.M (Male) - 1997 in Koinadugu - Forcibly conscripted.
 D.M (Female) age 8 - 1995 in Moyamba - Forced to labour. Raped and limb amputated.
 D.M (Male) age 10 - 1998 in Koinadugu - Forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.
 D.M (Male) age 24 - 1996 in Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.
 E.M (Female) - 1999 in Bonthe - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Raped.
 E.M (Female) age 27 - 1995 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed. Raped.
 F.M (Female) age 13 - 1991 - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Raped.
 F.M (Female) age 20 - 1998 in Kenema - Raped.
 F.M (Female) age 23 - 1998 in Port Loko - Displaced. Forced to labour. Raped.
 F.M (Female) age 23 - 1998 in Kono - Abducted. Raped.
 F.M (Female) age 26 - 1998 in Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Tortured, stripped and raped.
 F.M (Female) age 30 - 1993 in Kono - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted, stripped and raped.
 F.M (Female) age 33 - Property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted and raped.
 F.M (Female) age 44 - 1997 - Displaced. Abducted. Raped. Killed.
 G.M (Female) - 1991 in Pujehun - Raped.
 H.M (Female) - 1995 in Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Raped.
 H.M (Female) age 10 - 1999 in Pujehun - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and raped.
 H.M (Female) age 11 - 1997 in Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Raped.
 H.M (Female) age 13 - 1997 in Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Raped.
 H.M (Female) age 17 - 1999 in Kono - Forced to labour. Assaulted and raped.
 H.M (Female) age 17 - 1995 in Bonthe - Raped.
 H.M (Female) age 30 - 1991 in Bonthe - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.
 I.M (Female) - 1994 in Bo District - Raped.
 I.M (Female) - Displaced. Abducted. Raped.
 I.M (Female) age 15 - 1995 in Bo District - Abducted. Raped.
 I.M (Female) age 21 - 1998 in Kailahun - Forced to labour. Assaulted and raped.
 J.M (Female) - 1995 in Bo District - Displaced. Abducted. Raped.
 J.M (Female) - 1992 in Kailahun - Raped.
 J.M (Female) - 1996 in Moyamba - Abducted and detained. Assaulted, stripped and raped.
 J.M (Female) - 1995 in Bonthe - Abducted. Raped.
 J.M (Male) - 1991 in Kailahun - Forcibly conscripted.
 J.M (Female) age 10 - 1994 in Bo District - Displaced. Forced to labour and sexually enslaved.
 K.M (Female) - 1995 in Bonthe - Displaced and extorted. Raped.
 K.M (Female) - 1996 in Moyamba - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 K.M (Male) age 8 - 1997 in Kailahun - Displaced. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.
 K.M (Female) age 14 - 1991 - Raped.
 K.M (Female) age 16 - 1995 in Bonthe - Displaced. Sexually enslaved. Assaulted.
 K.M (Female) age 16 - 1997 - Displaced. Forced to labour and sexually enslaved. Assaulted.
 K.M (Female) age 18 - 1991 in Bonthe - Displaced. Sexually enslaved. Tortured.
 K.M (Female) age 22 - 2000 in Koinadugu - Raped.
 K.M (Female) age 23 - 1998 - Property looted. Sexually enslaved.
 K.M (Female) age 38 - 1998 in Kono - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and raped.
 L.M (Male) age 13 - 1998 in Tonkolili - Forcibly conscripted.
 L.M (Male) age 14 - 1991 in Kailahun - Extorted. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.
 L.M (Female) age 16 - 1991 in Kailahun - Sexually enslaved. Killed.
 M.M (Female) - 1996 in Moyamba - Raped.

M.M (Female) - 1995 in Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Raped.
 M.M (Female) - 1998 in Bombali - Property looted. Raped.
 M.M (Female) - 1993 in Pujehun - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 M.M (Male) - 1999 in Kambia - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.
 M.M (Female) - 1992 - Displaced. Raped.
 M.M (Female) - 1992 in Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 M.M (Male) - 1991 in Kailahun - Displaced. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.
 M.M (Male) age 9 - 1997 in Moyamba - Displaced. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.
 M.M (Male) age 10 - 1999 - Forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.
 M.M (Female) age 12 - 1997 in Kailahun - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted and raped.
 M.M (Female) age 13 - 2000 in Koinadugu - Forced to labour, sexually enslaved and drugged. Assaulted.
 M.M (Female) age 14 - 1991 in Kailahun - Sexually enslaved.
 M.M (Male) age 14 - 1999 in Moyamba - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.
 M.M (Male) age 15 - 1994 in Koinadugu - Forcibly conscripted. Tortured.
 M.M (Female) age 16 - 1998 in Koinadugu - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured and raped.
 M.M (Male) age 17 - 1995 in Moyamba - Forced to labour, forcibly conscripted and drugged. Assaulted and tortured.
 M.M (Female) age 20 - 1994 in Moyamba - Displaced. Forced to labour and sexually enslaved.
 M.M (Female) age 22 - 1999 in Koinadugu - Displaced. Forced to labour and sexually enslaved.
 M.M (Female) age 25 - 1998 - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted and raped.
 M.M (Female) age 27 - 1998 in Koinadugu - Abducted. Raped.
 N.M (Male) - 1991 in Kailahun - Forcibly conscripted.
 N.M (Male) age 11 - 2000 in Kenema - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted. Tortured.
 P.M (Female) - 1998 in Koinadugu - Sexually enslaved.
 P.M (Female) age 16 - 1998 in Koinadugu - Sexually enslaved. Assaulted and tortured.
 R.M (Female) - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured and raped.
 R.M (Female) - 1991 in Bonthe - Raped.
 R.M (Female) age 13 - 1994 in Bonthe - Displaced. Forced to labour. Raped.
 S.M (Female) - 1991 in Moyamba - Raped.
 S.M (Female) - Extorted. Abducted. Assaulted, tortured and raped.
 S.M (Male) - 1998 - Forcibly conscripted.
 S.M (Female) - 1991 - Displaced. Raped.
 S.M (Female) - 1991 in Pujehun - Forced to labour and sexually enslaved. Assaulted.
 S.M (Female) - 1992 in Kono - Sexually enslaved.
 S.M (Female) - 1998 in Koinadugu - Raped.
 S.M (Female) age 9 - 1998 in Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted and raped.
 S.M (Female) age 16 - 1999 in Western Area - Extorted. Forced to labour, sexually enslaved and drugged. Assaulted.
 S.M (Male) age 17 - 1998 in Koinadugu - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.
 S.M (Male) age 19 - 1999 in Western Area - Forcibly conscripted.
 S.M (Female) age 28 - Displaced. Sexually enslaved. Assaulted.
 S.M (Female) age 38 - 1997 - Property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Raped.
 S.M (Female) age 44 - 1992 in Kono - Raped.
 S.M (Male) age 46 - 1997 in Koinadugu - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Limb amputated.
 T.M (Male) age 7 - 2000 - Forcibly conscripted and drugged.
 T.M (Male) age 10 - 1998 in Kono - Forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.
 T.M (Female) age 19 - 1992 in Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured and raped.
 V.M (Male) age 14 - 1994 in Kailahun - Forcibly conscripted.
 Y.M (Male) - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.
 Y.M (Female) age 17 - Forced to labour. Raped.
 Y.M (Female) age 20 - 1995 in Kailahun - Forced to labour and sexually enslaved. Tortured.
 Z.M (Female) age 12 - 1996 in Bombali - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and raped.
 _N (Female) age 17 - 1991 in Kailahun - Sexually enslaved.
 _N (Female) age 40 - 1997 in Moyamba - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and raped.
 F.N (Female) age 15 - 1998 in Kono - Displaced. Sexually enslaved. Assaulted.
 F.N (Male) age 41 - 1991 in Kailahun - Forcibly conscripted.

H.N (Female) - 1995 in Bo District - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Raped.
 I.N (Female) - 1992 in Kailahun - Raped.
 I.N (Female) - 1997 in Moyamba - Abducted. Raped. Killed.
 K.N (Female) - 1998 in Kono - Abducted and detained. Raped. Killed.
 M.N (Male) age 23 - Displaced and extorted. Forcibly conscripted.
 S.N (Male) age 7 - 1999 in Kono - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted.
 S.N (Male) age 15 - 1998 in Tonkolili - Extorted. Forcibly conscripted.
 S.N (Male) age 42 - 1995 - Forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.
 T.N (Male) age 10 - 2000 in Koinadugu - Forcibly conscripted. Tortured.
 _P (Female) - Forced to labour. Raped.
 G.P (Female) age 11 - 1995 in Moyamba - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 G.P (Male) age 15 - 1994 in Bonthe - Displaced. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.
 J.P (Female) - Sexually enslaved.
 M.P (Female) - Sexually enslaved.
 M.P (Female) age 10 - 1992 in Moyamba - Sexually enslaved.
 N.P (Female) age 40 - 1995 in Kenema - Abducted. Raped. Killed.
 S.P (Female) - 1997 - Assaulted and raped.
 S.P (Male) - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted.
 R.Q (Female) age 13 - 1998 - Displaced. Abducted. Raped.
 A.R (Female) age 19 - 1991 - Displaced. Raped.
 K.R (Female) age 13 - 1995 in Moyamba - Sexually enslaved.
 M.R (Female) - 1998 - Abducted and detained. Tortured and raped.
 S.R (Female) age 20 - 1999 - Raped.
 _S (Female) - 1995 in Moyamba - Raped.
 _S (Female) - 1995 in Bo District - Raped.
 _S (Female) - Extorted. Raped.
 A.S (Female) - 1995 in Moyamba - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Raped.
 A.S (Female) - 1991 in Pujehun - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Raped.
 A.S (Female) - 1998 in Tonkolili - Forced to labour. Raped.
 A.S (Male) - 1991 in Kambia - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted. Assaulted and tortured.
 A.S (Male) age 8 - Forced to labour, forcibly conscripted and drugged.
 A.S (Male) age 8 - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Assaulted and tortured.
 A.S (Female) age 11 - 1998 in Tonkolili - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 A.S (Male) age 12 - 1998 in Port Loko - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.
 A.S (Male) age 12 - 1997 - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.
 A.S (Male) age 14 - 1998 - Forcibly conscripted.
 A.S (Male) age 14 - 1994 in Kailahun - Forcibly conscripted.
 A.S (Female) age 14 - 1998 in Tonkolili - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 A.S (Female) age 18 - 1995 in Kenema - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted and raped.
 A.S (Female) age 18 - 1998 in Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour and sexually enslaved. Assaulted.
 A.S (Female) age 20 - 1999 in Kono - Displaced. Raped.
 A.S (Female) age 23 - 1995 in Bo District - Extorted. Forced to labour. Raped.
 A.S (Female) age 46 - Property looted. Abducted. Assaulted and raped.
 B.S (Male) - 1998 in Tonkolili - Forced to labour, forcibly conscripted and drugged.
 B.S (Female) age 12 - 1994 in Kailahun - Displaced. Forced to labour and sexually enslaved. Assaulted and tortured.
 B.S (Female) age 12 - 2000 in Kono - Displaced. Raped.
 B.S (Male) age 13 - 1994 in Kailahun - Forced to labour, forcibly conscripted and drugged.
 B.S (Female) age 15 - 1998 in Bo District - Forced to labour. Raped.
 B.S (Male) age 18 - 1991 in Kailahun - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Assaulted and stripped.
 B.S (Female) age 18 - 1992 in Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Raped.
 B.S (Male) age 40 - 1994 - Displaced. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Tortured.
 C.S (Female) - 1999 in Tonkolili - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 D.S (Male) - Forcibly conscripted.
 D.S (Male) age 11 - 1995 in Bonthe - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.

D.S (Male) age 14 - 1995 in Pujehun - Displaced. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.
 D.S (Male) age 30 - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.
 E.S (Female) age 14 - 1995 in Bonthe - Forced to labour and sexually enslaved. Assaulted.
 E.S (Female) age 14 - 1995 in Bonthe - Extorted. Forcibly conscripted. Assaulted and stripped.
 F.S (Female) - 1998 in Tonkolili - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted and raped.
 F.S (Female) - 1998 in Bombali - Raped.
 F.S (Female) - 1998 - Sexually enslaved. Assaulted.
 F.S (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Forcibly conscripted.
 F.S (Female) - 1999 in Kambia - Displaced. Forced to labour. Raped.
 F.S (Female) age 8 - 1992 in Kailahun - Forced to labour and sexually enslaved.
 F.S (Female) age 9 - 1995 in Port Loko - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 F.S (Female) age 10 - 1998 in Western Area - Forcibly conscripted. Tortured and raped.
 F.S (Female) age 11 - 1999 in Kono - Displaced. Sexually enslaved. Assaulted.
 F.S (Male) age 12 - 1991 in Kailahun - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted.
 F.S (Female) age 13 - Displaced. Forced to labour. Raped.
 F.S (Male) age 20 - 1992 in Bo District - Forcibly conscripted.
 F.S (Female) age 21 - 1998 in Kenema - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted and raped.
 F.S (Female) age 44 - 1991 - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted. Raped.
 H.S (Female) - 1992 in Pujehun - Sexually enslaved. Assaulted and stripped.
 H.S (Female) - 1994 in Bo District - Raped.
 H.S (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Sexually enslaved.
 H.S (Female) - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted and sexually enslaved. Assaulted.
 H.S (Female) - 2000 in Port Loko - Abducted. Raped.
 H.S (Female) age 11 - 1992 in Pujehun - Sexually enslaved.
 H.S (Female) age 21 - 1999 in Kambia - Displaced. Raped.
 H.S (Female) age 25 - 1997 in Western Area - Assaulted and raped.
 I.S (Female) - Raped.
 I.S (Female) - 1994 in Bo District - Raped.
 I.S (Female) - 1999 in Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed. Sexually enslaved. Stripped.
 I.S (Male) - 1991 in Kailahun - Forcibly conscripted.
 I.S (Female) - 1998 in Kono - Sexually enslaved. Assaulted.
 I.S (Male) age 12 - 1999 in Bombali - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted.
 I.S (Female) age 12 - 1995 in Kailahun - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted and drugged.
 I.S (Female) age 13 - 1999 in Western Area - Sexually enslaved.
 I.S (Female) age 25 - 1992 in Kailahun - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and raped.
 I.S (Female) age 28 - 1999 in Western Area - Forced to labour. Assaulted and raped.
 J.S (Female) - Displaced. Sexually enslaved.
 J.S (Female) - 1992 in Kenema - Displaced. Raped. Killed.
 J.S (Male) - Forcibly conscripted.
 J.S (Female) age 10 - Forced to labour. Raped.
 K.S (Female) - 2000 in Kambia - Raped.
 K.S (Female) - 1998 in Kenema - Tortured and raped.
 K.S (Female) - 1998 in Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Stripped and raped.
 K.S (Male) age 8 - 1995 in Tonkolili - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.
 K.S (Female) age 10 - 1993 in Port Loko - Displaced. Forced to labour. Raped.
 K.S (Male) age 15 - 1998 in Western Area - Forcibly conscripted.
 K.S (Female) age 15 - 1994 in Koinadugu - Displaced. Sexually enslaved. Assaulted.
 K.S (Female) age 21 - 1998 in Kenema - Displaced. Sexually enslaved. Assaulted.
 K.S (Female) age 23 - 1998 - Displaced. Sexually enslaved.
 K.S (Female) age 25 - 1999 in Bo District - Extorted. Raped. Killed.
 K.S (Female) age 27 - 1999 in Bombali - Displaced. Forced to labour and sexually enslaved. Assaulted.
 L.S (Female) age 14 - 1999 in Western Area - Sexually enslaved. Assaulted.
 M.S (Female) - 2000 in Kambia - Raped.
 M.S (Female) - 1995 in Pujehun - Abducted and detained. Tortured and raped.

M.S (Female) - 1995 in Bo District - Displaced. Abducted. Raped.
 M.S (Female) - 1995 in Bonthe - Abducted. Raped.
 M.S (Female) age 8 - 1994 in Port Loko - Sexually enslaved.
 M.S (Female) age 10 - 1995 in Port Loko - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 M.S (Female) age 13 - 1991 in Bombali - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Raped.
 M.S (Female) age 13 - 1998 in Tonkolili - Forced to labour and sexually enslaved.
 M.S (Female) age 13 - 1994 in Bo District - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 M.S (Female) age 14 - 1994 in Kailahun - Displaced. Forced to labour, forcibly conscripted and sexually enslaved. Tortured.
 M.S (Female) age 14 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured, stripped and raped.
 M.S (Male) age 15 - 1998 in Port Loko - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.
 M.S (Female) age 16 - 1996 in Moyamba - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 M.S (Female) age 17 - 1995 - Sexually enslaved.
 M.S (Female) age 23 - 1998 - Abducted and detained. Assaulted, stripped and raped.
 M.S (Female) age 24 - 1991 in Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Stripped and raped.
 M.S (Female) age 28 - 1997 in Tonkolili - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and raped.
 M.S (Female) age 32 - 1994 in Kenema - Displaced. Sexually enslaved. Assaulted.
 M.S (Female) age 34 - 1996 in Moyamba - Forced to labour and sexually enslaved. Assaulted.
 N.S (Female) - 2000 in Kambia - Raped.
 N.S (Female) - 1999 in Bombali - Raped.
 N.S (Female) age 11 - 1995 in Port Loko - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 P.S (Male) age 10 - 1993 in Bonthe - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.
 S.S (Male) - 2000 in Kambia - Property looted. Forcibly conscripted.
 S.S (Male) - 1993 in Kailahun - Forcibly conscripted.
 S.S (Male) - Forcibly conscripted.
 S.S (Male) - 1999 - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted.
 S.S (Male) age 8 - 1999 in Kambia - Forced to labour, forcibly conscripted and drugged. Assaulted.
 S.S (Female) age 11 - 2000 in Tonkolili - Sexually enslaved.
 S.S (Male) age 11 - 1998 in Kono - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted.
 S.S (Female) age 14 - 1999 - Displaced. Sexually enslaved. Stripped.
 S.S (Male) age 14 - 1999 in Kambia - Forcibly conscripted.
 S.S (Female) age 15 - 1997 in Kailahun - Forced to labour and sexually enslaved.
 S.S (Female) age 16 - 1997 - Displaced. Sexually enslaved.
 S.S (Male) age 26 - 1994 in Moyamba - Displaced and property destroyed. Forcibly conscripted.
 T.S (Female) - 1997 in Bombali - Forcibly conscripted.
 T.S (Female) age 13 - 1999 in Bo District - Displaced. Forced to labour. Raped.
 T.S (Female) age 16 - 1994 in Kenema - Forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.
 U.S (Female) - 1998 in Port Loko - Displaced. Raped.
 U.S (Male) age 9 - 1995 in Bombali - Forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.
 U.S (Female) age 15 - 1995 in Bonthe - Displaced. Forced to labour. Raped.
 V.S (Male) age 14 - 1992 in Kailahun - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted. Assaulted and tortured.
 W.S (Female) age 13 - Raped.
 Y.S (Female) - 1998 in Kambia - Sexually enslaved. Killed.
 _T (Female) - 1999 in Kambia - Extorted. Raped.
 A.T (Male) - Forcibly conscripted.
 A.T (Male) - 1999 - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted.
 A.T (Male) age 7 - 1998 in Bombali - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.
 A.T (Female) age 15 - 1999 in Tonkolili - Displaced. Sexually enslaved. Assaulted and stripped.
 A.T (Female) age 22 - 1995 in Bonthe - Displaced. Sexually enslaved. Assaulted.
 A.T (Female) age 22 - 1995 in Kailahun - Displaced. Sexually enslaved. Tortured.
 A.T (Male) age 25 - 1996 in Kono - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Tortured.
 B.T (Female) - 1994 in Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Raped.
 B.T (Female) age 18 - 1995 in Moyamba - Displaced. Abducted. Raped.
 E.T (Male) age 10 - 1999 in Western Area - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.
 F.T (Female) - Abducted and detained. Raped.

F.T (Female) - 1999 in Tonkolili - Extorted. Forced to labour. Raped.
 F.T (Female) - Extorted. Raped.
 F.T (Female) age 13 - 1991 in Pujehun - Displaced. Sexually enslaved. Assaulted.
 F.T (Female) age 17 - 1999 - Sexually enslaved.
 F.T (Male) age 18 - 1991 in Pujehun - Forcibly conscripted.
 H.T (Female) - 1995 in Bonthe - Forced to labour and sexually enslaved.
 H.T (Female) age 16 - 1994 in Tonkolili - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 I.T (Female) age 13 - 1997 in Kambia - Displaced and extorted. Sexually enslaved. Stripped.
 I.T (Female) age 14 - 1995 in Tonkolili - Abducted and detained. Tortured and raped. Killed.
 I.T (Female) age 18 - 1999 in Port Loko - Forced to labour. Tortured and raped.
 J.T (Female) - 1991 in Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 J.T (Male) - Forcibly conscripted. Killed.
 J.T (Male) age 8 - 1998 in Tonkolili - Forcibly conscripted.
 J.T (Male) age 10 - 1998 in Kono - Forcibly conscripted.
 J.T (Male) age 11 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Forced to labour, forcibly conscripted and drugged. Tortured.
 K.T (Female) - Extorted. Raped.
 K.T (Male) age 9 - Displaced. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.
 K.T (Female) age 16 - 1998 in Tonkolili - Extorted. Sexually enslaved. Stripped.
 K.T (Female) age 19 - 1995 in Kambia - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and raped. Killed.
 L.T (Male) age 12 - 1999 in Port Loko - Forced to labour, forcibly conscripted and drugged. Tortured.
 M.T (Male) - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.
 M.T (Male) - 1999 in Bombali - Forcibly conscripted.
 M.T (Male) - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.
 M.T (Male) age 10 - Forcibly conscripted.
 M.T (Male) age 11 - 1995 in Bombali - Forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.
 M.T (Female) age 12 - 2000 in Tonkolili - Forced to labour. Raped.
 M.T (Female) age 14 - 1999 in Port Loko - Displaced. Sexually enslaved. Assaulted.
 M.T (Male) age 15 - 1998 in Tonkolili - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.
 M.T (Female) age 15 - 1998 in Kono - Displaced. Sexually enslaved.
 M.T (Male) age 16 - 1998 in Koinadugu - Forced to labour, forcibly conscripted and drugged.
 M.T (Female) age 18 - 1995 in Moyamba - Property looted. Abducted and detained. Tortured and raped.
 M.T (Female) age 21 - 1998 in Kono - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Raped.
 O.T (Male) age 64 - 2000 in Kambia - Property looted. Forcibly conscripted.
 P.T (Female) - 1999 - Raped.
 R.T (Female) - 1992 in Kono - Property looted. Assaulted, stripped and raped.
 R.T (Female) age 18 - 1998 in Kono - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Raped.
 S.T (Male) - 1992 in Pujehun - Displaced. Forced to labour, forcibly conscripted and drugged.
 S.T (Male) age 12 - 1992 in Pujehun - Displaced. Forced to labour, forcibly conscripted and drugged.
 S.T (Male) age 15 - 1999 in Kambia - Forcibly conscripted.
 F.V (Female) age 28 - 1991 in Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted. Raped.
 I.V (Female) age 10 - 1995 in Kenema - Displaced. Sexually enslaved.
 I.V (Male) age 28 - 1991 - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted.
 J.V (Male) age 23 - 1991 in Koinadugu - Forcibly conscripted. Assaulted.
 L.V (Male) age 17 - 1995 in Bonthe - Displaced. Forcibly conscripted.
 N.V (Female) age 15 - 1991 in Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Raped.
 T.V (Female) age 24 - 1992 in Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Stripped and raped.
 A.W (Female) age 21 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Raped.
 A.W (Female) age 23 - 1995 in Bonthe - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour and sexually enslaved.
 G.W (Female) age 10 - 1991 in Kailahun - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted and raped.
 M.W (Female) age 17 - 1991 in Pujehun - Sexually enslaved.
 M.W (Male) age 32 - 1996 in Kailahun - Extorted. Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted. Tortured.
 N.W (Male) age 10 - 1996 in Kenema - Displaced. Forced to labour, forcibly conscripted and drugged. Assaulted.
 O.W (Female) age 11 - 1991 in Western Area - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured and raped.

S.W (Female) age 46 - 1998 in Kono - Abducted and detained. Raped. Killed.
 T.W (Female) - 1991 in Bonthe - Raped.
 I.Y (Male) - 1991 in Pujehun - Forcibly conscripted.
 I.Y (Female) age 30 - 1991 in Kailahun - Displaced and extorted. Assaulted and raped.
 K.Y (Male) - 1998 in Kono - Forced to labour and forcibly conscripted.
 K.Y (Female) age 10 - 1998 in Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Raped.
 K.Y (Female) age 12 - 2000 in Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour and sexually enslaved. Tortured.
 M.Y (Female) - 1995 in Bonthe - Raped.
 M.Y (Female) age 35 - 1998 in Kono - Forced to labour. Assaulted and raped.
 S.Y (Male) age 12 - 2000 in Kono - Forcibly conscripted.
 T.Y (Male) age 11 - 1999 in Tonkolili - Forced to labour, forcibly conscripted and drugged.

Victims of the Conflict in Sierra Leone, 1991 to 2000

7. These entries give the names of the victims and their ages where known. Each entry is followed by the year in which the abuse began and, where possible, the chiefdom and district in which it occurred. Finally each entry includes a description of the violations perpetrated against each victim. It should be noted that many victims suffered several violations over a period of several years or in many different locations; however, only the first date and place is stated here. The age given is the victim's age at the time when the victim was first abused, but not necessarily the age at which the victim suffered all of the listed violations. The 1,587 individuals named in confidential statements have been excluded from this list. 10,404 victims are listed here.

Abass, Shede (Male) - 1993 in Peje, Pujehun - Property destroyed.
 Abdulah, Borbor (Male) age 15 - 1995 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Killed.
 Abdulah, Lansana (Male) age 62 - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Property looted and destroyed.
 Abdulai, Acassah (Male) - Killed.
 Abdulai, Aminata (Female) age 19 - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Abdulai, Baby (Female) - 1994 in Bagbo, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Abdulai, Bockarie (Male) age 8 - 1994 in Lugbu, Bo District - Abducted and detained.
 Abdulai, Brima (Male) age 73 - 1991 in Wunde, Bo District - Displaced. Killed.
 Abdulai, Joseph (Male) - 1992 in Tankoro, Kono - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Tortured.
 Abdulai, Kamali (Male) - Killed.
 Abdulai, Momoh (Male) age 63 - 1991 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Displaced.
 Abdulai, Moriba (Male) - 1994 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Abducted. Assaulted. Killed.
 Abdulai, Mustapha (Male) age 57 - 1995 in Kissi Teng, Kailahun - Displaced and property destroyed. Tortured.
 Abdulai, Saidu (Male) age 50 - 1995 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.
 Abdulai, Sao (Female) - Displaced.
 Abdulai, Tenneh (Female) - 1994 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted.
 Abdulai, Vandi (Male) age 32 - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Forced to labour.
 Abdulai, Wuata (Female) - 1991 - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Abibu, Kenei (Male) - Killed.
 Abu, Abdulai Dauda (Male) - 1995 - Displaced.
 Abu, Adama (Female) - 1995 in Bonthe - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Abu, Albert (Male) - 1996 in Imperi, Bonthe - Property looted.
 Abu, Albert (Male) age 43 - 1997 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Extorted. Abducted and detained.
 Abu, Amie (Female) age 19 - 1999 in Peje West, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Abu, Ansuma (Male) - 1998 in Peje West, Kailahun - Killed.
 Abu, Brima (Male) - 1995 in Bum, Bonthe - Abducted. Assaulted. Killed.

Abu, Brima (Male) age 17 - 1997 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Abu, Christiana (Female) age 34 - 1995 in Moyamba - Displaced.
 Abu, David (Male) age 36 - 1999 in Baoma, Bo District - Abducted.
 Abu, Duraman (Male) age 40 - 1995 in Timdel, Moyamba - Displaced.
 Abu, Hadima (Female) - 1996 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Tortured.
 Abu, Iye (Female) - 1999 in Baoma, Bo District - Abducted. Assaulted.
 Abu, Jenneh (Female) - 1998 in Imperi, Bonthe - Extorted.
 Abu, Jestina (Female) age 58 - 1998 in Kamara, Kono - Displaced. Abducted.
 Abu, Joe (Male) - Killed.
 Abu, Kadie (Female) - 1995 - Displaced.
 Abu, Kumba (Female) age 19 - 1992 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured.
 Abu, Lansana (Male) - 1994 in Tonko Limba, Kambia - Property destroyed. Killed.
 Abu, Mariama (Female) - 1997 in Kono - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Abu, Mariama (Female) - 1999 in Peje West, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Abu, Mattu (Female) - Displaced.
 Abu, Mattu (Female) age 24 - 1995 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Abu, Mohamed (Male) age 13 - Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Abu, Nyalla (Female) - 1996 in Tikonko, Bo District - Abducted. Tortured.
 Abu, Sahr (Male) age 19 - 1995 - Abducted. Killed.
 Abu, Saidu (Male) age 68 - 1995 in Baoma, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Abu, Sao (Male) - 1996 in Peje West, Kailahun - Killed.
 Abu, Senesie (Male) - 1996 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Killed.
 Abu, Sia (Female) - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Killed.
 Abu, Sidi (Male) - 1995 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced. Assaulted and tortured.
 Abu, Solomon (Male) age 30 - 1994 in Bagbo, Bo District - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Abu, Sonah (Male) age 23 - Forced to labour. Killed.
 Abu, Susan (Female) age 28 - 1994 in Kamajei, Moyamba - Detained.
 Abu, Tamba (Male) age 15 - 1998 in Kono - Displaced.
 Abu, Tamba (Male) age 33 - 1996 in Small Bo, Kenema - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted.
 Abu, Tommy (Male) - 1995 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced.
 Abu, Wahma (Male) - 1999 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Detained.
 Adama, Finda (Female) - Detained. Tortured. Killed.
 Adamu, Momoh (Male) age 74 - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Killed.
 Agbahun, Lansana (Male) - 1995 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Killed.
 Agbateh, Amadu (Male) - Killed.
 Aiah, Musa (Male) age 37 - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Abducted. Killed.
 Alabi, Ayiekeh (Female) age 28 - 1998 in Western Area - Property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Albert, Ndomahina (Male) age 58 - 1995 in Kowa, Moyamba - Displaced and property destroyed. Tortured.
 Alfred, Fatu (Female) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Alfred, Morie (Male) age 43 - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced.
 Alfred, Peter (Male) age 44 - 1995 in Nongowa, Kenema - Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Alfred Kaikai, Fukai (Male) age 30 - 1994 in Gorama Mende, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Alie, Abdul Raman (Male) - 1995 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Alie, Alen (Male) age 2 - 1995 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Alie, Andrew (Male) age 37 - 1994 in Gbendembu Ngowahun, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Tortured.
 Alie, Duraman (Male) age 7 - 1995 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Alie, Foday (Male) age 65 - 2000 - Abducted. Killed.
 Alie, Francis (Male) age 45 - 1995 in Tikonko, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Alie, Hadiatu (Female) age 4 - 1995 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Alie, Kamara (Male) age 22 - Assaulted.
 Alie, Mariama (Female) - 1996 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Killed.

Alie, Martha (Female) age 31 - 1995 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Alie, Messi (Female) - 1995 in Tikonko, Bo District - Displaced. Killed.

Alie, Nancy (Female) age 30 - 1998 in Peje West, Kailahun - Killed.

Alie, Sahr (Male) age 26 - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced.

Alie, Tamba (Male) - 1994 in Badjia, Bo District - Detained.

Alie, Tenneh (Female) age 9 - 1995 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Alie, Tommy (Male) age 39 - 1995 in Banta Mokele, Moyamba - Property looted. Forced to labour.

Alieu, Alhaji (Male) - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Property looted.

Alieu, Alpha (Male) - 1995 in Kagboro, Moyamba - Killed.

Alieu, Doris (Female) age 44 - 1994 in Valunia, Bo District - Extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Alieu, Finda (Female) age 8 - 1999 in Lei, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Alieu, Iye (Female) - 2000 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced.

Alieu, Jenneh (Female) - Killed.

Alieu, Keni (Male) - 1994 in Tikonko, Bo District - Killed.

Alieu, Kingsley (Male) age 36 - 1992 in Luawa, Kailahun - Property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Alieu, Komba (Male) age 15 - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Alieu, Komba (Male) age 68 - 1998 in Kamara, Kono - Property destroyed. Assaulted and tortured.

Alieu, Mariama (Female) age 17 - 1992 in Peje West, Kailahun - Killed.

Alieu, Morie (Male) - 1993 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Assaulted.

Alieu, Morie (Male) age 48 - 1996 in Dodo, Kenema - Displaced.

Alieu, Musu Gabay (Female) age 35 - 1992 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Alieu, Sahr (Male) - 1992 in Nimikoro, Kono - Killed.

Alieu, Sia (Female) age 42 - Assaulted.

Alieu, Tamba (Male) - 1999 in Lei, Kono - Tortured. Killed.

Alieu, Tangia (Male) - 1991 in Kissi Tongi, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Allieu, Foday (Male) age 54 - 1992 in Makpele, Pujehun - Assaulted and tortured. Killed.

Alpha, Abu (Male) - 1994 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Abducted and detained.

Alpha, Alhaji Musa (Male) - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Alpha, Alieu (Male) - 1997 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Alpha, Bockarie (Male) - 1996 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Killed.

Alpha, Borbor (Male) age 56 - 1991 in Wara-Wara Bafodia, Koinadugu - Displaced. Assaulted and tortured.

Alpha, David (Male) - Assaulted and tortured.

Alpha, Fallah (Male) age 24 - 1992 in Upper Bambara, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Alpha, Fatu (Female) - 1994 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted.

Alpha, James (Male) age 35 - 1995 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Killed.

Alpha, John (Male) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Alpha, Kamor (Male) - 1995 in Dodo, Kenema - Killed.

Alpha, Katumu (Female) - 1992 in Malema, Kailahun - Detained.

Alpha, Marie (Female) - 1998 - Forced to labour.

Alpha, Mbalu (Female) - 1995 in Bagbe, Bo District - Assaulted and tortured. Killed.

Alpha, Modibah (Male) - Killed.

Alpha, Musa (Male) - 1992 - Killed.

Alpha, Musa (Male) - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Property destroyed.

Alpha, Ngaya (Male) - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Alpha, Ngebeh (Male) age 65 - Property looted and destroyed.

Alpha, Tommy (Male) - 1997 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Abducted.

Alpha, Yatta (Female) age 15 - 1991 - Displaced.

Alusine, Momoh (Male) - Displaced.

Amadu, Abdulai (Male) age 34 - 1995 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced.

Amadu, Bockarie (Male) age 55 - 1994 - Displaced.

Amadu, Elizabeth (Female) age 18 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Amadu, Francis (Male) age 38 - 1996 - Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.

Amadu, Kadiatu (Female) age 11 - 1995 in Bum, Bonthe - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Amadu, Kumba (Female) age 33 - 1998 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced.

Amadu, Mudah (Male) - 1994 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Amadu, Musu (Female) age 25 - 1998 in Soa, Kono - Displaced.

Amadu, Patrick (Male) - 1999 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Amadu, Sahr (Male) age 4 - 1998 in Soa, Kono - Killed.

Amadu, Tranie (Male) age 32 - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Amadu, Vandi (Male) - 1996 in Jawie, Kailahun - Killed.

Amaka, Sao (Male) - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Assaulted.

Amara, Abu (Male) - Killed.

Amara, Aiah (Male) age 55 - 1992 in Gbane, Kono - Killed.

Amara, Ajuba (Male) age 8 - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Killed.

Amara, Alfred (Male) - 1999 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Property looted. Tortured.

Amara, Alhaji (Male) - 1995 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured. Killed.

Amara, Alhaji Fomba (Male) age 75 - 1992 in Luawa, Kailahun - Killed.

Amara, Amadu (Male) age 56 - 1992 in Malen, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed.

Amara, Amadu (Male) age 67 - 1999 in Malegohun, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Amara, Ambrose (Male) - 1998 in Kakua, Bo District - Property looted.

Amara, Augustine (Male) age 61 - 1997 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed.

Amara, Bintu (Female) age 8 - 1999 - Displaced. Assaulted.

Amara, Bobor (Male) age 46 - 1992 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Amara, Borbor (Male) - 1994 in Follofaba Dembelia, Koinadugu - Detained. Killed.

Amara, Brima (Male) - Displaced.

Amara, Brima (Male) age 25 - 1996 in Wandor, Kenema - Killed.

Amara, Brima (Male) age 35 - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced.

Amara, Brima (Male) age 55 - 1993 in Kono - Abducted and detained. Stripped.

Amara, Brima (Male) age 63 - 1995 in Yawei, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted.

Amara, Christina (Female) age 35 - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Property looted.

Amara, Edna (Female) age 40 - 1992 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed.

Amara, Elizabeth (Female) age 11 - 1999 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Amara, Fatmata (Female) age 29 - 1991 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Amara, Foday (Male) age 71 - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Property destroyed.

Amara, Gbessay (Male) - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Amara, Gloud (Male) - 1994 in Kori, Moyamba - Killed.

Amara, Gumbu (Male) - 1991 - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Amara, Isata (Female) age 41 - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced.

Amara, Isatu (Female) age 28 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.

Amara, James (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Assaulted.

Amara, Jeneba (Female) age 40 - 1991 in Bumpah, Bo District - Displaced and property looted.

Amara, Joe (Male) age 67 - 1995 in Small Bo, Kenema - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour.

Amara, Joseph (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.

Amara, Joseph (Male) age 23 - 1994 in Dodo, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed.

Amara, Junisa (Male) - Displaced.

Amara, Katie (Female) age 33 - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Amara, Kombe (Male) age 43 - Displaced. Stripped.

Amara, Lahai (Male) - 1996 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Amara, Lahai (Male) - 1994 in Simbaru, Kenema - Displaced.

Amara, Lahai (Male) age 31 - 1991 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Amara, Lamin (Male) - 1995 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Assaulted and tortured.

Amara, Mamaalie (Female) age 78 - 1995 in Yawei, Kailahun - Assaulted. Killed.

Amara, Manie (Male) age 37 - 1993 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Amara, Massah (Female) - 1991 in Peje Bongre, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Amara, Mattu (Female) age 48 - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Amara, Messie (Female) age 64 - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted.

Amara, Mohamed (Male) - Displaced. Assaulted.

Amara, Mohamed (Male) age 18 - 1995 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced and property looted. Killed.

Amara, Mohamed (Male) age 32 - 1995 in Dama, Kenema - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Amara, Moinina (Male) age 56 - 1996 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Amara, Morgboi (Male) age 46 - Displaced.

Amara, Musa (Male) - Displaced.

Amara, Mustapha (Male) age 31 - 1992 in Simbaru, Kenema - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Amara, Musu (Female) - 1998 in Kori, Moyamba - Displaced.

Amara, Musu (Female) age 32 - 1996 in Gbane Kandor, Kono - Displaced. Assaulted.

Amara, Musu (Female) age 40 - 1994 in Dodo, Kenema - Killed.

Amara, Nancy (Female) - 1995 in Kpanda Kemo, Bonthe - Displaced and property destroyed.

Amara, Philip (Male) - 2000 in Baoma, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Amara, Saha (Male) age 21 - 1995 - Killed.

Amara, Sahr (Male) age 34 - 1992 in Gbane, Kono - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.

Amara, Saidu (Male) age 32 - 1995 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Amara, Samai (Male) - 1991 in Peje West, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.

Amara, Sata (Female) age 13 - 1995 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced.

Amara, Sattu (Female) - 1997 in Gbane, Kono - Abducted.

Amara, Sheku (Male) - 1994 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted.

Amara, Sia (Female) age 50 - 1992 in Gbane, Kono - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Amara, Smart (Male) age 54 - 1991 in Gaura, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed.

Amara, Tenneh (Female) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted.

Amara, Tommy (Male) - Displaced. Assaulted.

Amara, Wuya (Female) age 38 - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Amara, Yusu (Male) - 1994 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Amidu, Alpha (Male) - Killed.

Amidu, Margaret (Female) - 1995 - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Amidu, Medie - 1995 - Abducted and detained.

Amidu, Wuya (Female) - 1995 - Abducted and detained.

Aminata, Saffa (Male) age 6 - 1996 in Simbaru, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Amos, Victor (Male) age 23 - Killed.

Ann, Alpha (Male) age 16 - 1996 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Abducted.

Ansarr, Bai Shebora Tonka (Male) age 76 - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted. Killed.

Anssumana, Adama (Female) - Killed.

Anssumana, Agnes (Female) age 45 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Anssumana, Aiah (Male) age 40 - 1994 in Gbane, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Anssumana, Albert (Male) age 27 - 1993 in Baoma, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed.

Anssumana, Alhaji (Male) - 1995 in Benducha, Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Anssumana, Aliah (Female) age 38 - 1993 in Upper Bambara, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Anssumana, Bockarie (Male) age 45 - 1998 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Displaced.

Anssumana, Bockarie (Male) age 57 - 1997 in Gorama Mende, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Anssumana, Brima (Male) - 1997 in Tikonko, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed.

Anssumana, Brima (Male) age 28 - 1991 in Panga Krim, Pujehun - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Anssumana, Fayia (Male) - 1993 in Kissi Tongi, Kailahun - Killed.

Anssumana, Foday (Male) age 36 - 1998 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Anssumana, James (Male) age 42 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Anssumana, Jeneh (Female) - Killed.

Anssumana, Jivirah (Male) - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Killed.

Anssumana, John J. (Male) age 41 - 1991 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed.

Anssumana, Joseph (Male) - 1997 in Nongowa, Kenema - Assaulted.

Anssumana, Jothanan (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Killed.

Anssumana, Jusu (Male) age 51 - 1993 in Western Area - Forced to labour.

Anssumana, Memuna (Female) - 1991 - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Anssumana, Mustapha (Male) age 33 - Displaced and property looted.

Anssumana, Ruben (Male) - 1996 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Displaced.

Anssumana, Sahr (Male) age 24 - 1997 in Kono - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Anssumana, Salifu (Male) age 28 - 1997 in Nongowa, Kenema - Property looted. Assaulted and tortured. Killed.

Anssumana, Sayoh (Male) - 1998 in Kamara, Kono - Displaced. Abducted. Tortured and limb amputated.

Anssumana, Sheku (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Abducted.

Anssumana, Sylvester (Male) age 47 - 1995 in Kwamebai Krim, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted.

Anssumana, Tamba (Male) age 32 - 1996 - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed.

Anssumana, Tamba (Male) age 75 - 1991 in Gbane, Kono - Abducted. Killed.

Ansu, Alpha (Male) - 1994 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced.

Ansu, Fatty (Female) age 25 - 1994 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced.

Ansu, Hawa (Female) - 1998 in Malema, Kailahun - Killed.

Ansu, Jinnah (Female) age 22 - 1998 - Property looted. Tortured.

Ansu, Maithias Goddo (Male) age 23 - 1993 in Koya, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.

Anthony, Foday (Male) age 25 - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Assaulted.

Anthony, Francis P. (Male) age 34 - 1995 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Property looted.

Aruna, Adama (Female) age 51 - 1992 in Gaura, Kenema - Displaced and property looted.

Aruna, Amara (Male) - 1991 in Yawei, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Aruna, Amara (Male) - 1991 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed. Tortured. Killed.

Aruna, Bockarie (Male) age 18 - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted.

Aruna, Brima (Male) age 53 - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Aruna, Jenneh (Female) - 1991 - Assaulted.

Aruna, Joseph (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Killed.

Aruna, Joseph (Male) age 47 - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted and tortured.

Aruna, Karu (Male) - 1992 in Jawie, Kailahun - Tortured.

Aruna, Lahai (Male) age 50 - 1991 - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Aruna, Mambu (Male) - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Assaulted.

Aruna, Maria (Female) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced and property destroyed.

Aruna, Massa (Female) - 1992 in Jawie, Kailahun - Assaulted.

Aruna, Michael (Male) age 42 - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Aruna, Mohamed (Male) age 18 - 1996 - Abducted.

Aruna, Morie (Male) - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour.

Aruna, Murray (Male) - 1993 in Bagbo, Bo District - Tortured.

Aruna, Noah (Male) age 72 - 1992 in Gaura, Kenema - Displaced and property looted. Abducted. Killed.

Aruna, Sabatu (Female) - 1999 in Banta Mokele, Moyamba - Killed.

Aruna, Tamba (Male) age 45 - 1993 in Luawa, Kailahun - Killed.

Aruna, Vandy (Male) age 37 - 1991 in Badjia, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Aruna-Amara, Sheku (Male) age 28 - 1995 in Dodo, Kenema - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Asimi, Bobor (Male) age 39 - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Tortured and limb amputated.
 Asimi, Frank (Male) age 33 - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced. Assaulted and limb amputated.
 Ayivi, Bockarie (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.
 Ayuba, Kpamea (Male) - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed.
 Baadie, Mamadu (Male) - 1997 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Baba, Fadilu (Male) - 1995 in Yawbeko, Bonthe - Assaulted.
 Babo, Gassimu (Male) - 1996 in Badjia, Bo District - Killed.
 Badara, Alieu (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced. Assaulted and tortured.
 Bagolay, Thomas (Male) age 27 - 1991 in Small Bo, Kenema - Forced to labour. Tortured.
 Bah, A.M. (Male) - 1996 in Sanda Tendaren, Bombali - Killed.
 Bah, Abu Bakarr (Male) - 1998 - Abducted.
 Bah, Abu Bakarr (Male) age 47 - 1991 - Displaced.
 Bah, Alhaji Amadu (Male) - 1999 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Detained.
 Bah, Alimatu (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.
 Bah, Alpha (Male) age 20 - Displaced. Tortured.
 Bah, Alusine (Male) - 1997 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Killed.
 Bah, Amadu (Male) age 45 - 1999 in Western Area - Extorted and property looted. Abducted.
 Bah, Bailor (Male) - 1991 in Nongowa, Kenema - Killed.
 Bah, Bailor (Male) age 27 - 1997 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Displaced.
 Bah, Brima (Male) age 36 - 1999 in Biriwa, Bombali - Property looted. Abducted. Assaulted.
 Bah, Chernor (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.
 Bah, Fatmata (Female) age 50 - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Bah, Fatu (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.
 Bah, Hawa (Female) - 1991 - Killed.
 Bah, Ibrahim (Male) - 1998 in Kakua, Bo District - Displaced and property looted. Detained.
 Bah, Idrissa (Male) age 11 - 1996 in Magbema, Kambia - Assaulted and stripped.
 Bah, Isatu (Female) - 1998 in Nimikoro, Kono - Killed.
 Bah, Isatu (Female) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.
 Bah, Jenebu (Female) - 1994 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Killed.
 Bah, Juldeh (Male) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Property looted.
 Bah, Kadiatu (Female) age 34 - 1994 in Nimiyama, Kono - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour.
 Bah, Khobbie (Male) age 37 - 1998 in Tonko Limba, Kambia - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Abducted. Assaulted.
 Bah, Lamrana (Female) age 56 - Displaced.
 Bah, Mamadu (Male) age 85 - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Bah, Mariama (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted.
 Bah, Mohamed (Male) age 8 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.
 Bah, Mohamed (Male) age 25 - 1998 - Assaulted.
 Bah, Mohamed (Male) age 26 - 1998 in Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Bah, Mohamed (Male) age 39 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Bah, Mohamed (Male) age 50 - 1992 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Bah, Mohamed (Male) age 51 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured and limb amputated.
 Bah, Mohamed (Male) age 57 - 1995 in Valunia, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured and limb amputated.
 Bah, Neneh (Female) age 50 - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted.
 Bah, Saiku (Male) age 70 - 1998 in Nimikoro, Kono - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Bah, Salamatu (Female) age 29 - Displaced. Tortured.
 Bah, Sheku (Male) age 35 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Limb amputated.
 Bah, Sulaiman (Male) - 1997 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Assaulted. Killed.
 Bah, Tajah (Male) - 1998 - Abducted.
 Bahwa, Abdulai (Male) - 1995 in Sogbini, Bonthe - Forced to labour.

Bai, Komba (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.

Bai, Thullah (Male) - 1999 in Kholifa Mabang, Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Baida, Kadie (Female) - 1996 in Bo District - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted.

Baigebaya, Nyoma (Female) - 1996 in Badjia, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Bailey, Alpha (Male) - 1991 in Nongowa, Kenema - Killed.

Bailey, Alpha (Male) age 41 - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Displaced.

Bailey, Musa (Male) - Property destroyed.

Bailey, Peter (Male) age 42 - 1994 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Bailey, Satta (Female) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Killed.

Bailey, Umu (Female) age 24 - 1997 in Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Baima, Brima (Male) age 42 - 1994 in Bumpah, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Baima, Thomas (Male) - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Assaulted and limb amputated.

Baimano, Abigail (Female) age 44 - 1999 in Western Area - Extorted. Abducted and detained.

Baimba, Fatmata (Female) age 40 - Killed.

Baimba, Jina (Male) - 1993 in Malen, Pujehun - Killed.

Baimba, Jinah - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Killed.

Baimba, Keikula (Male) age 21 - 1994 in Bumpah, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted.

Baimba, Mualemu (Male) - 1994 in Bumpah, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted.

Baimba, Sallay (Female) - 1994 in Bumpah, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted.

Baimba, Tommy (Male) - 1996 in Kwamebai Krim, Bonthe - Killed.

Bainda, Alhaji (Male) - 1996 in Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Tortured. Killed.

Bainda, Kenni (Male) - Killed.

Baindu Sannoh, Marie (Female) - Killed.

Baingo, Alpha (Male) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted and stripped.

Bainya, Mohamed (Male) age 28 - 1995 - Displaced and extorted. Assaulted.

Bainya, Sheku (Male) - 1995 - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Baisy, Peter (Male) - 1995 in Bonthe - Displaced. Killed.

Baiwa, Yatta (Female) - 1992 in Peje Bongre, Kailahun - Forced to labour. Killed.

Bajor, Foday (Male) - 1994 in Bagbo, Bo District - Extorted and property looted. Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.

Baka, Pieh (Male) - 1995 - Detained. Killed.

Bakar, Fumie (Female) age 31 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Baker, Moses (Male) - 1995 in Dasse, Moyamba - Property looted. Killed.

Baker, Orlon (Male) age 47 - 1997 in Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Bakoh, Aiah (Male) - 1993 - Assaulted. Killed.

Bakor, Joseph Henry (Male) age 47 - 1992 - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Bala, Komba (Male) age 68 - 2000 in Malegohun, Kenema - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Balenga, Braima (Male) age 70 - 1991 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Balenga, Lahai (Male) age 19 - 1991 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced.

Ballay, Mosseray (Male) - 1995 in Banta Mokele, Moyamba - Assaulted. Killed.

Ballay, Vafoi (Male) age 42 - 1994 in Small Bo, Kenema - Displaced.

Balleh, Hawa (Female) age 30 - 1998 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Displaced and extorted.

Balogun, Abdulai (Male) - 1991 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Killed.

Balogun, Alhaji Amsusu (Male) age 77 - 1991 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed.

Balugun, Mohamed (Male) - 1991 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Killed.

Bama, Brima (Male) - 1996 in Peje West, Kailahun - Killed.

Bamba, Adams (Female) age 15 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Bamba, Fayah (Male) age 31 - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained.

Bamba, Gladys (Female) age 24 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Bamba, Jina - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Killed.

Bambay, Joe (Male) - Killed.

Bamboh, Sahr (Male) age 38 - 1995 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced. Abducted. Assaulted.

Bammeh, Kemoh (Male) - 1996 - Tortured.

Bana, Amie (Female) - Killed.

Banada, Komba (Male) age 32 - 1997 in Gbane, Kono - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Bandoh, William (Male) - 1995 in Kagboro, Moyamba - Property looted and destroyed. Killed.

Bangalie, Alie (Male) - 1997 in Timdel, Moyamba - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Bangalie, Allieu (Male) - 1997 in Sittia, Bonthe - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Bangalie, Allieu (Male) - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Bangalie, Allieu (Male) age 23 - 1994 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Assaulted.

Bangalie, Andrew (Male) - 1997 in Tikonko, Bo District - Tortured.

Bangalie, Christiana (Female) - 1994 in Komboya, Bo District - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Bangalie, Hawa (Female) age 30 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Bangalie, Kumba (Female) age 45 - 1998 in Nimiyama, Kono - Displaced.

Bangalie, Maliek (Male) - 1995 in Tikonko, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Bangalie, Morie (Male) - 1994 in Simbaru, Kenema - Displaced and property looted.

Bangalie, Musu (Female) age 36 - 1995 in Tikonko, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Bangalie, Sahr (Male) age 12 - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.

Bangalie, Tamba (Male) age 10 - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.

Bangao, Kai (Male) age 48 - 1995 - Property destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted and tortured. Killed.

Bangebah, Sia (Female) age 30 - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced.

Bangloh, Amidu (Male) - 1994 in Lugbu, Bo District - Property destroyed. Assaulted.

Bango, Ansumana (Male) - 1996 in Sogbini, Bonthe - Displaced. Killed.

Bango, Ansumana (Male) - 1993 in Lugbu, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Bango, Isatu (Female) - 1996 in Sogbini, Bonthe - Displaced. Killed.

Bangura, Abass (Male) - Extorted.

Bangura, Abdul (Male) - 1995 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Assaulted.

Bangura, Abdul (Male) - 1995 in Maforki, Port Loko - Property destroyed. Detained.

Bangura, Abdul (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Bangura, Abdul (Male) age 20 - 1997 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Bangura, Abdul (Male) age 21 - 1995 - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Assaulted.

Bangura, Abdulai (Male) - 1994 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted and stripped.

Bangura, Abdulai (Male) - 1998 in Loko Massama, Port Loko - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Bangura, Abdulai (Male) - 1997 in Kagboro, Moyamba - Displaced.

Bangura, Abdulai (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.

Bangura, Abdulai (Male) age 12 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Bangura, Abdulai (Male) age 31 - 1997 in Bagruwa, Moyamba - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Bangura, Abdulai (Male) age 34 - 1998 in Koya, Port Loko - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted.

Bangura, Abdulai (Male) age 38 - 1995 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Bangura, Abibatu (Female) age 23 - Displaced, extorted and property looted.

Bangura, Abibu (Male) age 17 - 1999 in Western Area - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Bangura, Abie (Female) - 1996 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Killed.

Bangura, Abiebatu (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.

Bangura, Abu (Male) - 1999 in Koya, Port Loko - Forced to labour.

Bangura, Abu (Male) - 1994 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Abducted. Killed.

Bangura, Abu (Male) - 1997 in Masimera, Port Loko - Property looted. Assaulted.

Bangura, Abu (Male) - 1998 - Killed.

Bangura, Abu (Male) age 25 - 1991 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and stripped.

Bangura, Abu (Male) age 34 - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Property looted. Abducted and detained.

Bangura, Abu (Male) age 50 - Displaced. Abducted.

Bangura, Abu (Male) age 50 - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.

Bangura, Abu (Male) age 63 - 1998 in Samu, Kambia - Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.
 Bangura, Abu (Male) age 65 - 1998 in Kakua, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Bangura, Abu Bakarr (Male) - 1997 in Gbense, Kono - Forced to labour. Killed.
 Bangura, Abu Bakarr (Male) - 1998 in Tambakka, Bombali - Killed.
 Bangura, Abu Bakarr (Male) age 15 - 1998 in Kakua, Bo District - Displaced.
 Bangura, Abu Bakarr (Male) age 25 - Property destroyed.
 Bangura, Adama (Female) - 1998 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Bangura, Adama (Female) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Bangura, Adama (Female) age 25 - Assaulted and tortured. Killed.
 Bangura, Adama (Female) age 37 - 1998 in Buya Romende, Port Loko - Displaced and extorted.
 Bangura, Adama (Female) age 55 - 1999 in Koya, Port Loko - Displaced and property looted.
 Bangura, Adamsay (Female) age 15 - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and limb amputated.
 Bangura, Addiatu (Female) - 1998 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Displaced. Killed.
 Bangura, Adikalie (Male) age 22 - 1998 in Loko Massama, Port Loko - Property destroyed. Forced to labour. Tortured and limb amputated. Killed.
 Bangura, Agnes (Female) - 1994 in Sielenga, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted. Assaulted and tortured.
 Bangura, Albert (Male) - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Tortured.
 Bangura, Albert (Male) age 43 - 1995 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour.
 Bangura, Alex (Male) - Killed.
 Bangura, Alfred (Male) - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Killed.
 Bangura, Alhaji (Male) age 14 - 1998 in Marampa, Port Loko - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Bangura, Alhaji Idrissa (Male) age 56 - 1997 in Gorama Kono, Kono - Displaced, extorted and property looted.
 Bangura, Alhassan (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained.
 Bangura, Ali (Male) age 70 - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Bangura, Alice (Female) - 1995 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Property looted and destroyed. Detained. Killed.
 Bangura, Alice (Female) age 17 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.
 Bangura, Alie (Male) - 2000 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Bangura, Alie (Male) - Limb amputated.
 Bangura, Alie (Male) age 50 - 1995 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Property destroyed. Killed.
 Bangura, Alie (Male) age 63 - 1996 in Dia, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Bangura, Alimamy (Male) - 1998 in Nimiyama, Kono - Property destroyed. Abducted. Killed.
 Bangura, Alimamy (Male) - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Property destroyed.
 Bangura, Alimamy (Male) - Extorted.
 Bangura, Alimamy (Male) age 42 - 1998 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced and property looted.
 Bangura, Alimamy Abass (Male) age 35 - 1999 in Magbema, Kambia - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour.
 Bangura, Allie (Male) - 1996 in Badjia, Bo District - Killed.
 Bangura, Allusine (Male) age 30 - 2000 - Killed.
 Bangura, Almie (Female) - 1998 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Property destroyed.
 Bangura, Alpha (Male) - 1998 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Property destroyed.
 Bangura, Alpha (Male) - 1999 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Bangura, Alpha (Male) age 48 - 1995 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Bangura, Alpha Yama (Male) age 49 - 2000 - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Bangura, Alusine (Male) - 1998 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Assaulted.
 Bangura, Alusine (Male) age 35 - 1999 - Property destroyed. Forced to labour. Tortured.
 Bangura, Amadu (Male) - 1998 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Tortured. Killed.
 Bangura, Amadu (Male) - 1998 in Koya, Port Loko - Displaced. Abducted. Assaulted.
 Bangura, Amadu (Male) - Killed.
 Bangura, Amadu (Male) - 1998 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Bangura, Amadu (Male) - 1999 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced and property looted. Abducted.
 Bangura, Amara (Male) - Limb amputated.

Bangura, Amara (Male) - 1995 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Displaced. Killed.

Bangura, Amie (Female) - 1994 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Bangura, Aminata (Female) - Abducted and detained.

Bangura, Aminata (Female) age 17 - 1999 - Displaced.

Bangura, Aminata (Female) age 32 - 1998 in Briama, Kambia - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Bangura, Aminata (Female) age 65 - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Bangura, Ann (Female) - 1995 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Bangura, Aruna (Male) - 1999 - Extorted and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Bangura, Asona - 1999 - Assaulted.

Bangura, Assana (Male) - 1994 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Killed.

Bangura, Augustine (Male) - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Bangura, Augustus (Male) - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Bangura, Baby (Female) - 1996 in Tane, Tonkolili - Extorted and property looted.

Bangura, Baby (Female) age 26 - 1991 in Dia, Kailahun - Displaced.

Bangura, Balla (Male) - Displaced.

Bangura, Ballay (Female) age 59 - 1999 in Western Area - Detained. Tortured.

Bangura, Bayo Simah (Male) - 1995 in Sanda Magblonthor, Port Loko - Killed.

Bangura, Benito (Male) age 34 - 1998 in Western Area - Property destroyed.

Bangura, Bintilai (Female) - Displaced.

Bangura, Bockarie (Male) - 1998 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Bangura, Bockarie (Male) age 46 - 1994 in Lugbu, Bo District - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Bangura, Brima (Male) - 1996 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Bangura, Brima (Male) - 1994 - Abducted. Tortured. Killed.

Bangura, Brima (Male) - 1995 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Property looted and destroyed. Detained. Killed.

Bangura, Brima (Male) age 12 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Bangura, Charm (Male) - 1999 in Magbema, Kambia - Assaulted.

Bangura, Chernor (Male) - 1997 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Detained. Assaulted.

Bangura, Daniel (Male) age 45 - 1999 in Kalansogia, Tonkolili - Property looted. Assaulted.

Bangura, David (Male) - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Bangura, Digba (Female) - 1995 - Displaced.

Bangura, Dura (Male) - 1999 - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted. Killed.

Bangura, Edward (Male) age 50 - 1999 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Bangura, Edward Sorie (Male) age 50 - 1999 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Bangura, Ema (Female) age 19 - 1998 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Bangura, Fainkray (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.

Bangura, Fatmata (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Extorted and property destroyed. Assaulted.

Bangura, Fatmata (Female) - 1999 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced and property looted. Abducted.

Bangura, Fatmata (Female) - 1995 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Property looted and destroyed. Detained. Killed.

Bangura, Fatmata (Female) - 1999 in Magbema, Kambia - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Bangura, Fatmata (Female) age 7 - 1998 in Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Bangura, Fatmata (Female) age 12 - 1998 - Displaced.

Bangura, Fatmata (Female) age 47 - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.

Bangura, Fatu (Female) - Displaced.

Bangura, Fatu (Female) - Property looted.

Bangura, Fatu (Female) age 27 - 1998 in Kalansogia, Tonkolili - Property looted.

Bangura, Fatu (Female) age 33 - Assaulted.

Bangura, Fatu (Female) age 34 - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed.

Bangura, Fatu (Female) age 35 - 1995 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Property destroyed. Killed.

Bangura, Finda (Female) age 49 - 1994 in Kalansogia, Tonkolili - Killed.
 Bangura, Foday (Male) - 1996 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Killed.
 Bangura, Foday (Male) - 1995 in Sanda Magblonthor, Port Loko - Killed.
 Bangura, Foday (Male) - 1998 in Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili - Limb amputated.
 Bangura, Foday (Male) - 1999 in Konike Sande, Tonkolili - Killed.
 Bangura, Foday (Male) - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Property destroyed.
 Bangura, Foday (Male) - Forced to labour.
 Bangura, Foday (Male) - 1999 in Tambakka, Bombali - Extorted. Forced to labour.
 Bangura, Foday (Male) - 1992 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Bangura, Foday (Male) - 1995 - Displaced. Killed.
 Bangura, Foday (Male) - 1999 in Tonko Limba, Kambia - Displaced.
 Bangura, Foday (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.
 Bangura, Foday (Male) age 40 - 1998 in Tambakka, Bombali - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Detained. Stripped and limb amputated.
 Bangura, Francis Oniaro (Male) age 36 - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Tortured.
 Bangura, Fuard (Male) - 1997 in Loko Massama, Port Loko - Assaulted. Killed.
 Bangura, Fudia (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Bangura, Fullah (Male) age 30 - 1998 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Bangura, Gbarroh (Male) - 1999 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Abducted. Assaulted.
 Bangura, Gbassay (Male) - 1998 in Samu, Kambia - Abducted. Killed.
 Bangura, Gbessay (Female) - 1999 in Loko Massama, Port Loko - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Bangura, Gbla (Male) age 52 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and extorted.
 Bangura, Gibba (Male) - 1998 in Gorama Mende, Kenema - Killed.
 Bangura, Gibril (Male) age 31 - 1998 - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Bangura, Haroun (Male) age 65 - 1994 - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Bangura, Hassan (Male) - 1994 in Kholifa Mabang, Tonkolili - Property looted and destroyed. Detained. Tortured. Killed.
 Bangura, Hassan (Male) - Limb amputated.
 Bangura, Hassan (Male) - Tortured. Killed.
 Bangura, Hassan (Male) age 59 - 1999 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and stripped.
 Bangura, Hassan (Male) age 76 - 1999 - Extorted and property looted.
 Bangura, Hassana (Male) age 49 - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Property destroyed. Killed.
 Bangura, Hawa (Female) - 1997 in Kaffu Bullom, Port Loko - Abducted. Limb amputated.
 Bangura, Hawa (Female) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Bangura, Hawa (Female) - 1998 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Bangura, Hawa (Female) - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Bangura, Hawanatu (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed.
 Bangura, Ibrahim (Male) - Property destroyed. Forced to labour. Killed.
 Bangura, Ibrahim (Male) - 1998 in Kakua, Bo District - Property destroyed. Assaulted.
 Bangura, Ibrahim (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Bangura, Ibrahim (Male) age 25 - Killed.
 Bangura, Ibrahim (Male) age 30 - Detained.
 Bangura, Ibrahim (Male) age 53 - 1998 - Property looted. Forced to labour.
 Bangura, Idrissa (Male) - 1999 in Tambakka, Bombali - Abducted and detained.
 Bangura, Idrissa (Male) - 1995 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Displaced.
 Bangura, Idrissa (Male) - Displaced and extorted. Assaulted and tortured.
 Bangura, Idrissa (Male) age 18 - Displaced.
 Bangura, Idrissa (Male) age 47 - 1995 in Kaffu Bullom, Port Loko - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Bangura, Isata (Female) age 10 - 1999 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Killed.
 Bangura, Isatu (Female) - 1996 in Koya, Port Loko - Displaced. Abducted. Killed.
 Bangura, Isatu (Female) - 2000 in Tonko Limba, Kambia - Displaced.
 Bangura, Isatu (Female) - 1995 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Property looted and destroyed. Detained. Killed.
 Bangura, Isatu (Female) - 1999 in Magbema, Kambia - Abducted.

Bangura, Isatu (Female) age 16 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Bangura, Isatu (Female) age 31 - 1997 in Kaffu Bullom, Port Loko - Displaced and property looted.

Bangura, Isatu (Female) age 53 - 1998 in Loko Massama, Port Loko - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Bangura, Isha (Female) age 33 - Displaced and property destroyed. Detained.

Bangura, Ishmeal (Male) age 36 - 1999 in Western Area - Assaulted.

Bangura, Issa (Male) age 11 - 1998 - Displaced. Abducted.

Bangura, Issa (Male) age 12 - 1997 - Forced to labour.

Bangura, Issa (Male) age 50 - 1998 in Diang, Koinadugu - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and limb amputated.

Bangura, Jacomo Sorie (Male) age 47 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and extorted.

Bangura, James (Male) - 1997 in Kaffu Bullom, Port Loko - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Bangura, James (Male) - 1994 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Property destroyed.

Bangura, James (Male) - 1991 in Badjia, Bo District - Killed.

Bangura, James (Male) age 60 - 1991 in Gbense, Kono - Killed.

Bangura, James K (Male) age 33 - 1999 in Bombali - Extorted.

Bangura, Jimmy (Male) age 36 - 1996 in Kafe Simira, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Bangura, Joe (Male) - 1999 - Killed.

Bangura, Johanis (Male) age 58 - 1995 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Bangura, Johathan (Male) age 26 - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced.

Bangura, John (Male) age 22 - 1999 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Bangura, Joseph (Male) - 1998 in Bombali - Extorted. Assaulted.

Bangura, Joseph (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Property looted. Killed.

Bangura, Julius (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained.

Bangura, Jusu (Male) - 1994 - Killed.

Bangura, Kadiatu (Female) - 1991 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Killed.

Bangura, Kadiatu (Female) - 1999 in Koya, Port Loko - Abducted and detained.

Bangura, Kadiatu (Female) - 1999 - Abducted.

Bangura, Kadiatu (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.

Bangura, Kadiatu (Female) age 28 - 1998 in Mambolo, Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed.

Bangura, Kadiatu (Female) age 31 - 1998 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced. Assaulted.

Bangura, Kadiatu (Female) age 31 - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted, tortured and limb amputated.

Bangura, Kadiatu (Female) age 43 - 1996 in Koya, Port Loko - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Bangura, Kalie (Male) - 1998 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Bangura, Kamanda (Male) - 1998 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Assaulted. Killed.

Bangura, Kanlu (Male) - Killed.

Bangura, Komrabai - 1999 in Mambolo, Kambia - Killed.

Bangura, Koya (Female) age 15 - 1999 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Abducted. Assaulted.

Bangura, Lahai (Male) - 1995 in Sanda Magblonthor, Port Loko - Killed.

Bangura, Lamin (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Extorted and property destroyed. Tortured and stripped.

Bangura, Lamin (Male) age 32 - Displaced and extorted.

Bangura, Lamin (Male) age 60 - 2000 - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Bangura, Lamin (Male) age 71 - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Property looted. Abducted.

Bangura, Lamin T (Male) age 40 - 1998 in Koya, Port Loko - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Bangura, Lamina (Male) - 1992 in Bumpheh, Bo District - Property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and limb amputated.

Bangura, Lamina (Male) age 61 - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed.

Bangura, Lammoh (Male) - Displaced and property destroyed.

Bangura, Lansana (Male) - 1995 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Killed.

Bangura, Lansana (Male) - 1999 - Property looted. Killed.

Bangura, Mabinty (Female) age 42 - 1999 in Western Area - Property looted. Detained.

Bangura, Mabinty (Female) age 61 - 1999 - Displaced.

Bangura, Madieu (Male) age 12 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Bangura, Mana (Male) - 1998 in Koya, Port Loko - Property destroyed.

Bangura, Mankey (Male) - 1995 in Loko Massama, Port Loko - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted and tortured.

Bangura, Mannah (Male) - 1998 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Bangura, Margaret (Female) age 8 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained.

Bangura, Mariama (Female) age 23 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Bangura, Mariatu (Female) age 14 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Bangura, Marie (Female) - Displaced and extorted.

Bangura, Marie (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and extorted. Assaulted.

Bangura, Marie (Female) - 1998 in Kambia - Abducted and detained.

Bangura, Marie (Female) age 7 - 1998 - Killed.

Bangura, Marie (Female) age 16 - Displaced.

Bangura, Marie (Female) age 35 - 1994 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Bangura, Marie (Female) age 36 - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Bangura, Marie (Female) age 46 - Killed.

Bangura, Mary (Female) - 1999 in Sanda Tendaren, Bombali - Displaced.

Bangura, Mayah (Male) age 90 - 1995 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Bangura, Mbalu (Female) - 1999 - Assaulted.

Bangura, Menah (Female) - 1999 in Maforiki, Port Loko - Killed.

Bangura, Micheal (Male) age 20 - 1997 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Tortured.

Bangura, Mikailu (Male) age 54 - 1998 in Samu, Kambia - Property looted and destroyed.

Bangura, Minkaila (Male) age 42 - 1998 - Displaced.

Bangura, Mohamed (Male) - 1999 in Koya, Port Loko - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Bangura, Mohamed (Male) - 1999 in Koya, Port Loko - Killed.

Bangura, Mohamed (Male) - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Forced to labour.

Bangura, Mohamed (Male) - 1998 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Bangura, Mohamed (Male) - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and limb amputated.

Bangura, Mohamed (Male) - 1994 - Abducted and detained.

Bangura, Mohamed (Male) - Displaced and property destroyed.

Bangura, Mohamed (Male) - 1999 in Bumpah, Bo District - Displaced and property looted. Abducted.

Bangura, Mohamed (Male) - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced. Killed.

Bangura, Mohamed (Male) age 19 - 1995 in Kholifa Mabang, Tonkolili - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Bangura, Mohamed (Male) age 27 - 2000 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Assaulted and tortured.

Bangura, Mohamed (Male) age 34 - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Tortured.

Bangura, Mohamed (Male) age 44 - 1997 in Langorama, Kenema - Killed.

Bangura, Mohamed (Male) age 47 - 1998 in Magbema, Kambia - Displaced. Assaulted and tortured. Killed.

Bangura, Mohamed (Male) age 79 - 1999 in Koya, Port Loko - Property looted and destroyed.

Bangura, Molai (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Assaulted. Killed.

Bangura, Momodu (Male) - 1998 in Magbaimba Ngowahun, Bombali - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Bangura, Momodu (Male) - 2000 in Samu, Kambia - Killed.

Bangura, Momoh (Male) - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Bangura, Momoh (Male) - 1998 - Detained.

Bangura, Momoh (Male) - Killed.

Bangura, Momoh (Male) age 30 - 1999 in Tonko Limba, Kambia - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Bangura, Monday (Male) age 44 - 1999 in Saproko Limba, Bombali - Displaced.

Bangura, Moriba (Male) - 1995 in Sanda Magblonthor, Port Loko - Killed.

Bangura, Morlai (Male) - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Bangura, Morlai (Male) age 32 - 1998 in Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Bangura, Morlai (Male) age 60 - Killed.
 Bangura, Musa (Male) - 1995 - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour.
 Bangura, Musa (Male) - 1998 in Tambakka, Bombali - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Bangura, Musa (Male) age 39 - 1997 in Kono - Displaced and extorted. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.
 Bangura, Musa (Male) age 67 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Bangura, Musa T (Male) age 43 - 1999 in Western Area - Property looted and destroyed.
 Bangura, Mustapha (Male) - 1995 in Tonko Limba, Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Bangura, Mustapha (Male) age 48 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Bangura, Musu (Female) - 1994 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Killed.
 Bangura, Musu (Female) - 1995 - Property looted and destroyed.
 Bangura, N' (Female) - 1995 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Killed.
 Bangura, Ngadie (Female) - Displaced.
 Bangura, Nma (Female) - 1998 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Property destroyed.
 Bangura, Nmah (Male) - 1998 in Koya, Port Loko - Property destroyed.
 Bangura, Nmah Brima (Male) age 57 - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Bangura, Omari (Male) age 51 - 2000 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Bangura, Ousman (Male) - 2000 - Extorted and property looted.
 Bangura, Ousman (Male) - Abducted and detained.
 Bangura, Ousman (Male) age 26 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.
 Bangura, Ousman (Male) age 42 - Extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and stripped.
 Bangura, Patrick (Male) age 10 - 1995 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Abducted and detained.
 Bangura, Patrick (Male) age 18 - 1995 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.
 Bangura, Posseh (Female) - 1992 - Property looted and destroyed. Tortured.
 Bangura, Raymond (Male) age 15 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.
 Bangura, Roke (Male) age 35 - 1994 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Forced to labour. Tortured.
 Bangura, Rosaline (Female) - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted. Tortured.
 Bangura, Rugiatu (Female) - Killed.
 Bangura, Rugiatu (Female) - 1999 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced and property looted. Abducted.
 Bangura, S. Yunisa (Male) age 54 - 1993 in Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Bangura, Sahha (Male) - Killed.
 Bangura, Saidu (Male) - 1994 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Killed.
 Bangura, Saidu (Male) - 1999 in Sanda Tendaren, Bombali - Killed.
 Bangura, Saidu (Male) - 1995 - Displaced.
 Bangura, Saidu (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Killed.
 Bangura, Saidu (Male) - 1995 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Tortured.
 Bangura, Saidu (Male) age 9 - 1998 in Gorama Mende, Kenema - Displaced. Tortured.
 Bangura, Saimatu (Female) - 1993 in Kono - Killed.
 Bangura, Salamatu (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.
 Bangura, Salaymatu (Female) - 1992 - Killed.
 Bangura, Sallay (Female) - Displaced.
 Bangura, Sallay (Female) age 1 - 1997 in Samu, Kambia - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Bangura, Sallu (Male) age 16 - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Killed.
 Bangura, Sallu (Male) age 52 - 1999 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Property looted and destroyed.
 Bangura, Sallu (Male) age 55 - 1999 in Sanda Tendaren, Bombali - Extorted and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Bangura, Sally (Female) - 2000 in Western Area - Abducted.
 Bangura, Samie (Male) - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured. Killed.
 Bangura, Samuel (Male) - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and limb amputated.
 Bangura, Samuel (Male) age 46 - 1998 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Abducted and detained.
 Bangura, Samura (Male) - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Bangura, Santigie (Male) - 1998 in Koya, Port Loko - Property destroyed.

Bangura, Santigie (Male) - 1999 in Bombali - Abducted. Killed.

Bangura, Santigie (Male) - 1998 in Magbaimba Ngawahun, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Bangura, Santigie (Male) - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Bangura, Santigie (Male) - Detained.

Bangura, Santigie (Male) - Property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Bangura, Santigie (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Assaulted.

Bangura, Santigie (Male) age 35 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted. Detained. Limb amputated.

Bangura, Sarah (Female) - 1999 in Kalansogia, Tonkolili - Displaced. Tortured. Killed.

Bangura, Satefu (Male) age 31 - Forced to labour. Tortured and stripped.

Bangura, Sathem (Male) - Displaced.

Bangura, Sento (Female) - 1995 in Peje Bongre, Kailahun - Displaced and property destroyed.

Bangura, Sethaha (Male) - 1999 in Tonkolili - Assaulted.

Bangura, Sheku (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.

Bangura, Sheku (Male) age 27 - 2000 - Displaced and property looted.

Bangura, Sinneh (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.

Bangura, Sinneh (Male) age 25 - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted and stripped.

Bangura, Sombo (Female) - 1995 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted.

Bangura, Soriba (Male) age 72 - 1999 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed.

Bangura, Sorie (Male) - 2000 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Bangura, Sorie (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.

Bangura, Sorie (Male) - 1998 in Tambakka, Bombali - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Bangura, Sorie (Male) age 32 - 1995 in Leibasgayahun, Bombali - Displaced.

Bangura, Sorie (Male) age 37 - 1999 in Neini, Koinadugu - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Bangura, Sorie (Male) age 37 - 2000 in Samu, Kambia - Assaulted and tortured.

Bangura, Sorie (Male) age 39 - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed.

Bangura, Sorieba (Male) - 1998 in Gorama Mende, Kenema - Displaced. Killed.

Bangura, Stanley (Male) age 30 - 1995 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Bangura, Sullay (Male) - 1998 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Bangura, Taimu (Male) - 1997 in Kenema - Killed.

Bangura, Tamba (Male) age 41 - 1999 in Kalansogia, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Bangura, Tamba (Male) age 60 - 1999 in Kalansogia, Tonkolili - Displaced. Killed.

Bangura, Thabeh Alice (Female) age 29 - 1998 - Displaced.

Bangura, Tommy (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Bangura, Umu (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Bangura, Umu (Female) age 40 - 1999 in Sanda Tendaren, Bombali - Property looted. Assaulted.

Bangura, Unisa (Male) age 10 - 1999 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Abducted. Tortured.

Bangura, Wara (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Tortured. Killed.

Bangura, Woromah (Male) age 31 - 1998 - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Bangura, Wusa (Male) - Property looted. Assaulted.

Bangura, Yagha (Male) age 64 - Displaced.

Bangura, Yallah (Male) - Property destroyed.

Bangura, Yamarie (Female) - 1998 in Loko Massama, Port Loko - Displaced.

Bangura, Yatta (Female) - 1999 in Sanda Magblonthor, Port Loko - Killed.

Bangura, Yeabu (Female) - 1999 in Maforki, Port Loko - Killed.

Bangura, Yeabu (Female) - 1995 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Displaced.

Bangura, Yeabu (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Killed.

Bangura, Yeabu (Female) age 38 - 1994 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Bangura, Yei (Female) - 1996 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Killed.

Bangura, Yusufu (Male) - 1997 in Buya Romende, Port Loko - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Bangura, Yusufu (Male) age 49 - 1999 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted.

Bangura, Zachariah (Male) - Displaced.
 Banie, Isatu (Female) age 59 - 1997 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced. Detained.
 Bankolay, Desmond (Male) age 43 - 1996 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced.
 Bankoley, Gbagbei (Male) age 55 - 1996 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.
 Bannah, Brima (Male) - 1991 in Simbaru, Kenema - Killed.
 Bannet, Idrissa (Male) - 1999 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced, extorted and property looted.
 Bannoh, Jebeh (Female) age 60 - 1991 in Panga Krim, Pujehun - Displaced and extorted.
 Bannoh, Vandi (Male) age 17 - 1991 in Panga Krim, Pujehun - Displaced. Forced to labour. Killed.
 Banpewa, Jusu (Male) age 45 - 1992 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Banta, Bueh (Male) - 1997 in Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Banta, Isatu (Female) age 36 - 1996 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Displaced. Detained.
 Bantama, Minkailu (Male) age 36 - 1999 in Kassunko, Koinadugu - Assaulted and tortured.
 Banua, Karray (Male) - 1999 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Banya, Agnes (Female) - 1995 - Displaced.
 Banya, Brima (Male) age 68 - 1991 in Peje West, Kailahun - Property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.
 Banya, Jitta (Female) - 1997 - Killed.
 Banya, John (Male) age 29 - 1992 in Penguia, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured. Killed.
 Banya, Lahai (Male) - 1995 - Displaced.
 Banya, Mamawa (Female) - Displaced.
 Bao, Bockarie (Male) age 17 - 1998 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced. Killed.
 Bao, Borbor (Male) age 32 - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Bao, Fatmata (Female) age 6 - Forced to labour.
 Bao, Karmoh (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Extorted. Killed.
 Bao, Maitta (Female) - 1991 in Pujehun - Assaulted.
 Bao, Musa (Male) age 63 - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed. Detained. Tortured.
 Baraytay, Baba (Male) age 32 - 1998 in Tankoro, Kono - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.
 Barker, Abu (Male) - 1999 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted. Limb amputated.
 Barna, Mohamed (Male) - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Forced to labour.
 Barnett, Albert (Male) age 14 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted.
 Barrel, John (Male) - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Barrie, Abdul (Male) age 45 - Property looted. Assaulted.
 Barrie, Abdul (Male) age 58 - 1996 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Barrie, Abdulai (Male) age 60 - 1999 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Killed.
 Barrie, Abu (Male) - Killed.
 Barrie, Alhassan (Male) - Killed.
 Barrie, Alpha (Male) - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.
 Barrie, Alpha (Male) age 42 - 1999 - Extorted.
 Barrie, Alphajor (Male) - 1998 in Kassunko, Koinadugu - Killed.
 Barrie, Amadu (Male) - 1997 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Barrie, Amadu (Male) age 57 - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Property destroyed. Killed.
 Barrie, Amara Siray (Male) age 7 - 1998 - Abducted. Tortured.
 Barrie, Aminata (Female) age 40 - 1999 in Western Area - Extorted. Abducted.
 Barrie, Augusta (Female) - Displaced and property looted.
 Barrie, Chernor (Male) - 1994 in Baoma, Bo District - Displaced and property looted.
 Barrie, Fatmata (Female) age 4 - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Killed.
 Barrie, Fatmata (Female) age 9 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.
 Barrie, Hadiatu (Female) age 24 - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted.
 Barrie, Mariama (Female) age 55 - 1998 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced.
 Barrie, Massah (Female) age 12 - 1991 in Upper Bambara, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Barrie, Mohamed (Male) - 1996 in Kono - Displaced. Killed.

Barrie, Mohamed (Male) - 1998 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Displaced. Killed.

Barrie, Mohamed (Male) age 34 - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Property looted. Abducted. Assaulted.

Barrie, Mohamed (Male) age 55 - Displaced and property looted.

Barrie, Mohamed (Male) age 57 - Property looted and destroyed. Tortured.

Barrie, Sheku (Male) - 1998 in Sanda Magblonthor, Port Loko - Property looted.

Barrie, Sulaiman (Male) - 1995 in Benducha, Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Barrie, Sulaiman (Male) age 100 - 1994 in Luawa, Kailahun - Property looted and destroyed. Assaulted. Killed.

Barrie, Tejan (Male) - Killed.

Barrie, Thomas (Male) - 1995 in Kamajei, Moyamba - Abducted and detained.

Barrie, Umaru (Male) age 29 - 1992 - Abducted and detained.

Barrie, Yaheh Tharu (Male) age 28 - 1997 in Kakua, Bo District - Property looted.

Barrie, Yayah (Male) age 52 - 1992 - Killed.

Barrie, Yayah (Male) age 57 - Displaced.

Barrie, Zainab (Female) age 3 - 1996 in Kono - Displaced. Killed.

Bassie, David (Male) age 59 - 1995 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Forced to labour.

Bassie, David Ngenda (Male) age 24 - 1996 in Kori, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Bassie, Edward (Male) - 1994 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Bassie, James (Male) - 1995 in Tikonko, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Bassie, Joseph (Male) age 68 - 1995 - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Bassie, Kuna (Female) - 1996 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Killed.

Bassie, Monica (Female) age 26 - 1995 in Moyamba - Abducted and detained.

Bassie, Tamba (Male) - 1998 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed. Tortured.

Bawa, Tommy (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Killed.

Bawoh, Finda L. (Female) age 42 - 1992 in Gorama Kono, Kono - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Bawoh, Musa (Male) age 25 - Displaced. Tortured. Killed.

Bawoh, Saffa (Male) - 1991 in Sielenga, Bo District - Killed.

Bawoh, Sato (Male) age 46 - 1993 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted.

Bawoh, Satta (Female) age 37 - 1992 in Koya, Kenema - Displaced.

Bawoh, Sattoe (Female) age 35 - 1991 in Dama, Kenema - Killed.

Bawoh, Seidu (Male) age 53 - 1991 in Sielenga, Bo District - Displaced.

Bayoh, Brima (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.

Bayoh, Daramy (Male) - 1996 - Displaced.

Bayoh, Fatmata (Female) age 17 - 1995 in Kwamebai Krim, Bonthe - Abducted and detained.

Bayoh, Fiamusu (Female) age 49 - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Tortured.

Bayoh, Hawa (Female) age 48 - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed.

Bayoh, Kenneh (Male) - 1995 in Sogbini, Bonthe - Forced to labour.

Bayoh, Kumba (Female) - 1998 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour. Killed.

Bayoh, Matthew (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.

Bayoh, Mohamed (Male) - 1999 in Jawie, Kailahun - Abducted. Assaulted.

Bayoh, Musu (Female) age 51 - 1997 in Kakua, Bo District - Displaced and extorted. Assaulted.

Bayoh, Ousman (Male) - 1995 in Bo District - Assaulted. Killed.

Bayoh, Sam (Male) age 52 - 1994 in Bagbe, Bo District - Killed.

Bayoh, Samuel (Male) - 1997 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced.

Bayoh, Samuel (Male) - 1996 in Peje West, Kailahun - Property destroyed. Killed.

Bayoh, Sia (Female) age 40 - 2000 in Lei, Kono - Abducted. Assaulted and tortured.

Bayoh, Tamba (Male) - 1999 - Killed.

Bayoh, Theresa (Female) age 36 - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced.

Bayoh, Titus (Male) - 1995 in Kowa, Moyamba - Killed.

Bayoh, Yei (Female) age 35 - 1998 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Bayoh, Yusuf (Male) age 20 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Tortured and stripped.

Beach, Sundie (Male) age 43 - 1995 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Beachie, Ishmeal (Male) age 42 - 1998 - Extorted.

Beah, Jonathan (Male) age 41 - 1997 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Extorted.

Beah, Kapuru (Male) age 63 - 1995 in Kholifa Mabang, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted.
 Beah, Raymond (Male) - 1995 - Assaulted.
 Beah, Tommy (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour.
 Beayorma, Sulaiman (Male) age 38 - 1991 in Bagbo, Bo District - Displaced.
 Beckley, Alfred (Male) age 26 - 1999 - Displaced and property looted.
 Beckley, Momoh (Male) - Displaced.
 Bekeh, Joe (Male) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Killed.
 Belewa, Alieu (Male) age 36 - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Abducted and detained.
 Belewa, Amidu (Male) - 1996 in Tikonko, Bo District - Killed.
 Belgiuah, Joe (Male) - 1999 - Killed.
 Belmont, Peter (Male) age 53 - 1997 in Western Area - Displaced. Tortured.
 Bembe, Luseni (Male) - Forced to labour.
 Benbay, Komba (Male) age 42 - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced.
 Bende, Dwight (Male) - 1998 in Kagboro, Moyamba - Killed.
 Bendekoh, Kumba (Female) age 38 - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Abducted. Tortured. Killed.
 Bendu, Abdulai (Male) - 1995 in Kori, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Bendu, Allie (Male) age 45 - 1992 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Bendu, Aruna (Male) - 1997 in Kagboro, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Bendu, Aruna (Male) - 1995 in Kori, Moyamba - Property destroyed.
 Bendu, Hawa (Female) age 16 - 1992 in Nimikoro, Kono - Abducted.
 Bendu, Ibrahim (Male) age 9 - 1992 in Nimikoro, Kono - Abducted.
 Bendu, Jonathan (Male) age 49 - 1999 in Kagboro, Moyamba - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Bendu, Jursa (Male) - 1995 in Benducha, Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Bendu, Momoh (Male) - 1996 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.
 Bendu, Momoh (Male) - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Killed.
 Bendu, Yea (Female) - 1998 in Mandu, Kailahun - Extorted. Assaulted. Killed.
 Benga, Jane (Female) age 47 - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced.
 Benga, Maciray (Female) - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Bengah, Momoh (Male) age 48 - 1997 in Koya, Kenema - Property destroyed. Killed.
 Bengeh, Aruna (Male) age 15 - 1997 in Bagbo, Bo District - Displaced. Killed.
 Benjamin, John (Male) age 38 - 1999 in Western Area - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.
 Bennie, Kumba (Female) - 1992 in Gorama Kono, Kono - Displaced. Killed.
 Benolu, Sulaiman (Male) age 12 - 1992 in Nimikoro, Kono - Abducted.
 Benya, Amara (Male) - 1991 in Kwamebai Krim, Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Benya, Amidu (Male) age 60 - 1994 in Small Bo, Kenema - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and stripped.
 Benya, Karimu (Male) age 65 - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Benya, Lahai (Male) age 34 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted.
 Biaimo, Swaray Yamba (Male) age 17 - 1992 in Malema, Kailahun - Displaced.
 Biareh, Thomas (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Tortured.
 Bokie, Gufulo (Male) age 73 - 1993 in Simbaru, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Bindi, Albert (Male) age 62 - 1995 in Kori, Moyamba - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Bindi, Eddison (Male) - 1996 - Forced to labour. Assaulted and stripped.
 Bindi, Joe (Male) age 36 - 1996 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Abducted and detained.
 Bindi, Kadia (Female) age 3 - 1996 in Badjia, Bo District - Assaulted and tortured.
 Bindi, Martha (Female) age 31 - 1996 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Bindi, Mary (Female) - 1996 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Bindi, Ngaiteh (Male) age 35 - 2000 in Moyamba - Assaulted and tortured.
 Bindi, Saffa (Male) - 1991 - Forced to labour. Killed.
 Bindi, Sahr (Male) age 26 - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.
 Bindi, Sarah (Female) age 2 - 1996 in Kori, Moyamba - Killed.
 Binkongos, Richard (Male) age 38 - Displaced and extorted.

Bio, Alice (Female) - Forced to labour.

Bio, Hawa (Female) age 43 - 1995 - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained.

Bio, Jenaba (Female) - Displaced and property looted.

Bio, Joe (Male) - 1995 in Peje West, Kailahun - Killed.

Bio, Joesipo (Male) - 1995 in Peje West, Kailahun - Killed.

Bio, Joseph Mohamed (Male) age 80 - 1995 - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Bio, Musa (Male) - 1995 in Sogbini, Bonthe - Abducted and detained.

Bio, Musu (Female) - 1995 in Kpanda Kemo, Bonthe - Displaced.

Bio, Steven (Male) - 1995 in Kpanda Kemo, Bonthe - Displaced.

Bio, Steven (Male) - 1995 - Property destroyed.

Bio, Thomas (Male) age 20 - 1995 - Displaced. Killed.

Bla, Ibrahim (Male) age 35 - Killed.

Bla, Isatu (Female) age 35 - 1998 in Marampa, Port Loko - Displaced.

Black Kamara, Alhaji Abu (Male) - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted, tortured and stripped. Killed.

Blackie, Theresa (Female) - Displaced.

Blackie, Yatta (Female) - 1995 in Malegohun, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Blake, Melvin (Male) - Abducted and detained.

Blake, Samuel (Male) age 39 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Blake, Tommy (Male) age 57 - Forced to labour. Killed.

Boa, Bockarie (Male) - 1993 in Dama, Kenema - Displaced.

Boat, Sonia (Male) - 1997 - Extorted.

Bobor, Baindu (Female) age 33 - 1997 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Bobor, Baindu (Female) age 33 - Displaced.

Bobor, Brima (Male) age 26 - 1995 in Lugbu, Bo District - Abducted and detained.

Bobor, Hawa (Female) age 45 - 1996 - Tortured. Killed.

Bobor, Joe (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Property destroyed.

Bobor, John (Male) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Detained.

Bobor, Lahai (Male) age 19 - 1992 - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted.

Bobor, Miatta (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Assaulted.

Bobor, Saidu (Male) age 30 - 1998 - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Bobor, Vandi (Male) - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Killed.

Bockarie, Abu (Male) age 18 - 2000 in Kono - Tortured.

Bockarie, Alfred (Male) - 1994 in Komboya, Bo District - Killed.

Bockarie, Alieu (Male) age 9 - 1994 in Wandor, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Bockarie, Amadu (Male) age 39 - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Bockarie, Amara (Male) - 1991 in Upper Bambara, Kailahun - Abducted and detained.

Bockarie, Amara (Male) age 24 - 1993 in Baoma, Bo District - Displaced.

Bockarie, Amara (Male) age 69 - 1993 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Bockarie, Amie (Female) age 20 - Assaulted.

Bockarie, Aminata (Female) - 1991 - Displaced.

Bockarie, Augustine (Male) age 31 - 1991 - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted.

Bockarie, Baby (Female) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Abducted. Killed.

Bockarie, Barbar (Male) age 34 - 1996 - Detained. Killed.

Bockarie, Bobor (Male) - 1995 in Koya, Kenema - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Bockarie, Bondu (Female) age 21 - 1998 - Displaced. Abducted. Assaulted.

Bockarie, Brima (Male) - 1999 in Peje West, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.

Bockarie, Charles (Male) - 1997 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Limb amputated.

Bockarie, Daisy (Female) age 28 - 1991 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Bockarie, Dexion (Male) - 1998 in Nongowa, Kenema - Killed.

Bockarie, Elizabeth (Female) age 32 - 1991 in Kissi Tongi, Kailahun - Displaced.

Bockarie, Fatmata (Female) age 10 - Killed.

Bockarie, Fatmata (Female) age 36 - 1999 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced.
 Bockarie, Foday (Male) - Displaced.
 Bockarie, Foday (Male) age 45 - 1996 in Peje Bongre, Kailahun - Displaced.
 Bockarie, Fodie (Male) - 1997 in Upper Bambara , Kailahun - Killed.
 Bockarie, Francis (Male) - 1994 - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Bockarie, Gbanie (Male) age 87 - 1997 in Gorama Mende, Kenema - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted.
 Bockarie, Hawa (Female) age 18 - 1991 in Kailahun - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Bockarie, Hawa (Female) age 30 - 1991 in Langorama, Kenema - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Tortured.
 Bockarie, Hawa (Female) age 59 - 1991 - Displaced.
 Bockarie, Jaia (Male) - 1994 in Pujehun - Killed.
 Bockarie, Jaiha (Male) age 31 - 1993 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Bockarie, Jatu (Female) age 8 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Tortured.
 Bockarie, Joe (Male) age 32 - 1994 in Simbaru, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Bockarie, Jusu (Male) age 23 - 1991 - Displaced. Tortured.
 Bockarie, Kain (Male) - 1991 - Assaulted.
 Bockarie, Kanneh (Male) age 69 - 1998 in Malema, Kailahun - Abducted and detained.
 Bockarie, Karmoh (Male) - 1991 - Forced to labour. Killed.
 Bockarie, Karmoh (Male) age 39 - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Bockarie, Kennie (Male) - 1994 in Komboya, Bo District - Killed.
 Bockarie, Kini Vandi (Male) - 1991 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Abducted and detained.
 Bockarie, Lahai (Male) age 2 - 1996 - Tortured. Killed.
 Bockarie, Lahai (Male) age 30 - 1997 in Upper Bambara , Kailahun - Killed.
 Bockarie, Lamin (Male) age 19 - 1994 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Killed.
 Bockarie, Lansana (Male) - Killed.
 Bockarie, Lansana (Male) age 53 - 1991 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Bockarie, Lansana (Male) age 59 - 1991 - Displaced. Abducted. Killed.
 Bockarie, Lossie (Male) age 12 - 1991 - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Bockarie, Lucy (Female) age 5 - 1994 - Displaced. Killed.
 Bockarie, Mambu (Male) age 35 - 1996 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced. Detained. Killed.
 Bockarie, Mary (Female) - 1994 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Abducted.
 Bockarie, Micheal (Male) age 43 - 1995 in Bagbe, Bo District - Property looted. Forced to labour.
 Bockarie, Momoh (Male) - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Displaced. Assaulted and stripped. Killed.
 Bockarie, Momoh (Male) age 18 - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.
 Bockarie, Momoh (Male) age 29 - 1991 - Displaced. Killed.
 Bockarie, Moses (Male) - 1994 in Tikonko, Bo District - Displaced.
 Bockarie, Mualim (Male) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Killed.
 Bockarie, Musa (Male) age 14 - 1999 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Tortured.
 Bockarie, Musa (Male) age 46 - 1991 in Upper Bambara , Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted. Assaulted.
 Bockarie, Musa (Male) age 70 - 1991 in Valunia, Bo District - Displaced. Killed.
 Bockarie, Mustapha (Male) age 8 - Killed.
 Bockarie, Nansu (Female) - 1991 - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Bockarie, Nineh (Male) age 45 - 1998 in Wara-Wara Bafodia, Koinadugu - Forced to labour.
 Bockarie, Saffa (Male) - 1998 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Bockarie, Saffa (Male) age 49 - 1991 - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Bockarie, Sallia (Male) - 1994 in Tikonko, Bo District - Displaced. Assaulted. Killed.
 Bockarie, Satta (Female) - 1996 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Displaced.
 Bockarie, Sheriff (Male) age 1 - 1998 - Assaulted.
 Bockarie, Sheriff (Male) age 13 - 1997 - Displaced.
 Bockarie, Sidie (Male) age 44 - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.
 Bockarie, Tailu (Male) age 45 - 1994 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Bockarie, Tamba (Male) - 1991 in Kissi Tongi, Kailahun - Killed.
 Bockarie, Tamba (Male) age 37 - 1998 - Displaced.
 Bockarie, Tejan (Male) - 1994 in Bagbo, Bo District - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Bockarie, Tenneh (Female) age 30 - 1998 in Upper Bambara, Kailahun - Displaced.
 Bockarie, Thomas (Male) age 40 - 1999 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Bockarie, Vandi (Male) age 40 - 1998 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Bockarie, Vandy (Male) - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Property looted.
 Bockarie, Watta (Female) - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Abducted and detained.
 Bockarie, Watta (Female) age 10 - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Abducted. Killed.
 Bockarie Forwai, Padenga (Male) - 1991 in Pujehun - Property looted. Abducted. Assaulted.
 Bodkin, Rosaline (Female) age 42 - 1995 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained.
 Boi, Sallay (Female) - 1995 in Bagbo, Bo District - Killed.
 Boi, Selo (Female) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Killed.
 Boi, Yea (Female) - 1996 in Badjia, Bo District - Killed.
 Boima, Aiah (Male) age 18 - 1994 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Killed.
 Boima, Alhaji Ernest (Male) - Extorted and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.
 Boima, Alpha (Male) - 1997 in Kakua, Bo District - Killed.
 Boima, Ernest (Male) - 1994 in Tikonko, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Boima, Joe (Male) - 1995 in Bagbo, Bo District - Killed.
 Boima, Komba (Male) - 1999 in Kamara, Kono - Forced to labour. Killed.
 Boima, Kumba (Female) age 22 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Abducted. Assaulted.
 Boima, Kumba (Female) age 40 - 1997 - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.
 Boima, Martin (Male) age 52 - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.
 Boima, Matthew (Male) age 43 - 1991 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Displaced.
 Boima, Menie (Female) age 13 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.
 Boima, Moigboi (Male) age 71 - 1991 in Malegohun, Kenema - Displaced. Killed.
 Boima, Musu (Female) age 8 - 1992 in Peje West, Kailahun - Forced to labour.
 Boima, Patrick (Male) age 20 - 1997 in Malema, Kailahun - Forced to labour.
 Boima, Patrick (Male) age 53 - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Boima, Salia (Male) age 55 - 1998 in Luawa, Kailahun - Property looted. Assaulted.
 Boima, Shaika (Male) age 24 - 1996 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Killed.
 Boima, Sheku (Male) - 1991 in Lugbu, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Boima, Sia (Female) - 1992 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted.
 Boima, Tamba (Male) - 1992 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Boima, Tamba (Male) - 1998 - Property looted. Killed.
 Boima, Tamba (Male) age 61 - 1991 in Nomo, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted. Killed.
 Boima, Tenneh (Female) - 1998 - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Boitega, Amadu (Male) - 1997 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Boiwah, Sia (Female) - 1998 - Abducted.
 Boko, Fomba (Male) - 1991 - Property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Boko, Hawa (Female) - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Killed.
 Boma, Jattu (Female) age 73 - 1993 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Property destroyed. Killed.
 Bomboi, Marie (Female) - Assaulted.
 Bomboi, Muniru (Male) - Displaced.
 Bomdu, Komba (Male) - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Killed.
 Bomoi, Surmana (Male) - 1991 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Bona, Jassie (Female) age 60 - Displaced and property looted. Limb amputated.
 Bona, Sahr (Male) - 1992 in Gorama Kono, Kono - Assaulted. Killed.
 Bondowa, Momoh (Male) - Extorted. Forced to labour. Tortured and stripped.
 Bonga, Francis (Male) - 1997 - Killed.
 Bongji, Masseh (Female) - 1996 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.

Bongo, Janet (Female) age 60 - 1995 in Western Area - Property looted and destroyed.

Bongo, Kola (Male) - 1998 in Luawa, Kailahun - Killed.

Boni-Moiwo, Sahr (Male) age 44 - 1991 in Kakua, Bo District - Displaced and property looted.

Boni-Moiwo, Tamba (Male) age 14 - 1991 in Kakua, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Bonjebah, Aiah (Male) - 1998 in Kono - Displaced.

Bonjebah, Sia (Female) age 78 - 1998 in Kono - Killed.

Bonnie, Joe (Male) - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Bonsu, Sahr (Male) age 46 - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Assaulted and tortured.

Bornor, Joe (Male) - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Killed.

Bounnie, Gassimu (Male) - Killed.

Bowah, Amie (Female) - 1996 in Badjia, Bo District - Killed.

Boyah-Quee, Saffa (Male) - 1994 in Wunde, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.

Boyawah, Jamiatu (Female) - Displaced. Assaulted.

Braima, Hary (Male) - 1992 in Dodo, Kenema - Detained. Assaulted.

Braima, Kaddie (Female) - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Braima, Morie (Male) age 55 - Assaulted and stripped. Killed.

Braima, Saidu (Male) age 7 - 1993 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted.

Brainard, Francis (Male) age 35 - 1995 in Kori, Moyamba - Extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Brainard, Jonathan (Male) age 25 - 1997 in Imperi, Bonthe - Property looted.

Brewah, George (Male) age 55 - 1995 in Baoma, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted.

Brewah, Mildred (Female) - 1995 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced.

Brewah, Tommy (Male) - 1995 - Killed.

Briama, Alyssious (Male) age 39 - 1991 in Gaura, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Briama, Amara (Male) - 1991 in Dama, Kenema - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Detained. Killed.

Briama, Kalilu (Male) - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced.

Brian, Alhaji (Male) - 1992 - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Brima, Abass (Male) - Tortured. Killed.

Brima, Abdulai (Male) age 60 - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Killed.

Brima, Alhaji (Male) - 1998 in Jawie, Kailahun - Killed.

Brima, Alhaji Katta (Male) age 54 - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted.

Brima, Alhaji Morrow (Male) age 14 - 1995 in Luawa, Kailahun - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Brima, Alpha (Male) - 1995 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Assaulted. Killed.

Brima, Alpha (Male) age 68 - 1995 in Bonthe - Property looted. Assaulted.

Brima, Amadu (Male) age 44 - 1994 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Detained.

Brima, Amara (Male) age 13 - 1991 in Upper Bambara, Kailahun - Forced to labour. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.

Brima, Ansumana (Male) age 30 - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Brima, Aruna (Male) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced.

Brima, Aruna (Male) age 33 - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced.

Brima, Augustine (Male) age 22 - 1992 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Tortured. Killed.

Brima, Baidu (Female) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Brima, Baidu (Female) age 26 - Displaced.

Brima, Bockarie (Male) age 28 - Displaced.

Brima, Edison (Male) age 23 - 1991 in Kissi Kama, Kailahun - Extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Brima, Fatmata (Female) age 28 - 1991 in Malegohun, Kenema - Extorted. Abducted. Tortured.

Brima, Fatu (Female) - 1991 - Displaced. Killed.

Brima, Hawa (Female) age 40 - 1991 in Peje West, Kailahun - Abducted and detained.

Brima, Joe (Male) - 1999 - Tortured.

Brima, Joe (Male) age 21 - 1993 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Killed.

Brima, Kadie (Female) - 1992 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.

Brima, Kadie (Female) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced.

Brima, Kai (Male) - 1998 - Limb amputated.

Brima, Kaindaneh (Male) age 36 - 1997 in Koya, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and

tortured.

Brima, Kortor (Male) - 1991 - Displaced. Detained.
Brima, Kumba (Female) age 20 - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Tortured. Killed.
Brima, Lahai (Male) - Property destroyed.
Brima, Lamin (Male) age 59 - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed.
Brima, Lansana (Male) - 1991 in Peje West, Kailahun - Abducted. Killed.
Brima, Mariama (Female) age 7 - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Killed.
Brima, Massah (Female) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Killed.
Brima, Massah (Female) age 34 - 1997 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Forced to labour.
Brima, Mohamed (Male) age 16 - 1992 in Jawie, Kailahun - Stripped. Killed.
Brima, Momoh (Male) - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Abducted. Assaulted.
Brima, Moriba (Male) age 50 - 1997 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Property looted and destroyed.
Brima, Morie (Male) - 1995 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Displaced.
Brima, Morie (Male) age 48 - 1992 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced.
Brima, Munda (Male) - 1992 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced.
Brima, Musa (Male) - 1991 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Killed.
Brima, Musa (Male) age 15 - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.
Brima, Nancy (Female) age 26 - 1992 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
Brima, Saffa (Male) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained.
Brima, Sahr (Male) age 33 - Forced to labour. Tortured.
Brima, Sahr (Male) age 35 - 1992 in Penguia, Kailahun - Displaced.
Brima, Sahr (Male) age 45 - 1995 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Forced to labour. Tortured.
Brima, Sahr (Male) age 47 - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Stripped.
Brima, Satta (Male) age 43 - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Abducted and detained.
Brima, Senesie (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Assaulted.
Brima, Senesie (Male) age 57 - 1994 in Dia, Kailahun - Displaced. Detained. Tortured.
Brima, Sheku (Male) age 3 - 1991 in Peje West, Kailahun - Abducted and detained.
Brima, Sulaiman (Male) age 4 - 1994 in Kissi Teng, Kailahun - Abducted. Killed.
Brima, Tamba (Male) age 30 - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted. Tortured. Killed.
Brima, Tanu (Male) age 59 - 1991 - Displaced and property looted.
Brima, Wuya (Female) - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced. Killed.
Brima, Yeati (Female) age 38 - 1991 in Koya, Kenema - Property looted and destroyed.
Brima Fawundu, Mohamed James (Male) age 53 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
Brimah, Fatmata (Female) - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted.
Brorad, Kenny (Male) - Abducted and detained. Tortured.
Browne, Joe (Male) - 1998 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Property destroyed.
Browne, Jonathan (Male) age 26 - 1995 in Badjia, Bo District - Abducted. Assaulted and tortured.
Browne, Sabainah (Female) - Killed.
Bu, John (Male) - 1991 in Upper Bambara, Kailahun - Detained.
Buduka, Rugiatu (Female) age 58 - 1996 - Property looted. Assaulted.
Bulleh, Abdul (Male) - 1995 in Komboya, Bo District - Assaulted and tortured.
Bullie, John Patrick (Male) - 1995 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.
Bunda, Allieu (Male) - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
Bundah, Alhaji Brima (Male) - 1997 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Property looted and destroyed. Killed.
Bundamy, Tommy (Male) - 1997 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Extorted. Assaulted and tortured.
Bundeh, Alpha (Male) age 41 - 1998 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Extorted and property looted. Assaulted and stripped.
Bundor, Jusufu (Male) - Property destroyed.
Bundor, Michael (Male) - 1996 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Tortured.
Bundor, Tamba (Male) - Killed.
Bundu, Abdul (Male) age 30 - Extorted.
Bundu, Abu Bakarr (Male) age 46 - 1998 in Loko Massama, Port Loko - Displaced.
Bundu, Alfred (Male) - 1995 in Niawa Lenga, Bo District - Property destroyed.

Bundu, Alhaji Bai (Male) age 77 - 1995 in Dibia, Port Loko - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Bundu, Alpha (Male) age 31 - 1999 - Property looted. Abducted and detained.

Bundu, Aruna (Male) - 1998 in Port Loko - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Bundu, Bairoh age 48 - 1995 in Dibia, Port Loko - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Bundu, Brima (Male) - 1994 in Bagbo, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Bundu, Edward (Male) age 18 - 1994 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Extorted. Abducted.

Bundu, Eva (Female) age 47 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.

Bundu, Fattu (Female) age 16 - 1996 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Detained. Limb amputated.

Bundu, Isatu (Female) - 1999 - Killed.

Bundu, James (Male) age 51 - 1999 in Western Area - Property looted and destroyed.

Bundu, Joseph (Male) - 1994 - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Stripped.

Bundu, Kadiatu (Female) age 67 - 1999 in Konike Sande, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted.

Bundu, Keikura (Male) - 1997 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Bundu, Lavai (Male) - 1995 in Niawa Lenga, Bo District - Killed.

Bundu, Mariatu (Female) age 17 - 1999 in Konike Sande, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Bundu, Marie (Female) - Displaced.

Bundu, Missalie (Male) - Displaced. Killed.

Bundu, Samuel (Male) - 1995 in Kamajei, Moyamba - Property looted and destroyed.

Bundu, Sulaiman (Male) - 1998 in Sanda Tendaren, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Bundu, Sulaiman (Male) age 30 - 1994 in Neini, Koinadugu - Displaced.

Bundu, Sultan (Male) - 1999 in Dibia, Port Loko - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Bundu, Surjoh (Male) age 16 - 1995 in Sanda Magblonthor, Port Loko - Displaced.

Bundu, Tamba (Male) age 31 - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Bundu, Tamba Jonathan (Male) age 47 - 1998 in Gorama Mende, Kenema - Displaced. Assaulted and tortured.

Bundu, Yusif (Male) age 22 - 1995 in Gbense, Kono - Killed.

Bunduka, Amara (Male) - 1994 in Moyamba - Abducted and detained.

Bunduka, Amara (Male) age 23 - 1991 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and stripped.

Bunduka, Bockarie (Male) age 30 - 1992 in Upper Bambara , Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Bunduka, Isatu (Female) age 24 - 1995 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Abducted and detained.

Bunduka, James (Male) - 1991 in Mandu, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Tortured and stripped. Killed.

Bunduka, Musa (Male) - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.

Bunduka, Musa (Male) age 19 - 1995 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Bunumbu, Kenie (Male) - 1993 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Killed.

Burreh, Lansana (Male) - Extorted.

Burreh, Saffa (Male) - 1994 in Banta Mokele, Moyamba - Tortured.

Butscher, Aminata (Female) - 1997 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced.

Butscher, Hindolo (Male) age 52 - 1997 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and stripped.

Butscher, James (Male) - 1997 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Killed.

Campbell, Fatmata (Female) - 1999 - Property looted. Assaulted and tortured.

Campbell, J (Male) - 1997 in Bonthe - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Campbell, Kaikura (Male) age 40 - Assaulted. Killed.

Campbell, Magnus (Male) age 62 - 1999 - Property looted. Assaulted and tortured.

Carew, Kenei (Male) - Abducted and detained.

Carew, Mojama (Female) age 56 - 1999 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced and property destroyed.

Carpenter, Brima (Male) - 1994 in Tikonko, Bo District - Assaulted and tortured. Killed.

Carpenter, Jusu (Male) - 1991 in Panga Krim, Pujehun - Displaced. Assaulted.

Carpenter, Koroma (Male) age 34 - 1991 in Dia, Kailahun - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Carpenter, Moinah (Male) - 1991 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.

Carpenter, Momoh (Male) age 18 - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced, extorted and property looted

and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Carpenter, Vandi (Male) age 38 - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Caulker, Cecelia (Female) age 83 - 1997 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted, tortured and forced to participate in an act of cannibalism.

Caulker, Mohamed (Male) age 20 - 1994 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Abducted and detained.

Caulker, Victor (Male) age 57 - 1997 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured and forced to participate in an act of cannibalism. Killed.

Cawaley, James (Male) age 59 - 1995 in Dasse, Moyamba - Displaced.

Cawan, Adama (Female) age 71 - 1998 in Western Area - Property looted and destroyed.

Chalkey, Yema (Female) - 1997 - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured and limb amputated.

Challx, Dauda (Male) - 1994 in Sogbini, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Chana, Maita (Female) - 1998 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced. Killed.

Charles, Abu (Male) - 1995 - Displaced and property looted.

Charles, Abu (Male) - 1994 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Killed.

Charles, Bockarie (Male) age 53 - Displaced. Limb amputated.

Charles, Eyaja (Male) - 1998 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Tortured. Killed.

Charles, Jeneba (Female) age 56 - 1999 in Dodo, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Charles, Julius (Male) age 44 - 1995 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted. Abducted. Tortured.

Charles, Kemie (Male) age 45 - 1998 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Charles, Kenie Lansana (Male) age 46 - 1998 in Upper Bambara, Kailahun - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Charles, Marian (Female) - Displaced. Abducted.

Charles, Marie (Male) age 9 - 1993 in Dia, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted.

Charles, Momoh (Male) - 1998 in Dia, Kailahun - Abducted.

Charles, Patrick (Male) - 1993 in Baoma, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Charles, Prince (Male) age 33 - 1996 - Property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Charles, Saidu (Male) - 1994 in Bagbo, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Charlie, Charles Ruphus (Male) - 1998 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Abducted and detained. Tortured and stripped. Killed.

Charlie, Joe (Male) - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.

Charlie, Joe (Male) age 26 - 1997 in Sittia, Bonthe - Detained. Assaulted and stripped.

Charlie, Lahai (Male) - 1997 in Bonthe - Abducted.

Charlie, Mohamed Tommy (Male) age 26 - 1997 in Bagruwa, Moyamba - Displaced.

Charlie, Ramatu (Female) age 18 - 1995 in Bagruwa, Moyamba - Displaced.

Charlie, Umara (Male) age 37 - 1997 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Extorted. Detained.

Charlie, Yeama Kaima (Female) age 70 - 1997 in Bum, Bonthe - Tortured and limb amputated.

Chebie, Sahr (Male) - 1998 - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Chebie, Tamba (Male) - 1998 - Detained.

Chendeka, Mohamed (Male) age 20 - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Assaulted.

Clergy, Amara (Male) - 1991 in Langorama, Kenema - Abducted and detained.

Cleveland, Payangula (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced and property destroyed.

Cobio, Emmanuel (Male) - 1997 in Peje Bongre, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Coker, Alex (Male) age 23 - 1995 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Coker, Alpha (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Coker, Ansumana (Male) age 67 - 1994 in Bagbo, Bo District - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour.

Coker, Charles (Male) age 50 - Abducted. Assaulted.

Coker, Francis (Male) age 38 - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Coker, Gerald (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and extorted. Tortured and stripped.

Coker, Hazah (Female) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Coker, Kenie Torma (Male) - 1994 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Killed.

Coker, Lucinda (Female) age 20 - 1999 in Western Area - Property looted and destroyed.

Coker, Mambu (Female) age 76 - 1997 in Kakua, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed. Tortured

and limb amputated.

Coker, Marie (Female) - 1996 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Killed.

Coker, Moininah (Male) - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Coker, Samuel (Male) age 35 - 1996 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Displaced. Abducted.

Coker, Sesay (Male) - Assaulted.

Coker, Thomas (Male) age 44 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Coker, Tommy (Male) - 1994 in Bagbo, Bo District - Killed.

Coker, Yeama (Female) age 60 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Cole, Abdul Rahman (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Cole, Alhaji Tejan (Male) age 24 - 1998 in Nimiyama, Kono - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Tortured and stripped.

Cole, Christian (Male) - Killed.

Cole, Edwin (Male) age 34 - 1992 in Western Area - Displaced. Detained. Tortured.

Cole, Emmanuel (Male) age 9 - 1997 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Displaced. Killed.

Cole, Emmanuel (Male) age 62 - 1997 in Dia, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted.

Cole, Fatmata (Female) - 1999 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Cole, Georgiana (Female) - 1997 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Abducted and detained.

Cole, Jacob (Male) age 24 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Cole, Lusenii (Male) age 18 - 1991 in Banta Mokele, Moyamba - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Cole, Moses (Male) - 1994 in Barri, Pujehun - Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.

Cole, Siginie (Male) age 25 - Abducted. Killed.

Cole, Solomon (Male) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Property destroyed.

Cole, Tejan (Male) - 1998 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Stripped and limb amputated.

Collier, Alieu (Male) age 24 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Collier, Brima (Male) age 45 - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour.

Collier, Christian (Male) age 32 - 1998 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Collier, Sellu (Male) age 51 - 1992 in Malema, Kailahun - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Collings, Eldred (Male) - 1995 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Killed.

Comba, Amara (Male) - 1991 - Stripped. Killed.

Combay, Murray (Male) age 20 - 1996 in Gorama Mende, Kenema - Killed.

Combulah, Lansana Brima (Male) - Killed.

Conjoh, Sarah (Female) age 45 - Tortured.

Conteh, Abdoramam (Male) - 2000 - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Conteh, Abdul (Male) - Property destroyed. Tortured.

Conteh, Abdul (Male) - 1998 in Luawa, Kailahun - Property looted and destroyed.

Conteh, Abdul (Male) age 35 - 1999 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed.

Conteh, Abdul (Male) age 52 - 1999 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced. Killed.

Conteh, Abdul Raman (Male) - 1999 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced. Killed.

Conteh, Abdulai (Male) - 2000 - Displaced.

Conteh, Abdulai (Male) - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Conteh, Abdulai (Male) - 1996 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted.

Conteh, Abdulai (Male) - 1997 in Samu, Kambia - Killed.

Conteh, Abdulai (Male) age 27 - 2000 in Loko Massama, Port Loko - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Conteh, Abdulai (Male) age 31 - 1996 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Displaced.

Conteh, Abdulai (Male) age 32 - 1999 in Bureh, Port Loko - Displaced.

Conteh, Abdulai (Male) age 35 - 2000 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Conteh, Abdulai (Male) age 57 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.

Conteh, Abu (Male) age 16 - 1997 in Western Area - Abducted. Killed.

Conteh, Abu (Male) age 27 - 1994 in Kholifa Mabang, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Detained. Tortured. Killed.

Conteh, Abu (Male) age 40 - 1998 in Diang, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Conteh, Abu (Male) age 41 - 1998 in Kakua, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed.

Conteh, Abu (Male) age 52 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Conteh, Abu Bakarr (Male) - 1998 in Wara-Wara Bafodia, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted.

Conteh, Abu Bakarr (Male) - 2000 in Magbema, Kambia - Extorted and property looted.

Conteh, Adama (Female) - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Conteh, Adama (Female) - 1999 in Kongbora, Moyamba - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Conteh, Adama (Female) - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Killed.

Conteh, Adama (Female) - 2000 in Mambolo, Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed.

Conteh, Adama (Female) age 24 - 1999 in Biriwa, Bombali - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Conteh, Adama (Female) age 34 - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced and property destroyed.

Conteh, Adama (Female) age 35 - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Assaulted.

Conteh, Adama (Female) age 67 - 1999 in Western Area - Detained. Killed.

Conteh, Ahmed (Male) - 1999 in Biriwa, Bombali - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Conteh, Ahmed (Male) age 30 - 1994 in Tankoro, Kono - Killed.

Conteh, Aiah (Male) - 1999 - Property looted. Abducted.

Conteh, Alfred (Male) - 1997 in Bombali - Displaced and property looted. Abducted.

Conteh, Alfred (Male) age 40 - 1999 in Biriwa, Bombali - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour.

Conteh, Alhaji (Male) - 1997 in Western Area - Extorted.

Conteh, Alhaji (Male) - 1991 in Small Bo, Kenema - Killed.

Conteh, Alhaji (Male) age 21 - 1996 in Small Bo, Kenema - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Conteh, Alhaji B (Male) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Killed.

Conteh, Alhaji B (Male) - 1991 in Bumpah, Bo District - Killed.

Conteh, Alhaji Brima (Male) age 65 - 1991 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced and property looted. Killed.

Conteh, Alhaji Mohamed (Male) - 1998 - Displaced and property destroyed. Detained. Assaulted.

Conteh, Alhaji Sheku (Male) age 63 - 1996 in Loko Massama, Port Loko - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Conteh, Alice (Female) - 1995 in Sielenga, Bo District - Killed.

Conteh, Alie (Male) age 13 - 1999 in Gbendembu Ngowahun, Bombali - Killed.

Conteh, Aliou (Male) age 16 - 1999 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced and extorted. Abducted. Assaulted.

Conteh, Alimamy (Male) - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Conteh, Alimamy (Male) - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Conteh, Alimamy (Male) - 1999 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Conteh, Alpha (Male) - 1992 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Conteh, Alpha (Male) - 1996 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Conteh, Alpha (Male) - 1998 in Tane, Tonkolili - Abducted and detained.

Conteh, Alpha (Male) - 1998 in Western Area - Abducted and detained.

Conteh, Alpha (Male) age 25 - 1998 - Killed.

Conteh, Alusine (Male) - 1998 - Killed.

Conteh, Amadu (Male) - 1998 in Tane, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Conteh, Amadu (Male) - Assaulted.

Conteh, Amadu (Male) - 1998 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced. Assaulted.

Conteh, Amadu (Male) age 19 - 1997 - Property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Conteh, Amadu (Male) age 50 - 1998 in Briama, Kambia - Property destroyed. Killed.

Conteh, Amara (Male) - 1999 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Killed.

Conteh, Amidu (Male) - 1998 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Conteh, Amie (Female) - 1993 in Niawa, Kenema - Abducted and detained.

Conteh, Aminata (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted.

Conteh, Amodu (Male) - 1996 - Abducted and detained.

Conteh, Ansumana (Male) age 40 - 1998 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Conteh, Aruna (Male) age 6 - 1998 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced.

Conteh, Aruna (Male) age 14 - 1996 in Kenema - Killed.

Conteh, Bai (Male) age 56 - 1999 in Magbema, Kambia - Displaced, extorted and property looted and

destroyed.

Conteh, Ballay (Female) - 1999 in Maforki, Port Loko - Killed.

Conteh, Bashiru (Male) - 1997 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Killed.

Conteh, Bassie (Male) age 47 - 1994 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Conteh, Benna (Male) - 1998 in Gbendembu Ngowahun, Bombali - Property looted. Forced to labour.

Conteh, Bobor (Male) age 39 - 1992 in Nongowa, Kenema - Property destroyed. Abducted. Killed.

Conteh, Bockarie (Male) - 1999 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Conteh, Boi (Female) age 35 - 1995 in Western Area - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed.

Conteh, Brima (Male) - 1998 in Diang, Koinadugu - Abducted.

Conteh, Brima (Male) - 1994 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Killed.

Conteh, Brima (Male) - 1993 - Killed.

Conteh, Brima (Male) - 1993 in Niawa, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed.

Conteh, Brima (Male) - 1993 in Dama, Kenema - Displaced. Killed.

Conteh, Brima (Male) age 30 - 1999 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Conteh, Brima (Male) age 53 - 1993 in Dama, Kenema - Displaced.

Conteh, Brima (Male) age 57 - 1992 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced and extorted. Detained. Assaulted. Killed.

Conteh, Brima (Male) age 82 - 1998 in Koya, Port Loko - Property destroyed.

Conteh, C.S. (Male) - 1991 in Dia, Kailahun - Assaulted.

Conteh, Daniel (Male) age 35 - 1999 in Kafe Simira, Tonkolili - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Conteh, Dawa (Female) - 1999 in Maforki, Port Loko - Killed.

Conteh, Denis (Male) - Forced to labour.

Conteh, Dwadoi (Male) - 1999 - Property looted and destroyed.

Conteh, Edward (Male) age 51 - Displaced. Limb amputated.

Conteh, Fatmata (Female) - 1999 in Marampa, Port Loko - Displaced.

Conteh, Fatmata (Female) - 2000 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Abducted and detained.

Conteh, Fatmata (Female) age 15 - 1994 - Abducted and detained.

Conteh, Fatmata (Female) age 25 - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour.

Conteh, Fatmata (Female) age 28 - 1999 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced.

Conteh, Fatmata (Female) age 35 - 1998 - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Conteh, Fatu (Female) - 1999 in Maforki, Port Loko - Killed.

Conteh, Fatu (Female) - Displaced.

Conteh, Fatu (Female) - Assaulted.

Conteh, Fatu (Female) age 55 - 1994 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Conteh, Foday (Male) - 1994 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Conteh, Foday (Male) age 10 - 1999 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Conteh, Francis (Male) - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Limb amputated.

Conteh, Frank (Male) - 1992 in Kono - Assaulted. Killed.

Conteh, Gbessay (Female) age 70 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted.

Conteh, George (Male) age 25 - 1995 in Komboya, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Conteh, Gladys (Female) age 15 - 1997 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Displaced. Abducted.

Conteh, Hassan (Male) - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Conteh, Hassan (Male) - 1999 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Conteh, Hassan (Male) - 1997 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Killed.

Conteh, Hassan (Male) - 1996 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted.

Conteh, Hassan (Male) age 45 - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Conteh, Hawa (Female) - 2000 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Killed.

Conteh, Hawa (Female) - Abducted and detained.

Conteh, Hawa (Female) - 1992 - Killed.

Conteh, Hawa (Female) age 36 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and extorted.

Conteh, Hawa (Female) age 50 - 1998 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Assaulted. Killed.

Conteh, Ibrahim (Male) - 1996 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Killed.

Conteh, Ibrahim (Male) - 1995 in Tikonko, Bo District - Abducted. Limb amputated.

Conteh, Idrissa (Male) - 1995 in Bagruwa, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Forced to labour.

Conteh, Idrissa (Male) - Displaced. Assaulted.

Conteh, Idrissa (Male) age 6 - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.

Conteh, Idrissa (Male) age 23 - 1996 in Nongowa, Kenema - Killed.

Conteh, Isata (Female) - 1998 in Tambakka, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed.

Conteh, Isata (Female) - Displaced.

Conteh, Isatu (Female) - 1997 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Property looted. Abducted.

Conteh, Isatu (Female) - 1996 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted.

Conteh, Isatu (Female) age 17 - 1998 in Western Area - Killed.

Conteh, Isatu (Female) age 27 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.

Conteh, Isha (Female) age 24 - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced.

Conteh, Ishmael (Male) age 51 - 1993 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced.

Conteh, Issa (Male) - Property destroyed. Abducted.

Conteh, Issa (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.

Conteh, Iye (Female) - 1994 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Displaced. Abducted.

Conteh, Iye (Female) - Killed.

Conteh, Iye (Female) - 1999 - Displaced.

Conteh, James (Male) - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Conteh, James (Male) - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Killed.

Conteh, James (Male) age 7 - 1998 in Western Area - Forced to labour.

Conteh, James (Male) age 29 - 1994 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Abducted. Tortured.

Conteh, Jane (Female) - Property destroyed.

Conteh, Jane (Female) - 1995 in Komboya, Bo District - Property destroyed. Killed.

Conteh, Jebbeh (Female) - 1991 - Displaced.

Conteh, Jebbeh (Female) age 38 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Conteh, Jeneba (Female) age 12 - 1997 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Assaulted.

Conteh, Jeneba (Female) age 27 - 2000 in Kambia - Displaced and extorted.

Conteh, Jim (Male) age 29 - 1995 in Komboya, Bo District - Detained. Killed.

Conteh, John (Male) age 25 - 1999 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.

Conteh, Joseph (Male) - 1995 in Bumpah, Moyamba - Displaced. Killed.

Conteh, Joseph (Male) age 29 - 1994 in Tane, Tonkolili - Forced to labour.

Conteh, Joseph (Male) age 41 - 1998 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Displaced.

Conteh, Kabba (Male) - 1999 in Sanda Magblonthor, Port Loko - Killed.

Conteh, Kabba (Male) age 26 - 1994 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed.

Conteh, Kabbi (Male) - 1999 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced. Tortured.

Conteh, Kaday (Female) - 1993 in Koya, Port Loko - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted. Killed.

Conteh, Kaday (Female) - 1998 in Wara-Wara Bafodia, Koinadugu - Forced to labour.

Conteh, Kadiatu (Female) age 27 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.

Conteh, Kadiatu (Female) age 28 - 1998 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Conteh, Kadiatu (Female) age 35 - 1992 - Killed.

Conteh, Kandeh (Male) age 55 - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and stripped.

Conteh, Kanie (Female) - 1994 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Displaced.

Conteh, Kapru (Male) age 54 - 1996 in Kholifa Mabang, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted.

Conteh, Karmoh (Male) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed.

Conteh, Kate (Female) - 1998 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Killed.

Conteh, Keifa (Male) age 30 - Abducted. Killed.

Conteh, Keikuta (Male) age 35 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and stripped.

Conteh, Kemoh (Male) - 1994 in Komboya, Bo District - Tortured.

Conteh, Kemor Saffa (Male) - 1991 in Pujehun - Abducted.

Conteh, Kewulay (Male) - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and limb

Conteh, Koto (Male) - 1999 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Killed.

Conteh, Lamboi (Male) age 67 - 1999 in Diang, Koinadugu - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Conteh, Lamin (Male) age 38 - 1998 in Kassunko, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Conteh, Lamine (Male) - 1997 - Extorted. Tortured. Killed.

Conteh, Lansana (Male) age 61 - Displaced. Killed.

Conteh, Linda (Female) age 52 - 1998 in Diang, Koinadugu - Abducted. Killed.

Conteh, Lucy (Female) - 1995 in Kpanda Kemo, Bonthe - Extorted.

Conteh, Mabinty (Female) - 1998 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed.

Conteh, Mabinty (Female) - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Killed.

Conteh, Mabinty (Female) age 43 - 1996 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Property looted. Abducted. Assaulted.

Conteh, Makai (Female) age 13 - 2000 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Killed.

Conteh, Mako (Male) - 1998 in Kalansogia, Tonkolili - Abducted. Killed.

Conteh, Mamako (Male) age 39 - 1991 in Yakemo-Kpukumu Krim, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained.

Conteh, Manah (Male) age 54 - 1991 - Property looted and destroyed.

Conteh, Mankapru (Male) age 31 - 1992 in Kono - Displaced.

Conteh, Manso (Male) - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Displaced.

Conteh, Mariama (Female) - 1999 in Tambakka, Bombali - Displaced.

Conteh, Mariama (Female) - 1993 - Property destroyed.

Conteh, Mariama (Female) age 19 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Conteh, Marie (Female) - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Conteh, Marie (Female) - Property destroyed.

Conteh, Marie (Female) - 1998 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Conteh, Marie (Female) - 1997 - Displaced.

Conteh, Marie (Female) age 18 - 1999 in Western Area - Assaulted.

Conteh, Mark Pius (Male) age 47 - 1997 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Property looted.

Conteh, Massah F. (Female) age 65 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Abducted. Killed.

Conteh, Mayiteh (Female) - 1999 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Conteh, Mbalu (Female) age 16 - 2000 - Assaulted.

Conteh, Memuna (Female) age 19 - 1991 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Killed.

Conteh, Memuna (Female) age 60 - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted.

Conteh, Michael (Male) age 55 - 1995 in Komboya, Bo District - Property destroyed. Abducted.

Conteh, Mohamed (Male) - 1994 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Killed.

Conteh, Mohamed (Male) - 1994 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Conteh, Mohamed (Male) - 2000 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced. Tortured. Killed.

Conteh, Mohamed (Male) - 1999 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Conteh, Mohamed (Male) - 1997 - Abducted.

Conteh, Mohamed (Male) - Abducted. Tortured.

Conteh, Mohamed (Male) - 2000 in Samu, Kambia - Property destroyed. Tortured.

Conteh, Mohamed (Male) age 8 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained.

Conteh, Mohamed (Male) age 16 - 2000 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Abducted. Killed.

Conteh, Mohamed (Male) age 28 - 1999 in Bo District - Displaced.

Conteh, Mohamed (Male) age 35 - 1998 in Buya Romende, Port Loko - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Conteh, Mohamed (Male) age 45 - 1997 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Assaulted and stripped.

Conteh, Mohamed (Male) age 48 - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Forced to labour.

Conteh, Mohamed (Male) age 49 - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced and property looted.

Conteh, Mohamed (Male) age 50 - 1995 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained.

Conteh, Mohamed Foday (Male) age 52 - 1994 in Upper Bambara, Kailahun - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Conteh, Momodu (Male) - 1998 in Diang, Koinadugu - Abducted.

Conteh, Momoh (Male) - 1999 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Conteh, Momoh (Male) - 1994 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Killed.

Conteh, Momorie (Male) age 31 - 1999 in Diang, Koinadugu - Property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Conteh, Monday (Female) - 1998 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Conteh, More (Male) - 1998 in Diang, Koinadugu - Abducted.

Conteh, Morlai (Male) - 1999 in Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Conteh, Morlai (Male) age 20 - 1995 in Kono - Property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and limb amputated.

Conteh, Morlai (Male) age 67 - 2000 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed.

Conteh, Moses (Male) age 14 - 1999 in Tindel, Moyamba - Forced to labour. Forced to participate in an act of cannibalism.

Conteh, Murray (Male) - 1991 - Killed.

Conteh, Musa (Male) - 1992 in Peje, Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted.

Conteh, Musa Ibrahim (Male) age 35 - 1991 in Upper Bambara , Kailahun - Displaced and extorted. Assaulted and tortured.

Conteh, Mustapha (Male) - 1993 in Badjia, Bo District - Killed.

Conteh, Mustapha (Male) age 25 - 1999 in Langorama, Kenema - Tortured.

Conteh, Musu (Female) - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Killed.

Conteh, Musu (Female) age 24 - 1999 - Displaced.

Conteh, Musu (Female) age 47 - Extorted and property looted.

Conteh, Nadeh (Female) age 22 - 1999 in Western Area - Assaulted. Killed.

Conteh, Nankoh (Male) - 1999 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Extorted. Assaulted and tortured.

Conteh, Nbau (Female) - 1994 in Upper Bambara , Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Conteh, Nhoi (Male) - Property destroyed.

Conteh, Nmah (Female) - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Conteh, Ojuku (Male) - Killed.

Conteh, Ousman (Male) age 20 - 2000 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Conteh, Ousman (Male) age 25 - 1992 in Gbane, Kono - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted.

Conteh, Paul (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Assaulted.

Conteh, Paul (Male) age 13 - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Conteh, Peter (Male) age 35 - 1998 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Conteh, Polthay (Male) - 1999 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Conteh, Prince (Male) age 24 - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Detained.

Conteh, Ramatu (Female) - 1998 in Konike Sande, Tonkolili - Extorted and property looted.

Conteh, Ramatu (Female) - 1998 in Tane, Tonkolili - Abducted and detained.

Conteh, Ramatu (Female) - 1994 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced. Assaulted.

Conteh, Regina (Female) age 24 - Property destroyed.

Conteh, Sabina (Female) - 1998 in Diang, Koinadugu - Abducted. Assaulted.

Conteh, Sai (Female) age 65 - 1999 in Kakua, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Conteh, Saidu (Male) - Displaced. Killed.

Conteh, Sakumba (Male) age 38 - 1999 in Western Area - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Conteh, Salieu (Male) age 13 - 1996 in Kenema - Killed.

Conteh, Sampa (Female) - Killed.

Conteh, Sampa (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.

Conteh, Samuel (Male) - 1994 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Killed.

Conteh, Samuel (Male) - 1999 - Property destroyed. Killed.

Conteh, Samuel (Male) age 31 - 1995 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Conteh, Sandaems (Male) - 1998 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Conteh, Sandayama (Male) - 1998 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Killed.

Conteh, Sandima (Male) - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Killed.

Conteh, Santigie (Male) - 1998 in Port Loko - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Conteh, Santigie (Male) - 1999 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Assaulted. Killed.

Conteh, Santigie (Male) - Killed.

Conteh, Santigie (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.

Conteh, Santigie (Male) age 19 - 1999 in Kholifa Mabang, Tonkolili - Extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Conteh, Santigie (Male) age 27 - 1996 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Conteh, Sao (Female) - 1993 in Niawa, Kenema - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Conteh, Sarah (Female) - 1998 in Bombali - Property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Conteh, Sarah (Female) age 45 - Displaced.

Conteh, Sarah (Female) age 60 - 1998 in Wara-Wara Bafodia, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Conteh, Sarjoh (Male) - Killed.

Conteh, Sarjoh (Male) age 26 - 1999 in Marampa, Port Loko - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Conteh, Sarrah (Female) age 42 - 1998 - Property looted.

Conteh, Sasa (Female) - 1998 in Wara-Wara Bafodia, Koinadugu - Property looted. Forced to labour.

Conteh, Senesie (Male) - 1997 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Property looted. Abducted.

Conteh, Senesie (Male) age 74 - 2000 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed.

Conteh, Seray (Female) - 1998 in Tane, Tonkolili - Abducted and detained.

Conteh, Sheika (Male) age 32 - 1997 - Extorted and property looted. Forced to labour. Limb amputated.

Conteh, Sheku (Male) - 1993 in Koya, Port Loko - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Conteh, Sheku (Male) - 1999 in Diang, Koinadugu - Extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Conteh, Sheku (Male) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Killed.

Conteh, Sheku (Male) - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Killed.

Conteh, Sheku (Male) - 1991 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Killed.

Conteh, Siaka (Male) age 73 - 1993 - Killed.

Conteh, Sidique (Male) - Assaulted.

Conteh, Sidique (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Conteh, Sidique (Male) age 18 - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Conteh, Solomon (Male) age 33 - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted and tortured.

Conteh, Somgbo (Male) age 58 - 1998 - Abducted. Tortured and limb amputated.

Conteh, Soner (Male) age 25 - 1998 in Diang, Koinadugu - Abducted.

Conteh, Sorie (Male) - 1999 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Conteh, Sorie (Male) - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Conteh, Sorie (Male) - 1999 in Safroko Limba, Bombali - Displaced. Detained. Killed.

Conteh, Sorie (Male) - 1998 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Conteh, Sorie (Male) age 29 - 1998 in Kamara, Kono - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Conteh, Sorie (Male) age 35 - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Assaulted. Killed.

Conteh, Sorie (Male) age 43 - 1994 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed.

Conteh, Sorie (Male) age 45 - 1998 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Displaced. Tortured and limb amputated.

Conteh, Sorie (Male) age 49 - 1998 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted.

Conteh, Sulaiman (Male) - 1996 - Abducted and detained.

Conteh, Sulaiman (Male) - 1998 - Killed.

Conteh, Sullay (Male) - 1998 in Wara-Wara Bafodia, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Conteh, Sullay (Female) - 1996 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted.

Conteh, Sylvester (Male) age 45 - 1992 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Conteh, Tamba (Male) - Displaced and property destroyed.

Conteh, Tenneh (Female) age 27 - 1994 in Wandor, Kenema - Property looted.

Conteh, Tenneh (Female) age 28 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Assaulted and limb amputated.

Conteh, Titi (Female) - Displaced. Killed.

Conteh, Umaru (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.

Conteh, Umaru (Male) age 61 - Displaced and extorted.

Conteh, Vandi (Male) - 1991 in Kwamebai Krim, Bonthe - Property looted.

Conteh, Wandeh (Male) age 10 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Conteh, Wilson (Male) - 1994 in Konike Barina, Tonkolili - Assaulted. Killed.

Conteh, Yabu (Female) - 1997 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Killed.

Conteh, Yabundu (Male) - 1999 in Biriwa, Bombali - Displaced. Tortured.

Conteh, Yaka (Male) - 1999 in Leibasgayahun, Bombali - Killed.

Conteh, Yannah (Female) - 1999 in Leibasgayahun, Bombali - Killed.

Conteh, Yaother (Female) - 1998 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Killed.

Conteh, Yayah (Male) age 30 - 1999 in Biriwa, Bombali - Property looted. Abducted. Stripped.

Conteh, Yeabu (Female) age 30 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained.

Conteh, Yeankon (Female) - 1999 in Leibasgayahun, Bombali - Displaced and property looted.

Conteh, Yeanoh (Female) age 56 - 1999 in Koya, Port Loko - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Conteh, Yeanor (Female) age 41 - 1998 in Bombali - Killed.

Conteh, Yoyonthor (Female) - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Killed.

Conteh, Zainab (Female) age 20 - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed.

Cookson, Alfred (Male) - Displaced. Killed.

Cookson, Michael (Male) - Displaced. Killed.

Coomber, Alhaji Mustapha (Male) - 1995 in Western Area - Killed.

Coomber, Aruna (Male) age 53 - 1991 - Property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Coomber, Hawa (Female) age 31 - 1991 in Niawa, Kenema - Displaced.

Coomber, Lansana (Male) age 41 - 1991 in Niawa, Kenema - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Coomber, Lukiatu (Female) age 13 - 1992 in Dodo, Kenema - Displaced. Killed.

Coomber, Morie (Male) - 1995 in Banta Mokele, Moyamba - Detained. Killed.

Coomber, Mustapha (Male) - 1991 in Niawa, Kenema - Displaced. Killed.

Coomber, Musu (Female) age 55 - 1993 in Niawa, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed.

Coomber, Patrick (Male) age 43 - 1996 in Niawa Lenga, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Coomber, Sheku (Male) age 35 - Property destroyed. Detained.

Coomber, Sounah (Female) age 44 - 1997 in Mandu, Kailahun - Assaulted and tortured.

Cooper, Aruna (Male) - 1991 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Cooper, Momoh (Male) - Killed.

Copper, Agnes (Female) - 1994 - Property looted and destroyed.

Corpu, Jaia (Male) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Killed.

Crown, Hassan (Male) - 1991 in Badjia, Bo District - Abducted and detained.

Daa, Nanah (Female) - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Tortured. Killed.

Dabani, Slepther age 39 - 1991 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour.

Dabeni, Baindu (Female) age 21 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Dabeni, Joe (Male) age 10 - 1991 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Dabeni, Kpano (Male) age 13 - 1991 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Displaced. Assaulted.

Dabenni, Malikie (Male) age 58 - 1991 in Nongowa, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Daberrrie, Tiangay (Female) age 30 - 1991 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Dabo, Fatimah (Female) - 1999 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Property destroyed. Killed.

Dabo, Murrie (Male) - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Abducted.

Dabo, Numa (Female) - 1997 - Displaced. Abducted. Tortured.

Daboh, Alhassan (Male) - 1998 in Upper Bambara , Kailahun - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Daboh, Bockarie (Male) age 41 - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Daboh, Femusu (Female) age 37 - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Displaced.

Daboh, Foday (Male) - 1999 - Property looted and destroyed. Killed.

Daboh, Franklin (Male) age 33 - 1995 in Kowa, Moyamba - Property destroyed. Abducted.

Daboh, Hawa (Female) - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Killed.

Daboh, Isata (Female) age 64 - 1998 in Koinadugu - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Daboh, Jenneh (Female) - 1991 in Kenema - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained.

Assaulted.

Daboh, John (Male) - 1995 in Kowa, Moyamba - Abducted. Assaulted.

Daboh, Kanfata (Male) age 45 - 1998 in Neini, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Daboh, Kelfa (Male) age 29 - 1998 in Diang, Koinadugu - Property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Daboh, Lamina (Male) - 1994 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced. Assaulted. Killed.

Daboh, Mohamed (Male) age 33 - 1998 in Western Area - Property looted.

Daboh, Saio (Female) - Displaced and property looted.

Daboh, Sorie (Male) - 1998 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Stripped and limb amputated.

Dabontah, Marrah (Male) age 46 - 1998 in Diang, Koinadugu - Displaced.

Dabor, Alhaji (Male) - 1994 in Wunde, Bo District - Killed.

Dabor, Alusine (Male) - Assaulted.

Dabor, Fatmata (Female) age 15 - 1998 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Extorted. Abducted and detained.

Dabor, Finah (Female) age 18 - 1998 in Diang, Koinadugu - Limb amputated.

Dabor, Kumba (Female) age 25 - 1998 in Neini, Koinadugu - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Dabor, Leba (Male) age 60 - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted.

Dabor, Sarah (Female) age 9 - 1999 in Diang, Koinadugu - Forced to labour. Tortured.

Dabor, Silatie (Male) age 9 - 1994 in Bumpah, Bo District - Killed.

Dabor, Sinkarie (Female) age 40 - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed.

Dabor, Yama (Female) - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Killed.

Dabor, Yayah (Male) age 19 - 1998 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Dafie, Tommy (Male) - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Property destroyed.

Daiwodeh, Finda (Female) age 30 - 2000 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Limb amputated. Killed.

Daiwodeh, Sia (Female) age 1 - 2000 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Dakbawa, Ansumana (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced.

Dakoi, Brima (Male) age 43 - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Dakoi, Kenie (Male) - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Killed.

Dakoi, Lahai (Male) - 1992 in Barri, Pujehun - Detained.

Dakowa, Gbendeh (Male) age 38 - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Assaulted.

Dakowa, Hassan (Male) age 32 - 1993 - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Dakowa, Jeneba (Female) - Property looted.

Dakowa, John (Male) age 12 - 1991 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Detained.

Dakowa, John (Male) age 46 - 1991 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted. Killed.

Dale, Alfred (Male) age 48 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Dale, Alie (Male) - 1998 in Kassunko, Koinadugu - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Damawah, Jayah (Male) - 1991 in Langorama, Kenema - Abducted and detained.

Damba, Francis (Male) age 61 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Damba, Lansana (Male) - Killed.

Damba, Musa (Male) - Displaced. Killed.

Damba, Paul (Male) - Displaced. Tortured and stripped. Killed.

Damba, Saao (Female) - Killed.

Danda, Wuya (Female) - 1997 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Property looted.

Daniel, Fassah (Male) age 9 - 1998 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Dankay, Serry (Male) age 54 - 1998 in Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted, tortured, stripped and limb amputated.

Dankeh, Sheray (Female) - 1998 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Danmya, Sahr (Male) - 2000 in Kamara, Kono - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and stripped.

Daramy, Alpha (Male) - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted.

Daramy, Aminata (Female) age 35 - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed.

Daramy, Fatou (Female) age 60 - 1996 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed. Limb amputated.

Daramy, Gibrilla (Male) age 35 - 1992 in Kono - Displaced.

Daramy, Ismile (Male) age 38 - 1996 - Abducted and detained. Tortured and limb amputated.

Daru, Brima (Male) - 1993 in Jawie, Kailahun - Killed.
 Dasahr, Komba (Male) age 36 - 1999 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced. Tortured and stripped.
 Dassama, Vandy (Male) - 1997 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Assaulted. Killed.
 Dauda, Agnes (Female) - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Dauda, Alpha (Male) age 11 - Displaced.
 Dauda, Amie (Female) - 1997 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Dauda, Ansumana (Male) age 38 - 1995 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Dauda, Baimba (Male) age 63 - 1996 - Displaced. Abducted. Killed.
 Dauda, Bockarie (Male) age 44 - 1996 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Killed.
 Dauda, Foday (Male) age 27 - 1998 in Koya, Kenema - Displaced.
 Dauda, Ibrahim (Male) age 65 - 1994 in Nimikoro, Kono - Property destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted.
 Dauda, John (Male) - 1994 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Abducted. Tortured. Killed.
 Dauda, Juliana (Female) age 26 - 1994 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted.
 Dauda, Junisa (Male) age 60 - Displaced.
 Dauda, Keineh (Male) - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Detained. Assaulted. Killed.
 Dauda, Madio (Male) - 1996 in Bagbe, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Dauda, Mafoe (Female) - 1994 in Sielenga, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Dauda, Robert (Male) - 1997 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Property looted. Killed.
 Dauda, Sahr (Male) - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.
 Dauda, Sallu (Male) age 78 - 1997 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Killed.
 Dauda, Sia (Female) - 1996 in Gbane, Kono - Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.
 Dauda, Swaray (Male) age 23 - 1991 in Kakua, Bo District - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 David, Jusu (Male) - 1995 in Banta Mokele, Moyamba - Killed.
 David, Lahai (Male) - 1991 in Niawa Lenga, Bo District - Killed.
 Davies, Alfred (Male) - 1991 in Langorama, Kenema - Killed.
 Davies, Christian (Male) - Property destroyed. Detained. Assaulted.
 Davies, Francis (Male) age 6 - 1999 in Western Area - Assaulted.
 Davies, Karri - 1995 in Bonthe - Killed.
 Davies, Olive (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Tortured.
 Davies, Regina (Female) age 34 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Davies, Samuel (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Property looted.
 Davies, Victoria (Female) age 32 - 1999 in Western Area - Extorted. Abducted.
 Davowa, Amara Fomba (Male) - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Killed.
 Davowa, Brima Amara (Male) age 55 - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.
 Davowa, Mou (Male) age 46 - 1993 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Daw, Tommy (Male) - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Dawa, Lansana (Male) age 21 - 1993 - Displaced. Detained.
 Dawu, Abdul Raman (Male) age 25 - 1998 - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.
 Dayatu, Maama (Female) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Displaced. Killed.
 Dedewai, Lansana (Male) - Abducted. Killed.
 Deen, Marie (Female) age 52 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Deen, Sheku (Male) - 1996 in Niawa Lenga, Bo District - Assaulted and tortured.
 Deen-Kanu, Marie (Female) - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Defie, Yatta (Female) - 1994 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced.
 Deinkeh, Muctarr (Male) - 1995 in Dibia, Port Loko - Displaced. Forced to labour.
 Deinor, Ben (Male) - 2000 - Killed.
 Demby, Joseph (Male) - 1996 in Kongbora, Moyamba - Killed.
 Demby, Kadie (Female) age 23 - 1994 in Komboya, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted.
 Demby, Karimu (Male) - 1997 - Assaulted.

Demby, Yatta (Female) age 45 - 1994 in Tunkia, Kenema - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Demby, Yatta (Female) age 59 - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced.

Demoh, Luseni (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Killed.

Deoud, Joseph (Male) age 50 - 1997 - Property looted. Detained. Assaulted.

Dick, Gibriel (Male) - 1996 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Tortured.

Dixon, Julius (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Assaulted.

Dixon, Mary (Female) age 41 - 1997 in Western Area - Property looted and destroyed.

Dixon, Torboh (Male) age 33 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Dobbeuy, Gbassay (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.

Dobor, Kallie (Male) age 58 - 1999 in Dia, Kailahun - Property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Dodo, Momoh (Male) - 1993 in Malen, Pujehun - Killed.

Dodor, Karim (Male) age 16 - 1998 - Forced to labour. Tortured.

Dole, Sarah (Female) - Killed.

Dolleh, Ansumana (Male) - 1994 in Badjia, Bo District - Abducted.

Dorkoh, Brima (Male) - Killed.

Dormoi, Lahai (Male) - 1991 in Kagboro, Moyamba - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Dowie, Morray (Male) - 1994 in Simbaru, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted.

Dresser, Aiah (Male) - 1998 in Gorama Kono, Kono - Displaced. Abducted. Killed.

Dressy, Lahai (Male) age 56 - 1991 - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Dugba, Abigail (Female) age 18 - Displaced.

Dugba, Aiah (Male) - 1998 in Soa, Kono - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Dugba, Gilo (Female) age 27 - 1992 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Dugba, Jeneh (Female) age 13 - 1997 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Abducted. Assaulted.

Dugba, Kula (Female) age 60 - 1993 in Sielenga, Bo District - Property destroyed. Detained. Assaulted.

Dugba, Samuel (Male) - Property destroyed.

Dukra, Amara (Male) - Killed.

Dukulay, Ahmadu Fuad Ansumana (Male) age 54 - 1996 in Gaura, Kenema - Displaced.

Dukulay, Kemoh (Male) age 19 - 1991 in Tunkia, Kenema - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Dukulay, Momodu (Male) - 1994 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Dukulay, Morie (Male) age 22 - 1995 - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Dukulay, Sumaika Bamasie (Male) age 16 - 1991 in Lei, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Dulli, Hannah (Female) - 1994 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Property looted and destroyed. Killed.

Dulli, Morie (Male) - 1994 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Dumbuya, A.M. (Male) - 2000 in Sanda Magblonthor, Port Loko - Displaced. Detained.

Dumbuya, Ahmed (Male) age 36 - 1999 in Western Area - Extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Dumbuya, Alpha Momoh (Male) - 1999 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Assaulted. Killed.

Dumbuya, Assanatu (Female) age 19 - 1995 in Magbema, Kambia - Displaced.

Dumbuya, Ballie (Male) - 2000 in Tonko Limba, Kambia - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Dumbuya, Brima (Male) - 1999 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted. Tortured.

Dumbuya, Fatmata (Female) age 44 - Killed.

Dumbuya, Foday (Male) - 1999 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Displaced. Killed.

Dumbuya, Francis (Male) age 33 - 1999 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Displaced.

Dumbuya, Gibrilla (Male) age 28 - 1997 in Kongbora, Moyamba - Abducted.

Dumbuya, Kappru (Male) - Assaulted.

Dumbuya, Komrabai (Male) age 53 - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed.

Dumbuya, Lamin (Male) age 23 - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Displaced and property looted.

Dumbuya, Mabinty (Female) age 21 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed. Detained.

Dumbuya, Maferé (Female) age 50 - 1995 in Magbema, Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed.

Dumbuya, Matiatu (Female) - 2000 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Abducted. Killed.

Dumbuya, Mbalu (Female) age 49 - 1992 - Displaced and property looted.

Dumbuya, Mohamed (Male) age 20 - 1999 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Abducted. Killed.

Dumbuya, Mohamed (Male) age 30 - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Dumbuya, Mohamed (Male) age 30 - 1998 - Abducted and detained. Assaulted, tortured and limb amputated.

Dumbuya, Ousman (Male) age 32 - 1996 in Kambia - Property looted and destroyed.

Dumbuya, Saidu (Male) - 1999 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Dumbuya, Sama (Male) age 44 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Dumbuya, Sanku (Male) age 22 - 1999 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Killed.

Dumbuya, Sheka (Male) age 46 - 1998 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Displaced and property looted.

Duwadu, Komba (Male) - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Killed.

Duwah, Mohamed (Male) age 63 - 1993 in Niawa, Kenema - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Duwai, Theresa (Female) - 1998 in Sowa, Pujehun - Abducted.

Dyfan, Sowa (Male) - 1996 in Kamajei, Moyamba - Killed.

Ebb, Solomon (Male) - Property looted.

Eddie, Ensa (Male) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced.

Edmond, Priscilla (Female) age 71 - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed.

Edwards, Franklin Tibome (Male) age 27 - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Killed.

Egula, Robert (Male) - 1995 in Malegohun, Kenema - Property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Eku, Edmond (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Assaulted.

Ellie, Abdulai (Male) age 21 - 1993 in Kakua, Bo District - Killed.

Ellie, Alpha (Male) age 46 - 1993 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Ellie, Ann (Female) - 1994 in Komboya, Bo District - Displaced.

Ellie, Hotta (Male) - 1997 in Sittia, Bonthe - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Ellie, James (Male) - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Ellie, John (Male) - 1994 in Komboya, Bo District - Killed.

Ellie, John Hotaga (Male) - 1995 in Komboya, Bo District - Displaced.

Ellie, Saffi (Female) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Killed.

Ellie, Sahr (Male) - 1999 in Sandor, Kono - Killed.

Ellie, Sowa (Male) age 40 - Displaced and property looted.

Ellie, Vandi (Male) - Forced to labour.

Ensa, Murana (Male) age 33 - 1991 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed.

Ensa, Vandy (Male) - 1991 - Extorted and property destroyed.

Ensay, Ansu (Male) - 1995 - Property looted.

Ensay, Fattu (Female) - 1994 - Displaced. Abducted. Killed.

Ensay, James (Male) age 43 - 1995 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Ensay, Joe (Male) - 1994 - Displaced. Abducted.

Ernest, Fatmata Mabodo (Female) - 1995 in Yawboko, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted.

Ernest, Joe (Male) - 1996 in Kori, Moyamba - Displaced.

Ernest, Middie (Female) - 1995 in Banta Mokele, Moyamba - Abducted and detained.

Fabba, Keine (Male) - Extorted.

Fadika, Alieu (Male) - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Fagara, Gardiru (Male) age 64 - 2000 in Kakua, Bo District - Displaced.

Fahnbulleh, Hamed (Male) age 45 - Extorted. Detained. Assaulted.

Fahnbulleh, Ousman (Male) - 1994 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Killed.

Fahnbulleh, Taleh - 1994 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Killed.

Fahnbulleh, Umaru (Male) - 1994 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Killed.

Fallah, Mohamed (Male) - 1996 in Tikonko, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Stripped and limb amputated.

Fallah, Musa (Male) - 1991 in Kissi Tongi, Kailahun - Killed.

Fallay, Brima (Male) age 37 - 1992 in Bumpeh, Moyamba - Displaced. Abducted. Assaulted.

Fallay, James (Male) age 48 - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Killed.

Fallay, Moiguan (Male) - 1991 - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.

Fallay, Mustapha (Male) age 60 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Fallon, Kamor (Female) age 54 - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted.

Fallon, Mohamed (Male) age 60 - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and

destroyed.

Fallow, Alhaji Alieu (Male) age 51 - 1997 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Property looted. Assaulted.

Fambuleh, Momodu (Male) age 40 - Displaced and property looted.

Fambuleh, Musa (Male) - 1992 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Killed.

Fambuleh, Taweh (Male) - 1992 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Killed.

Fambuleh, Umaru (Male) - 1992 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Killed.

Fandah, Sia (Female) - 2000 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted.

Fandawayai, Joe (Male) - 1995 in Bonthe - Killed.

Fanday, Francis Foday (Male) age 45 - 1997 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Forced to labour. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.

Fandewai, Abu (Male) - 1995 in Bonthe - Displaced.

Fandewai, Agnes (Female) age 38 - 1995 in Sogbini, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted.

Fandewai, Brima (Male) - 1995 in Bonthe - Property looted and destroyed.

Fandewai, Margaret (Female) - 1995 in Bonthe - Killed.

Fandewai, Mohamed (Male) - 1995 - Killed.

Fandewai, Mohamed (Male) - 1996 in Sogbini, Bonthe - Displaced.

Fandewai, Muyatu (Female) - 1995 in Bonthe - Killed.

Fandewai, Nancy (Female) - 1995 in Bonthe - Killed.

Fandewai, Regina (Female) - 1999 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Detained.

Farma, Ansu (Male) age 22 - 1997 - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Farma, Fatu (Female) - 1995 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Abducted.

Farma, Lansana (Male) - 1995 in Badjia, Bo District - Killed.

Farma, Samuel Suma (Male) - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced and property destroyed.

Farma Mahalor, E.C. (Male) - 1991 in Kwamebai Krim, Bonthe - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Farmer, Julius (Male) age 39 - Displaced. Assaulted.

Farmer, Mohamed (Male) age 30 - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Displaced. Assaulted.

Farrow, Alhaji (Male) age 53 - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted.

Farrawah, Bockarie (Male) age 44 - 1991 in Peje Bongre, Kailahun - Forced to labour.

Fasai, Tommy (Male) age 33 - 2000 in Makpele, Pujehun - Stripped.

Fasukulu, Sullay (Male) age 80 - 1999 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Assaulted.

Fasuluku, Joseph (Male) age 46 - 1996 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Fatoma, Abdulai (Male) age 53 - 1997 in Wandor, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Fatoma, Alhaji Sumaila (Male) - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Stripped.

Fatoma, Allieu (Male) age 32 - 1992 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Assaulted. Killed.

Fatoma, Ansumana (Male) age 44 - 1991 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Fatoma, Brima (Male) age 20 - 1995 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Killed.

Fatoma, Bunde (Male) age 75 - 1992 in Kissi Tongi, Kailahun - Extorted and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Fatoma, Jaiah (Male) - 1992 in Wunde, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Tortured and stripped.

Fatoma, Komba (Male) - Killed.

Fatoma, Marian (Female) - 1994 - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Fatoma, Mohamed (Male) - 1991 in Badjia, Bo District - Property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Fatoma, Patrick (Male) - 1998 in Follasaba Dembelia, Koinadugu - Displaced.

Fatoma, Sulaiman (Male) - 1991 in Lugbu, Bo District - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Fatoma, Tiangay (Female) - 1997 in Wandor, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Fatta, Alhaji Abdul (Male) age 34 - 1994 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Fawundu, David Abu (Male) age 24 - 1991 - Displaced and extorted. Assaulted.

Fawundu, Koi (Male) age 20 - Assaulted. Killed.

Fayah, Morrison (Male) - 1994 - Property looted and destroyed.

Fayia, Bockarie (Male) - 1991 in Nongowa, Kenema - Killed.

Fea, Mondeh (Female) - Property looted. Abducted and detained.

Fea, Tamba (Male) - Property looted. Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.
 Feika, Bockarie (Male) - 1996 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced. Killed.
 Feika, Bockarie (Male) age 25 - 1997 in Dama, Kenema - Displaced. Killed.
 Feika, Braima (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.
 Feika, Brima (Male) age 42 - 1994 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced. Tortured.
 Feika, Gassimu (Male) age 63 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Property destroyed. Killed.
 Feika, Hawa (Female) - Displaced.
 Feika, James (Male) - 1996 - Killed.
 Feika, Juliet (Female) - 1996 - Killed.
 Feika, Lamin (Male) age 60 - Displaced.
 Feika, Massa (Female) - 1992 in Bagbo, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Feika, Mohamed (Male) age 36 - 1991 - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Feika, Mohamed (Male) age 39 - 1996 in Jong, Bonthe - Abducted. Assaulted. Killed.
 Feika, Momoh (Male) age 63 - 1991 in Niawa, Kenema - Displaced and property looted. Abducted.
 Feika, Momoh (Male) age 73 - 1993 in Niawa, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Feika, Musu (Female) - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Feika, Swiaman (Male) age 60 - 1994 in Niawa, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted. Assaulted and tortured.
 Feika, Umu (Female) age 66 - 1995 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Displaced.
 Feika, Vandí (Male) - Displaced.
 Feingui, Tamba (Male) - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Abducted. Tortured.
 Fellie, Kenneth (Male) - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Assaulted.
 Femba, Tei (Female) age 69 - 1992 in Soa, Kono - Displaced. Killed.
 Fengai, Aiah (Male) age 21 - 1998 in Fiama, Kono - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.
 Ferba, Bondu (Female) age 58 - 2000 - Killed.
 Fessan, Momoh (Male) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Property destroyed.
 Filkinger, Monda (Male) - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Fillah, Mohamed (Male) age 28 - 1991 - Abducted and detained.
 Fillie, Aiah (Male) age 23 - 1997 in Gbane, Kono - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Fillie, Francis (Male) - 1995 - Forced to labour. Killed.
 Fillie, Isata (Female) age 39 - 1997 in Gbane, Kono - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained.
 Fillie, James (Male) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted.
 Fillie, Komba (Male) age 14 - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Fillie, Santigie (Male) - Displaced.
 Finah, Mango (Male) - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Abducted.
 Finnoh, Joseph B. (Male) - 1995 in Kowa, Moyamba - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Finnoh, Tamba (Male) age 39 - 1998 in Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.
 Finnoh I, Alhaji Kandeh (Male) - 1998 - Displaced.
 Finoh, Aminata (Female) age 20 - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained.
 Finoh, Dunor (Female) - Abducted and detained.
 Fisal, Mohamed (Male) - 2000 in Magbema, Kambia - Forced to labour.
 Fllie, Sahr (Male) age 28 - 1998 in Kamara, Kono - Property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Fobbie, Joseph M.O. (Male) age 69 - 1997 in Bumpeh, Moyamba - Property looted.
 Focke, Fayia (Male) age 29 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed.
 Fodanah, Serray (Male) age 52 - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Displaced.
 Foday, Alice (Female) age 23 - 1999 in Kakua, Bo District - Property looted.
 Foday, Alpha (Male) age 38 - 1991 in Kono - Displaced.
 Foday, Amie (Female) - 1992 in Kakua, Bo District - Abducted. Killed.
 Foday, Aminata (Female) age 6 - 1995 in Dodo, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Foday, Aruna (Male) age 35 - 1996 in Baoma, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Foday, Augustine (Male) age 1 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.
 Foday, Baima (Male) age 44 - 1994 in Luawa, Kailahun - Extorted.
 Foday, Baidu (Female) age 19 - Assaulted.
 Foday, Bockarie (Male) age 16 - 1992 in Kakua, Bo District - Forced to labour.
 Foday, Bockarie (Male) age 44 - 1991 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Foday, Bockarie (Male) age 45 - 1997 - Displaced. Assaulted.

Foday, Brima (Male) age 45 - 1995 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Displaced.

Foday, Brima (Male) age 50 - 1998 - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Foday, Charles (Male) age 42 - 1995 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Foday, Ensa (Male) - Killed.

Foday, Ensa (Male) age 32 - 1992 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced.

Foday, Ernest (Male) - 1995 in Sogbini, Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Foday, Fatmata (Female) - 1994 in Jong, Bonthe - Abducted and detained.

Foday, Finda (Female) age 33 - 1999 in Western Area - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Foday, George (Male) age 50 - Property destroyed. Tortured.

Foday, Hawa (Female) - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted.

Foday, Hawa (Female) age 28 - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.

Foday, Iye (Female) age 40 - 1998 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Foday, Jebbeh (Female) - Killed.

Foday, Jeneba (Female) age 30 - 1995 in Kwamebai Krim, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted. Abducted. Assaulted.

Foday, Joe (Male) age 48 - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Foday, Joseph (Male) age 25 - 1992 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Foday, Juannah (Male) age 18 - 1991 in Upper Bambara, Kailahun - Abducted. Killed.

Foday, Jusufu (Male) - 1995 in Komboya, Bo District - Assaulted. Killed.

Foday, Kemoh (Male) age 23 - 1994 in Small Bo, Kenema - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted and stripped.

Foday, Kennie (Male) - 1991 in Simbaru, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Foday, Kor (Male) age 29 - 1995 - Extorted. Abducted. Tortured and stripped.

Foday, Kumba (Female) - 1998 in Fiama, Kono - Displaced.

Foday, Lahai (Male) - 1995 in Dodo, Kenema - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Foday, M.K. - 1997 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Killed.

Foday, Majoe (Female) - 1995 in Baoma, Bo District - Killed.

Foday, Malta (Female) - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Foday, Mariama (Female) - 1992 in Peje Bongre, Kailahun - Property looted. Killed.

Foday, Mariama (Female) age 31 - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Foday, Mariama (Female) age 37 - 1995 in Sogbini, Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Foday, Matha (Female) - 1999 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Foday, Mattu (Female) age 4 - 1995 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Foday, Miatta (Female) age 45 - Displaced.

Foday, Mohamed (Male) - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Foday, Mohamed (Male) age 20 - 1997 in Kono - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Foday, Moinah (Male) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Assaulted.

Foday, Moinya (Male) age 48 - 1994 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Killed.

Foday, Momoh (Male) age 61 - 1996 in Barri, Pujehun - Extorted. Detained. Tortured.

Foday, Ngadah (Male) age 52 - 1994 in Simbaru, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Foday, Saffa James (Male) age 42 - 1994 in Banta Mokele, Moyamba - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Foday, Sam (Male) - Killed.

Foday, Sankoh (Male) - Displaced and property looted.

Foday, Sheku (Male) - 1998 in Masungbala, Kambia - Abducted. Assaulted. Killed.

Foday, Sheku (Male) - 1997 in Mandu, Kailahun - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted. Killed.

Foday, Tenneh (Female) - 1996 in Small Bo, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Foday, Yei (Female) age 35 - 1998 in Samu, Kambia - Abducted. Assaulted.

Foday Jr, Sam (Male) age 5 - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Foday Maah Gbondo, Shurger (Male) age 60 - Displaced.

Foday Musa, Prince (Male) age 27 - 1995 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Displaced and property looted.

Fodaymah, Marjoe (Male) - 1995 in Badjia, Bo District - Killed.

Foddie, Jeneba Jadae (Female) age 64 - 1991 in Niawa, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Fode, Momoh (Male) age 59 - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Killed.

Fodie, Mathia (Male) - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Displaced.

Fodie, Watta (Female) age 71 - 1991 - Abducted.

Fofana, Abu Bakarr (Male) - Killed.

Fofana, Alhaji (Male) age 35 - 1998 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed.

Fofana, Alhaji Tejan (Male) - 1995 in Tikonko, Bo District - Property looted and destroyed.

Fofana, Alikalie (Male) age 43 - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Fofana, Fatmata (Female) age 20 - 1997 in Western Area - Displaced.

Fofana, Foday (Male) - 1998 in Kissi Teng, Kailahun - Property destroyed. Killed.

Fofana, Harding (Male) - 1994 in Follosaba Dembelia, Koinadugu - Detained. Killed.

Fofana, Ibrahim (Male) age 17 - 2000 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Assaulted.

Fofana, Ibrahim (Male) age 46 - 1999 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Property looted. Abducted. Tortured.

Fofana, Karmoh (Male) - 1996 in Kamajei, Moyamba - Killed.

Fofana, Lahai (Male) - 1993 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Assaulted.

Fofana, Lausana (Male) age 62 - 1992 - Displaced.

Fofana, Mohamed (Male) - Property destroyed.

Fofana, Mohamed (Male) age 23 - 1995 in Moyamba - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Fofana, Mohamed (Male) age 50 - 1993 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Fofana, Morlai (Male) age 60 - 1997 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Fofana, Mustapha (Male) - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Fofana, Saidu (Male) age 47 - Displaced.

Fofana, Samuel (Male) age 49 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Tortured.

Fofana, Umaru (Male) - 1995 in Tikonko, Bo District - Extorted.

Fofanah, Abass (Male) age 15 - 1997 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Abducted and detained.

Fofanah, Abdulai (Male) age 40 - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted.

Fofanah, Abdullai (Male) - 1994 in Neini, Koinadugu - Killed.

Fofanah, Abdulson Samuel (Male) age 51 - 1999 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed.

Fofanah, Abibatu (Female) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Fofanah, Abu Bakarr (Male) - 2000 in Samu, Kambia - Forced to labour.

Fofanah, Abu Bakarr (Male) age 10 - 1997 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Fofanah, Abu Bakarr (Male) age 34 - 1998 in Gorama Mende, Kenema - Extorted and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Fofanah, Abukala (Male) age 29 - Displaced.

Fofanah, Ahmed (Male) age 47 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted. Tortured.

Fofanah, Alhaji (Male) age 6 - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Killed.

Fofanah, Alhaji Ibrahim (Male) - 1995 in Benducha, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Fofanah, Alhaji Tejan (Male) - 1995 in Dodo, Kenema - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted.

Fofanah, Alhassan (Male) age 37 - 2000 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Forced to labour. Tortured.

Fofanah, Alie (Male) age 54 - 1994 in Kono - Abducted and detained.

Fofanah, Alieu (Male) age 48 - 1995 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Fofanah, Alusine (Male) - 1997 in Samu, Kambia - Extorted. Forced to labour.

Fofanah, Amidu (Male) age 15 - 1999 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Killed.

Fofanah, Aminata (Female) - 1995 - Killed.

Fofanah, Aminata (Female) age 39 - 1999 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Fofanah, Aminata (Female) age 65 - 1999 - Displaced.

Fofanah, Brima (Male) - 1995 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Killed.

Fofanah, Demaba (Male) - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Fofanah, Fatmata (Female) - 1995 in Kagboro, Moyamba - Displaced.

Fofanah, Fatmata (Female) - Displaced and property looted. Abducted.

Fofanah, Fattu (Female) - 1991 - Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.

Fofanah, Finda (Female) age 15 - 1998 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Killed.

Fofanah, Foday (Male) - 1997 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted. Killed.

Fofanah, Foday (Male) - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Killed.

Fofanah, Foday (Male) age 31 - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Fofanah, Hassan (Male) - 1993 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Killed.

Fofanah, Hawa (Female) - 1991 - Displaced.

Fofanah, Ibrahim (Male) - 1995 in Bumpeh, Moyamba - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Fofanah, Ibrahim (Male) - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Fofanah, Ibrahim (Male) age 48 - 1998 in Kamara, Kono - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Fofanah, Isata (Female) age 36 - 1994 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed.

Fofanah, Isatu (Female) age 30 - 1998 in Western Area - Forced to labour.

Fofanah, Jeneba (Female) age 10 - 1998 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Killed.

Fofanah, John (Male) - 1997 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Killed.

Fofanah, Kaday (Female) age 25 - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Killed.

Fofanah, Kadiatu (Female) - 1995 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Fofanah, Kadiatu (Female) age 38 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Detained. Limb amputated.

Fofanah, Karim (Male) - 1999 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Killed.

Fofanah, Katumu (Female) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Property looted.

Fofanah, Keifala (Male) age 41 - Displaced and property looted.

Fofanah, Lamin (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced.

Fofanah, Lansana (Male) - 1998 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Fofanah, Mabinty (Female) age 57 - 1995 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Property looted.

Fofanah, Maseray (Female) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced.

Fofanah, Mohamed (Male) - 1995 in Bumpeh, Moyamba - Forced to labour. Killed.

Fofanah, Mohamed (Male) - 1998 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed.

Fofanah, Mohamed (Male) - 1992 - Displaced. Killed.

Fofanah, Mohamed (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced. Assaulted. Killed.

Fofanah, Mohamed (Male) - 2000 in Samu, Kambia - Forced to labour.

Fofanah, Mohamed (Male) age 11 - Assaulted.

Fofanah, Mohamed (Male) age 15 - 1998 in Mambolo, Kambia - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Fofanah, Mohamed (Male) age 35 - 1997 in Niawa Lenga, Bo District - Forced to labour.

Fofanah, Mohamed (Male) age 39 - 1998 in Kassunko, Koinadugu - Assaulted and tortured.

Fofanah, Mohamed Moseray (Male) age 53 - 1995 in Bumpeh, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Fofanah, Momodu (Male) - 1995 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Killed.

Fofanah, Momoh (Male) age 32 - 1992 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour. Tortured and stripped.

Fofanah, Mulkou Sulaiman Anthony (Male) age 36 - 1995 in Koya, Port Loko - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Fofanah, Mustapha (Male) - Abducted and detained. Tortured and stripped.

Fofanah, Mustapha (Male) - Displaced.

Fofanah, Numkeh (Male) - 1995 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Fofanah, Saffa (Male) - 1992 - Extorted.

Fofanah, Saidu (Male) age 58 - 1999 - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Fofanah, Saidu (Male) age 60 - 1995 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed.

Fofanah, Salieu (Male) age 27 - 1998 in Imperi, Bonthe - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Fofanah, Sarah (Female) age 40 - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Property looted. Abducted and detained.

Fofanah, Sento (Female) age 15 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Fofanah, Sheku (Male) - 1993 in Sielenga, Bo District - Killed.

Fofanah, Sheriff (Male) - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Fofanah, Sunkarie (Male) - Property looted.

Fofanah, Thomas (Male) age 38 - 1998 in Nimiyama, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Fofanah, Umu (Female) - 2000 in Samu, Kambia - Forced to labour.

Fomba, Aiah (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained.

Fomba, Bockarie - 1992 in Mandu, Kailahun - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Fomba, Bockarie (Male) - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Killed.

Fomba, Kenie (Male) - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Assaulted.

Fomba, Kosia (Male) - 1995 in Upper Bambara , Kailahun - Abducted and detained.

Fomba, Kumba (Female) age 17 - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced.

Fomba, Luna (Female) - 1995 in Upper Bambara , Kailahun - Abducted and detained.

Fomba, Mannah (Male) age 38 - 1993 in Lugbu, Bo District - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Detained. Assaulted.

Fomba, Mustapha K (Male) age 58 - 1997 in Upper Bambara , Kailahun - Extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Fomba, Paul (Male) age 39 - Property destroyed.

Fomba, Sahr (Male) - 1998 in Follosaba Dembelia, Koinadugu - Forced to labour.

Fomba, Sia (Female) age 18 - 1998 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Abducted.

Fomba, Yatta (Female) age 19 - 1991 in Peje Bongre, Kailahun - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Fomolu, Joseph (Male) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Assaulted.

Fomulu, Kenie (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Tortured. Killed.

Fonnie, Martha (Female) age 20 - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Fonuwah, Amara (Male) age 80 - 1994 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Foray, Bondo (Female) age 30 - 1994 in Badjia, Bo District - Property looted and destroyed.

Foray, Francess (Female) age 32 - 1994 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Foray, Joseph (Male) - 1991 in Peje Bongre, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Foray, Komeh (Female) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Foray, Mambu (Male) - 1994 in Badjia, Bo District - Property looted and destroyed. Killed.

Foray, Mohamed Koroma (Male) age 18 - 1994 - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Foray, Paul (Male) - 1991 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Foray, Sarah (Female) age 29 - 1994 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Foray, Sullay (Male) age 71 - 1994 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Forbie, Kanja (Male) - 1997 in Kamajei, Moyamba - Abducted. Assaulted.

Forbie, Lamina (Male) age 46 - 1994 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Property looted.

Forbie, Samuel (Male) age 68 - 1999 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Fornah, Abdulai (Male) - 1998 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Tortured. Killed.

Fornah, Abdulai (Male) - Property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Fornah, Abdulai (Male) - 1998 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Killed.

Fornah, Abu (Male) age 11 - 1994 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Fornah, Abu (Male) age 44 - 1998 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed.

Fornah, Adama (Female) age 23 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Fornah, Alie (Male) age 22 - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Tortured.

Fornah, Alimamy (Male) age 65 - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Fornah, Alpha (Male) - 1998 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Killed.

Fornah, Amadu (Male) age 48 - 1998 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Property destroyed.

Fornah, Amie (Female) - 1994 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Forced to labour.

Fornah, Borbor (Male) age 25 - 1999 in Nongowa, Kenema - Killed.

Fornah, Brima (Male) - 1994 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Fornah, Brima (Male) - 1994 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Displaced. Killed.

Fornah, Brima (Male) - 1995 in Western Area - Killed.

Fornah, Demba (Male) - 1998 in Yawbeko, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Fornah, Fatmata (Female) - 1998 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Killed.

Fornah, Fatu (Female) - 1994 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Fornah, Foday (Male) - 1994 - Killed.

Fornah, Gibriil (Male) age 26 - 1997 - Abducted and detained.

Fornah, Hassana (Male) - 1998 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Killed.

Fornah, Hassana B. (Male) age 43 - 1994 - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour.

Fornah, Hawa (Female) age 53 - 1997 in Kaffu Bullom, Port Loko - Displaced.

Fornah, Hawanatu (Female) age 12 - 1999 in Leibasgayahun, Bombali - Displaced.

Fornah, Ibrahim (Male) - 1999 - Displaced. Killed.

Fornah, Ibrahim (Male) age 57 - 1994 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Fornah, Idrissa (Male) age 58 - 1998 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Fornah, Isatu (Female) age 12 - Abducted and detained.

Fornah, John (Male) age 28 - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.

Fornah, Kadiatu (Female) - 1998 - Tortured.

Fornah, Mabinty (Female) - 1998 in Konike Sande, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Fornah, Maurice (Male) age 11 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Fornah, Maxwell (Male) age 30 - 1999 in Magbema, Kambia - Assaulted.

Fornah, Mbalu (Female) - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Fornah, Memuna (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.

Fornah, Mohamed (Male) age 14 - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Fornah, Mohamed (Male) age 16 - 1999 in Gbendembu Ngowahun, Bombali - Abducted. Assaulted.

Fornah, Ousman (Male) - Displaced and property looted.

Fornah, Rugie (Female) - 1999 in Gbendembu Ngowahun, Bombali - Property looted.

Fornah, Saidu (Male) age 51 - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Fornah, Salier (Male) - 1998 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Killed.

Fornah, Salifu (Male) age 16 - 2000 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Fornah, Sampa (Female) - 1999 in Maforiki, Port Loko - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Fornah, Simbo (Male) - 1991 in Banta Mokele, Moyamba - Killed.

Fornah, Sorie (Male) - 1994 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Fornah, Sorie (Male) - Displaced.

Fornah, Sorie (Male) age 36 - Displaced. Assaulted.

Fornah, Sulaiman (Male) age 31 - 1998 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Displaced.

Fornah, Sullay (Male) - 1994 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Property looted and destroyed.

Fornah, Tamba (Male) age 48 - Assaulted, tortured and stripped.

Fornah, Thaimu (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Forced to labour. Killed.

Fornah, Unisa (Male) age 71 - 1994 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed.

Fornah, Yamba (Male) - 1994 in Loko Massama, Port Loko - Killed.

Fornah, Zinab (Male) age 20 - 1993 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted.

Forni, Aruna (Male) - 1991 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced. Killed.

Forni, Mahen (Female) - 1991 in Badjia, Bo District - Killed.

Forni, Mohamed (Male) - 1991 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Forry, Jeneba (Female) - 1996 in Lugbu, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Forry, Tangay (Female) age 29 - 1994 in Tikonko, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Fortune, Alfred (Male) age 27 - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Fortune, Bockarie (Male) - Killed.

Fortune, Kadie (Female) - 1992 in Malen, Pujehun - Killed.

Fortune, Koroma (Male) - 1998 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Killed.

Fortune, Luccia (Female) age 70 - 1995 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced. Assaulted. Killed.

Fortune, Satta (Female) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced.

Fortune, Vandi (Male) - 1998 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Foryoh, Sahr (Male) age 45 - 1995 - Assaulted. Killed.

Fowai, Francis (Male) age 40 - Abducted and detained.

Fowai, Jebbeh (Female) age 54 - 1996 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed.

Fowai, Ousman (Male) age 31 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Fowai, Wuya (Female) age 28 - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted.

Foyoh, Finda (Female) age 27 - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed.

Francis, Michael Alie (Male) age 15 - 1995 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Killed.

Francis Fanneh, Allie Kondo (Male) age 49 - 1996 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted.

Franco, Morie (Male) - 1994 in Kamajei, Moyamba - Abducted and detained.
 Freeman, Edward (Male) age 40 - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.
 Freeman, Ella (Female) - 1997 in Niawa Lenga, Bo District - Forced to labour.
 Freeman, Haja Sundie (Female) age 75 - 1995 in Western Area - Property looted and destroyed.
 Freeman, Lucinda (Female) age 38 - 1999 in Western Area - Property looted and destroyed.
 Freeman, Maada (Male) - 1994 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Detained. Assaulted. Killed.
 Freeman, Mohamed (Male) age 21 - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Killed.
 Freeman, Musu (Female) age 27 - 1997 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Freeman, Vandy (Male) - 1994 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Detained. Assaulted. Killed.
 French, Edward (Male) age 30 - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted.
 French, James (Male) - 1998 - Assaulted.
 Fuddie, Hawa (Female) age 23 - 1991 in Niawa, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Fuddie, Kosiah (Male) age 30 - 1997 in Upper Bambara, Kailahun - Detained.
 Fullah, Abdulai (Male) - 1994 - Displaced and property destroyed. Killed.
 Fullah, Abdulai (Male) - 1995 in Western Area - Forced to labour. Stripped. Killed.
 Fullah, Abdulai (Male) age 65 - 1995 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Abducted. Tortured. Killed.
 Fullah, Abu (Male) age 58 - 1999 - Extorted. Assaulted and tortured.
 Fullah, Adama (Female) - Extorted and property looted and destroyed.
 Fullah, Amara (Male) - 1994 in Lugbu, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted. Killed.
 Fullah, Aminata (Female) - 1993 in Kono - Killed.
 Fullah, Aminata (Female) age 25 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted. Assaulted.
 Fullah, Brima (Male) age 26 - 1999 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Forced to labour. Tortured.
 Fullah, Dauda (Male) age 20 - 1999 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Forced to labour. Tortured.
 Fullah, Fatmata (Female) age 18 - Displaced.
 Fullah, Hassan (Male) - 1995 in Western Area - Assaulted. Killed.
 Fullah, Hassana (Male) age 63 - 1995 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Forced to labour. Killed.
 Fullah, Issiaka (Male) age 5 - 1998 in Nimiyama, Kono - Abducted and detained.
 Fullah, Iye (Female) age 50 - 1995 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Fullah, John (Male) - 1994 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Killed.
 Fullah, Katumu (Male) - 1992 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Killed.
 Fullah, Luseni (Male) age 55 - 1991 in Peje, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Stripped.
 Fullah, Mamodu (Male) age 64 - 1999 - Property looted and destroyed.
 Fullah, Mbalu (Female) - 1998 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Fullah, Mohamed (Male) - 1994 - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Fullah, Mohamed (Male) age 32 - 1999 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Fullah, Santigie (Male) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.
 Fullah, Santigie (Male) - 1994 - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Fullah, Siaka (Male) - 1994 in Lugbu, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted.
 Fullah, Sulaiman (Male) age 30 - 1991 - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Fullah, Sullay (Male) age 64 - 1999 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Property destroyed.
 Fullah, Tommy (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.
 Fullah, Yeabu (Female) - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Forced to labour.
 Gaba, Mayah (Male) age 40 - 1991 in Nongowa, Kenema - Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Gabriel, Kehinde (Female) age 21 - 1997 in Kono - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Gailu, Baidu (Female) - Killed.
 Gaima, Abu (Male) age 12 - 1996 in Niawa, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted.
 Gaima, Abu (Male) age 45 - 1991 in Dia, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Gaima, Ayeni (Female) - 1991 in Dia, Kailahun - Killed.
 Gaima, David (Male) - 1991 in Dia, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Gaima, Davowa (Male) - 1993 in Dia, Kailahun - Displaced.
 Gaima, Gbessay (Male) - 1992 in Dia, Kailahun - Abducted and detained.

Gaima, Ibrahim (Male) - 1991 in Dia, Kailahun - Killed.
 Gaima, Isatu (Female) - 1991 in Dia, Kailahun - Killed.
 Gaima, Kwesha (Male) - 1991 in Dia, Kailahun - Killed.
 Gaima, Lahai (Male) - 1991 in Dia, Kailahun - Killed.
 Gaima, Momoh (Male) - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Limb amputated.
 Gaiwa, Massah (Female) age 71 - 1991 in Niawa, Kenema - Killed.
 Gama, Dauda (Male) - 1991 in Dia, Kailahun - Assaulted.
 Gama, Vandi (Male) - 1991 in Wunde, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Gamanga, Juma (Female) - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted.
 Gamanga, Suna (Female) - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted.
 Gamanga, Sylvester (Male) age 41 - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Displaced and extorted.
 Gamanga, Woma (Female) age 100 - 1994 in Simbaru, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Gamick, Boi (Female) age 33 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Ganawa, Bintu (Female) age 26 - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Ganawa, Brima (Male) age 54 - Displaced. Forced to labour.
 Ganawa, Mohamed (Male) age 36 - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained.
 Ganda, Bishop (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Stripped.
 Ganda, Joseph (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Stripped.
 Ganda, Solomon (Male) - 1995 in Kowa, Moyamba - Limb amputated.
 Gandi, Abdulai (Male) age 23 - 1994 - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Gandi, Brima (Male) - 1991 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Gandi, Emmanuel (Male) age 27 - 1993 in Baoma, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Gandi, Ibrahim (Male) age 25 - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Gandi, Joseph (Male) age 29 - 1992 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Gandi, Konda - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Gandi, Moijuel (Male) age 11 - 1993 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Assaulted.
 Gandi, Morie (Male) age 30 - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Tortured.
 Gangaa, Sheriff (Male) age 55 - 1995 in Dasse, Moyamba - Displaced.
 Gaoja, Bockarie (Male) - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Killed.
 Garjin, Mary (Female) - Displaced.
 Gassama, Fatorma (Male) - 1994 - Killed.
 Gassama, Mannah (Male) age 52 - 1994 in Western Area - Displaced.
 Gassama, Sheku (Male) - 1993 in Kono - Killed.
 Gazalie Macauley, Ayeshata (Female) age 75 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted.
 Gbabai, Dauda (Male) age 40 - 1994 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Displaced. Killed.
 Gbabamba, Keipula (Male) - 1996 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Killed.
 Gbad, Danda (Male) - 1995 in Bum, Bonthe - Abducted and detained.
 Gbajie, Edward (Male) - 1996 in Mandu, Kailahun - Displaced and property destroyed. Tortured.
 Gbaka, Ibrahim (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Tortured.
 Gbaka, Madina (Male) age 7 - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.
 Gbaka, Salamatu (Female) age 35 - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Tortured.
 Gbakima, Kai (Male) - 1994 in Kono - Killed.
 Gbakuna, Finda (Female) - 1994 in Kono - Displaced and extorted. Assaulted.
 Gbana, Sampa (Female) - 2000 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Killed.
 Gbanda, Moinima (Male) age 58 - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Gbandafo, Aiah (Male) age 25 - 1992 in Nimiyama, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Gbane, Mattu (Female) - 1994 in Bo District - Killed.
 Gbaneh, Kai (Male) - 1993 - Assaulted.
 Gbanga, Tamba (Male) - Displaced. Abducted. Tortured.
 Gbangati, Kona (Female) - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Killed.
 Gbangba, Fudia (Female) age 62 - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced, extorted and property looted.
 Gbani, Abdulai (Male) age 50 - 1995 in Kakua, Bo District - Property looted.
 Gbani, Angela (Female) - 1995 - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Gbanie, Sao (Male) - 1994 in Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Gbanyawa, Brima (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.
 Gbanyawa, Christopher (Male) age 67 - 1994 in Komboya, Bo District - Displaced.

Gbanyawa, Ernest (Male) - 1994 in Komboya, Bo District - Killed.

Gbao, Bobor (Male) - 1995 in Kpanda Kemo, Bonthe - Abducted and detained.

Gbao, David (Male) - 1997 in Niawa Lenga, Bo District - Forced to labour.

Gbao, Mariama (Female) - 1994 - Property looted and destroyed.

Gbao, Mohamed (Male) - 1998 in Barri, Pujehun - Tortured. Killed.

Gbao, Moinama (Male) - 1995 - Displaced.

Gbao, Mojama (Female) - Killed.

Gbao, Musu (Female) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced.

Gbao, Sheku (Male) age 60 - 1992 in Langorama, Kenema - Extorted. Assaulted. Killed.

Gbao, Yetngeno - 1995 in Kpanda Kemo, Bonthe - Abducted and detained.

Gbassa, Abdul (Male) - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Killed.

Gbassa, Momoh (Male) - 1998 in Luawa, Kailahun - Abducted and detained.

Gbassah, Swaray (Male) - 1995 - Abducted. Killed.

Gbassay, Alieu (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Tortured. Killed.

Gbassay, Hawa (Female) age 23 - 1993 in Bagbe, Bo District - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Gbassay, Kpana (Male) - 1993 - Property destroyed.

Gbasy, Momoh (Male) - 1991 - Displaced. Killed.

Gbata, Finda (Female) age 46 - 1994 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Gbavaneh, Moray (Male) - 1998 - Killed.

Gbawoh, Joseph (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted. Killed.

Gbeh, Gassumu (Male) age 26 - 1993 - Killed.

Gbeh, Kumba (Female) age 58 - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced. Killed.

Gbekeh Gbap, Baoma (Male) - 1991 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Killed.

Gbekie, Kumba (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed.

Gbekie, Rebecca (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained.

Gbekie, Sahr (Male) age 60 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained.

Gbekie, Tamba (Male) age 21 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Gbeme, Daramy (Male) - 1995 in Kpanda Kemo, Bonthe - Extorted. Forced to labour. Tortured and stripped.

Gbemeh, Joe (Male) age 63 - 1996 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Gbemeh, Sombo (Female) age 33 - 1996 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Displaced.

Gbenbo, Kinie (Male) - 1996 in Sielenga, Bo District - Abducted. Tortured. Killed.

Gbengeh, Tommy (Male) - 1995 in Tindel, Moyamba - Killed.

Gbengeh, Tua (Female) - 1995 in Badjia, Bo District - Property destroyed. Abducted. Tortured.

Gbengua, Marie (Female) - 1994 in Simbaru, Kenema - Abducted. Tortured.

Gberie, Sam (Male) - 1994 in Baoma, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted and tortured.

Gbessay, Momoh (Male) - Property destroyed.

Gbessay, Vandy (Male) - 1991 in Banta Mokele, Moyamba - Killed.

Gbesseh, Tommy (Male) - Killed.

Gbetie, Kennie (Male) - 1994 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Assaulted and tortured.

Gbetuwa, Sia (Female) age 75 - Displaced. Assaulted and tortured.

Gbewa, Baby (Female) age 26 - 1996 in Dodo, Kenema - Displaced.

Gbewa, George (Male) age 10 - 1995 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Gbewa, Momoh (Male) age 62 - 1992 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Gbewah, Sahr (Male) age 65 - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Gbini, Prince (Male) - 1998 in Wunde, Bo District - Assaulted and tortured.

Gbla, Abass (Male) - 1996 in Kafe Simira, Tonkolili - Killed.

Gbla, Abdulai (Male) age 64 - 1994 in Konike Barina, Tonkolili - Killed.

Gbla, Abu S. (Male) age 16 - 1994 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Gbla, Adama (Female) age 16 - 1994 in Luawa, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Gbla, Alhaji (Male) age 12 - 1994 in Luawa, Kailahun - Abducted and detained.

Gbla, Amidu (Male) age 71 - 1993 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Gbla, Andrew (Male) age 41 - 1999 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Property destroyed. Assaulted and tortured.

Gbla, Fatu (Female) - 1994 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Property destroyed. Killed.

Gbla, John (Male) - 1997 - Killed.

Gbla, John (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Limb amputated. Killed.

Gbla, Masim (Male) age 64 - 1991 in Tane, Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed.

Gbla, Mohamed (Male) - 1993 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Gbla, Mohamed (Male) age 48 - 1999 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Gbla, Mustapha (Male) - 1995 - Tortured. Killed.

Gbla, Saidu (Male) - 1994 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Property destroyed. Killed.

Gbla, Samuel (Male) - 1994 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Gbla, Sulay (Male) - 1993 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Killed.

Gbloh, Kadie (Female) - 1998 in Kongbora, Moyamba - Property destroyed.

Gbobuma, Brima (Male) - Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Gbogaba, Kumba (Female) age 40 - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced.

Gbogbo, Sheku (Male) - 1994 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.

Gbogn, Thomas (Male) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Gboi, Keine (Male) - Extorted.

Gboka, Brima (Male) - 1991 in Peje Bongre, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Gboko, Markson (Male) - 1993 in Dia, Kailahun - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Stripped.

Gbokumu, Mohamed (Male) - 1995 in Benducha, Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Gboleh, Bockarie (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.

Gbolleh, Saffiatu (Female) - 1995 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced. Detained.

Gbomda, Lamin (Male) - 1991 in Niawa, Kenema - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted.

Gbomi, Boi (Female) age 75 - 1998 in Kori, Moyamba - Displaced and property destroyed.

Gbonda, A.S. (Male) - Assaulted.

Gbonda, Alpha (Male) age 67 - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and stripped.

Gbonda, Isata (Female) age 6 - 1997 in Kongbora, Moyamba - Killed.

Gbonda, Jb (Male) age 75 - Killed.

Gbonda, Maada (Male) age 3 - 1997 in Kongbora, Moyamba - Killed.

Gbonda, Mohamed (Male) age 64 - Displaced.

Gbonda, Rebecca (Female) age 61 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Gbonda, S.A.S. (Male) age 62 - 1991 in Nongowa, Kenema - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured and stripped.

Gbonda, Saffa (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Tortured.

Gbonda, Samuel (Male) - 1991 in Panga Krim, Pujehun - Displaced and extorted. Assaulted.

Gbonda, Shar (Male) age 55 - Killed.

Gbonda, Sinah (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Tortured.

Gbondo, Aiah (Male) age 28 - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced and property destroyed.

Gbondo, Aliou (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Forced to labour. Killed.

Gbondo, Baby (Female) - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Abducted.

Gbondo, Borbor (Male) age 26 - Extorted. Assaulted.

Gbondo, Foday (Male) - Killed.

Gbondo, Foday (Male) age 43 - 1995 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Gbondo, Joe (Male) - 1994 in Malegohun, Kenema - Displaced.

Gbondo, Kini (Male) - 1995 in Dasse, Moyamba - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Gbondo, Komba (Male) - 1998 in Samu, Kambia - Extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.

Gbondo, Majo (Female) - Killed.

Gbondo, Manay (Male) - 1995 - Killed.

Gbondo, Marie Theresa (Female) age 19 - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained.

Gbondo, Mary (Female) - 1994 in Komboya, Bo District - Property looted and destroyed.

Gbondo, Mohamed (Male) age 21 - 1998 in Lei, Kono - Abducted and detained.

Gbondo, Momodu (Male) - 1995 - Displaced. Killed.

Gbondo, Momoh (Male) - Assaulted.

Gbondo, Momoh (Male) - 1991 in Langorama, Kenema - Tortured. Killed.

Gbondo, Prince (Male) - 1995 - Tortured.

Gbondo, Sia (Female) age 32 - 1995 - Property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Gbondo, Sundufu (Male) - 1991 in Upper Bambara , Kailahun - Abducted and detained.

Gbondo, Tamba (Male) age 30 - 1997 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Gbondo, Tamba (Male) age 46 - 1998 - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Tortured and stripped.

Gbondo, Toma (Male) age 24 - 1998 - Tortured.

Gbongeh, Mohamed (Male) - 1994 in Jong, Bonthe - Forced to labour.

Gbonghun, Kadie (Female) - 1991 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Gbongon, Thomas (Male) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed. Killed.

Gbonie, Annie Finda (Female) age 45 - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced.

Gbonie, Jonathan (Male) age 70 - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Killed.

Gbonma, Kamba (Male) - 1995 - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Gborbajihun, Momoh (Male) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed.

Gborie, Aiah (Male) - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Killed.

Gborie, Aminata (Female) - 1992 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Displaced.

Gborie, Bondu (Female) - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced and property destroyed.

Gborie, Idrissa (Male) - 1998 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Stripped and limb amputated.

Gborie, Kadi (Female) - 1996 - Property looted. Abducted. Assaulted.

Gborie, Kadiatu (Female) age 3 - 1992 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Displaced. Tortured.

Gborie, Kumba (Female) - Property destroyed. Killed.

Gborie, Kumba (Female) age 26 - 1994 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced.

Gborie, Kumba (Female) age 64 - 1997 in Gbane Kandor, Kono - Displaced.

Gborie, Sahr (Male) - 1998 in Mandu, Kailahun - Killed.

Gborie, Sulaiman (Male) - Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Gborie, Tamba (Male) - 2000 in Lei, Kono - Killed.

Gborie, Vandi (Male) - Displaced.

Gborie, Vandi (Male) - Displaced.

Gborlima, Mustapha (Male) - 1996 - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Gborma, Borbor (Male) age 4 - 1995 in Kowa, Moyamba - Killed.

Gbortu, Edward (Male) - 1995 in Niawa Lenga, Bo District - Killed.

Gbortu, Sao (Male) - 1995 in Niawa Lenga, Bo District - Killed.

Gboto Bangura, Idrissa (Male) - 1996 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Forced to labour.

Gbowah, Brima (Male) - Limb amputated.

Gbundema, Maseray (Female) age 50 - 1997 in Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Detained.

Gbuway, Brima (Male) - 1992 in Peje Bongre, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Gebawova, Foday (Male) age 74 - 1994 in Luawa, Kailahun - Abducted.

Gebawova, Senesie (Male) age 44 - 1994 in Luawa, Kailahun - Abducted. Killed.

Geebai, Francis (Male) age 33 - 1997 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Geh, Vandi (Male) - 1991 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Killed.

Geia, Bockarie (Male) - 1993 in Luawa, Kailahun - Killed.

Gendemeh, Allieu (Male) - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Killed.

George, Abram (Male) age 52 - 1998 in Kagboro, Moyamba - Killed.

George, Agnes (Female) - 1996 in Nongowa, Kenema - Killed.

George, Allieu (Male) age 18 - 1992 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Forced to labour.

George, Aruna (Male) - Forced to labour.

George, Francis Kelema (Male) age 50 - 1995 in Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

George, Gladys (Female) - 1995 in Kamajei, Moyamba - Abducted and detained.

George, Hawa (Female) age 49 - 1997 in Komboya, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Tortured.

George, John (Male) age 41 - 1994 in Bagbe, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted and tortured.

George, Josephine Elizabeth (Female) age 16 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained.

George, Mattu (Female) age 61 - 1994 in Dodo, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed.

George, Morie (Male) - 1994 in Bumpeh, Moyamba - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

George, Samuel (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

George, Samuel (Male) age 52 - 1997 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Assaulted.

George, Yamba (Male) age 29 - 1996 in Valunia, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.

Gerber, Railatu (Female) age 50 - 1999 - Extorted and property looted. Detained.

Ghombo, Sarah (Female) age 30 - 1994 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Giama, Momoh (Male) age 39 - 1991 in Dia, Kailahun - Extorted. Abducted. Assaulted.

Gibao, Adama (Female) - Displaced. Assaulted and tortured. Killed.

Gibao, Adima (Female) - 1996 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Displaced. Assaulted.

Gibao, Monya (Female) - Displaced. Killed.

Gibateh, Bockarie (Male) - 1998 in Diang, Koinadugu - Limb amputated.

Gibrilla, Gabriel (Male) - 1995 in Niawa, Kenema - Abducted and detained.

Gibrilla, Magai (Male) - 1992 in Penguia, Kailahun - Displaced. Killed.

Gibrilla, Makue (Female) age 72 - 1992 in Penguia, Kailahun - Displaced.

Gibrilla, Moigboi (Male) - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Ginnah, Momoh (Male) age 30 - 1992 - Property looted.

Ginnah, Tommy (Male) - 1992 - Tortured. Killed.

Giyeahun, Foday (Male) - 1996 in Barri, Pujehun - Assaulted.

Giyehun, Foday (Male) - 1992 in Malen, Pujehun - Killed.

Goba, Abu (Male) - 1991 - Displaced. Detained. Killed.

Goba, Agnes (Female) age 26 - 1991 in Baoma, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Goba, Aruna (Male) age 24 - Killed.

Goba, Baby (Female) - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Killed.

Goba, Brima (Male) - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Killed.

Goba, Francess (Female) age 18 - 1995 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Property looted.

Goba, Joe (Male) - Property destroyed.

Goba, Jonathan (Male) - 1996 in Kakua, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Tortured and limb amputated.

Goba, Lansana (Male) age 63 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Goba, Marie (Female) - 1995 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted.

Goba, Musa (Male) - 1994 - Displaced.

Goba, Rubean (Male) - 1994 - Killed.

Goba, Sallay (Female) - 1995 - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Gobio, Fatmata (Female) age 12 - 1992 in Luawa, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Gobio, Mabel (Female) age 26 - 1992 in Peje Bongre, Kailahun - Property looted and destroyed.

Gofra, Thomas (Male) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted. Detained.

Gogra, Alhaji (Male) - Assaulted.

Gogra, Badiatu (Female) age 51 - 1991 in Peje, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour.

Goll, Gina (Female) - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Gombowai, Brima (Male) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Limb amputated.

Gombu, Amara (Male) - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Killed.

Gonda, Braima (Male) age 70 - Killed.

Gonda, Massa (Female) age 62 - Displaced.

Gondama, Vandy (Male) - 1994 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Killed.

Gorglow, Maiky (Male) - 1991 in Follasaba Dembelia, Koinadugu - Killed.

Gormoh, Francis (Male) age 36 - 1991 in Kwamebai Krim, Bonthe - Displaced.

Gormoh, Luseni Sundema (Male) age 62 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Gosay, Amadu (Male) age 57 - 1995 in Kori, Moyamba - Displaced and property destroyed. Tortured.

Gottor, Boi (Female) - 1994 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Killed.

Gottor, Jusufu (Male) age 30 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Gowa, Bockarie (Male) - 1993 - Killed.

Gowa, Numa (Female) - 1991 - Killed.

Gudia-Kamara, Fatorma (Male) age 60 - 1991 - Displaced and property destroyed. Detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Guerra, Marie (Female) age 64 - 1998 in Briama, Kambia - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Gundema, Komba (Male) - 1998 in Kassunko, Koinadugu - Killed.

Gutu, Hawa (Female) - 1998 in Makpele, Pujehun - Property looted.

Guwei Sama, Amara (Male) - 1991 in Koya, Kenema - Displaced.

Habib, Daniel (Male) - 1997 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Property destroyed.

Hackin, Joe (Male) - 1999 in Timdel, Moyamba - Forced to labour. Forced to participate in an act of cannibalism.

Hai, Kona (Female) - Displaced and property looted.

Hai, Sesay (Male) - Displaced and property looted.

Hai, Yema (Female) age 70 - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Assaulted and tortured.

Hakpeh, Sao (Male) - 1994 in Barri, Pujehun - Tortured.

Halaby, Wahid (Male) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Killed.

Halloway, Christiana (Female) age 29 - Property destroyed.

Hamid, Noella (Female) age 20 - 1999 in Western Area - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted.

Hammond, Salia (Male) age 30 - 1994 in Baoma, Bo District - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Harding, Abibatu (Female) age 7 - Displaced. Assaulted.

Harding, Alfred (Male) age 36 - 1995 in Niawa Lenga, Bo District - Displaced.

Harding, Alieu (Male) - Displaced. Killed.

Harding, Amara (Male) - 1995 in Bagbe, Bo District - Extorted.

Harding, Aruna (Male) - Property destroyed.

Harding, Joe (Male) - 1995 - Killed.

Harding, Joseph (Male) age 28 - 1995 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Displaced and property destroyed.

Harding, Joseph (Male) age 40 - 1994 in Komboya, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed.

Harding, Nyawo (Male) - 1996 in Kakua, Bo District - Limb amputated.

Harding, Patrick (Male) - 1995 in Bagbe, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed.

Harding, Sarah (Female) - Displaced. Killed.

Harding, Sylvanus (Male) age 35 - 1995 in Kamajei, Moyamba - Property looted and destroyed.

Harding, Tommy (Male) age 48 - 1994 in Simbaru, Kenema - Displaced. Killed.

Harlow, Lahai (Male) - 1992 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced.

Harlow, Moighoi (Male) age 49 - 1992 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Killed.

Harrison, Jestina (Female) age 49 - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed.

Hassan, Abie Mogaba (Female) - 1997 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Tortured.

Hassan, Alpha (Male) age 47 - 1997 in Western Area - Killed.

Hassan, Amie (Female) age 32 - 1995 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Helebu, Kennie (Male) - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Forced to labour. Assaulted. Killed.

Higima, John (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Hindowa, Abu (Male) - 1994 - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Hindowa, Musa (Male) - 1994 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Hindowa, Sandy (Male) - 1994 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced.

Hinga, Sorba (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Killed.

Hollise, Desmond (Male) age 33 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Horton, Charles (Male) - 1992 in Kono - Displaced.

Horton, Roland (Male) age 48 - 1992 in Kono - Displaced. Assaulted. Killed.

Horton, Sebatu (Female) age 41 - Displaced. Killed.

Horton, Titty (Female) - 1992 in Kono - Displaced. Assaulted.

Humonya, Amie (Female) - Killed.

Humper, Jengbeh (Male) - 1991 in Kwamebai Krim, Bonthe - Killed.

Humper, Jibao (Male) - 1995 in Baoma, Bo District - Displaced and property looted.

Humper, Samuel (Male) - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Tortured.

Humper, Thomas (Male) age 51 - 1998 - Abducted and detained.

Humper, Yeama (Female) - 1995 in Baoma, Bo District - Displaced and property looted.

Hunter, Samuel (Male) - Killed.

Huscamp, Anthony (Male) age 6 - 1994 - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Hyde, Borbor (Male) age 35 - 1999 in Western Area - Tortured. Killed.

Ibrahim, Amie (Female) - Property destroyed.

Ibrahim, Ola (Male) age 32 - 1992 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Killed.

Ibrahim, Sillah (Male) age 17 - 1999 in Western Area - Tortured.

Idrisa, Karimu (Male) age 23 - 1992 - Tortured. Killed.

Idriss, Alhaji Bockarie (Male) - 1991 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Idriss, Jeneba (Female) - 1991 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced. Killed.

Idriss, Noah (Male) - 1991 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced. Killed.

Idriss, Senesie (Male) age 87 - Killed.

Idriss, Sheku (Male) - 1991 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Idrissa, Kadie (Female) - 1995 in Luawa, Kailahun - Detained.

Idrissa, Mohamed (Male) - 1998 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Assaulted.

Idrissa, Murray (Male) - 1997 in Bonthe - Extorted. Assaulted.

Issa, Abdulai (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Issa, Maad (Male) - 1999 in Magbema, Kambia - Assaulted, tortured and stripped.

Issa, Tamba (Male) - 1998 - Abducted and detained.

Issata, Haja (Female) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Killed.

Iye, Abdulai (Male) - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Property looted. Abducted and detained.

Jaba, Henry (Male) age 49 - 1994 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed.

Jabah, Finda (Female) age 41 - 1994 in Gorama Kono, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Jabati, Emmanuel (Male) age 30 - 1997 - Tortured and limb amputated.

Jabati, Gbundor (Male) - 1998 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Assaulted.

Jabati, Luke (Male) - 1995 in Badjia, Bo District - Abducted. Killed.

Jabati, Margaret (Female) - 1995 in Bagbe, Bo District - Displaced and property looted. Abducted. Assaulted.

Jabatie, Isatta (Female) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Abducted.

Jabatty, Bobor (Male) age 17 - 1996 in Bagbe, Bo District - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Jabba, Samuel (Male) age 10 - 1998 in Tankoro, Kono - Abducted. Tortured.

Jabbaty, Aminata (Female) - Displaced. Assaulted.

Jabber, Alhaji Salieu (Male) age 74 - Displaced.

Jabber, Fayier (Male) age 30 - Killed.

Jabber, Tamba (Male) age 25 - Killed.

Jabbie, Amara (Male) age 53 - 1999 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Jabbie, Aminata (Female) age 38 - 1993 in Kono - Displaced.

Jabbie, Augustine (Male) - 1998 - Killed.

Jabbie, Dabboh (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.

Jabbie, Fanka (Male) age 20 - 2000 in Neini, Koinadugu - Property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Jabbie, Ferenka (Male) age 8 - 1994 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Jabbie, Hassan (Male) age 11 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Jabbie, Hawa (Female) - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Jabbie, Mohamed (Male) - 1993 in Kono - Killed.

Jabbie, Mohamed (Male) - 1993 - Property destroyed. Killed.

Jabbie, Mohamed (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Extorted. Abducted and detained.

Jabbie, Mohamed (Male) age 15 - 1998 - Killed.

Jabbie, Mustapha (Male) - 1993 in Kono - Killed.

Jabbie, Sarah (Female) age 11 - 1997 in Nimiyama, Kono - Forced to labour.

Jabbie, Suma (Male) - Killed.

Jabbie, Sumaila (Male) age 63 - 1994 in Kori, Moyamba - Displaced.

Jabbie, Umaru (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.

Jabie, Fanta (Female) age 25 - 1999 - Displaced.

Jabie, Foday (Male) age 50 - 1999 - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Jabura, Tommy (Male) - 1994 in Bagbo, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Jackson, Iye (Female) - 1997 in Nimikoro, Kono - Property looted and destroyed. Killed.

Jacob, Morie (Male) age 16 - 1996 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Detained. Tortured and stripped.

Jagoma, Yatta (Female) - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Killed.

Jaguah, Momoh (Male) - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted.

Jah, Abdulai (Male) age 58 - 1995 in Dibia, Port Loko - Property destroyed. Abducted.

Jah, Abu (Male) - 1991 in Dodo, Kenema - Property looted. Forced to labour. Tortured and stripped.

Jah, Alimu (Male) - 1991 in Bagbo, Bo District - Killed.

Jah, Amadu Wurie (Male) age 18 - 1999 in Western Area - Extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour and drugged. Tortured.

Jah, Amara (Male) - 1991 in Bagbo, Bo District - Forced to labour.

Jah, Bockarie (Male) age 30 - 1993 in Bumpah, Bo District - Abducted. Tortured.

Jah, Brima (Male) - 1997 in Dodo, Kenema - Abducted and detained.

Jah, Fatmata (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained.

Jah, Fatmata (Female) age 43 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed.

Jah, Mohamed (Male) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Jah, Tanakolo (Male) - 1991 in Dodo, Kenema - Forced to labour. Killed.

Jah, Umaru (Male) - 1998 in Kakua, Bo District - Property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Jah, Umaru (Male) age 56 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.

Jah, Watta (Female) age 38 - 1991 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Jah, Yatta (Female) age 34 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced and extorted.

Jahmalanga, Momodu (Male) - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Displaced and property destroyed.

Jaiah, Keni (Male) - Abducted. Assaulted.

Jaiah, Lahai (Male) - 1994 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Jainkray, Ibrahim (Male) - 2000 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Killed.

Jaisie, Tommy (Male) - 1998 in Kagboro, Moyamba - Killed.

Jajua, Ansu (Male) - 1995 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced. Assaulted.

Jajua, Malikie (Male) - Killed.

Jaka, Jebah (Female) - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Abducted and detained.

Jaka, Kennie (Female) - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced.

Jakama, Anne (Female) - Killed.

Jakar, Hanna (Female) age 14 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Jakema, Alhaji (Male) - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Tortured.

Jakema, Alhaji Lahai (Male) - 1991 in Pujehun - Assaulted.

Jakema, Brima (Male) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Killed.

Jakema, Foday (Male) - 1991 in Nongowa, Kenema - Killed.

Jakema, Mohamed (Male) - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Tortured.

Jakema, Ngagba (Male) - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.

Jakietay, Abdul (Male) age 51 - 1998 in Follofaba Dembelia, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted.

Jalloh, Alpha (Male) - 1996 in Sanda Tendaren, Bombali - Killed.

Jalloh, A.S. (Male) - 1999 - Abducted.

Jalloh, Abdul (Male) age 15 - 1994 - Displaced.

Jalloh, Abdul Raman (Male) - Displaced. Killed.

Jalloh, Abdulai (Male) - 1994 in Kombaya, Bo District - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour.

Jalloh, Abdulai (Male) age 51 - Extorted and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Jalloh, Abu (Male) - Killed.

Jalloh, Abu (Male) - Displaced and property looted.

Jalloh, Abu (Male) age 20 - 1995 in Bumpah, Moyamba - Displaced. Killed.

Jalloh, Abu Bakarr (Male) - 1998 in Wara-Wara Bafodia, Koinadugu - Killed.

Jalloh, Abu Bakarr (Male) - 1998 - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Killed.

Jalloh, Abu Bakarr (Male) age 30 - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Jalloh, Abu Bakarr (Male) age 41 - 1999 in Follosaba Dembelia, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed.

Jalloh, Abu Bakarr (Male) age 49 - 1996 in Sanda Tendaren, Bombali - Property looted.

Jalloh, Abu Bockarie (Male) age 35 - 1991 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Killed.

Jalloh, Adama (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and extorted.

Jalloh, Adama (Female) age 23 - Displaced.

Jalloh, Ajibu (Male) age 35 - 1999 in Mambolo, Kambia - Displaced and property looted.

Jalloh, Alhaji (Male) - 1998 - Property destroyed.

Jalloh, Alhaji (Male) age 34 - 1998 in Neini, Koinadugu - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Jalloh, Alhaji Amadu (Male) - Killed.

Jalloh, Alhaji Bailor (Male) age 51 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Jalloh, Alhaji Momod Allieu (Male) - 1993 in Peje, Pujehun - Property destroyed.

Jalloh, Alie (Male) - 1995 in Dibia, Port Loko - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour.

Jalloh, Alieu (Male) age 41 - 1991 in Bagbo, Bo District - Killed.

Jalloh, Alimu (Male) age 3 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Assaulted.

Jalloh, Alpha (Male) - 1998 in Bumpeh, Moyamba - Property looted and destroyed.

Jalloh, Alpha (Male) - 1999 in Mambolo, Kambia - Property looted. Abducted. Killed.

Jalloh, Alpha (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.

Jalloh, Alpha (Male) age 41 - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Jalloh, Alusine (Male) - 1996 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Killed.

Jalloh, Alusine (Male) age 20 - 1995 in Sanda Tendaren, Bombali - Abducted. Killed.

Jalloh, Amadu (Male) - 1997 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.

Jalloh, Amadu (Male) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Property looted.

Jalloh, Amadu (Male) - 1996 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Killed.

Jalloh, Amadu (Male) - 1997 - Tortured. Killed.

Jalloh, Amadu (Male) - Killed.

Jalloh, Amadu (Male) age 43 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Jalloh, Amadu Wurie (Male) - 1998 - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Killed.

Jalloh, Amara (Male) age 15 - 1997 in Kafe Simira, Tonkolili - Killed.

Jalloh, Amie (Female) age 36 - Displaced. Killed.

Jalloh, Aminata (Female) age 14 - Assaulted.

Jalloh, Aruna (Male) age 27 - 1998 in Koya, Port Loko - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Jalloh, Atigu (Male) - 1991 in Bagbo, Bo District - Property looted. Killed.

Jalloh, Bai (Female) - 1996 in Kwamebai Krim, Bonthe - Killed.

Jalloh, Bailoh (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Jalloh, Balla (Male) age 50 - 1999 in Diang, Koinadugu - Displaced, extorted and property looted.

Jalloh, Bambay (Male) - 1998 in Safroko Limba, Bombali - Assaulted.

Jalloh, Barbar (Male) - 1997 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Jalloh, Binta (Female) - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Killed.

Jalloh, Binta (Female) - 1998 in Wara-Wara Bafodia, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed.

Jalloh, Bobida (Male) age 60 - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Killed.

Jalloh, Bockarie (Male) - 1998 in Neini, Koinadugu - Killed.

Jalloh, Braima (Male) - 1997 - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Jalloh, Brima (Male) - 1998 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Abducted and detained.

Jalloh, Brima (Male) age 26 - 1999 in Konike Sande, Tonkolili - Tortured. Killed.

Jalloh, Chernor (Male) - 1995 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.

Jalloh, Chernor (Male) - 1997 in Gbense, Kono - Property looted. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Jalloh, Dietay (Male) - 1994 in Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili - Displaced. Detained. Killed.

Jalloh, Fatmata (Female) - 1999 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Jalloh, Fatmata (Female) - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Displaced, extorted and property looted.

Jalloh, Fatmata (Female) - 1998 in Kassunko, Koinadugu - Abducted and detained.

Jalloh, Fatmata (Female) - 1997 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Jalloh, Fatmata (Female) - 1999 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Jalloh, Fatmata (Female) age 25 - 1998 - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Jalloh, Fatmata (Female) age 26 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Jalloh, Fatmata (Female) age 59 - 1999 in Western Area - Extorted.

Jalloh, Ferenkeh (Male) age 40 - 1994 in Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Jalloh, Finah (Female) - 1994 in Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili - Displaced. Abducted.

Jalloh, Frenkeh (Male) age 47 - 1998 - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and limb amputated.

Jalloh, Gballon (Male) - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Jalloh, Hassan (Male) - Extorted.

Jalloh, Hawa (Female) - 1997 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced. Killed.

Jalloh, Hawa (Female) - 1998 - Abducted.

Jalloh, Hawa (Female) age 10 - 1994 in Nimiyama, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Jalloh, Hawa (Female) age 66 - 1998 in Gbendembu Ngowahun, Bombali - Property destroyed. Assaulted.

Jalloh, Ibrahim (Male) - 1996 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Killed.

Jalloh, Ibrahim (Male) age 11 - 1999 in Western Area - Forced to labour.

Jalloh, Idrissa (Male) - 1995 - Displaced.

Jalloh, Idrissa (Male) - 1996 - Abducted and detained.

Jalloh, Isatu (Female) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Jalloh, Isatu (Female) - 1997 in Western Area - Killed.

Jalloh, Isatu (Female) age 8 - Abducted and detained. Tortured and forced to participate in an act of cannibalism.

Jalloh, Isatu (Female) age 9 - 1998 - Displaced. Assaulted.

Jalloh, Isatu (Female) age 27 - 1998 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Displaced. Assaulted.

Jalloh, Jang (Male) age 68 - 1995 in Bagruwa, Moyamba - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Jalloh, Jeneba (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.

Jalloh, Kabba (Male) age 2 - Displaced.

Jalloh, Kabbah (Male) age 40 - 1998 in Tambakka, Bombali - Displaced. Abducted. Assaulted, tortured and limb amputated.

Jalloh, Kaday (Female) - 1994 in Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Jalloh, Kadiatu (Female) - 1998 in Kaffu Bullom, Port Loko - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Jalloh, Kadiatu (Female) - 1999 in Gbendembu Ngowahun, Bombali - Displaced. Abducted.

Jalloh, Kadiatu (Female) age 18 - 2000 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed.

Jalloh, Kadiatu (Female) age 19 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Jalloh, Kalie Jaukalay (Male) age 65 - 1998 in Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Jalloh, Kallie (Male) - 1998 - Killed.

Jalloh, Karimu (Male) - 1996 in Kamajei, Moyamba - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Jalloh, Keifalla (Male) age 20 - 1998 in Neini, Koinadugu - Property destroyed. Assaulted.

Jalloh, Konkoro (Male) age 50 - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Jalloh, Konya (Male) - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Jalloh, Koromakabeh (Male) - 1999 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Property destroyed. Killed.

Jalloh, Lamrana (Female) - Displaced and property destroyed.

Jalloh, M.O. (Male) - 1991 in Malegohun, Kenema - Abducted and detained.

Jalloh, Malador (Female) age 28 - 1994 in Komboya, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted.

Jalloh, Mamadu (Male) - 1996 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Killed.

Jalloh, Mamadu (Male) - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Assaulted.

Jalloh, Mankanie (Female) age 26 - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Killed.

Jalloh, Mariama (Female) - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Killed.

Jalloh, Mariama (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Jalloh, Marie (Female) age 33 - 1999 in Western Area - Extorted and property looted and destroyed. Tortured.

Jalloh, Marlie (Female) age 54 - 1999 in Follosaba Dembelia, Koinadugu - Killed.

Jalloh, Mohamed (Male) - 1998 - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Jalloh, Mohamed (Male) - 1994 - Forced to labour.

Jalloh, Mohamed (Male) age 11 - 1995 in Valunia, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Jalloh, Mohamed (Male) age 17 - 1999 - Displaced and extorted. Assaulted and tortured.
 Jalloh, Mohamed (Male) age 24 - 1999 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Jalloh, Mohamed (Male) age 24 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Jalloh, Mohamed (Male) age 52 - Displaced and property destroyed. Limb amputated.
 Jalloh, Muctarr (Male) age 17 - 1998 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Abducted and detained.
 Jalloh, Musa (Male) - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Jalloh, Mustapha (Male) - Abducted and detained.
 Jalloh, Mustapha (Male) age 20 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained.
 Jalloh, Ousman (Male) age 16 - 1999 in Western Area - Forced to labour. Assaulted and limb amputated.
 Jalloh, Priney (Male) - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Jalloh, Ralim (Male) - 1999 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Extorted. Tortured.
 Jalloh, Saidu (Male) - 1998 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Jalloh, Saidu (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Forced to labour.
 Jalloh, Sallu (Male) age 37 - 1997 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Detained.
 Jalloh, Sally (Female) age 4 - 1991 in Western Area - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Jalloh, Salu (Male) age 22 - 1999 - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Jalloh, Samba (Male) age 45 - 1999 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Property destroyed. Abducted. Killed.
 Jalloh, Santigie (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Assaulted.
 Jalloh, Sellu (Male) - 1991 in Bagbo, Bo District - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Jalloh, Sheku (Male) - 1995 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced.
 Jalloh, Sheku (Male) age 46 - 1998 in Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Jalloh, Sidie (Male) age 51 - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced and extorted. Assaulted and tortured.
 Jalloh, Sinkarie (Female) age 50 - 1998 - Property looted. Abducted and detained.
 Jalloh, Sira (Male) - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Jalloh, Sirah (Female) - 1994 in Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili - Displaced.
 Jalloh, Sonnah (Female) - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Killed.
 Jalloh, Sorie (Male) - 1999 - Displaced. Abducted. Killed.
 Jalloh, Sulaiman (Male) - 1998 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Abducted and detained.
 Jalloh, Sulaiman (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.
 Jalloh, Sulaiman (Male) age 31 - 1999 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Property looted. Assaulted.
 Jalloh, Sunkar (Male) - 1994 in Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili - Displaced.
 Jalloh, Thaluta (Male) - 1998 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Jalloh, Tirmi (Male) - 1998 in Dembelia Sinkunia, Koinadugu - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Tortured and stripped. Killed.
 Jalloh, Umaru (Male) - 1998 in Sanda Tendaren, Bombali - Killed.
 Jalloh, Umu (Female) age 71 - 1999 in Kakua, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Jalloh, Wurie (Male) - 1998 in Wara-Wara Bafodia, Koinadugu - Killed.
 Jalloh, Wurie (Male) - 1995 in Sanda Tendaren, Bombali - Abducted. Killed.
 Jalloh, Wurie (Male) age 58 - 1998 in Koinadugu - Extorted.
 Jalloh, Yarreh (Male) age 49 - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Tortured.
 Jalloh, Yayah (Male) - 1998 in Sanda Tendaren, Bombali - Displaced.
 Jalloh, Yeanoh (Female) - 1994 in Kalansogia, Tonkolili - Property destroyed.
 Jalloh, Yegbeh (Female) age 54 - 1999 in Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Jalloh, Yeyeh (Female) - 1994 in Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili - Displaced and extorted. Abducted.
 Jama, Brima (Male) - 1993 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Stripped.
 Jamba, Hassanah (Male) age 43 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Jambai, Fomaie (Male) age 60 - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Jambai, Janet (Female) - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Killed.
 Jambai, Yatta (Female) age 53 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Jambai, Yatta (Female) age 57 - 1995 in Kongbora, Moyamba - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Jambawai, Mariama (Female) - 1998 in Koya, Kenema - Tortured.
 Jambawai, Musa (Male) age 43 - 1991 in Malegohun, Kenema - Extorted and property looted.
 James, Aiah (Male) age 17 - 1997 in Lei, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour.
 James, Alpha (Male) age 58 - 1994 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced, extorted and property looted.

James, Alusine (Male) age 63 - 1997 - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

James, Easter (Female) age 21 - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained.

James, Esther (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.

James, Feimata (Female) - 1995 in Tikonko, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed.

James, Gibrilla (Male) age 42 - 1995 in Kongbora, Moyamba - Forced to labour.

James, Gillo (Female) age 29 - 1997 in Dodo, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

James, Joseph (Male) age 31 - Displaced.

James, Kainwo (Male) age 9 - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

James, Katimu (Female) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Killed.

James, Komba (Male) age 40 - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced.

James, Kpanya (Female) - 1995 in Tikonko, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

James, Massah (Female) age 35 - 1994 in Dama, Kenema - Displaced.

James, Mboma (Male) age 61 - 1999 in Wandor, Kenema - Displaced. Detained. Killed.

James, Michael (Male) - 1996 - Forced to labour. Killed.

James, Moinama (Male) age 74 - 1994 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced and property looted.

James, Musu (Female) age 49 - 1999 in Wandor, Kenema - Displaced.

James, Nemah (Female) - Killed.

James, Sahr (Male) - 1994 in Gbense, Kono - Killed.

James, Satta (Female) - 1992 in Penguia, Kailahun - Displaced.

James, Serah (Male) - 1994 in Gbense, Kono - Killed.

James, Tamba (Male) - 1994 in Gorama Kono, Kono - Forced to labour.

James, Theresa (Female) age 34 - 1999 in Valunia, Bo District - Property looted. Assaulted.

James, Theresa (Female) age 43 - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced.

Jaminah, Kakie (Female) - 1994 in Kakua, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Jaminah, Morie (Male) - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Tortured and stripped. Killed.

Janeh, Moses (Male) - 1998 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Extorted. Assaulted and stripped.

Janneh, Abs (Male) - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Property looted.

Janneh, Balu (Female) age 30 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Janneh, Ishiatu (Female) age 26 - Displaced and property looted.

Janneh, Karim (Male) age 15 - 1999 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Jannie, Lussni (Male) - 1991 in Niawa, Kenema - Property looted.

Jar, Momoh (Male) - 1997 - Property destroyed.

Jarka, Alhaji Lamin (Male) age 42 - 1999 in Western Area - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Jarrie, Amara (Male) - Displaced.

Jaugba, Jinnah (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced. Tortured.

Jawawa, Moor (Male) - 1991 in Pujehun - Abducted. Stripped.

Jawawamassaquoi, Baindu Munda (Female) age 59 - 1991 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Jawara, Amidu (Male) age 27 - 1998 in Follofaba Dembelia, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted and stripped.

Jawara, Fasalie (Male) - Abducted and detained.

Jawara, Fasalie (Male) age 60 - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained.

Jawara, Fatmata (Female) age 53 - 1998 in Follofaba Dembelia, Koinadugu - Displaced.

Jawara, Finah (Female) - 1998 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Forced to labour.

Jawara, Foday (Male) age 51 - 1994 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Jawara, Gbemeh (Male) age 19 - 1996 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Killed.

Jawara, Kadiatu (Female) age 68 - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Jawara, Kalie (Male) age 45 - Property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Jawara, Karamoko (Male) age 55 - 1998 - Displaced and property looted.

Jawara, Kasale (Male) - 1998 in Kissi Teng, Kailahun - Killed.

Jawara, Momodu (Male) age 62 - 1998 in Follofaba Dembelia, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Jawara, Musa (Male) - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Jawara, Musa (Male) age 30 - 1998 in Follosaba Dembelia, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Jawara, Sallu (Male) age 55 - 1999 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Displaced and property looted.

Jawara, Sana (Female) - 1998 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Assaulted.

Jawara, Sarah (Female) age 72 - 1998 in Follosaba Dembelia, Koinadugu - Property destroyed.

Jawara, Sheku (Male) - 1994 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced. Killed.

Jawara, Sundu (Female) - 1994 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Abducted and detained.

Jawara, Umaru (Male) age 28 - 1998 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Jawara, Yarah (Male) - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Killed.

Jaward, Abdulai (Male) - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Killed.

Jaward, Alhaji Fomba (Male) age 64 - 1991 in Mandu, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted.

Jaward, Bobor (Male) age 13 - 1993 in Tankoro, Kono - Displaced. Tortured.

Jaward, Foday (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.

Jaward, Foday (Male) age 63 - 1994 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced and property looted.

Jaward, Mariama (Female) - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Killed.

Jaward, Nyademoh (Male) age 23 - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Jayah, Bobor (Male) - 1997 - Displaced and extorted. Abducted. Assaulted, tortured, limb amputated and forced to participate in an act of cannibalism.

Jayah, Foday (Male) - 1993 in Kenema - Killed.

Jayah, Hawa (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.

Jayah, Idrisa Francis Anthony (Male) age 60 - 1993 in Wandor, Kenema - Property destroyed.

Jayah, Joseph (Male) - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Assaulted.

Jayah, Kinny (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Killed.

Jayah, Mageret Adama (Female) age 25 - 1991 in Langorama, Kenema - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Jayah, Sheku (Male) age 38 - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed.

Jayah, Tommy (Male) - Displaced. Killed.

Jeanet, Nyapo (Female) - Abducted and detained.

Jebbeh, Maa (Female) - Killed.

Jebbo, Gassimu (Male) age 46 - 1995 - Displaced.

Jebu, Boi (Female) age 43 - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Property looted and destroyed.

Jegboh, Brima (Male) - 1995 in Kwamebai Krim, Bonthe - Killed.

Jegula, Malikie (Male) - 1991 in Penguia, Kailahun - Killed.

Jeneba, Yeama (Female) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Property destroyed.

Jeneh, Momoh (Male) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Displaced.

Jeneh, Sheriff (Female) age 15 - 1998 in Koya, Kenema - Tortured. Killed.

Jengbe, Hassana (Male) - 1994 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted.

Jenjo, Jebbeh (Female) - 1991 - Displaced.

Jerry, Borbor (Male) - 1991 - Abducted and detained.

Jiah, Joseph (Male) age 23 - 1994 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Killed.

Jiah, Vandi (Male) age 70 - 1991 in Mandu, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Jibateh, Luseni (Male) age 51 - 1998 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Detained. Assaulted.

Jimbo, John (Male) age 26 - 1996 in Badjia, Bo District - Killed.

Jimisa, Komba (Male) age 27 - 1992 in Kono - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour.

Jimmissa, Komba (Male) - 1993 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and stripped.

Jimmissa, Sahr (Male) age 29 - 1993 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced.

Jimmy, Amie (Female) age 48 - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced and property destroyed.

Jimmy, Bockarie (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.

Jimmy, Francis (Male) age 48 - 1995 in Nimiyama, Kono - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Jimmy, Francis (Male) age 48 - 1995 in Wandor, Kenema - Displaced.

Jimmy, Kadie (Female) age 34 - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced, extorted and property looted.

Jimmy, Momoh (Male) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Jimmy, Momoh (Male) - 1998 in Wunde, Bo District - Assaulted and tortured.

Jimmy, Momoh (Male) - 1991 in Baoma, Bo District - Killed.

Jimmy, Momoh (Male) age 53 - 1995 in Mandu, Kailahun - Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Jimmy, Tamba (Male) age 36 - Killed.
 Jinah, Kadie (Female) age 47 - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Displaced.
 Jjakema, Brima (Male) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Property looted.
 Job, Nabieu (Male) - 1997 in Kenema - Abducted and detained.
 Jobo, Mustapha (Male) - 1991 in Wunde, Bo District - Displaced and property looted.
 Joe, David (Male) age 45 - 1991 in Badjia, Bo District - Abducted.
 Joe, Komba (Male) age 36 - 1992 in Soa, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Joe, Kumba (Female) - 1996 in Gbane, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.
 Joe, Momoh (Male) - 1996 in Malegohun, Kenema - Killed.
 Joe, Njabu (Female) - 1995 - Abducted and detained.
 Joebeth, Abdulai Hinga (Male) age 24 - 1994 in Komboya, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Joebo, Hawa (Female) age 40 - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Jogo Turay, Mbalu (Female) age 40 - 1999 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Displaced.
 Johadie, Anna (Female) age 43 - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted.
 John, Baindu (Female) age 46 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted.
 John, Brima (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.
 John, Fatorma (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.
 John, Hawa (Female) age 67 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Assaulted and tortured.
 John, Jita (Female) - 1995 - Abducted and detained.
 John, Lasana (Male) age 28 - 1991 - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 John, Mariama (Female) age 27 - 1998 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced and property looted. Abducted. Assaulted.
 John, Mattu (Female) age 4 - 1996 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.
 John, Mauawa (Female) - 1997 in Simbaru, Kenema - Abducted.
 John, Musa (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.
 John, Patrick (Male) - 1995 in Valunia, Bo District - Killed.
 John, Saffa (Male) - Killed.
 John, Samuel (Male) age 45 - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.
 John, Sorba (Male) - 1996 - Property destroyed.
 John, Sorba (Male) age 34 - 1996 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Property looted and destroyed.
 John Bull, Banard (Male) age 63 - 1994 - Tortured. Killed.
 John Lavalie, Annie (Female) age 36 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.
 Johnbull, Aiah (Male) age 74 - 1998 in Kamara, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and stripped.
 Johnbull, Inna (Female) - Displaced.
 Johnbull, Saidu (Male) - Killed.
 John-Kobu, Foday (Male) age 45 - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and stripped. Killed.
 Johnny, Moses (Male) - 1995 in Kori, Moyamba - Killed.
 Johnpull, Kalilu (Male) age 35 - 1999 in Badjia, Bo District - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Johnson, Anetta (Female) - 1997 in Western Area - Tortured.
 Johnson, Cole (Male) age 20 - 1997 in Port Loko - Forced to labour. Tortured.
 Johnson, Diana (Female) age 20 - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted.
 Johnson, Elkanah (Male) age 27 - 1995 in Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Johnson, Fayia (Male) - Killed.
 Johnson, J.K. (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.
 Johnson, Joseph (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.
 Johnson, Ogunade (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.
 Johnson, Sahr (Male) age 37 - 1999 - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Johnson, Thomas (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.
 Jojo, Wuyata (Female) - 1991 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Abducted and detained.
 Jolloh, Ahmadu (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Forced to labour. Limb amputated.
 Joma, Foday (Male) - 1998 in Jawie, Kailahun - Killed.

Jombo, Tamba (Male) - 1998 - Killed.
 Jonathan, Ansumana (Male) age 46 - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Jones, Esther Isatu (Female) age 43 - 2000 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Property looted.
 Jones, Malcolm (Male) age 13 - 1999 in Western Area - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Jones, Massa (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed.
 Jongo, Borbor (Male) - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.
 Jongo, Murry (Male) age 37 - Displaced. Tortured.
 Jongopi, Momodu (Male) - Killed.
 Jonjo, Morie (Male) age 40 - 1998 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Jonner, Tenneh (Female) age 25 - 1992 in Tankoro, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Jonnie, Boima (Male) - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Killed.
 Joseph, Annie (Female) - 1998 in Lugbu, Bo District - Displaced.
 Joseph, Braima (Male) - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Joseph, Brima (Male) age 60 - 1997 in Jong, Bonthe - Property looted. Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Joseph, Hawa (Female) age 30 - 1995 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced.
 Joseph, James (Male) - 1994 in Tikonko, Bo District - Killed.
 Joseph, Kamah (Female) age 60 - 1997 in Jong, Bonthe - Extorted and property looted. Assaulted and tortured.
 Joseph, Saffiatu (Female) age 15 - Abducted.
 Joseph, Tamba (Male) age 38 - 1996 in Gorama Kono, Kono - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Joseph, Theresa (Female) age 16 - Displaced. Abducted. Assaulted.
 Josiah, Aiah (Male) age 71 - 1998 in Kono - Displaced and property looted. Abducted. Assaulted.
 Josiah, Aminata (Female) age 40 - 1995 in Kowa, Moyamba - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Josiah, Francis (Male) - 1994 in Kissi Tongi, Kailahun - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured. Killed.
 Josiah, Kinnie (Female) - 1996 in Bagbe, Bo District - Displaced.
 Josiah, Komba (Male) - 1998 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Killed.
 Josiah, Musa (Male) age 51 - 1991 in Penguia, Kailahun - Killed.
 Josiah, Musu (Female) age 10 - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced.
 Josiah, Sahr (Male) age 25 - 1997 - Tortured.
 Josiah, Sumaila (Male) - 1991 in Penguia, Kailahun - Abducted. Killed.
 Josiah, Sylvester (Male) age 41 - 1995 - Displaced.
 Juah-Young, Mannah (Male) age 30 - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Property looted.
 Juama, Brima (Male) - 1995 in Benducha, Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Juana, Bockarie (Male) age 24 - 1992 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured.
 Juana, Hawa (Female) age 49 - 1999 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Detained.
 Juana, Isata (Female) age 21 - 1992 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Tortured.
 Juana, Jusu (Male) - 1993 in Western Area - Detained.
 Juana, Kula (Female) age 25 - 1992 - Displaced.
 Juana, Tamba (Male) - 1991 in Banta Mokele, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Stripped.
 Juba, Sam (Male) - 1997 in Mandu, Kailahun - Tortured. Killed.
 Julia, Lahai (Male) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Killed.
 Julius, Joe (Male) age 10 - Killed.
 Juma, Bockarie (Male) - 1994 in Gorama Mende, Kenema - Abducted.
 Juma, Brima (Male) age 28 - 1993 in Nongowa, Kenema - Killed.
 Juma, Hawa (Female) - 2000 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Killed.
 Juma, Mattu (Female) age 3 - 2000 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Killed.
 Juma, Musa (Male) - 1991 in Langorama, Kenema - Killed.
 Jumah, Adama (Female) - 1994 in Gorama Mende, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted.
 Jumble, Ginnah (Female) - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour.
 Junisa, Abdulai (Male) - 1991 in Folloosaba Dembelia, Koinadugu - Property destroyed. Assaulted.
 Junisa, Alpha (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Assaulted.

Junisa, Jenneh (Female) age 60 - 1995 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Killed.
 Junisa, Kalilu (Male) age 32 - 1993 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced.
 Junisa, Kia (Female) - 1996 in Bumpeh, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Junisa, Messie (Female) age 51 - 1994 in Mandu, Kailahun - Killed.
 Junisa, Momoh (Male) age 73 - 1991 in Folloosaba Dembelia, Koinadugu - Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Junisa, Tommy (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Assaulted.
 Junny, Kadie (Female) age 30 - 1996 in Yawbeko, Bonthe - Abducted. Limb amputated. Killed.
 Jusu, Abdulai (Male) - 1992 in Dodo, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Jusu, Alex (Male) age 9 - 1991 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced. Forced to labour.
 Jusu, Alhaji (Male) - 1993 in Dasse, Moyamba - Abducted and detained.
 Jusu, Amara (Male) age 67 - 1993 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Jusu, Aruna (Male) age 26 - 1998 in Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Jusu, Edward (Male) - 1995 - Displaced.
 Jusu, Gbassay (Female) - 1997 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Property looted. Abducted. Tortured.
 Jusu, H.I.S (Male) - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Displaced.
 Jusu, Henry (Male) age 19 - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Displaced. Detained.
 Jusu, Henry (Male) age 61 - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Jusu, Ibrahim (Male) age 38 - Assaulted.
 Jusu, Ibrahim Momoh (Male) age 55 - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Jusu, James (Male) age 23 - 1998 in Koya, Kenema - Displaced.
 Jusu, John (Male) - 1996 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Displaced.
 Jusu, Juana (Male) - 1997 in Mandu, Kailahun - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Jusu, Juliane (Female) age 17 - Displaced.
 Jusu, Karmoh (Male) - 1991 in Bagbo, Bo District - Displaced.
 Jusu, Kono (Male) age 75 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Killed.
 Jusu, Lucy (Female) age 59 - 1992 in Dodo, Kenema - Displaced.
 Jusu, Mamatu (Female) - 1997 in Mandu, Kailahun - Displaced.
 Jusu, Marion (Female) age 28 - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Jusu, Mary (Female) age 39 - 1996 in Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Jusu, Massah (Female) age 30 - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Jusu, Mathew (Male) age 38 - 1995 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured.
 Jusu, Middi (Female) - 1995 in Banta Mokele, Moyamba - Displaced.
 Jusu, Mohamed (Male) - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Displaced. Assaulted and stripped.
 Jusu, Momoh (Male) - 1997 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.
 Jusu, Mustapha (Male) - 1992 in Dodo, Kenema - Killed.
 Jusu, O.P.J (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Property looted and destroyed.
 Jusu, Saffa (Male) age 50 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Jusu, Shaka (Male) age 59 - 1992 in Kailahun - Killed.
 Jusu, Simeon (Male) - 1995 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Jusu, Somaso (Male) age 21 - 1991 in Koya, Kenema - Displaced. Assaulted and tortured.
 Jusu, Steven (Male) age 28 - Displaced and property looted.
 Jusu, Tommy (Male) - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced. Assaulted. Killed.
 Jusu, Tommy (Male) age 18 - 1991 in Kpanda Kemo, Bonthe - Property looted. Forced to labour.
 Jusu, Tommy (Male) age 22 - 1995 - Displaced. Forced to labour.
 Jusu Lamboi, Smith (Male) - 1993 in Baoma, Bo District - Abducted and detained.
 Jusu Mallay, Alhaji (Male) - 1994 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Killed.
 Kaamoh, Gbendne (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.
 Kabanner, Foday (Male) - 1991 in Upper Bambara, Kailahun - Killed.
 Kabba, Abu (Male) age 73 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Kabba, Aiah (Male) age 50 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Kabba, Alhaji (Male) age 3 - 1998 in Kamara, Kono - Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Kabba, Alhaji Ibrahim (Male) age 65 - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and

destroyed.

Kabba, Aliou (Male) age 34 - 1995 - Property looted. Assaulted.

Kabba, Alusine (Male) - 1998 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Killed.

Kabba, Brima (Male) - Killed.

Kabba, Fatmata (Female) - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and limb amputated.

Kabba, Fatu (Female) age 41 - 1994 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted.

Kabba, Foday (Male) age 67 - 1997 - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and limb amputated.

Kabba, Hamaro - Limb amputated.

Kabba, Ibrahim (Male) age 31 - 1999 in Leibasgayahun, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Tortured.

Kabba, Isata (Female) age 27 - 1994 in Nimikoro, Kono - Property looted.

Kabba, Iye (Female) - 1995 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Displaced. Killed.

Kabba, Juana (Male) age 27 - 1995 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Tortured.

Kabba, Kai (Male) - 1998 in Kamara, Kono - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Kabba, Kemokai (Male) age 73 - 1991 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Kabba, Lamin (Male) - 1997 in Imperi, Bonthe - Assaulted.

Kabba, Lamin (Male) age 9 - 1993 - Forced to labour.

Kabba, Marie (Female) - 1996 in Koya, Port Loko - Killed.

Kabba, Musa (Male) - 2000 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Killed.

Kabba, Muskla (Male) - 1996 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kabba, Saidu (Male) age 40 - 1994 in Simbaru, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kabba, Sayo (Female) age 27 - 1995 - Displaced. Abducted. Tortured.

Kabba, Sellu Juana (Male) age 61 - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted and tortured.

Kabba, Sirah (Female) - 1998 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Property looted.

Kabba, Steven (Male) - 1992 - Killed.

Kabba, Takueu (Male) age 51 - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.

Kabbah, Alusine (Male) - 1995 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Killed.

Kabbah, Bangalie (Male) - 1996 - Forced to labour.

Kabbah, Bundu (Male) age 27 - 1999 in Western Area - Assaulted. Killed.

Kabbah, Mbalu (Female) age 36 - Displaced and property looted.

Kabbah, Mohamed (Male) - 1991 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Killed.

Kabbah, Mohamed (Male) age 90 - 1995 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Kabbah, Musu (Female) - 1995 in Dibia, Port Loko - Displaced and property looted.

Kabbah, Sallay (Female) age 33 - 1995 - Displaced and property looted. Abducted. Assaulted.

Kabbah, Sorie (Male) - 1995 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Displaced. Killed.

Kabbay, A.I. (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed.

Kabbia, Abdul (Male) age 38 - 1996 in Tane, Tonkolili - Property looted.

Kabbia, Alhaji (Male) - 1994 - Killed.

Kabbia, Foday (Male) age 45 - 1998 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kabbia, Ibrahim (Male) - 1999 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Extorted. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Kabbia, Isaac (Male) age 20 - 1994 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kabbia, Joseph (Male) - 1994 - Assaulted. Killed.

Kabbia, Mohamed (Male) - 1994 - Killed.

Kabbia, Mohamed (Male) age 30 - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kabbia, Ousman (Male) - 1994 - Forced to labour.

Kabbia, Unisa (Male) age 35 - 2000 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Kabbia, Yabalu (Female) - 1999 in Konike Sande, Tonkolili - Killed.

Kabbie, Alpha (Male) - 1998 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Stripped and limb amputated. Killed.

Kabbie, Mamawa (Female) age 50 - 1992 - Displaced.

Kabelia, Momodu (Male) - 2000 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted.

Kabeneh, Foday (Male) age 37 - 1991 in Tunkia, Kenema - Killed.

Kabenque, Sia (Female) - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Kabia, Abdulai (Male) - 1996 in Kafe Simira, Tonkolili - Abducted.
 Kabia, Abdulai (Male) age 43 - 1996 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Displaced.
 Kabia, Abu (Male) - 1996 in Marampa, Port Loko - Killed.
 Kabia, Adama (Female) - 1996 in Marampa, Port Loko - Abducted. Limb amputated.
 Kabia, Albert (Male) - 1997 - Stripped. Killed.
 Kabia, Alusine (Male) - 1997 - Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Kabia, Aminata (Female) age 16 - 1991 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Displaced.
 Kabia, Baba (Male) age 34 - 1998 - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Kabia, Bai (Male) - 1997 in Sanda Tendaren, Bombali - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and limb amputated.
 Kabia, Bai Lawyer (Male) - Abducted.
 Kabia, Bashir A (Male) age 39 - 1997 in Sanda Tendaren, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Kabia, Emmanuel Sallieu (Male) age 46 - 1995 in Loko Massama, Port Loko - Property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Kabia, Foday (Male) - 1996 in Western Area - Abducted. Assaulted and limb amputated.
 Kabia, Hawa (Female) - 1997 - Killed.
 Kabia, Ibrahim (Male) age 19 - 1994 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced.
 Kabia, Ibrahim (Male) age 30 - 1998 in Kalansogia, Tonkolili - Property looted. Abducted and detained.
 Kabia, Ibrahim (Male) age 55 - 1996 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Kabia, Idrissa (Male) - 1996 in Tane, Tonkolili - Property looted.
 Kabia, Isatu (Female) - 1999 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted.
 Kabia, Ishmail (Male) age 43 - 1998 in Kono - Displaced.
 Kabia, Kadiatu (Female) - 1998 in Sanda Tendaren, Bombali - Displaced.
 Kabia, Kadie (Female) age 58 - 1996 - Displaced.
 Kabia, Lamina (Male) - 1999 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.
 Kabia, Mabinty (Female) - 1998 in Marampa, Port Loko - Killed.
 Kabia, Mabinty (Female) - 1996 - Abducted.
 Kabia, Mohamed (Male) age 18 - 1996 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Displaced. Killed.
 Kabia, Ramatu (Female) - 1999 - Displaced.
 Kabia, Saidu (Male) - 1996 in Marampa, Port Loko - Killed.
 Kabia, Salamatu (Female) age 45 - 1998 in Kono - Displaced.
 Kabia, Sallay (Female) age 5 - 1996 - Abducted and detained.
 Kabia, Santigie (Male) age 25 - 1999 in Port Loko - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Kabia, Saudatu (Female) - Killed.
 Kabia, Sheka (Male) age 27 - 1998 in Mambolo, Kambia - Tortured.
 Kabia, Suba (Female) age 33 - 1997 - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Kabia, Wolematu (Female) - Killed.
 Kabindi, Tamba (Male) age 35 - 1998 in Mandu, Kailahun - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted. Tortured.
 Kabinneh, Mohamed (Male) age 44 - 1994 - Displaced and extorted. Detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Kadia, Amadu (Male) age 36 - 1994 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted.
 Kadie, Lusene (Female) - 1994 in Tikonko, Bo District - Killed.
 Kafo, Komba (Male) - 1994 in Gbense, Kono - Killed.
 Kafunor, Luseni (Male) - 1994 in Komboya, Bo District - Property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Tortured.
 Kagbada, Amadu Fomba (Male) - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Stripped. Killed.
 Kagbadi, Aiah (Male) - 1992 in Gorama Kono, Kono - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Kagbendi, Komba (Male) - 1994 in Nimikoro, Kono - Killed.
 Kai, Amadu (Male) age 27 - 1997 in Sittia, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Kai, Isatu (Female) age 16 - 1998 in Nimiyama, Kono - Displaced.
 Kai, James (Male) age 28 - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Abducted and detained.
 Kai, Joe (Male) - 1994 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced. Killed.
 Kai, Lamin (Male) - 1997 in Bonthe - Abducted. Killed.

Kai, Lansana (Male) age 39 - 1997 in Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Kai, Momoh (Male) - 1991 in Dia, Kailahun - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Kai, Willie (Male) age 29 - 1998 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Kaida, Momodu (Male) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced. Tortured.

Kaigbanja, Aiah (Male) age 31 - 1998 in Gbane, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kaigbanja, Komba (Male) - 1998 in Gbane, Kono - Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.

Kaigbanja, Sahr (Male) age 61 - 1995 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Kaigbanja, Samuel (Male) - 1995 - Killed.

Kaihun, Joseah (Male) age 54 - 1991 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Kaikai, Annie (Female) - 1991 - Displaced and property looted. Detained.

Kaikai, Ansumana (Male) - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Killed.

Kaikai, Augusta (Female) age 31 - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted.

Kaikai, Baby (Female) age 47 - 1992 in Malen, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kaikai, Josie Francis (Male) age 60 - 1991 - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Kaikai, Mamako (Female) age 32 - 1993 in Wunde, Bo District - Displaced and property looted.

Kaikai, Modibor (Male) age 33 - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted.

Kaikai, Mohamed (Male) age 18 - 1998 in Western Area - Forced to labour.

Kaikai, Mustapha (Male) - 1991 - Killed.

Kaikai, Sarah (Female) age 38 - Displaced.

Kaikai, Susan (Female) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Property looted.

Kaikai, Theresa (Female) age 16 - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced.

Kaikordu, Kumba (Female) - 1994 in Bumpheh, Bo District - Property looted.

Kailie, Sia (Female) age 21 - 1992 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Kailleydambo, John age 18 - 1995 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted. Tortured.

Kailondo, Sallu (Male) - 1995 in Banta Mokele, Moyamba - Property destroyed.

Kaimansa, Bockarie (Male) age 84 - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced.

Kaimanu, Lavai (Male) - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Kain Challeu, Joe (Male) - 1995 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.

Kainba, Amie (Female) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced. Tortured.

Kaindanah, Moinina (Male) age 30 - 1997 in Koya, Kenema - Assaulted.

Kaindaneh, Michael (Male) age 36 - 1995 in Dasse, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted and tortured.

Kainday, Edmond (Male) - 1995 - Limb amputated.

Kaine, Alieu (Male) - Extorted.

Kaine, Boackrie (Male) age 95 - 1991 - Abducted and detained. Stripped. Killed.

Kaine, John (Male) - 1995 in Kpanda Kemo, Bonthe - Displaced.

Kainessie, Alice (Female) - 1995 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kainessie, Aye (Female) - 1995 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced.

Kainessie, Borbor (Male) - 1995 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Kainessie, Choko (Female) age 23 - 1997 in Bumpheh, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kainessie, Janisa (Male) age 30 - Property looted. Abducted. Stripped.

Kainessie, Magai (Male) age 64 - 1997 - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Kainessie, Mary (Female) - 1996 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Property looted. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Kainessie, Tamba (Male) age 44 - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Kainessie, Yunisa (Male) - 1994 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Limb amputated.

Kairesie, Joseph (Male) age 24 - 1995 in Komboya, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kaisoh, Momoh (Male) - 1992 - Assaulted.

Kaitemoh, Jacob (Male) age 8 - 1995 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Forced to labour. Tortured.

Kaithibie, Regina (Female) - 1995 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.

Kaithibie, Sowo (Female) - 1995 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.

Kaitta, Ibrahim (Male) age 25 - 1999 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kaiwa, John (Male) age 25 - 1995 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Kaiyada, Femusu (Female) age 38 - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Kaiyada, Sia (Female) age 28 - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Kajua, Fema (Female) age 6 - Assaulted.
 Kajue, Albert (Male) age 60 - Displaced.
 Kajue, Amie (Female) age 4 - Assaulted. Killed.
 Kajue, Matu (Female) - Displaced.
 Kakura, Musa (Male) age 13 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted. Assaulted.
 Kailahun, Saffa (Male) - 1998 in Luawa, Kailahun - Abducted and detained.
 Kalawa, Alhaji (Male) age 50 - 1998 in Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Kalawa, Alimamy (Male) - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Property looted and destroyed.
 Kalawa, Amadu (Male) age 68 - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Kalawa, Murray (Male) age 80 - 1998 in Koinadugu - Property destroyed. Killed.
 Kalawa, Samba (Male) - 1998 in Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Kalawa, Sebatu (Female) - Displaced.
 Kalie, Alieu (Male) - 1995 - Property looted.
 Kalie, Mohamed (Male) age 69 - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.
 Kalie, Momoh (Male) - 1995 in Benducha, Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Kalliu, Mariama (Female) - 2000 in Kakua, Bo District - Tortured. Killed.
 Kalliu, Vandy (Male) - 1991 in Bagbo, Bo District - Forced to labour.
 Kallay, Abdul (Male) - 1995 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Kallay, Foday Baimba (Male) age 11 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and extorted.
 Kallay, Hawa (Female) - 1998 - Limb amputated.
 Kallay, Kaday (Female) - 1998 in Masungbala, Kambia - Property destroyed.
 Kallay, Martha (Female) - 1998 - Abducted and detained.
 Kallay, Sanniey (Male) age 38 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Kallie, Eleanor (Female) age 56 - 1995 in Moyamba - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Kallie, Marrah (Male) - 1998 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Kallie, Marrah (Male) age 66 - 2000 - Forced to labour. Tortured.
 Kallon, Sellu (Male) - 1995 - Assaulted and tortured.
 Kallon, Abdul (Male) age 33 - 1997 in Sittia, Bonthe - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Kallon, Abdulai (Male) - 1995 in Peje, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed.
 Kallon, Abdulai (Male) - Displaced.
 Kallon, Abu (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.
 Kallon, Alhaji Abdulai (Male) - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Kallon, Allieu (Male) - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Kallon, Amadu (Male) age 68 - 1991 - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.
 Kallon, Amara (Male) age 33 - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Kallon, Aminata (Female) - Displaced.
 Kallon, Baby (Female) - 1991 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Killed.
 Kallon, Baidu (Female) age 26 - 1991 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Kallon, Bashiru Imuran (Male) - 1994 in Pujehun - Property looted. Killed.
 Kallon, Betty (Female) age 70 - 1991 in Yawei, Kailahun - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.
 Kallon, Boakie (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted and tortured.
 Kallon, Bobor (Male) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Killed.
 Kallon, Bockarie (Male) - 1996 in Baoma, Bo District - Limb amputated.
 Kallon, Bockarie (Male) - 1997 in Malema, Kailahun - Killed.
 Kallon, Bockarie (Male) age 60 - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced. Property looted. Abducted. Detained.
 Kallon, Borbor (Male) age 24 - 1995 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Displaced.
 Kallon, Brima (Male) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed.
 Kallon, Brima (Male) - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Kallon, Brima (Male) - 1994 in Badjia, Bo District - Property destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted and tortured.
 Kallon, Brima (Male) age 25 - 1993 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced. Property looted and destroyed.
 Kallon, Brima (Male) age 29 - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted.

Kallon, Brima (Male) age 37 - 1998 in Gaura, Kenema - Tortured.

Kallon, Brima (Male) age 53 - 1999 in Peje, Pujehun - Extorted and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Kallon, Brima (Male) age 64 - 1994 - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Kallon, Fanta (Female) - Property destroyed. Killed.

Kallon, Fatorma (Male) - 1994 in Barri, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed.

Kallon, Faturma (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Forced to labour. Killed.

Kallon, Foday (Male) - 1991 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Assaulted, tortured and stripped.

Kallon, Foday (Male) age 14 - Displaced.

Kallon, Foday (Male) age 17 - 1997 in Koya, Kenema - Displaced.

Kallon, Foday (Male) age 49 - 1991 in Peje West, Kailahun - Property destroyed. Abducted.

Kallon, Foday (Male) age 73 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted.

Kallon, George (Male) age 20 - 1997 in Nongowa, Kenema - Assaulted.

Kallon, Gibrilla (Male) - 1996 in Baoma, Bo District - Limb amputated.

Kallon, Hasawa (Male) age 7 - 1991 - Forced to labour. Killed.

Kallon, Hawa (Female) age 48 - 1993 in Yakemo-Kpukumu Krim, Pujehun - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Kallon, Hawa (Female) age 68 - 1992 in Koya, Kenema - Displaced.

Kallon, Ibrahim (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Forced to labour. Tortured and stripped.

Kallon, Ibrahim (Male) - 1993 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Kallon, Jebbeh (Female) - 1998 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Extorted. Tortured.

Kallon, Jeneba (Female) age 30 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kallon, Jeneba (Female) age 43 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kallon, Jeneba (Female) age 45 - 1992 in Soa, Kono - Property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Kallon, Jenneh (Female) age 40 - 1991 in Peje, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kallon, Jitta Musu (Female) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.

Kallon, Jusu (Male) age 59 - 1991 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Kallon, Kadiatu (Female) age 10 - 1993 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kallon, Kenei (Male) - 1994 in Barri, Pujehun - Property destroyed.

Kallon, Kula (Female) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Killed.

Kallon, Kula (Female) - Killed.

Kallon, Kula (Female) - 1993 in Small Bo, Kenema - Killed.

Kallon, Kula (Female) - 1991 in Small Bo, Kenema - Killed.

Kallon, Kula (Female) age 27 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Kallon, Lahai (Male) age 50 - 1991 in Kagboro, Moyamba - Abducted and detained.

Kallon, Lamin (Male) - 1991 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Killed.

Kallon, Lamina (Male) - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Killed.

Kallon, Lansana (Male) age 19 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted and tortured.

Kallon, Lansana (Male) age 37 - 1993 in Yakemo-Kpukumu Krim, Pujehun - Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Kallon, Lappia (Male) age 45 - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kallon, Mannah (Male) age 18 - 1991 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Displaced. Tortured. Killed.

Kallon, Mariama (Female) age 10 - 1991 - Displaced.

Kallon, Mariama (Female) age 12 - 1994 in Badjia, Bo District - Killed.

Kallon, Mariama (Female) age 25 - 1997 in Dasse, Moyamba - Property destroyed.

Kallon, Mariama (Female) age 47 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kallon, Martha (Female) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kallon, Massah (Female) age 25 - Killed.

Kallon, Massah (Female) age 40 - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced.

Kallon, Matorma (Female) age 30 - 1998 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Abducted and detained.

Kallon, Mohamed (Male) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Extorted. Assaulted.

Kallon, Mohamed (Male) - Displaced. Killed.

Kallon, Mohamed (Male) - Property looted.

Kallon, Mohamed (Male) - 1991 in Sielenga, Bo District - Killed.
 Kallon, Mohamed (Male) - 1994 in Bumpoh, Bo District - Property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.
 Kallon, Mohamed (Male) - 1996 in Baoma, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.
 Kallon, Mohamed (Male) age 21 - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Assaulted and tortured.
 Kallon, Mohamed (Male) age 23 - 1992 in Dama, Kenema - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured.
 Kallon, Mohamed (Male) age 34 - 1991 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted. Detained. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.
 Kallon, Mohamed (Male) age 44 - 1997 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Forced to labour. Tortured.
 Kallon, Moigoa (Male) age 49 - 1991 in Gaura, Kenema - Displaced. Killed.
 Kallon, Moina (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.
 Kallon, Momoh (Male) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Property looted.
 Kallon, Momoh (Male) age 6 - 1991 in Gaura, Kenema - Displaced.
 Kallon, Momoh (Male) age 27 - 1992 in Tunkia, Kenema - Property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Kallon, Momoh Sao (Male) age 54 - 1991 in Koya, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Kallon, Mone (Male) age 33 - 1993 in Small Bo, Kenema - Displaced. Forced to labour. Killed.
 Kallon, Morie (Male) age 56 - 1995 in Baoma, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Kallon, Moses (Male) - 1998 in Dema, Bonthe - Property looted and destroyed.
 Kallon, Munda (Male) age 38 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.
 Kallon, Musa (Male) age 7 - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Kallon, Musa (Male) age 23 - 1991 in Peje, Pujehun - Property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Kallon, Musu (Female) - Property looted and destroyed.
 Kallon, Musu (Female) age 35 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted.
 Kallon, Ngor Lahai (Male) - 1993 in Sowa, Pujehun - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Kallon, Ousman (Male) - 1995 in Moyamba - Property destroyed. Killed.
 Kallon, Ousman (Male) - 1994 in Bagbo, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Kallon, Ousman (Male) age 22 - 1992 in Gaura, Kenema - Displaced. Tortured and limb amputated.
 Kallon, Patrick (Male) age 27 - 1997 in Gaura, Kenema - Abducted. Killed.
 Kallon, Saffa (Male) age 60 - 1991 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.
 Kallon, Saidu (Male) - Property looted and destroyed.
 Kallon, Saidu (Male) age 11 - 1994 - Displaced.
 Kallon, Saidu (Male) age 65 - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Kallon, Sam (Male) age 10 - Displaced. Tortured.
 Kallon, Samoka (Male) - Displaced.
 Kallon, Samu (Male) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Killed.
 Kallon, Satta (Female) age 29 - 1994 in Simbaru, Kenema - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Kallon, Sebatu (Female) age 12 - 1997 - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Kallon, Sellu M (Male) age 57 - 1993 in Kenema - Displaced.
 Kallon, Shegbe (Female) - 1991 in Sielenga, Bo District - Displaced and property looted. Killed.
 Kallon, Sheku (Male) age 46 - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Kallon, Shenge (Male) - 1994 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Killed.
 Kallon, Sowie (Female) age 29 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced.
 Kallon, Steven (Male) - 1994 in Malen, Pujehun - Tortured.
 Kallon, Tenneh (Female) age 22 - Displaced. Abducted. Assaulted.
 Kallon, Vandi (Male) age 45 - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.
 Kallon, Vandi (Male) age 55 - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Kallon, Vandi (Male) age 70 - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Abducted and detained.
 Kallon, Yambasu (Male) age 28 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.
 Kallon-Fallay, Amie (Female) age 28 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Kalokoh, Abdul (Male) - Assaulted.
 Kalokoh, Abdulai (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.
 Kalokoh, Abu (Male) age 28 - 1997 in Western Area - Property looted and destroyed. Detained. Tortured.
 Kalokoh, Adama (Female) age 26 - 1997 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Killed.
 Kalokoh, Alimamy (Male) age 19 - 1997 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kalokoh, Bashiru (Male) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.
 Kalokoh, Borma (Female) age 66 - 1998 in Bombali - Displaced.
 Kalokoh, Brima (Male) age 55 - 1996 in Buya Romende, Port Loko - Abducted. Killed.
 Kalokoh, Fatmata (Female) - 1998 - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Kalokoh, Ibrahim (Male) age 21 - 1998 in Western Area - Killed.
 Kalokoh, Issa (Male) - Limb amputated.
 Kalokoh, Issa (Male) age 31 - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced and property looted.
 Kalokoh, Mahmoud (Male) age 25 - 1998 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced and extorted. Assaulted.
 Kalokoh, Mohamed (Male) - 1999 in Kafe Simira, Tonkolili - Displaced.
 Kalokoh, Ramatu (Female) age 19 - 1999 in Western Area - Forced to labour.
 Kalokoh, Sullay (Male) age 15 - 1999 in Kafe Simira, Tonkolili - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Kama, Morie (Male) age 22 - Property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Kamanda, Abu (Male) - 1995 in Kori, Moyamba - Tortured.
 Kamanda, Albert (Male) age 42 - 1995 in Niawa Lenga, Bo District - Displaced.
 Kamanda, Alpha (Male) - 1995 in Bagbo, Bo District - Property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Tortured.
 Kamanda, Baby (Male) - 1991 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.
 Kamanda, Brima (Male) - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour.
 Kamanda, Fea (Female) age 8 - 1997 in Nimikoro, Kono - Assaulted.
 Kamanda, Finda (Female) - 1997 in Nimikoro, Kono - Killed.
 Kamanda, Finda (Female) age 11 - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Kamanda, Humu (Female) - 1994 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Displaced.
 Kamanda, Jeneba (Female) age 28 - 1993 in Dodo, Kenema - Displaced.
 Kamanda, Jenneh (Female) - Killed.
 Kamanda, Jonathan (Male) age 64 - 1994 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Kamanda, Joseph (Male) age 45 - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.
 Kamanda, Kaddi (Female) - 1996 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Killed.
 Kamanda, Kai (Male) - 1997 in Nimikoro, Kono - Killed.
 Kamanda, Kondewa (Male) - 1995 in Kori, Moyamba - Killed.
 Kamanda, Kumba (Female) - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Kamanda, Kumba (Female) age 50 - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced.
 Kamanda, Lucy (Female) age 47 - 1996 - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Kamanda, Mathew (Male) age 16 - Abducted and detained.
 Kamanda, Prince (Male) age 7 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.
 Kamanda, Samuel (Male) - 1995 in Dasse, Moyamba - Detained.
 Kamanda, Sao (Female) - 1992 in Malema, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted. Assaulted. Killed.
 Kamanda, Sembo (Male) - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Forced to labour. Assaulted. Killed.
 Kamanda, Tamba (Male) age 53 - 1994 in Kissi Tongi, Kailahun - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Kamanda, Tamba (Male) age 72 - 1995 in Kono - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Tortured and limb amputated.
 Kamanda, Tamba (Male) age 73 - 1995 in Gbense, Kono - Detained. Limb amputated.
 Kamanda, Vic (Male) - 1996 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Killed.
 Kamanda, Wuya (Female) age 28 - 1991 - Abducted and detained.
 Kamanda, Yaya (Male) age 34 - 1992 in Malema, Kailahun - Displaced. Forced to participate in an act of cannibalism.
 Kamanda-Koiriwa, Peter (Male) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Kamara, A.F. (Male) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Killed.
 Kamara, Abass (Male) - 2000 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Killed.
 Kamara, Abass (Male) - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Displaced and property looted.
 Kamara, Abass (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed.
 Kamara, Abass (Male) age 31 - 1997 in Gbendembu Ngowahun, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Kamara, Abass (Male) age 61 - 1999 in Koya, Port Loko - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted and

detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Kamara, Abdoulaye (Male) - Forced to labour.

Kamara, Abdul (Male) - 1998 in Marampa, Port Loko - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kamara, Abdul (Male) - 1995 - Property looted. Killed.

Kamara, Abdul (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Extorted. Killed.

Kamara, Abdul (Male) age 9 - 1997 in Western Area - Limb amputated.

Kamara, Abdul (Male) age 14 - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Kamara, Abdul (Male) age 29 - 1998 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced.

Kamara, Abdul (Male) age 34 - 1994 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Property destroyed. Killed.

Kamara, Abdul (Male) age 35 - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Kamara, Abdul (Male) age 46 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Abdul (Male) age 52 - 1995 in Loko Massama, Port Loko - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Abdul Rahaman (Male) - 1998 in Tambakka, Bombali - Killed.

Kamara, Abdul Rahman (Male) age 25 - 1991 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced and property looted.

Kamara, Abdul Raman (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Tortured and limb amputated. Killed.

Kamara, Abdul Saidu (Male) age 30 - 1995 in Koya, Port Loko - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Abdulah (Male) - 1998 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Abdulai (Male) - 1995 in Kafe Simira, Tonkolili - Forced to labour.

Kamara, Abdulai (Male) - 1999 in Koya, Port Loko - Displaced. Tortured.

Kamara, Abdulai (Male) - 1993 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Kamara, Abdulai (Male) - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Property destroyed.

Kamara, Abdulai (Male) - 1998 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Displaced. Killed.

Kamara, Abdulai (Male) - 2000 - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Kamara, Abdulai (Male) - 1994 in Bagbo, Bo District - Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Abdulai (Male) - 1996 in Leibasgayahun, Bombali - Abducted.

Kamara, Abdulai (Male) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted and tortured.

Kamara, Abdulai (Male) - 1999 - Forced to labour.

Kamara, Abdulai (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Assaulted.

Kamara, Abdulai (Male) age 22 - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kamara, Abdulai (Male) age 28 - 1995 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kamara, Abdulai (Male) age 31 - 1998 in Maforiki, Port Loko - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Kamara, Abdulai (Male) age 51 - 1998 in Tambakka, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kamara, Abdulai (Male) age 63 - 1998 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Property looted. Assaulted.

Kamara, Abdulai (Male) age 66 - 1991 in Niawa, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Kamara, Abdulai Bobor (Male) age 57 - 1994 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted.

Kamara, Abi (Female) age 19 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kamara, Abibatu (Female) - 1999 in Magbema, Kambia - Displaced.

Kamara, Abibu (Male) age 58 - 1999 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Kamara, Abu (Male) - 1999 in Koya, Port Loko - Tortured. Killed.

Kamara, Abu (Male) - 1998 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Kamara, Abu (Male) - 1993 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Kamara, Abu (Male) - 2000 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kamara, Abu (Male) - Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Kamara, Abu (Male) - 1998 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Kamara, Abu (Male) - Displaced. Assaulted.

Kamara, Abu (Male) - Killed.

Kamara, Abu (Male) - Displaced.

Kamara, Abu (Male) - 2000 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Killed.

Kamara, Abu (Male) age 12 - 1996 in Magbema, Kambia - Displaced. Tortured.

Kamara, Abu (Male) age 16 - 1999 - Displaced. Tortured.

Kamara, Abu (Male) age 22 - 1998 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.

Kamara, Abu (Male) age 22 - 1997 in Mambolo, Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kamara, Abu (Male) age 25 - 2000 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Abu (Male) age 30 - 1999 - Displaced.

Kamara, Abu (Male) age 34 - 1998 - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted.

Kamara, Abu (Male) age 35 - 1994 in Kholifa Mabang, Tonkolili - Abducted. Assaulted.

Kamara, Abu (Male) age 38 - 1995 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Kamara, Abu (Male) age 42 - 1992 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Abu (Male) age 62 - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kamara, Abu Bakarr (Male) - 1997 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Assaulted, tortured and limb amputated.

Kamara, Abu Bakarr (Male) - Extorted.

Kamara, Abu Bakarr (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.

Kamara, Abu Bakarr (Male) age 6 - Displaced. Assaulted.

Kamara, Abu Bakarr (Male) age 9 - Displaced. Abducted. Assaulted and tortured.

Kamara, Abu Bakarr (Male) age 26 - 1998 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Extorted. Forced to labour.

Kamara, Abu Bakarr (Male) age 30 - 1994 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted.

Kamara, Abu Bakarr (Male) age 31 - 1999 in Western Area - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Kamara, Abu Bakarr (Male) age 37 - Extorted.

Kamara, Abu Loko (Male) - 1996 in Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Kamara, Adama (Female) - 1992 in Konike Sande, Tonkolili - Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Kamara, Adama (Female) - Displaced.

Kamara, Adama (Female) - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced.

Kamara, Adama (Female) - 1998 in Western Area - Abducted.

Kamara, Adama (Female) age 6 - 1999 in Western Area - Assaulted.

Kamara, Adama (Female) age 15 - 1999 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced. Assaulted.

Kamara, Adama (Female) age 17 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour.

Kamara, Adama (Female) age 25 - 2000 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Displaced, extorted and property looted.

Kamara, Adama (Female) age 30 - 1998 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Adama (Female) age 40 - 1998 in Tonko Limba, Kambia - Displaced and property looted.

Kamara, Adama (Female) age 54 - 1994 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Adamsay (Female) - 1996 in Loko Massama, Port Loko - Displaced. Abducted. Tortured and limb amputated.

Kamara, Adamsay (Female) - 1999 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Killed.

Kamara, Adbakakie (Male) age 32 - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.

Kamara, Adekalie Sheku (Male) age 48 - 1995 in Sanda Magblonthor, Port Loko - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Adikalie (Male) - 1998 in Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili - Limb amputated.

Kamara, Adikalie (Male) - Property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kamara, Adikalie (Male) - 1995 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Killed.

Kamara, Adikalie (Male) age 27 - 1998 in Tambakka, Bombali - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Kamara, Adikalie Amara (Male) age 70 - 1998 in Tambakka, Bombali - Displaced.

Kamara, Adikalie A (Male) - 1998 in Koya, Port Loko - Property destroyed.

Kamara, Ahamdu (Male) age 32 - 1999 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Extorted. Assaulted.

Kamara, Ahamed (Male) age 5 - 1999 in Kambia - Displaced.

Kamara, Ahmed (Male) - 1998 - Killed.

Kamara, Ahmed (Male) - 1996 in Nongowa, Kenema - Killed.

Kamara, Albert (Male) - 2000 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Killed.

Kamara, Alex (Male) age 55 - 1999 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Displaced.

Kamara, Alfred (Male) - 1994 in Komboya, Bo District - Killed.

Kamara, Alfred (Male) age 30 - Killed.

Kamara, Alfred (Male) age 38 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Alhaji (Male) - 1999 in Bureh, Port Loko - Killed.

Kamara, Alhaji (Male) - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Kamara, Alhaji (Male) - Killed.

Kamara, Alhaji (Male) age 1 - 1997 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Tortured.

Kamara, Alhaji (Male) age 22 - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.

Kamara, Alhaji Alimamy (Male) - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Alhaji Mohamed (Male) age 54 - 1994 in Baoma, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Kamara, Alhaji Moyne Musa (Male) - 1999 - Property destroyed.

Kamara, Alhaji Musa (Male) - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Killed.

Kamara, Alhaji Musa (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.

Kamara, Alhaji Salif (Male) age 40 - 1999 in Benducha, Bonthe - Extorted. Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Alhaji Sheku (Male) - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced. Assaulted.

Kamara, Alhaji Tellizo (Male) - 1999 in Tambakka, Bombali - Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Alhassan (Male) age 35 - Property looted. Assaulted.

Kamara, Alice (Female) age 35 - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Displaced.

Kamara, Alie (Male) - 1995 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Assaulted.

Kamara, Alie (Male) - 1999 in Bumpeh, Moyamba - Abducted.

Kamara, Alie (Male) - 1999 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Kamara, Alie (Male) - 2000 in Tonko Limba, Kambia - Property destroyed.

Kamara, Alie (Male) age 15 - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kamara, Alie (Male) age 25 - 1998 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Displaced.

Kamara, Alie (Male) age 31 - 1998 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured. Killed.

Kamara, Alie (Male) age 35 - 1995 in Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Alie (Male) age 39 - 1994 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted.

Kamara, Alie (Male) age 40 - 1999 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kamara, Alieu (Male) - 1995 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Forced to labour. Killed.

Kamara, Alieu (Male) age 48 - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Kamara, Alimamy (Male) - 1994 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Killed.

Kamara, Alimamy (Male) - 1993 in Kono - Displaced.

Kamara, Alimamy (Male) - 1999 in Maforki, Port Loko - Property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Kamara, Alimamy (Male) - 1997 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.

Kamara, Alimamy (Male) - 1998 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Kamara, Alimamy (Male) - Displaced.

Kamara, Alimamy (Male) - 2000 - Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Alimamy (Male) - 1991 - Killed.

Kamara, Alimamy (Male) - 1999 in Briama, Kambia - Killed.

Kamara, Alimamy (Male) age 27 - 2000 in Samu, Kambia - Property destroyed.

Kamara, Alimamy (Male) age 27 - 1999 in Western Area - Extorted. Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Alimamy (Male) age 36 - 2000 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted.

Kamara, Alimamy (Male) age 40 - 1992 in Samu, Kambia - Killed.

Kamara, Alimamy (Male) age 51 - 1993 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Kamara, Alimamy (Male) age 55 - 1999 in Safroko Limba, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Kamara, Alimamy (Male) age 56 - 1996 in Kissi Teng, Kailahun - Extorted. Detained.

Kamara, Alimamy (Male) age 86 - 1998 in Tambakka, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Allie (Male) - 2000 - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Kamara, Allieu (Male) - 1999 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kamara, Allieu (Male) - 1991 - Killed.

Kamara, Alpha (Male) - 1994 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Killed.

Kamara, Alpha (Male) - 1999 in Kaffu Bullom, Port Loko - Displaced.

Kamara, Alpha (Male) - 1995 in Dibia, Port Loko - Abducted.

Kamara, Alpha (Male) - 1998 - Property destroyed.

Kamara, Alpha (Male) - 1995 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Kamara, Alpha (Male) - 1996 - Forced to labour.

Kamara, Alpha (Male) age 18 - 1995 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Kamara, Alpha (Male) age 22 - 1992 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced and property looted.

Kamara, Alpha (Male) age 24 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.

Kamara, Alpha (Male) age 40 - 1999 in Bumpah, Moyamba - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Alpha Alie (Male) age 57 - 2000 - Property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Alpha O (Male) age 55 - 1998 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Displaced.

Kamara, Alpha Sullayman (Male) age 64 - 1994 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Kamara, Aluba (Male) - Tortured.

Kamara, Alusanie (Male) age 73 - Displaced and extorted.

Kamara, Alusine (Male) - 1999 in Konike Sande, Tonkolili - Property destroyed. Tortured. Killed.

Kamara, Alusine (Male) - 1998 in Nimiyama, Kono - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Alusine (Male) age 29 - 1997 in Kakua, Bo District - Property destroyed.

Kamara, Alusine (Male) age 34 - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Kamara, Alusine (Male) age 35 - 1998 in Leibasgayahun, Bombali - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Kamara, Alusine (Male) age 36 - 1998 in Kono - Displaced and extorted. Assaulted.

Kamara, Alusine (Male) age 41 - 1999 in Western Area - Assaulted.

Kamara, Alusine (Male) age 67 - 1999 in Banta Mokele, Moyamba - Extorted and property looted. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Kamara, Amadu (Male) - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Killed.

Kamara, Amadu (Male) - 1992 - Killed.

Kamara, Amadu (Male) age 10 - 1999 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Displaced.

Kamara, Amadu (Male) age 13 - 1998 in Maforki, Port Loko - Forced to labour. Assaulted and limb amputated.

Kamara, Amadu (Male) age 41 - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.

Kamara, Amadu (Male) age 54 - 1999 in Marampa, Port Loko - Assaulted. Killed.

Kamara, Amadu (Male) age 59 - 1999 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Kamara, Amadu (Male) age 60 - 1998 - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Kamara, Amadu (Male) age 70 - 1998 in Masungbala, Kambia - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Amadu Sorie (Male) age 42 - 1999 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Kamara, Amadu Yannkay (Male) - 1999 in Kaffu Bullom, Port Loko - Assaulted.

Kamara, Amara (Male) - 1998 in Tambakka, Bombali - Property destroyed. Limb amputated.

Kamara, Amara (Male) - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Killed.

Kamara, Amara (Male) age 15 - 1995 in Marampa, Port Loko - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Kamara, Amara (Male) age 31 - 1995 in Briama, Kambia - Abducted.

Kamara, Amara (Male) age 60 - 1998 in Tambakka, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Kamara, Amara (Male) age 82 - 1999 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Amidu (Male) age 40 - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Kamara, Amidu (Male) age 47 - Property looted.

Kamara, Amie (Female) - 1997 in Kaffu Bullom, Port Loko - Abducted. Killed.

Kamara, Amie (Female) - 1998 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Forced to labour.

Kamara, Amie (Female) - 1997 in Sowa, Pujehun - Killed.

Kamara, Amie (Female) age 47 - 1992 in Bagbo, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kamara, Amie (Female) age 48 - 1994 in Tane, Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kamara, Aminata (Female) - 1994 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kamara, Aminata (Female) - 1996 in Tane, Tonkolili - Displaced. Abducted. Assaulted.

Kamara, Aminata (Female) - 1994 in Kholifa Mabang, Tonkolili - Property looted and destroyed. Detained. Tortured. Killed.

Kamara, Aminata (Female) - 1999 in Maforki, Port Loko - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Kamara, Aminata (Female) - 1999 in Koya, Port Loko - Tortured.

Kamara, Aminata (Female) - 1999 in Gbendembu Ngowahun, Bombali - Forced to labour. Tortured.
 Kamara, Aminata (Female) - Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Kamara, Aminata (Female) - Displaced.
 Kamara, Aminata (Female) - 2000 - Forced to labour.
 Kamara, Aminata (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed.
 Kamara, Aminata (Female) age 7 - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced.
 Kamara, Aminata (Female) age 13 - 1999 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Displaced. Forced to labour.
 Kamara, Aminata (Female) age 22 - 1997 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Kamara, Aminata (Female) age 24 - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced.
 Kamara, Aminata (Female) age 28 - 1999 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Property destroyed. Forced to labour.
 Kamara, Aminata (Female) age 30 - 1998 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Kamara, Aminata (Female) age 30 - 1999 - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Kamara, Aminata (Female) age 34 - 1998 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced.
 Kamara, Aminata (Female) age 37 - 1991 in Peje Bongre, Kailahun - Displaced.
 Kamara, Anaque (Male) - 1998 in Mambolo, Kambia - Property looted.
 Kamara, Andrew (Male) age 28 - 1994 in Nimikoro, Kono - Killed.
 Kamara, Ansumana (Male) - 1993 in Mano Sakrim, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted.
 Kamara, Ansumana (Male) - 1998 - Displaced.
 Kamara, Ansumana (Male) age 32 - 1996 in Leibasgayahun, Bombali - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour.
 Kamara, Ansumana (Male) age 37 - 1991 - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Kamara, Ansumana (Male) age 52 - 1991 in Kwamebai Krim, Bonthe - Property looted and destroyed.
 Kamara, Ansumana (Male) age 57 - 1996 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.
 Kamara, Aruna (Male) age 36 - 1998 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained.
 Kamara, Assana (Male) - 1997 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.
 Kamara, Augusta M. (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Kamara, Aye (Female) - 1998 in Loko Massama, Port Loko - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Kamara, Baalay (Male) age 20 - 2000 in Masungbala, Kambia - Killed.
 Kamara, Baba (Male) - 1999 in Bureh, Port Loko - Killed.
 Kamara, Baby (Female) age 25 - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Kamara, Baby Jay (Female) age 15 - 1998 in Peje Bongre, Kailahun - Killed.
 Kamara, Bai (Male) - 1995 in Sanda Magblonthor, Port Loko - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Kamara, Bai (Male) - 1997 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Detained.
 Kamara, Bai (Male) age 34 - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Killed.
 Kamara, Bai Bai (Male) - 1998 in Koya, Port Loko - Property destroyed. Killed.
 Kamara, Bai Bureh (Male) - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Property destroyed.
 Kamara, Baimba (Male) age 57 - 1997 in Gbendembu Ngowahun, Bombali - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained.
 Kamara, Baimba (Male) age 66 - 1999 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.
 Kamara, Bainba (Male) - 1998 - Displaced.
 Kamara, Baio Serry (Male) age 20 - 1997 in Kassunko, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Kamara, Balla (Male) - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Property destroyed.
 Kamara, Balla (Male) age 53 - 1998 - Property looted. Abducted.
 Kamara, Bampaya (Male) age 25 - 1999 in Magbema, Kambia - Abducted.
 Kamara, Bana (Male) age 25 - 1998 in Dembelia Sinkunia, Koinadugu - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.
 Kamara, Bangalie (Male) age 50 - 1998 in Tambakka, Bombali - Property destroyed. Killed.
 Kamara, Baromi (Female) - Displaced.
 Kamara, Bassie (Male) - 1999 in Maforki, Port Loko - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Kamara, Benjamin (Male) age 41 - 1998 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced and property looted.
 Kamara, Bockarie (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced. Killed.

Kamara, Bockarie (Male) - Killed.

Kamara, Bockarie (Male) age 32 - 1996 in Bonthe - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Kamara, Bona (Male) age 52 - 1991 in Kakua, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Kamara, Bornoh (Male) age 27 - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Assaulted.

Kamara, Bowarah (Female) - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Kamara, Boya (Male) - Abducted. Tortured. Killed.

Kamara, Braima (Male) - 1995 in Dodo, Kenema - Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Brima (Male) - 1999 in Tinkatupa Maka Saffoko, Port Loko - Property destroyed. Killed.

Kamara, Brima (Male) - 1994 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Killed.

Kamara, Brima (Male) - 1998 in Diang, Koinadugu - Abducted. Killed.

Kamara, Brima (Male) - 1992 in Peje, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Brima (Male) - 1995 - Displaced. Abducted.

Kamara, Brima (Male) - Killed.

Kamara, Brima (Male) - 1991 in Peje West, Kailahun - Killed.

Kamara, Brima (Male) - 2000 in Masungbala, Kambia - Extorted and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Kamara, Brima (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted.

Kamara, Brima (Male) age 2 - 1994 in Simbaru, Kenema - Killed.

Kamara, Brima (Male) age 5 - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Killed.

Kamara, Brima (Male) age 18 - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured. Killed.

Kamara, Brima (Male) age 31 - 1991 - Displaced.

Kamara, Brima (Male) age 37 - 1995 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Killed.

Kamara, Brima (Male) age 38 - 1995 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Killed.

Kamara, Brima (Male) age 56 - 1999 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Abducted.

Kamara, Brima (Male) age 67 - 1995 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced. Killed.

Kamara, Brima (Male) age 70 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced.

Kamara, Brima Nuru (Male) age 47 - 1991 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced.

Kamara, Brima Yamba (Male) age 33 - 1999 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Bullu (Female) age 55 - 1998 in Follasaba Dembelia, Koinadugu - Property looted.

Kamara, Bundu (Female) - 1999 in Kafe Simira, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Kamara, Bundu (Male) age 49 - 1999 in Western Area - Assaulted.

Kamara, Cecilia (Female) age 51 - 1995 in Kpanda Kemo, Bonthe - Displaced.

Kamara, Charles (Male) - 1997 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kamara, Chernor (Male) - 1997 in Sanda Tendaren, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Kamara, Chernor (Male) - 1999 in Magbema, Kambia - Assaulted and tortured.

Kamara, Chernor (Male) age 62 - 1999 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted.

Kamara, Damba (Male) age 6 - 1998 in Diang, Koinadugu - Limb amputated.

Kamara, Danda (Male) age 43 - 2000 in Magbema, Kambia - Extorted. Forced to labour.

Kamara, Daniel (Male) - 1991 - Extorted and property destroyed.

Kamara, Darba (Female) - 1998 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Displaced.

Kamara, Dauda (Male) - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Kamara, Dauda (Male) age 59 - 1999 in Kambia - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Kamara, Dauda (Male) age 67 - 1995 in Kenema - Displaced.

Kamara, David Prince (Male) age 36 - 1994 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Demba (Male) age 55 - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kamara, Digba (Female) age 56 - 1998 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Dunu (Male) age 36 - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Killed.

Kamara, Earnest (Male) age 41 - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Eddie (Male) - 1998 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Edmond (Male) age 45 - 1998 in Safroko Limba, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed.

Forced to labour.

Kamara, Edward (Male) - 1996 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Killed.
Kamara, Edward (Male) - 1997 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Killed.
Kamara, Elvis (Male) age 31 - 1999 in Nongowa, Kenema - Killed.
Kamara, Emma (Female) age 26 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.
Kamara, Emmah (Female) age 40 - 2000 in Samu, Kambia - Property looted.
Kamara, Emmanuel (Male) age 2 - 1998 - Abducted.
Kamara, Emmanuel (Male) age 33 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.
Kamara, Ernest (Male) age 60 - 1998 in Kono - Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.
Kamara, Esther (Female) - 1994 - Displaced. Killed.
Kamara, Evelyn (Male) age 37 - 1992 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Tortured.
Kamara, Fagberie (Male) age 41 - Displaced and property destroyed.
Kamara, Faiah (Male) - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Killed.
Kamara, Fakulay (Male) - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.
Kamara, Fanta (Female) age 33 - 1997 - Displaced and extorted.
Kamara, Fatalay (Male) - 1999 in Diang, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Tortured.
Kamara, Fatima (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.
Kamara, Fatima (Female) age 14 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Killed.
Kamara, Fatmata (Female) - 1999 in Maforiki, Port Loko - Killed.
Kamara, Fatmata (Female) - 1996 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Forced to labour.
Kamara, Fatmata (Female) - 1997 in Kaffu Bullom, Port Loko - Abducted. Killed.
Kamara, Fatmata (Female) - 1996 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Killed.
Kamara, Fatmata (Female) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Extorted. Abducted. Assaulted.
Kamara, Fatmata (Female) - Displaced.
Kamara, Fatmata (Female) - 1998 - Abducted.
Kamara, Fatmata (Female) - 1995 - Extorted. Assaulted.
Kamara, Fatmata (Female) - 1999 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed.
Kamara, Fatmata (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.
Kamara, Fatmata (Female) - 1992 in Magbema, Kambia - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
Kamara, Fatmata (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
Kamara, Fatmata (Female) age 15 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured and limb amputated.
Kamara, Fatmata (Female) age 20 - 1995 in Diang, Koinadugu - Abducted and detained.
Kamara, Fatmata (Female) age 21 - 1998 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Displaced.
Kamara, Fatmata (Female) age 22 - 1998 - Detained.
Kamara, Fatmata (Female) age 24 - Displaced.
Kamara, Fatmata (Female) age 32 - 1995 in Masungbala, Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed.
Kamara, Fatmata (Female) age 39 - 1997 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.
Kamara, Fatmata (Female) age 52 - 1995 in Buya Romende, Port Loko - Extorted and property destroyed. Assaulted and tortured.
Kamara, Fatmata (Female) age 65 - 1992 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed.
Kamara, Fatu (Female) age 51 - 1994 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced. Assaulted.
Kamara, Fayiah (Male) age 27 - Displaced. Forced to labour. Killed.
Kamara, Ferenkeh (Male) - 1998 - Killed.
Kamara, Filla (Female) - 1998 in Dembelia Sinkunia, Koinadugu - Displaced.
Kamara, Fannah (Female) age 28 - 1998 in Diang, Koinadugu - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.
Kamara, Florence (Female) - 1999 in Koya, Port Loko - Forced to labour. Assaulted.
Kamara, Foday (Male) - 1999 in Koya, Port Loko - Killed.
Kamara, Foday (Male) - 1998 in Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili - Limb amputated.
Kamara, Foday (Male) - 1999 in Dibia, Port Loko - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
Kamara, Foday (Male) - Extorted and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.
Kamara, Foday (Male) - 1998 - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted.

Kamara, Foday (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Property looted and destroyed. Killed.
 Kamara, Foday (Male) - Killed.
 Kamara, Foday (Male) - Property destroyed. Forced to labour.
 Kamara, Foday (Male) - Abducted and detained.
 Kamara, Foday (Male) - 1998 in Tambakka, Bombali - Property destroyed. Limb amputated.
 Kamara, Foday (Male) - Displaced and property destroyed. Killed.
 Kamara, Foday (Male) - 1995 in Koya, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Kamara, Foday (Male) - 2000 in Magbema, Kambia - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Kamara, Foday (Male) - 2000 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Displaced.
 Kamara, Foday (Male) age 15 - Displaced.
 Kamara, Foday (Male) age 23 - 1999 - Killed.
 Kamara, Foday (Male) age 25 - 1997 in Western Area - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and stripped.
 Kamara, Foday (Male) age 28 - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Kamara, Foday (Male) age 35 - Displaced.
 Kamara, Foday (Male) age 35 - 1995 in Briama, Kambia - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Kamara, Foday (Male) age 37 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted. Killed.
 Kamara, Foday (Male) age 42 - 1994 in Upper Bambara , Kailahun - Displaced and property looted.
 Kamara, Foday (Male) age 56 - 1998 - Property looted and destroyed. Tortured.
 Kamara, Foday (Male) age 56 - 1998 in Masungbala, Kambia - Killed.
 Kamara, Foday (Male) age 65 - Displaced. Forced to labour.
 Kamara, Foday (Male) age 75 - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.
 Kamara, Foday Mohamed (Male) - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Abducted and detained.
 Kamara, Foday Saidu (Male) - 2000 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced.
 Kamara, Fodie (Male) age 69 - 1994 in Langorama, Kenema - Property looted and destroyed.
 Kamara, Fodie Jeneba (Male) age 75 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted.
 Kamara, Fodie Momodu (Male) age 80 - Killed.
 Kamara, Fomba (Male) age 31 - 1991 in Upper Bambara , Kailahun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.
 Kamara, Fonnle (Male) age 26 - Displaced. Assaulted and tortured.
 Kamara, Francis (Male) age 38 - 1999 in Koya, Port Loko - Forced to labour.
 Kamara, Fudia (Female) age 21 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed. Killed.
 Kamara, Fudie (Male) - 1994 in Simbaru, Kenema - Assaulted.
 Kamara, Gbassay (Female) - 1999 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Killed.
 Kamara, Gbassay (Male) age 13 - 1998 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Abducted and detained.
 Kamara, Gbassy (Male) - 1998 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced.
 Kamara, Gbenu (Female) age 30 - 1997 in Sowa, Pujehun - Killed.
 Kamara, Gbessay (Male) - Abducted and detained.
 Kamara, Gbessay (Female) age 30 - 1999 in Maforki, Port Loko - Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.
 Kamara, Gboyah (Male) - 1998 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Property destroyed.
 Kamara, Gibrilla (Male) - Tortured.
 Kamara, Gibrilla (Male) age 21 - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Property looted. Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Kamara, Gibrilla (Male) age 32 - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.
 Kamara, Haja Mariama (Female) age 23 - 1998 in Maforki, Port Loko - Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.
 Kamara, Hamed B (Male) age 35 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed. Detained. Killed.
 Kamara, Hanan - 1998 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Property destroyed.
 Kamara, Hasana (Male) age 49 - 1995 in Kholifa Mabang, Tonkolili - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Kamara, Hassan (Male) - 1999 in Bumpeh, Moyamba - Killed.
 Kamara, Hassan (Male) - 1998 in Follosaba Dembelia, Koinadugu - Forced to labour.
 Kamara, Hassan (Male) - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced. Killed.

Kamara, Hassan (Male) - 1993 in Kakua, Bo District - Killed.
 Kamara, Hassan (Male) age 10 - Abducted and detained.
 Kamara, Hassan (Male) age 13 - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured.
 Kamara, Hassan (Male) age 15 - Displaced. Forced to labour.
 Kamara, Hassan (Male) age 21 - 1997 in Maforki, Port Loko - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour.
 Kamara, Hassan (Male) age 32 - 1999 in Koya, Port Loko - Displaced. Forced to labour.
 Kamara, Hassan (Male) age 35 - 2000 - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour.
 Kamara, Hassan (Male) age 35 - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and stripped.
 Kamara, Hassan (Male) age 36 - 2000 in Samu, Kambia - Killed.
 Kamara, Hassan (Male) age 51 - 1999 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Kamara, Hassan (Male) age 54 - 1996 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Killed.
 Kamara, Hassan (Male) age 56 - 1998 in Tane, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Kamara, Hassan Mantama (Male) - 1998 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Property looted.
 Kamara, Hassan Y (Male) - Displaced and property looted.
 Kamara, Hassana (Male) - 1999 in Konike Sande, Tonkolili - Abducted. Tortured.
 Kamara, Hassana (Male) - 1999 in Kafe Simira, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour.
 Kamara, Hassana (Male) - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted.
 Kamara, Hassana (Male) age 28 - 1994 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.
 Kamara, Hassana (Male) age 33 - 1999 in Kambia - Forced to labour. Killed.
 Kamara, Hassana (Male) age 58 - 1998 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Kamara, Hawa (Female) - 1996 in Kafe Simira, Tonkolili - Displaced. Abducted. Killed.
 Kamara, Hawa (Female) - 1991 - Displaced.
 Kamara, Hawa (Female) - Abducted and detained.
 Kamara, Hawa (Female) age 7 - 1993 in Sowa, Pujehun - Abducted.
 Kamara, Hawa (Female) age 24 - 1998 - Extorted. Abducted and detained.
 Kamara, Hawa (Female) age 28 - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Forced to labour.
 Kamara, Hawa (Female) age 31 - 1992 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Kamara, Hawa (Female) age 40 - 1991 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained.
 Kamara, Hawa (Female) age 47 - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Kamara, Hawa (Female) age 48 - 1999 in Western Area - Property looted. Detained. Assaulted.
 Kamara, Henry (Male) age 15 - 1995 - Killed.
 Kamara, Heteh (Male) age 61 - 1997 in Gbendembu Ngowahun, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Kamara, Hippo (Male) - 1998 in Gbendembu Ngowahun, Bombali - Displaced.
 Kamara, Humu (Female) age 15 - Forced to labour. Killed.
 Kamara, Ibrahim (Male) - 1998 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Abducted and detained.
 Kamara, Ibrahim (Male) - Abducted.
 Kamara, Ibrahim (Male) - 1998 - Killed.
 Kamara, Ibrahim (Male) - 1997 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Killed.
 Kamara, Ibrahim (Male) - 2000 in Samu, Kambia - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Kamara, Ibrahim (Male) - 1997 in Tonko Limba, Kambia - Abducted and detained.
 Kamara, Ibrahim (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Limb amputated. Killed.
 Kamara, Ibrahim (Male) age 10 - 2000 in Samu, Kambia - Killed.
 Kamara, Ibrahim (Male) age 20 - Extorted. Assaulted.
 Kamara, Ibrahim (Male) age 23 - 1998 in Kakua, Bo District - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Kamara, Ibrahim (Male) age 24 - 1999 in Marampa, Port Loko - Displaced. Detained.
 Kamara, Ibrahim (Male) age 29 - 1997 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Kamara, Ibrahim (Male) age 29 - 1994 in Tikonko, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Assaulted. Killed.

Kamara, Ibrahim (Male) age 30 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kamara, Ibrahim (Male) age 35 - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kamara, Ibrahim (Male) age 41 - 1991 in Baoma, Bo District - Forced to labour.

Kamara, Ibrahim (Male) age 50 - 1998 in Kassunko, Koinadugu - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Kamara, Ibrahim Sorie (Male) age 11 - 1995 in Magbema, Kambia - Displaced.

Kamara, Ibrahim (Male) - Property destroyed.

Kamara, Idrissa (Male) - 1994 in Konike Sande, Tonkolili - Tortured. Killed.

Kamara, Idrissa (Male) age 25 - 1991 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and stripped.

Kamara, Idrissa (Male) age 35 - 1994 in Kholifa Mabang, Tonkolili - Property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Tortured. Killed.

Kamara, Imam Abu Bakarr (Male) - 2000 - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Imar (Female) age 36 - 1999 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Property destroyed. Abducted.

Kamara, Isata (Female) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kamara, Isata (Female) age 20 - 1998 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced and extorted.

Kamara, Isata (Female) age 21 - 1995 - Displaced.

Kamara, Isata (Female) age 57 - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Kamara, Isatou (Female) - Displaced. Assaulted.

Kamara, Isatu (Female) - 1996 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Abducted.

Kamara, Isatu (Female) - 1995 in Kongbora, Moyamba - Killed.

Kamara, Isatu (Female) - 1996 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Kamara, Isatu (Female) - 1995 in Konike Sande, Tonkolili - Displaced. Abducted.

Kamara, Isatu (Female) - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Kamara, Isatu (Female) - 1993 - Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Isatu (Female) - 1998 - Displaced.

Kamara, Isatu (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed.

Kamara, Isatu (Female) - 1999 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed. Killed.

Kamara, Isatu (Female) - 1999 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kamara, Isatu (Female) age 10 - Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Kamara, Isatu (Female) age 20 - 1998 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Forced to labour.

Kamara, Isatu (Female) age 20 - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Property destroyed. Assaulted.

Kamara, Isatu (Female) age 25 - Killed.

Kamara, Isatu (Female) age 29 - 1999 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Killed.

Kamara, Isatu (Female) age 31 - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Abducted and detained. Tortured and limb amputated.

Kamara, Isatu (Female) age 41 - 1998 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Kamara, Isatu (Female) age 44 - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed.

Kamara, Ishamel (Male) - Property destroyed.

Kamara, Ishmaila (Male) - 1997 in Kagboro, Moyamba - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Islam (Male) age 29 - 1999 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted.

Kamara, Ismeah (Male) - 1997 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Killed.

Kamara, Issa (Male) - 1998 in Diang, Koinadugu - Limb amputated.

Kamara, Issa Konie (Male) - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Kamara, Issata (Female) age 3 - 1992 in Western Area - Displaced. Tortured. Killed.

Kamara, Iye (Female) - Displaced. Abducted. Assaulted.

Kamara, Iye (Female) - 1995 - Displaced.

Kamara, Iye (Female) - 1992 - Property looted.

Kamara, Iye (Female) - 1994 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Iye (Female) age 10 - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Jacinta (Female) age 11 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour.

Kamara, Jaiah (Male) age 40 - 1993 in Dia, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted.

Kamara, James (Male) - Displaced.

Kamara, James (Male) age 28 - 1994 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.

Kamara, Jariatu (Female) age 64 - 1996 in Koya, Port Loko - Displaced.

Kamara, Jaye (Female) age 15 - 1993 - Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Jebbeh (Female) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour.

Kamara, Jeneba (Female) - 1991 in Baoma, Bo District - Assaulted.

Kamara, Jeneba (Female) age 41 - 1991 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Jenneh (Female) age 80 - 1993 - Displaced.

Kamara, Jerrimaia (Male) age 35 - 1994 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Kamara, Jestina (Female) age 67 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kamara, Joe (Male) - 1998 in Western Area - Property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, John (Male) - 1992 - Abducted and detained.

Kamara, John (Male) age 12 - 1996 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Displaced. Abducted. Stripped. Killed.

Kamara, John (Male) age 22 - 1997 in Kono - Displaced and extorted. Stripped.

Kamara, John (Male) age 26 - Property looted and destroyed. Assaulted and tortured.

Kamara, John (Male) age 27 - 1998 in Wara-Wara Bafodia, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Kamara, John (Male) age 40 - 1998 in Western Area - Property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Kamara, John (Male) age 42 - 2000 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted and stripped.

Kamara, John (Male) age 49 - 1998 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kamara, John (Male) age 72 - 1995 - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kamara, John Daniel (Male) age 44 - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Kamara, Joseph (Male) - 1998 in Kakua, Bo District - Killed.

Kamara, Joseph (Male) age 12 - 1996 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Displaced. Abducted. Stripped. Killed.

Kamara, Joseph (Male) age 26 - 1994 in Mambolo, Kambia - Displaced and property looted.

Kamara, Joseph (Male) age 34 - 1998 - Displaced.

Kamara, Joseph (Male) age 46 - 1999 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Detained. Assaulted.

Kamara, Juanna (Male) age 60 - 1991 in Simbaru, Kenema - Detained. Killed.

Kamara, Juma (Male) - Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Jusufu (Male) age 37 - 1991 in Upper Bambara, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kamara, Kabba (Male) - 1998 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Kamara, Kaday (Female) age 31 - 1994 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Kadiatu (Female) - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Kamara, Kadiatu (Female) - 1999 - Abducted.

Kamara, Kadiatu (Female) - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Kamara, Kadiatu (Female) - 1998 in Kambia - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kamara, Kadiatu (Female) - 1999 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed. Killed.

Kamara, Kadiatu (Female) age 15 - Displaced.

Kamara, Kadiatu (Female) age 15 - 1999 - Displaced. Killed.

Kamara, Kadiatu (Female) age 18 - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Abducted.

Kamara, Kadiatu (Female) age 19 - 1999 in Koya, Port Loko - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kamara, Kadiatu (Female) age 22 - 1992 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Killed.

Kamara, Kadiatu (Female) age 22 - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Killed.

Kamara, Kadiatu (Female) age 25 - 1998 in Kongbora, Moyamba - Displaced. Assaulted.

Kamara, Kadiatu (Female) age 27 - 1998 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kamara, Kadiatu (Female) age 31 - 1999 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Kadiatu (Female) age 33 - 2000 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Kadiatu (Female) age 36 - 1994 in Nimiyama, Kono - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kamara, Kadiatu (Female) age 37 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kamara, Kadiatu (Female) age 40 - 1998 in Bombali - Displaced. Abducted.

Kamara, Kadiatu (Female) age 40 - 1999 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Property destroyed. Abducted. Tortured and limb amputated.

Kamara, Kadiatu (Female) age 42 - 1996 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Kadiatu (Female) age 45 - 1996 in Dia, Kailahun - Killed.

Kamara, Kadimodu (Male) - 1999 in Tambakka, Bombali - Displaced.

Kamara, Kainemanu (Male) - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kamara, Kalay (Male) age 59 - 1999 in Gorama Kono, Kono - Displaced and extorted. Abducted. Tortured and stripped.

Kamara, Kalibah (Male) age 13 - 1999 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Forced to labour.

Kamara, Kalilu (Male) age 27 - 2000 - Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Kallatu (Female) age 57 - 1995 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted. Tortured.

Kamara, Kallay (Male) age 38 - 1998 in Kono - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.

Kamara, Kallon (Male) - 1991 in Upper Bambara , Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Kamara, Kamanda (Male) - Displaced.

Kamara, Kananday (Female) age 65 - 1994 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Killed.

Kamara, Kandeh (Male) - 1998 in Koya, Port Loko - Killed.

Kamara, Kandeh (Male) - 1999 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Killed.

Kamara, Kanku (Female) age 55 - 1998 in Follosaba Dembelia, Koinadugu - Property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Kapr (Male) - 1998 in Bombali - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted.

Kamara, Kapri (Male) - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Abducted.

Kamara, Karankay (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted. Killed.

Kamara, Karifa (Male) - 1998 - Abducted. Killed.

Kamara, Karifala (Male) - 1998 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Kamara, Karifala (Male) age 10 - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Killed.

Kamara, Karim (Male) age 56 - 1995 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Kamara, Karmoh (Male) - Limb amputated.

Kamara, Kathy (Female) - 1997 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted.

Kamara, Kattie (Male) - 1996 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Kamara, Keh (Male) - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Kamara, Keifala (Male) age 30 - 1991 in Peje West, Kailahun - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Tortured.

Kamara, Keilei (Male) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Killed.

Kamara, Kekura (Male) age 30 - 1991 in Wunde, Bo District - Displaced. Killed.

Kamara, Kelfala (Male) - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Killed.

Kamara, Kelfalah (Male) age 62 - 1994 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Kamara, Kelpha (Male) - 1998 in Kambia - Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Kesima (Male) - 1994 in Neini, Koinadugu - Killed.

Kamara, Kolakoh (Male) age 58 - 1998 in Kamara, Kono - Killed.

Kamara, Kolanko (Male) age 16 - 1998 - Killed.

Kamara, Kole (Male) age 75 - 1998 in Tinkatupa Maka Saffoko, Port Loko - Property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Koleh (Male) age 53 - 2000 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted.

Kamara, Kolleh (Male) age 7 - 1999 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Koloneh (Female) age 31 - 1998 in Nimikoro, Kono - Abducted. Killed.

Kamara, Komrabai (Male) - 2000 in Masungbala, Kambia - Property destroyed. Killed.

Kamara, Kona (Female) - 1991 - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Kamara, Konbah (Male) - 1998 in Tonkolili - Forced to labour. Killed.

Kamara, Kondeh (Male) - 1998 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed. Killed.

Kamara, Konsoh (Female) - 1999 in Kassunko, Koinadugu - Tortured. Killed.

Kamara, Kortor (Male) - 1991 - Abducted. Killed.

Kamara, Kortor (Male) age 40 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted.

Kamara, Kosaroh (Female) - Killed.

Kamara, Kotor (Male) - 1993 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.
 Kamara, Kula (Female) - 1993 in Badjia, Bo District - Killed.
 Kamara, Kumba (Female) - 1998 - Displaced.
 Kamara, Lahai (Male) - Killed.
 Kamara, Lahai (Male) - 1991 in Wandor, Kenema - Property looted. Assaulted.
 Kamara, Lahai (Male) age 27 - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Kamara, Lahai (Male) age 49 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Abducted and detained.
 Kamara, Lahai (Male) age 54 - 1994 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Displaced.
 Kamara, Lamarana (Female) age 37 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Kamara, Lamin (Male) - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Property looted.
 Kamara, Lamin (Male) age 15 - 1992 in Kakua, Bo District - Displaced.
 Kamara, Lamin (Male) age 27 - 1999 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.
 Kamara, Lamin (Male) age 31 - 1995 in Upper Bambara , Kailahun - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted.
 Kamara, Lamin (Male) age 40 - 1998 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Property looted. Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Kamara, Lamin (Male) age 42 - 2000 in Masungbala, Kambia - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Kamara, Lamin (Male) age 42 - 2000 in Briama, Kambia - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Kamara, Lamin (Male) age 47 - Displaced.
 Kamara, Lamina (Male) - 1996 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Killed.
 Kamara, Lamina (Male) - 1996 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Kamara, Lamina (Male) - 1998 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour.
 Kamara, Lamina (Male) age 16 - Killed.
 Kamara, Lamina (Male) age 70 - 1999 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Property looted.
 Kamara, Lamina (Male) age 80 - 2000 in Briama, Kambia - Extorted.
 Kamara, Lamina Maya (Male) age 70 - 2000 in Masungbala, Kambia - Displaced and property looted.
 Kamara, Lamrana (Female) - 1994 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Kamara, Lansana (Male) - 1996 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Killed.
 Kamara, Lansana (Male) - 1997 in Loko Massama, Port Loko - Displaced and property looted.
 Kamara, Lansana (Male) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.
 Kamara, Limana (Male) age 65 - 1996 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Property destroyed.
 Kamara, Loko (Male) - 1998 in Safroko Limba, Bombali - Killed.
 Kamara, Loko (Male) - 1995 in Safroko Limba, Bombali - Killed.
 Kamara, Lombay (Male) - 1999 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Displaced.
 Kamara, Luba (Female) - 1995 - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Kamara, Lusainie (Male) age 69 - Displaced and property looted.
 Kamara, Maama (Female) - Displaced.
 Kamara, Mabinty (Female) - 1995 in Bumpeh, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.
 Kamara, Mabinty (Female) - 1993 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Killed.
 Kamara, Mabinty (Female) - 1996 - Abducted. Killed.
 Kamara, Mabinty (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Killed.
 Kamara, Mabinty (Female) age 30 - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Kamara, Mabinty (Female) age 45 - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Kamara, Maboado (Female) age 73 - 1996 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Killed.
 Kamara, Mafai (Male) age 47 - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed.
 Kamara, Maferi (Female) - Displaced.
 Kamara, Maferi (Female) - 1999 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Assaulted.
 Kamara, Mahawa (Female) - Displaced.
 Kamara, Mahmoud (Male) - 1999 in Kafe Simira, Tonkolili - Displaced. Abducted. Assaulted. Killed.
 Kamara, Mahmoud (Male) - 1999 in Maforki, Port Loko - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Kamara, Mahmoud (Male) - Displaced.

Kamara, Maikaba (Male) age 22 - 1999 in Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Kamara, Mamadu (Male) - 1999 in Maforki, Port Loko - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Kamara, Mamadu (Male) - 1995 in Dasse, Moyamba - Property looted. Killed.
 Kamara, Mamako (Female) - Killed.
 Kamara, Mambundu (Male) - 1994 in Dama, Kenema - Abducted and detained.
 Kamara, Mamiseh (Female) - 1998 - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted.
 Kamara, Mamoua (Male) - 1999 in Sanda Tendaren, Bombali - Killed.
 Kamara, Mamuru - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Property destroyed. Killed.
 Kamara, Mane (Male) - Displaced and property looted.
 Kamara, Marah (Male) - 1998 in Masungbala, Kambia - Abducted. Assaulted. Killed.
 Kamara, Marco (Male) - Forced to labour.
 Kamara, Mardo (Male) age 10 - 1997 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Forced to labour.
 Kamara, Margaret (Female) - 1992 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured.
 Kamara, Margrette (Female) - 1998 in Malema, Kailahun - Killed.
 Kamara, Mariama (Female) - 2000 in Masungbala, Kambia - Killed.
 Kamara, Mariama age 13 - 1992 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced. Assaulted. Killed.
 Kamara, Mariama (Female) age 15 - 1994 - Displaced.
 Kamara, Mariama (Female) age 27 - 1999 - Displaced.
 Kamara, Mariatu (Female) - 1996 in Loko Massama, Port Loko - Displaced. Abducted. Tortured and limb amputated.
 Kamara, Mariatu (Female) - 1997 in Kakua, Bo District - Killed.
 Kamara, Mariatu (Female) age 12 - 1998 in Saproko Limba, Bombali - Displaced and extorted. Assaulted and tortured.
 Kamara, Mariatu (Female) age 15 - 1999 - Displaced.
 Kamara, Marie (Female) - 1999 in Bureh, Port Loko - Killed.
 Kamara, Marie (Female) - 1999 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Kamara, Marie (Female) - 1995 - Displaced. Abducted.
 Kamara, Marie (Female) - Killed.
 Kamara, Marie (Female) - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Abducted and detained.
 Kamara, Marie (Female) - 1994 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Displaced. Tortured.
 Kamara, Marie (Female) - 1999 - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Kamara, Marie (Female) age 37 - 1998 in Leibasgayahun, Bombali - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Kamara, Marie (Female) age 46 - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed.
 Kamara, Marie (Female) age 57 - 1995 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Tortured.
 Kamara, Marima (Female) - Displaced.
 Kamara, Mariray (Female) - 1999 - Abducted.
 Kamara, Martha (Female) age 16 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour and drugged. Tortured.
 Kamara, Martha (Female) age 43 - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced.
 Kamara, Mary (Female) - Displaced.
 Kamara, Mary (Female) age 27 - 1995 in Tunkia, Kenema - Tortured.
 Kamara, Masain (Female) - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Kamara, Maseray (Female) age 85 - Tortured.
 Kamara, Maseray A. (Female) age 30 - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Kamara, Massa (Female) - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Abducted and detained.
 Kamara, Massah (Female) age 37 - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Detained. Assaulted.
 Kamara, Massah (Female) age 65 - 1997 in Dama, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Kamara, Mathawa (Female) age 40 - Property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Kamara, Mathew (Male) age 58 - 1994 in Nongowa, Kenema - Property looted and destroyed.
 Kamara, Matta (Female) age 52 - 1991 in Simbaru, Kenema - Displaced. Detained.
 Kamara, Mawa May (Female) age 13 - 1991 - Extorted.
 Kamara, Maya (Female) age 72 - 2000 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced and property looted.
 Kamara, Mbalu (Female) - 1993 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Killed.
 Kamara, Mbalu (Male) - 1998 in Kambia - Abducted and detained.
 Kamara, Mbalu (Female) age 10 - 1998 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced.
 Kamara, Mbalu (Female) age 12 - 1998 in Koya, Port Loko - Abducted and detained.
 Kamara, Mbalu (Female) age 37 - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced and property looted.

Kamara, Mbawai (Male) - 1994 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.
 Kamara, Memuna (Female) - 1997 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Limb amputated.
 Kamara, Memuna (Female) age 24 - 1999 - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.
 Kamara, Memuna (Female) age 39 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Abducted. Assaulted.
 Kamara, Memunatu (Female) - 1997 in Kaffu Bullom, Port Loko - Abducted. Limb amputated.
 Kamara, Memunatu (Female) - 1995 in Masungbala, Kambia - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Kamara, Memunatu (Female) age 24 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Kamara, Merra (Female) age 26 - 1998 in Koinadugu - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Kamara, Messie (Female) - 1995 in Bumpah, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Kamara, Michael Abu (Male) age 20 - 1995 in Loko Massama, Port Loko - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Kamara, Mimi (Female) - 1995 in Gbendembu Ngowahun, Bombali - Displaced.
 Kamara, Mohamed (Male) - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted.
 Kamara, Mohamed (Male) - 1993 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Displaced.
 Kamara, Mohamed (Male) - 1998 in Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili - Abducted.
 Kamara, Mohamed (Male) - 1999 in Kaffu Bullom, Port Loko - Displaced.
 Kamara, Mohamed (Male) - 1994 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Abducted and detained.
 Kamara, Mohamed (Male) - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.
 Kamara, Mohamed (Male) - Killed.
 Kamara, Mohamed (Male) - 2000 - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted.
 Kamara, Mohamed (Male) - 1998 - Property destroyed. Forced to labour.
 Kamara, Mohamed (Male) - Killed.
 Kamara, Mohamed (Male) - Abducted and detained.
 Kamara, Mohamed (Male) - Extorted. Assaulted.
 Kamara, Mohamed (Male) - 1998 in Tambakka, Bombali - Property destroyed. Limb amputated.
 Kamara, Mohamed (Male) - 1997 in Gaura, Kenema - Detained. Killed.
 Kamara, Mohamed (Male) - 1994 in Komboya, Bo District - Killed.
 Kamara, Mohamed (Male) age 7 - 1992 in Gbane, Kono - Forced to labour.
 Kamara, Mohamed (Male) age 7 - 1997 in Kakua, Bo District - Assaulted.
 Kamara, Mohamed (Male) age 10 - 1999 in Moyamba - Forced to labour.
 Kamara, Mohamed (Male) age 14 - 1997 - Displaced. Forced to labour.
 Kamara, Mohamed (Male) age 15 - 1998 in Kakua, Bo District - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Kamara, Mohamed (Male) age 19 - 1992 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Displaced. Tortured.
 Kamara, Mohamed (Male) age 20 - 1992 in Nimiyama, Kono - Displaced. Abducted.
 Kamara, Mohamed (Male) age 20 - 1996 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced. Abducted. Assaulted and tortured.
 Kamara, Mohamed (Male) age 20 - 2000 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced. Tortured.
 Kamara, Mohamed (Male) age 25 - 1998 in Kaffu Bullom, Port Loko - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Kamara, Mohamed (Male) age 25 - Property looted.
 Kamara, Mohamed (Male) age 27 - 1999 - Displaced. Tortured.
 Kamara, Mohamed (Male) age 28 - 1995 - Displaced, extorted and property looted.
 Kamara, Mohamed (Male) age 30 - Property destroyed.
 Kamara, Mohamed (Male) age 30 - 1995 - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Kamara, Mohamed (Male) age 33 - 1995 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Kamara, Mohamed (Male) age 33 - 1991 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Tortured.
 Kamara, Mohamed (Male) age 34 - 1992 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.
 Kamara, Mohamed (Male) age 34 - 1998 in Badjia, Bo District - Killed.
 Kamara, Mohamed (Male) age 35 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted.
 Kamara, Mohamed (Male) age 35 - 1992 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced.
 Kamara, Mohamed (Male) age 36 - 1997 - Displaced and property looted.
 Kamara, Mohamed (Male) age 36 - 1998 in Mambolo, Kambia - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Kamara, Mohamed (Male) age 38 - 2000 - Displaced and property looted.

Kamara, Mohamed (Male) age 40 - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kamara, Mohamed (Male) age 40 - 1998 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kamara, Mohamed (Male) age 40 - 1992 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Mohamed (Male) age 45 - 1995 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Kamara, Mohamed (Male) age 45 - 1998 in Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Mohamed (Male) age 46 - 1999 in Gbendembu Ngowahun, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Kamara, Mohamed (Male) age 48 - 1998 in Tambakka, Bombali - Property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Mohamed (Male) age 55 - 1997 in Peje Bongre, Kailahun - Property destroyed.

Kamara, Mohamed (Male) age 56 - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Assaulted and limb amputated.

Kamara, Mohamed (Male) age 76 - 1995 - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Assaulted and tortured.

Kamara, Mohamed Abu (Male) age 19 - 1999 in Kambia - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Kamara, Mohamed Basir (Male) age 62 - 1998 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Detained.

Kamara, Mohamed Bella (Male) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Mohamed Lamin (Male) age 34 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Kamara, Moi Lahai (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Moigboi (Male) - 1997 - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Kamara, Moigieh (Male) age 36 - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Killed.

Kamara, Moigua (Male) age 31 - 1994 in Simbaru, Kenema - Killed.

Kamara, Moijueh (Male) - 1991 in Upper Bambara, Kailahun - Extorted. Forced to labour.

Kamara, Moikuwa (Female) age 24 - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Killed.

Kamara, Moinina (Male) - Displaced. Tortured.

Kamara, Mojamie (Male) age 90 - 2000 in Samu, Kambia - Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Momodie (Male) - 1998 in Dembelia Sinkunia, Koinadugu - Displaced.

Kamara, Momodu (Male) - 1998 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Kamara, Momodu (Male) - 1998 in Follosaba Dembelia, Koinadugu - Assaulted.

Kamara, Momodu (Male) - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Kamara, Momodu (Male) - 1998 in Koinadugu - Displaced.

Kamara, Momodu (Male) - 2000 in Baoma, Bo District - Killed.

Kamara, Momodu (Male) age 17 - 1998 in Follosaba Dembelia, Koinadugu - Extorted. Forced to labour.

Kamara, Momodu (Male) age 27 - 1998 in Wara-Wara Bafodia, Koinadugu - Displaced, extorted and property looted.

Kamara, Momodu (Male) age 29 - 1998 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Kamara, Momodu (Male) age 30 - 1998 in Wara-Wara Bafodia, Koinadugu - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Kamara, Momodu (Male) age 39 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Kamara, Momodu (Male) age 43 - 1998 in Tambakka, Bombali - Killed.

Kamara, Momoh (Male) - Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.

Kamara, Momoh (Male) - 1998 - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted. Killed.

Kamara, Momoh (Male) - Assaulted.

Kamara, Momoh (Male) - Property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Kamara, Momoh (Male) - 1998 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Kamara, Momoh (Male) - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Property looted and destroyed. Assaulted and tortured. Killed.

Kamara, Momoh (Male) age 22 - 1997 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Momoh (Male) age 25 - Assaulted.

Kamara, Momoh (Male) age 35 - 1997 in Western Area - Extorted.

Kamara, Momoh (Male) age 49 - 2000 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Extorted and property looted. Assaulted and tortured.

Kamara, Momoh (Male) age 60 - 1995 in Kori, Moyamba - Property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Momoh B (Male) age 31 - 1991 in Baoma, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured and stripped.

Kamara, Momolie (Male) - 1998 - Abducted. Assaulted. Killed.

Kamara, Monday (Female) - 1999 in Maforki, Port Loko - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Moray (Male) - 1999 in Follofaba Dembelia, Koinadugu - Property looted.

Kamara, Morlai (Male) - 1996 in Kagboro, Moyamba - Property looted. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Kamara, Morlai (Male) - 1998 in Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili - Killed.

Kamara, Morlai (Male) - 1999 in Tambakka, Bombali - Assaulted.

Kamara, Morlai (Male) - 1994 - Killed.

Kamara, Morlai (Male) - 1999 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Killed.

Kamara, Morlai (Male) - 1998 in Tonko Limba, Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kamara, Morlai (Male) - 1999 in Magbema, Kambia - Abducted.

Kamara, Morlai (Male) age 17 - 1999 in Marampa, Port Loko - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.

Kamara, Morlai (Male) age 30 - 2000 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kamara, Morlai (Male) age 46 - 1999 - Displaced and extorted.

Kamara, Morlai (Male) age 51 - 1999 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Kamara, Morlai B. (Male) - 1998 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Kamara, Morlai N'mah (Male) age 55 - 1999 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kamara, Morlia (Male) - 1993 in Kalansogia, Tonkolili - Killed.

Kamara, Morrba (Female) - 1999 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Property destroyed.

Kamara, Moses (Male) age 28 - 1998 in Western Area - Property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Musa (Male) - 1999 in Kassunko, Koinadugu - Tortured. Killed.

Kamara, Musa (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.

Kamara, Musa (Male) - 2000 - Displaced.

Kamara, Musa (Male) - Killed.

Kamara, Musa (Male) - Forced to labour. Tortured.

Kamara, Musa (Male) - 1996 - Displaced and extorted. Assaulted.

Kamara, Musa (Male) - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Kamara, Musa (Male) - 1991 in Kakua, Bo District - Killed.

Kamara, Musa (Male) age 18 - 1995 in Konike Sande, Tonkolili - Killed.

Kamara, Musa (Male) age 19 - 1998 in Diang, Koinadugu - Displaced. Tortured.

Kamara, Musa (Male) age 23 - 1991 - Displaced.

Kamara, Musa (Male) age 25 - Property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted, tortured and limb amputated.

Kamara, Musa (Male) age 31 - 1991 in Niawa, Kenema - Displaced. Assaulted.

Kamara, Musa (Male) age 36 - 1999 in Lei, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Kamara, Musa (Male) age 53 - Displaced and property looted.

Kamara, Musa (Male) age 56 - 1999 in Wara-Wara Bafodia, Koinadugu - Extorted. Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Mustapha (Male) - 1998 in Diang, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Mustapha (Male) - 1991 in Peje West, Kailahun - Killed.

Kamara, Mustapha (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Killed.

Kamara, Mustapha (Male) age 68 - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kamara, Mustapha B.M. (Male) age 45 - 1996 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Kamara, Musu (Female) - Killed.

Kamara, Musu (Female) - 1995 in Badjia, Bo District - Killed.

Kamara, Musu (Female) age 30 - 1994 in Masungbala, Kambia - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Kamara, Musu (Female) age 30 - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced. Killed.

Kamara, Musu (Female) age 40 - 1998 in Briama, Kambia - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Abducted.

Kamara, Musu (Female) age 57 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Kamara, Musu (Female) age 82 - 1994 - Killed.

Kamara, Myindu (Male) - 1997 in Tankoro, Kono - Displaced and property destroyed. Killed.

Kamara, N Sorie (Male) - 1998 in Kambia - Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Nabie (Male) age 22 - Displaced and extorted. Assaulted and tortured.

Kamara, Nabie (Male) age 29 - 1995 in Magbema, Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Kamara, Nabie (Male) age 36 - 1998 in Tambakka, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Kamara, Nadie (Female) age 21 - 2000 - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Kamara, Namisa (Female) - 1994 in Neini, Koinadugu - Killed.

Kamara, Namisah (Female) age 70 - 1998 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Kamara, Nanah Soko (Female) age 32 - 1997 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kamara, Nancy (Female) age 35 - 1999 - Extorted.

Kamara, Nanfa (Female) - 2000 - Abducted.

Kamara, Nannah (Female) age 60 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Neneh (Female) age 22 - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Ngadie (Female) - 2000 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kamara, Ngaimah (Female) - 1999 in Maforki, Port Loko - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Kamara, Nyallay (Female) - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Kamara, Omaru (Male) - 1991 - Displaced.

Kamara, Osei (Female) age 47 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kamara, Ousman (Male) - 1998 in Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili - Killed.

Kamara, Ousman (Male) - 1994 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Ousman (Male) - 1995 in Kori, Moyamba - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Kamara, Ousman (Male) - 1996 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Displaced. Killed.

Kamara, Ousman (Male) - 1994 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kamara, Ousman (Male) - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed.

Kamara, Ousman (Male) - 1997 in Jong, Bonthe - Extorted.

Kamara, Ousman (Male) - 1998 - Displaced.

Kamara, Ousman (Male) - 1998 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Kamara, Ousman (Male) age 21 - Extorted and property destroyed.

Kamara, Ousman (Male) age 29 - 1994 - Displaced.

Kamara, Ousman (Male) age 30 - 1998 in Tambakka, Bombali - Killed.

Kamara, Ousman (Male) age 42 - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Assaulted. Killed.

Kamara, Ousman (Male) age 53 - 1998 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Displaced and property looted.

Kamara, Ousman (Male) age 58 - 1998 in Tambakka, Bombali - Property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Kamara, Ousman (Male) age 60 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Ousman (Male) age 60 - 1998 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Pakai Nday (Male) - 1997 in Kassunko, Koinadugu - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Kamara, Philip (Male) age 40 - 1998 in Kalansogia, Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Kamara, Ramatu (Female) - 1999 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kamara, Ramatu (Female) age 57 - 2000 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Killed.

Kamara, Razzaq Abdul (Male) age 30 - Displaced. Abducted.

Kamara, Regina (Female) age 41 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Kamara, Roland Sidikie (Male) age 4 - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced.

Kamara, Rugiatu (Female) age 26 - 1998 in Western Area - Extorted.

Kamara, Rugiatu (Female) age 29 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted.

Kamara, Rugie (Female) - 1999 in Maforki, Port Loko - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Kamara, Saffa (Male) - 1991 in Kakua, Bo District - Killed.

Kamara, Saffiatu (Female) age 39 - 1997 in Dodo, Kenema - Displaced and property looted.

Kamara, Saffie (Female) - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced.

Kamara, Saffie (Female) - 1999 - Assaulted.

Kamara, Saffie (Female) age 36 - 1999 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced. Assaulted.

Kamara, Sahr (Male) age 31 - 1994 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Assaulted. Killed.

Kamara, Said Foday (Male) age 66 - 2000 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced and property looted.

Kamara, Saidu (Male) - 1999 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Saidu (Male) - 1999 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Tortured. Killed.

Kamara, Saidu (Male) - 1991 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Kamara, Saidu (Male) age 7 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Saidu (Male) age 14 - 1994 in Konike Sande, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Kamara, Saidu (Male) age 26 - 1997 in Neini, Koinadugu - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Kamara, Saidu (Male) age 27 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kamara, Saidu (Male) age 29 - 1991 in Pujehun - Abducted.

Kamara, Saidu (Male) age 29 - 1999 in Maforki, Port Loko - Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Kamara, Saidu (Male) age 31 - 1999 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Assaulted.

Kamara, Saidu (Male) age 65 - 1995 in Mambolo, Kambia - Extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Saio (Male) age 28 - 1998 in Follosaba Dembelia, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Kamara, Sakartay (Male) age 60 - 1999 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Salamatu (Female) - 1996 in Malen, Pujehun - Property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Kamara, Salamatu (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kamara, Salia (Male) age 48 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Salieu (Male) age 24 - 1996 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Kamara, Salifu (Male) age 13 - 2000 in Kassunko, Koinadugu - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Kamara, Salifu (Male) age 91 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kamara, Saliu (Male) - 1991 - Killed.

Kamara, Salim (Male) age 58 - 2000 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced.

Kamara, Sallay (Female) age 45 - 1997 in Upper Bambara, Kailahun - Property destroyed. Assaulted and tortured.

Kamara, Salleu (Female) age 28 - 1998 in Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili - Forced to labour.

Kamara, Sallyman (Male) age 27 - 1995 in Buya Romende, Port Loko - Displaced.

Kamara, Sallu (Male) age 87 - 1999 in Mambolo, Kambia - Assaulted.

Kamara, Samah (Male) - Killed.

Kamara, Samba (Male) - 1999 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Killed.

Kamara, Samir (Male) age 35 - 1999 in Magbema, Kambia - Abducted.

Kamara, Sampa (Female) age 38 - 2000 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Samuel (Male) - 1994 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Killed.

Kamara, Samuel (Male) - 1998 - Killed.

Kamara, Samuel (Male) - 1998 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Killed.

Kamara, Sana (Female) - 2000 in Baoma, Bo District - Killed.

Kamara, Saneh (Male) age 48 - 2000 in Kassunko, Koinadugu - Displaced and extorted.

Kamara, Sanfa (Male) - 1998 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Tortured. Killed.

Kamara, Sannie (Male) - Displaced.

Kamara, Sannoh (Male) age 57 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Kamara, Santigie (Male) - 1999 in Koya, Port Loko - Forced to labour.

Kamara, Santigie (Male) - 1998 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Killed.

Kamara, Santigie (Male) - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed. Tortured.

Kamara, Santigie (Male) - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Kamara, Santigie (Male) - 1996 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Kamara, Santigie (Male) - 1996 in Sanda Tendaren, Bombali - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kamara, Santigie (Male) age 12 - 2000 - Displaced.

Kamara, Santigie (Male) age 34 - 1997 in Langorama, Kenema - Displaced.

Kamara, Santigie (Male) age 41 - 1999 in Biriwa, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted.

Kamara, Santigie (Male) age 45 - 1999 in Maforki, Port Loko - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kamara, Santigie (Male) age 47 - 2000 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Santigie (Male) age 53 - 1998 in Mambolo, Kambia - Property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Sao (Female) age 15 - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Killed.

Kamara, Sao (Male) age 26 - 1992 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kamara, Sara (Female) - Property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Sarah (Female) - 1998 - Displaced. Abducted. Tortured. Killed.

Kamara, Satta (Female) - 1996 - Displaced. Killed.

Kamara, Satta (Female) age 45 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kamara, Saunatu (Female) age 26 - 1994 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced. Abducted.

Kamara, Sayma (Male) - 1999 in Gbendembu Ngowahun, Bombali - Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Sayo (Male) - 1998 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Stripped and limb amputated.

Kamara, Sayoh Serah-Sain (Male) age 28 - 1994 in Diang, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Kamara, Seinya (Female) - 1994 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced. Killed.

Kamara, Seita (Female) - Displaced. Assaulted.

Kamara, Sembeka (Male) age 50 - 1994 - Killed.

Kamara, Sembo (Male) - Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Sembu (Male) - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted.

Kamara, Sembu (Male) age 47 - 2000 in Kholifa Mabang, Tonkolili - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Kamara, Senesie (Male) age 39 - 1994 in Mandu, Kailahun - Killed.

Kamara, Senthoo (Female) - 2000 - Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Serice (Female) age 61 - 1996 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Killed.

Kamara, Seru (Male) - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kamara, Shaka (Male) age 56 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted.

Kamara, Sharka M (Male) age 35 - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kamara, Sharrac (Male) age 11 - 1997 in Western Area - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Kamara, Sheka (Male) - 1999 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Displaced. Limb amputated.

Kamara, Sheka (Male) age 22 - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Tortured.

Kamara, Sheka (Male) age 27 - 1995 in Magbema, Kambia - Displaced. Killed.

Kamara, Sheka (Male) age 67 - 1999 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kamara, Sheka (Male) age 77 - 1997 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kamara, Sheksa (Male) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Kamara, Sheku (Male) - 1999 in Koya, Port Loko - Property destroyed. Killed.

Kamara, Sheku (Male) - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Killed.

Kamara, Sheku (Male) - 1998 in Magbaimba Ngowahun, Bombali - Property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kamara, Sheku (Male) - 1991 in Kwamebai Krim, Bonthe - Killed.

Kamara, Sheku (Male) - Assaulted. Killed.

Kamara, Sheku (Male) - 1994 in Wunde, Bo District - Tortured. Killed.

Kamara, Sheku (Male) - 1991 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced, extorted and property looted.

Kamara, Sheku (Male) age 19 - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kamara, Sheku (Male) age 30 - 2000 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Kamara, Sheku (Male) age 32 - 1996 - Property looted. Assaulted.

Kamara, Sheku (Male) age 66 - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kamara, Shekuna (Male) - 1998 in Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili - Limb amputated.

Kamara, Shenge (Male) - Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Sheriff (Male) - 1999 in Koya, Port Loko - Forced to labour.

Kamara, Shiaka (Male) age 45 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Siaka (Male) age 17 - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Kamara, Siaka (Male) age 20 - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.

Kamara, Sikeh (Male) - 1998 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Extorted and property destroyed. Tortured.

Kamara, Sim Baria (Male) - 1994 in Konike Sande, Tonkolili - Killed.

Kamara, Sinneh (Male) - 2000 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Displaced. Abducted.

Kamara, Sinneh (Male) age 85 - 1995 in Briama, Kambia - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Siray (Female) - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Kamara, Soriba (Male) - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Soriba (Male) age 7 - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Soriba (Male) age 30 - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Kamara, Sorie (Male) - 1995 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Killed.

Kamara, Sorie (Male) - 1994 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Killed.

Kamara, Sorie (Male) - 1998 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Sorie (Male) - 1999 in Tambakka, Bombali - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Sorie (Male) - 1999 in Gbendembu Ngowahun, Bombali - Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Sorie (Male) - 1998 in Safroko Limba, Bombali - Extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Kamara, Sorie (Male) - 2000 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Kamara, Sorie (Male) - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kamara, Sorie (Male) age 11 - 1997 in Western Area - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Kamara, Sorie (Male) age 21 - 1998 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Killed.

Kamara, Sorie (Male) age 21 - 1997 in Tankoro, Kono - Displaced.

Kamara, Sorie (Male) age 22 - 1998 - Extorted. Abducted. Tortured.

Kamara, Sorie (Male) age 35 - 1998 - Property looted. Tortured.

Kamara, Sorie (Male) age 47 - 1995 in Briama, Kambia - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Sorie (Male) age 48 - 2000 in Baoma, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Kamara, Sorie (Male) age 69 - Killed.

Kamara, Sorie Bobor Cole (Male) age 60 - 1998 in Safroko Limba, Bombali - Property looted.

Kamara, Sorie Morlie (Male) - 1994 in Nimiyama, Kono - Displaced and property destroyed. Killed.

Kamara, Sorieba (Male) - 1999 - Assaulted.

Kamara, Sorieba (Male) - Assaulted.

Kamara, Sorieba (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.

Kamara, Sowoi (Female) age 50 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kamara, Sulaiman (Male) - 1998 in Dembelia Sinkunia, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Sulaiman (Male) - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Sullay (Male) - 1998 in Yawbeko, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Kamara, Sullay (Male) - Abducted and detained.

Kamara, Sullay (Male) - Killed.

Kamara, Sundu (Female) age 37 - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour.

Kamara, Sundufu (Male) age 28 - 1992 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced.

Kamara, T.L. (Male) - 1994 in Tonkolili - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Kamara, Taimu (Male) - 1998 - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted. Killed.

Kamara, Tamba (Male) age 36 - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and limb amputated.

Kamara, Tejan (Male) - 1998 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Limb amputated. Killed.

Kamara, Tejan (Male) - Displaced.

Kamara, Tenneh (Female) - 1993 - Killed.

Kamara, Tenneh (Female) - 2000 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Forced to labour.

Kamara, Tenneh (Female) age 45 - 2000 in Wara-Wara Bafodia, Koinadugu - Property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Kamara, Terena (Female) age 47 - 1999 in Western Area - Assaulted.

Kamara, Thaim (Male) age 40 - 1998 in Leibasgayahun, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted and stripped.

Kamara, Thaimu (Male) - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kamara, Thaimu (Male) age 23 - 1999 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kamara, Thaimu (Male) age 45 - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Killed.

Kamara, Thaimu (Male) age 45 - 2000 in Masungbala, Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed. Stripped.

Kamara, Thaimu Brima (Male) age 49 - 1999 in Biriwa, Bombali - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kamara, Thomas (Male) - 1999 in Bumpeh, Moyamba - Displaced.
 Kamara, Thomas (Male) - 1998 - Property destroyed.
 Kamara, Tina Marah (Female) age 24 - 1998 - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Kamara, Titi (Female) - 1995 in Sandor, Kono - Property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.
 Kamara, Tity (Female) age 36 - 1991 in Mandu, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Kamara, Tity (Female) age 42 - 1994 - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Kamara, Tommy (Male) age 54 - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced and extorted.
 Kamara, U. Balu - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Kamara, Umaro (Male) age 50 - 1999 in Wara-Wara Bafodia, Koinadugu - Property looted.
 Kamara, Umaru (Male) - 1998 in Western Area - Abducted.
 Kamara, Umaru (Male) age 31 - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.
 Kamara, Umu (Female) - 1998 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Property destroyed.
 Kamara, Umu (Female) age 28 - 1998 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Property looted and destroyed. Killed.
 Kamara, Unisa (Male) - 1998 in Koya, Port Loko - Property destroyed.
 Kamara, Unisa (Male) - 2000 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Abducted. Killed.
 Kamara, Unisa (Male) age 42 - 1999 in Kambia - Displaced.
 Kamara, Unisa (Male) age 54 - 1999 in Kaffu Bullom, Port Loko - Property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted and stripped.
 Kamara, Unissa (Male) age 26 - Property looted. Assaulted.
 Kamara, Vandi (Male) age 21 - 1993 - Killed.
 Kamara, Vandy (Male) - 1991 in Baoma, Bo District - Killed.
 Kamara, Vandy (Male) age 41 - 1993 in Dia, Kailahun - Displaced.
 Kamara, Wahan (Female) age 37 - 1992 in Western Area - Displaced.
 Kamara, Watta (Female) age 20 - 1991 in Simbaru, Kenema - Detained. Killed.
 Kamara, Watta (Female) age 34 - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Killed.
 Kamara, Watta (Female) age 43 - 1992 in Small Bo, Kenema - Property destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted and tortured. Killed.
 Kamara, Wazeg (Male) - 1991 in Wandor, Kenema - Assaulted.
 Kamara, Will (Male) - 1994 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Displaced.
 Kamara, Wulaymatu (Female) - 1999 in Konike Sande, Tonkolili - Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Kamara, Wusu (Male) age 17 - 1996 in Marampa, Port Loko - Forced to labour. Killed.
 Kamara, Yabom (Female) age 20 - 1999 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced.
 Kamara, Yabom (Female) age 26 - Assaulted.
 Kamara, Yabour (Female) age 80 - 1999 - Killed.
 Kamara, Yamakai (Female) - 1999 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Property destroyed.
 Kamara, Yambo (Female) - 1999 in Maforki, Port Loko - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Kamara, Yande (Female) age 45 - 1993 in Kono - Displaced.
 Kamara, Yangie (Female) age 32 - 1994 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained.
 Kamara, Yaya (Male) age 31 - 1998 in Masungbala, Kambia - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Kamara, Yayah (Male) - 1995 in Malema, Kailahun - Property looted and destroyed.
 Kamara, Yeabu (Female) - 1994 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted.
 Kamara, Yeabu (Female) - 1998 in Tane, Tonkolili - Displaced.
 Kamara, Yeabu (Female) - 1995 - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Kamara, Yeabu (Female) - 1998 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Displaced.
 Kamara, Yeabu (Female) - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Killed.
 Kamara, Yeahoh (Female) - 1999 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Kamara, Yealie (Female) - Displaced.
 Kamara, Yeanoth (Female) age 7 - 1999 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Displaced.
 Kamara, Yeonor (Female) age 32 - 1995 in Magbema, Kambia - Displaced.
 Kamara, Yema (Female) - 1991 - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Kamara, Yeyea (Female) age 27 - 2000 - Displaced. Abducted. Tortured.
 Kamara, Yimalu (Female) - 1998 in Dembelia Sinkunia, Koinadugu - Displaced.
 Kamara, Yusufu (Male) - 1998 in Masungbala, Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Kamara, Yusufu (Male) age 32 - 2000 in Magbema, Kambia - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Kamara, Zainab (Female) - Displaced and property looted.
 Kamara, Zainab (Female) - 1992 in Magbema, Kambia - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Kamara, Zainab (Female) age 31 - 1999 - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained.
 Kambo, Abdul (Male) - 1993 in Wunde, Bo District - Property destroyed.
 Kamie, Boama (Male) age 26 - 1995 in Wandor, Kenema - Displaced and property looted. Abducted. Killed.
 Kamo, Gibrila (Male) - 1996 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Killed.
 Kamoh, Gbedeh (Female) - 1991 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Killed.
 Kamoh, Kenie (Male) - 1994 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Killed.
 Kamuwa, Lamin (Male) age 70 - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Kana, Mustapha (Male) age 55 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Kanagboi, Fatima (Female) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.
 Kanagboi, Maseray (Female) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Forced to labour.
 Kanagboi, Nabieu (Male) - Killed.
 Kanagboi, Nyallay (Female) age 34 - 1995 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Kanagbou, Millicent (Female) age 30 - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted.
 Kanawa, Tamba (Male) age 16 - 1993 - Assaulted.
 Kande, Baby (Female) - 1997 in Moyamba - Killed.
 Kande, Isata (Female) - Forced to labour.
 Kande, Lahai (Male) age 25 - 1994 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Killed.
 Kande, Mohamed (Male) age 73 - Property looted.
 Kande, Yatta (Female) age 33 - 1994 in Kamara, Kono - Displaced. Tortured.
 Kande, Yatta (Female) age 54 - 1994 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Displaced.
 Kandgboi, Maseray (Female) age 12 - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Forced to labour.
 Kangaju, Lahai (Male) - 1999 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.
 Kangbai, Juliana (Female) age 18 - 1997 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Kani, Joe (Male) - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Displaced.
 Kanimeh, Foday Patrick (Male) age 54 - 1994 in Sogbini, Bonthe - Property looted and destroyed.
 Kanja, Kumba (Female) age 8 - 2000 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Kanja, Sahr (Male) - 2000 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Killed.
 Kanja, Tamba (Male) age 40 - 1998 in Soa, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.
 Kanneh, A.K. (Male) - 1993 in Kissi Tongi, Kailahun - Killed.
 Kanneh, Abdulai (Male) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Killed.
 Kanneh, Abdulai (Male) - Killed.
 Kanneh, Abdulai (Male) age 32 - 1991 in Dodo, Kenema - Killed.
 Kanneh, Alhaji Maldieu (Male) - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Killed.
 Kanneh, Alieu (Male) age 41 - 1991 in Mandu, Kailahun - Abducted.
 Kanneh, Amara (Male) - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Assaulted.
 Kanneh, Ansumana (Male) age 71 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed.
 Kanneh, Baidu (Female) age 31 - 1997 in Upper Bambara, Kailahun - Extorted and property looted.
 Kanneh, Baidu (Female) age 53 - 1993 in Nomo, Kenema - Displaced. Tortured.
 Kanneh, Bockarie (Male) - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Killed.
 Kanneh, Doris (Female) - 1996 in Komboya, Bo District - Assaulted.
 Kanneh, Fatu (Female) age 18 - 1991 in Gaura, Kenema - Killed.
 Kanneh, Fei (Male) - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Kanneh, Foday (Male) - 1991 in Dodo, Kenema - Killed.
 Kanneh, Fodie (Male) - 1993 in Small Bo, Kenema - Killed.
 Kanneh, Fomba (Male) age 11 - 1998 in Malema, Kailahun - Killed.
 Kanneh, Isatu (Female) age 4 - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Assaulted.
 Kanneh, Isatu (Female) age 27 - 1993 in Upper Bambara, Kailahun - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Abducted and detained.
 Kanneh, Jamatu (Female) age 23 - 1991 in Upper Bambara, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted.
 Kanneh, Jenneh (Female) age 13 - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Kanneh, Jenneh (Female) age 55 - 1991 in Kakua, Bo District - Displaced and property looted.

Kanneh, Juana (Male) - 1992 in Penguia, Kailahun - Abducted and detained.
 Kanneh, Juma (Male) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Killed.
 Kanneh, Juma (Female) - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Assaulted.
 Kanneh, Jusu (Male) - 1991 in Badjia, Bo District - Tortured.
 Kanneh, Jusu Abudlai (Male) age 51 - 1998 in Malema, Kailahun - Displaced.
 Kanneh, Kadijatu (Female) - 1991 - Abducted. Assaulted. Killed.
 Kanneh, Kemoh (Male) age 20 - 1996 in Upper Bambara , Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Kanneh, Lahai (Male) - 1993 in Barri, Pujehun - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Kanneh, Lansana (Male) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Property looted.
 Kanneh, Lansana (Male) age 21 - 1997 in Gaura, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Kanneh, Lansana (Male) age 64 - 1997 in Dodo, Kenema - Displaced and property looted.
 Kanneh, Lusenii (Male) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Property looted.
 Kanneh, Madina (Female) age 24 - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Displaced and extorted. Abducted. Assaulted.
 Kanneh, Malhadieu (Male) - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Kanneh, Mamawah Okiesta (Female) age 35 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Kanneh, Mariama (Female) - 1996 in Panga Krim, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted.
 Kanneh, Mariama (Female) - 1993 in Small Bo, Kenema - Killed.
 Kanneh, Mariama (Female) age 40 - 1991 in Bo District - Displaced and property looted. Detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Kanneh, Marie (Female) - 1991 in Upper Bambara , Kailahun - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Abducted and detained.
 Kanneh, Mary (Female) age 50 - 1997 in Kakua, Bo District - Displaced.
 Kanneh, Messi (Female) age 26 - 1991 - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Kanneh, Mohamed (Male) - 1993 in Small Bo, Kenema - Killed.
 Kanneh, Mohamed (Male) age 10 - 1995 in Koya, Kenema - Forced to labour. Tortured.
 Kanneh, Mohamed (Male) age 26 - 1991 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Property looted. Killed.
 Kanneh, Mohamed Babbie (Male) age 40 - 1999 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Assaulted and tortured.
 Kanneh, Moigboi (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Property destroyed.
 Kanneh, Moiguia (Male) - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Displaced. Assaulted and stripped.
 Kanneh, Momoh (Male) - Extorted. Assaulted.
 Kanneh, Momoh (Male) - 1991 in Koya, Kenema - Property looted and destroyed. Tortured. Killed.
 Kanneh, Momoh (Male) age 32 - 1998 in Upper Bambara , Kailahun - Displaced.
 Kanneh, Momoh (Male) age 40 - 1995 in Koya, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.
 Kanneh, Momoh (Male) age 72 - 1992 in Malen, Pujehun - Killed.
 Kanneh, Murray (Male) - Killed.
 Kanneh, Musa (Male) age 6 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced. Killed.
 Kanneh, Musu (Female) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Killed.
 Kanneh, Saffa (Male) age 13 - 1993 in Small Bo, Kenema - Killed.
 Kanneh, Salia (Male) age 39 - 1993 in Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Kanneh, Samie (Male) age 35 - 1998 in Mandu, Kailahun - Displaced. Detained. Assaulted and stripped.
 Kanneh, Sandy (Male) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed.
 Kanneh, Sara (Female) age 77 - 1991 in Dia, Kailahun - Property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.
 Kanneh, Sheku (Male) age 38 - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Abducted and detained.
 Kanneh, Tenneh (Female) - Property looted and destroyed.
 Kanneh, Umaru (Male) age 41 - 1991 in Dia, Kailahun - Killed.
 Kanneh, Vandi (Male) - 1991 - Killed.
 Kanneh, Watta (Female) age 40 - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Property looted.
 Kanneh, Wuya (Female) - 1994 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Tortured.
 Kanneh, Zainabu (Female) age 4 - Killed.
 Kanu, Abass (Male) age 23 - 1997 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Kanu, Abdul (Male) - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Property destroyed.
 Kanu, Abdulai (Male) age 34 - 1999 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Kanu, Abdulai (Male) age 43 - 1999 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed.

Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Kanu, Abu (Male) - 1996 - Abducted. Killed.

Kanu, Abu (Male) - 1998 in Gbendembu Ngowahun, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kanu, Abu (Male) - Limb amputated.

Kanu, Abu (Male) age 58 - 1998 in Safroko Limba, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Kanu, Adama (Female) age 32 - 1999 in Bombali - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour.

Kanu, Adama (Female) age 41 - 1999 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Property looted and destroyed.

Kanu, Adamsay (Female) - 1999 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Property looted and destroyed.

Kanu, Adikalie (Male) age 42 - 1998 in Koya, Port Loko - Abducted. Tortured. Killed.

Kanu, Alex (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.

Kanu, Alhaji (Male) - 1996 in Gbense, Kono - Property destroyed. Killed.

Kanu, Alhassan (Male) age 7 - 1999 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Forced to labour.

Kanu, Alie (Male) - 1995 in Tane, Tonkolili - Property destroyed.

Kanu, Alie (Male) - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Kanu, Alie (Male) - 1998 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Property looted. Assaulted.

Kanu, Alie (Male) age 31 - 1994 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Property destroyed.

Kanu, Alie (Male) age 63 - 1996 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Killed.

Kanu, Alimamy (Male) - 1997 in Port Loko - Displaced.

Kanu, Alimamy (Male) - 1997 in Buya Romende, Port Loko - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kanu, Alimamy (Male) - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Kanu, Alimamy (Male) age 49 - 1999 in Port Loko - Property looted.

Kanu, Alimamy (Male) age 96 - 1999 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Property destroyed. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Kanu, Alimu (Male) - 1995 in Buya Romende, Port Loko - Killed.

Kanu, Alpha (Male) - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Limb amputated.

Kanu, Alpha (Male) - 1995 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kanu, Alpha (Male) age 4 - 1998 - Displaced. Killed.

Kanu, Alusine (Male) age 14 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Kanu, Amadu (Male) - 1995 in Safroko Limba, Bombali - Killed.

Kanu, Amadu (Male) age 53 - 1998 in Masimera, Port Loko - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Kanu, Amara (Male) - 1998 in Nimiyama, Kono - Killed.

Kanu, Baba (Male) age 15 - 1999 - Assaulted.

Kanu, Bai (Male) - Displaced.

Kanu, Bai (Male) - 1995 - Displaced and property looted.

Kanu, Bai (Male) age 53 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kanu, Bassie (Male) - 1998 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Killed.

Kanu, Bomo (Male) - 1998 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.

Kanu, Brima (Male) - 1995 in Kori, Moyamba - Abducted. Tortured. Killed.

Kanu, Brima (Male) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Kanu, Brima (Male) age 59 - 1996 - Forced to labour. Tortured and stripped.

Kanu, Cokapri Simmie (Male) - 1997 in Gbendembu Ngowahun, Bombali - Property looted. Assaulted.

Kanu, David (Male) age 46 - 1998 in Western Area - Abducted and detained.

Kanu, Degba (Female) - 1999 in Gbendembu Ngowahun, Bombali - Displaced.

Kanu, Fatmata (Female) - 1999 - Abducted.

Kanu, Fatmata (Female) age 23 - 1998 in Buya Romende, Port Loko - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Kanu, Fatu (Female) - 1999 in Luawa, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Kanu, Foday 1 (Male) - 1998 in Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted. Tortured.

Kanu, Fonty (Male) age 25 - 1995 in Buya Romende, Port Loko - Displaced.

Kanu, Gbassay age 13 - 1998 in Leibasgayahun, Bombali - Abducted and detained. Tortured and limb amputated.

Kanu, Hassan (Male) - Killed.

Kanu, Hassan (Male) age 41 - 1999 in Kaffu Bullom, Port Loko - Displaced. Abducted. Assaulted.

Kanu, Hassan (Male) age 48 - 1994 - Displaced.

Kanu, Hassan (Male) age 64 - 1994 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Kanu, Hassan (Male) age 70 - 1995 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kanu, Hassan G. (Male) - 1998 in Koya, Port Loko - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kanu, Ibrahim (Male) - 1996 in Gbense, Kono - Abducted. Tortured.

Kanu, Ibrahim (Male) age 16 - 1992 in Dia, Kailahun - Forced to labour.

Kanu, Ibrahim (Male) age 48 - 1995 in Maforki, Port Loko - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kanu, Idrissa (Male) age 46 - 1994 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Kanu, Isatu (Female) - 1998 - Killed.

Kanu, Ishmeal (Male) - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Kanu, Iye (Female) - 1997 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kanu, Jain (Female) age 38 - 1998 in Kassunko, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Kanu, John (Male) - 1998 in Magbaiamba Ngowahun, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kanu, John (Male) age 42 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and extorted. Assaulted.

Kanu, Kadiatu (Female) - 1998 in Marampa, Port Loko - Killed.

Kanu, Kadiatu (Female) age 30 - 1995 in Koya, Port Loko - Killed.

Kanu, Kandeh (Male) - 1997 in Port Loko - Displaced. Killed.

Kanu, Keya (Male) - 1999 - Extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Kanu, Komrabai (Male) age 30 - Property destroyed.

Kanu, Kotoh (Male) - 1997 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kanu, Lamin (Male) - 1995 - Killed.

Kanu, Mabinty (Female) - 1995 - Forced to labour. Limb amputated.

Kanu, Makaprr (Female) age 42 - 1997 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Kanu, Manu (Male) - 1998 - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Kanu, Mariatu (Female) age 13 - 1998 in Dia, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Kanu, Mariatu (Female) age 45 - Extorted and property looted.

Kanu, Marie (Female) - Property looted and destroyed.

Kanu, Marie (Female) - 1998 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Killed.

Kanu, Marie (Female) age 31 - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Kanu, Marie (Female) age 63 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kanu, Marie (Female) age 76 - Killed.

Kanu, Mayah (Female) - Displaced.

Kanu, Mbalu (Female) - 1994 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Killed.

Kanu, Mohamed (Male) - Extorted.

Kanu, Mohamed (Male) age 15 - 1998 in Safroko Limba, Bombali - Displaced. Assaulted.

Kanu, Mohamed (Male) age 39 - 1998 - Abducted. Assaulted. Killed.

Kanu, Mohamed (Male) age 41 - Extorted. Assaulted and tortured.

Kanu, Mohamed (Male) age 45 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Tortured, stripped and limb amputated.

Kanu, Momoh (Male) - 1998 in Koya, Port Loko - Displaced.

Kanu, Momoh (Male) - 1998 in Kalansogia, Tonkolili - Assaulted. Killed.

Kanu, Momoh (Male) - 1998 - Abducted. Tortured and forced to participate in an act of cannibalism. Killed.

Kanu, Momoh (Male) - 1998 in Gbendembu Ngowahun, Bombali - Displaced and property looted.

Kanu, Momoh (Male) - 1991 in Mandu, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Kanu, Momoh (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Kanu, Morlai (Male) - 1999 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Property looted. Assaulted.

Kanu, Morlai (Male) age 2 - 1997 in Kaffu Bullom, Port Loko - Abducted. Killed.

Kanu, Mustapha (Male) - 1998 in Loko Massama, Port Loko - Tortured. Killed.

Kanu, Musu (Female) - 1992 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Kanu, Musu (Female) age 17 - 1999 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Displaced. Abducted. Tortured.

Kanu, Obai (Male) - 1997 in Bumpeh, Moyamba - Killed.

Kanu, Ousman (Male) - 2000 in Magbema, Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kanu, Posseh (Female) - 1998 in Magbaiamba Ngowahun, Bombali - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Kanu, Ramatu (Female) - 1996 in Gbense, Kono - Abducted and detained.

Kanu, Roland (Male) - 1994 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Kanu, Saidu (Male) age 19 - 1999 - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Kanu, Saidu (Male) age 29 - 1999 in Western Area - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Kanu, Salifu (Male) age 45 - Property destroyed. Tortured and limb amputated.

Kanu, Sama (Female) age 28 - 1994 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted. Limb amputated.

Kanu, Samuel (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.

Kanu, Santigie (Male) - 1999 in Kori, Moyamba - Killed.

Kanu, Santigie (Male) - 1998 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Property looted.

Kanu, Santigie (Male) age 65 - 1998 in Buya Romende, Port Loko - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Kanu, Santigie (Male) age 74 - 1995 in Koya, Port Loko - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Detained. Assaulted.

Kanu, Sara (Male) age 38 - 1998 in Safroko Limba, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kanu, Sorie (Male) - 1994 in Tane, Tonkolili - Killed.

Kanu, Sorie (Male) age 71 - 1999 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Displaced. Assaulted.

Kanu, Tamba (Male) - Killed.

Kanu, Umaru (Male) age 45 - 1999 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kanu, Umu (Female) - 1996 in Gbense, Kono - Abducted and detained.

Kanu, Yaboi (Female) - 1996 in Sanda Tendaren, Bombali - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Kanu, Yankuba (Male) - 1998 in Safroko Limba, Bombali - Forced to labour. Assaulted. Killed.

Kanu, Yannoh (Female) - 1998 in Leibasgayahun, Bombali - Limb amputated.

Kanu, Yayah (Male) - Displaced and property looted.

Kanu, Zainab (Female) age 35 - 1994 in Kalansogia, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Kanu Conteh, Emmanuel (Male) age 15 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kanu Li Sesay, John (Male) age 67 - 1999 in Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Kanugba, Musa (Male) - 1994 in Tikonko, Bo District - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Tortured, stripped and limb amputated.

Kanyako, Andrew Musa (Male) age 18 - 1991 - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Stripped.

Kanyako, Kamaray (Male) age 8 - 1993 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Kanyako, Kamaray (Male) age 40 - 1991 in Western Area - Killed.

Kappoi, Haji (Male) - 1993 in Bumpah, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kapuwa, Sheriff (Male) - 1995 in Dodo, Kenema - Forced to labour.

Kargayobo, Bockarie (Male) age 67 - 1994 in Gaura, Kenema - Killed.

Kargayobo, Musa (Male) age 30 - 1994 in Gaura, Kenema - Displaced.

Kargbendi, Kumba (Female) age 8 - 1994 in Nimikoro, Kono - Tortured.

Kargbeni, Seemah (Male) - 1991 in Bumpah, Bo District - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted. Killed.

Kargbeni, Wudie (Male) - 1991 in Bumpah, Bo District - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained.

Kargbo, Abass (Male) age 9 - Killed.

Kargbo, Abdul (Male) - 1994 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Killed.

Kargbo, Abdul (Male) - 1994 - Displaced.

Kargbo, Abdul (Male) - 1997 - Property destroyed. Tortured. Killed.

Kargbo, Abdul (Male) age 9 - 1999 in Konike Sande, Tonkolili - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Kargbo, Abdul (Male) age 44 - 1994 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Kargbo, Abdulai (Male) - 1997 in Kaffu Bullom, Port Loko - Abducted. Tortured and limb amputated.

Kargbo, Abdulai (Male) - 1999 in Leibasgayahun, Bombali - Property looted. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Kargbo, Abdulai (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Assaulted. Killed.

Kargbo, Abdulai (Male) age 23 - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Kargbo, Abdulai (Male) age 38 - 1995 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Kargbo, Abu (Male) - 1999 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Kargbo, Abu (Male) - 1999 in Koya, Port Loko - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kargbo, Abu (Male) - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kargbo, Abu (Male) - 1995 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Kargbo, Abu (Male) - 1995 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kargbo, Abu (Male) - 1996 in Badjia, Bo District - Killed.

Kargbo, Abu (Male) age 18 - 1995 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Killed.

Kargbo, Abu (Male) age 42 - 1999 in Sanda Magblonthor, Port Loko - Displaced and property looted.

Kargbo, Abu (Male) age 46 - 1999 in Niawa, Kenema - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Kargbo, Abu B (Male) age 34 - 1999 in Sanda Tendaren, Bombali - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Kargbo, Abu Bakarr (Male) age 14 - 1999 in Kaffu Bullom, Port Loko - Extorted. Detained. Assaulted and stripped.

Kargbo, Abu Bakarr (Male) age 24 - 1999 in Western Area - Extorted. Forced to labour. Limb amputated.

Kargbo, Abu Bakarr (Male) age 30 - 1998 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kargbo, Abu Bakarr (Male) age 39 - 1999 - Assaulted.

Kargbo, Adama (Female) - 1999 in Loko Massama, Port Loko - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour.

Kargbo, Adama (Female) - 1998 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Kargbo, Adama (Female) - 2000 in Tonko Limba, Kambia - Displaced.

Kargbo, Adama (Female) age 35 - 1993 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Property looted and destroyed.

Kargbo, Adama (Female) age 45 - 1994 - Displaced.

Kargbo, Adikalie (Male) - 1995 in Tane, Tonkolili - Displaced. Killed.

Kargbo, Ahmed (Male) - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced. Killed.

Kargbo, Aidakalie (Male) age 30 - 1998 in Tonko Limba, Kambia - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Kargbo, Albert Alimamy (Male) - 1999 in Moyamba - Killed.

Kargbo, Alhaji (Male) age 25 - 1998 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Displaced.

Kargbo, Alhassan (Male) - 1998 in Kakua, Bo District - Property destroyed.

Kargbo, Alice (Female) age 14 - 1997 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Displaced and extorted.

Kargbo, Alie (Male) - 1993 in Tane, Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Kargbo, Alie (Male) - 1998 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Property looted.

Kargbo, Alie (Male) - 1994 in Kenema - Killed.

Kargbo, Alie (Male) age 29 - 1992 - Displaced.

Kargbo, Alikali (Male) age 41 - 2000 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kargbo, Alimamy (Male) age 17 - 1995 in Magbema, Kambia - Killed.

Kargbo, Alimamy (Male) age 20 - 1999 in Western Area - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Kargbo, Alimamy (Male) age 59 - 1999 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kargbo, Allie (Male) age 37 - 1997 in Samu, Kambia - Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.

Kargbo, Alpha (Male) - 1999 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Property destroyed. Assaulted.

Kargbo, Alpha (Male) - 1999 in Tinkatupa Maka Saffoko, Port Loko - Displaced.

Kargbo, Alpha (Male) - 1998 in Sanda Tendaren, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kargbo, Alpha M. (Male) - 1998 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Stripped and limb amputated.

Kargbo, Alusine (Male) - 1996 in Koya, Port Loko - Killed.

Kargbo, Alusine (Male) age 24 - 1998 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Property looted. Abducted and detained. Stripped.

Kargbo, Amadu (Male) - 1994 in Kholifa Mabang, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kargbo, Amadu (Male) age 40 - Property looted. Tortured.

Kargbo, Amara (Male) - 1995 in Kori, Moyamba - Abducted. Tortured. Killed.

Kargbo, Amara (Male) - 1999 in Koya, Port Loko - Killed.

Kargbo, Amara (Male) - Killed.

Kargbo, Amidu (Male) - 1998 in Leibasgayahun, Bombali - Displaced.

Kargbo, Amidu (Male) - Killed.

Kargbo, Amie (Female) - 1992 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Kargbo, Amie (Female) age 2 - 1998 - Abducted.
 Kargbo, Aminata (Female) age 13 - 1995 in Kori, Moyamba - Abducted. Tortured. Killed.
 Kargbo, Aminata (Female) age 14 - Displaced.
 Kargbo, Aminata (Female) age 16 - 1999 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Kargbo, Aminata (Female) age 29 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Kargbo, B (Male) - 1998 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Assaulted.
 Kargbo, Bai (Male) - Property looted.
 Kargbo, Balansama (Male) age 46 - 1999 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Property looted and destroyed.
 Kargbo, Balla (Male) age 29 - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Kargbo, Bamba (Male) - Displaced. Killed.
 Kargbo, Bambeh (Female) - Property looted and destroyed.
 Kargbo, Bayamba (Male) - 1996 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Kargbo, Bobor (Male) - 2000 in Wara-Wara Bafodia, Koinadugu - Displaced.
 Kargbo, Bockarie (Male) age 55 - 1998 - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed.
 Kargbo, Bom-Poroh (Female) - 1995 in Buya Romende, Port Loko - Displaced.
 Kargbo, Brima (Male) - 1999 in Konike Sande, Tonkolili - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.
 Kargbo, Brima (Male) - Assaulted. Killed.
 Kargbo, Brima (Male) age 15 - 1999 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Killed.
 Kargbo, Brima (Male) age 21 - 1998 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted and stripped.
 Kargbo, Brima (Male) age 29 - 1999 in Loko Massama, Port Loko - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Kargbo, Cento (Female) - 1996 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Killed.
 Kargbo, Colleu (Female) age 64 - 1999 in Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili - Extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour.
 Kargbo, Damba-Kumbayila (Male) age 48 - 1998 in Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained.
 Kargbo, Dauda (Male) - 1999 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Abducted and detained. Tortured and limb amputated.
 Kargbo, Dauda (Male) age 22 - 1997 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Property looted. Forced to labour. Limb amputated.
 Kargbo, Deborah (Female) age 15 - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced. Tortured.
 Kargbo, Demba (Male) age 56 - 1998 in Neini, Koinadugu - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted. Tortured.
 Kargbo, Doloba (Female) - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Abducted.
 Kargbo, Doris (Male) age 10 - 1992 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Kargbo, Dura (Male) - 1998 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Property destroyed.
 Kargbo, Edward Bassie (Male) age 55 - 1995 in Magbema, Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Kargbo, Ejatu (Female) - 1994 - Displaced.
 Kargbo, Emivia (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted.
 Kargbo, Emma (Female) age 27 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Tortured.
 Kargbo, Emma (Female) age 30 - 1997 in Western Area - Displaced.
 Kargbo, Ernest (Male) - 1997 in Western Area - Property looted.
 Kargbo, Esther (Female) age 34 - 1998 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Killed.
 Kargbo, Fatmata (Female) - 1998 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Abducted. Killed.
 Kargbo, Fatmata (Female) age 25 - 2000 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Kargbo, Fatmata (Female) age 35 - 1995 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Kargbo, Fatmata (Female) age 39 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.
 Kargbo, Fatmata Baby (Female) age 16 - 1998 in Western Area - Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.
 Kargbo, Fatu (Female) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Kargbo, Fatu (Female) - 1998 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Property destroyed.
 Kargbo, Faty (Female) - 1998 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Abducted.
 Kargbo, Fekemoh (Male) - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Property looted. Assaulted and tortured.
 Kargbo, Fermah (Female) age 32 - 1998 in Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kargbo, Finah (Female) - 1997 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Killed.

Kargbo, Fitha (Male) - 2000 in Tonko Limba, Kambia - Property destroyed.

Kargbo, Foday (Male) age 42 - 1999 in Western Area - Property looted and destroyed.

Kargbo, Foday (Male) age 63 - 1998 - Limb amputated.

Kargbo, Hamidu (Male) - Killed.

Kargbo, Hassana (Male) - 1999 in Koya, Port Loko - Killed.

Kargbo, Hassana (Male) - 2000 - Assaulted. Killed.

Kargbo, Hawa (Female) age 10 - 1998 - Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Kargbo, Hawa Alice (Female) age 40 - 1995 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kargbo, Haykay (Male) - 1995 in Sanda Magblonthor, Port Loko - Killed.

Kargbo, I.B. (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.

Kargbo, Ibrahim (Male) - Limb amputated.

Kargbo, Ibrahim (Male) - 1997 in Jong, Bonthe - Extorted.

Kargbo, Ibrahim (Male) age 11 - 1997 - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kargbo, Ibrahim (Male) age 26 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Kargbo, Isata (Female) - 1995 in Western Area - Killed.

Kargbo, Isata (Female) age 20 - 1993 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced.

Kargbo, Isatu (Female) - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kargbo, Isatu (Female) - 1997 in Samu, Kambia - Abducted and detained.

Kargbo, Isatu (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained.

Kargbo, Isatu (Female) age 15 - 1992 - Displaced. Killed.

Kargbo, Isatu (Female) age 22 - 1992 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted. Killed.

Kargbo, Isatu (Female) age 35 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kargbo, Isatu (Female) age 53 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Kargbo, Issa (Male) age 16 - 1999 in Tonko Limba, Kambia - Killed.

Kargbo, John (Male) age 24 - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced.

Kargbo, John (Male) age 26 - 1999 in Maforki, Port Loko - Detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Kargbo, John (Male) age 43 - 1997 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.

Kargbo, Joseph (Male) age 64 - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced and property looted.

Kargbo, Julius (Male) - Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Kargbo, Junisa (Male) age 28 - 1998 in Kamara, Kono - Displaced. Abducted. Tortured.

Kargbo, Jusufu (Male) age 26 - 1997 in Bumpeh, Moyamba - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Kargbo, Kabba (Male) - 1998 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Kargbo, Kabba (Male) - 1999 in Tonko Limba, Kambia - Displaced.

Kargbo, Kabba (Male) age 34 - 1999 in Gbendembu Ngowahun, Bombali - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Kargbo, Kabbie Kandeh (Male) age 67 - 1992 in Kono - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Kargbo, Kadae (Female) age 49 - 1999 in Port Loko - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Kargbo, Kaday (Female) - 1996 in Kholifa Mabang, Tonkolili - Killed.

Kargbo, Kadiatu (Female) - 1995 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kargbo, Kadiatu (Female) age 66 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kargbo, Kallie (Male) age 49 - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Kargbo, Kamah (Female) - 1995 in Tane, Tonkolili - Displaced. Killed.

Kargbo, Kandeh (Male) age 22 - 1995 in Magbema, Kambia - Property looted.

Kargbo, Karmokoh (Male) age 75 - 1995 in Tane, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Kargbo, Kenkoro (Male) - 1994 in Neini, Koinadugu - Killed.

Kargbo, Komrabai (Male) age 55 - 1998 in Western Area - Property looted.

Kargbo, Lamin (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kargbo, Lamin (Male) age 40 - 1998 - Displaced.

Kargbo, Lamina (Male) age 64 - 1998 in Konike Sande, Tonkolili - Killed.

Kargbo, Maama (Female) age 60 - 1991 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and

destroyed.

Kargbo, Mabinty (Female) - 1998 - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Kargbo, Mabinty (Female) age 39 - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted.

Kargbo, Mabinty (Female) age 51 - 1997 in Samu, Kambia - Property looted. Abducted and detained.

Kargbo, Makura (Female) age 5 - 1998 - Abducted and detained.

Kargbo, Mansa Musa (Male) age 41 - 1999 in Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.

Kargbo, Mariama (Female) - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced. Killed.

Kargbo, Mariatu (Female) age 15 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Kargbo, Marie (Female) - 1996 in Koya, Port Loko - Abducted and detained.

Kargbo, Marie (Female) - 1996 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Killed.

Kargbo, Marie (Female) - 1998 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kargbo, Marie (Female) - 1999 - Displaced and property looted.

Kargbo, Marie (Female) - 1998 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Abducted and detained.

Kargbo, Marie (Female) age 15 - 1992 - Killed.

Kargbo, Masseray (Female) age 26 - 1991 in Kissi Tongi, Kailahun - Displaced. Detained. Assaulted.

Kargbo, Mateneh (Female) - 1995 in Magbema, Kambia - Property destroyed.

Kargbo, Mbayo (Male) - Displaced and property looted. Abducted. Assaulted and tortured.

Kargbo, Mende (Male) - Displaced and property destroyed. Killed.

Kargbo, Mohamed (Male) - 1997 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Kargbo, Mohamed (Male) - 1994 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Kargbo, Mohamed (Male) age 7 - 1995 in Kongbora, Moyamba - Abducted.

Kargbo, Mohamed (Male) age 21 - 1995 in Western Area - Abducted. Assaulted and tortured.

Kargbo, Mohamed (Male) age 32 - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kargbo, Mohamed (Male) age 45 - 1997 in Kori, Moyamba - Property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kargbo, Momodu (Male) - 1996 in Sanda Tendaren, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kargbo, Momoh (Male) - 1998 in Kalansogbia, Tonkolili - Extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Kargbo, Momoh (Male) - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Kargbo, Momoh (Male) - Killed.

Kargbo, Momoh (Male) - 1996 in Tikonko, Bo District - Killed.

Kargbo, Momoh (Male) age 44 - 1996 in Dibia, Port Loko - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed.

Kargbo, Momoh (Male) age 50 - 2000 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kargbo, Morlai (Male) age 34 - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Kargbo, Mosewa (Male) - 1996 in Kongbora, Moyamba - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Kargbo, Mualen (Male) - 1997 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Extorted. Assaulted and tortured.

Kargbo, Musa (Male) age 32 - 1995 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kargbo, Musa (Male) age 37 - Tortured.

Kargbo, Musa (Male) age 58 - 1998 in Konike Sande, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted.

Kargbo, Musu (Female) age 59 - 1991 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Detained.

Kargbo, Namo (Female) - 1998 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Kargbo, Nanah (Female) - Killed.

Kargbo, Nbalii (Male) age 22 - 1999 in Western Area - Property looted. Tortured.

Kargbo, Ousman (Male) - 1994 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Killed.

Kargbo, Ousman (Male) - Displaced.

Kargbo, Ousman (Male) age 49 - 1999 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Property looted. Detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Kargbo, Saffie (Female) - 1997 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Forced to labour.

Kargbo, Saio (Male) - 1997 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Forced to labour. Killed.

Kargbo, Saliu (Male) age 80 - 1995 in Koya, Port Loko - Displaced and property looted.

Kargbo, Salid A (Male) age 42 - 1998 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted.

Kargbo, Sallay (Female) - 1996 - Killed.
 Kargbo, Sallay (Female) - 2000 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Displaced.
 Kargbo, Sallay (Female) age 19 - 1996 - Abducted and detained.
 Kargbo, Samuel (Male) age 17 - 1999 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Assaulted. Killed.
 Kargbo, Samuel (Male) age 21 - 1999 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Killed.
 Kargbo, Samuel (Male) age 28 - 1997 in Western Area - Displaced. Detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Kargbo, Samuel (Male) age 37 - 1992 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted and tortured.
 Kargbo, Samuel Abdul (Male) age 39 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Killed.
 Kargbo, Sanoh (Male) age 18 - 1998 in Tonko Limba, Kambia - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Kargbo, Santigie (Male) - 1999 in Bumpeh, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted. Killed.
 Kargbo, Santigie (Male) - 1999 - Assaulted and tortured.
 Kargbo, Santigie (Male) - Displaced, extorted and property looted.
 Kargbo, Santigie (Male) - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Kargbo, Santigie (Male) age 21 - 1999 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Tortured.
 Kargbo, Santigie (Male) age 64 - 1998 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Kargbo, Sao (Male) age 62 - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Kargbo, Sarah (Female) - 1999 in Safroko Limba, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted.
 Kargbo, Sheriff (Male) - 1997 - Killed.
 Kargbo, Sheriff (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Kargbo, Sia (Male) age 50 - 2000 in Tonko Limba, Kambia - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour.
 Kargbo, Siginba (Female) - 1998 in Koinadugu - Limb amputated.
 Kargbo, Sitha (Male) age 63 - 2000 in Tonko Limba, Kambia - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Kargbo, Sokoya - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Limb amputated.
 Kargbo, Sorie (Male) - 1997 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted, tortured, stripped and limb amputated.
 Kargbo, Sorie (Male) - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Assaulted.
 Kargbo, Sorie (Male) age 9 - 1999 - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Kargbo, Sorie (Male) age 40 - 1998 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Displaced and property looted.
 Kargbo, Sorkoya (Male) age 42 - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Kargbo, Sukohya (Male) - 1998 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Property destroyed.
 Kargbo, Sulaiman (Male) age 54 - 1991 in Western Area - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed.
 Kargbo, Tamba (Male) - 1999 in Safroko Limba, Bombali - Killed.
 Kargbo, Thaim (Male) age 41 - 1999 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Kargbo, Todoh (Male) - 1999 in Kassunko, Koinadugu - Tortured. Killed.
 Kargbo, Unisa (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Kargbo, Yallie (Female) - 1996 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Killed.
 Kargbo, Yamba (Male) age 51 - 1993 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Kargbo, Yankay (Male) age 77 - 1997 in Leibasgayahun, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Kargbo, Yeabu (Female) - 1994 in Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili - Property looted.
 Kargbo, Yenor (Female) - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured.
 Kargbo, Yiran (Male) age 76 - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Kargbo, Yusuf (Male) age 12 - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Kargbo, Zainab (Female) - 1993 in Konike Barina, Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted.
 Kargbokanu, Fatu (Female) - 1998 in Safroko Limba, Bombali - Displaced.
 Karim, Abdul (Male) - Killed.
 Karim, Abu (Male) - 1995 in Bagbe, Bo District - Forced to labour. Killed.
 Karim, Abu (Male) age 36 - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted.

Karim, Amara (Male) age 39 - Killed.
 Karim, Bockarie (Male) age 85 - Killed.
 Karim, Hawa (Female) - Killed.
 Karim, Ibrahim (Male) age 24 - 1997 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Tortured.
 Karim, Mautor (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Property looted.
 Karim, Momoh (Male) age 75 - Killed.
 Karimu, Amie (Female) - 1991 - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Karimu, Brima (Male) age 32 - 1997 - Property destroyed.
 Karimu, Jebeh (Female) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.
 Karimu, Joseph (Male) age 15 - 1994 in Sielenga, Bo District - Displaced.
 Karimu, Mahai (Female) - 1991 - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Karimu, Memuna (Female) - 1995 - Abducted and detained.
 Karimu, Musa (Male) age 1 - 1992 in Luawa, Kailahun - Assaulted.
 Karimu, Nancy (Female) - 1992 in Luawa, Kailahun - Killed.
 Karimu, Pessima (Male) - 1994 in Kakua, Bo District - Killed.
 Karimu, Sahr (Male) age 35 - 2000 - Killed.
 Karimu, Vandí (Male) age 49 - 1991 in Upper Bambara, Kailahun - Displaced.
 Karimu, Vandí (Male) age 60 - Abducted.
 Karku, Boe (Female) - 1992 in Soa, Kono - Killed.
 Karku, Femba (Female) age 43 - 1998 in Tankoro, Kono - Abducted and detained.
 Karmo, Joe (Male) age 70 - 1995 in Lugbu, Bo District - Property destroyed. Assaulted.
 Karmoh, Sheriff (Male) - 1994 in Malen, Pujehun - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Tortured.
 Karteh, Amie (Female) - Tortured.
 Karteh, Ibrahim (Male) - 1994 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Killed.
 Karteh, Musu (Female) age 30 - 1998 - Property looted.
 Kartewu, Bockarie (Male) age 48 - 1991 in Peje Bongre, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.
 Kasigbama, Sahr Momorie (Male) age 53 - 1994 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Kasio, Momoh (Male) - 1996 in Luawa, Kailahun - Tortured.
 Kassay, Bockarie (Male) age 37 - 1994 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Kasse, Unama (Female) - 1994 in Badjia, Bo District - Killed.
 Kassigbama, Ali (Male) - 1998 - Tortured.
 Kassim, Ramatu (Female) age 77 - 1999 in Western Area - Property looted and destroyed.
 Katta, Alhaji (Male) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Limb amputated.
 Katta, Basie (Male) age 49 - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Katta, Fudia (Female) - 1995 - Abducted and detained.
 Katta, Idrissa (Male) age 21 - 1998 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Displaced.
 Katta, Isatta (Female) - 1997 in Western Area - Tortured.
 Katta, Jenneh (Female) - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Tortured and limb amputated.
 Katta, Jenneh (Female) age 44 - 1992 - Property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.
 Katta, Jibrilla (Male) age 72 - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced.
 Katta, Joseph (Male) age 71 - 1997 in Western Area - Detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Katta, Mariama (Female) age 27 - 1997 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Kawa, Adu (Male) age 68 - 1999 in Pujehun - Property looted. Abducted.
 Kawa, Amara (Male) - 1991 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.
 Kawa, Amie (Female) age 39 - 1991 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Property looted.
 Kawa, Bockarie (Male) - Property looted.
 Kawa, Fatmata (Female) - 1991 in Kissi Tongi, Kailahun - Displaced. Killed.
 Kawa, Francis (Male) - 1998 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured. Killed.
 Kawa, Francis (Male) - 1997 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Kawa, Gina (Female) age 31 - Displaced.

Kawa, Jama (Male) age 60 - 1991 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kawa, Lamin (Male) age 45 - 1991 in Tunkia, Kenema - Killed.

Kawa, Moiguan (Male) age 20 - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kawa, Musa (Male) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Tortured.

Kawa, Musa (Male) - Abducted. Tortured.

Kawa, Musa (Male) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Kawa, Musu (Female) - 1999 in Pujehun - Abducted. Killed.

Kawa, Senesie (Male) - 1993 in Sowa, Pujehun - Killed.

Kay, Alan (Male) - 1996 in Kissi Tongi, Kailahun - Assaulted.

Kayamba, Amara (Male) - Displaced.

Kayamba, Brima (Male) - Displaced.

Kayamba, Gayema (Female) - 1998 in Soa, Kono - Killed.

Kayamba, Haji (Male) - Displaced.

Kayamba, Jusu (Male) - Displaced.

Kayamba, Lissa (Male) - Displaced.

Kayamba, Yamba (Male) - Displaced.

Kayeimba, Dauda (Male) age 50 - 1991 - Tortured. Killed.

Kayeimba, Mariama (Female) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced. Tortured.

Kayeimba, Vandy (Male) age 50 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kayeimba, Yamba (Male) age 41 - 1999 - Extorted. Abducted. Assaulted and stripped.

Kayengeh, Henry (Male) age 36 - 1996 in Koya, Port Loko - Killed.

Kaymawai, Tity (Female) - Killed.

Kebbie, Adama (Female) - Property looted and destroyed.

Kebbie, Agnes (Female) - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Displaced. Killed.

Kebbie, Ansu (Male) age 32 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Abducted. Killed.

Kebbie, Augustine (Male) - Tortured.

Kebbie, Brima (Male) - 1991 - Killed.

Kebbie, Brima (Male) age 50 - 1993 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kebbie, Ernest (Male) age 58 - 1997 in Kamajei, Moyamba - Abducted. Assaulted.

Kebbie, Finda (Female) - 1998 in Gbane, Kono - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kebbie, Foday (Male) - 1995 in Koya, Port Loko - Killed.

Kebbie, George (Male) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.

Kebbie, Hawa (Female) age 26 - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed.

Kebbie, Jacob (Male) age 37 - 1995 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Kebbie, Janet (Female) - 1995 - Displaced. Killed.

Kebbie, Joseph (Male) age 6 - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Displaced.

Kebbie, Josephine (Female) age 8 - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Displaced.

Kebbie, Josie (Male) age 71 - 1991 in Lugbu, Bo District - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Abducted and detained.

Kebbie, Kaine (Male) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Killed.

Kebbie, Kismoh (Male) - 1997 in Kamajei, Moyamba - Abducted. Killed.

Kebbie, Mabinty (Female) - 1998 in Tankoro, Kono - Abducted. Tortured. Killed.

Kebbie, Manawa (Male) - 1995 - Displaced.

Kebbie, Miake (Male) - 1993 in Malen, Pujehun - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Kebbie, Mick (Male) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Killed.

Kebbie, Mike (Female) - 2000 in Makpele, Pujehun - Killed.

Kebbie, Mimie (Female) - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Displaced. Killed.

Kebbie, Mohamed (Male) age 37 - 1997 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Kebbie, Saffa (Male) - 1994 in Lugbu, Bo District - Assaulted.

Kebbie, Safula (Female) - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kebbie, Sahr (Male) - 1998 in Tankoro, Kono - Forced to labour. Killed.

Kebbie, Samai (Male) - 1998 in Dema, Bonthe - Detained. Tortured and stripped.

Kebbie, Samuel (Male) age 9 - 1998 in Tankoro, Kono - Displaced. Abducted. Assaulted and tortured.
 Kebbie, Sorba (Male) age 24 - 1997 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Kebbie, Tenneh (Female) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.
 Kebbie, Tenneh (Female) age 60 - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Kebbie, V.B.S (Male) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Kebbie, Victor (Male) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Stripped.
 Kebbie, Watta (Female) - 1993 in Malen, Pujehun - Killed.
 Keifalah, Abu (Male) - 1995 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.
 Keifalah, Baindu (Female) - 1991 in Kagboro, Moyamba - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Keifalah, Hassan (Male) age 17 - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Keifalah, Hawa (Female) - 1991 in Peje, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.
 Keifalah, Ibrahim (Male) age 52 - 1994 in Moyamba - Displaced and property looted.
 Keifalah, Lansana (Male) age 52 - 1995 in Yawbeko, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted.
 Keifalah, Luseni (Male) - 1995 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Detained. Assaulted.
 Keifalah, Morie (Male) - 1996 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Killed.
 Keifalah, Musa (Male) - 1995 - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Keifalah, Ramatu (Female) age 25 - 1995 in Kongbora, Moyamba - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Keifalah, Sanfa (Male) - 1995 - Tortured.
 Keifalah, Vandi (Male) - 1998 in Kakua, Bo District - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted.
 Keifineh, Aiah (Male) age 43 - 1999 in Safroko Limba, Bombali - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Keikura, Bobor J.T. (Male) age 25 - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured. Killed.
 Keikura, Junisa (Male) - 1999 in Fiama, Kono - Property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Keikura, Maada (Male) - 1998 in Kaffu Bullom, Port Loko - Killed.
 Keita, Eayo (Female) - 1997 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Tortured.
 Keita, Hawa (Female) age 50 - Displaced. Tortured.
 Keita, Issa (Male) age 13 - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Keita, Kemoh Yughuma (Male) age 29 - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Detained. Stripped.
 Kelly, Fafoelee (Male) - 1999 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Property destroyed.
 Kelly, Fayia (Male) - 1992 in Penguia, Kailahun - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Kelly, Finda (Female) age 30 - 1991 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.
 Kelly, Jusu (Male) age 33 - 1995 in Luawa, Kailahun - Killed.
 Kelly, Komba (Male) age 17 - 1992 in Soa, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Kelly, Kumba (Female) age 24 - 1998 in Neya, Koinadugu - Displaced and extorted. Tortured.
 Kelly, Maddi (Female) age 70 - 1998 in Soa, Kono - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Kelly, Mody (Female) - 1998 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced and property looted. Abducted. Assaulted.
 Kelteh, Joseph (Male) - 1996 - Property looted. Assaulted.
 Kema, Yeabu (Female) - 1992 in Malema, Kailahun - Detained.
 Kemba, Bockarie (Male) - 1995 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted. Tortured. Killed.
 Kembe, Ibrahim Maada (Male) - 1996 - Killed.
 Kemoh, Abu (Male) age 28 - Displaced and property looted. Detained. Assaulted.
 Kemoh, Alamatu (Female) age 17 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted. Assaulted.
 Kemoh, Bockarie (Male) age 34 - 1998 in Koya, Kenema - Displaced. Tortured.
 Kemoh, Hawa (Female) - 1998 in Kamara, Kono - Assaulted.
 Kemoh, Jeneh (Female) age 19 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Detained.
 Kemoh, Joso - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Kemoh, Karmoh (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.
 Kemoh, Lansana (Male) - 1991 in Peje, Pujehun - Displaced.
 Kemoh, Mohamed (Male) - 1998 in Koya, Kenema - Displaced.
 Kemoh, Mohamed (Male) age 18 - 1991 - Property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Kemoh, Munda (Male) age 21 - 1991 in Pujehun - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and stripped.

Kemoh, Murana (Male) - 1991 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Kemoh, Omi (Female) age 30 - 1991 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Kemoh, Roke (Male) age 35 - 1994 in Konike Sande, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Kemoh, Sahr (Male) age 27 - 1992 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Kemoh, Semai (Female) - 1996 in Lugbu, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kemoh - Fawundu, Alimu (Male) age 40 - 1991 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kemokai, Alpha (Male) - 1995 in Benducha, Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Kemokai, Amadu (Male) age 51 - Property looted and destroyed. Killed.

Kemokai, Amoh (Male) age 42 - 1991 in Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Kemokai, Bendu (Male) age 16 - 1999 in Western Area - Assaulted and stripped.

Kemokai, Bockarie (Male) age 33 - 1991 in Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Limb amputated. Killed.

Kemokai, Bockarie (Male) age 45 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Abducted and detained.

Kemokai, Brima (Male) age 46 - 1991 in Pujehun - Displaced. Killed.

Kemokai, Brima (Male) age 55 - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Detained. Tortured.

Kemokai, Gbessay age 68 - 1998 in Makpele, Pujehun - Property looted.

Kemokai, Hawa (Female) age 22 - 1993 - Displaced.

Kemokai, Jannah (Female) age 17 - 1999 in Western Area - Assaulted.

Kemokai, Jassie (Female) age 16 - 1999 in Western Area - Assaulted.

Kemokai, Jeanny (Female) age 50 - 1991 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kemokai, Jusu (Male) age 30 - 1991 in Koya, Kenema - Displaced. Assaulted and tortured.

Kemokai, Lahai (Male) age 36 - 1991 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Extorted and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Kemokai, Mariama (Female) age 9 - 1999 in Western Area - Assaulted.

Kemokai, Mariama (Female) age 35 - 1991 in Kailahun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Kemokai, Mariama (Female) age 63 - 1991 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Displaced. Tortured.

Kemokai, Massah (Female) age 45 - 1991 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kemokai, Miatta (Female) age 50 - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kemokai, Moinama (Male) age 47 - 1992 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.

Kemokai, Momodu (Male) - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Forced to labour.

Kemokai, Momodu (Male) - Killed.

Kemokai, Momoh (Male) - 1991 in Pujehun - Displaced. Assaulted. Killed.

Kemokai, Momoh (Male) - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Forced to labour. Killed.

Kemokai, Munda (Male) age 7 - 1991 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Forced to labour.

Kemokai, Murray (Male) age 45 - Property looted and destroyed.

Kemokai, Pinny (Male) - 1992 - Killed.

Kemokai, Senesie (Male) - 1991 in Pujehun - Displaced.

Kemokai, Simah (Male) - Extorted.

Kemokai, Soromoi (Male) - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Killed.

Kemokai, Sowie (Female) age 60 - Displaced.

Kemokai, Tenneh (Female) - Abducted.

Kemokai, Vandy (Male) age 36 - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kendeh, Mabel (Female) age 26 - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kenema, Brima (Male) - Displaced. Abducted. Assaulted.

Kengefay, Solomon (Male) age 48 - 1995 in Luawa, Kailahun - Property looted and destroyed. Detained. Assaulted.

Kengo, Fatmata (Female) age 42 - 1991 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kengo, Mariama (Female) age 34 - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kenneh, D.O. (Male) - 1997 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Abducted and detained.
 Kenneh, Jebbeh (Female) age 17 - Killed.
 Kenneh, Lamin (Male) age 48 - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted and tortured.
 Kenneh, Mohamed (Male) - 1995 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Kenneh, Mohamed (Male) age 31 - 1998 in Upper Bambara, Kailahun - Tortured. Killed.
 Kenneh, Momoh (Male) age 20 - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.
 Kenneh, Momoh (Male) age 21 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Forced to labour.
 Kenneh, Moses (Male) age 41 - 1992 in Dama, Kenema - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted.
 Kenneh, Saffa (Male) - 1998 - Displaced.
 Kenneh, Salia (Male) age 14 - 1992 in Tunkia, Kenema - Killed.
 Kennen Locie, Foday (Male) age 39 - 1991 in Upper Bambara, Kailahun - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.
 Kenny, Gamoh (Male) age 31 - 1993 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Kenny, Issa (Male) - 1995 in Sanda Magblonthor, Port Loko - Abducted and detained.
 Kenny, Rashid (Male) age 63 - 1994 in Simbaru, Kenema - Displaced.
 Kenyeh, Ensa (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Kenyi, Komba (Male) - 1992 in Soa, Kono - Killed.
 Kera, Lansana (Male) age 51 - 1994 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Kesebeh, Amadu (Male) - Abducted. Killed.
 Kessambo, Kelvin (Male) age 43 - 1998 in Dema, Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Ketteh, Foday (Male) age 59 - 1995 - Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Ketteh, Foday (Male) age 66 - 1997 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Ketteh, Juliana (Female) age 9 - 1996 in Panga Krim, Pujehun - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Ketteh, Saffie (Female) - 1996 in Panga Krim, Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Keyamu, Musu (Female) - 1991 - Killed.
 Keyia, Kemoh (Male) age 47 - 1992 in Mandu, Kailahun - Property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Khalil, Rhodah (Male) - 1995 in Maforki, Port Loko - Property looted. Assaulted. Killed.
 Khan, Nafat (Female) - Property destroyed.
 Khobie, Kadie (Female) - 1994 - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Khonkuba, Abu (Male) - Property looted.
 Kianyeh, Muhalam (Male) - 1994 in Kori, Moyamba - Killed.
 Kiazoo, Sheku (Male) age 13 - 1997 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Kienkieh, Momoh (Male) age 49 - 1991 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed. Killed.
 King, Hassan (Male) - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced.
 King, Kadie (Female) - 1995 in Timdel, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 King, Theresa (Female) age 20 - 1995 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Displaced. Abducted.
 Kingsley, Vannah (Female) age 35 - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Kingsway, Isata (Female) - Killed.
 Kioz, Abioseh (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.
 Kissie, Abu (Male) - 1999 - Assaulted.
 Kobba, Abdulai (Male) - 1998 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced.
 Kobba, Alimamy (Female) age 20 - 1996 in Tonko Limba, Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted.
 Kobba, Amidu (Male) - 1994 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced.
 Kobba, Kandeh (Male) - 1996 in Tonko Limba, Kambia - Killed.
 Kobba, Lappia (Male) age 66 - 1994 in Malegohun, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Kobba, Mattu (Female) - 1995 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed. Killed.
 Kobba, Shaka (Male) - 1994 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Killed.
 Kobolo, Brima (Male) - 1998 in Kassunko, Koinadugu - Killed.
 Ko-Fallah, Kadie (Female) - Abducted and detained.
 Koggie, Kumba (Female) age 60 - 1998 - Property destroyed. Killed.
 Koguaka, Massah Ne Koroma (Female) age 40 - 1991 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kohjou, Sao (Male) age 7 - 1993 - Displaced.

Koi, James (Male) - 1993 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Killed.

Koi, Joe (Male) - 1995 in Yawbeko, Bonthe - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Koi, Mayatta (Female) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.

Koi, Nancy (Female) age 62 - 1992 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Koinya, Batto (Male) - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and stripped.

Koitagba, Momoh (Male) age 41 - 1991 in Niawa, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Koitagba, Samu (Male) - 1991 in Niawa, Kenema - Displaced. Killed.

Koitagba, Siaka (Male) age 28 - 1991 in Niawa, Kenema - Displaced. Killed.

Kojoe, Amara (Male) - 1991 in Peje West, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.

Kojoe, Joe (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Killed.

Kojoe, Muda (Male) - 1993 in Bagbo, Bo District - Killed.

Kojoe, Munda (Male) - 1993 in Bagbo, Bo District - Abducted. Tortured. Killed.

Kojoe, Sarah (Female) age 64 - 1994 in Kalansogia, Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed.

Koker, Gbondo (Male) - 1997 in Kakua, Bo District - Killed.

Kolay, Iye (Female) - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Kolleh, Alhaji Amara (Male) - 1997 in Dia, Kailahun - Killed.

Kolleh, Momoh (Male) age 60 - 1997 in Dia, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Koluvoma, Fatmata (Female) - 1994 in Komboya, Bo District - Displaced.

Komba, Aiah (Male) age 11 - 2000 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Komba, Aiah (Male) age 40 - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Tortured.

Komba, Alpha (Male) - 1998 - Displaced. Killed.

Komba, Amara (Male) - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Stripped. Killed.

Komba, Amara (Male) age 62 - 1997 in Bagbo, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and stripped.

Komba, Hawa (Female) - 1998 - Displaced and extorted. Abducted. Killed.

Komba, Isatu (Female) age 37 - 1999 in Soa, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Komba, John (Male) age 42 - 1992 in Langorama, Kenema - Displaced.

Komba, Kally (Male) - 1991 in Bumpeh, Moyamba - Killed.

Komba, Koi (Male) - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Komba, Kumba (Female) age 15 - 1999 in Soa, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Komba, Kumba (Female) age 65 - 1994 - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Komba, Meiyo (Male) - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced. Killed.

Komba, Sahr (Male) - 2000 in Western Area - Killed.

Komba, Sahr (Male) age 22 - 1998 - Forced to labour.

Komba, Sahr (Male) age 42 - 1992 in Nimikoro, Kono - Killed.

Komba, Sia (Female) - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Killed.

Komba, Sia (Female) age 28 - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced.

Komba, Tamba (Male) age 40 - 2000 in Lei, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Komba, Yei (Female) age 50 - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced.

Kombe, Marian (Female) age 63 - 1995 in Kagboro, Moyamba - Displaced and property destroyed.

Komeh, Alusine (Male) - 1995 - Abducted. Assaulted.

Komeh, Aminata (Female) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Tortured.

Komeh, Hassana (Male) age 53 - 1995 - Extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured and stripped.

Komeh, Idrissa (Male) age 35 - 1997 in Gorama Mende, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.

Komeh, Kaday (Female) age 32 - 1999 - Killed.

Komeh, Kadiatu (Female) - 1994 in Konike Sande, Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Komeh, Lansana (Male) - 1991 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Killed.

Komeh, Mariama (Female) age 33 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Komeh, Mattu (Female) - 1991 in Upper Bambara, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted.

Komeh, Mohamed (Male) - 1998 in Konike Sande, Tonkolili - Killed.

Komeh, Mohamed (Male) age 36 - 1994 in Konike Sande, Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Komeh, Sorie (Male) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Komrabai, Alhaji Sumah (Male) age 95 - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced, extorted and property looted.
 Kondeh, Balla (Male) - 1998 in Diang, Koinadugu - Killed.
 Kondeh, Bomba (Male) - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Killed.
 Kondeh, Dauda (Male) age 35 - Extorted. Detained. Assaulted.
 Kondeh, Finda (Female) age 68 - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Kondeh, Kai (Male) - 1992 - Killed.
 Kondeh, Kumba (Female) - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Kondeh, Mohamed (Male) age 33 - 1996 - Forced to labour.
 Kondeh, Momodu (Male) age 59 - 1998 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.
 Kondeh, Moses (Male) - 1994 in Komboya, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Kondeh, Neneh (Female) - 1998 - Displaced.
 Kondeh, Sahr (Male) - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Forced to labour. Killed.
 Kondeh, Sahr (Male) age 51 - 1998 - Displaced. Abducted. Tortured.
 Kondeh, Sahr (Male) age 61 - 1996 in Kamara, Kono - Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.
 Kondeh, Sia (Female) age 43 - 1996 - Forced to labour.
 Kondeh, Sia (Female) age 50 - 1996 in Kamara, Kono - Displaced.
 Kondeh, Sia (Female) age 70 - 1992 - Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Kondo, Abu (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Abducted and detained.
 Kondo, Joe (Male) - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Abducted. Tortured.
 Kondo, Kenie (Male) age 63 - 1993 in Small Bo, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Kondo, Lahai (Male) - 1995 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Kondonwa, Baindu (Female) age 55 - 1991 - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.
 Kondoqui, Sahr (Male) age 49 - 1993 in Gorama Kono, Kono - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted.
 Kondor, Bockarie (Male) - 1991 - Tortured.
 Kondor, Bockarie (Male) - Displaced.
 Kondor, Monina (Male) age 38 - 1992 in Kakua, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Kondor, Satta (Female) age 40 - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Kondowa, Joe (Male) - 1992 in Bagbo, Bo District - Killed.
 Koney, Matha (Female) - 1999 - Killed.
 Kong, Joe (Male) - 1996 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Killed.
 Kong, Martha (Female) - 1995 in Kpanda Kemo, Bonthe - Displaced.
 Kong, Musa (Male) - 1991 - Extorted.
 Kong, Taliu (Male) - 1995 in Kpanda Kemo, Bonthe - Displaced.
 Kongla, Albert Jamal (Male) age 29 - 1995 in Kamajei, Moyamba - Property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Kongo, Ellie (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Property destroyed.
 Kongoli, Jibao (Male) age 12 - 1992 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Kongoli, Karimu (Male) age 38 - 2000 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Killed.
 Kongolie, Joe (Male) - 1991 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Killed.
 Koniwa, Abdulai (Male) age 25 - 1994 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Konjo, Abraham (Male) age 19 - 1994 in Bagbo, Bo District - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Konjo, Munda (Male) - Abducted and detained.
 Konjor, Fatu (Female) - 1991 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Property looted. Assaulted.
 Konkoafeh, Tamba (Male) - 1998 in Kenema - Assaulted.
 Konkoron, Siro (Male) - Assaulted.
 Konkpaka, Koroma (Male) age 61 - 1995 - Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.
 Konneh, A.K. (Male) - 1993 in Luawa, Kailahun - Killed.
 Konneh, Abie (Female) - 1994 in Wunde, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Konneh, Alhaji Ansumana (Male) - 1991 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Konneh, Alpha (Male) age 33 - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted.

Konneh, Ansumana (Male) age 43 - 1991 in Dia, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted. Assaulted and limb amputated.

Konneh, Bobor (Male) - 1994 in Kakua, Bo District - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Konneh, Bockarie (Male) - 1994 in Wunde, Bo District - Displaced.

Konneh, Brima (Male) - 1991 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Killed.

Konneh, Brima (Male) age 12 - 1991 in Kissi Tongi, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Konneh, Brima (Male) age 43 - 1994 in Wunde, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Konneh, Brima (Male) age 47 - 1991 in Mano Sakrim, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted.

Konneh, Christopa (Male) - 1991 in Pujehun - Displaced. Killed.

Konneh, Fanta (Female) age 64 - 1992 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Konneh, Fatmata (Female) - 1994 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Konneh, Foday (Male) - 1994 in Kakua, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted. Assaulted. Killed.

Konneh, Fouad (Male) age 38 - 1999 in Fiama, Kono - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Konneh, Iye (Female) age 10 - 1992 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Assaulted.

Konneh, Janga (Female) age 37 - 1998 in Luawa, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Konneh, Jenneh (Female) age 23 - 1991 in Peje West, Kailahun - Displaced and extorted.

Konneh, Jonah (Male) - 1994 in Wunde, Bo District - Displaced.

Konneh, Joseph (Male) age 15 - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Abducted.

Konneh, Juana (Male) age 54 - 1995 in Gaura, Kenema - Displaced.

Konneh, Lansana (Male) age 46 - 1993 - Displaced. Abducted. Tortured.

Konneh, Maijue (Male) - Extorted.

Konneh, Mamawa (Female) - 1994 in Wunde, Bo District - Displaced.

Konneh, Mariama (Female) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced. Tortured.

Konneh, Mary (Female) age 15 - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Konneh, Masalatu (Female) - 1991 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Konneh, Mohamed (Male) age 39 - 1991 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Konneh, Moinah (Male) - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Konneh, Morray Yarjah (Male) age 30 - Killed.

Konneh, Morris Moisa (Male) age 44 - 1991 in Dodo, Kenema - Forced to labour.

Konneh, Mualamu Mustapha (Male) age 10 - 1994 - Abducted and detained.

Konneh, Musa (Male) - 1993 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Konneh, Musu (Female) age 75 - 1997 in Koya, Kenema - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted.

Konneh, Ousman (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Konneh, Saffa (Male) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Killed.

Konneh, Saffa (Male) age 63 - 1995 in Gaura, Kenema - Killed.

Konneh, Sallay (Female) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Killed.

Konneh, Swahilo (Male) age 15 - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Konneh, Tamba (Male) age 43 - Displaced.

Konneh, Vandy (Male) age 41 - Forced to labour. Tortured.

Konneh, Vandy (Male) age 75 - 1994 - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Konneh, Weyatta (Female) - 1991 in Upper Bambara, Kailahun - Killed.

Konneh, Yeawa (Female) - 1994 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kono, Jusu (Male) - 1991 - Killed.

Konoboy, Aiah (Male) - 1994 in Gbense, Kono - Killed.

Konor, Kema (Female) - Killed.

Konta, Makura (Male) - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Property looted and destroyed.

Konto, Momoh (Male) - Killed.

Konuwa, Abu (Male) age 47 - 1995 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Killed.

Konuwa, Amara Morie (Male) age 9 - 1997 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Tortured.

Konuwa, Ansumana (Male) age 49 - 1991 in Pujehun - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Konuwa, Aruna (Male) - 1992 in Luawa, Kailahun - Forced to labour. Stripped. Killed.

Konuwa, Kiaprr (Male) - Displaced.

Konuwa, Lahai Samuka (Male) age 66 - 1994 in Kenema - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Konuwa, Mbeina (Female) - 1991 in Kakua, Bo District - Killed.

Konuwa, Moiray Amara (Male) age 58 - 1994 in Small Bo, Kenema - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Stripped.

Kordor, Mariama (Female) age 69 - 1994 in Tikonko, Bo District - Displaced.

Korgbai, Sudie (Female) age 62 - 1995 - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Korgbi, Solomon (Male) - 1994 - Property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.

Koroma, A.G. (Male) - 1998 in Magbema, Kambia - Property looted.

Koroma, Aban (Male) - 1996 in Koya, Port Loko - Killed.

Koroma, Abass (Male) age 32 - Displaced.

Koroma, Abdul (Male) age 5 - 1992 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Killed.

Koroma, Abdul (Male) age 10 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Assaulted.

Koroma, Abdul (Male) age 12 - 1993 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced.

Koroma, Abdul (Male) age 15 - 1991 - Killed.

Koroma, Abdul (Male) age 19 - 1995 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced. Assaulted.

Koroma, Abdul (Male) age 22 - 1998 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced and extorted. Abducted.

Koroma, Abdul (Male) age 48 - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Koroma, Abdulah (Male) - Displaced.

Koroma, Abdulai (Male) - 1993 in Gbense, Kono - Killed.

Koroma, Abdulai (Male) - 1994 in Loko Massama, Port Loko - Killed.

Koroma, Abdulai (Male) age 21 - 1999 - Killed.

Koroma, Abdulai (Male) age 24 - 1999 in Leibasgayahun, Bombali - Killed.

Koroma, Abdulai (Male) age 40 - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Koroma, Abdulai (Male) age 47 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted. Tortured.

Koroma, Abu (Male) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Koroma, Abu (Male) - Forced to labour. Killed.

Koroma, Abu (Male) - 1998 in Safroko Limba, Bombali - Property destroyed. Killed.

Koroma, Abu (Male) - 1994 in Lugbu, Bo District - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Koroma, Abu Bakarr (Male) age 30 - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Koroma, Adama (Female) - 1993 in Gbense, Kono - Killed.

Koroma, Adama (Female) - 1998 in Nimiyama, Kono - Killed.

Koroma, Adama (Female) - 1995 in Tane, Tonkolili - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Koroma, Adama (Female) - 1994 in Gbendembu Ngowahun, Bombali - Displaced.

Koroma, Adama (Female) - 1997 in Gbendembu Ngowahun, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Detained.

Koroma, Adama (Female) - 1994 - Property looted.

Koroma, Adama (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Koroma, Adama (Female) - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Forced to labour.

Koroma, Adama (Female) age 15 - 1998 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour.

Koroma, Adama Fudia (Female) - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced.

Koroma, Adamsay (Female) age 16 - 1993 in Tane, Tonkolili - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Koroma, Ademah (Female) - Extorted and property destroyed.

Koroma, Agatha (Female) - 1996 in Barri, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.

Koroma, Aiah (Male) - Killed.

Koroma, Aiah (Male) age 33 - Displaced and property destroyed. Detained. Tortured.

Koroma, Ajiji (Male) - 1995 - Forced to labour.

Koroma, Albert (Male) - 1999 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Tortured. Killed.

Koroma, Alford (Male) age 54 - 1998 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Koroma, Alfred (Male) - 1993 in Gbense, Kono - Killed.

Koroma, Alfred (Male) age 39 - 1998 in Gbendembu Ngowahun, Bombali - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Koroma, Alhaji (Male) - 1993 in Gbense, Kono - Abducted and detained.

Koroma, Alhaji (Male) - 1991 - Property looted.

Koroma, Alhaji (Male) - Displaced.

Koroma, Alhaji Brima (Male) - Abducted and detained.

Koroma, Alhaji Idrissa (Male) age 4 - 1999 in Bo District - Displaced.

Koroma, Alhaji Monya (Male) - 1993 in Peje, Pujehun - Property destroyed.

Koroma, Alhaji Sheku (Male) - 1993 in Peje, Pujehun - Displaced. Assaulted.

Koroma, Alhaji Umaru (Male) - 1997 in Malema, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.

Koroma, Alhaji Umaru (Male) - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted. Killed.

Koroma, Alie (Male) - 1994 in Loko Massama, Port Loko - Killed.

Koroma, Alie (Male) age 22 - 1996 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Koroma, Alie (Male) age 24 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Koroma, Alie Aliekarthy (Male) age 40 - 1994 in Kalansogia, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Koroma, Alimamy (Male) - 1994 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Killed.

Koroma, Alimamy (Male) - 1996 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Killed.

Koroma, Alimamy (Male) - 1998 - Property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Koroma, Alimamy (Male) age 10 - 1994 in Kalansogia, Tonkolili - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured. Killed.

Koroma, Alimamy (Male) age 30 - 1997 - Property looted. Assaulted.

Koroma, Alimamy (Male) age 59 - 1994 in Konike Sande, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Koroma, Alimamy (Male) age 65 - 1994 in Kalansogia, Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed.

Koroma, Allieu (Male) age 47 - 1994 in Pujehun - Displaced.

Koroma, Alpha (Male) - 1997 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Killed.

Koroma, Alpha (Male) - 1991 in Bagbo, Bo District - Abducted. Tortured. Killed.

Koroma, Alpha (Male) age 32 - 1996 in Kongbora, Moyamba - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Koroma, Alpha (Male) age 74 - 1999 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Koroma, Alusine (Male) - Extorted.

Koroma, Alusine (Male) - 1998 - Killed.

Koroma, Alusine (Male) - Extorted and property looted. Assaulted.

Koroma, Alusine (Male) age 42 - 1995 in Koya, Port Loko - Property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Koroma, Amadu (Male) - 1994 - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Koroma, Amadu (Male) - 1991 in Niawa, Kenema - Displaced and extorted.

Koroma, Amadu (Male) age 37 - 1994 in Neini, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed.

Koroma, Amadu (Male) age 52 - 1994 - Assaulted.

Koroma, Amadu (Male) age 68 - 1995 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Killed.

Koroma, Amara (Male) - Displaced.

Koroma, Ambo (Male) - 1999 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Killed.

Koroma, Amidu (Male) - 1998 in Koya, Port Loko - Displaced. Assaulted. Killed.

Koroma, Amidu (Male) age 12 - 1997 in Koya, Port Loko - Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.

Koroma, Amidu (Male) age 45 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Koroma, Amidu (Male) age 60 - 1996 in Koya, Port Loko - Killed.

Koroma, Amie (Female) - 1996 in Koinadugu - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and limb amputated.

Koroma, Amie (Female) - 1996 in Nongowa, Kenema - Killed.

Koroma, Amie (Female) - 1996 in Wunde, Bo District - Killed.

Koroma, Amie (Female) - 1991 in Kissi Tongi, Kailahun - Displaced and extorted. Tortured.

Koroma, Amie (Female) age 40 - Killed.

Koroma, Amie (Female) age 53 - 1995 in Kori, Moyamba - Extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Koroma, Amie (Female) age 91 - 1999 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Koroma, Aminata (Female) - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Abducted and detained.

Koroma, Aminata (Female) - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Killed.

Koroma, Aminata (Female) age 15 - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced. Assaulted.

Koroma, Aminata (Female) age 26 - 1994 - Displaced.

Koroma, Aminata (Female) age 27 - 1997 - Displaced.

Koroma, Aminata (Female) age 52 - 1999 in Koya, Port Loko - Property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Koroma, Amodu (Male) age 40 - 1992 in Peje, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted.

Koroma, Amodu (Male) age 63 - 1991 in Kakua, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Koroma, Andumana (Male) - 1995 in Kori, Moyamba - Displaced. Tortured. Killed.

Koroma, Ansumana (Male) - 1997 in Gbendembu Ngowahun, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Koroma, Ansumana (Male) age 10 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained.

Koroma, Anthony (Male) age 44 - 1998 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Abducted. Tortured.

Koroma, Aruna (Male) age 8 - 1994 in Kalansogia, Tonkolili - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Koroma, Assanatu (Female) age 10 - 1998 in Western Area - Tortured.

Koroma, Baby (Female) - Killed.

Koroma, Bai (Male) - Property destroyed.

Koroma, Bai (Male) age 56 - 1999 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted. Tortured.

Koroma, Baidu (Female) - Abducted and detained.

Koroma, Baidu (Female) - 1991 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Assaulted. Killed.

Koroma, Baidu (Female) age 17 - 1999 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Displaced. Assaulted.

Koroma, Balla (Male) age 50 - 1994 - Killed.

Koroma, Balla (Male) age 65 - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted.

Koroma, Bamba (Male) - 1998 in Neini, Koinadugu - Assaulted.

Koroma, Bambay (Male) - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.

Koroma, Bangalie (Male) - 1991 in Yakemo-Kpukumu Krim, Pujehun - Property destroyed. Detained. Killed.

Koroma, Bangalie (Male) - 1991 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Killed.

Koroma, Barba (Male) - 1999 - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.

Koroma, Basiru (Male) age 51 - 1997 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Property looted and destroyed.

Koroma, Bindy (Male) - 1998 in Gbendembu Ngowahun, Bombali - Abducted and detained. Limb amputated. Killed.

Koroma, Binta (Female) - 1994 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Abducted.

Koroma, Boakie (Male) - 1993 - Property destroyed.

Koroma, Bockarie (Male) - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Koroma, Bockarie (Male) - 1991 - Killed.

Koroma, Bockarie (Male) age 25 - 1993 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Abducted. Assaulted.

Koroma, Bockarie (Male) age 42 - 1998 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Property looted.

Koroma, Bockarie (Male) age 71 - 1994 in Tikonko, Bo District - Displaced. Killed.

Koroma, Bockarie Yalla (Male) age 64 - 1994 in Kalansogia, Tonkolili - Property looted and destroyed.

Koroma, Bomba (Male) age 14 - 1997 - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Koroma, Bombalai (Male) - Limb amputated.

Koroma, Bomkaprr (Male) - 1995 in Gbendembu Ngowahun, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted.

Koroma, Borbor (Male) - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Property looted. Killed.

Koroma, Braima (Male) - Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Koroma, Brima (Male) - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed.

Koroma, Brima (Male) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Killed.

Koroma, Brima (Male) - 1991 in Peje, Pujehun - Killed.

Koroma, Brima (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Detained. Killed.

Koroma, Brima (Male) - 1994 - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Koroma, Brima (Male) - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Koroma, Brima (Male) - 1994 in Niawa, Kenema - Tortured. Killed.

Koroma, Brima (Male) - 1997 in Malema, Kailahun - Abducted and detained.

Koroma, Brima (Male) age 28 - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.

Koroma, Brima (Male) age 31 - 1991 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Displaced and property looted.

Koroma, Brima (Male) age 35 - 1991 in Peje, Pujehun - Displaced.

Koroma, Brima (Male) age 41 - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Koroma, Brima (Male) age 54 - 1991 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Koroma, Brima (Male) age 56 - Property looted.

Koroma, Chernor (Male) age 100 - 1995 - Extorted and property destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Koroma, Comrabai (Male) age 49 - 1996 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Koroma, Dankay (Female) age 63 - 1995 - Abducted. Assaulted.

Koroma, Dauda (Male) - 1999 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Property destroyed. Killed.

Koroma, Dauda (Male) - 1997 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Property destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted and tortured.

Koroma, Dauda (Male) - 1995 in Kwamebai Krim, Bonthe - Killed.

Koroma, Dauda (Male) - 1997 in Malema, Kailahun - Abducted and detained.

Koroma, Dauda (Male) age 33 - 1995 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Abducted. Assaulted.

Koroma, Dauda (Male) age 37 - 1997 in Diang, Koinadugu - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Koroma, Dauda (Male) age 53 - 1998 in Neini, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Koroma, Dauda (Male) age 74 - 1994 in Jawie, Kailahun - Property destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted. Killed.

Koroma, David (Male) - 1998 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Koroma, Duwai (Male) - 1999 in Barri, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed.

Koroma, Edward (Male) - 1994 in Konike Barina, Tonkolili - Killed.

Koroma, Emily (Female) - 1995 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Displaced, extorted and property looted.

Koroma, Fadei (Female) age 48 - 1991 - Displaced.

Koroma, Famor (Male) - Abducted. Assaulted. Killed.

Koroma, Farrah (Male) - Tortured.

Koroma, Farrah (Male) age 23 - 1998 - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Koroma, Fatmata (Female) - 1998 in Jong, Bonthe - Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.

Koroma, Fatmata (Female) age 17 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Assaulted.

Koroma, Fatmata (Female) age 21 - 1999 in Loko Massama, Port Loko - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Koroma, Fatmata (Female) age 21 - 1998 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced and property looted.

Koroma, Fatmata (Female) age 43 - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Koroma, Fatta (Female) - 1995 in Tikonko, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Koroma, Fattu (Female) age 9 - 1999 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Koroma, Fattu (Female) age 28 - Tortured.

Koroma, Fatu (Female) - 1994 - Displaced.

Koroma, Fatu (Female) - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed.

Koroma, Fatu (Female) - 1999 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted.

Koroma, Fatu (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted.

Koroma, Fatu (Female) age 33 - Assaulted.

Koroma, Fatu (Female) age 37 - 1995 in Koya, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed.

Koroma, Fatu (Female) age 56 - Displaced and property looted.

Koroma, Ferenkeh (Male) age 38 - 1998 in Neini, Koinadugu - Property destroyed. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Koroma, Finah (Female) - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Koroma, Finnah (Female) age 35 - 1998 in Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed.

Koroma, Foday (Male) - 1998 in Diang, Koinadugu - Displaced.

Koroma, Foday (Male) - 1999 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Koroma, Foday (Male) - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed.

Koroma, Foday (Male) - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured. Killed.

Koroma, Foday (Male) - 1997 in Nongowa, Kenema - Property looted. Detained. Assaulted and stripped.

Koroma, Foday (Male) age 10 - 1991 in Peje Bongre, Kailahun - Abducted.

Koroma, Foday (Male) age 34 - 1992 in Nongowa, Kenema - Property destroyed. Assaulted.

Koroma, Foday (Male) age 41 - 1998 in Diang, Koinadugu - Property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Koroma, Foday (Male) age 41 - 1991 in Bagbo, Bo District - Displaced.

Koroma, Foday (Male) age 62 - 1999 - Extorted.

Koroma, Foday Lamin (Male) age 61 - 1995 in Tunkia, Kenema - Forced to labour. Stripped. Killed.

Koroma, Fodei (Male) age 68 - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Koroma, Fodi Mustapha (Male) age 33 - 1995 in Tunkia, Kenema - Displaced.

Koroma, Fodie (Male) age 48 - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Koroma, Gabriel (Male) age 13 - Forced to labour.

Koroma, Gassimu (Male) - 1993 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.

Koroma, Gbaara (Male) age 57 - 1999 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed.

Koroma, Gbagahun (Male) age 79 - 1991 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced and property looted. Killed.

Koroma, Gberie (Male) - 1994 in Baoma, Bo District - Killed.

Koroma, Gbessay (Female) age 54 - 1995 - Displaced and property destroyed. Tortured.

Koroma, Haja (Female) - 1997 in Malema, Kailahun - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Koroma, Haja Inia (Female) age 37 - 1998 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Koroma, Haja Jeneba (Female) age 62 - 1998 in Nimiyama, Kono - Displaced and extorted. Assaulted and tortured.

Koroma, Hambo (Male) - 1999 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Killed.

Koroma, Hannah (Female) age 25 - 1999 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Koroma, Harrold (Male) - 1991 in Kpanda Kemo, Bonthe - Forced to labour.

Koroma, Hassan (Male) - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Koroma, Hassan (Male) age 19 - 1995 in Kholifa Mabang, Tonkolili - Property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Koroma, Hassan (Male) age 41 - 1992 in Kono - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Koroma, Hassana (Male) age 27 - 1994 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed.

Koroma, Hawa (Female) - 1996 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Assaulted.

Koroma, Hawa (Female) - 1999 - Displaced and property looted.

Koroma, Hawa (Female) - Displaced.

Koroma, Hawa (Female) - 1991 - Killed.

Koroma, Hawa (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Koroma, Hawa (Female) age 22 - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted.

Koroma, Hawa (Female) age 36 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Koroma, Hawa (Female) age 46 - 1994 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Koroma, Hawanatu (Female) age 22 - 1999 in Western Area - Tortured.

Koroma, Ibrahim (Male) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted.

Koroma, Ibrahim (Male) - Killed.

Koroma, Ibrahim (Male) - 1991 - Assaulted.

Koroma, Ibrahim (Male) - 1997 in Small Bo, Kenema - Forced to labour.

Koroma, Ibrahim (Male) - 1998 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Stripped and limb amputated.

Koroma, Ibrahim (Male) age 31 - 1999 - Displaced, extorted and property looted.

Koroma, Ibrahim (Male) age 34 - 1998 - Property looted. Stripped.

Koroma, Idrissa (Male) - Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Koroma, Isata (Female) age 7 - 1994 in Dama, Kenema - Killed.

Koroma, Isatu (Female) - 1993 in Gbense, Kono - Killed.

Koroma, Isatu (Female) - 1999 in Koya, Port Loko - Displaced. Assaulted.

Koroma, Isatu (Female) - 1997 in Malema, Kailahun - Killed.

Koroma, Isatu (Female) age 12 - 1999 in Koya, Port Loko - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Koroma, Isatu (Female) age 38 - 1999 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Koroma, Ishmel (Male) age 17 - 1999 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Koroma, Issa (Male) - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Koroma, Iye (Female) - Displaced.

Koroma, Iye (Female) age 11 - 1998 - Displaced. Killed.

Koroma, Iye (Female) age 50 - 1998 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced and property looted. Limb amputated.

Koroma, Iye (Female) age 90 - 1995 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Killed.

Koroma, J.P. (Male) - 1997 in Bonthe - Extorted.

Koroma, Jamatu (Female) - 1996 in Malegohun, Kenema - Killed.

Koroma, Jatu (Female) age 78 - 1991 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted. Assaulted.

Koroma, Jebbeh (Female) - 1991 in Dia, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Koroma, Jeneba (Female) - 1991 in Nongowa, Kenema - Killed.

Koroma, Jeneba (Female) age 23 - Displaced. Assaulted and tortured.

Koroma, Jenneh (Female) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Koroma, Jinnah (Male) - Killed.

Koroma, Joe (Male) - 1992 in Malen, Pujehun - Killed.

Koroma, Joe (Male) age 47 - 1992 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Killed.

Koroma, John (Male) - 1994 in Loko Massama, Port Loko - Killed.

Koroma, John (Male) - Property looted.

Koroma, John (Male) age 22 - 1994 - Displaced.

Koroma, John (Male) age 23 - 1998 in Konike Sande, Tonkolili - Extorted.

Koroma, Johnny (Male) - Property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Koroma, Joseph (Male) - 1993 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Killed.

Koroma, Joseph (Male) - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Abducted and detained.

Koroma, Joseph (Male) - 1998 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced. Tortured and limb amputated.

Koroma, Joseph (Male) - 1991 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Koroma, Joseph (Male) - 1997 in Gbendembu Ngowahun, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Koroma, Julius (Male) age 51 - 1994 - Displaced.

Koroma, Juma (Male) age 50 - 1993 - Killed.

Koroma, Jusu (Male) - 1992 in Nongowa, Kenema - Assaulted.

Koroma, Kabba (Male) age 25 - 1998 in Bombali - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Koroma, Kadae (Female) age 2 - 1997 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Killed.

Koroma, Kaday (Female) - 1998 - Assaulted.

Koroma, Kadiatu (Female) - 1996 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed.

Koroma, Kadiatu (Female) - 1995 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Koroma, Kadiatu (Female) - 1998 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Koroma, Kadiatu (Female) - 1999 - Displaced and extorted.

Koroma, Kadiatu (Female) - 1998 - Displaced.

Koroma, Kadiatu (Female) - Killed.

Koroma, Kadiatu (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed. Tortured.

Koroma, Kadiatu (Female) - 1991 in Upper Bambara, Kailahun - Abducted and detained.

Koroma, Kadiatu (Female) - 1991 in Yawei, Kailahun - Killed.

Koroma, Kadiatu (Female) age 16 - Displaced.

Koroma, Kadiatu (Female) age 31 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.

Koroma, Kadiatu (Female) age 40 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted.

Koroma, Kadiatu (Female) age 42 - 1998 in Gbane, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Koroma, Kadiatu (Female) age 47 - 2000 in Kholifa Mabang, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Koroma, Kadie (Female) - 1991 in Kakua, Bo District - Killed.

Koroma, Kadie (Female) age 45 - 1991 in Pujehun - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Koroma, Kaeonma (Male) - 1998 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Koroma, Kai (Male) age 32 - 1994 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced.

Koroma, Kailie (Male) age 51 - 1998 - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Koroma, Kamba (Male) - 1997 in Kongbora, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted.

Koroma, Kanah (Male) age 56 - 1994 in Kalansogia, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Koroma, Karifa (Male) - 1998 - Displaced. Killed.

Koroma, Karifadu (Male) - 1997 - Displaced.

Koroma, Karim (Male) - 1997 in Gbendembu Ngowahun, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Koroma, Karimu (Male) age 47 - 1998 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Koroma, Kathy (Female) - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Killed.

Koroma, Katumu (Female) - 1991 in Nongowa, Kenema - Killed.

Koroma, Kelvin (Male) age 26 - 1995 in Buya Romende, Port Loko - Displaced.

Koroma, Kenee (Female) - 1991 - Killed.

Koroma, Kennie (Male) - 1994 in Wunde, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.

Koroma, Kodo (Male) - 1999 - Abducted. Assaulted.

Koroma, Kona (Female) age 49 - 1994 in Kalansogia, Tonkolili - Property destroyed.

Koroma, Kulako (Female) age 16 - 1998 in Diang, Koinadugu - Abducted and detained.

Koroma, Kumba (Female) age 35 - 1998 - Displaced.

Koroma, Lahai (Male) - 1991 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.

Koroma, Lahai (Male) - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Killed.

Koroma, Lahai (Male) - 1999 in Peje, Pujehun - Killed.

Koroma, Lahai (Male) - Displaced, extorted and property looted.

Koroma, Lahai (Male) age 42 - Displaced. Assaulted and tortured.

Koroma, Lahai (Male) age 75 - 1997 in Bonthe - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Koroma, Lahai Ndokoi (Male) age 76 - 1998 in Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted. Stripped.

Koroma, Lamin (Male) - 1996 in Magbema, Kambia - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Koroma, Lamin (Male) age 10 - 1992 in Malen, Pujehun - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Koroma, Lamin (Male) age 18 - 2000 in Soa, Kono - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Koroma, Lamin (Male) age 34 - 1999 in Maforki, Port Loko - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Assaulted.

Koroma, Lamin (Male) age 40 - 1996 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted.

Koroma, Lamina (Male) - 1991 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Killed.

Koroma, Lansana (Male) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Killed.

Koroma, Lansana (Male) - 1997 in Malema, Kailahun - Abducted and detained.

Koroma, Lansana (Male) age 46 - 1996 in Magbema, Kambia - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Koroma, Lansana (Male) age 47 - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced.

Koroma, Lemba (Male) age 14 - 1998 in Fiama, Kono - Forced to labour.

Koroma, Lensenie (Male) - 1998 in Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Koroma, M (Male) - 1996 in Nongowa, Kenema - Killed.

Koroma, Mabinty (Female) - 1992 in Gorama Kono, Kono - Killed.

Koroma, Mabinty (Female) age 38 - 1996 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Displaced.

Koroma, Mabinty (Female) age 47 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Koroma, Macus (Male) - 1995 in Tikonko, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Koroma, Mafilla (Female) age 31 - 1999 in Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili - Property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Koroma, Magai (Male) - 1999 in Sanda Magblonthor, Port Loko - Abducted. Killed.

Koroma, Magdalene (Female) age 43 - 1994 in Kori, Moyamba - Displaced.

Koroma, Mahmoud (Male) - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Koroma, Mambu (Male) - Extorted. Abducted and detained.

Koroma, Manimo-Sheku (Male) - Assaulted.

Koroma, Manseh (Male) age 40 - 1999 in Diang, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Koroma, Manso (Male) - 1999 in Koinadugu - Killed.

Koroma, Manso (Male) age 6 - 1998 in Neini, Koinadugu - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Koroma, Marcus (Male) age 33 - 1994 in Tikonko, Bo District - Limb amputated.

Koroma, Mariam (Female) - 1997 in Koya, Port Loko - Abducted and detained.

Koroma, Mariama (Female) - 1991 in Kakua, Bo District - Killed.

Koroma, Mariama (Female) - 1991 in Western Area - Extorted.

Koroma, Mariama (Female) age 12 - 1994 - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Koroma, Mariama (Female) age 20 - Extorted and property looted. Tortured.

Koroma, Mariama (Female) age 61 - 1992 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Koroma, Marie (Female) age 44 - 1997 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Koroma, Marie (Female) age 51 - 1994 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Extorted and property looted. Assaulted.

Koroma, Marie (Female) age 56 - 1999 in Loko Massama, Port Loko - Extorted. Tortured.

Koroma, Martha (Female) - 1998 in Leibasgayahun, Bombali - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Koroma, Masia (Male) age 31 - 1998 in Diang, Koinadugu - Forced to labour.

Koroma, Massah (Female) - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Koroma, Massah (Female) age 20 - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Koroma, Massah (Female) age 61 - 1997 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed.

Koroma, Modu (Male) - 1995 in Kongbora, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Koroma, Mohamed (Male) - 1999 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Killed.

Koroma, Mohamed (Male) - 1992 - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Koroma, Mohamed (Male) - 1994 - Killed.

Koroma, Mohamed (Male) - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Koroma, Mohamed (Male) - Killed.

Koroma, Mohamed (Male) - 1997 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced.

Koroma, Mohamed (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Koroma, Mohamed (Male) - 1992 in Badjia, Bo District - Assaulted.

Koroma, Mohamed (Male) age 10 - 1993 in Kenema - Killed.

Koroma, Mohamed (Male) age 17 - 1992 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Tortured.

Koroma, Mohamed (Male) age 20 - 1994 - Displaced.

Koroma, Mohamed (Male) age 30 - 1991 in Langorama, Kenema - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Koroma, Mohamed (Male) age 34 - 1991 - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Assaulted.

Koroma, Mohamed (Male) age 37 - 1999 in Diang, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Koroma, Mohamed (Male) age 37 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Koroma, Mohamed (Male) age 40 - 1994 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Killed.

Koroma, Mohamed (Male) age 52 - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced and property looted. Abducted. Assaulted, tortured and limb amputated.

Koroma, Mohamed (Male) age 56 - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Koroma, Moiguan (Male) - 1991 in Sielenga, Bo District - Killed.

Koroma, Moijoy (Male) age 44 - 1992 in Nomo, Kenema - Property destroyed.

Koroma, Moijue (Male) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Koroma, Molie (Male) age 45 - 1999 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Koroma, Momodu (Male) - 1998 in Follosaba Dembelia, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Koroma, Momodu (Male) - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Koroma, Momodu (Male) - 1997 in Kongbora, Moyamba - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Koroma, Momodu (Male) - 1998 in Koya, Port Loko - Killed.

Koroma, Momodu (Male) - 1997 in Malema, Kailahun - Abducted and detained.

Koroma, Momodu (Male) - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.

Koroma, Momodu (Male) age 45 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Koroma, Momoh (Male) - 1994 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Killed.

Koroma, Momoh (Male) - 1999 in Peje, Pujehun - Killed.

Koroma, Momoh (Male) - 1996 in Nongowa, Kenema - Killed.

Koroma, Momoh (Male) - Killed.

Koroma, Momoh (Male) - Killed.

Koroma, Momoh (Male) - 1994 in Tikonko, Bo District - Limb amputated.

Koroma, Momoh (Male) - 1996 in Gaura, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.

Koroma, Momoh (Male) - 1991 in Nongowa, Kenema - Killed.

Koroma, Momoh (Male) age 10 - Forced to labour.

Koroma, Momoh (Male) age 52 - 1997 in Kenema - Property destroyed.

Koroma, Momoh (Male) age 56 - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Property looted and destroyed.

Koroma, Momoh (Male) age 57 - 1998 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Assaulted. Killed.

Koroma, Momoh (Male) age 62 - 1998 in Konike Barina, Tonkolili - Killed.

Koroma, Momoh (Male) age 64 - 1997 in Gaura, Kenema - Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Koroma, Momoh (Male) age 66 - 1997 in Gaura, Kenema - Limb amputated.

Koroma, Momoh (Male) age 70 - 1998 in Briama, Kambia - Forced to labour. Tortured.

Koroma, Momorie (Male) age 13 - 1994 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Forced to labour.

Koroma, Monya (Male) age 37 - 1992 in Dia, Kailahun - Property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Koroma, Moriba (Male) age 64 - 1991 in Bumpah, Bo District - Property looted and destroyed.

Koroma, Morie (Male) - 1993 in Kissi Tongi, Kailahun - Killed.

Koroma, Morray (Male) age 28 - 1994 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Koroma, Moses (Male) age 41 - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained.

Koroma, Musa (Male) - 1997 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Abducted and detained.

Koroma, Musa (Male) - Property looted.

Koroma, Musa (Male) - 1991 in Kailahun - Killed.

Koroma, Musa (Male) - 1991 in Peje Bongre, Kailahun - Property looted and destroyed. Killed.

Koroma, Musa (Male) - 1994 in Kenema - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Koroma, Musa (Male) - 1992 in Dia, Kailahun - Assaulted. Killed.

Koroma, Musa (Male) age 10 - 1991 in Kissi Tongi, Kailahun - Killed.

Koroma, Musa (Male) age 19 - 1998 - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Koroma, Musa (Male) age 25 - 1998 in Diang, Koinadugu - Displaced.

Koroma, Musa (Male) age 28 - 1997 in Small Bo, Kenema - Abducted. Tortured. Killed.

Koroma, Musa (Male) age 49 - 1994 in Konike Barina, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Koroma, Mustapha (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.

Koroma, Mustapha (Male) - 1993 in Badjia, Bo District - Killed.

Koroma, Mustapha (Male) age 22 - 1992 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Assaulted.

Koroma, Mustapha (Male) age 32 - 1991 in Bumpah, Bo District - Property looted.

Koroma, Mustapha (Male) age 33 - 2000 in Sandor, Kono - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and stripped.

Koroma, Mustapha (Male) age 47 - 1995 in Benducha, Bonthe - Displaced.

Koroma, Musu (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Extorted.

Koroma, Musu (Female) age 25 - 1998 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced, extorted and property looted.

Koroma, Nancy (Female) age 20 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Koroma, Ndiamond (Male) age 71 - 1998 in Gbendembu Ngowahun, Bombali - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Koroma, Nfalie (Male) - 1999 in Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili - Property looted. Forced to labour.

Koroma, Nohals (Male) - Abducted and detained.

Koroma, Nyandeamoh (Female) - 1999 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed.

Koroma, Nyapo (Female) age 45 - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Displaced and extorted.

Koroma, Ousman (Male) - 1999 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Koroma, Ousman (Male) - 1999 in Diang, Koinadugu - Killed.

Koroma, Ousman (Male) age 33 - 1998 in Leibasgayahun, Bombali - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Koroma, Ousman (Male) age 55 - 1992 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed.

Koroma, Ousman (Male) age 75 - Killed.

Koroma, Paeyoh (Male) - 1999 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Koroma, Patrick (Male) - Extorted. Tortured.

Koroma, Patrick (Male) age 51 - 1991 - Displaced. Abducted. Assaulted.

Koroma, Peter (Male) - 1994 in Kalansogia, Tonkolili - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Koroma, Posseh (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Koroma, Rashid (Male) age 20 - 1995 in Marampa, Port Loko - Forced to labour.

Koroma, Richard (Male) - 1999 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Property looted and destroyed.

Koroma, Rugiatu (Female) - 1994 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Abducted and detained.

Koroma, Rukor (Female) - 1992 in Gorama Kono, Kono - Displaced. Killed.

Koroma, Ruth (Female) age 15 - 1994 - Displaced.

Koroma, Saata (Female) age 39 - 1995 - Assaulted.

Koroma, Sad (Male) age 42 - 1997 in Small Bo, Kenema - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and stripped.

Koroma, Saffa (Male) - 1991 - Killed.

Koroma, Saffa (Male) age 44 - 1994 in Nongowa, Kenema - Property destroyed. Killed.

Koroma, Saffa (Male) age 51 - 1991 in Bagbo, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured. Killed.

Koroma, Saidu (Male) - 1997 in Kaffu Bullom, Port Loko - Assaulted.

Koroma, Saidu (Male) - 1998 in Safroko Limba, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Koroma, Saidu (Male) age 22 - Property looted. Assaulted.

Koroma, Saidu (Male) age 23 - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.

Koroma, Saidu (Male) age 45 - 1996 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Displaced and property destroyed.

Koroma, Saio (Male) age 25 - 1998 in Koinadugu - Property destroyed. Abducted. Killed.

Koroma, Salamu (Male) age 22 - 1995 - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Koroma, Salia (Male) - Killed.

Koroma, Salifu (Male) - 1998 in Gbendembu Ngowahun, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Koroma, Sallay - Displaced. Assaulted.

Koroma, Salln (Male) age 13 - 1998 in Koinadugu - Killed.

Koroma, Sallu (Male) - 1997 in Gbendembu Ngowahun, Bombali - Displaced.

Koroma, Sallu (Male) age 18 - 1991 in Peje, Pujehun - Killed.

Koroma, Sama (Female) age 30 - 1994 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced.

Koroma, Samai (Male) age 30 - 1993 in Simbaru, Kenema - Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Koroma, Samodu (Male) age 45 - Property looted.

Koroma, Sampha (Male) - 1992 in Kono - Displaced. Killed.

Koroma, Sampha (Male) - 1994 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Killed.

Koroma, Samuel (Male) age 44 - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Koroma, Sando (Female) age 46 - Displaced.

Koroma, Sannah (Male) - 1998 - Killed.

Koroma, Santigie (Male) - Property destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted. Killed.

Koroma, Santigie (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Killed.

Koroma, Sao (Male) - 1994 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Koroma, Sao (Male) age 35 - 1997 in Gaura, Kenema - Displaced.

Koroma, Saomomoh (Male) - 1992 in Dia, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.

Koroma, Sapham (Male) - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed. Tortured.

Koroma, Sarah (Female) age 26 - Killed.

Koroma, Sarah (Female) age 53 - 1998 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Koroma, Sassie (Male) - 1993 in Gbense, Kono - Killed.

Koroma, Satta (Female) age 52 - 1993 in Simbaru, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Koroma, Sendor (Female) age 5 - 1994 - Killed.

Koroma, Senesie (Male) - 1991 in Nongowa, Kenema - Killed.

Koroma, Senesie (Male) age 54 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Koroma, Sengbe (Male) age 53 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed. Tortured and stripped.

Koroma, Sheka (Male) age 64 - 1999 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Koroma, Sheku (Male) - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Property looted.

Koroma, Sheku (Male) - 1995 - Killed.

Koroma, Sheku (Male) - 1997 in Niawa Lenga, Bo District - Forced to labour.

Koroma, Sheku (Male) age 26 - 1999 in Diang, Koinadugu - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Koroma, Sheku (Male) age 35 - Killed.

Koroma, Sheku (Male) age 62 - 1999 in Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Koroma, Sheku (Male) age 64 - 1999 in Kafe Simira, Tonkolili - Property destroyed. Tortured.

Koroma, Sheriff (Male) - 1998 in Diang, Koinadugu - Displaced. Abducted. Limb amputated. Killed.

Koroma, Shiaka (Male) age 26 - 1991 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Koroma, Simbo (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Detained.

Koroma, Smart (Male) age 67 - 1997 in Kenema - Tortured. Killed.

Koroma, Sokurun (Male) age 82 - 1999 in Diang, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Tortured.

Koroma, Sondima (Male) age 20 - 1995 in Niawa Lenga, Bo District - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Koroma, Sorie (Male) - 1998 in Diang, Koinadugu - Abducted. Limb amputated. Killed.

Koroma, Sorie (Male) - 1994 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Abducted and detained.

Koroma, Sorie (Male) - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Koroma, Sorie (Male) - 1999 in Safroko Limba, Bombali - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Koroma, Sorie (Male) age 28 - 1992 in Gorama Kono, Kono - Displaced.

Koroma, Sorie (Male) age 31 - 1999 in Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Koroma, Sorie (Male) age 36 - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted.

Koroma, Sorie (Male) age 39 - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced. Killed.

Koroma, Sorie (Male) age 57 - 1996 in Leibasgayahun, Bombali - Displaced and extorted.

Koroma, Sudufu (Male) - 1994 in Wunde, Bo District - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Koroma, Sukairiatu (Female) age 46 - 1996 in Bo District - Extorted. Tortured.

Koroma, Sulaiman (Male) - 1994 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Killed.

Koroma, Sulaiman (Male) - 1998 in Kakua, Bo District - Killed.

Koroma, Sulaiman (Male) age 10 - 1991 in Peje, Pujehun - Assaulted.

Koroma, Sullay (Male) - 1998 in Masimera, Port Loko - Extorted. Abducted. Assaulted.

Koroma, Sullay (Male) - 1999 - Assaulted. Killed.

Koroma, Sullay (Male) - 1996 in Malegohun, Kenema - Killed.

Koroma, Sundu (Female) age 45 - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Koroma, Symbo (Male) age 19 - 1999 - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Koroma, Tamba (Male) - 2000 in Sandor, Kono - Abducted. Assaulted and tortured. Killed.

Koroma, Tamba (Male) - 1998 in Diang, Koinadugu - Abducted. Tortured. Killed.

Koroma, Tamba (Male) - 1998 in Safroko Limba, Bombali - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Koroma, Tamba (Male) age 53 - 1991 in Nomo, Kenema - Displaced.

Koroma, Tamba Necky (Male) - 1998 in Safroko Limba, Bombali - Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.

Koroma, Tenneh (Female) age 57 - 1995 in Nomo, Kenema - Killed.

Koroma, Thaim (Male) - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Koroma, Theresa (Female) - 1993 in Simbaru, Kenema - Forced to labour. Tortured.

Koroma, Thomas (Male) - 1998 - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Koroma, Titty (Female) - 1997 in Jong, Bonthe - Property looted. Tortured.
 Koroma, Tity (Male) - 1997 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Assaulted.
 Koroma, Tommy (Male) - 1999 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Property destroyed. Killed.
 Koroma, Tommy (Male) age 30 - 1997 in Bonthe - Property looted.
 Koroma, Tumuru (Male) age 51 - 1998 in Koinadugu - Property destroyed.
 Koroma, Umara (Male) age 64 - 1998 in Dembelia Sinkunia, Koinadugu - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Abducted and detained.
 Koroma, Umaru (Male) - 1995 in Tikonko, Bo District - Killed.
 Koroma, Umaru Mohamed (Male) age 36 - 1997 in Malema, Kailahun - Property looted.
 Koroma, Unisa (Male) - Killed.
 Koroma, Vandi (Male) - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Koroma, Vandy (Male) age 42 - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Forced to labour. Assaulted. Killed.
 Koroma, Vandy (Male) age 47 - 1994 in Nongowa, Kenema - Property destroyed.
 Koroma, Vandy (Male) age 61 - 1994 in Gaura, Kenema - Property looted.
 Koroma, Yankoro (Male) - 1999 in Diang, Koinadugu - Forced to labour.
 Koroma, Yatta (Female) age 7 - Abducted. Assaulted.
 Koroma, Yatta (Female) age 40 - 1991 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Koroma, Yeabu (Female) - Tortured.
 Koroma, Yebu (Female) - 1998 in Leibasgayahun, Bombali - Displaced.
 Koroma, Yegbeh (Female) - 1999 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Property destroyed. Killed.
 Koroma, Yegbeh (Female) - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Koroma, Yenor (Female) - 1992 in Gorama Kono, Kono - Displaced.
 Koroma, Yereh (Male) age 55 - Displaced and property looted.
 Koroma, Yusuf (Male) - Assaulted.
 Koroma, Zainab (Female) - Killed.
 Koroma, Zainab (Female) age 17 - 1996 in Kamajei, Moyamba - Displaced. Forced to labour.
 Koromakallon, Yatta (Female) - 1991 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained.
 Koromanyormeh, Bobor Deen (Male) age 70 - 1995 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Korpeh, Senesie (Male) age 63 - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Korpeh, Surba (Male) - 1995 - Tortured.
 Kortu, Julius (Male) age 57 - 1995 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Kortu, Kenie (Female) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Property destroyed.
 Kortu, Mariama (Female) - 1991 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.
 Korwa, Iye (Female) age 30 - 1994 in Tikonko, Bo District - Displaced and property looted.
 Korwa, Mustapha (Male) age 15 - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced. Forced to labour.
 Kosia, Isata (Female) - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Kosia, Lansana (Male) - 1993 in Peje, Pujehun - Property destroyed.
 Kossaba, Daniel (Male) age 22 - Extorted. Killed.
 Kotei, Agbo (Male) - Killed.
 Kougoteh, Saffa (Male) - 1995 in Koya, Kenema - Limb amputated.
 Kowa, Abu (Male) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Killed.
 Kowa, Bobson (Male) age 36 - 1996 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Extorted and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Kowa, Daniel (Male) age 48 - 1995 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Kowa, Fatmata (Female) - Displaced.
 Kowa, Haja (Female) - Killed.
 Kowa, Haja (Female) - 1997 in Peje Bongre, Kailahun - Property destroyed.
 Kowa, Hawa (Female) - Killed.
 Kowa, Jattu (Female) age 12 - 1998 in Koya, Kenema - Tortured.
 Kowa, Jayia (Male) age 48 - 1995 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Kowa, Joe (Male) age 46 - 1991 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed. Assaulted and tortured.
 Kowa, Jusu (Male) age 50 - 1993 in Peje, Pujehun - Displaced.

Kowa, Karpou (Male) - 1997 in Peje Bongre, Kailahun - Property destroyed. Killed.
 Kowa, Lucy (Female) age 25 - 1995 - Displaced. Assaulted and limb amputated.
 Kowa, Mariama (Female) - 1997 in Bumpah, Bo District - Displaced.
 Kowa, Mariama Sivia (Female) - 1997 in Bumpah, Bo District - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Kowa, Mohamed Alpha (Male) age 47 - 1994 - Displaced, extorted and property looted.
 Kowa, Momoh (Male) - 1992 in Bumpah, Moyamba - Displaced. Abducted. Assaulted. Killed.
 Kowa, Musa (Male) - 1994 in Follosaba Dembelia, Koinadugu - Detained. Killed.
 Kowa, Musa (Male) age 10 - 1998 in Koya, Kenema - Tortured.
 Kowa, Musa (Male) age 65 - 1998 in Koya, Kenema - Displaced.
 Kowa, Nancy (Female) age 27 - 1997 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Detained. Killed.
 Kowa, Sorgo (Male) - 1994 in Peje Bongre, Kailahun - Killed.
 Kowa, Vandí (Male) - 1996 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.
 Kpagoi, John (Male) - Abducted. Killed.
 Kpagoi, Marray (Male) - Abducted. Killed.
 Kpagoi, Nabieu (Male) - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted.
 Kpaka, Abdul (Male) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Kpaka, Alhaji Alieu (Male) age 39 - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Kpaka, Alpha (Male) age 55 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Kpaka, Amara (Male) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Killed.
 Kpaka, Amie (Female) - Displaced. Abducted.
 Kpaka, Amie (Female) age 29 - 1991 - Displaced and property looted.
 Kpaka, Ansu (Male) age 20 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed.
 Kpaka, Ansumana (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Property destroyed.
 Kpaka, Ansumana (Male) age 17 - 1991 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Forced to labour.
 Kpaka, Boakaríe (Male) - 1997 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Kpaka, Bockaríe (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.
 Kpaka, Brima (Male) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Kpaka, Brima (Male) - Property destroyed. Killed.
 Kpaka, Brima (Male) - 1997 in Nongowa, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Kpaka, Celina (Female) - 1995 in Kori, Moyamba - Killed.
 Kpaka, Chernor (Male) age 33 - 1997 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Kpaka, Ensa (Male) - 1991 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Killed.
 Kpaka, Foday (Male) - 1991 in Pujehun - Killed.
 Kpaka, Foday (Male) - 1991 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Tortured.
 Kpaka, Foday (Male) - 1998 in Mandu, Kailahun - Killed.
 Kpaka, Foday (Male) age 23 - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Kpaka, Hawa (Female) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced. Tortured.
 Kpaka, Hawa (Female) age 38 - 1991 in Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed.
 Kpaka, Idrissa (Male) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Kpaka, Isatu (Female) age 34 - 1991 in Koya, Kenema - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained.
 Kpaka, James (Male) - 1991 - Killed.
 Kpaka, Joseph (Male) - Displaced. Killed.
 Kpaka, Jusu (Male) - 1997 in Sowa, Pujehun - Tortured.
 Kpaka, Jusu (Male) age 73 - 1992 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Killed.
 Kpaka, Kondagba (Male) - 1995 in Bonthe - Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Kpaka, Lahai (Male) - 1991 - Abducted and detained.
 Kpaka, Lahaiwa (Male) age 76 - 1991 in Niawa, Kenema - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Kpaka, Lucia (Female) age 47 - 1998 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Kpaka, Lusenie (Male) - Property looted and destroyed.
 Kpaka, Mabú (Male) - Property destroyed. Killed.
 Kpaka, Mamanor (Female) - 1991 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Abducted.
 Kpaka, Mamawa (Female) - 1991 in Peje, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.
 Kpaka, Mana (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.
 Kpaka, Manawa (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.

Kpaka, Mariama (Female) - 1997 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Property looted.

Kpaka, Mariama (Female) - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Abducted and detained.

Kpaka, Maseray (Female) - 1997 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Displaced.

Kpaka, Matthew (Male) age 46 - 1991 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kpaka, Mattu (Female) - Property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Kpaka, Mendaga (Male) - Displaced. Abducted.

Kpaka, Mohamed (Male) age 36 - 1991 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed.

Kpaka, Moinima (Male) age 60 - 1991 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Killed.

Kpaka, Momodu (Male) age 51 - 1991 in Sielenga, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Kpaka, Momoh (Male) age 50 - 1991 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Kpaka, Murana (Male) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced. Tortured.

Kpaka, Musa (Male) - 1993 in Sowa, Pujehun - Killed.

Kpaka, Musa (Male) age 34 - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted.

Kpaka, Musa (Male) age 40 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kpaka, Mustapha (Male) age 75 - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Kpaka, Nabien (Female) - 1998 in Kakua, Bo District - Property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Kpaka, Ome (Female) - 1993 - Killed.

Kpaka, Saffa (Male) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced. Tortured.

Kpaka, Saffa (Male) - 1995 in Makpele, Pujehun - Forced to labour.

Kpaka, Saffa (Male) age 47 - 1998 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Kpaka, Saidu (Male) - Property looted and destroyed.

Kpaka, Sallay (Female) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced. Tortured.

Kpaka, Sao (Female) age 38 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Kpaka, Seiyah (Female) - 1991 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Abducted.

Kpaka, Senesie (Male) - 1991 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Killed.

Kpaka, Shegbe (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.

Kpaka, Shengbe (Male) - 1994 - Killed.

Kpaka, Shengbe (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.

Kpaka, Sima - 1991 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Property looted. Abducted. Assaulted.

Kpaka, Sombo (Female) - 1991 - Abducted and detained.

Kpaka, Sowoteh (Female) - Displaced. Assaulted.

Kpaka, Tibo (Male) - 1991 - Abducted and detained.

Kpaka, Vaikai (Male) age 38 - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Kpaka, Vandi (Male) - 1997 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Property looted.

Kpaka, Vandi (Male) - 1995 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Kpaka, Vandy (Male) age 43 - 1997 in Western Area - Property destroyed.

Kpaka, Wuya (Female) - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted.

Kpaka, Yama (Female) - 1996 in Kwamebai Krim, Bonthe - Killed.

Kpaka, Yeawa (Female) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced. Tortured.

Kpakima, Aiah (Male) age 55 - Killed.

Kpakima, Kai (Male) age 51 - 1997 - Property looted. Abducted. Assaulted.

Kpakima, Kumba (Female) - Displaced. Tortured.

Kpakima, Sia (Female) age 25 - 1992 - Assaulted and tortured.

Kpakima, Vandy (Male) age 69 - 1997 in Tunkia, Kenema - Property destroyed.

Kpakra, Hokie (Female) - Displaced.

Kpana, Binta (Female) - 1997 - Displaced.

Kpana, Isata (Female) - 1997 - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Kpana, John (Male) - 1999 in Timdel, Moyamba - Forced to labour. Forced to participate in an act of cannibalism.

Kpana, Julius (Male) - 1995 in Baoma, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Kpana, Lamin (Male) age 48 - 1997 - Displaced and property looted.

Kpana, Lansana (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Abducted.

Kpana, Marian Jebeh (Female) - 1997 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Kpana, Marie (Female) - 1995 in Yawei, Kailahun - Abducted. Tortured. Killed.

Kpana, Satta (Female) - 1997 - Displaced.

Kpanabome, Andrew (Male) age 37 - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced.

Kpanabome, James (Male) age 32 - 1995 in Bagruwa, Moyamba - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Kpanabome, Joe (Male) age 57 - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Kpanabome, Junisa (Male) - 1995 - Displaced. Abducted. Killed.

Kpanabome, Maseray (Female) age 63 - 1995 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Kpanabome, Momodu (Male) age 15 - Forced to labour.

Kpanabome, Musu (Female) age 34 - 1995 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kpanabome, Sannah (Male) age 59 - 1997 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Extorted. Detained.

Kpanabome, Shorgor (Female) - Assaulted. Killed.

Kpanabome, Tommy (Male) - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced.

Kpanahun, Karimu (Male) - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Kpanda, Moses (Male) age 26 - 1994 - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kpandewa, Hannah (Female) age 23 - 1996 in Kono - Property looted. Abducted. Assaulted.

Kpandeyenge, Sahr (Male) age 51 - 2000 - Extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Kpangay, Bobor (Male) age 32 - 1995 in Banta Mokele, Moyamba - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Kpangay, Finda (Female) age 48 - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Kpangay, Hannah (Female) age 38 - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced.

Kpangay, Hawa (Female) - 1991 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced, extorted and property looted.

Kpangay, Lahai (Male) - 1995 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Killed.

Kpangay, Sheku (Male) age 32 - 1998 in Kamara, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour. Killed.

Kpangay, Vandy (Male) age 42 - 1991 - Property looted and destroyed.

Kparka, Abdulai (Male) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Property destroyed. Killed.

Kpatewai, Vandi (Male) age 55 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kpawa, Abu (Male) - 1994 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Killed.

Kpawa, Boackai (Male) - 1995 in Kpanda Kemo, Bonthe - Property destroyed.

Kpele, Musu (Female) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Killed.

Kpembo, Yei (Female) age 19 - 1992 in Fiamsa, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Kpengba, Mustapha (Male) age 48 - 1994 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kpengba, Shaka (Male) - 1995 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Extorted. Abducted. Assaulted. Killed.

Kpewa, Amie (Female) - 1991 - Assaulted.

Kpewa, Kpawa (Male) age 45 - 1992 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Kpewa, Tommy (Male) - 1991 in Kakua, Bo District - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Kpima, Sandy (Male) age 52 - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kpolie, Mabondo (Female) - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Kpornike, Aruna (Male) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Limb amputated.

Kposowa, Abdul (Male) age 31 - 1997 in Western Area - Extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Kposowa, Boi (Female) - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Kposowa, Fatmata (Female) age 27 - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced. Assaulted.

Kposowa, Joe (Male) - 1994 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced.

Kpukumu, Borbor (Male) age 29 - 1993 - Displaced and extorted.

Kpukumu, Kaibene (Male) - 1993 - Property destroyed.

Kpukumu, Lansana (Male) age 47 - Extorted.

Kpukumu, S (Male) age 44 - 1996 in Panga Krim, Pujehun - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Kpukumu, Sao (Male) age 45 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kpukunu, Kabineh (Male) - Property destroyed.

Kpulun, Abdul (Male) age 37 - Assaulted. Killed.

Kpulun, James (Male) age 23 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Tortured and limb

amputated.

Kromanty, James (Male) age 44 - 1999 in Western Area - Forced to labour. Killed.

Kuala, Isatu (Female) age 48 - 1992 in Magbema, Kambia - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Kula, Mgo (Male) - 1992 - Killed.

Kula Seituah, Kenei (Female) - 1991 in Dama, Kenema - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Kuma, Kaprr (Male) age 72 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Kumabeh, Ansumana (Male) age 32 - 1995 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Kumbay, Komba (Male) - Abducted.

Kumbay, Toetoe (Male) - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kunateh, Abu Bakarr (Male) age 45 - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced. Tortured.

Kundema, Komba (Male) - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Displaced. Abducted.

Kunnah, Sorie (Male) - 1998 in Port Loko - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Forced to labour.

Kutubu, Sahr (Male) age 34 - 1997 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Kuyaleh, Abdulai (Male) - Killed.

Kuyama, Aiah (Male) age 38 - 1998 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Displaced. Assaulted.

Kuyata, Fatmata (Female) - Abducted and detained.

Kuyateh, Abdul (Male) age 52 - 1994 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Kuyateh, Alhassan (Male) age 24 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.

Kuyateh, Alpha (Male) - 1998 - Assaulted and tortured.

Kuyateh, Bashiru (Male) - 1995 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Kuyateh, Foday (Male) age 41 - 1999 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Property looted. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Kuyateh, Giba (Male) - 1998 in Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Killed.

Kuyateh, Isata (Female) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Extorted and property looted. Abducted. Assaulted.

Kuyateh, Korifala (Male) - 1998 - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Kuyateh, Kula (Female) age 25 - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted.

Kuyateh, Manika (Female) - Assaulted.

Kuyateh, Mohamed (Male) age 13 - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Kuyateh, Mohamed A. (Male) age 24 - 1995 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Lacoh, Hassana (Male) age 42 - 1994 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed.

Lagah, Joseph (Male) - 1995 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Property looted and destroyed.

Lagao, Joseph (Male) age 22 - 1996 in Dodo, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted.

Lagao, Margrette (Female) - 1998 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and limb amputated.

Lahai, Abdulai (Male) - 1991 in Bagbo, Bo District - Displaced.

Lahai, Abdulai (Male) age 56 - Displaced. Tortured. Killed.

Lahai, Abu (Male) age 10 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Lahai, Alhaji Alieu (Male) age 51 - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Tortured.

Lahai, Alhaji Brima (Male) age 57 - 1995 in Badjia, Bo District - Property destroyed.

Lahai, Alpha (Male) age 20 - 1991 in Wunde, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and stripped.

Lahai, Amadu (Male) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Abducted. Killed.

Lahai, Andrew (Male) - 1991 in Bagbo, Bo District - Displaced.

Lahai, Ansu (Male) - 1991 in Bagbo, Bo District - Displaced.

Lahai, Aruna (Male) - 1991 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Lahai, Augustine (Male) - 1991 in Bagbo, Bo District - Displaced. Killed.

Lahai, Baby (Female) - 1994 in Malen, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.

Lahai, Bangalie (Male) age 60 - 1993 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Killed.

Lahai, Beatrice (Female) - 1991 in Bagbo, Bo District - Displaced.

Lahai, Bendu (Male) age 10 - 1996 in Nimikoro, Kono - Killed.

Lahai, Borbor (Male) age 24 - 1997 - Displaced. Killed.

Lahai, Brima (Male) - 1994 in Malen, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.

Lahai, Brima (Male) age 40 - 1998 in Luawa, Kailahun - Forced to labour. Tortured. Killed.

Lahai, Brima (Male) age 44 - 1991 in Bagbe, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted and tortured.

Lahai, Bundeu (Male) - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Killed.

Lahai, Effieda (Female) - 1995 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.

Lahai, Efrider (Female) - 1995 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced.

Lahai, Foday (Male) age 24 - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted and tortured.

Lahai, Francis (Male) - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Lahai, Hawa (Female) age 16 - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced.

Lahai, Isatta (Female) age 60 - 1996 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Displaced and extorted. Tortured.

Lahai, Issa (Male) - 1995 in Baoma, Bo District - Property destroyed.

Lahai, Iye (Female) - 1991 in Bagbo, Bo District - Displaced.

Lahai, Joe (Male) age 44 - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Lahai, John (Male) age 33 - 1994 - Property destroyed. Abducted. Tortured and stripped.

Lahai, Joseph (Male) - Displaced. Assaulted. Killed.

Lahai, Joseph (Male) age 24 - Killed.

Lahai, Kadie (Female) - 1997 in Koya, Kenema - Extorted. Forced to labour.

Lahai, Kadie (Female) age 50 - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.

Lahai, Luseni (Male) - 1996 - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Lahai, Martha (Female) - 1991 in Bagbo, Bo District - Displaced.

Lahai, Mohamed (Male) age 39 - 1996 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Extorted and property looted. Abducted and detained. Stripped.

Lahai, Momoh (Male) - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Lahai, Morie (Male) age 24 - 1991 in Upper Bambara , Kailahun - Displaced and property destroyed.

Lahai, Musa (Male) - 1997 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Lahai, Musa (Male) - 1993 - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Lahai, Nabieu (Male) age 57 - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Tortured.

Lahai, Nyakeh (Male) - 1991 in Bagbo, Bo District - Displaced.

Lahai, Roland (Male) age 54 - Displaced. Assaulted.

Lahai, Sahr (Male) - 1993 in Kissi Tongi, Kailahun - Killed.

Lahai, Saidu (Male) age 35 - 1991 in Kagboro, Moyamba - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Lahai, Sallay (Female) age 25 - 1995 in Upper Bambara , Kailahun - Displaced and property destroyed.

Lahai, Sao (Male) age 19 - 1994 in Malen, Pujehun - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Lahai, Satta (Female) - 1993 in Badjia, Bo District - Killed.

Lahai, Saysay (Male) - 1997 in Western Area - Killed.

Lahai, Steven (Male) - Property looted.

Lahai, Tainge (Female) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Abducted. Killed.

Lahai, Tom (Male) - 1992 in Malen, Pujehun - Killed.

Lahai, Tommy (Male) - 1995 in Yawbeko, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Lahai, Vandi (Male) - 1997 in Luawa, Kailahun - Property destroyed. Detained. Assaulted.

Lahai, Victoria (Female) - 1997 in Western Area - Killed.

Lahai, Walker (Male) - 1997 in Western Area - Killed.

Lahai, Wuya (Female) age 10 - 1993 in Nongowa, Kenema - Forced to labour.

Lahai, Yatta (Female) age 27 - 1994 in Jawie, Kailahun - Extorted. Abducted. Assaulted.

Lahai, Yusufu (Male) age 45 - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Property looted and destroyed.

Lahunya, Faya (Female) age 42 - 1999 - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Lahunya, Fayia (Male) age 43 - 2000 - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Lakoh, Abdulai (Male) age 42 - 1994 in Kafe Simira, Tonkolili - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Lakoh, Abu Bakarr (Male) - 1999 in Gbendembu Ngowahun, Bombali - Property looted.

Lakoh, Adama (Female) - 1994 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Lakoh, Alimamy (Male) age 45 - 1995 in Tane, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Lakoh, Amadu (Male) - 1997 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.

Lakoh, Amadu (Male) age 24 - 1994 in Kholifa Mabang, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Lakoh, Foday (Male) - 1995 in Tane, Tonkolili - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Lakoh, Iye (Female) - 1994 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Lakoh, Sorie (Male) age 67 - 1999 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Lamboi, Brima (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.

Lamboi, John (Male) - 1993 in Baoma, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Lamboi, Joseph (Male) age 28 - 1996 in Badjia, Bo District - Property looted. Stripped.

Lamboi, Mahota (Female) age 35 - 1998 in Kori, Moyamba - Killed.

Lamboi, Solomon (Male) age 42 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Lamin, Aiah (Male) - Detained. Killed.

Lamin, Allieu (Male) age 43 - 1994 in Nongowa, Kenema - Killed.

Lamin, Ansu (Male) age 48 - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Displaced and extorted. Abducted. Tortured.

Lamin, Brima (Male) - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed.

Lamin, Brima (Male) age 81 - 1991 in Niawa, Kenema - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Lamin, Dauda (Male) - Displaced.

Lamin, David (Male) age 55 - 1992 in Kakua, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Lamin, David M (Male) - 1992 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced. Detained. Tortured.

Lamin, Fomba (Male) age 60 - 1994 in Luawa, Kailahun - Property looted.

Lamin, Henry (Male) - 1994 in Baoma, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Lamin, Joe (Male) - 1995 in Kowa, Moyamba - Killed.

Lamin, Jusu (Male) - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed.

Lamin, Lucia (Female) - 1997 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Tortured.

Lamin, Maddi (Male) age 53 - 1994 in Gorama Mende, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed.

Lamin, Mariama (Female) age 33 - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Displaced.

Lamin, Martha (Female) age 33 - 1997 in Bonthe - Property looted. Abducted. Assaulted and tortured.

Lamin, Michael (Male) age 48 - 1997 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Forced to labour. Killed.

Lamin, Mohamed (Male) age 18 - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Killed.

Lamin, Moris (Male) age 21 - 1997 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced. Forced to labour. Killed.

Lamin, Moses (Male) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Lamin, Musa (Male) - 1997 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted. Killed.

Lamin, Musa (Male) - 1992 in Nongowa, Kenema - Detained. Tortured.

Lamin, Musa (Male) age 53 - 1994 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced.

Lamin, Musa (Male) age 74 - 1994 in Niawa, Kenema - Property destroyed. Killed.

Lamin, Pieh (Male) - 1995 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Killed.

Lamin, Sahr (Male) age 28 - 1994 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced and property looted.

Lamin, Sahr (Male) age 76 - 1998 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Lamin, Surman (Male) age 15 - 1992 in Malen, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.

Lamin, Tamba (Male) - Detained. Killed.

Lamin, Umu (Female) - Killed.

Lanford, Joe (Male) - 1997 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Lansana, Abibatu (Female) age 12 - 1998 in Nongowa, Kenema - Abducted and detained.

Lansana, Albert (Male) - 1996 in Niawa Lenga, Bo District - Assaulted.

Lansana, Alpha (Male) age 21 - 1991 in Kissi Teng, Kailahun - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Assaulted.

Lansana, Baby (Female) - 1997 - Killed.

Lansana, Baidu (Female) age 38 - 1993 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced.

Lansana, Edward (Male) - 1996 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Lansana, Fatmata (Female) age 13 - Displaced.

Lansana, Foday (Male) age 25 - 1996 in Niawa Lenga, Bo District - Extorted. Assaulted.

Lansana, Fodie (Male) age 55 - 1993 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Lansana, Hawa (Female) age 4 - 1991 in Nongowa, Kenema - Abducted and detained.

Lansana, Hawa (Female) age 22 - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed.

Lansana, Iye (Female) age 15 - 1996 in Badjia, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Lansana, James (Male) - 1998 - Killed.

Lansana, James (Male) age 58 - 1991 in Bagbo, Bo District - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour.

Lansana, Jaunua (Male) age 65 - 1992 - Displaced. Abducted. Assaulted and tortured.

Lansana, Jenneh (Female) age 52 - Property looted.

Lansana, Jiah Federic (Male) age 49 - Abducted. Assaulted and tortured.

Lansana, John (Male) age 23 - 1997 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Property looted. Assaulted and stripped.

Lansana, Kamoh (Male) - 1994 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced.

Lansana, Keni (Male) - 1991 in Kagboro, Moyamba - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Lansana, Mariama (Female) age 48 - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Property destroyed.

Lansana, Massa (Female) - 1999 in Luawa, Kailahun - Killed.

Lansana, Mattia (Male) - Forced to labour.

Lansana, Maulemu (Male) age 32 - 1993 in Small Bo, Kenema - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Abducted. Assaulted.

Lansana, Mimmoh (Male) age 44 - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted.

Lansana, Mohamed (Male) age 37 - 1993 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced.

Lansana, Momoh (Male) - 1993 in Peje, Pujehun - Killed.

Lansana, Momoh (Male) - 1994 in Nongowa, Kenema - Abducted. Assaulted and tortured. Killed.

Lansana, Morie (Male) - Killed.

Lansana, Mualemu (Male) - 1991 in Niawa, Kenema - Assaulted.

Lansana, Saidu (Male) age 62 - 1992 in Malegohun, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Lansana, Samuel (Male) age 42 - 1998 in Gaura, Kenema - Property destroyed.

Lansana, Sao (Male) - 1993 - Property destroyed. Killed.

Lansana, Soh (Male) - Abducted and detained.

Lansana, Swalay (Female) - Property destroyed.

Lansana, Thomas (Male) - 1996 - Abducted.

Lansana, Tity (Female) - 1996 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Property looted and destroyed.

Lansana, Tommy (Male) - 1994 in Malen, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.

Lansana, Vandy (Male) - 1991 in Bonthe - Killed.

Lansana, Yatta (Female) - Killed.

Lansana Jobbie, Thomas (Male) age 46 - 1995 in Bagruwa, Moyamba - Forced to labour.

Lansanwo, Gbogbowai (Male) age 42 - 1994 in Yawei, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted. Killed.

Lappia, Amie (Female) age 19 - 1995 - Displaced.

Lappia, Diema (Male) age 45 - 1994 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Lappia, Jusu (Male) - 1995 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Property looted. Assaulted. Killed.

Lappia, Thomas (Male) age 51 - 1995 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed.

Larbey, Mariama Marie Sannoh (Female) age 49 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Lassayo, Henry D.B. (Male) age 60 - 1995 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Lassayo, Sandy (Male) - 1995 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Killed.

Lassayo, Tenneh (Female) age 45 - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Property destroyed.

Lassie, Lamin (Male) - 1995 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Killed.

Lassie, Safula (Female) age 49 - 1994 in Simbaru, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed.

Lassie, Seidia (Female) age 79 - 1997 in Simbaru, Kenema - Displaced and property looted.

Lassiz, Anthony (Male) age 35 - Displaced and extorted.

Lavalie, Agnes (Female) age 48 - 1996 in Bo District - Displaced and property looted.

Lavalie, Dora (Female) - 1995 - Abducted.

Lavalie, Emmanuel (Male) age 56 - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Lavalie, Fatmata (Female) age 34 - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced and property looted.

Lavalie, Gardie (Female) age 14 - 1994 - Displaced.

Lavalie, Gborie (Male) - 1994 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced. Killed.

Lavalie, Joe (Male) - 1994 - Killed.

Lavalie, John (Male) - 1995 in Bagruwa, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Lavalie, Kai (Male) age 33 - 1995 - Detained. Killed.

Lavalie, Komba (Male) age 39 - 1995 - Displaced. Abducted.

Lavalie, Momba (Male) - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Property destroyed.

Lavalie, Musa (Male) - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Lavalie, Musu (Female) - 1994 - Killed.
 Lavalie, Neima (Female) - 1994 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced and extorted. Assaulted.
 Lavalie, Sundiama (Male) age 20 - 1999 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Displaced and extorted. Assaulted.
 Lavalie, Yoyui (Female) age 25 - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced.
 Lawonday, Farah (Male) - Assaulted. Killed.
 Leaf, Brima (Male) - 1993 in Kissi Tongi, Kailahun - Killed.
 Lebbie, Adama (Female) - 1994 in Lugbu, Bo District - Assaulted. Killed.
 Lebbie, Aiah (Male) age 21 - 1996 - Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Lebbie, Alfred (Male) age 48 - 1995 in Kowa, Moyamba - Tortured. Killed.
 Lebbie, Amie (Female) - 1996 in Kori, Moyamba - Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Lebbie, Amodu (Male) - 1994 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced. Assaulted. Killed.
 Lebbie, Brima (Male) - 1994 in Lugbu, Bo District - Killed.
 Lebbie, Emmanuel (Male) - 1995 in Kowa, Moyamba - Property looted and destroyed.
 Lebbie, Fea (Female) age 39 - 1999 - Displaced.
 Lebbie, Finda (Female) age 13 - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured.
 Lebbie, Finda (Female) age 15 - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Lebbie, Florence (Female) age 33 - 1993 in Baoma, Bo District - Property destroyed.
 Lebbie, Hawa (Female) - 1994 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour. Killed.
 Lebbie, Joe (Male) - 1994 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted.
 Lebbie, Junisa (Male) - 1997 in Timdel, Moyamba - Property destroyed.
 Lebbie, Kona (Female) age 37 - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Lebbie, Laghenyor (Male) - Killed.
 Lebbie, Mandi (Female) - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Lebbie, Mark (Male) age 36 - 1997 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and stripped. Killed.
 Lebbie, Mary (Female) age 35 - 1993 in Komboya, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Lebbie, Mohamed (Male) - 1995 - Killed.
 Lebbie, Moses (Male) - 1995 in Niawa Lenga, Bo District - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Lebbie, Moses (Male) age 44 - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Lebbie, Nieru (Male) - 1997 in Kagboro, Moyamba - Displaced.
 Lebbie, Robert (Male) - 1996 in Kori, Moyamba - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Lebbie, Saffa (Male) - 1994 in Lugbu, Bo District - Killed.
 Lebbie, Sahr (Male) age 41 - 1992 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Lebbie, Sahr (Male) age 60 - 1998 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced and property looted. Abducted. Assaulted and tortured.
 Lebbie, Sahr (Male) age 60 - 1998 - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Lebbie, Samu (Male) age 17 - 1994 in Lugbu, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Lebbie, Samuel (Male) - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured. Killed.
 Lebbie, Shar (Male) - 1998 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Stripped and limb amputated.
 Lebbie, Sia (Female) - 1999 in Safroko Limba, Bombali - Displaced.
 Lebbie, Sia (Female) age 34 - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Lebbie, Solomon (Male) age 41 - 1995 in Kpanda Kemo, Bonthe - Displaced, extorted and property looted.
 Lebbie, Sulaiman (Male) - 1993 in Bagbo, Bo District - Killed.
 Lebbie, Tamba (Male) age 45 - 1992 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Lebbie, Thomas (Male) age 49 - 1995 in Kamajei, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.
 Lebbie, Wusein (Male) - 1995 in Niawa Lenga, Bo District - Killed.
 Lebbie, Yei (Female) - 1999 - Abducted. Assaulted.
 Legg, James (Male) - Abducted.
 Lehdoe, Brima (Male) - 1991 in Peje Bongre, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Lehleh, Manu (Male) age 72 - 1995 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Leigh, Fayah (Male) - 1992 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced.

Lelie, Musu (Female) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Lengor, Jenneh (Female) - 1994 in Tikonko, Bo District - Killed.
 Lengore, Baby (Female) - 1992 in Jawie, Kailahun - Abducted and detained.
 Lessie, Brima Wat (Male) - 1998 - Killed.
 Lewis, Augustine (Male) - 1999 - Killed.
 Lewis, Betty (Female) - 1998 in Bonthe - Displaced.
 Lewis, Betty (Female) - 1996 in Badjia, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Lewis, Donald (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.
 Lewis, Erric (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.
 Lewis, Isaac (Male) - 1999 - Extorted and property looted. Detained.
 Lewis, Mariatu (Female) age 26 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted.
 Lewis, Ousman (Male) age 90 - 1997 in Timdel, Moyamba - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained.
 Lewis, Subu (Female) - Property looted.
 Lewis, Thomas (Male) age 40 - 1997 in Imperi, Bonthe - Extorted and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Lewis, Victoria (Female) age 37 - 1999 - Displaced, extorted and property looted.
 Lewis, Yakuba (Male) - 1995 in Timdel, Moyamba - Abducted.
 Lewis, Yakuba (Male) - 1997 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Abducted and detained.
 Lewis, Yanqube (Male) - 1997 in Timdel, Moyamba - Abducted and detained.
 Liggeh, Jonathan (Male) age 42 - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Limba, Hassan (Male) - 1997 in Niawa, Kenema - Abducted. Assaulted. Killed.
 Limbo, Kabba (Male) - 1999 in Mambolo, Kambia - Killed.
 Lisah, Bockarie (Male) age 54 - 1994 in Niawa, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted.
 Lissa, Charles (Male) - 1995 in Sogbini, Bonthe - Abducted.
 Lissa, Hannah (Female) age 24 - 1997 in Moyamba - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.
 Lissa, Jacob (Male) - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed.
 Lissa, Lahai (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.
 Lissah, Daniel (Male) age 51 - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Tortured.
 Lofty, Tamba (Male) - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Loko, Momoh (Male) - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Killed.
 Lombe, William (Male) age 80 - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Looper, Andrew (Male) age 22 - 1995 - Property looted. Assaulted and limb amputated.
 Lorlon, Tamba (Male) - 2000 in Lei, Kono - Tortured.
 Lossie, Alhaji (Male) - 1998 in Jawie, Kailahun - Killed.
 Loue, Agnes (Female) age 47 - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Loue, Satta (Female) - Killed.
 Loya, Bai (Male) - Limb amputated.
 Lugbu, Momoh (Male) - 1995 - Displaced.
 Lukalay, Adama (Female) age 53 - 1991 in Langorama, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted.
 Luke, Jabaty (Male) age 51 - 1996 in Badjia, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.
 Lukulay, Abdul (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted.
 Lukulay, Abdulai (Male) - Displaced.
 Lukulay, Alhaji (Male) - 1991 - Displaced.
 Lukulay, Allieu (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted.
 Lukulay, Aruna (Male) age 6 - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Lukulay, Baidu (Female) age 26 - 1994 in Koya, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted. Killed.
 Lukulay, Bintu (Female) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Property looted.
 Lukulay, Bockarie (Male) age 30 - 1996 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced.
 Lukulay, Jeneba (Female) age 35 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted.
 Lukulay, Karmoh (Male) age 50 - 1991 - Displaced and property looted.
 Lukulay, Manuwah (Male) age 31 - 1993 in Niawa, Kenema - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Lukulay, Momoh (Male) age 29 - 1997 - Killed.

Lukulay, Moriba (Male) age 28 - Killed.

Lukulay, Musa (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted.

Lukulay, Mustapha (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted.

Lukulay, Sheku (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Property looted.

Lukulay, Sowe (Female) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Property looted.

Luleh, Saffa (Male) age 19 - 1991 - Abducted. Assaulted. Killed.

Luleh, Sallay (Female) age 25 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Lumbeh, Patrick (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Abducted.

Lumeh, Momoh (Male) - 1999 in Baoma, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Luseni, Abu (Male) - 1997 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Extorted. Tortured.

Luseni, Baindu (Female) - 1994 in Kakua, Bo District - Killed.

Luseni, Bockarie (Male) - 1993 in Bagbo, Bo District - Killed.

Luseni, Jeneba (Female) - 1992 in Tikonko, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Luseni, Jiah (Male) age 79 - 1991 in Mandu, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Luseni, John (Male) - 2000 in Jong, Bonthe - Property looted and destroyed.

Luseni, Mariama (Female) - 1994 - Displaced.

Luseni, Marian (Female) age 26 - 1998 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced.

Luseni, Matthew (Male) age 29 - 1994 - Displaced.

Luseni, Moray (Male) age 38 - 1998 in Nimikoro, Kono - Killed.

Luseni, Mustapha (Male) - 1994 in Komboya, Bo District - Assaulted.

Luseni, Patrick (Male) age 59 - 1994 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Luseni, Tejan (Male) age 34 - 1994 in Komboya, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

M, Brima (Male) - 1998 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Maa Kai, Satta (Female) - 1997 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Displaced.

Maada, Sevali (Male) - 1994 in Tikonko, Bo District - Killed.

Maah, Majoe Foday (Male) - 1995 in Dema, Bonthe - Killed.

Maama, A.B. (Male) - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Mabey, Ellie (Male) age 17 - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Mabina, Kain (Male) - 1996 in Kwamebai Krim, Bonthe - Killed.

Mabinty, Kamanda (Male) - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced. Assaulted.

Mabuyeh, Aiah (Male) - 1998 in Fiama, Kono - Displaced.

Mabuyeh, Jeneba (Female) - 1998 in Fiama, Kono - Displaced.

Mabuyeh, Sahr (Male) - 1998 in Fiama, Kono - Limb amputated.

Mabuyeh, Tamba (Male) age 76 - 1998 in Fiama, Kono - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted.

Macakui, Keine (Male) - 1997 - Killed.

Macanaky, Lusene (Male) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Macarthy, J.P. (Male) - Displaced.

Macarthy, Victor (Male) age 24 - 1995 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Macarthy, Yei (Female) - Displaced. Assaulted.

Macauley, Emmah (Female) - 1997 - Killed.

Macauley, Hajah (Female) age 45 - 1997 in Western Area - Property looted.

Macauley, Millicent (Female) age 21 - 1999 in Western Area - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Macauley, Sheku (Male) - 1997 in Mandu, Kailahun - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted and tortured.

Macauley, Sheku (Male) - 1997 in Mandu, Kailahun - Killed.

Macavoray, Isatu (Female) - 1995 in Baoma, Bo District - Displaced.

Macavoray, Momoh (Male) - 1995 in Kakua, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.

Macfoi, Juana (Male) age 18 - 1991 - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Madde, Boi (Female) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Property destroyed.

Maddui, Amara (Male) - 1996 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Property destroyed.

Madebo, Sahr (Male) age 65 - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and

tortured.

Madigba, Sallay (Female) - 1994 in Luawa, Kailahun - Killed.
Maferren, Isatu (Female) - 2000 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced. Tortured.
Mafinda, Aiah Amadu (Male) age 41 - 1998 - Displaced. Assaulted.
Mafinda, Finda (Female) age 12 - 1998 in Kakua, Bo District - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
Mafinda, Mabel (Female) age 17 - 1998 - Displaced. Assaulted.
Mafindor, Finda (Female) - Displaced. Killed.
Magao, Lahai (Male) - 1995 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
Magbindi, Kadie (Female) - 1995 - Killed.
Magbity, Joseph (Male) age 24 - 1998 in Western Area - Assaulted.
Magbo, Patrick (Male) - 1994 in Malegohun, Kenema - Displaced. Killed.
Magona, Alhaji (Male) - 1993 in Mandu, Kailahun - Assaulted.
Magona, Amie (Female) - Assaulted.
Magona, Ella (Female) age 31 - 1993 in Dodo, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
Magona, Haja Naa (Female) age 47 - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Tortured.
Magona, Momoh (Male) age 19 - Assaulted. Killed.
Mahalor, Ernest (Male) - 1991 in Kwamebai Krim, Bonthe - Property looted and destroyed. Killed.
Mahoi, Bampia (Male) age 22 - 1999 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Displaced and property destroyed. Tortured.
Mahoi, Haji (Male) - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Assaulted.
Mahoi, Ousman (Male) age 15 - 1998 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Killed.
Mahular-Farma, Earnest B. (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Killed.
Mahulo, Earnest (Male) - Killed.
Maiah, Nancy (Female) age 19 - 1995 in Kamajei, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted.
Maiguha, Munda (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Property destroyed. Assaulted.
Maillah, Nasoko (Female) age 38 - 1994 in Konike Barina, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
Majinda, Sosoka (Female) age 31 - Abducted and detained.
Makah, Sinkarie (Female) age 17 - 2000 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
Malal, Fenti (Male) age 64 - 1994 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Property looted. Abducted. Tortured. Killed.
Maleh, Sasay (Male) - 1993 in Tonkolili - Killed.
Malen, Sahn (Male) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Killed.
Maleu, Tommy (Male) - Displaced. Tortured.
Malgie, Nahen (Female) - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Abducted.
Mallah, Alhaji (Male) - 1994 in Gorama Kono, Kono - Killed.
Mallah, Bockarie (Male) age 39 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced.
Mallah, Brima (Male) - 1991 in Pujehun - Killed.
Mallah, Jama (Male) age 30 - 1991 in Dia, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.
Mallah, Lahai (Male) - 1994 in Gorama Kono, Kono - Killed.
Mallah, Lamin (Male) age 70 - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and stripped.
Mallah, Mariama (Female) - 1994 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced.
Mallah, Mohamed (Male) age 32 - 1991 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced. Forced to labour.
Mallah, Musu (Female) age 25 - 1998 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Assaulted.
Mallah, Nyamoh (Female) age 40 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced.
Mallah, Saffa (Male) - 1994 in Gorama Kono, Kono - Killed.
Mallo-Yernie, Joseph (Male) age 42 - Extorted. Abducted and detained.
Mamadu, Joe (Male) age 63 - 1995 in Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
Mamakon, Tauhyon (Female) age 24 - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced.
Mambu, Amie (Female) age 47 - 1992 in Peje West, Kailahun - Displaced and property destroyed.
Mambu, Betty (Female) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed.
Mambu, Brima (Male) - 1992 in Mandu, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.
Mambu, John (Male) - 1995 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Killed.
Mambu, Keifa (Male) - 1993 in Bagbo, Bo District - Displaced and property looted.
Mambu, L (Male) - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
Mambu, Mohamed (Male) - 1992 in Peje West, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Killed.
Mambu, Patrick (Male) age 40 - 1995 in Bagbe, Bo District - Killed.

Mambu, Sergbe (Male) - Tortured.

Mambu, Tamba (Male) age 50 - 1998 in Soa, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Mambu, Vanjo (Male) age 27 - 1996 in Kakua, Bo District - Displaced. Assaulted.

Mami, Forwai (Male) age 24 - 1991 in Panga Krim, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed.

Mamie, Abu (Male) - 1997 in Bonthe - Abducted.

Mamie, Amidu (Male) - 1997 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Mammah, Lawrence (Male) age 66 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.

Mammy, Baidu (Female) age 43 - 1999 in Western Area - Extorted and property destroyed. Assaulted.

Mammy, Lansana (Male) age 48 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Assaulted.

Mammy, Peter (Male) age 48 - 1997 in Kakua, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Stripped.

Manah, Konta (Male) age 1 - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Abducted.

Manasaray, Abdulai (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Manasaray, Musa (Male) age 66 - 1998 in Kakua, Bo District - Property looted and destroyed.

Manasaray, Sundufu (Male) - Displaced and extorted. Assaulted.

Manbu, Haja Massa (Female) age 26 - 1993 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced.

Mandeh, Amos (Male) age 32 - 1994 in Bagbe, Bo District - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Mando, David (Male) age 39 - 1993 in Mano Sakrim, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted and stripped.

Mando, Lansana (Male) - 1996 in Kwamebai Krim, Bonthe - Killed.

Mando, Philip (Male) age 28 - 1993 in Mano Sakrim, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted.

Mando, Saidu (Male) - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Property destroyed. Killed.

Mando, Vandii (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Tortured. Killed.

Manga, Ansumana (Male) - 1997 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Manga, Henry (Male) - 1993 in Malegohun, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Manga, Jestina (Female) - 1993 in Malegohun, Kenema - Abducted.

Manga, Julius (Male) age 71 - 1994 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Mangebu, Iye (Female) - 1994 in Tikonko, Bo District - Assaulted and tortured. Killed.

Mani, Mustapha (Male) - 1991 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Killed.

Mani, Sumsiama (Male) age 85 - Killed.

Mani, Tamba (Male) - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Manika, Abu (Male) - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed.

Mankie, Foday (Male) - 1999 - Forced to labour. Killed.

Mankoreh, Brima (Male) - Tortured.

Mannah, Denis (Male) - Detained.

Mannah, Henry (Male) - 1993 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Abducted and detained.

Mannah, Kadie (Female) - Forced to labour.

Mannah, Lansana (Male) age 23 - 1996 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Assaulted, tortured and stripped.

Manneh, Lahai (Male) - 1997 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Killed.

Mano, Feamusu (Female) age 40 - 1998 in Gbane, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Mansaray, Abdul Raman (Male) - 1996 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Killed.

Mansaray, Abibatu (Female) age 25 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed.

Mansaray, Abu (Male) - Property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Abu (Male) age 5 - 1997 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Abu (Male) age 23 - 1993 in Tunkia, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed.

Mansaray, Abu Bakarr (Male) - 1998 in Baoma, Bo District - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Abducted and detained.

Mansaray, Adama (Female) - 1999 in Dasse, Moyamba - Displaced and extorted.

Mansaray, Adama (Female) - 1998 in Safroko Limba, Bombali - Displaced.

Mansaray, Adama (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Abducted and detained.

Mansaray, Adama (Female) age 29 - 1996 in Buya Romende, Port Loko - Displaced.

Mansaray, Adikalie (Male) age 45 - 1998 in Tambakka, Bombali - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted.

Mansaray, Adu (Male) - Property looted and destroyed.

Mansaray, Alhaji (Male) - Displaced.

Mansaray, Alhaji (Male) age 39 - 1994 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.

Mansaray, Alhaji Abu (Male) age 22 - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Killed.

Mansaray, Alhaji Alpha (Male) age 75 - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Mansaray, Alhaji Alpha Amadu (Male) age 69 - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Mansaray, Alhaji Amadu (Male) - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Property looted.

Mansaray, Alhaji Mohamed (Male) age 9 - 1991 - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour.

Mansaray, Alhaji Salloh (Male) - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Property looted.

Mansaray, Alhassan (Male) age 25 - 1998 in Tinkatupa Maka Saffoko, Port Loko - Extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.

Mansaray, Alie (Male) - 1998 in Bombali - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and limb amputated. Killed.

Mansaray, Alie (Male) - 1999 in Safroko Limba, Bombali - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Alilic (Male) age 47 - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Abducted and detained. Stripped.

Mansaray, Alimamy (Male) - 1994 in Nimikoro, Kono - Killed.

Mansaray, Alimamy (Male) age 22 - 1999 in Western Area - Assaulted.

Mansaray, Alimamy (Male) age 57 - 1999 in Dembelia Sinkunia, Koinadugu - Property looted and destroyed.

Mansaray, Alpha (Male) - 1998 - Killed.

Mansaray, Alphajor (Male) - 1999 in Kassunko, Koinadugu - Tortured. Killed.

Mansaray, Alusine (Male) - 2000 in Small Bo, Kenema - Property looted and destroyed.

Mansaray, Alusine (Male) age 12 - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Mansaray, Alusine (Male) age 43 - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted and tortured.

Mansaray, Alusine (Male) age 55 - 1999 in Bumpeh, Moyamba - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Mansaray, Amadu (Male) - 1998 in Wara-Wara Bafodia, Koinadugu - Property destroyed. Forced to labour. Limb amputated.

Mansaray, Amadu (Male) - 1998 in Bombali - Killed.

Mansaray, Amadu (Male) - 1993 - Property looted. Tortured.

Mansaray, Amadu (Male) age 40 - 1998 in Koya, Port Loko - Displaced and extorted. Tortured.

Mansaray, Amadu (Male) age 48 - 1999 - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Amara (Male) - 1996 - Abducted and detained.

Mansaray, Amara (Male) age 54 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed.

Mansaray, Amara (Male) age 59 - 1999 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Displaced.

Mansaray, Amidu (Male) - 1997 - Limb amputated.

Mansaray, Amidu (Male) age 23 - 1999 in Wara-Wara Bafodia, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and stripped.

Mansaray, Amie (Female) - Property looted. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Amie (Female) age 31 - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Aminata (Female) age 25 - 1995 in Marampa, Port Loko - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Mansaray, Aminata (Female) age 58 - 1999 in Follosaba Dembelia, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Mansaray, Arafan (Male) age 30 - 1998 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Babakku (Male) - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Mansaray, Baidu (Female) age 57 - 1998 - Displaced. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Balia (Male) age 38 - 1994 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained.

Mansaray, Balla (Male) - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed.

Mansaray, Balla (Male) - 1998 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Mansaray, Balla (Male) age 23 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Mansaray, Ballansama (Male) age 65 - 1998 - Property destroyed. Assaulted and tortured.

Mansaray, Bangalie (Male) age 37 - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Mansaray, Bassie (Male) - 1999 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Killed.

Mansaray, Bintu (Female) - 1991 - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Mansaray, Bockarie (Male) - 1994 in Pujehun - Killed.

Mansaray, Bockarie (Male) - Killed.

Mansaray, Bockarie (Male) - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted. Killed.

Mansaray, Bockarie (Male) - 1996 in Nongowa, Kenema - Killed.

Mansaray, Bockarie (Male) age 65 - Killed.

Mansaray, Borbor (Male) - 1995 - Forced to labour.

Mansaray, Brima (Male) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Killed.

Mansaray, Brima (Male) - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Forced to labour. Killed.

Mansaray, Brima (Male) - 1994 - Abducted and detained.

Mansaray, Brima (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Killed.

Mansaray, Brima (Male) - 2000 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Abducted. Killed.

Mansaray, Brima (Male) - 1991 in Bumpheh, Bo District - Property looted. Killed.

Mansaray, Brima (Male) - 1991 in Small Bo, Kenema - Killed.

Mansaray, Brima (Male) age 57 - 1994 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted.

Mansaray, Brima-Alhaji (Male) - 2000 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Killed.

Mansaray, Cecilia (Female) - 1995 in Bum, Bonthe - Abducted and detained.

Mansaray, Danda (Male) age 34 - Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.

Mansaray, Dauda (Male) age 55 - 1995 in Bagbe, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Mansaray, David (Male) age 38 - 1998 in Kassunko, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Fasalie (Male) - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Fatmata (Female) - Abducted and detained.

Mansaray, Fatmata (Female) - Killed.

Mansaray, Fatmata (Female) - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Mansaray, Fatmata (Female) age 12 - 1998 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Mansaray, Fatmata (Female) age 15 - 1992 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced.

Mansaray, Fatmata (Female) age 18 - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Abducted and detained.

Mansaray, Fatmata (Female) age 33 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Mansaray, Fatu (Female) age 35 - 1995 in Bumpheh, Moyamba - Killed.

Mansaray, Fatu Yeama (Female) age 44 - 1999 - Property looted. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Feckha (Male) - 1995 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed. Killed.

Mansaray, Ferenkeh (Male) - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Killed.

Mansaray, Ferenkye (Male) age 36 - Property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Finah (Female) - Killed.

Mansaray, Finnah (Female) age 50 - 1998 in Koinadugu - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Foday (Male) - 1998 - Killed.

Mansaray, Foday (Male) - Displaced. Tortured.

Mansaray, Foday (Male) - Detained.

Mansaray, Foday (Male) age 40 - 1998 in Tambakka, Bombali - Displaced.

Mansaray, Foday (Male) age 43 - 1998 in Neya, Koinadugu - Forced to labour.

Mansaray, Foday (Male) age 46 - 1999 in Biriwa, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Mansaray, Forah (Male) - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Forced to labour.

Mansaray, Gasimu (Male) age 41 - 2000 in Magbema, Kambia - Extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Mansaray, Gladys (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Property looted and destroyed.

Mansaray, Habibu (Male) age 12 - 1999 - Assaulted and tortured.

Mansaray, Haja (Female) - Displaced.

Mansaray, Haja Jakka (Female) - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Mansaray, Hassan (Male) age 16 - 2000 in Wara-Wara Bafodia, Koinadugu - Forced to labour.

Mansaray, Hassan (Male) age 42 - 1995 in Kongbora, Moyamba - Property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Mansaray, Hassana (Male) - 1994 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Hawa (Female) - Displaced.

Mansaray, Hawa (Female) - Displaced. Abducted. Killed.

Mansaray, Hawa (Female) age 26 - 1997 - Displaced and property looted. Abducted.

Mansaray, Hawa (Female) age 29 - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Mansaray, Hawanaatu (Female) - 1999 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Displaced. Killed.

Mansaray, Ibrahim (Male) - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Mansaray, Ibrahim (Male) age 14 - 1998 in Baoma, Bo District - Displaced. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Ibrahim (Male) age 29 - 1994 in Tane, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Mansaray, Ibrahim (Male) age 52 - 1995 in Bumpeh, Moyamba - Displaced.

Mansaray, Idrissa (Male) - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed.

Mansaray, Idrissa (Male) age 34 - 1995 in Kori, Moyamba - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Mansaray, Isata (Female) age 18 - 1992 - Displaced. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Isatu (Female) - 1999 - Displaced.

Mansaray, Isatu (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.

Mansaray, Isatu (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Property looted and destroyed.

Mansaray, Issa (Male) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Mansaray, J.R. Samai (Male) - 1994 - Killed.

Mansaray, Janet (Female) age 40 - 1995 in Bum, Bonthe - Displaced and property destroyed.

Mansaray, Jebbeh (Female) - 1992 - Extorted and property looted. Killed.

Mansaray, Jebbeh (Female) age 35 - 1993 in Sielenga, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Mansaray, Jeneba (Female) age 15 - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Killed.

Mansaray, Jeneba (Female) age 22 - 1991 - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Mansaray, Jeneba (Female) age 35 - 1991 in Langorama, Kenema - Displaced and property looted.

Mansaray, Jeneba (Female) age 50 - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed.

Mansaray, Jeneba (Female) age 50 - 1998 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Property looted and destroyed.

Mansaray, Jeneh (Female) age 37 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted.

Mansaray, Jimmy (Male) age 9 - 1998 in Fiam, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Mansaray, John (Male) - 1995 in Safroko Limba, Bombali - Killed.

Mansaray, John (Male) - 1998 in Bombali - Killed.

Mansaray, John (Male) - 1997 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Mansaray, John (Male) - 1997 in Samu, Kambia - Property destroyed. Assaulted.

Mansaray, John (Male) age 20 - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.

Mansaray, John (Male) age 60 - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Joseph (Male) age 42 - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Joseph (Male) age 45 - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.

Mansaray, Junu (Male) - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Killed.

Mansaray, Kaday (Female) - 1998 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Killed.

Mansaray, Kadiatu (Female) - 2000 in Wara-Wara Bafodia, Koinadugu - Forced to labour.

Mansaray, Kadiatu (Female) - Displaced.

Mansaray, Kadiatu (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Mansaray, Kadiatu (Female) - 1997 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Abducted and detained.

Mansaray, Kadiatu (Female) age 13 - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Kadiatu (Female) age 18 - 2000 in Kassunko, Koinadugu - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Mansaray, Kadiatu (Female) age 38 - 1998 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed.

Mansaray, Kadie (Female) - 1994 in Kenema - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Mansaray, Kadie (Female) age 65 - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Killed.

Mansaray, Kallie (Male) - 1998 in Neini, Koinadugu - Forced to labour.

Mansaray, Kallie (Male) age 57 - 2000 in Wara-Wara Bafodia, Koinadugu - Property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Mansaray, Kamadou (Male) age 28 - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed.

Mansaray, Karainkay (Male) - 1998 in Koinadugu - Displaced.

Mansaray, Karifa (Male) age 20 - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Karmokoh (Male) - 1998 in Tambakka, Bombali - Killed.

Mansaray, Katty (Female) - 1998 in Wara-Wara Bafodia, Koinadugu - Forced to labour.

Mansaray, Keifala (Male) - 1994 - Abducted and detained.

Mansaray, Kekulah (Male) age 45 - 1994 in Kakua, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed. Tortured.

Mansaray, Kolleh (Male) age 75 - 2000 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Property destroyed.

Mansaray, Kruto (Female) age 15 - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Killed.

Mansaray, Kula (Female) - 1991 - Extorted.

Mansaray, Kumba (Female) - Killed.

Mansaray, Kutta (Male) age 5 - 2000 in Wara-Wara Bafodia, Koinadugu - Assaulted.

Mansaray, Kwfai (Female) age 41 - 1998 in Fiama, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Mansaray, Lahai (Male) - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Property looted. Killed.

Mansaray, Lamin (Male) age 49 - 1999 in Western Area - Assaulted.

Mansaray, Limina (Male) age 41 - 1994 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Extorted and property destroyed. Detained. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Lovetta (Female) age 35 - 1999 in Western Area - Extorted.

Mansaray, Lusaine (Male) age 57 - 1999 in Magbema, Kambia - Extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.

Mansaray, Mabinty (Female) - 1994 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Displaced.

Mansaray, Mabinty (Female) age 33 - 1999 in Marampa, Port Loko - Property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Mansaray, Mahmoud (Male) age 35 - 1999 in Biriwa, Bombali - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Mahmoud (Male) age 41 - 1999 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Property destroyed. Tortured and limb amputated.

Mansaray, Mallia (Female) - 1991 in Nongowa, Kenema - Killed.

Mansaray, Manso (Male) - 1999 in Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili - Tortured.

Mansaray, Marco (Male) - Killed.

Mansaray, Margaret (Female) age 42 - 1999 in Western Area - Tortured.

Mansaray, Mariama (Female) - 2000 in Tonkolili - Abducted and detained.

Mansaray, Mariama (Female) - 1993 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced and property looted.

Mansaray, Mariama (Female) age 23 - 1995 in Bagbe, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Mariama (Female) age 26 - 1991 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Mansaray, Mariama (Female) age 35 - 1993 in Barri, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Mariama (Female) age 36 - 1998 in Konike Sande, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted.

Mansaray, Mariama (Female) age 42 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted.

Mansaray, Marie (Female) - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Marie (Female) age 41 - 1999 in Wara-Wara Bafodia, Koinadugu - Forced to labour.

Mansaray, Marie (Female) age 69 - 1999 - Extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Mansaray, Mary (Female) age 18 - 1997 in Western Area - Displaced.

Mansaray, Mary (Female) age 43 - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Displaced and property destroyed.

Mansaray, Maseray (Female) - 1995 - Displaced.

Mansaray, Massa (Female) - 1993 in Tunkia, Kenema - Property destroyed. Killed.

Mansaray, Massah (Female) - Displaced. Killed.

Mansaray, Massah (Female) age 28 - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Mansaray, Massah (Female) age 36 - 1993 in Small Bo, Kenema - Displaced.

Mansaray, Massah (Female) age 45 - 1993 in Koya, Kenema - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour.

Mansaray, Mbedu - Abducted and detained.

Mansaray, Memorie (Male) - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Modie (Male) - 2000 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Property looted. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Mansaray, Mohamed (Male) - 1998 - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Mohamed (Male) - 2000 - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Mohamed (Male) - Tortured. Killed.

Mansaray, Mohamed (Male) - Killed.

Mansaray, Mohamed (Male) - 1994 - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained.

Mansaray, Mohamed (Male) - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Mansaray, Mohamed (Male) age 14 - 1998 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Mansaray, Mohamed (Male) age 22 - 1998 in Kailahun - Forced to labour.

Mansaray, Mohamed (Male) age 25 - 2000 in Kassunko, Koinadugu - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Mansaray, Mohamed (Male) age 41 - 1991 in Tunkia, Kenema - Displaced and property looted.

Mansaray, Mohamed (Male) age 42 - 1992 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed.

Mansaray, Mohamed (Male) age 55 - 1998 in Nimiyama, Kono - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Mansaray, Mohamed (Male) age 71 - 1991 in Gaura, Kenema - Displaced. Killed.

Mansaray, Momodu (Male) - 1998 in Wara-Wara Bafodia, Koinadugu - Forced to labour. Tortured.

Mansaray, Momodu (Male) age 40 - 1994 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Property destroyed.

Mansaray, Momoh (Male) - 1998 in Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Mansaray, Momoh (Male) - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Mansaray, Momoh (Male) - Forced to labour. Killed.

Mansaray, Momoh (Male) age 31 - 1991 - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Mansaray, Momoh (Male) age 48 - 1991 in Langorama, Kenema - Abducted. Killed.

Mansaray, Momoh (Male) age 55 - 1994 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Momorie (Male) - Property looted.

Mansaray, Moriba (Male) - 1995 in Bum, Bonthe - Abducted and detained.

Mansaray, Muctarr (Male) - 2000 in Wara-Wara Bafodia, Koinadugu - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured. Killed.

Mansaray, Musa (Male) age 38 - Displaced.

Mansaray, Musah (Female) - 1998 in Wara-Wara Bafodia, Koinadugu - Property looted.

Mansaray, Mustapha (Male) age 24 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Mansaray, Musu (Female) age 27 - 1999 in Malen, Pujehun - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed.

Mansaray, Nancy (Female) - Abducted and detained.

Mansaray, Ngadie (Female) - Abducted and detained.

Mansaray, Niara (Female) age 18 - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Killed.

Mansaray, Omaru (Male) - 1996 - Tortured. Killed.

Mansaray, Osama (Male) age 19 - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.

Mansaray, Ousman (Male) - 1999 in Marampa, Port Loko - Displaced.

Mansaray, Ousman (Male) - 1998 - Assaulted.

Mansaray, Ousman (Male) age 26 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and limb amputated.

Mansaray, Paul Abraham (Male) age 31 - 1997 in Western Area - Displaced, extorted and property looted.

Mansaray, Paul K (Male) age 34 - 1994 in Kakua, Bo District - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Mansaray, Ramatu (Female) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Mansaray, Rukeh (Female) - 1998 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Killed.

Mansaray, Saidu (Male) age 45 - 1999 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Mansaray, Saidu (Male) age 51 - 1998 in Wara-Wara Bafodia, Koinadugu - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Mansaray, Saio (Female) - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Mansaray, Saio (Male) age 62 - 1998 in Neini, Koinadugu - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Salfu (Male) age 30 - 2000 in Diang, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted. Tortured.

Mansaray, Salia (Male) - 1995 in Yawbeko, Bonthe - Property destroyed.

Mansaray, Salifu (Male) age 18 - 1999 in Wara-Wara Bafodia, Koinadugu - Property looted. Forced to

labour. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Salifu (Male) age 19 - 2000 in Kassunko, Koinadugu - Forced to labour.

Mansaray, Salifu (Male) age 45 - 1996 in Wara-Wara Bafodia, Koinadugu - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Mansaray, Salitu (Male) age 30 - 1998 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Sallay (Female) age 33 - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed.

Mansaray, Sallu (Male) age 17 - 1993 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Samai (Male) age 16 - 1994 - Displaced.

Mansaray, Samai (Male) age 50 - 1993 in Tunkia, Kenema - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Mansaray, Sanfa (Male) age 53 - 1995 - Property destroyed. Killed.

Mansaray, Santigie (Male) age 27 - 1998 in Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Sara (Female) - Killed.

Mansaray, Sarah (Female) - 1998 in Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili - Forced to labour.

Mansaray, Sarah (Female) - 1992 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Mansaray, Sarah (Female) - 1998 - Killed.

Mansaray, Sarah (Female) - 1998 in Bagbo, Bo District - Property looted. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Sarifu (Male) - 1998 in Komboya, Bo District - Abducted. Limb amputated.

Mansaray, Sheka (Male) - 1996 in Magbema, Kambia - Killed.

Mansaray, Sheka (Male) age 28 - 1999 in Loko Massama, Port Loko - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Sheku (Male) - 1999 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Mansaray, Sheku (Male) - Killed.

Mansaray, Sheku (Male) - 1991 - Extorted and property destroyed. Abducted.

Mansaray, Sheku (Male) age 16 - 1998 in Leibasgayahun, Bombali - Displaced.

Mansaray, Sheku (Male) age 32 - 2000 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Mansaray, Sheku (Male) age 38 - 1997 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Mansaray, Sheku (Male) age 40 - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced.

Mansaray, Sheku (Male) age 70 - 1998 in Koinadugu - Extorted and property destroyed. Abducted.

Mansaray, Shevuba (Male) age 12 - 1998 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Abducted and detained.

Mansaray, Sidia (Male) - 1995 in Sogbini, Bonthe - Killed.

Mansaray, Sidie (Male) age 30 - 1998 in Yakemo-Kpukumu Krim, Pujehun - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Sidikie (Male) age 51 - 1999 in Dembelia Sinkunia, Koinadugu - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Abducted.

Mansaray, Sidikie (Male) age 80 - 1998 - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Sima (Male) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Assaulted.

Mansaray, Sima (Male) age 68 - 2000 in Wara-Wara Bafodia, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained.

Mansaray, Sinakatta (Male) - 1991 in Kakua, Bo District - Killed.

Mansaray, Sinkina (Male) - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Forced to labour. Killed.

Mansaray, Sinoh (Female) - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Forced to labour. Killed.

Mansaray, Sirah (Female) - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Killed.

Mansaray, Sisnduko (Female) age 55 - 1998 in Dembelia Sinkunia, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed.

Mansaray, Sorie (Male) - 1994 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced. Killed.

Mansaray, Sorie (Male) - 1999 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Displaced. Killed.

Mansaray, Sorie (Male) age 19 - 2000 in Wara-Wara Bafodia, Koinadugu - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Mansaray, Sundufu (Male) age 30 - 1991 - Killed.

Mansaray, Tadi (Female) - 1998 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Abducted and detained.

Mansaray, Taiwo (Male) age 29 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted.

Mansaray, Tamba (Male) age 65 - 2000 in Soa, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Mansaray, Tejan (Male) - 1994 in Bagbo, Bo District - Extorted and property looted.

Mansaray, Thaima (Male) age 38 - 1998 in Maforki, Port Loko - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Mansaray, Theresa (Female) age 33 - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Tiange (Female) - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Mansaray, Tinda (Female) age 45 - 1999 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.

Mansaray, Tolo (Female) age 60 - 1991 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.

Mansaray, Vandi Ngebeh (Male) age 43 - 1995 in Peje Bongre, Kailahun - Displaced and property destroyed.

Mansaray, Watta (Female) age 2 - 1993 in Nomo, Kenema - Tortured.

Mansaray, Wuya (Female) age 16 - 1991 in Dia, Kailahun - Displaced. Detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Mansaray, Yaliba (Female) age 70 - 1998 in Baoma, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Mansaray, Yarie (Female) - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Killed.

Mansaray, Yayah (Male) - 1998 in Wara-Wara Bafodia, Koinadugu - Assaulted.

Mansaray, Yayah (Male) - Killed.

Mansaray, Yeabu (Female) age 32 - 1994 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Mansaray, Yeama (Male) - 1997 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Extorted. Assaulted and tortured.

Mansaray, Yirah (Male) - 2000 - Abducted.

Mansaray, Zainab (Female) age 33 - 1999 in Marampa, Port Loko - Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Manso, Katimu (Female) age 33 - 1997 in Bonthe - Displaced.

Manso, Kpana (Male) age 55 - 1997 in Bonthe - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.

Mansu, Olive (Female) age 42 - 1997 in Kono - Displaced and extorted. Abducted. Assaulted.

Manyeh, Aminata (Female) age 35 - 1995 in Baoma, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed.

Manyeh, Betty (Female) - 1996 in Wunde, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Manyeh, Bockarie (Male) age 31 - 1991 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Manyeh, Brima (Male) - 1992 in Dia, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and stripped.

Manyeh, Brima (Male) - 1993 in Wunde, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted.

Manyeh, Iye (Female) age 17 - 1994 - Displaced.

Maobia, Ernest (Male) - 1995 in Banta Mokele, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted.

Marah, Abu (Male) - 1997 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Marah, Aminata (Female) age 20 - 1998 in Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Marah, Baionsama (Male) - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Property looted. Forced to labour.

Marah, Balla (Male) age 55 - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Marah, Ballansama (Male) - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed.

Marah, Balua (Male) - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Forced to labour.

Marah, Bockarie (Male) - 1998 - Property destroyed.

Marah, Bundu (Male) age 55 - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Marah, Chernoh (Male) - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Marah, Dagbweh (Male) - 1998 in Diang, Koinadugu - Assaulted.

Marah, Damba (Male) - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed.

Marah, Demba (Male) age 59 - 1999 in Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Marah, Dusu (Female) - 1997 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Killed.

Marah, Famareh (Male) - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Forced to labour. Killed.

Marah, Fawuda (Male) - 1999 in Koinadugu - Displaced.

Marah, Ferenkeh (Male) - 1998 in Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili - Forced to labour.

Marah, Ferenkeh (Male) age 66 - 1999 in Diang, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Marah, Ferenkye (Male) age 56 - 1999 in Neini, Koinadugu - Displaced, extorted and property looted and

destroyed.

Marah, Finah (Female) - Abducted and detained.

Marah, Foray (Male) age 21 - 1999 in Diang, Koinadugu - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Marah, Hassana (Male) - 2000 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Marah, Hawa (Female) - 1998 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed.

Marah, Ibrahim (Male) - Extorted.

Marah, Ibrahim (Male) age 35 - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Extorted and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Marah, Kadiatu (Female) - Displaced.

Marah, Kadiatu (Female) - 1997 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Killed.

Marah, Kamara (Male) age 51 - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained.

Marah, Karimu (Male) - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Marah, Kekurah (Male) - Abducted and detained.

Marah, Konkoro (Male) age 38 - 1998 in Neini, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Marah, Kumba (Female) - Abducted and detained.

Marah, Lahai (Male) - 2000 in Tonkolili - Abducted and detained.

Marah, Lansana (Male) - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Marah, Lansana (Male) age 57 - 1998 in Masungbala, Kambia - Extorted.

Marah, Manteneh (Female) - 1998 in Koinadugu - Property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Marah, Masseh (Female) - 1998 in Follosaba Dembelia, Koinadugu - Forced to labour.

Marah, Mohamed (Male) - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Marah, Mohamed (Male) age 21 - 1999 in Neini, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Marah, Mohamed (Male) age 42 - 1999 in Tambakka, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Marah, Mohamed (Male) age 70 - Displaced and property looted.

Marah, Musa (Male) age 25 - 1998 - Extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Marah, Musu (Female) - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted.

Marah, Nyalay Konta (Male) - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Killed.

Marah, Saio (Male) age 46 - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Marah, Saio Masinah (Male) age 22 - 1998 - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Marah, Saio Morie (Male) - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Property destroyed.

Marah, Sameh (Male) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Marah, Samuel (Male) age 17 - 1992 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced. Killed.

Marah, Sheku (Male) - 1998 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Marah, Sheku (Male) age 28 - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Extorted and property looted. Forced to labour.

Marah, Sheku (Male) age 52 - 1998 in Neini, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Marah, Sirah (Female) - 1994 in Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Marah, Sonnoh (Female) - 2000 - Abducted.

Marah, Sorie (Male) - 2000 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Forced to labour and drugged. Assaulted and stripped.

Marah, Sorie (Male) age 6 - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Killed.

Marah, Sundu (Female) - Abducted and detained.

Marah, Sundu M. (Female) age 75 - 1998 in Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Marah, Tenneh (Female) age 42 - 2000 in Tonkolili - Extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Marah, Yakuba (Male) - 1998 in Koinadugu - Property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Marah, Yibah (Male) - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Marah, Yilah (Male) age 40 - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Killed.

MarcCarthy, Robert (Male) age 55 - 1995 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Abducted.

Mare, Tamba (Male) age 47 - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Margai, Karimu (Male) - 1992 in Peje West, Kailahun - Abducted and detained.
 Margai, Mustapha (Male) - 1994 in Wunde, Bo District - Assaulted.
 Margao, Musa (Male) - 1996 in Kakua, Bo District - Killed.
 Margena, Pelai (Male) - 1991 - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Marh, Manteneh (Female) - Assaulted.
 Mariama, Sheku (Male) - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Property looted. Abducted and detained.
 Mario, Fc (Male) - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Abducted and detained.
 Marju, Ansuma (Male) age 55 - 1996 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Marrah, Abu (Male) age 17 - 1998 in Western Area - Detained.
 Marrah, Amadu (Male) - Assaulted and limb amputated.
 Marrah, Bondu (Female) - 1998 - Abducted.
 Marrah, Fandaya (Male) - 1998 - Displaced.
 Marrah, Foday (Male) age 45 - 1998 in Neini, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Marrah, Foday (Male) age 48 - 1998 - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and limb amputated.
 Marrah, Isha (Female) age 5 - 1998 in Koinadugu - Displaced.
 Marrah, Kallie (Male) age 46 - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Marrah, Kewullay (Male) - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Property destroyed.
 Marrah, Lamin (Male) - 1998 in Western Area - Killed.
 Marrah, Mabinty (Female) - 1998 in Diang, Koinadugu - Limb amputated.
 Marrah, Mabudu (Male) - 1994 in Wunde, Bo District - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Marrah, Manseh (Male) - 1998 in Diang, Koinadugu - Killed.
 Marrah, Mohamed (Male) - 1999 in Timdel, Moyamba - Forced to labour. Forced to participate in an act of cannibalism.
 Marrah, Mohamed (Male) age 19 - 1998 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Displaced. Assaulted and limb amputated.
 Marrah, Morgboy (Male) - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Property destroyed.
 Marrah, Musa (Male) - 1998 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Stripped and limb amputated. Killed.
 Marrah, Musu (Female) age 29 - Killed.
 Marrah, Saidu (Male) age 20 - 2000 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Forced to labour.
 Marrah, Simeon (Male) age 55 - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Marrah, Sinkarie (Female) age 25 - 1998 - Displaced and extorted. Abducted. Assaulted.
 Marrah, Sundu (Female) age 46 - 1998 in Neya, Koinadugu - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Martyn, I.D. (Male) age 53 - 1998 in Western Area - Property destroyed.
 Masaquoi, Massa (Female) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Abducted.
 Masaquoi, Musa (Male) age 29 - 1993 in Barri, Pujehun - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Massa, Jaia (Male) age 47 - 1993 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Massah, Yea (Female) - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Killed.
 Massaley, Abdulai (Male) age 36 - 1998 in Kongbora, Moyamba - Displaced and extorted. Killed.
 Massaquoi, Abu (Male) age 20 - 1991 - Killed.
 Massaquoi, Abu (Male) age 48 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Massaquoi, Albert (Male) age 43 - 2000 in Tikonko, Bo District - Extorted. Abducted and detained.
 Massaquoi, Alfred (Male) - 1993 - Killed.
 Massaquoi, Alhaji (Male) - 1995 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Massaquoi, Alhaji Vandi (Male) age 41 - 1996 in Nongowa, Kenema - Extorted. Detained. Tortured.
 Massaquoi, Alieu (Male) - 1993 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.
 Massaquoi, Allieu (Male) age 70 - 1996 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Killed.
 Massaquoi, Alpha (Male) - 1991 in Wunde, Bo District - Displaced. Tortured.
 Massaquoi, Amara (Male) - Displaced.
 Massaquoi, Amara (Male) age 68 - 1993 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Massaquoi, Ambulai (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.
 Massaquoi, Aminata (Female) age 31 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Massaquoi, Amoelu (Male) - 1992 in Makpele, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted. Killed.

Massaquoi, B.S. (Male) - 1997 in Nongowa, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.
 Massaquoi, Baimba (Male) age 38 - 1991 in Dia, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted and stripped.
 Massaquoi, Baindu (Female) age 30 - 1998 in Makpele, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed.
 Massaquoi, Betty (Female) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.
 Massaquoi, Bobson (Male) age 32 - 1996 - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Massaquoi, Bockarie (Male) age 50 - 1994 in Koya, Kenema - Property destroyed.
 Massaquoi, Bockarie (Male) age 73 - 1991 in Dama, Kenema - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.
 Massaquoi, Braima (Male) - 1997 in Kenema - Assaulted.
 Massaquoi, Brima (Male) - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Assaulted. Killed.
 Massaquoi, Brima (Male) age 13 - 1991 in Gorama Mende, Kenema - Extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Massaquoi, Brima (Male) age 68 - 1991 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Property destroyed. Killed.
 Massaquoi, Christiana (Female) age 18 - Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Massaquoi, Desmond (Male) age 11 - 1994 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced.
 Massaquoi, Dibor (Male) - 1994 in Lugbu, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.
 Massaquoi, Dominic (Male) age 31 - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Detained. Assaulted.
 Massaquoi, Edward (Male) age 34 - 1994 in Nimiyama, Kono - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour.
 Massaquoi, Farmah (Male) - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Killed.
 Massaquoi, Foday (Male) age 51 - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Massaquoi, Foday (Male) age 53 - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Abducted.
 Massaquoi, Foday (Male) age 65 - 1993 in Sowa, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed. Killed.
 Massaquoi, Foday Fofie (Male) - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Massaquoi, Fodei (Male) age 66 - Property looted.
 Massaquoi, Francis (Male) age 25 - 1991 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced.
 Massaquoi, Gassimu (Male) - 1995 in Dodo, Kenema - Displaced. Forced to labour.
 Massaquoi, Gbessay (Male) age 55 - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Abducted and detained.
 Massaquoi, Hawa (Female) - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Massaquoi, Hawa (Female) age 16 - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Massaquoi, Hawa (Female) age 28 - 1998 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Massaquoi, Hawa (Female) age 47 - 1995 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Displaced.
 Massaquoi, Ibrahim (Male) - 1993 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.
 Massaquoi, Idrissa (Male) - 1993 - Killed.
 Massaquoi, Iye (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Extorted.
 Massaquoi, Iye (Female) age 38 - 1991 in Dama, Kenema - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Massaquoi, Jariah (Male) - 1991 in Pujehun - Assaulted.
 Massaquoi, Jayah (Male) - 1997 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.
 Massaquoi, Jebbeh (Female) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Tortured. Killed.
 Massaquoi, Jebbeh (Female) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.
 Massaquoi, Jeneba (Female) - 1993 in Sielenga, Bo District - Displaced. Killed.
 Massaquoi, Jenneh (Female) age 50 - 1991 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Property looted.
 Massaquoi, Jima (Male) - 1991 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Killed.
 Massaquoi, John (Male) age 38 - 1991 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Massaquoi, Joseph (Male) - 1995 - Displaced.
 Massaquoi, Joseph P.S. (Male) age 57 - 1997 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour.
 Massaquoi, Junisa (Male) age 35 - Displaced.
 Massaquoi, Kabba (Male) - 1991 - Displaced. Killed.
 Massaquoi, Kadiatu (Female) - 1994 in Kakua, Bo District - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Assaulted.
 Massaquoi, Kadiatu (Female) age 24 - 1997 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced.

Massaquoi, Kadie (Female) age 50 - 1991 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.
 Massaquoi, Kannie (Male) - 1995 - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Massaquoi, Katumu (Female) - 1996 in Nongowa, Kenema - Killed.
 Massaquoi, Kpana (Male) - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Detained. Killed.
 Massaquoi, Kpana (Male) - 1997 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Killed.
 Massaquoi, Kpana (Male) - Killed.
 Massaquoi, Kula (Female) age 34 - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced.
 Massaquoi, Lansana (Male) age 11 - 1992 in Bagbe, Bo District - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Massaquoi, Mambu Ngeyawaa-Tamoi (Male) age 55 - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Massaquoi, Mariama (Female) - 1995 - Displaced.
 Massaquoi, Marie (Female) age 50 - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Massaquoi, Maseray (Female) age 40 - 1991 in Small Bo, Kenema - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Massaquoi, Massah (Female) - 1991 in Peje, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.
 Massaquoi, Mathew (Male) - 1993 - Property destroyed.
 Massaquoi, Mattia (Female) - 1995 - Abducted. Assaulted.
 Massaquoi, Mohamed (Male) - 1995 in Bo District - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Massaquoi, Momoh (Male) - 1993 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.
 Massaquoi, Momoh (Male) - Killed.
 Massaquoi, Momoh (Male) - 1991 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Killed.
 Massaquoi, Momoh (Male) - 1991 in Dia, Kailahun - Property destroyed.
 Massaquoi, Momoh (Male) age 30 - 1994 in Jawie, Kailahun - Detained. Killed.
 Massaquoi, Momoh (Male) age 50 - Property looted and destroyed.
 Massaquoi, Morry (Male) age 39 - 1993 in Bagbo, Bo District - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour.
 Massaquoi, Moses (Male) age 31 - 1991 - Extorted and property looted and destroyed.
 Massaquoi, Mustapha (Male) - 1997 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Massaquoi, Mustapha (Male) - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted.
 Massaquoi, Mustapha (Male) - 1993 - Killed.
 Massaquoi, Mustapha (Male) age 33 - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Displaced. Forced to labour.
 Massaquoi, Musu (Female) - Abducted and detained.
 Massaquoi, Nyapo (Female) age 29 - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted and tortured.
 Massaquoi, Peter (Male) age 29 - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Massaquoi, Ramatu (Female) - 1995 - Abducted. Assaulted.
 Massaquoi, Saffa (Male) age 49 - 1992 in Nomo, Kenema - Killed.
 Massaquoi, Saidu (Male) age 11 - 1995 - Displaced. Forced to labour.
 Massaquoi, Samu (Male) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Killed.
 Massaquoi, Sandy (Male) - 1993 - Property destroyed.
 Massaquoi, Satta (Female) age 27 - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Massaquoi, Senesie (Male) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Forced to labour. Killed.
 Massaquoi, Shengbe (Male) age 30 - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.
 Massaquoi, Shiaka (Male) age 27 - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Massaquoi, Shiaka (Male) age 50 - 1991 in Dia, Kailahun - Property looted and destroyed. Killed.
 Massaquoi, Sullay (Male) - 1991 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Killed.
 Massaquoi, Tenneh (Female) - 1992 in Makpele, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted. Killed.
 Massaquoi, Tenneh (Female) age 60 - 1991 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed.
 Massaquoi, Tom (Male) - 1995 in Pujehun - Displaced.
 Massaquoi, Tonia (Female) age 21 - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Property looted.
 Massaquoi, Vandi (Male) - 1998 in Lugbu, Bo District - Displaced. Killed.
 Massaquoi, Vandi (Male) age 50 - 1991 in Pujehun - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour.
 Massaquoi, Vandy (Male) age 60 - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted and tortured.

Massaquoi, Wuya (Female) - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed.
 Massaquoi, Wuya (Female) - 1994 - Property destroyed. Killed.
 Massaquoi, Wuyata (Female) age 33 - 1991 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Tortured.
 Mator, Allieu (Male) - 1996 - Extorted and property destroyed.
 Matthew, Ensa (Male) age 17 - 1991 in Simbaru, Kenema - Displaced. Forced to labour.
 Mattia, Abu (Male) - 1991 - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Mattia, Alhaji (Male) - 1991 in Lugbu, Bo District - Extorted.
 Mattia, Allieu (Male) - Property looted.
 Mattia, Daniel (Male) age 43 - 1995 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Tortured.
 Mattia, Fatu (Female) age 35 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Mattia, Haja Isata (Female) age 63 - 1991 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Mattia, Joe (Male) - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.
 Mattia, Joseph (Male) age 50 - 1995 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.
 Mattia, Kainessie (Male) age 30 - 1994 in Baoma, Bo District - Displaced and property looted.
 Mattia, Kamor (Male) - Assaulted.
 Mattia, Kini (Male) - 1997 in Bagruwa, Moyamba - Extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Mattia, Lahai (Male) age 25 - 1991 - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.
 Mattia, Mariama (Female) - 1997 - Displaced. Forced to labour.
 Mattia, Matter (Female) age 61 - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Killed.
 Mattia, Memuna (Female) age 52 - 1995 in Bagbo, Bo District - Property destroyed. Tortured.
 Mattia, Moinina (Male) - 1991 in Badjia, Bo District - Property looted.
 Mattia, Munda (Male) - 1995 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Displaced. Assaulted and limb amputated.
 Mattia, Mustapha (Male) age 35 - 1991 in Badjia, Bo District - Abducted and detained.
 Mattia, Nancy (Female) age 65 - 1994 in Simbaru, Kenema - Displaced and property looted. Abducted.
 Mattia, Peter (Male) - 1995 in Bagbo, Bo District - Killed.
 Mattia, Richard (Male) - 1996 in Bumpeh, Moyamba - Tortured.
 Mattia, Saidu (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Killed.
 Mattia, Sheku (Male) age 38 - Displaced.
 Mattia, Sia (Female) - 1999 in Sandor, Kono - Killed.
 Mattia, Sia (Female) age 21 - 1996 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced. Assaulted and tortured.
 Mattia, Tommy (Male) age 62 - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Mattia, Yei (Female) age 21 - 1999 in Sandor, Kono - Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.
 Matturie, Kai (Male) - 1997 in Kono - Displaced and property destroyed. Tortured.
 Matturie, Kumba (Female) age 16 - 1997 in Kono - Displaced.
 Matturie, Samuel (Male) age 14 - 1999 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced. Forced to labour.
 Matturie, Tamba (Male) age 28 - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted.
 Mava, Joseph (Male) age 26 - 1994 in Follosaba Dembelia, Koinadugu - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured.
 Mava, Mbalu (Female) age 3 - 1994 in Badjia, Bo District - Abducted.
 Mawibu, Amie (Female) - 1995 in Kpanda Kemo, Bonthe - Killed.
 Mawoh, Massah (Female) age 45 - 1993 in Kakua, Bo District - Property looted and destroyed.
 Mayah, Brima (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Forced to labour. Killed.
 Maye, Sima (Female) - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Killed.
 Mayer, Fatmata (Female) - Abducted.
 Mayie, Simah (Female) - 1996 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.
 Mbagbume, Isata James (Female) age 32 - 1997 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Displaced. Tortured. Killed.
 Mbaimba, Alimamy (Male) age 61 - 1999 in Koya, Port Loko - Detained.
 Mbaka, Amara (Male) - 1991 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced.
 Mbatoma, Musu (Female) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Killed.
 Mbawa, Baindu (Female) age 42 - 1993 in Small Bo, Kenema - Displaced.
 Mbawa, Bockarie (Male) age 37 - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted and stripped.

Mbawa, James (Male) - 1992 in Penguia, Kailahun - Property destroyed.

Mbawa, Momoh (Male) - 1991 in Langorama, Kenema - Killed.

Mbawa, Wudia (Male) - 1995 in Bagbe, Bo District - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Mbawah, Jonathan (Male) - 1995 in Yawbeko, Bonthe - Property looted.

Mbawah, Surh (Male) - 1991 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Mbaya, Joe (Male) - 1994 in Sielenga, Bo District - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Mbayo, Adu (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Mbayo, Aiah (Male) - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Tortured.

Mbayo, Dauda (Male) - 1994 in Sielenga, Bo District - Property destroyed.

Mbayo, Fatu (Female) age 20 - 1994 in Sielenga, Bo District - Property destroyed. Killed.

Mbayo, Foday (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Mbayo, Iye (Female) - 1996 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced. Assaulted.

Mbayo, Musu (Female) - 1995 in Sogbini, Bonthe - Killed.

Mbayo, Nancy (Female) - 1995 in Sogbini, Bonthe - Killed.

Mbayo, Thomas (Male) - 1991 in Lugbu, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Mbogba, Jayah (Male) age 52 - Displaced.

Mbogba, Tommy (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Abducted and detained.

Mboka, Lamin Bagie (Male) age 59 - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Mbolowah, Joe (Male) age 33 - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Mboma, Fabbah (Male) age 4 - 1994 in Tikonko, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Mboma, Jebson (Male) - Killed.

Mboma, Joe (Male) - 1994 in Niawa Lenga, Bo District - Property destroyed. Killed.

Mboma, Madio (Male) - 1996 in Bagbe, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Mbosa, Mohamed (Male) age 15 - 1998 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Abducted and detained. Tortured and stripped. Killed.

Mbowa, Sharkah (Male) - 1996 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Mccalister, Fr. Felix (Male) - 1992 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Killed.

Meama, Amara (Male) - 1995 in Koya, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Meama, Joe (Male) age 68 - 1995 in Koya, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed.

Mei, Komba (Male) age 14 - 1998 in Samu, Kambia - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Mei, Mohamed (Male) age 18 - 1997 in Kowa, Moyamba - Displaced.

Meikeh, Lahai (Male) - 1997 - Detained. Assaulted.

Meima, Ramatu (Female) age 30 - 1998 in Benducha, Bonthe - Assaulted and tortured.

Meimoh, Sharka (Male) - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Property destroyed.

Mendemahun, Brima (Male) - 1996 in Jawie, Kailahun - Killed.

Mendemahun, Sam (Male) age 77 - 1997 in Wandor, Kenema - Assaulted. Killed.

Mendewa, James (Male) - 1994 in Komboya, Bo District - Killed.

Mendi, Abdul Mohamed (Male) age 23 - 1999 in Western Area - Extorted.

Mendi, Mohamed Manso (Male) age 55 - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed.

Menikeya, Aiah (Male) - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Killed.

Menima, Fatmata (Female) - 1994 in Nongowa, Kenema - Killed.

Menjor, Komba (Male) age 40 - 1992 in Gorama Kono, Kono - Displaced. Killed.

Menssah, Finda (Female) age 35 - 1999 in Fiama, Kono - Displaced.

Menssah, Kai (Male) age 33 - 1999 - Displaced.

Menssah, Kumba (Female) - Abducted. Assaulted and tortured.

Menssah, Sahr (Male) age 54 - 1999 - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Menssah, Tamba (Male) age 6 - 1992 - Displaced.

Metzeger, M.K. (Male) - 1991 in Nongowa, Kenema - Killed.

Mewa, Samai (Male) - Displaced and property destroyed. Killed.

Mewah, Moiwai (Male) age 61 - 1992 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Mewah, Vandy (Male) age 51 - 1991 in Langorama, Kenema - Killed.

Miatta, Vandi (Male) age 48 - Displaced.

Miccar, Felix (Male) age 75 - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Michael, Amos (Male) age 31 - 1995 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Michael, Baidu (Female) age 20 - 1991 in Kwamebai Krim, Bonthe - Displaced. Assaulted. Killed.

Michael, Charles (Male) - 1997 - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Michiwa, Abu (Male) age 15 - 1997 in Kono - Displaced and extorted.

Miimore, Baidu (Female) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Killed.

Millo-Yemie, Joseph (Male) age 42 - 1995 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Property destroyed. Detained.

Minah, Joe (Male) - 1997 in Yawbeko, Bonthe - Extorted. Assaulted.

Minah, Lahai (Male) age 38 - 1991 in Peje West, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Mnaga, Edmond (Male) - 1994 in Luawa, Kailahun - Killed.

Modu, Adikalie (Male) - 1998 in Port Loko - Killed.

Modu-King, Nathaniel (Male) age 54 - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.

Mohalamu, Kpaka V. (Male) - Property looted and destroyed.

Mohamed, Alie (Male) age 19 - 1993 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained.

Mohamed, Ibrahim (Male) - Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Mohamed, Isatu (Female) age 13 - 1993 in Western Area - Displaced. Killed.

Mohamed, Kadie (Female) age 19 - 1997 in Kowa, Moyamba - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Mohamed, Mariama (Female) age 42 - 1992 in Luawa, Kailahun - Forced to labour. Tortured.

Mohamed, Marjo (Female) - Displaced.

Mohamed, Sajiyatu (Female) - 1993 in Gorama Kono, Kono - Detained.

Mohamed, Tamba (Male) age 27 - 1993 in Gorama Kono, Kono - Abducted. Tortured. Killed.

Moi Foray, Raymond (Male) - 1997 - Abducted. Assaulted. Killed.

Moi Kallon, Saffa (Male) - Displaced.

Moiforay, James (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Property looted and destroyed.

Moiforay, Mariama (Female) age 18 - 1994 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced and extorted.

Moiforay, Massah (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Moiforay, Sambo (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Moiforay, Sofy (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Tortured.

Moigba, Kadie (Female) age 51 - 1991 in Malegohun, Kenema - Displaced.

Moigboi, Ansumana (Male) age 26 - 1991 in Malegohun, Kenema - Displaced. Tortured and stripped.

Moigboi, Momoh (Male) age 39 - 1992 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Moigboi, Saffa (Male) age 35 - Killed.

Moigua, Braima (Male) age 44 - 1994 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced.

Moigua, Dauda (Male) - 1991 in Langorama, Kenema - Abducted.

Moigua, Hawa (Female) age 42 - 1997 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced. Detained.

Moigua, Kpukuwa (Male) - 1992 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Moigua, Massah (Female) - 1991 in Langorama, Kenema - Displaced.

Moigua, Saffea (Male) age 39 - 1998 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Moiguah, Amara (Male) - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Killed.

Moiguah, Andrew (Male) - 1995 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Killed.

Moiguah, Aruna (Male) age 70 - 1996 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Killed.

Moiguah, Foday (Male) age 53 - 1998 in Dodo, Kenema - Displaced. Killed.

Moiguah, Mohamed (Male) age 18 - 1998 in Dodo, Kenema - Displaced.

Moiguah, Sengbeh (Male) age 27 - 1992 in Langorama, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Mojneh, Keni-Briama (Male) - 1991 - Displaced. Killed.

Mojueh, Bobor (Male) age 13 - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted.

Mojueh, Maada (Male) age 63 - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour.

Mojueh, Sarah (Female) age 42 - 1998 in Mambolo, Kambia - Displaced.

Moilona, Bockarie (Male) - Abducted.

Moinah, Benya (Male) age 30 - 1995 in Small Bo, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Moinah, Betty (Female) age 37 - 1994 - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Moinenah, Messie (Female) - 1991 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and

tortured.

Moinina, Lahai (Male) - 1991 - Extorted and property destroyed.

Moinina, Sannoh (Female) - 1997 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Assaulted.

Moinina, Sao (Male) age 22 - 1997 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Moinjeh, Sahr (Male) - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Moino, Brima (Male) - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Assaulted.

Moiqula, Hannah (Female) age 44 - 1995 - Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Moiwa, Amara (Male) age 13 - 1992 in Peje West, Kailahun - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Moiwa, Bockarie (Male) age 29 - 1994 in Mandu, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Moiwa, Brima (Male) - 1991 in Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Moiwa, Joseph (Male) - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Moiwa, Margaret (Female) age 17 - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Moiwa, Mariama (Female) age 26 - 1997 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Moiwa, Saffa (Male) age 17 - 1993 - Killed.

Moiwa, Sia (Female) age 29 - 1992 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Moiwa, Tamba Augustine (Male) - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Moiwo, Aruna (Male) age 11 - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Forced to labour.

Moiwo, Bockarie (Male) age 44 - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted and tortured.

Moiwo, Brima (Male) - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Assaulted. Killed.

Moiwo, Enssa (Male) age 45 - 1991 - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Moiwo, Lukay - Killed.

Moiwo, Moinima (Male) age 59 - 1997 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Moiwo, Momoh (Male) - 1994 in Kakua, Bo District - Killed.

Moiwuna, Saffa (Male) - 1994 in Sowa, Pujehun - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Molia, Mamawa (Female) - 1995 in Badjia, Bo District - Killed.

Momobie, Sahr (Male) age 41 - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced.

Momodu, Julius (Male) - Killed.

Momodu, Marah (Male) age 67 - 2000 in Wara-Wara Bafodia, Koinadugu - Displaced. Killed.

Momodu, Mohamed (Male) age 9 - 1993 in Western Area - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Momodu, Sheku (Male) - 1991 in Lugbu, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Momodu, Wuyata (Female) - Abducted and detained.

Momoh, Abdulai (Male) age 60 - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Killed.

Momoh, Adima (Female) age 63 - 1996 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Abducted. Assaulted and tortured.

Momoh, Alhaji (Male) age 17 - 1998 in Mandu, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Momoh, Alhaji Saidu (Male) age 67 - 1996 in Upper Bambara, Kailahun - Displaced and extorted. Abducted. Assaulted.

Momoh, Aliah (Female) age 29 - 1995 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Assaulted and tortured.

Momoh, Alpha (Male) - 1997 in Bumpeh, Moyamba - Displaced and property destroyed.

Momoh, Amara (Male) - 1991 in Peje Bongre, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Momoh, Aminata (Female) age 20 - 1997 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Momoh, Andrew (Male) - Killed.

Momoh, Aruna (Male) age 34 - 1992 in Luawa, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Assaulted, tortured and stripped. Killed.

Momoh, Baby (Female) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.

Momoh, Baidu (Female) - 1995 in Jawie, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Momoh, Bockarie (Male) age 31 - Displaced. Killed.

Momoh, Bockarie (Male) age 44 - 1991 - Tortured.

Momoh, Boima (Male) age 27 - 1992 in Penguia, Kailahun - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Momoh, Brima (Male) age 50 - 1992 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced.

Momoh, Brima (Male) age 53 - 1993 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced.

Momoh, Cyril (Male) - 1994 in Kakua, Bo District - Killed.

Momoh, Fatmata (Female) - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained.

Momoh, Fiassah (Male) - 1991 in Small Bo, Kenema - Displaced. Assaulted.

Momoh, Fissah (Male) age 41 - 1991 in Small Bo, Kenema - Displaced and property looted. Tortured.

Momoh, Foday (Male) - 1998 in Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili - Limb amputated.

Momoh, Foday (Male) - 1998 in Jawie, Kailahun - Killed.

Momoh, Foday (Male) age 58 - 1992 in Sowa, Pujehun - Extorted. Abducted and detained.

Momoh, Fomba (Male) - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Momoh, Francis (Male) - 1995 - Killed.

Momoh, Fuddi (Male) - 1995 in Banta Mokele, Moyamba - Killed.

Momoh, Gbessay age 56 - 1996 - Tortured. Killed.

Momoh, George (Male) - 1997 in Timdel, Moyamba - Abducted and detained.

Momoh, Guwulah (Male) - Killed.

Momoh, Hawa (Female) - 1996 in Tikonko, Bo District - Killed.

Momoh, Hawa (Female) age 23 - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Momoh, Hawa (Female) age 53 - 1991 in Fiama, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Momoh, Hawa (Female) age 59 - 1997 - Displaced.

Momoh, Iye (Female) age 6 - 1994 in Simbaru, Kenema - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Momoh, Jabio (Male) - 1995 - Killed.

Momoh, James Saidu (Male) - 1995 in Kagboro, Moyamba - Limb amputated. Killed.

Momoh, Jattu (Female) - 1995 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced.

Momoh, Jebbeh (Female) - 1992 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.

Momoh, Jebbeh (Female) age 34 - 1995 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Momoh, Jeneba (Female) - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Momoh, Jeneba (Female) age 13 - 1997 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced.

Momoh, Jenneh (Female) age 30 - 1991 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced.

Momoh, Jita (Female) age 36 - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Momoh, Joe (Male) - 1995 - Killed.

Momoh, John (Male) - Killed.

Momoh, Jojo (Male) age 63 - 1991 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Momoh, Joseph (Male) age 42 - 1991 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Tortured and stripped.

Momoh, Joseph (Male) age 45 - 1995 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced. Killed.

Momoh, Joseph Saidu (Male) age 30 - 1995 in Kagboro, Moyamba - Assaulted and limb amputated. Killed.

Momoh, Juana (Male) - 1992 in Dia, Kailahun - Assaulted.

Momoh, Juana (Male) age 29 - 1997 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Momoh, Julius (Male) - 1991 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Momoh, Kadie (Female) - 1996 in Peje West, Kailahun - Property destroyed. Killed.

Momoh, Kai (Male) - 1993 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Killed.

Momoh, Katimu (Female) age 47 - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Displaced.

Momoh, Lahai (Male) age 41 - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Property looted and destroyed. Tortured.

Momoh, Mattis Maliebah (Male) age 36 - 1994 in Upper Bambara, Kailahun - Extorted. Detained. Assaulted.

Momoh, Mbaimba (Female) - 1991 - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Momoh, Moiguhan (Male) - 1998 in Sowa, Pujehun - Killed.

Momoh, Morie (Male) - Property destroyed. Tortured.

Momoh, Morie (Male) - 1996 in Jawie, Kailahun - Killed.

Momoh, Morie (Male) age 31 - 1992 in Kakua, Bo District - Assaulted and tortured.

Momoh, Muana (Male) - 1995 in Kori, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Momoh, Musa (Male) - 1995 in Mandu, Kailahun - Forced to labour. Killed.

Momoh, Musa (Male) age 48 - 1997 in Dodo, Kenema - Abducted. Assaulted.

Momoh, Nyande (Female) - 1997 in Timdel, Moyamba - Abducted and detained.

Momoh, Saidu (Male) - 1997 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Displaced.

Momoh, Satta (Female) - 1997 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Detained. Killed.

Momoh, Satu (Female) - 1995 - Killed.

Momoh, Sheku (Male) age 30 - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced.

Momoh, Sheriff (Male) age 30 - 1998 in Koya, Kenema - Tortured. Killed.

Momoh, Syril (Male) - 1997 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted and stripped.

Momoh, Tamba (Male) age 19 - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Momoh, Tamba (Male) age 31 - 1998 in Gbane, Kono - Abducted. Tortured.

Momoh, Tamba (Male) age 34 - 1999 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Momoh, Tenneh (Female) - 1995 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.

Momoh, Yankuba (Male) age 48 - 1991 - Killed.

Momoria, Tamba (Male) age 54 - 1994 in Lei, Kono - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Momorie, Sesay (Male) age 30 - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Abducted. Killed.

Mondeh, Aiah (Male) age 71 - 1998 in Kamara, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Limb amputated. Killed.

Mondeh, Komba (Male) - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.

Mondeh, Komba (Male) - Property looted. Abducted and detained.

Mondeh, Komba (Male) age 56 - Abducted. Assaulted and tortured. Killed.

Mondeh, Sahr (Male) age 29 - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Mondeh, Sahr (Male) age 57 - 1994 in Niawa, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.

Mondo, Sharka (Male) - 1995 in Kwamebai Krim, Bonthe - Killed.

Monica, Kadiatu (Female) age 33 - 1998 - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Monjaduwa, Amara (Male) - 1995 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Monrovia, Emmanuel (Male) age 41 - 1995 in Kowa, Moyamba - Displaced and property destroyed.

Monrovia, Nat (Male) - 1996 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Killed.

Monrovia, Samuel (Male) - Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Moore, Alfred (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Moore, Elenor (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Moore, Fatu (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Moore, James (Male) age 45 - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.

Moore, Mojama (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Moore, Sunny (Male) - 1998 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Displaced and property looted.

Moore, Thomas (Male) age 56 - 1995 in Kongbora, Moyamba - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Moray, Konna (Female) - 1996 in Baoma, Bo District - Displaced. Assaulted and limb amputated.

Moray, Sam A. (Male) age 55 - 1993 in Gorama Kono, Kono - Abducted and detained. Tortured and stripped.

Morgne, Aiah (Male) - 1992 - Killed.

Moriba, Andrew (Male) - 1997 - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Moriba, Bockarie (Male) - 1995 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Moriba, Brima (Male) - Abducted. Killed.

Moriba, Henry (Male) age 41 - 1998 in Kakua, Bo District - Property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Moriba, Janet (Female) age 33 - 1998 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Displaced.

Moriba, Jatu Giba (Female) - 1996 in Bo District - Displaced. Killed.

Moriba, Jilo (Female) - Abducted and detained.

Moriba, Joseph (Male) - 1995 in Bagbe, Bo District - Displaced. Forced to labour. Killed.

Moriba, Joseph (Male) age 70 - 1998 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Property destroyed. Killed.

Moriba, Kadiatu (Female) - Displaced. Killed.

Moriba, Kamadu (Female) - 1994 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted.

Moriba, Kannie (Male) - 1994 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted.

Moriba, Kele (Female) - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Moriba, Kemoh (Male) - 1997 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Extorted. Assaulted and tortured.

Moriba, Mariatu (Female) - Forced to labour.

Moriba, Marie (Female) - Killed.

Moriba, Momoh (Male) - Displaced.
 Moriba, Moody (Male) - 1995 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.
 Moriba, Peter (Male) age 33 - 1995 in Sielenga, Bo District - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Moriba, Samking (Male) - 1996 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Moriba, Samuel (Male) - Property looted. Killed.
 Moriba, Sidique (Male) - Extorted and property looted and destroyed.
 Moriba, Solomon (Male) - 1994 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Moriba, Sulaiman (Male) age 55 - 1997 in Imperi, Bonthe - Assaulted and tortured.
 Moriba, Swarray (Male) age 24 - 1991 in Kowa, Moyamba - Tortured.
 Moriba, Tenneh (Female) - 1994 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted.
 Morie, Amara (Male) age 89 - 1992 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted. Tortured.
 Morie, Batu (Female) age 24 - 1994 - Killed.
 Morie, Kanneh (Male) age 35 - Killed.
 Morie, Mohamed (Male) age 15 - 1994 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Killed.
 Morie, Sahr (Male) age 24 - 1992 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Morison, Brima (Male) - 1992 in Luawa, Kailahun - Assaulted.
 Morison, Ginneh (Female) - 1993 in Luawa, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Morison, Jenneh (Female) age 21 - 1997 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Morison, Jinnah (Female) age 30 - 1992 in Kissi Tongi, Kailahun - Extorted and property looted. Detained. Tortured.
 Morison, Jusu (Male) - 1997 in Kenema - Abducted and detained.
 Morkoi, Momoh (Male) age 22 - 1993 in Kissi Teng, Kailahun - Tortured.
 Morlai, Mamawa (Female) - 1995 in Baoma, Bo District - Killed.
 Morlai, Sarah (Female) - Forced to labour.
 Morovia, James (Male) - Killed.
 Morovia, Mohamed (Male) - Killed.
 Morovia, Nancy (Female) - Abducted and detained.
 Morovia, Nat (Male) - Killed.
 Morsay, Christiana (Female) age 23 - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced.
 Morsay, Doris (Female) age 4 - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Morsay, Finda (Female) age 13 - 1998 in Kamara, Kono - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Morsay, Komba (Male) - 1998 in Kenema - Killed.
 Morsay, Sahr (Male) age 9 - 1998 in Kono - Displaced.
 Morsay, Sahr (Male) age 46 - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Morsay, Tamba (Male) - Killed.
 Morsay, Tamba (Male) age 43 - 1999 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced.
 Mosema, Kafoo (Male) - 1997 in Kongbora, Moyamba - Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Moseray, Abu (Male) - 1996 in Tikonko, Bo District - Killed.
 Moseray, Amu (Female) - 1995 in Yawbeko, Bonthe - Abducted.
 Moseray, Bondu (Female) age 42 - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced.
 Moseray, Christiana (Female) age 21 - 1995 in Dasse, Moyamba - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Moseray, Doris (Female) age 9 - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Moseray, Fea (Female) - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Forced to labour.
 Moseray, Foday (Male) - 1997 - Assaulted.
 Moseray, Foday (Male) - 1995 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted. Killed.
 Moseray, Hawa (Female) - 1995 in Yawbeko, Bonthe - Assaulted. Killed.
 Moseray, Jestina (Female) age 40 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Moseray, Kigba (Female) - Abducted and detained.
 Moseray, Kinie (Male) - 1995 - Property looted.
 Moseray, Moses (Male) age 44 - 1996 in Valunia, Bo District - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.
 Moseray, Sahr (Male) - 1998 in Fiama, Kono - Killed.
 Moseray, Solomon (Male) age 22 - 1995 in Banta Mokele, Moyamba - Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Moseray, Thoronko (Male) - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Moseray, Tommy (Male) - 1995 in Kpanda Kemo, Bonthe - Property looted and destroyed.

Moses, Aminata (Female) - 1997 - Displaced.

Moses, James (Male) - 1994 in Baoma, Bo District - Killed.

Moses, Maude (Female) age 39 - 1991 in Kissi Teng, Kailahun - Displaced and property destroyed.

Mosima, Karfo (Male) - 1996 in Bumpeh, Moyamba - Assaulted.

Muhamu, Alhaji (Male) - 1995 in Komboya, Bo District - Killed.

Muawoma, Samu (Male) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Killed.

Mudu, Alpha (Male) - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Killed.

Mujtabah, Mohamed (Male) - 1998 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Abducted. Tortured. Killed.

Mulai, Musu (Female) age 30 - 1996 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Mulbah, John B (Male) age 29 - 1994 - Displaced.

Muna, John (Male) age 47 - 1996 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed.

Munda, Albert (Male) age 36 - 1994 - Killed.

Munda, Ibrahim (Male) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Killed.

Munda, Lucy (Female) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Abducted. Killed.

Munda, Musa (Male) - 1991 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Property destroyed. Tortured.

Munda, Musa (Male) age 35 - 1991 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Munda, Senesie (Male) age 33 - 1991 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed.

Munu, Adama (Female) - 1998 - Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Munu, Amadu (Male) - 1997 in Sanda Tendaren, Bombali - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Munu, Brima (Male) age 25 - 1995 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Munu, Gbako (Male) - 1997 - Abducted. Tortured.

Munu, Hassan (Male) age 33 - 1997 - Displaced and property destroyed. Detained. Assaulted.

Munu, Issa (Male) - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted.

Munu, Morua (Male) age 27 - 1998 - Killed.

Munu, Ousman (Male) age 18 - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Munu, Santigie (Male) - 1997 in Sanda Tendaren, Bombali - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Munya, Shekuba (Male) age 21 - 1999 in Kamara, Kono - Assaulted. Killed.

Munyah, Yei (Female) age 46 - 1999 in Kamara, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Murana, Idrissa (Male) age 48 - 1991 - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Murana, Kadie (Female) - 1995 in Luawa, Kailahun - Assaulted.

Murana, Kelfala (Male) - Killed.

Murana, Kinie (Male) - Killed.

Murana, Lahai (Male) age 39 - 1991 - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Detained.

Murana, Musa (Male) age 50 - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted.

Murana, Sulaiman (Male) - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Killed.

Murana, Tiangay Jusu (Female) - Killed.

Murana-Momoh, Sama Konso (Male) age 49 - 1997 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted.

Murray, Haja Mariama (Female) age 13 - 1993 in Small Bo, Kenema - Displaced.

Murray, Baindu (Female) - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Killed.

Murray, Brima Morie (Male) age 40 - 1998 in Nongowa, Kenema - Tortured.

Murray, Fatmata (Female) age 17 - 1996 in Tunkia, Kenema - Killed.

Murray, Joe (Male) age 57 - 1996 in Jong, Bonthe - Killed.

Murray, Lahai (Male) - 1997 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Abducted and detained.

Murray, Lansana (Male) - 1993 in Small Bo, Kenema - Displaced.

Murray, Sheriff (Male) age 44 - 1995 in Yawbeko, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Musa, Abu (Male) - 1995 - Killed.

Musa, Adama (Female) - 1995 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.

Musa, Ajiji (Male) - 1995 in Sogbini, Bonthe - Abducted.

Musa, Alfred (Male) - 1995 - Forced to labour.

Musa, Amara (Male) - 1991 in Koya, Kenema - Displaced. Detained. Tortured.

Musa, Amie (Female) age 7 - 1991 in Koya, Kenema - Displaced.

Musa, Aminata (Female) age 12 - 1999 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Musa, Baimda (Male) - 1997 in Western Area - Extorted. Killed.

Musa, Baimdu (Female) - 1992 in Luawa, Kailahun - Killed.

Musa, Bethy (Female) age 25 - 1995 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Displaced.

Musa, Bockarie (Male) - 1994 in Baoma, Bo District - Displaced.

Musa, Borbor (Male) age 56 - 1992 in Malegohun, Kenema - Displaced. Killed.

Musa, Daniel (Male) age 32 - 1996 in Kori, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Musa, Esther (Female) age 46 - 1997 in Upper Bambara, Kailahun - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained.

Musa, Fanta (Female) - 1999 in Gbense, Kono - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Musa, Fatmata (Female) age 26 - 1991 in Koya, Kenema - Displaced. Killed.

Musa, Fatu Jebe (Female) - 1992 - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Musa, Faya (Male) - Property looted and destroyed. Killed.

Musa, Foday (Male) - 1994 - Abducted.

Musa, Fodie Morie (Male) - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Property destroyed.

Musa, Francis (Male) - Killed.

Musa, Francis (Male) age 34 - 1991 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Musa, Francis (Male) age 63 - 1994 in Bumpah, Bo District - Displaced and property looted.

Musa, Frank (Male) age 40 - 1998 in Wandor, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Musa, Frank (Male) age 63 - 1997 in Dodo, Kenema - Extorted. Abducted. Tortured.

Musa, Gagba (Male) - 1996 - Tortured. Killed.

Musa, Gbessay (Female) age 73 - 1991 in Kissi Teng, Kailahun - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Assaulted.

Musa, Gladys (Female) - 1997 in Dodo, Kenema - Killed.

Musa, Hawa (Female) - Abducted and detained.

Musa, Hawa (Female) age 12 - 1991 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Abducted and detained.

Musa, Jebbeh (Female) - 1995 in Banta Mokele, Moyamba - Extorted. Abducted. Tortured. Killed.

Musa, Jeneba (Female) age 12 - 1995 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Displaced.

Musa, Joe (Male) - 1995 in Bonthe - Displaced.

Musa, Joe (Male) - Detained.

Musa, Joe (Male) - 1991 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Forced to labour.

Musa, Joe (Male) - 1998 - Abducted.

Musa, Joseph (Male) age 35 - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.

Musa, Joseph (Male) age 56 - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Musa, Josiah (Male) - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Killed.

Musa, Junisa (Male) - 1994 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Killed.

Musa, Junisa (Male) age 19 - 1991 in Peje Bongre, Kailahun - Killed.

Musa, Junisa (Male) age 35 - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Musa, Kadie (Female) - 1995 in Kpanda Kemo, Bonthe - Forced to labour.

Musa, Kai (Male) - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained.

Musa, Kallay (Male) age 15 - 1995 - Forced to labour.

Musa, Lahai (Male) - 1992 in Luawa, Kailahun - Abducted and detained.

Musa, Luba (Female) - Killed.

Musa, Mamamyon (Female) - 1995 in Koya, Kenema - Abducted. Killed.

Musa, Mambu (Male) - 1992 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and stripped. Killed.

Musa, Mary (Female) age 37 - 1999 in Western Area - Property looted and destroyed.

Musa, Massah (Female) - 1991 in Peje Bongre, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Musa, Miata (Female) - 1991 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted.

Musa, Miata (Female) age 60 - 1998 in Jawie, Kailahun - Abducted and detained.

Musa, Mohamed (Male) - 1995 in Kpanda Kemo, Bonthe - Abducted and detained.

Musa, Moinina (Male) age 34 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Musa, Moiwa (Male) - Assaulted.

Musa, Moiwa (Male) - Forced to labour. Tortured. Killed.

Musa, Momoh (Male) - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Killed.
 Musa, Musu (Female) - Assaulted. Killed.
 Musa, Nabieu (Male) - 2000 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Displaced.
 Musa, Nasu (Female) age 18 - 1992 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Musa, Nemah (Female) - 1992 in Luawa, Kailahun - Killed.
 Musa, Saatu (Female) age 76 - Displaced.
 Musa, Saffa (Male) age 58 - 1992 in Malegehun, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Musa, Sahr (Male) - 1994 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Displaced, extorted and property looted.
 Musa, Sahr (Male) age 13 - 1999 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Musa, Sallay (Female) - 1997 in Badjia, Bo District - Killed.
 Musa, Sam (Male) age 77 - 1993 in Baoma, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Musa, Sao (Male) - 1991 in Peje Bongre, Kailahun - Displaced. Killed.
 Musa, Satta (Female) - 1995 in Kpanda Kemo, Bonthe - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour.
 Musa, Satta (Female) age 12 - 1998 - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Musa, Satta (Female) age 42 - 1991 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Abducted and detained.
 Musa, Senesie (Male) age 55 - 1998 in Kagboro, Moyamba - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted and tortured.
 Musa, T.J. (Male) age 47 - 1994 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Displaced.
 Musa, Tamba (Male) age 19 - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Musa, Tommy (Male) - Property looted. Abducted and detained.
 Musa, Vandy (Male) - 1998 in Luawa, Kailahun - Killed.
 Musa, Yatta Solimalibea (Female) age 34 - 1992 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted.
 Mustapha, Abai (Male) age 24 - 1994 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Killed.
 Mustapha, Alhaji Shek (Male) - 1998 in Western Area - Killed.
 Mustapha, Alieu (Male) - 1998 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.
 Mustapha, Alusine (Male) age 50 - 1994 in Tonko Limba, Kambia - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.
 Mustapha, Fatmata (Female) - 1995 in Malema, Kailahun - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Mustapha, Hawa (Female) age 26 - 1999 in Kenema - Displaced.
 Mustapha, John (Male) age 30 - 1994 in Barri, Pujehun - Property destroyed.
 Mustapha, Kemoh (Male) age 27 - 1991 in Koya, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Mustapha, Mahmoud (Male) age 45 - 1994 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Mustapha, Marie (Female) age 19 - 1993 in Baoma, Bo District - Killed.
 Mustapha, Mohamed (Male) - 1997 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Displaced. Tortured.
 Mustapha, Mohamed (Male) age 56 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Mustapha, Solomon (Male) - 1995 in Bumpeh, Moyamba - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured.
 Mustapha, Zaccariah (Male) - 1997 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Displaced. Limb amputated.
 Musu, Joe (Male) - 1995 in Sogbini, Bonthe - Forced to labour.
 Myokor, Aiah (Male) - 1992 in Soa, Kono - Killed.
 Nabbie, Abu (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Nabbie, Jaia (Male) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Killed.
 Nabbie, Jaia (Male) age 42 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted. Killed.
 Nabbie, Jaiah (Male) - Killed.
 Nabbie, Kinie (Male) - 1995 in Valunia, Bo District - Killed.
 Nabbie, Musa (Male) age 67 - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Nabbie, Sahr (Male) age 63 - 1993 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.
 Nabieu, Aruna (Male) - 1997 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour.
 Nabieu, Edward (Male) - 1998 in Koya, Kenema - Displaced.
 Nabieu, Gbessay (Male) age 25 - 1991 in Penguia, Kailahun - Abducted. Tortured. Killed.
 Nabieu, James (Male) - 1995 in Kongbora, Moyamba - Tortured. Killed.
 Nabieu, Jinnah (Female) - 1991 in Penguia, Kailahun - Displaced.
 Nabieu, Kadiatu (Female) age 8 - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Nabieu, Musa (Male) age 68 - Killed.

Nabieu, Musu (Female) age 12 - 1997 in Kenema - Displaced and extorted. Abducted.

Nalli, Tommy (Male) - 1993 in Bagbo, Bo District - Killed.

Nallie, Anthony (Male) - 1995 in Kakua, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Nallo, Alieu (Male) - 1993 in Lugbu, Bo District - Killed.

Nallo, Amidu (Male) - 1991 in Lugbu, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Nallo, Brima (Male) - 1994 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Nallo, Janet (Female) age 25 - 1995 in Kissi Tongi, Kailahun - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Forced to labour.

Nallo, Joe Jusu (Male) - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Nallo, Joseph (Male) - 1994 in Kamajei, Moyamba - Killed.

Nallo, Kadie (Female) - 1994 in Lugbu, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Nallo, Mohamed (Male) - 1994 - Limb amputated and forced to participate in an act of cannibalism.

Nallo, Momoh (Male) - 1993 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Killed.

Nallo, Sandufu (Male) - 1992 in Bagbo, Bo District - Abducted and detained.

Nallo, Sundufu (Male) - 1993 in Bagbo, Bo District - Extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Nallo, Yatta (Female) - 1995 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Nambi, Jaia (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.

Nanah, Nga (Female) age 56 - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Property looted. Killed.

Nanoh, Sahr (Male) - 1992 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced. Abducted. Assaulted.

Nanoh, Sia (Female) age 19 - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Nanor, Vaii age 32 - 1999 in Fiama, Kono - Displaced and property destroyed.

Nasuwa, Kerry (Male) - Killed.

Navo, Joe (Male) age 55 - Extorted and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Navo, Musu (Female) age 24 - 1997 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Navo, Umaru (Male) - Abducted and detained.

Nboma, Lissa (Male) age 20 - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured. Killed.

Nboma, Silvalie (Male) age 69 - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained.

N'dama, Alie (Male) - 2000 in Briama, Kambia - Displaced.

Ndanema, Baidu (Female) age 25 - 1995 in Kowa, Moyamba - Property looted and destroyed. Killed.

Ndanema, John (Male) age 45 - 1995 in Kowa, Moyamba - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Ndanema, Lassayo (Male) - Displaced and property looted.

Ndanema, Vandy (Male) - 1996 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Killed.

Ndangima, Mohamed (Male) age 48 - 1992 in Barri, Pujehun - Property looted. Forced to labour.

Ndeyila, Mustapha (Male) age 7 - 1995 - Assaulted.

Ndimawa, Alieu (Male) - 1999 - Property destroyed.

Ndimawa, Alieu (Male) - 1996 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Ndimawa, Vandi (Male) - 1996 in Kakua, Bo District - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Ndimawa, Vandy (Male) age 27 - 1991 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained.

Ndiyah, Saffie (Female) age 12 - 1995 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Tortured.

Ndoeka, Brima (Male) age 39 - 1991 in Koya, Kenema - Extorted.

Ndoenje, Larua (Male) - 1996 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Ndoinyanie, Foday (Male) - 1994 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced.

Ndoko, Jeneba (Female) age 11 - 1995 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Ndoko, Peter (Male) age 55 - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Ndokoi, Lohoi (Male) - Extorted and property looted. Assaulted.

Ndomahina, Bangalie (Male) - 1995 - Abducted and detained.

Ndomahina, Joe (Male) - 1995 - Abducted and detained.

Ndomahina, Kadie (Female) - 1995 - Abducted and detained.

Ndomahina, Margaret (Female) - 1995 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Killed.

Ndomahina, Smart (Male) age 72 - 1995 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Ndomboi, Iye (Female) age 7 - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Neekah, Mustapha (Male) age 95 - 1991 - Extorted.
 Neima, Jenneh (Female) - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Killed.
 Neima, Yeabu (Female) - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Killed.
 Nello, Yema (Female) age 9 - 1992 in Bagbo, Bo District - Abducted and detained.
 Nermaloma, David Gibao (Male) age 56 - 1998 - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Nemghun, Ansu (Male) - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Killed.
 Nessie Amadu, Nesie (Female) age 38 - 1993 in Koya, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Ngabai, Samuel (Male) age 69 - 1997 in Bumpeh, Moyamba - Extorted and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and stripped.
 Ngabai, Slena (Female) - 1995 in Kpanda Kemo, Bonthe - Killed.
 Ngagba, Aiah (Male) age 54 - 1991 in Gbane, Kono - Displaced.
 Ngagba, Edith (Female) age 30 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Ngagba, Jibao (Male) age 30 - 1991 in Langorama, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained.
 Ngagba, Kamaoh Quee (Male) age 73 - 1996 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced.
 Ngagba, Kobatie (Male) age 26 - 1997 in Gaura, Kenema - Extorted. Forced to labour.
 Ngagba, Kumba (Female) age 40 - 1992 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced.
 Ngagba, Micheal Quee (Male) age 58 - 1996 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Killed.
 Ngagba, Moses (Male) age 12 - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Ngagba, Musu (Female) - 1995 - Abducted and detained.
 Ngagba, Sahr (Male) age 16 - 1999 in Gbense, Kono - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Ngagba, Sarrah (Female) - 1994 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced.
 Ngagba, Semineh - 1995 - Abducted and detained.
 Ngagba, Solomon (Male) age 52 - Killed.
 Ngagba, Tamba (Male) age 64 - 1992 in Gorama Kono, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour.
 Ngagba, Wusanie - 1995 - Abducted and detained.
 Ngaima, Tamba (Male) age 38 - 1998 in Kamara, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Ngaina, Andrew (Male) age 15 - Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Ngaluee, Joe (Male) - 1995 - Abducted and detained.
 Nganda, Tommy (Male) - 1997 in Bonthe - Killed.
 Ngandi, Sina (Female) - Killed.
 Ngaujah, Kai (Male) age 30 - 1998 in Fiama, Kono - Displaced and property looted. Tortured.
 Ngaujah, Musa (Male) age 34 - 1994 in Gbane, Kono - Displaced. Killed.
 Ngaujan, Theresa (Female) age 14 - 1999 in Maforiki, Port Loko - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Ngawe, Berry (Female) age 69 - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Ngawe, Jebeh (Female) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Abducted and detained.
 Ngawe, Luncinda (Female) age 13 - 1995 - Abducted.
 Ngawe, Samuel (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured. Killed.
 Ngawul, Isamuez (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Tortured. Killed.
 Ngboya, Adama (Female) age 20 - 1994 in Wunde, Bo District - Displaced and property looted.
 Ngebeh, Foday (Male) age 49 - 1998 in Peje Bongre, Kailahun - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Ngebeh, Vandi Alieu (Male) age 81 - 1997 in Peje Bongre, Kailahun - Property destroyed.
 Ngebu, Hatta (Male) - 1997 in Timdel, Moyamba - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Ngebuna, Mariama (Female) age 36 - 1996 in Gorama Kono, Kono - Extorted. Forced to labour.
 Ngebuva, Betty (Female) age 10 - 1995 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted. Tortured.
 Ngebuva, Frank (Male) age 5 - 1995 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted. Tortured.
 Ngebuva, Mabel (Female) age 4 - 1995 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted. Tortured.
 Ngebuva, Matu (Female) age 5 - 1995 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted. Tortured.
 Ngekia, Tamba Yombo (Male) age 39 - 1992 in Kamara, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured.
 Ngele, Jusu (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted.
 Ngele, Marie (Female) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted.
 Ngeva, Foday (Male) age 60 - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Ngiema, Aruna (Male) - Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.
 Ngiema, Juana (Male) - 1993 in Dama, Kenema - Killed.

Ngiema, Murana (Male) - Limb amputated.
 Njihun, Foday (Male) - 1996 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.
 Ngnajah, Finda (Female) age 75 - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Killed.
 Ngoajia, Mohamed (Male) - 1995 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Killed.
 Ngoatia, David Kuray (Male) age 47 - 1995 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Abducted.
 Ngoba, Mustapha (Male) - 1994 in Wunde, Bo District - Killed.
 Ngoba, Saata (Female) age 51 - 1991 in Simbaru, Kenema - Abducted and detained.
 Ngobeh, Bakkie - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Tortured. Killed.
 Ngobeh, Sahrco (Male) - 1995 - Killed.
 Ngoboi, Paul (Male) - Tortured. Killed.
 Ngolovo, James (Male) - 1995 in Kamajei, Moyamba - Abducted.
 Ngombeh, Sylvester (Male) - Displaced. Forced to labour.
 Ngombu, Amara (Male) - 1992 in Penguia, Kailahun - Killed.
 Ngombu, Mustapha (Male) age 50 - 1991 - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour.
 Ngombukila, Joe (Male) age 52 - 1995 in Kpanda Kemo, Bonthe - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Ngomor, Momoh (Male) - 1991 in Peje Bongre, Kailahun - Property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Ngonima, Joe (Male) - Killed.
 Ngunyahun, Amara (Male) age 52 - 1998 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Nguyei, Moray (Male) - 1998 in Bagbo, Bo District - Killed.
 Nicol, David (Male) age 55 - 1997 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Property looted. Detained. Assaulted.
 Nicol, Samuel (Male) age 20 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted.
 Nicol, Shar Me-Meh (Male) age 28 - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Niekah, Umaru (Male) age 50 - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Niko, Kambo (Male) - 2000 in Lei, Kono - Tortured.
 Njai, Musu (Female) - 1995 in Gbendemu Ngowahun, Bombali - Displaced. Tortured.
 Njamu, Messie (Female) - 1998 - Assaulted. Killed.
 N'jangba, Joe (Male) - 1995 in Yawboko, Bonthe - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Njegeh, Sahr (Male) - 1997 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Property destroyed.
 Njorlia, Vandy (Male) - 1998 in Sowa, Pujehun - Killed.
 Noah, Konima (Female) - 1997 - Displaced. Killed.
 Nonie, Magdaline (Female) age 33 - 1995 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Property destroyed.
 Norgon, Musu (Female) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed.
 Norman, Marie (Female) - 1991 in Simbaru, Kenema - Abducted and detained.
 Norman, Prince Abdulai (Male) age 32 - 1997 in Kaku, Bo District - Tortured. Killed.
 N'sama, Sahr (Male) - 1998 - Assaulted. Killed.
 Nune, Elizabeth (Female) age 45 - 1991 in Panga Krim, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Nuwaka, Adama (Female) age 24 - 1991 in Bagbo, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Nuyaba, Joe (Male) - 1997 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Killed.
 Nyaama, Finda (Female) age 33 - 1997 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced. Tortured.
 Nyabeh, Musu (Female) age 34 - 1992 in Upper Bambara, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Nyaboa, Hawa (Female) - Killed.
 Nyadndemoh, Magbendi (Female) age 55 - 1994 in Nimikoro, Kono - Killed.
 Nyahaminah, Shegbey (Male) age 21 - 1994 in Koya, Kenema - Property destroyed. Killed.
 Nyahayepoh, Hawa (Female) - 1996 - Displaced.
 Nyahayepoh, Isata (Female) age 24 - 1996 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Nyaka, Sahr (Male) age 26 - 1999 in Kono - Extorted. Detained. Tortured.
 Nyakoi, Kamoh Muadee (Male) age 65 - 1993 in Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Nyallay, Ahmadu (Male) - 1991 in Bagbo, Bo District - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and stripped.
 Nyallay, Amodu (Male) - 1992 in Wunde, Bo District - Tortured and stripped.

Nyallay, Lahai (Male) age 43 - 1991 in Tunkia, Kenema - Killed.

Nyallay, Momodu (Male) age 34 - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Nyallay, Vandy (Male) age 49 - 1997 in Koya, Kenema - Killed.

Nyama, Jeneba (Female) age 26 - Abducted and detained.

Nyamba, Momoh (Male) age 45 - 1991 - Abducted and detained. Stripped. Killed.

Nyambe, Brima (Male) - 1995 in Kpanda Kemo, Bonthe - Killed.

Nyamimor, Sia (Female) age 16 - 1994 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.

Nyamo, Eddison (Male) - Displaced and property looted.

Nyamuko, Finda (Female) age 54 - 1998 in Fiama, Kono - Displaced. Abducted. Assaulted and tortured. Killed.

Nyandebo, Alfred (Male) age 34 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Nyandebo, Komba (Male) age 16 - 1998 in Nimikoro, Kono - Killed.

Nyandebo, Tamba (Male) age 70 - 1992 in Gorama Kono, Kono - Property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Nyandebo, Tommy (Male) - 1995 in Timdel, Moyamba - Abducted.

Nyandemoh, Augustine (Male) age 39 - 1991 in Kamara, Kono - Assaulted and stripped.

Nyandemoh, Jeneba (Female) age 7 - Assaulted.

Nyandemoh, Kai (Male) age 63 - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Nyawa, Musa (Male) - 1991 in Peje West, Kailahun - Killed.

Nyawa, Saffa (Male) - 1992 in Dia, Kailahun - Tortured.

Nyawulo, Feimata (Female) - 1993 in Dia, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted. Killed.

Nyeteh, Tamba (Male) age 9 - 1998 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Nylander, George (Male) - 1997 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Abducted and detained.

Nylander, Margaret (Female) - 1992 - Displaced.

Nyohine, Ibrahim (Male) age 37 - 1994 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour.

Nyoma, Sahr (Male) age 3 - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Forced to labour. Killed.

Nyujaba, Eric (Male) - 1994 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Nyuma, Tamba (Male) age 11 - 1991 in Western Area - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Nyuyaba, Patrick (Male) - 1995 - Killed.

Ojo, Maada (Male) - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced.

Okala, Taju Deen (Male) age 22 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Okes, Sao (Male) - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Assaulted.

Omaru, Alhaji Alpha (Male) - 1991 in Lugbu, Bo District - Detained. Tortured.

Osho, Victoria (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Assaulted.

Ousman, Thomas (Male) - Killed.

Ova, Saffa (Male) age 38 - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and stripped. Killed.

Ovas, Ever (Female) age 26 - 1998 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Displaced and property looted.

Pabai, Sombo (Female) age 38 - 1991 in Dama, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed.

Pabai, Tennyson (Male) age 43 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced, extorted and property looted.

Palmer, Philip (Male) - 1996 in Luawa, Kailahun - Abducted. Tortured.

Palmer, Tommy (Male) - 1997 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Panda, George (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Extorted and property destroyed. Killed.

Paray, Abu (Male) - 1993 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Killed.

Passay, Bockarie (Male) age 48 - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained.

Passay, Jattu (Female) age 32 - 1992 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Killed.

Patrick, Njabu (Female) age 10 - 1996 in Small Bo, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Patrick, Sam (Male) age 42 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Paye, Momoh (Male) age 49 - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced and property destroyed.

Pearce, Lilian (Female) age 62 - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Killed.

Peku, Curtis (Male) age 39 - 1991 in Kwamebai Krim, Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Pennyikie, Shamanga (Male) age 27 - 1997 - Abducted. Tortured.

Penyikie, Kaimyande (Male) - 1991 in Kwamebai Krim, Bonthe - Killed.

Perryombo, Jainee (Female) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced. Tortured.
 Pessima, Alice (Female) age 24 - 1992 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced.
 Pessima, Ansumana (Male) age 35 - 1997 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Pessima, Francis (Male) age 44 - Tortured.
 Pessima, Isata (Female) age 58 - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Pessima, Lahai (Male) age 35 - 1995 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Forced to labour.
 Pessima, Lahai (Male) age 55 - 1994 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced and property looted. Abducted. Assaulted.
 Pessima, Michael (Male) age 42 - 1995 - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Pessima, Mohamed (Male) age 32 - 1994 in Nongowa, Kenema - Property looted. Tortured and limb amputated.
 Pessima, Momoh (Male) age 25 - 1994 in Niawa, Kenema - Abducted. Assaulted and stripped. Killed.
 Pessima, Safea (Male) - 1991 in Tankoro, Kono - Assaulted. Killed.
 Pessima, Sahr (Male) age 55 - 2000 in Lei, Kono - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.
 Pessima, Saidu (Male) - 1994 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Killed.
 Pessima, Tamba (Male) age 27 - 1997 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Petoll, Tommy (Male) - 1996 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Petus, Amara (Male) - 1998 in Luawa, Kailahun - Abducted and detained.
 Pewa, Safula (Female) age 35 - 1993 in Langorama, Kenema - Displaced.
 Pewa, Sengbe (Male) age 52 - 1993 in Langorama, Kenema - Displaced and property looted. Abducted. Assaulted and tortured.
 Pewah, Sahr (Male) age 54 - 1994 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour. Killed.
 Pexombo, Brima (Male) age 16 - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Peyemba, Momoh (Male) - 1997 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Property looted.
 Peyembo, Brima (Male) - 1997 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Property looted.
 Philie, Morray (Male) - Forced to labour.
 Pieh, Jebbeh (Female) - 1998 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Abducted and detained.
 Pimpy, Nengban (Male) - 1999 in Diang, Koinadugu - Assaulted.
 Pisie, Musa (Male) age 58 - 1991 - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Piyeh, Amara (Male) age 63 - 1991 in Lugbu, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Poro, Momoh (Male) - 1991 - Abducted and detained.
 Porreh, Mareh (Female) age 35 - 1998 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Potho, Abdul (Male) age 29 - 1998 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Powers, Ajua (Female) age 66 - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed.
 Powers, Samuel (Male) age 21 - 1999 in Western Area - Property looted. Killed.
 Pratt, Emmanuel (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Pratt, Hellen (Female) - 1994 - Displaced.
 Pratt, Remikeh (Female) age 51 - 1998 in Western Area - Property destroyed.
 Preneh, Abu (Male) - Property looted.
 Pujeh, Amara (Male) - 1995 in Bumpeh, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Pujeh, Kama (Female) - 1995 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Property destroyed. Killed.
 Pujeh, Kona (Female) - 1995 in Kwamebai Krim, Bonthe - Killed.
 Pujeh, Lamin (Male) age 22 - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced and extorted.
 Pujeh, Mamakanah (Female) - 1995 in Benducha, Bonthe - Killed.
 Pujeh, Massah (Female) - 1992 in Peje Bongre, Kailahun - Killed.
 Pumai, Jebbeh (Female) - 1994 in Kakua, Bo District - Killed.
 Pumbu, James (Male) - Limb amputated.
 Punyandeh, Komba (Male) age 31 - 1992 - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured.
 Puvande, Albert Abu (Male) age 72 - 1997 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Puvande, Joseph (Male) - 1995 in Niawa Lenga, Bo District - Extorted.
 Pyne, Albert (Male) - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour.
 Quee, Aiah (Male) - 2000 - Killed.

Quee, Dalinton (Male) age 67 - 1995 in Kowa, Moyamba - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted. Killed.
 Quee, Fatmata (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.
 Quee, J.W. (Male) - 1995 - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Quee, James (Male) age 70 - 1995 in Kowa, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Quee, Janet (Female) age 8 - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Killed.
 Quee, Joe (Male) age 32 - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Quee, Joseph (Male) age 20 - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.
 Quee, Joseph (Male) age 75 - 1996 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Quee, Michael (Male) age 39 - 1995 in Kowa, Moyamba - Killed.
 Quee, Musa (Male) age 52 - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed.
 Quee, Philip (Male) age 55 - 1995 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Extorted.
 Quee, Sahr (Male) - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Quee, Sahr (Male) - 1999 in Valunia, Bo District - Detained.
 Quee, Samuel (Male) age 3 - 1994 - Killed.
 Radder, Jojo - 1991 in Badjia, Bo District - Killed.
 Rahman, Abdul (Male) - 1998 in Port Loko - Killed.
 Rahman, Abdul (Male) - 1999 in Mambolo, Kambia - Displaced.
 Rashidu, Musu (Female) age 23 - 1995 in Nongowa, Kenema - Property destroyed. Forced to labour.
 Reason, Soa (Male) - Displaced.
 Reid, Agnes (Female) age 60 - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Abducted.
 Reid, Micheal (Male) age 34 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted.
 Robinson, Ema (Female) age 40 - 1998 in Diang, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Roberts, Agnes (Female) - 1992 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced.
 Roberts, Amie (Female) age 17 - 1994 in Kissi Tongi, Kailahun - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Roberts, Charles (Male) - 1994 in Malegohun, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Roberts, Daniel (Male) age 46 - 1995 - Displaced.
 Roberts, E.J.B. (Male) age 71 - 1992 in Gaura, Kenema - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.
 Roberts, Ekutami (Male) age 69 - 1997 in Western Area - Property looted.
 Roberts, Francis (Male) age 53 - 1995 - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Roberts, Mattu (Female) - 1994 in Kakua, Bo District - Displaced and extorted.
 Roberts, Samuel (Male) - Killed.
 Roberts, Samuel (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.
 Roberts, Sarian (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed.
 Rofers, Safula (Female) - 1991 in Peje, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Rogers, Abdulai (Male) - Property looted and destroyed.
 Rogers, Agatha (Female) - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Abducted.
 Rogers, Agnes (Female) age 22 - Assaulted.
 Rogers, Alhaji Senesie (Male) age 79 - 1991 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Property looted.
 Rogers, Alusine (Male) age 23 - 1991 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted.
 Rogers, Amadu (Male) - 1991 in Nongowa, Kenema - Killed.
 Rogers, Amadu (Male) age 18 - 1991 - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Rogers, Amie (Female) - 1991 in Peje, Pujehun - Displaced.
 Rogers, Andrew (Male) age 75 - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Killed.
 Rogers, Aruna (Male) - Killed.
 Rogers, Brima (Male) - 1993 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Tortured. Killed.
 Rogers, Brima (Male) age 34 - 1991 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted.
 Rogers, Ensa (Male) - 1994 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.
 Rogers, Fatmata (Female) age 30 - 1991 in Dodo, Kenema - Displaced. Forced to labour.
 Rogers, Foday (Male) - 1995 in Barri, Pujehun - Tortured.
 Rogers, Hassan (Male) age 26 - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Assaulted, tortured

and forced to participate in an act of cannibalism.

Rogers, Imamy (Male) age 33 - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Displaced and extorted. Stripped.

Rogers, Isata (Female) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed.

Rogers, Isatu (Female) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced. Tortured.

Rogers, Jattu (Female) - 1991 in Peje, Pujehun - Displaced.

Rogers, Jeneba (Female) - Property destroyed.

Rogers, Jestina (Female) - 1999 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted.

Rogers, Joseph V (Male) age 49 - 1991 in Peje, Pujehun - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour.

Rogers, Kadiatu (Female) age 45 - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Rogers, Koniema (Female) - 1997 in Bum, Bonthe - Killed.

Rogers, Maada (Male) age 18 - 1991 in Dodo, Kenema - Displaced. Forced to labour. Stripped.

Rogers, Manso (Male) - 1991 in Peje, Pujehun - Killed.

Rogers, Mariama (Female) age 60 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced.

Rogers, Mark (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Rogers, Mohamed (Male) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Killed.

Rogers, Mohamed (Male) age 21 - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Rogers, Mohamed (Male) age 31 - 1991 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Rogers, Mohamed (Male) age 35 - 1991 in Kagboro, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted. Abducted.

Rogers, Mohamed (Male) age 58 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted. Assaulted.

Rogers, Momodu (Male) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Rogers, Momodu (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Property destroyed. Killed.

Rogers, Momoh (Male) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Killed.

Rogers, Momoh (Male) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Rogers, Muktaru (Male) - Extorted. Abducted and detained.

Rogers, Mustapha (Male) age 27 - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Rogers, Mustapha (Male) age 39 - 1998 - Abducted.

Rogers, Musu (Female) age 35 - 1994 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced.

Rogers, Ramatu (Female) age 23 - 1991 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Rogers, Salia (Male) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced.

Rogers, Sheku (Male) age 40 - Extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Rogers, Shengbe (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Rogers, Sonny (Male) - 1994 - Tortured. Killed.

Rogers, Square (Male) - 1991 - Killed.

Rogers, Swamaa (Male) age 62 - 1991 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Rogers, Vakai (Male) - 1991 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Rogers, Vandii (Male) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Rogers, Yatta (Female) - 1991 - Abducted and detained.

Roy Bangura, John (Male) age 22 - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Rukor, Bai (Male) - 2000 in Briama, Kambia - Killed.

Saaba, Boakie (Male) - 1994 in Baoma, Bo District - Killed.

Saahun, Jebbeh (Female) - 1991 - Displaced.

Saama, Peter (Male) age 19 - 2000 in Kamara, Kono - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Saccoh, Abdulai (Male) - 1991 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Saccoh, Abdulai (Male) age 64 - 1999 in Biriwa, Bombali - Displaced and property looted.

Saccoh, Alhaji (Male) - 1997 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Detained.

Saccoh, Amie (Female) - 1994 in Bagbo, Bo District - Killed.

Saccoh, Ibrahim (Male) age 38 - 1998 in Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Saccoh, Mariatu (Female) age 40 - 1997 in Marampa, Port Loko - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Saccoh, Mohamed (Male) age 26 - 1996 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Saccoh, Sao (Male) - Killed.

Saffa, Alfred (Male) age 46 - 1991 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Saffa, Alie (Male) age 24 - 1998 - Abducted.

Saffa, Amie (Female) - 1994 in Simbaru, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Saffa, Aruna (Male) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Property destroyed.

Saffa, Aruna (Male) - 1996 in Nongowa, Kenema - Property destroyed.

Saffa, Baindu (Female) - 1991 in Upper Bambara, Kailahun - Abducted and detained.

Saffa, Bockarie (Male) age 40 - Killed.

Saffa, Bockarie (Male) age 49 - 1992 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Saffa, Bondu (Female) age 52 - 1998 - Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Saffa, Feimata (Female) - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Assaulted.

Saffa, Hawa (Female) - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Saffa, Hawa (Female) age 53 - 1996 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Saffa, Idriss (Male) age 24 - 1994 - Extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Saffa, Jattu (Female) age 18 - Displaced.

Saffa, John (Male) age 27 - Property looted. Killed.

Saffa, Joseph (Male) age 35 - 1992 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Saffa, Jusu (Male) age 28 - 2000 in Dia, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Saffa, Kona (Female) age 40 - 1995 - Killed.

Saffa, Kula (Female) age 10 - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Assaulted. Killed.

Saffa, Lahai (Male) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed.

Saffa, Lahai (Male) age 49 - 1997 - Displaced.

Saffa, Mamanie (Female) age 72 - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Saffa, Mambu (Male) - 1994 in Simbaru, Kenema - Assaulted. Killed.

Saffa, Miatta (Female) - 1996 - Extorted and property destroyed. Killed.

Saffa, Morie (Male) - 1991 in Upper Bambara, Kailahun - Abducted and detained.

Saffa, Musa (Male) - 1994 in Simbaru, Kenema - Displaced. Assaulted. Killed.

Saffa, Musa (Male) age 35 - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.

Saffa, Musa (Male) age 53 - 1993 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Saffa, Patrick S (Male) age 43 - 2000 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Extorted and property looted. Assaulted.

Saffa, Samu (Male) - 1991 in Yawei, Kailahun - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.

Saffa, Senesie (Male) - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Killed.

Saffa, Tamba (Male) - Displaced.

Saffa, Vandí (Male) age 45 - 1992 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced and extorted. Detained. Tortured.

Saffa, William (Male) age 75 - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Sagba, Francis (Male) - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Abducted. Killed.

Sahbeh, Aiah (Male) - 1992 in Nimikoro, Kono - Killed.

Sahr, Aruna (Male) age 34 - 1992 in Western Area - Displaced. Limb amputated.

Sahr, Fatmata (Female) age 21 - 1994 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Extorted.

Sahr, Fatu (Female) age 30 - 1992 in Yawei, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted.

Sahr, Lansana (Male) - 1992 in Malema, Kailahun - Killed.

Sahrefea, Finda (Female) age 14 - 1994 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Saidu, Amara (Male) age 16 - 1997 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Saidu, Baindu (Female) - 1992 in Langorama, Kenema - Killed.

Saidu, Emmanuel (Male) age 25 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Saidu, Fatu (Female) age 63 - 1991 in Langorama, Kenema - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Saidu, James Gbessay (Male) age 46 - 1993 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour.

Saidu, Katta (Male) age 12 - 1997 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Saidu, Michael (Male) age 27 - 1999 in Western Area - Forced to labour. Limb amputated.

Saidu, Mohamed (Male) age 15 - 1997 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Killed.

Saidu, Mohamed Alpha (Male) age 33 - 1995 in Banta Mokele, Moyamba - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Saidu, Musa (Male) age 23 - 1991 - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Saidu, Tom (Male) - 1999 - Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Saio, Simbelie (Male) - Assaulted.

Sakilla, Tamba (Male) - Killed.

Sakoh, Fanta (Female) - 1994 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Abducted.

Sakoh, Massima (Male) - 1994 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Killed.

Sakoh, Memuna (Female) age 25 - Abducted.

Sakoh, Mohamed (Male) - 1994 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Killed.

Sakoh, Sheku A.G. (Male) age 58 - 1994 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sakpa, Abdulai (Male) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Killed.

Sakpa, Bockarie Boakie Gbengie (Male) age 66 - 1991 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Sakpa, Foday (Male) - 1994 in Bumpah, Bo District - Killed.

Sakpa, Massah (Female) - 1991 - Tortured.

Sakpa, Mathew Brima (Male) age 22 - 1997 in Kakua, Bo District - Abducted and detained.

Sakpa, Miata (Female) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted and tortured.

Sakpa, Momoh (Male) age 32 - 1994 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced.

Sakpa, Momoh (Male) age 67 - Displaced. Tortured.

Sakpa, Munda (Male) age 60 - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted.

Sakpa, Musu (Female) age 34 - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Displaced.

Sakpeps, Mattu (Female) - 1991 - Property looted.

Sakpu, Momoh (Male) - 1994 in Banta Mokele, Moyamba - Killed.

Salame, Momoh (Male) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.

Salia, Every (Male) - 1996 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Killed.

Salia, George (Male) - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Extorted and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.

Salia, Isata (Female) - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Salia, Joseph (Male) - Displaced and property destroyed.

Salia, Mohamed (Male) age 25 - 1997 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Salia, Momoh (Male) - 1994 in Kakua, Bo District - Killed.

Salia, Saffa (Male) age 42 - 1996 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Displaced.

Salia, Safula (Female) - 1994 in Tikonko, Bo District - Displaced. Assaulted. Killed.

Salia, Sama (Male) age 41 - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Salieu, Baby (Female) - 1997 - Forced to participate in an act of cannibalism. Killed.

Sallieu, Fatie (Female) age 39 - Displaced.

Sallieu, Fatu (Female) age 45 - Killed.

Sallieu, Joe (Male) - 1993 in Bagbo, Bo District - Assaulted.

Sallieu, Joe (Male) - 1995 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Sallieu, Lansana (Male) - Abducted.

Sallieu, Massa Baby (Female) - Displaced and property destroyed.

Sallieu, Morray (Male) - 1995 - Displaced. Abducted.

Sam, Aiah (Male) - 1998 in Mandu, Kailahun - Abducted.

Sam, Aiah (Male) age 22 - 1991 in Penguia, Kailahun - Displaced.

Sam, Anthony (Male) - 1994 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Sam, Bobor (Male) age 23 - 1995 in Kamajei, Moyamba - Displaced. Abducted.

Sam, Bockarie (Male) age 50 - 1997 in Wandor, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed.

Sam, Finda (Female) age 17 - 1998 in Lei, Kono - Displaced.

Sam, Janneh (Female) age 26 - Forced to labour.

Sam, Jebbeh (Female) - 1994 in Wunde, Bo District - Displaced.

Sam, Jeneba (Female) age 42 - 1994 in Bagbe, Bo District - Displaced.

Sam, Joseph (Male) - 1994 - Killed.

Sam, Khon (Male) - Killed.

Sam, Kong (Male) - 1997 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Killed.

Sam, Margaret (Female) - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Property looted. Assaulted.

Sam, Margaret (Female) - 1994 in Komboya, Bo District - Abducted and detained.

Sam, Mary (Female) - 1994 in Komboya, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Sam, Mary (Female) age 33 - 1991 in Penguia, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Sam, Morlai (Male) - Assaulted and tortured. Killed.

Sam, Moses (Male) - 1996 in Bumpah, Moyamba - Tortured.

Sam, Musa (Male) age 55 - Displaced. Tortured.

Sam, Peter (Male) - Displaced.

Sam, Sahr (Male) age 24 - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Sam, William (Male) age 11 - 1994 - Forced to labour.

Sam King, Kanneh (Male) - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Sama Jebea, Samai (Male) age 24 - 1997 in Makpele, Pujehun - Property destroyed.

Samai, Abu Bakarr (Male) - Killed.

Samai, Abu Bakarr (Male) age 9 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Samai, Alhaji (Male) age 66 - 1997 in Makpele, Pujehun - Killed.

Samai, Allieu (Male) age 17 - 1992 in Simbaru, Kenema - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Samai, Alphan (Male) age 62 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Samai, Ansumana (Male) - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed.

Samai, Augustine (Male) age 44 - 1994 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Samai, Belewa (Male) age 11 - 1992 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Samai, Bobor (Male) - 1995 in Banta Mokele, Moyamba - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Samai, Brima (Male) - 1992 in Makpele, Pujehun - Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.

Samai, Brima (Male) - Property looted and destroyed.

Samai, Brima (Male) age 58 - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced and extorted. Assaulted.

Samai, Fatmata (Female) age 22 - 1993 in Yawei, Kailahun - Abducted.

Samai, Foday (Male) - Abducted and detained.

Samai, Haja (Female) age 90 - 1998 - Killed.

Samai, Hawa (Female) age 19 - 1993 in Dama, Kenema - Displaced. Assaulted.

Samai, Janneh (Female) age 51 - 1998 in Mandu, Kailahun - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained.

Samai, Jaria (Female) - 1998 in Makpele, Pujehun - Killed.

Samai, Jebbeh (Female) - 1991 in Kwamebai Krim, Bonthe - Property looted.

Samai, Jonathan (Male) - 1995 - Abducted and detained.

Samai, Joseph (Male) - 1998 - Property destroyed.

Samai, Jumu (Male) - 1994 in Malen, Pujehun - Detained.

Samai, Jusu (Male) - Killed.

Samai, Keifa (Male) age 60 - 1991 in Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Samai, Lansana (Male) - Property destroyed.

Samai, Massah (Female) age 65 - 1994 in Nomo, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Samai, Memuna (Female) age 26 - 1996 in Dodo, Kenema - Displaced. Killed.

Samai, Momoh (Male) - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Forced to labour.

Samai, Momoh (Male) age 64 - 1996 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced.

Samai, Momoh (Male) age 72 - 1991 in Tunkia, Kenema - Property looted. Killed.

Samai, Musa (Male) - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Forced to labour.

Samai, Mustapha (Male) age 19 - 1991 in Pujehun - Extorted. Forced to labour. Stripped.

Samai, Nasu (Female) age 56 - 1993 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.

Samai, Noah (Male) - 1997 in Nongowa, Kenema - Killed.

Samai, Safiatu (Female) age 23 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Samai, Vandi (Male) - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Samai, Vandi (Male) - 1998 in Malema, Kailahun - Killed.

Samai, Vandi (Male) - 1998 in Mandu, Kailahun - Abducted. Assaulted and stripped. Killed.

Samai, Watta (Female) age 55 - 1991 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Detained.

Assaulted.

Samai, Wuya (Female) age 35 - 1998 in Wandor, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Samai, Wuyah Kema (Female) age 58 - 1994 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced and property destroyed.

Samatu, Munda (Male) - 1995 in Malegohun, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Samawa, James (Male) - 1995 in Kakua, Bo District - Assaulted.

Samaya, Lamin (Male) - Displaced.

Samba, Abu (Male) - 1998 in Bonthe - Killed.

Samba, Borbor (Male) - 1994 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Killed.

Samba, Chernor (Male) - 1998 in Kakua, Bo District - Killed.

Samba, Ibrahim (Male) age 40 - 1993 in Mafindor, Kono - Property looted. Tortured.

Samba, Juana (Male) - Detained.

Samba, Kenie (Male) age 37 - 1992 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Samba, Komba (Male) - 1998 in Gbane, Kono - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Samba, Mabinty (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted.

Samba, Messie (Female) age 27 - 1992 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Samba, Momodu (Male) - 1994 in Baoma, Bo District - Killed.

Samba, Samuel (Male) - 1994 in Komboya, Bo District - Killed.

Samba, Tamba (Male) - 1999 in Nimikoro, Kono - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured. Killed.

Samking, Mussay (Male) age 47 - 1994 in Bagbe, Bo District - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Sam-King, Bobor (Male) - 1997 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Samodu, Jusu (Male) - 1991 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed.

Samokia, Junisa (Male) - 1991 in Kwamebai Krim, Bonthe - Assaulted.

Sam-Robbin, Margrette (Female) age 32 - 1996 - Assaulted.

Sam-Robbin, Missam (Male) age 60 - 1996 - Killed.

Samu, Augustine (Male) age 32 - 1999 in Bagbo, Bo District - Displaced.

Samu, Bockarie (Male) age 35 - 1994 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Tortured.

Samu, Brima (Male) - 1994 in Tikonko, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed.

Samu, Kenia (Female) age 13 - 1996 in Niawa, Kenema - Abducted.

Samu, Sulaiman (Male) - 1999 in Bagbo, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Limb amputated. Killed.

Samuels, Abu Karfoh (Male) age 42 - 1995 in Kamajei, Moyamba - Property looted and destroyed.

Samuels, Munda (Male) age 34 - 1995 - Displaced. Forced to labour. Limb amputated.

Samuels, Saffa (Male) - 1991 in Yawei, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Samuels, Sallieu (Male) age 13 - Abducted. Assaulted.

Samuka, Abu (Male) - 1998 - Killed.

Samuka, Joseph E.S. (Male) age 43 - 1995 in Kpanda Kemo, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted.

Samura, Abdulai (Male) - 1999 - Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.

Samura, Abu (Male) - 1999 - Property looted.

Samura, Alhaji (Male) - 1998 in Baoma, Bo District - Forced to labour.

Samura, Alibunafan (Male) age 42 - 1996 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted.

Samura, Alifu (Male) - 1998 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted.

Samura, Allieu (Male) - 1991 - Abducted and detained.

Samura, Andrew (Male) - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Abducted. Killed.

Samura, Assan (Male) age 24 - 1998 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted.

Samura, Bockarie (Male) - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Tortured.

Samura, Bockarie (Male) age 12 - 1991 in Dama, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted.

Samura, Brima (Male) - 1998 in Baoma, Bo District - Forced to labour.

Samura, Danser (Male) age 50 - 2000 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted.

Samura, Dantilie (Male) age 35 - 1998 in Dembelia Sinkunia, Koinadugu - Displaced.

Samura, Demba (Male) - 2000 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted. Killed.

Samura, Fasineh (Male) age 37 - 1998 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted.

Samura, Fasineh (Male) age 50 - 1998 in Baoma, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and

destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Samura, Fatmata (Female) age 23 - 1998 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Samura, Foreh (Male) - 1998 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Displaced.

Samura, Foreh Sewa (Male) age 56 - 1998 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Samura, Hassan (Male) age 40 - 1998 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained.

Samura, Isatu (Female) - 1999 - Displaced. Abducted.

Samura, Issa (Male) - 1999 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Samura, Jeneba (Female) age 38 - 1998 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Samura, John (Male) age 24 - Extorted. Assaulted.

Samura, Kaday (Female) - 1999 in Follofaba Dembelia, Koinadugu - Assaulted.

Samura, Kadiatu (Female) - 1995 - Assaulted.

Samura, Kadie (Female) - 1998 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed.

Samura, Kalifa (Male) - 2000 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Property destroyed.

Samura, Karifala (Male) age 44 - 1999 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Samura, Karijala (Female) age 43 - 1998 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Samura, Kindo (Female) age 24 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.

Samura, Kumba (Female) age 40 - 1998 in Follofaba Dembelia, Koinadugu - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Samura, Kuriya (Female) age 60 - 2000 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Samura, Mahmoud (Male) age 15 - 1999 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Forced to labour and drugged. Assaulted.

Samura, Mohamed (Male) - 1998 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Displaced.

Samura, Momodu (Male) age 47 - 1998 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Extorted and property looted. Forced to labour.

Samura, Momodu (Male) age 63 - 1999 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Samura, Mordie (Male) age 60 - 1998 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted.

Samura, Mustapha (Male) age 32 - 2000 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Samura, Ousman (Male) - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Samura, Percy (Female) - 1998 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Displaced. Assaulted.

Samura, Saidu (Male) age 46 - 1999 in Masungbala, Kambia - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Samura, Saio (Female) age 36 - 2000 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Tortured.

Samura, Saio (Male) age 43 - 1998 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Samura, Salifu (Male) - 1998 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced.

Samura, Salifu (Male) age 53 - 1999 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Property looted.

Samura, Sama (Male) age 35 - 1999 in Koya, Port Loko - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Samura, Sana (Male) - 1998 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Tortured.

Samura, Santigie (Male) age 37 - 1998 in Baoma, Bo District - Property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Samura, Sawmie (Male) - 1998 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Forced to labour.

Samura, Sheriff (Male) - 1998 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Abducted. Killed.

Samura, Sierrah (Female) - 1999 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Abducted and detained.

Samura, Sorie (Male) - 1999 in Briama, Kambia - Property destroyed. Killed.

Samura, Sorie (Male) - 1998 in Baoma, Bo District - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Samura, Sulaiman (Male) age 25 - 1998 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Displaced.

Samura, Suma (Male) age 51 - 1998 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Forced to labour.

Samura, Tadie (Female) age 9 - 1998 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Assaulted. Killed.

Samura, Tommy Adn (Male) - 1994 in Simbaru, Kenema - Killed.

Samura, Umaru (Male) - 1998 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Property destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted. Killed.

Samura, Yelli (Female) - Displaced and property looted. Abducted. Tortured.

Samura, Yereh (Male) - 2000 in Neini, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained.

Samura, Yereh (Male) - 1998 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Samura, Yereh (Male) age 59 - 1998 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Samura, Zainab (Female) - 1996 in Western Area - Limb amputated.

Sanbola, Foday (Male) age 68 - Killed.

Sanda, Bockarie (Male) - 1992 in Malen, Pujehun - Killed.

Sandi, Abdulai (Male) - 1995 in Komboya, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Sandi, Adama (Female) - 1992 in Fiama, Kono - Abducted and detained.

Sandi, Adama (Female) - 1997 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Abducted and detained.

Sandi, Agnes (Female) age 21 - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Forced to labour. Tortured.

Sandi, Aiah (Male) - 2000 in Soa, Kono - Killed.

Sandi, Anthony (Male) age 54 - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Killed.

Sandi, Brima (Male) age 10 - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Sandi, Duramany (Male) age 10 - 1995 - Displaced.

Sandi, Fatmata (Female) age 31 - 1995 in Timdel, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Sandi, Fea (Female) - 1992 in Fiama, Kono - Abducted and detained.

Sandi, Finda (Female) - 1992 in Fiama, Kono - Abducted and detained.

Sandi, Francis (Male) - 1994 in Tikonko, Bo District - Killed.

Sandi, Inatorma (Female) age 32 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Sandi, James (Male) age 47 - 1994 in Tikonko, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sandi, Jane (Female) - 1995 in Kpanda Kemo, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sandi, Jeneba (Female) age 38 - 1997 in Sittia, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted.

Sandi, Komba (Male) - Displaced.

Sandi, Kumba (Female) age 28 - 1992 in Fiama, Kono - Forced to labour. Tortured.

Sandi, Mohamed (Male) age 3 - 1998 in Koinadugu - Abducted. Tortured.

Sandi, Momoh (Male) - 1998 in Koya, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Sandi, Momoh (Male) age 34 - 1991 in Bonthe - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Sandi, Musa (Male) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed.

Sandi, Saffa (Male) age 30 - 1998 in Koya, Kenema - Abducted and detained.

Sandi, Saffia (Male) age 35 - 2000 in Soa, Kono - Displaced. Tortured.

Sandi, Sahr (Male) - 1992 in Fiama, Kono - Abducted and detained.

Sandi, Sallu (Male) age 46 - Property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Sandi, Sia (Female) - 2000 in Soa, Kono - Killed.

Sandi, Sorh Francis Jaba (Male) - 1995 in Yawbeko, Bonthe - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Sandi, Surma (Male) age 38 - 1995 - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.

Sandi, Susana (Female) - 1992 in Fiama, Kono - Abducted and detained.

Sandi, Tamba (Male) - Displaced. Limb amputated.

Sandi, Tamba (Male) age 34 - 1998 - Extorted and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Sandi, Tamba (Male) age 55 - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Sandi, Vandi (Male) - Killed.

Sandi, Yei (Female) - 1992 in Fiama, Kono - Abducted and detained.

Sandifu, Morie (Male) age 15 - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced.

Sandola, Mariama (Female) age 52 - Displaced.

Sandu, Maasudu (Male) - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced.

Sandy, Aliou (Male) - 1991 - Extorted and property destroyed.

Sandy, Amadu (Male) age 33 - 1997 in Kenema - Assaulted. Killed.

Sandy, Amara (Male) - 1993 in Sowa, Pujehun - Abducted.

Sandy, Baindu (Female) age 25 - 1998 in Peje Bongre, Kailahun - Killed.

Sandy, Foday (Male) - 1992 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Killed.

Sandy, Fofana (Male) - 1997 in Badjia, Bo District - Forced to labour.

Sandy, Joe (Male) age 35 - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Killed.

Sandy, Joseph (Male) age 111 - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Killed.

Sandy, Juma (Male) age 51 - 1992 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced and extorted. Tortured.

Sandy, Kienre (Male) - 1995 in Baoma, Bo District - Property looted.

Sandy, Lahai (Male) - Displaced. Assaulted.

Sandy, Lamin (Male) - Property destroyed.

Sandy, Marie (Female) age 43 - 1994 in Koya, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed.

Sandy, Momoh (Male) age 47 - Extorted. Assaulted.

Sandy, Moses (Male) - 1998 in Follosaba Dembelia, Koinadugu - Forced to labour.

Sandy, Nabieu (Male) age 40 - 1995 in Baoma, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sandy, Saffiatu (Female) age 27 - 1994 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted. Tortured.

Sandy, Sam (Male) - 1997 in Simbaru, Kenema - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Sandy, Samuel (Male) - 1997 in Kakua, Bo District - Assaulted.

Sandy, Sharka (Male) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sandy, Sia (Female) age 76 - 1998 in Nimiyama, Kono - Abducted. Killed.

Sandy, Simore (Male) - 1997 in Badjia, Bo District - Forced to labour.

Sandy, Smart (Male) - 1992 in Sowa, Pujehun - Extorted. Forced to labour.

Sandy, Yelie (Female) age 42 - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed.

Sandy, Yirah (Male) - Tortured.

Sangarie, Fatmata (Female) age 50 - 1994 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sangarie, Sheku (Male) - 1994 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Killed.

Sangeh, Momoh (Male) - 1992 in Malen, Pujehun - Killed.

Sangie, Massaih (Female) - 1995 - Abducted and detained.

Sani, Abraham (Male) - 1997 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Extorted. Assaulted and tortured.

Sanjawali, Tommy (Male) - 1994 in Kakua, Bo District - Killed.

Sankarie, Lamina (Male) - 2000 in Wara-Wara Bafodia, Koinadugu - Assaulted.

Sankoh, Abdul (Male) age 29 - 1999 - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted. Tortured and limb amputated.

Sankoh, Abdulai (Male) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted.

Sankoh, Abdulai (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.

Sankoh, Abdulai (Male) age 38 - 1995 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Sankoh, Abdullai (Male) age 53 - 1999 in Kholifa Mabang, Tonkolili - Property looted. Assaulted and stripped.

Sankoh, Abu (Male) - 1995 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Killed.

Sankoh, Abu (Male) - 1994 in Tikonko, Bo District - Killed.

Sankoh, Abu (Male) age 36 - 1997 in Port Loko - Displaced and property destroyed.

Sankoh, Abu (Male) age 50 - 2000 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Tortured and stripped.

Sankoh, Abu Bakarr (Male) - 1998 in Maforki, Port Loko - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Sankoh, Abu Bakarr (Male) age 28 - 2000 in Safroko Limba, Bombali - Displaced. Assaulted.

Sankoh, Adama (Female) - 1997 in Samu, Kambia - Property looted.

Sankoh, Alhaji (Male) age 54 - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Sankoh, Alimamy (Male) age 16 - 1999 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Extorted. Abducted. Tortured.

Sankoh, Alpha (Male) - Abducted and detained.

Sankoh, Alusine (Male) - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour.

Sankoh, Alusine (Male) - 1998 - Abducted. Tortured. Killed.

Sankoh, Alusine (Male) - 2000 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed.

Sankoh, Alusine (Male) age 36 - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Property looted and destroyed.

Sankoh, Amadu (Male) age 25 - 1994 in Kholifa Mabang, Tonkolili - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured. Killed.

Sankoh, Amadu (Male) age 44 - 1994 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sankoh, Amadu (Male) age 75 - 1995 - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Sankoh, Amidu (Male) - Displaced and extorted.

Sankoh, Amidu (Male) - 1999 - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Sankoh, Amidu (Male) - Forced to labour.
 Sankoh, Aminata (Female) - Displaced.
 Sankoh, Bockarie (Male) - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Property looted.
 Sankoh, Brima (Male) age 44 - 1994 in Konike Sande, Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Sankoh, Brima (Male) age 74 - 1994 - Killed.
 Sankoh, Dankeh (Female) age 23 - 1996 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Displaced.
 Sankoh, Fatmata (Female) - Abducted and detained.
 Sankoh, Fatmata (Female) age 17 - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Forced to labour.
 Sankoh, Foday (Male) age 8 - 1997 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Sankoh, Fudia (Female) age 62 - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Killed.
 Sankoh, Gassimu (Male) age 34 - 1994 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Displaced. Tortured.
 Sankoh, Ibrahim (Male) age 21 - 1995 in Loko Massama, Port Loko - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Sankoh, Ibrahim (Male) age 39 - 1997 - Displaced and extorted. Assaulted.
 Sankoh, Isatu (Female) - 1997 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Extorted.
 Sankoh, Isatu (Female) age 45 - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Sankoh, Issa (Male) age 7 - 1999 in Sanda Magblonthor, Port Loko - Assaulted and tortured.
 Sankoh, Iye (Female) age 65 - Displaced and extorted.
 Sankoh, James (Male) age 30 - 1991 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Sankoh, Jeneba (Female) age 50 - 1995 in Kpanda Kemo, Bonthe - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted. Tortured.
 Sankoh, John (Male) - Assaulted.
 Sankoh, Kadiatu (Female) - 1995 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Sankoh, Karimu (Male) age 2 - 1997 in Marampa, Port Loko - Tortured. Killed.
 Sankoh, Komrabai (Male) - Property looted and destroyed. Assaulted. Killed.
 Sankoh, Lamina (Male) age 70 - 2000 - Extorted and property looted. Forced to labour.
 Sankoh, Lansana (Male) - Forced to labour. Killed.
 Sankoh, Mabinty (Female) age 56 - 1998 in Western Area - Killed.
 Sankoh, Marie (Female) - 1999 in Koya, Port Loko - Displaced.
 Sankoh, Marie (Female) - 1999 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.
 Sankoh, Marie (Female) - Displaced and property looted.
 Sankoh, Marie (Female) - 1998 in Kambia - Tortured. Killed.
 Sankoh, Marouf (Male) age 20 - 1998 - Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.
 Sankoh, Maulimu (Male) age 41 - 1991 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Sankoh, Mohamed (Male) - 1997 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Forced to labour.
 Sankoh, Mohamed (Male) - 1995 in Baoma, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.
 Sankoh, Mohamed (Male) - 1998 in Western Area - Killed.
 Sankoh, Mohamed (Male) age 41 - 1998 in Banta Mokele, Moyamba - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Sankoh, Mohamed (Male) age 42 - 1999 - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Assaulted and tortured.
 Sankoh, Mohamed (Male) age 77 - 1999 - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Sankoh, Mohamed Moray (Male) age 43 - 1996 in Magbema, Kambia - Property destroyed.
 Sankoh, Mohawa (Female) - 1994 in Kaffu Bullom, Port Loko - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained.
 Sankoh, Morlai (Male) age 16 - Abducted.
 Sankoh, Morlai (Male) age 57 - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Abducted and detained.
 Sankoh, Musa (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Detained.
 Sankoh, Ousman (Male) - Forced to labour.
 Sankoh, Ousman (Male) - Forced to labour.
 Sankoh, Rashid (Male) - 1994 in Tikonko, Bo District - Limb amputated. Killed.
 Sankoh, Roke (Male) - 1999 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Killed.
 Sankoh, Roke (Male) age 60 - 1995 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Sankoh, Rugie (Female) age 12 - 1999 - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Sankoh, Saidu (Male) - Abducted. Killed.

Sankoh, Saidu (Male) age 27 - 1996 in Kenema - Killed.

Sankoh, Salamatu (Female) - 1996 in Magbema, Kambia - Assaulted. Killed.

Sankoh, Salieu (Male) age 25 - Killed.

Sankoh, Sampha (Female) - 1994 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Abducted and detained.

Sankoh, Sanda (Male) age 34 - 1998 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Sankoh, Sellu (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced.

Sankoh, Shekman (Male) - 1992 in Konike Sande, Tonkolili - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Sankoh, Soko (Male) - 1997 in Samu, Kambia - Property looted. Killed.

Sankoh, Sonkemo (Female) - Property looted and destroyed. Killed.

Sankoh, Sorie (Male) - 1999 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Property looted and destroyed.

Sankoh, Sulaiman (Male) age 35 - Displaced.

Sankoh, Tejan (Male) - Tortured and stripped.

Sankoh, Usif (Male) - 1999 - Abducted. Tortured.

Sankoh, Yealee (Female) age 61 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sankoh, Yusuf (Male) age 50 - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Forced to labour.

Sankoh Yillah, Kadijatu Kubra Madam (Female) age 60 - 1999 in Mambolo, Kambia - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sannah, Boakie (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Property destroyed.

Sannah, Maseh (Female) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced.

Sannoh, Abdulai (Male) age 44 - 1991 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Sannoh, Abu (Male) - 1993 - Property destroyed. Killed.

Sannoh, Abu (Male) - 1991 in Small Bo, Kenema - Killed.

Sannoh, Alhaji Baimba (Male) age 34 - 1996 in Wunde, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Sannoh, Aminata (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.

Sannoh, Aminata (Female) age 26 - 1998 - Detained.

Sannoh, Arma (Male) age 50 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Sannoh, Bintu (Female) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed.

Sannoh, Bintu (Female) - 1991 in Mandu, Kailahun - Displaced.

Sannoh, Brima (Male) - 1994 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Sannoh, Brima (Male) age 40 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted.

Sannoh, Brima (Male) age 65 - 1991 in Koya, Kenema - Killed.

Sannoh, Dibor (Male) - 1993 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.

Sannoh, Emmanuel (Male) age 37 - 1995 in Benducha, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Sannoh, Foday (Male) - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.

Sannoh, Foday (Male) age 11 - 1998 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Sannoh, Foday (Male) age 28 - 1998 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Displaced.

Sannoh, Foday (Male) age 45 - 1993 in Kenema - Displaced.

Sannoh, Gladys (Female) age 25 - 1996 in Bagbo, Bo District - Displaced and property looted. Killed.

Sannoh, Hawa (Female) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced.

Sannoh, Hawa (Female) age 31 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Sannoh, Hawa (Female) age 44 - 1994 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Extorted. Forced to labour.

Sannoh, Jebeh (Female) - Assaulted.

Sannoh, Juana (Male) age 30 - 1997 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed.

Sannoh, Kemoh (Male) age 37 - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Sannoh, Lahai (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Property destroyed.

Sannoh, Lahai (Male) age 28 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Tortured.

Sannoh, Lahai K (Male) - 1991 in Upper Bambara, Kailahun - Killed.

Sannoh, Lamin (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.

Sannoh, Lansana (Male) age 45 - 1996 in Bagbo, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted. Tortured and stripped.

Sannah, Lansana (Male) age 47 - 1991 in Koya, Kenema - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Sannah, Lansana (Male) age 50 - 1993 in Dama, Kenema - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Sannah, Lusenii (Male) age 46 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted.

Sannah, Maddi (Female) age 35 - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Sannah, Mariama (Female) age 18 - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Sannah, Massah (Female) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.

Sannah, Mattia (Male) - 1997 in Dama, Kenema - Extorted and property looted.

Sannah, Mohamed (Male) - 1993 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.

Sannah, Mohamed (Male) - 1998 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Sannah, Mohamed (Male) age 22 - 1994 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced. Tortured.

Sannah, Mohamed (Male) age 56 - 1998 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and stripped.

Sannah, Mohamed Fonigei Jawia-Moi (Male) age 34 - 1991 in Nongowa, Kenema - Abducted and detained.

Sannah, Momoh (Male) - 1997 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced. Killed.

Sannah, Moriforay (Male) age 48 - 1998 in Neini, Koinadugu - Displaced.

Sannah, Moses (Male) - 1997 in Sittia, Bonthe - Detained.

Sannah, Munda (Male) - 1997 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Sannah, Mustapha (Male) - 1993 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Sannah, Mustapha (Male) age 61 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Extorted and property destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Sannah, Satia (Male) - 1998 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Sannah, Siallah (Male) - 1991 in Upper Bambara, Kailahun - Displaced.

Sannah, Tejan (Male) - 1994 in Tikonko, Bo District - Property looted and destroyed.

Sannah, Tenneh (Female) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced.

Sannah, Tiange (Female) age 25 - 1997 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Sannah, Tommy (Male) - 1997 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Abducted.

Sannah, Vandy (Male) - 1991 - Abducted. Killed.

Sannah, Wiata (Female) age 19 - 1999 in Western Area - Extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Sannah, Wuya (Female) age 57 - 1993 in Dama, Kenema - Killed.

Sannah, Wuya (Female) age 65 - Killed.

Sanoh M., Henry (Male) age 43 - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Santigie, Gbassay (Female) age 26 - 1995 in Banta Mokele, Moyamba - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Santigie, Tity (Female) age 39 - 1997 in Imperi, Bonthe - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Sanu, Abie (Female) age 32 - 1994 in Simbaru, Kenema - Displaced.

Sanu, Daniel (Male) age 68 - 1998 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour.

Sanu, Fatmata (Female) age 13 - 1998 in Koya, Port Loko - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured and limb amputated.

Sanu, Santigie (Male) - 1998 in Leibasgayahun, Bombali - Killed.

Sao, Francis (Male) - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and limb amputated.

Sao, Hawa (Female) - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted and tortured.

Sao, Momoh (Male) - 1992 in Barri, Pujehun - Detained.

Sapateh, Ramatu (Female) age 48 - 1998 in Maforki, Port Loko - Displaced. Tortured.

Sapawato, Tommy (Male) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Killed.

Sapha, Margrette (Female) - Abducted and detained.

Sapha, Vandi (Male) - 1995 in Koya, Kenema - Forced to labour.

Sargie, Tom (Male) age 49 - 1998 in Kaffu Bullom, Port Loko - Displaced.

Sarmu, Umaru (Male) - Displaced. Assaulted.

Sarty, Baidu (Female) - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted. Killed.

Saruqe, Sandy (Male) age 33 - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced.

Satic, Sakpa (Male) - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Satta, Konna (Female) age 50 - Displaced and property looted.

Satta, Lansana (Male) - 1994 in Yawei, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted. Killed.

Saudi, Adama (Female) - 1997 in Timdel, Moyamba - Abducted and detained.

Saw, Kadiatu (Female) age 29 - 1995 in Bonthe - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Sawaneh, Bambay (Male) age 15 - 1998 - Displaced. Limb amputated.

Sawaneh, Foday (Male) age 29 - 1997 in Loko Massama, Port Loko - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Sawaneh, Ibrahim (Male) age 51 - 1999 in Western Area - Extorted and property destroyed. Assaulted.

Sawaneh, Kainawova (Male) - 1991 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Property looted. Forced to labour. Killed.

Sawaneh, Musa (Male) - 1994 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Property looted and destroyed.

Sawaneh, Tiangeh (Female) age 7 - 1991 in Western Area - Displaced. Assaulted.

Sawyer, Anthony (Male) age 15 - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Displaced.

Sawyer, Bainatu (Male) - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Assaulted.

Sawyer, Fean (Male) - 1998 in Western Area - Abducted and detained.

Sawyer, Henry (Male) - 1991 - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained.

Sawyer, Matilda (Male) age 40 - Displaced and property looted.

Sawyer, Joseph (Male) age 16 - 1999 in Western Area - Forced to labour.

Sedekei, Sahr (Male) age 33 - 1999 - Displaced. Abducted. Assaulted.

Sefoi, Alie (Male) - 1995 in Kori, Moyamba - Killed.

Sei, Baby (Male) - 1995 in Kagboro, Moyamba - Displaced. Abducted.

Sei, Brima (Male) age 32 - 1992 in Niawa, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Sei, Brima (Male) age 40 - 1991 in Nomo, Kenema - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Sei, Duramani (Male) - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Sei, Eric (Male) age 36 - 1993 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Sei, Joe (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.

Sei, Momoh (Male) age 45 - 1992 in Niawa, Kenema - Abducted and detained.

Sei, Ousman (Male) age 53 - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.

Sei, Tommy (Male) age 35 - 1995 in Gbendembu Ngowahun, Bombali - Displaced.

Sei Rogers, Momoh (Male) age 55 - 1991 in Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed. Killed.

Seigeh, Momoh (Male) age 30 - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Seita, Wuya (Female) - 1997 in Makpele, Pujehun - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Seitua, Brima (Male) - 1991 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Killed.

Seitua, Foday (Male) age 47 - 1997 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Seitua, Hanasan (Male) age 51 - 1991 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Seitua, Jinnah (Male) age 24 - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Seitua, Jusu Kono Boy (Male) age 31 - 1992 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour.

Seitua, Mariama (Female) age 19 - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Seitua, Momoh (Male) age 64 - 1997 in Makpele, Pujehun - Killed.

Seitua, Sai (Male) age 84 - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Property destroyed. Assaulted.

Seituah, Sengbe (Male) age 50 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Seiwoh, Mattu (Female) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.

Seiyah, Joseph (Male) - 1995 in Kowa, Moyamba - Displaced.

Sekua, Saffa (Male) - 1991 - Tortured.

Sellu, Abel (Female) - 1997 in Dodo, Kenema - Displaced.

Sellu, Alhaji (Male) - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted. Tortured and stripped. Killed.

Sellu, Amara (Male) age 31 - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Tortured.

Sellu, Amara (Male) age 68 - 1996 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Sellu, Aminata (Female) - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted and tortured.

Sellu, Brima (Male) - 1995 in Kpanda Kemo, Bonthe - Killed.

Sellu, Brima (Male) age 32 - 1995 in Peje West, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Sellu, Fanta (Female) age 43 - 1996 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Sellu, Joe (Male) - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sellu, John (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced and property destroyed.

Sellu, Karimu C.Y. (Male) age 38 - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted. Detained. Assaulted.

Sellu, Kula (Female) - 1991 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Killed.

Sellu, Kumba (Female) age 27 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed. Detained.

Sellu, Kurah (Female) - 1998 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Abducted and detained.

Sellu, Mattu (Female) - 1995 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Abducted and detained.

Sellu, Mooray (Male) - 1995 in Dodo, Kenema - Abducted and detained.

Sellu, Ngaijeh (Male) - 1997 in Mandu, Kailahun - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted. Killed.

Sellu, Sama (Male) age 30 - 1994 in Peje Bongre, Kailahun - Displaced. Tortured.

Sellu, Samuel (Male) age 42 - 1996 in Bagbe, Bo District - Property destroyed.

Sellu, Sheku (Male) age 8 - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted.

Sellu, Susan (Female) age 23 - 1999 in Western Area - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Sellu, Tommy (Male) - 1997 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Sema, Jinnah (Female) - 1991 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Assaulted.

Semah, Duba (Male) - 1999 in Sanda Magblonthor, Port Loko - Killed.

Semah, Jinnah (Female) - 1991 in Peje Bongre, Kailahun - Killed.

Sembe, Yeama (Female) - 1995 in Sogbini, Bonthe - Displaced.

Semeh, Gabriel (Male) - 1994 in Kakua, Bo District - Killed.

Semendu, Sahr (Male) - 1999 in Gbense, Kono - Killed.

Senedah, Mohamed (Male) age 17 - 1997 in Bo District - Tortured.

Senese, Keine (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Killed.

Senesie, Adama (Female) age 37 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.

Senesie, Brima (Male) - 1996 - Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.

Senesie, Digba (Male) age 38 - 1995 in Kono - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Senesie, Finda (Female) age 13 - 1999 in Fiama, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Senesie, Fomba (Male) - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Killed.

Senesie, Franklyn (Male) age 26 - 2000 in Western Area - Tortured.

Senesie, Gassimu (Male) - 1996 - Abducted.

Senesie, Kenie (Male) - 1996 - Abducted and detained.

Senesie, Kennie (Male) age 42 - 1996 in Wandor, Kenema - Displaced.

Senesie, Kona (Female) - 1991 - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Senesie, Lippia (Male) - 1996 in Niawa Lenga, Bo District - Killed.

Senesie, M.A. (Male) age 59 - 1994 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced.

Senesie, Mabinty (Female) age 30 - 1995 in Dasse, Moyamba - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Senesie, Momoh (Male) age 57 - 1995 in Kwamebai Krim, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted.

Senesie, Patrick (Male) - 1995 in Dasse, Moyamba - Tortured.

Senesie, Sahr (Male) age 33 - 1991 in Penguia, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Senesie, Sao (Male) age 30 - 1991 in Penguia, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.

Senesie, Tongowa (Male) - 1994 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Abducted and detained.

Senesie, Vandy (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.

Senesie, Woudie (Male) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Senessi, Aiah (Male) - 1998 in Gorama Kono, Kono - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted. Killed.

Senessi, Fatu (Female) age 33 - 1992 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted.

Senessi, Kumba (Female) age 48 - 1998 in Gorama Kono, Kono - Displaced and property looted and

destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Senessi, Steven (Male) age 46 - 1992 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Senessie, Aiah A (Male) age 28 - 1997 in Soa, Kono - Killed.

Senessie, Emmanuel (Male) age 10 - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced. Assaulted.

Senessie, Komba (Male) age 15 - 1997 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Senessie, Mohamed (Male) - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Senessie, Moray (Male) age 30 - 1991 - Killed.

Sengbe, Ibrahim (Male) age 47 - 1994 in Dodo, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed.

Sengbeh, Keikula (Male) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Property destroyed.

Sengbeh, Satta (Female) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Assaulted.

Sengeh, Abu (Male) age 23 - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Displaced.

Sengeh, Dauda (Male) - 1994 in Kakua, Bo District - Killed.

Sengeh, David (Male) - 1991 in Lugbu, Bo District - Killed.

Sengeh, Foday (Male) - 1994 in Malen, Pujehun - Killed.

Sengeh, Lansana (Male) age 44 - 1991 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Sengeh, Massah (Female) age 29 - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Displaced. Assaulted.

Sengeh, Mohamed (Male) - Abducted and detained.

Sengeh, Momoh (Male) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Killed.

Sengeh, Sumani (Male) - 1992 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.

Seray, Alpha (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Assaulted and stripped.

Serray, Aruna (Male) - Extorted.

Serry, Alie (Male) age 46 - 1998 in Kholifa Mabang, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Serry, Amadu (Male) - 1999 - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Serry, Amie (Female) age 38 - 1994 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Serry, Aruna (Male) - 1998 - Displaced.

Serry, James (Male) age 24 - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Serry, Mabinty (Female) age 17 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Serry, Ramatu (Female) age 11 - 1999 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Serry, Ramatu (Female) age 24 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed.

Serttia, Momoh (Male) age 45 - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted. Abducted.

Sesay, Abass (Male) - 1999 in Kassunko, Koinadugu - Tortured. Killed.

Sesay, Abass (Male) age 13 - 1998 - Forced to labour. Killed.

Sesay, Abass (Male) age 31 - 1994 - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted and tortured.

Sesay, Abdul (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Sesay, Abdul (Male) age 3 - 1998 - Displaced.

Sesay, Abdul (Male) age 25 - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed.

Sesay, Abdul (Male) age 27 - 1999 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Sesay, Abdul (Male) age 34 - 1996 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted.

Sesay, Abdul Rahman (Male) - 1999 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Sesay, Abdul Rahman (Male) - 1998 in Koya, Port Loko - Property destroyed.

Sesay, Abdulai (Male) - 1997 - Extorted.

Sesay, Abdulai (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Property looted.

Sesay, Abdulai (Male) age 7 - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Sesay, Abdulai (Male) age 20 - 1994 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.

Sesay, Abdulai (Male) age 37 - Displaced and property looted.

Sesay, Abdulai (Male) age 40 - 1998 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Sesay, Abu (Male) - 1995 in Sanda Magblonthor, Port Loko - Killed.

Sesay, Abu (Male) - 1999 in Marampa, Port Loko - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Sesay, Abu (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed.

Sesay, Abu (Male) - 1996 - Property looted. Killed.

Sesay, Abu (Male) - Killed.

Sesay, Abu (Male) - 1998 in Gbendemu Ngowahun, Bombali - Abducted and detained. Tortured and limb amputated. Killed.

Sesay, Abu (Male) - 1999 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced. Killed.

Sesay, Abu (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Killed.

Sesay, Abu (Male) age 1 - 1999 in Western Area - Limb amputated.

Sesay, Abu (Male) age 16 - 1991 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and stripped.

Sesay, Abu (Male) age 45 - 1998 in Follasaba Dembelia, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Sesay, Abu (Male) age 67 - 1994 in Neini, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed.

Sesay, Abu Bakarr (Male) - 1997 in Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed.

Sesay, Abu Bakarr (Male) age 28 - 1995 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Property destroyed. Killed.

Sesay, Adama (Female) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted.

Sesay, Adama (Female) - 1999 - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Sesay, Adama (Female) - 1998 - Limb amputated.

Sesay, Adama (Female) - 1999 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Property destroyed.

Sesay, Adama (Female) age 23 - 1999 in Western Area - Assaulted.

Sesay, Adama (Female) age 35 - 1998 - Displaced.

Sesay, Adama (Female) age 46 - 1996 - Displaced and property looted.

Sesay, Adikalig (Male) - 1999 in Tonko Limba, Kambia - Displaced, extorted and property looted.

Sesay, Albert (Male) age 37 - Displaced.

Sesay, Alhaji (Male) - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.

Sesay, Alhaji (Male) - Tortured.

Sesay, Alhaji (Male) - 1998 in Kakua, Bo District - Property destroyed.

Sesay, Alhaji Ibrahim (Male) - 1991 - Property looted and destroyed.

Sesay, Alhaji M.I. (Male) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Property destroyed.

Sesay, Alhaji Mohamed Lamin (Male) age 79 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Sesay, Alhaji Monya (Male) - 1998 in Jawie, Kailahun - Killed.

Sesay, Alice (Female) age 22 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted.

Sesay, Alie (Male) - 1995 in Kori, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sesay, Alie (Male) age 22 - Killed.

Sesay, Alie (Male) age 61 - 1999 - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Sesay, Alimamy (Male) - 1999 in Sanda Magblonthor, Port Loko - Killed.

Sesay, Alimamy (Male) - 1999 in Maforki, Port Loko - Displaced and property looted.

Sesay, Alimamy (Male) - 1998 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Sesay, Alimamy (Male) - 1999 in Leibasgayahun, Bombali - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Sesay, Alimamy (Male) - Killed.

Sesay, Alimamy (Male) - Displaced and property destroyed.

Sesay, Alimamy (Male) age 18 - 2000 in Samu, Kambia - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Sesay, Alimamy (Male) age 27 - 1999 in Gbendembu Ngowahun, Bombali - Displaced.

Sesay, Alimamy (Male) age 40 - 1998 in Dembelia Sinkunia, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sesay, Alimamy (Male) age 58 - 1997 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced.

Sesay, Allie (Male) - 1996 in Kongbora, Moyamba - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Sesay, Alpha (Male) - 1997 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Killed.

Sesay, Alpha (Male) - 1998 in Kaffu Bullom, Port Loko - Abducted and detained.

Sesay, Alpha (Male) - 2000 - Displaced.

Sesay, Alpha (Male) - 1999 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sesay, Alpha (Male) - 1994 in Yawei, Kailahun - Abducted and detained.

Sesay, Alpha (Male) age 9 - 1999 in Loko Massama, Port Loko - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Sesay, Alpha (Male) age 20 - Killed.

Sesay, Alpha (Male) age 43 - 1998 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Sesay, Alpha (Male) age 45 - 1998 - Killed.

Sesay, Alpha (Male) age 55 - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Tortured.

Sesay, Alpha (Male) age 78 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted.

Sesay, Alpha Bedor (Male) age 26 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted

and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Sesay, Alpha Taimu (Male) age 47 - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced and property looted.

Sesay, Alusine (Male) - Abducted and detained. Stripped.

Sesay, Alusine (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Killed.

Sesay, Alusine (Male) age 18 - 1996 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Displaced.

Sesay, Alusine Juana (Male) age 45 - 1997 in Mandu, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Sesay, Amadu (Male) - 1999 in Koya, Port Loko - Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Sesay, Amadu (Male) age 65 - 1995 in Maforki, Port Loko - Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Sesay, Amadu (Male) age 66 - 1999 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Killed.

Sesay, Amara (Male) age 23 - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.

Sesay, Amara (Male) age 54 - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sesay, Amie (Female) - 1997 - Displaced. Tortured.

Sesay, Amie (Female) - 1997 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Abducted and detained.

Sesay, Amie (Female) age 65 - 1994 in Nimiyama, Kono - Displaced and extorted.

Sesay, Aminata (Female) - 1998 - Property destroyed. Detained.

Sesay, Aminata (Female) - 1999 - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Sesay, Aminata (Female) - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted and forced to participate in an act of cannibalism.

Sesay, Aminata (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.

Sesay, Aminata (Female) age 32 - 1999 in Western Area - Assaulted.

Sesay, Aminata Baromie (Female) age 49 - 1994 in Kalansogia, Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed.

Sesay, Aruna (Male) - 1996 - Assaulted.

Sesay, Assana (Male) - 1998 in Kagboro, Moyamba - Killed.

Sesay, Babber (Male) - Killed.

Sesay, Baby (Female) - 2000 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Killed.

Sesay, Bai (Male) age 31 - 1998 in Magbema, Kambia - Displaced. Assaulted.

Sesay, Baimba (Male) age 18 - 1991 in Western Area - Displaced. Tortured.

Sesay, Baindu (Female) - 1991 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Killed.

Sesay, Bala (Male) age 34 - 1998 - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Sesay, Balie (Male) - 1994 in Gbense, Kono - Killed.

Sesay, Balla (Male) age 44 - 1997 in Mambolo, Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Sesay, Balla (Male) age 56 - 1998 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Assaulted.

Sesay, Bambeh (Female) - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Abducted and detained.

Sesay, Bangeya (Male) - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Sesay, Barica (Male) - 1992 in Gorama Kono, Kono - Displaced.

Sesay, Bockarie (Male) - 1997 in Simbaru, Kenema - Killed.

Sesay, Bockarie (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Killed.

Sesay, Bomkapr (Male) - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Sesay, Borbor (Male) - 1999 - Displaced.

Sesay, Borwoh (Male) - 1999 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Sesay, Brima (Male) - 1998 in Konike Sande, Tonkolili - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Sesay, Brima (Male) - 1995 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sesay, Brima (Male) - 2000 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and stripped.

Sesay, Brima (Male) - 1997 in Kwamebai Krim, Bonthe - Extorted and property looted. Detained.

Sesay, Brima (Male) - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Sesay, Brima (Male) - Killed.

Sesay, Brima (Male) - 1991 in Dodo, Kenema - Killed.

Sesay, Brima (Male) age 56 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Sesay, Brima Josephous (Male) age 50 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Property looted.

Sesay, Brima Saio (Male) age 41 - 1999 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Sesay, Brima Siaka (Male) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Property looted. Killed.
 Sesay, Collier (Male) age 55 - 1991 in Peje West, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted.
 Sesay, Combor (Male) - Killed.
 Sesay, Dakoh (Male) age 40 - 1998 - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Assaulted.
 Sesay, Damba (Male) - 1999 in Tambakka, Bombali - Abducted and detained.
 Sesay, Dauda (Male) - 1996 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced.
 Sesay, David (Male) age 26 - 1999 in Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained.
 Sesay, Digba (Female) - Killed.
 Sesay, Emma (Female) age 44 - 1997 - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Sesay, Emmanuel (Male) age 35 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Abducted.
 Sesay, Emmanuel (Male) age 41 - 1998 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Sesay, Famoroh (Male) age 10 - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Tortured.
 Sesay, Fanta (Female) - 1998 in Kassunko, Koinadugu - Killed.
 Sesay, Fasalie (Male) - 1998 in Follosaba Dembelia, Koinadugu - Abducted.
 Sesay, Fatmata (Female) - 1996 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Displaced and property looted. Abducted.
 Sesay, Fatmata (Female) - 1998 - Tortured.
 Sesay, Fatmata (Female) - 1998 - Property destroyed. Forced to labour.
 Sesay, Fatmata (Female) - 1991 in Kakua, Bo District - Killed.
 Sesay, Fatmata (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.
 Sesay, Fatmata (Female) age 24 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Sesay, Fatmata (Female) age 25 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained.
 Sesay, Fatmata (Female) age 31 - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed.
 Sesay, Fatmata (Female) age 53 - Displaced.
 Sesay, Fatmata Abu (Female) - 1997 in Bombali - Assaulted.
 Sesay, Fatu (Female) - 1991 in Kamara, Kono - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Sesay, Fatu (Female) - 1999 in Maforki, Port Loko - Killed.
 Sesay, Fatu (Female) - Displaced.
 Sesay, Fatu (Female) - 1998 - Killed.
 Sesay, Fatu (Female) - 1998 in Magbema, Kambia - Property destroyed. Tortured. Killed.
 Sesay, Fatu (Female) - 1996 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted.
 Sesay, Fatu (Female) age 38 - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed.
 Sesay, Fina (Female) - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Sesay, Fannah (Female) - 1998 - Detained. Assaulted.
 Sesay, Foday (Male) - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Abducted and detained.
 Sesay, Foday (Male) - 1998 in Kamara, Kono - Abducted and detained.
 Sesay, Foday (Male) - 1999 in Dembelia Sinkunia, Koinadugu - Assaulted. Killed.
 Sesay, Foday (Male) - 1998 in Koinadugu - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Sesay, Foday (Male) - Property looted.
 Sesay, Foday (Male) - 1999 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Displaced and extorted. Assaulted.
 Sesay, Foday (Male) - 2000 in Samu, Kambia - Assaulted.
 Sesay, Foday (Male) age 10 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Sesay, Foday (Male) age 20 - 1998 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Assaulted, tortured and limb amputated.
 Sesay, Foday (Male) age 37 - 1998 in Koinadugu - Property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.
 Sesay, Foday (Male) age 37 - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted.
 Sesay, Foday (Male) age 51 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Sesay, Foday Kenke (Male) age 43 - 1998 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Property looted. Forced to labour. Tortured and stripped.
 Sesay, Foray (Male) age 46 - 1998 - Property destroyed. Killed.
 Sesay, Gassimu (Male) - 1991 - Killed.
 Sesay, Gbanay (Male) age 31 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted.
 Sesay, Gbasse (Female) - 1994 - Tortured. Killed.
 Sesay, Gbla (Male) - 1999 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Property destroyed. Killed.
 Sesay, Haja (Female) - 1998 in Dia, Kailahun - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.
 Sesay, Haja (Female) age 13 - 1991 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced and extorted. Abducted. Assaulted and

tortured.

Sesay, Hassan (Male) - 1998 in Konike Sande, Tonkolili - Displaced. Tortured and limb amputated. Killed.
Sesay, Hassan (Male) age 33 - Displaced.
Sesay, Hassana (Male) - 1998 in Koinadugu - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.
Sesay, Hassana (Male) age 60 - 1994 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted and stripped.
Sesay, Hawa (Female) - 1998 - Abducted and detained.
Sesay, Hawa (Female) age 17 - 1996 in Kono - Displaced.
Sesay, Hawa (Female) age 56 - 1992 in Dia, Kailahun - Abducted and detained.
Sesay, Hawa (Female) age 58 - 1999 in Western Area - Property looted.
Sesay, Hippo (Male) - Property destroyed.
Sesay, Ibrahim (Male) - 1997 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced. Abducted.
Sesay, Ibrahim (Male) - 1997 - Property destroyed.
Sesay, Ibrahim (Male) age 18 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.
Sesay, Ibrahim (Male) age 22 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Killed.
Sesay, Ibrahim (Male) age 33 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
Sesay, Ibrahim (Male) age 35 - 1999 - Displaced and property destroyed.
Sesay, Ibrahim Koyo (Male) - 1995 in Bumpheh, Moyamba - Killed.
Sesay, Ibrahim Patho (Male) - 1999 in Bureh, Port Loko - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
Sesay, Ibrahim Sorrie (Male) age 38 - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.
Sesay, Idrissa (Male) age 38 - 1998 in Western Area - Property looted.
Sesay, Isata (Female) age 12 - 1999 in Western Area - Assaulted.
Sesay, Isata (Female) age 39 - 1996 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed.
Sesay, Isatu (Female) - 1999 in Kaffu Bullom, Port Loko - Abducted.
Sesay, Isatu (Female) - Displaced and property destroyed.
Sesay, Isatu (Female) age 25 - 1998 in Kissi Teng, Kailahun - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour.
Sesay, Ishmail (Male) - 1999 - Displaced.
Sesay, Ishmaila (Male) age 24 - 1995 in Moyamba - Property destroyed. Killed.
Sesay, Iye (Female) - 1995 in Kori, Moyamba - Abducted. Tortured. Killed.
Sesay, Iye (Female) - 1997 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Forced to labour. Killed.
Sesay, Iye (Female) - 1991 in Dama, Kenema - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
Sesay, James (Male) age 59 - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.
Sesay, James (Male) age 68 - 1996 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
Sesay, Jariatu (Female) - 2000 in Western Area - Abducted.
Sesay, Jebbeh (Female) - 1998 in Bumpheh, Bo District - Assaulted.
Sesay, Jebbeh (Female) age 9 - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
Sesay, Jenneh (Female) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.
Sesay, Jenneh (Female) - 1991 - Killed.
Sesay, Jenneh (Female) age 11 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced.
Sesay, John (Male) - 1998 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Killed.
Sesay, John (Male) - 1998 - Assaulted.
Sesay, John (Male) - 1998 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
Sesay, John (Male) age 7 - 1992 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Abducted and detained.
Sesay, John (Male) age 53 - 1999 in Briama, Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed.
Sesay, John (Male) age 56 - 1999 - Killed.
Sesay, Joselyn (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.
Sesay, Joseph (Male) age 9 - 1999 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Forced to labour. Tortured.
Sesay, Joseph (Male) age 26 - 1998 in Maforki, Port Loko - Property destroyed. Assaulted and tortured.
Sesay, Kabbah (Male) - Killed.
Sesay, Kaday (Female) age 44 - 1994 in Konike Sande, Tonkolili - Property destroyed.
Sesay, Kadiatu (Female) - 1995 in Buya Romende, Port Loko - Property destroyed.

Sesay, Kadiatu (Female) age 16 - 1996 - Abducted and detained.

Sesay, Kadiatu (Female) age 21 - 1998 in Safroko Limba, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted.

Sesay, Kadiatu (Female) age 27 - 1999 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Displaced. Tortured.

Sesay, Kadiatu (Female) age 34 - 1992 - Extorted and property destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted and tortured.

Sesay, Kadiatu (Female) age 46 - 1999 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Displaced.

Sesay, Kadiatu (Female) age 55 - 1998 in Port Loko - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sesay, Kadie (Female) - 1991 in Kakua, Bo District - Killed.

Sesay, Kaifea (Male) age 20 - 1994 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced.

Sesay, Kalie (Male) age 58 - 1998 - Killed.

Sesay, Kamanda (Male) age 6 - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Sesay, Kamatu (Female) age 47 - 1999 in Ribbi, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sesay, Kanda (Male) age 60 - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Property looted and destroyed.

Sesay, Kapri (Male) - 1994 - Displaced.

Sesay, Karifa (Male) age 38 - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Forced to labour.

Sesay, Kebbie (Male) age 50 - 1994 in Gbendembu Ngowahun, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sesay, Keikuda (Male) - Killed.

Sesay, Kekura Finneh (Male) - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Killed.

Sesay, Kendy (Male) - 1994 in Tikonko, Bo District - Property looted and destroyed.

Sesay, Kolleh (Male) age 42 - 1998 in Koinadugu - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and limb amputated.

Sesay, Koloneh (Female) age 49 - 1995 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Sesay, Kombo (Male) - 1998 in Gbendembu Ngowahun, Bombali - Limb amputated. Killed.

Sesay, Komeh (Female) age 25 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour.

Sesay, Konwa (Male) - 1998 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Sesay, Kula (Female) - 1991 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Killed.

Sesay, Kurtis (Male) - 1998 in Buya Romende, Port Loko - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Sesay, Lahai (Male) age 64 - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced.

Sesay, Lamin (Male) - 1995 - Killed.

Sesay, Lamin (Male) age 8 - 1999 - Forced to labour and drugged. Tortured.

Sesay, Lamin (Male) age 25 - 1998 in Magbema, Kambia - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sesay, Lansana (Male) age 35 - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Sesay, Lansana (Male) age 47 - 1999 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Property destroyed. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Sesay, Lansana (Male) age 65 - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Forced to labour.

Sesay, Lemoh (Female) - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced. Assaulted.

Sesay, Lima (Male) - 1998 in Bombali - Killed.

Sesay, Lovetta (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Extorted. Detained. Assaulted.

Sesay, Lucy (Female) age 30 - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced.

Sesay, Mabaa (Female) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Killed.

Sesay, Mabinty (Female) - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Sesay, Mabinty (Female) - 1999 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Forced to labour. Killed.

Sesay, Mabinty (Female) age 8 - 1999 in Western Area - Forced to labour.

Sesay, Mabinty (Female) age 15 - 1998 - Displaced and extorted. Assaulted.

Sesay, Mamadu (Male) - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Sesay, Mamawa (Female) - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Killed.

Sesay, Mamawa (Female) age 37 - 1991 in Langorama, Kenema - Displaced. Killed.

Sesay, Mambu (Male) age 44 - 1991 in Langorama, Kenema - Property destroyed. Killed.

Sesay, Mamodu (Male) - 1995 in Magbema, Kambia - Displaced.

Sesay, Marco (Male) - 1999 - Killed.

Sesay, Margrette (Female) age 36 - 1996 in Kagboro, Moyamba - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Sesay, Mariama (Female) - 1998 in Kassunko, Koinadugu - Assaulted and tortured.

Sesay, Mariama (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained.

Sesay, Mariama (Female) age 43 - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sesay, Mariatu (Female) age 9 - 1994 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Detained. Assaulted.

Sesay, Mariatu (Female) age 10 - 1998 in Tambakka, Bombali - Displaced. Abducted. Assaulted.

Sesay, Mariatu (Female) age 24 - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed.

Sesay, Marie - 1999 in Bureh, Port Loko - Killed.

Sesay, Marie (Female) age 27 - 1999 in Western Area - Extorted. Assaulted.

Sesay, Marie (Female) age 38 - 1999 in Loko Massama, Port Loko - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Sesay, Martin (Male) age 15 - 1995 in Magbema, Kambia - Displaced. Tortured.

Sesay, Mathew (Male) - 1994 in Wandor, Kenema - Killed.

Sesay, Memuna (Female) - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Sesay, Merah (Female) age 40 - 1998 - Displaced.

Sesay, Miatta (Female) age 24 - 1997 in Kailahun - Displaced.

Sesay, Michael (Male) age 39 - 1994 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced.

Sesay, Minata (Female) age 65 - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Displaced, extorted and property looted.

Sesay, Mohamed (Male) - 1994 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Assaulted.

Sesay, Mohamed (Male) - 1994 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Forced to labour.

Sesay, Mohamed (Male) - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Sesay, Mohamed (Male) - 1991 - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained.

Sesay, Mohamed (Male) - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Property looted. Killed.

Sesay, Mohamed (Male) - 1998 in Baoma, Bo District - Property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Sesay, Mohamed (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Sesay, Mohamed (Male) age 17 - 1999 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Sesay, Mohamed (Male) age 34 - 1998 in Wara-Wara Bafodia, Koinadugu - Extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Sesay, Mohamed (Male) age 35 - 1999 in Western Area - Detained. Assaulted. Killed.

Sesay, Mohamed (Male) age 36 - Killed.

Sesay, Mohamed (Male) age 36 - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Abducted. Limb amputated.

Sesay, Mohamed (Male) age 38 - 1995 in Magbema, Kambia - Displaced and property looted.

Sesay, Mohamed (Male) age 42 - 1996 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Sesay, Mohamed (Male) age 51 - 1998 - Displaced.

Sesay, Mohamed (Male) age 65 - 1994 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced and property destroyed.

Sesay, Mohamed Amadu (Male) - 1995 in Sanda Magblonthor, Port Loko - Killed.

Sesay, Mohamed Kanke (Male) age 25 - Displaced.

Sesay, Momodu (Male) - Extorted. Killed.

Sesay, Momodu (Male) - 1999 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Extorted. Assaulted and tortured. Killed.

Sesay, Momodu (Male) age 26 - 1991 - Killed.

Sesay, Momodu (Male) age 54 - 1997 in Tonko Limba, Kambia - Forced to labour.

Sesay, Momoh (Male) - 1995 in Kori, Moyamba - Tortured.

Sesay, Momoh (Male) - 1998 in Malema, Kailahun - Detained. Stripped.

Sesay, Momoh (Male) - 1999 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Property destroyed.

Sesay, Momoh (Male) age 31 - 2000 - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour.

Sesay, Momoh (Male) age 35 - Killed.

Sesay, Momoh (Male) age 37 - 1994 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Sesay, Momoh (Male) age 38 - 1998 in Port Loko - Displaced and property destroyed.

Sesay, Momoh (Male) age 49 - 1998 in Luawa, Kailahun - Forced to labour.

Sesay, Momoh (Male) age 55 - 1994 in Niawa, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Sesay, Momoh (Male) age 63 - 1999 - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Sesay, Moriforay (Male) - 1998 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sesay, Morlai (Male) age 60 - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured. Killed.

Sesay, Muda (Male) - 1991 - Killed.

Sesay, Mukor (Male) - 1999 - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Sesay, Murana (Male) age 38 - 1997 in Mambolo, Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed.

Sesay, Musa (Male) - 1995 in Sanda Magblonthor, Port Loko - Killed.

Sesay, Musa (Male) - 1999 in Safroko Limba, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sesay, Musa (Male) age 26 - 1997 in Nongowa, Kenema - Extorted. Abducted. Assaulted and tortured.

Sesay, Musa (Male) age 56 - 1999 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Assaulted and tortured.

Sesay, Musu (Female) - 1997 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced. Killed.

Sesay, Musu (Female) - Displaced and property looted.

Sesay, Nabie Musa (Male) age 73 - 1996 in Magbema, Kambia - Property destroyed.

Sesay, Nafatu (Female) - 2000 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured. Killed.

Sesay, Naferema (Female) age 65 - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Sesay, Neneh (Female) age 39 - 1997 - Displaced.

Sesay, Nenneh (Female) age 18 - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted. Killed.

Sesay, Neriah age 38 - 1995 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sesay, Nma (Female) age 82 - 1997 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed.

Sesay, Noah (Male) age 29 - 1999 in Western Area - Extorted. Forced to labour. Tortured and stripped.

Sesay, Obai (Male) age 28 - Displaced. Tortured.

Sesay, Ousman (Male) - 1998 - Killed.

Sesay, Ousman (Male) age 12 - 1997 in Western Area - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Sesay, Ousman (Male) age 33 - 1999 in Koya, Port Loko - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured and limb amputated.

Sesay, Paul (Male) - 1991 - Killed.

Sesay, Paul (Male) age 27 - 1999 in Safroko Limba, Bombali - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Sesay, Philip (Male) age 34 - 1999 in Biriwa, Bombali - Extorted. Abducted. Assaulted.

Sesay, Rado (Male) - Assaulted and tortured.

Sesay, Ramatu (Female) - Killed.

Sesay, Ramatu (Female) age 21 - 1999 in Western Area - Extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Sesay, Robert (Male) - 1998 in Safroko Limba, Bombali - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Sesay, Rugiatu (Female) - 1997 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Forced to labour. Killed.

Sesay, Rugiatu (Female) - 1998 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced. Abducted. Assaulted and tortured.

Sesay, Rugiatu (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Sesay, Sad Mambu (Male) age 60 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Sesay, Saffi (Female) - 1995 - Displaced.

Sesay, Saffie (Female) age 48 - 1999 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced.

Sesay, Saidu (Male) - 1998 in Leibasgayahun, Bombali - Killed.

Sesay, Saidu (Male) age 25 - 1999 - Killed.

Sesay, Saidu (Male) age 40 - Displaced.

Sesay, Saidu (Male) age 81 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sesay, Saio (Male) age 40 - 1999 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Sesay, Saio (Male) age 45 - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Sesay, Salamatu (Female) - 1999 in Maforki, Port Loko - Killed.

Sesay, Salifu (Male) age 4 - 1999 in Marampa, Port Loko - Assaulted.

Sesay, Sallay (Female) - 1997 in Port Loko - Displaced. Killed.

Sesay, Sallieu (Male) age 8 - 1998 in Safroko Limba, Bombali - Assaulted.

Sesay, Salliu (Male) age 13 - 1994 in Wandor, Kenema - Displaced.

Sesay, Sally (Female) - 1998 in Western Area - Abducted and detained.

Sesay, Salu (Male) age 24 - 1997 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Forced to labour.

Sesay, Samba (Male) age 20 - 1995 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Sesay, Samie (Male) age 46 - 1997 in Western Area - Tortured.

Sesay, Samuel (Male) age 39 - 1997 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Sesay, Samura (Male) - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Sesay, Santigie (Male) - 1998 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Sesay, Santigie (Male) - 1999 in Sanda Tendaren, Bombali - Property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Sesay, Santigie (Male) age 31 - 1994 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Sesay, Santigie (Male) age 35 - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted, tortured and limb amputated.

Sesay, Santigie (Male) age 41 - 1994 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Assaulted.

Sesay, Santigie (Male) age 86 - 2000 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced and property looted.

Sesay, Sao (Male) - 1996 - Killed.

Sesay, Sara (Female) - 1998 in Kassunko, Koinadugu - Assaulted and tortured.

Sesay, Sarah (Female) - 1998 - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured. Killed.

Sesay, Saynie (Male) age 35 - 1998 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed.

Sesay, Sembu (Male) - 1999 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Killed.

Sesay, Senneh (Male) age 57 - 1999 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Sesay, Sento (Female) age 16 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted.

Sesay, Shaika (Male) - 1991 in Dodo, Kenema - Killed.

Sesay, Shekah (Male) - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced.

Sesay, Sheku (Male) age 30 - 1999 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Property looted and destroyed. Killed.

Sesay, Sheku (Male) age 30 - 1998 in Koinadugu - Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Sesay, Sheku (Male) age 70 - 1999 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Property looted and destroyed. Killed.

Sesay, Sheriff (Male) age 38 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted. Assaulted. Killed.

Sesay, Shiaka (Male) - Killed.

Sesay, Siaka (Male) age 30 - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Abducted. Limb amputated.

Sesay, Siaka (Male) age 51 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Extorted and property looted. Abducted. Killed.

Sesay, Simethy (Female) - 1998 in Follosaba Dembelia, Koinadugu - Killed.

Sesay, Sinneh (Male) age 6 - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced. Abducted. Killed.

Sesay, Siray (Female) - 1997 - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Sesay, Sorie (Male) - 1999 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Sesay, Sorie (Male) - 1998 in Kaffu Bullom, Port Loko - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Sesay, Sorie (Male) - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Sesay, Sorie (Male) - 1999 in Gbendemu Ngowahun, Bombali - Abducted and detained.

Sesay, Sorie (Male) - 1991 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced. Assaulted.

Sesay, Sorie (Male) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sesay, Sorie (Male) - Forced to labour.

Sesay, Sorie (Male) - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Sesay, Sorie (Male) - 1995 in Safroko Limba, Bombali - Killed.

Sesay, Sorie (Male) - 1999 in Magbema, Kambia - Displaced. Assaulted and tortured.

Sesay, Sorie (Male) - 2000 in Tonko Limba, Kambia - Property destroyed.

Sesay, Sorie (Male) age 18 - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Sesay, Sorie (Male) age 31 - 1999 - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Sesay, Sorie (Male) age 43 - 1999 in Western Area - Extorted and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and stripped.

Sesay, Sorie (Male) age 47 - 1997 in Dodo, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.

Sesay, Sorie (Male) age 50 - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour.

Sesay, Sorie (Male) age 85 - Displaced and property looted.

Sesay, Sorie Bolo (Male) - 1999 in Diang, Koinadugu - Displaced. Killed.

Sesay, Subba (Male) age 16 - 1991 in Langorama, Kenema - Displaced.

Sesay, Sukurie (Female) - 1998 in Follosaba Dembelia, Koinadugu - Tortured.

Sesay, Sulaiman (Male) age 14 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Tortured and limb amputated.

Sesay, Sulaiman (Male) age 27 - 1997 in Jong, Bonthe - Extorted.

Sesay, Sumaila (Male) age 18 - 1995 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Sesay, Sylvester (Male) age 41 - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Stripped.

Sesay, Tamba (Male) - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.

Sesay, Tamba (Male) age 30 - Property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.

Sesay, Tenneh (Female) - 1991 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Property destroyed.

Sesay, Tenneh (Female) - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained.

Sesay, Tenneh (Female) age 20 - 1991 in Yakemo-Kpukumu Krim, Pujehun - Property destroyed. Detained.

Sesay, Tenneh (Female) age 70 - 1998 - Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.

Sesay, Thaim (Male) - 1998 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Sesay, Thamu (Male) - 1996 in Magbema, Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed.

Sesay, Umaru (Male) - 1994 - Property destroyed.

Sesay, Umaru (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.

Sesay, Unisa (Male) - 1997 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed.

Sesay, Unisa (Male) - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced. Tortured and limb amputated.

Sesay, Vandi (Male) age 48 - 1995 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Sesay, Vandi (Male) age 65 - 1991 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sesay, Woyoh (Male) - 1999 in Kassunko, Koinadugu - Tortured. Killed.

Sesay, Y.T. (Male) - 2000 - Property destroyed.

Sesay, Yabom (Male) - 1995 in Bumpeh, Moyamba - Killed.

Sesay, Yamarie (Female) - 1999 in Koya, Port Loko - Property looted.

Sesay, Yanku (Male) - 1998 in Diang, Koinadugu - Limb amputated.

Sesay, Yawor (Female) - 1998 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sesay, Yeanor (Female) - 1999 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Abducted. Assaulted.

Sesay, Yelie (Female) - 1998 - Detained.

Sesay, Yenebu (Male) - 1997 in Kissi Teng, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Sesay, Yenku (Female) - 1998 in Diang, Koinadugu - Limb amputated.

Sesay, Yie (Female) - 1999 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Killed.

Sesay, Yusufu (Male) age 31 - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Sesay, Zainab (Female) - 1998 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Sesay, Zainab (Female) age 31 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.

Sesay, Zairabu (Male) - 1999 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced.

Sesay, Zarah (Male) age 35 - 1991 in Mandu, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Sewa, Keltala (Male) age 34 - 1994 in Kalansogia, Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed.

Sewah, Baby (Female) - Forced to labour.

Sewolu, Musa (Male) - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Shaku, Hawa (Female) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Killed.

Shebureh, Jacors (Male) age 67 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed.

Shebureh, Sophia (Female) age 51 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed.

Sheika, Sao (Male) age 47 - 1996 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced.

Sheku, Abu (Male) age 22 - 1994 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Sheku, Aminata (Female) - 1991 in Lugbu, Bo District - Abducted and detained.

Sheku, Baby (Female) - 1995 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Sheku, Charles (Male) - 1994 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Property looted and destroyed. Tortured.

Sheku, Iye (Female) age 83 - 1993 in Simbaru, Kenema - Property destroyed.

Sheku, Jebbeh (Female) age 52 - 1998 in Langorama, Kenema - Tortured.

Sheku, Joe Lassie (Male) age 88 - 1996 in Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed.

Sheku, Martha (Female) - 1995 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Killed.

Sheku, Momoh (Male) age 29 - 1993 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced.

Sheku, Momoh (Male) age 65 - 1992 in Langorama, Kenema - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sheku, Satta (Female) - 1998 in Langorama, Kenema - Assaulted.

Shengbe, Vandi (Male) - 1993 in Sielenga, Bo District - Killed.

Sheriff, Abdul (Male) - Assaulted.

Sheriff, Abibatu (Female) age 40 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sheriff, Abu (Male) age 82 - 1996 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Sheriff, Adama (Female) age 24 - 1998 in Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Sheriff, Adama (Female) age 32 - 1996 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Sheriff, Alhaji Baba (Male) - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Killed.

Sheriff, Alhaji Issa (Male) - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Killed.

Sheriff, Alhaji M.B. (Male) - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Killed.

Sheriff, Alhaji Momodu (Male) age 38 - Displaced.

Sheriff, Alieu (Male) age 56 - 1995 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained.

Sheriff, Allieu (Male) age 60 - 1991 - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Sheriff, Alusine (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained.

Sheriff, Amara (Male) age 50 - 1993 in Wandor, Kenema - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Sheriff, Aminata (Female) - 1994 in Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sheriff, Aminata (Female) - 1995 - Killed.

Sheriff, Aminata (Female) age 9 - 1994 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Displaced.

Sheriff, Andrew (Male) - 1995 in Banta Mokele, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted. Abducted. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.

Sheriff, Ansumana (Male) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced.

Sheriff, Ansumana (Male) age 40 - 1991 in Simbaru, Kenema - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sheriff, Bassie (Male) age 24 - 1995 - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Sheriff, Binta (Female) - 2000 in Kassunko, Koinadugu - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Sheriff, Boi (Female) - 1991 - Property destroyed. Assaulted.

Sheriff, Brima (Male) age 32 - 1991 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Killed.

Sheriff, Fanta (Female) - 1998 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Sheriff, Fatmata (Female) - 1994 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Killed.

Sheriff, Fatmata (Female) - Property destroyed.

Sheriff, Fatmata (Female) age 10 - 1997 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced.

Sheriff, Fatmata (Female) age 38 - 1999 in Western Area - Extorted and property destroyed.

Sheriff, Fatty (Female) - 1994 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Killed.

Sheriff, Foday (Male) - 1995 - Property looted and destroyed. Killed.

Sheriff, Hafijun (Male) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Sheriff, Hawa (Female) - 1993 in Sowa, Pujehun - Forced to labour.

Sheriff, Hawa (Female) - 1996 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced.

Sheriff, Hawa (Female) age 26 - 1998 - Displaced.

Sheriff, Hawa (Female) age 73 - 1993 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced. Killed.

Sheriff, Ibrahim (Male) - Killed.

Sheriff, Ibrahim (Male) - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted, tortured and limb amputated.

Sheriff, Iye (Female) age 35 - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Sheriff, Jadu (Male) age 22 - 1992 in Nomo, Kenema - Displaced.

Sheriff, Jebbeh (Female) age 75 - 1996 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Sheriff, Jeneba (Female) - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Sheriff, Kaday (Female) - 1998 in Sanda Tendaren, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Sheriff, Kaddie (Female) age 22 - 1995 in Banta Mokele, Moyamba - Abducted and detained.

Sheriff, Kadie (Female) - 1991 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Killed.

Sheriff, Kadie (Female) age 35 - 1995 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Sheriff, Karmor (Male) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Killed.

Sheriff, Keineh (Male) - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Detained. Assaulted.

Sheriff, Khalilu - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained.

Sheriff, Lansana (Male) age 27 - 1997 in Small Bo, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Sheriff, Lansana (Male) age 29 - 1995 in Banta Mokele, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted.

Sheriff, Lansana (Male) age 38 - 1997 in Jong, Bonthe - Extorted and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Sheriff, M.A. (Male) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Property destroyed.

Sheriff, M.A. (Male) - 1998 in Kakua, Bo District - Property destroyed.

Sheriff, Makama (Female) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Tortured.

Sheriff, Mamako (Female) age 23 - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sheriff, Mariama (Female) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced.

Sheriff, Mariama (Female) age 25 - 1992 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted.

Sheriff, Mariama (Female) age 30 - 1991 - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed.

Sheriff, Mariama Lombe (Female) age 27 - 1991 in Simbaru, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted.

Sheriff, Marian (Female) age 47 - 1991 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Sheriff, Mohamed (Male) - 1997 - Assaulted.

Sheriff, Mohamed (Male) - 1994 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Displaced and property looted.

Sheriff, Mohamed (Male) age 20 - 1995 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.

Sheriff, Mohamed (Male) age 34 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Sheriff, Mohamed (Male) age 41 - 1995 in Western Area - Property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Sheriff, Mohamed (Male) age 69 - 1992 in Nomo, Kenema - Displaced. Killed.

Sheriff, Moiyia (Male) age 27 - 1998 in Mandu, Kailahun - Displaced. Detained. Assaulted and stripped.

Sheriff, Momodu (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Detained.

Sheriff, Momoh (Male) - 1995 in Kwamebai Krim, Bonthe - Killed.

Sheriff, Momoh (Male) - 1998 in Jawie, Kailahun - Killed.

Sheriff, Monya (Male) - 1998 in Malema, Kailahun - Detained. Stripped.

Sheriff, Morison (Male) - Abducted and detained.

Sheriff, Morlai (Male) - 1994 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Abducted. Tortured.

Sheriff, Musa (Male) - 1998 in Malema, Kailahun - Displaced.

Sheriff, Mustapha (Male) - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and stripped.

Sheriff, Musukala (Female) - 1994 - Displaced. Assaulted.

Sheriff, Patrick (Male) - Abducted. Killed.

Sheriff, Saidu (Male) - 1995 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Sheriff, Saudatu (Female) age 30 - Displaced.

Sheriff, Sheka (Male) age 68 - 1998 in Konike Sande, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Sheriff, Sheku (Male) age 19 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Sheriff, Sulaiman (Male) - 1995 in Moyamba - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Sheriff, Sulaiman M.B. (Male) age 20 - 1997 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured. Killed.

Sheriff, Sumaila (Male) age 10 - 1995 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Sheriff, Sundufu (Male) age 31 - 1991 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Assaulted.

Sheriff, Tenneh (Female) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sheriff, Vandi (Male) - 1998 in Jawie, Kailahun - Killed.

Sheriff, Watta (Female) age 50 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Sheriff, Yayah (Male) - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Sheriff, Yeabu (Female) - 1998 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Killed.

Sheriff, Zainab (Female) age 32 - 1991 in Valunia, Bo District - Displaced.

Shieka, Bobor (Male) - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Property looted.

Shieka, Brima (Male) - 1992 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Shieka, Foday (Male) - 1994 - Detained. Killed.

Shieka, Hawa (Female) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Shieka, Hawa (Female) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Killed.

Shieka, Jeneba (Female) - 1991 - Killed.

Shieka, Jitta (Female) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Shieka, Joe (Male) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Killed.

Shieka, Jusu (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Shieka, Kaima (Female) age 15 - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Assaulted.

Shieka, Kekula (Male) age 58 - 1997 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Tortured.

Shieka, Majisatu (Female) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Shieka, Mambu (Male) age 47 - 1991 - Killed.

Shieka, Sulaiman (Male) - 1994 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Shilon, Mary (Female) age 30 - 1998 in Mambolo, Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed.

Sia, Nyayo (Female) age 75 - 1998 in Neya, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Sia, Thomas (Male) age 32 - 1995 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Sia, Yomba (Female) age 26 - 1994 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Displaced, extorted and property looted.

Siaffa, Momoh (Male) age 47 - 1997 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Siama, Hawa (Female) - 1991 in Kailahun - Displaced. Killed.

Siawui, Vandi (Male) - Killed.

Sidikatu, Haja Balugun (Female) age 48 - 1991 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Killed.

Sidique, Alfred (Male) - 1995 in Tikonko, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted.

Sidique, Lamin (Male) - 1997 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Property looted. Assaulted.

Sidique, Marie (Female) - 1997 in Tikonko, Bo District - Killed.

Sillah, Abu (Male) - Property destroyed. Killed.

Sillah, Abu (Male) age 32 - 1993 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sillah, Albert Mohamed (Male) age 50 - 1994 in Luawa, Kailahun - Property looted and destroyed. Tortured.

Sillah, Alhaji (Male) - 1994 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Extorted.

Sillah, Allieu (Male) age 32 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted.

Sillah, Aminata (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained.

Sillah, Ansu (Male) - Displaced.

Sillah, Ansu (Male) - 1995 - Abducted. Killed.

Sillah, Ansumana (Male) - Displaced.

Sillah, Baindu (Female) - Displaced and property destroyed.

Sillah, Bobor (Male) - Displaced.

Sillah, Dauda (Male) age 33 - 2000 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Sillah, Duramane (Male) - Limb amputated.

Sillah, Fatmata (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sillah, Fatmata (Female) age 29 - 1994 in Gaura, Kenema - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sillah, Fatmata (Female) age 37 - 1994 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted. Abducted. Assaulted.

Sillah, Foday (Male) - Displaced.

Sillah, Foday (Male) - Limb amputated.

Sillah, Foday (Male) - Limb amputated.

Sillah, Foday Abass (Male) age 33 - 1999 in Magbema, Kambia - Displaced.

Sillah, Fodie (Male) age 33 - 1998 in Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili - Limb amputated.

Sillah, Gadiru (Male) - 1991 in Kwamebai Krim, Bonthe - Killed.

Sillah, Hawa (Female) - 1996 - Property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Sillah, Hawa (Female) age 48 - 1996 in Kono - Displaced and property destroyed.

Sillah, Imallah (Male) - 1999 - Displaced. Abducted.

Sillah, Iye (Female) age 24 - 1997 in Imperi, Bonthe - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Sillah, Joseph (Male) age 59 - 1997 in Gaura, Kenema - Displaced.

Sillah, Kadiatu (Female) age 24 - 2000 - Assaulted.

Sillah, Kadiatu F (Female) age 17 - 2000 in Jong, Bonthe - Assaulted.

Sillah, Kathy (Female) - 1998 - Displaced.

Sillah, Konah (Female) age 36 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Sillah, Lansana (Male) - Displaced.

Sillah, Mahmoud (Male) age 16 - 1999 - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Sillah, Memuna (Male) - 1998 in Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili - Killed.

Sillah, Mohamed (Male) age 13 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained.

Sillah, Mohamed (Male) age 21 - 1991 in Gaura, Kenema - Displaced.

Sillah, Mohamed (Male) age 23 - 1998 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Displaced and extorted. Detained. Assaulted and stripped.

Sillah, Mohamed (Male) age 51 - 1999 in Diang, Koinadugu - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Sillah, Moinima (Male) - 1995 - Abducted. Killed.

Sillah, Musa (Male) - 1996 in Imperi, Bonthe - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Sillah, Musa (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted.

Sillah, Nmodama (Female) - 1998 in Tambakka, Bombali - Displaced. Killed.

Sillah, Ousman (Male) - 1996 - Forced to labour.

Sillah, Ousman (Male) - 2000 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted.

Sillah, Saiyo (Male) - 1996 - Forced to labour.

Sillah, Salamatu (Female) age 43 - 2000 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced and property looted.

Sillah, Sallay (Female) age 57 - 1997 in Pujehun - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted.

Sillah, Sallay Kambejay (Female) age 53 - 1995 - Displaced. Abducted.

Sillah, Saynie (Male) - 1996 - Forced to labour.

Sillah, Sheku (Male) - 1993 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Sillah, Sorie (Male) - Limb amputated.

Sillah, Yusufu M. (Male) age 70 - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Silvalie, Brima (Male) - 1997 - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Simbo, Adama (Female) age 42 - 1991 in Kori, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted.

Simbo, Claude (Male) - 1995 in Valunia, Bo District - Killed.

Simbo, Edward (Male) - 1995 in Valunia, Bo District - Killed.

Simbo, Francis (Male) - 1995 in Valunia, Bo District - Killed.

Simbo, James (Male) age 25 - 1995 in Komboya, Bo District - Property looted. Forced to labour.

Simbo, Joe (Male) - 1996 - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Simbo, Joseph (Male) - 1995 in Valunia, Bo District - Killed.

Simbo, Mbalu (Female) age 24 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Simbo, Moses (Male) - 1995 in Valunia, Bo District - Killed.

Simbo, Sorba (Male) - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Simbo, Sumaila (Male) - 1994 in Moyamba - Abducted and detained.

Simbo, Tommy (Male) - 1995 in Valunia, Bo District - Killed.

Simoi, Kenny (Male) - 1991 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Extorted. Assaulted and tortured.

Sinnah, Betty (Female) age 33 - 1996 in Kakua, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted. Killed.

Sinnah, Julius (Male) age 57 - Killed.

Sinnah, Mark (Male) age 51 - 1996 in Kakua, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted.

Sinsedu, Tamba (Male) age 68 - 1998 - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Sipo, Marie (Female) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted.

Sippo, Francis (Male) - 1995 in Niawa Lenga, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Sisoqo, Mohamed (Male) - Assaulted. Killed.

Sitha, Momoh (Male) - Killed.

Sitta, Bockarie (Male) age 51 - 1992 in Langorama, Kenema - Killed.

Sitta, Luseni (Male) - 1991 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Extorted. Assaulted and tortured.

Sitta, Moiwa (Male) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Tortured.

Smart, Alfred (Male) - 1996 in Tikonko, Bo District - Abducted.

Smart, Alfred (Male) - 1996 in Baoma, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Smart, Alfred (Male) age 11 - 1995 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Killed.

Smart, Alimamy (Male) age 18 - 1999 in Dasse, Moyamba - Displaced.

Smart, Bobor (Male) - 1996 in Bagbe, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Smart, Gibril (Male) - 1994 in Kakua, Bo District - Killed.

Smart, Jamie (Female) age 36 - 1996 in Dodo, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Smart, Joe (Male) - 1994 - Displaced.

Smart, Joseph (Male) age 10 - 1995 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Killed.

Smart, Marie (Female) - 1995 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Killed.

Smart, Mary (Female) age 24 - 1997 in Western Area - Assaulted and tortured. Killed.

Smart, Mawonde (Female) age 16 - 1995 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Killed.

Smart, Sannoh (Male) - 1994 in Moyamba - Abducted and detained.

Smart, Sharka (Male) age 11 - 1995 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Killed.

Smith, Ambrose (Male) - 1995 in Western Area - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Detained. Stripped.

Smith, Bana (Male) - 1994 in Wunde, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Smith, Barnard (Male) - 1999 in Wunde, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Smith, Borbor John (Male) age 27 - 1991 in Dodo, Kenema - Killed.

Smith, Charles (Male) - 1995 in Bagbe, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Smith, Ciara (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Extorted.

Smith, Doris (Female) - 1995 in Valunia, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed.

Smith, Esther (Female) - 1995 in Bagbe, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Smith, John (Male) - 1995 in Western Area - Displaced. Killed.

Smith, Mariama (Female) age 28 - 1995 in Western Area - Displaced.

Smith, Mohamed (Male) age 26 - 1995 in Baoma, Bo District - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Smith, Moses (Male) - 1994 in Wunde, Bo District - Displaced.

Smith, Priscilla (Female) age 61 - 1998 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Tortured.

Smith, Sandy (Male) - 1993 in Sowa, Pujehun - Killed.

Smith, Victoria (Female) age 32 - 1998 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Soewu, Menjor (Male) - 1994 in Komboya, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Sofiana, Victor (Male) age 20 - 1998 in Kakua, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Sogbadie, Abdulai (Male) age 70 - 1998 in Safroko Limba, Bombali - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Sogbale, Foday (Male) - Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Sogbandi, Amie (Female) - 1992 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced and property looted.

Sogbandy, Saryoh (Male) - Killed.

Sogbandy, Saryoh (Male) - 2000 in Nongowa, Kenema - Killed.

Sogbeh, Aiah (Male) age 61 - 2000 in Lei, Kono - Displaced. Abducted. Tortured.

Sogbeh, Linda (Female) age 31 - Displaced.

Sogbeh, Sahr (Male) - Stripped. Killed.

Sogbeh, Sattu (Female) - 1994 in Lugbu, Bo District - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Sogbeh, Sia (Female) age 50 - 2000 in Lei, Kono - Abducted. Assaulted.

Sogbeh, Yomba (Male) age 41 - 1999 - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Sojoe, Kadie (Female) - Killed.

Soko, Bockarie (Male) age 58 - 1991 in Langorama, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed.

Soko, Brima (Male) - 1994 in Kissi Teng, Kailahun - Abducted. Killed.

Soko, Gibao (Male) - 1994 in Malen, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.

Soko, Kadie (Female) age 47 - 1997 in Langorama, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted.

Soko, Kenny (Male) - 1991 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Killed.

Soko, Mariama (Female) - 1994 in Malen, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.
 Soko, Moyatu (Female) - 1994 in Malen, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.
 Soko, Sia (Female) - 1998 in Soa, Kono - Killed.
 Sokwo, Momoh (Male) - Property destroyed.
 Soleh, Robert (Male) age 35 - 1999 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced.
 Solleh, Sahr (Male) - Killed.
 Solomon, Bessen (Male) age 56 - 1997 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Property looted. Stripped.
 Solomon, Robert (Male) - 1994 in Kakua, Bo District - Killed.
 Solomon, Sahr (Male) - 1994 in Gbane, Kono - Killed.
 Somaba, Aruna (Male) - Property destroyed.
 Somaila, Bockarie (Male) - 1993 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced. Killed.
 Somasa, Kadie (Female) - Forced to labour.
 Somasa, Momodu (Male) - Forced to labour.
 Sombai, Lansana (Male) age 25 - 1991 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted and tortured.
 Sombie, Amanda (Female) - 1995 in Kori, Moyamba - Killed.
 Sondufu, Joseph (Male) - 1997 in Kakua, Bo District - Property destroyed.
 Sondufu-Koroma, Ansumana-Saffa (Male) age 70 - 1995 in Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Songa, Brima (Male) age 52 - 1997 in Yawei, Kailahun - Forced to labour and drugged. Assaulted and tortured.
 Songa, Kawangbaro (Male) - 1995 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Displaced.
 Songa, Massa (Female) age 65 - Property destroyed. Assaulted.
 Songah, Baidu (Female) - 1994 in Lugbu, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Songah, Juanah (Male) - 1994 in Small Bo, Kenema - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and stripped.
 Songha, Abdulai (Male) - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Killed.
 Songha, Bobor (Male) - 1998 in Jawie, Kailahun - Assaulted.
 Songha, Musa (Male) - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Killed.
 Songha, Randi (Male) - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Killed.
 Songha, Vandi (Male) age 65 - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Displaced.
 Songu, Hindoveh-James (Male) age 40 - 1994 in Bagbe, Bo District - Property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.
 Songu, Matta (Female) - 1993 in Jong, Bonthe - Abducted and detained.
 Songu, Yamba (Male) - 1996 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Detained. Tortured and stripped. Killed.
 Soni, Malie (Male) - 2000 - Extorted. Killed.
 Sonie, Kula (Female) age 33 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Sonie, Mohamed (Male) - 1994 in Baoma, Bo District - Killed.
 Sonjor, Fatmata Sowoi (Female) age 54 - 1996 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted.
 Sonjor, Satta (Female) age 32 - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.
 Sonle, Sakpa (Male) age 40 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Sonna, Ambulai (Male) age 70 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Sonnie, Hassan (Male) age 50 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Sonnie, Momoh (Male) - 1991 in Upper Bambara, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted. Tortured.
 Sonnie - Seitwa, Angella (Female) - 1992 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced.
 Sonny, Jebeh (Female) - Displaced. Forced to labour.
 Sonsiama, Sahr (Male) age 31 - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.
 Sorbeh, Yema (Female) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained.
 Sorgai, Borbor (Male) - 1997 in Badjia, Bo District - Abducted and detained.
 Sorgbo, Keni (Male) - 1996 - Limb amputated.
 Soriba, Mustapha (Male) - 1995 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Killed.
 Sorie, Chernoh Ibrahim (Male) - 1998 - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted.
 Sorie, Fatmata (Female) - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Abducted and detained.
 Sorie, Khemeh (Male) - 1998 in Tambakka, Bombali - Assaulted.
 Sorie, Marah (Male) age 7 - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and

tortured.

Sorie, Nina (Female) age 9 - Displaced.

Sorie, Raymond (Male) age 26 - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Sorie, Sahr (Male) age 32 - 1998 in Mandu, Kailahun - Displaced and property destroyed. Detained. Stripped and limb amputated.

Sorko, Fudie Alie (Male) age 21 - 1992 in Bagbo, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed. Tortured.

Sorko, Joseph (Male) - 1994 - Displaced and property looted.

Sorkpoh, Bobor Deen (Male) - 1994 - Killed.

Sorra, Kanei (Male) - 1995 - Killed.

Sospo, Sarba (Male) age 41 - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted and tortured.

Sovla, Bockarie (Male) age 36 - 1992 in Upper Bambara , Kailahun - Property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Sovnlah, Joseph (Male) age 27 - 1995 in Nongowa, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.

Sovula, Brima (Male) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sovula, Simeon (Male) age 48 - 1994 - Property looted and destroyed.

Sovula, Simeon (Male) age 48 - 1994 in Kakua, Bo District - Property looted and destroyed. Detained.

Sow, Ali (Male) age 43 - 1999 in Biriwa, Bombali - Killed.

Sow, Alpha (Male) - 1996 in Tikonko, Bo District - Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Sow, Alusine (Male) age 31 - 1999 in Follosaba Dembelia, Koinadugu - Property looted. Killed.

Sow, Amadu (Male) - 1993 in Gbense, Kono - Killed.

Sow, Chernoh (Male) - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Sowa, Alice (Female) - 2000 in Kakua, Bo District - Property looted. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Sowa, Ansumana (Male) - Killed.

Sowa, Baidu (Female) - 1998 in Sowa, Pujehun - Property destroyed.

Sowa, Bockarie (Male) - 1992 in Jawie, Kailahun - Property destroyed. Killed.

Sowa, Haja (Female) age 45 - 1991 - Displaced and property looted.

Sowa, Jebbeh (Female) - 1993 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Tortured. Killed.

Sowa, Jebbeh (Female) age 37 - 1994 - Displaced.

Sowa, Joseph (Male) age 41 - 1998 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Property looted. Tortured.

Sowa, Kwa (Female) age 58 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Sowa, Lahai (Male) age 36 - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sowa, Lamin (Male) - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Killed.

Sowa, Modibah (Male) age 24 - 1994 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Sowa, Modibor (Male) - 1994 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Killed.

Sowa, Mohamed (Male) age 43 - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sowa, Moinina (Male) - 1993 in Peje, Pujehun - Property destroyed.

Sowa, Momoh (Male) age 48 - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Displaced.

Sowa, Moriba (Male) - 1992 in Barri, Pujehun - Detained.

Sowa, Pius (Male) age 45 - 1992 in Nomo, Kenema - Assaulted.

Sowa, Salia (Male) - 1994 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Killed.

Sowa, Sheku (Male) - 1993 in Sowa, Pujehun - Abducted.

Sowa, Thomas (Male) - Killed.

Sowa, Vandy (Male) - 1993 in Sowa, Pujehun - Killed.

Sowa, Vanley (Female) age 51 - 1991 in Dodo, Kenema - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Spencer, Francis (Male) age 38 - 1997 in Bumpeh, Moyamba - Displaced and extorted. Detained.

Squire, Alfred (Male) age 15 - 1995 in Bonthe - Displaced.

Squire, Alfred (Male) age 65 - 1997 - Abducted and detained.

Squire, Jello (Female) - Displaced.

Squire, Jeneba (Female) - Killed.

Squire, Massa (Female) - Displaced and property destroyed.

Squire, Micheal (Male) age 61 - 1997 in Imperi, Bonthe - Assaulted.

Squire, Momoh (Male) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced. Tortured.

Stevens, Beah (Male) - 1997 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Assaulted.

Stevens, Ibrahim (Male) age 15 - 1995 in Kori, Moyamba - Displaced.

Stevens, Idrissa (Male) age 24 - 1994 in Tikonko, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed.

Stevens, Joe (Male) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Sulaiman, Baidu (Female) age 24 - 1994 in Niawa Lenga, Bo District - Displaced.

Sulaiman, Brima (Male) age 16 - 1993 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Sulaiman, Mary (Female) - Killed.

Sully, Iye (Female) age 26 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced.

Suma, Abdul Rahman (Male) age 80 - 1998 in Tambakka, Bombali - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Suma, Abdulai (Male) age 53 - 1996 in Magbema, Kambia - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Suma, Abu (Male) age 67 - 1995 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced and property looted.

Suma, Abu Bakarr (Male) age 42 - 2000 - Displaced and property looted.

Suma, Alusine (Male) age 45 - 1998 in Tambakka, Bombali - Abducted. Killed.

Suma, Duramanie (Male) - 1998 in Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili - Limb amputated.

Suma, Fatmata (Female) - 1997 in Makpele, Pujehun - Killed.

Suma, Foday (Male) age 59 - 1992 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed.

Suma, Foday Abu (Male) age 50 - 2000 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Suma, Ibrahim (Male) - Killed.

Suma, Ibrahim (Male) age 15 - 1999 in Western Area - Forced to labour.

Suma, Kadiatu (Female) - 1999 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Suma, Kadiatu (Female) age 18 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained.

Suma, Kadiatu (Female) age 45 - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Suma, Lamin (Male) - 2000 in Samu, Kambia - Property looted.

Suma, Lansana (Male) - 1998 in Tambakka, Bombali - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Suma, Mabinty (Female) age 16 - 1999 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Killed.

Suma, Mohamed (Male) - 1998 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Tortured.

Suma, Mohamed (Male) age 41 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Suma, Mohamed Lamin (Male) age 57 - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted.

Suma, Morlai (Male) - 1998 in Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili - Abducted. Killed.

Suma, Morlai (Male) age 1 - 1998 in Koya, Port Loko - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Suma, Nanah (Female) age 38 - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Suma, Salifu (Male) - Displaced.

Suma, Samuel (Male) - Displaced.

Suma, Swarray (Male) - Displaced.

Sumah, Abdul Kasimu (Male) age 48 - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced.

Sumah, Alhaji (Male) - 2000 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Sumah, Alimamy (Male) age 70 - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sumah, Alusine (Male) age 41 - 2000 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced and property looted.

Sumah, Aminata (Female) - 2000 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced. Tortured.

Sumah, Hassan (Male) age 32 - 1999 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Sumah, Kankay (Female) age 40 - 1999 in Bumpeh, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sumah, M.K. (Male) - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Property looted.

Sumah, Mariama (Female) - 2000 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced.

Sumah, Mbambay (Male) - 2000 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced.

Sumah, Nabieu (Male) age 57 - 1992 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted.

Sumah, Nbaimba (Male) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Sumah, Nmah (Female) - 1999 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Killed.

Sumah, Sorieba (Male) age 22 - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained.

Sumaila, Alieu (Male) - 1997 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Sumaila, Karmoh (Male) - 1991 in Langorama, Kenema - Killed.

Sumaila, Mabudu (Male) - 1995 in Kailahun - Killed.

Sumaila, Mangundia (Female) - 1995 in Yawbeko, Bonthe - Property destroyed.

Sumaila, Michael (Male) age 31 - 1995 - Tortured and limb amputated.

Sumaila, Musa (Male) age 34 - 1992 in Dama, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed.

Sumana, Aiah (Male) age 15 - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Sumana, Amara (Male) age 70 - 1998 - Displaced.

Sumana, Finda (Female) - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Sumana, Kai (Male) age 38 - 2000 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced.

Sumana, Kumba (Female) - 2000 in Sandor, Kono - Killed.

Sumana, Sahr (Male) - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Sumeh, Alusine (Male) - 1998 in Tambakka, Bombali - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Sumochendeh, Aiah (Male) age 20 - 1998 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Sumodhendeh, Tamba (Male) age 37 - 2000 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Tortured and stripped.

Sumoe, Sahr (Male) age 34 - 1998 - Displaced and property looted.

Sumoiray, Sidikie (Female) age 28 - 1991 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Sundifu, Jusu (Male) age 53 - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted. Tortured.

Sundifu, Morie (Male) age 15 - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Tortured.

Sundifu, Morie (Male) age 35 - 1997 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Abducted. Killed.

Sundu, Komba (Male) - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Sundufa, Lahai (Male) age 50 - 1993 - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Sunkaila, Joseph (Male) age 54 - 1997 - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Supur, Ediewee (Male) - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Killed.

Swaray, Alusine (Male) - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Swaray, Amara (Male) - 1991 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Abducted. Assaulted. Killed.

Swaray, Ansu (Male) age 35 - 1992 in Dama, Kenema - Displaced, extorted and property looted.

Swaray, Augustine (Male) - 1991 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Displaced. Killed.

Swaray, Banard Koroma (Male) - 1991 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Displaced. Killed.

Swaray, Boackie (Male) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Property looted.

Swaray, Bockarie (Male) age 72 - 1996 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Displaced.

Swaray, Brima (Male) - Killed.

Swaray, Coker (Male) age 44 - 1999 in Wara-Wara Bafodia, Koinadugu - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Swaray, Fatmata (Female) age 30 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Swaray, Foday (Male) age 35 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Swaray, Gbaewa (Male) - 1991 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Displaced. Killed.

Swaray, Hawa (Female) age 9 - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Swaray, Hawa (Female) age 23 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced and extorted.

Swaray, James (Male) age 36 - 1998 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced. Assaulted and tortured.

Swaray, Janet (Female) age 46 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced.

Swaray, June (Female) - 1991 in Peje, Pujehun - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Swaray, Kadiatu (Female) age 19 - 1991 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Displaced.

Swaray, Kenie (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.

Swaray, Koroma (Male) - 1991 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Displaced. Killed.

Swaray, Kula (Female) age 43 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Detained.

Swaray, Lahai (Male) - 1993 in Peje, Pujehun - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Swaray, Lailai (Male) - 1992 in Peje, Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted. Killed.

Swaray, Lansana (Male) - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Swaray, Malama (Female) - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Killed.

Swaray, Mambu (Male) age 39 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted.

Swaray, Mohamed S (Male) age 21 - 1998 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour.

Swaray, Moifengeh (Female) age 47 - 1993 in Dama, Kenema - Displaced.

Swaray, Moigboi (Male) age 49 - 1992 in Makpele, Pujehun - Forced to labour. Killed.

Swaray, Moinania (Male) - 1997 in Wunde, Bo District - Killed.

Swaray, Momodu (Male) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.
 Swaray, Momodu (Male) age 45 - 1991 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Displaced and extorted. Assaulted and tortured.
 Swaray, Moriba (Male) age 78 - 1998 in Gaura, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Swaray, Marray (Male) age 37 - 1992 in Gaura, Kenema - Extorted and property destroyed. Abducted and detained.
 Swaray, Murana (Male) age 45 - 1993 - Displaced. Forced to labour. Killed.
 Swaray, Musa (Male) age 65 - 1991 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Swaray, Mustapha (Male) - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Forced to labour. Tortured.
 Swaray, Musu (Female) - 1991 in Niawa, Kenema - Abducted and detained.
 Swaray, Saffa (Male) - Killed.
 Swaray, Satta (Female) - Killed.
 Swaray, Sheku (Male) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Killed.
 Swaray, Tasie (Male) - Property destroyed. Tortured.
 Swaray, Theresa (Female) - 1996 in Nongowa, Kenema - Killed.
 Swaray, Theresa (Female) age 40 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Swaray, Umu (Female) age 31 - 1991 in Sielenga, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Swaray, Vandí (Male) - 1992 in Upper Bambara , Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Swaray, Wuyata (Female) age 15 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained.
 Swaray-Kpaka, Mamawa (Female) age 65 - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.
 Swarray, Alhaji Frank Amara (Male) age 65 - 1994 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.
 Swarray, Amie (Female) age 26 - Displaced. Abducted.
 Swarray, Ansu (Male) age 28 - 1994 - Displaced and property looted.
 Swarray, Baindu (Female) age 25 - 1994 in Nimikoro, Kono - Killed.
 Swarray, Boakie (Male) - 1993 in Badjia, Bo District - Killed.
 Swarray, Bockarie (Male) - Displaced. Killed.
 Swarray, Brima (Male) - 1995 in Kori, Moyamba - Killed.
 Swarray, Brima (Male) - 1992 in Sowa, Pujehun - Assaulted.
 Swarray, Brima (Male) - 1991 - Forced to labour. Killed.
 Swarray, Brima (Male) age 43 - 1999 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Assaulted.
 Swarray, Fatmata (Female) age 19 - 1999 in Nongowa, Kenema - Assaulted.
 Swarray, Foday (Male) age 15 - Displaced. Forced to labour.
 Swarray, Francis (Male) age 30 - 1994 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted.
 Swarray, Hawa (Female) age 8 - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.
 Swarray, Hawaguan (Female) - 1995 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Displaced.
 Swarray, Isata (Female) age 36 - 1992 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced.
 Swarray, Jeneba (Female) age 44 - 1991 in Peje, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Swarray, Kumba Satta (Female) - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Swarray, Lahai (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Property destroyed. Assaulted. Killed.
 Swarray, Maddi (Male) age 27 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Killed.
 Swarray, Mamako (Male) - Killed.
 Swarray, Mariama (Female) age 30 - 1991 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Assaulted.
 Swarray, Momoh (Male) - 1991 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted. Assaulted.
 Swarray, Momoh (Male) - 1991 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.
 Swarray, Momoh (Male) age 43 - 1991 in Peje, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Swarray, Musa (Male) age 45 - 1991 in Peje, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Tortured.
 Swarray, Nesie (Female) age 45 - 1991 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Swarray, Saffa (Male) age 51 - 1991 in Upper Bambara , Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Swarray, Shaika (Male) age 60 - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.
 Swarray, Sulaiman (Male) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Swarray, Tarjo (Female) - 1992 in Sowa, Pujehun - Property destroyed.

Swarray, Theresa (Female) age 69 - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Swarray, Vandi (Male) age 30 - 1992 in Upper Bambara , Kailahun - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Swarray, Wahai (Male) age 13 - 1995 in Banta Mokele, Moyamba - Displaced.

Swarray, Yatta (Female) age 25 - 1991 in Upper Bambara , Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.

Syllah, Foday (Male) - 1995 - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained.

Syllah, Hawa (Female) - 1997 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Displaced.

Syllah, Mohamed Bombohage (Male) age 75 - 1997 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Syllah, Sheku (Male) age 83 - 1994 in Kamajei, Moyamba - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Taesewah, Sahr (Male) - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Taesewah, Tamba (Male) age 35 - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Tagunda, Mattu (Female) - 1995 in Tikonko, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Tailu, Lansana (Male) age 60 - 1991 in Wandor, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Talewah, Karimu (Male) - 1991 in Peje Bongre, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Talleh, Foday (Male) age 72 - 1992 - Abducted. Killed.

Talleh, Ibrahim (Male) age 42 - 1992 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Tamba, Alie (Male) age 41 - 1999 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.

Tamba, Betty (Female) age 45 - Displaced.

Tamba, Ellie (Male) age 50 - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Tamba, Fasuluky (Male) - Assaulted and tortured. Killed.

Tamba, James (Male) - 1994 in Yawei, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted. Killed.

Tamba, Joseph (Male) age 30 - 1994 in Yawei, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Tamba, Lahai (Male) - 1991 - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Tamba, Mahmoud (Male) age 8 - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Tamba, Momodu (Male) - 1997 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Forced to labour.

Tamba, Mondeh (Male) age 45 - Displaced.

Tamba, Nyama (Female) age 41 - 1998 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Displaced and property looted. Abducted. Tortured.

Tambasu, Momoh (Male) - Property looted. Assaulted.

Tammie, Jinnah (Male) - 1992 in Sowa, Pujehun - Assaulted.

Tamu, Jina (Female) age 24 - 1991 - Property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Tamu, Jina (Male) age 34 - 1991 in Koya, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Tapeima, Musa (Male) - 1991 - Extorted and property destroyed.

Taqui, Amara (Male) - 1991 in Peje Bongre, Kailahun - Assaulted.

Taqui, Sumaila (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Killed.

Tarawalie, Abdul (Male) age 8 - Displaced.

Tarawalie, Abdulai (Male) - 1996 - Abducted. Assaulted. Killed.

Tarawalie, Abdulai (Male) age 56 - 1998 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Displaced and property looted.

Tarawalie, Abibatu (Female) age 18 - 1998 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Tarawalie, Abu (Male) - 1997 - Killed.

Tarawalie, Abu (Male) age 32 - 1997 - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Tarawalie, Abu (Male) age 61 - 1998 - Displaced.

Tarawalie, Abu Bakarr (Male) age 26 - 1997 in Buya Romende, Port Loko - Killed.

Tarawalie, Aliou O. (Male) age 38 - 1996 in Buya Romende, Port Loko - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Assaulted.

Tarawalie, Amadu (Male) age 44 - Property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Tarawalie, Amara (Male) age 31 - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Killed.

Tarawalie, Amie (Female) - 1996 - Abducted.

Tarawalie, Aminata (Female) age 32 - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced.

Tarawalie, Bockarie (Male) age 47 - 1997 - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Tarawalie, Fatmata (Female) - 1999 in Diang, Koinadugu - Displaced.

Tarawalie, Feremusu (Female) - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Limb amputated.

Tarawalie, Ferrie (Female) - Displaced and extorted. Limb amputated.

Tarawalie, Foday (Male) age 51 - 1997 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Extorted.

Tarawalie, Gibril (Male) age 27 - 1998 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Tarawalie, Hawa (Female) age 54 - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Killed.

Tarawalie, Iye (Female) age 60 - 1998 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed.

Tarawalie, Kadiatu (Female) age 32 - 1999 - Property destroyed.

Tarawalie, Lahai (Male) age 76 - 1994 in Gaura, Kenema - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Tarawalie, Lamin (Male) - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted and tortured.

Tarawalie, Mariama (Female) - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Abducted and detained.

Tarawalie, Mbalu (Female) age 39 - 1998 in Kassunko, Koinadugu - Property destroyed. Tortured.

Tarawalie, Mohamed (Male) age 45 - 1991 - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Tarawalie, Momoh (Male) age 55 - 1991 - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Tarawalie, Ousman (Male) - 1998 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.

Tarawalie, Ousman (Male) age 29 - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Tarawalie, Ousman (Male) age 58 - Abducted. Tortured. Killed.

Tarawalie, Rugie (Female) age 21 - 1998 - Displaced. Killed.

Tarawalie, Sahr (Male) age 38 - 1998 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced. Tortured.

Tarawalie, Salamatu (Female) - Extorted.

Tarawalie, Samuel (Male) age 46 - 1998 - Displaced.

Tarawalie, Samuel (Male) age 64 - 1999 - Extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Tarawalie, Santigie (Male) - 1999 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Tortured.

Tarawalie, Santigie (Male) age 26 - 1999 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted. Killed.

Tarawalie, Sheku (Male) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Tarawalie, Sheriff (Male) age 60 - 1998 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Tarawalie, Thaim (Male) - 1999 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Property looted and destroyed. Assaulted and tortured. Killed.

Tarawalie, Vandi (Male) - 1991 in Malema, Kailahun - Killed.

Tarawally, Alusine (Male) age 9 - 1992 in Dia, Kailahun - Displaced.

Tarawally, Amadu (Male) - 1991 in Wara-Wara Bafodia, Koinadugu - Assaulted. Killed.

Tarawally, Barkie (Male) - Displaced.

Tarawally, Fatmata (Female) age 5 - Displaced.

Tarawally, Foday (Male) age 3 - Displaced.

Tarawally, Foday (Male) age 29 - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Tortured.

Tarawally, Fodie (Male) - Killed.

Tarawally, George (Male) age 48 - 1998 in Kakua, Bo District - Property destroyed.

Tarawally, Hawa (Female) age 51 - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Tarawally, Kefala (Male) - 1998 in Mandu, Kailahun - Killed.

Tarawally, Lansana (Male) age 55 - 1991 in Gaura, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Tarawally, Lusenii (Male) age 44 - 1997 in Gaura, Kenema - Extorted.

Tarawally, Marie (Female) - Displaced.

Tarawally, Momoh (Male) age 63 - 1991 in Gaura, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Tarawally, Musa (Male) - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted.

Tarawally, Saffa (Male) - 1991 in Niawa, Kenema - Displaced.

Tarawally, Zachariah (Male) age 6 - Displaced.

Tarlue, Amos (Male) age 26 - 1999 in Moyamba - Displaced and property destroyed.

Tatugba, Hawa (Female) - Abducted and detained.

Tatugba, Hawa (Female) - Abducted and detained.

Tatugba, Kowa (Male) age 55 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Taylor, Eku (Male) age 25 - 1998 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Taylor, James (Male) age 40 - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed.

Taylor, Mohamed (Male) - 1991 - Abducted. Killed.

Taylor, Samuel (Male) - 1997 in Kagboro, Moyamba - Abducted and detained.

Taylor, Samuel (Male) age 18 - 1997 in Timdel, Moyamba - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Taylor, Sheku (Male) - 1995 in Sogbini, Bonthe - Forced to labour.
 Taylor, Siaffa (Male) - Killed.
 Taylor, Tommy (Male) - 1995 - Assaulted.
 Tayo, Bockarie (Male) age 55 - 1994 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Displaced. Killed.
 Tayo, Mariama (Female) age 51 - 1994 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Displaced.
 Tayoh, Manie (Male) - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced. Abducted.
 Teika, Sumaila (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Property destroyed.
 Tejan, Ahmed (Male) age 34 - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed.
 Tejan, Fatima (Female) age 25 - 1999 - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Tejan, Imuana (Male) - 1992 in Tunkia, Kenema - Killed.
 Tejan, Korti (Male) age 7 - 1994 in Wunde, Bo District - Killed.
 Tejan, Mohamed (Male) - 1994 in Jong, Bonthe - Forced to labour.
 Tejan, Mohamed (Male) age 4 - 1994 in Wunde, Bo District - Killed.
 Tejan, Musa (Male) age 16 - 1999 in Western Area - Extorted. Abducted and detained.
 Tejan, Ramatu (Female) age 25 - 1999 - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Tejan, Yusufu (Male) - 1992 in Tunkia, Kenema - Killed.
 Tejan-Cole, Abdul (Male) - 1998 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Stripped and limb amputated.
 Tejan-Sie, Sulaiman Banja (Male) - 1997 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Tekui, Simeon (Male) - 1994 in Dodo, Kenema - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.
 Tellu, Jamiratu (Female) age 35 - 1995 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced.
 Tellu, Johnny (Male) age 33 - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced and extorted. Assaulted and tortured.
 Tellu, Momoh (Male) age 27 - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.
 Tengbeh, Momoh (Male) - Killed.
 Tennah, Mohamed (Male) age 38 - 1993 - Abducted.
 Tensumor, Musa (Male) age 71 - 1999 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted.
 Tessiwa, Sahr (Male) age 41 - 1998 in Jong, Bonthe - Property destroyed. Assaulted. Killed.
 Tewuleh, Kobia age 65 - Displaced.
 Tewuleh, Tiange (Female) age 80 - Killed.
 Tham, Kong (Male) - 1998 in Dema, Bonthe - Assaulted.
 Thibin, Abu Kain (Male) - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Abducted and detained.
 Thoikfaineh, Amadu (Male) - 1997 in Western Area - Displaced. Abducted and detained.
 Thomas, Alusine (Male) age 59 - 1997 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted.
 Thomas, Augustine (Male) age 9 - 1999 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted, detained and drugged. Assaulted.
 Thomas, Eddie (Male) age 28 - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.
 Thomas, Fatu (Female) age 26 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.
 Thomas, Foday (Male) - 1995 in Kwamebai Krim, Bonthe - Killed.
 Thomas, Foday (Male) age 50 - 1999 in Kaffu Bullom, Port Loko - Property looted. Assaulted.
 Thomas, Hassan (Male) - 1995 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Tortured. Killed.
 Thomas, Hauta (Female) - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.
 Thomas, Jenneh (Female) - 1995 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced. Forced to labour.
 Thomas, Josephine (Female) - 1998 in Western Area - Killed.
 Thomas, Kai (Male) age 38 - 1996 in Fiama, Kono - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.
 Thomas, Kai (Male) age 82 - 1992 in Nimikoro, Kono - Property looted. Killed.
 Thomas, Mabai (Female) age 77 - 1992 in Nimikoro, Kono - Property looted. Killed.
 Thomas, Mbala (Female) - 1997 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Abducted. Assaulted.
 Thomas, Nancy (Female) - 1995 - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted, tortured and limb amputated.
 Thomas, Safea (Male) age 8 - 1998 in Kamara, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour.
 Thomas, Tamba David (Male) age 43 - 1991 in Soa, Kono - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.
 Thompson, Ayo (Female) age 41 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.

Thompson, Margrette (Female) - 1996 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Property destroyed.

Thorley, Abdulai (Male) - Killed.

Thorley, Abdulai (Male) age 59 - 1999 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Property looted and destroyed. Assaulted and stripped.

Thorley, Abdulai (Male) age 67 - 2000 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Property looted. Abducted and detained.

Thorley, Alfred (Male) - 1993 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Killed.

Thorley, Amadu (Male) age 59 - 1999 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Displaced and property looted. Tortured and stripped.

Thorley, Amidu (Male) - 1996 in Western Area - Detained. Limb amputated.

Thorley, Asanatu (Male) age 66 - 1999 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Thorley, Brima (Male) - 1996 in Marampa, Port Loko - Killed.

Thorley, Daniel (Male) - 1996 in Bagbo, Bo District - Killed.

Thorley, Hassan (Male) - 1996 in Marampa, Port Loko - Killed.

Thorley, Issa (Male) - 1999 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Forced to labour. Assaulted and stripped.

Thorley, Kadiatu (Female) - 1994 - Property looted and destroyed.

Thorley, Lamina (Male) - Killed.

Thorley, Marie (Female) - Killed.

Thorley, Mohamed (Male) - 1999 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Killed.

Thorley, Mohamed (Male) - 1996 in Marampa, Port Loko - Killed.

Thorley, Narukeh - 1994 - Killed.

Thorley, Ousman (Male) - 1996 in Bagbo, Bo District - Assaulted.

Thorley, Ramatu (Female) age 25 - 1995 - Property looted. Detained. Assaulted.

Thorley, Richmond age 36 - 1998 - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted.

Thorley, Saidu (Male) - 1999 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Killed.

Thorley, Sallay (Female) age 38 - 1995 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Abducted. Assaulted.

Thorley, Sallieu (Male) age 37 - 1999 in Western Area - Killed.

Thorley, Santigie (Male) - 1996 in Bagbo, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed.

Thorlie, Abdulai (Male) - Killed.

Thorlie, Alie (Male) age 13 - 1994 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Abducted.

Thorlie, Brima (Male) age 49 - 1994 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Displaced. Abducted. Tortured. Killed.

Thorlie, Haroun (Male) age 18 - 1994 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Thorlie, Marie (Female) age 35 - 1994 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Displaced. Abducted. Tortured. Killed.

Thorley, Haja (Female) - 1997 in Sittia, Bonthe - Killed.

Thoronka, Abu Bakarr (Male) age 35 - 1999 in Nimiyama, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Thoronka, Alfred (Male) - 1993 in Tane, Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Thoronka, Alpha (Male) age 47 - 1994 in Diang, Koinadugu - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Thoronka, Bassie (Male) age 24 - 1992 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Displaced and extorted. Assaulted.

Thoronka, Fatu (Female) - 1994 in Diang, Koinadugu - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted.

Thoronka, Foday (Male) age 40 - 1992 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Killed.

Thoronka, Iye (Female) - 1999 - Assaulted.

Thoronka, Kadiatu (Female) - Displaced.

Thoronka, Merah (Female) age 35 - 1997 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Thoronka, Mohamed (Male) age 24 - 1997 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Thoronka, Momoh (Male) age 65 - 1994 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed.

Thoronka, Murray (Male) - 1999 in Nimiyama, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour. Killed.

Thoronka, Musa (Male) age 47 - 1999 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Property destroyed. Killed.

Thoronka, Santigie (Male) - 1997 in Gbendembu Ngowahun, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Thoronka, Sorie (Male) age 55 - 1994 in Diang, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Thoronka, Swaib (Male) - Displaced.

Thoronka, Umaru (Male) - 1995 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Thua, George (Male) - 1998 in Kagboro, Moyamba - Killed.

Thulla, Anthony (Male) age 46 - 1992 - Forced to labour. Tortured.

Thulla, Iye (Female) age 47 - 1994 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Thulla, Williams (Male) - 1999 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Forced to labour.

Thulla, Yusuf (Male) age 70 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted and tortured.

Thullah, Abdulai (Male) - 1996 in Kholifa Mabang, Tonkolili - Killed.

Thullah, Fatmata (Female) - 1994 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted and tortured.

Thullah, Ibrahim (Male) - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Thullah, Lamin (Male) age 32 - 1996 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Thullah, Marie (Female) - 1999 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Thullah, Memuna (Female) age 30 - Displaced.

Thullah, Mustapha (Male) age 42 - Property looted. Forced to labour.

Thullah, Paul (Male) age 10 - 1998 in Sengbe, Koinadugu - Displaced.

Thullah, Samuel (Male) - 1996 in Kholifa Mabang, Tonkolili - Killed.

Thullah, Sorie Ibrahim (Male) age 54 - Displaced and property looted.

Thunkara, Dauda (Male) age 21 - 1999 - Displaced and property looted.

Thunkara, Sidi (Male) age 13 - 1994 - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Thuray, Bai Masamuntha (Male) age 34 - 1998 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced and property looted.

Thuray, Tamba (Male) age 51 - 2000 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Thurley, Abdul (Male) - 1993 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced, extorted and property looted.

Thurley, Aminata (Female) - 1993 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced, extorted and property looted.

Thurley, Sulaiman (Male) - 1998 in Tane, Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed.

Thurley, Yeabu (Female) - 1998 - Displaced.

Thurley, Zainab (Female) age 10 - 1993 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced.

Tia, Hawa (Female) - 1994 in Mandu, Kailahun - Killed.

Tia, Mary (Female) age 30 - 1998 in Peje Bongre, Kailahun - Killed.

Tibbie, Peter (Male) age 56 - 1995 in Kowa, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Tibby, Musu (Female) age 26 - 1994 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Tibo, Francis Augustine (Male) age 42 - 1994 in Simbaru, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Tiffa, Amadu (Male) - Property destroyed.

Tiffa, Hawa (Female) age 29 - 1991 - Abducted.

Tiffa, John (Male) age 55 - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour.

Tiffa, Margrette (Female) age 55 - 1996 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Displaced.

Tiffa, Mariama (Female) age 53 - 1993 in Dodo, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed.

Tiffa, Thomas (Male) age 64 - 1996 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Abducted. Assaulted. Killed.

Tigba, Tommy (Male) - Extorted.

Tijani, Abu (Male) - 1994 in Komboya, Bo District - Killed.

Tijani, Foday (Male) - 1994 in Komboya, Bo District - Killed.

Tilton, Rogers (Male) age 14 - 1996 in Nomo, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Timbo, Mohamed (Male) age 33 - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Timbo, Sheka (Male) age 36 - 2000 in Leibasgayahun, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Timi, Musa (Male) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Killed.

Toby, Alfred Boizy Tugbea (Male) age 61 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Toby, Frederick (Male) age 15 - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced. Assaulted. Killed.

Togbie, Alfred (Male) age 73 - 1991 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Toko, Yema (Female) age 47 - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Displaced.

Tokpa, Peter (Male) - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Tortured and stripped. Killed.

Tolie, Sorie (Female) - Displaced and extorted. Assaulted.

Tolima, Abdulai (Male) age 50 - Killed.

Tollie, Amidu (Male) age 34 - 1998 in Nimiyama, Kono - Displaced. Assaulted and tortured.

Tollow, Samai (Male) age 15 - 1996 in Peje West, Kailahun - Displaced.

Tomba, Kelfala (Male) age 60 - 1999 - Displaced. Killed.

Tomboyeke, Abu (Male) age 65 - 1994 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Tommy, Agnes (Female) - 1994 in Komboya, Bo District - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Tommy, Alieu (Male) - 1993 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Abducted. Tortured.

Tommy, Amara (Male) - Displaced.

Tommy, Boiwo (Female) - 1995 in Benducha, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained.

Tommy, Bokie (Male) - 1991 - Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.

Tommy, Brima (Male) age 10 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced. Tortured.

Tommy, Eric (Male) age 31 - 1995 in Komboya, Bo District - Displaced and property looted.

Tommy, Francis (Male) - 1995 - Forced to labour.

Tommy, Gabriel (Male) age 43 - 1995 in Sielenga, Bo District - Displaced and extorted. Assaulted.

Tommy, Gbessay (Male) age 58 - 1998 in Fiama, Kono - Abducted. Assaulted and tortured.

Tommy, Henry (Male) age 42 - 1997 in Benducha, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Tommy, Kadie (Female) - 1995 - Abducted and detained.

Tommy, Komba (Male) age 12 - 1997 in Lei, Kono - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Tommy, Mobondo (Female) - 1995 in Benducha, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Tommy, Mustapha (Male) age 37 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Tommy, Nabieu (Male) - 1994 in Komboya, Bo District - Assaulted.

Tommy, Niematu (Female) - 1995 - Killed.

Tommy, Samuel (Male) age 59 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Tommy, Samura (Male) - 1996 in Kpanda Kemo, Bonthe - Killed.

Tommy, Tenneh (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced.

Tommy, Vandy (Male) age 52 - 1992 in Koya, Kenema - Killed.

Tommy, Yankuba (Male) age 49 - 1994 - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Tordoi, Satta (Female) age 67 - 1996 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Killed.

Torma, Kenie (Male) - 1994 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Killed.

Tortmabum, Junisa (Male) - 1994 in Tonko Limba, Kambia - Extorted.

Torto, Joseph (Male) age 59 - Detained. Tortured and stripped.

Torto, Kai (Male) age 29 - 1992 in Nimiyama, Kono - Displaced and extorted. Assaulted.

Torto, Komba (Male) age 38 - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Torto, Sahafea (Male) age 20 - 2000 in Kamara, Kono - Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.

Tortoe, Michael (Male) age 40 - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Touficabdallah, John (Male) age 16 - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Towabo, Gbessey (Male) age 23 - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Property looted. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Toyota, Amara (Male) - Killed.

Tqkoh, Sia (Female) age 13 - 1998 in Gorama Kono, Kono - Displaced. Abducted. Killed.

Troble, Sheku (Male) - 1995 in Badjia, Bo District - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Tuawie, James (Male) age 18 - 1994 - Assaulted.

Tuciber, Sheku (Male) - 1997 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Tucker, Alieu (Male) age 23 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Tucker, Amie (Female) - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Killed.

Tucker, Baimba (Male) age 54 - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced.

Tucker, Borbor (Male) - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted and tortured.

Tucker, Brima (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.

Tucker, Charles (Male) age 60 - 1995 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Displaced and property destroyed.

Tucker, Charlie (Male) - 1991 in Bumpeh, Moyamba - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.

Tucker, Christiana (Female) age 14 - 1999 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Tucker, Doreen (Female) age 20 - 1999 in Western Area - Extorted. Abducted.

Tucker, Emma (Female) - 1995 in Moyamba - Abducted.

Tucker, Foday (Male) age 48 - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured and limb amputated.

Tucker, Francis (Male) - Detained.

Tucker, Frank (Male) age 41 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Tucker, Henry (Male) age 62 - Displaced and property looted.

Tucker, James (Male) - 1991 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Tucker, James (Male) age 65 - Displaced and property looted. Assaulted.

Tucker, Janet (Female) age 55 - 1997 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Tortured.

Tucker, John (Male) - 1996 in Moyamba - Killed.

Tucker, John (Male) age 54 - 1995 in Kakua, Bo District - Displaced. Detained.

Tucker, Jonathan (Male) - 1995 in Yawbeko, Bonthe - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Tucker, Josephine (Female) age 38 - 1995 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Tucker, Lahai (Male) - 1994 in Langorama, Kenema - Displaced.

Tucker, Lahai (Male) age 20 - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Killed.

Tucker, Lucy (Female) - 1995 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Displaced.

Tucker, Mary (Female) age 35 - 1995 in Yawbeko, Bonthe - Property looted.

Tucker, Mathia (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Property destroyed.

Tucker, Miata (Female) - 1996 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Displaced.

Tucker, Miatta (Female) - 1991 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted.

Tucker, Moriba (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.

Tucker, Munda (Male) age 58 - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced.

Tucker, Oscar (Male) - 1997 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Tucker, Sumaila (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Killed.

Tucker, Susan (Female) - 1995 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Displaced.

Tucker, Teneh (Female) - Displaced, extorted and property looted.

Tucker, Thomas (Male) age 25 - 1996 in Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Tucker, Thomas (Male) age 28 - 1991 in Kpanda Kemo, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Tucker, Watta (Female) age 41 - 1991 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted.

Tucker, Yalma (Female) age 32 - 1993 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced.

Tucker, Yema (Female) - 1991 in Sogbini, Bonthe - Killed.

Tue, Bondu (Female) age 31 - 1998 in Kamara, Kono - Killed.

Tugbeh, Alfred (Male) age 61 - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced.

Tukoa, Sia (Female) - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.

Tumbey, Nyuma (Male) age 48 - 1991 in Mandu, Kailahun - Displaced.

Tumbu Yamba, Sandy (Male) - 1992 in Soa, Kono - Killed.

Tumoe, Yei (Female) age 58 - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Turay, Abass (Male) - 1998 in Bagbe, Bo District - Displaced. Killed.

Turay, Abdul (Male) - 1996 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Forced to labour. Killed.

Turay, Abdul (Male) - 1995 in Marampa, Port Loko - Killed.

Turay, Abdul (Male) age 11 - 1995 in Kholifa Mabang, Tonkolili - Forced to labour. Tortured.

Turay, Abdul (Male) age 27 - 1998 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Turay, Abdul (Male) age 31 - 2000 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Turay, Abdul (Male) age 35 - 1997 in Western Area - Property looted. Detained.

Turay, Abibatu (Female) - Displaced. Killed.

Turay, Abie (Female) - 1993 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Turay, Abie (Female) - 1996 in Tane, Tonkolili - Displaced. Abducted.

Turay, Abu (Male) - 1994 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Property destroyed. Killed.

Turay, Abu (Male) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced.

Turay, Abu (Male) - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Turay, Abu (Male) - 1998 - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Turay, Abu (Male) - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Turay, Abu (Male) - 2000 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Killed.

Turay, Abu (Male) - 2000 in Samu, Kambia - Killed.

Turay, Abu (Male) age 18 - 1995 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Tortured and forced to participate in an act of cannibalism.

Turay, Abu (Male) age 42 - 1996 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Turay, Abu (Male) age 50 - 1999 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Turay, Abu (Male) age 55 - 2000 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour.

Turay, Abu (Male) age 62 - 1994 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced and property destroyed.

Turay, Abu Bakarr Keturay (Male) age 48 - 2000 in Gbense, Kono - Property looted and destroyed.

Turay, Abu S (Male) age 33 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.

Turay, Adama (Female) - 1997 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Abducted. Assaulted and limb amputated.

Turay, Adama (Female) - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Limb amputated.

Turay, Adama (Female) - 1999 - Abducted. Killed.

Turay, Adama (Female) age 21 - Property destroyed.

Turay, Adamsay (Female) - Assaulted.

Turay, Ahmed Umaru (Male) age 26 - 1994 in Niawa, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Turay, Alhaji (Male) - 1995 in Loko Massama, Port Loko - Assaulted.

Turay, Alhaji (Male) - 1998 - Detained.

Turay, Alhaji (Male) age 20 - 1998 - Displaced.

Turay, Alhaji (Male) age 42 - Displaced and property looted.

Turay, Alhaji Muctaru (Male) age 35 - 1992 in Barri, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed.

Turay, Alhassan (Male) age 26 - 1998 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Killed.

Turay, Alice (Female) age 22 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted.

Turay, Alie (Male) - 1999 in Tonkolili - Tortured. Killed.

Turay, Alie (Male) - Displaced.

Turay, Alie (Male) - 1999 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Displaced and property looted.

Turay, Alie (Male) age 18 - 1999 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured. Killed.

Turay, Alie (Male) age 49 - 1998 in Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Turay, Alie (Male) age 49 - 1998 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced. Assaulted. Killed.

Turay, Alimamy (Male) - 1998 in Port Loko - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Turay, Alimamy (Male) - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Turay, Alimamy (Male) - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Turay, Alimamy (Male) - 1998 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Turay, Alimamy (Male) age 33 - 1998 - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Turay, Alpha (Male) age 34 - 1994 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Displaced.

Turay, Alpha (Male) age 38 - 1998 in Tane, Tonkolili - Tortured.

Turay, Alusine (Male) - 1998 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Killed.

Turay, Alusine (Male) age 18 - 2000 - Property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Turay, Alusine (Male) age 22 - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted, tortured and limb amputated.

Turay, Amadu (Male) - 1998 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Turay, Amadu (Male) - 1996 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Killed.

Turay, Amadu (Male) age 31 - 1999 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Abducted. Tortured. Killed.

Turay, Amadu (Male) age 64 - 1999 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Turay, Amara (Male) age 13 - 1999 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Abducted. Tortured.

Turay, Amed Sheku (Male) age 33 - 1995 in Kenema - Property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Turay, Amidu (Male) - 1999 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Killed.

Turay, Amidu (Male) age 24 - 1998 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Turay, Amie (Female) - 1999 in Koya, Port Loko - Displaced. Assaulted.

Turay, Amie (Female) - Forced to labour.

Turay, Amie (Female) - 1992 in Bagbe, Bo District - Abducted.

Turay, Amie (Female) age 50 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Turay, Aminata (Female) age 12 - 1995 in Bumpeh, Moyamba - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Turay, Aminata (Female) age 19 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained.

Turay, Aminata (Female) age 40 - 1998 in Port Loko - Displaced and property looted.

Turay, Aminata (Female) age 41 - 1998 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced.

Turay, Anie (Female) - 1993 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Turay, Augustine (Male) - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Turay, Baba (Male) - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Turay, Baindu (Female) age 55 - 1991 in Banta Mokele, Moyamba - Displaced.

Turay, Bala (Male) - 2000 in Loko Massama, Port Loko - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Turay, Barbah (Male) - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Turay, Bassie (Male) - 1998 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Turay, Baybah (Male) - 2000 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced.

Turay, Bintu (Female) age 73 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Turay, Bockarie (Male) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.

Turay, Bonkapri (Male) - 1998 in Koya, Port Loko - Killed.

Turay, Brima (Male) - 1994 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Abducted and detained.

Turay, Brima (Male) age 65 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced. Forced to labour. Killed.

Turay, Bundu (Male) - 1998 - Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.

Turay, Danka (Male) age 83 - 1998 in Baoma, Bo District - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Turay, Denis (Male) age 28 - 1995 in Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Detained.

Turay, Fallah (Male) - Displaced.

Turay, Fanda (Female) - 2000 - Abducted. Killed.

Turay, Fanta (Female) age 32 - 1998 in Biriwa, Bombali - Killed.

Turay, Fatmata (Female) - 1995 in Loko Massama, Port Loko - Killed.

Turay, Fatmata (Female) - 1994 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Abducted and detained.

Turay, Fatmata (Female) - 1999 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Killed.

Turay, Fatmata (Female) - 1999 - Forced to labour.

Turay, Fatmata (Female) age 7 - 1998 - Displaced. Tortured.

Turay, Fatmata (Female) age 35 - Displaced. Assaulted.

Turay, Fatmata (Female) age 38 - Displaced and property looted.

Turay, Fatu (Female) - 1998 - Abducted and detained.

Turay, Fatu (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Detained. Killed.

Turay, Fidee (Male) - Forced to labour.

Turay, Finda (Female) - 2000 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Forced to labour.

Turay, Foday (Male) - 1998 in Sambaia Bendugu, Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured and limb amputated.

Turay, Foday (Male) age 42 - 1995 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Turay, Gbasha (Male) - 1998 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Turay, George (Male) age 26 - 1994 in Kissi Teng, Kailahun - Killed.

Turay, Gibehlu Muctaru (Male) - 1992 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.

Turay, Haja (Female) - 1992 in Barri, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.

Turay, Hanna (Female) - 1992 in Masungbala, Kambia - Displaced.

Turay, Hassan (Male) - 1999 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Killed.

Turay, Hassan (Male) - 1994 in Kholifa Mabang, Tonkolili - Property looted and destroyed. Detained. Tortured. Killed.

Turay, Hassan (Male) - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and limb amputated.

Turay, Hassan (Male) - 1998 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Turay, Hassan (Male) age 20 - 1995 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Extorted. Forced to labour.

Turay, Hassan (Male) age 22 - 1998 in Koinadugu - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Turay, Hassan (Male) age 32 - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Turay, Hassan (Male) age 41 - 1999 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Turay, Hassana (Male) - 1995 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Abducted.

Turay, Hassana (Male) - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced.

Turay, Hassana (Male) age 18 - 1999 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Abducted. Tortured. Killed.

Turay, Hassana (Male) age 59 - 1999 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Turay, Hody (Male) - 1991 in Simbaru, Kenema - Forced to labour.

Turay, Ibrahim (Male) - 1996 in Tane, Tonkolili - Assaulted.

Turay, Ibrahim (Male) age 20 - Killed.

Turay, Ibrahim (Male) age 26 - 1994 - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Turay, Ibrahim (Male) age 31 - 1998 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Property looted. Abducted. Tortured.

Turay, Ibrahim (Male) age 35 - 1998 - Displaced.

Turay, Ibrahim (Male) age 42 - 2000 in Kambia - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Turay, Ibrahim (Male) age 45 - 1999 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Assaulted.

Turay, Isa (Male) age 23 - Displaced. Assaulted.

Turay, Isatu (Female) - 1999 in Briama, Kambia - Property destroyed. Killed.

Turay, Isatu (Female) age 39 - 1998 in Konike Sande, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Turay, Isatu (Female) age 67 - 1999 in Sogbini, Bonthe - Property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Turay, Iye (Female) - 1996 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Abducted.

Turay, Iye (Female) - 1997 in Gbendembu Ngowahun, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Turay, James (Male) age 27 - 1997 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Assaulted.

Turay, James (Male) age 58 - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Turay, Joseph (Male) age 2 - 1995 - Abducted and detained.

Turay, Joseph (Male) age 45 - 1995 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Killed.

Turay, Junisa (Male) - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Turay, Kadiatu (Female) - 1999 in Maforki, Port Loko - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Turay, Kadiatu (Female) - 1994 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Killed.

Turay, Kadiatu (Female) age 58 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.

Turay, Kadie (Female) - 1995 - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Turay, Kaima (Male) - 1998 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Killed.

Turay, Kainday (Female) age 22 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted. Killed.

Turay, Kamba (Male) - 2000 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed.

Turay, Karim (Male) age 40 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Turay, Kebbie (Male) age 52 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed.

Turay, Kelfa (Male) - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Turay, Kelpha (Male) - 1998 in Samu, Kambia - Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.

Turay, Komrabai (Male) - 1996 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed.

Turay, Lahai (Male) age 59 - 1994 in Neini, Koinadugu - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour.

Turay, Lamin (Male) age 21 - 2000 in Follosaba Dembelia, Koinadugu - Property looted. Killed.

Turay, Lamin (Male) age 35 - 1999 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted.

Turay, Lamin (Male) age 38 - 1999 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Turay, Lamin (Male) age 50 - 1999 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Turay, Lansana (Male) - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed. Killed.

Turay, Lansana (Male) - 1999 in Baoma, Bo District - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Turay, Maana (Male) - 1998 in Koya, Port Loko - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Turay, Mabinty (Female) - 1997 in Kaffu Bullom, Port Loko - Abducted. Limb amputated. Killed.

Turay, Mabinty (Female) - 1997 in Bombali Shebora, Bombali - Killed.

Turay, Mahawa (Female) age 11 - 1999 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Killed.

Turay, Mahmoud (Male) age 32 - 1992 in Masungbala, Kambia - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Turay, Maki (Male) - Tortured. Killed.

Turay, Mambu (Male) - 1998 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Turay, Mankey (Male) age 59 - 1999 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Abducted. Tortured. Killed.

Turay, Mariama (Female) - 1998 in Konike Sande, Tonkolili - Killed.

Turay, Mariama (Female) age 40 - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced.

Turay, Mariatu (Female) - 1999 - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Tortured.

Turay, Mariatu (Female) age 16 - 1996 in Koya, Port Loko - Displaced.

Turay, Marie (Female) - 1997 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Assaulted and tortured.

Turay, Marie (Female) - 1999 in Western Area - Extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Turay, Marie (Female) - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted.

Turay, Mbalu (Female) age 33 - 1994 in Tankoro, Kono - Detained.

Turay, Mma (Female) age 35 - 1999 in Konike Sande, Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Tortured.

Turay, Mohamed (Male) - 1994 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Abducted and detained.

Turay, Mohamed (Male) - 1994 in Niawa, Kenema - Abducted and detained.

Turay, Mohamed (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.

Turay, Mohamed (Male) - 1997 in Western Area - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Turay, Mohamed (Male) age 17 - 1996 in Tane, Tonkolili - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Turay, Mohamed (Male) age 18 - 1998 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured, stripped and limb amputated.

Turay, Mohamed (Male) age 19 - 1999 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Turay, Mohamed (Male) age 21 - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Property looted. Abducted and detained.

Turay, Mohamed (Male) age 25 - 1998 in Nimiyama, Kono - Property destroyed. Killed.

Turay, Mohamed (Male) age 25 - Killed.

Turay, Mohamed (Male) age 29 - Property looted and destroyed.

Turay, Mohamed (Male) age 32 - 1996 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Turay, Momodu (Male) age 25 - 1999 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured. Killed.

Turay, Momodu (Male) age 80 - 1998 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Turay, Momoh (Male) - 1994 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Killed.

Turay, Momoh (Male) - 1997 in Makari Gbanti, Bombali - Extorted. Assaulted and tortured.

Turay, Muniru (Male) - 1998 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Stripped.

Turay, Musa (Male) - 1998 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Displaced. Killed.

Turay, Musa (Male) - 1998 - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Turay, Musa (Male) age 35 - 1999 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced. Assaulted and tortured.

Turay, Nandama (Female) - 1998 in Gbanti Kamaranka, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Turay, Nbetu (Female) - 1998 in Western Area - Displaced.

Turay, Ndebia (Male) - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Turay, Ousman (Male) - 1992 in Masungbala, Kambia - Displaced.

Turay, Ousman (Male) age 16 - 1999 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced. Forced to labour. Tortured. Killed.

Turay, Ousman (Male) age 18 - 1999 in Magbema, Kambia - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Turay, Ousman (Male) age 31 - 1999 in Tonkolili - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and stripped.

Turay, Pateh (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Turay, Patrick (Male) age 53 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and extorted. Tortured.

Turay, Robert (Male) age 33 - 1996 in Western Area - Displaced and property destroyed.

Turay, Rugiatu (Female) - 1992 in Masungbala, Kambia - Displaced.

Turay, Rugiatu (Female) age 36 - 1993 in Konike Sande, Tonkolili - Displaced. Abducted.

Turay, Saidu (Male) - 1994 in Tankoro, Kono - Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.

Turay, Saidu (Male) - 1999 - Property destroyed. Tortured. Killed.

Turay, Saidu (Male) age 15 - 1995 in Malal Mara, Tonkolili - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Turay, Saidu (Male) age 36 - Property looted and destroyed.

Turay, Saio (Male) age 39 - 2000 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Property looted. Abducted.

Turay, Salieu (Male) - 1997 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Killed.

Turay, Salu (Male) - 1992 in Masungbala, Kambia - Displaced.

Turay, Sama (Male) - 1999 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Displaced.

Turay, Samba (Male) age 22 - Abducted. Tortured.

Turay, Samura (Male) age 23 - 2000 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Turay, Sandy (Male) age 45 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Extorted and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Turay, Sanfa (Male) age 37 - 1994 in Koya, Port Loko - Displaced and property destroyed.

Turay, Santigie (Male) - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.

Turay, Santigie (Male) age 37 - 1997 - Killed.

Turay, Sarah (Female) age 44 - 1994 in Kalansogia, Tonkolili - Displaced and property destroyed.

Turay, Sayma (Male) - 1999 in Gbinleh-Dixon, Kambia - Killed.

Turay, Sewa (Male) age 55 - 1998 in Mongo, Koinadugu - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Turay, Sheik Bakarr (Male) - 1999 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Property looted. Tortured.

Turay, Sheku (Male) - 1991 in Tonko Limba, Kambia - Extorted. Abducted and detained.

Turay, Sidi (Male) - 1991 - Forced to labour.

Turay, Sonie (Female) age 14 - 1991 in Mandu, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Turay, Sorie (Male) - 1994 in Kono - Killed.

Turay, Sorie (Male) - 1998 in Koya, Port Loko - Property destroyed.

Turay, Sorie (Male) - 1995 in Bumpeh, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Turay, Sorie (Male) - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Property destroyed.

Turay, Sorie (Male) age 45 - 1998 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Turay, Sorieba (Male) - 1997 in Western Area - Killed.

Turay, Sulaiman (Male) age 38 - 1998 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Turay, Umu (Female) - 1998 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Killed.

Turay, Unisa (Male) - 1998 - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Turay, Usanie (Male) - 1997 in Yawbeko, Bonthe - Extorted. Tortured.

Turay, Waker (Male) - 1999 in Western Area - Tortured. Killed.

Turay, Wondan (Male) age 75 - 2000 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Extorted. Assaulted.

Turay, Wotoe (Female) age 61 - 1999 in Kalansogia, Tonkolili - Assaulted.

Turay, Yalloh (Male) - 1991 in Tonko Limba, Kambia - Killed.

Turay, Yeanoh (Female) - 1998 - Killed.

Turay, Yusufu (Male) age 28 - 1998 in Sulima, Koinadugu - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Turner, Mohamed A (Male) - 1992 in Tankoro, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Umaru, Alpha (Male) - 1999 in Sanda Magblonthor, Port Loko - Killed.

Umaru, Gbassay (Male) - 1995 in Tikonko, Bo District - Killed.

Umaru, James (Male) age 60 - 1995 in Tikonko, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Umaru Daboh, Tenneh (Female) - 1994 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced. Assaulted.

Unsia, Abu (Male) - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Displaced and property destroyed. Killed.

Vaama, Alhaji (Male) - 1991 in Dia, Kailahun - Assaulted.

Vaama, Kadie (Female) - 1991 in Dia, Kailahun - Assaulted. Killed.

Vaawa, Brima (Male) age 57 - 1992 in Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Vaawa, Momoh (Male) age 61 - 1991 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Vajah, Allieu (Male) age 46 - 1993 in Dama, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.

Vallugbeh, Foday (Male) - 1999 in Mambolo, Kambia - Tortured.

Vamboi, Julius (Male) - 1994 - Killed.

Vandi, Albert (Male) age 32 - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Property destroyed.

Vandi, Amie (Female) age 41 - 1991 in Bagbo, Bo District - Displaced and property destroyed.

Vandi, Aminata (Female) - 1995 in Dodo, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Vandi, Baidu (Female) age 52 - 1991 in Upper Bambara, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Vandi, Christopa (Male) age 8 - 2000 in Gbane, Kono - Abducted. Tortured.

Vandi, Fatmata (Female) - 1995 in Kpanda Kemo, Bonthe - Assaulted.

Vandi, Foday (Male) - 1994 in Bo District - Extorted. Assaulted and tortured.

Vandi, Francis (Male) - 1995 in Dodo, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Vandi, John (Male) age 58 - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Vandi, Karimu (Male) - 1991 in Upper Bambara, Kailahun - Abducted and detained.

Vandi, Kenei (Male) age 49 - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Vandi, Lahai (Male) - 1991 in Bagbo, Bo District - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour. Stripped.

Vandi, Lamin (Male) age 52 - 1992 in Upper Bambara, Kailahun - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained.

Vandi, Lansana (Male) - 1991 in Bumpah, Bo District - Killed.

Vandi, Lansana (Male) age 28 - 1991 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Displaced.

Vandi, Martha (Female) age 40 - 1996 in Malegohun, Kenema - Property destroyed.

Vandi, Massa (Female) age 69 - 1991 in Dia, Kailahun - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Vandi, Matten (Female) - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Abducted.

Vandi, Mohamed (Male) - 1991 in Mandu, Kailahun - Abducted.

Vandi, Mohamed (Male) age 3 - 1998 in Lugbu, Bo District - Killed.

Vandi, Mohamed (Male) age 28 - 1991 in Pujehun - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Vandi, Moiwa (Male) age 30 - 1991 in Valunia, Bo District - Abducted and detained.

Vandi, Momoh (Male) - 1991 in Upper Bambara, Kailahun - Abducted and detained.

Vandi, Momoh (Male) age 8 - 1996 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Displaced.

Vandi, Momoh (Male) age 49 - 1991 in Mandu, Kailahun - Displaced. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.

Vandi, Nancy (Female) - 1996 in Peje West, Kailahun - Property destroyed. Killed.

Vandi, Sabatu (Female) - 1995 - Displaced. Abducted.

Vandi, Sallay (Female) - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Killed.

Vandi, Sama (Male) age 50 - 1993 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Vandi, Satu (Female) - 1995 in Kpanda Kemo, Bonthe - Detained.

Vandi, Sulaiman (Male) - 1995 in Imperi, Bonthe - Killed.

Vandi, Sulaiman Abu Bakarr (Male) age 58 - 1995 in Simbaru, Kenema - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Vandi, Wuya (Female) - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Abducted.

Vandi, Yatta (Female) age 39 - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Vandy, Alhaji (Male) - 1994 - Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Vandy, Amara (Male) age 54 - 1996 - Displaced.

Vandy, Amie (Female) age 22 - 1996 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Abducted.

Vandy, Amie (Female) age 23 - 1991 - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained.

Vandy, Battu (Female) - 1996 in Kaiyamba, Moyamba - Assaulted.

Vandy, Boima (Male) - Extorted. Killed.

Vandy, Brima (Male) - 1991 in Sowa, Pujehun - Property destroyed.

Vandy, Ensah (Male) age 26 - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Forced to labour.

Vandy, Fatmata (Female) age 75 - 1995 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Property destroyed. Assaulted.

Vandy, Feimata (Female) age 20 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Vandy, Jinnah (Male) - 1996 in Dia, Kailahun - Property destroyed. Assaulted.

Vandy, Kama (Female) - 1994 - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured. Killed.

Vandy, Keifa (Male) - Killed.

Vandy, Kohjoh (Male) age 36 - 1993 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed.

Vandy, Lansana (Male) age 56 - 1993 in Dodo, Kenema - Displaced. Killed.

Vandy, Momoh (Male) age 45 - 1993 in Upper Bambara, Kailahun - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Vandy, Moses (Male) age 38 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Vandy, Musa (Male) age 53 - 1991 in Dodo, Kenema - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Vandy, Saffa (Male) age 67 - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Vandy, Senesie (Male) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Vandy, Swaray (Male) age 29 - 1991 in Dia, Kailahun - Displaced.

Vandy, Yema (Female) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Displaced.

Vankah, Mameh (Female) age 36 - 1999 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Vanneh, K.B. (Male) - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Abducted and detained.

Vao, Isatu (Female) age 22 - 1995 in Bonthe - Displaced and extorted. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Vao, Lydia (Female) - 1995 in Yawbeko, Bonthe - Displaced.

Vao, Prince (Male) - 1995 in Yawbeko, Bonthe - Displaced.

Vargie, Joe (Male) - 1995 in Fakunya, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted. Abducted. Killed.

Vayombo, Lahai (Male) - 1995 in Bagbo, Bo District - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Victor, Baidu (Female) - 1992 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.

Vincent, Bankole (Male) age 63 - 1996 in Baoma, Bo District - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted. Assaulted.

Voeglin, Gladys (Female) age 65 - 1999 in Western Area - Tortured.

Vonfoe, Hanna (Female) age 42 - 1995 in Bo District - Displaced and extorted. Assaulted and tortured.

Vonuman, Amadu (Male) - 1991 in Peje West, Kailahun - Killed.

Vunjah, Alie (Male) age 28 - 1995 in Kamajei, Moyamba - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed.

Vunjah, Daniel (Male) - 1995 in Komboya, Bo District - Abducted. Assaulted. Killed.

Vunjah, Philip (Male) - 1996 in Bo District - Displaced.

Wahab, Alhaji Nuha Abdul (Male) age 67 - 1997 in Sittia, Bonthe - Extorted. Assaulted and tortured.

Wai, Amara (Male) age 25 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Waifakoi, Dauda (Male) - 1997 - Assaulted.

Wajah, Yawah (Female) age 62 - 1995 in Baoma, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted. Tortured.

Walihun, Joe (Male) - 1995 in Kori, Moyamba - Killed.

Wapoh, Sesay (Male) - 1999 in Bumpeh, Moyamba - Assaulted.

Weaver, David (Male) age 52 - 2000 in Kholifa Rowalla, Tonkolili - Displaced.

Weggoh, Thomas (Male) age 17 - 1993 in Gorama Mende, Kenema - Displaced.

Wenze, Ebenezer (Male) - Extorted. Assaulted. Killed.

White, Abu (Male) - Abducted.

White, Peter (Male) - 1995 - Abducted and detained.

Wilhem, Alphonso (Male) - 1999 - Extorted and property destroyed. Abducted, detained and drugged.

Will, Junisa (Male) - Displaced and property destroyed.

Will, Junisa (Male) age 60 - 1997 - Displaced and property looted.

Will, Konchama (Female) - 1995 in Bagruwa, Moyamba - Displaced and property destroyed.

Will, Mohamed (Male) - 1996 in Imperi, Bonthe - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Will, Regina (Female) - 1995 in Western Area - Tortured. Killed.

Will, Tenneh (Female) age 39 - 1991 - Displaced.

William, Adu (Male) age 31 - 1995 in Bagbe, Bo District - Property destroyed. Tortured.

William, Joe (Male) - 1994 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced. Killed.

Williams, Aiah (Male) age 35 - 1992 in Tankoro, Kono - Property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.

Williams, Alfred (Male) - 1995 in Jong, Bonthe - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Williams, Bondu (Female) age 30 - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced and property destroyed. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Williams, Francis (Male) - 1999 in Kagboro, Moyamba - Property destroyed.

Williams, Francis (Male) - 1995 in Dasse, Moyamba - Displaced. Detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Williams, Joseph (Male) age 30 - 1998 in Mambolo, Kambia - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Williams, Kai (Male) age 89 - Killed.

Williams, Kumba (Female) - 1992 in Nimikoro, Kono - Abducted. Killed.

Williams, Makieue (Male) age 60 - 1994 in Simbaru, Kenema - Displaced.

Williams, Margrette (Female) - 1997 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Williams, Mattu (Female) age 19 - 1994 in Simbaru, Kenema - Abducted and detained.

Williams, Musu (Female) - 1992 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Assaulted.

Williams, Ola (Male) age 34 - 1999 in Western Area - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and limb amputated.

Williams, Richard (Male) age 31 - 1996 in Wara-Wara Yagala, Koinadugu - Displaced and extorted. Detained.

Williams, Sahr (Male) age 14 - 1997 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Williams, Samuel (Male) - 1995 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Forced to labour.

Williams, Sheku (Male) age 8 - 1998 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced.

Williams, Tamba (Male) - 1992 in Nimikoro, Kono - Abducted. Killed.

Williams, Winymaina (Female) - 1998 in Western Area - Extorted and property destroyed.

Wilson, Borbor (Male) - 1998 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Abducted and detained.

Wilson, Joe (Male) - 1997 - Property looted. Stripped. Killed.

Wilson, Max (Male) - 1997 in Bonthe UDC, Bonthe - Abducted and detained. Assaulted. Killed.

Wilson, Talabi (Female) age 57 - 1999 in Western Area - Displaced and property looted. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Wondegoi, Hawa (Female) age 54 - 1991 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Wonima, Joe (Male) - 1997 in Mandu, Kailahun - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted. Killed.

Wonnah, Saffa (Male) age 45 - 1992 in Barri, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.

Wonneh, Lansana (Male) age 58 - Displaced.

Wonoko, Ali (Male) - 1999 in Konike Sande, Tonkolili - Killed.

Woode, Alhaji (Male) - 1995 in Kpanda Kemo, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Killed.

Woode, Brima (Male) age 43 - 1993 in Niawa Lenga, Bo District - Property destroyed. Killed.

Woode, John (Male) age 23 - 1991 - Killed.

Worrally, Bobor (Male) age 33 - 1995 in Baoma, Bo District - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Wova, Saffa (Male) - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Killed.

Wright, Fumie (Female) age 35 - Forced to labour.

Wubay, Sellu (Male) age 32 - 1991 in Bum, Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Wuhai, Sao (Female) age 34 - 1991 in Jawie, Kailahun - Displaced. Assaulted and tortured. Killed.

Wully, Musa (Male) - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.

Wundah, Aminata (Female) age 60 - 1995 in Kenema - Abducted. Tortured. Killed.

Wundah, Joe (Male) age 47 - Displaced. Tortured.

Wundeh, Alhaji Osman (Male) - Displaced, extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted.

Wundeh, Ansumana (Male) - 1991 - Killed.

Wundeh, Foday (Male) age 11 - Forced to labour. Killed.

Wundeh, Jebbeh (Female) - 1991 - Killed.

Wundeh, Margrette (Female) age 10 - 1993 in Sowa, Pujehun - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Wurie, Alhaji (Male) age 5 - Displaced. Killed.

Wurie, Bassie (Male) age 39 - 1998 in Western Area - Property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Wuso, Alfred (Male) - 1995 in Kowa, Moyamba - Property destroyed. Abducted and detained. Limb amputated.

Wusoh, Bockarie (Male) age 75 - 1991 in Koya, Kenema - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured. Killed.

Wusoh, Lamin (Male) age 25 - 1991 in Koya, Kenema - Displaced.

Wuya, Yea (Female) - 1995 - Abducted and detained.

Wuyah, Gladys Olile (Female) age 19 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed. Abducted.

Yaa, Karta (Female) age 10 - 1993 - Abducted and detained.

Yabai, Betty (Female) - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.

Yabei, Momodu (Male) - 1999 in Mambolo, Kambia - Killed.

Yajoh, Augustine (Male) age 29 - 1997 in Bumpeh, Moyamba - Extorted and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted.

Yaju, Jatu (Female) age 55 - Displaced. Assaulted.

Yallah, Alie (Male) - 1999 in Magbema, Kambia - Abducted. Assaulted.

Yallah, Morsay (Male) age 67 - 1997 in Gorama Mende, Kenema - Displaced and property destroyed.

Yamba, Hassanatu (Female) age 14 - 1994 in Kakua, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Yamba, John (Male) - 1994 in Tikonko, Bo District - Displaced. Assaulted.

Yamba, Kain Hopanda (Male) age 36 - 1997 in Kando Leppeama, Kenema - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Yamba, Komba (Male) - 1997 in Western Area - Tortured.

Yamba, Massah (Female) - 1994 in Tikonko, Bo District - Killed.

Yamba, Micheal A (Male) age 53 - 1996 in Niawa Lenga, Bo District - Property destroyed. Assaulted.

Yamba, Nancy (Female) age 72 - 1996 in Badjia, Bo District - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Yamba, Taesewah (Male) age 35 - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Yamba, Yusufu (Male) - Property looted.

Yambasu, Aiah (Male) - 1994 in Gbense, Kono - Killed.

Yambasu, Alfred Gibao (Male) age 47 - 1998 in Kori, Moyamba - Displaced and property destroyed.

Yambasu, Aminata (Female) - 1995 in Nongoba Bullom, Bonthe - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Yambasu, Finda (Female) - 1994 in Gbense, Kono - Killed.

Yambasu, Finda (Female) age 23 - 1998 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Yambasu, Finda Cathrine (Female) age 29 - 1992 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced.

Yambasu, Kai (Male) age 11 - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced. Killed.

Yambasu, Musu (Female) age 54 - 1991 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Detained.

Yambasu, Nabieu (Male) age 84 - 1999 - Killed.

Yambasu, Patrick (Male) age 55 - 1995 in Bumpah, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Yambasu, Sahr (Male) age 35 - 1998 in Nimikoro, Kono - Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Yambasu, Tamba (Male) - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Stripped.

Yancoba, Sei (Male) age 32 - 1994 in Lower Bambara, Kenema - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Yande, Messie (Female) - 1994 - Killed.

Yandeh, Hawa (Female) - 1994 - Killed.

Yanga, Amara (Male) - 1995 in Jiama-Bongor, Bo District - Displaced. Abducted and detained.

Yanguba, Mamawa (Female) - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Tortured.

Yanka, Foday (Male) age 38 - 1994 in Nongowa, Kenema - Displaced. Killed.

Yankah, Mohamed (Male) age 10 - 1999 in Nimikoro, Kono - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Yankay, Sesay (Male) age 42 - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted.

Yankuba, Alhaji (Male) - Killed.

Yankuba, Samu (Male) - 1997 - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Yansaneh, Foday (Male) age 79 - 1997 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced, extorted and property looted.

Yarjah, Abu (Male) age 16 - 2000 - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Yarjah, Aiah (Male) age 7 - 1998 in Gbense, Kono - Displaced and extorted. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Yarjah, Amara (Male) age 7 - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Yarjah, Fea (Female) - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Yarjah, Kpana (Male) - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Killed.

Yarjah, Tamba (Male) - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced. Abducted. Killed.

Yarjah, Yai (Female) age 37 - 2000 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured. Killed.

Yarmoh, Musa (Male) - 1991 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Property looted and destroyed.

Yatteh, Abdul (Male) - 1994 - Assaulted. Killed.

Yatteh, John (Male) age 6 - 1994 in Gbonkolenken, Tonkolili - Abducted and detained.

Yatteh, Mankaprie (Female) age 70 - Displaced.

Yawei, Thomas (Male) - 1997 - Detained. Assaulted.

Yayah, Amara (Male) age 43 - 1991 in Bumpah, Bo District - Displaced. Tortured.

Yayah, Habib (Male) age 25 - 1995 in Niawa, Kenema - Displaced. Assaulted.

Yayah, Sahr Abu (Male) age 6 - 1998 in Sandor, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Yayah, Side (Male) age 7 - 1995 in Bagbo, Bo District - Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Yaysoh, Iye (Female) - 1999 in Mambolo, Kambia - Killed.

Yazbeck, Domingo (Male) - 1991 in Lugbu, Bo District - Assaulted and tortured. Killed.

Yegn, Jerrieh (Male) - Abducted. Killed.

Yek, Kain (Male) - 1997 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Killed.

Yele, Iye (Female) - 1999 in Koya, Port Loko - Property destroyed. Killed.

Yelieba, Samura (Male) - 1998 in Sella Limba, Bombali - Displaced and property destroyed. Assaulted.

Yellah, Sheku (Male) age 70 - 1999 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted.

Yembah, Alie (Male) - 2000 in Yoni, Tonkolili - Killed.

Yeneba, Sorie (Male) - Assaulted.

Yennie, Joseph (Male) - 1997 - Assaulted.

Yerge, Kona (Female) - 1995 in Panga Kabonde, Pujehun - Abducted and detained.

Yiembo, Musa (Male) age 78 - Displaced and property destroyed.

Yillah, Alimamy Kafoir (Male) age 48 - 1997 in Kaffu Bullom, Port Loko - Abducted and detained.

Yillah, Bala (Male) - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Yillah, Fatu (Female) - Displaced and property looted.

Yillah, Kadiatu (Female) - 1998 in Sanda Loko, Bombali - Abducted. Killed.

Yillah, Memuna (Female) - Killed.

Yillah, Mohamed (Male) age 46 - 2000 in Samu, Kambia - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Forced to labour.

Yillah, Nabie (Male) age 45 - 1998 in Paki Masabong, Bombali - Property looted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted, tortured and stripped.

Yillah, Ntuma (Female) - Abducted and detained.

Yimbo, Karim Kullie (Male) - 1995 in Banta Gbangbatoke, Moyamba - Property looted.

Yimbo, Malia - 1995 in Sittia, Bonthe - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Yimbo-Kaikai, Matta (Female) - 1995 in Timdel, Moyamba - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Yobei, Allieu (Male) - Abducted and detained.

Yogbor, Lahai (Male) - 1996 in Barri, Pujehun - Killed.

Yojai, Momoh (Male) age 73 - 1991 in Kpaka, Pujehun - Displaced, extorted and property destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Yokah, Fatu (Female) - Displaced. Abducted.

Yomba, Falla (Female) - 1991 in Kissi Teng, Kailahun - Killed.

Yombo, Isata Mummy (Female) age 10 - 1998 in Nimiyama, Kono - Displaced. Forced to labour.

Yonga, Boima (Male) - Displaced. Forced to labour. Assaulted.

Yonina, Maddi (Female) - 1995 - Abducted and detained.

Yorma Benge, Phebian (Female) age 47 - 1991 in Luawa, Kailahun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Yormeh, Hampa (Male) - 1998 in Dema, Bonthe - Detained. Tortured.

Yorpi, Doris (Female) age 30 - 1992 in Nimikoro, Kono - Displaced and property destroyed.

Yorpi, Khon (Male) age 56 - Extorted and property looted. Assaulted and tortured.

Yorpoi, Jusu (Male) - 1997 in Jalahun, Kailahun - Killed.

Yorpoi, Sahr (Male) - 1997 in Simbaru, Kenema - Displaced and property looted. Forced to labour. Assaulted and tortured.

Younger, Richard (Male) age 41 - 1996 in Nongowa, Kenema - Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured. Killed.

Youonie, David (Male) age 47 - 1998 in Kamajei, Moyamba - Extorted. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Yusuf, Aminata (Female) age 45 - 1998 in Lei, Kono - Displaced and property destroyed. Abducted and detained.

Zoker, Brima (Male) age 45 - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Displaced and extorted.

Zoker, Brima (Male) age 54 - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Zoker, Fatmata (Female) age 15 - 1991 in Malen, Pujehun - Displaced. Abducted and detained. Tortured.

Zoker, Hawa (Female) - 1991 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed.

Zoker, Jinah (Male) age 35 - Killed.

Zoker, Kabba (Male) age 31 - 1991 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted and detained. Assaulted and tortured.

Zoker, Kabba (Male) age 35 - 1991 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced, extorted and property looted. Assaulted and tortured.

Zoker, Mamanyamu Kadiatu (Female) age 37 - 1992 in Makpele, Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Abducted.

Zoker, Mohamed (Male) - Abducted and detained. Killed.

Zoker, Momoh (Male) - 1991 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Displaced. Killed.


Zoker, Sandy (Male) age 43 - 1991 in Soro Gbema, Pujehun - Property destroyed. Killed.

Zoker, Sency (Male) age 17 - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Tortured. Killed.

Zoker, Siatta (Female) age 55 - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.

Zomba, Vamba (Male) - 1991 in Gallinasperi, Pujehun - Killed.

Zombo, Jebbeh (Female) age 25 - 1991 in Pujehun - Displaced and property looted and destroyed. Assaulted.
Zombo, Messie (Female) age 37 - 1991 in Barri, Pujehun - Displaced and property destroyed.
Zombo, Sannu (Male) - Displaced.
Zombo, Vambo (Male) - 1991 in Bumpeh, Bo District - Displaced.



WITNESS TO TRUTH:

Report of the
Sierra Leone
Truth & Reconciliation
Commission

VOL 3A

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ISBN 9988 -8097-6-X


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
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
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Ahmed Tijan Kabbah, President of sierra Leone on 5th October 2004


Bishop Joseph Christian Humper
Chairman



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CHAPTER ONE

Historical Antecedents to the Conflict

TRC

**Tru at
fo tok
but na im
nomo go
bring pis**

Produced by the TRC Steering Committee with support
from the International Human Rights Law Group

CHAPTER ONE

Historical Antecedents to the Conflict

Introduction

1. In the final decade of the twentieth century, Sierra Leone – a tiny country on the coast of West Africa made up of just 4.5 million people – became the scene of one of the greatest human tragedies of our time. On 23 March 1991, armed conflict broke out in Sierra Leone when forces crossed the border from Liberia into the town of Bomaru near the eastern frontier. Over the next eleven years, the country was devastated by a complex and bitter war that unleashed appalling brutality against the civilian population.
2. How did a peace-loving nation become engulfed, seemingly overnight, in horror? What events occurred in the history of Sierra Leone to make this conflict possible? Explanations put forward have varied from 'bad governance' and 'the history of the post-colonial period' to 'the urge to acquire the country's diamond wealth' and the roles of Libya or the Liberian faction leader Charles Taylor.¹ The international community initially dismissed the war in Sierra Leone as just another example of tribal conflict in Africa; another failed state imploding in the context of environmental degradation and acute economic crisis.²
3. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission ("TRC" or "the Commission") was established in 2000 with a primary objective "to create an impartial historical record of ... the armed conflict in Sierra Leone, from the beginning of the conflict in 1991 to the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement."³ The functions of the Commission, as set out in its founding Act, included investigating and reporting on the causes, nature and extent of the violations and abuses that occurred, including the antecedents to those violations and abuses and the context in which they took place.⁴ From its outset, the Commission interpreted these provisions broadly, aiming to fulfil the intention of the drafters of the Act that the TRC should "compile a clear picture of the past."⁵ Accordingly the Commission devoted considerable resources towards examining the pre-conflict history of Sierra Leone.

¹ Charles Taylor led the faction called the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), which launched an insurgency in Liberia in December 1989. Taylor warned in a BBC radio interview in 1990 that Sierra Leone would "taste the bitterness of war" because of the country's membership and backing of the West African Intervention Force (ECOMOG) that was attacking his bases in Liberia.

² See Kaplan R., 'The Coming Anarchy'; *Atlantic Monthly*, February 1994. Also see Clapham C., 'Sierra Leone: The Global-Local Politics of State Collapse and Attempted Reconstruction'; Failed States Conference, Florence, 10-14 April 2001.

³ See Section 6(1) of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000. For further details, see the chapter entitled 'The Mandate of the Commission' in Volume One of this report.

⁴ See Section 6(2) of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000.

⁵ This objective is contained in Section 1 of the Lomé Peace Agreement, as expounded in the 'Memorandum of Objects and Reasons', attached to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Bill when it was tabled before Parliament in February 2000 by the then Attorney General and Minister of Justice, Solomon Berewa.

4. This chapter reflects a brief summary of the Commission's research into the 'Historical Antecedents to the Conflict'. The chapter attempts to locate causes of conflict in Sierra Leone's past, place the conflict within its proper historical context and offer explanations for what went wrong. It identifies social trends that spawned division and confrontation between the various groups that make up Sierra Leone. It picks out fault lines and key events that created the structural conditions for conflict. It highlights decisions on the part of the political elite that were designed to strengthen their grip on power at the expense of common benefit, progress and ultimately peace.
5. Central to the study contained in this chapter is the social and political interaction among Sierra Leone's constituent groups. Throughout Sierra Leone's history, the nature and extent of such interaction – often negative and limited – has influenced people's perceptions of the state in which they live and their own places within it. These perceptions have in turn presented the greatest challenges to the concepts of nationhood and citizenship. They have served to undermine the positive sense of national identity needed to build a strong and unified independent nation.
6. In order to adduce a balanced historical perspective on the conflict, the Commission invited a host of national and international stakeholders to make submissions about the key events of the past. It held public and closed hearings at which individuals, institutions of state, non-governmental organisations and donor agencies were able to express their views and opinions. It substantiated the material from all these testimonies by referring to multiple secondary sources, including books and periodicals on the country, as well as memoirs by Sierra Leoneans. The resultant chapter compiles a concise narrative out of these various resources and reflects contrasting versions of history in an impartial manner to the greatest extent possible.
7. The 'Historical Antecedents to the Conflict' have been divided into three sections for the purposes of this chapter. 'Part I – The Historical Evolution of the State' examines Sierra Leone's social, political and economic development under colonial rule and in the first few years of independence. 'Part II – The Management of Power by the APC' is a short synopsis of the system of government adopted by Sierra Leone's longest-serving and most influential pre-war Government, under the All People's Congress (APC) party. 'Part III – Local Historical Antecedents' traces pre-conflict dynamics in a variety of important Districts that help to explain the manner in which the war unfolded across the nation. The main points of the chapter are drawn together at the end in a brief 'Conclusion'.

PART I – THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE STATE

8. The Commission has identified four distinct phases in the historical evolution of Sierra Leone, which it regards as crucial to understanding the roots of the conflict and some of the challenges that the country still faces today. These four phases are analysed below in the following order:
- The Colony and the Protectorate. Rather than constructing a unified Sierra Leonean state, the colonial government effectively created two nations in the same land. The divide between the entities known as the 'Colony' and the 'Protectorate' had far-reaching implications for issues such as citizenship, land tenure rights and conflict of laws.
 - The Era of Party Politics (1951-1961). After the 1947 Constitution had amalgamated Sierra Leone's 'two nations' in preparation for independence, party politics became the greatest obstacle to national cohesion and identity. Party allegiance proved just as divisive as ethnicity, class or regional prejudice in the battle over who should succeed the British. On the cusp of independence in 1961, the ten-year-old Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) was joined in the political arena by the All People's Congress (APC), which would become its main rival in contesting elections.
 - The Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) in Power. The euphoria and perceived unity of the immediate post-colonial period appear with hindsight to have been artificial. The first independent government, formed by the majority SLPP party, served to polarise public opinion in the country, introduced notions of cronyism in many state institutions and laid the foundation for military involvement in politics. This period had terrible, albeit foreseeable consequences on the unity of the young state and served to deepen existing cleavages.
 - The 1967 Elections and their Aftermath. The elections of 1967 were scarred by bitter power struggles based on ethnicity, personality and party affiliation. Although the APC won the most seats, the leadership of the SLPP stoutly refused to concede defeat. The resultant standoff signalled a watershed in the political fortunes of the country and ultimately led to the destruction of the multi-party system.

The Colony and the Protectorate⁶

9. Before 1947, Sierra Leone was divided socially, geographically and historically into two entities. The colonial capital Freetown, known as the Colony, and the much larger area of provincial territory, known as the Protectorate, were political creations of the British, designed to facilitate their administration of the people as part of their expanding Empire. The Crown Colony State, established in 1808, was originally limited to the area of Freetown and its immediate environs on the Western peninsula, later taking in the Bonthe Urban District of Bonthe Island. The Protectorate, encompassing the remainder of the territory known in modern times as Sierra Leone, was established in 1896.

⁶ This section of the chapter encompasses three periods, which are historically distinct from one another: 1808-1896; 1896-1947; and 1947-1961

10. The imperial leadership pursued a social engineering strategy that was deeply divisive in its nature and impact. Simply put, the Colony and the Protectorate were developed separately and unequally. The colonialists used commerce, Christianity and notions of 'civilisation' as their tools to manipulate the relationships among the indigenous peoples, who had intermingled and dealt with one another for centuries. In place of harmonious co-existence, the colonialists sowed seeds of distrust, competition and intransigence.
11. By way of example, the chiefs and peoples of the Sierra Leonean interior had originally welcomed the arrival and gradual resettlement of various categories of freed slaves⁷ on the Western peninsula. Several traditional rulers even made their land available to the freed slaves. Yet the British colonial administration promoted the notion that western values and Christianity were superior to the traditional customs and religions practised in the Protectorate. The people in the Protectorate were thus effectively discriminated against on the basis of their belief systems.
12. In terms of land area, the Crown Colony was not more than 200 square miles. The Protectorate, on the other hand, extended some 182 miles from West to East, and 210 miles from North to South.⁸ The Colony had only about sixty thousand people by the end of the colonial period, while the Protectorate had about two million people.⁹ These massive disparities in land size and population, however, appeared to be inverted by the sociological and political divide.
13. The British had acquired the original land in the peninsula and its environs (now known as the Western Area) for the Colony in 1787, from the Temne ruler, King Nimbana, whose northern Koya Kingdom extended to the western tip of the territory. With colonial expansion, Bonthe Island, off the south-western shore, was later added. The Sierra Leone Company, a corporate entity created by the British Abolitionists who had led the campaign to end the slave trade in the United Kingdom, administered the Colony at first. By 1800, former slaves and their descendants had developed into a distinctive social group who were known as the Creoles, or Krios. They developed a language from among their various dialects, which became known as Krio.¹⁰ By 1808, with the collapse of

⁷ The categories of slaves freed onto the Western peninsula included the black poor from England, the labourers of Nova Scotia, the Maroons and the Recaptives. For a more detailed discussion of these immigrations, see Fyfe C.; *A Short History of Sierra Leone*, London, Longman, 1962 (hereinafter "Fyfe, *A Short History of Sierra Leone*"), at pages 26, 32, 38 and 61.

⁸ See Gwynne-Jones D.R.G., Mitchell, P.K., Harvey, M. E. and Swindell, K.; *A New Geography of Sierra Leone*, Essex, Longman, 1978 (hereinafter "Gwynne-Jones, et al., *A New Geography of Sierra Leone*"); at pages 4-5.

⁹ The peoples of the area formerly covered by the Protectorate include three dominant ethnic groups: Temne - 30%, originally in the Northern Province; Mende - 30%, originally in the Southern and Eastern Provinces; and Limba - 20%, originally in the Northern Province. Other minority tribes include the following: Susu, Koranko and Yalunka in the North; Vai, Krim, and Sherbro in the South; and Kono, Kissi and Gola in the East. Scattered among these groups are the Fullah and Mandigo tribes, as well as increasing numbers in the Lebanese community (4,000 in 2002 at end of the conflict, following massive emigration). For details of population distribution, see Manifesto 1999; *Traditional Methods of Conflict Management and Resolution of Possible Complementary Value to the proposed Sierra Leone TRC*; unpublished internal report; Freetown, July 2002 (hereinafter "Manifesto 99, *Traditional Methods of Conflict Management and Resolution*"), at page 6. See also Fyfe, *A Short History of Sierra Leone*, at page 174.

¹⁰ Krio (sometimes referred to as 'Creole') is a unique pidgin English that incorporates words and phrases used in popular dialect by the freed slaves in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. It is the *lingua franca* of Sierra Leone today.

the Sierra Leone Company administration, the Creoles had become colonial subjects governed directly by the British crown.

14. The territories of the Protectorate, meanwhile, came under British rule through the gradual and subtle advance of the colonialists into the hinterland. The British took their lead from Krio traders and Christian missionaries, whose entry into the outlying territories provided the context and the conditions for their annexation. By 1896, the British had expanded their coverage and control to a sufficient extent to be able to declare the hinterland a Protectorate. Thus, almost nine decades after the resettled former slaves had come under British colonial rule in 1808, the remainder of the population also lost their sovereignty to the avarice of imperialism.
15. The British treated the peoples of the Colony and the Protectorate quite differently. The inhabitants of the Protectorate were classified as “protected subjects” and were commonly referred to as “natives”. The people in the Colony were considered to be direct British subjects and were thus referred to as “non-natives”. These designations were not merely descriptive, but rather had huge political, social, economic and administrative implications. Only the Crown Colony State was governed by the monarch and recognised as part of the British Empire. The Protectorate was administered indirectly, as a British “protected territory”.
16. The existing rulers of the hinterland, who were monarchs in their own right, were nevertheless quickly subordinated to the colonialists. They had previously governed their people directly, but now became representatives of the Crown and were answerable to the local British administrator. In the past, these rulers had derived their legitimacy through a process of selection in accordance with the customs and traditions of their people. They represented the interests of their people and served as symbols of unity. They were subject to a variety of in-built checks on their power that purportedly prevented them from becoming abusive or autocratic.¹¹
17. In the process of acquiring territory and expanding the frontiers of the British Empire, the colonialists in Sierra Leone entered into treaties and agreements with traditional rulers in approximately 400 land units, which they designated as chiefdoms. The leader of each of these chiefdoms was given the title of ‘Paramount Chief’. In terms of functions and powers, Paramount Chiefs were restricted in comparison to the pre-colonial rulers.¹² Hierarchically, Paramount Chiefs fell directly under the District Commissioners, who were mainly white, British citizens. Only if a Paramount Chief fulfilled the District Commissioner’s demands for labour and taxes, as well as “maintaining law and order” within his territories, would he be given a degree of autonomy to rule his subjects.
18. Conscious of their steady marginalisation, the Chiefs objected strongly, albeit in vain, to colonial domination. Their protestations culminated in the so-called ‘Hut Tax War’ of 1898, led by Bai Bureh of Kasseh and a number of Mende chiefs, such as Nyagua of Kpanguma. The ‘Hut Tax War’ was a revolt against the proposed imposition of a tax based on the size of one’s homestead. The British suppressed the rebellion and the tax was retained. The perceived ringleaders of the protest were arrested and 98 of them were hanged in

¹¹ See Abraham, A.; *The History of Chieftaincy in Sierra Leone*; UNDP Governance Issues, 2003 (hereinafter “Abraham, *The History of Chieftaincy*”), at pages 3 – 4.

¹² See Abraham, *The History of Chieftaincy*, at pages 6 – 8.

Bandajuma. Indeed most of the Chiefs who had rebelled were punished – some of them imprisoned, others banished – while those who supported the British were rewarded along with their subjects.¹³ The period of unrest around the ‘Hut Tax War’ thus marked the effective consolidation of colonial rule. All the chiefs were compelled to adjust to their new status as the servants and representatives of the colonial government.

19. The overhaul of the structure of Chieftaincy was to have grave implications on the ways in which traditional rulers related to their subjects and on the socio-political organisation of the communities. The overbearing attitudes and behaviour imbibed by the Chiefs from their colonial masters led to their assuming new and overwhelming powers over their subjects. Some of these measures, such as the ability to impose fines or other punishments for errant behaviour, were retained long into the post-colonial period and permanently defined the negative perceptions of Chiefs among many of their subjects. Indeed, these negative perceptions carried over into the conflict in Sierra Leone in the 1990s as a partial explanation for the brutality of the treatment meted out to Chiefs and other figures of status or authority.
20. No system of Paramount Chieftaincy existed in the Colony. Instead the Office of Colonial Governor was charged with administration. By 1863, the people of the Colony were allowed some form of representation in the colonial Legislative Council and therefore had the opportunity to learn and grow in the management of their own affairs. The Municipality Act of 1893 inaugurated the City Council, the equivalent of local government for the Colony. The existence of a City Council in Freetown gave the inhabitants of the Colony a distinct advantage over their counterparts in the Protectorate. The institution was to become a significant factor for the people of the Protectorate as they dealt with their fears of domination by the Krios in the years before self-government.

Education

21. The disparities between the Colony and the Protectorate were particularly acute in the realms of social and economic development. British colonial policies afforded the residents of the Colony vastly superior access to resources such as education. These advantages for the Krios, the predominant residents of the Colony, endured until the end of colonialism in 1961.
22. Education in the Colony flourished to the extent that some residents were able to attain what were considered high standards in the West. In 1827, one of the first universities in sub-Saharan Africa was established in Freetown in the shape of Fourah Bay College. The Krios, who were the sole beneficiaries of such facilities, became the first professional lawyers, doctors, missionaries, educators and engineers.¹⁴

¹³ For more details see Squire, C. B., *Ill-fated Nation?*; Ro-Marong Limited, Freetown, 1995 (hereinafter “Squire, *Ill-fated Nation*”), at pages 63 – 67. See also Fyfe, *A Short History of Sierra Leone*, at pages 141 – 158. A further negative consequence of this period of unrest was the killing of a large number of Krios, especially those living in Mende territories, because they were seen as collaborators of the British colonialists.

¹⁴ See Earl Conteh Morgan and Dixon-Fyle, M.; *Sierra Leone at the End of the Twentieth Century: History, Politics and Society*; Peter Lang, New York, 1999 (hereinafter “Dixon-Fyle, et al., *Sierra Leone at the End of the Twentieth Century*”), at pages 20 – 28.

23. In respect of primary education, the Colony had 67 schools, which was a disproportionately high number compared to only 104 schools in the Protectorate. Moreover, the colonial government supported 50 out of 67 schools in the Colony and only 24 out of 104 in the Protectorate. This disparity in educational provision manifested itself clearly in the contrasting percentages of children attending primary school in the different regions of the country in 1947.¹⁵

Southern Province (Protectorate)	4.8%
Northern Province (Protectorate)	1.8%
Western Area (Colony)	50%
Eastern Province (Protectorate)	N/A

24. A cursory examination of these statistics against population figures reveals that the Western Area had far more children attending school than the rest of the country combined. There were also notable disparities within the Protectorate itself, given that the number of children attending primary school in the South was twice that of the North.
25. There was an upsurge in the number of school-going children between 1946 and 1953, following the establishment of the Colonial Development Welfare Fund and a massive investment in education in the Protectorate.¹⁶ However, the expansion did little to address any of the disparities because the new facilities were totally inadequate.
26. Further problems could be ascertained by examining the social profile of the children who were given the opportunity to go to school. In Bo, the main town of the Southern Province, for example, a school for boys was set up in 1906. Yet this school catered almost exclusively for the children of the elite and included the nominees and children of Chiefs. The establishment of such a school promoted the notion in the minds of ordinary people that members of the traditional ruling class were forming themselves into an elitist group. Indeed, this 'traditional elite' would provide the country's leadership from the end of colonialism. Meanwhile, there was only one school for girls anywhere in the Protectorate, namely the Hartford School at Moyamba.
27. With regard to teacher training colleges, the Northern Province had none at all, while there was one each in the South and East, owned and run by the missionaries in Bo and Bunumbu respectively. The highest qualification obtainable at these colleges in the Protectorate was the Teacher's Elementary Certificate, which qualified the holder to teach only at primary school level. No holder of such a certificate could enter Fourah Bay College, as the teacher training colleges did not offer Latin or science, both compulsory subjects for entrance to the university.

¹⁵ The source for these figures is Tucker, P., *The SLPP at 50: 42 Years of Trials and Tribulations*; originally printed in the *Standard Times International*, Vol. 1, No. 30; reprinted in *West Africa* magazine, 2 May 2003 (hereinafter "Tucker, *The SLPP at 50*"), at page 11.

¹⁶ The number of primary school-going children in the Protectorate expanded in a three-year period between 1950 and 1953 alone, from 18,931 to 24,889. By that period the South had nearly half (176 out of 367) of all the primary schools in the Protectorate. The entire North had only 96, while the East had 95. See Tucker, *The SLPP at 50*, at page 11.

28. As only persons who were “suitably educated” could serve in the colonial administration, the Krios had a massive advantage over people from the rest of the country. Accordingly, the Krios dominated all the important positions in the colonial government. Even the emergent entrepreneurial class relied on a literate work force, which was essentially Krio. The Krios were therefore extended inordinate advantages over other Sierra Leoneans, considering their population size.
29. The enduring disparities in education were not the result of some historical accident that favoured the Krios. On the contrary, the colonial rulers were adept at promoting specific indigenous groups with particular skills, which served their own interests. Communities close to the coast were the first to encounter the Europeans and had access to western education long before communities in the hinterland. The population from the coastal areas provided the bulk of interpreters, court officers, messengers and other support staff for the colonial administration.
30. The Krios were in a sense doubly advantaged because they were already literate by the time the Colony was governed directly from London and they had direct familial and other links to the United Kingdom arising from their historical relationship. They were classed as British subjects, which conferred certain privileges upon them and enabled them to be influential players in the period leading to self-government. Their only major drawback was their paucity of numbers. In 1947, when a constitutional debate addressed the question of voting rights, the Krios opposed an extension of the franchise to illiterate people. This opposition was widely considered to have been a self-preservation tactic on the part of the Krio minority, aimed at excluding illiterates (most of whom were from the Protectorate) from the political arena and thus allowing the Krios to continue to dominate domestic affairs. The move created deep resentment among the emerging educated elite in the Protectorate and heightened the perception of discrimination against Protectorate people.
31. Even educated Krios soon began to realise the impact of limited opportunities, however, when they found that there was a certain level in the colonial service beyond which non-British persons could not advance. The Krios were then quick to mobilise public opinion against the policies of the colonial government. With a vibrant civil society including established media houses, they constantly attacked the divisive politics of the colonialists. Experiences elsewhere on the African continent had demonstrated that such threats to colonialism were inevitably neutralised through the promotion of the interests of the numerically superior natives by the colonialists. Sierra Leone proved to be no exception. The British increasingly began finding common cause with the Protectorate peoples and the emergent immigrant groups such as the Lebanese and the Syrians. New constitutional arrangements that granted increased representation to the numerically superior Protectorate were ostensibly designed to expand public participation in governance. It is difficult to escape the impression, though, that in reality these measures were the first steps by the colonialists towards reining in the vocal and perceptibly “over-educated” Krio elite.

Legal duality

32. The distinction between the Colony and the Protectorate was also reflected in the laws that governed them. Whereas the Colony adopted the English Common Law, the Protectorate operated a combination of legal doctrines and a three-tier court system, as follows:
- (a) The Court of Native Chiefs, which regulated matters relating to land and factional fights. It had no jurisdiction over criminal offences;
 - (b) The court of the District Commissioner, which had original jurisdiction over all offences; and
 - (c) The Court of the District Commissioner and Native Chiefs, on which both parties sat to try criminal cases. This court had the power to impose the death penalty.¹⁷
33. The ambiguity over the hierarchy of these three courts in the Protectorate created a great deal of confusion about the powers and the limits of the Chiefs. In theory, the Chiefs were not permitted to adjudicate on criminal cases alone. In practice, however, they often did so and they became very powerful as a result. The Chiefs frequently exploited their people's uncertainty about the legal system to impose fines and other kinds of punishment as a means of consolidating their authority. Their abuse of the courts sowed the seeds for conflict over which law would prevail in any given situation. Quite apart from the differences between the Colony and the Protectorate, the Chiefs created a harmful situation of legal duality within the Protectorate itself.
34. The multiple conflicts of laws were to reverberate long into the post-colonial period. The Colony had a heritage of applying only the Common Law, whereas the Protectorate had a mixed system of inconsistent and irrational application. The Common Law was supposed to supersede customary law in the event of a conflict between the two, but in reality most disputes were decided at the whim of the adjudicator. The Common Law was codified while Customary Law was not, making the latter more susceptible to arbitrary interpretation, varying from Chiefdom to Chiefdom as well as between different ethnic groups. The impact of this legal duality was that people were treated differently in response to the same forms of illegal behaviour. The people of the Protectorate were given cause to resent the law and feel aggrieved at their second-class treatment; they looked spitefully upon the Krios, who seemed to have everything tailor-made for them.
35. As custodians of custom, the Chiefs were responsible for creating and adjusting the laws of the Protectorate. Their interpretations were often influenced by considerations other than a sense of justice. An impression spread among the people that the Chiefs had become predators on their own subjects.¹⁸ Such a negative perception undermined the legitimacy of the Chiefs and further alienated them from the ordinary folk. In addition, survival as a Chief came to

¹⁷ See Abraham, *The History of Chieftaincy*, at page 7.

¹⁸ See Palmer, I., *Investigating the Antecedents of the Rebel War in Sierra Leone*, narrative report on a project commissioned by the Ford Foundation for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, University of Sierra Leone, Freetown, July 2002 (hereinafter "Palmer, *Investigating the Antecedents of the Rebel War*").

depend almost entirely on one's subservience to the colonial authority rather than on one's allegiance to the population one was elected to serve. Sadly this did tradition became entrenched to the extent that it did not change when colonialism ended. Chiefs were to be co-opted in an identical fashion by the post-colonial political parties, who relied on them to corral support from their people at election time. In exchange, the parties offered their support to help the Chiefs retain their positions even when there was good cause to remove them.

Systems of local government

36. The Colony and the Protectorate were also governed differently at the local level. In the Colony the Municipality of Freetown was established as far back as 1895. The management of the Freetown council was by election of a substantial percentage of the population who were literate and had assets that qualified them to be on the voters' list.
37. By contrast, in the Protectorate native administrations were first established in 1937, District Councils in 1946 and Town Councils in 1950. These institutions were perceived by the people in the Protectorate not to be progressive as they were dominated by Paramount Chiefs who were elected on a limited franchise by only the Tribal Authorities, to represent their Chiefdoms on the Councils. Feelings of disenfranchisement took root quite early in the Protectorate and contributed to a diminished sense of self-esteem and perception of enforced marginalisation, especially among the youths, which became a recurring theme as a cause of conflict.

Resources

38. The endowment of resources was another area in which the Colony and the Protectorate experienced contrasting fortunes. On the face of it, the Protectorate enjoyed a natural advantage in this regard, as it was blessed with all the economic resources (including bauxite, iron ore, rutile (titanium ore), diamonds, coffee and cocoa) the country needed to develop, while the Colony had virtually nothing to offer.
39. However, what the Colony lacked in economic resources it compensated for with its highly literate and privileged population. The people of the Colony were to form the professional classes that were needed to run the post-colonial bureaucracy. Centralisation of government enabled those in the Colony to enrich themselves using the resources that the people of the Protectorate had produced. The profits of Sierra Leone's resource endowment were channelled almost exclusively into the Colony, financing the construction of huge houses, hospitals and other infrastructure, as well as a clean water supply for the citizens of Freetown. The citizens of the protectorate were deprived of any such benefits and remained in abject poverty.

Strangers in the same country

40. The British colonialists suspected the Krios of inciting the people of the Protectorate into rebellion during the Hut Tax War in 1898. The colonial administration therefore enacted stringent laws to exclude all Krios from the hinterland. Krios became “strangers” in the Protectorate by virtue of the Protectorate Ordinance of 1896 and they had to pay “stranger” fees to the local Chief, making them a lucrative source of revenue. Given that Krios were regarded as ‘foreigners’ in the Protectorate territories, they were afforded only those rights extended to them by the local Chiefs.
41. In the Colony, the different ethnic groups from the Provinces were segregated and compelled to reside in designated areas: for example, the Mendes stayed in Ginger Hall, East Freetown, while the Fullahs were put in the area that became known as Fullah Town. Apart from living in individual ghettos, people from the Protectorate could not acquire voting rights in the city since they were illiterate and had no assets that qualified them to be on the roll of voters.¹⁹ The Krios of the Colony did not mix with the Protectorate people in any way that could have fostered greater understanding of each other. Being ignorant of one other, it was easy and convenient for the Krio elite to characterise the Protectorate people as uncivilised. This stereotype was applied to the Mende people in particular, as illustrated by the following newspaper excerpt from the 1920s, which depicted them as:
- “...dressed, or rather undressed, in a style which would have been considered scanty even in the days when Adam delved and Eve spun. [They] go about our thoroughfares offering silent and nude reproaches to the existing local regulations, our civilisation and ideas of decency. The Kossoh folk or, as they liked to be called, Mendes... filled along the streets, all in a row, like skewered herrings, clothed for the most part with hideous grins and adorned with dirt. The lower apparel or rather appendage, which they ought not to wear, only render[s] the absence of those which they ought to wear more conspicuous...”²⁰
42. The endurance of this prejudice was such that, by 1947, the Protectorate people in the Colony outnumbered the Krios²¹ but were totally excluded from Colony politics.
43. The arrival of Lebanese and Syrian immigrants in 1905 created new dynamics in inter-group relations. The Protectorate people embraced the new arrivals and diverted the bulk of their trade to them. The Lebanese and the Syrians were efficient, humble and literate and they had capital. They were willing, unlike the Krios, to grant credit to the Protectorate traders. In a short time, the British also began to favour the Lebanese and the Syrians over the Krios. This shift in economic alignment removed the remaining opportunity for inter-dependency between the people of the Protectorate and the Krios.

¹⁹ See Kandeh, J. D., “Politicisation of Ethnic Identities in Sierra Leone”, in *African Studies Review*, 1992 (hereinafter “Kandeh, *Politicisation of Ethnic Identities*”) at page 7.

²⁰ See Sierra Leone Weekly News, 9 September 1922, at page 8.

²¹ *Ibidem*, at page 8.

44. In the period between 1896 and 1947, the separation between the Krios and the people of the Protectorate grew ever wider. The two groups became strangers to each other in the same land. The deepening division had stark effects on the approaches of both groups to post-colonial politics. The Krios, fearful that they would not be treated fairly under a Protectorate government, formed a party of their own, the National Congress of Sierra Leone, to protect their interests. The Protectorate people, in defiance of the Krios, seized the opportunity at independence to assert themselves and to redistribute the national wealth in a manner reflective of their numerical strength.

Land tenure and ownership

45. The differences in the rules for land tenure and ownership between the Colony and the Protectorate contributed in large measure to the neglect of the Protectorate and a glaring lack of investment in its rich arable lands. Whereas Sierra Leoneans from all parts of the country had similar rights in the ownership of land in the Colony, the same was not true in the Protectorate.
46. Three types of land ownership obtained in the Protectorate: communal land holding, family land holding and individual land tenure.²² Irrespective of the type of land ownership an individual asserted in the Protectorate, different land laws applied to Sierra Leoneans depending on whether they were “natives” (those originating from the Provinces) or so-called “non-natives” (those originating from the Colony). “Natives” could hold an indefinite interest in land in the Protectorate but “non-natives” could only acquire land and hold it on limited tenancy. The Provincial Land Act of 1906 stated that “no non-native shall acquire a greater interest in land in the Provinces than a tenancy for fifty years.” The same statute contained the further clause that “nothing in this Section shall prevent the insertion in any lease of a clause providing for the renewal of such lease for a second or further terms not over twenty one years.”²³
47. The Provincial Land Act of 1906 was manifestly discriminatory, as it gave certain advantages and privileges to the Protectorate people by reason of their place of birth or origin, which were not extended to other Sierra Leoneans. The Chiefs could arbitrarily recover land sold to “non-natives” if they so desired, especially if the land was formerly communally owned. The Act was designed to protect lands in the Provinces and have them available for use by the local people. In practice, however, it constrained the conversion of land into economic capital and prevented “non-natives” from making long-term investments in the Provinces for fear that their capital was not secure, being subject to recovery by the chiefs. Therefore, despite the huge agricultural potential in the Provinces, economic activities there focused mainly on trading and mining. Only the government made any real investment in agriculture in the Protectorate (through the Integrated Agricultural Projects scheme). The overwhelming majority of private economic investments were concentrated in Freetown and other parts of the Western Area.

²² As regulated by Section 4, Article 122 of the Provincial Land Act 1906, in the *Laws of Sierra Leone*.

²³ Both passages come from Section 4, Article 122 of the Provincial Land Act 1906, in the *Laws of Sierra Leone*.

48. Discriminatory provisions against Krios and others regarded “non-natives”, such as the Lebanese, existed in the statutes of Sierra Leone for a period of 85 years, from 1906 to 1991. The effect of these discriminatory laws was a deep-rooted reluctance to invest in the Protectorate. Thus even where the possibility existed for partnerships to make the land profitable, the majority of the people in the Provinces, lacking the capital and restricted by law and communal ownership, remained poor in the midst of an abundant land. In particular, the banks and commercial enterprises interpreted the restriction imposed by Communal Ownership as a basis to reject Provincial land as collateral for loans. The people of the Provinces saw no route out of poverty.
49. Meanwhile the population of Freetown was able to secure commercial bank loans and access state services with comparative ease. This development steadily deepened the social gap between the two peoples and explains the perception of people in the Protectorate that those in the Colony consumed all the country's wealth.
50. The cumulative outcome of socio-economic divisions, coupled over time with a host of other disparities between the Colony and the Protectorate, would induce people who had lived harmoniously for most of history to become polarised along ethnic and regional lines at moments of crisis. The polarity that is captured in the phrase ‘two nations in the same land’ was an ominous historical antecedent for future civil conflict with ethnic and regional undertones.

The Era of Party Politics

51. The system that governed the Colony and the Protectorate as two separate entities lasted until 1947. Up to that point, the only contact between the two entities in terms of governance was the presence of three Paramount Chiefs on the colonial Legislative Council, as provided for in the Constitution of 1927. The numerical strength of the Protectorate was not reflected in the disbursement of institutional influence or state resources. It was iniquitous for such a small number of people as lived in the Colony to have such access to and control over state resources.
52. Contradictory views on the management of state resources had fostered such mistrust between the Krios and the Protectorate people that it would largely shape the subsequent political alignments of both groups. The impact of this mistrust came to the fore in 1947 when a new Constitution (known as the ‘Stevens Constitution’ after its chief drafter Siaka Stevens) was proposed in order to prepare the country for independence. This Constitution amalgamated the Colony and the Protectorate into a single political entity, but divided their elite representatives into opposing factions, each dedicated to protecting the interests of its own people.
53. Among the key provisions of the 1947 Constitution were:
 - The creation of an elected “unofficial” (non-executive) majority in the Legislative Council, comprising 22 members;
 - 14 “unofficial” positions in the Legislative Council for representatives from the Protectorate. These representatives would be elected by fellow Paramount Chiefs and members of Tribal Authorities to the Protectorate Assembly (which had been set up in 1946 as a counterbalance to the Legislative Council in the Colony), and then on to the Legislative Council;

- 7 “unofficial” positions in the Legislative Council for representatives from the Colony, who were to be directly elected.
54. The creation of a single legislature for the country signalled the demise of Krio dominance since the Krios were numerically far inferior. The Krios in the Colony argued vehemently against the 1947 Constitution on the basis that it was wrong and impracticable to have uneducated Chiefs making laws for people who were colonial subjects. The Krios therefore advocated that a separate legislature should be created for the Colony. To champion their respective positions, the factions from both Colony and Protectorate formed themselves into narrow, regionally-based political parties with little or no national agenda.
 55. In the Colony, the original ideals of the West African Youth League,²⁴ namely to bring together the working class in both the Protectorate and the Colony to fight the evils of colonialism, gave way to the movement of Creole ethnic protectionism. This movement in turn gave birth to the National Congress of Sierra Leone, headed by Dr. Bankole Bright.
 56. In the Protectorate, pressure groups such as the Protectorate Educational and Progressive Union, which was dominated by Paramount Chiefs, and the Sierra Leone Organisational Society, which was dominated by the Protectorate elite, were galvanised into action. They united into a single force, putting aside their differences at least temporarily, to meet the Creole challenge.
 57. The political agenda became a battle over which regional elite would succeed the British. Little consideration was given to the majority of the inhabitants in either the Colony or the Protectorate. The debate on the issue of a single national legislature was indicative of this battle. Dr. Bankole Bright was reported to have said, “the Colony and the Protectorate are two hills standing opposite each other and can never meet.”²⁵
 58. The feelings of the Protectorate people were equally uncompromising, as vented by Bai Koblo Path Bana, one of the Protectorate representatives in the Legislative Council:

“We warn the inhabitants of the Colony that they are embarking on dangerous grounds in making any claims of independence from us. We would urge them to reflect on what is happening between India and Pakistan and between the Arabs and the Jews in Palestine, before they persist in claiming exclusive rights. If our emancipation should come, as we earnestly hope it will, we could well depend upon our treaties to reclaim our here lands ceded to the British crown, now known as the Colony area, and I would therefore ask our Colony brethren to locate themselves elsewhere.”²⁶
 59. A variety of political groups in the Protectorate came together in 1951 to create the Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP). They included the Protectorate Education Progressive Union (PEPU), the People’s Party (PP) and the

²⁴ The West African Youth League was set up by I. T. A. Wallace Johnson as a pan-African organisation.

²⁵ See Tucker, *The SLPP at 50*, at page 11.

²⁶ See Tucker, *The SLPP at 50*, at page 11.

Sierra Leone Organising Society. Moderate members of the Krio community joined the party as well. This effort to forge a link between the Colony and the Protectorate was not welcomed among the elite Krios.²⁷ Despite claiming to be a party for all the people of the Protectorate, the SLPP was composed almost entirely of Protectorate middle class interests, the only exception being Siaka Stevens, who was a trade union leader. The party was not a broad-based party of mass appeal and relied on Chiefs to “deliver” popular support in the communities. Its origins would affect its management of power in the post-colonial period.

60. The 1951 Legislative Assembly elections pitted the NCSL against the SLPP. The result was victory for the SLPP. Protesting Krios, who constituted themselves into the Settlers’ Descendant Union, challenged the constitutional legality of imposing “native” rule on them, without success. Having failed to stop the SLPP, political and economic survival for the Krios depended on creating an alliance with any group opposed to the SLPP. This strategy was to prove convenient in elections held at the end of the colonial period and it places in context the historical link between the Krios and the Northern-dominated All People’s Congress (APC).
61. The defeat of the Krios in the political theatre did not eliminate their impact on the newly self-governing state of 1951, as they continued to dominate the positions in the state bureaucracy. With its electoral victory, the SLPP was invited to choose members who would sit on the Executive Council, a kind of nascent cabinet. The Executive Council assumed a more indigenous character than the colonial administration, with the SLPP members becoming its Ministers and Sir Milton Margai becoming the Chief Minister.
62. In 1956, the Protectorate Assembly was finally dismantled. A year before its abolition, in 1955, the weak nature of support for the SLPP among the working class and peasantry was revealed by strikes in the North, South and East of the country, as well as in Freetown. Sierra Leoneans were rising up against various oppressors. In the North, the imposition of the precept – an extra tax levied by the Native Administration – sparked an open rebellion by the people against their Chiefs. Residences of Chiefs were burnt down, goods were looted from Lebanese shops in Port Loko, Kambia, Bombali and Tonkolili Districts and many people were killed.²⁸ Buildings belonging to either Chiefs or Tribal authorities were burnt.
63. In the Southern District of Moyamba, similar acts were repeated. In the Eastern District of Kono, the Chiefs were targeted for their appropriation of diamond licence fees and for failing to improve the general welfare of the people. Finally in the Western Area, Marcus Grant, the Secretary General of the Artisanal and Allied Workers Union, led his group of urban unemployed and working class into rioting against official corruption and poor labouring conditions. The SLPP was not in tune with the mood of the provincial working classes, the support base it would need to win elections.

²⁷ La Ray Denzer, *Constance Cummings-John: Memoirs of a Krio Leader*, Sam Bookman publishers, Ibadan, Nigeria, 1995 (hereinafter “*Cummings-John: Memoirs of a Krio Leader*”), at pages 43-59.

²⁸ See Cartwright, J. R., *Politics in Sierra Leone 1947 – 1967*, University of Toronto Press, 1970 (hereinafter “*Cartwright, Politics in Sierra Leone 1947 – 1967*”), at page 79.

64. In 1957, the British colonial authorities conducted another election. This time the NCSL found an ally in the Kono Progressive Union, an ethnic-based party, to challenge the SLPP. It appeared for a time as if the NCSL-SLPP party rivalry was subsiding and being replaced by a division based on ethnicity, class and regionalism. The KPU won all the parliamentary seats in the Kono District. The overall victory of the SLPP was assured, however, as the party had no effective rival in the rest of the Protectorate.
65. The SLPP victory of 1957 was soon to be undermined by an internal split in the party. Albert Margai had defeated his brother Sir Milton Margai in the contest for party leader and should therefore have become Chief Minister. Yet the leaders of the party prevailed upon Albert Margai to allow his brother to remain as leader. When forming his cabinet, Sir Milton Margai removed from the list those members of the party who had opposed him, despite the list having been approved by the party's executive council. Among the members excluded was Siaka Stevens, while Sir Milton Margai's brother, Albert, was retained.²⁹
66. The internal split in the SLPP led to the formation of the People's National Party – the PNP. The breakaway group that formed the PNP included Albert Margai, Siaka Stevens and many others who had been marginalised by Sir Milton Margai. An ethnic dimension was added to this opposition against the conservative wing of the party when Sir Milton Margai effected a cabinet change in 1960, which jettisoned Temne members from his cabinet.
67. The strikes of 1955, the formation of a splinter group from the SLPP, the defeat of the NCSL and the perceived Temne exclusion from cabinet had all contributed to the fragmentation of the political system by 1960. The constitutional talks underway in London, in contrast, called for some form of unity if the British were not to postpone the granting of independence. Anxious to rid themselves of colonial rule, the political class coalesced by necessity into the United National Front and went to London to negotiate for independence. Among the main players in the delegation was Siaka Stevens of the PNP, who would become a key player in post-independence Sierra Leone.
68. At the London talks, Siaka Stevens refused to sign the final document, which established the basis for granting independence to Sierra Leone in 1961. Stevens objected because, as he put it, the British "had given us the goat and held onto the rope."³⁰ His turn of phrase was a clear reference to the defence agreement between Sierra Leone and the United Kingdom for the use of the Freetown port as a naval facility for the British armed forces. Stevens returned home and immediately acted to exploit popular disenchantment with the political elite by forming The All People's Congress party – the APC.
69. The new APC party was quite different in composition from the SLPP. The majority of APC leaders came from working class backgrounds, while the SLPP leaders came from established traditional Chieftaincy homes. While the SLPP boasted numerous university graduates, the APC had none. The SLPP comprised mostly older men while the APC had a higher proportion of younger men.³¹

²⁹ See *Cummings-John: Memoirs of a Krio Leader*, at pages 118 – 121.

³⁰ See Cartwright, *Politics in Sierra Leone 1947 – 1967*, at page 79.

³¹ Of the United National Front delegation that went to London in 1960, the average age of its SLPP members was 53 years old, while the average age of its APC members was 35 years old.

70. The APC was also ideologically detached from the SLPP. The SLPP motto of “One People, One Country” signified that national unity was important to the party.³² The APC motto of “Now or Never” centralised the notion of capturing state power. While the SLPP claimed it wanted unity between the Colony and the Protectorate, the APC professed socialist ideals: a welfare state with no tribalism, no class distinctions, and no exploitation.³³ In addition, the APC was against the autocratic rule of Paramount Chiefs and wanted the whole institution of Chieftaincy to be democratised. Chiefs still provided the main bastion of support for the SLPP. Most important of all, the founding fathers of the APC were almost exclusively of Northern origin.
71. From 1960 onwards, the fight for political power would develop into a protracted rivalry between these two opposing parties. On the one hand, the APC sought to appeal to the proletarian masses and the influential tribes of the North; on the other hand, the SLPP drew on the backing of the middle class, traditional elite, dominated by the ruling houses of the South and East. From the 1960s onwards, party politics supplanted the Colony-Protectorate divide as the greatest obstacle to national cohesion and identity, and as a premise for prejudice, hostility and, ultimately, conflict.

The Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) in Power

72. On 27 April 1961, independence was granted to Sierra Leone. The new Constitution made provision for a legislature consisting of but one chamber, in which twelve Paramount Chiefs would sit alongside other, elected representatives. The Chiefs who were to be voted on to the legislature by a limited franchise of the Tribal Authorities, whereby one Chief would represent each of the twelve districts. The SLPP majority party formed the first post-colonial government, with Sir Milton Margai as Prime Minister. Key members of the APC were arrested on the eve of independence on suspicion that they wanted to stir up trouble. Consequently Sir Milton Margai declared the first state of emergency in independent Sierra Leone.
73. Barely a year after independence, the 1962 elections revealed the depths of ethnic and regional polarisation in the country and the superficiality of the ideological differences between the two main parties. First, perhaps predictably, the victorious SLPP obtained far more of its seats in the South and the East than in the North and the Western Area. The party won 18 of the 32 seats on offer in the South and the East and only ten of the 29 seats on offer in the North and the Western Area. It lost seats in its “safe areas” of Bo and Kenema due largely to the votes of northerners settled in these areas, the majority of whom were traders and diamond miners. It also failed to win any seats in Kono.
74. The poor showing of the SLPP in the North, the Western Area and in Kono illustrated that a growing divide was pitting the South and the Southeast (pro-SLPP strongholds) against the North and the West (apparently anti-SLPP territories). This divide seemed to be overlaid by a divergence of attitudes between traditionalists, on the pro-SLPP side, and youths, or radicals, against.

³² See Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), Submission to TRC Thematic Hearings on Political Parties, 2003.

³³ See All People's Congress (APC), Submission to TRC Thematic Hearings on Political Parties, April 2003.

In addition, the rout of the SLPP in Kono District suggested the emergence of two new political forces. First, the impact of migrant workers in diamond-mining areas had demonstrated their clear potential to influence local politics. Second, the rejection of the SLPP by Kono voters represented their firm desire to retain ownership of the District's diamond resources. The SLPP Government, in collaboration with local Chiefs, had sold off many diamond licences to the foreign-owned Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST), which was an unpopular move.

75. Partly due to the fact that its main support base came from areas populated by Mende people, and partly because of opposition across the rest of the country, the impression grew that the SLPP was a "Mende man's party." The SLPP Government was therefore labelled as a Mende government.

Cronyism and the public perception of the SLPP

76. The image of a single, strong ethnic group running the government polarised public opinion in the country yet further and introduced notions of cronyism and nepotism in many state institutions.
77. In 1964, Sir Milton Margai died in office and was succeeded by his brother, Sir Albert Margai. The manner of succession was to cause another major fission in the Party. Section 58 (2) of the 1961 Constitution empowered the Governor General, Sir Lightfoot Boston, to appoint as "Prime Minister any Member of Parliament who appeared to him likely to command the support of the majority in the House". This was a controversial clause. In the first place, no person could know, prior to any vote, which MP commanded the majority at any given time. The clause therefore introduced the potential for a damaging split in the ruling SLPP. Predictably, Sir Albert Margai's appointment caused just such a split.
78. The controversy was underscored by the immediate measures Sir Albert Margai took against those who opposed his appointment. He sacked most of the prominent dissidents from his Cabinet,³⁴ with little appreciation of the rancour his move would cause. Most of those he sacked were not only strong erstwhile party members, but also men with formidable individual, ethnic and regional support bases. Each of them left the SLPP to join the APC, carrying large sections of their supporters with them.
79. Sir Albert Margai's reduction of the cabinet from nineteen to eleven members, coupled with the promotion of younger men who were personally loyal to him, seemed pre-destined to estrange the conservative members who had benefited under Sir Milton Margai's cabinet. The downsizing of the cabinet was also perceived as an attempt to sideline the North, especially the Temne ethnic group. The cabinet had five Mendes, four Creoles, one Temne and one Susu. There was no Limba and no Kono representation.

³⁴ The members of the SLPP Government sacked by Sir Albert Margai included Honourable Y.D. Sesay, Honourable D. L. Sumner, Honourable A. D. Wurie, Honourable M. S. Mustapha and Dr. J. Karefa-Smart.

80. Sir Albert Margai increasingly turned to his own Mende ethnic group to consolidate his power. When he doubled the percentage of Mendes in the officer corps of the Sierra Leone Army from 26 percent to 52 percent,³⁵ his actions were perceived as an attempt to “Mende-ise” the forces. In addition, he gave David Lansana, a Gola affiliated to the Mende, accelerated promotion until he became the Force Commander. Nepotism on the basis of ethnicity became rampant in the Army from Sir Albert Margai’s rule onwards.³⁶
81. After the Army, Sir Albert Margai turned his attention to the judiciary. He appointed his long-standing friend, Gershon Collier, to the post of Chief Justice and then sent the Acting Chief Justice C. E. O. Cole (whose loyalty he doubted) to become Sierra Leone’s Permanent Representative to the United Nations.³⁷ This replacement was aimed at neutralising and bringing into line a dissonant judiciary, which was filled with Creoles allied to and increasingly supportive of the APC.
82. In the Civil Service, the changes effected by Sir Albert Margai created the impression that he was purging it of non-SLPP members. As Mendes received appointment to a number of high-profile jobs in the public sector, the perception of “cronyism” with ethnic undertones continued to deepen.³⁸
83. Many Sierra Leoneans point out that such pro-Mende discrimination was not as pervasive as it appeared given that Krios retained 80 percent of all civil service jobs. One reason often cited as justification for these appointments was that Sir Albert Margai wanted to address the inequality of Krio domination in a proactive fashion. The very suggestion of such radical changes, however, increased concern among the affected elite and encouraged them to find common cause with the sidelined Temnes and Limbas who predominated in the APC.

Local elections and ethnic polarisation

84. The town and district council elections of 1966 proved that ethnic polarisation had become entrenched in politics. Moreover, it showed that the incumbent Prime Minister would go to any lengths to save himself and his party from defeat. Prior to these elections Sir Albert Margai took several measures to suppress the opposition. In 1965, for example, he used the Defamatory Libel Act to silence APC supporting journalists.³⁹ He was also alleged to have used Paramount Chiefs actively to suppress his opponents. In some constituencies he encouraged the Chiefs openly to take part in elections,⁴⁰ while in others the Chiefs refused permission for APC candidates to campaign in their Chiefdoms.⁴¹ Increasingly the Chiefs were sucked into partisan politics and commanded less and less respect in the eyes of their subjects. Although the SLPP won the election, it was a hollow victory secured largely by intimidating the opposition and manipulating the Chiefs.

³⁵ See Dixon-Fyle, et al., *Sierra Leone at the End of the Twentieth Century*, at page 78.

³⁶ Major (Retired) Abu Noah, Submission to TRC Thematic Hearings on the Sierra Leone Army, May 2003.

³⁷ See the report in the *Daily Mail* newspaper, 27 November 1965.

³⁸ See Tucker, *The SLPP at 50*, at page 17.

³⁹ One example of the use of this legislation was the prison sentence given to A. F Thorlu Bangura of the *We Yone* newspaper, as reported in the *Journalist Daily Mail*, 22 December 1965.

⁴⁰ See the report in the *We Yone* newspaper, 25 September 1965.

⁴¹ See Cartwright, *Politics in Sierra Leone 1947 – 1967*, at page 197.

85. An examination of the electoral returns of 1966⁴² seems to lend credence to the theory that Chieftaincy had become a political office. For example, 172 of the 208 seats in the Mende Chiefdoms of the South and East were obtained unopposed by the SLPP candidates. In the North and in Kono, the SLPP obtained only 47 unopposed seats out of the 165 on offer.
86. The SLPP could only really count on the Mende votes of the South and East to secure its majority. In the North, the results would suggest that the Temnes were assuming their own political identity in the form of the APC. In Freetown, the Krios threw in their lot with the APC, largely because of their view of the SLPP as a common adversary.
87. A widely held view among academics in Sierra Leone is that the SLPP was the first political party to have manipulated the electoral process through the intimidation of political opponents. The SLPP was alleged to have used such tactics as preventing aspiring adversaries from appearing at nomination centres in order for SLPP candidates to be declared as 'elected unopposed'. The cynical tactics of the SLPP under Sir Albert Margai amounted to a very flagrant denial of the right of the electorate to choose their leaders. Indeed, its practices were to be perfected and put to yet more debilitating use by the APC when it came to power later.
88. The victory of the APC in Freetown local elections brought Siaka Stevens to the seat of Mayor. The northern-led APC was now in control of the municipal government in the capital. The electoral tactics of both parties, along with the unashamedly "chameleonic" nature of Sierra Leonean politicians, ensured that disillusionment was the main reaction of ordinary people to politics. Nevertheless, it must be noted that while District Council election results arose from a limited franchise (only the Tribal Authorities could participate in the poll), the local elections of 1966 were indicative of the real political pendulum and therefore served notice that the 1967 general elections would be hotly contested.

⁴² The figures included in this paragraph are obtained from the official election results as published in the Sierra Leone Gazette of 26 May 1966.

The 1967 Elections and their Aftermath

89. With the experience of the District Council elections having emphasised the fragility of his grip on power, Sir Albert Margai is alleged to have taken measures to prevent a defeat in the general elections of 1967. First he attempted to introduce a one party state, but in the face of intense opposition from civil society, his bill was withdrawn before it was presented to Parliament. He then announced a coup attempt on 9 February 1967, implicating some prominent Krios like Dr. Sarif Easmon and Dr. Davidson Nicol as its sponsors. He arrested eight military officers including the Deputy Force Commander, John Bangura, who was the only Temne among the six top-ranking officers in the armed forces.⁴³
90. The arrests of Krio and Temne military officers overtly fuelled the accusations of an SLPP campaign to target people from these ethnic groups. Predictably there was a backlash. Anti-Mende feelings were whipped up to unprecedented levels prior to the election in Freetown.⁴⁴ SLPP attempts to rig the elections and widespread personal corruption were to be documented in the report of the Forster Commission of Inquiry, which was set up after the assumption of political power by the Army some time later.
91. On the eve of the general election in 1967, Sir Albert Margai was confronted with division and dissatisfaction that were largely of his own making. He had denied the party symbol to his internal opponents and prevented them from standing as official candidates of the SLPP. He encountered huge hostility from the Western Area and, in the shape of the APC, an aggressive opposition party that had successfully mobilised popular sentiment against the SLPP, particularly in the Northern Province. On the whole, the elections were scarred by bitter power struggles based on ethnicity, personality and party affiliation. The results, when they were eventually discerned from amidst the confusion, would spell defeat for Sir Albert Margai personally and for the SLPP party.
92. The SLPP officially won 28 seats out of a total of 66. When the Electoral Commissioner declared that the party had obtained 32 seats, the same number as the APC, it stoked a pervasive confusion that dominated the days after the elections. Just as at the local level, there were again stark regional variations in the election results. Most of the SLPP seats were obtained in the South and the East. It won only one seat in the North and not a single seat out of the eleven contested in the Western Area.
93. By ethnic division, the SLPP won 19 Mende seats and nine non-Mende seats, of which a total of six were "unopposed". The APC, on the other hand, won 32 seats, mostly in the North and West. The APC returned 15 Temne seats, seven Krio seats, two Kono seats and eight seats in areas of mixed-ethnicity electorate, including Limbas, Korankos and Mendes.⁴⁵ On the basis of these results, it appeared that the country was divided in half along ethnic and regional lines.

⁴³ Captain (Retired) Moigboi Moigande Kosia, former officer in the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF) and later recruited into the RUF by Foday Sankoh as his first 'G-1' officer; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 7 May 2003.

⁴⁴ See *Cummings-John: Memoirs of a Krio Leader*, at pages 154 – 155.

⁴⁵ See Cartwright, *Politics in Sierra Leone 1947 – 1967*, at page 205.

94. The Electoral Commissioner created a new source of tension by abruptly changing the rules for the Paramount Chieftaincy election results. Whereas in the past the Paramount Chiefs were expected to join the majority party in Parliament, the Commissioner in 1967 allotted these seats unilaterally to the SLPP before a winner of the elections had been declared. The Commissioner's actions provoked blind hysteria all over the country, with both parties celebrating that they had won the election.⁴⁶ There were reports of Temnes being attacked and expelled from the South and the East, as well as Mendes being assaulted in Ginger Hall (a Mende sector of the city of Freetown).⁴⁷
95. In the course of its public hearings in 2003, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission received a number of submissions and testimonies regarding the conduct of the 1967 elections. It became clear that Sir Albert Margai's policy of excluding his internal opponents within the SLPP from contesting the elections on an SLPP ticket resulted in many of them contesting the elections as independent candidates. Four independent candidates who stood in this fashion defeated their former SLPP colleagues. Given what had transpired in 1962, the SLPP expected these independents to return to the fold after the election, which would have enabled the party to claim that it had secured 32 seats in Parliament. This prophecy was to prove impossible.
96. The independent candidates in question were Prince Williams of Bo, L. A. M. Brewa of Moyamba, Kai Samaba of Kenema and Manna Kpaka of Pujehun. This group of four insisted, apparently after consultations with members of the APC leadership, that the condition for their return to the SLPP party was that Sir Albert Margai stand down as leader. When Margai refused to step aside, the four independents declared their opposition to his continuing as Prime Minister. In effect therefore, the SLPP came out with 28 seats, four less than the tally of the APC.
97. The leadership of the SLPP stoutly refused to concede defeat, which heightened the political temperature in the country. The Governor General tried to calm the situation by inviting the leaders of the two parties, Sir Albert Margai and Siaka Stevens, to form a coalition government.⁴⁸ The APC rejected the proposal, maintaining that it had won the election by simple majority and should be allowed to form the new government. Several accounts of what transpired after this point have since surfaced. A submission to the TRC by Peter Tucker, who was Secretary to Sir Albert Margai during his reign as Prime Minister, claims that pressure was placed on the Governor General by elderly APC stalwarts, many of whom had been his former schoolmates and judges of the Superior Court. The APC delegation is said to have visited the Governor General at State House and pressed him to recognise Siaka Stevens as the winner of the election. Tucker therefore insinuates that cronyism was the key to Stevens' succession to the post of Prime Minister.⁴⁹

⁴⁶ See All People's Congress (APC); Submission to TRC Thematic Hearings on Political Parties; April 2003.

⁴⁷ See Alie, J. A. D., *Background to the Conflict (1961-1991): What Went Wrong and Why*, in Ayissi, A. and Poulton, R. E. (eds.), *Bound to Co-operate: Conflict, Peace and People in Sierra Leone*, commissioned for UNIDIR, at page 4. See also the report in the *Daily Mail* newspaper of 18 July 1968, which stated that between 21 and 23 March 1967, nine people were killed in Freetown alone, 54 were treated for gunshot wounds and 42 were admitted to hospital with other injuries.

⁴⁸ See Tucker, P. (former Secretary to the Prime Minister, Sir Albert Margai), Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, November 2003, at pages 16 – 17.

⁴⁹ *Ibidem*, at pages 16 – 17.

98. However, the four independent candidates had by this time written to the Governor General and informed him that they would not rejoin the SLPP as long as Sir Albert Margai remained leader. The undertaking of the independent candidates was proof enough to conclude that the SLPP could not command a majority in the incoming parliament. It was therefore formally correct for the Governor General, the representative of the Queen, who was still Head of State, to have invited the leader of the APC, as majority party, to form a new government in March 1967.
99. In the middle of the swearing-in ceremony of the new Prime Minister, Siaka Stevens, the Sierra Leone Army made a dramatic entrance into the mainstream political arena. The Governor General, Sir Henry Lightfoot Boston, was placed under arrest whilst conducting the ceremony by a Mende Army officer called Lieutenant Samuel Hinga Norman. Siaka Stevens and three other prospective APC Ministers were also taken captive. Lieutenant Hinga Norman, who was the Governor General's *aide de camp*, was apparently acting on the instructions of the Force Commander, David Lansana. Within twenty-four hours Brigadier Lansana had announced that the swearing-in of Stevens was unconstitutional and declared martial law.
100. The turmoil did not end at Brigadier Lansana's announcement, though. A further twenty-four hours later, when it became apparent that Lansana's move was engineered to reinstate Sir Albert Margai as Prime Minister, junior-ranking soldiers staged a coup to overthrow him. After minor internal wrangling in the military, a new administration led by Colonel Andrew T. Juxon Smith installed itself in power. It was known as the National Reformation Council (NRC).
101. The Commission can only speculate on whether the trajectory of Sierra Leonean national politics would have been any different if the SLPP had accepted defeat in the 1967 elections and gone magnanimously into opposition. What is certain is that the standoff the SLPP precipitated with the APC signalled a watershed in the political fortunes of the country and ultimately led to the destruction of the multi-party system. The consequent period of military rule under the NRC served to narrow the political space and would encourage others to seek alternative routes to power that did not depend on free and fair elections. It was a historical antecedent for conflict and instability, because it set the scene for multiple further coup attempts in the following decades.

PART II – THE MANAGEMENT OF POWER BY THE APC

102. In its official submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in April 2003, the All People's Congress (APC) recalled its basis for a major policy shift upon finally assuming power in 1968. The APC stated that the SLPP-engineered military intervention of March 1967 had set an ominous precedent for the country. In the wake of that intervention, the APC perceived that the threat to remove it from office by unlawful means was ever present. Accordingly, in the interests of its own survival, the APC felt compelled to place emphasis on internal security rather than on governance.⁵⁰ Indeed, with the hindsight that history permits, it can be seen that the APC used its concerns about internal security as a pretext to stifle the nascent democratic culture.
103. On assumption of the office of Prime Minister, Siaka Stevens attended most urgently to the consolidation of his power. Despite espousing socialist principles, he adopted authoritarian methods of governance. All the institutions of the state were subjected to strict party control. Institutions that should have been checks on an overbearing executive were emasculated. The prolonged period of Siaka Stevens' rule is captured in more expansive detail in the chapter of this report entitled 'Governance', so a brief summary should suffice for present purposes.
104. First and foremost, the APC set out to ensure that it had effective control of the Army. The transformation of the Army Chief of Staff into a Member of Parliament in 1974 completed the subordination of the army as a tool for political manipulation. So fearful was Stevens of the threat posed to him by a well-equipped Army, he denied the soldiers any proper training and systematically suppressed their fighting capacity.
105. During Siaka Stevens' rule, all the gains made by Southerners and Easterners during the Albert Margai era were reversed. Government had become balkanised in the 1960s and the predominant ethnic group of the ruling party would seek to enrich and aggrandise itself, along with any co-opted members from other ethnic groups. So endemic was corruption that the government was simply expected by all sides to use state resources to advance the interests of its supporters.
106. Stevens created the Internal Security Unit (ISU), a paramilitary police force, which was more heavily equipped than the national Army and whose members were absolutely loyal to the APC. ISU recruits were chosen from the ranks of minority ethnic groups like Koranko and Limba. The current Inspector-General of the Police Service in his testimony before the Commission described the ISU, which later became the Special Security Division, or SSD, in the following terms:

"The [ISU] group was feared even by Police Commissioners, [which] eroded the basic rules of discipline within the force. A de facto 'force within a force' was created, which bore little or no allegiance to the Sierra Leone Police. This divided loyalty greatly affected the cohesiveness of the police, resulting in maladministration. Inefficiency, as a direct consequence of such maladministration, became prevalent.

⁵⁰ See All People's Congress (APC), Submission to TRC Thematic Hearings on Political Parties, April 2003.

Promotions and postings were based on political patronage and were done on political recommendation."⁵¹

107. Stevens also targeted the judiciary. With power vested in the Head of State to appoint and remove judges, all judicial officers cowed in fear. Lawyers and court officials alike were afraid to take on cases involving leading party members. With the only formal institution for mediating grievance compromised, the 'rule of might' prevailed over the 'rule of law'. Political disputes were settled by invariably brutal means on the streets, at election venues and in community spaces. Even intra-party disagreements within the APC generated terrible violence. Political disputes were played out in places such as Pujehun (Ndorgboryosoi), Koinadugu and Bombali Districts, as well as in Freetown during the 1977 and 1982 elections.
108. The creation of a one party state in Sierra Leone through the enactment of the One Party Act of 1978 led to the demise of independent political alternatives, with many individuals holding widely divergent political views forced to cluster under the same banner.
109. In examining the dynamics of this method of managing power – practised to differing degrees and at different times by both of Sierra Leone's main political parties – the Commission has heard many testimonies about the adverse effects it has had on the population. Ironically, oppressive and authoritarian governance seems to have led to both inward and outward forms of defection.
110. On the one hand, the fear of political exclusion forced members of the SLPP to join the APC party during the one-party system. These 'inward defections' were largely opportunistic, reflecting an unprincipled lust for power and denying them any hint of credibility when they later proclaimed a lifelong association with the SLPP upon the promulgation of a new Constitution for a multi-party system in 1991.
111. On the other hand, albeit related, the widespread loss of confidence in the political elite and the patently fickle nature of Sierra Leonean politics have driven inordinately high numbers of talented Sierra Leoneans to abandon their country and seek opportunities abroad. These 'outward defections' testify to the hopelessness experienced by the majority under a government that sustains itself through corruption, nepotism and the plundering of state assets whilst paying no attention to the human rights of its citizens.
112. By the late 1980s, Sierra Leone had become a fragmented country in which central government was almost totally irrelevant to people's everyday lives. The population in the Provincial communities conferred their loyalty and trust in their ethnic groups and traditional associations, rather than in the leadership of the nation. Yet the corrosive practices of the APC were replicated at regional and local levels, where Chieftaincy remained synonymous with power, patronage and control of resources. All semblance of accountability or effective opposition was eliminated, leaving disgruntled Sierra Leoneans with no outlet through which to vent their grievances. The one-party system simply exacerbated the worst of the nation's existing trends towards conflict and national disintegration. Sierra Leone was left poised on the precipice of a bottomless pit.

⁵¹ Brima Acha Kamara, Inspector-General of the Sierra Leone Police Service, Submission to TRC Thematic Hearings on the State Security Apparatus, May 2003.

PART III – LOCAL HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS

113. Prior to the outbreak of war in 1991, there were undercurrents of conflict in many Districts of Sierra Leone. The local dynamics of these areas would substantially influence the character and conduct of the war, from the border Districts that served as 'gateways' for the fighting forces, to the strategically located 'heartland' Districts that initially supported the insurgency to overthrow the APC. At local level as at national level, many of the answers as to why and how this conflict happened are to be found in its historical antecedents.

Pujehun District (Southern Province)

114. Pujehun District is in the extreme south of Sierra Leone, bounded in to the East by Liberia, to the West by Bonthe District and the Atlantic Ocean, to the North East by Kenema District, and to the North by Bo District.⁵² The Southern boundary between Sierra Leone and Liberia is at the Mano River Bridge in Soro Gbema Chiefdom, Pujehun District.
115. Before the conflict, Pujehun District was beset with a host of problems, including the following five issues:
- (i) Amalgamation and Chieftaincy conflicts. Disputes over the amalgamation of two Chiefdoms into Soro Gbema in 1953 and again in Barri in 1975 left lingering resentment between residents. In Pujehun's five amalgamated chiefdoms there were no formal agreements on rotation for the solitary seat of Paramount Chief, where previously there had been two positions. Chieftaincy elections became fiercely contested and candidates went all out to ensure victory. An especially bitter battle marred the election of the Paramount Chief in Gallinass Perri in 1976. With every new controversy the society became more severely divided, opening up numerous grudges, grievances and vendettas for exploitation by an armed insurgent group.
 - (ii) The presence of non-native Paramount Chiefs in three strategic Chiefdoms. The Kaikai and Sillah ruling houses in Pujehun Town, comprised of Fullahs and Susus respectively, along with the Magonas, a Mende clan, in Barri Chiefdom, were anomalous figureheads in predominantly Mende territories. These three ruling houses were installed in Pujehun as their reward for supporting the British during the Hut Tax War, despite their lack of local legitimacy with the indigenous population. The opportunity to throw off the yoke of these imposed Chieftaincies presented a strong allure to disaffected residents to take up arms against them. It became common for people who objected to their Chiefs to collaborate with the armed groups in attacking the ruling houses when the war broke out.⁵³

⁵² For background to the geography of the Pujehun District, see Gwynne-Jones, et al., *A New Geography of Sierra Leone*, at page 58.

⁵³ A similar set of local dynamics existed in the neighbouring Bonthe District, where the imposition of two Paramount Chiefs from outwith the traditional ruling houses created a massive amount of dissension among the local population. In both Pujehun and Bonthe, the Commission recorded violent attacks on Chiefs in the early years of the conflict, which represented especially traumatic events for the people of those Districts.

- (iii) The high percentage of illiteracy in the District, resulting from the late arrival of western education methods and the dominance of Koranic teachings. The illiterate masses proved easier for the militias to mobilise and manipulate based on ethnic and religious affiliations. Promises to end their marginalisation were for many of them irresistible. When the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) arrived in Pujehun pledging free education, clean water and other social services people flocked forward volunteering to serve the 'revolution'.
 - (iv) The nation-wide student demonstrations of 1977 and the heavy-handed response of the Special Security Division (SSD). This period of civil unrest had the effect of driving most students in the Pujehun District over the border into Liberia. Many of these exiled students later returned as infiltrators and rebel leaders.⁵⁴
 - (v) The lucrative diamond fields at Zimmi. The lure of illicit diamond mining attracted a huge pool of so-called "san san" boys (labourers who dig for diamonds in the sand) and hustlers from all over the country. These strong, unskilled young men would become willing tools in the hands of a manipulative invading force.
116. The most important local antecedent in Pujehun, however, was the Ndorgboryosoi rebellion, which started in Soro Gbema Chiefdom shortly after the first one-party state election in 1982. The Mende word 'Ndorgboryosoi' carried powerful connotations of the involvement of forest spirits in protecting the local people from an enemy. In 1982, according to a Pujehun resident interviewed by the Commission,⁵⁵ the enemy was the APC state security apparatus and the rebellion was directed against dictatorship, a gross disregard for human rights and the brutalisation of the rural people by the SSD.
117. There were essentially two factions in the dispute that gave rise to the Ndorgboryosoi rebellion: the Demby – Minah faction with the support of the Chiefs on one side; and the Manna Kpaka faction on the other. The election had been conducted and apparently rigged in favour of the incumbent Member of Parliament, Honourable Solomon Demby. Demby was supported by the APC strongman in the District Francis Minah, the Attorney General and Minister of Justice. Yet Demby became infuriated when a legal challenge to his election victory was filed against him in the courts.
118. Demby, with the support of President Siaka Stevens, called in the paramilitary force, the SSD, under the command of M. S. Dumbuya. The SSD was deployed to intimidate and arrest Demby's opponents in a move to have the election petition dropped. In Soro Gbema Chiefdom, where the support for Demby's opponent Manna Kpaka was strongest, a local militia was formed in order to resist the campaign of intimidation. The Ndorgboryosoi Group, as this militia became known, engaged in armed combat with the SSD for the rest of 1982 and part of 1983.

⁵⁴ A prominent example of this pattern was Richard Kemoh, one of the leaders of the 1977 demonstrations in Pujehun District. Kemoh escaped from the SSD into Liberia, only to return over a decade later as a commando fighting for the RUF. See also Palmer, *Investigating the Antecedents of the Rebel War*.

⁵⁵ Munda Rogers, former resident of Pujehun District; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 22 December 2003.

119. As part of a sustained campaign in the Pujehun District, the SSD burnt down several whole villages across various Chiefdoms and killed many innocent civilians, including women and children. Hundreds of Demby opponents were arrested, while more than half of those detained died in jail.
120. The Attorney General and Minister of Justice, Francis Minah, was tasked with the prosecution of all those SSD members involved in the killing of civilians. Minah, however, procrastinated inexplicably over these cases, which many observers interpreted as an expression of his support for his friend Mr. Demby.
121. The Ndorgboryosoi rebellion ended only after the Army had been called in to assist the SSD in suppressing the militia. The hostile sentiments against the APC regime endured for much longer, though. Some of the Ndorgboryosoi ringleaders and their family members were among the first militiamen to join the RUF when it entered Pujehun District from Liberia in 1991. They formed a civil defence unit of the RUF called the 'Joso Group', deliberately invoking part of the word 'Ndorgboryosoi' in its name to represent continuity.
122. Pujehun District was thus replete with historical antecedents to the conflict, including several periods of mass unrest, which provoked repression and deprivation from the State in response. The District had a well-known history of rebellion, a large pool of exiled and aggrieved youths in Liberia and, ultimately, a volatile security climate. As Foday Sankoh and his RUF 'vanguards' plotted their entry into Sierra Leone in March 1991, Pujehun District had the vital characteristics of a 'gateway' through which the launch of an insurgency against the incumbent APC would meet with ideological support and find willing recruits.

Kailahun District (Eastern Province)

123. Kailahun District in the Eastern Province of Sierra Leone shares its boundary with both Liberia and Guinea at the point called the "Parrot's Beak". Like Pujehun, the District became a 'gateway' for the initial incursion by the RUF in March 1991. It has the same dense vegetation as Pujehun District, including thick forests that are impenetrable by armoured cars or conventional army columns and highly conducive for guerrilla warfare.
124. Before the war the Kailahun District was plagued by rivalry between its two ruling families, the Ngobehs and the Banyas (from the Kailondo ruling house). From 1943 to 1966 the Banyas and the Ngobehs produced Paramount Chiefs who were dethroned during their tenure on allegations of abusing the office and engaging in cannibalism.⁵⁶ Indeed, accusations of cannibalism against traditional rulers arose in many of the Chiefdoms in the District.
125. Kailahun District was gradually ravaged of its common identity and forcibly split into factions. Tyrannical Chiefs acted ruthlessly against suppressed subjects whenever there was a hint of rebellion. The antecedents to conflict in the District are best summarised in three points: desperately poor infrastructure, causing people to cry out for a social 'revolution'; antagonism towards APC rule and disillusionment with the ruling houses; and remoteness from the control of central authority.

⁵⁶ See Palmer, *Investigating the Antecedents of the Rebel War*.

126. This final point was critical because it emphasised the ordinary man's sense of detachment from the central government in Freetown. The resultant feeling of alienation in Kailahun was captured by the popular phrase (shared with other rural communities) when travelling to the capital city: "I dae go na Salone", meaning "I am going to Sierra Leone". Effectively Sierra Leone was associated with distance rather than belonging. The central government was irrelevant to most people's daily lives and loyalty to it was non-existent. Any promise of change in the economic and political order would prove very appealing in the Kailahun District.

Kono District (Eastern Province)

127. Kono District shares boundaries with the Republic of Guinea to the East, as well as four other Sierra Leonean Districts: Kailahun to the Southeast; Kenema to the South; Koinadugu to the North and Northwest; and Tonkolili to the West. Large areas of Kono are densely forested and would lend themselves to the creation of hidden 'bush paths' by the fighting factions during the conflict.
128. Indigenous Kono speakers were the predominant group in the District before the discovery of diamonds. Subsequent mining of the lucrative gemstone attracted vast numbers of other ethnic groups and foreign nationals to the District, especially Lebanese, Guineans and Malians. While the main offices of political power remained in the hands of the Konos, outsiders prised away control of the economic life.
129. Despite the overwhelming riches attached to diamonds, they were mined amidst mass illiteracy, poverty and general underdevelopment. The APC government did not build a single paved road in the entire District. Chiefdoms like Toli, Mafindo, Gbane, Sando and Lei remain inaccessible by vehicle to the present day. This paradox of Sierra Leone's most richly endowed territory was even more pronounced in Chiefdoms that actually produced diamonds, such as Tankoro, Kamara, Nimikoro, Sando and Nimiyama: mining proceeded in the middle of destitute wastelands.
130. Ultimately three classes of people emerged in Kono. First, rich foreign nationals lived comfortably in cohort with local traditional leaders. Many foreigners enjoyed their own private water wells, lived in huge mansions with satellite dishes on their rooftops and drove Mercedes Benz sedans. The second class encompassed the vast majority of the indigenous population. They were poor and forced to seek their own means of survival, with minimal access to the fruits of their land. The third class comprised the youths of all the ethnic groups who flooded the District and had no allegiance to traditional norms. They came from all over the country, desperate to become players in the diamond trade, as hustlers, diggers, middlemen or traders. This outcast group was referred to disparagingly as "san san" boys.
131. Only with the rarest of good fortune did a "san san" boy find a diamond in the sand. Most of these youths lived on the edge, barely able to eke out a living. They frequently resorted to banditry and petty crime to ensure their survival and were naturally willing conscripts, as both miners and combatants, when the RUF came calling.

132. Perhaps the most telling feature of Kono District was the total vacuum of state security in which its whole miniature economy operated. The nearest Army brigade was stationed at Tekoh Barracks in the central Bombali District, over 60 kilometres from the Kono headquarter town of Koidu. The APC regime's neglect of its defences and inept policing of its Eastern border made a mockery of the Kono District's genuine strategic worth to the country.

Kambia District (Northern Province)

133. Located in the far Northwest of the country, Kambia shares a lengthy boundary with Guinea, through which the RUF attempted several raids on Sierra Leone's neighbour in 2000. In a familiar tale of neglect of outlying areas, the Kambia District's remoteness from Freetown robbed the District of infrastructural development prior to the war and has denied it serious investment for reconstruction ever since.
134. The Temnes are the dominant ethnic group in Kambia, controlling three of the seven Chiefdoms in the District. Minority ethnic groups include Susu and Limba. An examination of the antecedents to the conflict in this District reveals the following factors:
- (i) Intense competition between ruling houses such as the Yumkellas and their rivals in the Samu Chiefdom;
 - (ii) Gross injustices occasioned by arbitrary rulings and heavy fines imposed in Local Chiefdom Courts;
 - (iii) Persistent smuggling through the unprotected border with Guinea, which has remained a major source of illicit personal gain for traders at the expense of national benefit; and
 - (iv) The extreme poverty and illiteracy that are characteristic of geographical isolation, creating a sense of hopelessness among the people.
135. Kambia's historical connection to the central government in Freetown has been tenuous at best. Far removed from the bargains and benchmarks of national politics, the Chiefs wielded absolute power over their subjects. Traditionally, many young people found the stranglehold of the Chiefs so unbearable that they crossed the border into Guinea and never returned. Rather than allowing Freetown and the Western Area to benefit exclusively from their extraction of natural resources, Kambians often traded independently with Guinea. Over time, intended symbols of Sierra Leonean State authority, such as public buildings and institutions, became little more than hated monuments to the disdain displayed in Freetown towards the outlying Provinces.

Moyamba District (Southern Province)

136. Moyamba District was left scarred more than most by thuggery and election violence in the first thirty years of Sierra Leonean independence. The ruling parties had routinely overlooked candidates of the people's choice during election time, instead deploying thugs and using intimidation tactics to impose party strongmen and devoted stalwarts upon them. This scenario was most acutely illustrated in the 1982 elections, when the henchmen of the APC strongman Harry T. T. Williams forced the Paramount Chief of Kagboro Chiefdom, Honoria Ballor-Caulker, into enforced exile for nearly ten years.⁵⁷
137. The indigenous population was also aggrieved with the employment policies of SIEROMCO, the Sierra Leone wing of an international mining conglomerate, which had the lease for the mining of bauxite in Mokbanji, Moyamba District. They saw the company's policy of hiring workers from outside the District as especially unjust because of the first-class social facilities offered within the company. Employees who had moved from elsewhere to Mokbanji enjoyed professional and domestic luxury, while people in the host community wallowed in abject poverty and deprivation. The SIEROMCO site in Moyamba was one of numerous industrial installations that would be attacked during the conflict; local people were frequently alleged to have vented their pre-existing grudges with major firms by acquiescing or contributing to such attacks.

Bo District (Southern Province)

138. The central District of Bo was the heartland of the SLPP from the inception of the era of party politics. Although several SLPP stalwarts switched their allegiance to the APC in order to take up positions in the one-party government,⁵⁸ there was a general feeling among the residents of Bo that their fortunes would be vastly improved if the SLPP could be revived and restored to power.
139. For this reason, the idea of "revolution" in Sierra Leone was popular in Bo. Many inhabitants of the District were even in favour of an armed action to overthrow the APC and scores of youths travelled to Kailahun to volunteer for the RUF in the first few months of the conflict. As in neighbouring Moyamba, a prevailing history of election violence and thuggery had also reinforced the propensity for conflict in Bo. The centrality and high population of the District made it a natural wartime headquarters for the Southern-based Mende militia known as the Kamajors.

⁵⁷ See Palmer, *Investigating the Antecedents of the Rebel War*.

⁵⁸ Alhaji Daramy-Rogers, former Minister of the APC Government and recognised supporter of the present SLPP Government; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 24 – 29 October 2003.

Tonkolili District (Northern Province)

140. Tonkolili is most central of all the Districts in Sierra Leone and is therefore, in conflict terms, one of the most “strategically located”. It shares boundaries with eight of the twelve other Districts. It has ten Chiefdoms, five of which resulted from amalgamation. Economic opportunities were few in the District, with non-mechanised gold mining in the North-eastern areas providing the single most important source of employment. The Magbass Sugar Factory boasted a large industrial complex, but offered only seasonal employment in the form of casual labour. The majority of the people were either petty traders or subsistence rice growers in the *boli* lands.
141. The major ethnic groups in the area are Temnes, Korankos and Limbas but Temne is the dominant language spoken in the Tonkolili District. Significant local peculiarities that were to have an impact on the course of the war include the following:
- (i) Sibling and Chieftaincy rivalry. In Yoni Chiefdom, two brothers contested the Paramount Chieftaincy. The loser exploited the disappointment of his supporters to undermine his brother’s leadership and destabilise the Chiefdom.
 - (ii) Youth deprivation. There was a desperate scarcity of job opportunities for the youths in the area, forcing many into petty trading and many more into petty crime. There developed an enormous army of unemployed youths who subsequently used the conflict to ‘act out’ their frustrations at the lack of economic opportunities.
 - (iii) The death of emergent political personalities from the District at the hands of the APC. When Siaka Stevens came to power in 1968, he faced increasing pressure on various issues from prominent natives of Tonkolili District who were in the Army or were members of his APC party. Dr. Mohammed Sorie Forna and Ibrahim Bash-Taqi, who were among the visionaries of the APC, broke away in acrimonious circumstances and formed the United Democratic Party (UDP) in 1970. The two men were then implicated by the Stevens Government in an alleged coup plot in 1971 and were arrested, charged and convicted, along with 13 others, in a celebrated treason trial in 1974. In July 1975 Forna, Bash-Taqi and six other men were executed.⁵⁹ Their deaths alienated most of the influential and educated members of Gbonkolenken Chiefdom from the APC, which resulted in many inhabitants of that Chiefdom taking up of arms when the conflict began.
 - (iv) The attachment to prominent sons of the District and identification with their fates. Another successful and well-loved son of Tonkolili District was Sam Bangura, the former Governor of the Bank of Sierra Leone. When Bangura died in suspicious circumstances in 1980,⁶⁰ the people

⁵⁹ Dr. Mohamed Sorie Forna’s daughter, Aminatta Forna, has written perhaps the most detailed account of the circumstances leading up to his trial, along with 14 others, and eventual execution. It is contained in a memoir in narrative form: see Aminatta Forna, *The Devil that Danced on the Water*, HarperCollins, London, 2003.

⁶⁰ The original explanation given for the death of Sam Bangura was that he had fallen accidentally from his balcony. In the face of raised public suspicion, a number of alleged murder suspects were eventually arrested, but the case was never prosecuted to full trial.

of Tonkolili perceived his death as a murder, stemming from internal feuding within the APC, to the detriment of their District. Moreover Foday Sankoh, the leader of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) hailed from the Tonkolili District. Sankoh's uncle has remained a Chief in his home community and no member of the Sankoh family has ever been punished or ostracised for the harm and suffering their relative brought to the district. A widely held view in Sierra Leone is that the launching of the conflict was very popular in Tonkolili, despite the subsequent atrocities that were carried out by the RUF and others against the civilian population. The logic of armed struggle against the APC was accepted in Tonkolili and many residents allied themselves with the fate of their native son. Upon returning to the District after signing the Lomé Peace Agreement in 1999, Foday Sankoh was even accorded what his widow described to the Commission as a "hero's welcome".⁶¹

142. The local historical antecedents profiled in this part of the chapter are not intended to put the conflict into context in an exhaustive fashion. However, they are illustrative of some of the local undercurrents that ran parallel to daily life in Sierra Leone prior to the conflict, including popular grievances with socio-economic conditions and widespread opposition to the APC State. The country in which war broke out was in fact already a cluster of unresolved disputes and barely suppressed hostilities.

CONCLUSION

143. In examining the history of Sierra Leone through the lens of the mandate of the Commission, a picture emerges of a fragmented, exploited and deeply insecure country. The colonial government was responsible for dividing the land into two nations, one in the Protectorate and one in the Colony, and developing them separately and unequally. The impact of the colonial strategy affected access to education for generations and defined social, political and economic progress, or regression, for the whole population. It bred deep ethnic and regional resentment, the manifestations of which can still be observed, albeit in more subtle prejudices, to the present day.
144. The colonial government was also responsible for destabilising the system of Chieftaincy and creating a crisis of legitimacy around the traditional rulers. The colonial government formalised the Common Law but neglected the development of customary law, resulting in mass confusion and effective legal duality. Customary law became the preserve of the Chiefs who interpreted traditions and customs in an arbitrary fashion and utilised their authority to whatever ends they so desired. The rights of women, in particular, were denied during this period.

⁶¹ Madam Fatou Sankoh, member of the RUFF and widow of the former Leader of the RUF, Foday Saybana Sankoh; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 07 to 09 November 2003.

145. During the post-colonial period, ethnic tensions were exacerbated by the emergence of domestic political parties. The elections of 1962 and 1967 had dangerous and divisive legacies for all the branches of government. Sir Albert Margai's overt manipulation of the Paramount Chiefs, the military sphere and the supposedly 'independent' judiciary devastated public confidence in the self-run State. When the Sierra Leone Army intervened in 1967 in an attempt to pervert the course of democracy, a precedent was set for military men to play influential roles in politics for decades to come.
146. It was during the protracted reign of the APC, however, that politicians and the processes they directed were to forfeit all credibility. A system of power through patronage developed, with blatant corruption and the plundering of state assets at its heart. Exclusionary politics led to an incestuous relationship between the APC and the SLPP: they merged into one, unprincipled "political elite". Ordinary people in Sierra Leone lost all faith in government. Up to the present day, Sierra Leoneans expect arbitrary administration of "justice", nepotism and cronyism in all public institutions, and little genuine prospect of a fairer and brighter future.
147. Neither the SLPP nor the APC has made any real effort to attend to the debasement of the post-independence politics and economy of the country. On the contrary, history speaks of a systemic failure, whereby all the members of the political elite belonged to the same failing system.
148. With time, it became difficult for Sierra Leoneans to distinguish between the SLPP and the APC. While the government changed hands from one to the other, many of the faces remained the same. The popular adage about government was that Sierra Leoneans would board "a different bus, but with the same driver". Deep-seated pessimism now prevails as to whether things can ever really get better.
149. While they may claim to be ideologically different, in reality the two parties have always shared a brand of politics that is all about power and the benefits it confers. Even a high-ranking member of the political elite⁶² conceded to the Commission that "indeed, there is no difference" between the SLPP and the APC. Tragically many of the characteristics identified in this chapter as antecedents to the conflict persist today in Sierra Leone. The vital test in preventing the recurrence of such a tragedy lies in whether Sierra Leone can learn the lessons of its past.

⁶² Alhaji Daramy-Rogers, former Minister of the APC Government and recognised supporter of the present SLPP Government; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 24 – 29 October 2003.

CHAPTER TWO

Governance

TRC

**Learn from
Yesterday
for a better
Tomorrow**

Produced by the TRC Steering Committee with support
from the International Human Rights Law Group

CHAPTER TWO

Governance

Introduction

1. The Commission heard submissions from a variety of authoritative sources that the war in Sierra Leone was largely the result of failures in governance and government institutions.¹ Successive regimes diminished the state's capacity to meet such critical challenges as the security and livelihood of its citizens, let alone to provide for democratic participation in decision-making processes.
2. In this chapter, the Commission sets out to explore how unsound governance created a context conducive for the interplay of poverty, marginalisation, greed and grievances that caused and sustained the conflict. The Commission hopes its treatment of governance issues in its report – by identifying past distortions, evaluating the adequacy of current remedies and making recommendations to fill the gaps – will enhance efforts towards national recovery, stability and reconciliation.
3. The Commission understands governance to mean a system of laws, institutions, processes and practices that promotes and protects the fundamental rights and freedoms, as well as facilitating the development and advancement, of people living in any given territory. Accordingly, the instruments of good governance include equitable laws, efficient institutions, due processes and humane practices that lead to such desired ends as security, justice, enhanced livelihoods and democratic participation. People living in a particular territory include citizens and non-citizens, as well as majority and minority groups. Proper governance is therefore not only about serving citizens, but also about regulating and securing the rights of minorities, of which non-citizens constitute a significant component.
4. The perceptions adduced by the Commission during its hearings indicate that the people of Sierra Leone yearn for a principled system of governance. They want a system that upholds the rule of law over the rule of strong patrons and protects the people from the abuse of rulers through a system of checks and balances. They wish to see horizontal and vertical accountability through the effective operation of such institutions as the judiciary, the auditor general's office, the electoral commission, the media and civil society.

¹ See United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Submission to TRC Thematic Hearings on Causes of the Conflict, 7 May 2003, at pages 7-11. See also Mrs. Olayinka Creighton-Randall, Campaign for Good Governance, Submission to TRC Thematic Hearings, 5 May 2003, pages 1-3. See also UNAMSIL, Submission to TRC Thematic Hearings, 1 March 2003, at pages 2-5.

5. The Commission has looked at the record of each administration in the post-independence period on the following critical 'indicators': separation of powers; decentralisation; public participation in democratic processes; the independence of the judiciary; the rule of law; and the existence and effective operation of oversight bodies and institutions of accountability.
6. The Commission has analysed approximations towards or deviations from proper governance on two levels. First, it has reviewed the basic legal documents of the land, such as Constitutions and the evolving body of laws, to assess whether 'indicators' of proper governance were enshrined and guaranteed. Second, it has assessed the manifestation of these 'indicators' in practice.
7. This methodical approach has enabled the Commission to draw conclusions about the extent to which each of the post-independence governments contributed to the structural and proximate causes of the conflict in 1991. The chapter ends by discussing the lessons of Sierra Leone's past in the context of the obstacles to proper governance that still exist to the present day.

SEPARATION OF POWERS

8. For good governance to obtain, the three branches of government – the executive, the legislature and the judiciary - must be separate and independent of one another, and each must have the requisite power to fulfil its functions. The constitutional provisions that ensure the separation of powers must not merely exist on paper, but rather must be developed and reaffirmed continuously in their application. A failure to respect this separation inevitably allows one branch of government – most often the executive – to act in an unaccountable fashion and to influence or undermine the work of the other two. A government that permits little or no restraint on its own powers is an authoritarian government, which epitomises bad governance. In analysing the pre-war period in Sierra Leone, the Commission regards authoritarianism, wherever it occurred, as a direct cause of injustice and, accordingly, as a cause of the conflict.
9. The Independence Constitution of Sierra Leone in 1961 created a parliamentary system in the Westminster mould, with apparently less than absolute separation of powers between the three branches of government. The Governor General² delegated executive power to the Prime Minister and his cabinet, who were chosen from among Members of Parliament.³
10. Promisingly, the Constitution created room for checks and balances in the relationship between the executive and the legislature. For example, every decision of the Prime Minister was subject to Parliamentary approval and the Governor General had to be notified in advance. Equally, the Governor General could not act on major issues such as the proposed dissolution of the

² Governor General is a post familiar to the constitutions of many former British colonies and members of the British Commonwealth. Its holder is the representative of the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. In the independence settlement of 1961, the Queen remained the monarch and Head of State, with the Governor General acting as her immediate representative *in* Sierra Leone.

³ See the Independence Constitution of Sierra Leone 1961 at Chapter V, Section 58. See also Public Notice No.78 of 1961.

Parliament⁴ without the approval of Prime Minister. Moreover, the Governor General could not remove the Prime Minister from office unless it appeared to him that the Prime Minister no longer commanded the support of a majority of the Members of Parliament.

11. However, at the practical level, parliament's ability to hold the executive to account was restricted. At the time of independence in April 1961, Parliament comprised of a loose coalition of Members from various parties who had been brought together a year earlier by the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP). In a spirit of compromise on the eve of independence, representatives with contrasting political beliefs had formed the cross-party United National Front to secure a smooth transition into self-rule. The main beneficiary of this arrangement was the SLPP, which managed to subsume most of its opposing parties by awarding Ministerial positions to their leaders in the first independence government. This crude exercise in coalition building by the SLPP marked the beginning of weakened party politics in Parliament, undermined the relationship of individual politicians with the executive branch and disabled Parliament's capacity to check executive excesses in subsequent eras.
12. The independence settlement created two judicial tiers of contrasting character. The first, superior tier was set up to dispense English common law and its courtrooms modelled themselves on their English counterparts. There were three courts operating under English common law: the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeal and the High Court. They mainly served inhabitants of the capital Freetown and the surrounding Western Area.⁵ There were no Magistrate Courts until Act No. 31 of 1965 provided for their establishment.⁶
13. This superior tier of the judiciary remained separate from the executive during the period from 1961 to 1964. It had control over its own financial resources, operating an autonomous 'Judiciary Account' into which all monies obtained from court fines or charges, as well as Government allocations, were deposited directly. The Chief Justice and all judges of the High Court had tenure of office until 62 years of age. They could only be removed in very limited circumstances, with the approval of the Judicial Service Commission.⁷ The Attorney General was not classified as a Ministerial Office⁸ but as a public one, to which non-politicians with the necessary legal qualifications would be appointed. The Commission found no evidence of any direct executive interference in the operations of the superior tier during Sir Milton Margai's regime.
14. The second tier consisted of local 'courts' in the Provinces, where over 80% of the population lived. The 'courts' were a facet of the traditional system of customary law and depended on the moral authority of Chiefs and community elders. Act No. 20 of 1963, which formalised this second tier, contained no provision for legal practitioners to have audience before the local courts.

⁴ See the Independence Constitution of Sierra Leone 1961 at Chapter III, Section 55.

⁵ These three courts also had appellate and criminal jurisdiction over matters in the Provinces. They were not, however, courts of first instance in the overwhelming majority of cases in the Provinces.

⁶ See Chief Justice Abdulai A. Timbo, Submission to TRC Institutional Hearings on the Judiciary, July 2003, at page 1.

⁷ See the Independence Constitution of Sierra Leone 1961 at Chapter VI, Part I.

⁸ See the Independence Constitution of Sierra Leone 1961 at Chapter V, Section 59.

During Sir Milton Margai's regime, the executive abused the local court system to suppress the activities of the opposition All People's Congress (APC) party at Chiefdom level.⁹

15. The death of Sir Milton Margai in 1964 and the assumption of the office of Prime Minister by his brother, Sir Albert Margai, brought about ominous changes in the checks and balances between the executive, Parliament and the judiciary. Using the ambiguous Section 58 (2) of the Constitution,¹⁰ the Governor General appointed Sir Albert Margai as Prime Minister without any formal procedure to ascertain whether he or any of the other contenders for the position commanded the support of the majority in the House. It was a classic case of imposed executive supremacy over Parliament.
16. Thereafter Parliament increasingly squandered its opportunities to curb executive excesses. It failed to block Prime Minister Albert Margai's misuse of Government funds for personal gain because it hardly bothered to monitor public income and expenditure. For example, the opposition APC newspaper "*We Yone*" alleged that Sir Albert had used huge sums of money to buy buildings in Washington and London, which he then rented to the Sierra Leone Missions in those countries for private gain.¹¹ Parliament failed to investigate these allegations, despite the need to transmit a clear message of accountability to the general public. This lapse precipitated a sense of resignation among Sierra Leoneans that corruption was an inevitable indulgence of government, in which Parliament was far more likely to acquiesce than to find fault or demand sanction.
17. Parliament failed to study or challenge effectively the Bills that could have made Sierra Leone a one-party State in 1966 and it supported the Absenteeism Bill, which led to the removal from Parliament of four members of the opposition in 1965. Similarly, there was no democratic dissent to the objectionable Public Order Act of 1965. The laws that came through Parliament in this period gave wide powers to the Executive to clamp down on opposition activities and dissent. The legacies of this regime would be used extensively in later years to bypass the judiciary and eliminate opponents of the government through arbitrary arrest and detention.

⁹ For example in Kono District, in the Eastern Province, the local courts threatened to jail anyone who brought the APC party symbol into their Chiefdoms. For further details, see Cartwright, J. R., *Politics in Sierra Leone 1947 – 1967*, University of Toronto Press, 1970 (hereinafter "Cartwright, *Politics in Sierra Leone 1947 – 1967*"), at pages 150 – 155.

¹⁰ See the Independence Constitution of Sierra Leone 1961 at Section 58(2), which included a clause that entitled the Governor General to appoint as Prime Minister "any Member of Parliament who appeared to him likely to command the support of the majority in the House".

¹¹ See the report in the '*We Yone*' newspaper on 6 August 1966.

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Ministers in the current SLPP Government gather with representatives of civil society at a public meeting of the Commission in Freetown.

18. Other actions during Sir Albert Margai's rule that set the trend towards increased executive dominance¹² included the promotion of Chief Justice Bankole-Jones to Presidency of The Court of Appeal in order to replace him with the entirely unqualified Gershon Collier.¹³ The latter was a close associate of Sir Albert Margai and his role as Chief Justice would allow him to sit on election petition cases and manipulate them in favour of the ruling SLPP.
19. Sir Albert Margai also used the local courts and Chiefs to restrain the opposition party's activities yet more severely. He acquired the power to appoint the President of Native Administrative Courts through the Local Court Act of 1963 and thereby completely robbed the local judiciary of its independence.¹⁴ The courts became practically an extension of the SLPP party machine, proceeding to harass APC stalwarts in places such as Koya Chiefdom and Makeni Town in 1965.¹⁵
20. After the disgraceful election standoff, in March 1967 the constitution was suspended and all executive and legislative power was concentrated in the hands of the junta called the National Reformation Council (NRC), which ruled by decree. Thus there was no separation of powers nor checks and balances as the actions of the military council could not be challenged in any court of law.
21. Although democratic government was purportedly reinstated with the inauguration of Siaka Stevens and the APC, the separation of powers would in fact suffer a series of devastating reverses from 1968 onwards. The first fundamental blow occurred in April 1971 when Sierra Leone was made a Republic with an executive President. The manner in which this major constitutional change was effected seemed to confirm the demise of both Parliament and the judiciary as institutions capable of averting Stevens' drive towards absolute power. Fewer than ten out of the sixty parliamentarians opposed the Republican Bill of 1971.
22. The Republican Bill made changes to the Independence Constitution, with the Chief Justice replacing the Queen as a ceremonial Head of State. Within 48 hours of the creation of the Republic and the swearing-in of Chief Justice Cole, however, Parliament adopted further constitutional changes, transforming this ceremonial Presidency into an executive one. The Chief Justice, who had just been sacked as ceremonial President, then swore in the Prime Minister, Siaka Stevens, as executive President. This extraordinary sequence of events represented a fatal complicity by the judiciary in its own subordination and manipulation by the executive.

¹² Sir Albert Margai's imposition of executive power on parliament and the judiciary had an important nuance, however, according to testimonies before the Commission by important political observers. It arose in the fact that Sir Albert was hesitant on several occasions to follow through with particular paths of encroachment that he had started. See, for example: Francis Gabbidon, Ombudsman of Sierra Leone, Submission to TRC Thematic Hearings on Governance, Freetown, June 2003.

¹³ See Cartwright, *Politics in Sierra Leone 1947 – 1967*, at page 215.

¹⁴ See the Local Court Act 1963 at Section 4(a). See also the Debates of the House of Representatives, 1965-66, Volume II (22 September 1965), at columns 308-99.

¹⁵ See the cited instances of these cases in Cartwright, *Politics in Sierra Leone 1947 – 1967*, at page 215.

23. With such a stranglehold on power, Stevens and his associates arranged for important court cases to be tried by their friends, tribesmen and loyal servants. In the notorious treason trial of Mohamed Sorie Forna and 14 others, from 1971 to 1973, a relative of the then First Vice-President, Sorie Ibrahim Koroma, served as a juror. According to memoirs published subsequently, the trial judge briefed the Vice-President about the progress of the case on a daily basis.¹⁶
24. Inevitably, the term of the head of government (now the President) was to be extended without reference to the electorate, despite his original tenure as Prime Minister having been limited to a period of five years. Parliament became nothing more than a rubber stamp institution. In 1970 and 1972, without much debate or scrutiny, Parliament endorsed two decisions by the executive that have significantly hampered the development of the country. First the closure of the Sierra Leone railway, which served as a vital link between the capital and the Provinces, was endorsed by Parliament without reference to the potential economic consequences for the population. Second, in 1972, Parliament blindly approved the abolition of District Councils and elected Local Government. These were archetypal bad governance decisions, for they centralised power and influence in Freetown, whilst suffocating the delivery of resources and services to the majority population in the Provinces.
25. Court cases involving elections under the APC were decided in favour of the APC by a compliant judiciary. Violent by-elections conducted under a state of emergency between 1969 and 1970 led to the loss of 23 SLPP opposition seats. Thus by the time the Republican Constitution was passed in 1971, the APC commanded more than the two-thirds majority necessary to pass whatever bill it deemed necessary. With an executive President and an obedient legislature and judiciary, the creation of a dictatorial system and destruction of state institutions took hold.¹⁷
26. The promulgation of a one-party constitution in 1978 unmasked all pretence to democracy and the principle of separation of powers from the Siaka Stevens regime. Chapter III, Section 21 (4) of the 1978 Constitution personalised the office of President - solely for Siaka Stevens - and extended his term of office to seven years.¹⁸ In the moment the Constitution took effect, the 11 SLPP members still in Parliament were given the stark choice of joining the APC or losing their seats.¹⁹ To their discredit, all of them joined the APC.
27. Powers vested in the President, in relation to both Parliament and the judiciary, were substantially increased under the One-Party Constitution. Chapter IV, Section 34 gave the President the power to appoint an Electoral Commissioner who would be responsible solely to him. Also, the central committee of the party, controlled by the President, was entitled to reject candidates for Parliament even where such people were the choice of the people in their constituencies.²⁰

¹⁶ See Aminatta Forna, *The Devil that Danced on the Water*, HarperCollins, London, 2003.

¹⁷ See Joe Opala, *Sierra Leone: The Politics of State Collapse*; an essay prepared for the conference on Irregular Warfare in Liberia and Sierra Leone, 30 July to 1 August 1998 (hereinafter "Opala, *The Politics of State Collapse*").

¹⁸ See the One-Party Constitution of Sierra Leone 1978 at Chapter III, Section 21(4).

¹⁹ See Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), Submission to TRC Thematic Hearings on Political Parties, 2003; at page 6.

²⁰ See the One-Party Constitution of Sierra Leone 1978 at Chapter IV, Section 38.

28. Constitutional provisions also simplified the procedures under which electoral candidates could be returned unopposed,²¹ a practice that was frequently invoked. Parliamentarians elected in the one-party state were only accountable to the president and the APC party machinery. There was essentially no check on the actions of the executive. In one example that became infamous across the continent, Parliament failed to scrutinise the budget outlay for the hosting of the OAU in 1980, allowing scarce national revenue to be wasted on the megalomania of President Stevens.
29. The Auditor General had been mandated by Constitutions since 1961 to oversee government finances and ensure their outlay in the manner provided for by parliament. However, whilst the institution worked relatively effectively during Sir Milton Margai's regime, its capacity to ensure sound financial monitoring gradually diminished from the time of Sir Albert Margai through to the eve of the conflict. As government expenditure passed unregulated, corruption blossomed. The quality of service provision in the public sector plummeted across the spectrum, affecting security and justice just as it affected health and education. Meanwhile other oversight bodies such as the Electoral Commission and the Office of the Ombudsman were rendered equally redundant.
30. Yet perhaps the most flagrant breach of the separation of powers under President Stevens was reserved for the executive's control of the judiciary. Section 113 of the One-Party constitution stipulated that the President would appoint the Chief Justice (the head of the judiciary).²² The President also had the right to suspend the Chief Justice or, acting in accordance with the advice of the First Vice-President, any other judge.
31. Judges abandoned their independence to preserve their jobs, as they faced the possibility of arbitrary removal or suspension if they incurred the displeasure of the executive. The provision in the 1978 constitution permitting the President to compulsorily "retire" judges who had attained the age of 55²³ was a potent weapon in the hands of the executive. It was especially so because most of the judges were well past the age of 55 at the time the Constitution came into effect. In its most abusive application the provision was cited to depose two successive Chief Justices of the country, namely Justice C. O. E. Cole and Justice Livesey Luke.
32. The financial autonomy of judges was also far from assured. The determination of their conditions of service was subject to the one-party parliament and any improvement of these conditions required prior approval from the President. The self-accounting system that enabled the judiciary to have control over its income was discontinued. The judiciary thus became wholly financially dependent on the Ministry of Finance. The Ministry provided inadequate resources and the arrangement precipitated the ascendancy of corrupt practices throughout the justice system.²⁴

²¹ See the One-Party Constitution of Sierra Leone 1978 at Chapter IV, Section 39(5).

²² See the One-Party Constitution of Sierra Leone 1978 at Section 113, sub-sections (1) to (30).

²³ See the One-Party Constitution of Sierra Leone 1978 at Section 115(1).

²⁴ See Chief Justice Abdulai A. Timbo, Submission to TRC Institutional Hearings on the Judiciary, July 2003, at page 3.

33. Another act of contempt towards the separation of powers was the merger of the Office of Attorney General with that of Minister of Justice by the 1978 constitution. The Minister, also a Member of Parliament, retained supervisory power over the judiciary, and gained discretionary power in the prosecution of cases. Thus the joint office of Attorney General and Minister of Justice became a fusion of executive, legislative, judicial and prosecutorial powers,²⁵ and it remains just as problematic to the present day.
34. The ruling political class assumed absolute power and carved out a 'legal position' that deprived all its opponents of their basic rights as Sierra Leoneans. The outright supremacy of the executive and its domination of the other arms of government did not alter under President Momoh's tenure of office between 1985 and 1992. The one party constitution that destroyed the doctrine of separation of powers was firmly in place, along with the devastating perception on the part of many opponents that only armed rebellion could bring it down.

DECENTRALISATION

35. The process of decentralisation is intended to ensure that political power and the activity of government should impact positively on all levels of the society. The rationale is that a decentralised system of government allows for better delivery of public services and facilitates constant interaction between politicians, administrators and those they govern. Over-centralisation generally translates into inequity, particularly due to poor service delivery to peripheral regions and the vulnerable sectors of society.
36. There were two main structures of local government at independence in 1961. The first was the traditional local government structure that revolved around Chiefdoms, paramount Chiefs and the hierarchies they formed. The second included district councils, town councils and the Freetown City Council.
37. With the exception of the Freetown City Council, which was created by the Freetown Municipality Ordinance of 1893, the councils owed their existence to laws passed between 1946 and 1950. The 12 district councils representing Sierra Leone's 12 administrative districts were created in 1946. These councils were granted purely advisory roles.²⁶ The system was expanded in 1950 by the District Council Ordinance to include promotion of the economic development of the district and of the welfare of its people, using funds at the council's disposal. The town councils were situated in Bo, Kenema, Makeni, Koidu and New Sembehun. All local government structures were under the control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

²⁵ The joint office of Attorney General and Minister of Justice was originally created under the One-Party Constitution of Sierra Leone 1978, Chapter V, Section 88, sub-sections (2) to (4). This constitutional anomaly has been retained ever since.

²⁶ See Abraham, A.; *Development Issues in Sierra Leone: Selected Essays*, Atlantic Printers, Freetown, 1994 (hereinafter "Abraham, *Development Issues in Sierra Leone*"), at pages 53 – 62.

38. Under Sir Milton Margai the councils and decentralised local government structures functioned efficiently and continued to deliver vital services in education, health and agriculture, as well as small-scale construction of community facilities. However the councils had a number of weaknesses that placed them at the mercy of officials of the central government. Primarily, since their very existence was not entrenched in the constitution, they depended on the passing mood of the executive and the central legislature. Moreover, their establishing laws subjected them to administrative and political dominance of the Minister and his officials in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Thus they were ultimately accountable to the central government rather than to the people of their various local bases.
39. Other weaknesses included the reliance of the councils on central government for up to 70% of their operational costs, their sub-ordination by Paramount Chiefs and the ease with which district council finances could be mismanaged and misappropriated. These weaknesses were ripe for exploitation by the over-centralising tendencies of successive governments. Sir Milton Margai set a precedent with his incapacitation of the opposition-controlled Kono District Council by withholding its operational funds.²⁷ Also, rather than reform district councils, Sir Milton Margai's regime suspended several of them on grounds of alleged financial malpractice in 1962. They were to remain neglected until 1967, as Sir Albert Margai would make no attempt to review local governance structures.
40. Though the traditional tier of local government was entrenched in the constitution, its office-holders were in reality placed under administrative and supervisory control by officials of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. Chiefs could be suspended, dethroned or banished from their Chiefdoms by the central government. Chief Mbriwa of Kono, for instance, was unceremoniously banished from his Chiefdom by Sir Milton Margai.
41. When reform arrived, under the National Reformation Council (NRC) junta regime, it merely accelerated the demise of local government and decentralised administration. The NRC established a pivotal Commission of Enquiry led by Justice Bekou-Betts, which exposed rampant malpractice across government.²⁸ Among the measures taken as a result were the arrests and detention of several Paramount Chiefs. It created public suspicion of Chiefs along with something of a power vacuum at the traditional local government level.
42. In 1972, the Siaka Stevens regime dissolved local governments all over the country. Whilst town councils were replaced by committees of management, the district councils were not to be revived during the entire rule of the APC up to the outbreak of conflict.

²⁷ See Abraham, *Development Issues in Sierra Leone*, at page 62.

²⁸ The Bekou-Betts Commission of Inquiry reported numerous acts of corruption and mismanagement on the part of public officials in several sectors. Most relevant to local government was the Commission's document of 19 January 1968, which resulted in the arrest of Paramount Chief B. V. S. Kebbie of Mallen Chiefdom, Paramount Chief Alikalie Mordu III of Maforki Chiefdom and several other traditional rulers.

TRC



Representatives of political parties participate in a meeting with the Commission.

43. Governance was clearly over-centralised during the regime of Siaka Stevens. Provincial and rural areas were left to their own devices and their inhabitants became disenchanted with the political system. In its submission to the TRC, the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights (NCDHR) stated:
- “The abolition of local government system and its replacement by officers appointed by the centre (Freetown) led to marginalisation of the rural people. This, coupled with the centre’s co-option of the traditional chiefs, increased the alienation. These two acts amounted to marginalisation and made many rural people to be receptive to the propaganda of the rebels and more tolerant to their presence.”²⁹
44. From 1972 onwards, socio-economic development in the Provinces was handled by central government agencies far removed from the people. The only alternative development assistance came from local or international NGOs who instigated their own activities at district level. Despite their many weaknesses, district councils had at least supplied water, roads, health care, agricultural services and rudimentary communal facilities during the 1960s. It would have been eminently more prudent to institute measured reforms of local governance rather than dissolving the councils outright.
45. As it was, the dissolution of district councils gradually stifled the flow of services to people in most of the Provinces. Riverine districts like Bonthe and Kambia, as well as remote ones like Koinadugu, Pujehun and Kailahun, received no electricity or pipe-borne water. Bridges and roads were in a state of disrepair and few schools or health centres survived. The whole of the North had neither running tap water nor electricity by the end of the 1970s. These were facets of regression rather than underdevelopment, as previous governments had apparently left several such facilities intact.³⁰
46. The management committee system introduced into towns and municipalities effectively ensured that appointed individuals were more accountable to their political patrons than to the people they served. The decline in services such as sanitation, as well as poor maintenance of roads, streets, markets, slaughter houses, cemeteries, fire stations and public toilets were rooted in the abolition of elected municipal and town councils.
47. The dissolution of the councils also led to the emergence of members of the so-called “political elite” with no apprenticeship in governance at the local level being elevated to the national political stage. This trend, which has snowballed from 1972 right up to 2003, led to the installation of decision-makers whose actions were disastrously uninformed by the needs of ordinary people. Medical practitioners and teachers in the provincial communities were often the last to receive salaries. The provision of basic services in the Provinces collapsed long before it did in Freetown.

²⁹ See National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights (NCDHR), Submission to TRC Thematic Hearings on Governance and Human Rights, June 2003, at page 2. See also United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Submission to TRC Thematic Hearings on the Causes of the Conflict, 7 May 2003, at page 2.

³⁰ See Sierra Leone People’s Party (SLPP), Submission to TRC Thematic Hearings on Political Parties, 2003.

MASS PARTICIPATION IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS

48. Good governance necessarily encompasses democracy, with an opportunity for the general populace to express its voice through regular elections. People should have opportunities to establish and belong to political parties, which in themselves should have organised internal systems of electing and replacing leadership according to the wishes of the membership. Bad governance obtains where the governing party engages in anti-democratic practices to undermine its opposition, or where political parties are themselves undemocratic. Where decisions are taken by an elite few people without reference to a wider constituency, they are less likely to reflect the interests of the majority. In such a situation, exclusionary politics prevails and discrimination against particular groups or regions is likely.
49. Sierra Leone's political scene has been dominated since independence in 1961 by two political parties - the Sierra Leone Peoples Party (SLPP) and the All Peoples Congress (APC). With the exception of the thirteen-month NRC military interregnum from 1967 to 1968, these two parties ruled the country for the 30 years between independence in 1961 and the outbreak of conflict in 1991. At the time of writing, the SLPP has ruled the country since the return of multi-party democracy in 1996. The APC, overthrown by the NPRC junta in 1992, is now the largest opposition party.
50. The increasing regionalism³¹ and undemocratic strategies employed by these two parties have impacted negatively on the political process in Sierra Leone. A string of alternative parties have mounted challenges in the past, often to address particular political crises, but have ultimately gone down as failed historical experiments. These included the National Council of Sierra Leone (NCSL), the People's National Party (PNP), the United Progressive Party (UPP) and the Sierra Leone People's Independent Movement (SLPIM) in the 1950s and early 1960s, as well as the National Democratic Party (NDP) in the early 1970s. As a result, outside the membership of the two mainstream parties, most Sierra Leoneans have felt excluded from the domestic political process that independence was supposed to bestow upon them.
51. The Independence Constitution of 1961 made provisions for the conduct of multi-party parliamentary elections every fifth year. Two other legal instruments that bolstered the conduct of elections in the immediate post-colonial period were the Franchise and Electoral Registration Act of 1961 and the Electoral Provisions Act of 1962. Section 37 of the independence constitution established an electoral commission comprising a chief electoral commissioner or chairman, plus between two and four other members to be appointed by the Governor General on the advice of the Prime Minister. The commission was classified not as an independent body but as a unit of the Ministry of Internal Affairs; its administrative staffers were members of the civil service seconded to the Commission through the Ministry. The Commission also lacked a self-accounting status; the Ministry of Finance handled its finances on its behalf.

³¹ The SLPP increasingly became identified as the party of the South and East of the country, whereas the APC was associated with the Northern Province and the Western Area.

52. Elections can be considered as three distinct time periods: the pre-election period; polling day itself; and the immediate post-election period. Exclusionary tactics were apparent in the pre-election period of the first post-colonial general election,³² held in 1962. The SLPP under Sir Milton Margai deployed the Chiefs against the opposition in Kono and many other parts of the country by cleverly side-stepping the Electoral Provision Act 1962. This Act formally debarred the Chiefs from interfering in political meetings, unless it had become disorderly or appeared likely to lead to a breach of the peace. However, the provision in question applied only during the official period of election campaign and not before its announcement. SLPP Chiefs therefore acted pre-emptively to stop the opposition from campaigning in their Chiefdoms.
53. The District Council Elections of 1962 saw an extension of anti-democratic policies. Many APC supporters were charged before the Native Administration Courts for "incitement undermining the authority of the Paramount Chiefs."³³ The perceived mistreatment of these APC supporters would invoke hostility to a number of Chiefs after they resumed power in 1968. Some APC members advocated that the Chiefs should be suspended or dethroned as retribution for their repressive actions during the Milton Margai years.
54. Sierra Leonean politics in the 1960s also began to be undermined by the notion of the 'pa', a tag of quasi paternal authority attached to the perceived 'big man' of any given political grouping. In addition to its connotations of deferential respect, the title of 'pa' has always brought with it administrative, political and financial power over other members of the group or party.³⁴ In consequence it represents a personalisation of politics, as was the case in the SLPP in the run-up to the 1962 elections.
55. The sitting SLPP Members of Parliament allocated the party symbol for candidature to themselves, contrary to the rules agreed on in January 1962.³⁵ This tactic prevented the selection of any candidates whose loyalty to the leadership was not assured. Further pre-election manoeuvrings by the regime also led to six SLPP candidates being returned completely unopposed.³⁶ The Commission however found no evidence of attempts to rig the elections on polling day, which was relatively peaceful and orderly.³⁷

³² The colonial authorities had staged two previous general elections in Sierra Leone, in 1951 and 1957. Both of them were won by the SLPP.

³³ At the time of these charges, no magistrate courts had been established in the Provinces. The Native Administration Courts were run by members of the traditional elite allied closely with the SLPP.

³⁴ The 'pa' figure determines the political career, the mobility and the level of influence of the other members in his party, compensating political allegiance and blocking perceived rivals. Thus it has always proven difficult to nurture a culture of debate or principled dissent within a political party. Those who dare oppose the 'pa' risk a career in the political wilderness. Sierra Leone's experience of party politics is replete with examples of those who rebelled against the controlling elite and the punishment meted out to them, directly or indirectly.

³⁵ The SLPP had agreed in January 1962 that local committees would allocate the party symbol to a candidate with the majority vote in each constituency, so that the field would be open to all aspirants.

³⁶ See All People's Congress (APC), Submission to TRC Thematic Hearings on Political Parties, April 2003, at page 4.

³⁷ The election results of 1962 put the SLPP in government, albeit without an outright majority. The SLPP won 22 elected seats, along with six unopposed seats, giving it a total of 28 seats. The APC won 16 seats, plus four seats from a party associated with it, giving it a total of 20 seats. Independent candidates won the 14 remaining seats.

56. After his brother's death, Sir Albert Margai inherited a party that was over-reliant on Chiefs and split internally over his controversial selection by the Governor General to become Prime Minister in 1964. Sir Albert Margai restricted the participatory process by obstructing opposition activities in several ways. First he used the Public Order Act 1965, Section 24 abusively to prevent the opposition from campaigning in the Provinces.³⁸ Paramount Chiefs chased out known APC members from their Chiefdoms allegedly on the instructions of the Prime Minister. Several Chiefs who appeared immune to this type of manipulation were simply removed from power.³⁹
57. Sir Albert Margai weakened the opposition inside Parliament by introducing the 1965 Absenteeism Bill, which stipulated that any member who absented himself for 30 days without reasonable excuse would forfeit his seat. Four APC Members of Parliament lost their seats after they had been convicted and jailed for riotous conduct. Thus Sir Albert hampered an important element of democratic good governance by reducing the voice of the opposition in Parliament.
58. Another example of restricted political participation was the denial of the opposition's right to be heard over the national radio station operated by the Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service (SLBS).
59. Sir Albert's ultimately vain attempt at creating a one-party state in Sierra Leone was a further example of the inherently exclusionary political tendency under his regime.⁴⁰ He was only prevented from pursuing his plans by massive and sustained opposition from civil society.
60. Yet the SLPP's lacking internal democracy manifested itself again in the way Sir Albert Margai distributed party symbols during the 1967 general election campaign. He is alleged to have given symbols only to those who pledged him their unflinching support,⁴¹ thus alienating party members who opposed his style of leadership. It was a classic case of personal interest being placed above party and national interests, as it forced a number of popular figures to stand as 'objectionist' independent candidates.⁴²

³⁸ The Act empowered the Chiefs to forbid meetings or assemblies of more than 12 people within their Chiefdoms. See Public Order Act 1965, Section 24.

³⁹ One notable example of a Chief ejected for political reasons was Gbwaru Mansaray of Koinadugu District.

⁴⁰ See All People's Congress (APC), Submission to TRC Thematic Hearings on Political Parties, April 2003, at page 8. See also Tucker, P., *The SLPP at 50: 42 Years of Trials and Tribulations*; originally printed in the *Standard Times International*, Vol. 1, No. 30; reprinted in *West Africa* magazine, 2 May 2003 (hereinafter "Tucker, *The SLPP at 50*").

⁴¹ During the election campaign itself, Sir Albert Margai was also alleged to have used the main secret societies - Bondo (female) and Poro (male) - to force people to swear allegiance to the SLPP and vote for his preferred candidates.

⁴² See Tucker, *The SLPP at 50*.

61. The Prime Minister then allegedly instructed the civil servants who served as returning officers in the Provinces to rig the 1967 elections.⁴³ The Government had the Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service (SLBS) announce the results over radio in such a manner as to appear as if the SLPP had won 32 seats and the APC 32. In fact the APC had won 32 seats and the SLPP had managed only 28 seats. A prolonged and damaging standoff followed, descending into farce when military officers hijacked the political process and a hastily convened National Reformation Council (NRC) was anointed.⁴⁴
62. The NRC junta was an aberration on the political scene. Having grabbed political power through a coup, the regime lacked legitimacy, which could only really be conferred on a regime through electoral success. The NRC was also extremely reluctant to implement the outcome of the 1967 elections, despite enormous popular pressure for the mass vote to be recognised. The regime neither represented nor encouraged broad-based political participation.
63. The first APC government under Siaka Stevens began deviating from the canons of free and fair elections and participatory politics almost immediately upon assuming power. Stevens disregarded the agreement of national unity between his party and the SLPP that had been set up in 1968 to heal a nation deeply divided by the elections of 1967.⁴⁵ He orchestrated a series of legal challenges, which unseated 23 SLPP Members of Parliament and later his regime instigated widespread violence against SLPP supporters in subsequent by-elections between 1968 and 1970. The APC Government also proscribed a new political party, the National Democratic Party, set up by some of Stevens' most outspoken opponents in 1970.
64. The Electoral Commission was a highly compromised institution during the regime of Siaka Stevens and was complicit in undermining the electoral process. It turned a blind eye to the immense violence of the by-elections in 1969 and 1970 and endorsed obviously flawed victories for the APC. In the 1973 polls, the Electoral Commission presided over numerous incidents in which SLPP candidates were violently prevented from entering nomination centres to certify their candidature, as was required by law. Thus by the close of the campaign on 24 March 1973, APC candidates were declared unopposed in 46 out of the 85 constituencies.⁴⁶ The SLPP was to withdraw from these elections as a result.⁴⁷
65. The Electoral Commission became a dumping ground for the APC party faithful. Its credibility suffered immensely in the eyes of a populace that saw it as nothing but an agency of the ruling regime bent on maintaining it in power through violent and coercive tactics.

⁴³ See Honourable U. S. B. Munu, Submission to TRC Thematic Hearings on Governance, April 2003, at pages 4-5.

⁴⁴ For a comprehensive analysis of this period of political turmoil, see the chapter entitled 'Historical Antecedents to the Conflict' at Volume 3A, Chapter 1 of this report, specifically in the section headed 'The 1967 Elections and their Aftermath'.

⁴⁵ See Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), Submission to TRC Thematic Hearings on Political Parties, 2003; at page 8.

⁴⁶ See the reporting in the *Daily Mail* newspaper, 2 to 6 May 1973.

⁴⁷ See Lavallie, A. M.; *The SLPP: A Political History of the Sierra Leone People's Party*, unpublished MA Thesis, University of Sierra Leone, 1983 (hereinafter "Lavallie, *A Political History of the SLPP*"), at page 224.

TRC



The Commissioners meet leaders of political parties, including Mr. Ernest Bai Koroma (first right) of the All People's Congress (APC) and Major (Retired) Johnny Paul Koroma (second right) of the Peace and Liberation Party.

66. In 1977, widespread intimidation and thuggery again resulted in an election that was neither free nor fair.⁴⁸ APC candidates were unopposed in all constituencies in the Bonthe, Koinadugu, Kambia, Tonkolili and Bombali Districts.⁴⁹ SLPP candidates in these areas were arrested under the Public Emergency Act 1978 and detained.⁵⁰
67. The most devastating blow to a free, fair and participatory political process in Sierra Leone was the introduction of a one-party system of governance in 1978. In turning the country into a One Party State, the Parliament ruled that only members of the recognised party (the APC) could qualify for election to the Presidency.⁵¹ Moreover, only members of that party in a conference of national delegates were eligible to nominate a candidate for presidential elections.⁵²
68. The One-Party Constitution destroyed all constitutional pretences about an independent Electoral Commission. Chapter IV of the new Constitution stated that the Electoral Commission was to be appointed by the President and could be deposed by the President for inability to discharge its duty or for misbehaviour. The wide discretionary powers given the President in relation to the Electoral Commission ensured that its members held office only at the pleasure of the President and therefore could hardly perform their functions without being overtly or covertly biased in favour of the President or his preferred candidates. The notion of 'government candidate' took universal hold, denoting a candidate with the President's support who would be elected as a formality, whatever the preferences of voters.
69. Members of Parliament in 1978 had to join the APC party or face expulsion. Despite this objectionable downturn in the governance of the country, there is no indication that the 11 remaining SLPP MPs made any protest at the deliberate robbing of the right to mass participation in the political process. The opposition political elite instead proved that it would rather be included in the one-party structure than stand up for the cardinal democratic right and responsibility of the populace to chose candidates of its choice. The SLPP politicians, like their APC counterparts, have always preferred individual short-term survival over sound ideology, doctrines of principle or good governance. Thus in 1978, the SLPP members abdicated their responsibilities to challenge bad governance, their major focus instead switching to means of reaping the loot of co-optation.

⁴⁸ See Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), Submission to TRC Thematic Hearings on Political Parties, 2003; at page 6.

⁴⁹ The result was a large absolute majority for the APC and a crippling reduction in the strength of the parliamentary opposition. It was the consequent stranglehold on Parliament that enabled the APC to introduce the One-Party Constitution.

⁵⁰ See Public Notice Numbers 39-50 of 31 August 1978, announcing the arrest and subsequent detention of 158 opposition members all over the country. Among this batch were four SLPP MPs who were to lose their seats in Parliament by the invocation of the 1965 Absenteeism Act.

⁵¹ See the One-Party Constitution of Sierra Leone 1978 at Chapter III, Section 22.

⁵² See the One-Party Constitution of Sierra Leone 1978 at Chapter III, Section 5.

70. The challenge of effecting change was left in the hands of students and marginalised youths. In its submission to the Commission, UNAMSIL directly linked the emergence of this ‘unofficial opposition’ to the causes of the war:

“The institution of a One Party system in 1978 and the suppression of freedom under that system suffocated the growth of democracy and good governance. This suppression also nurtured the rebellious attitude amongst the youth, making it easier for them to embrace demagogues like Foday Sankoh who had promised to overthrow the system violently.”⁵³

71. Exclusionary and violent electoral practices also blighted the conduct of the 1982 elections, the first such exercise under the One-Party Constitution. Many individuals who were distrusted or not favoured by the APC central committee were either excluded from the process by non-issuance of the party symbol, or looked on helplessly as their supporters were prevented from voting. Such blatant attempts at exclusion inevitably generated violence. Electoral violence occurred in Bombali between the supporters of Abdulai Timbo (mainly Fullah) and Thaimu Bangura (mainly Temne),⁵⁴ as well as in Pujehun South, between supporters of Manna Kpaka and Solomon Demby. The conflict between Kpaka’s and Demby’s supporters spawned what was referred to as the ‘Ndorgboryosoi’, which is widely acknowledged as a forerunner of the localised conflict that erupted there as part of the insurgency ten years later.⁵⁵ In Kagboro Chiefdom in Moyamba District, intense violence was waged on opponents by APC strongman, Harry T. T. Williams. In the Western Area, thuggery in the West One constituency led to the cancellation of the elections.
72. An especially ominous development was the emergence of ‘drugging’ as a means of preparing thugs to participate in electoral violence. The anti-democratic actions of drug-using youths, manipulated by politicians, foreshadowed similar practices in the conflict, often involving child combatants or forced recruits.⁵⁶
73. The narrowing of the participatory process did not end with the transfer of power from Siaka Stevens to his APC successor President J. S. Momoh in 1985. Indeed, the succession itself epitomised many of the deficiencies in the wider political process. Within the APC party structure, dubious means were adopted to exclude the former First Vice-President S. I. Koroma, who believed that he ought to have succeeded Siaka Stevens.⁵⁷ The party selection process

⁵³ See UNAMSIL, Submission to TRC Thematic Hearings on Governance, 1 March 2003; at page 2. For further discussion of the use of thugs, see also Rashid, I., Subaltern Reactions: Lumpens, Students and the Left”, in *African Development*, Vol. XXII, 1997, at page 24.

⁵⁴ See Revolutionary United Front, Submission to TRC Thematic Hearings on Political Parties, July 2003.

⁵⁵ For a comprehensive analysis of the ‘Ndorgboryosoi’, see the chapter entitled ‘Historical Antecedents to the Conflict’ at Volume 3A, Chapter 1 of this report, specifically in the section headed ‘Local Historical Antecedents’.

⁵⁶ See Dr. Dennis Bright, Minister of Youth and Sports, Submission to TRC Thematic Hearings on Youth, June 2003. See also the submissions to TRC Thematic Hearings by the SLPP, the Ombudsman, the NCDDR and the Centre for the Co-ordination of Youth Activities (CCYA).

⁵⁷ See Earl Conteh Morgan and Dixon-Fyle, M.; *Sierra Leone at the End of the Twentieth Century: History, Politics and Society*, Peter Lang, New York, 1999 (hereinafter “Dixon-Fyle, et al., *Sierra Leone at the End of the Twentieth Century*”), at pages 121-122.

contrived to present General J. S. Momoh, the Head of the Army, as the sole candidate of the party for the presidential elections.⁵⁸

74. Since the Momoh regime was in many respects a continuation of Siaka Stevens' rule, the APC party's contempt for internal democracy was very much evident. Under Momoh, however, a small circle of members of the President's ethnic group – Limba – came to dominate decision-making processes. As well as being Limba, all the most important individuals were alleged to belong to the tribalistic Ekutay society.⁵⁹
75. Local government elections were never conducted under Momoh, thus continuing the exclusionary political trend he inherited from Siaka Stevens.
76. To Momoh's credit, however, there were some improvements in electoral administration. The Electoral Commission conducted the 1986 elections in a relatively free and fair manner, devoid of violence. Shortly after those elections, the appointment of Max Bailor as Chairman of the Electoral Commission led to changes in its administration that improved its capacity to conduct elections. University graduates were recruited, a far cry from the usually poorly educated officers who staffed the neglected professional wing of the Commission. Amendments made to the voting methods in 1990 saw the reintroduction of ballot papers and a single box for candidates to replace the much abused marbles or tokens put separately in different boxes for each candidate. A process of computerisation of voters' registration was also begun. Thus the electoral commission was able effectively to conduct a referendum that approved the reintroduction of the multi-party system in 1991.
77. Unfortunately these incremental improvements were all too little too late. The upturn in participatory mechanisms coincided with the start of the conflict in 1991. Unsurprisingly a conspiracy theory emerged to question the veracity of Momoh's democratic credentials. It was alleged that instead of accelerating a return to democracy, his government wished to use the war as a pretext to delay multi-party elections, or to hold elections only in secure areas of the country where the APC enjoyed strong support.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ This contrivance was partly achieved through an enabling amendment of the One-Party Constitution 1978 on 24 July 1985.

⁵⁹ See Opala, *The Politics of State Collapse*, at pages 9-12.

⁶⁰ See, *inter alia*, Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, current President of the Republic of Sierra Leone; testimony before the TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown; 5 August 2003.

THE RULE OF LAW

78. The rule of law signifies a society in which law is supreme. The running of state institutions, the relationship between the rulers and the ruled, interactions amongst and between individuals or corporate bodies; they should all be done according to law. The rule of law opposes the arbitrary rule of powerful men and women. The basic principles of the rule of law include equality before the law of the land;⁶¹ an impartial and independent judiciary; an accessible justice system; irrevocable constitutional guarantees; and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.⁶² Other important components of the rule of law are due process and fair legislative mechanisms that do not discriminate against particular groups in the society.
79. Citizenship provisions in the 1961 Constitution discriminated against Sierra Leonean women in many important respects. The most telling unfairness was that whilst the provision automatically granted citizenship to descendants of male Sierra Leoneans, it denied citizenship to the offspring of female Sierra Leoneans where the father was not of African Negro descent. The citizenship provisions also excluded the Lebanese, a long-standing and important community in Sierra Leone, from becoming citizens. The discrimination against them was racial – they were not of African Negro descent.
80. In 1906, the laws created to govern land tenure discriminated on grounds of ethnicity. Different land laws were applied to Sierra Leoneans depending on whether they were “natives” (those originating from the Provinces) or so-called “non-natives” (those originating from the Colony of Freetown, who were predominantly Krios). “Natives” could hold an indefinite interest in land in the Provincial areas but “non-natives” could only acquire land and hold it on limited tenancy. The Provincial Land Act of 1906 stated that “no non-native shall acquire a greater interest in land in the Provinces than a tenancy for fifty years.” The same statute contained the further clause that “nothing in this Section shall prevent the insertion in any lease of a clause providing for the renewal of such lease for a second or further terms not over twenty one years.”⁶³
81. The Provincial Land Act of 1906 gave certain advantages and privileges to the Protectorate people by reason of their place of birth or origin, which were not extended to other Sierra Leoneans. The Chiefs could arbitrarily recover land sold to “non-natives” if they so desired, especially if the land was formerly communally owned. In this area, the rule of law was subverted.
82. Most Sierra Leoneans also lacked access to the superior courts of the land, which were located in Freetown. The English common law applied in these courts was not understood by ordinary Sierra Leoneans, the majority of whom were illiterates from the Provinces who could not speak English. The courts were administered mainly by people belonging to one ethnic group – Krio.

⁶¹ Equality before the law means that everyone, notwithstanding status, is subject to and must abide by the ordinary laws of the State.

⁶² Human rights include the right to life, the right not to be subjected to torture or any form of cruel or inhuman treatment, the right not to be deprived of one’s liberty arbitrarily, the right to a fair trial and the right to a private life. Fundamental freedoms include freedom of expression, freedom of religion and freedom of association.

⁶³ Both passages come from Section 4, Article 122 of the Provincial Land Act 1906, in the *Laws of Sierra Leone*.

Thus even members of other ethnic groups who resided in Freetown avoided these courts. They preferred courts based on the traditional system of customary law, which were set up especially by Tribal Headmen in Freetown and its environs. The ordinance establishing Tribal Headship in the Western Area made no provision for the establishment of these courts. They were therefore illegal.

83. As magistrate courts were not established in the Provinces until 1965, provincial inhabitants only had access to local courts run according to custom, which varied from Chieftdom to Chieftdom. Customary law was not codified, no was there any uniformity of procedure or penalty. The room for arbitrariness was therefore too large.
84. Arguably the high point of Sir Albert Margai's regime in terms of rule of law was the passage of the Courts Act of 1965, which created magistrate courts that could be accessed directly by inhabitants of the Provinces. However, the Criminal Procedure Act of 1965 lacked acceptable safeguards to protect criminal defendants and was littered with anachronistic provisions. In particular, judges and magistrates were afforded an undue degree of discretion, inviting arbitrariness and abuse of their discretionary powers.
85. Many provisions in the Public Order Act of 1965 undermined basic rights. Provisions relating to seditious libel and the grossly arbitrary powers of the government during a state of emergency were typical examples.⁶⁴ Other measures that clearly undermined the tenets of the rule of law included giving control of public meetings in the Provinces to the Chiefs, which many Chiefs used in practice to ban APC meetings.
86. The APC under Siaka Stevens pursued the demolition of the rule of law to new and very violent levels. Stevens quickly declared a state of emergency using the deficient regime of the Public Order Act. Whilst Albert Margai had usually been hesitant in implementing some of the unfair laws passed by his regime to their full effect, Stevens became adept at utilising many of those laws in new and unimaginable ways. The Steven's regime promulgated its state of emergency during the by-elections of 1969-70 and under its cover unleashed the army and police against the opposition SLPP.
87. The state of emergency met with clamorous political dissent. Yet ironically, the more its opponents protested, the more the screws of its legal mechanisms were tightened. Notably the vocal and burgeoning National Democratic Party (NDP) of Dr. John Karefa-Smart was banned outright. Another instance of misuse of emergency powers came in 1977, after students demonstrated against President Stevens at a graduation ceremony at Fourah Bay College. The security forces intervened with brutal effect, firing live ammunition on the crowd. In 1978-79, in the face of mounting labour unrest and a threatened nation-wide strike, President Stevens again used emergency powers to clamp down on union leaders.

⁶⁴ The Commission has expressed its grave concern with remnants of the legal regime established under the Public Order Act 1965 elsewhere in this report: in particular, see the chapter entitled 'Recommendations' at Volume 2, Chapter 2 of this report.

TRC



The late Mr. Cleo Hancilles, a governance specialist and one of the intellectual driving forces behind the Pan African movement of the 1980s, consults with Leader of Evidence Ozonnia Ojielo at a TRC public hearing.

88. In the 1973 elections, APC thugs were hired by the APC specifically to operate above the law in kidnapping SLPP candidates until after nominations of candidates were closed. Laws passed during Sir Albert Margai's rule required candidates to be present at the nomination grounds on nomination day.⁶⁵ Thus the involuntary absence of SLPP candidates in effect meant that APC candidates were returned unopposed in a majority of constituencies.
89. The APC government's failure to implement laws like the Non-citizenship Trade and Business Act of 1969 (meant to empower indigenous Sierra Leonean business people by excluding foreigners from certain sectors of the economy) convinced a lot of persons that it was not a government that cared about the law. Rather than assessing laws on their merits, most people believed that the government only did things according to the wishes of the highest bidders.⁶⁶
90. As the rule of law diminished, judgements in court cases were often decided on grounds other than those justified by law. Unethical practices were rampant among lawyers. It became common for lawyers to solicit bribes from their clients for judges, magistrates and court officials. Barristers and solicitors colluded with their clients to pervert the course of justice. Litigation proceedings were often reduced to a snail's pace with the deliberate concurrence of the lawyers involved.
91. The legal profession contributed a great deal towards the massive abuse of human rights that took place before and during the war. Indeed the lawyers of today are just as responsible for the woeful state of human rights protection that persists in the country. It was not uncommon during the 1970s and 80s for members of the Sierra Leone Bar Association to act as spies for the regime of President Siaka Stevens. Barristers leaked decisions by the Bar Association to government, thereby forestalling planned protests against oppressive and unconstitutional government actions.
92. Law reporting was neglected during the regime of Siaka Stevens. Between 1920 and 1973, regular editions of the African Law Report (Sierra Leone Series) had been published. The reporting of judgements of the courts of Sierra Leone was abruptly halted without proper explanation in 1973. One direct consequence of this decision was the upsurge in inconsistencies in subsequent judgements. These inconsistencies have left many decorated lawyers, not to mention the general population, utterly confused as to what really constitutes the laws of Sierra Leone. From the time of Stevens to the present day, the country has been denied an efficient system of recording and reporting the judgements of the courts.

⁶⁵ The provision requiring candidates to be present at nomination grounds had been promulgated by the Albert Margai regime to destabilise the APC. It represented a clear case of bad and biased law making. Under Stevens the government used the provision to suppress a section of the population on political grounds. Thus the bad law was compounded by a clear case of bad and biased implementation.

⁶⁶ See Indigenous Commercial and Petty Traders' Association, Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, April 2003.

93. Of equal concern has been the static nature of the laws of Sierra Leone. Without law reforms and revisions, the rule of law is gradually compromised because new challenges facing the state are not addressed satisfactorily. Although the APC government established a Law Reform Commission in 1975,⁶⁷ it did not treat the commission with any respect or seriousness. Thus the country was left with laws that were outdated⁶⁸ and largely irrelevant to the demands of development, growth and multi-faceted integration.
94. Local court officials lacked legal training. The Local Courts Act No. 20 of 1963 provided for their work to be supervised by judicial advisers or customary law officers. These officers were empowered to advise local courts in matters of law, train local court personnel and exercise judicial review over decisions of local courts. However, declining interest in the rule of law and poor conditions of service meant that few such customary law officers were appointed. Local courts' personnel continued to act as they wished without heed to the integrity or the improvement of the law. Customary law was never codified.
95. There were no marked changes in the rule of law situation during the regime of Siaka Stevens' successor, President Joseph Saidu Momoh. Though perceptibly less violent overall than the Stevens regime, the Momoh regime nonetheless hanged its own First Vice-President, Francis Minah, after he was implicated in an improbable coup. Minah was almost certainly a victim of political vendetta within the APC, but a compromised judiciary was not likely to acquit him of treason in a climate where political favours mattered more than legal justifications. Minah was convicted and condemned to death with a number of other party outcasts.
96. Momoh's reign elevated members of a tribalistic clique within the APC party, known as Ekutay, to a position well above the ordinary laws of the land. As the economic situation worsened, the regime carried the promulgation of states of emergencies yet another step further by declaring a state of *economic* emergency. State officials used emergency as a pretext to seize people's money and property without regard for the law. The economic state of emergency was itself a suspension of the rule of law and fundamental rights. Allegedly looking for 'economic saboteurs,' state officials invaded private homes, disrupted businesses and generally created a climate of economic mayhem.

⁶⁷ See Act No. 12 of 1975 in the *Laws of Sierra Leone*.

⁶⁸ Due to its colonial history, most of Sierra Leone's laws were either adopted or adapted from England. Section 74 of the Courts Act 1965 made pre-1880 laws of England automatically applicable to Sierra Leone. Examples of laws adopted pursuant to this section include the Statute of Frauds 1677, the Wills Act 1837 and the Common Law Procedure Act 1852. Post-1880 English statutes that were adopted additionally include the Conveyancing Act 1881, the Settled Land Act 1882, the Perjury Act 1911, the Forgery Act 1913, the Larceny Act 1916 and the Married Women's Maintenance Act (Cap. 100) enacted in 1888.

THE MEDIA

97. At independence, Sierra Leone enjoyed a vibrant media tradition, which included the first newspapers, radio broadcasters and television stations in sub-Saharan Africa. The governments of the post-independence era were theoretically in an excellent position to consolidate the country's proud heritage.
98. During the colonial period, newspapers like the West African Reporter (1876 – 1884) and the Sierra Leone Weekly News (1886 – 1951) had not only criticised the colonial authorities, but also created awareness about issues of common concern such as education, health and agriculture.⁶⁹ During Sir Milton Margai's three-year tenure, there was no deliberate attempt to gag the press by the regime.⁷⁰ There was pluralism in relation to the print media, albeit that the government controlled the only radio and television stations, as was the case in many parts of the world in that era.
99. Sir Albert Margai introduced laws to curtail press freedom, however. For example, a directive was issued to the government-owned newspaper, 'The Daily Mail', and the state broadcasting agency, the SLBS, not to afford any publicity to APC activities. When the government lost a libel case against the APC-leaning 'We Yone' newspaper for attempting to expose corruption at the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board (SLPMB), the regime removed juries from seditious libel cases and introduced trial by judge alone.⁷¹ Journalists such as Ibrahim Bash Taqi, A. F. Thorlu Bangura, and Samuel Holist, who exposed corruption at the SLPMB through *We Yone*, were constantly harassed. A. F. Thorlu Bangura, who was the newspaper's financial controller, was sentenced to a year in jail for defamatory libel of the Prime Minister. The Public Order Act 1965 criminalised defamatory libel and set the tone for suppression of the press by successive regimes up to the present day.
100. The Media was considerably suppressed under the NRC, despite its short tenure in power. The junta passed a decree which "forbade publication of any mention of the overthrown SLPP regime, the opposition APC or any defamatory matter concerning the NRC or its individual members or any statement likely to stir up ill-will between the ethnic groups in the country."⁷² The press subjected itself to extreme censorship as a result.
101. The Siaka Stevens regime orchestrated violent attacks against the independent press. One of the reasons Dr. Mohamed Sorie Forna gave for his resignation as APC Finance Minister in 1970 was the looting and burning down of the offices of 'Freedom Press', during which a child was killed. In 1972, the opposition newspaper, 'The People' was ransacked; in March 1973, following threats to journalists by the President, the editor of the opposition 'Unity' newspaper was detained without trial. Within five years the press was thoroughly cowed through threats, detentions and violent attacks on their

⁶⁹ Fyfe C.; *A Short History of Sierra Leone*, London, Longman, 1962 (hereinafter "Fyfe, *A Short History of Sierra Leone*"), at page 118. See also Tucker, *The SLPP at 50*.

⁷⁰ See Ibrahim El-Tayyib Bah, President of the Sierra Leone Association of Journalists (SLAJ), Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, August 2003.

⁷¹ See Criminal Procedure Act 1965 at Section 144(3), amending the Criminal Procedure Act 1961 at Section 41(a), which had originally granted trial by jury.

⁷² See the reports in the *Sierra Leone Daily Mail* newspaper of 4 April 1967 and the *West Africa* magazine of 15 April 1967, as cited in Cartwright, *Politics in Sierra Leone 1947 – 1967*, at pages 507-508.

premises. Those left alone were largely those that had metamorphosed into propaganda machines for the APC. Newspapers like 'We Yone', the 'Sierra Leone Daily Mail', 'The Nation' and 'Sunday Flash' became mouthpieces for the APC triumvirate of Siaka Stevens, S.I. Koroma and CA Kamara-Taylor.

102. A government news organ, the Sierra Leone News Agency (SLENA), was established in 1980 to clear all news items and other issues pertaining to the OAU conference. After the conference, the government agreed to a neutrality clause as a condition for continuous funding to SLENA from UNESCO and PANA (Pan African News Agency). The government steadily diverged from the ethos of this clause, however, and SLENA became another agency for government misinformation.⁷³
103. Radio and television broadcasting were monopolised by the tightly-controlled SLBS. There has never been a Freedom of Information Act in Sierra Leone and its absence allowed for much speculative journalism. People's freedom of speech was severely restricted by the tendency of the security forces to arrest people for what was known as '*careless talk*' - essentially any criticism of the government. Newspapers that reported corruption or human rights violations were invariably admonished or attacked.⁷⁴ In 1982, state security agents bombed the offices and printing facilities of the independent newspaper 'The Tablet'. The publisher, editors, and senior journalists fled into exile.
104. In 1980, Parliament passed the Newspaper Amendment Act, which increased the cost of newspaper registration to exorbitant levels. The Minister of Information received and approved all applications and also had the right to refuse registration.
105. President Momoh inherited a regime hostile towards press freedom. The government-controlled broadcast media retained the same monopoly over the dissemination of information. During Momoh's reign, the coverage of the SLBS was restricted to Freetown. Thus when the conflict broke out in 1991, the majority of Sierra Leoneans relied on rumour to determine its progress. The SLBS effectively promoted the government's version of the war until junior officers from the war front descended upon Freetown to overthrow the regime in April 1992. A culture of misinformation laid the foundation for gossip and popular myth to dominate people's impressions of the conflict – a phenomenon known as the '*den say*' syndrome. Incongruously, Sierra Leoneans were over-reliant on the BBC World Service to keep up-to-date with events in their own country. Moreover, the dearth of accurate reporting contributed to propaganda successes on the part of the insurgent RUF,⁷⁵ driving large numbers of people away from their villages in panic even when the threat of attack was in reality very distant.

⁷³ See Professor Septimus Kaikai, Minister of Information and Broadcasting, Government of Sierra Leone, Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 30 July 2003.

⁷⁴ See Ibrahim El-Tayyib Bah, President of the Sierra Leone Association of Journalists (SLAJ), Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, August 2003.

⁷⁵ Prominent RUF commanders became familiar contributors to news reports and radio broadcasts during the conflict years. Their trademark was boastful bravado and exaggerated claims of military prowess. Since there was rarely an objective view from the ground to contradict the RUF, its commanders spread fear and havoc among civilians and government forces alike by saying that an attack was imminent, when often their forces were not even close.

106. The continued attacks on the media drove many qualified and experienced people away from the profession, decimating the calibre and capacity of the so-called 'Fourth Estate'. Nowadays, anyone with a secondary school leaving certificate could practice as a journalist. Many of the media houses, in particular print media, are owned by people who wear their political loyalties on their sleeves. Many of the newspapers have degenerated into political rags.
107. A culture of debate and principled reporting still remains unattainable for most media practitioners in Sierra Leone. In consequence the average Sierra Leonean has no confidence in the media, either for newsworthy stories or informed, objective editorial opinion. The poor financial state of most of the media houses implies that the journalists are only paid a pittance. Many journalists are therefore inclined to practice blackmail, whereby people about whom they have received unsavoury information are 'compelled' to pay them to prevent the information from being published. Public figures who have attempted to call the journalists' bluff are rewarded with sustained negative press reporting. In order to protect their reputations, many people embark on criminal prosecutions for defamation against the erring journalists. Thus both press and public are ensnared in a vicious circle, which is all too often squared by the intervention of the ruling party.
108. The Sierra Leone Association of Journalists (SLAJ) needs to clean its house out in order to retrieve the reputation of journalism from its detractors intent on dragging it through the mud. SLAJ must clarify the criteria for admission to practise as a journalist. Only a small number of newspapers still remain true to the ideals of the profession. All other media practitioners must try to build upon the example these newspapers set and redeem the status of the media as valuable, regulated space for dialogue between all sectors, institutions and individuals in society.

CIVIL SOCIETY

109. Civil Society in the colonial era was mainly composed of elitist Freetown-based groups active in pressuring the colonial authorities to open up the political space between 1920 and 1947. By 1950, these groups had coalesced to form a political party – The National Council of the Colony of Sierra Leone (NCCSL) – dedicated to promoting the interests of the Krio ethnic group in the accelerated decolonisation process of the 1950s.
110. The two major civil society groups in the former Protectorate, the Sierra Leone Organisation Society (SOS) and the Protectorate Educational and Progressive Union (PEPU), also merged into a political party. It was the beginning of the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), established ostensibly to promote the interests of people in the provincial areas.
111. The NCCSL was not successful in reaching its objectives and the rancour at having lost out to the political thrust of Protectorate civil society, embodied in the SLPP, had still not evaporated by independence in 1961. The NCCSL's enmity found new expression in the alliance forged between its constituent groups and the APC. The latter had grown out of splits within the ranks of the Protectorate representatives in the run-up to independence. The APC mainly represented one particular social category (people without ties to traditional rulers) and one Region of the country (the North). Like the Krios, however, its

members felt marginalised by the emerging dominance of the political scene by people from the South and those with strong ties to the Chiefs.

112. The support given by members of the Krio-dominated civil society in Freetown to the organisers of the 1955 riots⁷⁶ foreshadowed their readiness in subsequent years to support any strong engagement with Protectorate elite as represented by the SLPP. The organisers of the strike, the Artisanal and Allied Workers led by Marcus Grant, were agitating for an increase in salaries and improvement in working conditions. It was alleged that the leader of the National Council of the Colony of Sierra Leone (NCCSL) instigated the riot as a last-ditch effort to undermine the inevitable dominance of the SLPP in the post-colonial period.⁷⁷ Sir Milton Margai refused to talk to the workers and instead suppressed the riot after violent days, during which much destruction was done. Several strikers were killed and property belonging to some prominent cabinet ministers was destroyed.⁷⁸ This clash set the tone for a difficult relationship between workers and the ruling elite. Workers' demands were generally met with intransigence and force by the state.
113. Notwithstanding the Elections Before Independence Movement (EBIM),⁷⁹ which later spawned the APC, there were to be no further confrontations between civil society and the Milton Margai regime. Civil society was largely bereft of a flagship issue with which to engage passionately between 1961 and 1964.
114. The situation was quite different during Sir Albert Margai's tenure between 1964 and 1967. Freetown civil society discovered in Albert Margai's overbearing political tendencies reasons to be afraid that their future was under threat. Thus Freetown-based civic groups like the Fourah Bay Academic Staff and Students' organisations, the Sierra Leone Bar Association and the independent press actively engaged the regime on issues such as the proposed one-party state, harassment of the media and the introduction of a republican constitution. Civil society also challenged the regime on its alleged corruption and its appointment of mostly Southerners to public positions.
115. Civil society groups found a real focus, however, in their loathing of the NRC junta's attempts to perpetuate itself in power. Despite the regime's attempts at co-opting key members of civil society by appointing them into the Civilian Advisory Committee, the latter recommended a swift handover of power to civilians. Eventually junior military officers overthrew the NRC and set up the Anti-Corruption Revolutionary Council, which handed over power to a civilian government headed by the APC.
116. The return to civilian rule was basically a victory for the Freetown-dominated civil society groups, most of which were in reality aligned to the APC. These groups proceeded weakly to oblige the APC by turning a blind eye to the party's increasingly autocratic practices.

⁷⁶ See the observations made in this regard in the Shaw Report on the 1955 Riots, at pages 12–13.

⁷⁷ See Tucker, P. (former Secretary to the Prime Minister, Sir Albert Margai), Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, November 2003, at pages 2-3.

⁷⁸ Among the cabinet members whose property was destroyed in the 1955 riots were M. S. Mustapha, Albert Margai and Siaka Stevens.

⁷⁹ The leaders of this Movement were to spend Independence Day, 27 April 1961 in jail, being held under emergency powers assumed by Prime Minister Milton Margai.

117. That civil society failed to challenge the APC's brutal electoral practices in the by-elections of 1969-70 and the obviously doubtful legality of its proclamation of a republic in 1971 was symptomatic of a narrow-minded ethnic and professional fear of the SLPP political alternative. Civil society leaders were largely opportunistic and they saw in co-optation by the APC a better route to keeping their privileged positions that had been threatened under the SLPP.⁸⁰
118. Even the Sierra Leone Bar Association, arguably the civil society group with the strongest potential voice, failed to stand up to the dictatorship of Siaka Stevens. Their meek submission to the One-Party Constitution in 1978 was a far cry from their vibrant protestations at the Albert Margai one-party initiative. In his submission to the Commission, a respected member of the Bar Association at that time lamented thus:
- "We the people of this country must accept some of the blame, because we did not challenge the government then, as has been done in Ghana and Nigeria. We the middle class, the professionals and intellectuals failed the people of this country, because when similar circumstances arose in Ghana and Nigeria, we would see the Ghanaian middle class or Nigerian middle class and intellectuals and professionals take to the streets! Unlike us, they went the course, they were prepared to go to prison, they were prepared to die!"⁸¹
119. Other groups within civil society lacked the financial or intellectual clout of the bar association and the academic staff association to mount a credible challenge to the APC. Other factors also contributed to their disinterest in engaging the APC in the early 1970s. First living standards had not yet deteriorated. Second the leaders of the unions shared ethnic ties with the leaders of the APC and were reluctant to act against the party.
120. However the foremost deterrent to opponents of the deteriorating governance situation lay in the violent methodologies deployed by the APC to crush dissent. Members of police units, the Special Security Division (SSD) and hired youths or thugs meted out brutality sanctioned by the state. In his submission to the commission, the Ombudsman stated:
- "The SSD was the instrument of tyranny in this country. It was used to cow opposition leaders; it was used to cow the press, the citizens, students and people who tried to protest; It was used for killing people, maiming and to some extent armed robbery. But everybody kept silent because of the fact that we were scared that they could seek their revenge."⁸²

⁸⁰ For more discussion of the opportunistic liaisons of members of Freetown civil society with the APC, see Squire, C. B., *Ill-fated Nation?*; Ro-Marong Limited, Freetown, 1995 (hereinafter "Squire, *Ill-fated Nation*"), at page 83.

⁸¹ See Francis Gabbidon, Ombudsman of Sierra Leone, Submission to TRC Thematic Hearings on Governance, Freetown, June 2003.

⁸² See Francis Gabbidon, Ombudsman of Sierra Leone, Submission to TRC Thematic Hearings on Governance, Freetown, June 2003.

121. The government's ability to co-opt civil society leaders was markedly enhanced by the One-Party Constitution 1978 which in Chapter IV, Section 43 empowered the President to appoint seven members to Parliament by instrument under his own hand. Consequently, the Presidents of the Sierra Leone Teachers' Union (SLTU) and the Sierra Leone Labour Congress were appointed as Members of Parliament. Also, key members of the Academic Staff Association were co-opted and given ambassadorial posts or made ministers.
122. Student bodies, in which leadership was necessarily transient, were left as the only organised civil society. Their youth worked in their favour, since the government did not consider it worth co-opting them and they were bold enough not to back off from confronting the regime. However, the brutal suppression of the nation-wide students' demonstrations of 1977 muted student protest for a considerable period of time.
123. In 1982, deteriorating living conditions led to a regime-threatening strike organised by the Sierra Leone Labour Congress. The strike action was violently crushed in a manner that confirmed the government's willingness to take extreme measures to preserve its position. Thus was extinguished the last major flourish of civil society in highlighting either the political or economic deterioration of the country during the Siaka Steven era.
124. Upon assuming office in 1985, President Momoh met a virtually lifeless civil society. Though a military man and an obviously incompetent administrator, the new president was not overtly violent, so civil society actors started to raise their voices. A group of parliamentarians formed the Backbenchers' Association and they were complimented by such newspapers as the 'New Shaft' and 'For di People' in their call for an opening up of political discourse.
125. There were, however, members of President Momoh's administration who were prepared to unleash violence on opponents of the regime. The leader of this violent clique was the Inspector General of Police, Bambay Kamara. The President lacked the authority to shackle such men; thus the APC in its last days swung between violence on the one hand and, on the other, the more subtle interventions of intellectuals like Dr. Abdulai O Conteh, the Attorney General and Minister of Justice. Conteh was to lead the APC's thrust to become a multi-party constitutional regime. A new constitution was promulgated, but the untamed men of violence were allegedly planning to brutally rig the multi-party elections when war broke out.
126. The role of faith institutions in the period leading to the war also demands examination. It is indeed regrettable that faith institutions seem to have found common cause with the governments of the day and therefore took no stand on the issues that were tearing the country apart between 1961 and 1991. Faith institutions were content to be feted and revered by the respective Governments. They did not use the access this reverence conferred on them to engage in dialogue with the rulers and try to have them change their oppressive politics.

127. In this sense, the church men and imams were no different from their colonial forebears who encouraged the people to read their Bibles and Korans while their land and other resources were appropriated by the colonial government. The religious institutions have engaged the Government only once in public, when in 1993 an officer of the NPRC regime, Colonel Gabriel Mani, assaulted a notable religious figurehead, Bishop Keillie of Bo Diocese. Up to 1991 therefore, faith institutions in Sierra Leone buried their heads in the sand and intoned that everything was fine in the country, admonishing the faithful through their sermons to be loyal to constituted authority.
128. It took until the final throes of the conflict for the attitude of faith institutions to change in any significant way. One factor that accounted for the improvement was the establishment of the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone (IRC/SL) in 1997. For the first time, an umbrella organisation that brought the leadership of all the faith institutions together was established. It became common for them to articulate unified positions on the burning issues of the day and to engage the unpopular junta government of the AFRC from a position of strength. Gradually the faith institutions were to play an important role in efforts at bringing peace, beginning with the Conakry Peace Plan and leading up to the Lomé Peace Agreement. Today, the churches and mosques are engaged in consolidating the peace through their work at community level, reintegrating and reconciling their followers whilst attempting to meet their developmental needs.

TRC



Members of the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) participate in the Commission's National Reconciliation Procession on 6 August 2003.

SECURITY INSTITUTIONS IN SIERRA LEONE

The Sierra Leone Army

129. The Sierra Leone Army at the time of independence was small and confined to the barracks. There were only four barracks, positioned at Daru in the Kailahun District, and at Wilberforce, Juba and Murray Town in Freetown.
130. When the British colonial authorities created the Sierra Leone Army, they used dual criteria for recruitment.⁸³ In the South and East, where more people had undergone western type education,⁸⁴ there was an insistence on educational qualifications. This requirement coupled with the fact that seven of the country's 12 districts were in the South and the East led to a preponderance of Southerners and Easterners in the officer corps of the Army in the immediate post-colonial period.⁸⁵
131. In the North, a different criterion was used. Fitness and height were emphasised and educational qualifications were played down. Many Korankos, albeit uneducated because of the lack of western type educational facilities in their region, met these conditions. They were recruited in large numbers into the lower ranks. Some members of the other major ethnic groups in the North - the Temnes and the Limbas - also established themselves in the Army in this manner.
132. The Army inherited by Sir Milton Margai was therefore ethnically unbalanced. There were few Northerners in the officer corps, yet they were over-represented in the lower ranks. Upward mobility was limited, as a formal education and passing of professional examinations were standard requirements for promotion to the officer corps.
133. Terms of recruitment for soldiers included free medical and surgical services for their immediate families,⁸⁶ a salary commensurate to the cost of living, an annual leave allowance, adequate travelling allowances, promotion through fair examinations, provision for overseas training and security of tenure for all serving officers. Arbitrary removal was deliberately rendered difficult by the Constitution.⁸⁷

⁸³ See Lieutenant Colonel Sowa, current Commanding Officer at the Armed Forces Personnel Centre, Sierra Leone Army; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 13 December 2003.

⁸⁴ See Fyfe, *A Short History of Sierra Leone*, at page 74.

⁸⁵ See Lieutenant Colonel Sowa, current Commanding Officer at the Armed Forces Personnel Centre, Sierra Leone Army; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 13 December 2003.

⁸⁶ See Lieutenant Colonel Sowa, current Commanding Officer at the Armed Forces Personnel Centre, Sierra Leone Army; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 13 December 2003.

⁸⁷ See the Independence Constitution of Sierra Leone 1961 at Chapter IV.

134. However, on the negative side, the space in the barracks was too small to house many soldiers' families. Unhygienic bucket toilets were prevalent in almost all the barracks in the city of Freetown – a condition that has not changed up to the time of writing in 2004. Inadequate accommodation in the barracks led to many low-ranking soldiers moving outside the barracks and becoming much more susceptible to party politics right up to the time of the conflict.
135. Sir Albert Margai inherited a neutral, non-politicised Army headed by British Officers. The Commission found no evidence that the conditions of service in the Army deteriorated during Sir Albert's regime. However, the regime's 'Africanisation' of the force resulted in a lot of meddling in the hierarchies and inter-relationships between soldiers. The rapid promotion of Brigadier David Lansana, a compatriot of Sir Albert's from the East who was closely affiliated to the Mende tribe, did not go down well with members of the officer corps from other ethnic groups. In his submission to the Commission, a member of the Army at the time, Major (Rtd.) Abu Noah stated:
- "The fruit of such political largesse was *given* [to Lansana], I say, because he had not merited [such a rank] outside of the unnecessary need for Africanisation. It appeared then as if the programme were designed to put the most senior Sierra Leonean Officer in a position of trust as political insurance for the politician who introduced the scheme. In 1964, for example, the speech of the Governor General lauded the elevation of Lieutenant Colonel Lansana to the substantive rank of a Colonel and in 1965 he was promoted to the rank of Brigadier. Those were the salad days of Sir Albert Margai's reign."⁸⁸
136. When in 1967 the Deputy Head of the Army, John Bangura, and six other Northerners and Krios were arrested for an alleged coup plot, it left mainly Mende officers in the senior cadre. Of the seventeen cadets recruited in 1967, thirteen were Mendes.⁸⁹
137. The promotions that Sir Albert Margai effected and the overall domination of the officer corps by members of his Mende ethnic group paved the way for the Army's political intervention in 1967. Disputes and depositions by members of the Army, rather than politicians, would eventually lead to the installation of the country's first military regime, known as the National Reformation Council (NRC).⁹⁰

⁸⁸ Major (Retired) Abu Noah, Submission to TRC Thematic Hearings on the Sierra Leone Army, 22 July 2003, at page 6.

⁸⁹ Dixon-Fyle, et al., *Sierra Leone at the End of the Twentieth Century*, at pages 26 – 52.

⁹⁰ For a comprehensive analysis of the period of political turmoil preceding the NRC, see the chapter entitled 'Historical Antecedents to the Conflict' at Volume 3A, Chapter 1 of this report, specifically in the section headed 'The 1967 Elections and their Aftermath'.

138. The NRC appointed the Head of the Police, William Leigh, as deputy chairman of their ruling council. This appointment represented the beginning of the politicisation of the Police Force, ironically instigated by the Army. Members of the NRC then promoted themselves to ranks that they did not merit. For example Colonel A. T. Juxon-Smith, the audacious Head of State, promoted himself to Brigadier. The actions of the NRC formed a blueprint for subsequent military regimes to distort ranks in the military by giving themselves unmerited promotions.⁹¹ The officer corps was still dominated by Mendes under the NRC, however.⁹²
139. Siaka Stevens ultimately came to power as a result of another military coup in 1968, which handed over power to Stevens on the basis that he was the rightful winner of the 1967 General Election. The Army was an unstable institution by the time Stevens took up office. Sir Albert Margai's policies had driven a wedge down the middle of the Army and the growing rift had become irreversible by the time Stevens took over.
140. Stevens accelerated political interference in the military, enacting a variety of policies that decimated its worth to the state, including the following:
- When Brigadier Bangura was Head of the Army, a system referred to as "Tribal Returns" was introduced. All ranks were accordingly re-examined in terms of their tribal composition. Ranks containing large numbers of Mendes, whether duly qualified or not, were reduced in number by the removal of members of this ethnic group. Thus many Southerners and Easterners were dismissed from the Army arbitrarily with an accompanying note stating simply "Service no longer required."⁹³
 - Conversely, all those soldiers who had been declared redundant by Juxon Smith for abandoning the Army to join APC loyalists for training in Guinea were re-enlisted under a policy called 'AWOL Recall'. These returning soldiers, most of them Northerners, were given the positions that had become vacant as a result of the "Tribal Returns Policy".
 - So-called 'Specific Special Recruitment' was carried out between 1968 and 1969 to target Northerners. The benchmark set for such recruitment was the ability to lift a bag of rice over one's head. Such a baseless method of enlistment sapped the sense of professionalism from service and promotion in the Army, a trend that was never corrected in the decades preceding the conflict.

⁹¹ In the wake of the NPRC coup of April 1992, for example, all the members of the administration apart from the Head of State, Captain Valentine Strasser, awarded themselves rapid promotions. When the NPRC handed over power in 1996, the adjustment of such ranks by the civilian government to reflect service and experience would have required a problematic overhaul of military protocol. A similar scenario unfolded when the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) seized power in May 1997. When the AFRC was deposed by force and its main officers retreated into the hinterland, the military was confronted with the peculiar phenomenon of quasi-official "Bush Brigadiers".

⁹² See Kandeh, J. D., "Politicisation of Ethnic Identities in Sierra Leone", in *African Studies Review*, 1992, at page 12.

⁹³ See Lieutenant Colonel Sowa, current Commanding Officer at the Armed Forces Personnel Centre, Sierra Leone Army; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 13 December 2003.

141. The APC regime deployed the Army against its political opponents. AMIPOL, a combined unit of the Army and the police force apparently set up to curb armed robberies, was used to put down supporters of the rival United Democratic Party (UDP). In addition, a new security agency – the Internal Security Unit (ISU) - accountable only to Siaka Stevens and the APC was created to serve as a check on the military whose loyalty the APC still doubted.⁹⁴ Finally, the APC deliberately starved the military of supplies. An under-equipped Army would be no match for the generous firepower of the ISU in case of any attempt by the soldiers to once again take over the running of the state.
142. Senior officers quickly began to share in the spoils of corruption under the APC. For instance, senior officers were given 25,000 bags of rice per month to distribute to soldiers, even though the total number of members of the institution was less than 4,000.⁹⁵ Finances allocated to the Army were not audited. The recruitment process also accommodated ‘favours’ to powerful members of the regime. Recruitment cards were given to party bosses to enlist whosoever they wanted into the Army.
143. In 1978, the Army lost all semblance of political neutrality when the Head of the Military, Colonel Joseph Saidu Momoh, was appointed to a simultaneous seat in Parliament and made Minister of State. Momoh’s extraordinary move was made possible by a tailor-made provision in the One-Party Constitution 1978.
144. The APC put forward the following justification as the basis for its policies on security institutions:

“Since the APC was returned to power after the SLPP-led military interregnum in 1968, the ever-present threat to remove the party from office by force of arms forced successive APC governments into a self-defence and state defence posture. In the process, internal security and stability assumed a very prominent place on the government agenda, thus slowing down the full impact of our development strategies.”⁹⁶

⁹⁴ See Brima Acha Kamara, Inspector-General of the Sierra Leone Police Service, Submission to TRC Thematic Hearings on the State Security Apparatus, May 2003, at page 3. See also Alie, J. A. D., *A New History of Sierra Leone*, Macmillan, London, 2002, at page 8. See also Lieutenant Colonel Sowa, current Commanding Officer at the Armed Forces Personnel Centre, Sierra Leone Army; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 13 December 2003.

⁹⁵ See Lieutenant Colonel Sowa, current Commanding Officer at the Armed Forces Personnel Centre, Sierra Leone Army; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 13 December 2003.

⁹⁶ See All People’s Congress (APC), Submission to TRC Thematic Hearings on Political Parties, April 2003, at page 3.

145. Under President J.S. Momoh, the same patrimonial system, the same Northern dominance, the same card system and the same corrupt rice policy were continued. The policy of stifling the resources available to the Army also continued. Thus the military, under-equipped,⁹⁷ under-trained and with a leadership engrossed in chasing ill-gotten gains, was most ill-prepared to meet the challenge of defending the country at the start of the war in 1991.⁹⁸

The Sierra Leone Police Force

146. There is no evidence that Sir Milton Margai tried to manipulate the Sierra Leone Police force (SLP) based on partisan interests. The Police was largely under the control of British Officers for the transitional period around the country's independence.
147. Similarly, there was no widespread use of the Police force to suppress popular opposition during Sir Albert Margai's tenure. The only recorded attempt to deploy the police in this manner arose during the 1967 elections when the Prime Minister was alleged to have instructed the police officers not to grant police protection for opposition party meetings in the Provinces except where such authorisation came directly from the District Officer. The District Officers invariably refused to grant such permission, so Sir Albert's instruction amounted to a prohibition. However, in cases where some officers initially provided protection at opposition meetings, there is no evidence that they were sacked, demoted or transferred by the Prime Minister.
148. The Police was first brought into politics when its head, Commissioner William Leigh, was appointed deputy leader of the NRC regime in 1967. Mr. Alpha Kamara, Assistant Commissioner of Police, also served as a member of the NRC's Military Council.
149. Substantial political interference in police affairs took place during Siaka Stevens' regime. Furthermore, the police became so incapacitated that it struggled to provide even the most basic of services to the general populace.
150. The APC regime recruited party activists to form the nucleus of a paramilitary wing of the police, the Internal Security Unit (ISU).⁹⁹ Members of the rank and file of the ISU were mostly illiterates, drawn primarily from the Limba ethnic group. Their loyalty to the APC and Siaka Stevens was unflinching. They were deployed at key government locations and were very ruthless in suppressing political opposition. They wielded considerable political influence and some of them enjoyed accelerated promotions. The ISU was disloyal to Police Headquarters as its officers considered themselves as political appointees.

⁹⁷ See Lieutenant Colonel Sowa, current Commanding Officer at the Armed Forces Personnel Centre, Sierra Leone Army; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 13 December 2003; including the following quote: "We had to go and beg the SSD for support weapons". The dearth of weaponry was corroborated by several other long-serving military officers, including: Brigadier (Retired) Kellie H. Conteh, current National Security Co-ordinator at the Office of National Security and former long-serving officer in the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF); testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown; June 2003.

⁹⁸ See Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, current President of the Republic of Sierra Leone; testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown; 5 August 2003.

⁹⁹ See Brima Acha Kamara, Inspector-General of the Sierra Leone Police Service, Submission to TRC Thematic Hearings on the State Security Apparatus, May 2003, at page 2.

The presence and the operational approach of the ISU greatly undermined the cohesiveness of the Sierra Leone Police.

151. Political interference adversely affected relationships between those officers with high political profiles and those with none. The latter group, probably out of frustration, made no meaningful effort at improving the force, while the former concentrated on improving their own lot. Between 1970 and 1985, this divided force became increasingly incompetent and corrupt. Without security of tenure, the police tried constantly to please their political patrons. Recruitment, promotion and dismissal of police officers were all decided on arbitrary and secret grounds. Thus the SLP was shaped into a force that acted as a ready tool in the perpetration of state terror against dissenters and political opponents.
152. Large-scale corruption by Police Officers due to poor remuneration and conditions of service led to the exploitation of the very people they were supposed to protect. Deviant behaviour by police officers in turn created disdain on the part of the public towards the SLP.
153. The heavy-handed means and tyrannical attitudes of most senior officers towards their juniors also served to heighten tensions in the force. Junior officers were routinely bullied and had their rice rations, salaries and other entitlements seized unlawfully. Some dependants of these junior officers would later graduate into the force and swell the ranks of rebellion.
154. This appalling situation was further compounded by the unprofessional behaviour of police officers in handling and investigating reports made by the public, which remained their core function. There was widespread extortion of complainants, taking of sides in disputes and daily violation of basic human rights, especially those of suspects. The violations included unlawful incarceration, brutal torture in order to extract 'confessions,' violent suppression of anti-government demonstrations and the lethargic failure of senior officers to investigate complaints made against the police. All these factors served to widen the already existing gulf between the public and the police.
155. In 1978, the Police Force was further politicised under the One-Party Constitution when its head was appointed by the President to be a Member of Parliament. This destroyed the institutional autonomy of the police, just as the Army had been robbed of its own. When he ceded to the Presidency in 1985, the Head of the Army J. S. Momoh made no tangible effort to restore the reputation of the Sierra Leone Police Force as an effective, non-partisan protector and promoter of people's lives, property and dignity.

SERVICE DELIVERY

156. Governance balances the right to rule with the responsibility to deliver services that enhance, rather than retard, people's basic material requirements. Service delivery is dependent on the available natural and human resources, the willingness of the governing regime to use these resources to enhance economic viability and a distribution mechanism that caters for vulnerable groups like youths, workers, women, children and rural dwellers. The distribution of services should never be decided on political grounds, or be used to deprive any sector of society of its essential supplies.
157. Sir Milton Margai inherited an economy that was fuelled by the export of diamonds, iron ore, bauxite and cash crops like cocoa and coffee. The first post-independence government established the Sierra Leone Produce Marketing Board (SLPMB) to enhance the cultivation and marketing of ginger, cassava, palm oil, palm kernels, cocoa and coffee. A stabilisation fund was established by the SLPMB to compensate farmers against fluctuations in world prices for these commodities.¹⁰⁰ Agricultural co-operatives were created all over the country to help farmers maximise their profits. The regime also established the Rice Corporation to ensure that the nation's staple food was affordable. The SLPP failed however to promulgate laws to make the investment climate in the agricultural sector more attractive.
158. The administration founded the Njala University College near Bo for the training of agriculturists and teachers, along with Milton Margai Training College in Freetown to produce teachers for the Junior Secondary School level. There was free medical care for all students and there was pipe borne water and electricity for all District Headquarter Towns. The School of Nursing in Freetown was established during Sir Milton Margai's rule.
159. The Government was able to negotiate with Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST) to reduce the latter's lease of the country's lucrative diamond fields from 99 years to 36 years. However, there was no arrangement to compensate the people of Kono District and Tongo for their diamondiferous lands. Instead the Paramount Chiefs of these localities were paid surface rents which they utilised for personal enrichment rather than community development.
160. Sir Albert Margai's regime established the central Bank and set up the first buying and exporting offices for diamond and gold in Kenema, Bo and Freetown. However, the SLPMB was handled in a very patrimonial and corrupt manner,¹⁰¹ squandering the state funds required for service provision. It was also a case of members of the urban elite exploiting rural people to finance extroverted consumption patterns – the Prime Minister used monies obtained from the SLPMB to acquire properties abroad.¹⁰²

¹⁰⁰ See Mr. Kallon, Deputy Director-General of Agriculture and Forestry, Submission to TRC Thematic Hearings on Governance, May 2003, at page 3.

¹⁰¹ See the Bekou-Betts Commission of Inquiry Report on the SLPMB.

¹⁰² Sir Albert Margai was also alleged to have allowed his friends on the board of the SLPMB to appropriate the stabilisation funds. See the reports in *We Yone* newspaper, 14 November 1964 and 12 January 1965.

161. The APC under Siaka Stevens took two decisions in the early 1970s that proved disastrous for service provision in the country: the closure of the railway in 1970 and the dissolution of elected local government in 1972. These actions cut off efficient service delivery to people in the Provinces.
162. The economy of Sierra Leone depended heavily on the mining sector, especially diamonds. A sharp decline in official export rates of diamonds considerably reduced government revenue during the Stevens years. In 1970, two million carats of diamonds was the figure officially exported. By 1980, the export total had dwindled to 595,000 carats. Three years before the conflict, it had dropped to only 48,000 carats.¹⁰³
163. The country's woes were compounded by low producer prices for coffee and cocoa and an unrealistic foreign exchange rate. But it was corruption that totally ruined the economy. Corrupt acts¹⁰⁴ during the APC regime included the disappearance of a 968 carat Diamond (the feted 'Star of Sierra Leone') in 1972 and the 'Vouchergate' scandal in late 1970s.¹⁰⁵ \$100 million was budgeted for the hosting of the OAU in 1980, yet in the event more than \$200 million was spent on it.¹⁰⁶ The Governor of the Bank of Sierra Leone, Mr. Sam Bangura, had opposed the expenditure perhaps too openly and was allegedly murdered.¹⁰⁷
164. The APC oversaw a number a infrastructural construction projects including the following: the Youyi Building; the Police Headquarters; and the National Stadium; the Juba Bridge; Hill Cut Road; the Mange and Kambia Bridges; the Masiaka–Bo Road; the Makeni–Kono Road; the Makeni–Lunsar Road; the Makeni–Kabala Road; the Bo–Kenema Highway; the Bo–Bandajuma Highway; and the Dodo Hydro Electric Power Project. Percentage distribution of these infrastructural achievements shows that 56% were in the Western Area, 30% in the North and 24% in the South and East. Barely a single infrastructural project was carried out in a financially sound fashion.

¹⁰³ See Smilie, I. et al., *The Heart of the Matter: Sierra Leone Diamonds and Human Security*, Partnership Africa Canada, Ottawa, 2000.

¹⁰⁴ See Mrs. Olayinka Creighton-Randall, Campaign for Good Governance, Submission to TRC Thematic Hearings, 5 May 2003. See also Opala, *The Politics of State Collapse*. See also Colonel Komba S. M. Mondeh, Submission to TRC Thematic Hearings on Governance, June 2003.

¹⁰⁵ 'Vouchergate' was the phrase coined to capture the scandal when civil servants stole millions of Leones from Government Revenue by cashing in counterfeit workers' vouchers. The culprits of this devious scheme were initially dismissed but later reinstated. The Minister whose discovery exposed the scam, Mr. Alfred Akibo-Betts, was subsequently sacked.

¹⁰⁶ See Francis Gabbidon, Ombudsman of Sierra Leone, Submission to TRC Thematic Hearings on Governance, Freetown, June 2003. See also Alie, J. A. D., *Sierra Leone Since Independence: A Brief Political History*, internal document prepared for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 2002, at page 8. See also Opala, *The Politics of State Collapse*.

¹⁰⁷ For a discussion of the local dynamics associated with the death of Mr. Sam Bangura, see the chapter entitled 'Historical Antecedents to the Conflict' at Volume 3A, Chapter 1 of this report, specifically in the section headed 'Local Historical Antecedents'.

165. Over-centralisation of Government service delivery negatively affected health services in the regions. Of the total number of between 250 and 300 medical doctors on the eve of the conflict, only 150 served the Provinces, where the vast majority of the population lived. Thus although the country's aggregate infant mortality rate was amongst the highest in the world, the situation was far worse in the Provinces than in the Western Area.¹⁰⁸ Sierra Leoneans had a life expectancy of less than 40 years on the eve of the conflict.
166. The pipe borne water supply was also concentrated entirely in Freetown at the expense of the Provinces. Whereas throughout the colonial period up to the first half of the 1970s all District Headquarter towns and some Chiefdom towns had pipe borne water, none except Bo and Kenema had retained such facilities up to the eve of the conflict.
167. By 1991, the road network was also in ruins. The total length of roads in good condition was not more than 160 kilometres for the entire country. The depleted road network hampered troop movements for the Government's conventional fighting forces during the conflict.
168. Education clearly did not rank as a priority for successive regimes prior to the war. A report by the present Government attributes a budgetary allocation of only 5% to education.¹⁰⁹ The APC regime's neglect for the education sector was exemplified in Krio sayings attributed to President Stevens, such as: '*Nar sense mek book, nor to book mek sense.*'¹¹⁰ There were several "go-slow" strike actions, during which teachers went to school but refused to teach. As state provision deteriorated in the education sector, private schools grew, but they were unaffordable to most Sierra Leoneans. Dropout rates escalated to alarming rates, while many children never went to school at all. School dropouts and others who never had an education were to provide easy recruits for the various armed factions during the war.
169. The Stevens regime created eight Integrated Agricultural development Projects (IDAs) in the country.¹¹¹ Two factors however hampered their success:¹¹² they were donor-created; and they had top to bottom conceptualisation, planning and implementation policies. All the IDA projects collapsed immediately after donor support was withdrawn.¹¹³ Thus government increasingly imported rice

¹⁰⁸ The results of a 1977 survey carried out by Kandeh, B. and others revealed that under-fives mortality was 333.5 out of a thousand births in the Southern Province, 320.6 in the Eastern Province, 314.0 in the Northern Province and only 199.7 for the Western Area. Most of the premature deaths were due to Tetanus and fever-related diseases. The source for these statistics is the 'Analytical Report 1985 Population and Household Census' CSO, Freetown.

¹⁰⁹ See *Sierra Leone Government Report on the Compliance with the Convention on the Right of the Child*, Geneva, 10 January 2000.

¹¹⁰ For commentary on Stevens' popular sayings and their explicit or implicit meanings, see Opala, *The Politics of State Collapse*.

¹¹¹ The IDAs included: Eastern Area Project located in Kenema; Northern Project located in Koinadugu; Magbosi Project; North Western Project located in Kambia; Southern Project located in Njala; IDA Port Loko Project located in Port Loko (created under President Momoh); IDA Moyamba Project located in Moyamba; and Bo-Pujehun Development Project.

¹¹² For detailed analysis of these projects, see Abraham, *Development Issues in Sierra Leone*.

¹¹³ Other factors that contributed to the collapse of the IDAs included the inappropriate technologies used and the fact that the government paid extremely low prices for husk rice. The government's failure to offer viable rates discouraged the farming communities from staying involved in the projects.

between 1980 and the eve of the conflict,¹¹⁴ draining scarce government resources. Due to dependence on imported rice, the commodity became a political weapon in the hands of the few politicians who had access to it. The Army was placated through the constant supply of rice quotas that were far below the market price. Politicians campaigned with rice and withdrew rice from Chiefdoms and communities that did not support them.¹¹⁵

170. There was no improvement in the agricultural situation when President Momoh took over the reins of government. His much-vaunted 'Green Revolution' was more rhetoric than reality. Dependence on external sources of rice actually increased. With the general economic decline, high inflation and collapse of agriculture in the Provinces, the average Sierra Leonean family could hardly manage to eat one meal a day. While the rural and urban poor were getting hungrier, the political elite who controlled the import and distribution of rice became steadily richer.
171. President Momoh inherited an empty Treasury and huge foreign debts. Economic mismanagement continued unabated. Attempts to control prices in the first few months of the regime led to an acute shortage of goods. The government could not find the money to finance a restock. Prices subsequently rocketed when government rescinded the price control measures. In an attempt to arrest the dwindling economic fortunes of the state, the government declared a disastrous state of economic emergency in 1987. Far from remedying existing woes, the emergency obscured the regulatory climate and provided yet more opportunities for extortion of money and seizure of property by corrupt state officials.

PRESENT CHALLENGES

172. Proper governance is still an imperative, unfulfilled objective in Sierra Leone. Corruption remains rampant and no culture of tolerance or inclusion in political discourse has yet emerged.
173. Many ex-combatants testified that the conditions that caused them to join the conflict persist in the country and, if given the opportunity, they would fight again.
174. Yet, distressingly, the Commission did not detect any sense of urgency among public officials to respond to the myriad challenges facing the country. Indeed, the perception within civil society and the international community is that all efforts at designing and implementing meaningful intervention programmes, such as the National Recovery Strategy, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) or 'Vision 2025', are driven by donors rather than the national government. This is lamentable.

¹¹⁴ See table 1.1. in Abraham, *Development Issues in Sierra Leone* at page 23.

¹¹⁵ President Momoh's Vice-President, Francis Minah of Pujehun, was given the nickname "devuyama", which means "life giver" in the Mende language. The moniker reflected the fact that he was the only one who sold rice per bag in the whole of Pujehun District in 1982. During electioneering, Minah's campaign slogan was 'Mbei, mbei, mbei' meaning rice, rice, rice. See Paul Sengeh, UNICEF employee and former teacher in a school in Minah's constituency in Pujehun, TRC Interview at private residence, October 2003.

175. The country has enjoyed peace for four years now. It is a credit to the government and the international community that Sierra Leoneans are beginning to sleep soundly again. Nevertheless a culture of silence, or murmured discontent, typical of the years of APC dictatorship still persists. The boundless energies of the people cannot be released for economic and social transformation if they perceive that they and their interests might be harmed if they hold 'politically incorrect' views or if they dare to be different. The Government needs to be active in promoting a culture of tolerance and good governance to convince Sierra Leoneans that the nation's future consists of more than its past has offered.

CONCLUSION

176. The Commission concludes that all the post-colonial regimes contributed shamefully in creating the structural and proximate contexts that led to the conflict in 1991. While the administration of Sir Milton Margai was perhaps less more tolerable of dissent than his successors, Sir Milton also engaged in dictatorial and vengeful practices that undermined the unity and cohesion of his party and laid the foundation for polarisation in the body politic. Terrible practices of governance began in Sierra Leone's honeymoon period and were encouraged by Sir Albert Margai, consolidated and then taken to new heights by Siaka Stevens.
177. The duality of the country's administrative and judicial structures made them vulnerable to manipulation, which the regimes of Sir Milton Margai, Sir Albert Margai and Dr. Siaka Stevens duly utilised to their respective advantages. In the Provincial areas, for example, local courts and Chieftaincy structures were used to clamp down on opposition activities and to entrench the authority of whichever traditional ruling houses were allied to the party in power. Meanwhile the continual assault on the rule of law weakened the capacities of state institutions to perform.
178. The judiciary was subordinated to the executive, parliament did little more than 'rubber-stamp', the civil service became a redundant state machine and the Army and police force became vectors of violence against the very people they were established to protect. Non-state bodies that ought to ensure accountability – like media houses or civil society groups – were thoroughly co-opted. Opposition political parties were suppressed and eventually banned by President Stevens' One Party Constitution of 1978.
179. Since it appeared impossible to halt the decline of state institutions and processes through democratic means, a number of Sierra Leoneans became convinced that the structures of governance could only be changed through violence. The initial planning for a revolutionary enterprise coincided with the inauguration of a new APC government under President Joseph Saidu Momoh.

180. Momoh attempted to decelerate the economic and political decline through the promulgation of an economic state of emergency and a multi-party constitution. These measures were, however, managed in a dictatorial and abusive fashion, which rendered them 'too little, too late' to salvage the situation. Against this backdrop, Sierra Leoneans became increasingly disgruntled and aggrieved with the malaise in governance and their inability to do anything to alleviate it. Many citizens, particularly the poor, marginalised youths of the provinces, became open to radical means of effecting change: they would readily answer the call to arms when so-called 'revolution' began to enter the country in 1991.
181. Today the state is an abstract concept to most Sierra Leoneans and central government has made itself largely irrelevant to their daily lives. In order to correct this deficit in engagement, an overhaul in the culture of governance is required. The executive in the post-conflict period needs to prove that is different from its predecessors in the post-independence period. It needs to demonstrate ownership, leadership, imagination and determination in developing and implementing programmes for change. Strong and independent monitoring institutions must hold the government accountable in this exercise. Only then will Sierra Leoneans believe that the necessary lessons have been learnt from the decades of rotten governance that culminated in the tragedy of conflict.

CHAPTER THREE

The Military and Political
History of the Conflict

TRC

Truth
hurts but
war
hurts more

Produced by the TRC Steering Committee with support
from the International Human Rights Law Group

CHAPTER THREE

The Military and Political History of the Conflict

Introduction

1. This chapter of the report is intended primarily to fulfil the obligation on the Commission to produce an 'impartial historical record' of the violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law related to the conflict in Sierra Leone. It takes the form of a narrative that spans across more than two decades of political and military activities in the country, but places its main focus on the years from 1991 until 2002, when the country was embroiled in armed civil conflict and war-related violations and abuses were visited upon the population.
2. This military and political history is couched in the terms of the Commission's mandate, attempting to present accurately the social and historical "context in which the violations and abuses occurred" and to address "the question of whether those violations and abuses were the result of deliberate planning, policy or authorisation by any government, group or individual".
3. In the first place, the Commission has sought to lend an appropriate context to the outbreak of hostilities in Sierra Leone by analysing its most proximate antecedents in this chapter. These factors are included under the rubric of 'The Predecessors, Origins and Mobilisation of the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF)'. Thereafter, in understanding and analysing the military and political history, the Commission has deemed it necessary to devise a periodisation of the conflict that adequately reflects its main phases and captures its main events.
4. To the extent that the greatest preponderance of key events in the military and political history of the conflict, not to mention the overwhelmingly majority of violations and abuses stemming from them, were driven by the combatants of the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (the "RUF"), it has been considered appropriate that the periodisation should reflect the evolving character of that faction, as well as the manner in which the conflict evolved as a result.
5. The chapter begins with an analysis of the broader context in which the RUF originated, which is closely tied to the means by which conflict came to Sierra Leone. By the same token, the chapter ends by focussing on the events that led to the demise of the RUF, which are ultimately inseparable from the circumstances that brought the war to its conclusion. Based upon this logic, the framework overleaf has been adopted to divide the chapter into 'phases':

**Pre-Conflict Phase The
Predecessors, Origins and Mobilisation
of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)**

- the period that gave rise to the immediate causes of the outbreak of the conflict

Phase I Conventional 'Target' Warfare

- the period from the outbreak of the conflict until 13 November 1993

Phase II 'Guerrilla' Warfare


- the period from 13 November 1993 until 2 March 1997

Phase III Power Struggles and Peace Efforts

- the period from 2 March 1997 until the present day

6. During the first three years of armed conflict in Sierra Leone, the defining events in military history were predominantly driven by the agenda of the RUF, or by the respective plans and actions of its predecessors and / or accomplices. On the political front, whilst ostensibly unrelated to the RUF itself, the elevation into Government of a group of junior officers of the Sierra Leone Army, calling themselves the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), can be traced in origin and motivation to the perception on the part of the coup-makers that the Government had failed to prosecute the war efficiently. In other words, it stemmed from a perception that the Government had failed properly to defend the state against RUF incursions into its territories.
7. Thus, the period from 23 March 1991 until 13 November 1993 can aptly be called Phase I of the RUF's conflict. As the ensuing analysis will demonstrate, while it was focused primarily on the assignment and assault of 'targets', it is as close as Sierra Leone's armed struggle would ever come to 'conventional warfare.'
8. The selected cut-off point for Phase I is 13 November 1993. It was on this date that the RUF lost the border town of Baidu in Kailahun District to the advancing 'Allied Forces' of the NPRC Government and appeared to be on the verge of total defeat. However, on or around the same day, Foday Sankoh announced the reversion to 'jungle warfare' as a survival tactic and a strategy of attack, thereby signalling the start of a new phase - Phase II of the conflict.
9. The transition between Phases I and II encapsulated both setback and forward momentum for the RUF. It also heralded a far less predictable series of events that would expand the coverage and impact of the conflict as a whole into every provincial District of the country, onto the radar of the world's media and to the top of the agenda for the sub-region's peace negotiators.

TRC



Vice President Solomon Berewa addresses the audience at the opening of TRC public hearings in Freetown on 14 April 2003.

10. The challenge faced by the Commission in its periodisation was to identify a date that would be similarly pertinent to the transition between Phases II and III. In this regard, the watershed date of 25 May 1997 was not proven to be entirely satisfactory, since the events of that day were neither driven by the RUF nor directed towards the RUF. That day witnessed a protest action in the military, instigated by junior soldiers against their senior officers and culminating in an overthrow of the elected Government of President Kabbah. These events are of immense significance in the conflict as a whole, but they are unsuitable to form a cut-off point in the present frame of analysis. It is trite that in using a frame of analysis focused on the RUF, it is essential that any cut-off point should encompass either an event driven by the RUF or an action directed at the RUF.
11. Thus the separation between Phases II and III instead falls on the date of 2 March 1997. It was on this date that Foday Sankoh was taken into the custody of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, from which his subsequent firearms charges effectively put an end to any hopes of sustainability in the negotiated peace that had emerged from the Abidjan Talks of 1996.
12. By 2 March 1997, effective guerrilla warfare had been ended by the overthrow of all but a few of the RUF's original jungle bases, including its Headquarter Camp 'Zogoda'. Sankoh's second-in-command and perceived natural deputy, Mohamed Tarawallie, was missing, presumed dead in the siege of Zogoda. Accordingly, like the cut-off point for Phase I, the date constituted a seemingly fatal blow to the RUF. The morale-sapping effect of Sankoh's arrest was inestimable and left many of the 'men on the ground' questioning whether the struggle had in fact been decisively lost.
13. Moreover, the date heralded a period of bitter contention among the aspirant alternative 'leaders' of the RUF. These included a challenge for recognition from a group spearheaded by Captain Philip S. Palmer and the consequent re-assertion of control by Sam "Mosquito" Bockarie. The ignominious conclusion to Palmer's challenge can be seen to typify the subsequent wider 'struggles for power' in Sierra Leone: it was ill-conceived, implemented in a haphazard fashion and ultimately foiled by the actions of an opponent who pretended or purported to play fair and acquiesce, but in reality used deceit and brute force to come out on top.
14. Similar dynamics can be observed in many of the events that followed in Phase III: the AFRC seizure of power; the planning for self-restoration by the Government-in-Exile and the ECOMOG intervention; the 1998 Detentions, Trials and Executions; the internal divisions between the AFRC and RUF, as well as between Johnny Paul Koroma and 'Mosquito'; the violent backlash of 1998 and early 1999 that culminated in the January 1999 assault on Freetown; the Lomé Peace Accord and its problematic implementation; the UN Hostage-taking crisis; and the events of May 2000. Indeed, most of the material gathered by the Commission can be fitted comfortably into such a frame of analysis.

15. The title 'Power Struggles and Peace Efforts' for Phase III is intended to reflect the fact that 'warfare' in the sense of the first two phases did not really exist in the latter stages of the war. Confrontation was just as likely to take place away from the battlefield as on it. It was not always the same type of power that people were struggling for. In fact, sometimes negotiated settlements were floated as alternatives to power struggles; yet it might ultimately be concluded that these peace efforts were themselves little more than thinly-veiled power struggles.

PRE-CONFLICT PHASE

THE PREDECESSORS, ORIGINS AND MOBILISATION OF THE REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT (RUF)

The Rise of Revolutionary Thinking and Sierra Leonean Participation in Training Programmes in Libya

16. The system of government adopted by President Siaka Stevens during his tenure at the helm of the All People's Congress (1969 – 1985) was one that marginalised and suppressed any semblance of opposition.¹ The creation of a one-party state monopolised decision-making influence and created a precedent for 'token' party membership that subsists to the present day. More than simply overcoming voices of dissent within the political sphere, however, Stevens contrived further to squeeze out the other institutions that would normally (either individually or collectively) impose checks and balances on the exercise of executive power
17. In particular by suppressing freedom of expression in the local media and in the schools and colleges, respectively, the Government did nothing to encourage constructive independent thought and open debate as to the best way forward for the country. There was only minimal democratic space in which ideas that went against the political programme of the APC Government could be shared openly. Accordingly, most of those who wished to propound or be exposed to such ideas were forced to do so in the political shadows.
18. As a direct result of their suppression, journalists, students and school leavers sought an alternative outlet in the company of like-minded individuals from Sierra Leone or, occasionally, abroad. They engaged one another socially and ideologically in the informal, unthreatening settings where they gathered in the evenings – outdoor yards set back off the street, upstairs rooms in inconspicuous apartments, newspaper offices and other selected safe havens. In the tendencies of such persons lay the roots of the first organisations that seriously contemplated a challenge to the state by means of 'revolution'.

¹ This brand of governance is assessed comprehensively in the 'Governance' chapter of the report. The much reduced commentary rendered here is thus intended only to trace the genesis of the revolutionary groups that were the effective predecessors to the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF).

19. In the realms of the media, *The Tablet* newspaper² acted as one of the few genuinely independent advocates for political change and for human rights. It provided a platform for the Labour Unions and student bodies to state their opinions freely and without prejudice, often exposing elements of the management of the state that made uncomfortable reading for the ruling party. After being subjected to continual harassment by Government supporters, the editor and journalists of *The Tablet* were ultimately deterred only by an attempted bombing of their offices and the unbearable threats to their lives. The newspaper petered out without a truly worthy replacement and the opinion-makers were driven underground or into exile.
20. To a large extent, the struggle for a civil opposition to the APC was thereafter left in the hands of students. The University of Sierra Leone, divided into two constituent campuses, was the obvious breeding ground for revolutionary thinkers. As early as 1977, Fourah Bay College on Freetown's Mount Aureol had been a focal point for proactive demonstration of student dissent, invoking a clampdown from the state security forces. In spite of this event, FBC became associated with the development of 'organic intellectuals'³ who formed clubs and 'social niches' in which to share ideas. Groups like The Gardeners' Club convened seminars and public events at which radical speakers would address crowds of young, impressionable minds.
21. The ideology of 'Pan Africanism', which attempted to promote a tailored approach to development and governance paradigms on the African continent, found a fertile soil among these radical groups, who in turn tried to inculcate that brand of thinking into the broader society. The visionaries of the Pan African Union (PANAFU) believed that youth, even in their schools and urban hang-outs, could be mobilised in their masses if only the informational material was sufficiently inspiring. The perceived educational standard or the background of the youth in question does not seem to have been of the utmost importance; any suggestion that the propagation of revolutionary ideals was limited to students is inaccurate. An ability to think laterally, a shared anti-APC sentiment, a commitment to the advancement of oneself and one's fellow man, and an individual 'focus' on the way forward have been proffered by some PANAFU members as the essential attributes a candidate had to possess. Beyond those characteristics, admission to a discussion group was on a fairly indiscriminate basis; a school leaver might sit with a journalist and a civil servant, while a student would lecture them on dialectics.
22. Out of the loose collection of students, therefore, blossomed a broader group of people from various walks of life who would gather together to smoke marijuana, discuss issues like resource distribution and the ills of materialism⁴ and convince themselves that they were revolutionaries. In Freetown and other selected locations, the category was further sub-divided into so-called 'cells',

² *Tablet* is widely considered to have been the only free-speaking press on political issues during the repressive days of the APC; its motto - "the use of words is a choice of arms" - was a pertinent slogan for the effective voice-piece of the revolutionaries of the day.

³ The text is drawing here on the terminology used by both Ishmail Rashid and Ibrahim Abdullah in their respective articles in *Africa Development*, Vol. XXII, Nos. 3 & 4, 1997.

⁴ The discussions held among PANAFU groups were firmly geared towards intellectual stimulation; some of those who participated in such plenary sessions have been eager to point out that the materials used would span across a broad spectrum of revolutionary writings such as those by Fanon, Marx, Engels, Mao Tse Tung (supplied by the Chinese and printed at We Yone Press, which was - ironically - considered to be the official printing press of the APC). A widely read author was one Professor Cox.

the purpose of which was to engender comfortable and secure environments (away from the scrutiny of the Government) in which no more than six people at a time would 'cross-fertilise'.

23. In this climate, the first connections on an institutional level between 'revolutionaries' in Sierra Leone and representatives of the Government of Libya were established. The earliest channels to be carved out were for FBC students, including two successive student Presidents, to attend conferences in Tripoli at which Pan-African ideals and the socialist philosophies of the Green Book were discussed. Upon the expulsion of 41 students – including the incumbent student President Alie Kabba – and three of their lecturers from Fourah Bay College in March 1985,⁵ however, the stakes were raised to the point where the youthful revolutionaries felt that they had nothing left to lose.
24. It appears that upon one visit to Tripoli in the wake of these expulsions, a delegation led by Alie Kabba petitioned successfully for what had previously been regarded as a last resort⁶ – provisions for commando training to be made for Sierra Leonean revolutionaries. The acceptance of such a proposal by Libya is probably best understood in the first instance as an indication of that state's broader and longer-term, albeit complementary, objective of establishing an African-wide 'Green Army' to take on the perceived global hegemony of the United States and in support of revolutionary movements globally. There is no concrete evidence in the Commission's findings that Libyan President Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi harboured any inherent will to thrust war upon Sierra Leone in particular, although the regime of Joseph Saidu Momoh was perceived as pro-Western and its overthrow would certainly have been welcomed by Libya as a desirable corollary benefit.⁷
25. The first group of Sierra Leoneans to take up the offer of commando training, numbering four in total, were effectively those who expressed the highest degree of readiness or eagerness. Thus, among them was a man named Victor Idowu Ebiyemi Reider,⁸ from Freetown, and another named Rashid Mansaray, a teenage revolutionary with a much-respected commitment to the cause and intellectual energy. Their group, which travelled to Libya in August 1987 and underwent training at the Benghazi base, was intended to become the core of a larger-scale programme, whereby those who had been trained would return to Sierra Leone and recruit others to follow in their footsteps.

⁵ The reasons for these expulsions, as well as nearly 60 further rustications that accompanied them, will be expanded upon in the further draft of this section that is being prepared jointly with the Governance team.

⁶ Indeed, it has been suggested by one of the members of that delegation, expelled lecturer Olu 'Richie' Gordon, that the option of requesting training provision had not even been endorsed by all those present. Gordon contends that his intention was to secure funding for further peaceful revolutionary activity, including the opening of a printing press in Freetown; he states that Alie Kabba went 'behind his back' by discussing the prospect of revolutionary commando training for Sierra Leoneans.

⁷ The averred role of Libyan state and non-state actors in providing a platform for the foundation of the RUF and in supporting the insurgent forces in Sierra Leone is assessed further in the chapter on 'External Actors'.

⁸ Victor Reider is regarded as a duplicitous figure by his one-time colleagues and comrades in the PANAFU movement. He participated in an interview with the Commission on 21 October 2003 at which many of the key points of contention about his role in the precedents of the RUF were put to him; he produced a subtly different version of events, which the Commission believes should also be reflected in further writing about the pre-conflict period.

26. While both Reider and Mansaray did come back to the country after their training and participated in the motivation of further PANAFU cells, their respective influences on the origins and resultant character of the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF) were not entirely congruous. Mansaray would become the RUF's First Battalion Commander and continue to inspire those around him with the sincerity and passion of his revolutionary beliefs until he himself fell victim to the dangers of a rebel war. Reider had only one further claim, albeit with hindsight a significant one, to have shaped the course of the RUF conflict: he was responsible for the effective 'recruitment' of Foday Saybana Sankoh,⁹ who subsequently elevated himself to the leadership of what became known as the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, or RUF.
27. Three other persons in a cell under Reider's auspices travelled out of Freetown along with Sankoh in April 1988; the distinguishing factor in their case was that Reider did not tell them in advance about the nature of what awaited them at the end of their journey. Each of Sankoh's travelling companions thought he was heading to undergo 'Advanced Capacity Building in Revolutionary Ideology' and told, variously, that he would be taken to an institution such as the University of Nigeria or the Al-Fattah University in Tripoli to be further lectured and inspired.¹⁰ This invitation came aptly to represent the kind of deceit and mismanagement of human resources that ultimately invoked a vacuum in revolutionary leadership¹¹ and a reversion towards militarism. The narrative of those who accepted their invitations in good faith, but instead underwent guerrilla training in Libya, resonates far more widely when examined under the lens of the subsequent military and political history of the conflict in Sierra Leone.
28. While in Libya, the budding revolutionaries were said to have fallen out among themselves. Among the issues were opposition by those in the Alie Kabba group to the idea of launching a revolutionary war without a composite political education. Alie Kabba was also accused of corruption in his management of funds belonging to the group and challenged for his refusal to personally undergo training. This was to cause the first split in the movement as Alie Kabba and those loyal to him left the training camps and returned to Sierra Leone. He subsequently emigrated to the United States where he presently lives. Meanwhile PANAFU in Freetown had also disassociated itself from the revolutionary programme, believing that a sustained period of political education was necessary before embarking on an armed struggle. In consequence, those of its members who had participated in the first training simply dispersed. PANAFU would not engage in the subsequent recruitment of people to undergo training in Libya. It is believed that all subsequent arrangements for training were by Foday Sankoh. These later trainees were not PANAFU members but may have been recruited by Sankoh through his contacts in PANAFU.

⁹ Confidential TRC Interview with a member of the same PANAFU cell co-ordinated by Victor Reider, conducted in Freetown, Western Area, September 2003. Corroborated by the TRC Interview with Olu Gordon, conducted in Freetown, 23 April 2003.

¹⁰ Confidential TRC Interviews with Sierra Leoneans who underwent training in Libya in 1988, conducted in Freetown, Western Area between 8th and 12th September 2003.

¹¹ At the time of Sankoh's travel to Libya, the organisation of which Alie Kabba was the indisputable leader was called the Popular Democratic Front, or PDF. Upon Kabba's departure to Canada at the beginning of 1989, the PDF structure disintegrated altogether and the only group of Sierra Leoneans left in Libya was a faction led by Sankoh, which would form the core of the RUF.

29. In Libya, a leadership vacuum developed among the remaining revolutionaries. Foday Sankoh became the spokesman of the group because of his age and prior military experience. Others therefore deferred to him. The training camps in Libya contained revolutionaries from all over the world. Interaction with foreign revolutionaries, particularly Charles Taylor, exposed Sankoh to revolutionary thinking and potential sources of support.
30. Although Sankoh's grasp of revolutionary ideology was broadly lambasted as weak by other members of PANAFU who travelled to Libya with him or met him on the training camp there, he clearly stood out to all of them as a strategist and manipulator. While the accounts of his self-elevation to the Leadership of a Sierra Leonean 'Front' organisation in Libya are not entirely consistent, Sankoh's time observing and discussing among peers in PANAFU and, especially, among the cosmopolitan collection of revolutionary thinkers in Libya was mostly time spent with people who displayed greater intensity and comprehension than he could muster himself. Nevertheless, with his prowess as an orator and an astuteness that stood him in good stead in most interpersonal contexts, Sankoh was able to elicit meaning from the ideology of others and propagate it elsewhere as his own. Allied to a good degree of perceptiveness and human instinct, Sankoh's innate charisma appears to have been a potent tool for convincing others of the merits of his agenda, despite his somewhat idealistic tone and his tendency for grave exaggeration.
31. All of these characteristics strengthened Foday Sankoh's subsequent claims to leadership of the RUF. Among the persons with whom Sankoh associated at the Libyan training camps were a number of Liberians, whose avowed intention was to overthrow the regime of Samuel Doe. An agreement of mutual support developed between the Sierra Leoneans and the Liberians to assist each other in executing their respective revolutions. The Liberians encompassed potentially several different sub-groups intent on overthrowing Samuel Doe. One of these sub-groups was to launch a rebellion in Liberia much earlier than anticipated by others. It therefore set the stage for subsequent developments in Liberia and parts of the sub-region including Sierra Leone. This sub-group was the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL).

Sub-Regional Dynamics, the Conflict in Liberia and the Formation of an Agenda for an Incursion into Sierra Leone

32. The Commission heard from several sources that the earliest immediate antecedent to armed conflict involving Liberia on the territory of Sierra Leone should be identified as the abortive 'rebel incursion' into Liberia from the Ivory Coast in 1985 led by the late Liberian General Thomas Quiwonkpa. It was widely alleged by Liberian nationals that the Sierra Leone Government had supported Quiwonkpa in his uprising against the then President of the Republic of Liberia, Samuel K. Doe.
33. The faction that Quiwonkpa spearheaded in 1985 had called itself the National Patriotic Front of Liberia, or NPFL. Its leaders were drawn predominantly from the Liberian Gio and Mano ethnic groups, whose origins are mostly traced to the Nimba County on Liberia's eastern border with the Ivory Coast. When President Doe had unleashed the full weight of his security apparatus, led by his Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), to crush the NPFL, his treatment of the rebellion was widely condemned as heavy-handed, with strong allegations of

regionalist malice against the citizens of Nimba County. By some accounts over 3,000 civilians of Gio and Mano origin lost their lives in the counter-insurgency, causing massive ill-feeling: “The people could never forgive Doe for massacring the children of Nimba County.”¹² Quiwonkpa too was killed and his defeated NPFL troops fled into exile, apparently hankering for a chance to launch a second, vengeful assault on Doe’s regime.

34. By a sequence of events in the second half of the 1980s, the NPFL would find a new leader in the shape of Charles Ghankay Taylor. Taylor had once been a member of Doe’s Government, but fled Liberia after accusations of embezzlement and harboured a grudge of his own against Doe, whom he declared had framed him on account of his connection with Quiwonkpa. Although his biography includes a period of incarceration in the United States on account of his alleged fraudulent activity in Government and an eventual haven in Ghana, Taylor’s most far-reaching contribution to the descent of the sub-region into conflict was his reactivation of the NPFL as a fighting force, this time with vastly expanded capacity, from 1988 onwards.
35. In the process of mobilising resources, both human and financial, Taylor established relationships with supportive foreign Governments and their ‘revolutionary-minded’ leaders: first Burkina Faso and its President Blaise Compaore; then Libya and its President (Colonel) Muammar Ghaddafi. The latter link, as intimated in the foregoing analysis, was to prove especially formative for Taylor as he developed an “ideological” and strategic basis on which to prosecute his aggressive agenda.
36. The National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) eventually launched its insurgency against the Government of Liberia in December 1989, striking once again from the Ivory Coast into Nimba County. In the Commission’s view this event was an integral immediate antecedent to the conflict in Sierra Leone. The ensuing analysis demonstrates that the single greatest threat to Sierra Leone’s security in the years from 1989 to 1991 came from the Liberian conflict and the various ways it could spill over into the territory of its neighbour.

Sub Regional Dynamics of the War in Sierra Leone

37. According to a popular version of events relayed to the Commission by several key stakeholders, Charles Taylor had at one point entertained the notion of launching an insurgency into Liberia on two fronts, the second of them from Sierra Leone. It appears that Taylor went so far as to seek official approval for his plan by approaching the incumbent President of Sierra Leone, Joseph Saidu Momoh, in order to secure the use of territories in the East and South of the country as a ‘springboard’ and potentially a training base for his fighting forces. The following testimony was received from one witness:

“Charles Taylor came here with some of his senior officers – this I know for sure, because Sankoh told me and some of the very officers in the NPFL told me. They came here and found Momoh and late Bambay Kamara, who was the Commissioner of Police, to get some sort of clearance to launch their revolution.

¹² TRC Confidential interview with Sierra Leonean national who was detained in Liberia in September 1990; conducted in Freetown; 18 – 21 September 2003.

So he had certain conversations, he went through these people... and Momoh's people agreed. But later on they changed their minds and he [Taylor] was arrested together with some of his men. They were detained in Pademba Road Prisons."¹³

38. The current President of Sierra Leone, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, told the Commission that Charles Taylor was "first received and even encouraged... as a result of some financial consideration paid by him (Taylor) to the higher echelons of the APC regime."¹⁴ President Kabbah then implied that the APC Government subsequently retracted its support without returning Taylor's bribe, apprehended Taylor for making such a request and detained him in state custody for a time. According to President Kabbah, "this conduct by the APC regime is a factor that might have provoked the hostility of Charles Taylor and his active participation in the rebel war in Sierra Leone... This country and its people have paid most dearly and are still paying for such improper conduct of the APC Government."¹⁵
39. The Commission has confirmed that Taylor was indeed detained at Freetown Central Prison for a limited period in 1989, but must caution against the story being afforded any undue credence or significance as a motivation for his later involvement in the Sierra Leone conflict. Taylor had developed multiple other reasons for attacking Sierra Leone by March 1991 and his period of imprisonment ranked very low among them. Acknowledging that the detention itself was not the main cause of Taylor's rancour, some commentators have made claims that Foday Sankoh was incarcerated in the Prison alongside Taylor and that their friendship grew out of this common plight. Testimonies before the Commission do not support this version of events. Several first-hand testimonies place Sankoh in Libya and the Ivory Coast during the period in question. Taylor and Sankoh had met in Libya in 1988 and had become part of the deal between Sierra Leonean and Liberian revolutionaries to mutually support each other in their respective plans. Thus when Taylor was released from custody in Sierra Leone and returned to the Ivory Coast to pursue his incursion on a single front, he would meet Sankoh on Ivorian territory and the two of them would continue their joint plans from there.
40. In any case, what actually transpired with regard to Sierra Leonean state involvement in the Liberian conflict was diametrically opposed to the plan that Taylor had presented to Momoh. Rather than ceding territory to Taylor, Momoh instead permitted the use of Sierra Leone's central Lungi International Airport, situated across the peninsula from Freetown, to be used as a launch pad for air raids that were essentially levelled 'against' Taylor. Momoh's decision involved playing host to ECOMOG, the 'Ceasefire Monitoring Group' of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) that had intervened in Liberia's conflict and was perceived as a hostile force by the NPFL. The Sierra Leone Government further sanctioned at least two direct deployments of troops in what become known as the 'LEOBATT' (Sierra Leone Battalion) contingent of

¹³ Captain (Retired) Moigboi Moigande Kosia, former officer in the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF) and later recruited into the RUF by Foday Sankoh as his first 'G-1' officer; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 7 May 2003.

¹⁴ Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, President of the Republic of Sierra Leone (hereinafter "President Kabbah"); testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown; 05 August 2003; at page 3 of the manuscript.

¹⁵ President Kabbah; *Ibidem*; at page 3 of the manuscript.

ECOMOG, numbering 377 personnel.¹⁶

41. Although its 'Special Battalion' was smaller in terms of military bulk than that of other countries in the 'Group of Five' troop-contributors,¹⁷ the very fact that Sierra Leone had deigned to participate at all in operations 'against' its neighbour drew an embittered and vengeful response from within Liberia. Certainly Sierra Leone was among those nations whose role in opposing him Taylor himself particularly resented. Hence he famously declared in a BBC radio interview on 1 November 1990 his conviction that Sierra Leone would "taste the bitterness of war" as a result of its interventionary vigour; his point was that these unfaithful acts by his neighbours would not be allowed to pass without a violent response.¹⁸
42. Commensurately, anti-Sierra Leonean sentiments were running high among certain segments of the Liberian population. The Commission heard testimony from Sierra Leoneans who lived in Liberia at the time, averring that they were routinely subjected to verbal abuse and molestation in public and occasionally even sustained beatings and attacks on their properties. The Commission did not find any evidence that such attacks were punished by the Liberian law enforcement agencies. In fact, the trend identified by the Commission based on the limited evidence available to it was for such acts to be endorsed and even more likely carried out directly by the new, self-proclaimed rulers of the territories in question – the commandos of the NPFL.
43. The question of personal choice in this matter is difficult and sensitive. From its extensive analysis of similar dynamics in the Sierra Leone conflict, the Commission holds the view that civilians are deprived of the right to choose freely once they are under threat to their lives and that certain of their actions might thus be considered as being the product of compulsion. What is certain, though, is that once they had become subject to the will of the NPFL aggressors, many Liberian civilians appear to have adopted certain attitudes held by the NPFL, including hostility towards its enemies, among whom were Sierra Leonean nationals. In testimonies to the Commission, descriptions of this hostility were usually accompanied by bewildered grievance on the part of its victims:

"I don't think it was justified [on the part of the civilians]; it wasn't their place to take it out on those of us who had innocently come to their country to make our livings."¹⁹

¹⁶ Colonel Bashiru S. Conteh, formerly Adjutant to the Sierra Leone Army's 'LEOBATT' contingent that served in Monrovia in late 1990 and early 1991; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 02 August 2003.

¹⁷ The countries in the 'Group of Five' were Nigeria, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea and Sierra Leone; there were also reported to be soldiers from Mali and, later, Senegal deployed to Liberia as part of ECOMOG. In total, there were thought to be around 10,000 troops posted to Liberia. These details were reported to the Commission by Colonel Bashiru S. Conteh, formerly Adjutant to the Sierra Leone Army's 'LEOBATT' contingent that served in Monrovia in late 1990 and early 1991; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 02 August 2003.

¹⁸ BBC *Focus on Africa*; BBC Africa Service; "Interview with rebel leader Charles Taylor of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)"; broadcast on 01 and 02 November 1990.

¹⁹ TRC Confidential Interview with Sierra Leonean national who was beaten by Liberian civilians, captured by the NPFL and subsequently joined them as a clerk; interview conducted in Freetown, 17 October 2003.

44. Residents of the 'occupied territories', including some Sierra Leoneans themselves, surmised that in the interests of securing their lives, families and properties, their only option was to join the NPFL, or at least to perform auxiliary tasks such as driving or secretarial duties on its behalf. One witness testified that such a course of action was also "not one of free choice, in the truest sense"²⁰ but that it was eminently preferable to be on the side of the NPFL than to be perceived as being against them. This supposition takes on added prescience when it is assessed in the light of what happened in the latter months of 1990.
45. Having interpreted ECOMOG's role in the Liberian conflict as being hostile to the NPFL, Charles Taylor had set out to oppose the intervening forces in any way he could. ECOMOG was deemed to constitute the greatest scourge to the Taylor's overall objective of seizing control of power. At the point when NPFL forces started to incur casualties as a result of ECOMOG bombing raids, which started around August 1990, Taylor was prepared to retaliate. He issued an arbitrary order to his NPFL troops to arrest and imprison all those persons on the territories under his control who were nationals of ECOWAS states, with a particular focus on the so-called 'Group of Five' countries, who had contributed troops to form part of the ECOMOG military operation. Taylor announced his policy over the radio and named the countries, including Sierra Leone, whose nationals he deemed due for detention.²¹
46. Potentially hundreds of Sierra Leoneans are thought to have been rounded up by the NPFL in this operation, although the Commission was unable to attain an exact or even estimated figure from an official source. What is certain is that whatever courtesies and immunities from harm might previously have been extended to those who performed important roles in their communities, like teaching and engineering, were immediately rescinded. One Sierra Leonean who was working as a senior instructor at a Technical Institute in Nimba County testified about his experiences of 15 September 1990 in the following terms:

"At ten o'clock in the morning I heard hard knocks at my door with gun butts, threatening me to immediately open up or I would be killed. I opened the door and I was immediately placed under arrest, along with my whole family. In the afternoon of that day there was a press release heard on LAMCO FM radio station that all foreign nationals resident in Liberia, whose countries of origin formed ECOMOG based in Sierra Leone, were to be arrested. It stated that for every Liberian NPFL commando killed by jet bombings of ECOMOG, we were going to bear similar consequences.

That night my whole family and I were taken by four armed men to a nearby jail; there we met over 85 other foreign nationals, including women, children and the elderly. The old, the women and the children were released two weeks later and allowed to return to their homes, while a number of us were still held in detention. Executions were carried out for every time the ECOMOG jet bombed their areas, even without killing anyone. I came to understand that multiple executions

²⁰ TRC Confidential Interview with Sierra Leonean national who was beaten by Liberian civilians, captured by the NPFL and subsequently joined them as a clerk; interview conducted in Freetown, 17 October 2003.

²¹ Taylor's position with regard to this policy was broadcast on Radio Number Three out of Gbarnga, where he was based at the time.

were carried out in all control areas throughout the country as retaliation."²²

47. The Commission heard similar testimonies from several other Sierra Leoneans who were taken into detention in different parts of Liberia during the same operation by the NPFL. One long-term resident, who was arrested along with a fellow Sierra Leonean teacher at his local college, described how he was locked up with up to a hundred others in "a large container that had been used to transport frozen fish or meat."²³ He testified that NPFL gunmen would periodically open the hatch at the top of the container and fire rounds of bullets indiscriminately into the crowd below, among whom were many women and children.
48. The Commission deplores the lack of basic respect for human life that the NPFL demonstrated through these detentions and the killings that accompanied them. Charles Taylor's instruction that civilians represented legitimate targets in the promotion of a his 'revolutionary' agenda carried immense destructive potential. Throughout its enquiries summarised in the present report, the Commission has maintained the position, well established under international humanitarian law, that there can be no worse violation than the deliberate targeting of civilians.
49. The interpretations and impact of Sierra Leonean involvement in the Liberian conflict can be distilled into two main points that are relevant to the causes of the conflict and the human rights violations that were to follow in Sierra Leone. The first point is that Sierra Leone's hosting of ECOMOG was *interpreted* by Charles Taylor as a legitimate ground for retaliation against the state. The second, partly connected point is that Taylor's war *impacted* profoundly on Sierra Leoneans living in Liberia, as they were deliberately targeted and maltreated by NPFL fighters.

The Role of Foday Sankoh in the Conflict in Liberia

50. Foday Sankoh, the RUF leader-in-waiting, eventually left Libya in 1989 and travelled via Burkina Faso to join the NPFL cadre that had assembled in the Ivory Coast. Effectively, Sankoh was to become one of Taylor's key NPFL commandos in the conflict in Liberia, organising and carrying out military operations alongside other senior NPFL combatants on the ground. He would later talk passionately about the experiences he had acquired on the battlefield in Liberia, participating in the capture of strategic 'enemy' positions including County Capital towns and military barracks formerly used by the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL).
51. Among the captured County Capitals was Gbarnga, capital of Bong County in the central North of Liberia. Having chased out INPFL²⁴ forces from there in June 1990, it was in this town that Charles Taylor established his operational Headquarters for the NPFL in a secure urban residence he called the 'Mansion'. The town is well-connected to the road network of the country and

²² TRC Confidential interview with a Sierra Leonean national who was detained in Liberia in September 1990; interview conducted in Freetown; 18 – 21 September 2003.

²³ TRC Confidential interview with a Sierra Leonean national who was detained in Liberia in September 1990; interview conducted in Freetown; 01 December 2003.

²⁴ The Independent National Patriotic front of Liberia, led by Prince Yormie Johnson which broke away from the NPFL in 1990.

relatively easily accessible from all sides, including from the direction of the Sierra Leonean border.

52. One of the captured AFL military barracks was a sizeable but inconspicuous base called 'Camp Namma', situated approximately 20 miles north of Gbarnga just outside the small town of Namma itself. It was on this base that Sankoh would seek to put into practice his programmes of commando training, drawing upon the techniques of ideological and military instruction he had picked up in Libya. Taylor initially retained sole dominion over the Camp Namma base for the training of his new recruits into the NPFL; accordingly the base provided the training ground for a unique and vicious breed of fighters, many of them child combatants, who passed out under the rigorous supervision of mostly Libyan-trained commanders. Sankoh is thought to have visited Camp Namma regularly in the first few weeks of its use by the NPFL and trained some recruits there himself. It does not appear that he had any firm conception at that stage as to how he would assemble his fighters.
53. Yet by then there was already developing something of a two-way overlap between the conflict in Liberia and the conflict-to-come in Sierra Leone. For example, the Commission heard testimony that other Sierra Leonean commandos who subsequently attained prominence in the RUF fighting force had also first participated in the armed conflict in Liberia on the side of the NPFL; the names mentioned in this regard include Abu Kanu, Rashid Mansaray, Mohamed Tarawallie, Mike Lamin, Sam Bockarie (alias "Mosquito"), Patrick Lamin and Morris Kallon. In terms of high-level engagement, though, the Commission has been unable to adduce any evidence that suggests any of these men was especially influential or responsible for human rights violations in the NPFL. In any case none of them was a commander of requisite seniority to be directing operations by then.
54. In contrast, the connections that Sankoh himself had made at the training camp in Libya appear to have afforded him a certain elevated respect in the eyes of his NPFL compatriots, not least because of his direct relationship with Taylor. It has been suggested to the Commission that Sankoh was held in high regard by Taylor as a military strategist; indeed, one testimony inferred that Taylor sought input from Sankoh in his "planning of battlefront manoeuvres" for the NPFL.²⁵ There were also many commanders in the NPFL more influential than Sankoh. One of these commanders was Prince Johnson, who is thought to have led NPFL battlefront tactics up until his breakaway in 1990 to form the Independent National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL). There were also many other Libyan-trained commandos, most of them having passed out at a higher level of military attainment than any Sierra Leonean reached.

²⁵ TRC Confidential Individual Interviews with members of the RUF 'vanguards' contingent; interviews conducted variously in Freetown, Makeni, Magburaka, Kailahun and Kono; June to December 2003.

Foday Sankoh's Training Programme and the Assembly of RUF 'Vanguards'²⁶

55. Sankoh began assembling his fighting group in or around the second week of October 1990, when an NPFL troop of which he was a member began to sweep through various detention facilities in which Sierra Leoneans were being held. The available evidence suggests that Sankoh had already developed a clear strategy in his mind as to how he would convert the captives into his trainees. He had been briefed on the potential availability of 'recruits' by one of his earliest 'trusted lieutenants' in the RUF, Mike Lamin. Lamin, who had supposedly been recruited by the NPFL during his studies at the University of Liberia, first appeared to at least one of the detainees who subsequently became part of the assembly strategy as a "small boy with dreadlocks and an AK-47".²⁷ It was Lamin who had opened Sankoh's eyes to the prospect of speedily assembling Sierra Leonean manpower to put towards his revolutionary 'vanguard' force and furthermore establishing an instant moral imperative in their minds by casting himself as their 'liberator'.

The 'Detainee-turned-Vanguard' Category

56. Sankoh personally accompanied members of NPFL 'hit squads' who visited some of the detention facilities, apparently for the sole purpose of enlisting the men and women he wanted to make into his first revolutionary commandos. Among the locations in which Sierra Leoneans were held were detention facilities of differing character in Monrovia, Habell, Yekepa, Totota, Buchanan and Cape Mount.
57. In a number of the accounts given to the Commission, Sankoh appeared as part of a unit of NPFL fighters dressed in all-black uniforms, striking at the crack of dawn on an October or November morning. Several groups of soon-to-be 'vanguards' were exposed first to a show of mercilessness, whereby innocent fellow detainees among their number were severely beaten, molested or executed in front of them. Conspicuously, though, the Sierra Leoneans were always spared such a fate when Sankoh was present; they would be separated from the other nationalities and ushered into the hands of Sankoh by other commanders. Through a combination of conviction and compulsion, Sankoh would then proceed to conscript those he deemed he wanted into his RUF movement.

²⁶ Unless otherwise notated, all of the quotations and excerpts used in this section of the report are taken from TRC Confidential Individual Interviews with members of the RUF 'vanguards' contingent; interviews conducted variously in Freetown, Makeni, Magburaka, Kailahun and Kono; June to December 2003. Since most of the individuals who gave information to the Commission remain in vulnerable positions today, their identities are kept anonymous for their own safety and that of their families.

²⁷ TRC Confidential Interview with a member of the RUF High Command who worked closely with Foday Sankoh after joining him in 1990; interview conducted in Freetown; 01 December 2003.

58. In other testimonies to the Commission, the detainees were alternatively delivered to Sankoh from the places they were being held. A member of what appears to have been the first group of 'vanguards' to meet Sankoh in this manner gave the following testimony to the Commission:

"On the 14th of October 1990 we were made to understand that we would be released the next day upon the orders of Charles Taylor, but instead of being released that day, we were picked up in the early morning hours and driven to Gbarnga [the capital of Bong County in Liberia], on the pretext of giving us clearance documents by Charles Taylor to spare us from further embarrassment. Upon our arrival in Gbarnga we were met by Foday Sankoh... [Later he] advised us that in the interests of our own lives we should stay there and dare not make any attempt to escape... There was in fact no need to escape as that attempt meant committing suicide."²⁸

59. Sankoh's favoured means of recruitment depended on convincing people that their lives lay squarely in his hands and that if they refused to join him, they would be responsible for their own fate – effectively, he blackmailed them into becoming members of the RUF. Many of those enlisted by this means were acutely aware of what Sankoh was doing, but were equally powerless to prevent it in view of the all-pervading dangers at that time of being a Sierra Leonean in Liberia:

"Had it not been for Foday Sankoh's mission, plenty of us might have been killed. So we regarded it as a rescue mission... Had he left it to volunteerism, perhaps he might not have successfully got that number that he managed to get in a very short time. So I believe that he used the warfare in Liberia as an opportunity for him to strengthen."

60. Some of the vanguards were faced with the choice in plain life-or-death terms:

"Sankoh spoke to me as a fellow Sierra Leonean. He told me that had he left me there I was going to be killed."

61. It follows that one did not have to have even the slightest streak of militarism or 'revolutionary' pedigree to be enlisted in this manner. Indeed, on the contrary, the inclination of most of those people picked up from detention had been towards *not taking sides* in the conflict in Liberia; they had neither joined the NPFL nor fled in allegiance with members of the ousted Doe regime. Many of them told the Commission that they had wanted nothing more than a peaceful existence and to continue with the jobs they were pursuing in Liberia before the war had engulfed their homes. It was purely based on their grave misfortune of having been Sierra Leoneans in the wrong place at the wrong time that they had even come to be detained in the first place.

²⁸ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF 'vanguard' commander who was taken from detention in Liberia to become a member of the movement; interview conducted in Freetown; 19 September 2003.

62. All of the recruits from this 'detainee-turned-vanguard' category appear to have been picked up in semi-darkness, loaded into NPFL trucks and driven to assembly points in the North of Liberia. The very first group, comprising six detainees picked up from Nimba County, was taken initially to the campus of Cuttington University College (CUC) in Lofa County, where they were accommodated in the rather incongruous surroundings of former student dormitories. CUC had been used as an NPFL training base in its own right between 2 July 1990 and 4 October 1990. According to the recollections of the then acting President of the institution, the NPFL had housed over 40 trainers and their dependents on the campus, incurred about USD \$4 million worth of damage and trained as many as 6,000 recruits in the space of just three months.²⁹
63. For the Sierra Leonean RUF contingent, CUC was to be nothing more than a stopover point; not all of the 'vanguards' passed through there at all, particularly those who were enlisted after November. The common destination of all the vanguards was the former military barracks that Sankoh had earmarked a few weeks earlier as a suitable training ground. Thus the 'vanguards' would make their base and take their instruction at 'Camp Namma', which some of them also referred to as 'Sokoto'.
64. After the initial period of training had got underway, it seems that Foday Sankoh still persisted with his tactic of 'forced recruitment' as a means of boosting the numbers in his force:
- "Others used to come on a daily basis from all the areas where the NPFL was in control; they were scouring the country in search of Sierra Leoneans – the ones who survived were brought to Camp Namma."³⁰
65. Although some vanguards claimed differently, it appears that there was necessarily a discriminatory policy in favour of Sierra Leoneans during the trawl of the NPFL's detention facilities. This preference can be connected directly to Foday Sankoh's objectives of winning over the hearts and minds of the population in Sierra Leone to further the revolution: it would be eminently easier to gain support for a 'revolution' that was led by indigenes of the nation it was purporting to liberate, or at least those who could trace their familial heritage back there. The RUF Leader would later deviate from this approach and at tremendous cost to his public perception.

²⁹ For further details on CUC, see the following article: Tokpa, H. F.; "Cuttington University College During the Liberian Civil War: An Administrator's Experience"; in *Liberian Studies Journal*, Volume XVI, 1 (1991); at page 79.

³⁰ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF 'vanguard' commander; interview conducted in Freetown; 16 September 2003.

The Composition of the RUF 'Vanguards'

66. Contrary to popular perceptions of an exclusively illiterate body comprised of marginalised lumpen youth, the RUF vanguards were actually a disparate collection of Sierra Leoneans and Liberians from across the demographic spectrum gelled together through coercion and training into a fighting force. The vanguards included among their number both men and women; Sierra Leoneans of most of the major ethnic groups in the country, including large numbers of Mendes and Temnes; boys as young as 11 years of age, 'senior citizens'; illiterate labourers and secondary-school drop-outs through to a few highly educated professionals in diverse fields.
67. A core group of seven young men formed the bedrock upon which the vanguard force would be built. They had been brought to the base by Foday Sankoh from the Ivory Coast, where apparently Sankoh had identified them as Sierra Leoneans and told them individually to join him in Liberia because there was a "job for them to do." Issa Sesay and Mustapha Thonkara (alias "Thomas Sankara"), both of whom would take commanding roles in the conflict, were among this group. Issa Sesay had been involved in petty trading in the Ivory Coast and was one of the first younger RUF members to be taken under Sankoh's wing and habitually referred to as 'my son'.
68. Added to the core group in a slow but constant flow were the 'detainee-turned-vanguards', among whom a select few had been educated well above the average: Jonathan Kposowa, Prince Taylor, Lawrence Wormandia and Peter Vandy were all teachers or instructors; some of the older men had held positions of considerable responsibility, including Dr. Fabai, a medical practitioner, and Mr. Nyandeh, a secondary school Vice-Principal; Philip Palmer, Augustine Koroma, Joseph Magona (alias "One Man One") and Augustine Bao had also acquired respectable qualifications and had jobs in areas including engineering and administration.
69. There were also many other Sierra Leonean vanguards, whose presence on the base was brought to the Commission's attention during its research. The list presented here is not exhaustive; nevertheless the historical record should include the following names as RUF vanguards: Joseph Kargbo, Ahmed Fullah, Yusu Sillah, Yusufu Sesay, Alicious Caulker, Saidu Kallon, John Kargbo, Edward Fembeh, Eldred Collins, Jatta Massaquoi, Richie Honeyrow, Memunatu Sesay, Fatu Gbengbe, Mustapha Koroma (alias "Senkollah"). Abdulrahman Bangura, 'Kelfawai' and 'Kailondo'. The 'pure' identity denoted here was widely referred to in interviews with vanguards, but it does not have any ethnic connotations for particular Sierra Leonean tribes; rather, it was used on the basis that the named persons used it: to differentiate themselves from a further category, known as 'Liberian-Sierra Leoneans'.
70. Among this 'Liberian-Sierra Leonean' group were some people who had been detained, others who had volunteered to join Sankoh, and others again who had been 'lent' to the RUF by Taylor from among his NPFL commandos. According to testimony received by the Commission:

"The Liberians used the training as a means of rescuing themselves from the heat of the warfare in Liberia... Most of them were under no compulsion... the NPFL was in control of over half the territory, so they could have gone anywhere in the country... I think it was an agreement

between Sankoh and Taylor that there should be a small contingent of Taylor's own men among the Liberians."³¹

71. It was through this channel that a former NPFL fighter named Dennis Mingo (alias "Superman") became part of the vanguards. Mingo was identified by most RUF members as a Liberian of the Gbandi ethnic group; yet one of his parents was Sierra Leonean and he thus spoke Mende and Krio with ease. He was transferred to the RUF under Foday Sankoh in 1990, mostly on account of his prowess as a front-line fighter and mastery of Sierra Leonean languages.

72. Ibrahim Dugbeh, who testified somewhat evasively to the Commission at its public hearings in Makeni, was originally a trained soldier in Doe's Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), but was captured by the NPFL in 1990. He was 'turned over' to Sankoh's RUF and became a vanguard, apparently with something of a stake in Sierra Leone on account of his mother's nationality. Dugbeh described his case as unique, stating that his participation in training was sparse:

"We were having only one training depot, and as you entered that camp, you would not be allowed to go out until after the training... For me I didn't used to go into too much of the training because I was an old soldier – I was a soldier, so I don't need a long training. But the training took about six months."³²

73. Among the 'Liberian-Sierra Leonean' group was perhaps the RUF's most notorious female combatant, Monica Pearson (alias "CO Monica"). In addition, there was a whole batch of commanders who later entered on the Southern flank going only by their nicknames, such as 'Dirty De Jango'. Many of the vanguards in fact never revealed their true identities to their fellow trainees, hence the response of one witness that he could not tell the Commission much about the backgrounds of his fellow members:

"All I knew was that I had been saved from death – so I didn't ask any questions. You are what you are: you don't talk to me; I don't talk to you; I don't want to know about you."³³

74. The Commission recognises that the period spent in training by the vanguards of the RUF was to provide a benchmark for the formation of other militias and armed groups that participated in the Sierra Leone conflict: in character, this group of people stands to be considered as a highly unconventional fighting force; its members were taken on board in troubled circumstances, many of them under false pretences, duress, or threats to their lives; and they were only loosely bound together by superficial bonds, more out of a sense of common adversity than any true notion of unity. It is therefore hardly surprising that the relationships of these vanguards among themselves would fluctuate between friendly camaraderie and mutual suspicion.

³¹ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF 'vanguard' commander; interview conducted in Freetown; 18 September 2003.

³² Ibrahim Dugbeh, former RUF 'vanguard' and erstwhile commander on the Northern axis; testimony before Commission Public Hearings held in Makeni Town, Bombali District; 29 May 2003.

³³ TRC Confidential Interview with a member of the RUF High Command who worked closely with Foday Sankoh after joining him in 1990; interview conducted in Freetown; 1 December 2003.

“Maybe some people took it as a choice, but it came at a time when there was that insecurity in the lives of most of the trainees; where they had no alternative but to go for refuge. So the training camp was used as a refuge for most trainees; because once life is no longer safe in any other zone besides that training base, you have to consider it as something forceful.”³⁴

75. In placing the assembly and composition of the initial RUF force into its proper context, the Commission does not intend in any way to exclude or mitigate the responsibility of certain individuals among them for their actions in the conflict. In the narrative of the conflict that follows in this chapter, a variety of responsibilities are attributed to the vanguards notwithstanding their backgrounds. Moreover, along with stories of forced enlistment, the Commission had heard many tales of vanguards who entered the RUF with the express intention of proliferating conflict. In this vein the Commission notes the presence on the base of some of those who would later attain senior command roles in the combatant cadre of the RUF, particularly Morris Kallon and Augustine Bao.
76. Another of these members is Sam Bockarie (alias “Mosquito”) , who had apparently made an ignominious exit from Sierra Leone after being accused of theft while labouring for a period as a ‘san-san boy’ in the diamond pits. In Liberia he was known to his compatriots as a hairdresser and a disco dancer with little education and a chip on his shoulder. He had wanted to become an electrician but had failed to attain the standards of entry to any of Liberia’s technical schools. By all accounts ‘Maskita’ joined Foday Sankoh voluntarily at a relatively late stage in the training.
77. Finally, in line with the terms of its mandate, the Commission wishes to draw special attention to the plight of a small sub-group among the vanguards, who apparently numbered a maximum of five: they were children recruited by Foday Sankoh and formed the RUF’s first contingent of ‘small boys’. According to one of the vanguards, these boys were not trained with the adult recruits, but did on occasion carry firearms on the premise that they were ‘bodyguards’ or ‘small soldiers’. They were said to be ‘taken care of’ by their ‘guardians’ or relatives on the base; for example, one of them, known as ‘Young Pearson’, was the younger brother of the aforementioned combatant Monica Pearson. Nevertheless, it was broadly accepted by the vanguards who testified that these boys, despite being estimated to have been between 10 and 14 years, went on to play roles as “fierce fighters” during the Sierra Leone conflict. At least three of them, nicknamed “Base Marine”, “Gas” and “Steward”, would become commanders and combatants in the RUF’s Small Boys’ Unit, or SBU.

³⁴ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF ‘vanguard’; interview conducted in Freetown; 18 September 2003.

The Preparation of the RUF Vanguarders for Incursion into Sierra Leone

78. The Commission has established through its enquiries that Foday Sankoh introduced a system of numbering of the RUF vanguards during the training period at Camp Namma. Admittedly, there are certain anomalies associated with Sankoh's numbering, primarily that it appeared to have no coherent order and that it began not at zero, but at 021. The latter glitch was explained in the following terms:
- “Sankoh kept telling us that we were not given 001 because we were not the first; he just said: ‘I have some colleagues who will join us later on’.”³⁵
79. Among these ‘colleagues’ whom it is believed were allocated numbers from 001 to 020 are Sankoh's co-trainees from Libya like Rashid Mansaray, Abu Kanu and Mohamed Tarawallie, as well as further Libyan-trained Sierra Leoneans like Noah Kanneh and CO Daboh who would come into the RUF at a later date. Mike Lamin and Patrick Lamin were also in this more exclusive group. And although no evidence exists that either man was trained in Libya, it is clear that they did not train concurrently with the vanguards at Camp Namma. The Commission notes that the number of ‘colleagues’ who joined later on was never said to have reached 20, however.
80. Through testimony from senior members of the RUF administration, the Commission has gained evidence that the number of RUF vanguards reached 387 at its highest ebb. Two members of the training group were apparently killed in training, leaving the figure at 385.
81. With regard to the training undertaken by this group, there are several indicators to affirm that physical and ideological instruction was administered in a manner reminiscent to the programmes conducted for members of the Sierra Leonean contingent in Libya. There were, for example, imported exercises like the dreaded ‘halaka’ and others known by names such as ‘escaping for survival’ and ‘road march’. The basic objective of such techniques was euphemistically expressed as being: ‘giving you a light beating to get you used to any hardness in the warfare.’
82. The training instructors on the Namma base were predominantly commanders of the NPFL who mostly volunteered their services to Sankoh due to their prior experiences of war. The Head Trainer was a Liberian NPFL commander called CO ‘Gornkanue’, in whom Sankoh was said to have “total trust and confidence.” After several months of the training had passed, both Rashid Mansaray and Mohamed Tarawallie appeared to assist with instruction, but perhaps surprisingly it seems that their contributions were limited to functional military and public relations training, rather than anything that would stimulate ideological discussion among the trainees: “even if they had political ideology at the backs of their minds, there was no time for them to disseminate that to the other trainees.”

³⁵ Jonathan Kposowa, former Adjutant General of the RUF who worked closely with the Leader and other members of the RUF High Command throughout the conflict; TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 23 June 2003.

"The training we received was all-round political-military commando training. It was political in the sense that the warfare was going to be exposed to civilians as well as military affairs, so basic political knowledge had to be introduced... such as the welfare of captives; such as administering people who have been cut off from their original style of livelihood; such as dealing with the old-aged; and dealing with women. The military training covered exposure to light weapons such as AK-47s, Berettas, G3s, RPGs and the like. The training was not for a long duration; it was a hasty training carried out basically to expose people to the use of arms on an emergency basis... and to prepare us for the revolution."³⁶

83. In the Commission's view, the historical resonance of this period of training goes well beyond the purported preparation of its participants to take their own part in the war. On the one hand, it has become clear to the Commission that the training left the vanguards unprepared to wage revolutionary warfare. On the other hand, the exposure of the vanguards to extreme violence during training seemed to have had an enduring effect on each of them personally, creating a propensity to subject others to acts of personal violation and compulsion. This assertion is borne out by the fact that some of the vanguards went on to exercise their own reigns of terror over conscripts in the Sierra Leone conflict, especially child recruits at the infamous Camp Charlie.

³⁶ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF 'vanguard' commander; interview conducted in Freetown; 18 September 2003.

PHASE I

CONVENTIONAL 'TARGET' WARFARE

BUILD-UP TO THE OUTBREAK OF CONFLICT IN SIERRA LEONE

84. The outbreak of actual hostilities on the territory of Sierra Leone has yielded widespread misunderstanding of its underlying motives and means of coming into being. There are considerable areas of disagreement in the interpretations offered to the Commission by the parties who themselves instigated the war, let alone in the second-hand accounts that circulate as popular myth. Rather than providing clarity, the attack on Bomaru on 23rd March 1991 added a layer of intrigue of its own.
85. Thus, the earliest instances of human rights violations recorded by the Commission took place in 1990 and bear the character of cross-border raids from Liberia. Moreover, the first attackers who engaged the Sierra Leone Army were all combatants who had fought and were based in Liberia. Foday Sankoh's plans on when to launch his 'revolution' in Sierra Leone was affected by the Liberian conflict. Had the agenda that Sankoh formulated in Liberia been enacted in the manner and in accordance with the time-scale he had originally foreseen, the outcome of the revolution may have been different. Instead Sankoh, the self-styled master planner, was overtaken by events on the ground and prevailed upon by Charles Taylor.

Context, Build-up and Dynamics of the Attack on Bomaru

86. Saturday 23rd of March 1991 has until now has stood as the date on which the first shots were fired in the Sierra Leone conflict; yet in fact it is a misleading milestone in history. What happened on that day was an attack that culminated in the commencement of the conflict, not the first attack of the conflict itself. There is no need to dwell excessively on the semantics of this subtle differentiation, but for a variety of reasons the Commission deems it necessary to place the event itself in an appropriate historical context.
87. The geographical area in question is in the northernmost portion of Sierra's Leone border with Liberia. Since the border is for the most part densely forested, towns adjacent to the open crossing points tend to assume strategic and economic importance inordinate to their size. Bomaru, in the Kailahun District, is one such place, renowned for its weekly market days to which Liberians would routinely cross from Vahun, in Lofa County, to buy and sell local produce including coffee and cocoa. The route between Vahun and Bomaru had become a free-flowing channel for both formal and illicit agricultural trade. As the Liberian conflict escalated, the volume of persons crossing the border became impossible to gauge or to regulate. The many hundreds of civilian refugees who plied this route in vehicles and on foot were then infiltrated by combatants from the different Liberian warring factions.

88. First, as was generally true for other border crossings from Liberia, fleeing members or supporters of the executive and elite of the Samuel Doe regime plied the route into Sierra Leone through Bomaru. According to various testimonies to the Commission, certain fragmented units of the former state security apparatus of Liberia arrived among this contingent with the full intention of establishing a base in one of the border Districts, where they would mobilise a new fighting force to strike back against the NPFL. The Commission heard the following testimony from the President of Sierra Leone as to the dynamics of the security situation that his predecessors in the APC Government had faced:

“By late 1990 when the Liberian war had reached the outskirts of Monrovia, the refugee flow into Sierra Leone had reached its highest peak. Among these refugees were a substantial number of remnants of the late President Samuel Doe’s Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and Liberia Police Force Personnel who had fled the fighting. Their common objective was to regroup and return to Liberia to continue their resistance against Charles Taylor’s NPFL. This group included a number of influential Liberians who were supporters of the late Samuel Doe’s regime.”³⁷

89. From the opposite end of the spectrum, NPFL commandos, apparently in significant numbers, also took advantage of the porous border to pass into and from Sierra Leonean territory anonymously and without regulation. According to residents of Bomaru, truckloads of Liberian youths would on occasion engage in harassment and looting of the local population before returning.
90. Apparently in direct response to formal complaints lodged by the community of Bomaru with the Army’s Eastern Headquarters at Moa Barracks, Daru, a small deployment of Army Engineers from the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLMF) was transferred to Bomaru from Wilberforce Barracks in Freetown in order to strengthen the security presence in the border vicinity. This platoon of about 30 men from the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) was commanded by Captain Emmanuel Foday and it formed the fatefully-named ‘Operation Bomaru.’³⁸
91. The SLA deployment stationed itself just outside Bomaru Town on the road leading to Vahun and, according to local residents, succeeded at first in stemming the flow of NPFL commandos. In any case, relief appears to have been short lived, as concerns soon surfaced that these soldiers were engaging in transactions with the very ‘rebels’ whose activities they were supposed to deter:

“They started exchanging visits, recreational activities and so on and so forth. The friendship developed into trade by barter; that is, these NPFL men were bringing in their looted items, refrigerators, videos, fridges, televisions and all these things to the soldiers. They only demanded much-needed items like rice, palm oil, cigarettes and such things in

³⁷ Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, current President of the Republic of Sierra Leone; testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown; 05 August 2003; at paragraph 55 of the manuscript.

³⁸ Prior to the deployment of Captain Foday and his men, the only security force present in the Bomaru axis was a modest number of paramilitaries attached to the Special Security Division (SSD).

exchange. Our soldiers use to take the items from these people, go down to Kenema or other places and sell them... often without returning."³⁹

92. Furthermore, the soldiers are thought to have reneged on a particular deal by failing to give anything in exchange for a number of items, most significantly a blue Toyota pick-up van, and thus incurring the wrath of the NPFL commandos. The NPFL Area Commander in the Liberian town of Voinjama, Anthony Meku-Nagbe, is said to have cautioned the soldiers about their dishonesty and even petitioned the Section Chief of Bomaru to act as a go-between; but neither factor prevailed upon SLA Major Foday. When Meku-Nagbe crossed back into Liberia for the last time prior to 23 March 1991, approximately one week earlier, he is said to have promised ominously that he and his men would return with a 'score to settle'.⁴⁰
93. The Commission has confirmed that the subsequent attack on Bomaru, shortly after dawn on 23 March 1991, was carried out by between 40 and 60 NPFL commandos and incurred thirteen fatalities: eleven civilians and two soldiers of the Sierra Leone Army.⁴¹ These killings have taken on a symbolic resonance over the years as they represent a format of attack and violations that would be repeated during later operations. They further constituted the first direct knowledge on the part of the Sierra Leonean population of the defining character that the conflict in their country would take. Following Bomaru, civilians would continue to account for the overwhelming majority of deaths at the hands of the various militias and armed groups.
94. The RSLMF officers killed in the attack have also come to symbolise recurring features of the military history of the conflict as it has been recorded by the Commission. Major Foday was targeted on this mission due to a personal vendetta stemming from inter-factional connivance between the NPFL and the SLA soldiers. He is said to have been conducting an inspection of his troops at the time of the attack and had insufficient time or capacity at his disposal to resist the swarms of fighters who entered Bomaru from the surrounding bush. He was eventually shot dead in his house.
95. The other deceased soldier was Lieutenant Osman Kargbo, who was on his way from nearby Senga to reinforce the defences of Bomaru but was not apprised of the reality on the ground due to failing communications. Indeed, the ill-fated action of Lieutenant Kargbo, plunging himself into a hostile environment without adequate heed or prior warning of the dangers he would

³⁹ Commission Statement No. 3864, pertaining to events in Bomaru, Pendembu and other places in Kailahun District; statement taken in Freetown; 24 March 2003.

⁴⁰ Whether this threat was delivered in public or whether it has become part of the local folklore surrounding the events in Bomaru is unclear from the testimonies received. It appears that the Liberians were especially aggrieved over the failure to 'pay up' for the blue Toyota van and had vowed to return to Bomaru to reclaim it from the soldiers. This element of the story is widely accepted by the people of Bomaru and its environs; see TRC Interviews with residents of Bomaru and its environs, April 2003.

⁴¹ These figures, gathered by the Commission in its investigations in and around the town of Bomaru, correspond with the report compiled by the team of military officers sent to the scene in the wake of the attack to assess the situation on the ground. Details of this report were provided to the Commission during its public hearings: see Brigadier (Retired) Kellie H. Conteh, current National Security Co-ordinator at the Office of National Security and former long-serving officer in the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF); testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown; June 2003.

encounter there, served as a harbinger of the fate that awaited many of his compatriots in the Sierra Leone Armed Forces.

96. Immediately after their violent raid, which is reported to have lasted for about three hours, the NPFL attackers retreated back over the border into Liberian territory. The cruel irony of the event was that the contested motor vehicle that had apparently provoked the attack was left languishing in Bomaru and never collected. Anthony Meku-Nagbe's 'score' was settled nonetheless; in lieu of the pick-up truck, the NPFL commandos heavily looted Major Foday's house and drove away in the support vehicle that had been used to hurry to the scene by Lieutenant Kargbo. Anthony Meku-Nagbe came on a murderous mission "for the Major and not civilians"⁴²; in settling his 'score', he left numerous human rights violations, a shattered Bomaru community and a country fearing further pandemonium in his wake.

Differing Perspectives on the Attack on Bomaru

97. At the outset, it is pertinent to reflect that the attack was woefully misreported in the local media and substantially misrepresented by the APC Government. It appears to the Commission that the root of much of this misinformation was to be found in the understandably hysterical rumours emanating from the 'first-hand' accounts of those civilians who had fled from the direct vicinity of Bomaru. Evidence given to the Commission by the leader of the military team sent to investigate the attack hints at the susceptibility of public information mechanisms to stories that portrayed the incident out of all due proportion:

"On arrival [in Kailahun District] it was clear that something unprecedented had happened in that area. There was a visibly panic-stricken and unsettled public with various versions of what had happened and what was to come... In respect of the number of rebels that had crossed the border, some said they were about a thousand while some put the figure upwards of five thousand. Indeed, some messages had already been sent to Freetown from the police and military net speaking of some five thousand NPFL rebels advancing deep into Sierra Leone territory and some added 'with tanks and artillery'.

Most of what we heard in Daru and read in signal messages from Kailahun proved to be grossly exaggerated."⁴³

98. In this light one might surmise that the official statement released by the APC Government in response to the Bomaru attack was in fact quite moderate. It read as follows:

"On 23rd March 1991 at 1.00 a.m. an armed gang belonging to the National Patriotic Front, one of the dissident factions in the ongoing civil unrest in Liberia under rebel leader Charles Taylor, invaded two border villages, namely Bomaru and Senga in Dia Chiefdom, bordering Liberia.

⁴² This statement was apparently made to residents of Bomaru by other NPFL commandos in Meku-Nagbe's unit: See Interviews with residents of Bomaru and its environs; interviews conducted as part of an investigative field trip to Kailahun District; April 2003.

⁴³ Brigadier (Retired) Kellie H. Conteh, current National Security Co-ordinator at the Office of National Security and former long-serving officer in the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF); testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown; June 2003.

This unprovoked and wanton attack by members of the National Patriotic Front of Charles Taylor resulted in a number of casualties among the people resident in these areas, including many deaths, three of whom are military personnel belonging to the Sierra Leone Military Forces. Government has taken necessary measures to ensure the safety of the residents and security of the area.”

99. The Government account erroneously suggests that the attack was two-pronged; in fact, the officer from Senga who was killed had met his fate in Bomaru. The time of the attack is wrongly stated, as is the number of military casualties. Moreover, the assertion that the Government had taken ‘necessary measures to ensure the safety... of the area’ appears to be somewhat disingenuous. Submissions to the Commission indicate that the level of acknowledgement in Government of the circumstances prevailing on the ground was totally unsatisfactory; SLA Brigadier (Retired) Kellie Conteh coined the phrase ‘silent political sanction’ to describe the invidious self-constraints retained by the APC, which hampered any effective response.⁴⁴ One element of the truth behind the Bomaru attack is that the Army High Command failed to act properly to prevent it, while the Army officers on the ground had acted irresponsibly to provoke it.
100. Some testimonies to the Commission have stated that there were Liberians visiting the Bomaru axis, as well as other towns in Kailahun such as Pendembu, on a series of ‘reconnaissance missions’ that were drawn out over several months preceding 23 March 1991. For example, one teacher from Pendembu expressed his utter disillusionment with the conduct of his erstwhile colleague Patrick Beinda, whom he alleged was the host and escort to Liberian spies on their regular visits to Bomaru and Pendembu.⁴⁵ He further contended that the very same Liberians later appeared in Pendembu as armed commanders when the town was eventually attacked.
101. In his own testimony to the Commission, Beinda accepted that he was among the first of the local townspeople who joined with the Liberian commanders upon their entry into Pendembu, but denied that he had ever previously encountered any of the assailants in question.⁴⁶ He claimed that as a long-time resident of Liberia before the war broke out, he was in a position to provide translation into the local Mende language for the Liberian English-speaking commanders. He thus facilitated their address to public gatherings at the Pendembu ‘court barray’ and may have appeared to some of the townspeople to have known the Liberians. Other RUF commanders, including some of those who were among the vanguard force in Pendembu, also suggested that although Beinda was one of the first appointments, he was unlikely to have played any prior reconnaissance role.

⁴⁴ Brigadier (Retired) Kellie H. Conteh, current National Security Co-ordinator at the Office of National Security and former long-serving officer in the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF); testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown; June 2003. For further analysis on this issue, see the section on ‘The Incapacity of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) to Respond to Armed Incursion’.

⁴⁵ Commission Statement No. 2151 from Pendembu and Bomaru in the Kailahun District.

⁴⁶ Patrick S. Beinda, former RUF ‘G-2’ commander and Chair of Investigations Boards in the Kailahun District; TRC Interview conducted in Freetown; 18 and 19 June 2003.

102. These explanations should not obscure the fact that there were indeed teams of spies gathering information on behalf of the attackers well in advance of their incursion. Although the Commission was unable to speak directly to any of those who performed such roles under the auspices of the RUF or the NPFL, reports were received as to the presence of 'informants' not only in the border areas of Kailahun and Pujehun, but also at various points in Freetown and even within the security structures of the state. They had acquired maps and details of deployment by the Army, ascertained locations of potential obstacles and 'enemy' forces and drawn up proposed 'targets' and routes of entry into the territory of Sierra Leone.⁴⁷
103. In the immediate aftermath of 23 March 1991, based on the reported sightings of 'informants' and the exaggerated messages of what was happening in Kailahun District, the press and members of the public in Freetown began piecing together the circumstantial evidence to speculate somewhat disbelievingly that 'Sankoh's war' had arrived.⁴⁸ In the ensuing mayhem of the conflict that soon engulfed the country, the historical importance of the attack was never contextualised properly.
104. The Commission's own research indicates that the attack on Bomaru of 23 March 1991 served an important strategic purpose for the would-be insurgents. It demonstrated that the border crossing was effectively unprotected and that troops stationed in the territory just beyond could easily be caught off-guard. It convinced the commandos involved that they could, quickly repeat the tactic and conduct further attacks in a similar vein, probing deeper and staying longer. On the whole, if Sankoh had at all been wavering as to his attacking strategy, the attack was a fillip to his confidence.
105. Responsibility for the attack is not quite as transparent as its effect, however.
106. In later years and to considerable effect, Foday Saybana Sankoh recounted the tale that he had planned and timed his incursion for the 23rd of March 1991 in order to evoke some sense of circularity in his relationship with the long-standing APC Government. Sankoh's intimation was that the date bore great personal significance to him and was thus envisaged as a 'launch date' for symbolic reasons. Even in his address to fellow delegates at the signing of the Lomé Accord on 7th July 1999, Sankoh made reference to "the armed struggle we embarked upon on 23rd March 1991
107. It is indeed interesting to note that on 23 March 1971, exactly twenty years earlier, Sankoh had delivered a rousing speech to an assembled crowd of soldiers in the Sierra Leone Army, effectively presenting his views on an alleged coup plot, for which he was subsequently arrested and later put on trial.⁴⁹ In his statement to the police, Sankoh narrated the events that led to his arrest. In particular, he described in elaborate detail his speech of 23 March

⁴⁷ TRC Confidential Individual Interviews with members of the RUF 'vanguards' contingent; interviews conducted variously in Freetown, Makeni, Magburaka, Kailahun and Kono; June to December 2003.

⁴⁸ See, *inter alia*, Sierra Leone Daily Mail; *Can Sankoh's Threat Be Real?*; 26 March 1991; at page 1.

⁴⁹ See the statement given to the Sierra Leone Police by Corporal Alfred Foday Sankoh, taken on 1st April 1971 and marked as Exhibit No. 1 in the Case for the Prosecution of the Fifth Accused before the *Court Martial of Major D. A. B. S. Noah and Five Others*, 20 March 1972 [case file in the possession of the Commission].

1971 and recounted a subsequent congratulatory remark from Major Abu Noah to the effect that he (Sankoh) should be “respected for [his] bravery and outspokenness” and that he was “the only Non-Commissioned Officer... who could express himself like [he] did to an officer”.⁵⁰ The prosecution case against Sankoh appears to have been based on the claims that he was present photographing and participating in key meetings of the coup plotters, and that he thus aided and abetted Brigadier John Amadu Bangura and others in their efforts to overthrow the Government. The files referred to here are unclear as to the exact outcome of the Court Martial proceedings, but further testimonies gathered by the Commission attest that Sankoh was convicted for his part in the plot and spent just over four years in prison, before being released in 1975.⁵¹

108. In an effort to attribute significance to the recurring date, observers have pointed out that the grudge Sankoh harboured from this day onwards caused him to avenge his arrest twenty years later. One witness testified to the Commission that Sankoh had made an ominous declaration upon his arrest in 1971, to the effect that “even if it takes me twenty years, I will take revenge against the APC.”⁵²
109. In reality, though, this theory appears to be somewhat far-fetched. It is a matter of oddity that two key events in Sankoh’s life came to pass on the same day of the same month twenty years apart,⁵³ In this regard the Commission has set out to analyse the credible alternative perspectives.
110. The first interpretation is that the attack was never envisioned as anything more than the venting of a personal grudge harboured by NPFL commander Meku-Nagbe against his Sierra Leonean ‘trading partners’. In this characterisation, the attack was intended purely as a revenge or reclamation mission, in which the Liberians wanted either to punish the SLA soldiers for their failure to ‘pay up’ on the deal, or to assert themselves as a force to be reckoned with in the border territories. This version seems plausible as an original motivation for the singling out of Bomaru and the Army officers deployed there.

⁵⁰ Statement given to the Sierra Leone Police by Corporal Alfred Foday Sankoh; *Ibidem*.

⁵¹ Testimonies to the Commission indicated that Sankoh’s sentence was actually set at seven years, but that a ‘year’ in the military classification under which he was sentenced actually constitutes a period of only seven or eight months. In any case, Sankoh was released from prison by the latter part of 1975.

⁵² Captain (Retired) Moigboi Moigande Kosia, former officer in the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF) and later recruited into the RUF by Foday Sankoh as his first ‘G-1’ officer; testimony before TRC Public Hearings held in Freetown; 17 April 2003.

⁵³ Indeed, although 23 March 1971 was the date on which Sankoh made his speech, he was not arrested until 25 March 1971 – two days later. One could therefore just as well argue that the real date of significance was the 25th, and that the 23rd was given a spurious retrospective importance in a vain effort by Sankoh and others to concoct a connection with the outbreak of the war.

111. One senior former member of the RUF who joined after the conflict broke out presented his own understanding of events in his testimony to the Commission, which he maintains was also the version presented to him by Foday Sankoh during their time together in the conflict:

“What Anthony Meku-Nagbe did was to mobilise his men on the 23rd of March to retrieve some of the items they [the Sierra Leonean soldiers] had taken... and that brought the war on the 23rd of March 1991. Immediately that happened, the International Community and other people started crying foul that Charles Taylor had invaded Sierra Leone.

By then Charles Taylor never knew anything about the first attack on the 23rd; Sankoh too was on the base with his men... waiting for his own logistics, like arms and everything, to come through. They were both unaware, you know, of what was going on...

So Charles Taylor sent for Foday Sankoh, and said ‘this is the time for you to launch your attack’; in order to exonerate himself [from the allegation] that he had invaded Sierra Leone. Foday Sankoh said no. He said ‘I haven’t got my logistics, I am still waiting for my weapons; I am waiting for ammunition, for vehicles’. Charles Taylor said: ‘No, this is the time; I will give you everything - all the weapons, the commanders and everything’. So, it was then that they assembled their men.”⁵⁴

112. Another interpretation was that the attack on Bomaru was pre-conceived by members of the High Command to gauge the auspiciousness of a larger incursion in the following days and weeks. In this case, the encroachment at Bomaru does not become the launch of the ‘revolution’ proper, but rather as something of a catalyst that encouraged Sankoh to accelerate and finalise his plans to instigate the Sierra Leone conflict.
113. These interpretations are not mutually exclusive. Sankoh had on 1st March 1991 given a 90 day ultimatum to the government of Joseph Momoh to relinquish power or “I will remove him from power”. It was quite plausible that he gave such a lengthy time frame to enable him acquire his arms and ammunition. It was also well known to the government of Sierra Leone that dissident forces were being trained in Liberia to wage war on Sierra Leone. Anthony Meku Nagbe and his group were part of the subsequent incursion into the country. As the conflict subsequently demonstrated, factional alliances were quite fluid, more so in respect of Liberians who didn’t share the revolutionary ideology (if any) of the Sierra Leoneans and were only involved in the conflict for private accumulation.

⁵⁴ Captain (Retired) Moigboi Moigande Kosia, former officer in the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF) and later recruited into the RUF by Foday Sankoh as his first ‘G-1’ officer; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 07 May 2003.

Charles Taylor's Strategic Interests

114. Taylor perceived the immediate evolving threat to his military ascendancy in Liberia to come from the so-called Liberian United Defence Forces (LUDF), which comprised many of the exiled soldiers and police officers of the Samuel Doe regime who had fled into Sierra Leone in the wave of refugee flows noted above. Assessments of the activities of this faction had filtered through to Taylor in his base at Gbarnga, suggesting that it was evolving into a formidable force with logistics, command structure and a base at Kpetema in the Kenema District. The Commission heard various testimonies to the effect that Taylor wanted to eliminate this adversary before it could properly challenge him in Liberia. As the following excerpt from a close ally of Sankoh's attests, countering the LUDF was a prominent consideration in accelerating the time-frame for incursion:

"Sankoh himself told me that the time was not ripe for him to cross with the war into Sierra Leone. His own plan was for December 1991. But [it was superseded] because Charles Taylor had received an intelligence report from Sierra Leone that there's a village called Kpetema near Joru in the Eastern Province, where dissidents were training to fight him. They [the dissidents] called themselves the LUDF: Liberian United Defence Forces, headed by Reiley Seikie. So he [Sankoh] said that Charles Taylor then urged him to stop his training and prepare to cross into Sierra Leone as soon as possible."⁵⁵

115. A constant additional concern in Taylor's mind was the burgeoning presence in Sierra Leone of ECOMOG, whose shadow was inching closer to the Liberian border. Military sources testified to the Commission that discussions had been taking place in early 1991 for the bulk of the ECOMOG deployment stationed at Lungi Airport in the west of Sierra Leone to be transferred to Moa Barracks, Daru in the Eastern Kailahun District. Taylor had laid bare his antagonism towards ECOMOG in his infamous radio broadcast the previous year, so his continual attempts in March and April 1991 to deny that he was striving to scupper ECOMOG rang rather hollow.⁵⁶ It came as little surprise to the people of Sierra Leone when a statement from an early 'rebel' captive betrayed Taylor's true intentions:

"I have decided to tell Sierra Leoneans the truth about this invasion. I am making a voluntary statement. I have decided to expose Charles Taylor because he lied over the radio that he knows nothing about our invasion... We are here [because] he ordered us to come and destabilise Sierra Leone because it is the ECOMOG base."⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Gibril Massaquoi, former RUF Target Group and Battalion Commander, originally recruited as a junior commando in Pujehun and later Personal Assistant to former RUF Leader, Foday Sankoh; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; July 2002.

⁵⁶ See, *inter alia*, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, detailing a variety of statements and reproducing an original report from Voice of Nigeria; *Taylor Denies NPFL Involvement*, 29 April 1991.

⁵⁷ New Shaft, Sierra Leone (motto: 'We Lead, Others Follow'); *And Now the Truth is Out: Captured Rebels Expose Charles Taylor*, 15-21 April 1991.

116. The urgency to confront both LUDF and ECOMOG as well as respond to international criticism against the incursion of 23rd March 1991 seemed to have pushed Taylor to convince Sankoh to commence his revolution well before the scheduled time.
117. With the agreement secured to commence a full-scale attack, all the plans that had been made by Sankoh were put into forward gear. The RUF would be relying absolutely on the goodwill and support of the NPFL fighters, most of whom were not part of their training, and owed loyalty to Charles Taylor to prosecute its revolution. With hindsight, this marked the abortion of the revolution even before it had started. It was a terrible strategic miscalculation and would cost Sankoh and the RUF very dearly.
118. The wisdom of the decision to rely on the NPFL fighters to prosecute the revolution was questioned by Sankoh's erstwhile most trusted co-organiser, Rashid Mansaray, in forceful and disillusioned terms:
- "How can you train us, prepare our minds and then allow somebody else to lead us into our own country? You are selling out the revolution!"⁵⁸
119. According to one of Mansaray's closest friends, he made his stance on philosophical grounds:
- "Rashid's point was not that he opposed the Liberians per se, but that he believed their entry into Sierra Leone would be bad for the revolution. He stood by his position that if the NPFL joined the RUF then they were going to cause problems for us... and that is exactly what happened."⁵⁹
120. Mansaray's words obtain all the more resonance from the assertion by some vanguards that he was not only speaking for himself, but for a large constituency of the RUF recruits who had witnessed the NPFL's propensity for violence at first hand and despised their generally unprincipled orientation. Sankoh apparently could not stand such an overt challenge to his Leadership of the movement and decided to proceed in spite of Mansaray's advice. He also ordered the detention of Rashid Mansaray in a cell at Gbarnga, thus preventing him from participating in the mobilisation of the RUF. The dispute thus excluded one of the RUF's most committed ideologues from the initial entry into the country.
121. Confidential interviews conducted by the Commission provide substantial evidence to support Mansaray's assertion that NPFL fighters would constitute a liability for the RUF. In fact, as will be shown later in this report, the NPFL were to become the primary perpetrators of the first two years of the conflict. Thus, perhaps the implications of the use of NPFL manpower in the RUF 'revolution' are best summarised in the following testimony from a senior RUF commander:

⁵⁸ These are the words of Rashid Mansaray as they were recalled by a member of the RUF who was present in the meeting at which the disagreement between Sankoh and Mansaray erupted. See TRC Confidential Individual Interviews with members of the RUF 'vanguards' contingent; interviews conducted variously in Freetown, Makeni, Magburaka, Kailahun and Kono; June to December 2003.

⁵⁹ TRC Confidential Interview with a former RUF junior commander who joined the Pujehun front in 1991 and became a close friend to Rashid Mansaray; interview conducted in Freetown; 21 September 2003.

“The explanation had been made to us so many times by the Leader himself that the old dictatorial regime of the APC is the only tyrant... Our targets would not be against civilians; nor even against armed men who surrendered. It was just rather unfortunate that the war started with a certain group of people who were not exposed to that type of ideology. Had it been a warfare started by people trained with that understanding, it would not have badly affected civilians in that initial phase⁶⁰ .

Dynamics of the Full-Scale Incursion into Sierra Leone

122. According to the TRC’s research and investigations, the conflict in Sierra Leone was launched from Liberia into both the Kailahun and Pujehun Districts, almost simultaneously. For the duration of Phase I, from 1991 to 1993, the combatant factions would use strategies of conventional ‘target’ warfare and the conflict would retain the character of a war on two fronts. The two fronts will be referred to throughout this chapter as the Eastern Front, centred on Kailahun District, and the Southern Front, centred on Pujehun District.
123. Initial combat operations on the Eastern and Southern Fronts commenced within a week of each other in late March and early April 1991. All the military indicators analysed by the Commission point to centralised leadership and direction of these Fronts: they employed strikingly similar troop movements from their respective points of entry; civilians were treated in a similar fashion in all the communities they entered; objectives of their operations were announced in an identical manner on both Fronts; and the hierarchies of commandship were structured and implemented under the same High Command.
124. Elementary and distorted details about the character and composition of the incursion force were spread among civilians by the insurgents, both initially upon their entry into many communities and repeatedly upon being asked by anyone who dared. The insurgents presented themselves in both Kailahun and Pujehun Districts as ‘Freedom Fighters’ of the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone. They announced that they were here to overthrow the APC regime and were under the leadership of one ‘Corporal Foday Sankoh’.
125. The incursion force was comprised of two distinct factions under the rubric of the RUF: the ‘Special Forces’ of the NPFL and the vanguards of the RUF.

The ‘Special Forces’ of the NPFL

126. Following Charles Taylor’s promise of assistance, the overwhelming bulk of the fighters in the initial incursion force were commandos of the NPFL. Through analysis of data and numerous testimonies, the Commission has been able to determine that a force of approximately two thousand (2,000) insurgents entered Sierra Leone and that over four fifths of them – in the region of 1,600 fighters – belonged to the NPFL.

⁶⁰ TRC Confidential Interview with a former RUF junior commander who joined the Pujehun front in 1991 and became a close friend to Rashid Mansaray; interview conducted in Freetown; 21 September, 2003.

127. Nearly all of these NPFL fighters in Sierra Leone were of Liberian nationality, with possibly a maximum of one hundred (100) nationals from third countries among their number. Through the testimony of both their colleagues and their victims, the Commission has been able to verify that there were commanders as well as fighters from Burkina Faso (commonly called 'Burkinabes') and the Ivory Coast, in addition to individual or small groups of combatants from The Gambia, Nigeria, Guinea and Togo.
128. The Commission heard that all the NPFL commandos, whatever their nationalities, were referred to as 'Special Forces'. The term 'Special Forces' derives from the vocabulary of the NPFL and is understood to denote those fighters who have been trained outside the territory of the country in which they are fighting. The same title was applied to the select few Sierra Leonean commandos in the RUF who had been trained extra-territorially and had fought in the Liberian conflict, but were not vanguards; these included the senior commanders Rashid Mansaray, Mohamed Tarawallie, Abu Kanu, Mike Lamin, Noah Kanneh, Patrick Lamin, 'Pasawe' and CO Daboh.
129. The attack on the Eastern Front into Kailahun was led by NPFL General Francis Mewon while the attack on the Southern Front into Pujehun was led by NPFL General Oliver Vandy.
130. Key further commanders in the incursion into Sierra Leone included James Karnwhine (alias "Pa Jim"), Samuel Tuah (alias "Samtuah"), Benjamin Yaeten, Charles Timba, Dupoe Mekazohn ("General Dupoe"), James Wolonfa, John Wuseh, "Action" Jackson, CO "Bosco" and the man responsible for the Bomaru attack, Anthony Meku-Nagbe (who also used the alias CO "Dry Pepper"). Directional and command responsibility for the military operations of the NPFL – and thus for the bulk of the operations carried out by the combined incursion force between March 1991 and September 1992 – were vested in the hands of these men.

TRC



A former combatant testifies before the Commission during TRC public hearings in Magburaka, Tonkolili District.

The Vanguard of the RUF

131. Meanwhile the RUF vanguards, as described above, were largely untested in the realms of conventional or guerrilla warfare. They had been put through a programme of training that was unexpectedly curtailed due to the exigencies of the intervention plan. As one of the vanguards reflected:
- “They had told us [it would last for] six months... [so] according to the schedule, we never reached the end of the training programme.”⁶¹
132. Nevertheless, this contingent would remain something of a ‘special case’ in terms of the composition of the RUF in the military and political history of the conflict. Their original number would not be expanded during the course of the hostilities, nor would the term be applied to any other group. In the folklore of the RUF movement, as it was later documented in ‘public relations’ texts like *Footpaths to Democracy*,⁶² the vanguards were the founders of the revolution.
133. In this light it is ironic that the wholesale mobilisation of the RUF vanguards from their training base at Camp Namma was actually the secondary component of the deployment plan. According to testimonies of those who were involved in the incursion, the vanguards were divided approximately in two, each half constituting an initial ‘Battalion’ of the RUF. On this point, the Commission’s research indicates that despite being numbered up to 385, the vanguard contingent in fact comprised between 360 and 370 operational fighters. The discrepancy resulted from the non-participation of most of the men with vanguard numbers from 001 to 021, who were claimed by Foday Sankoh to be ‘colleagues who will join us later’.
134. Thus the aggregate number of RUF vanguards divided roughly into two groups of 180 fighters: the ‘First Battalion’ heading for the Southern Front, the ‘Second Battalion’ destined for the Eastern Front.
135. The ‘First Battalion’ had the longer distance to travel from Camp Namma, passing through Gbarnga and Bomi Hills on their way southwards to an assembly point at Bo Waterside, situated in Liberia’s Grand Cape Mount County just over the border from Pujehun District. The ‘Second Battalion’ would cross towards the northernmost part of the Sierra Leone border, passing the NPFL stronghold at Voinjama and gathering at two assembly points, Foya Kamaya and Vahun, both of them in Liberia’s Lofa County, within striking distance of Kailahun District.

⁶¹ TRC Confidential Individual Interviews with members of the RUF ‘vanguards’ contingent; interviews conducted variously in Freetown, Makeni, Magburaka, Kailahun and Kono; June to December 2003.

⁶² *Footpaths to Democracy* is a 44-page booklet that was published in the name of the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF) in 1995 and for a time was available on the streets of Freetown. It contains several lengthy sections propounding the RUF’s version of events in the early part of the war and some of its purported “liberation ideology and theology”. Its keynote essay is attributed to “Foday Saybana Sankoh, The Zogoda, Sierra Leone”. In their testimonies to the Commission, RUF members referred to the document as an original work, many of them claiming to have contributed personally to its writing. Nevertheless, the Commission has come to understand that much of the content is plagiarised from other, unaccredited sources. The text is available in full on the internet at the following address: <http://www.sierra-leone.org/footpaths.html>

136. While senior commanders, appointed at an uncertain time several weeks in advance, clearly knew the details of this plan, the instructions given to the majority of vanguards were said to be vague and confusing:
- “The Leader [Foday Sankoh] called us in the early hours and said that ‘today we are going to launch’ – we didn’t have any warning, we were just loaded into trucks and moved. Most of us had no arms.”⁶³
137. The final sub-division of the vanguards before entering Sierra Leone appears to have been the most important. Each ‘Battalion’ was apparently split into three platoon-sized groups of about sixty (60) vanguards each, designed purposely to correspond with the ‘targets’ of conventional warfare on Sierra Leonean territory.
138. Each group was assigned to follow and buttress a particular cadre of commandos from the NPFL, with functions that encompassed both administration and combat.
139. Some of the educated and ‘ideologically-trained’ vanguards were given briefs as administrative commanders and tasks that included managing the movements and needs of civilians in the captured towns, recruiting new members into the RUF and investigating allegations of misconduct or rule-breaking.
140. Meanwhile the RUF’s ‘hardened fighters’, including its senior Battalion and Battle Group commanders, joined the frontline advances of the NPFL and began to assemble growing cadres of Sierra Leonean combatants under their own command.
141. Commandership of the First Battalion on the Southern Front had originally been earmarked for Rashid Mansaray. He had been Sankoh’s second-in-command throughout the period when the RUF was taking shape, including the training of the vanguards described above. However, due to the dispute between the two men and Mansaray’s enforced exclusion from participation in the incursion, this position had to be re-assigned.
142. The title of RUF First Battalion Commander accordingly was handed to Patrick Lamin, under whom ‘Pasawe’, Abu Kanu (who apparently adopted the battlefield alias ‘AB1B’) and Mike Lamin were senior ground commanders.
143. On the Eastern Front, the RUF Second Battalion Commander and also the overall Battlefront Commander was Mohamed Tarawallie (alias “Zino” or “CO Mohamed”). The Battle Group Commander upon entry into Kailahun District was John Kargbo. Kargbo’s biography appears to have been somewhat unique in the RUF: he was a former officer of the Special Security Division (SSD) of the Sierra Leone Police (SLP). The Commission heard that he had fought against the Doe regime in Liberia in the 1980s and was captured, tried and imprisoned. He was one ‘genuine criminal’ freed by Sankoh in his assembly of the vanguards. Pivotal ground commanders included Issa Sesay, Peter Vandy and Alicious Caulker, as well as the Libyan-trained Sankoh cohorts Noah Kanneh and CO ‘Daboh’, who joined the warfront somewhat later.

⁶³ TRC Confidential Individual Interviews with members of the RUF ‘vanguards’ contingent; interviews conducted variously in Freetown, Makeni, Magburaka, Kailahun and Kono; June to December 2003.

144. Both the Eastern and Southern Fronts of the RUF vanguards were firmly under the command and direction of Foday Sankoh. The above-named RUF commanders, as well as the RUF's senior administrators, looked to Sankoh for their own distinct instructions, as well as for validation of the commands that were passed to them by the NPFL commanders.
145. Unlike Taylor, whom the Commission did not record as being present in Sierra Leone on a single occasion in Phase I, Sankoh would frequently visit both Fronts during the opening months of the war and eventually set up his own dwellings in the village of Sandiallu, Luawa Chiefdom in the Kailahun District. In his capacity as Leader and Commander-in-Chief of the RUF, Foday Sankoh was therefore in the position to have the final say on all RUF matters, including military operations, recruitment and promotion, political strategies and disciplinary measures.
146. It is worth concluding with a re-acquaintance of the RUF's objectives at the time they launched into their incursion plan. These should be reported notwithstanding the infinitely more complex dynamics that had been introduced by the subordination of the vanguards to Taylor's NPFL forces in terms of numbers, command and control.
147. Jonathan Kposowa, the Adjutant General of the RUF from the time of the training at Camp Namma, articulated the aim of the RUF movement in his testimony to the Commission:

"The general objective of the RUF was to capture power. Sankoh told us that the Government was not doing anything better for the nation, so we could take them out. The people in power had gained power through force; so the only way to take them out was through force. Only after capturing power would we then think about ways to improve our own lives."⁶⁴

Differing Dynamics on the Eastern and Southern Fronts

148. The Commission has come to understand that despite their supposedly common hierarchy of command and control, the Eastern Front and the Southern Front evolved as largely self-contained conflicts, at least on the side of the RUF. For much of Phase I, the combatants in the East had little or no idea of how their compatriots were faring in the South and *vice versa*.
149. Such disjunction was perhaps avoided at first because Foday Sankoh was able to use Charles Taylor's Headquarters in Gbarnga as an operational base from which to monitor developments on both fronts. Indeed Foday Sankoh visited Pujehun District on several occasions in 1991, as well as spending considerable time on the ground in Kailahun.

⁶⁴ Jonathan Kposowa, former Adjutant General of the RUF who worked closely with the Leader and other members of the High Command throughout the conflict; primary interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 25 June 2003.

150. However, within a matter of weeks, acrimony began to grow between members of the NPFL and RUF factions. As will be described below, a split in the Fronts and the emergence of differing dynamics became inevitable from this point onwards.
151. At the very latest, Foday Sankoh started losing contact with the Southern Front when the NPFL faction was forced out of the Pujehun and Kenema Districts by a strong alliance of various pro-Government forces in 1991. The significant factor here was that the core of the RUF in the South refused to jump on the bandwagon of the NPFL retreat to Liberia, believing that they could retain the territory they had captured until they linked up with the Eastern command.
152. On the contrary, the RUF actively encouraged the departure of the NPFL fighters by pitting itself against them. It had become clear to the RUF that the NPFL had become a liability, not sharing the objectives of the revolution, refusing to accept commands from Sankoh or any of the RUF commanders and having committed terrible atrocities against the people. In the process, the Southern Front of the RUF became isolated, territorially and in terms of communications. The separation of the Fronts would persist from that moment onwards, until the end of Phase I.
153. In one exceptional move, Rashid Mansaray, who had joined the Southern Front after his release from detention in 1991, travelled personally into Liberia and up to Kailahun in 1992 in an attempt to bridge the gap between the Fronts. However, Mansaray became 'cut off' from his return route and became deeply immersed in the dynamics of the Eastern Front. He was eventually executed in Kailahun District in late 1993 on allegations of connivance with pro government forces.
154. Thereafter, without direct lines of communication or any other conduits of information, Sankoh heard so little news from Pujehun that he was thought by some of his closest colleagues to have given up altogether on the Southern Front's chances of success. It was only upon commencement of Phase II and a different set of operations – analysed by the Commission under the rubric of 'guerrilla warfare' – that the RUF commandos from the two Fronts came back together and the movement was once again united.
155. This clear albeit unforeseen separation of the Fronts became increasingly apparent to the Commission during its information-gathering activities. In testimonies before the Commission, most of those who had been situated in the East gave their insights on a particular set of events that were concentrated in or directed from the East. Likewise most of those who had been situated in the South told a different set of stories, specific to their own area of operations.
156. The remainder of this section attempts to characterise the key military events on each of the Fronts as they were driven by or directed against the insurgents. At every turn, through the analysis rendered, an attempt is made to place these differing dynamics into the broader context of the conflict as a whole.

Incursion on the Eastern Front: Kailahun District

157. The Commission heard that within four days of the attack on Bomaru, the full-scale incursion into Sierra Leone was launched into the same Kailahun District. Accordingly the outbreak of the conflict in Sierra Leone is most accurately recorded as having taken place on Wednesday 27 March 1991. Statements given to the Commission indicate that the attackers crossed the border at Baidu in the early evening and that the first civilian settlement on which the incursion impacted was the market town of Koindu, Kissi Teng Chiefdom.
158. This location is much further north than Bomaru, but still on Sierra Leone's Eastern border with Liberia, close to the point where the two countries also meet Guinea. The incursion took the form of an entry along the main road into Sierra Leone from Liberia, leading directly from the town of Foya Kamala, which had been the final assembly point for the insurgents. At least one border guard was shot and killed as the insurgents forced their way into Sierra Leone.
159. The Commission further heard that the incursion was led by General Francis Mewon, a Libyan-trained commander of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), who travelled over the border in a camouflaged truck. The initial objective of the attackers was to 'clear the road' up to Koindu, at which point they would set up a holding position, receive reinforcements and begin to make incremental advances southwards. In the process of achieving this objective they forcibly displaced several hundred civilians from Koindu and began to carry out looting sprees and indiscriminate killings as they passed by houses on the main road.
160. The troops in the advance contingent commanded by Mewon were exclusively comprised of NPFL combatants, numbering approximately sixty – the strength of a platoon. In character and conduct, these men in almost every sense represented the prototype of combatants who would participate in the Sierra Leone conflict.
161. The insurgents carried firearms that included AK-47s, G3 automatic weapons, General Purpose Machine Guns (GPMGs) and Rocket Propelled Grenade launchers (RPGs). While the numbers alone constituted an ostensibly formidable arsenal, certainly in the eyes of the many civilian victims who reported on their activities to the Commission, it can also be pointed out that all of the firearms cited actually fall into the military classification of 'light weapons'. From the testimony presented to the Commission, weapons of their calibre were to remain by far the most common types of arms used in this conflict as a whole.
162. The attackers did not arrive in tanks or Armoured Personnel Carriers, nor did they receive air support from bomber jets or helicopter gunships. The fighting forces that instigated the conflict were exclusively ground forces, moving on foot or in trucks, trailers, pick-up vans and 4x4 vehicles, many of which were captured or stolen from the battlefield in Liberia. In terms of clothing, these commandos betrayed their unconventional nature through a combination of camouflaged uniforms, civilian clothes and a variety of 'charms', which were comprised of shells, nets, wigs, face paints and other adornments. Their appearance was intended to induce awe and alarm in those they encountered, based on the premise, shared by fighters of almost every faction, that they looked 'fearful'.

163. Crucial differences between the incursion of 27 March 1991 and the attack on Bomaru of 23 March 1991 are to be seen in the mode of entry, the nature and scale of mobilisation and the subsequent movements of the troops in question. The Commission heard that the group led by Mewon was quickly followed into the country by other fighters in trucks and on foot. These batches of insurgents did not retreat like the Bomaru group did; on the contrary they were ordered to move further into the District in the following days.
164. The numbers of insurgents present in the northern part of Kailahun is estimated to have grown to several hundred within two weeks, by which time the town of Koindu had been consolidated as a base and checkpoint, while the further towns of Dambo, Kangama and Buedu had also been taken. SLA troops in the area are reported in most accounts to have exchanged fire with the attackers for a brief period, before eventually retreating due to lack of logistics. According to one of the RUF vanguards, the SLA at that time “would repel you if you attacked them; but they were not strategising, so they could be easily defeated in battle.”⁶⁵
165. Moreover a second, separate flank on the Kailahun Front had been opened when several further platoon-sized contingents re-entered Bomaru and its environs on 31 March 1991; many residents of Bomaru, scattered in panic at the original attack, had only just returned to the town when the new wave of insurgents arrived. This time the nearby village of Senga was also directly targeted. SLA soldiers inside and outside the towns were reported to have returned gunfire, but were hopelessly outnumbered and ill-equipped to resist. Baiwala and Mobai were then taken by the insurgents by 12 April 1991, each of them experiencing similar patterns of human rights violations at the hands of Liberian fighters speaking in Gio, Mano and Pelleh languages.
166. Testimony received by the Commission suggests that the incursion group into Kailahun was led by the ‘Special Forces’ :
- “The NPFL Liberians were really the topmost commanders in the revolution when it met me. I came to learn that the Sierra Leoneans were just sub-commanders; they were not in control.”⁶⁶

Incursion on the Southern Front: Pujehun District

167. In Pujehun, the vanguard contingent appears to have entered the country simultaneously with the NPFL commanders; the role assigned to the vanguards was to ‘backstop’ the positions taken by the NPFL as they made their advance further into the territory. A number of Sierra Leonean vanguards were left to keep control of some of the earliest townships captured by the advancing Liberians. They were also the ones who ‘prepared the ground’ for the arrival of Foday Sankoh, the Leader, in the early days of April, when he addressed crowds of local people and ‘sensitised’ them as to the purpose and objectives of his ‘revolution’.

⁶⁵ TRC Confidential Interview with a member of the RUF High Command who worked closely with Foday Sankoh after joining him in 1990; interview conducted in Freetown; 1 December 2003.

⁶⁶ TRC Confidential Interview with an RUF combatant, ‘G-5’ commander and former intelligence officer; interview conducted in Koidu Town, Kono District; 12 August 2003.

168. A second front was opened in the south with the attack on the Mano river bridge, giving the rebels unlimited access into the Pujehun district. The capture of Potoru, and other towns like Bumpah, Njaluhun, Gbaa and Benga, brought the rebels uncomfortably closer to Bo, the second city: Nyagorehun in Bargbo chiefdom about thirty miles from Bo town had come under attack by the 19th April, Bandajama and Koribondo in the Bo district by 27th April⁶⁷.
169. Word had been circulating for some time among the Bomi Hills contingent of the NPFL in Liberia that an attack on the Southern Province of Sierra Leone was being planned for the 2nd of April 1991. On the 3rd, from Bo Waterside, a SL refugee from Liberia recounted meeting the insurgents already in place⁶⁸ – he spoke with a Sierra Leonean named Ahmed Fullah who appeared to be part of a rearguard/backstop defensive position in Gendema – this was definitely reflective of the modus operandi of the insurgents: the NPFL fighters, who had a monopoly over the firearms and the lion's share of the logistics, would surge forward on the offensive, while Sierra Leonean vanguards and some of their early recruits would remain behind to guard the rear.
170. Among those who were left to guard the first town to be captured, Gendema, were the following Sierra Leonean vanguards in the initial incursion on the Southern front: Ahmed Foulah, Patrick Lamin, Augustine Koroma, Philip Palmer, Okeh George and Isatu Sesay.
171. Foulah advised some of the new recruits – “a fighter without political ideology is a criminal”; in the evening, the RUF cadres would gather together and conduct lengthy discussions about philosophy and ideology; Foulah handed some of the recruits an exercise book in which to make notes on the RUF ideology: causes of the war, eight codes of conduct, eleven principles of leadership, history of the country – Foulah himself had made his own notes in an exercise book during his training in Liberia; the new recruit in turn was intended to absorb the material, or to jot it down, to a sufficient extent to be able to pass it on to others.
172. Oliver Vandy, the commander of the Sixth Battalion of the NPFL based at Bomi Hills, led the attack on the Southern flank through Pujehun and to a great extent appears to have dictated the character of the military dynamics on that flank. On 17 June 1991, Vandy made a declaration in Zimmi that Sierra Leoneans were the avowed enemies of the NPFL. After that announcement, the Liberian contingent became extraordinarily violent towards Sierra Leonean civilians and the ruthless killings escalated. The acrimony on this flank then owed much to the strength and single-mindedness of the RUF leadership, particularly Mike Lamin, who repeatedly stood up for what was seen as the ‘rightful’ approach to revolution. Lamin, for example, was credited with the enforcement of rules and codes of conduct against miscreant NPFL commandos by administering punishments, including killings, in a public forum.⁶⁹

⁶⁷ See SLENA News 29th April 1991, Daily Mail

⁶⁸ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF ‘junior commando’ recruited on the Pujehun front, who subsequently became a Front-line Commander and Training Instructor; interview conducted in Freetown, 29 September 2003.

⁶⁹ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF ‘junior commando’ recruited on the Pujehun front, who subsequently became a Front-line Commander and Training Instructor; interview conducted in Freetown, 29 September 2003.

173. It has been contended almost universally by former RUF members who have testified to the Commission that there was a “sharp difference” between the commandos of the NPFL and the newly-formed comrades of the RUF. While the former were said to be rough and unrefined, the latter claimed to carry with them a certain sense of purpose and pride in their programme, which sometimes even manifested itself in shows of mercy or moderation.
174. The essence of this contention would seem to be borne out by the submission of one of the Paramount Chiefs who suffered a wretched plight at the hands of the insurgents, Madam Matilda Y. L. Minah V.⁷⁰ The Chief was confronted with members of both fighting factions and recounted to the Commission a catalogue of violations carried out against her, her family and her people. Her testimony is salient, though, in the degree to which it demonstrates the subtle variations in the treatment of civilians and their authority figures by the NPFL and the RUF respectively:⁷¹
- “Sometime in 1991 I was in my Chiefdom Headquarter Town of Karlu when I learnt that rebels had arrived in Pujehun... [After two days] they met me at Karlu. The group was a very strange-looking set of people among whom I could recognise only one person whom I had known during my time as a teacher at Zimmi Makpele.
- [...] After introducing himself, [the person I recognised] introduced me to the rest of the party. Their leader then explained their policy as one designed to liberate the country from corruption and all other malpractice. They then went ahead to lay down some ground rules for their operations, among which was their practice not to visit any town or village at night. He also emphasised that as a revolution, the RUF’s policy was against looting, harassment and intimidation of civilians.
175. Foday Sankoh himself entered Sierra Leone initially through the Pujehun route, appearing in Gendema on 7 April 1991 in order to address a crowd that included three distinct groups: Liberian and other NPFL fighters; a host of vanguards from both Liberia and Sierra Leone; and a large gathering of civilians from local communities. The speech he delivered was the first in a series of efforts Sankoh made to sensitise and mobilise particular groups in support of his averred revolutionary objectives. By all accounts, he spoke passionately and convincingly on such occasions and was generally well received by his audiences.
176. According to a variety of testimonies before the Commission, Sankoh often spoke of his ‘national vision’ for the country. Many of the RUF members believe that Sankoh retained this vision for the whole duration of the conflict. He thus presented himself as an ideological force – and rather than crediting any of his mentors with his ideological posturing, he would emphasise that he

⁷⁰ Madam Matilda Y. L. Minah V, Paramount Chief in the Pujehun District; submission to TRC Public Hearings held in Pujehun Town, Pujehun District, June 2003.

⁷¹ Understandably, the differing backgrounds of the attackers were not always clear to statement givers like P.C. Madam Minah. The collective and individual identities of the various insurgents mentioned in statements like this one has therefore had to be inferred by the Commission through further interviews with residents of the towns in question, combatants belonging to or captives who moved with the various factions involved, and patterns of abuse and attribution generated by the Commission’s database.

owed his background only to the people of Sierra Leone and was therefore accountable only to them.

177. Despite all the efforts that Foday Sankoh made to institute some control of the destruction reaped in the name of the RUF, he was unable to put a stop to crimes against the people of Sierra Leone. From the inception of the conflict, he apparently maintained a notebook in which he would write down the names of all those whom he perceived as requiring to answer to the people of Sierra Leone. According to his Adjutant General, the notebook was Sankoh's means of discerning individual responsibilities and noting his regrets when members of the RUF deviated from the directions he had envisaged and issued:

"Sankoh continually expressed regrets; not for the RUF in itself, but for the behaviour of its fighters. The one thing we most often heard him saying was: 'this is not what I told you.'⁷²

178. The RUF fighters became the instruments of other people's grudges. For this reason, recruitment into the RUF was compulsorily tied into the indoctrination of certain principles; at the earliest training bases, the purported idea was to educate the boys how to fight truly for their people.

179. Part of the motivation behind the insistence on a national sentiment in the RUF was meant to try and counter the dependence on personal grudges as a basis on which to wage the war. When Sankoh was around and a structure was in place to pass on such ideology, the tactic of training people ideologically was effective to a certain extent. However, this component of the RUF's programme mutated as the realities of warfare overtook it. Although it would underpin the first several years of RUF operations, it began to be eroded very early by the practice of the fighters. According to one of the earliest recruits, the commandos of the NPFL were the ones who set the predominant adverse examples:

"The first collapse of political ideology in the RUF should be laid at the door of the NPFL. Look at the behaviour of most of their fighters; you will see they have no good ideology. Many of our young boys used to imitate the actions of the NPFLs and never understood what we were trying to do."⁷³

⁷² Jonathan Kposowa, former Adjutant General of the RUF who worked closely with the Leader and other members of the High Command throughout the conflict; primary interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 25 June 2003.

⁷³ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF 'junior commando' recruited on the Pujehun front, who subsequently became a Front-line Commander and Training Instructor; interview conducted in Freetown, 29 September 2003.

180. Difficulties were also experienced in controlling the minds of those recruits who were taken from their homes against their will. Nevertheless the RUF continued to recruit forcibly. According to one of those who participated in the enlistment of new combatants, the command for such enlistment often came from the top:

Sankoh just used to get word to us: 'X amount of young men are required to come on base and train'. After all, this was a 'national struggle'.⁷⁴

181. Partly because of the miscreant activities of the NPFL and partly because of the acts committed by inexperienced or dishonest RUF fighters, the RUF contrived to alienate the civilian population from the very earliest throes of its revolutionary incursion:

When a civilian population is with you one day and against you the next, there must be a reason: if you take someone's food from them, do you think they are going to support you? It became almost a custom of the RUF that everywhere you went you would have to loot.⁷⁵

182. Among the prime reasons behind the selection of Pujehun as one of the entry points, or 'gateways', for an armed assault on the APC Government was that the District had a pedigree of anti-APC uprising. The opposition of the people of Pujehun to the APC had reached its pinnacle in 1982 with the civil unrest spearheaded by the 'Ndorgboryosoi'.

183. 'Ndorgboryosoi' was a reference to the feted 'bush devil' of the Mende people. In the 1982 rebellion, it had spawned the so-called 'Joso Group', or 'Bush Devil Group', a civil militia that embodied a particular mode of traditional warfare, invoking the assistance of the spirits. The concept was that the bush devil acted as bait to enemies by drawing them into the bush and leading them astray. It was said that the 'Joso Group' had the capability to spring surprise attacks on several points at the same time.⁷⁶

184. The erstwhile second-in-command of the 'Joso Group' civil militia from the Ndorgboryosoi conflict nearly ten years previously, Lieutenant Momoh Konneh, became an unlikely ally and co-ordinator of field operations in the RUF for a time.⁷⁷ The original motivation for this group to mobilise appears to have grown from the widespread disgust among the civilian population at the behaviour of the NPFL commandos who had entered the District. The civilians presented a proposal to Lamin Kamara, who played a role in the RUF akin to that of a close civilian liaison to Foday Sankoh. The proposal sought the re-establishment of some kind of 'Joso Group' to participate in the liberation struggle.

⁷⁴ TRC Confidential Interview with a former RUF combatant and 'G-5' commander; interview conducted in Koidu Town, Kono District; 12 August 2003.

⁷⁵ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF 'junior commando' recruited on the Pujehun front, who subsequently became a Front-line Commander and Training Instructor; interview conducted in Freetown, 29 September 2003.

⁷⁶ TRC Confidential Interview with the former Executive Secretary of the Pujehun Residents' and Descendants' Association, who traced the links between Ndorgboryosoi and the early RUF; interview conducted in Freetown; 31 December 2003.

⁷⁷ Konneh contributed initial 'manpower' of 27 willing fighters to the RUF through one of Foday Sankoh's most trusted vanguards named Lamin Kamara. Konneh's motivations for adding his men to the RUF's fighting strength are not entirely clear, but it is incontrovertible that this addition changed the character of the movement on the Southern front.

185. The RUF took on the 'Joso Group' as an integral part of its infrastructure on the Southern Front. At least 27 of them were trained under Joseph Magona (alias One-Man-One), who was the RUF Battle Group Commander at the time, albeit only for a period of about three days. They were nevertheless immediately deployed in Potoru to counter the advancing ULIMO and SLA troops. Indeed the 'Joso Group' was probably the most prominent segment of the RUF fighting force on the Pujehun front line in the early months of the conflict.
186. The 'Joso Group' went into battle in a formation similar to that which would later be deployed by the Kamajors; wielding crude weapons like cutlasses and sticks with nails attached. As they bravely confronted the soldiers 'head on' in Potoru, these militiamen struck such a fearsome impression on the RUF fighters that the latter would later be convinced that it was not prudent to confront the similarly-constituted Kamajors.
187. Of course, the original name of 'Joso Group' was directly lifted from the 1982 uprising and reflected the fact that most of the fighters were in fact the same. Sankoh was aware that this group had in fact been the lifeblood of the First Battalion in its early stages, but wanted the character of the movement in the South to be more inclusive of potential other recruits. Thus, Foday Sankoh advised that the 'Joso Group' change its name to 'RUF Action Group' – partly as a stamp of his own endorsement, partly also to distance the RUF from any overt direct link with the Ndorgboryosoi uprising of 1982.
188. The advance of the initial invaders in the Pujehun District was much faster and arguably more direct than that of their counterparts in Kailahun. The reasons for this appear to be found in a combination of several factors: effective strategising and fast acting on the part of the NPFL;⁷⁸ lack of preparation and failure to take the attack seriously on the part of the Government forces; little or no resistance (if not active support) from most of the communities the invaders entered; and surprise tactics in various forms.
189. Within a few weeks of the incursion in Pujehun, the RUF had formed a Special Task Force intended to gather information about the activities of the fighters at the front. The STF also had the job of explaining the ethos of the revolution to the civilian population, since the Action Group was insufficiently trained in the ideology to perform such a task, and the commandos of the NPFL could not be relied upon to do in a manner that would encourage anybody to believe them.

⁷⁸ In particular, it appears that the NPFL had planned in advance to attack the base near Kenema that was being used for the mobilisation of LUDF, or ULIMO, forces. This information was contained in Gibril Massaquoi's statement and will probably be corroborated by some of our further sources, including Reuben's investigations.

THE PRACTICE OF CONVENTIONAL 'TARGET' WARFARE IN PHASE I OF THE CONFLICT

190. In exposing the rationale behind the original strategy of conventional warfare adopted in Sierra Leone by the combined forces of the RUF and the NPFL, it is essential to address the phenomenon of the 'target'. The Commission understands this term to be an area of territory that the attacking force wishes to capture and establish control over, assuming an offensive or a defensive posture.
191. As such, a 'target' will often be the subject of concentrated reconnaissance and planning well before any operations are conducted there. The object therein is to assess the topography, including roads, rivers, forested areas, hills, natural resource endowments and civilian settlements within the boundaries of the 'target'.
192. In seeking to understand the operational objectives of the strategy employed by the insurgent factions, the Commission gathered evidence from some of the RUF combatants charged with its implementation. The following testimony reflects one RUF junior commando's personal interpretation of the dynamics of conventional 'target' warfare and, in particular, its interface with the civilian population:

"Foday Sankoh strictly warned that after the advancement into any 'target' and the capturing of any town or village, the inhabitants of those areas should only be responsible for feeding and accommodating [the troops] for a limited period of seventy-two hours. After that point, no single commando should stay or live in the towns, but should advance a mile or two forward and set up a defensive [position].

From thence on, the commandos should be responsible not only for the feeding but also for the security of the inhabitants of the land captured [the 'target']. All food to support the people of that newly-captured land should be taken from the enemy-controlled areas. In other words, Sankoh said: 'RUF Feed the Nation and Protect the Nation'.⁷⁹

193. On the side of the pro-Government forces, the type of warfare deployed was dependent on the nature of the threat they faced. The Army was not tactically flexible enough to develop into an effective jungle warfare unit, so it largely had to respond with a conventional strategy of frontal fighting. As one soldier who was recruited during Phase I told the Commission, there was also a degree of bravado in the approaches of the two factions to conventional 'target' warfare:

"In that first phase, we would never use by-passes and neither would they. It was like a sense that we didn't need to go in a roundabout way because we felt we were stronger than them: we just relied on our support and so did they."⁸⁰

⁷⁹ TRC Confidential interview with a former RUF junior commando recruited in Kono District in 1992; interview conducted in Freetown; 04 November 2003.

⁸⁰ TRC Confidential Interview with a former officer of the Sierra Leone Army who was recruited in 1992 under the NPRC and deployed in various parts of Kailahun, Kono and Kenema Districts; interview conducted in Freetown; 17 September 2003.

194. The tempo, medium and nature of the conflict as a whole were destined to be set by the conduct of the warring factions during Phase I. In this regard, the Commission regrets that certain facets of the tactics and operations proscribed by the High Commands of the NPFL, the RUF and the SLA were conducive to an inordinate level of civilian suffering.

Enlistment into and Expansion of the Insurgent Forces in Phase I

195. Channels of enlistment into the RUF were secured with varying degrees and different types of compulsion in the early years of the conflict. The Commission has encountered sensitive and astonishingly complex dynamics in many of the accounts of how Sierra Leoneans became 'junior commandos'.
196. In striving to generate an impartial overall understanding, it should be noted that there are always exceptional and unique tales, which will not fit comfortably into any of these categories. Nevertheless, the Commission presents the following narrative in the belief that it reflects some instances of enlistment that grew out of violations and abuses, some instances that directly caused violations and abuses, and some instances in which victims could go on to become perpetrators.

The 'Detainee-turned-Junior Commando' Category

197. The Commission received reports from both the Kailahun and Pujehun Districts that upon entering into major towns, the insurgents typically demanded that the residents should identify any soldiers, policemen or those in the community who were thought to be APC representatives or powerbrokers. In the event that these persons had fled, attention would turn to their relatives, their friends, their acquaintances and those who were deemed to know 'where they were hiding'.
198. Each of the persons pointed out in this manner, even where they denied any knowledge of the status they were alleged to hold, would be arrested and placed in captivity. Accordingly, sizeable groups of local residents, sometimes up to 20 at a time, were detained in a local cell or guardhouse on the premise that they had connections to the APC regime, however tenuous the link that connected them.
199. These detentions are of special relevance to the composition of the RUF because many of the detainees were subsequently converted into members, in a similar mode of compulsory 'recruitment' to the one applied to the 'detainee-turned-vanguard' category in Liberia. One resident of Pendembu, Kailahun District described to the Commission how he was enlisted into the RUF after a two-week period of detention until 29 April 1991:

"Upon his first arrival in Pendembu, Foday Sankoh was made to understand that some people were jailed and that they were still in the cell. Immediately he sent for us and we were brought before him. We had been told the previous night that they were going to kill us next morning, so some of us thought Sankoh was going to do the killing. Rather fortunately he was our saviour.

He became very furious with the [NPFL] commanders; he told him that this was not what he had sent them on and that they should not treat his people in such a way... He apologised to us and begged us to accept it in good faith as it was wartime... He then picked me up as the youngest among those from jail and asked for my name, my occupation and my qualification. He told me that the revolution is for those of us who are educated but have no better jobs.”⁸¹

200. A similar story was recounted from the town of Gendema, Pujehun District, where Foday Sankoh appeared on 7 April 1991 and similarly lambasted his commanders for putting prominent functionaries of the authorities in a cell. Upon securing their release, Sankoh apparently embraced and praised the detainees for their courage and welcomed them, especially the soldiers among them, into his movement.⁸²
201. According to testimonies, Sankoh described the men as “our brothers, not our enemies”; a popular refrain was that these people had no choice but to be working for the authorities because it was a one-party state. In Gendema as elsewhere, such displays by Sankoh in releasing detainees were reportedly greeted with rapturous ovations from the civilian crowds, from which Sankoh clearly drew valuable populist credentials.
202. From Pendembu, for example, Sankoh recruited his War Council Chairman S. Y. B. Rogers, his GSO-1 Moigande Moigboi Kosia and other educated persons like Francis Musah and Patrick Beinda, who would perform crucial roles in his administrative cadre. From Gendema he introduced service personnel like Patrick Mattia, Emmanuel Sheriff and Chico Myers to his growing force. In addition to their calibre, these men were destined to provide unflinching loyalty to Sankoh because he had cast himself as their ‘liberator’ and foreseen that they would then become captive to his wishes.
203. As the following testimony from a vanguard indicates, Sankoh was notorious for exerting moral compulsion over individuals and communities by playing on the perceived indebtedness of those he had freed:

“He continuously reminded me of the fact [that he was my ‘liberator’], everywhere we went. Even when we first captured my hometown, he gathered my relatives from the area and asked me to tell them where he had found me... When I just said the place, he was not comfortable. He wanted me to say ‘in prison’, which I did; so as to make it clear to the people that he had rescued me.”⁸³

⁸¹ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF ‘junior commando’ recruited on the Kailahun front, who later became a G-2 / IDU commander; interview conducted in Freetown, 13 September 2003.

⁸² TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF ‘junior commando’ recruited on the Pujehun front, who subsequently became a Front-line Commander and Training Instructor; interview conducted in Freetown, 29 September 2003.

⁸³ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF ‘vanguard’ commander who was taken from detention in Liberia to become a member of the movement; interview conducted in Freetown; 19 September 2003.

204. As with the vanguards themselves, the 'detainee-turned-junior commando' category would become a key sub-group within the RUF, whose contributions to decision-making, in the realms of administration and political strategy in particular, would to a great extent help to shape the evolution of the movement into which they had been enlisted.

Willing 'Revolutionaries' and the Influence of Foday Sankoh

205. There are, it would appear, some complicated sociological dynamics to be considered when looking at the concept of 'volunteering' one's own or a family member's services to the RUF. It is often in ignorance of such dynamics that Sierra Leoneans from outside the Kailahun District have expressed surprise and faint derision to the Commission that, at the outset at least, it had appeared that many families in Kailahun had actually urged their youngsters to join the RUF as a token of their support for the 'revolution'.
206. The Commission heard of instances in which this phenomenon occurred; but these accounts do not warrant the stigma often attached to the people of Kailahun on the basis that they 'gave their children to the RUF'.
207. At the time when the insurgents entered Sierra Leone there was deep-rooted discontent among many segments of the population, much of it attributable to the Government that the RUF declared they had come to overthrow. With this in mind it is possible to regard the acts of 'volunteerism' registered in Kailahun and elsewhere as symbols of an overriding will to change the system. At the early stages of the insurgency there was no means of knowing that the RUF would go on to become an even greater scourge on the people of the country than the oppressive Government they opposed.
208. Nevertheless a variety of individuals in both the East and South of the country, with particular emphasis on young men from rural areas, joined the RUF of their own volition, stayed with the movement until the end of the conflict and, in many cases, have gone on to become members of the Revolutionary United Front Party (RUF), which they feel still embodies their ideas for change. They comprise a category of recruits, first and most recognisably drawn from Phase I of the conflict, who absorbed the ideological rhetoric of the RUF's orators, identified appealing elements to its agenda and decided in good faith that they should ally themselves to its insurgency. They are best described, in their own words, as 'willing revolutionaries'.⁸⁴
209. 'Willing revolutionaries' testified in significant numbers to the Commission about their experiences before the conflict and their reasons for joining the RUF. The stereotype seems to fit a young man who had come from a lower-class background of abject poverty and whose parents had not enjoyed any favour or good fortune under the APC, despite often having worked hard in the agricultural sector. He had nonetheless been able to acquire enough education to perceive some of the blatant injustices to which he was being subjected; but at the point the RUF found him, he had lost all social bearing and was therefore open to the option of taking up arms.

⁸⁴ TRC Confidential interview with a former RUF junior commando recruited in Kono District in 1992; interview conducted in Freetown; 04 November 2003.

210. This stereotype could be applied to thousands of former RUF combatants and it was borne out again and again by witnesses before the Commission. A common decisive factor in many of the stories told by 'willing revolutionaries' was that they had been ultimately convinced to join the RUF through a public address by Foday Sankoh or one of his compatriots, similar to the speeches described above. One young man narrated the impact an address by Sankoh had on him in the following terms:

"What Sankoh said was what really made me stay with the RUF for a long time – his argument was really convincing. He made reference to many Sierra Leoneans who had been killed by the APC; to the mismanagement of our natural resources, not just diamonds, but all the land – that there is a lot to boast of, but what does the average man have to show for it? He kept coming back to the point that Sierra Leoneans were being deprived of their legal rights; he talked about so much bad governance; how politicians were manipulating the people – through tribal politics, sectional politics and party politics... [He said] that unless we bridge the gap between the North and the South we can never establish national unity... and without unity we can never achieve progress. Pa Sankoh had a huge amount of national pride."⁸⁵

211. Similarly 'willing revolutionaries' testified that they had seen the RUF as a means of effecting a positive change in the country, of freeing themselves from their soul-destroying socio-economic circumstances and of putting right some of the injustices that they perceived to have left them disadvantaged or marginalised in society. Through its discussions with these RUF junior commandos in this category, the Commission gained plentiful evidence of Foday Sankoh's uncanny ability to exploit the legacies of the multi-faceted bad governance that successive political elites had wrought on the country.
212. It is indeed in this regard that the Commission has come to realise the centrality of bad governance, corruption, all forms of discrimination and the marginalisation of certain sectors of society among the causes of conflict in Sierra Leone. As has been discussed in the chapter on antecedents, these historical ills and injustices had prepared the ground for someone of Sankoh's renowned manipulative ability to canvass among the people and find scores of would-be RUF commandos who could be brought on board with relatively little persuasion.
213. Sankoh in fact made pointed and often astute attempts to sensitise and mobilise particular groups in support of his averred 'revolutionary' objectives. By all accounts, he spoke passionately and convincingly in his public addresses and was apparently well-received by his audiences in the early weeks of the conflict. In addition to being a generally compelling character, he would often adapt his style, or indeed his rhetoric, to play on the particular characteristics or insecurities of the local population who were receiving him.
214. Thus in the Kailahun District, Sankoh's addresses dealt with the plight of impoverished farmers and coffee or cacao harvesters who were historically prevented from receiving due compensation for their yields; in the coastal District of Pujehun he was reported to have spoken about fishery and marine

⁸⁵ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF 'junior commando' recruited on the Pujehun front, who subsequently became a Front-line Commander and Training Instructor; interview conducted in Freetown, 29 September 2003.

resources, as well as the local undercurrents of social disgruntlement that had given rise to events like the Ndorgboryosoi rebellion in the 1980s.

215. To accomplish such a level of familiarity with the diverse cultural and historical contours of Sierra Leone and its peoples had required years of exposure and application on Sankoh's part; it is this recognition that lends credence to the theory that Sankoh had been methodically gathering insights and experiences that would stand him in good stead as a 'revolutionary' leader for years in advance of his 1991 incursion. His time working as a photographer in the late 1970s and early 1980s, along with his extensive in-country travelling, had permitted Sankoh to gather up multiple public opinions on the perceived wrongs of the APC and thus to shape himself as a man of the people wherever he might go.
216. These perspectives on Foday Sankoh go some way to assisting our understanding of how certain members of the RUF were drafted in with what one might describe as the minimum degree of compulsion. These can be considered, on a certain level, to have been 'revolutionary-minded' recruits, who found common cause with the powerful, albeit unsophisticated, case for a revolution expounded by Sankoh.
217. Many of them, in the fullness of time, appear to have abandoned their original philosophical orientations and engaged in atrocities in the name of the RUF; many of them became discouraged by the acts of others, but saw dissent as futile when the most powerful commanders were prone to executing dissenters; some of them indeed opposed the course and conduct of the war, but their opposition apparently cost them their lives.
218. For the few such 'willing revolutionaries' who remained, it is fair to consider the perpetual paradoxes that they found themselves confronting as the realities of warfare enveloped them. Yet the incontrovertible truth is that none of these people ultimately did anything concrete to temper the ascendancy of volatile combatant commanders in the RUF or to halt the overall spate of violations and abuses for which the faction is collectively responsible.
219. Thus, in the Commission's summation, there were indeed some RUF members who genuinely and consistently seemed to believe in the possibility of effecting democratic change through a revolutionary programme; but right from the start of Phase I they constituted a miniscule and quite powerless minority in the RUF.
220. It was equally possible for the Commission to discern that there was often a very thin dividing line between purported 'genuine subscription' to the values of the RUF's agenda and the opportunistic pursuit of personal gain or retribution based on misplaced grudges, grievances and vendettas. In short, many people claimed to be 'revolutionary' when they were actually nothing of the sort; they simply wanted to utilise the RUF as a means of acquiring a firearm and a vehicle for their own aggression. As the RUF's former Adjutant General testified to the Commission:

“Some people felt that going on the base would give them a chance to revenge for anything that had happened to them.”⁸⁶

The Original Strategic Objectives of Conventional ‘Target’ Warfare

221. The incursion as it had been envisaged by Foday Sankoh had one central objective: the capture of the strategic military barracks at Daru, situated on the banks of the Moa River in the Kailahun District. Its success would have cleared the way for the insurgents to consolidate their grip on Kailahun District without fear of large-scale attacks by the Sierra Leone Army and further to launch operations into the important Kenema District. It would also have signalled a more successful adoption of the blueprint carved out by the NPFL in the Liberian conflict, whereby Provincial military installations were routinely captured and thereafter became the training bases and fortresses of the NPFL.
222. Moa Barracks, at Daru, in the Kailahun District, was to stand out in Phase I of the conflict as the main hinge on which the fortunes of both the insurgency and the defensive effort would swing.
223. As far as the defensive effort was concerned, President Momoh, who was also a General in the Sierra Leone Army, knew that all available resources would have to be plied into the Barracks speedily and methodically to fortify it as his Eastern stronghold; its fall would have deprived the Army of its single largest installation and quite possibly stood to cripple the war effort irrecoverably before it had even properly begun.
224. Conventional ‘target’ warfare suited the geographical dynamics on the ground in Kailahun District: sizeable towns spaced apart at regular and manageable intervals; deployments of SLA units whose retreat would follow a fairly predictable path along main roads; and a series of distinct ‘targets’, progressively greater in size, that would build up to the grand strategic objective of capturing Moa Barracks, Daru.
225. Moreover, the social, economic and political conditions were amenable to a programme of the sort that the RUF purported to stand for. The area was known to be a hotbed of support for the SLPP, which made it relatively easy to derive cheap ‘revolutionary’ capital out of the political inclinations of the populace by adopting a signature colour of green and an emblem of palm fronds as RUF symbols. The following testimony suggests that these tactics were a rather crude effort, since the symbolism was not even understood by some of the people who were meant to spread its practice:

“There was a little boy who ran up to me as soon as he saw me. He asked if I was a ‘Momoh soldier’. At that time they were speaking Liberian pigeon language. The boy asked me if I was a ‘Momoh soldier’. I said I was not a soldier. I asked him who brought the war. He said they had somebody supporting them and his name was Foday Sankoh [and] that he was a Sierra Leonean. ‘We have just come to remove

⁸⁶ Jonathan Kposowa, former Adjutant General of the RUF who worked closely with the Leader and other members of the High Command throughout the conflict; primary interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 25 June 2003.

APC', he said. The other boy said that we should have a palm tree or a green cloth tied on our hand."⁸⁷

226. The people were mostly farmers, who had received an especially rough deal under the APC because they were never properly paid for their agricultural produce and forced to labour long and hard to support their families. One farmer's son who subsequently joined the RUF described his perspective in the following terms:

"Members of Parliament in the APC Government regime chiefly exploited and oppressed the poor farmers with their selfish and greedy ideas. They and their children evaded all works of life by eating out of the farmers' farming activities... They would either cheat them of the money that was supposed to be paid for their produce, delay the payments, or pay the farmers by instalments instead of paying them everything at a stretch... They made sure that the farmers could not make any effective use out of their money earned from their plantations to make them become prosperous. We knew it was a deliberate act... so that everything should work at the advantage of the oppressors and at the disadvantage of the poor farmers."⁸⁸

227. The Commission heard that when Sankoh's revolution was launched through speeches laced with populism and panaceas, many villagers were convinced that they should support the RUF as a preferable alternative to the system under which they struggled. A combatant cadre grew out of many different sources of enlistment, including volunteers. There were high numbers of 'willing revolutionaries', as people were seduced by the simplistic RUF mantra that claimed the first step to material betterment was to turn the guns of the system against it: "Arms to the People, Power to the People, Wealth to the People."

228. There were also recruits who were forced to undertake training purely on the basis that they were 'able-bodied', no matter what their age. The Commission heard from the RUF's Adjutant General that overt pressure was applied in this regard to ensure that would-be fighters effectively had no choice:

"At that time anybody who was fit to walk could be put on the training base... if you didn't go for training you would have a load put on your head and be made to carry it to Liberia."⁸⁹

229. The training bases set up by the RUF entailed terrifying exercises that habitually tormented their participants and often led to their deaths. As one child recruit testified to the Commission's closed hearings, this torture commenced from the moment the 'training' started.

"The first day we arrived on the place they ordered us to lie flat on the floor. We had no idea and we lay down as if we were lying on a bed.

⁸⁷ Morie Feika, former RUF junior commando, recruited on the Kailahun front in 1991; testimony before Commission public hearings held in Kailahun Town, Kailahun District; 13 May 2003.

⁸⁸ TRC Confidential interview with a former RUF junior commando recruited in Kailahun District in 1991; interview conducted in Tongo Field, Kenema District; 15 July 2003.

⁸⁹ Jonathan Kposowa, former Adjutant General of the RUF who worked closely with the Leader and other members of the High Command throughout the conflict; primary interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 25 June 2003.

They showed us how to lie down flat and if they saw your foot up they will use their foot to stamp your foot down. Then they will use the gun; they put it on the forehead of the first person in the line and fire! In that process if you are hit by the bullet you are killed. If you are not perfectly in line with the first person, that is the end of your life. They were doing that so that we can get accustomed with the sound of a gun. They taught us how to fire guns for ourselves. They also taught us courtesy and discipline that will show us how to respect them. But even though you respect them they will not respect you. It was no formal training where you go to a classroom. With that kind of training if you are sent to the warfront only God will help you.”⁹⁰

230. Additionally the administrative cadre took on added capacity by abducting, indoctrinating and affording lofty positions to a range of local teachers and clerks in the communities they entered.
231. On the Southern Front, on the other hand, neither the terrain nor the human population was quite as susceptible to this type of operation. In terms of land, there were three natural obstacles to overcome from the outset: the site of a major diamond-mining settlement, in the shape of Zimmi, surrounded by lucrative fields of gemstones; the path of the Moa River through the heart of the District, flowing into the awkward Turner Peninsula on its Southern coast; and the absence of major military installations that were easily and foreseeably assailable.
232. The first factor, material wealth, would prove to be a distraction of avarice, whereby NPFL commandos with a patent obsession for self-enrichment would choose to indulge themselves in looting and mining activities, using mostly forced labour, rather than to advance further into the territory of Sierra Leone. The second factor, the riverine terrain, could not be negotiated due to sloth: effectively the NPFL commandership could not muster the necessary sophisticated tactical assaults that would have been required to transgress plentiful rivers and marshlands. The third factor, distant targets, posed a quandary to the insurgents primarily because it required concerted and sustained application on their part; having been coaxed into more profitable pursuits by the first factor and somewhat overawed by the second factor, the fighting force demonstrated that it was simply not up to a task of that magnitude.
233. The Commission’s research attests to the fact that the NPFL faction, comprising Liberians and a selected few other nationals of foreign countries in the sub-region, largely confined their bases in the Pujehun District to the areas around larger towns like Zimmi. In other words, since the goals were further out of reach than originally anticipated, it was easier for the NPFL just to rest on their laurels and live off the land.
234. This widespread deviation from original strategic objectives was confirmed by the Commission in interviews with many of those who fought for the RUF side alongside the NPFL. As one of the vanguards on the Southern Front testified:

⁹⁰ TRC Confidential Testimony from an early child recruit of the RUF in Kailahun District; testimony before Commission closed hearings held in Kailahun Town, Kailahun District; 14 May 2003.

“When the fighting started, those who were in control of the arms, when they reached Zimmi, thought that Zimmi was Bo or Kenema. The properties that they met around those areas were all that they were after, to take back to Liberia. They became so amazed with all that they had met in Pujehun that they totally forgot about continuing the war. Instead, they were only interested in looting and taking properties back to Liberia. We started getting concerned: ‘Are these people here to help us fight our war or are they just here to take all our peoples’ properties?’”⁹¹

235. In the case of the Moa Barracks, it led to a fierce, all-out battle far greater than the one that the insurgents had planned for at the outset of their planning. The magnitude of the battle in fact attests to the added importance that had been attached to the Barracks in the light of ECOMOG’s utterances that it could become a new station for its forces (supplanting Lungi on the grounds of geographical and strategic importance).
236. The Commission heard testimonies about the ferocity of the battle for Moa Barracks, Daru from combatants who fought there in several distinct capacities: RUF fighters whose objective had been to overcome the Barracks; SLA officers who provided infantry power to the defensive operations; and ‘irregulars’ from both the North and South of the country who fought on the side of the Government troops. Each of the perspectives garnered differed subtly from the next, but a unanimous, two-part conclusion was shared by them all: the battle was the single most critical strategic confrontation between the two sides in the entire duration of Phase I and it culminated in defeat for the insurgents.
237. The clash was essentially played out from the two opposite banks of the Moa River. The river runs between the town of Daru, on the Eastern bank, and the Barracks themselves, on the Western bank, traversed by a landmark bridge that is the sole crossing point in that vicinity. The insurgent forces were spearheaded by some of the most senior and most hardened fighters among Taylor’s NPFL, who were of both Liberian and Burkinabe nationalities. They were buttressed by Sierra Leonean and Liberian RUF fighters, including up to two platoons of vanguards from the Eastern Front. The total force numbered up to one thousand commandos, who were well armed with light weapons and grenades, but had nothing of the cumulative calibre possessed by the pro-Government forces on the other side of the river.
238. On the side of the Government, the most formidable firepower was provided by the Guinean Armed Forces (GAF) faction, which is thought to have comprised only 200 troops. It was not so much the quantity as the quality of their artillery that made the difference in the confrontation that ensued.

⁹¹ TRC Confidential Individual Interviews with members of the RUF ‘vanguards’ contingent; interviews conducted variously in Freetown, Makeni, Magburaka, Kailahun and Kono; June to December 2003.

Early Tensions between NPFL and RUF commandos

239. Tensions between the RUF vanguards and the Liberian-led NPFL faction started to arise at a very early stage of the conflict. Indeed, rather than being drawn out along strictly factional lines, instances of in-fighting were reported to have taken place even between members of the same groups. For example, a series of incidents in Bunumbu Town in Kailahun District demonstrated the types of bloody spats that broke out among NPFL fighters. A Gambian commando, apparently also Libyan-trained, known to his compatriots only by the name of Abraham, had carried out a summary execution of one of his Liberian colleagues who was alleged to have committed various atrocities against civilians.⁹²
240. In retaliation for this act, Abraham was set upon by the leader of the Liberian group, Colonel Samuel Tuah, shot in each of his legs and left to bleed slowly to death. Some of the Sierra Leonean vanguards who had originally supported Abraham's effort to quell such atrocities against civilians were understandably silenced by Tuah's response. By demonstrating such a callous disregard for human life and by slaughtering those – even from among their own – who stood in their way, the Liberians succeeded in orchestrating a reign of terror over the territories they entered.
241. Sankoh was unable to control the Liberians. Had it been simply a question of financial or logistical support, perhaps Sankoh could still have retained the prerogative to direct operations on the ground, commanded the unbending loyalty of his troops and taken firm leadership decisions to guide his 'revolution' in the direction he alone saw fit. However, such a level of autonomy would prove impossible to achieve whilst up to 2,000 armed NPFL commandos were present on the territory of Sierra Leone. These fighters were detrimental to Sankoh's leadership in two key ways. The most obvious is that collectively they had little respect for Sankoh once they crossed the border and therefore acted with malice and violence exactly as they wished, which was often against Sankoh's will.
242. The second factor is perhaps not immediately perceptible, but would result in irreparable damage to Sankoh's agenda. Having brought them here under the auspices of the RUF, he had to accept that in the eyes of the population these people *were* the RUF. Accordingly, whether Sankoh liked it or not, the acts and atrocities carried out by the NPFL fighters would be his ultimate responsibility.

⁹² Among his other violations, the Liberian NPFL fighter had been witnessed by Abraham and many of the local townspeople as he killed and beheaded a civilian female, who was the mother of his girlfriend. The Liberian's justification for this act was that he had been visited in a dream by the evil spirit of his victim, and warned that she would place a curse on him if he pursued his relationship with her daughter. Accordingly, the Liberian had become so haunted by the prospect that he had told his colleagues of his intention to kill the woman's spirit for good. He had attacked her at her home, shot her dead, decapitated her corpse and thrown her remains into the bush, instructing the townspeople not to go near it. For this heinous act, Abraham decided to execute the Liberian.

THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF THE RESPONSE TO THE ARMED INCURSION

The APC Legacy of Deficiencies in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA)

243. The Commission heard numerous testimonies regarding deficiencies in the conventional state security apparatus at the outbreak of the war. In their totality, these accounts paint a picture of grave abandonment of the basic needs of the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF) under the APC, to the extent that the country was devoid of an operational Army when it needed one most in 1991.
244. Some witnesses have indicated a belief that the impoverishment of the military was merely symptomatic of the universally tight constraints on Government spending that blighted the APC regime, both prior to and after the start of the conflict.⁹³ Others have speculated that the APC had purposely suppressed the development of the state military forces through a combination of misplaced priorities and 'intense political interference'; according to a lucid and authoritative submission from Brigadier (Retired) Kellie H. Conteh, "it seemed a deliberate strategy to make the Army a non-effective fighting force."⁹⁴
245. In the light of the Commission's findings on the system-wide bad governance of the APC, there is little need to reiterate here the extent to which the military was marginalised throughout the 1970s and 1980s. By the commencement of the conflict, the army didn't have moveable vehicles, communication facilities were non-existent, and most of the soldiers were not combat ready. They had not attended refresher courses or gone to the practice range for years. The senior officers had indulged in the good life and were therefore unwilling to go to the warfront. The army was simply in a mess.⁹⁵ It is worthwhile to point out certain specific effects of that period of systematic institutional destruction insofar as they were relevant to the dynamics of the military's involvement in the conflict.
246. The Commission heard scathing assessments from several long-serving officers. Colonel K. E. S. Boyah drew attention to the staleness as well as the small size of the force:

"Before the war, we just had this single full battalion; just First Battalion. It consisted of a little below 1,000 extremely old soldiers, who have been here before, during the advent of the post-colonial days. So they were permanently here and they were in their [relatively] large numbers. Then we had the Second Battalion of about 500 to 600 personnel; then the

⁹³ Colonel K. I. S. Kamara, current Director of Army Medical Services and senior officer in the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF) who served under the APC, NPRC, AFRC and SLPP Governments during the conflict period; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 15 October 2003.

⁹⁴ Brigadier (Retired) Kellie H. Conteh, current National Security Co-ordinator at the Office of National Security and former long-serving officer in the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF); testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown; June 2003.

⁹⁵ Brigadier (Retired) Kellie H. Conteh, current National Security Co-ordinator at the Office of National Security and former long-serving officer in the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF); testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown; June 2003.

training units in Daru and Benguema. So it was not that much. I am not sure we were up to about 3,000; the infantry elements.”⁹⁶

247. Colonel Bashiru Conteh delivered a similarly bleak verdict in his testimony:

“In my opinion because our Army was very small at the time, it was more or less a ceremonial army not really fit for combat... the few officers who were there were not competent officers.

[We] are talking about the entire Army including fewer than four thousand soldiers. In fact it was not even up to four thousand; it was just three thousand plus.”⁹⁷

248. In spite of its withering numbers and apparently for the sake of keeping up international appearances, the APC Government had posted 377 soldiers – more than one tenth of its total troops – to Liberia in late 1990 to participate in ECOMOG operations there. Asked if this LEOBATT ‘Special Battalion’ comprised the ‘cream of the crop’, Colonel Bashiru Conteh, Adjutant to the deployment, responded as follows:

“I want to believe so because we were taken from different units and there were a lot of debates on the nomination of officers, the nomination of the NCOs (Non-Commissioned Officers) and even the nominations of the men. They were very selective.

That was the first International Mission after the Congo crisis in 1961. So the commander by then had hand-picked officers who could represent the country outside properly.”⁹⁸

249. By the time a second LEOBATT contingent left for Liberia on 3 March 1991, it could be said that more than half of the SLA’s ‘competent officers’ were in fact stationed outside the country.

250. SLA troops had been rendered not only collectively dysfunctional, but also individually disaffected. From the testimonies of soldiers who filled both the senior and junior ranks at the outbreak of the conflict, it is clear to the Commission that personal, familial and tribal disharmonies had eaten away at the sense of common purpose that is supposed to be the very essence of a national army. At every level, right to the core of the institution, morale was pathetic.

⁹⁶ Colonel K. E. S. Mboyah, long-serving officer in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), erstwhile Battalion Commander and Director of Defence Information; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 29 August 2003.

⁹⁷ Colonel Bashiru S. Conteh, current Director of Training in the Sierra Leone Army, erstwhile Battalion Commander and one-time Secretary of State for the Eastern Province under the NPRC; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 02 August 2003.

⁹⁸ Colonel Bashiru S. Conteh, current Director of Training in the Sierra Leone Army, erstwhile Battalion Commander and one-time Secretary of State for the Eastern Province under the NPRC; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 02 August 2003.

251. In place of pride and professionalism, the soldiers – particularly senior officers – had indulged in vices such as embezzlement of public funds and favouritism along nepotistic or tribal lines. These were abuses of power that had been learnt and were copied from counterparts among the political elite. Their practice in the military meant that most of the officer class was corrupt while junior ranks harboured unhealthy levels of resentment towards their seniors.
252. The Army was also increasingly plagued by what were described to the Commission as ‘generation gaps’: fundamental disparities in the self-perceptions of different ‘generations’ of recruits, grouped by their year or ‘era’ of recruitment. Where a particular set of soldiers identified itself according to an exclusive ‘group mentality’, this would give rise to tensions and prejudices from and towards others.
253. One striking reference to this trend came in the testimony of Julius Maada Bio, a Lieutenant at the beginning of the war who would later become Head of State by virtue of his seizure of the Chairmanship of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC). Bio identified a host of more stringent standards of attainment in the processes used to recruit or promote soldiers in the late 1980s and claimed that they had helped to develop “a totally different breed of officers”. According to Bio’s testimony, the officers who had benefited from the reforms of the 1980s were convinced of their superior pedigree:
- “The bulk of the military by 1990 was just ceremonial... most of the old officers were there because of tribal affiliations and did not merit their positions. But if you compared our batch to previous batches, you would have realised a significant improvement... for example in the general level of education.”⁹⁹
254. Bio’s statement appears to carry a lot of credence in fact. At least a degree of positive evolution seems to be attributable to the introduction of the Progressive Qualification Scheme, Levels One and Two (PQS 1 & 2), which was an initiative of the Operations Department to ensure that Army ranks were connected to merit. However, it should be reiterated that new developmental initiatives were terribly narrow in their scope; for example, only two sets of PQS 1 & 2 officers had graduated before 1991 and any further training programmes envisaged were nipped in the bud when war broke out. Thus, it would have been premature to think that the Army was somehow turning the corner towards higher standards.
255. The Commission has instead come to realise that even the modest incremental advances made in these areas were being interpreted by trainees and non-trainees alike as grounds on which to differentiate themselves from their colleagues and to assert their own superiority, regardless of rank. Loyalty, respect and obedience did not obtain along the lines of conventional command structure; they depended much more on arbitrary considerations such as where you were from, which ethnic group you belonged to and whether you might be amenable to engaging in or turning a blind eye to someone else’s malpractice. Quite apart from feeling that the politicisation and stigma attached to their collective identity was unjustified, many soldiers confessed to disillusionment with the ways in which personnel were treated within the military hierarchy.

⁹⁹ Brigadier (Retired) Julius Maada Bio, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from January to March 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 30 September 2003.

256. It would be an understatement to say that the Army was not unified. There were innumerable cleavages in competence and perceived competence that served to divide and alienate at every level: they caused disagreements between members of the officer corps on key directional issues; they precipitated widespread mutual suspicion in the rank and file; and they distanced the former cadre from the latter.

257. In addition to the manpower weaknesses there were also operational deficiencies:

“The problem was that the whole thing was new to us. We were not prepared for it, in terms of training, in terms of arms and ammunition, in terms of getting the right structure to support a war machinery; and a lot of other things were against us in the system. Quite apart from the fact that the manpower itself was not there. The operations too were very new to us, because the conventional nature that is taught within the system was not what was applied by the rebels then. So it takes you sometime before people rethink to respond to the type of warfare that was introduced into the country.”¹⁰⁰

258. Most of the units deployed along the first line of defence in 1991 were without any form of modern communications equipment. Although they were scattered across considerable distances and unforgiving terrain, they mostly depended on human messengers to transmit situation reports or pleas for assistance to neighbouring deployments.

259. The length of time entailed in delivering a message was almost always prohibitive of any robust preventive measures being taken by the recipient. Where fear or folly caused soldiers to act upon messages of this nature, they were actually more likely to put their own lives in jeopardy than to counter the reported threat:

“By the time a message was delivered at point B the situation would have been so different that any plan based on the message would prove to be useless and in most cases suicidal.”¹⁰¹

The Legacy of Political Preference for Paramilitary Forces

260. It is worth pointing out that the Special Security Division (SSD), effectively the paramilitary wing of the Sierra Leone Police (SLP) force, had prospered in almost inverse proportion to the conventional military. The preference given to the SSD, formerly the Internal Security Unit or ISU, was attributable to the personal insecurities of Siaka Stevens, as the Commission heard from the incumbent Inspector-General of the Sierra Leone Police, Brima Acha Kamara:

¹⁰⁰ Colonel K. E. S. Mboyah, long-serving officer in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), erstwhile Battalion Commander and Director of Defence Information; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 29 August 2003.

¹⁰¹ Brigadier (Retired) Kellie H. Conteh, current National Security Co-ordinator at the Office of National Security and former long-serving officer in the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF); testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown; June 2003.

“Once Siaka Stevens became Prime Minister in 1967 and the plans to unseat him failed, he began to rely more on the police than the military to protect him in undertaking his functions. A paramilitary wing was formed inside the police and gradually it became an instrument of tyranny and suppression. This was the start of the drift from [the police’s] traditional peace-keeping constitutional role to that of a fighting force and its subsequent failure to protect the people...”¹⁰²

261. Many of the SSD’s functionaries had undergone advanced training abroad, notably in Guinea and in Cuba on state-sponsored programmes in the 1970s.¹⁰³ SSD officers were the enforcers of the will of the Government and were always on hand to perform specialist security tasks as a complement, or a substitute, to the RSLMF, as the Army was then known. Notably the SSD had made a decisive contribution to the quelling of the Ndorgboryosoi rebellion in the Pujehun District in 1982. The participation of the SSD in such operations invariably made the military acutely aware of its own inadequacies, but the poorly-funded and institutionally backward RSLMF could not aspire to even rudimentary improvements, far less parity in combat capacity with the SSD.
262. The Commission has interpreted the predominance of the SSD over the military as a sign that the APC state had concentrated its resources on equipping itself to put down dissent and potential uprising domestically, including that which emanated from inside the Army. This preoccupation with internal security had a naturally debilitating effect on the RSLMF and in particular its readiness for an attack from outside the country.

Incapacity at the Point of the Attack on Bomaru and the Incursion into Sierra Leone

263. Neither the government in Freetown nor the army appeared to have taken the first armed incursion of 23 March very seriously. The military’s response to the events of 23rd March was very slow due to logistical and other problems
264. Although the strength of the Army deployment was bolstered from a platoon to a company, this increase in troop size happened only in Bomaru. Other areas of military deployments were still undermanned (with platoon size deployments) for a border that is about one hundred and fifty miles in length: any further attacks could not be easily defended. Under protected, the entire border region was left open to the attacks that followed the initial attack on Bomaru.
265. The army at that time was unused to any kind of warfare and so lacked the skills to counter the attacks that that followed 23rd March. It was purely a ceremonial army and was ill prepared for a war of this nature.¹⁰⁴ It lacked logistics, and personnel. Intense political interference suppressed most training initiatives and the military had less training in field exercise since 1980.

¹⁰² Brima Acha Kamara, current Inspector-General of the Sierra Leone Police (SLP); testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown; 23 July 2003.

¹⁰³ M. S. Dumbuya, Former Head of the Special Security Division (SSD) of the Sierra Leone Police and one of those who attended a training academy in Cuba in the early 1970s; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 1 July 2003.

¹⁰⁴ Colonel Bashiru S. Conteh, current Director of Training in the Sierra Leone Army, erstwhile Battalion Commander and one-time Secretary of State for the Eastern Province under the NPRC; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 02 August 2003.

266. For almost ten years, troops did not have the privilege of practicing their skills at the range for long periods even with their personal rifles. In 1989, the army had less than three infantry battalions (about 1,500 men) many of whom needed training; less than 30% of its transportation needs, less than 20% of support weapons and many more essential equipment in drastically short supply or non-existent.¹⁰⁵ By 1991, the total strength of the military in Sierra Leone was less than four thousand, with the 'cream of the crop' deployed in Liberia as part of the LEOBATT contingent of ECOMOG.¹⁰⁶
267. As early as 6th and 16th April 1991 officers of the Special Security Division SSD, Liberian United Defence Forces (LUDF) and Guinean troops were reported fighting alongside Government troops in Potoru, Mobai and Daru and parts of Kenema district. 'Self defense committees were set up in the affected districts': civilians used arms such as machetes, shot guns and sticks in support of the armed forces.¹⁰⁷ Civil defense units were formed in many towns with volunteers receiving tactical training to combat possible rebel attacks on their towns and villages.¹⁰⁸
268. Two months following the initial incursion, five senior officers Col. Lansana Turay, Major John Demby, Major Samuel Wellington, Capt. Theophilus Tengbeh and Capt. Maurice Banya were dismissed from the military. (These officers were in charge of most of the areas that fell to the rebels in the early days of the war.) The decision was a lighter penalty to court martial and had to do with the performance of these officers in their respective roles on the front lines in the eastern and southern provinces: they lost the confidence of the combat forces under their command.¹⁰⁹
269. By June it was reported that government troops had virtually halted the progress of rebel forces in their clinical operation and were mopping up areas previously occupied by the rebels.
270. From the foregoing it is patently clear that the Sierra Leone Army embarked upon the eleven-year conflict from the brink of oblivion. The military was in a state of utter disrepair when the conflict broke out, hampered by ravaging deficiencies in its management, alarming inadequacies and glaring rifts in its human resources and a further catalogue of shortcomings across the full spectrum of its operational capabilities. In the views of some of those in the ranks, the range of problems afflicting the Army was so grave as to perhaps be insurmountable by whatever remedial efforts might be mustered in the decade that lay ahead:

¹⁰⁵ Brigadier (Retired) Kellie H. Conteh, current National Security Co-ordinator at the Office of National Security and former long-serving officer in the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF); testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown; June 2003.

¹⁰⁶ Colonel Bashiru S. Conteh, current Director of Training in the Sierra Leone Army, erstwhile Battalion Commander and one-time Secretary of State for the Eastern Province under the NPRC; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 02 August 2003.

¹⁰⁷ See SLENA News 6th April 1991

¹⁰⁸ Daily Mail 18th May 1991

¹⁰⁹ See New Citizen 1st June 1991. It is surprising that a government which had not taken action on intelligence and which had failed to equip its national army could take such measures on poorly equipped frontline commanders)

"The Army was not worthy of being called a military force when the war broke out and it was never going to be possible to make it worthy of that name during the war."¹¹⁰

271. In a series of speeches designed to encourage solidarity among the local population and the various expatriate communities based in Sierra Leone, President Momoh was eager to portray the efforts to defend Sierra Leone against the threat of the insurgents as an issue whose successful resolution was in the interests of all the countries of the sub-region. Within two weeks of the outbreak of hostilities, Momoh announced that both Nigeria and Guinea had "responded positively to our requests [for assistance] by sending military hardware and soldiers,"¹¹¹ although the sizes and mandates of the respective deployments from these states remained a topic of some confusion and consequent debate. The Nigerians, for example, were moved to correct rumours in their local press that as many as three Battalions had been deployed in Sierra Leone soon after the start of the conflict, announcing that in fact their contribution numbered only 800 soldiers and that its role was restricted to guarding "airports and other key installations to ensure their protection from the threat of war."¹¹² In effect it appears that Nigeria had simply bolstered the defence of Lungi Airport, whose strategic importance was as much derived from its use as a take-off and landing point for ECOMOG flights over Liberia as from its status as Sierra Leone's only international airfield. Indeed, the Commission did not receive any reports of the participation of Nigerian soldiers in warfront activities in Sierra Leone until later in the conflict.
272. The impact of the use of Guinean troops was much more immediately felt, although like that of the Nigerians, their positioning was representative of a broader sub-regional dimension to the conflict.

¹¹⁰ Brigadier (Retired) Julius Maada Bio, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from January to March 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 30 September 2003.

¹¹¹ Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service (SLBS), Freetown; "Momoh says Troops and Material Received from Nigeria and Guinea"; broadcast on 12 April 1991, included in the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 April 1991.

¹¹² Voice of Nigeria, Lagos; "Only 800 Nigerian soldiers in Sierra Leone, says Nigerian official"; broadcast on 04 July 1991, included in the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 08 July 1991.

THE COUP OF 29 APRIL 1992 THAT LED TO THE OVERTHROW OF THE APC GOVERNMENT

273. The original testimonies proffered to the Commission indicate that the events of Wednesday 29 April 1992 have been widely misinterpreted and misunderstood in the broader history of Sierra Leone's conflict. The crucial feature of this landmark date is that notions of power and control in the military and political spheres converged significantly for the first time since the launch of the full-scale incursion just over a year earlier.
274. To the considerable and undoubted surprise of the wider population, the dynamics of the warfront were brought to the theatre of Freetown not by the insurgent forces but by elements of the national Army. Thus the fifteen years of one-party rule by the All People's Congress (APC) were brought to an end in the space of a single day by a cunning and decisive coup plot conceived, organised and executed by a contingent of SLA junior officers. It culminated in the establishment of a military administration led by Captain Valentine E. M. Strasser under the nomenclature of the National Provisional Ruling Council, (NPRC).
275. The inference that the coup was connected to the insurgency is not entirely misplaced, for each of the men at the heart of its conception had been engaged in head-to-head combat with RUF forces for the several months immediately prior to April 1992, often being asked to overcome massive logistical constraints as well as incontestably fierce adversaries. However it is entirely mistaken to extrapolate further that the action was the handiwork of the insurgents, or even that they must have had a hand in it.
276. The NPRC coup plotters acted as an independent group with an autonomous agenda. They did not overthrow the Government in order to secure victory for the RUF or to validate the insurgents' objectives in waging war on the state. Nor did they intend for a moment to unify ranks with the militiamen they had been fighting against and call a halt to the hostilities that were ravaging the country.
277. Such direct connivance would have been welcomed by the RUF – or, more accurately, at least by the RUF's Sierra Leonean fighters – and to a great extent its troops were disappointed when no such offer to form an 'Army of national unity' was forthcoming from the junta leaders. Yet to suggest that the non-invitation to the RUF after 29 April 1992 was tantamount to a broken promise is to miss the point about this coup and to imagine too far into the potential conspiracy theories of this conflict.
278. The coup-plotters' motives for seizing the power of Government had everything to do with their collective sentiment that their predecessors had abused power to the detriment of the people of Sierra Leone. In the first instance, as Strasser himself testified to the Commission, the move for a coup was driven by the fact that the APC's mismanagement of the war effort had left a lot to be desired:

"Fundamentally why the Army, in my view, took a decision to go for a regime change was because troops in the front had not the support that they needed to fight the war. Rations were not available; re-enforcements were not available; re-supplies were not available.

Officers and men were losing their lives... So it became evident that the Government was negligent in the handling of the war."¹¹³

279. At the same time, though, the Commission recognises that it was a desire for a lot more than simply control of the military that brought Strasser and his colleagues to Freetown.

Motivation and Planning for the Coup

280. The Commission heard that planning for a coup in late April 1992 had begun approximately one month in advance of the date chosen to execute it. A core group of officers, among whom were Valentine Strasser, Solomon A. J. Musa (commonly called SAJ Musa) and Julius Maada Bio were the lynchpins, had begun to strategise for the overthrow, from their respective postings in the Provinces.

281. Strasser at the time was convalescing at Tekoh Barracks, Makeni, having sustained an injury during fighting in the East of the country. He nevertheless travelled frequently back eastwards for a number of co-ordination meetings with Maada Bio in Segbwema, Kailahun District. Asked as to the exact nature of his role in organising the coup, Maada Bio testified to the Commission that:

"I was one of the actual planners because I was in the centre of our operational area... I wouldn't say I conceived the plan... but there was a commonality of purpose at the time."¹¹⁴

282. Among the others who contributed to the planning were Tom Nyuma, Komba Mondeh, Charlie Mbayo, Komba Kambo and even Johnny Paul Koroma, who attained subsequent infamy mainly for his part in another coup.¹¹⁵ All the men involved in the NPRC plot had been members of the same warfront operations in which Strasser had been a commander in the East; under the APC's renaming and re-aligning of the troops as described above, most of these men were in the 'Tiger Battalion', with Musa and Nyuma the notable exceptions in the 'Cobra Battalion'.

283. The coup-making group comprised largely Lieutenants and Second Lieutenants in rank, with Strasser, as the sole temporal Captain, a moderate notch above the rest. The death in action of one of their like-minded comrades, Lieutenant Prince Ben Hirsch, in the February before the coup, had proven to be a decisive source of resolve and single-mindedness on the part of the plotters.

¹¹³ Captain (Retired) Valentine E. M. Strasser, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from 1992 to 1996; testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown, 30 July 2003.

¹¹⁴ Brigadier (Retired) Julius Maada Bio, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from January to March 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 30 September 2003.

¹¹⁵ According to Maada Bio, Johnny Paul Koroma knew about the plot in finite detail in advance, but chose not to see it through to the operation itself. Apparently he did nothing to undermine the coup, such as sharing the information or alerting the authorities, but rather "backed off for reasons he never told us".

284. In particular, the widespread suggestion of Government complicity in Hirsch's death gave rise to a shared sentiment among these young, committed officers that they could not afford to leave their lives in the hands of a notoriously slippery and unfaithful political elite:

"We felt that we were being used as pawns; we felt neglected. We decided that it was better to come and fight in town than to die out there."¹¹⁶

285. Hirsch's death had apparently also brought about the 'moral support' of John Benjamin, the deceased's elder brother, who was naturally suspicious of the APC elite and convinced that a coup by the soldiers could serve his own purposes. Benjamin was thus one of the few civilians to be informed of the coup plot in advance, and would become a crucial ally to the new administration due to his familiarity with the political terrain and his contacts in business.

286. The main motive of the coup as it was described to the Commission by Julius Maada Bio was to try to instil a more vivid connection between the state and its citizens. Maada Bio cited inadequacies in the delivery of services such as healthcare, squandering of the state's natural resources and the continued unresponsiveness of the Government over exigencies such as record unemployment and continual shortages of fuel and electricity. These unmet, in Maada Bio's analysis, to an awfully indignifying existence for the average Sierra Leonean, quite apart from the fact that the war was visiting especially acute suffering on large sections of the population in the East and the South:

"We knew that the social conditions were ripe for a change. There was no rice; people would quite literally kill for two or three gallons of petrol; and they used to call Freetown the 'darkest city in the world'. Nothing seemed right and all that people really wanted was for someone to do things right."¹¹⁷

287. In Maada Bio's further evidence to the Commission he went on to philosophise about his perception of 'a coup':

"A coup is not just about taking ground; it is a mental battle. You are working together with people and you have to know that they are ready for it. If they are not ready for it, don't try because you are going to lose."¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶ Brigadier (Retired) Julius Maada Bio, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from January to March 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 30 September 2003.

¹¹⁷ Brigadier (Retired) Julius Maada Bio, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from January to March 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 30 September 2003.

¹¹⁸ Brigadier (Retired) Julius Maada Bio, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from January to March 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 30 September 2003.

288. It is apposite to place Maada Bio's comments into their correct context and deduce that he was in fact reflecting on the potential hazards that his own coup faced and only narrowly overcame. For all that the coup-plotters thought they knew each other well enough to trust in one another's readiness and adherence to the script, their individual characters would only show themselves fully at the moment of truth.
289. It is here that the imponderables of the 'mental battle' to which Maada Bio refers come to the fore. The NPRC coup was not to be thwarted altogether by such imponderables, but would come into being in a subtly different manner that has until now widely influenced the way it is seen in the eyes of Sierra Leoneans and the world.

The Execution of the Coup

290. Partly due to the aforementioned element of surprise that caught much of the nation off guard, it has become common for people to think of the action of 29 April 1992 as something that started out as a spur-of-the-moment mutiny against the unbearable conditions of service at the front.
291. This version of events points to a build-up of unpaid salaries and undelivered consignments of medical supplies as the root of the problem; it maintains that the soldiers despatched their delegates to Freetown to register their discontent with the High Command and had nothing more grandiose in mind than that. Public and personal euphoria, it is said, was what drove the young officers to rush to State House, after which they suddenly found themselves in power.
292. This version of events does not reflect what really happened. The reasons for the myth are understandable, on the one hand, because the plan that was in place was not precisely adhered to in the event. The NPRC coup was a pre-conceived overthrow of the Government, in which the modalities were planned but the implementation was improvised.
293. To convey clearly these separate 'layers' of the coup, it is necessary also to present something of the background to its three main orchestrators and their roles. First, Valentine Strasser was final choice (after the coup makers had considered and discarded Jusu-Sheriff) to lead whatever administration would stand to be constituted in the wake of a successful operation. He had been injured at the warfront and was stationed at Tekoh Barracks, Makeni, by the time of the proposed action. He would ultimately engineer a way of being in Freetown at the right time through somewhat convoluted means, as the Commission heard from Colonel K. E. S. Mboyah, Strasser's erstwhile Battalion Commander:

"Strasser then was my Impress, my Paymaster you know... He asked for permission to come to Freetown, to do one or two transactions for the Battalion; so he left. We stayed for a couple of days without hearing from him. So I had to send to town to find out what the whole situation was about. He called to tell me that definitely he has some problems with the guys at Headquarters.

[...] But the whole problem was that, whilst he was leaving [his residence in] Allen Town to come to Headquarters on foot, I think because of the rainy season he had some kind of cold and he was being treated... that

was why he didn't get on to me, but promised that in the next two days he will be back with me in Makeni. Only to find out later, two days later, [one of my men] said he heard somebody's voice on the radio [declaring] that a coup had taken place and that the person talking was Strasser."¹¹⁹

294. Strasser's movements were crafty and evasive of official monitoring. First by taking the leave of his commander to go to the city to pick up salaries for the month, he planted a different premise in the minds of his superiors. Then by reporting himself sick and extending time at his residence he kept clear of suspicion as the coup approached. Finally by relaying a fabricated story to his commander at base that there were delays with the salaries, which would necessitate his prolonged stay in Freetown to 'sort out the problem', he fuelled an erroneous retrospective assumption about why the coup had taken place. Upon hearing Strasser's voice on the radio on 29 April 1992, Mboyah and others assumed that it was a case of protest about their salaries that had got out of hand.
295. The impression that the coup was an impromptu action by disgruntled soldiers from the front was lent credence by the actions of SAJ Musa and Tom Nyuma. SAJ Musa, the second key player in the NPRC administration was to become ever more conspicuously troublesome from this point onwards. Brash and tactless in the extreme, Musa had set out for Freetown in the company of Tom Nyuma, two days in advance of the agreed upon date. The duo had, in their apparent gusto, commandeered a number of trucks filled with their men and 'bulldozed' an unspecified number of checkpoints on their route into the city, alerting the Army High Command to the imminence of a possible coup plot in the offing. It was this blunder, precipitated by Musa's gung-ho style, which gave credence to the assertion that the NPRC administration had been born out of bravado and exuberance, devoid of careful contingency planning.
296. While there is no doubt that Musa and Nyuma were quite unrestrained in their individual and dual approach to the whole notion of taking power, testimony before the Commission enables it to conclude that the operation was lent sufficient forethought to be described as a deliberate and pre-conceived attempt to unseat the incumbent President.
297. The coup was originally scheduled to take place on 30 April 1992, one day later than it actually transpired. Maada Bio reflected somewhat scornfully on the advance of Musa and Nyuma on 28 April 1992 in his testimony to the Commission, surmising that their action had left him "stranded at Daru."¹²⁰
298. There are lessons about both the strengths of the coup-plotters' planning and the weaknesses of the state's defence mechanisms to be drawn from the relative ease with which the long-standing Government was overthrown. In the case of the former, the Commission heard evidence from Maada Bio that the last-minute hastening of the coup agenda did not adversely affect its outcome because all the logistical supplies were already in place; for example, the requisite firepower had been smuggled into Freetown in a concerted and

¹¹⁹ Colonel K. E. S. Mboyah, long-serving officer in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), erstwhile Battalion Commander and Director of Defence Information; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 29 August 2003.

¹²⁰ Brigadier (Retired) Julius Maada Bio, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from January to March 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 30 September 2003.

methodical fashion in the weeks preceding the coup:

“We actually smuggled a lot of ammunition into different points in Freetown – not any serious arms, just small arms... Nobody in town was involved; we were all members of that same Battalion... Komba Kambo was responsible for most of the actual transporting.”¹²¹

299. As for the weakness of the defensive effort, the coup became the final legacy of the many deficiencies in the APC’s management of the state security apparatus, as described above. In this case, the crucial factor appears to have been short-sighted political favour-mongering, whereby the political elite had afforded ‘comfortable’ positions in the city to those officers with nepotistic, tribal or other connections in order not to expose them to the dangers of the warfront.

300. These functionaries were of course lacking in battle-hardness, while all the best fighters from other Battalions were posted to their respective fronts in the war against the NPFL and RUF. Thus the defence of the Presidency was left in the hands of willing auxiliary staff who were never likely to be a match for the assembled coup-makers, as was pointed out to the Commission by Kellie Conteh:

“The NRPC coup could not possibly have been resisted by the hotchpotch of cooks, drivers, tailors and carpenters hurriedly put together as a resisting force to stop it. Internal indecisiveness among the APC party strongmen completed the comedy of errors because even the SSD, which had been developed for that purpose at the cost of the development of the Army, could not be given clear orders.”¹²²

301. The battle for State House that ensued, beginning at around 8.00 a.m. on 29 April 1992, was reported in the international media to have pitted as many as sixty SLA soldiers against the ramshackle Presidential security squad, during which the soldiers were only able to take over the premises “after blasting two huge holes in the side of the building with a mortar.”¹²³ The situation in the immediate vicinity of State House had apparently calmed down by the mid-afternoon, after which other parts of the city were said to have experienced “sporadic shooting,”¹²⁴ before the whole affair settled out into a “relatively quiet night.”¹²⁵ The Commission was unable to ascertain, on the evidence available to it, whether anyone was in fact killed or seriously injured in the course of these skirmishes.

¹²¹ Brigadier (Retired) Julius Maada Bio, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from January to March 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 30 September 2003.

¹²² Brigadier (Retired) Kellie H. Conteh, current National Security Co-ordinator at the Office of National Security and former long-serving officer in the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF); testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown; June 2003.

¹²³ British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), “Sierra Leone five-man junta claims to have ousted Government – Momoh ‘in hiding’”; collected from broadcasts made on 29 April 1992, included in the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1 May 1992.

¹²⁴ British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), “Sierra Leone five-man junta claims to have ousted Government – Momoh ‘in hiding’”; broadcasts made on 29 April 1992, included in the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 1 May 1992.

¹²⁵ Agence France Presse, “Coup leader says junta in control, President fled”; broadcast on 30 April 1992.

302. The NPRC came to power through a relatively bloodless coup. It is also apparent that the ranks of those in favour of the coup in fact swelled considerably as awareness of the action spread. Not only police and military officers, but also members of the Freetown public actively encouraged the overthrow to succeed.
303. One element of unresolved ambiguity was the role on that day of Lieutenant Colonel James Yayah Kanu, the erstwhile Commander of the Eastern-based 'Cobra Battalion' from which some of those involved in the coup had travelled to Freetown. Kanu was definitely not among the contingent who planned and executed the coup, nor did he jump on the bandwagon as it rumbled into power.
304. On the contrary, Kanu was thrown amidst the chaos of 29 April 1992 on behalf of the Government to act as a kind of pacifier to the coup-makers, or a mediator between them and the troops who remained loyal to President Momoh. In spite or perhaps because of the fact that he initially brought a degree of persuasion to bear on some of the junior officers, particularly on Tom Nyuma whom he had formerly commanded, Kanu's intervention was held in contempt by the coup's ringleaders.
305. Kanu thought the men's actions would discredit the military and he appears to have said as much in his efforts to appease; instead the approach served to inflame their disgust.¹²⁶ Thus Kanu was instantly, arbitrarily detained at Freetown Central Prison on 29 April 1992, from whence, due to circumstances described below, he would not emerge alive.
306. Testimony available to the Commission indicated that the Government was actually aware that a coup was in the offing. Intelligence information received on 10th December 1991 was that two coups were being planned by majors and captains respectively, with details about the planners. However a senior official of the government doubted that the information was passed on to the President, Joseph Momoh. In his view, a number of important officials of the APC regime wanted regime change for their own personal agenda. Many of them including the then Force Commander Major General Tarawalie and other senior military officers were aware of the coup and did not lift a finger to stop it. When he finally confronted the President with the information, he saw total resignation and an unwillingness to confront the challenge by the President.¹²⁷

¹²⁶ Brigadier (Retired) Julius Maada Bio, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from January to March 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 30 September 2003.

¹²⁷ TRC Interview with Brigadier Sam King, Private residence, September 2003.

MANAGEMENT AND PROSECUTION OF THE WAR EFFORT BY THE NPRC GOVERNMENT

Recruitment under the NPRC

307. One of the most immediate goals that the NPRC Government set for itself upon assuming power was to bolster the capacity of the Army to prosecute the war. As the Commission heard from Valentine Strasser, there were a variety of difficulties for the administration to overcome:

"I stated that one of my Government's most fundamental concerns was to end the war quickly. Now at the time when I took office, the Army had a lot of problems. One of [them] had to do with the very size of the organisation: it was very, very small; we had basically about three infantry Battalions at that time. It was also badly organised. It was poorly trained and ill-equipped. [So] the first thing I had to do was reorganise it."¹²⁸

308. In addition to some less perceptible structural measures,¹²⁹ the NPRC launched a massive recruitment drive, inviting patriotic citizens to join the Army and serve their country. The initiative was well publicised through radio advertisements and posters and succeeded in expanding the force exponentially. While exact figures were not made available to the Commission, some officers estimated in their testimonies that within three years the Army grew three-fold to an aggregate size of 10,000 troops.¹³⁰

309. Unlike previous recruitment intakes into the Sierra Leone Army, the one which was launched in 1992 was not accompanied by clearly specified entrance criteria.¹³¹ The majority of the recruits taken on were young, some of them quite possibly under 18 years of age, uneducated and unemployed. They had come forward from fairly downtrodden backgrounds, many of them from the school of hard knocks in urban Freetown. According to Julius Maada Bio, it was not a matter of policy to bring in recruits of this nature, but rather a variety of social circumstances forced the hand of the NPRC:

"We had to take on all kinds of people who were offering themselves to the Army. Those who were coming were those who didn't have jobs... No self-respecting parents were going to send their children to join the military at that time... [So] those guys from the street were the ones who made themselves available to us."¹³²

¹²⁸ Captain (Retired) Valentine E. M. Strasser, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from 1992 to 1996; testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown, 30 July 2003.

¹²⁹ According to Strasser, the creation of the First Infantry Brigade out of the three existing Battalions was the main achievement of NPRC restructuring.

¹³⁰ See, *inter alia*, Colonel Bashiru S. Conteh, current Director of Military Training and senior officer in the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF); TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown, 02 August 2003.

¹³¹ Brigadier (Retired) Sam H. King, former National Security Adviser to the NPRC Government from 1992 to 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 1 September 2003.

¹³² Brigadier (Retired) Julius Maada Bio, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from January to March 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 30 September 2003.

310. Some of the more accomplished officers looked upon the recruitment drive as an unfortunate development for the Army. Colonel Bashiru Conteh told the Commission that departures from standard practice, while perhaps unavoidable, led to unsuitable recruits slipping through the net:

"It was indiscriminate recruitment, ignoring the laid down standards. Nobody was blaming anybody about that because basically it was done as a result of the authorities trying to meet their commissioning obligations. They had to provide forces to secure the territorial integrity of Sierra Leone. The only thing about it was that in the process, the wrong people were recruited. When you ignore the laid down standards, these are the consequences. You recruit people who are not supposed to be recruited and they disrespect a lot of military principles."¹³³

311. The Commission heard that some of those who answered the NPRC call were at the time leading lifestyles consisting of criminal activity and drug abuse in the ghettos of Freetown.¹³⁴ It was also pointed out that fire officers, security guards, sportsmen and labourers put themselves forward on the basis that they had "good fighting credentials."¹³⁵ One volunteer who was 21 years old at the time said he knew of the battles the Army had been facing and was seized by the impulse to become a fighter when he heard an advertisement on the radio:

"I believed that if I could get out to that warfront, I could do better than them."¹³⁶

312. It therefore seems that predominantly young men from the margins of society answered the NPRC call. On the whole they joined the Army for the wrong reasons: mostly because of idleness, disaffection with their previous surroundings and misplaced bravado. None of these characteristics boded well for the future direction of the conflict.
313. Perhaps the worst upshot of all, however, was the obvious scope the recruitment drive offered for persons of malicious intent. In addition to the attraction of receiving a monthly salary, a period of service in the Army carried with it several temptations for delinquent characters. They would be equipped with a firearm, engaged in high-adrenaline pursuits and would operate in a largely lawless zone at the warfront. In other words, some of them had given little consideration to what they might contribute to the war effort, imagining instead what they might get out of it.
314. Colonel Bashiru Conteh testified that in his own view, even some members of the insurgents were able to creep into the state security apparatus to acquire information or weaponry before later returning to the RUF:

¹³³ Colonel Bashiru S. Conteh, current Director of Military Training and senior officer in the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF); TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown, 02 August 2003.

¹³⁴ TRC Confidential Interview with a private soldier in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who was recruited in 1992 under the NPRC; interview conducted in Freetown; 08 December 2003.

¹³⁵ TRC Confidential Interview with a former soldier in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who was recruited in 1992 under the NPRC; interview conducted in Freetown; 16 July 2003.

¹³⁶ TRC Confidential Interview with a former officer of the Sierra Leone Army who was recruited in 1992 under the NPRC and deployed in various parts of Kailahun, Kono and Kenema Districts; interview conducted in Freetown; 17 September 2003.

"I tend to believe that the RUF were recruited into that type of recruitment system... There were occasions later on when some of these recruits were deployed, but when checks were made none of the deployed soldiers could be found at their deployment area. When they tried to account for them they could not. There were so many cases of 'missing in action', and later on when the RUF surfaced most of the boys who were 'missing in action' were seen back with them."¹³⁷

315. Certainly the consensus among most military sources appears to be that with hindsight there was little long-term merit in the NPRC Government's approach of flooding the warfront with hordes of youths in the hope that it could overwhelm the insurgency and seal a swift victory. The NPRC's National Security Adviser, Brigadier (Retired) Sam King, told the Commission that the folly of the exercise had been apparent to him at the time but that he left the decision in the hands of the executive:

"It seemed like they went for bodies rather than brains – those who can go and fight. It was perhaps their own way of recruiting to cope up with the war situation... wherein they were fearful of the war turning against them."¹³⁸

316. In this vein Julius Maada Bio defended the policy as a necessary reversal of the historical dilapidation of the Army. The Commission heard his admission that entry standards were in practice abandoned and that new soldiers were definitely of a lower calibre, but that the NPRC was "only trying to fix a broken boat."¹³⁹
317. There was in the Commission's view a major foreseeable dilemma with the sheer numbers of new soldiers recruited. It lay in the risk that a decisive victory on the warfront might not be as readily forthcoming as the NPRC campaign had implied. The expanded, unorthodox Army would then have to be managed through more pressing challenges requiring more intricate solutions. In other words, no one quite knew what would happen if those drafted in as a hoped-for quick fix were to become in due course an unwanted permanent fixture.

Problems in Training and Discipline

318. Aside from the recruitment drive itself, perhaps the unsuitability of the newly-enlisted soldiers could have been mitigated by prudent management of the Army's human resources. However there were further grave inadequacies in the Government's efforts to train and discipline its new breed of soldiers.
319. The Commission heard that even a recruit with the "right credentials" would in normal circumstances require at least a year of professional instruction to

¹³⁷ Colonel Bashiru S. Conteh, current Director of Military Training and senior officer in the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF); TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown, 02 August 2003.

¹³⁸ Brigadier (Retired) Sam H. King, former National Security Adviser to the NPRC Government from 1992 to 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 1 September 2003.

¹³⁹ Brigadier (Retired) Julius Maada Bio, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from January to March 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 30 September 2003.

graduate into the military ranks.¹⁴⁰ Naturally he or she would require considerably more time than that to become fit for participation in a conflict situation. The measured and multi-layered screening process undergone in respect of the Sierra Leone Battalion (LEOBATT) sent to Liberia was testament to the rigours of assembling a worthy fighting force out of the pre-war SLA,¹⁴¹ let alone out of the beast of burden that it had become.

320. Yet the ramshackle intake of 1992 would be fortunate to receive even a few months of rudimentary training when they joined the Army; some received just six weeks.¹⁴² Benguema Training Centre became a veritable conveyor belt for new recruits, each of them processed on a fast track to the warfront. They were taught little more than how to fire a gun, how to move in formation, how to mount offensives and how to respond to orders,¹⁴³ the rest would be left to their instincts. Among the telling omissions then were how to react when faced with an enemy deploying guerrilla tactics and how to interact with the civilian population.
321. In terms of discipline, the raw new batch was apparently predestined to cause problems for its seniors. According to military officers who were already in the force, some of the new recruits sought to import the social habits of their former lives into the ranks.¹⁴⁴ The consumption of drugs, as it proved, was unpreventable and the use of marijuana in particular became endemic. Military codes of conduct were frequently neither observed nor enforced in this regard;¹⁴⁵ one young private soldier told the Commission that his commanding officer condoned and actively partook in "smoking so much *djamba* every day."¹⁴⁶
322. Organisation, structure and professionalism in many units became less rigid and more ragged. On the one hand, it was suggested that the numbers of newcomers were so large that soldiers were scarcely able even to identify their own kind, let alone to know who to take orders from.¹⁴⁷ On the other hand, though, there were certainly individuals who were refusing to take instructions

¹⁴⁰ Brigadier (Retired) Julius Maada Bio, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from January to March 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 30 September 2003.

¹⁴¹ Colonel K. E. S. Mboyah, long-serving officer in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), erstwhile Battalion Commander and Director of Defence Information; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 29 August 2003.

¹⁴² TRC Confidential Interview with a private soldier in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who was recruited in 1992 under the NPRC; interview conducted in Freetown; 08 December 2003.

¹⁴³ TRC Confidential Interviews with various soldiers recruited in 1992 under the NPRC; interviews conducted in Freetown, Makeni and Kenema; June to December 2003.

¹⁴⁴ Colonel K. E. S. Mboyah, long-serving officer in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), erstwhile Battalion Commander and Director of Defence Information; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 29 August 2003.

¹⁴⁵ Colonel Bashiru S. Conteh, current Director of Military Training and senior officer in the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF); TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown, 02 August 2003.

¹⁴⁶ TRC Confidential Interview with a private soldier in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who was recruited in 1992 under the NPRC; interview conducted in Freetown; 08 December 2003.

¹⁴⁷ TRC Confidential Interview with a former officer of the Sierra Leone Army who was recruited in 1992 under the NPRC and deployed in various parts of Kailahun, Kono and Kenema Districts; interview conducted in Freetown; 17 September 2003.

and often defying basic tenets of military conduct.¹⁴⁸ Combined with the 'power of the gun', as so many ex-combatants described it in their testimonies, such an attitude gave rise to a dangerous propensity on the part of these soldiers to commit violations.

323. In the end the recruitment intake and its accompanying disregard for the quality of human resources served to exacerbate the overall lack of common understanding and common purpose in the SLA. The Commission heard that the NPRC never managed to unify its Army under a single, coherent command structure.¹⁴⁹ The recruits of 1992 formed another distinct faction in an already divided force.
324. It was the high degree of intra-factional disharmony that had always appeared most likely to spark confrontations within the Army and to give rise to negative sentiments towards the Army on the part of civilians. That likelihood merely increased after 1992.

The Executions and Associated Violations of December 1992

325. On 29th December 1992, the airwaves burst with the news of an attempted coup on the government of Valentine Strasser. On the 30th it was announced that the coup plotters numbering 26 had been executed after a trial by a military court-martial. According to Strasser, "a group of officers and civilians had attacked the presidential residence at Kabassa Lodge" in Freetown.¹⁵⁰
326. The mastermind of the story of the coup plot was the Vice Chairman of the NPRC, Captain SAJ Musa. SAJ Musa's version was that someone came and informed him about the plan in the offing; he then spiked the officer and sent him back to report – on two further meetings, in which the list of those involved was compiled and various items of documentary evidence were *apparently* procured. Strasser claimed in his testimony to the Commission that there was in fact a plot to overthrow his government. What has become evident is that despite the official posturing in 1992, no judicial trials of the coup plotters took place. According to Strasser, his government was too busy with the war effort to organise a trial immediately. A trial was subsequently organised posthumously.¹⁵¹ Some of the alleged coup plotters like Lt. Col. Yaya Kanu were actually in detention at Pademba Road prison at the time of the alleged coup plot.
327. The Commission has been able to piece together the circumstances of what transpired on the day of their arrest on 28 December 1992 and their execution the next day.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁸ Colonel Bashiru S. Conteh, current Director of Military Training and senior officer in the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF); TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown, 02 August 2003.

¹⁴⁹ Brigadier (Retired) Kellie H. Conteh, current National Security Co-ordinator at the Office of National Security and former long-serving officer in the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF); testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown; June 2003.

¹⁵⁰ Agence France Press report, 31st December 1992.

¹⁵¹ Captain (Retired) Valentine E. M. Strasser, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from 1992 to 1996; testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown, 30 July 2003.

¹⁵² The then National Security Adviser to the NPRC Government, Brigadier Sam H. King indicated to the Commission that the alleged coup plotters were actually arrested on 22 December 1992 and

328. SAJ Musa had known some of those implicated in the coup from their time together in the army; he regarded them unambiguously as traitors who had betrayed him, personally and politically. According to Maada Bio, who had known in advance of SAJ Musa's volatile temperament and the likelihood that he would attempt to carry out some kind of summary justice, some of the implicated men were taken to Musa's own residence and subjected to torture by Musa himself: *"When I went there at night, he had actually tortured them very seriously – their ears were cut off and they were practically dead"*.¹⁵³ SAJ realised that by daybreak they had been really badly tortured in his compound; so he confronted the gruesome, *"it was better to do away with them, than to keep them on his hands in this terrible state"* – he was then alleged to have organised the summary executions. Maada Bio lamented their inability to put the coup plotters through proper judicial process, blaming it on SAJ Musa's ambitions for power: *"to a very large extent, SAJ was somebody who liked power and could do anything to retain it... that was the darkest side of our whole period in power"*.

"SAJ Musa's quest for power was an obsession for the man; and he had a wife who inculcated that into him; so it was a terrible combination"; SAJ was also responsible for the killings of looters. At this point in time, he was actually the key actor; Strasser was much more laid back, and to an extent he let SAJ get on with his business."¹⁵⁴

Maada Bio's account is an attempt to shift responsibility for a gross failure of leadership by their government to the shoulders of one person. The execution of the alleged coup plotters did not advance SAJ Musa's lust for power in any way.

329. Lt. Col Yaya Kanu was arrested on the 29th April, the day of the coup and taken into detention at the Pademba Road, prisons, from which he didn't emerge alive. No reason was offered to his family or his wife who was at the time, a major and second in command at the Army Ordinance Section of the Sierra Leone Army.
330. Throughout his period of detention, his wife made several representations to most of the NPRC officers. They assured her that her husband had not committed any offence and would be released shortly.¹⁵⁵ Public statements by the NPRC were that they were being held in "protective custody" and would be very well taken care of.
331. Col. Kanu was in detention for eight months. All through that period neither his wife nor any member of his family was allowed access to him. Even when he developed dental health problems and his family made arrangements for him to

executed one week later. See: Brigadier (Retired) Sam H. King, former National Security Adviser to the NPRC Government from 1992 to 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 1 September 2003.

¹⁵³ Brigadier (Retired) Julius Maada Bio, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from January to March 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 30 September 2003.

¹⁵⁴ Brigadier (Retired) Julius Maada Bio, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from January to March 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 30 September 2003.

¹⁵⁵ Major (Retired) Lucy Kanu, former officer in the Sierra Leone Army dismissed in the wake of the NPRC executions of 29 December 1992; TRC Interview conducted in Freetown; March 2004.

be treated by a dentist, the NPRC authorities refused to take him to the hospital because “they were afraid for his security”¹⁵⁶.

332. On the day the alleged coup plotters were executed, there was a passing out parade for newly commissioned officers. As was the custom, the head of State would normally take the salute. In the instant case, all the key officers of the NPRC including Strasser were not present at the passing out parade at Wilberforce Barracks in Freetown. Brigadier Jusu Gottor took the salute. Captain Strasser and his key henchmen claimed that they were busy and couldn't attend the passing out parade. The Commission was informed that they had assembled at Strasser's Kabassa Lodge residence where the coup plotters were brought for “trial”.
333. The Commission was told that Col Kanu was tricked that he was finally going to be taken to the dentist. So he entered the van and was taken to Kabassa Lodge where Strasser and his colleagues resolved that they should be executed. SAJ Musa then took them away and subjected them to terrible torture before they were executed at the Lumley beach in Freetown. Mrs. Kanu told the Commission that witnesses to the execution informed her that their bodies were taken to the Kingtom cemetery, acid poured on them and burnt before being buried in unmarked graves.¹⁵⁷ The Commission requested the Director of Prison Services to identify the location and graves where the men were buried so that their families could organise funeral services and reburials for them. He replied that all documents relating to their execution and burial had been burnt during the January 6 1999 attack on Freetown.
334. On 29 December 2002, Captain Strasser made a public broadcast that a coup attempt against his government had been uncovered, all the people had been arrested and “executed summarily”. Capt. Strasser, Col. KES Boyah, Lt. SAJ Musa, Lt. Karefa Kargbo and other henchmen of his government were alleged to have coordinated the arrest, detention and murder of the alleged coup plotters. None of the other leaders of the regime intervened to ensure that they were granted any form of judicial process. The Commission holds all the leaders of the NPRC responsible for the murder of these men.
335. In a press statement issued the same day, the NPRC claimed that:

“The special military tribunal convened by His Excellency the Captain to immediately try the suspects apprehended has met and they have proved beyond all reasonable doubt that (alleged plotters) did try to overthrow the government of the National Provisional Ruling Council and has found each of them guilty of treason and has sentenced them to death by firing squad. The confirming authority of the National Provisional Ruling Council have met and endorsed the sentence recommended and have ordered that the executions take place immediately”.

¹⁵⁶ Major (Retired) Lucy Kanu, former officer in the Sierra Leone Army dismissed in the wake of the NPRC executions of 29 December 1992; TRC Interview conducted in Freetown; March 2004.

¹⁵⁷ Major (Retired) Lucy Kanu, former officer in the Sierra Leone Army dismissed in the wake of the NPRC executions of 29 December 1992; TRC Interview conducted in Freetown; March 2004.

TRC



The former NPRC Head of State, Captain (Retired) Valentine E. M. Strasser, leaves the podium after testifying before a TRC public hearing in Freetown.

336. The three alleged coup plotters were killed in a “cross fire”. They were ¹⁵⁸

- a. Sgt. Mohammed Lamin Bangura, alias Scorpion, of the Sierra Leone Military Police (leader of the coup)
- b. Private Alusine Mohammed Sito Sesay of the First Battalion Headquarters (spokesman)
- c. Major (rtd.) A.S. Jalloh, Sierra Leone police.

Among those executed were the following:¹⁵⁹

- d. Lt. Col James Yaya Kanu, former Commanding Officer of the 4th Battalion
- e. James Bambay Kamara, former Inspector General of Police
- f. Corporal Mohammed Mansary, alias Candapa of the 1st Battalion
- g. Warrant Officer Class 1 Kargbo, alias Fernando of the 1st Battalion Headquarters
- h. Lieutenant Colonel (Rtd.) Kahota M.S. Dumbuya, Army Headquarters.
- i. Major (Rtd.) M.C. Jalloh, former Paymaster
- j. Captain Hanciles Bangura, Quartermaster, Benguema Training Centre
- k. Mr. Chernor Jan Jalloh of thunder Hill
- l. Mr. S. Samba
- m. Siah Bangura, Deputy Superintendent of police (Second-in-Charge, “D” Division, Kissy Police Station)
- n. Sub Inspector D.T.S. Lebbie, Kissy Police Station
- o. Mr. Salami Coker, 8 Huggin Street, Freetown
- p. Mr. Victor Jarret, 37 Campbell Street, Wellington
- q. Ms. Salamatu Kamara, 7 Huggin Street, Freetown
- r. SLA/18168240 Private Bangura Mohammed, c/o RSLMF
- s. Mr. Emmanuel E.Mani, 9 Jones Street, Kissy
- t. Mr. Sorie Bangura, Bangura Street, Lumpa
- u. Mr. Yapo Conteh, 17 City Road, Wellington
- v. Sergeant 1315 Conteh A.F., 57 Dundas Street, Freetown.
- w. PC 6819 Bangura S. 3s George Brook, Kissy.
- x. Sergeant 1107 Saffa J., Police Training School, Hastings.
- y. Corporal 407 Lavalie W., Police Training School, Hastings.
- z. Mr. Moses Davies, Police Training School.
- aa. Mr. Emmanuel Koroma, Police Training school
- bb. Mr. Foday Turay, Police Training School.
- cc. Mr. Siah Turay, 92 Dundas Street, Freetown.

337. On 31 December 1992, armed soldiers from the Military Police unit invaded the Kanu’s official residence at the Wilberforce Barracks, arrested Mrs Lucy Kanu and took her to the military headquarters at Cockerill in Freetown. She was presented before Brigadier Jusu Gottor, who read to her a letter compulsorily terminating her services with the army for “being the wife of Yaya Kanu”. She was further ordered to vacate her official residence the same day. She returned to her house under armed escort to forcibly hand over possession of the house to the army. The family subsequently moved in with some family members. For months thereafter, soldiers of the NPRC raided the family’s residence at random or would cordon off the neighbourhood shooting indiscriminately into the air, so as to put Mrs. Kanu and members of her family as well as her

¹⁵⁸ As published in the Sierra Leone Review, Volume 1, Summer-Autumn 1992.

¹⁵⁹ As published in the Sierra Leone Review, Volume 1, Summer-Autumn, 1992.

neighbours under psychological stress and torture. The army authorities with drew her passport:

“I went from one office to the other requesting them to give me back my passport. Lt. Karefa Kargbo told me that they needed to know why I wanted to travel out of the country and that in any case, my file was on the desk of the head of state, Captain Strasser and only he could decide my fate. These were people I had known fairly well in the army. They were very junior to me but I had treated them well and regarded them as colleagues”.¹⁶⁰

338. Col Kanu was very popular in the army. The first broadcast on the coup by the NPRC on 29 April 1992 had claimed that Col. Kanu was the leader of the coup. This was a trick designed to tap into his huge popularity with the officers and the rank and file of the army. On the basis of this announcement, SLA troops in Freetown did not resist the coup plotters. Some of the soldiers even encouraged him to take over power as he mediated between President Momoh and the mutinous soldiers but he refused. The coup was therefore largely bloodless and the plotters secured the capital, Freetown, before the end of the day. The claim that Kanu led the coup has entered the literature on the conflict as some scholars have repeated it as truth.¹⁶¹
339. Col Kanu was not one of the plotters. On hearing about the coup, he had gone to meet the plotters at the State House, urging them that as soldiers, their loyalty was to the government of the day, and that they could not change the government by force of arms. His mediation effort was to get the mutineers to renounce the coup in exchange for pardon. Finally he was arrested and taken to the Pademba Road prison.
340. Brigadier Sam King, National Security Adviser to the NPRC regime, informed the Commission that the alleged coup plotters were killed and buried without any trial. All the officers of the NPRC that the Commission spoke to denied knowledge of a coup and of any trials that followed, including the chief of Army Staff, Brigadier Kellie Conteh, the Attorney General Mr Arnold Gooding, Colonel K.E.S. Boyah and Major General Tom Carew. Brigadier Conteh denied that the coup plot was ever discussed at a meeting of the Council of State or any of the organs of Government of which he was a member. He claimed he heard the rumour just like any other officer. At no time did the Council of State or the Army Council meet to confirm any sentences from a military tribunal. There was however speculation that a military tribunal had been set up with two officers Colonel K.E.S. Boyah and Colonel J.A.S. Conteh as members.
341. There was indeed an attempt to retroactively legitimize the process. Accusing fingers were pointed at the then Attorney General, Arnold Bishop Gooding as the arrowhead of the government's attempt to mitigate the backlash following the execution of the coup plotters. Bishop Gooding was said to have been very close to Capt Strasser, yet when confronted with the allegation by the Commission, he claimed that he actually felt threatened by the NPRC and was afraid that if he had left the government, he and his family would have been targetted. In the view of many witnesses before the Commission Bishop Arnold

¹⁶⁰ Major (Retired) Lucy Kanu, former officer in the Sierra Leone Army dismissed in the wake of the NPRC executions of 29 December 1992; TRC Interview conducted in Freetown; March 2004.

¹⁶¹ In his book, *Fighting for the Rain Forest*, Paul Richards cites at page 9 that Lt. Col Yaya Kanu led the NPRC coup of 29 April 1992, and that he was subsequently arrested because he was a Momoh loyalist.

Gooding, the Attorney General and Minister of Justice conveniently put the blinkers on and allowed the Government to trample on the rights of the people.

342. In his testimony before the Commission, Captain Strasser claimed that there was a military tribunal appointed which tried the coup plotters. He named Colonel K.E.S. Mboyah as the President of the tribunal. When confronted with this allegation by the Commission, Col. Mboyah replied:

“My own contribution here [before the Commission] is that we want people to accept responsibilities for whatever right or wrong they do. It has happened [that way] in many, many areas. It is good to distribute blames; it is normal. But if you do it in a way that you know people who were destined to rule, or people who for whatever reason found you as their leader, then it can be unfortunate.

[...] What I want to say is that never, never in my career have I sat down as President of any Court Martial in this country. That is what I wanted to tell the Sierra Leone public... Never in my life have I sat down on a Court Martial [Board] in this country since I joined this Army; you know, from 1976 to now. So anybody who attempts for any reason to say that I served in such a capacity; he is doing it for his own purpose or whatever.”¹⁶²

343. Despite Colonel Boyah's denials however, his colleagues in the army allege that at that time, he was claiming publicly that a tribunal had been set up and that he was the president of the tribunal.¹⁶³ K.E.S. Boyah claimed that it was later in 1998 that someone told him that a paper had been circulated within military circles early in 1993 that a military tribunal had been set up which named him as a member of the tribunal. According to him, all his efforts to trace the letter were abortive.
344. What is obvious to the Commission is that there was no trial of the suspects. This much was admitted by Captain Strasser at his public testimony before the Commission that the suspects were tried retroactively. The Commission is dumfounded to think that the Government of Captain Strasser, first killed people and then put them on trial.
345. Having got them executed, SAJ Musa according to testimony before the Commission poured acid on the bodies of the suspects and then had them buried at different graves at the Kingtom cemetery. Efforts by the Commission to get the prison authorities to identify the exact locations where the men were buried have not met with success as the prison authorities deny knowing where the men were buried.
346. In spite of having killed them extra judicially, the families of the alleged suspects began to be targeted. In one particular, case, the wife of Colonel Yaya Kanu, Mrs. Lucy Kanu who herself was a major in the RSLMF at the time, was dismissed without excuse by the Army High Command. All her supervising officers who testified before the Commission in response to the petition she wrote to the Commission, including the then Force Commander, Brigadier

¹⁶² Colonel K.E.S. Boyah, long-serving officer in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), erstwhile Battalion Commander and Director of Defence Information; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 29 August 2003.

¹⁶³ TRC Confidential Interview with former commanding officer in the Sierra Leone Army.

Kellie Conteh and Major General Tom Carew described Mrs. Kanu as a very dedicated officer and saw no reason why she was dismissed. They all urged the Commission to remedy the injustice done to Mrs. Kanu.

INTERNAL DIVISIONS BETWEEN AND AMONG THE INSURGENT FORCES

The Top 20, Top 40 and Top Final Operations

347. The NPFL contingent had rested on its laurels in the Kailahun District and failed either to hit its primary target of Moa Barracks or to endear itself to the population of the territories it entered as a 'liberation force'.
348. Several RUF operatives who worked in the internal security operations of the movement testified that they had received detailed reports from members of the civilian communities they occupied about the violations and abuses of the NPFL fighters on the Kailahun flank; and that they in turn filed reports with the High Command. This registering of discontent was seen as a direct threat to the authority of the NPFL commandos, stemming primarily from the administrative cadre of the RUF.
349. The combatant cadre too had revolted – despite their often facile grasp of the guiding principles they had been taught on the training bases, they had retained at least one of the mantras drummed into them at the behest of Foday Sankoh – that “a fighter without ideology is a criminal.” Thus rose a tide of opposition to the NPFL based on the principled position that civilians should not be the ones to suffer so extremely at the hands of this supposedly liberating revolution. The consensus among the members of the RUF appears to have been centred on the notion that 'enough is enough'; the question therefore became not whether but when a confrontation between the two factions would break out.
350. Sankoh was well acquainted with the deep-seated reservations of many of his fighters regarding the activities of the NPFL commandos, but he was utterly powerless to do anything about it. In the face of continual complaints, he eventually petitioned Taylor, who then recalled his fighters to Liberia. The recall by Charles Taylor did serve an important purpose for the Sierra Leonean vanguards. It signalled the severance of arms supply from Liberia, meaning that the commandos who remained on the ground would be gradually debilitated as their existing ammunition ran out.
351. In terms of manpower, however, 90% of the NPFL commandos are thought to have stayed on in spite of the Taylor removal order.
352. Before the recall, tempers had reached boiling point and skirmishes were breaking out between the NPFL fighters and members of the RUF. This resulted in the infamous Top 20 operation. TOP 20 was an attempt by the Liberian NPFL commandos to decapitate the administrative command structure of the RUF.

353. TOP 20 was conceived and led by NPFL commando Jim Karnwhine. The plan to get rid of all RUF top commanders and their deputies, as well as all strong fighters – “they wanted to eliminate the heart and brains of the RUF so that they could take control of the whole thing for themselves.”¹⁶⁴
354. Effectively, those responsible for carrying out the Top 20 operation were the ones who had refused to follow Taylor’s orders to return. Their refusal notwithstanding, some of the most senior commanders had been removed against their volition upon the insistence by Taylor that they were among the foremost troublemakers – Samuel Tuah was in this category, as was the commander known as ‘Sergeant Major’. Their withdrawal took place in December 1991.
355. In January 1992, one of the more assiduous junior commandos assigned to the RUF’s G2, or internal investigation unit, discovered and reported a gruesome act of cannibalism in a village off the Kono Highway, to which he had been led by the civilian population of the District. The official registering of the issue in the disciplinary files of the High Command enraged the NPFL commandos to the extent that they vowed to quell the perceived ‘petty dissent’ by the RUF. In consequence a number of leading RUF members were arrested on 10th February 1992, and taken to Gbarnga where they were detained. Among those arrested included Jonathan Kposowa, Moiganda Kosia, Pa Kallon and Eldred Collins.
356. The original arrests of these senior administrators were carried out without Charles Taylor’s advance knowledge. When Taylor found out about it, in April 1992, he ordered their immediate release and they returned to Pendembu along with Foday Sankoh.
357. In the wake of these arrests, numerous junior commandos and civilians (largely those in the communities were targeted because they were the hometowns or villages of the commandos the NPFL was looking for) took refuge in ‘hiding places’ in the surrounding bushes along with their families. The NPFL nonetheless coerced some civilian communities into disclosing their whereabouts and many of them were killed. One junior commando testified to the Commission that he had been shot in the back as the NPFL commandos tried to apprehend him, but believes that he would not have survived if they had really wanted to shoot him dead: “They wanted to capture me alive, torture me and pull out my heart to eat.”¹⁶⁵
358. After a while, the hot pursuit of RUF commandos ceased and many of them were sent messages that they should come out of hiding, for it was safe. This proved to be a tactic of deceit on the part of the NPFL.
359. The killing of civilians during the ‘Top 20’ operation was largely indiscriminate: it was a general campaign of malice directed against the Sierra Leonean population of Kailahun District by the Liberian commanders of the NPFL.

¹⁶⁴ TRC Confidential Interview with one of the RUF commanders arrested during the Top 20 operation; interview conducted in Freetown; September 2003.

¹⁶⁵ TRC Confidential Interview with one of the RUF commanders arrested during the Top 20 operation; interview conducted in Freetown; September 2003.

360. The kinds of words spoken in anger by the NPFL aggressors while they were carrying out these systematic violations can perhaps assist in understanding the motivations behind their acts. They would repeatedly bemoan the reception they were given in local communities, abusing the residents for being 'ungrateful' for their purported acts of 'liberation'. They also harboured a vengeful grudge against Foday Sankoh in particular, whom they believed had betrayed them with his reports back to Taylor about their misdemeanours.
361. Sankoh would later come and apologise to the victims of the operations; his only refrain was that there was nothing he could have done: this was war and nobody could change what had already happened.
362. Jim Karnwhine subsequently came to Pendembu and in front of Sankoh's very eyes arrested 'Kelfawai', Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon, Peter Vandyand Mohamed Tarawallie (alias "Zino" or "CO Mohamed"). Seven or eight of Sankoh's key commanders were tied up, loaded into a truck and carried to Kuiva. One of them was even executed, a Liberian vanguard who was apparently particularly resented because to the NPFL aggressors he was "one of our own brothers".
363. These arrests signalled the beginning of 'Top 40' – in around June 1992. None of the RUF fighters had done anything in particular to antagonise the NPFL commandos, but were rather targeted because they were perceived to be the major power-brokers in the combatant cadre of the RUF movement. They were held for approximately two weeks before being released.
364. The original detainees of Top 20 were 'administrators' – Collins, Kposowa, Kosia, Pa Kallon. These men were seen as the 'book men' of the movement and were thought to be the ones who were meticulously making notes on every movement of the NPFL commandos, thus undermining their command authority.
365. On the second occasion, however, the focus was changed to that of the combatant commanders, whereas Top 20 had primarily been restricted to administrative commanders, Top 40 was effectively a continuation of Top 20, designed to get rid of the top commanders of the RUF.
366. Top 40 was ended when it became obvious to the RUF that the NPFL fighters had run out of ammunition. Then, Musah (Internal Defence Unit), Isaac Mongor (Battlegroup Commander), Michael Rogers (MP Commander) Patrick Beinda (originally G-5 but by then IDU commander) came to the conclusion that the arms the Liberians were carrying were basically furniture. Their supplies of ammunition from Taylor had been cut off at the point where he had ordered withdrawal. If the SLA soldiers had known about it, they would have crushed the incursion once and for all. Testimony indicates that the NPFL fighters were normally too 'trigger-happy', firing unnecessarily whenever they got the chance, but suddenly the firing died down and the Sierra Leoneans concluded that there must be something of an ammunition crisis and the same information was relayed to the Sierra Leoneans by their own informant 'small soldiers'. So, having concluded that ENOUGH WAS ENOUGH, the opportunity then presented itself to launch a decisive 'Top Final'.
367. The RUF philosophy behind 'Top Final' was that if the revolutionary movement was to achieve anything, it would have to remove those who were systematically violating the security and thus undermining any prospect of support from the civilian population.

“We too had no ammunition, but we sent [word] to the front line.” Alicious Caulker [at Laah], Issa Sesay and CO Mohamed (Zino) [at Bunumbu] and one other commander [at Baiama] were then requested to send ammunition – but some of them were afraid to do so. Issa and Mohamed were particularly reluctant to participate, but upon Wormanidia’s insistence they eventually sent men from Kono Bypass [Gandorhun] under the command of CO Foday. The RUF pulled their men together and strategised on their mode of attack.”

368. Liberians were reputed to enjoy living in groups, although one could surmise that the desire to be with the group was directly related to the need for security. They had not set up defences around their group assembly points but rather carried out human rights violations in groups, including cannibalism and rape.
369. Sankoh was always a little wary of the impact that an overt operation would have, he therefore had to turn a blind eye to Top Final, but in its aftermath he applauded the efforts of his vanguards and communicated the change in command structure. His only fear was that the war might not be able to be continued without the presence of these hardened fighters and their firearms, but his fears were soon allayed by the important ambush captures on the Gandorhun flank that would propel the RUF towards Kono.
370. The operation ‘Top Final’ lasted about two months in all, August and September 1992. It covered the key points of Pendembu and its environs (first week in August), Kailahun (towards end of August), Buedu and Koindu [in that order]. About 45 men participated in the initial move at Pendembu, 20 of whom were carrying arms. Gradually the numbers would increase, and even civilians joined up as momentum gathered. From Pendembu, over 100 NPFL men were flushed out, from a variety of different corners of the town.
371. The Liberians were neither particularly spirited fighters nor able to withstand much pressure – they were far too reliant on their guns; by all accounts they were in fact quite cowardly and could only assert themselves through armed force against innocent civilians. As would be echoed in the sentiments of other foreign fighters later in the conflict, one popular refrain heard from the Liberians was that “we don’t want to die in this place oh – it’s not our country.”
372. Upon attacking the NPFL afresh in Kailahun Town, the RUF assailants were joined by reinforcements sent from CO Lawrence (Gandorhun) and Alicious Caulker (from Laah); their numerical strength had by this time gone up to about 200 persons. Nevertheless they were unsuccessful in dislodging the NPFL on their first night. Musah was sent on recce and had to fight physically (backs to the wall) before finally being overpowered and struck with a gun butt and a bayonet – the NPFL were too many for one man and they didn’t want to give up their positions that easily, particularly because they had looted so much material during the Top 20 and Top 40 campaigns and were abducting human caravans to carry it over the border on their behalf [bicycles, Hondas bags of rice] they had actually detained over 40 civilians whom they intended to enlist for this purpose the following morning. Indeed the Commission’s research supports the conclusion that for the NPFL cadre, the conflict had become an exercise in self enrichment. Eventually the NPFL took flight from Kailahun to Buedu; but again they were pursued, this time by over 200 men.

373. The top final operation was a dramatic declaration of self-reliance by the RUF in Kailahun district and represented the first time that the movement had acted in a manner that could be seen to have protected the interests of the civilian population. Ironically, though, its impact was limited. The RUF men had finally managed to purge the Liberians by the end of September 1992. All the NPFL commandos had gone; the only ones who remained were the ones trusted by the RUF, the 'Liberians' who had been recruited into, or willingly joined, the RUF. In the Commission's attempts to trace the origins of this faction, it became clear that most of them were not purely Liberians, but rather among the category of Sierra Leoneans who settled in Liberia. They could not speak the Sierra Leonean languages, so people mistook them for Liberians because of their accents.
374. The upshot of Top Final was that in November 1992, the RUF managed to capture a BZT and other heavy-weaponry from the SLA at Baiama, which afforded them a substantial boost to their self-morale. Potentially over 10,000 RUF had already been assembled and were left behind after the 'Top' Operations to set out on the new phase of their operations. But it turned out to be a false dawn. The main problem was the perpetual dearth of arms and ammunition. The RUF in Kailahun District had only 45 'functional' automatic weapons between them, allied with a clutch of shotguns, Berettas, 'cock-and-fires' and other rudimentary local weaponry. These figures which are born out by both the Commission's interviews with commandos of the RUF and by testimony from members of the civilian population, challenge the widely held belief that Charles Taylor was still providing weaponry to the RUF. Whatever supplies he had shared with the RUF during the early part of the incursion had seemingly dried up by 1992. This may perhaps indicate that he was only fuelling the war in Sierra Leone in advancement of his own agenda, rather than truly believing in that of the RUF.
375. The inescapable conclusion therefore is that the NPFL and the RUF in fact entered Sierra Leone with completely distinct and partly divergent agendas. There was no sincerity in Taylor's offer to Sankoh to assist with the launch of a fraternal revolution with a common purpose. Rather, Taylor wanted to shift some of his cumbersome military capacity out of Liberia and in the process disguise the culpability of his fighters for the grave consequences of their cross-border raid on Bomaru. He wanted to counter the menace of the ULIMO militia group that was building up manpower and capacity by training on a base near Joru, Kenema District. He wanted to destabilise the border region and create a further security dilemma for the Government of Sierra Leone and the ECOMOG contingent it hosted. Perhaps he even aspired to toppling the APC and earning the acclaim of the Sierra Leonean people as a supreme liberator. But there is no evidence that he ever provided viable and useful assistance to Foday Sankoh in promoting his revolution in the manner that Sankoh saw fit. This would have entailed considerable solidarity with the civilian population, and possibly eventually also the soldiers of the Sierra Leone Army, against a corrupt and dictatorial regime. The NPFL and the RUF had different programmes, different command structures and different minds when they encroached upon the territory of Sierra Leone in 1991.

ESCALATION OF ARMED CONFRONTATION AND THE END-PHASE OF 'TARGET' WARFARE

376. Having finally dislodged the RUF from Koidu Town in February 1993, the SLA slowly but surely picked off RUF positions one by one over the ensuing six months. On 06 May 1993, the Army captured Pendembu, confining the RUF to the four Chiefdoms in the north-eastern tip of the Kailahun District. Three months later, after a series of smaller-scale skirmishes, the Headquarter Town of Kailahun was also overcome. At this point the RUF on the Eastern front was diminished to a level of territorial confinement that it had not experienced since the very first month of its incursion. Its senior combatant commanders knew that they were being chased up the same blind alleyway that the NPFL 'Special Forces' had fled along during 'Top Final' and they feared that their fate would be an equally wholesale expulsion.
377. Indeed, by 08 November 1993, when Sankoh's own Headquarters at Sandiallu and the town of Koindu, where the full-scale incursion had been launched, had both been secured by the Sierra Leone Army, the RUF stood squarely on the border with Liberia and on the brink of oblivion.
378. Bolstered by air support from Nigerian Alpha Jets, their advance had continued right up to the border town of Baidu, the last customs point on the road out of Koindu; but that was to be the point where they stopped.

The Ascendancy of the SLA

379. At this juncture it is appropriate to examine the reasons for the relatively sudden, seemingly decisive ascendancy of the SLA. In the end-phase of conventional 'target' warfare, they actually conquered every single one of the RUF's 'targets', and prevented them from achieving their original strategic objectives. As 1993 drew to a close, the whole nature of the conflict would change dramatically, as the tactics of the insurgents and the stakes for which they were fighting would be changed to devastating effect. The SLA's battlefield victory would prove not to be sustainable, but it was a victory nonetheless.
380. The foregoing analysis has demonstrated that each of the key events between 1991 and 1993 had impacted profoundly on one or other of the factions and their respective capacities to prosecute the war. On the part of the insurgents, deviations from the original strategic objectives of 'target' warfare had diminished their chances of success, as had the swelling tides of internal division between the RUF and their supporters in the NPFL. On the side of the pro-Government forces, the massive boost provided by the Guineans at Moa Barracks, the recruitment and fast-track deployment of thousands of youths and the strategic use of auxiliary forces that included vigilantes and civil militias had resulted in the capture of all the territories that the RUF had captured upon entry into Sierra Leone. Indeed the dynamics of Phase I of the conflict tipped the aggregate balance in favour of the pro-Government forces.
381. The ascendancy of the SLA was greatly helped by the total lack of ammunition within the RUF, following the departure of the NPFL forces. The RUF could no longer hold on to the territory it had captured and it was receiving a terrible beating on the battlefield. The use of jet bombers which began in October 1992 following the capture of Baiama by the RUF began to turn the tide in favour of the pro-Government forces. The jets continually strafed RUF positions with the

pro-Government ground forces moving in to finish off the remaining RUF forces on the ground. The Government propaganda machinery was also working effectively. Strasser had come to power amidst great expectations of peace. The NPFL commandos who were with the RUF at that time thought that the war was over. Instead Strasser declared that he would fight the enemy by "land, air and sea". This statement of intent dealt an enormous shock to the RUF and provided a fillip to the SLA troops.

382. It has become clear to the Commission that the pro-Government forces had sufficient large-scale weaponry to finish off the RUF if they had used it sparingly and efficiently in the few head-to-head confrontations that took place between the two factions. The RUF at that time was uniquely, albeit fleetingly incapacitated as it awaited the arrival of new arms consignments from its trading over the Guinean border. Commanders testified that they had completely expended their missiles and RPGs and no longer had any ammunition even for their automatic rifles and personal weapons. They were retreating backwards with the bare minimum of firepower, reduced to the level that one commander said was only suitable for "emergency defensive response."¹⁶⁶
383. These incapacities were apparently unknown to the SLA, however, who for their part appear to have advanced with tedious over-cautiousness. The soldiers confessed with hindsight that they tended to show the RUF combatants more respect than was perhaps necessary. In fairness, much of this was probably due to the vastly-exaggerated accounts filtering through the civilian population about the fearsome potency of the insurgents. However, as it rolled over each town and strategic point with very little or no resistance, the SLA should have begun to realise that the RUF was not such a force to be reckoned with; the soldiers should have quickened their advance and forced the RUF decisively into submission.
384. The Commission heard that by September 1993, having relinquished every key town in the Kailahun District to the advancing forces of the SLA, the RUF had nothing more than an indefatigable spirit to rely upon in the face of virtual defeat. Astonishingly some RUF commanders told the Commission in defiant terms that they were neither giving up nor losing confidence. They claimed that they had drawn renewed conviction from their period of common adversity and had been instructed that they were poised to revive their offensive:

"We didn't think that the war was over; we thought that the war was very hot."¹⁶⁷

385. Other commanders disagreed, however, confessing somewhat more believably that their collective confidence had withered. They told the Commission that they might have laid down their arms during 1993 had it not been for the example set by the RUF Leader:

¹⁶⁶ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF 'vanguard' commander who was taken from detention in Liberia to become a member of the movement; interview conducted in Freetown; 19 September 2003.

¹⁶⁷ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF 'vanguard' commander who was taken from detention in Liberia to become a member of the movement; interview conducted in Freetown; 19 September 2003.

“All of us thought we were going to be overcome at that point in time; we thought that RUF was going to come to an end – it was only Foday Sankoh who gave us courage.”¹⁶⁸

386. Most of the civilians who had been flushed from RUF-held territory did in fact cross the border into Liberia. The soldiers were establishing a reputation for dispensing merciless summary justice to any captive whom they suspected of even the flimsiest connection with the RUF, which in practice seemed to mean almost all residents of Kailahun District.
387. The RUF combatants, though, did not dare to cross onto what they knew would be enemy territory, though they were not certain of which of their enemies they would encounter. On the one hand, reports were emerging of a significant presence of ULIMO fighters in Lofa County, allegedly deployed in an effort to cut off the suspected supply line between Taylor (at Gbarnga) and the RUF. When Sankoh had despatched Morris Kallon, one of his most accomplished field commanders, with a troop of up to one hundred junior commandos to assess the feasibility of an escape route, he had apparently returned alone, reporting a massacre in battle at the hands of ULIMO. On the other hand – and according to most RUF commanders the consideration that weighed most heavily – the RUF feared recriminations from the very same NPFL commandos whom they had chased out barely a year earlier. They were wary of the reportedly brutal treatment that was being meted out by the NPFL to anyone crossing from Kailahun and deduced that should they be captured and identified as RUF combatants, they would certainly be killed.
388. Thus, the final decision of the RUF appears to have been justified on the grounds that it would better to face up to the devil you know than the devil you don't. There was always the chance that the SLA would capture and kill an RUF commando, but such a fate was one with which RUF commanders were far more readily able to come to terms with.

Successful 'self-preservation' on the Southern Front

389. The Commission heard that the unique dynamics of the Southern Front had created conditions that were thoroughly divergent from those on the Eastern Front and had brought with them a host of different challenges for the RUF members fighting there. While they retained the status of the 'RUF First Battalion' in name, they were much more of a nebulous and disorganised force in nature. Their main objective in Phase I, practically from the time they had established an initial foothold, became simple self-preservation.
390. Having failed to make the same level of territorial gains as their counterparts in the East, the RUF in Pujehun District could not lay claim to 'control' of large towns or to anything remotely worthy of the description of a Regional Headquarters, its original office in Zimmi notwithstanding. Instead, its combatants and the civilians they carried with them had become accustomed to taking up positions in villages and forested areas of little strategic importance. In effect the RUF occupied only paltry and peripheral parts of its 'targets' in the South, having relinquished the main towns and highways to the combined forces of the Army and ULIMO and had been unable to recover the lost ground.

¹⁶⁸ *Ibid*

391. The battles in the Southern Province in the latter stages of Phase I had therefore been far less pivotal to the course of the conflict than those that were taking place in Kailahun. The RUF Southern Front was fighting mostly in an attempt to assert its existence and prevent further fragmentation. Its key fighters were stung by the brutal murder of so many of their 'senior' commanders at the hands of Gibril Massaquoi and his cohorts. Those outside Massaquoi's inner circle huddled mainly on the banks of the Moa River and sought fairly primitive means of sustenance. Nevertheless they ensured resolutely that they would not be completely wiped out, even if it meant that only one single town remained under their control. One of those who formed the RUF core contingent at that time portrayed the struggle to retain a Southern RUF in the following terms:

"In Pujehun we had to employ all possible tactics for survival from the very beginning. The enemy kept using conventional warfare against us and they were having very strong fighters. But we were more determined to survive and somehow we managed..."¹⁶⁹

392. The concept of jungle warfare had in fact been mooted by some of the vanguards as an alternative to 'target' strategies at the very beginning of the conflict. The reality on the ground in the East and South was to make this option inevitable for the RUF.

Recovery from virtual defeat on the Eastern Front

393. On 13 November 1993, when only Geima and selected areas of border jungle remained under his forces' control, Foday Sankoh circulated a message among his followers that the time had come to embark on a new approach to the war – a strategy of 'guerrilla tactics' centred around jungle warfare.
394. For some time already there had been a tendency towards the cover of the forest among certain RUF commandos in the Kailahun District. Apart from general distrust of the civilian population in the towns and rising concerns about their internal security in the light of the execution of several of their colleagues, many of the RUF cadres favoured residing in the bush due to the devastating effectiveness of the bombing missions carried out against them by the Government-backed Nigerian Alpha Jet. Accordingly, it was not entirely unexpected when Sankoh ordered the creation of hundreds of 'zoo-bushes'¹⁷⁰ in the forest in Eastern Kailahun in order to provide new forms of shelter for the RUF movement.
395. Sankoh had always counselled his troops that real commandos had to live in 'zoo-bushes'; but during the period when the Kailahun District had been relatively welcoming (and comfortable) for the insurgents, they had almost all preferred to stay in the towns, replete as they were with the comforts of life in a civilian settlement, such as housing, food and cooking equipment, produce on sale and medical supplies.

¹⁶⁹ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF 'junior commando' recruited on the Pujehun front, who subsequently became a Front-line Commander and Training Instructor; interview conducted in Freetown, 29 September 2003.

¹⁷⁰ 'Zoo-bush' is a local term for makeshift accommodation in the dense jungle. Typically it comprises a community of small huts, constructed using tree trunks, branches and pieces of foliage, sometimes supplemented by sheets of zinc (corrugated iron).

396. In particular, though, the RUF addressed itself to the need for some form of territorial stronghold that would not be so susceptible to frontal attack by pro-Government forces. In resolving that issue and devising an entirely new *modus operandi* for the advancement of its armed struggle, the RUF set the conflict off on a fundamentally changed course, attendant with revised strategic objectives and varied patterns of violations and abuses carried out by all warring factions. This heralded Phase Two of the conflict.

Declaration of a cease-fire

397. By the end of 1993 believing that the war had been won, the Head of State, Captain Valentine Strasser declared a cease-fire in the war. The Commission acknowledges the gesture that Strasser made, for it did seem to be a positive step towards reconciliation and a break from the confrontation of the warfront.
398. Nevertheless, Sierra Leoneans have come to regard the offer by Strasser as something of a strategic blunder, whereby the military had a clear advantage over the RUF troops on the front and should have pursued the fight to its natural conclusion.
399. Speculation as to why in fact Strasser should have been moved to make such a mistake effectively divides itself along several fault lines: either he was compelled to do so by circumstances beyond his control; or he thought that he could gain some kind of international recognition as a peace-broker as well as a successful leader of the war effort. There was also speculation that he declared a cease-fire because of the alleged prior links between the NPRC and the RUF. The Commission believes that there was no relationship between the RUF and the NPRC. There was speculation that if the army had moved decisively against the RUF, there would have been a clamour by the public for the army to hand over power to civilians. In allowing the RUF a breather, the NPRC government was charged with wanting to perpetuate itself in office through justifying the need for a firm handling of the war effort.
400. Despite the cease-fire, the Government should have put in place measures to confine the RUF to the border areas and limit their scope for manoeuvre. The declaration of a cease-fire however was a strategic mistake that allowed the RUF the breathing space to reorganize and restock its ammunitions to be able to wage war against the government of Sierra Leone.

PHASE II

'GUERRILLA' WARFARE

THE TRANSITION TO 'GUERRILLA' WARFARE

401. In the light of the dynamics of the end-phase of 'target' warfare described above, the transition into a new phase of 'guerrilla' warfare in late 1993 can be seen in the first place as a necessary measure for self-preservation on the part of the RUF. While Foday Sankoh had remained defiant during his retreat on the Eastern Front, he was not oblivious to the somewhat fortunate circumstances that had conspired to save the RUF narrowly from an all-out defeat.¹⁷¹
402. Crucially Sankoh had been disabused of his notion that the unconventional fighting force of the RUF could match the Sierra Leone Army and its auxiliaries in a battle fought on conventional terms of engagement. The survival, let alone the victory, of the RUF depended on the formulation of a new operational plan. There was therefore a military imperative for the RUF to become a 'guerrilla' movement.
403. The Commission notes the allusion to the motivations for a switch to guerrilla warfare as they were subsequently published in the RUF Handbook, *Footpaths to Democracy*. While the story is presented in somewhat simplified terms in this document, it appears to be a relatively accurate reflection of the main events as they unfolded towards the end of 1993:
- "Frankly we were beaten and were on the run but our pride and deep sense of calling would not let us face the disgrace of crossing into Liberia as refugees or prisoners of war. We dispersed into smaller units, whatever remained of our fighting force. The civilians were advised to abandon the towns and cities, which they did... We now relied on light weapons and on our feet, brains and knowledge of the countryside. We moved deeper into the comforting bosom of our mother Earth – the forest."¹⁷²
404. The Commission also heard, however, that Sankoh had conceded that his hitherto continued insistence on the rhetoric of 'revolution' would only serve to create unwanted paradoxes in the minds of the civilian population. The following perspective on Sankoh's thinking at the time came from one RUF commander who claims to have spoken regularly with his leader on points of strategy:

¹⁷¹ Reference to the decision by Strasser to declare a cease-fire

¹⁷² *Footpaths to Democracy* is a 44-page booklet that was published in the name of the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF) in 1995 and for a time was available on the streets of Freetown. It contains several lengthy sections propounding the RUF's version of events in the early part of the war and some of its purported "liberation ideology and theology". Its keynote essay is attributed to "Foday Saybana Sankoh, The Zogoda, Sierra Leone". In their testimonies to the Commission, RUF members referred to the document as an original work, many of them claiming to have contributed personally to its writing. Nevertheless, the Commission has come to understand that much of the content is plagiarised from other, unaccredited sources. The text is available in full on the internet at the following address: <http://www.sierra-leone.org/footpaths.html> -

“The war went on to a certain period when Sankoh himself felt that his ideology was no longer holding; because if you say that you have come to fight for the people and then these people are being killed for their sheep and goats [and] their properties are being looted... [Then] people start running away from the ‘revolution’... By early 1994; that was when the RUF Phase Two operations started.”¹⁷³

405. Testimony suggested that Sankoh wanted to concentrate more of his energies on devising and directing the operations of the movement. According to some of the RUF’s commanders, Sankoh effectively wanted to “centralise” his leadership in order to assert a tighter grip on the direction of the movement as a whole and the conduct of his field commanders in particular.
406. In terms of ‘centralisation’, it is also pertinent to note that the transition to guerrilla warfare coincided with the re-convergence of the combatants from the separated Eastern and Southern Fronts. The dynamics of the transition are therefore inseparable from the objective, described below, of attaining a wider coverage for the RUF.
407. The ‘reunification’ itself was effected somewhat unexpectedly through the appearance of an entire unit of commandos from the Southern Front at Pendembu, on the Eastern Front, in early 1994. According to RUF members on the Eastern Front, this contingent comprised 21 men upon arrival and was led by the Pujehun-based commanders Augustine Koroma and CO ‘Manawa’. This account is remarkable because the RUF commandos arrived wearing full SLA uniforms and claimed to have marched in formation through parts of the Pujehun, Kenema and Kailahun Districts without being identified as ‘rebels’.
408. These commanders briefed Sankoh on the activities of the Southern Front and its relatively depleted nature. After the initial offensives of the guerrilla warfare phase had then succeeded, upon which a permanent base was established, messengers were despatched back to Pujehun in order to summon the remaining members of the RUF’s Southern Front from their various positions around the District; many of them were in makeshift lodgings around the banks of the Moa River.
409. The Commission heard that Sankoh received the main contingent of commanders from the Southern Front with apparent surprise and words of apology for having lost touch. Many among this contingent were subsequently given ‘refresher’ training in order to integrate them fully into RUF operations for Phase II.
410. In addition to bolstering the RUF’s capacity on account of the added, or rather rediscovered, manpower, the appearance of the combatants from the Southern Front emphasised to Sankoh the importance of efficient communications to the success of the movement. Throughout the period from 1991 to 1993, the only medium through which the main executive body of the RUF in Kailahun had received word of the activities of its counterparts in the South was that of international radio broadcasts. Reports of significant battles in which the SLA or ULIMO had succumbed to or overcome ‘rebel forces’ would give the two

¹⁷³ Gibril Massaquoi, former RUF Target Group and Battalion Commander, originally recruited as a junior commando in Pujehun and later Personal Assistant to former RUF Leader, Foday Sankoh; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; July 2002.

fronts an indication of the approximate geographical spread of one another's 'targets', whereas no news for a period of several weeks or months would be interpreted as a sign of setback, misfortune or defeat.

411. In the absence of any news of territorial gain from either South or East in 1993, the RUF on both Fronts had fought under the illusion that their defensive efforts were the last embers of the struggle and that they were the only prospects of keeping the 'revolution' alive. It was only after they re-established contact in 1994 that the members of the two original RUF Battalions gained any accurate impression of the successes and failures of their respective contingents.
412. Foday Sankoh vowed never again to allow such a cleavage to develop between the wings of his military operations. He had received specialist training in signalling during his time in the Sierra Leone Army and declared himself eager to put his expertise to use to avert further instances of disconnection.

Operations and Tactics of the RUF 'Guerrilla' Warfare

413. The RUF's *Footpaths to Democracy* included its own statement on Phase II operations that portrayed its fighting forces as a revolutionary force:

"What is clear is that the patriotic and democratically-minded Africans of Sierra Leone are waging a successful guerrilla warfare using their feet and brains, footpaths and by-passes to surprise, disarm and totally disorganise the offensive operations of the rebel NPRC."¹⁷⁴

414. The Commission heard the contention from several former RUF commandos that the tactics of guerrilla warfare were as much in the mind as in the practical implementation. One RUF commander who served as an 'Intelligence Officer' during Phase II gave a lengthy narration of his experiences of how guerrilla tactics assisted the RUF in carrying out its operations to attack key defensive positions of the Sierra Leone Army. A portion of his testimony, which is typical of the modus operandi of RUF guerrilla warfare in the Commission's view, is included below:

"Ambush was one of our tactics; 'recce' was one of our tactics; intelligence was one of our tactics; braveness was one of our tactics; and accurate information was one of our tactics as well...

[...] As an example, when we were preparing to attack Koidu, Kono, with all the forces that were there, we used to send 'reccie' teams sometimes four, five, six times a day. They would spend the whole day with the enemy in the township, then in the night, they carried their feedback back to us: their locations; location of their armoured tanks; how many armoured tank carriers; the manpower situation; location of civilians - all this information was given to us.

[...] Then we ourselves set up one of our strategic fighting forces; the plan was that at night, we would put up night attacks - 'combat at night'. That operation used to comprise only two to three men, who would only

¹⁷⁴ *Footpaths to Democracy*, Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF), 1995; available in full on the internet at the following address: <http://www.sierra-leone.org/footpaths.html>

come into Koidu, or to enemy positions, just open two or three rounds of rapid firing and then leave the town. For that whole night the enemies would be firing – some of them would even be killing themselves. This was showing that there was prejudice all over. So we made the whole Koidu Township so fearful even for the enemy combatants until they all packed themselves into one location. So what we did as guerrillas, we left them in Koidu here and went behind as offensive ambush towards Makeni. We laid the ambush and the ambush was effective up to a month without these people in Koidu here taking any notice at all.

[...] We arranged our ambush into three categories: we had our 'Iron Gate'; we had our middle team; and we had our front team. So whenever any force left from Koidu towards Makeni, the 'Iron Gate' towards Koidu would never open fire; the middle team would never open fire; the last team will only give them an 'air firing'. Then, the back team, as the 'Iron Gate' from the back, replies with fire; and then the rest are in the middle of the ambush. So just tell me [how it feels], in the seven mile distance of all that; you cannot do any fighting, you are weakened totally because all of you are travelling in a big panic. So you have no option but to give yourselves up; these were the ways we used to capture these people."¹⁷⁵

415. In essence then, the first notable difference in tactics during the guerrilla warfare phase lay in the RUF's mode of engagement with the Sierra Leone Army. The RUF deliberately moved away from head-to-head confrontations with Government troops and tried instead to enfeeble them by surrounding them, separating them and terrorising them.
416. In its military operations just as in its attacks on civilian communities, the RUF effectively went underground: it sought to become less visible, less predictable, less consistent and less distinguishable in everything that it did. As a consequence it became infinitely more difficult to fight against and drove SLA military officers lacking in ingenuity into contriving a variety of irrational responses. The war had indeed changed. It was no longer between armed groups confronting each other in battle fields. The civilian population began to bear the brunt of the war.
417. The Commission database recorded more instances in which the RUF alone attacked civilian settlements in Phase II than in either the earlier or later stages of the conflict. However, in comparison with the Phase I tactics of direct and transparent entry into towns and villages, the mode of attack used in Phase II seemed to invoke stark contrasts; sometimes even polar opposites.
418. Whereas, for instance, there had been an audacious policy of forewarning a town or village of an RUF advance in the early months of the war, there was now an unerring uncertainty in the timing and location of attacks. Combatants would sometimes quite literally lie in wait for periods of several days, observing the conditions at the site of proposed attack and assessing the attendant dangers and likely modalities of different types of operations.

¹⁷⁵ TRC Confidential Interview with an RUF combatant, 'G-5' commander and former intelligence officer; interview conducted in Koidu Town, Kono District; 12 August 2003.

419. A common objective was to ascertain the movements and destinations of military and civilian convoys, usually by means of sustained surveillance from hidden watch posts in the jungle next to key local thoroughfares and major cross-Regional highways. The Commission heard that such 'stake-outs' could often last for up to a week, demanding rigorous levels of physical endurance that were instilled into RUF combatants through their concentrated commando training.
420. When the scope and nature of a particular attack was determined, the key to its success would then rely upon achieving an element of surprise. In attacking a civilian settlement, for instance, the commandos would invariably strike at dawn or at another moment when the inhabitants of the chosen location were least expecting it. In their fright and alarm, the inhabitants would most often attempt to flee into the nearby bush, imagining that the attack would take over their town or village and subject them to the prolonged abuses of occupation associated with previous years.
421. However, the response of flight, which spared so many civilian lives in Phase I, was often cruelly scuppered in the guerrilla warfare phase due to the setting of 'traps' with clinical efficiency along the same bush paths and by-passes to which civilians would normally bolt in search of an escape route. Accordingly, at the very point when they tried to run away, civilians became most vulnerable to capture and abduction.

The Strategic Objectives and Consequences of RUF 'Guerrilla' Warfare

422. One of the strategic objectives of the RUF was the crippling of commercial and industrial activities. The short term consequence of this was that it destroyed the revenue base of the government. In the long term however, it was to make reconstruction more difficult for the country. The strategy at the heart of RUF guerrilla warfare was therefore one of incremental territorial expansion and ever-increasing material and psychological yields. In each operational area, the RUF commandos deployed at the front were instructed to build up gradually from small-scale attacks, limited in scope, to larger strikes intended to have national or international impact by sabotaging the Government's primary military or economic interests and robbing civilians of any chance of a life free of fear and human rights abuse.
423. In contrast to the activities of Phase I, the RUF did not seek to 'seal off' large areas of territory in the form of 'targets', or to co-opt civilian administration in towns and communities in the name of the 'revolution'. Instead the movement set out to infiltrate deep into Government-held territory, operating across a far broader geographical area than the original armed incursion had been able to reach. This differed from the 'target' approach of Phase I in the sense that territorial control was secondary to nationwide coverage, however thinly spread. The aim was not occupation but penetration; the objective was not to take control, but to carry out raids, ambushes and arbitrary violations and abuses to such a disturbing extent that nobody would be genuinely in control.

424. The RUF 'guerrilla' warfare deliberately sought to cause rampant confusion and destruction throughout the state of Sierra Leone, to the massive cost of the country's human and infrastructural development. The RUF seemed to be driven in this pursuit by the belief that if it made the life of the people in the Provinces unbearable, it would render the Government devoid of alternatives but to engage in negotiations. It therefore played upon what it perceived to be an uncomfortable relationship between the leaders of the NPRC military administration and their civilian subjects.
425. Hence as the call for democratic elections grew among certain constituencies, the RUF then opposed these constituencies directly and declared that what the country needed before elections was 'peace'. In a harbinger of what was to come in Phase III of the conflict, this strategy was one which was dressed up as striving for peace, whilst actually struggling for power.
426. Another vital component of the RUF approach entailed the crippling of commercial industrial sites that were seen to be contributing revenue to the Government's war effort. In 1995, the two highest-profile and highest-earning mineral mining companies in the country, Sierra Rutile and SIEROMCO, were subjected to ravaging assaults by the RUF that would lead to their enforced closure for the remainder of the conflict. Several smaller minerals concerns, including gold and diamond prospectors, miners, dealers and buying houses, were similarly put out of action by attacks that overran and destroyed their premises.
427. The RUF admitted to having accrued some resources from these attacks, especially in the form of looted vehicles, telecommunications equipment, food and fuel, but the loss on the part of the proprietors and by extraction the state was always exponentially higher than the gains made by the RUF.
428. A corollary objective of the RUF was to attract international publicity for its armed struggle. Publicity in this regard should not be confused with positive recognition, though, for popularity *per se* was out of the question by this stage in the conflict. The RUF had invoked derision and alienation from the Sierra Leonean population in Phase I, wherein the astounding qualification was that the international community had been conspicuous by its lack of outspoken condemnation for the insurgency. The RUF guerrilla warfare in Phase II aroused the moral consciousness of the world and forced it to take notice of the violations and abuses that were being perpetrated against the civilian population.
429. Foday Sankoh thought that he could manipulate the international media and, when the time came, the foreign peace-brokers who got involved. Thus Phase II would for the first time carry the dynamics of the conflict outside the territories of Sierra Leone and Liberia, most notably to Abidjan in the Ivory Coast for a series of negotiations between the parties. The responses of the incumbent national Government of Sierra Leone as well as those of the leaders of interested external actors would then go a long way in determining whether the RUF would opt for peace or perpetuation.
430. Finally, but most significantly in the Commission's view, the RUF was intent on undermining the general physical security of the state and its inhabitants, primarily by casting the institution of the Army as a pariah in the eyes of the civilian population. The RUF deliberately carried out 'false flag' operations,

dressing in the full camouflage uniforms and other insignia of the SLA and often adopting troop formations or positions of deployment that were used by the SLA. In these instances, the RUF commandos not only violated the laws of war pertaining to combatant identification, but also systematically flouted human rights and humanitarian law norms in their acts of targeting civilian areas, destroying and plundering properties and carrying out mass killings.

431. To reflect on such a tactic of malicious deception is to say nothing at this juncture about the conduct of the 'real' soldiers, for this will be drawn out in more detail in the ensuing analysis. What requires to be stated here is that the RUF intentionally spread confusion and terror among the civilian population, while doing their utmost to impute responsibility for their attacks to the Sierra Leone Army. In a conflict of this nature it has continually proved staggeringly difficult to decipher any clarity between the blurred lines of perpetrator responsibility, but this dilemma was to prove particularly acute in Phase II.

Designing and Operationalising RUF Guerrilla Warfare

432. Just as the Sierra Leonean RUF vanguards and junior commandos testified that collectively they had fought for the ownership of the movement when they attacked the NPFL during 'Top Final', so the Commission heard that Foday Sankoh asserted his claim for more stringent control and became a far less tolerant and all-embracing leader as Phase II operations commenced.
433. According to some of those who were close to him, Sankoh had developed a heightened sense of paranoia about plots to undermine and ultimately assassinate him. He assumed the sole prerogative for strategic thinking in the RUF and sought assistance only from his closest administrative allies and his most dependable ground commanders in designing and operationalising his strategies.
434. Accordingly, the operational plan for guerrilla warfare had been conceived by Foday Sankoh himself and was drawn up at Sankoh's behest by the RUF's 'G-1' commander in the administrative cadre, Moigande Moigboi Kosia. Kosia had been appointed 'G-1', with responsibility for recruitment and training policies, at the time of Sankoh's first visit to the town of Pendembu, Kailahun District, on 29 April 1991. The two men knew one another well from their days together as junior officers in the Sierra Leone Army of the 1960s.
435. Kosia testified to the Commission that he was one of very few members of the RUF with a military pedigree and ingrained professional ethics. He claimed that his own personal approach in the RUF was one based on disengagement and deftness, trying to exert some degree of influence on the activities of the movement without incurring the wrath of his younger colleagues, whose objectives were essentially geared towards achieving power at all costs and impunity for the acts committed in its pursuit. In turn, he appears to have been considered as something of a perfunctory figure in the eyes of many of the RUF's combatant commanders.
436. Sankoh nevertheless identified Kosia as a trustworthy and efficient strategist who, by his own admission, thrived on the paperwork of war. At around the same time that the RUF was pushed right back to the Liberian border, in November 1993, Sankoh requested Kosia to draw up the blueprint for a comprehensive RUF guerrilla training programme and a means of

implementing a system of jungle warfare. This blueprint provided the basis for the main thrust of the RUF's operations between 1994 and 1996; in recognition of his contribution to the design of the strategy, Kosia earned the RUF sobriquet of 'The Jungle Wizard'.

437. On the question of putting Kosia's plans into practice, the Commission heard a series of testimonies that pointed to the RUF's most senior battlefield commanders as the key purveyors of guerrilla warfare. Foremost among them was the RUF's sole surviving Battle Group Commander and the last of the Libyan-trained Sierra Leoneans to fight for the RUF, Mohamed Tarawallie (alias "Zino" or "CO Mohamed"), who by 1994 was the only Lieutenant Colonel in the movement. He carved a niche for himself as the commander in charge of 'expanding' the RUF's areas of operations and leading attacks on Government installations of perceived strategic importance.
438. Tarawallie was answerable directly to Foday Sankoh and in the Commission's view bears a larger share of responsibility than any other single combatant for the spread of RUF attacks into the Northern Province of Sierra Leone from 1994 onwards. The Commission's database recorded multiple violations and abuses that were directly attributed to Tarawallie under one or more of his various *nommes de guerre*, including "Zino" and "CO Mohamed".
439. The Commission furthermore regards Tarawallie as a central instigator of the considerable mayhem and bitter mutual distrust that grew out of the RUF's 'false flag' operations; he was cited by a string of fellow RUF combatants in their testimony to the Commission as the main and most frequent perpetrator of attacks in which the whole troop under his command wore full SLA uniforms.
440. Phase II was also the period in which one of the RUF's most notorious future military leaders, Sam Bockarie (alias "Mosquito"), rose to prominence as both a Battlefield Commander of lethal prowess and a deviant unknown quality who would frequently disobey orders and commit human rights abuses with total abandon. Bockarie was in some quarters considered to be a henchman for Foday Sankoh; explicit in the testimony of at least two fellow vanguards was the suggestion that when Sankoh wanted somebody to carry out his "dirty work" he would look to Mosquito.
441. The Commission further heard that Mosquito was for a time tasked with responsibilities to oversee the jungle bases of the Southern Province, which included the training position in the town of Matru Jong, Bonthe District. It was from this posting that he was recalled by Foday Sankoh to The Zogoda and investigated on allegations of summary killings, although the Internal Defence Unit (IDU) of the RUF did not take any stern punishment against him.
442. The third noteworthy commander among the RUF's guerrilla warfare cadre was the vanguard Dennis Mingo (alias "Superman"). In testimony given to the Commission, Mingo was blamed for a multiplicity of violations and abuses in Phase II, many of them abduction-related crimes against children, including forced recruitment and forced drugging. It was Mingo who, in conjunction with Mohamed Tarawallie, came closest to attacking the city of Freetown in 1995; he had participated in the battle to open a Western flank of RUF military operations, which included establishing a Western Jungle base and inflicting a host of attacks on the previously unaffected Districts of the North-West of Sierra Leone.

443. According to an RUF signaller who monitored most of the radio communications among commanders between 1994 and 1996, Mingo and Tarawallie went so far as to announce a plan to advance to Freetown in 1995 but were ordered by Sankoh to refrain on the grounds that “the RUF was not going to attack the city. The Leader told the men that ‘the RUF would enter Freetown without a single shot’. And that is exactly what happened.”¹⁷⁶
444. Thus, the Commission received testimony that the success of guerrilla operations was contingent not upon a rush to the capital city, or indeed the overthrow of any major towns in the Provinces like the District Headquarter Towns, but on gradual strengthening of the RUF’s attacking capabilities through one successful raid or ambush after another.
445. The first offensive of the second phase was planned by Foday Sankoh in the company of almost all his senior combatants, including the above-named guerrilla commanders, from their starting point in the defensive *zoo-bush*¹⁷⁷ in Giema, Kailahun District at the end of 1993. It took the form of an ambush on the SLA position at Gborworbu, spearheaded by Dennis Mingo (alias “Superman”) and Sam Bockarie (alias “Mosquito”). The Commission heard that due to the dearth of weaponry and logistics faced by the RUF at this time, the attack was carried out by a troop of guerrillas moving through the bush on foot, wielding fewer than ten machine guns and a single Rocket-Propelled Grenade launcher (RPG).
446. The RUF used a variety of simple but effective tactics to create a sense of pandemonium among the unsuspecting occupants of the targeted position, including shouting “war cries in hundreds of voices at the same time” and throwing a barrage of stones incessantly onto the corrugated iron roofs of the soldiers’ dwellings. Upon gaining sight of a suitable target, the RPG was then launched and backed up by sparing, sporadic firing from different angles. Both RUF commandos and their various warfront adversaries attested that such tactics had the effect of convincing soldiers, many of whom were young and panic-stricken, that they were under siege from an enormous and well-armed force. Consequently they would abandon their posts as they did in Gborworbu and leave their bases, including arms stores, at the mercy of the RUF.
447. The modest yield of the Gborworbu attack was registered as follows in the Giema base files: eight ‘rocket-sticks’ for a Rocket-Propelled Grenade launcher (RPG); one ‘sardine tin’ of ammunition rounds for a German-Three (G-3) machine gun; and two boxes of ammunition rounds for automatic AK-47 rifles.¹⁷⁸ The significance of this haul obtains not ostensibly from its magnitude,

¹⁷⁶ TRC Confidential Interview with a former RUF signaller and radio operator who channelled and monitored communications between commanders; interview conducted in Freetown; 23 October 2003.

¹⁷⁷ The terminology used here was found in numerous testimonies to the Commission from former RUF members in both the civilian and combatant cadres. It is understood to denote makeshift accommodation in the dense jungle. Typically it comprises a community of small huts, constructed using tree trunks, branches and pieces of foliage, sometimes supplemented by sheets of zinc (corrugated iron) or other looted building materials. In *Footpaths to Democracy* the term used is slightly different: *sowo bushes*. It is defined in that document in rather cryptic language as a “sacred grove for the initiated”.

¹⁷⁸ The source of this information is the register kept by officers of the Internal Defence Unit (IDU), whose tasks included verification of all looted properties and captured logistics from the scene of an attack. TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF ‘junior commando’ recruited on the Kailahun front, who subsequently became a ‘G-2’ Commander and investigator in the Internal Defence Unit; interview conducted in Freetown, 22 September 2003.

but from the fact that its capture emboldened the ranks to undertake larger raids on other SLA positions in the District. Thus the real turning point in terms of boosting morale and acquiring materials was the next attack, which struck the town of Giehun.

448. Giehun sits between two bridges approximately halfway between Pendembu and Kailahun Town on the main access road. Just outside the town on either side are a number of classic ambush points, where attackers concealed in roadside foliage can sabotage vehicles passing into or out of the town. In early 1994, the NPRC Government was attempting to consolidate its grip on the Eastern border areas by transporting plentiful supplies of arms and ammunition to fortify its military positions close to Liberia.¹⁷⁹
449. A convoy of at least seven vehicles was making its way North from Pendembu to Kailahun when it first fell into the RUF ambush at a point short of Giehun; armed men sprung onto the road and laid siege to the military vehicles, inducing an immediate and powerful response from the SLA's 'war-tank'.¹⁸⁰ While the first attack was repelled, it appears to have shocked and disrupted the convoy, causing some of the vehicles, carrying manpower reinforcements, to head back to Pendembu while others, carrying a wealth of military provisions, pressed on towards Giehun.
450. Demonstrating another of the tactics that came to characterise its guerrilla operations, the RUF garnered 'reconnaissance',¹⁸¹ and assessed the remnants of the convoy in Giehun Town to be ripe for attack. It then launched an unexpected assault on buildings and vehicles in the town and flushed the soldiers out of Giehun.
451. The Commission heard that the RUF stayed in the town for two days and plundered all available military supplies before succumbing to a counter-attack by the soldiers and retreating into the bush. Sam Bockarie registered a list of captured materials from the Giehun attack that was to prove of inestimable significance: 185 brand new 'TD' weapons; 150 boxes of ammunition rounds for automatic AK-47 rifles; 18 boxes of 'rocket-sticks' for RPGs; and, of special note, one-and-a-half bales of SLA military uniforms.¹⁸² In one fell swoop this attack re-equipped the RUF and allowed it to operationalise its guerrilla army.

¹⁷⁹ Reference to this series of operations is contained in the files of the National Security Agency (NSA) of the NPRC Government, which were obtained by the Commission from the former NPRC National Security Adviser, Brigadier (Retired) Sam H. King.

¹⁸⁰ The vehicles known as 'war-tanks' were commonly used by the NPRC Government to escort its convoys of supplies to the warfront and lead attacks to recapture RUF positions. Despite RUF accounts suggesting that several armoured tanks were commandeered from Government troops, the Commission heard that only one such tank was registered as 'lost' in an ambush. See Captain (Retired) Valentine E. M. Strasser, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from 1992 to 1996; testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown, 30 July 2003.

¹⁸¹ 'Reconnaissance', or 'reccie' as it became known across all the combatant factions, was a facet of the guerrilla phase that implicated large numbers of civilians, including women and children, in the RUF's assault on the state security apparatus. Reconnaissance missions were largely low-key, undercover affairs, carried out either by RUF combatants in disguise, or by civilians pretending to be on innocent searches for food, sex or protection from the soldiers whilst actually gathering information.

¹⁸² The source of this information is again the register kept by officers of the Internal Defence Unit (IDU), whose tasks included verification of all looted properties and captured logistics from the scene of an attack. TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF 'junior commando' recruited on the Kailahun front, who subsequently became a 'G-2' Commander and investigator in the Internal Defence Unit; interview conducted in Freetown, 22 September 2003.

452. The weaponry and the uniforms acquired from Giehun were the main materials used by the RUF in its operations to dislodge SLA positions in Kailahun District and parts of Kenema and Bo Districts in 1994. The RUF was able to recapture both Buedu and Kailahun Town from the SLA and establish training and administrative bases there as part of its stranglehold on most of the District. Beyond Kailahun, the materials were also put to use in the 'clearance' operations that were an important prerequisite for the RUF's establishment of jungle bases in other parts of the country.
453. The RUF continued to attack SLA convoys as a means of acquiring weapons and other resources. The major inter city highways became death traps for both civilian and soldier alike. What has been dubbed the mother of all ambushes took place on Wednesday 2 August on the Freetown-Bo highway at the notorious stretch between Magbosi and Mile 91. The attack took place near Mile 77 on a convoy that was progressing towards the provinces. The convoy came under a salvo of bullets and RPG gunfire. Nearly 70 out of a total of 75 vehicles, mainly trailers and trucks - laden with precious relief supplies for the provincial cities of Bo and Kenema, were destroyed. Government claims that 15 people were killed was contested by other reports. The realistic number was put at between 80 and 100 people. Scores of people were wounded and taken to hospitals in Freetown. Many of those who escaped to the bushes were feared to have perished in their search for sanctuary. Described as the worst throughout the civil war, this incident was preventable but it seemed the authorities were given the wrong signals. There were calls for an immediate investigation. The government announced the setting up of an inquiry because of the widespread belief that the ambush could only have taken place with the collusion and connivance of elements in the army who had an eye on the goods on the vehicles. For example, it was alleged that despite the protestations of the men of Executive Outcomes, that it was not safe for the convoy to travel up country at that material time, they were nonetheless overruled by senior officers and the convoy was allowed to proceed."¹⁸³
454. An RUF combatant who participated in the Magbosi Hill attack described it to the Commission:

"As we were pulling out, we saw a truck and they said we were going to Magbosi. I was told that I should capture that village in order to get my height in the jungle. There was a Lt. Jongopie and others who wanted to know me. By then I was a small boy and everybody wanted to know me. We were then in control of Magbosie right unto Okra Hill; we made a short cut from Magbosie to Okra Hill. Magbosie was called Foday Sankoh's Garage; there were a lot of cars there. We were there for a long time; people did not realize what we were doing; but in 91 area, the Temne area, they knew that rebels were there. We decided to find women; we laid ambushes for vehicles. Lungi and the surrounding villages were my area; when you approach the town from the direction of Bo, the first storey building was my office. I captured five SLA soldiers. I am not denying that I kill or burn houses, but to say that I killed an

¹⁸³ Focus on Sierra Leone internet journal, containing news and opinion on the conflict in Sierra Leone.

innocent man, I did not. Instead, if you asked me not to kill you, I would ask you to join the revolution.”¹⁸⁴

455. From the totality of the evidence before it, the Commission concludes that the two tactical pillars on which the RUF guerrilla campaign was built were ambushes and ‘hit and run attacks’. Both types of operations seem to have depended on vigilance in advance and ‘courage’ in the heat of the moment, two of the attributes that were brutally instilled into junior commandos on their training bases through the forced ingestion of stimulants during preparation and through the frequent administering of punishments for any outward displays of cowardice.
456. In the recurring accounts of ‘hit and run’ attacks about which the Commission received testimonies, violations and abuses appeared to follow two principle sub-patterns within the operation. First, the ‘hit’ intended, in its conception at least, to entail a targeted assault on an installation of military or strategic importance. The targeting, however, became gradually less discriminate as the guerrilla campaign broadened and it transpired to inflict gross human rights violations on numerous civilian communities. Violations typically included killings on sight, detentions of civilians (often *en masse* in cramped conditions), beatings of captives and incidents of rape and gang rape.
457. The ‘run’ then took the form of either a retreat in the face of counter-attack or a return to the relative safety of a nearby bush base. In the process, new ‘members’ were habitually and unwillingly taken from their communities, tortured and forced into carrying loads. The clear demographic preponderance among abductees was young boys deemed suitable for conversion into combatants and young girls who were subjected to rape and sexual violence violations and abuses. Violations of forced recruitment and sexual slavery increased substantially during Phase II as both were more typically perpetrated in the jungle environment.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NETWORK OF JUNGLE BASES

458. Jungle bases provided the RUF with a form of territorial stronghold that would not be susceptible to frontal attack by pro-Government forces. Often growing out of a secluded settlement in the bush where rural peasantry had established a clearing, a well or a small plantation, each of these sites was built up to accommodate potentially hundreds of commandos for training purposes and for the launch and return of attacking forces under the cover of the forest. Typically, the RUF would seek to situate a base in a mountainous area, which the Commission was told would allow for the placement of different ‘combat units’ at various heights on the mountainside; the group in the foothills would then be responsible for attacks on surrounding villages and ambushes on passing highways.¹⁸⁵

¹⁸⁴ TRC Closed Hearings with former child combatants who participated in ambush attacks during the guerrilla warfare phase; hearings conducted in Bo and Bombali Districts; May to June 2003.

¹⁸⁵ This division of ‘combat units’ was corroborated by intelligence information amassed by the NPRC during its investigations into jungle bases. See the document entitled: “RUF Bandits – Hideouts and Enclaves in Sierra Leone”, dated 21 February 1995; contained in confidential files compiled by the National Security Agency (NSA) of the NPRC Government, 1992 - 1996; presented to the Commission by the former NPRC National Security Adviser, Brigadier (Retired) Sam H. King; September 2003.

459. Within the first year of guerrilla operations, the number of jungle bases had mushroomed to such an extent that the RUF boasted a fully-fledged network of 'strongholds' and safe havens across the country, which would become the main locations for training, harbouring and indoctrinating their new recruits as well as for planning and co-ordinating their operations.
460. Typically, advance teams of reconnaissance officers and commanders, where possible with an appropriate 'local knowledge', were despatched on missions to identify and 'clear' an appropriate area of the bush for conversion into an RUF jungle base. The Commission heard that the first such mission was commanded and undertaken by Foday Sankoh himself in the company of troops under Sam Bockarie (alias "Mosquito") . Their express intention and indeed result was to carve out a symbolic first base in the heart of the Eastern Province.

Jungle Bases in the Eastern Province

461. Thus the Headquarters of the RUF from February 1994 until October 1996 would become **The Zogoda**, an encampment of makeshift buildings and storage huts nestled in the forest atop a ridge in the Kambui Hills of the Kenema District. From the point the territory was originally claimed by Sankoh and Mosquito, this camp was characterised and also protected by its difficulty to access: from the nearest road, which runs south from Blama Junction and passes through the town of Gbandawo, it required a trek of more than seven miles over rugged footpaths, all of them uphill.
462. Moreover, **Gbandawo** itself was the location for a defensive base, marshalled by the vanguard commando Augustine Koroma. A further base at Jui Koya, referred to as '**Camp Lion**' and occupied by a variety of training instructors under the supervision of Gibril Massaquoi, provided a further screen in the nearby bush.
463. Foday Sankoh was regularly, if not almost permanently, stationed at The Zogoda for approximately two years. The camp was intended to be the 'Control Centre' of the RUF, its hub of communications from which Sankoh would despatch messages and instructions to his field commanders over signalling equipment and other radio gadgetry that had been appropriated in ambushes from the Sierra Leone Army.
464. The base also played host to meetings, both collective and individual, between Sankoh and his senior commanders, in which reports from the front were presented to the Leader. There was at least one regular meeting of the High Command, commonly called 'The Forum', at which members of the RUF's War Council, chaired by S. Y. B. Rogers, would discuss and decide upon elements of structural or political strategy. Sankoh retained autonomy over combat operations in his capacity as the RUF's Commander-in-Chief.
465. Testimonies indicated that a summons to report to The Zogoda was often a disciplinary measure through which Sankoh planned to admonish combatants who had been involved in alleged misconduct. On other occasions all officers of a particular rank or from a particular operational area would be called to the base for purposes of reassignment, re-training or the issuance of specific orders relating to an imminent military operation.

466. The Commission heard that it was often directly upon returning from such meetings to their various smaller bases in other parts of the country that commanders would unleash new campaigns of abuse or implement changes to their training activities on a particular base. It was reported to the Commission that every RUF operation of any scale or significance in the period between 1994 and 1996 was orchestrated from, carried out with the full cognisance of, or at the very least reported to the High Command at The Zogoda. The RUF command structure was in this sense intended to be centralised under the sole authority of Foday Sankoh. Nevertheless, his authority was often undermined by the failure to punish or otherwise discipline commanders in the field who carried out operations without his express instruction.¹⁸⁶
467. For a number of reasons the Eastern Province encompassed the jungle territories which the personnel of the RUF movement were most familiar. The overwhelming majority of junior commandos who were enlisted in the years between 1991 and 1993 were indigenes of the Kailahun and Kono Districts; this group also formed the numerical majority in the RUF by the commencement of guerrilla operations. Meanwhile the vanguards had grown to know the terrain intimately during their fighting on the Eastern Front; several Sierra Leoneans testified that having lived in Liberia for many years before the outbreak of the war, they were better acquainted with Kailahun District than with their own places of origin in other parts of the country.¹⁸⁷
468. Accordingly, in addition to The Zogoda, other vital strategic bases were positioned in the East and assigned to senior members of the High Command. First, in the Kenema District, Sam Bockarie (alias “Mosquito”) was responsible for the so-called **Cuba Base** situated near the mining town of Peyama in the more northerly ridges of the Kambui Hills. Mosquito was not often present on the base in person, but was reported during one of his visits to have brought in ‘juju men’ and a ‘doctor’ from Liberia who injected drugs and administered herbal medicines to each of the forced recruits on the basis that it would ‘boost their morale’. On one rare occasion when he conducted a training session at Cuba Base, Mosquito was said to have been particularly merciless, executing three child combatants for their failure to run fast enough.¹⁸⁸
469. Second, in the Kailahun District, the Battle Field Commander Issa Sesay assumed leadership of what was popularly called **Camp Burkina** or **Burkina Faso**. Sesay’s communications were set up in the town of Geima, Luawa Chiefdom, which was the effective home of the RUF’s Second Battalion. However this base covered a greater expanse of territory than the other control areas and accordingly was known by some commanders simply as **Kailahun Jungle**. In many ways Sesay was bestowed control of the ‘target’ areas on the Eastern Front that had been ‘behind rebel lines’ for most of the first three years of the conflict.

¹⁸⁶ For further details, refer to the section below on Patterns of Violations and Abuses.

¹⁸⁷ TRC Confidential Individual Interviews with members of the RUF ‘vanguards’ contingent; interviews conducted variously in Freetown, Makeni, Magburaka, Kailahun and Kono; June to December 2003.

¹⁸⁸ TRC Confidential Interview with a former RUF junior commando recruited in the Bonthe District in 1995; interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 15 July 2003.

470. Third, in the Kono District, the ‘Vanguard Commander’ Morris Kallon (alias Birlai Karim) held the **Kono Jungle**, which was alleged to be in Kono along the main road from Kailahun to Koidu Town but was actually closer to Kenema.
471. Additionally in the East, the Commission heard reports of bases whose exact locations was not clear. The first of these was the **Kenema By-pass Jungle**, which appears to have been a stopping point on the bush route used to move between Kenema and Kailahun; it was headed by an RUF commander named ‘Mohamed Small Voice’. Additionally a base was created on the banks of the Moa River and referred to as **Across Moa Jungle**. Several RUF combatants recollected that the troop at this location was led by the former Small Boys’ Unit (SBU) commander Sheriff Parker (alias “Base Marine”), although Parker himself did not allude to such a position in his testimony to the Commission.¹⁸⁹

Jungle Bases in the Northern Province

472. The RUF second-in-command Mohamed Tarawallie was assigned to take command of the **‘Northern Jungle’**, which in reality comprised a sub-network of disparate individual bases spread over several Districts. The most strategic cluster of camps was **Kangari Hills**, positioned in the vicinity of the village of Kpetima, Tonkolili District in a remote gold-mining creek called Nakwata. The creek is reportedly so hilly and treacherous that even second- and third-time visitors experienced difficulty locating the camps there.
473. In addition, the Northern Province hosted the RUF base commonly referred to as **Malal Hills**, located near Mabang, Tonkolili District on the thickly-forested Ropulun Hill. According to information in the possession of the NPRC Government, it was commanded by an RUF commando nicknamed ‘First Blood’.¹⁹⁰ There was another jungle base known as Mantumbi in Matoloka.
474. A third strategic base-point in the North was in **Makundu Hills**, Bombali District, within ten miles of the Northern Headquarter Town of Makeni. According to the RUF’s administrative head of recruitment and training, Moigboi Moigande Kosia, this axis was opened by troops under the command of Dennis Mingo (alias “Superman”).¹⁹¹ It encompassed the RUF training base referred to as **Camp Charlie**.
475. The Commission heard testimony from a variety of abductees, predominantly children, who were taken to Camp Charlie under the purview of training commanders such as Rashid Sandi and Monica Pearson. Within these accounts the Commission registered a litany of violations carried out by the commanders on this base, including forced recruitment, torturous training exercises, deployment of children into attacks on civilian areas and systematic forced drugging.

¹⁸⁹ Sheriff Parker (alias “Base Marine”), former RUF vanguard and erstwhile commander of the Small Boys’ Unit (SBU); TRC Interview conducted in Magburaka, Tonkolili District; 14 August 2003.

¹⁹⁰ See the document entitled: “Rebel Activities at Mabang, Rocharmalal in the Port Loko Area – A Few Kilometres to Lungi, which is close the City of Freetown”, dated 23 January 1995; contained in confidential files compiled by the National Security Agency (NSA) of the NPRC Government, 1992 - 1996; presented to the Commission by the former NPRC National Security Adviser, Brigadier (Retired) Sam H. King; September 2003.

¹⁹¹ Captain (Retired) Moigboi Moigande Kosia, former officer in the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF) and later recruited into the RUF by Foday Sankoh as his first ‘G-1’ officer; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; May 2003.

476. Among all the RUF training bases where violations against children were perpetrated, the site of Camp Charlie must be highlighted as the scene of particularly abhorrent conduct by its commanders.

Jungle Base in the Western Area

477. The coverage of the RUF guerrilla campaign by 1995 was such that even a **Western Jungle**, located around Fogbo on the axis approaching the capital city of Freetown, was established and maintained for a period of up to one year. It was held and supervised by Dennis Mingo (alias "Superman"). In 1995, Dennis Mingo had wanted to use the base as a springboard from which to launch a series of full-scale attacks including a proposed attack on Freetown with support from troops led by Mohamed Tarawallie. However, due to Sankoh's veto on that occasion and due to the concentration of military strength in Freetown around the NPRC Government, the Western Area was the part of the country least affected by guerrilla attacks.

Jungle Bases in the Southern Province

478. As described in the foregoing analysis, several cadres of RUF fighters in Pujehun District, as well as in limited areas of Kenema and Bo Districts, had been deploying unconventional tactics of warfare while their compatriots in the East were still engaged in conventional 'target' warfare. Thus there existed *de facto* jungle bases in the Southern Province well before Sankoh conceived his guerrilla strategy. The question was not so much one of establishing new areas of control, but of identifying the most viable areas that were formerly in use and incorporating them into the national network.
479. The former First Battalion base on the outskirts of Pujehun Town assumed a similar significance in the South to that of its Second Battalion counterpart in Kailahun in the East: it afforded a sense of continuity to the movement by launching new operations from old ground. The Commission heard some of its trainees refer to the base as **Camp Libya**, while it was apparently known more widely simply as **Pujehun Jungle**. At the start of Phase II operations, Gibril Massaquoi held commandship of the First Battalion but was subsequently reassigned to front-line duties alongside Mohamed Tarawallie and did not command the base. Instead it was led predominantly by another Southerner, Michael Rogers (alias Bordal), who also commanded the base known as the **Rutile Jungle**, Bonthe District.
480. During 1993 the RUF in the South had also established the **Koribondo Jungle**, which sat on the banks of the Waaje River close to the town of Bandajuma, Bo District. This position derived much of its strategic importance from its proximity to the SLA garrison at Koribondo itself, which was the subject of intense inter-factional fighting for much of the third phase of the conflict. The nearest base to the Southern Headquarter town of Bo was the so-called **Njala Jungle**, from which important covert attacks on the SLA units deployed around Bo were frequently launched.
481. Finally, the town of **Matru Jong**, Bonthe District, became an important training base for RUF officers in the Internal Defence Unit (IDU). The former 'G-2' commander Patrick Beinda led a training programme for several batches of

recruits there , while prominent vanguards including Augustine Koroma, Sam Bockarie and Morris Kallon each served a stint in the town in order to co-ordinate the activities of the RUF in the Bonthe District as a whole. The Commission heard that the RUF commanders and combatants based in the Bonthe District underwent numerous disciplinary investigations between 1994 and 1995, particularly with regard to their perceived raggedness in the aftermath of the attack on Sierra Rutile in early 1995.¹⁹²

DYNAMICS OF THE DEFENSIVE RESPONSE TO THE TACTICS OF 'GUERRILLA' WARFARE

482. In Pujehun District, the fighters who were affiliated to the RUF in Phase I had always subscribed had a very limited local objective to their participation in the conflict. While the vanguards and early batches of junior commandos were set on the propagation of 'Sankoh's revolution', the militiamen of the 'Action Group' styled themselves more as 'defenders of the people' against the pro-Government forces of the Army and ULIMO. It was always likely to be a confusing dichotomy for the military properly to understand. In trying to decipher the blurred lines between civil defence and rebellion, the Army often got it wrong and ended up targeting innocent civilians. Local people started to see the soldiers as the most likely abusers of their human rights, whereas the various squads of local militiamen fighting under the umbrella of the RUF were, conversely, a source of protection.

"The information that we got was that most of those who mobilised as Kamajors were either once with RUF as members or they were civilians who were behind the RUF."¹⁹³

483. Their gripe was that the RUF had caused too much havoc off their own backs and had not done enough to defend the people against other attackers; they thought that they could do better under an alternative strategy embodied by the CDF, whereby the objective would be advancement of a concept of civil defence, rather than an ideology for improved or reformed governance in the country. Accordingly, almost the entire 4th Battalion of the RUF relocated to Liberia and left it in the hands of the local militias.

484. Obviously this somewhat disfigured face of the war in Pujehun can be traced back to the unfortunate events of 1982 and 1983, when the civilian uprising in Ndorgboryosoi was quelled by a heavy-handed response on the part of the Government troops and SSD.

485. There are good grounds on which to conclude that the Sierra Leone Army engaged in vindictive targeting of purported 'rebels' and 'collaborators' in the first two phases of the conflict, and that numerous violations of human rights also stemmed from their ragged and undisciplined deployment, compounded by massive fear, lack of training and an enemy whose war tactics were designed specifically to exploit such weaknesses. Many soldiers also saw the war as an opportunity for personal profit and engaged in reprehensible conduct

¹⁹² Submission by Moiganda Mogboi Kosia, February 2003.

¹⁹³ TRC Confidential Interview with an RUF combatant, 'G-5' commander and former intelligence officer; interview conducted in Koidu Town, Kono District; 12 August 2003.

such as the looting of property of civilians, and in extreme cases colluding with the RUF in planning attacks on communities.

486. In a sense, while there were grounds for mistrust of the army, it was manipulated out of proportion to what was existing on the ground. There was certainly misbehaviour by elements within the army. There were also false flag operations carried out by the RUF which deepened the perception among the civilian populace that the army could no longer be trusted. Politicians had begun to manipulate the widespread discontent against the army for partisan political objectives: as a basis or pressuring the army to hand over power, since it was no longer capable of successfully prosecuting the war. However, the army did little to clean up its image. The perceptions therefore lingered.
487. The failure of the army to protect the populace gave rise to an overwhelming desire among the people to institutionalise the existing civil militia as the only force that could protect the communities against attacks by the RUF. The RUF's 'false flag' tactic, necessarily kept secret from the public consciousness by its perpetrators, added fuel to the fire of the politicians' argument that the Army had reduced itself to a mode of behaviour that was no better than that of the 'rebels' – neatly encapsulated in the rubric of 'sobels'. As the concept was readily absorbed by the civilians – who themselves witnessed and reported what they thought were attacks by soldiers in every corner of the country – the position of a Government spearheaded by soldiers became untenable.
488. In turn, the politicians' shrewdness brought power at a high price. In winning over the civilians on the ticket that soldiers were against them, the politicians conveyed a message to the soldiers that indeed they were the pariahs of the state. Since their best efforts would yield only derision, the soldiers took on the mantle that had been cast upon them and gradually transformed themselves into a deliberate enemy of 'democracy'. Simultaneously but particularly subsequent to this transformation, the politicians, now bedding themselves into Government, were left with no option but to create an additional arm to the state security apparatus that would supplant and compensate for the Army.

SEEDS OF DISTRUST IN THE SIERRA LEONE ARMY

489. In the space of little over one year, the whole context of the conflict in Sierra Leone changed for its civilian population. In November 1993, every civilian settlement in the country had been purged of RUF presence. The insurgents were living in the bush, largely devoid of weaponry and ammunition, cut off from their former supply route out of Liberia. As described above, the Head of State, Captain Strasser, was subsequently moved to declare a cease-fire in what many had hoped would be end-phase of the conflict.
490. In contrast, by late January 1995, when the RUF attacked Kambia Town in the North, there was not a single District in the Provinces in which the RUF was not present. The RUF's guerrilla attacks impacted on civilians in many ways, but their foremost effect was to make everyone feel vulnerable.
491. In times of crisis, according to the Constitution, the Sierra Leone Army has the duty to preserve the lives and property of the citizens of the state. The inescapable impression reached by the majority of civilians was that the Army was failing in its task. By any standards, the sheer breadth of geographical coverage achieved by the RUF represented a fundamental collapse in the state

security apparatus. Naturally, the civilians developed certain misgivings about the capacities of the soldiers on the ground to protect them.

492. RUF guerrilla attacks, as described above, were characterised by killings, abductions and systematic destruction of property. In the wake of such an attack, it became commonplace for collective 'post-mortems' to be conducted in which soldiers and civilians would put forward their explanations as to why the defence of communities was so frequently breaking down. A familiar pattern in these explanations emerged, just as it did in the testimonies received by the Commission: soldiers and civilians would narrate two different sides to the same story.
493. On the one hand, the Army would claim that it was powerless to prevent such attacks taking place on account of its 'institutional incapacities': its soldiers were inexperienced, poorly-trained, ill-equipped and unused to the type of fear that guerrilla tactics could induce. They were forced to take flight in the face of overwhelming pressure and occasionally lost men or military materials to an ambush or assault that was impossible to withstand. Military leaders would then declare that they were making provisions to overcome their incapacities and would continue to do their utmost to protect lives and property.
494. On the other hand, civilians refused to accept that such far-reaching and regular spates of violations and abuses could continue to occur in spite of the Army's best efforts. Instead they would point to highly suspicious circumstances surrounding guerrilla attacks in their communities and aver that the soldiers had engaged in 'connivance'. Their allegations would portray degrees of connivance that fluctuated from place to place and from one week to the next. In their moderate form, they said that the Army had deliberately abandoned the civilians to suffer violations at the hands of the RUF. In their more unrestrained form, they said that the soldiers themselves had carried out an attack and visited violations and abuses upon civilians directly.
495. As Phase II unfolded, the word spread among civilians that SLA soldiers were working with the rebels, providing arms and supplies to the rebels, acting on instructions from the rebels, and even carrying out joint operations with the rebels. In fact, according to conventional wisdom, many SLA men were "soldiers by day, rebels by night." All of these notions of an untrustworthy Sierra Leone Army were neatly encapsulated in one accusatory word: "sobels."
496. More so than in any other sphere of its research and investigations into this conflict, the Commission's guiding principle with regard to the tense relationship between the Sierra Leone Army and the civilian population has been to strike an impartial balance. Neither 'institutional incapacities' nor 'sobels' can serve as an entirely historically accurate portrayal of the dynamics that governed the relationship. The truth, in fact, lies somewhere in between.

Understanding the Conduct of the Sierra Leone Army

497. One of the keys to understanding the role of the Sierra Leone Army in the conflict is to think of it not as an institution, but as a conglomeration of individuals. For all the reshuffling and restructuring, the creation of new units and the renaming of existing ones, the essential nature of the Army and its conduct in practice derived from the human characteristics of those who filled its ranks.
498. During the reign of the NPRC, the Sierra Leone Army encompassed a broader and more diverse mixture of mindsets and capabilities than at any other point in its history. First and foremost, the unprecedented variety was a function of size. The paltry force of between 3,000 and 4,000 soldiers that started the war in 1991 accounted for only a minority of the total force by 1994.
499. The enormous recruitment drive begun in 1992 had enlisted predominantly urban youths from the streets of Freetown. It was the greatest single contributor of new 'manpower', but it was not the only source.
500. Steady and significant additional growth had also been taking place locally at the various frontlines. Quite informally at first, but ever more systematically as time passed, Army units incorporated local volunteers into their midst. The voluntary cadre burgeoned into a whole new class of soldiers known as 'irregulars', which comprised vigilantes, Border Guards (SLBGs) and other auxiliary forces. Eventually these irregulars were given weapons, uniforms and military identification numbers. Equally, their names were added to the SLA register in their thousands.
501. An important factor in determining the way a soldier behaves is his own self-perception. Before 1991 most soldiers saw themselves as performing a largely ceremonial role. The central difference for those who entered the Army during the conflict was their certain knowledge that they would see action at the warfront. Such an inevitability of combat meant that people came on board specifically because of their eagerness to fight. Professional values like loyalty and humanitarian concern were not then prerequisite to becoming a soldier.
502. Some 1992 recruits testified that the prospect of serving the SLA invoked sentiments of national pride in them. Nevertheless there were others who joined up with dangerous misperceptions of the types of personal gains they would get out of it. The same was true for the irregulars: most of them brought indispensable local knowledge to the good of the Army; but some of them also sought to act out irremissibly localised vendettas to its detriment.
503. The Commission's database records that early as 1991, violations and abuses were carried out against the civilian population by the members of the army. Most of these violations and abuses fitted into a particular pattern, whereby soldiers detained, tortured or killed people they suspected to be 'rebels' or 'collaborators'. The Commission regards such acts of summary justice as being representative of a wider trend: armed combatants of all factions acted hastily and violently to eliminate an 'enemy' whom they did not know for certain was an enemy.

504. Often these actions were directed or encouraged by other civilians. Apparently they were mostly motivated by their unresolved personal feuds; – disputes over land ownership rights between families and ‘ruling houses’ – were cited as frequent examples. Residents pointed fingers at other members of their communities with whom they had a history of civil strife. On occasion, SLA soldiers or RUF fighters then executed the alleged wrongdoer without substantiating the accusation.
505. The Commission understands this type of violations as a category of isolated incidents that were caused by the localised dynamics of the particular deployment areas in which they took place. This does not lessen the seriousness of the individual acts in any way, but it ought to prevent their being seen as evidence of a campaign of deliberate killings by the Government. They were caused by their individual contexts rather than by commands from above.
506. In this light the Commission notes that soldiers were ‘driven’ to kill some of those detained in their custody on the basis of what they didn’t know and what others told them. Contributing factors included unfamiliarity with the local populace and vindictive urgings from their accompanying ‘auxiliary forces’, like ULIMO and the vigilantes. The following testimony from an officer who served in the South indicates that he and his colleagues were often rushed into taking inappropriate action:
- “Being strangers to the place, we hardly knew how to differentiate between the real ‘rebels’ and the civilians. So anyone that was brought before us accused of being a rebel... it was very difficult to investigate properly... [This was the case] especially when we were fighting alongside ULIMO, because they had had their experiences in Liberia concerning the rebel tactics. Whenever a ‘rebel’ was brought before us, it sometimes took just two or three hours before we formed a ‘Kangaroo Court’ and if found guilty, the ‘rebel’ was executed...
- When we became aware of this situation, we started mounting up thorough investigations before we could execute rebels at random. But before that time, to be frank, a lot of innocent lives were lost due to the inexperienced nature of the troops.”¹⁹⁴
507. What is most telling of all, then, is that many soldiers failed to respond in a measured fashion to the exigencies they faced at the warfront. Herein the Commission perceives the first symptoms of insufficient training and waning self-confidence coming to the surface.
508. Understandably the impact of soldiers’ shortcomings varied from one community to the next, but on the whole, the early instances of abuse by soldiers are not sufficient in number or nature to represent a systematic deviation from the Army’s constitutional role.

¹⁹⁴ TRC Confidential Interview with an officer of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who served on the Pujehun Front between 1991 and 1993; interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 07 July 2003.

509. The task is to establish whether this situation had changed by 1994 and for what reasons. The Commission is required to take stock of key events in the conflict up to this point and trace what influences they had brought to bear on the attitudes and actions of soldiers.

Ramifications of the 1992 coup on the Conduct of Soldiers

510. In the Commission's view, those who carried out the coup of 1992 possessed a unique opportunity to overhaul the APC culture of military unaccountability when they took power. Yet the majority of testimonies received suggest that they did not seize this opportunity. Instead, according to erstwhile Force Commander Kellie Conteh, they embarked upon an altogether more destructive approach to the running of the Army:

“Although they replaced the APC, which we had all experienced had become a bad political entity, the NPRC was no better... This is not to say there were no fine sides to the regime... For sure they were not short of enthusiasm, zeal and courage, even if these were misplaced. [Their] excesses however dealt a heavy blow especially to the military's capability to prosecute the war effectively.”¹⁹⁵

511. The coup represented the ascendancy into political decision-making of a core group of hardened fighters in their mid-twenties. Valentine Strasser, who was just 26 years old at the time, became the Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Army. His attainment of this dual role meant that he usurped both his predecessors in the APC and his erstwhile seniors in the military hierarchy. This sudden change in the pecking order had a critical psychological impact on every soldier, from the freshest recruit to the longest-serving officer.
512. Older, more experienced men of senior rank held a generally low opinion of the NPRC leadership cadre. Some of them nevertheless acquiesced and accepted positions in the NPRC Government, including Brigadier (Retired) Sam King, who was the NPRC's National Security Adviser. With hindsight, King looked upon the youthfulness of the Head of State and his cronies as being a disadvantage in their exercise of authority:

“I was working with young and inexperienced men who were totally hypersensitive and hyperactive. [They] were full of themselves and full of some ideas or ideology that they were bright stars... They were acclaimed as heroes in the society, so they thought they knew everything [and thought they] had it all. I just looked at Strasser and said: 'I joined the Army in 1959; you were born in 1966. I was a Captain when you were born'.”¹⁹⁶

513. Brigadier Kellie Conteh told the Commission that while he was Force Commander he were never able to assert any influence on policy on account of being ignored, suspected and derided by men such as SAJ Musa and Tom Nyuma.

¹⁹⁵ Brigadier (Retired) Kellie H. Conteh, current National Security Co-ordinator at the Office of National Security and former long-serving officer in the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF); testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown; June 2003.

¹⁹⁶ Brigadier (Retired) Sam H. King, former National Security Adviser to the NPRC Government from 1992 to 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 1 September 2003.

514. Anecdotal evidence abounded of a flippant lifestyle of excess and self-importance pursued by the junta leaders in Freetown. In some testimonies it was also put up as demonstration of the continuing scourge of corruption at the heart of Government.
515. The patterns of violations committed by members of the Sierra Leone Army under the NPRC speak of opportunism and abandon. These traits appear to have filtered down to the warfront from the leadership in Freetown.

Allegations of direct connivance with the RUF

516. A further problem in the field was the reactionary nature of the NPRC High command towards complaints made against commanders. While the civilians perceived discipline to be slack, the truth was that disciplinary action was hardly taken against an errant commander. If a commander was found to be engaging in some kind of unsavoury or unscrupulous activity, he would simply be switched and replaced. There was very little continuity as a result and civilians had no particular conception of who was in charge in their area at any given time. Under international law, the command structure would be guilty of omission. Witnesses testified that this practice of reassigning people is symptomatic of governance in Sierra Leone where non performers are simply reassigned to other important government offices. It disrupted the effectiveness of the command structure and led to a far higher degree of indiscipline as well as fed into perceptions of collusion with the RUF:

“If they [the RUF] were helped, I wouldn’t say for sure; but they definitely had some connections. There was a guy who they called ‘Ambush Commander’. Wherever there was an ambush, he would clear it. Later we learnt that in fact he was in it, hand and glove, with the rebels. He is Tom Nyuma. He was held in high esteem by everyone. It was only later that we learnt that he was working in collaboration with the rebels. That’s very sad.”¹⁹⁷

517. The Commission heard that in the pre-war years Sierra Leoneans had joined the Army for reasons that could range from patriotism to political favour-seeking, but were rarely actively bellicose.¹⁹⁸ In any case they were treated as second-class citizens in the APC security apparatus because of the primacy in the use of armed force given to the paramilitary SSD. Soldiers mostly considered themselves as performing a ceremonial role, with only the so-called ‘party strongmen’ in the inner circle around the President having any active say in the conduct of the affairs of the state. Merit and dedication to one’s duties were really of very little importance to one’s rise through the ranks; officers who engaged in political sycophancy or who played on their tribal connections were the ones most likely to advance their careers.

¹⁹⁷ Dr. Samuel Maligie, former Secretary of State for Internal Affairs, Rural Development and State Security under the NPRC; TRC Interview conducted at private residence in Freetown; 31 March 2003.

¹⁹⁸ Captain (Retired) Moigboi Moigande Kosia, former officer in the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF) and later recruited into the RUF by Foday Sankoh as his first ‘G-1’ officer; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 07 May 2003.

518. Soldiers were quite often desperately unhappy with their plight at the warfront. When they were unfed and generally maltreated, their moods could degenerate to such an extent that they would seek solace in the thrills of front-line activity. In some instances the very objective of a mission might be to loot or gather food in order to fill empty stomachs.
519. Many of the NPRC's efforts at structural engineering fell far short of making tangible improvements to the capacities of the Army at the warfront. Most of them in fact served merely to perpetuate the internal divisions in the military hierarchy because they were ordained by the brash, younger men in the inner circle of Government and did not have the support of the senior officers, including successive Force Commanders, Major General Gottor and Brigadier Kellie Conteh.
520. Nevertheless, the NPRC was responsible for enlisting the services of the South African security firm, Executive Outcomes (EO) in 1995. In the circumstances of the time, the enlistment is understandable. In the long term however it amounted to a surrender of the country to mercenaries, led to concessions on economic resources for which the country is still paying, and sustained perceptions of structural weakness of the army and its alleged relationship with the RUF. According to the mastermind of the recruitment of the Executive Outcomes,

"I knew the military was not going to save us and I was in charge of the military. I thought EO was the only chance to save our country."¹⁹⁹

521. From a purely military perspective, EO was able to afford an immeasurable boost to the defensive operations of the SLA. In the space of just a few months and with an initial contingent of just 200 men, EO was in effect able to reverse the decline of the Army as a fighting force and begin to regain the upper hand in guerrilla warfare. Its intervention therefore also served to highlight some of the shortcomings of the Army in the period that had gone before. First, EO brought with it superior communications sets and monitoring equipment that allowed efficient code-breaking work in identifying the RUF's whereabouts and movements. Second, it injected clinical precision and devastating power into the air assaults of the SLA. Its helicopter pilots and gun controllers commandeered the three existing helicopter gunships in the Sierra Leonean fleet and flew raids over key bases and ambush points used by the RUF. Finally, its sophisticated night-vision equipment enabled the pro-Government forces to carry out surprise attacks of their own, often succeeding in sending the unsuspecting RUF cadres "running around like ants."²⁰⁰
522. It is quite easy to understand why the efforts at structural re-engineering were not working: captains and lieutenants were the political masters of Brigadiers and Colonels. There was obvious disharmony between the largely impoverished soldiers on the front lines and the astoundingly decadent junta leaders, mostly their peers, in Freetown. Moreover there was latent rancour in the administration itself, since the Head of State did not see eye-to-eye with his

¹⁹⁹ Brigadier (Retired) Julius Maada Bio, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from January to March 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 30 September 2003.

²⁰⁰ Brigadier (Retired) Julius Maada Bio, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from January to March 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 30 September 2003.

Vice Chairman, nor did the Force Commander see eye-to-eye with either of them.

523. Their constitutional status notwithstanding, there were some parts of the country in which a soldier would be more likely to kill you than would a commando of the RUF. One reason for this was that civilians were unreasonably yet unambiguously held to be partisan to the forces among which they lived. If a civilian had failed, usually through no fault of his or her own, to escape from territory held by the RUF, then he or she would invariably be deemed to have been working with the RUF. Without clarity of thought or any means of verifying information given to them at source, soldiers were usually bound to punish anyone picked out as such a 'collaborator'. Additionally complications derived from the fact that there always individuals who were ready to point fingers, not because the person had necessarily done anything wrong, but on account of a pre-existing grudge or grievance that in all likelihood had very little to do with the conflict.
524. The leadership did nothing to stem the tide of distrust. The military junta was naturally implicated in the whole affair. At the very least its decisions were roundly criticised for having created the climate in which wayward youths from the margins of society could have become soldiers in the first place. On top of that most civilians believed that officers of the NPRC inner circle were deeply involved in 'sobel' activity, leading their men in committing violations and abuses themselves, or conniving with commanders in the RUF to prolong the war and continue to prosper from its ill-gotten gains.
525. The state of the Army did not improve under the new civilian government for reasons that are discussed below. In fairness to the government, the president had complained to the Commission that he was not receiving advice from the army even when he requested it. The army just didn't want him in power. At some level however, the government must accept responsibility for its failures, after all, the military is an institution of the state.
526. On the part of the Sierra Leone Army, there were many trends that gave rise to distrust even within the ranks. Colonel K.E.S. Boyah, a member of the NPRC administration, reflected that the recruitment drive begun in 1992 and the subsequent deficiencies in training and disciplining the expanded army had "created the foundation for a lot of ugly happenings within the system."²⁰¹
527. Bishop Kellie in Bo was actually beaten up rather violently by Gabriel Mani, Minister of State by the NPRC in full view of the gathered public of Bo Town – something of a costly misdemeanour. This was used as an issue from which to extract political capital by the politicians. Mani was subsequently sacked.
528. There came a point when soldiers began to lose faith in themselves. At around the time of the transition between the military council and civilian rule, the Army began to show signs of structural collapse and pervasive uncertainty as to its worth to the state.

²⁰¹ Colonel K. E. S. Mboyah, long-serving officer in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), erstwhile Battalion Commander and Director of Defence Information; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 29 August 2003.

529. It was directly out of this somewhat paranoid sense of persecution that the beginnings of a further sentiment of marginalisation started up. The CDF, ever the unpopular party in the eyes of the soldiers, began targeting the soldiers directly. In a way, the sense of persecution on the part of the military became something of a self-fulfilling prophecy.
530. However, in the eyes of the civilian population, the very group to whom they were looking for protection was effectively turning its guns against them. The SLA was slowly but surely being stripped of its credibility as a defender of the people's human and constitutional rights. Indeed there were some communities that were immediately antagonised by the conduct of particular SLA units and their significance should not be underestimated in the longer term.
531. Sierra Leoneans lost all confidence in the Army as an institution that could protect the population from ravaging attacks on lives and property. Many civilians reported incidents in which they felt the Army had been actively malicious, rather than simply incompetent. In the Southern Province in particular, the military lost any semblance of public confidence and any chance of co-operation from the civil defence committees and liaison structures that had been put in place to try and ease the tension. Indeed, rather than leaving their protection in the hands of the Army, communities mobilised all the loyal manpower they could muster, particularly from among the youth, and made a decisive choice to defend themselves.
532. Civilians began to refer to the Government troops as 'sobels'. The implication of this was that those who were soldiers by day were becoming 'rebels' at night. It clearly reflected the complete suspicion with which the army was now viewed and the conclusion in the minds of the people that the army was incapable of protecting the communities.
533. It came to the point in 1995 when any military unit that relinquished control of a town or installation would be said to have done so deliberately. Nor was there an effort to distinguish between the actions of genuine soldiers who were genuinely miscreant and the acts of manipulative RUF commandos who masqueraded as soldiers. The term 'sobels' became somewhat fashionable, as a figure of speech, used to will away the full extent and complexity of the problems that were vitiating the apparatus of state security.
534. A major gripe on the part of the civilian population was that disciplinary action was extremely rare and always insufficient to deter recurrence. It is clear from the Commission's investigations that there were certain SLA commanders whose conduct was above reproach. Yet there were equally those whose conduct was reprehensible in the sense that they appeared to be at least neglecting their duties, if not directly conniving with the enemy.
535. On some occasions, SLA commanders were known to acknowledge that there had been misconduct on the part of their own soldiers. Typically, the acceptance of responsibility would be something of a token gesture made through gritted teeth, however. Civil society members in the Bo District described how "scores of complaints" were referred by the Paramount Chiefs to the Brigade Commander, Colonel Tom S. Carew.²⁰² Even where an SLA

²⁰² TRC Discussions with prominent civil society representatives from the Southern Province, conducted in Bo Town, Bo District, 16 to 19 August 2003.

officer put up a different story in his defence, invariably the Paramount Chief would report that the civilians' version of events had been favoured. The problem was that no robust action materialised and the climate of distrust would remain unchanged:

"This was the time when the Army was in Government and whatever misconduct was reported against them was not taken very seriously. Sometimes they would believe the civilians' complaints over the soldiers, but nothing much would actually come out of it. The Brigade Commander might ask him to pull out, report back at his station... but after one week he would be deployed in another area. As far as we were concerned that means nothing came out of it."²⁰³

536. David Kobby worked as a liaison between the civilian population and the soldiers of the Sierra Leone Army in his own community. Kobby told the Commission about the accumulation of events that caused him to conclude that SLA soldiers were conniving with the RUF:

It doesn't actually mean that we understood the relationship between the rebels and the soldiers. It doesn't actually mean that we saw them sitting down together, talking or making any arrangements for anything. What I am saying here is that, with all the things that happened... I would form a case to say that it was a sell-out.

For example, there's a situation where the rebels have attacked and they're in one location; [so] we want the army, in fulfilment of their own duties, to step down some distance so that they can gather some information. But they simply cannot do that!

There is another situation where the night before the attack, some of them come to tell us that they have been into the area where the rebels were coming out from and they discovered that the rebels are not there. But the following day we're attacked from the very same place!

There is another situation where an army commander has ammunition in his house. And when there is an attack, he doesn't call his men to carry this ammunition away, so that it cannot be taken by the rebels. He leaves the ammunition there for the rebels to take!

So with all these kinds of scenarios, one would just infer that there was some kind of connivance."²⁰⁴

²⁰³ TRC Discussions with prominent civil society representatives from the Southern Province, conducted in Bo Town, Bo District, 16 to 19 August 2003.

²⁰⁴ David Kobby, former civilian liaison between communities in the Bo District and SLA deployments stationed there, later Regional Information Officer (South) for the Civil Defence Forces (CDF); TRC Interview conducted in Bo Town, Bo District; 09 August 2003.

The Role of the RUF in the Relationship between the SLA and Civilians

537. RUF guerrilla tactics were designed specifically to undermine the military. The RUF sought to soil the reputation of the Army in order to heighten the feelings of 'state insecurity'.
538. There was something of a tactical naivety in this premise, however, since it failed to acknowledge that the Army at that time was the Government and that it already suffered from a damaging disjunction with the civilian population. The upshot of this short sighted opportunism was a blow to the chances of the RUF of attaining a satisfactory peaceful settlement, *because the SLPP would prove infinitely harder to negotiate with than the NPRC.*
539. The RUF precipitated a crisis of identification: people often did not know whom to trust because they did not know the true identity of those they were being asked to trust. As the Commission heard from some of the organisers of community defence initiatives in Kenema District, the level of suspicion was extended to both those who appeared to be civilians and those who appeared to be soldiers:
- “The first problem is that you would not know who was a rebel. Even on the day we were attacked, a lot of strangers we saw around, our people suspected that they might be rebels, but you would never have said so at that time because you did not see them with weapons; you did not even hear them say that they were this or they were that.
- As for the military personnel at that time, except if I knew somebody personally to be a soldier before I could believe he was a soldier. But if I had not seen you anytime before, if I had not known you before that time and I saw you in a uniform then I will take you as a rebel.”²⁰⁵
540. In a country the size of Sierra Leone, it is inevitable that there are familial, tribal and financial connections that in fact make for extreme factional fluidity. Two of the more intriguing individual biographies in the NPRC administration in this regard are those of Julius Maada Bio and Tom Nyuma, both of whom were alleged in testimonies received by the Commission to have had direct family ties with the RUF that allowed them relationships of influence and persuasion within the High Command.
541. In the case of Julius Maada Bio, testimony received by the Commission from one of his sisters, Elizabeth 'Baby' Bio, would seem to belie the accusation in the most conclusive terms. It is true that two of Maada Bio's sisters, Elizabeth Bio and Agnes Deen-Jalloh (nee Bio), as well as his brother-in-law, Ibrahim Deen-Jalloh, spent several years with the RUF. They were captured in 1991 during an attack on the Bunumbu Teachers' College, Kailahun District, where Ibrahim Deen-Jalloh was a senior staff member.

²⁰⁵ TRC Discussions with members of civil society in the Kenema District who participated in the efforts to defend their local communities; conducted in Kenema Town, Kenema District, 12 to 17 July 2003.

542. It is untrue, however, to infer that Maada Bio's relatives stayed with the RUF of their own free will: all of them suffered horrendous abuses of their human rights and were forced to remain in the personal dominion of the RUF leader, Foday Sankoh. Elizabeth Bio, herself a victim of continual sexual violence, explained part of the harrowing ordeal as follows:

"When they captured us, we stayed with them in Bunumbu for three days and in Salonwo (Small Freetown) for four days. We then went to Kailahun Town with Foday Sankoh. He did not want people to know about us. Foday Sankoh had sex with my sister Mrs. Agnes Deen-Jalloh in the presence of her husband against her wish. While we were in that camp, they made us launder and cook for them.

I stayed with them from 1991 until 1994. One day my brother Julius Maada Bio sent soldiers with our photographs to look out for us. Fortunately they met me at Vahun [in Liberia], because we their 'wives' had been sent out... I went back to Mrs. Agnes Deen-Jalloh in the camp and told her about the incident. She said it was impossible for her to leave her husband behind because if she did, the rebels would kill him. She added that since Foday Sankoh was having sex with her, her husband also could not leave her there, knowing that they would kill her. Therefore she told me to go alone. I returned to the soldiers and we boarded a bus and travelled to Freetown.

When we arrived in Freetown in 1994, the soldiers informed my brother Julius Maada Bio. When he came and saw me, he cried bitterly and took me to hospital for treatment."²⁰⁶

543. By all accounts Foday Sankoh systematically raped Agnes Deen-Jalloh for a period of several years. He thereby also inflicted prolonged psychological torture on the victim's husband, Ibrahim Deen-Jalloh. Part of Sankoh's cruel and deliberate abuse was to compel both Agnes and her husband to perform active and public roles in the RUF movement. Ibrahim Deen-Jalloh became something of a spokesperson for the RUF, making statements on behalf of Sankoh and a movement for which he can have left little affinity. Agnes Deen-Jalloh was despatched to the Ivory Coast as part of the first RUF peace delegation there in 1996.
544. Until now, the common suspicion has been that Maada Bio nurtured underhanded political connections with the RUF, based on the presence of his family members in its midst. The inference made through such an allegation is that Agnes Deen-Jalloh and her husband wanted to stay with the RUF and advance its objectives. It suggests that the Bio family all worked together with Foday Sankoh towards a common cause. This is patently not the case.
545. Foday Sankoh singled out the Bio family deliberately for a range of violations and abuses at his personal behest, principally at his own hands. When Julius Maada Bio became a member of the NPRC administration and later the Head of State, Sankoh sought to place the family under the most deplorable pressure. Indeed, several further Bio relatives were killed or maimed in the Tihun massacre of 1995, as narrated elsewhere in this report.

²⁰⁶ Elizabeth 'Baby' Bio, sister of former NPRC Chairman Julius Maada Bio and abductee of the RUF; Commission Statement No. 4602 taken in Sogbini Chiefdom, Bonthe District; 20 February 2003.

546. In this light, it is to Julius Maada Bio's great credit that he retained a statesmanlike demeanour towards Sankoh during the peace efforts of early 1996. Against a background of widespread distrust in Maada Bio as the head of a military junta that was thought to want to perpetuate itself in power, his dignity and courage in overcoming a family tragedy was not publicly understood. His effort in attempting to make peace with Sankoh in Abidjan in 1996 is commendable. In his interview with the Commission, Maada Bio lamented the personal agony he felt in negotiating with a man who had caused so much pain and anguish to his family. Putting nation above self, he pushed himself to shake Sankoh's outstretched hand in Abidjan.
547. More so than in any other sphere of its research and investigations, the Commission's guiding principle with regard to the relationship between the Army and the civilian population has been that there are at least two sides to every story.
548. It is prudent to begin, as many witnesses before the Commission did, by acknowledging the importance of the battle for the hearts and minds of the populace in any conflict situation. The people of Sierra Leone had held a generally low opinion of the military in advance of the conflict, based largely on its well-known incapacity as described earlier in this chapter. Moreover the RUF had proven itself to be adept in capturing whole communities in one fell swoop and introducing quasi-governmental measures intended to incorporate civilians into their membership and their administrative structures. Thus it became all the more imperative to institute a concerted process of educating and sensitising the civilian areas in which troops were expected to operate.
549. According to senior administrators in the RSLMF, there existed a certain degree of awareness of the pressing need for good public relations:
- "It was my firm conviction that unless the military secured the full co-operation of the civilians the war would never be won."²⁰⁷
550. Yet the Commission has found that the Army singularly failed to achieve any such harmonious relationship with the civilian population. Rather than regarding the soldiers as a friendly defensive force, many civilians appear to have looked upon them as simply another armed group with the potential for destruction.

Tactics of the RUF to shatter the relationship between the SLA and the public

551. The RUF did everything in its power to entrench the perception among civilians that the SLA ought to be considered a hostile force. Through a combination of subtle indoctrination by its administrative cadre and ruthless operations by its combatants, the RUF effectively smeared the reputation of the SLA and undermined much of the good work it had done in the conventional warfare of Phase I of the conflict.

²⁰⁷ Brigadier (Retired) Kellie H. Conteh, current National Security Co-ordinator at the Office of National Security and former long-serving officer in the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF); testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown; June 2003.

552. Certainly by 1995, the RUF had contrived at one time or another to 'occupy' significant areas of territory in the Eastern Districts of the country, referring to them as 'liberated territories' and casting the Army perversely as a threat to the freedom of the inhabitants. On the back of this 'occupation' grew a notion among many members of the RUF that they had effective 'ownership' of large groups of civilians, whom they forced to travel with them, carry out labour or auxiliary tasks for them, march with them over long distances and, occasionally, create an impression that their advancing group was larger or more powerful than it actually was. Thereafter, the RUF combatants began to perceive a distinction between the plight, or indeed the protection, of the civilians under their own faction's purview – "our civilians" – and the commensurate conditions of the civilians who were not in this group – "their civilians". This perception is adequately demonstrated by the following statement by an ex-RUF combatant:

"One of the discoveries I made through observations in my early days with the movement was the capability of my fellow Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone combatants to protect *our* civilians and the properties they had with them. It was never common to find armed combatants floating among the civilians with their arms, except for the bodyguards of those combatant commanders who were having assignments towards the rear... Also, one would notice that from the civilian base or settlement known as 'the rear' there would be a distance not less than eight miles to the no man's land – it would not just be too easy for an enemy combatant to infiltrate the control area of our commandos to destroy lives and properties of *our* civilians at the rear. All of this was unlike the Government soldiers, whose ways of setting up their defensive positions indicated their incapacity to secure and protect the lives and properties of *their* civilians."²⁰⁸

553. Contained in this statement is the attitude of derision applied by the RUF to the SLA, which they successfully managed to impute to the civilians. Even in areas where RUF members were neither welcomed nor well-liked by the civilians, it seems that a variety of factors often conspired to ensure that they were marginally more tolerable than the SLA as the lesser of two evils. Hence the strategists of the RUF, led by their so-called 'Intelligence Officers', grasped the concept that if they couldn't force the civilians to actively like them, they could perhaps manipulate the civilians to hate the SLA more than they hated the RUF. Using the commando skills derived from their training, RUF fighters began to carry out many of their further and more far-reaching attacks on civilian communities in the guise of Government soldiers. They would dress in Army uniforms they had captured from successful ambushes and battlefield victories and present themselves as fully-fledged SLA officers.

"Whenever our intelligence is applied, in the strategies I have explained, then we create our offensive ambushes and become successful..."

Sometimes, you know, one thing from the Government's side was that anything they were doing, instead of keeping it a secret, they used to give announcements. So we used to listen to radio all the time for

²⁰⁸ Excerpt from a confidential submission to the Commission by an ex-RUF fighter who joined the movement in the Eastern Kono District in late 1992; submission prepared and submitted to the Commission in October 2003.

their movement. Sometimes, when they are moving, they will send messages and when these tracks are in communication, so and so date we are coming to so and so point, at so and so time; be expecting! So obviously we would go and set up our offensive ambush. This was how we used to track these people down. It happened so many times.

Upon that success, we dress in the full military attire, like any 'pips' of the highest command of that mission. We can use all types of uniforms: some were Captains; some were Colonels; some were Sergeants...

People always felt that rebels were the most dirty people, that they are not clean, not civilised and so forth; and at the initial stage of the war that was true. But after we had got far on with this thing and we went up to training bases with some of these tactics, we begin to apply them. We dressed as the soldiers dressed, behaved as the soldiers behaved, then we were successful.

It was a good number [of commandos involved in these operations]. Actually, we didn't just present ourselves as Military Officers. You know, as I said, as rebels we had so many tactics and ways of fighting, when fully implemented."²⁰⁹

554. The Commission was able to obtain several vivid accounts of this tactic being implemented, as RUF guerrilla fighters spread across the country in Phase II and began to set their sights on the capture of larger towns and civilian communities, as well as some of the key strategic and economic installations of the state, including its minerals mines and commercial enterprises. Hence, the Commission confirmed that the attacks on the Sierra Rutile and SIEROMCO mining sites in the Bonthe District were both carried out by RUF troops, led on those occasions by Mohamed Tarawallie (alias "Zino" or "CO Mohamed") and CO Gibril Massaquoi. Likewise, the Commission traced several acts of grand deception to the fighters of the RUF, whereby soldiers and civilian residents alike were duped by the RUF and rendered vulnerable to costly and destructive attacks. One such attack, in Kabala, the Headquarter Town of the Koinadugu District, was recounted to the Commission in the following terms:

"In Kabala, when we went in, we were all dressed in white shirts; because we got the information that on that day there was going to be an occasion – a football match. When we heard of that, we organised a group: the fighting group, the 'reccie' team, we all went together. The first 'reccie' team presented itself as surrendered rebels; so we dressed in white, tied white on our foreheads, went to the people, put our hands up, and said we have come to surrender...

We let ourselves fall into their hands... [but] it was not a proper surrendering programme; it was just done to find a way how to 'encounter ourselves' with the enemies...

Later they [the soldiers] did not take careful notice, so our real fighting force entered and took positions, strategic positions. You know, they

²⁰⁹ TRC Confidential Interview with an RUF combatant, 'G-5' commander and former intelligence officer; interview conducted in Koidu Town, Kono District; 12 August 2003.

were all playing football somewhere, some were dancing; some were drinking. It was somewhat towards 4.00pm or 5.00pm in the evening...

There was an exchange of fire and all of the enemies were overcome in the town... Before ever they could make up their minds, we had spread over the whole town. We were able to capture their missiles – 40-barrel missiles up to two; their BZT; their AAs; 50-calibre or so forth; and some other things. Even down to ground missiles – 120-millimetre mortar bombs also were captured. These are the ways we used to get weapons from these enemies; by using our 'offensive intelligences'.²¹⁰

555. Another RUF combatant offers a very important perspective on how they manipulated the public discontent with the RUF:

"In the area wherein people always say soldiers have connived and joined the rebels, I'm categorically against that. These are the instances I've just explained. You see, as a soldier or as a guerrilla, you live by your senses, you live by your braveness, you live by your 'intelligences'...

Let me just say something very clear. Some of these people who are talking about 'sobels' were not on the full front of the warfront. Somebody can be seated in Freetown; how can he say something about the warfront? He's not there. So most of these things that were supposed to be happening were just by hearsay, then said to these people.

When people were hearing this, it was a big historical effect. What do I mean by historical effect? Okay, well, already before the junta, the soldiers were somehow not trusted by the Government. Government had more interest at that time in the hunters, the Kamajors. More support, more logistics and trust went to the Kamajors. So many of these soldiers felt discouraged...

So, with all our tactics – like most especially our ambushes – whenever some of these soldiers fell in our ambushes, those that were fortunate to be captured and those that were unfortunate to be 'missing in action', you know, it was a big, big problem to the Government side. Already there was no real loyalty to the Government. So it was just additional feelings on the part of the people who had become disadvantaged by the 'sobel' situation. They were also saying: "as the legal Government soldiers, why doesn't the Government have trust in us?"

Not knowing it, our tactics had brought in a misunderstanding, you know, so that's how the hunters issue came up. The Government was having more interest in the hunters than in the Army, the lesser Army. What I'm saying is about the lower ranks. All the top-ranked Officers were in Freetown. So, actually, this is only what I have to explain and

²¹⁰ TRC Confidential Interview with an RUF combatant, 'G-5' commander and former intelligence officer; interview conducted in Koidu Town, Kono District; 12 August 2003.

tell you the facts and explain the tactics, how we used to overcome these people.”²¹¹

556. Public confidence in the army degenerated. Communities in the Eastern and Southern Provinces declared the army unwanted in their areas. They began to organise sporadic attacks on military settlements and personnel in their neighbourhoods. Many of those who attacked soldiers went unpunished. A siege mentality began to develop within the army.
557. The new government began to encourage the strengthening of the community defence groups as an alternative security mechanism to replace the distrusted army. In these efforts lay the institutionalisation of community defence.

THE GENESIS OF THE KAMAJORS OUT OF THE CONCEPT OF CIVIL DEFENCE

558. The coastal areas of Bonthe and Pujehun Districts, concentrated around the neighbouring Chiefdoms of Kwamebai Krim (Bonthe) and Mano Sakrim (Pujehun), held an inestimably important place in the heritage of the Kamajor Society. The natives of that area were uniquely capable of fighting ‘on the sea’, since they were able to swim and to navigate boats through the marshlands and riverine territories.
559. The men in their prime (‘youths’) who lived in these areas were among the first civilians to confront the RUF face-to-face, despite an ostensibly unassailable deficit in terms of weaponry. Moreover, they succeeded in chasing the RUF out of their communities by sheer doggedness and a refusal to comply with the will of their attackers. According to the testimony of Francis Gormoh, this strategy evolved out of a single incident on 12 February 1995, when a group of fewer than twenty men called upon God-given powers to overcome an RUF contingent:

“The rebels were armed with AK-47s and Beretta machine guns. When they stated their intention of moving to our Chiefdom to collect foodstuffs as well as to abduct youths to prepare salt for them, we started exchanging abuses. At that moment, one of our men declared defiantly: ‘Today God is going to fight on our side because you have inflicted so many unjust casualties on us’. The rebels then immediately took to their heels.

We were inspired to give chase, armed with cutlasses, swords and paddles. One of the rebels aimed his gun at us and as he was about to fire, another of our men shouted at him: ‘Your gun will not fire today’. God answered our man’s remark and the gun failed to fire. In complete panic they dropped three of their guns and ran away. We chased them for about three miles and succeeded in capturing two of them with their guns.”²¹²

²¹¹ TRC Confidential Interview with an RUF combatant, ‘G-5’ commander and former intelligence officer; interview conducted in Koidu Town, Kono District; 12 August 2003.

²¹² Francis Gormoh, organiser of vigilantes in the Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom, founding member of the Kamajors and former Member of the CDF War Council at Base Zero; Commission Statement No. 7352 taken in the Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom, Bonthe District; 8 June 2003.

560. The Commission heard that certain SLA officers in the Southern Province actively encouraged the deployment of these men as auxiliary forces, sometimes despatching them on missions to search for RUF locations or to capture stray insurgents and report back to the SLA base. Typically groups of twenty-five (25) or more young men would go on patrol in a particular area of operations. The boundaries were usually defined according to a stretch of coastline, or the flow of a river.
561. Moreover the vigilantes often engaged in active combat, independently or alongside the Army, at the warfront. Although they were not usually provided with firearms by the soldiers, they had full authority from the SLA to fire their single-barrelled shotguns in defence of their people. Many of them became formidable vigilante fighters. Joseph A. S. Koroma was one such fighter in Pujehun District; he explained to the Commission in a public hearing how his participation materialised:
- “I left my village and came to Pujehun Town, where I reported to the SLA men who were stationed there at that time. I had been moved to inform them that as a result of all my experiences, I am interested in ‘the game’ and that I want to volunteer my services so that I can help them to drive out the rebels. They welcomed my interest, but they wanted to know how I proposed to assist them. I simply told them to give me weapons.
- They refused my request; they said they cannot give me a single gun. However, they did suggest an alternative: they said if any of our people were in possession of single-barrelled shotguns (‘single barrels’) then we should go and collect the weapons from them. The people should be willing to help us, since we are mobilising in the interests of those very same people.
- We approached our people for their support and they were able to provide us with three ‘single barrels’, which we duly collected from them... With a single packet of cartridges we managed to sustain ourselves at the warfront for up to a month.”²¹³
562. Contrary to popular perception, the transition between hardened, patriotic defence of local communities and membership of a fully-fledged warrior society was not simply a question of coalescing into a unified force. The Kamajor Society was in fact a novel creation of human minds, expressly geared towards waging war and cognisant of the need to endow unconventional combatants with the confidence to go to the warfront and face the enemy.
563. At one level, the resort to traditional defence mechanisms is an entirely understandable, even logical progression from wanting to repel an enemy but not having the means to do so. In retrospect, however, the incorporation of age-old ‘societal’ practices into the theatre of the conflict was a destructive and irresponsible move. It produced a shambled and unscrupulous militia that tried to compensate for its military inadequacies and virtually non-existent hierarchical controls by deferring to a transcendental ‘belief’ in the invincibility of its members. It has also sullied the sacrosanct nature of the hundreds of pre-existing, long-standing and culturally inviolable secret societies in Sierra Leone.

²¹³ Joseph A. S. Koroma, former National Director of Operations for the CDF; testimony before Commission Public Hearings held in Pujehun Town, Pujehun District; 24 June 2003.

564. The key to the genesis of the wartime Kamajors lies in the reprehensible abuse of the practice known as 'initiation'. There must be a clear comprehension at the outset that adherence to rules, rituals and even sacrifices are not uncommon among secret societies across the country. Moreover, it should be recognised that many such practices are highly sensitive areas of the sociological make-up of the country.
565. However, in the case of the Kamajors, 'initiation' was co-opted by a cadre of individuals who were morally and spiritually corrupt. The evidence adduced by the Commission, as described below, indicates that the 'initiators' of the Kamajors wrested a notion of empowerment from dignified beginnings and turned it into a vehicle for their own material enrichment and the abuse of the human rights of others.
566. Several Kamajors who testified to the Commission ascribed notions of supernatural power that reached Biblical proportions to the handful of men and one woman whom they knew as their 'initiators'. Just as the dreams of the Bible were interpreted to be direct messages from God, the Kamajor Society was reported to have arisen from a divine miracle, wherein three elderly ladies in the two coastal Chiefdoms of Kwamebai Krim (Bonthe) and Mano Sakrim (Pujehun) shared an identical vision in their sleep.
567. Francis Gormoh, who became one of the founding members of the new incarnation of the Kamajors, gave the Commission a detailed first-hand account of the dream that inspired the Society and the actions that were taken based thereon:
- "In the dream, [the three ladies] said that our ancestors have heard our cries and that they were willing to come to our rescue. According to them, we the men were instructed to gather at Kale village in the Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom and pour libation to our ancestors. They said our ancestors had signalled that upon doing that, a revelation would be made to one of the participants. We performed the ceremony [accordingly] and the revelation was given to Allieu Kondewah, who was then living in Kale, to be the Initiator of Kamajors."²¹⁴
568. Allieu Kondewah was known in the South of Sierra Leone as an amateur 'herbalist', a native doctor who specialises in the uses of leaves to cure ailments and, on occasion, to bestow himself or others with capabilities and immunities that they would not otherwise possess. For example, Kondewah was said to have lived in a house without a roof, yet was able to remain dry inside even in the heaviest of rainstorms.²¹⁵ His ancestors and relatives were also thought to carry special powers, which gave him the perceived "birthright" to engage with the spirits.²¹⁶

²¹⁴ Francis Gormoh, organiser of vigilantes in the Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom, founding member of the Kamajors and former Member of the CDF War Council at Base Zero; Commission Statement No. 7352 taken in the Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom, Bonthe District; 8 June 2003.

²¹⁵ TRC Discussions with prominent civil society representatives from the Southern Province, conducted in Bo Town, Bo District, 16 to 19 August 2003.

²¹⁶ The Commission heard that a particular ancestry or family lineage is a prerequisite for somebody aspiring to engage in native herbalism in Sierra Leone. See, *inter alia*, Chief Augustine Safea Nyademo, Town Chief of Baiama and former 'Donso' commander; TRC Interview conducted in Koidu Town, Kono District; 12 August 2003.

569. Kondewah's inherent shortcomings were also made clear to the Commission in testimonies from those who knew him. Much of his mythos derived from his performances as a roving magician. He led a band of younger men akin to a cultural dance troupe and put on displays of dancing and drumming in which he conjured 'illusions' for watching audiences. He was also known to be a man of vices: he gambled incessantly and was almost perpetually drunk.²¹⁷
570. One Kamajor told the Commission that Kondewah's alcoholism drove him to concoct ever more warped ideas for 'initiation' practices in his semi-conscious stupors.²¹⁸ He would later present them as 'dreams' he had experienced that entitled him to subject initiates of the Kamajor Society to further ceremonies. In effect, he was charging them money to endure further ordeals of physical and psychological torture, which they believed would give them renewed or improved 'special powers'.²¹⁹ In due course, the 'initiator' transformed himself into the High Priest, carrying the fantastical title of King Dr. Allieu Kondewah.
571. The original conception of 'initiation' was reported to be something altogether humbler and simpler. It was the first and only formula that could be considered to be the authentic product of spiritual togetherness. Francis Gormoh described how the late Pa Modibo Jalloh, resident of Mokpeva village in the Nongoba Bullom Chiefdom (Bonthe District), introduced the idea of merging an expertise in herbalism with excerpts of evocative script from the Holy Koran. The stimulus for this combination was also said to emanate from a vision:

"Pa Modibo Jalloh was selected to be the sorcerer. He too had a dream after the [above-mentioned] ceremony [in Kale]... It came from Kasila, the traditional sea-god of the area known as Turner's Peninsula. In the dream, he was directed to a location along the coastline of Turner's Peninsula. In the morning he went there and found a small book written in Arabic together with some dried leaves lying next to it.

[Jalloh] used that book and the dried leaves to foretell the day-to-day activities and movements of the enemies. His activities assisted the Kamajors greatly in their fight."²²⁰

572. The Commission notes that the story of how the Kamajor Society came into being has been told and retold in many different forms as the years have passed. Predictably, as rumours have circulated among Kamajor initiates as to the origin of Kondewah's 'special powers', variations and exaggerations of the above narrative have filtered into the folklore of the Mende people.²²¹ A popular

²¹⁷ TRC Confidential Interviews with members of the Kamajors who worked together with Chief Sam Hinga Norman at Base Zero; interviews conducted in Bo, Kenema, Pujehun and Freetown, July to November 2003.

²¹⁸ TRC Confidential Interview with former Kamajor fighter for the Civil Defence Forces; interview conducted in Bo Town, Bo District; 05 June 2003.

²¹⁹ TRC Confidential Interviews with members of the Kamajors who worked together with Chief Sam Hinga Norman at Base Zero; interviews conducted in Bo, Kenema, Pujehun and Freetown, July to November 2003.

²²⁰ Francis Gormoh, organiser of vigilantes in the Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom, founding member of the Kamajors and former Member of the CDF War Council at Base Zero; Commission Statement No. 7352 taken in the Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom, Bonthe District; 8 June 2003.

²²¹ TRC Discussions with prominent civil society representatives from the Southern Province, conducted in Bo Town, Bo District, 16 to 19 August 2003.

component of these fictional alternatives is that Kondewah had to perform some heroic act of escapism in order to become the Initiator of the Kamajors.

573. Thus, in the only noteworthy published account of the genesis of the Kamajors,²²² an academic by the name of Patrick Muana drew upon fairly typical stories told by Kamajor fighters and displaced persons in the wartime camps around Bo. Muana's account situated Kondewah in the Jong Chiefdom of Bonthe District under conditions of considerable duress at the point of his revelation:

"Following an RUF attack on a village in the Jong Chiefdom, the rebels are reported to have massacred people in the village including a great Kamajoi and medicine man called Kposowai. His brother Kondorwai [sic Kondewah]²²³ is said to have been captured by the rebels, forced to carry looted goods and tied with 'tabay' securely for the night whilst the rebels pitched camp.

As he drifted to sleep in spite of his pains, Kondewah is said to have had a vision of his brother who had been killed the day before. The ropes fell loose and the elder brother invested him with the authority to take to all able-bodied Mende men that the defence of their own lives, homes, wives and children was a sacred duty.

To assist them in that task, Kposowai is said to have shown Kondewah a secret concoction of herbs and instructed that a stringent initiation process should precede the 'washing' of the warriors in the herbs. This concoction would make them invincible in battle, impervious to bullets, and endow them with powers of clairvoyance if all taboos were kept. Kondewah is said to have slaughtered the RUF rebels, freed the other captives, and trekked several miles to a secret hiding place where he initiated the first set of men."²²⁴

574. The Commission found no evidence that Kondewah was detained by the RUF. Indeed, based upon confessions from RUF members in other Districts, it is highly unlikely that he would have been spared death if he had been captured in the manner suggested because men thought to possess 'special powers' and to be working with the enemy were routinely killed upon capture.²²⁵ Moreover, Kondewah displayed no such abilities in escapology when he was

²²² See, principally, Patrick K. Muana; "The Kamajoi Militia: Civil War, Internal Displacement and the Politics of Counter-Insurgency", in *Africa Development*, Vol. XXII, Nos. 3-4, 1997; at pages 87 to 88.

²²³ The spelling of the surname of the High Priest of the Kamajors was given to the Commission variously as Kondowai, Kondorwai and Kondewah. It is understood that the spellings are practically interchangeable, due largely to the fact that the man himself is illiterate. Nevertheless, the Commission has opted for the spelling 'Kondewah' because it is consistent with what was written on the 'certificates of initiation' distributed by the High Priest, as well as the spelling that appeared on his official stamp.

²²⁴ Muana; "The Kamajoi Militia: Civil War, Internal Displacement and the Politics of Counter-Insurgency", *Ibidem*; at pages 87 to 88. Muana described this as an "amorphous account" and conceded at the time of his writing that "the origin of the Kamajoi militia as it is presently constituted, however, remains obscure."

²²⁵ TRC Confidential Interview with an RUF combatant, 'G-5' commander and former intelligence officer; interview conducted in Koidu Town, Kono District; 12 August 2003; and TRC Confidential Individual Interviews with members of the RUF 'vanguards' contingent; interviews conducted variously in Freetown, Makeni, Magburaka, Kailahun and Kono; June to December 2003.

detained in a later episode, as one senior member of the Kamajors told the Commission:

“On one occasion, this Kondewah looted a truck and the people came to report it to me; I passed the complaint on to ECOMOG... Kondewah came and challenged them, so they put him in the cells. The commander said to him: ‘If you have your correct charms, you escape then!’ People [like him] were just lying about their abilities. If you have your correct charms, why don’t you disappear? He was there for several hours.”²²⁶

575. From first-hand testimonies, the Commission ascertained that the first initiates of the Kamajor Society as it was constituted during the war comprised between four and six native sons of the Kwamebai Krim (Bonthe) and Mano Sakrim (Pujehun) Chiefdoms.²²⁷ They included Francis Gormoh, Joe Timmeday, Joseph A. S. Koroma and Moinina Fofana.
576. The first initiation ceremony took place in Kale village, Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom, Bonthe District in June 1996 and was performed by Allieu Kondewah. These initiates represented the first *de facto* members of the wartime Kamajor Society. Their status as descendants of Bonthe families and residents of the Bonthe District was vital, for at that time membership of the Kamajor Society was essentially an ancestral heirloom. Thousands of fellow Bontheans would follow them into the ranks of the Kamajors. The Bonthe District became the defensive stronghold of the movement.
577. Indeed, there might have been some credence in the contention that the Kamajor Society was purely a collective traditional defence mechanism if only membership had been limited to the citizenry of Bonthe District. In this light, it would have accorded with the widespread social custom of passing particular ‘local’ knowledge, skills or characteristics from one generation to the next. The concept is akin to keeping a secret, or keeping something in the family.
578. Such custom is practised in all parts of Sierra Leone, particularly with rituals and the powers accrued from them.²²⁸ The limited extent to which sharing and mixing takes place is evidenced by the strong and distinct locative identities that most Sierra Leoneans retain; in other words, a large component of who you are depends on where you come from.
579. The scale and nature of the role played by the Kamajor Society in the Sierra Leone conflict would have been very different if this traditional practice were to have been retained. There ought to have been a shared understanding of the parameters within which initiations could take place. From the testimony of Francis Gormoh, however, it is clear that there was a breach of faith somewhere down the line. What the whole of Sierra Leone came to know as the Kamajor

²²⁶ Alhaji Daramy-Rogers, former Member of the CDF War Council at Base Zero and later Regional Co-ordinator (South) of the CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 24 – 29 October 2003.

²²⁷ TRC Confidential Interviews with members of the Kamajors who worked together with Chief Sam Hinga Norman at Base Zero; interviews conducted in Bo, Kenema, Pujehun and Freetown, July to November 2003.

²²⁸ See Commission Research Paper entitled ‘*Traditional Belief Systems and Customs of Ethnic Groups and their Implications for Reconciliation*’; 26 March 2003.

Society grew out of an abuse of the ancestral heirloom by the man whom it had chiefly empowered:

“Allieu Kondewah was instructed by the ancestors and Kasila [the sea god] never to perform any initiation ceremony outside of Bonthe District and that if he ever did that he would get his downfall. Failure on his part to pay heed to this instruction was what led to his downfall.”²²⁹

THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL DYNAMICS OF ‘ELECTIONS BEFORE PEACE’

Internal Dynamics in the NPRC and the Maada Bio Palace Coup

580. Towards the end of its period in Government, the NPRC administration became mired in internal power struggles and peace efforts. These events represented the culmination of several distinct but parallel trends. They also formed the basis for the handover of power to a democratically-elected Government, which all parties hoped would signal a new dawn for the country. Finally they offered a pre-emptory pointer to what lay ahead in the third phase of the conflict.
581. Valentine Strasser’s grip on the office of Head of State had begun to look increasingly tenuous. In 1995, his susceptibility to an in-house plot to remove him from power was drawn to his attention on numerous occasions, both formally and informally. Rather than alter his perspective or the arrangements in place for his personal protection, Strasser rested on his laurels. His avowed faith in his closest colleagues had given rise to a false sense of security. It would prove to be his undoing.
582. The Force Commander of the Sierra Leone Army, Brigadier Julius Maada Bio, knew of the deficiencies in Strasser’s leadership more than most. In his capacity as Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Council he had been asked to step into the breach on more than one occasion to compensate or cover for his compatriot’s shortcomings. It was Maada Bio’s contention to the Commission that he never seriously considered vying for power throughout the three roller coaster years that had passed. Indeed he maintained that his eventual intervention was an emergency measure carried out in the best interests of the country:
- “If I had wanted power then I would have become Head of State long before I actually became Head of State....”²³⁰
583. What became known as the ‘Palace Coup’ was essentially an action in two parts. The first entailed a protracted political and philosophical disagreement over the modalities of succession and the conduct of elections. The second was a meeting of military minds on the point that Strasser had to be forced from office and out of the country. The outcome was the arrest and removal of

²²⁹ Francis Gormoh, organiser of vigilantes in the Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom, founding member of the Kamajors and former Member of the CDF War Council at Base Zero; Commission Statement No. 7352 taken in the Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom, Bonthe District; 8 June 2003.

²³⁰ Brigadier (Retired) Julius Maada Bio, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from January to March 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 30 September 2003.

Valentine Strasser, leading to the installation of Julius Maada Bio as the new Chairman of the NPRC. Maada Bio assumed all protocols as Head of State on the day of his 'Palace Coup', 16 January 1996.

Putting in place the Modalities for Presidential and Parliamentary Elections

584. In accordance with objectives stated at the time it came to power, the NPRC would make way for a civilian Government during its fourth year. This policy was endorsed and frequently reiterated by all members of the Council, at least in principle. Julius Maada Bio travelled to Ghana to assess institutions and 'good practices' in the transition to military rule that Sierra Leone could adopt.²³¹ Succession was to be effected through democratic multi-party elections for both the Presidency and the national Parliament.
585. Inevitably the practical issues around elections would present a variety of challenges, primarily in determining the format and timing for the polls themselves. There was certainly a play-off between two key priorities in the process: thoroughness and public trust. Thoroughness, it was argued, required lengthy deliberation and several preliminary steps before staging the elections. Conversely, public trust and confidence would only be maintained if the process was seen to be advancing smoothly and speedily.
586. The Commission heard from the former Chief Secretary of the Supreme Council, John Benjamin, that the NPRC's original succession proposal placed an emphasis on thoroughness. It advocated for an incremental re-introduction of politics into Sierra Leonean governance. The first step was intended to comprise non-partisan elections at the level of Town and District Councils. According to Benjamin, it was based on the rationale that freedom and fairness were best secured by slowly ceding organisational responsibilities back to the people:
- "Our programme was gradual... We had a programme to register voters and do local elections without a political platform. Then, instead of having a management team appointed by the Government, you do elections which are party-free. You let the people function for six to 12 months, and thereafter you lift the political party ban and introduce politics. Only then will people contest the General and Presidential Elections on a political platform."²³²
587. To a large extent, however, this proposal appears to have been shelved in favour of expediency. In a speech on 27 April 1995, the anniversary of Sierra Leone's independence, Strasser declared that the standing ban on political parties would be lifted immediately and permanently. The speech resonated principally because of its undertaking to stage a national 'consultative conference' in advance of a handover to civilian rule:

²³¹ The Commission heard that Maada Bio's report from his fact-finding trip would lead to the creation of important transitional institutions such as the National Electoral Commission and the National Commission for Democracy; see Brigadier (Retired) Julius Maada Bio, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from January to March 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 30 September 2003.

²³² John Benjamin, former Chief Secretary of State and Secretary-General under the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), from 1992 to 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 10 April 2003.

“This [conference] would provide a forum for all parties concerned to genuinely discuss the details and criteria for the declared electoral process, leading to the swearing-in of the new President in January 1996.”²³³

588. The Commission has found that this speech represented a crucial point of divergence within the NPRC administration. It precipitated a sudden clamouring for ‘ownership’ of the succession process. It also had profound ramifications on how and when elections would be held. Strasser obviated the possibility of non-partisan local elections and accelerated the timetable for the election of a new President.
589. Moreover, Strasser took a further decisive step by removing important consultations from the internal forum of the NPRC and transferring the prerogative into the public domain. The body created for the purpose of steering these consultations was called the Interim National Electoral Commission (INEC). Its Chief Electoral Officer was the former United Nations Assistant Secretary-General Dr. James Jonah.
590. The Commission heard from Dr. Sam Maligie, who was a Minister at the time, that Strasser’s declaration was made unilaterally and to the great disdain of other members of the Government:

“He lifted that ban [on political parties] without discussing it with either the Supreme Council or with us in Cabinet. It was unexpectedly during one Independence Anniversary. A lot of them were very disappointed and upset.

When he appointed the Electoral Commissioner, he said that by rights the Electoral Commission should be under the Ministry of Internal Affairs, but that he did not want the Commission to be influenced by me or by any other members of the Council. [So] they worked with me and we used to hold meetings together but then the report was sent straight to him...”²³⁴

591. On the face of it, Strasser’s ‘consultative conference’ was an alternative mechanism for ensuring that the electoral process was immune from manipulation by members of the NPRC. The Commission heard that the NPRC administration undertook meticulous efforts in planning the legislative and institutional basis for the elections, which included a Commission for Education on Rights and Civic Responsibilities in addition to INEC.²³⁵

²³³ Captain (Retired) Valentine E. M. Strasser, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from 1992 to 1996; Address to the Nation on the Occasion of the 34th Anniversary of Independence; speech delivered in Freetown, 27 April 1995; copy contained in the ‘Protocol’ files of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), obtained by the Commission from Government archives; April 2003.

²³⁴ Dr. Samuel Maligie, former Secretary of State for Internal Affairs, Rural Development and State Security under the NPRC; TRC Interview conducted at private residence in Freetown; 31 March 2003.

²³⁵ See, *inter alia*, John Benjamin, former Chief Secretary of State and Secretary-General under the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), from 1992 to 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 10 April 2003; and Brigadier (Retired) Julius Maada Bio, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from January to March 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 30 September 2003.

592. James Jonah's allurements back to Sierra Leone was a prize that was pursued ardently over several months of negotiations. Maada Bio testified that members of the NPRC administration "were so much bent on really cleaning up the political system" that they had set their sights on a co-ordinating committee comprised solely of credible and impartial functionaries.²³⁶
593. However, behind the common albeit subtly differing expressions of noble objectives, there was clear discord. Some witnesses testified to the Commission that Strasser's departure from a unified position belied the existence of tribalism within the NPRC administration.²³⁷ Maada Bio expounded his own suspicion that Strasser was coerced by a powerful constituency of Krios in the Cabinet to engineer the process in order to become the first Krio President of the Republic.²³⁸ He highlighted the lobbying of Krio personalities such as Arnold Bishop Gooding, the then Secretary of State for Information, and Hindolo Trye, whose brief was Transport and Communications.
594. A similar viewpoint was put forward by John Benjamin. He also contended that those who should have been in charge were effectively marginalised:
- "[Strasser] was badly influenced by some politicians, like Dr. Jonah and his other [Krio] tribe-mates. He was no longer listening to the people with whom he actually had the greater share of the Government. When you stop listening to advice, you make mistakes."²³⁹
595. These allegations of tribalism were not borne out in practice. The path that Strasser took was in fact one that led to multi-party elections being held in the shortest possible space of time. Moreover, he did not contest those elections; nor did he become the first Krio President. Thus, the accusation of a Krio-driven conspiracy remains unsubstantiated.
596. Nevertheless, the Commission notes that the elections without Strasser's participation were more realistically salvaged in spite of him rather than secured by him. Certainly Strasser's political convictions seem to have fluctuated somewhat between April 1995 and January 1996. It is in these fluctuations and the reactions to them that one can best understand how the whole episode culminated in a peaceful handover to a new Government.
597. Having publicly billed the 'consultative conference', Strasser was held to his word by a vigorous insistence on democracy among the civilian population. Accordingly, the National Consultative Conference on the Electoral Process

²³⁶ Brigadier (Retired) Julius Maada Bio, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from January to March 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 30 September 2003.

²³⁷ See, inter alia, TRC Confidential Interview with a civil society leader who attended Bintumani I and II and supported 'Elections before Peace'; interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 31 October 2003.

²³⁸ Brigadier (Retired) Julius Maada Bio, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from January to March 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 30 September 2003.

²³⁹ John Benjamin, former Chief Secretary of State and Secretary-General under the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), from 1992 to 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 10 April 2003.

took place at the Bintumani Hotel in Freetown between 15 and 17 August 1995. A second conference on the same theme was held in the same location six months later, between 12 and 14 February 1996. These two events are popularly referred to as 'Bintumani I' and 'Bintumani II'.

598. At Bintumani I, Strasser relinquished the task of deciding whether or not elections should proceed. Instead he sought the Conference's direction. In doing so he betrayed an almost counter-intuitive acceptance that elections would have to go ahead sooner rather than later. He demonstrated his reservations by posing the following questions to the conference participants:

"Given that the security situation deteriorates or improves, would the voter be secure on polling day? Should the peace process be linked with a date for elections? Assuming the RUF, true to its word, intends disrupting the electoral process, do we still insist on elections without a cease-fire? If we must have elections regardless of the RUF's threat to disrupt them, how are these elections going to be conducted and what voting system is going to be adopted given the current size of the displaced and refugee population?"²⁴⁰

599. Among those present at both Bintumani I and II were religious leaders and civil society groups, including representatives of the professional associations for teachers, medics, lawyers and journalists. A particularly strong voice was that of Sierra Leonean women,²⁴¹ who formed their own body called Women Organised for a Morally Enlightened Nation (WOMEN), led by the women's rights activist Zainab Bangura.
600. On the whole the attendants were seen to be staunchly in favour of elections, no matter what obstacles were proclaimed to exist by the military Government. Some sections of the civilian population held the NPRC leadership in utter contempt. They suspected that to wait for 'Peace before Elections' would be to play into the hands of the 'sobels' who wanted to prolong the war.²⁴²
601. Bintumani I thus overwhelmingly insisted that elections must be conducted despite the hazardous security situation. The participants characterised democratic stability as a precondition for a negotiated end to the war.²⁴³ In short, they opted for 'Elections before Peace'. The provisional date for

²⁴⁰ Captain (Retired) Valentine E. M. Strasser, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from 1992 to 1996; Address to the National Consultative Conference on the Electoral Process; speech delivered in Freetown, 15 August 1995; copy contained in the 'Protocol' files of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), obtained by the Commission from Government archives; April 2003.

²⁴¹ For more details of the roles played by women in the drive towards 'elections before peace', see the following submissions: Marie Bangura (Mrs.), Secretary-General, Sierra Leone Market Women Association; "The Role of Market Women in the Conflict and the Effect of the Conflict on Market Women"; Submission to TRC Thematic and Special Hearings on Women; May 2003; and Christiana Thorpe, Founding Chair, Sierra Leone Chapter, Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE); "The Role of Women in the Armed Conflict"; Submission to TRC Thematic and Special Hearings on Women; 22 May 2003.

²⁴² TRC Confidential Interview with a civil society leader who attended Bintumani I and II and supported 'Elections before Peace'; interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 31 October 2003.

²⁴³ TRC Confidential Interview with a civil society leader who attended Bintumani I and II and supported 'Elections before Peace'; interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 31 October 2003.

Presidential elections was agreed upon by the plenary. A slight postponement was accommodated, with the primary vote scheduled for 26 February 1996.

602. Amidst a raft of concerns about the likelihood of RUF violence, Strasser made another point at Bintumani I that carried prophetic significance:

“Past experience has shown us that politicking and electioneering in our country have always been characterised by widespread violence and bloody confrontations. We must have learnt our lessons now; and this time around political groupings must be prepared to play by the rules.”²⁴⁴

603. The rules themselves were the subject of considerable controversy. James Jonah was mandated to complete a nationwide registration of voters. In the original plan, the registration process was due to preface local elections, which in turn would provide the basis for Presidential elections. However, Jonah was unable to meet the deadline for registration. He contrived a revised plan of action in order save face and to ensure that at least the primary Presidential elections would remain on course.

604. John Benjamin testified to the Commission that Jonah’s inability to “perform against target” had impacted considerably on the sense of common purpose within the administration:

“I had a lot of disagreement with people like Dr. Jonah because our programme was supposed to be gradual. We wanted first to revise the constitution, because the one we had [the APC constitution of 1991] was ‘washed’ on the people without a proper referendum. The present President [Ahmad Tejan Kabbah] was working with the NPRC as an Adviser, or Counsellor... He did a revised constitution and we were going to do a referendum based on the work that he had done... But because Dr. Jonah could not register people against the deadline that we were working with, he then convinced the Chairman [Strasser] that we can reverse the whole process.”²⁴⁵

605. Thus in another crucial fluctuation, the rules eventually succumbed to a change of direction by Strasser. The previously favoured incremental approach, complete with a newly-drafted Constitution, was rejected as too cumbersome. Strasser declared instead that the regulations of the 1991 Constitution promulgated under the APC would be used to conduct the elections. The General and Presidential Elections would take place first in February 1996; local council elections would, as it turned out, be put off indefinitely.²⁴⁶

606. Maada Bio recounted that the proposed reversal of process encountered stout resistance during a meeting of members of the NPRC Cabinet. One of the

²⁴⁴ Captain (Retired) Valentine E. M. Strasser, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from 1992 to 1996; Address to the National Consultative Conference on the Electoral Process; speech delivered in Freetown, 15 August 1995; copy contained in the ‘Protocol’ files of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), obtained by the Commission from Government archives; April 2003.

²⁴⁵ John Benjamin, former Chief Secretary of State and Secretary-General under the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), from 1992 to 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 10 April 2003.

²⁴⁶ At the time of completion of the Commission’s information-gathering phase, the local elections envisaged in 1996 had yet to take place, a full eight years later.

firmest dissenters was the NPRC Secretary-General John Benjamin. Nevertheless Strasser signed the rules into effect as the basis for succession. The Commission heard from Benjamin that the influence of James Jonah on Strasser's course of action was conspicuous:

"Strasser said we should use the 1991 constitution... It was on the advice of Dr. Jonah. Because [originally] he had told Dr. Jonah that he was not interested in politics. So Jonah had been directing him. When Strasser did that [insisted on the 1991 Constitution], we said: 'Fine; but the 1991 Constitution states that for you to contest the Presidency, you must be 40 years old or above'... We went along and set everything in position for the elections to take place."²⁴⁷

607. One somewhat unexpected product of the NPRC in the subsequent build-up to the elections was a political party of its own creation. The so-called National Unity Party (NUP) was formed in order expressly to secure some NPRC representation in the election campaign.
608. It was speculated before the Commission that Julius Maada Bio harboured ambitions to stand as the NUP candidate in the elections, but that Strasser's ratification of the constitutional minimum age had prevented him. Maada Bio was quite guarded in his testimony on this issue. He stated his continued perception that the NUP was envisioned as a vehicle for the civilian members of the NPRC; not a platform that would be commandeered by one of its military officers.²⁴⁸
609. It transpired that the NUP candidate for the Presidential Elections was John Karimu, the former NPRC Secretary of State for Finance. He was one of thirteen candidates who put themselves forward for the Presidential Elections. With regard to the fluctuations of the succession process, there was one other candidate with notable connections to the NPRC. He was Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, former Head of the NPRC Advisory Council and drafter of the proposal for the revised constitution that was subsequently rejected. Kabbah was nominated as the candidate for the Sierra Leone Peoples' Party (SLPP).
610. Thus all the modalities were put in place for General and Presidential Elections to take place in February 1996. This period would have profound reverberations on the immediate and longer-term future of governance in Sierra Leone.
611. Of immediate consequence was the rumour that Strasser had changed his mind and wanted to contest the 1996 elections. In order for the incumbent Head of State, who was 31 years of age by that time and had for a lengthy period been the youngest serving Head of State in history, to assume the Presidency through victory in a ballot conducted under the terms of the Constitution, there would have had to be a change made to the provision containing the proposed minimum age. Strasser himself had signed this provision into force, which appears to indicate that, up until a certain point, he

²⁴⁷ John Benjamin, former Chief Secretary of State and Secretary-General under the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), from 1992 to 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 10 April 2003.

²⁴⁸ Brigadier (Retired) Julius Maada Bio, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from January to March 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 30 September 2003.

genuinely harboured no intention of contesting the election. It would seem that pressure had been put upon him by certain interest groups to make him change his mind sufficiently to advocate for the Constitutional change.

612. Strasser denied that he attempted to change the constitution to make him contest the election to the presidency:

“You would perhaps know that our Constitution has a minimum age limit of 40 years; that if you want to put yourself up as a candidate in the Presidential elections, you have to be 40 years old or above... Some people might have felt that I had intentions to change or amend the Constitution so [as to] make it possible for me to run in the Presidential elections – so as to succeed myself.

[...] I will say this clearly: I had no intention to succeed myself because I knew then at the time that the Constitution made it impossible for me to contest in that particular Presidential election in 1996. But some of the members of the Government might have felt that I intended to change or amend the Constitution with Parliament in suspension, so that it would be possible for me to put myself up as a candidate in the Presidential election and in doing so succeed myself. That might have been one of the reasons why my Government was overthrown. I actually don't know.”²⁴⁹

613. The Commission heard testimony from the former Secretary of State for Internal Affairs, Dr. Samuel Maligie that Strasser actually wanted to change the Constitution. However he wanted to do so in order to avert a piece of belated double-dealing from Maada Bio:

At the eleventh hour, when he realised that his Deputy [Maada Bio] was in running for Presidency, that's when he said: 'No, I will put a stop to this now; I'm interested in it now'. But he really was not interested in becoming President; he had already received his admission letter from a college in England... He was framed and that was a very sad thing.”²⁵⁰

614. Testimony available to the Commission indicated that at a meeting of the Supreme Council of State on or about 12th or 13th January 1996, Strasser told his colleagues, “let's change the Constitution, I want to contest”.²⁵¹ He was stoutly opposed by Maada Bio, Charlie Bayoh and Karefa Kargbo. The meeting was inconclusive as Strasser angrily walked out. At a second meeting on the subject, Maada Bio and the others became convinced that Strasser was serious to succeed himself. They therefore concluded that a regime change had become inevitable.

²⁴⁹ Captain (Retired) Valentine E. M. Strasser, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from 1992 to 1996; testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown, 30 July 2003.

²⁵⁰ Dr. Samuel Maligie, former Secretary of State for Internal Affairs, Rural Development and State Security under the NPRC; TRC Interview conducted at private residence in Freetown; 31 March 2003.

²⁵¹ Brigadier (Retired) Julius Maada Bio, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from January to March 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 30 September 2003.

615. Strasser himself began applying pressure on the key members of his government to change their minds. He sent Chief Steve Bio to convince his nephew Maada to change his mind, otherwise by the next Monday, Maada Bio would be arrested and taken to Pademba Road prison.

I knew that I had only two options in that situation – let him throw the country into chaos with my support, or refuse him and end up in prison. I spent the Saturday and Sunday plotting the way to remove him. I knew his natural enemies, so I would have to enlist their support; I called Charlie Bayoh, Karefa Kargbo, Idriss Kamara, Tom Nyuma, his Chief of Security, Mondeh.²⁵²

Some of the military officers were looking for Strasser's head on a plate. Maada Bio claims that he insisted on no bloodshed, "less chaos, just disarm the security, surround him and perform a clinical operation."

616. They agreed that at the next Council meeting the following Monday, Strasser was to be removed. Maada Bio had to make sure that none of his co-plotters had leaked the plan to Strasser. He therefore paid Strasser a visit over the weekend and convinced him to re-present the plan on the Monday, assuring him that most Council members would support it.²⁵³ An opportunity presented itself to carry out the coup that weekend as Strasser was guest of honour at the passing out parade from training of military personnel at the Benguema military camp. Strasser had travelled by helicopter and the coup plotters considered shooting it down. Finally they restated their resolve that the overthrow should be bloodless and deferred their plans to the following Monday.
617. All through the weekend, Maada Bio perfected his plans. He ensured that only troops loyal to him would be on duty at the Cockerill Military Headquarters where the meeting was to take place. He also smuggled his personal pistol into the meeting. Once the meeting commenced, the doors to the Council chambers were to be locked until he directed otherwise. He also got the army pilot to be on standby with the engine of the helicopter running to drown out any noise from the Council chamber and to be able to take off at a moment's notice.
618. At the rescheduled Council meeting, Strasser repeated his plans, and sought the support of his colleagues to enable him contest the election to president. The moment he finished, Maada Bio told him that they wouldn't support him and that as at that moment, he was no longer Head of State. Maada Bio pulled out his pistol and pointed it to Strasser's head. Strasser turned out to be very strong. He engaged Maada Bio in a fistfight and many of those present joined in. After a while they managed to wrestle Strasser to the ground:

"The whole operation did not take more than five minutes; he might have resisted initially, but as soon as we got the handcuffs on him, he stopped fighting. He was immediately put on the helicopter and flown out to Guinea."²⁵⁴

²⁵² Brigadier (Retired) Julius Maada Bio, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from January to March 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 30 September 2003.

²⁵³ Brigadier (Retired) Julius Maada Bio, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from January to March 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 30 September 2003.

²⁵⁴ *Ibidem*.

619. Having constructed an elaborate electoral process including adopting a constitution that disallowed anyone below 40 years from contesting for the president, the motivations behind Strasser's designs to continue in power as an elected civilian president are unclear. At the outset of their government, the NPRC had stated that it would hand over after four years. The Government had courted and recruited Sierra Leoneans in the diaspora who could assist it with organising a transparent election. It also set up a number of important institutions such as the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights, as bulwarks for strengthening democracy in the country. His Vice Chairman, Maada Bio had travelled extensively within the sub region understudying other experiences in arranging transitions from military to civil rule. There was therefore so much expectation riding on a successful transition.

620. Brigadier Maada Bio saw the attempt at transmutation into a civilian president as the culmination of deep seated personal problems that Strasser had had for a long time, which conduced him to bouts of unpredictability and inconsistency and from which the public had largely been shielded until then:

"My personal belief is that Strasser has serious psychological problems and that these things had started to come in when he was in power; but we were all in denial; I am now trying to trace this issue back to certain things he did – he became queer, he pushed important appointments to the side of his agenda, failing to Chair even his own Cabinet meetings. Sierra Leoneans were kept in the dark on all of these things..... There were times when even his Chief Security came to me and asked me to take over from him, but I refused. I was loyal to him to the point that I could be.

[...] sometime in September 1995 – Strasser left to go to the UN General Assembly. He was out of the country for one month (30 days) and did not make a single phone call home. Sani Abacha called at one point to speak to the Head of State, but I could not even provide a phone number for him.

[...] I don't expect him to forgive me, but I've never regretted that action. Whenever I considered my life to be at stake, which is usually connected with a strong national issue, that's when I would resort to an action like that."²⁵⁵

621. Whether or not Strasser was coaxed into following a path of folly by other, older men of the same Krio ethnic group to which he belongs is a matter for conjecture. The objectives that were harboured by those who sought to coax him are an equally elusive question. In any case, the only discernible outcome of the internal double-dealings of the members of the NPRC regime was further disharmony between them. Strasser's own nature proved to be his undoing.

²⁵⁵ Brigadier (Retired) Julius Maada Bio, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from January to March 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 30 September 2003.

PHASE III

POWER STRUGGLES AND PEACE EFFORTS

622. This last section of the chapter presents the third and final phase of the darkest decade in Sierra Leone's history. It allows the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to convey the clearest possible understanding in retrospect of all the military and political dynamics that went before. It reflects on what brought an end to the conflict. Finally it focuses the lens gradually onto peace-time and a contemplation of how best to prevent a recurrence.
623. The Commission has given primacy in its title for the third phase to the notion of power struggles. The Commission thereby aims to demonstrate the causes of the overwhelming majority of violations and abuses committed in the conflict. Woven through almost every event in the foregoing narrative are conflicting notions of power, as seen through the eyes of those who pursued them. Members of every faction referred to their participation in the conflict as "the struggle", giving the impression that it was waged in the name of the people. As the chapter on the Nature of the Conflict demonstrates, the dynamics are more complex than that.
624. Sierra Leoneans were displaced, pillaged, killed and subjected to all imaginable forms of torture because fellow Sierra Leoneans saw these violations as unfortunate, though avoidable collateral damage in the protection or pursuit of power. Innocent, powerless civilians were targeted more than ever in the final phase of the conflict on the premise that the 'power-brokers' affiliated with them might sit up and take notice of their plight.
625. There were important elements in the power struggles that occurred during this phase of the conflict. These elements are assessed below.
626. In introducing the concept of peace efforts, the Commission bridges the gap between the past and the future. There will not be true peace in Sierra Leone until there is communal peace of mind. Thus, the Commission does not regard the signing of the Lomé Accord as the culmination of peace efforts, but rather as a set of measures that would bring an end to the hostilities. As this section will show, Lomé did not draw a line under the power struggles that occurred within and between military or political factions. The TRC is one remnant of the Lomé Accord's mostly trampled framework. In that regard, the Commission is endowed with the duty to open the way for a more enduring model for peace based on conflict prevention.

Rivalries within the Factions

627. All the factions were riven by internal conflicts. Often it was represented by an individual's assertion of ascendancy over his local, factional or political rival. In these cases, the individual himself could act to suppress, harm or eliminate his rival directly, or he could deploy his agents to do so on his behalf. The arrest and detention of Foday Sankoh in Nigeria set the stage for the gradual but inevitable decline and disappearance of the RUF as a military and political force, a process that was completed in the period following the events of 6-8 May 2000 in Freetown.

628. There was no one of the same stature and sagacity as Sankoh to command the loyalty and confidence of the commanders and footmen. As the Battle Group Commander, leadership of the movement fell to Sam Bockarie ("Mosquito"). Mosquito was feared by his fellow commanders for his brutality. Being ensconced in Buedu in Kailahun district, he was not centrally located to control the heartbeat of the movement. Individual commanders retained absolute authority over their areas of control and could on occasion take actions that were not approved by Mosquito or for which he had not even been consulted. A process of competition for control and management of the movement and its resources ensued. This was to have disastrous consequences on the movement.
629. Some of the leaders of the AFRC told the Commission that the only reason they invited the RUF to join them in government in 1997 was their desire to bring the war to an end and stop the suffering of the people. Such invitation did not seem to have been clearly thought through. From the onset there were stresses and strains tearing at the seams of the partnership. In the first week of the overthrow, the Commission was told that the leader of the AFRC Major Johnny Paul Koroma had consented to end his unconstitutional act and give way to the elected president.²⁵⁶
630. At a meeting with the then British and Nigerian High Commissioners, he had agreed to make a broadcast announcing that he was stepping down and inviting President Kabbah to come back from exile and resume his presidency. Elements within the RUF arm of the new government threatened mayhem if he made the broadcast. On the appointed day, the High Commissioners waited in vain for the scheduled broadcast. Subsequently, each faction in the governing AFRC/RUF coalition wanted to stamp its authority and control on the instruments of governance. The result was that officers of state continued to act with impunity and could not be disciplined as they resorted to their respective factions for protection.
631. In the Civil Defence Forces, an intense internal struggle had erupted by late 1997 for the control of the soul of the movement. The central characters were the National Coordinator, Chief Sam Hinga Norman and the War Council in Exile, the arrowhead of the president's attempt to bring the movement under executive control. All kinds of persons, some of them with very dubious credentials were to be invited into the contest in support of the rival groups. This debilitating contest for the soul of the CDF partially explains how the movement deviated from a people's cause to serving individual and group interests, and finally spilled into the political arena with the end of the war. To some of Chief Norman's followers, his present travails are a reflection of these power struggles within the CDF and the attempts to prevent him deriving political mileage for his national service in institutionalising and leading the CDF to resist the AFRC and the RUF.

²⁵⁶ Peter Penfold, former High Commissioner of the United Kingdom to Sierra Leone; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 31 July 2003.

Power for the Sake of the Trappings of Power

632. This particular form of power-hungriness is most identifiable in the actions of ground-level commanders and the remarkably ad-hoc rabbles of combatants they carried with them. The quest for power led to the emergence of new factions and sub-factions from existing ones.
633. The coup leaders of 25 May 1997 were incapable of resigning themselves to the life of soldiers serving a civilian Government. They made a concerted thrust to redefine their conditions of service by overhauling the state security apparatus of which they were part. They carried a sizeable proportion of the Sierra Leone Army with them, leading to a large-scale shift in allegiance and a 'new' fighting force known as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC).
634. When the AFRC junta was ousted forcibly from political office, the institution was wiped out but the factional identity persisted for its soldiers. Having been rejected by the people they claimed to be liberating, they claimed they were fighting in revenge for the trial, detentions and execution of some of their colleagues, and in the vain hope that they could acquire power through battlefield successes. Their sole right to bear arms as soldiers was to protect lives, property and the territorial integrity of the country. Thus, the longer they fought against the will of their people, the more confused became their cause, and the more impossible it was for them to win from the battlefield.
635. The context of the conflict was certainly compounded by the intervention of foreign troops under ECOMOG. The mandate of this Nigerian-led force was as a ceasefire monitoring group. With the existing national army having turned its guns against the government and the people, ECOMOG was compelled to step in to restore the legitimate government. This was viewed as partisan by the AFRC and the RUF and may have contributed to prolonging the conflict.
636. Essentially the ECOMOG intervention was mandated by the Heads of State of the sub regional body as well as the Organisation of African Unity. The United Nations Security Council subsequently accepted the intervention as necessary to restore the elected government to power. By rights, soldiers of the SLA should fulfil a mandate to protect the state; yet it was SLA soldiers who posed the greatest threat against the state. Meanwhile foreign troops who entered Sierra Leone to separate the fighting forces and ensure observance of ceasefire were increasingly looked upon and requested by the state to become its foremost source of protection.
637. Upon applying these dynamics to the minds of the combatants themselves, it becomes possible to understand the way the factions behaved. The Sierra Leonean soldiers having committed treason were stripped of their constitutional status. This precipitated resentment and frustration, which in turn gave rise to an irrational tendency to lash out violently. The soldiers viewed civilians with contempt because they regarded civilian life as the hallmark of what their enemies stood for. By deliberately disrupting and destroying civilian life, the soldiers were striking at the foundations of civilian Government.
638. ECOMOG faced an enemy that was unpredictable and unrestrained by the conventional parameters of warfare between Armies. ECOMOG soldiers were disadvantaged by their lack of topographical knowledge. Roads flanked with thick forests were imbued with the danger of ambush attacks. Alternative

routes were only navigable with the assistance of local militiamen. It therefore continued to recruit scouts and work with the Kamajors in resisting the forces of the RUF and AFRC. The topography meant that vehicles, heavy weaponry and other superior logistics had to be left behind. Liberated areas could not be held for long as ECOMOG dispersed itself thinly on the ground. Members of the RUF and AFRC testified to the Commission that the key to overcoming ECOMOG was to put them under sufficient psychological pressure to render an all-out gunfight unnecessary. Yet, ECOMOG engaged the AFRC and the RUF all over the country scoring resounding victories. Its thin spread meant that the victories could not be consolidated as the RUF and the AFRC took to the countryside while ECOMOG maintained intimidating presence in the main towns. It was therefore difficult for ECOMOG to respond sufficiently to attacks in the countryside as the RUF deployed its ambush strategy to devastating effect, quickly dispersing into the bushes before ECOMOG arrived.

639. In the wake of the devastating events in Freetown in January 1999, combatants coalesced afresh around commanders with whom they had become allied or associated during the fighting.
640. Approximately two years later, having been forcefully repelled from office and again in their renewed assault on power, a smaller core of them constituted a splinter group called the West Side Boys. Their declared aim was to be re-absorbed into the new Sierra Leonean Army.

The Peace Paradigm: Power Sharing

641. It is accordingly of immense significance that the paradigm for peace opted for under the Lomé Accord was one centred on power sharing. This route was the only one available for compromise between the two sides since none of them had the capacity for an all out victory to bring the war to an end. The mantra of the RUF that it was a revolutionary movement had become totally rejected by this time and sounded hollow even to its members, many of who didn't even know what the movement stood for. Terror became its chief weapon in fighting for power. The restored SLPP government in attempting to consolidate its rule and defeat the RUF and the AFRC, promoted a civil militia that engaged in gross abuses and violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, to which the government turned a blind eye.
642. The RUF became a totally amorphous movement in the third phase. Its command structure had been decapitated by Foday Sankoh's arrest and confinement in Abuja, Nigeria. In his last direction to the combatant cadre of the RUF that was paid heed and carried out, Sankoh announced an alliance with the soldiers of the AFRC to establish a People's Army. Thereafter he became a pawn in other parties' moves towards 'conflict resolution'.
643. Perhaps the most important finding of the Commission is that erstwhile soldiers of the Sierra Leone Army carried out the most egregious acts of atrocity during the third phase. They acted largely in their individual capacities in doing so and are held accountable accordingly. Yet in certain instances they were deployed as agents of someone else's agenda, precisely because they were known to be malleable and unscrupulous by those who directed them.

644. The factional fluidity that defined this conflict is also drawn into sharper focus in the third phase. Many of the early members of the RUF on its Southern Front in the Pujehun District reappeared as Kamajors under the banner of the CDF. There was not so much a switching of sides as the identification of a new vehicle on which to purvey their notions of empowerment as civil militiamen. The chameleonic nature of the third phase of the conflict is part of the uncomfortable truths around the conflict.
645. Hence, perhaps the most uncomfortable truth about the third phase of the conflict: the very same core of individuals who visited mayhem on Freetown on 6 January 1999 were subsequently co-opted by the Government to eliminate the RUF on and around 8 May 2000.

THE AFRC COUP OF 25 MAY 1997

646. To most observers within the military, the 25 May 1997 coup was predictable. Most of the army officers interviewed by the Commission claimed that the new Government made so many wrong decisions in its early months in power. This compounded existing feelings of alienation in the army, and coupled with the political ambitions of some of the junior officers, they concluded that a coup was a matter of time. A number of reasons have been offered as to why the coup occurred.

“On my taking up office as President in 1996 thereby succeeding a military junta, the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), I was bequeathed with a security outfit which had been polarised for years as I have already mentioned and which regarded itself as having loyalty not to the Government of the day but to the only political class which they had known over the years and to which they had related. The one thing the NPRC coup of 1992 did was to bring an end to that political hegemony and to prevent it from perpetuating itself further. But the ill effect of that coup, like all others, was to entrench the military in government in this case for a period of four years.

In this situation, even when the leadership of the NPRC appeared to have given up power on the assumption of office of my civilian Government in 1996, there still remained in the military in both senior and junior ranks, elements who had tasted power and what they considered as the perquisites of power. They were not prepared to give these up lightly and become loyal to my civilian Government. These were, for instance, personal bodyguards, drivers and batmen of the NPRC Secretaries of State. Such lackeys, because of the positions occupied by their patrons were able to amass a lot of ill-gotten wealth by their extortion and intimidation of the civilian population who held such soldiers in awe. The fear of their losing their undeserved privileges and of an end of the opportunities they had for amassing more wealth illegally was one main reason for their unwillingness to accept the changes from a military regime to civilian rule.”²⁵⁷

²⁵⁷ Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, current President of the Republic of Sierra Leone; testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown; 5 August 2003; at page 16 of the transcript.

647. The Army had become divided by the various differences of opinion within it towards the transfer to civilian rule. According to Julius Maada Bio, his intention from the point at which he assumed the Chairmanship of the NPRC was to secure the handover of the reins of government back to a civilian party. Yet many of the boys who Maada Bio and his compatriots were leaving behind did not want to relinquish their hold on power. These constituencies applied sustained pressure on Maada Bio in an attempt to elicit an assurance from him that he was staying put.

“If I had told them for one moment that I would hand over power, I am sure that I would have been overthrown. I therefore kept on giving them the impression that I would stay on until the very last minute. On the day I handed over power, some of them came to me to express their disappointment, and they warned me that we would hear from them in the future²⁵⁸”

The ‘future’ reference implied an express link between the fallout of the handover to civilian rule and the eventual execution of a coup by some of the same disaffected soldiers.

648. One of the reasons why the AFRC coup occurred was that the ring leaders had some affiliation with the previous NPRC government.

“In the first place, if you look at the key players of that coup, more than 80% were the same guys who were either bodyguards or whatever [other auxiliary functions] to the NPRC guys. If you look at it, eighty to eighty-something percent of those guys really took part in the coup. Their backgrounds meant they had personal connections to the guys who had left. And apparently none of them was actively involved in war at any one time. They were all at the rear.

[...] Some were footballers; some were just mere civilians. Some were just living off the work of others and that kind of thing. I agree that when you look at the genesis of what happened, there were one or two problems with the war. But none of them was a key player in the war; so for somebody to tell me that the AFRC guys did what they did because the war situation was not properly managed, I will not buy it.”²⁵⁹

649. Beyond the issue of affiliation to the NPRC, there were further reasons that made 25 May 1997 predictable:

“It was common knowledge to most critical Sierra Leoneans that the majority of the military were dissatisfied with the apparent exposure of serious abuse and misuse of public funds in prosecuting the war [which] they themselves had not succeeded in ending. Allegations continued to be highlighted about massive corrupt practices and

²⁵⁸ Brigadier (Retired) Julius Maada Bio, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from January to March 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 30 September 2003.

²⁵⁹ Colonel K. E. S. Mboyah, long-serving officer in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), erstwhile Battalion Commander and Director of Defence Information; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 29 August 2003.

embezzlement of funds in key sector ministries such as Finance, Education, Mineral Resources, Defence and so on.”²⁶⁰

650. In the perception of the soldiers, what followed was a major purge of the Army in a bid to rid the institution of NPRC junta elements. Examples included the Chiefs of Defence and Army Staff, Brigadier Joy Toure and Colonel Komba Mondeh respectively, both of whom were replaced. There were also serious moves by the new civilian government to implement major reforms directed at improving the system of accountability and transparency in the financial management of the army. At the heart of this reform within the defence ministry alone was the downsizing of the bloated army and review of the quantity of rice allocated to the armed forces every month.²⁶¹
651. The size of the Army was always a contentious issue, more so because rice allocations to the army were correlated to its official size. By 15 September 1994, the official size of the army was put at 11,694 including 395 officers.²⁶² The President in 1996 ordered a census of the size of the army to ascertain its exact strength. At that time, the Government was giving out approximately 25,000 bags of rice to the Armed Forces every month as salary supplement.
652. The official size of the Army that was presented to the president was approximately 17,000. The Government therefore decided to prune the size down to no more than 7,000. Accordingly only 8000 bags of rice were released to the army every month. This decision was conveyed by the President in respective meetings with the officers and the rank and file.
653. However, in order to continue to allocate to themselves large quantities of rice, the officers told the rank and file that the Government had drastically reduced their rice quotas. No one could have foreseen that the reduction of the rice quotas to accord with the actual size of the army would give rise to such anger.
654. There was intense resentment against the government and the officer corps from within the rank and file, who notionally held the officer corps responsible for their reduced quotas. They saw the officers as colluding with the government to deny them the only material expression of appreciation by the government for their service to the country. As one soldier put it:

They took the rice away from us; the senior officers just said that the Government said they should cut down the rice. All of the circumstances combined to make the plight of the junior soldier fairly miserable... the serving officers were living well at the time... I thought that they were eating some of our supplies... they promised that they were going to raise the salary by 50%; but it never materialised. By March 1997 the CDS was apologising that there were no better supplies.

²⁶⁰ Professor Ernest Wright, Vice Chancellor, University of Sierra Leone. Submission to the Commission, July 2003, p.5

²⁶¹ Ibid

²⁶² Colonel Kellie H. Conteh, Chief of Army Staff; confidential memo to the Under Secretary of State, Department of Defence on the “Status, DOD/RSLMR Relationship and TRG Plans as a Broad Working Guide for DOD”; document dated 15 September 1994; original copy of document submitted to the Commission by Brigadier (Retired) Kellie H. Conteh, current National Security Co-ordinator at the Office of National Security and former long-serving officer in the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF); June 2003.

Senior officers and the Government alike were pushing down the junior soldiers.²⁶³

655. The threat of redundancy following the decision to purge the army of NPRC junta elements added to the resentment. In one instance, Maada Bio recounted to the Commission the speed with which the SLPP government retired about 17 soldiers who had been sent on intensive training in executive protection. They were to form the bulwark of a protection arm for the office of the President, providing him with eagle eyed and well trained security protection. This force he had commended to his successor.²⁶⁴ No sooner had they returned from their training, than they were retired. A close associate of the president had defended this action saying that the men were retired on the advice of the serving officers in the army who warned the president that having such a group around him would make it easier for him to be overthrown. It was therefore in the national interest that they be retired.²⁶⁵

656. Whatever be the case, the impression within the entire armed forces was that the new government was out on a witch-hunt. This was compounded by the relationship between the soldiers and the Kamajor militia.

“Another issue which was regarded as a sensitive factor which displeased the army was the Kamajor–soldier relationship against the RUF as a common enemy. Before this time, the Kamajor as a local militia force mobilised by the Deputy Minister of Defence Chief Hinga Norman had stemmed the tide of advances of the RUF mainly in the southern region of the country. With the coming into power the SLPP-led democratic government, there were plans to integrate the fighters into the regular army, and the somewhat increased attention paid to their welfare fuelled speculation of the desire of the SLPP stalwarts to create a private army to manipulate their continued stay in power. Thus it was obvious that an uneasy calm characterized their relationship which grew worse when there were reports of serious fighting between the army and Kamajor at Mile 91 sometime around the end of 1996.”²⁶⁶

657. While the reforms may have been carried out with the best of intentions, the timing was wrong. The reforms did not lead to the consolidation of the rule of the new government. The army was riven with factions and the government could not count on the effective support of any segment of the army. The alternative to the reforms might have been that the Government would continue to be held to ransom by the soldiers. The impact however was that the reforms alienated the few friends the Government had in the army who folded their hands to watch events as they unfolded.

²⁶³ TRC Confidential interview with a serving member of the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF); interview conducted in Freetown; April 2003.

²⁶⁴ Brigadier (Retired) Julius Maada Bio, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from January to March 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 30 September 2003.

²⁶⁵ Momodu Koroma, former Minister of Presidential Affairs in the Government in Exile and current Minister of Foreign Affairs; TRC Interview conducted at state office, Freetown; 5 January 2004.

²⁶⁶ Professor Ernest Wright. Submission to the Commission op cit. p.6

658. According to one military witness:

“Because of the treatment of the Army; every soldier knew it was going to happen at that time – everybody was disgruntled, so when this thing began, we all just said let it happen and afterwards we’ll confront it.”²⁶⁷

659. From his appointment as Deputy Minister of Defence in 1996, Chief Hinga Norman made no bones of his distrust of the army and increasingly sought to institutionalise the Civil Defence Forces as an effective security apparatus on which the government could depend. There may have been some justification for his actions. The seeds of distrust in the Sierra Leone Army were beginning to take root with the increasing adoption of phrases like ‘sobels’ to describe the soldiers.²⁶⁸ What irked the rest of the armed forces and irrevocably turned them against the government was the wholesale condemnation of the army rather than some members of it, as colluding with the RUF. While the army was accused of supporting the RUF, members of the CDF felt encouraged to attack soldiers in the regions.

Since the war started in 1991, the RUF was not able to capture any district in the country until after the elections of 1996. If we had been with them, we would have allowed them to capture many places and that would have given them the leverage to discuss (allow them to talk from a position of strength.) How could we have allowed ourselves to have anything with them when you had officers and men of the army being killed at the war fronts. From Colonel to private, they were being killed. I don’t know how we could have played such a game and have had such an unholy alliance when our colleagues were being killed. Let’s assume that someone among us had been giving them information, that I can’t tell. But to say that there was an alliance, I want to challenge that. Up till this moment, there has been no proof and I challenge somebody to come up and say this is the proof.²⁶⁹

660. Despite the spirited denials by the army that it was not colluding with the RUF, the perception continued to grow among the populace that the army could not be trusted. Attacks against men in uniforms mounted.

661. In 1996 the army had sought to impose a very sharp and decisive military response to those attacks through organising a raid against Kamajor elements at Telu Bongor. Scores of Kamajors were killed in that attack and Chief Norman, the then Regent Chief of the Chiefdom narrowly escaped being killed.

662. With his appointment as Deputy Minister of Defence, rather than striving to bring an end to attacks on soldiers, Chief Norman continued making inflammatory remarks against soldiers. Other officers of government joined in too, including the then Vice President, Dr. Joe Demby. The Kamajors took this as an invitation to launch attacks on soldiers. The whole of the south was declared a no go area for soldiers. Those wandering outside their barracks risked being killed by Kamajor militia men.

²⁶⁷ TRC Confidential Interview with a private soldier in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who was recruited in 1992 under the NPRC; interview conducted in Freetown; 08 December 2003.

²⁶⁸ See section of this chapter entitled ‘Seeds of Distrust in the Sierra Leone Army’ and also the chapters on Nature of the Conflict and Youths.

²⁶⁹ Colonel Robert Kamara, long-serving officer in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA); TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 24 March 2003.

663. According to Colonel K. E. S. Boyah²⁷⁰:

“I think the army was able to hold the rebels for a considerable period to prevent them from taking over this country, until when things started getting some dimensions. If you look at the time we came back from [political] command to headquarters you will find out that the whole situation became complex. You cannot now know who a government soldier is, because the government soldier will say the CDF or whosoever is given more priority than the soldier. At a point soldiers came complaining. Let me tell you that very senior people [in Government] will go and meet them and say “we are sorry for you... your situation is such that it can be compared to 2nd World War, when soldiers came back and they were demobilized.” You see the message they want to send to them is that any time from now, they would all be demobilised.”

664. Maada Bio also confirmed the integrity problem faced by the Government with the armed forces:

“The military only became a problem when it was politicised; my successors [in the SLPP Government] saw the military as their major threat so they wanted to shift the power to a new group on whose loyalty they thought they could more definitely depend.”²⁷¹

The problem was that the military was already politicised by its participation in government which began in the 1960's. The latest experience of governance during the NPRC regime created a hunger for the spoils of office in the serving soldiers. The miscalculations of the SLPP government fed into this hunger.

665. Feeling themselves under attack by the new government and having lost political power, morale among the armed forces quickly deteriorated. Many were no longer keen to go to the war front, not when they perceived that they were not appreciated by the government:

“The CDF was a creation of the army. When the war started, we were not prepared because we did not have enough manpower and arms and arms to effectively fight the war. This was so because the army had largely become a ceremonial army... The Deputy Minister of Defence should not tell the national army to leave a certain area and be replaced by a militia... the soldiers felt that the Deputy Defence Minister was not only supporting the Kamajors but was also their chief and it was like somebody was playing the ethnic card. It made one wonder what role he was playing best between Deputy Defence Minister and Kamajor chief. The soldiers felt that they should not leave things lying down. They made a lot of complaints and wrote a lot of anonymous letters. I have the feeling that both Hinga Norman and our bosses did not foresee the danger until it was too late by which time

²⁷⁰ Colonel K. E. S. Boyah, long-serving officer in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), erstwhile Battalion Commander and Director of Defence Information; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 29 August 2003.

²⁷¹ Brigadier (Retired) Julius Maada Bio, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from January to March 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 30 September 2003.

the boys had struck. This was one of the reasons they gave for the coup.²⁷²

666. According to a very senior officer in the Army:

“The soldiers believed that the government had a hidden agenda to eliminate the army and replace it with the Kamajors as they were saying it in the open that they were going to build a new army. I don’t know what their agenda was but it was reckless of the Deputy Minister of Defence to ally himself [with the Kamajors] and let that issue get out of hand because he knew everything that was happening.

[...] For instance, [he knew] about the soldiers who were killed in Kenema. It may not be true but let me give you another example. He was in Bo the previous night before the Kamajors attacked our positions there. They were holding a meeting together with the CDS, which was called to see how best a compromise could be reached in the relationship between the army and the Kamajors. During the meeting, commitments were made that the hostilities would cease and that they would come together to fight the common enemy, which was the RUF. The next morning, the Kamajors attacked our position and a lot of Kamajors were killed including their Paramount Chief. After some inquiries it was made clear that Hinga Norman had left Bo late at night. I said to myself that if this was his plan, then he must be a mad man because we were the constitutional army. If this man had no hidden agenda, why didn’t he take them [the Kamajors] to task when they executed 11 soldiers and one army officer in Kenema?”²⁷³

It should have been obvious that there would be contradictions in allowing a dual role to exist for Chief Hinga Norman as Deputy Minister of Defence and National Coordinator of the CDF. As Deputy Minister of Defence he was expected to move against the paramilitary force when it overstepped the bounds of its authority or for breaching the peace. His dual role compromised his independence and integrity.

667. Majority of the members of the armed forces therefore felt alienated. Rumours spread of impending coups. Everyone was on edge.

In addition to their [the army’s] continued active collaboration with the rebels, they attempted a number of coups d’état, which were foiled. One such coup plot involving an Acting Major, Johnny Paul Koroma was unearthed early in 1997. In order to produce a thorough and objective investigation into the allegations relating to the plot I requested the Government of Nigeria to assist my Government by the provision of experienced Nigerian investigators. As a result of those investigations, Major Johnny Paul Koroma and a number of junior military officers were charged with treason.²⁷⁴

²⁷² Colonel Robert Kamara, long-serving officer in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA); TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 24 March 2003.

²⁷³ TRC Confidential interview with a Senior Army Officer, conducted in Freetown, March 2003.

²⁷⁴ Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, current President of the Republic of Sierra Leone; testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown; 5 August 2003; at page 16 of the manuscript.

668. Worried by the worsening relations between the army and the CDF, the President set up a committee in March 1997 to investigate the problems in the relationship and make recommendations to him. The committee was comprised of members of the SLA and representatives of various factions of the CDF under the chairmanship of Bishop Keilli. The committee could not conclude its assignment when the May 25th coup occurred. With the death of Bishop Keilli and the restoration of the President to power in 1998, the Committee ceased to operate. By this time too, the majority of the members of the armed forces had joined the AFRC in the bush.
669. The President also invited Nigerian military personnel to investigate allegations of a coup plot. Based on the investigation, a number of army officers including Major Johnny Paul Koroma were put on trial. The trial of the alleged coup plotters was in progress when the coup of May 25 1997 occurred.
670. It seemed that there was more than one coup attempt. According to the then Chief of Defence Staff, Brigadier Hassan Conteh:

“During my tenure of office, I was able to foil two coup attempts against the SLPP government, namely, the attempt by Major Johnny Paul Koroma and others, and the attempt by Stephen Bio, Lieutenant Tamba Alex Brima and others few months later. As regards Major Johnny Paul Koroma and others, I learnt of their plot from the late W.O. I Mansaray and the military intelligence branch. I wasted no time in informing His Excellency the President and other authorities. In the case of Lt. Brima I was informed by Hon. Prince Harding the then Minister of Mineral Resources and I took action to arrest the alleged coup plotters and the matter was still being investigated at the CID when the coup of the AFRC took place.”²⁷⁵

671. Major Johnny Paul Koroma disputed the fact that he participated in an alleged coup attempt.

Since 1996 I was in prison for an alleged coup for which I knew nothing. It was when we were in court that the whole thing came out because there was one accused person who testified he was given Le25,000 to implicate me by one Captain Miller. And then there was also one warrant officer who was at the armoured regiment, armoured unit. He testified that he was also threatened to be killed, that if he didn't implicate me he was going to die just like one staff sergeant died. So he was afraid and he mentioned my name in a statement. But what he said about me was not very important because he only said that he met me at the junction and I didn't say anything when he greeted me. My lawyer saw there was nothing and was asking that I be acquitted, but...they never let me go...they started adjourning the case. I was preparing to go to court on the Monday morning when this coup took place on the Sunday.²⁷⁶

²⁷⁵ Brigadier Hassan Conteh, Statement made to the Criminal Investigation Department of the Sierra Leone Police in relation to the AFRC coup; statement made at CID Headquarters, Freetown; 10 May 1998.

²⁷⁶ Johnny Paul Koroma, Former Head of State as Chairman of the AFRC and latterly Chairman of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP); interview conducted by a television journalist from Oxygen Media, on behalf of New-York based human rights group WITNESS; recorded on DVCAM (Tape R2003-0543) in Freetown; 5 November 2001.

672. Another credible allegation of a coup plot was presented to the President by the Deputy Minister of Defence Chief Hinga Norman on 16th May 1997. Chief Norman had sought the president's permission to summon a meeting that included the President, the Vice President and the service chiefs, including the Chief of Defence Staff, Brigadier Hassan Conteh, the Chief of Army Staff, Colonel Max Kanga, the Naval Commander Commodore A.B. Sesay and the Inspector General of Police, Mr. Teddy Williams.

673. At the meeting, Chief Norman accused the CDS and the Army Chief of having prior knowledge of a pending coup against the government and doing nothing to suppress it.

After I had finished talking, the president turned to the two officers and said, "gentlemen, did you hear what Chief Norman said?" They said "yes sir". Then His Excellency went on further to say, "do you have anything to say?" The officers said. "No Sir". The President then turned to me and said, "Chief Norman, they say they do not have anything to say".

I became lost for words for a while. After a few minutes, I said, "Your excellency, I did not invite these two officers to say something, but since it is conclusive you do not intend to do anything, I am therefore inviting your Excellency as the Minister of Defence, Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces of Sierra Leone and the President of the Republic to order these officers not to carry out the coup or allow it otherwise if they do, I shall have no alternative but join the people of Sierra Leone to fight and reverse the coup. Thereafter, your Excellency will be constitutionally required to sign their death warrants after due process of law. As of now I shall pray that God will make you survive the coup and to see the consequences of your not taking the appropriate action to protect the people and the state"²⁷⁷

674. According to Chief Norman, he felt a sense of betrayal by the President's inability to act and prevent the coup from occurring. This was clear evidence of a deepening crisis of confidence among the leading members of the government such that the President was incapacitated in taking a decision. He didn't know who to trust.

675. The CDS, Hassan Conteh had a different recollection of this meeting. He called it an operational meeting which took place on Sunday 19th May to discuss the general operational theatre in the country and the war front. His recollection did not include the levelling of any allegations against him by Chief Hinga Norman.²⁷⁸

676. The Commission confronted one of the president's associates with this allegation. His defence was that the President could not be blamed for not taking immediate action on the allegation since the President was getting numerous reports of coups and no longer knew who to believe.²⁷⁹ Whatever be the case, to have ignored the allegation from the Deputy Minister of Defence

²⁷⁷ Chief Hinga Norman, Letter to the Commission on the May 25th 1997 coup. November 2003.

²⁷⁸ Brigadier Hassan Conteh, Statement made to the Criminal Investigation Department of the Sierra Leone Police in relation to the AFRC coup; statement made at CID Headquarters, Freetown; 10 May 1998; at page 9.

²⁷⁹ Momodu Koroma, former Minister of Presidential Affairs in the Government in Exile and current Minister of Foreign Affairs; TRC Interview conducted at state office, Freetown; 5 January 2004.

meant that there was a real crisis of confidence between the President who is also the Minister of Defence and his deputy Minister. This crisis of confidence impacted on how the information from the deputy Minister was treated. The President and the country were to pay dearly for this state of affairs.

Staging the Coup

677. The mastermind of the 25 May 1997 coup was Sgt Alfred Abu Sankoh (alias "Zagallo"). The coup was not detected by the officers or the military intelligence because it was planned on the 24th and executed the next day. Zagallo was a bodyguard to a former Secretary of State during the NPRC regime, and had enjoyed a lot of benefits from that association. He was also a footballer and had been associated with a number of Freetown clubs and was finally requested to set up a football club for the army. The membership of the club was to provide the nucleus of the coup plotters. Zagallo gave vent to the frustrations in the army that led to the coup:

"Soldiers in the lower ranks were not paid a good salary unlike the officers...we were denied of privileges such as overseas courses... soldiers were killed at the war front and no provision was made for their families...there was the burning issue of the rice allocation, our rations had been drastically reduced and many times we got them quite late...the issue of Kamajors was another thing that finally discouraged the soldiers under the regime of the SLPP. As all of this was happening there was widespread rumour in the army that the government wanted to cut down the size of the army...about 240 soldiers were retired from the army early in 1997...most of them had served for more than 30 years...when their retirement benefits were finally paid it was a mere four thousand Leones and four bundles of zinc to each retired soldier and nothing more. There was a lot of grumbling from both the retired soldiers and even serving soldiers were not happy about the way the old men who had suffered in the army were treated."²⁸⁰

678. There was complete disorderliness in the military among the rank and file. The officer cadre played ostrich while the soldiers complained. Many of the rank and file, including Zagallo, decided to resign from the army. Their letters of resignation were not accepted.
679. On the morning of 24 May 1997, Zagallo assembled his team of footballers numbering 17 at the billet of the Wilberforce Barracks where the footballers were camping and reiterated the problems in the country to them, the need for them to take action, and that the way forward had been presented to him in a dream the previous night. He was told in the dream that all their problems were caused by the senior officers. They agreed to arrest all the senior officers and detain them at the military headquarters in Cockerill, Freetown. They further resolved to carry out the operation the next day. In attendance at this meeting were the following people, listed overleaf:

²⁸⁰ Alfred Abu Sankoh (alias "Zagallo"), former Sergeant in the Sierra Leone Army and one of the seventeen coup leaders of the AFRC coup of May 1997 (subsequently executed after Court Martial proceedings); statement given to the Sierra Leone Police Force at Defence Headquarters, State Avenue, Freetown; 27 to 31 March 1998.

1. Sgt. Alex Tamba Brima
2. Lance Corporal Tamba Gborie
3. Corporal George Adams
4. Warrant Officer 11 Franklyn Conteh
5. Warrant Officer 11 Samuel Kargbo
6. Sgt. Ibrahim Bazy Kamara
7. Sgt. Brima Kamara
8. Sgt. Moses Kabia alias Rambo
9. Sgt. Sullay Turay
10. Corporal Mohammed Kanu alias 55
11. Corporal Momoh Bangura
12. Lance Corporal Foday Kallay
13. Lance Corporal papa Bangura alias Batuta
14. Ex SSD Officer Hector Lahai
15. Civilian Bioh Sisay
16. Abdul Sesay, a civilian staff of the army, and
17. Sgt. Abu Sankoh (alias "Zagallo")²⁸¹

680. On Sunday 25 May 1997 they all met at 6.00am at Cockerill, the military headquarters. They went through the main gate and met Corporal Gborie who was on duty. All seventeen of them were encouraged to assemble with their personal arms. Major King, the Commanding officer in charge of the Air Force in Cockeril was allegedly contacted by Alex Tamba Brima and had pledged his support to the group. Alex Tamba and WO II Franklyn Conteh were to take care of the armoured tanks. The group then moved on to the arms store. The door was not locked. They collected as much arms as they could carry on their persons including AK 47 rifles and rocket-propelled bombs and tubes. They arrested the soldiers on duty at the Airforce and headquarters security office, tied them up and locked them at the Military Police guardroom. They seized all the arms and ammunition contained in both offices.²⁸² They then proceeded to the tanks and ammo stores. There was no soldier on duty there either. From this store, they collected a formidable supply of rocket-propelled grenades which they loaded in three Mercedes Benz cars they found at Cockerill. They then surrounded the perimeter of the military headquarters and mounted a road block.²⁸³

681. As they did so, other soldiers quickly understood what was happening and joined them swelling their ranks to about 100 men. They began deploying themselves to strategic areas. One group headed by Tamba Gborie quickly left for the state radio station SLBS FM 99.9 to announce the take over of government to a shocked nation, and to alert other soldiers on guard duty at the station. Sgt. Alex Tamba Brima was despatched to the Wilberforce Military Barracks while Sgt Brima Kamara quickly moved to secure the army ordnance

²⁸¹ Alfred Abu Sankoh (alias "Zagallo"), former Sergeant in the Sierra Leone Army and one of the seventeen coup leaders of the AFRC coup of May 1997 (subsequently executed after Court Martial proceedings); statement given to the Sierra Leone Police Force at Defence Headquarters, State Avenue, Freetown; 27 to 31 March 1998.

²⁸² Tamba Gborie, Corporal in the Sierra Leone Army and one of the leaders of the coup of 25 May 1997; statement made to the Criminal Investigation Department of the Sierra Leone Police at Defence Headquarters, Freetown; 22 to 25 March 1998.

²⁸³ Alfred Abu Sankoh (alias "Zagallo"), former Sergeant in the Sierra Leone Army and one of the seventeen coup leaders of the AFRC coup of May 1997 (subsequently executed after Court Martial proceedings); statement given to the Sierra Leone Police Force at Defence Headquarters, State Avenue, Freetown; 27 to 31 March 1998.

at Murray town with a group of soldiers. WO II Franklyn Conteh was left behind to take care of the military headquarters. Group three under the command of Corporal Mohammed Kanu alias 55 was to handle the 7th Battalion. The rest of the group commandeered several vehicles and moved into the town towards the prison. At the Wilberforce Barracks they arrested about 15 senior officers including Colonels K.I.S. Kamara; A.K. Sesay; S.O. Williams; S.T. Davies; A.B.Y. Kamara and Major Koroma. The arrested officers were locked up at the military guardroom at the barracks.

682. By 7.00am this group had numbered several thousand soldiers. They split into different groups and approached the prison from different directions. There was agreement that all the prisoners, in particular, the military officers who were detained at the prison were to be set free. With the numbers of soldiers who had joined the revolt, sporadic shooting was occurring all over the city.
683. There was no resistance at the prison gates, as the prison officers obediently opened the gates. The Nigerian ECOMOG officers that previously guarded the prison were nowhere to be seen. They were too few to offer any meaningful resistance. All the detained prisoners were set free. One of them was Major Johnny Paul Koroma detained earlier for alleged coup plotting. He praised the boys for freeing him, describing them as brave.²⁸⁴

Later, Major Johnny Paul's countenance changed and as he assumed command of the operation which had now taken a different dimension, he first gave orders that we should head for CID headquarters... so that we could burn it down. The reason he gave was that this was a place where cases were not decided with fairness taking his own case as an example. He later changed his mind. No one told Major Johnny Paul Koroma to assume command of the operation but seeing the situation and after we explained to him that our intention initially was to arrest all the senior officers in the army for reasons already outlined above, he told us that he was now taking over command as he saw that we were all junior officers.²⁸⁵

684. By 8 o' clock a blue helicopter flew towards Juba Hill in Freetown. A few minutes later they saw the helicopter flying towards Lungi. The President was leaving the country. They suddenly found themselves in control of the country.
685. Johnny Paul Koroma has given a somewhat different account of the events of this date. He claimed that he had requested his liberators to simply release him so that he, his wife and children could leave the country safely, to which they replied:

"No you have to be with us. You have to lead or else we will not allow you to go. If you say you are going we will have to kill you."²⁸⁶

²⁸⁴ Alfred Abu Sankoh (alias "Zagallo"), former Sergeant in the Sierra Leone Army and one of the seventeen coup leaders of the AFRC coup of May 1997 (subsequently executed after Court Martial proceedings); statement given to the Sierra Leone Police Force at Defence Headquarters, State Avenue, Freetown; 27 to 31 March 1998.

²⁸⁵ Alfred Abu Sankoh (alias "Zagallo"), former Sergeant in the Sierra Leone Army and one of the seventeen coup leaders of the AFRC coup of May 1997 (subsequently executed after Court Martial proceedings); statement given to the Sierra Leone Police Force at Defence Headquarters, State Avenue, Freetown; 27 to 31 March 1998.

²⁸⁶ Johnny Paul Koroma, Former Head of State as Chairman of the AFRC and latterly Chairman of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP); interview conducted by a television

686. Johnny Paul Koroma believed that his presence helped stabilise things as the coup plotters were going to kill all the politicians and all the senior officers.
687. The first sign that the CDS, Brigadier Hassan Conteh had of the coup was a radio message he received at 4.30am on the 25th from a Lt. Banja Marrah of the Signals Squadron at Wilberforce reporting that some armed soldiers in a Mercedes Benz car had claimed that they were staging a coup and had taken over the country. He began calling on all senior officers to report to the Myohaung Officers Mess. Within a short while, there was sporadic shooting all over the city.²⁸⁷
688. For the President, he was having his early morning shave, when he heard the exchange between Brigadier Conteh and the Lieutenant on the service radio. He requested information from Brigadier Conteh on the efforts being made to repel the coup. Not satisfied with the response, he continued to call the Brigadier regularly on the service radio. After a short while, the radio went off air. That was when it dawned on him that the coup makers had succeeded. He quickly accelerated his plans to leave the country.²⁸⁸
689. Meanwhile Brigadier Conteh and a group of other officers having learnt that the plotters had taken over the officers mess and were on the lookout for officers quickly detoured to the British High Commission where they holed up to plan a counter attack strategy for wresting control of the capital city from the coup plotters. He tried to rally the remaining troops to the support of the government. Increasingly it became clear that the respective formations were either not lifting their finger in support of the government or were pledging support to the coup plotters. Col Tom Carew after escaping arrest at the Wilberforce barracks had tried to mobilise the remaining officers and men to mount a resistance. Some of the officers like Major Gottor and Lt Akim had already joined with Johnny Paul Koroma at the State House. By 10.00am there was a broadcast by Corporal Tamba Gborie on the state controlled radio that the “other ranks” of the armed forces had taken over power. The broadcast called on Foday Sankoh to join the new government and urged the RUF to come out of the bush. This weakened the resistance of the remaining loyal troops who all scampered to different parts of the country for personal safety.
690. Johnny Paul Koroma prevented the mounting of an assault on the State House, which had been proposed by the soldiers. He also ordered that no politician should be molested by the soldiers. Many of them were arrested, detained for a while and then released. All senior officers were directed to report at Cockerill and those who did, like this witness, were locked up:

“It was during that period when this fourteen other ranks, mostly junior ranks interfered with the operations of governance. After that I was detained by junior military officers. I was there for three weeks on the allegation that the President was in contact with me by telephone at my house. My official residence was looted and vandalized and they came

journalist from Oxygen Media, on behalf of New-York based human rights group WITNESS; recorded on DVCAM (Tape R2003-0543) in Freetown; 5 November 2001.

²⁸⁷ Brigadier Hassan Conteh, Statement made to the Criminal Investigation Department of the Sierra Leone Police in relation to the AFRC coup; statement made at CID Headquarters, Freetown; 10 May 1998.

²⁸⁸ Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, current President of the Republic of Sierra Leone; testimony before the TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown; 5 August 2003.

to my office. I tried very hard to work with other officers to let the boys understand that it was not acceptable for coup or whatsoever. They could not understand.”²⁸⁹

691. Later in the day there was a phone call from London to Major Johnny Paul Koroma by Omrie Goley the external spokesperson of the RUF, who said he had heard the radio broadcast calling on Sankoh to join the new government. He said that in the interest of peace he was going to make Sankoh's phone number in Nigeria available to the coup plotters.²⁹⁰ Major Johnny Paul Koroma then called Sankoh in the presence of some of the coup leaders such as “Zagallo” and Tamba Gborie. Major Koroma told Foday Sankoh that the war was over and invited Sankoh to take over the leadership of the new government. Sankoh replied that this was impossible since he was detained in Nigeria. He commended the plotters for their nationalistic action in inviting the RUF to join the new government and requested that he wanted to relay a message to his fighters which he wanted recorded immediately. He gave his blessing to the new regime and called on all his fighters to come out of the bush and join the new government. They were directed to henceforth take all orders from Johnny Paul Koroma.²⁹¹ This statement was subsequently rebroadcast repeatedly on the state run radio station. The invitation to the RUF was justified as necessary to end the war:

“We are all Sierra Leoneans and were just killing one another all the time; so you see it was senseless. At least we could call these guys from the bush to come and join us to get peace in this country. They decided to bring the two armies to one – the RUF and the SLA, we are all brothers; we are all one. So we should join to make a People's Army.

I had small fear of them, because the [RUF] guys were proper trained commandos. The plan was to train them to be trained like professional soldiers. I was really surprised [because] it was peaceful at the time – no firing, no ambushes, just peaceful. I felt happy because I was tired of war at that time. The RUF too said that they are tired of war and that this is the time to bring peace in Sierra Leone. There were all Sierra Leoneans, just like us.”²⁹²

692. The new government suspended the constitution as well as political parties. To the shock and consternation of the populace, Freetown was overwhelmed within days by the presence of the RUF combatants who came to the city in their thousands.

²⁸⁹ Colonel Bashiru S. Conteh, current Director of Military Training and senior officer in the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF); TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown, 02 August 2003.

²⁹⁰ Tamba Gborie, Corporal in the Sierra Leone Army and one of the leaders of the coup of 25 May 1997; statement made to the Criminal Investigation Department of the Sierra Leone Police at Defence Headquarters, Freetown; 22 to 25 March 1998.

²⁹¹ Tamba Gborie, Corporal in the Sierra Leone Army and one of the leaders of the coup of 25 May 1997; statement made to the Criminal Investigation Department of the Sierra Leone Police at Defence Headquarters, Freetown; 22 to 25 March 1998.

²⁹² TRC Confidential Interview with a former officer of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who served as a ‘Brigadier’ under the AFRC and later became Leader of the ‘West Side Boys’; interview conducted in Freetown; 17 October 2003.

“Some of us were in the bush at that time, we only heard an instruction that we are to go and join the AFRC junta; that it is because of peace that we should join them and then the UN will come in between for peace. So that gave the passion to some of us – when the command was given, there was no time to waste. In the space of three days, some good number of the RUF left their hiding places and came to bigger towns. Some were sent to Bo, some were sent to Kenema, some in fact went as far as Freetown.

In fact, as I told you, we believe in loyalty. When the instruction came that we should join, we never knew the circumstances at the end but our feeling was that when we were coming to a town like Freetown, we could be in Freetown, then the UN and other international bodies would come in between us and make the peace. That was what the other Commanders told us: that the war is over; we are agreeing to join the AFRC for disarmament.

But when we came to Freetown, after a couple of times, we saw different issues; things were looking somehow unsuitable with regards to what they had told us in the bush. So, some of us who had far-sighted thinking started to leave from Freetown. We said: ‘hey, this is not the peace, this is just a sort of suspended government’.²⁹³

693. This effort to end the war worked briefly in getting the RUF out of the bush but it was counter productive. It endorsed the assertion that the army was in connivance with the ‘rebels’. This stiffened the peoples resolve not to have anything to do with the new “people’s army”. All commercial enterprises closed shop, schools and offices remained closed for much of the nine months that the AFRC was in power. About eighty percent of the armed forces had forsworn their allegiance to the constitution and the elected government and joined the Peoples’ Army established by the AFRC.²⁹⁴ The CDF and all militia groups were ordered disbanded and to hand in their weapons at the nearest police stations.

²⁹³ TRC Confidential Interview with an RUF combatant, ‘G-5’ commander and former intelligence officer; interview conducted in Koidu Town, Kono District; 12 August 2003.

²⁹⁴ Major General Tom. S. Carew, former Chief of Defence Staff; testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown; 16 July 2003.

THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL *MODUS OPERANDI* OF THE SLPP GOVERNMENT IN EXILE

Roots of Chief Samuel Hinga Norman's Dissonance with the Government in Exile

694. The immediate impact of the AFRC coup on the incumbent SLPP Government was to force all of its key office-holders into exile. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah and the core of his Cabinet went to Conakry, Guinea, where they were accommodated by the Guinean President Lansana Conté in the Government Guest House. Conakry also became the operational centre for the Government. Most the key in-house strategy meetings between Ministers took place there. It also hosted the negotiations between ECOWAS and the AFRC junta leaders that led to the ECOWAS-brokered Peace Plan on 23 October 1997; according to the President, the Government held an “observer status” at those talks.²⁹⁵
695. President Kabbah undertook only fleeting trips outside Guinea for diplomatic purposes, notably to Abuja, New York and Edinburgh. Otherwise he was based exclusively in Conakry until his restoration on 10 March 1998. As he testified to the Commission, President Kabbah had already felt detached from the workings of his state security apparatus during his first year in office.²⁹⁶ His nine months in exile would precipitate yet further episodes that served to undermine his authority as Commander-in-Chief. His ideas about how the war should be managed were radically different from those of his Deputy Minister of Defence. This differing was about the overall management of the restoration effort.
696. Meanwhile, Chief Hinga Norman followed a somewhat dissonant, albeit apparently more decisive strategy. In his capacity as Deputy Minister of Defence, he began immediately to lobby for an armed intervention driven by a Sierra Leonean fighting force. The Kamajor militia of the Southern and South-Eastern Districts would form the bulk of this force, under his direction and command. Hinga Norman invited great risks to his life and his credibility to put his vision into practice.
697. Hinga Norman was successful in garnering international backing from a diverse array of sources. Importantly, he found favour with various foreign donors: some of them were multinationals based in Sierra Leone; others were groups constituted abroad by Sierra Leonean expatriates. He was subsequently able to enlist support in the form of finances, food supplies and a variety of crucial logistical needs for the Kamajors.
698. One example of the broad-based input from commercial interests arose in a statement given to the Sierra Leone Police in 1999 by an Israeli businessman named Yair Gal (alias Yair Galklein). Gal recounted how Hinga Norman approached him on board the US Navy ship that evacuated foreign nationals from Freetown soon after the 25 May 1997 coup. Gal and some of his

²⁹⁵ Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, current President of the Republic of Sierra Leone; testimony before the TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown; 05 August 2003.

²⁹⁶ Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, current President of the Republic of Sierra Leone; testimony before the TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown; 05 August 2003.

compatriots in the diamond trade informed Hinga Norman that they would be staying in Guinea. Accordingly he narrated the following events:

699. "In Conakry we put up at the Mamado Hotel. While there, Hinga Norman visited us. At that time there were owners of other companies staying in the same hotel. Those other big companies were working in Kono in Sierra Leone. Hinga Norman then asked all the owners of companies working in Sierra Leone to help to restore the legitimate Government of Tejan Kabbah.
700. The owners of companies made promises, including our company. However, I remember we fulfilled our own promise by supplying food to Chief Hinga Norman in Liberia to feed the Kamajors. After some time, Chief Hinga Norman left Conakry and went to Liberia to organise the Kamajors."²⁹⁷
701. Hinga Norman's immediate presence in Guinea after the coup had been fleeting. Having received a variety of pledges and made the business community aware of his plans, he promptly left the country. He was to spend very little time in the company of the President, his fellow Ministers and senior parliamentarians during their period in exile. His justification was that he preferred to remain closer to the 'ground operations' he had already envisaged in Sierra Leone. As the Commission heard from one of Hinga Norman's close associates in the Kamajors:

"When we met, you know... Hinga Norman said he did not stay there [in Guinea] because if all of them in the Government were cut off from the country, then nobody will be there to fight these people. He believed that you should not stay outside the country to fight the enemy who are fighting your people. Therefore he left them there in Conakry and came to organise his Kamajors; those were the reasons he gave us."²⁹⁸

702. Hinga Norman's choice of Liberia as a place from which to launch back into Sierra Leone was founded on the continued stationing of ECOMOG there. He was granted permission and protection to stay in ECOMOG's strategic military base in Monrovia and he travelled under escort. It made it easier for him to receive support from ECOMOG and he was able to maintain telephone links with prospective partners in the outside world.
703. Perhaps the most significant of all Hinga Norman's international partnerships was formed in the month of July 1997. It grew out of the diligent efforts of Reverend Alfred SamForay, an American-based Sierra Leonean with a robust network of contacts. The added importance of SamForay's participation was attributable to the fact that he liaised not only with Hinga Norman, but simultaneously with President Kabbah, Richard E. S. Lagawo and several other figures in the hierarchy of Sierra Leone's Government in Exile.

²⁹⁷ Yair Gal (alias "Yair Galklein") Israeli businessman involved in diamond mining companies and dealerships in both Liberia and Sierra Leone during the conflict period; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police Force at RSLMF Headquarters, Cockrill, Freetown; 28 January 1999; at page 5 of the transcript.

²⁹⁸ TRC Confidential Interviews with members of the Kamajors who worked together with Chief Samuel Hinga Norman at Base Zero; interviews conducted in Bo, Kenema, Pujehun and Freetown, July to November 2003.

704. SamForay provided substantial evidence to the Commission about his own conversations with these key players and their dealings with one another. He described the genesis and nature of this link as follows:

"In July 1997... the Deputy Minister of Defence [Hinga Norman] was in Monrovia and seeking international support to remove the AFRC military junta... A few personal friends of mine immediately suggested that some of us organise ourselves into an independent support group to assist the Deputy Minister and his Civil Defence Forces (CDF).

[...] Later that month I did speak with Chief Norman. About the same time, some of my colleagues were able to link me with President Tejan Kabbah. After acquainting the President with our contact with Chief Norman, Kabbah informed us that he would greatly welcome any assistance we would give to Chief Norman and the CDF... President Kabbah told us in a phone conversation on 17 August 1997: 'Anything done to restore democracy in Sierra Leone is fine with me'.²⁹⁹

705. SamForay further told the Commission that he became the Secretary-General of a newly-founded body known as the Sierra Leone Action Movement for the CDF (SLAM-CDF). He described its role in the following terms:

"SLAM became the external mouthpiece of the CDF and in some instances the Government in Exile... Members of SLAM-CDF served both as couriers and a liaison between Hinga Norman and Kabbah for much of the time the Government was in exile, with Hinga Norman in Monrovia and Kabbah in Conakry."³⁰⁰

706. Based on the evidence adduced by the Commission, Hinga Norman also shared a commonality of purpose with Nigeria that local forces should liberate the country with the support of countries in the sub region. It was eminently preferable for a 'home-grown' faction to bolster, if not lead the operation to oust the AFRC. This participatory approach would engender greater support among Sierra Leoneans for an armed intervention. It would also heighten the prospects of a relatively 'clean-break' for ECOMOG by putting in place some kind of indigenous security forces that could perhaps evolve into a reformed national Army.

707. ECOMOG's Chief of Staff in Liberia, General Abdul Aziz Mohamed, was another strong proponent of the deployment of the Kamajors in an armed intervention to dislodge the AFRC. Certainly as far as the military option was concerned, Hinga Norman therefore had valuable allies for his strategy from the outset. A symbiosis between ECOMOG and an indigenous militia would not have been possible without Hinga Norman's swift manoeuvring to raise funds and consciousness among international backers. By seizing the initiative in such a manner, though, he succeeded in making the option viable ahead of diplomacy or an exclusively international restorative intervention.

²⁹⁹ Reverend Alfred M. SamForay, former Secretary-General of the Sierra Leone Action Movement for the Civil Defence Forces (SLAM-CDF); written statement and supporting documentation submitted to the Commission by e-mail; 2-10 December 2003.

³⁰⁰ Reverend Alfred M. SamForay, former Secretary-General of the Sierra Leone Action Movement for the Civil Defence Forces (SLAM-CDF); written statement and supporting documentation submitted to the Commission by e-mail; 2-10 December 2003.

708. Chief Norman's enthusiasm was misinterpreted and perhaps misunderstood. The Commission heard that it deepened the level of suspicion between Hinga Norman and President Kabbah. These two influential figures held the two most important positions in planning military operations in the name of the state: President Kabbah was the Commander-in-Chief and Minister of Defence; Hinga Norman his Deputy Minister and the National Co-ordinator of the CDF. Yet they did not share the same opinion as to how the reinstatement of their Government should be managed. SamForay described his impressions in this regard as follows:

"I believe that Hinga Norman and Kabbah saw the conflict in Sierra Leone from two different viewpoints. Norman was a born soldier who had been in the colonial Army from the age of fourteen. As a soldier and as Deputy Minister of Defence, I believe he saw his role as defending the country and defeating the enemy on the battleground. Norman had never actually lived outside Sierra Leone and had no interest in living anywhere [else]. Sierra Leone was the only home for Norman.

[...] Kabbah, on the other hand, had lived nearly all his professional life abroad. He was a wealthy man and could live wherever he chose to in the world. Sierra Leone was like a second home for Kabbah... [He] was a consummate diplomat who would do anything to resolve the conflict through diplomacy."³⁰¹

709. The President and Chief Norman were united in the view that the AFRC should be removed from power. From the testimonies received by the Commission, the difference lay in the management of the effort to remove the junta from power. Witnesses testified to fears among the President's close associates of the amount of power and influence that Chief Norman would muster were he to directly lead the restoration efforts. It was therefore necessary to rein him in and have the President retain control. In the Commission's assessment of the chronology of events, the strongest possible case for the President to remove Hinga Norman from his role in the prosecution of the war was to develop when Hinga Norman re-entered Sierra Leone.

710. Yet according to the testimony from Sam Foray, an attempt to install a new National Co-ordinator of the CDF was instigated as early as July 1997, while Hinga Norman was still stationed in Monrovia. The candidate touted as Hinga Norman's replacement was Tom Nyuma, one of the most influential members of the NPRC administration.

³⁰¹ Reverend Alfred M. SamForay, former Secretary-General of the Sierra Leone Action Movement for the Civil Defence Forces (SLAM-CDF); written statement and supporting documentation submitted to the Commission by e-mail; 2-10 December 2003.

Perspectives on the Reappearance of Tom Nyuma

711. The facts as they have been presented to the Commission must first be stated. SamForay's assessment of President Kabbah's personal and professional relationships is instructive in establishing a background understanding:
- "Kabbah relied very heavily on the advice of his Senior Adviser and confidant, Honourable Richard E. S. Lagawo, as he did on his personal friend [and Minister of Presidential Affairs] Momodu Koroma. At the diplomatic front he leaned heavily on his UN Ambassador James O. C. Jonah... It is therefore inconceivable that Kabbah would have tried to replace Hinga Norman without the knowledge or advice of Lagawo, Koroma or perhaps Jonah... Hinga Norman later told me that the architect of this scheme was Kabbah's Spokesman Momodu Koroma."³⁰²
712. Tom Nyuma was living in the United States at the time of the 1997 coup, having been compulsorily retired from the Army. His last significant post in service was as General Staff Officer during the final year of the NPRC administration.³⁰³ He was the beneficiary of a United Nations scholarship that funded his pursuit of college studies in the United States of America. The arrangement under which he took up this scholarship was similar to the one afforded to other members of the NPRC regime, including Valentine Strasser and Julius Maada Bio. The broker of these arrangements was Sierra Leone's Permanent Representative to the United Nations, James Jonah.³⁰⁴
713. According to SamForay, Jonah paid for Tom Nyuma to travel from the USA to Guinea. Nyuma made the trip on or around 20 August 1997 and reported directly to President Kabbah in Conakry. One of those with whom Nyuma met in Conakry was Momodu Koroma, who confirmed that Nyuma engaged in discussions with President Kabbah and others about the possibility of liberating Freetown.³⁰⁵
714. SamForay explained to the Commission that the selection of Nyuma as "President Kabbah's choice for the job"³⁰⁶ was based primarily on what the President saw as Nyuma's credentials in the realms of military planning. For instance, he had spoken in praise of Nyuma's 'expertise' in mapping and topography,³⁰⁷ which were seen to be key attributes for anyone entrusted with command of the effort to liberate Freetown. Nevertheless there were particular

³⁰² Reverend Alfred M. SamForay, former Secretary-General of the Sierra Leone Action Movement for the Civil Defence Forces (SLAM-CDF); written statement and supporting documentation submitted to the Commission by e-mail; 10 December 2003.

³⁰³ Tom Nyuma was one of the nine officers who were relieved of their political duties and posted back to barracks in 1995, as discussed above in the analysis of the transition to civilian rule. According to SamForay, he had been retired on allegations of a coup attempt.

³⁰⁴ Brigadier (Retired) Julius Maada Bio, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from January to March 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 30 September 2003; corroborated by SamForay.

³⁰⁵ Momodu Koroma, former Minister of Presidential Affairs in the Government in Exile and current Minister of Foreign Affairs; TRC Interview conducted at state office, Freetown; 5 January 2004.

³⁰⁶ These were the words of James Jonah expressed to SamForay when SamForay expressed reservations about Nyuma. Apparently Nyuma had made known his financial demands in advance of the trip but nevertheless was brought over to Guinea in order to effect the planned handover.

³⁰⁷ James Jonah relayed this impression to SamForay in a conversation held while Jonah was arranging Nyuma's flight over to Conakry from the United States.

warning signs about Nyuma that the Government appears to have overlooked, or that it dealt with in an insufficiently cautious manner.

715. First, as noted in the foregoing analysis,³⁰⁸ People's views about Tom Nyuma's were that he was an opportunist and a turncoat. His factional allegiance was almost impossible to decipher conclusively. In testimonies to the Commission he was identified as having played different roles. Some erstwhile colleagues in the Sierra Leone Army knew him as a hardened front-line commander;³⁰⁹ members of the RUF knew him as a relative of Foday Sankoh and one of the few dissident soldiers with whom they worked together in guerrilla operations;³¹⁰ Kamajors and civilians in the Eastern Region knew him as one of the pioneers of the use of vigilantes on the battlefield.³¹¹
716. In short there were major question marks over the wisdom of taking a risk on a man like Nyuma. Certainly he was well connected to the leadership of the AFRC, including his peer Johnny Paul Koroma. All of those who had carried out the coup on 25 May 1997 were his military juniors and he referred to them in conversations with SamForay as '*me borbor dem*' (my boys). This reference was apparently intended by Nyuma to convince the Government that he could prevail upon the junta members if given the chance. It ought rather to have alerted the Government to Nyuma's dubious character and misplaced sense of self-importance.
717. Tom Nyuma stated that he would not be willing to fight for the Government unless he was awarded the sum of ten thousand US dollars (\$10, 000) as remuneration for his services.³¹² According to Momodu Koroma, this sum was never paid out.³¹³ Instead President Kabbah despatched Nyuma, along with his two former NPRC cohorts Captain Amara Kwegor and Captain Komba Mondeh, to the ECOMOG base in Monrovia, Liberia. They were tasked to recruit soldiers serving in the Sierra Leone Battalion (LEOBATT) to put together a 'task force' that could launch an attack on Freetown to dislodge the junta.
718. The Commission heard testimony from a soldier who was posted to Monrovia in the LEOBATT contingent in 1991 and 1992.³¹⁴ He confirmed that Nyuma and Komba Mondeh, whom he knew as 'Colonel RPG', approached the SLA

³⁰⁸ See section on 'Seeds of Distrust in the SLA' and the allegations that Tom Nyuma was one of the Army officers involved in committing violations and abuses against the civilian population.

³⁰⁹ See, *inter alia*, Brigadier (Retired) Julius Maada Bio, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from January to March 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 30 September 2003.

³¹⁰ See, *inter alia*, TRC Confidential Interview with a member of the RUF High Command who worked closely with Foday Sankoh after joining him in 1990; interview conducted in Freetown; 1 December 2003.

³¹¹ See, *inter alia*, Dr. Albert Joe Edward Demby, former Vice President of the Republic of Sierra Leone; "Presentation on Militias and Armed Groups"; testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown; June 2003.

³¹² Nyuma had stated in advance that he would ask for this level of remuneration: Transcript recollections from telephone conversations involving SLAM-CDF and Tom Nyuma; August 1997; details given to Commission by Reverend Alfred M. Sam Foray. According to SamForay, James Jonah was also aware of this stipulation in advance; he later told SamForay that Nyuma had made the same request to the President.

³¹³ Momodu Koroma, former Minister of Presidential Affairs in the Government in Exile and current Minister of Foreign Affairs; TRC Interview conducted at state office, Freetown; 5 January 2004.

³¹⁴ TRC Confidential Interview with a former soldier in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA); interview conducted in Freetown; 16 July 2003.

troops stationed there with the offer of money to fight the AFRC. Yet the LEOBATT men had no collective desire to go back into Sierra Leone and fight against their own compatriots. They refused to join with Nyuma and an armed confrontation erupted near to the ECOMOG base, although no deaths were reported.

719. Nyuma was expelled from Liberia along with his compatriots and returned to the USA. SamForay received information about this incident and relayed it to President Kabbah.³¹⁵ It constituted the last active participation of Tom Nyuma in the Sierra Leone conflict. It also spelled the enforced end of the President's plan to replace Hinga Norman as the National Co-ordinator of the CDF in the operation to restore the Government.
720. In his testimony to the Commission, Momodu Koroma denied the involvement of the President or of himself in any effort to have Nyuma replace Chief Hinga Norman. Koroma confirmed that Nyuma had a meeting with the President in Conakry, although he insisted that it was at Nyuma's own instigation. According to Koroma, the President was suspicious of Nyuma's motives for wishing to assist; the President therefore merely acknowledged Nyuma's offer and looked forward to the outcome of his intervention, which never in fact materialised.³¹⁶

The Appointment of M. S. Dumbuya to the CDF

721. A major public relations concern for the Government was the widespread belief that the CDF was an exclusively Mende militia. Throughout Kabbah's Presidency the view had been expressed, mostly by Northerners, that there was a tribalist agenda behind the favourable treatment afforded to the Kamajors. The then Vice President Joe Demby testified to the Commission that the Kamajors were the "focus of the whole country" and that they were popularly referred to "using political or tribal connotations."³¹⁷ Towards the end of its reign, the NPRC Government had averred that the Kamajors were deliberately ethnically-aligned against the Army. Subsequent clashes between the SLA and the CDF had merely compounded that impression.
722. For the sake of preserving national unity in the restoration effort, President Kabbah wished to rebut the accusation of tribalism in the CDF. The most effective means of countering tribal concerns in Sierra Leone is to create an impression of Regional balance. In this instance Kabbah identified a course of action that would allow him to do this whilst simultaneously installing a counterweight to Hinga Norman in the institutional structure of the CDF.
723. Thus, in August 1997, the President summoned the former Head of the Special Security Division (SSD) of the Sierra Leone Police, M. S. Dumbuya, to meet him in Conakry. Dumbuya's credentials speak volumes of the reasons for his recruitment to the cause of the Civil Defence Forces: by experience, he was a

³¹⁵ Reverend Alfred M. Sam Foray, former Secretary-General of the Sierra Leone Action Movement for the Civil Defence Forces (SLAM-CDF); written statement and supporting documentation submitted to the Commission by e-mail; 10 December 2003.

³¹⁶ Momodu Koroma, former Minister of Presidential Affairs in the Government in Exile and current Minister of Foreign Affairs; TRC Interview conducted at state office, Freetown; 5 January 2004.

³¹⁷ Dr. Albert Joe Edward Demby, former Vice President of the Republic of Sierra Leone; "Presentation on Militias and Armed Groups"; testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown; June 2003.

highly-trained military professional³¹⁸ and by birth, he was a Northerner of Limba ethnicity. It didn't seem that the President considered Dumbuya's record which was tilted against the people of the South.³¹⁹

724. In his testimony to the Commission, M. S. Dumbuya conceded that his appointment had everything to do with the President's perceived need to present the CDF in a more neutral light:

"The primary motive for me to come in was to allay the rumours that the Kamajors were a force to destroy the North. I was called upon directly by His Excellency [the President]... to sort of calm down the growing speculation that the Kamajors was an armed group geared to destabilise the whole country along ethnic lines."³²⁰

725. Dumbuya was immediately installed as the Northern Commander of the Civil Defence Forces. His position was the second most senior in the whole movement in terms of command and control responsibilities. He took on the CDF rank of Colonel, which was deemed to be equivalent to his former SSD police rank. Yet Hinga Norman, the National Co-ordinator of the CDF, was neither notified nor consulted before the appointment was made.³²¹ This deepened even more the suspicion between him and the Commander-in-Chief and affected the war effort.

726. In assessing the impact of the President's commissioning of Dumbuya in this manner, the question of threat perception must be brought to the fore. According to Dumbuya himself, Hinga Norman instantly felt that Dumbuya wanted to take over from him in one or both of his roles as Deputy Minister of Defence and National Co-ordinator of the CDF.³²² The men were supposed to work closely together, but their relationship was doomed before it had started, due to the undercurrents of rivalry between them. It was to have a profoundly detrimental effect on the operational structure of the CDF.

727. The appointment of Dumbuya was the President's prerogative. It however exacerbated the existing levels of discord and suspicion that had existed between Chief Norman and Dumbuya for at least the preceding three months. Just when the restoration of the Government – and certainly the CDF's role in that restoration – depended to such a large extent on this relationship, it moved further away from cordiality.

³¹⁸ M. S. Dumbuya undertook three years of advanced infantry training in Cuba on a scholarship from the Sierra Leone Government between 1971 and 1974. When he returned to Sierra Leone he was attached to the paramilitary wing of the Sierra Leone Police, which at the time was called the Internal Security Unit (ISU) but later became Special Security Division (SSD). Dumbuya headed the SSD for ten years and was eventually promoted to Assistant Commissioner of Police, in charge of state security under the APC.

³¹⁹ The people of Pujehun District were known to harbour strong feelings of distrust against Dumbuya because of his leading role in quelling the Ndorgboryosoi rebellion of 1982. See TRC Confidential Interview with former Secretary-General of the Pujehun District Descendants' Association; interview conducted in Freetown; 19 December 2003.

³²⁰ M. S. Dumbuya, former Commanding Officer of the Northern CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 21 October 2003.

³²¹ M. S. Dumbuya admitted that Hinga Norman had not been involved in prospective discussions of his appointment. However, he testified as follows: "I don't think it was necessary because every grouping was mobilising to protect its own area."

³²² M. S. Dumbuya, former Commanding Officer of the Northern CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 21 October 2003.

728. The institutional structure of the CDF also included an ECOMOG presence in the shape of Nigerian General Maxwell Khobe, who was based at Lungi Airport. General Khobe's designation was supposed to create a unified, integrated line of command and an additional layer of accountability for both Dumbuya and Chief Hinga Norman.
729. The President's inclusion of General Khobe was perhaps the best medium through which to limit operational friction between Dumbuya and Hinga Norman, since it kept them apart. Dumbuya testified to Commission that his own role was concentrated mostly at Lungi, where he was training alongside ECOMOG under Khobe's command. According to Dumbuya's understanding of the institutional structure, Khobe was intended in addition to oversee Hinga Norman:
- “Actually Hinga Norman and I were not most times together. What I know is that Hinga Norman was made National Co-ordinator of all the groupings together under one command... But I was actually with late General Khobe under ECOMOG. The only time I remember being directly with Hinga Norman was at Base Zero.
- [...] The motivation behind the CDF at that time was basically to complement the efforts of the foreign troops coming to assist the Government... [So] myself and Hinga Norman were supposed to be answerable to General Khobe.”³²³
730. In practice, the proposed line of command from Hinga Norman to Khobe did not materialise. Rather Khobe and Dumbuya worked on planning the intervention into Freetown, while Hinga Norman prepared and carried out independent operations to remove the junta from the towns of the South and East. There were two different flanks to the restoration operation and for the most part they went about their preparations for combat in starkly contrasting fashions.

The Establishment of the War Council in Exile

731. President Kabbah's final effort to contrive institutional accountability and oversight of the CDF's operations in Sierra Leone was his establishment of a structure known as the 'War Council in Exile', based with him in Conakry. Chairmanship of this War Council was awarded to one of Kabbah's staunchest political allies and his Chief Adviser, Richard E. S. Lagawo. It comprised twelve members, all of them SLPP 'party stalwarts' and Ministers or senior officials of Kabbah's Government.
732. While the Commission was unable to obtain documentary evidence of the meetings convened by this War Council, evidence was heard that the following persons either held permanent positions or participated in its decision-making consultations at some point during the exile period.³²⁴

³²³ M. S. Dumbuya, former Commanding Officer of the Northern CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 21 October 2003.

³²⁴ All designations given are posts in the Cabinet in Exile, which had been retained from President Kabbah's reshuffle of 21 November 1996. The composition of the War Council in Exile was heard from a variety of sources, including: TRC Confidential Interview with former Kamajor fighter for the Civil Defence Forces; interview conducted in Bo Town, Bo District; 05 June 2003; M. S. Dumbuya, former Commanding Officer of the Northern CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters,

Chairman R. E. S. Lagawo	Chief Adviser to the President
Dr. Prince Harding	Minister of Mineral Resources
Shirley Gbujama	Minister of Foreign Affairs
Momoh Pujeh	Deputy Minister of Finance
Dr. Harry Will	Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and the Environment
Momodu Koroma	Minister of Presidential Affairs and the Public Service
S. B. Marrah	Leader of the House
T. K. Vandi	SLPP party stalwart
SLPP Consul	The Deputy Ambassador to Guinea
Charles Margai	SLPP party stalwart
Foday M. D. Sesay	Deputy Minister of Health and Sanitation
Mohamed B. Daramy	Deputy Minister of Finance

733. M. S. Dumbuya provided evidence to the Commission based on having attended two meetings of the War Council in Exile during his time in Conakry in August 1997:

“By the time I went there all these structures were already in place... They had a Council that was responsible for the affairs and the prosecution of the war. It was known as the War Council in Exile. They reported directly to the President; [their objective was] to facilitate the return of Government to Sierra Leone. They invited me to the War Council meeting and I was introduced and so on... Later I went to Base Zero [in Sierra Leone] but that never happened there; I was a member of the War Council only in Conakry.”³²⁵

734. The Commission heard that the War Council sat to deliberate on operational and political elements of the effort to restore the Government. Having lost all control of the SLA and therefore disowned its conventional military forces, the Government concentrated its endeavours on the CDF. Thus the War Council's main concern was to support and direct the operations of the CDF through Chief Hinga Norman. Its attempts to have an active say in the prosecution of the war met with varying degrees of success, however. The War Council's efficacy depended largely on the extent to which its directions converged with Hinga Norman's own views, or where its decisions served his needs.

735. There is considerable evidence to support the impression that the War Council struggled to assert its mandate, particularly over the National Co-ordinator. Hinga Norman did not attend meetings of the War Council in Exile, even when he was in Conakry.³²⁶ Nor did he hold its work in high esteem; thus, according to the testimony from SamForay, the existence and the role of the War Council in Exile merely perpetuated the rifts between the President and Hinga Norman:

“From President Kabbah's perspective, the War Council was an advisory body which met regularly to discuss ways and means to end the war

Freetown; 21 October 2003; and Alhaji Daramy-Rogers, former Member of the CDF War Council at Base Zero and later Regional Co-ordinator (South) of the CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 24 – 29 October 2003.

³²⁵ M. S. Dumbuya, former Commanding Officer of the Northern CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 21 October 2003.

³²⁶ M. S. Dumbuya, former Commanding Officer of the Northern CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 21 October 2003.

through dialogue with the AFRC junta. From Chief Hinga Norman's perspective, the Council was a *tok-tok* organisation (a talking shop) whose main purpose was to carry on endless debates about the war in the safety of the Guest House in Conakry. Hinga Norman and [ECOMOG Chief of Staff in Liberia] General Abdul Aziz Mohamed had little faith in dialogue with the junta and had little or no regard for the War Council, whatever it was [meant to be].³²⁷

736. Nonetheless the Commission is able to conclude that the War Council was fully apprised of events that were taking place on the ground in Sierra Leone. The Chairman of the Council, R. E. S. Lagawo, participated personally in multiple telephone conferences organised by SLAM-CDF. The Commission was provided with transcript excerpts of four separate conversations in the months of August and September 1997 alone.³²⁸ In these conferences, information was not only shared through SLAM as a conduit, but also directly divulged to Lagawo by Hinga Norman himself.
737. In another telephone conference whose details were presented by SLAM-CDF, President Kabbah and members of the War Council including Lagawo, Shirley Gbujama and Charles Margai spoke directly with Hinga Norman about the provision of arms to the CDF. Another participant in this conversation was the President's late wife, Mrs. Patricia Kabbah. According to the testimony from SamForay, Mrs. Kabbah addressed Hinga Norman in Mende language during this conversation and confirmed that the CDF had received a consignment of firearms she had sent for them. This consignment was understood to have comprised revolvers or pistols, which were referred to simply as 'short ones'.³²⁹
738. The Commission has found no evidence to conclude that there was any systemic provision of arms or ammunition to the CDF through its War Council in Exile, but according to SamForay some of its members "often plied the back alleys of the international arms market to acquire arms for the CDF and I was made to believe that they did so at the request and / or [with the] knowledge of the President."³³⁰
739. The Commission heard that Hinga Norman's presence was frequently requested in Conakry, both by fellow members of the Government and by private groups of supporters who travelled there eager to make contact with him.³³¹ On at least one occasion he was invited expressly by the War Council to attend one of its meetings in Conakry. While there is no evidence as to whether he subsequently attended the meeting, it is clear that Hinga Norman travelled to Conakry in August 1997. With hindsight the reasons that the War

³²⁷ Reverend Alfred M. SamForay, former Secretary-General of the Sierra Leone Action Movement for the Civil Defence Forces (SLAM-CDF); written statement and supporting documentation submitted to the Commission by e-mail; 10 December 2003.

³²⁸ Reverend Alfred M. SamForay, former Secretary-General of the Sierra Leone Action Movement for the Civil Defence Forces (SLAM-CDF); written statement and supporting documentation submitted to the Commission by e-mail; 10 December 2003.

³²⁹ Telephone conference involving SLAM-CDF, Chief Hinga Norman, President Kabbah, Mrs. Patricia Kabbah and various members of the War Council in Exile; 29 July 1997; details given to the Commission by Reverend Alfred M. SamForay.

³³⁰ Reverend Alfred M. Sam Foray, former Secretary-General of the Sierra Leone Action Movement for the Civil Defence Forces (SLAM-CDF); written statement and supporting documentation submitted to the Commission by e-mail; 10 December 2003.

³³¹ TRC Confidential Interviews with members of the Kamajors who worked together with Chief Samuel Hinga Norman at Base Zero; interviews conducted in Bo, Kenema, Pujehun and Freetown, July to November 2003.

Council and indeed the President insisted on his trip seem to have extended beyond attendance at a meeting into wider issues relating to the management of the war effort.

Hinga Norman's Visit to Conakry in August 1997

740. August and September 1997 in many respects constituted a watershed in the organisation of the CDF's operations at the level of its High Command. Simultaneously, in many parts of Sierra Leone the AFRC junta had turned towards armed confrontation with ECOMOG forces and civil militia groups. Kabbah was anxious to instigate a more decisive plan of action, particularly one which initiated the liberation of Freetown.³³² Thus the time arrived for a decisive resolution on the question of where Hinga Norman should be based as he pursued his programme to mobilise the CDF as part of the restoration force.
741. The sub-regional dynamics of the Sierra Leone conflict again came into play at this juncture. Charles Taylor, who won the Liberian Presidential elections on 19 July 1997, was furious with the presence of Hinga Norman on Liberian territory. According to some Kamajor fighters from the Eastern Province who had fled across the border when the coup took place, Hinga Norman was frequently threatened with assassination attempts ordered directly by Taylor.³³³ Others who subsequently joined up with Hinga Norman after his re-entry into Sierra Leone testified that his existence in Liberia was one of perpetual fear:
- "Hinga Norman had a very hard life in Liberia: he could never stay in one place for a long time... So he was sleeping in a certain location for two days, then in a different location for the next two days. All the time he was in the hands of ECOMOG, so Charles Taylor never saw him. But every time they [Taylor's men] heard about him, they sent their bodyguards to get him. It's just fortunate that they failed."³³⁴
742. President Taylor communicated with President Kabbah in August and September 1997; Kabbah later reported to SLAM-CDF that Taylor had expressed 'concern' about Hinga Norman's activities in Liberia.³³⁵ Specifically, Taylor cited Hinga Norman's connections with the Liberian commander Alhaji Kromah, who headed the ULIMO-K faction. ULIMO-K had fighters in both Liberia and Sierra Leone, who were pitted against Taylor's Government and the AFRC/RUF alliance respectively. Taylor had alleged that Kromah was asking Hinga Norman to provide protection for ULIMO-K fighters in Sierra Leone.³³⁶

³³² Reverend Alfred M. SamForay, former Secretary-General of the Sierra Leone Action Movement for the Civil Defence Forces (SLAM-CDF); written statement and supporting documentation submitted to the Commission by e-mail; 10 December 2003.

³³³ TRC Confidential Interviews with members of the Kamajors in the Eastern Province; interviews conducted in Kenema District; 12 to 16 July 2003.

³³⁴ TRC Confidential Interviews with members of the Kamajors who worked together with Chief Samuel Hinga Norman at Base Zero; interviews conducted in Bo, Kenema, Pujehun and Freetown, July to November 2003.

³³⁵ Telephone conference between members of SLAM-CDF and President Kabbah, 9 September 1997; details given to Commission by Reverend Alfred M. Sam Foray.

³³⁶ Telephone conference between members of SLAM-CDF and War Council Chairman R. E. S. Lagawo, 20 September 1997; details given to the Commission by Reverend Alfred M. Sam Foray.

743. There is no evidence that President Kabbah made any assurances to President Charles Taylor in response to the latter's allegations. Nevertheless, shortly after having spoken with Taylor, Kabbah reported to SLAM-CDF that he had advised Hinga Norman to cease operating on Liberian territory.³³⁷ The President's direction to Hinga Norman was framed as a choice between staying with the rest of the Cabinet in Conakry or proceeding immediately across the border into Sierra Leone. In other words, Kabbah sought to condition Hinga Norman's movements and, specifically, to have him move from his base in Liberia.
744. The events that enveloped around Chief Hinga Norman in Conakry on his visit there in August and September 1997 soon ruled out any viable prospect of his staying with the rest of the Cabinet. Hinga Norman travelled to Conakry on 14 August 1997 upon the insistence of President Kabbah and various members of the War Council in Exile.³³⁸
745. The nature of Hinga Norman's trip was described to the Commission as 'clandestine',³³⁹ whereby CDF fighters in Liberia were not told of its destination or purpose.³⁴⁰ On the day of his arrival, Hinga Norman was given an unspecified 'mission' by the President, which entailed his remaining in Conakry for approximately one month.³⁴¹ It is uncertain what the mission was and whether the 'mission' in question was ever completed. According to SamForay's understanding, the trip was organised on false pretences, in connection with the courting of Tom Nyuma described above:
- "I later learned that the real reason [why] President Kabbah was so anxious to bring Hinga Norman and Nyuma to Conakry [at the same time] was to replace Hinga Norman as head of the CDF with Colonel Nyuma."³⁴²
746. According to SamForay, Hinga Norman later confided to members of SLAM-CDF that his passport had been temporarily confiscated from him by Momodu Koroma and was only returned to him when he threatened Koroma with physical force.³⁴³ The details of this version of events were disputed by

³³⁷ Telephone conference between members of SLAM-CDF and President Kabbah, 9 September 1997; details given to the Commission by Reverend Alfred M. Sam Foray.

³³⁸ Transcript excerpts from a telephone conference involving SLAM-CDF, Chief Hinga Norman, President Kabbah, Lady Patricia Kabbah and various members of the War Council in Exile; 29 July 1997; details given to Commission by Reverend Alfred M. Sam Foray.

³³⁹ Reverend Alfred M. SamForay, former Secretary-General of the Sierra Leone Action Movement for the Civil Defence Forces (SLAM-CDF); written statement and supporting documentation submitted to the Commission by e-mail; 10 December 2003.

³⁴⁰ TRC Confidential Interviews with members of the Kamajors in the Eastern Province; interviews conducted in Kenema District; 12 to 16 July 2003.

³⁴¹ Transcript excerpts from a telephone conference involving SLAM-CDF, Chief Hinga Norman, President Kabbah, Lady Patricia Kabbah and various members of the War Council in Exile; telephone conference held on 29 July 1997; details given to the Commission by Reverend Alfred M. Sam Foray.

³⁴² Reverend Alfred M. SamForay, former Secretary-General of the Sierra Leone Action Movement for the Civil Defence Forces (SLAM-CDF); written statement and supporting documentation submitted to the Commission by e-mail; 10 December 2003.

³⁴³ Transcript recollections from a telephone conference involving SLAM-CDF and Chief Hinga Norman; details of conversation given to Commission by Reverend Alfred M. SamForay.

Momodu Koroma, who claimed in his testimony to the Commission that no such plot to replace Hinga Norman was ever hatched.³⁴⁴

747. In any case, President Kabbah's attempt to gain a tighter grip of the CDF had been presented to Hinga Norman in the form of two options: the National Coordinator should remain in Conakry and direct the movement from a distance; or he should cross the border from Liberia into Sierra Leone and stay permanently on Sierra Leonean territory thereafter.³⁴⁵
748. Hinga Norman opposed both of these options on practical grounds.³⁴⁶ On the one hand he could not remain in Guinea because he would become too detached and distanced from the fighters on the ground. On the other hand he could not relocate permanently into Sierra Leone because he required access to his international channels in Liberia in order to be able to secure logistical support.
749. In the end Hinga Norman decided to move back into Sierra Leone, but he did not do so on the terms laid down to him by President Kabbah; on the contrary he would continue to visit Liberia frequently. The upshot of Hinga Norman's trip to Conakry was that he returned to his hide-out in Liberia, harbouring deep-seated reservations about the strategies of those he was supposed to be working with on the restoration effort. According to SamForay, Hinga Norman departed Guinea embittered, without taking formal leave of the President or the War Council in Exile.³⁴⁷

Hampering the Government's Management of the War Effort

750. The struggle to dislodge the AFRC junta from power had begun in earnest with a lingering grudge: the Deputy Minister of Defence was at loggerheads with his Commander-in-Chief over the latter's failure to pay heed to warnings of the 25 May 1997 coup.³⁴⁸ As the efforts towards restoration entered their operational phase, the relationship between Kabbah and Hinga Norman had been further soured. The Commission was provided several examples to illustrate the resultant impact: that their mutual distrust hampered their joint management of the war effort.
751. Hinga Norman petitioned President Kabbah to allow the CDF to mine and trade diamonds in order to support their efforts in the war. Hinga Norman's proposal was for the CDF to take a portion of the profits from the alluvial diamond pits around Tongo Field, Kenema District. President Kabbah later explained to

³⁴⁴ Momodu Koroma, former Minister of Presidential Affairs in the Government in Exile and current Minister of Foreign Affairs; TRC Interview conducted at state office, Freetown; 5 January 2004.

³⁴⁵ Transcript excerpts from a telephone conversation between SLAM-CDF and President Kabbah; conversation held on 9 September 1997; details given to the Commission by Reverend Alfred M. SamForay.

³⁴⁶ Transcript recollections from telephone conversations between SLAM-CDF and Chief Hinga Norman; details given to the Commission by Reverend Alfred M. SamForay.

³⁴⁷ Reverend Alfred M. SamForay, former Secretary-General of the Sierra Leone Action Movement for the Civil Defence Forces (SLAM-CDF); written statement and supporting documentation submitted to the Commission by e-mail; 10 December 2003.

³⁴⁸ Transcript excerpts from a telephone conversation between SLAM-CDF and Chief Hinga Norman; conversation held on 7 October 1997; details given to the Commission by Reverend Alfred M. SamForay.

SLAM-CDF that he had rejected the proposal on the basis that “he did not want to mortgage the country.”³⁴⁹

752. Hinga Norman of course saw it differently; he took Kabbah’s response as further evidence of the detachment and insensitivity of the Government.³⁵⁰ Moreover, CDF fighters testified that they went on to mine in Tongo regardless and to exchange the diamonds they found with Lebanese and Fullah ‘middlemen’.³⁵¹
753. On a separate occasion President Kabbah was said to have “asked [Hinga] Norman to send Kamajors to the North to initiate the liberation of Freetown.”³⁵² According to Reverend SamForay, Hinga Norman vetoed the request on the premise that “units of the CDF were only allowed to fight in their respective ethnic and geographic areas.”³⁵³
754. Subsequent events would prove that Hinga Norman was not as committed to this principle as he might have suggested: Kamajors frequently fought outside of the South and East upon the National Co-ordinator’s return to Sierra Leone. Hinga Norman’s refusal in this instance appeared instead to be an assertion of his prerogative to direct ground movements of the Kamajors as he saw fit, in spite of the President’s promptings.
755. Disagreements like these set the tone for management of the CDF during the Government’s period in exile. Chief Hinga Norman retained practical autonomy over the day-to-day operations of the CDF on the ground. President Kabbah controlled the institutional workings of the CDF and the purse strings on the monies it received from central Government. Neither party was entirely satisfied with these arrangements, as candid testimonies from their associates attest.³⁵⁴
756. Nevertheless President Kabbah ensured that he retained intimacy with the operations of the CDF during his period in exile. According to the Secretary-General of SLAM-CDF, the very rationale behind the telephone conferences his organisation administered was for Kabbah retain a firm finger on the pulse:

“The President set up a regular session which began at 6.00 a.m. (US Eastern Standard Time) two to three days a week, at which time we [SLAM-CDF] would make a three-way conference call between himself

³⁴⁹ Transcript recollections from a telephone conference involving SLAM-CDF and President Kabbah; details of conversation given to the Commission by Reverend Alfred M. SamForay.

³⁵⁰ Transcript recollections from a telephone conference involving SLAM-CDF and Chief Hinga Norman; telephone conference held on 7 October 1997; details given to the Commission by Reverend Alfred M. SamForay.

³⁵¹ TRC Confidential Interviews with members of the Kamajors who worked together with Chief Samuel Hinga Norman at Base Zero; interviews conducted in Bo, Kenema, Pujehun and Freetown, July to November 2003.

³⁵² Transcript recollections from a telephone conference involving SLAM-CDF and Chief Hinga Norman; telephone conference held on 7 October 1997; details given to the Commission by Reverend Alfred M. SamForay.

³⁵³ Reverend Alfred M. SamForay, former Secretary-General of the Sierra Leone Action Movement for the Civil Defence Forces (SLAM-CDF); written statement and supporting documentation submitted to the Commission by e-mail; 10 December 2003.

³⁵⁴ See, *inter alia*, Alhaji Daramy-Rogers, former Member of the CDF War Council at Base Zero and later Regional Co-ordinator (South) of the CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 24 – 29 October 2003; and M. S. Dumbuya, former Commanding Officer of the Northern CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 21 October 2003.

[Kabbah] in Conakry and Chief Hinga Norman in Monrovia. These weekly sessions lasted almost throughout the period of time the President was in exile in Guinea. The general purpose of these sessions was to allow President Kabbah and Chief Hinga Norman to discuss plans for restoration of democracy in Sierra Leone and general security issues.”³⁵⁵

757. The president nevertheless spoke to his associates in a fashion that betrayed his naivety about the conduct of unconventional military operations.³⁵⁶ At crucial moments he had been found lacking in vigilance and foresight, as the AFRC coup had proved.³⁵⁷ He also failed to understand what was feasible in the conditions that prevailed. Hence he advocated for a Kamajor assault on Freetown within months of the coup, when in reality the Kamajors on the ground scarcely had the logistics to defend their own villages.³⁵⁸
758. Hinga Norman, meanwhile, used his geographical and conceptual detachment from the Government to establish positions and plans that did not involve the President or the War Council in their making.³⁵⁹ He gave field updates when called upon to do so by SLAM-CDF. Senior Kamajors who testified to the Commission said that they knew the relationship between the Commander-in-Chief and his Deputy to be perpetually “tense.”³⁶⁰
759. Kabbah and Hinga Norman engaged in a struggle for ascendancy that had profound short-term and long-term ramifications. It not only detracted from the efficacy of their joint prosecution of the war, it also raised vital questions about accountability at the heart of the Government that the Commission has addressed at the end of this chapter.

³⁵⁵ Reverend Alfred M. Sam Foray, former Secretary-General of the Sierra Leone Action Movement for the Civil Defence Forces (SLAM-CDF); written statement and supporting documentation submitted to the Commission by e-mail; 10 December 2003.

³⁵⁶ Reverend Alfred M. SamForay, former Secretary-General of the Sierra Leone Action Movement for the Civil Defence Forces (SLAM-CDF); written statement and supporting documentation submitted to the Commission by e-mail; 10 December 2003.

³⁵⁷ See section on the Motivations and Makings of the AFRC Coup.

³⁵⁸ TRC Confidential Interviews with members of the Kamajors who worked together with Chief Samuel Hinga Norman at Base Zero; interviews conducted in Bo, Kenema, Pujehun and Freetown, July to November 2003.

³⁵⁹ Alhaji Daramy-Rogers, former Member of the CDF War Council at Base Zero and later Regional Co-ordinator (South) of the CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 24 – 29 October 2003.

³⁶⁰ TRC Confidential Interviews with members of the Kamajors who worked together with Chief Samuel Hinga Norman at Base Zero; interviews conducted in Bo, Kenema, Pujehun and Freetown, July to November 2003.

ACTIVITIES TOWARDS THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE RESISTANCE EFFORT ON THE GROUND

Reactions to the Coup of 25 May 1997

760. The Commission heard that the military coup of 25 May 1997 was greeted with horror by supporters of the SLPP Government on the ground. The Kamajors and other members of the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) construed themselves to be among the foremost targets of potential AFRC violence.³⁶¹ For its part, the AFRC leadership issued a highly ambiguous statement as to the status of pre-existing fighting forces in Sierra Leone. Johnny Paul Koroma's words were that the AFRC would welcome its enemies to come forward and join a united Army, but that he didn't want to see or hear anything more of the Kamajors.

761. The CDF membership interpreted Johnny Paul Koroma's statement as a thinly-veiled threat towards its militiamen, which effectively forced them to go into hiding in fear of their lives. Hassan Jalloh, one of the most prominent ground commanders in the Pujehun District, recalled the immediate disdain with which the announcement to the nation was greeted:

"We were not able to tell exactly what the man meant by dropping us and calling the rebels to join him. Johnny Paul Koroma made a particular reference that he didn't want to hear about that name 'Kamajors' again. We were made to feel that our lives were endangered.

[...] Let's just assume when he took over the Government of Sierra Leone that he could have called all [of us] together as one – CDF, RUF to come down from the bush and do one thing for the state. Then we might have worked out what we needed to do together. But instead he said he didn't want to see us. So we knew he was coming to bring more fighting or revolution in Sierra Leone."³⁶²

762. Other Kamajors also understood the message from the AFRC to be overtly hostile. Joseph A. S. Koroma, a senior commander in the Southern Province and an early initiate into the Kamajor Society, told the Commission of the gravity of this situation:

"It was while we were still on that fight protecting our villages that we heard about the overthrow of the Government. After the overthrow, the newly-instated junta who took over Government declared that they didn't even want to see any signs of Kamajors. Then we started to see it in their actions; they were out to kill us. They wanted to eliminate the whole *Kamajoisia*. It was certainly not a laughing matter."³⁶³

³⁶¹ TRC Confidential Interviews with members of the Kamajors who worked together with Chief Sam Hinga Norman at Base Zero; interviews conducted in Bo, Kenema, Pujehun and Freetown, July to November 2003.

³⁶² Al-Hassan W. Jalloh, former Kamajor and Battalion Commander for the Civil Defence Forces; TRC Interview conducted in Freetown; 06 August 2003.

³⁶³ Joseph A. S. Koroma, former National Director of Operations for the CDF; testimony before Commission Public Hearings held in Pujehun Town, Pujehun District; 24 June 2003.

763. Such testimonies ran somewhat contrary to the evidence given by members of the AFRC and RUF. In retrospect both of these factions averred that their counterparts in the CDF were called forward to forge a permanent peace among all the warring factions on an equal basis. Both of them further alleged that the CDF outrightly rejected the proposal. One soldier told the Commission about this offer in the following terms:

“We also called the CDF to come peacefully; [but] they refused to join us. It was not that we wanted to disarm them, just to let them join us. For the sake of peace, we just decided to put all the past behind us to welcome them too as brothers.”³⁶⁴

764. In the context of the foregoing clashes between the CDF and the Sierra Leone Army, any retrospective suggestion that an alliance of the two was possible is totally misplaced. The unresolved violence had left no room for fraternal sentiment between these two armed camps; on the contrary there was still rampant antipathy on both sides.

765. The rank and file of the Army was deeply embittered and enraged by the CDF. Many SLA men, whom soldiers referred to in testimony as their “brothers,” had been killed at the hands of the Kamajors. Soldiers perceived the Kamajors as a body created purposely to undermine them: after all, senior Ministers had publicly spoken out in support of the Kamajors and to the belittlement of the SLA. They also suspected that their reduced rations were attributable to the Government’s favouritism of the Kamajors in terms of financial and moral support.

766. The men who led the action on 25 May 1997 clearly shared these sentiments and had cited the Government’s ‘biased’ handling of the Kamajors as one of the injustices they wanted to avenge. Abu Sankoh (alias “Zagallo”), one of the SLA Sergeants who spearheaded the coup, later explained this to the Sierra Leone Police:

“The issue of the Kamajors was another thing that finally discouraged us the soldiers under the regime of the SLPP. It reached a stage when the Kamajors turned their guns against us and soldiers were now being killed by Kamajors. The reason behind this was simply because the Kamajors as a Civil Defence Unit tried to equate their standing in the Government to ours and [they] now treated us as if they thought we were no more the Constitutional Army of Sierra Leone. It came to a time that when a Kamajor killed a soldier no action would be taken by the authorities; but when a soldier killed a Kamajor that soldier will definitely be taken to Pademba Road Prisons.”³⁶⁵

767. The particular soldiers who had been detained in Pademba Road Prison harboured deep-lying personal grudges. Potentially several hundred of them were released during the jailbreak of 25 May 1997 and allied themselves with the AFRC. According to evidence received from soldiers, the majority of these prisoners were there as a result of their part in clashes with the CDF:

³⁶⁴ TRC Confidential Interview with a former officer of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who served as a ‘Brigadier’ under the AFRC; interview conducted in Freetown; 17 October 2003.

³⁶⁵ Alfred Abu Sankoh (alias “Zagallo”), former Sergeant in the Sierra Leone Army and one of the seventeen coup leaders of the AFRC coup of May 1997 (subsequently executed after Court Martial proceedings); statement given to the Sierra Leone Police Force at Defence Headquarters, State Avenue, Freetown; 27 to 31 March 1998.

“When they broke out everybody [from] inside the prisons... there were so many of our brothers in there without charge. Instead of investigating what had really happened with the Kamajors in the South, we found out that they had just put the soldiers in Pademba Road and left them there.”³⁶⁶

768. These aggrieved soldiers carried vengeful feelings with them into service under the AFRC. There was also a clear empathy with their plight among those who had carried out the coup. Above all the new Chairman of the AFRC, Johnny Paul Koroma, had been in prison at the same time as them, albeit on charges unrelated. In short, the prevailing collective sentiment in the SLA towards the Kamajors was one of hatred. Thus those testimonies that suggest the AFRC issued an ‘invitation’ to the CDF to come forward must be regarded as disingenuous.
769. The Commission finds it inconceivable with hindsight that the two factions could possibly have co-existed harmoniously in the wake of the coup. The AFRC’s ulterior motive of neutralising its main domestic challenger was all too obvious; the CDF in any case would not stand for a change in the Government that had brought it into being. Thus at the point where the AFRC seized power, the two sides entrenched their opposing positions and immediately began spoiling for the fight that lay ahead.
770. The Commission heard from a variety of CDF members and SLPP loyalists that they had no choice but to go into hiding when the military junta started to take over the major towns.³⁶⁷ Inevitably the places that were most closely identified with the SLPP Government were in the Mende heartlands of the South and East. These were also the areas in which the majority of Kamajors were based. Hence they became the prime targets of the AFRC.
771. The AFRC and RUF quickly occupied the Southern and Eastern Regional Headquarter Towns of Bo and Kenema. The presence of AFRC soldiers and RUF commandos in the towns gave rise to legitimate fears on the part of Kamajors and prominent community figureheads that they would be killed in a witch hunt. Some of them therefore moved out of their homes and into ‘safe houses’ belonging to friends or relatives.³⁶⁸ Others cooped themselves up in underground cellars; others again established makeshift dwellings in the bush. Large numbers escaped to their villages and plantations in rural parts of the country.
772. The Commission heard that many of these people were eager to engage in some form of organised resistance against the AFRC. The major obstacle to effective resistance was the absence of any viable co-ordination structure, which prevented meaningful mobilisation of manpower or logistics. The flow of information from the Government in Exile dried up in the first few months after

³⁶⁶ TRC Confidential Interview with a former officer of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who served as a ‘Brigadier’ under the AFRC; interview conducted in Freetown; 17 October 2003.

³⁶⁷ TRC Confidential Interviews with members of the Kamajors who worked together with Chief Sam Hinga Norman at Base Zero; interviews conducted in Bo, Kenema, Pujehun and Freetown, July to November 2003.

³⁶⁸ Alhaji Daramy-Rogers, former Member of the CDF War Council at Base Zero and later Regional Co-ordinator (South) of the CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 24 – 29 October 2003.

the coup. Thus, its supporters on the ground were forced to begin their resistance activities surreptitiously.

Emergence of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD)

773. The name given to the overall resistance against the AFRC in 1997 was the 'Movement for the Restoration of Democracy' (MRD). To a great extent, MRD was a public proxy for the CDF, whose activities were supposed to be kept as a tightly-guarded secret while they were operating under the noses of the junta. Nevertheless, as one senior CDF member from Bo District testified, there were also added dimensions to the resistance:

"MRD was really a name for everybody who was not supporting the AFRC junta. All of us were members, but those who did not join the CDF as Kamajors joined the MRD. While the Kamajors were in the bush, they [the civilian MRD] were in the towns. They were also in Conakry; and everywhere else where there were Sierra Leoneans in exile; they were there – MRD. They were playing a very important role to promote democracy, to show the international community that we were not supporting the junta Government. In fact the MRD made the AFRC to become very unpopular."³⁶⁹

774. Accordingly, some MRD members attended AFRC meetings 'undercover' in towns like Freetown, Bo and Kenema in order to gather information on the plans of the soldiers. Others assisted the groups of Kamajors in different Districts to keep in touch by relaying information through messenger boys or traders. They also provided food for the Kamajors and other key civilian organisers in their areas, trying to remain incognito and out of the reach of the AFRC.

775. During these early resistance activities, it was generally agreed among participants in the MRD that the catalyst they were waiting for was news of the whereabouts of Chief Samuel Hinga Norman. All over the South and East, Hinga Norman was expected to mount a concerted campaign to oust the junta in his capacity as the Deputy Minister of Defence and National Co-ordinator of the CDF. One senior member of the CDF described to the Commission why Hinga Norman's presence on the ground was seen to be so important to the launch of an armed resistance:

"Upon hearing of the overthrow of the Government, all the Kamajors left the town; they went into the suburbs. So we were asking ourselves how we could contact these people, so that we would be able to join up with them... But Hinga Norman who had been the head of these vigilantes [and] who had been training us was not there.

All our Districts were becoming vulnerable because we had no co-ordination of Kamajors. Particularly in the big towns like Bo, we who were left here were vulnerable, because a good number of the Kamajors had gone to the outskirts of their Chiefdoms... We came together and we started sending people into the areas where the Kamajors were based, in order to organise them – I was the liaison officer for that particular operation. But we were looking out for Hinga Norman to

³⁶⁹ TRC Confidential Interview with former Member of the CDF War Council at Base Zero; interview conducted in Bo Town, Bo District; 10 August 2003.

co-ordinate with him properly so that we would be able to get rid of these people and bring back our elected Government.”³⁷⁰

776. The Commission heard from several individuals who were involved in active efforts to trace and link with the CDF National Co-ordinator. Among the elders of the Bo District, where Hinga Norman had been a Regent Chief and where support for him was undoubtedly at its strongest, a proposal emerged to send representatives to Conakry, Guinea. This delegation left in September 1997.³⁷¹ Although Hinga Norman was actually in Liberia at the time, one of these representatives testified that their trip to Guinea enabled them to establish common purpose with the Government in Exile:

“I was one of the delegates that led the delegation to Guinea; two of us went there... We went to Conakry in search of Chief Norman but we could not find him there; still we were able to stay there for quite a good time – about a month.

We spoke with Ministers and Members of Parliament who were based there in Conakry; indeed we achieved our aim, which was to prepare some documents, work out what we needed to do in order to get these people [the AFRC junta] out of power. Eventually we returned here [to Sierra Leone] without getting Chief Norman.”³⁷²

Original Assembly Points of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy

777. While the members of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy in the Bo District were therefore somewhat slow in getting off the ground, the same could not be said for their counterparts to the South and to the East. Indeed, in accordance with the general trends in civil defence that persisted throughout the conflict, there were subtle differences in the experiences recounted to the Commission from people in different parts of the country.
778. It is apparent that the Kamajors of the two Southern coastal Districts, Bonthe and Pujehun, were the most successful in organising themselves in the early months of the resistance. For the people of Bonthe, the period of junta rule was seen as an extension of the adversity they had faced in the preceding three years whilst continually repelling the RUF. There had already developed a siege mentality among the civil militiamen, particularly after the genesis of the Kamajor Society that had taken place there in 1996.
779. A core of Kamajors who were defending their local community in Tihun, Sogbini Chiefdom had established a stronghold that they regarded as impenetrable to potential attackers. The area in question is essentially marshland, dotted with creeks, rivers, lakes and streams. Much of it is only traversable by boat when the water level is high, especially during the rainy

³⁷⁰ TRC Confidential Interview with former Member of the CDF War Council at Base Zero; interview conducted in Bo Town, Bo District; 10 August 2003.

³⁷¹ TRC Confidential Interviews with members of the Kamajors who worked together with Chief Sam Hinga Norman at Base Zero; interviews conducted in Bo, Kenema, Pujehun and Freetown, July to November 2003.

³⁷² TRC Confidential Interviews with members of the Kamajors who worked together with Chief Samuel Hinga Norman at Base Zero; interviews conducted in Bo, Kenema, Pujehun and Freetown, July to November 2003.

season. The people living in the settlements built on the inhabitable higher ground generally refer to themselves as islanders. According to Joseph A. S. Koroma, Tihun became a perishing point for RUF assailants and a base in which all the inhabitants of the area could feel secure:

"While our people were based there at Tihun, the island was our weapon – our best form of defence. We wouldn't allow our island to be infiltrated by the rebels; we prevented them from coming there. If in the event that one of them made it there, they would not come back again.

[...] We continued in that manner until we became really strong men in 'the game'. We could move far away from our base and settle elsewhere, but whenever the rebels threatened our base at Tihun we would come back and drive them away... I'm telling you the facts: I've already told you several times that we had a most potent weapon in the form of our island; our gun was the river surrounding us. We were untouchable on our island.

[...] Eventually we had succeeded in flushing all the rebels out; in fact there was not a single rebel on the ground in our area of control."³⁷³

780. The Kamajor stronghold at Tihun earned its codename from the concept that 'not a single rebel on the ground' could encroach on the base: it was the original 'Base Zero'.
781. Meanwhile CDF members from across the Southern Districts had begun to converge in the Pujehun District. Many of them had set out on their journeys with the original intention of crossing into Liberia to seek refuge from attack and a means of regrouping there. However, a CDF base was established in Gendema, Soro Gbema Chiefdom, within a fortnight of the coup. The Commission heard from Al-Hassan W. Jalloh, a prominent Kamajor in the Pujehun District, that Gendema was the crucial first assembly point for the CDF and a launch pad for early warning raids on enemy positions:

"I can tell you it was 6 June in 1997 when we opened Gendema Base... Gendema Base was the first base of the Kamajors and the CDF for the 'junta war'. It was created for Kamajors, so that whosoever would find his way to Gendema, [it] meant that he was saved... We did not say 'we are coming to build this base in order to fight for Sierra Leone or to fight for revolution in Sierra Leone'. We only found the place there because it was the last station on the way to Liberia.

While we were there, we were grouping ourselves; moving down to the bases of other fighters like the AFRC junta and the rebels, to attack them; so that they would know that we ourselves were ready to fight. This was how we gained that base. It became a permanent base for disrupting the junta forces."³⁷⁴

³⁷³ Joseph A. S. Koroma, former National Director of Operations for the CDF; testimony before Commission Public Hearings held in Pujehun Town, Pujehun District; 24 June 2003.

³⁷⁴ Al-Hassan W. Jalloh, former Kamajor and Battalion Commander for the Civil Defence Forces; TRC Interview conducted in Freetown; 06 August 2003.

782. The location of the Kamajor base at Gendema was afforded added importance because of its close proximity to the Army barracks at Zimmi, Makpele Chiefdom. The soldiers in Zimmi and the Kamajors at Gendema were reported to have attacked one another's positions frequently in the first few months of junta rule. Neither side was able to gain a decisive upper hand. Instead they engaged in a see-saw battle, inflicting casualties on both contingents. As one of Kamajors involved in some of the battles for Zimmi testified, there was a distinct volatility to the situation there:

"We launched our attacks on Zimmi Township but we were unsuccessful in capturing the place properly. Some of our people were killed and at the same time we killed some of them. If we had just sat down alone and waited at that point for more than a few days, then their reinforcements would have come and they would have captured us. So instead we retreated to our base."³⁷⁵

783. The Commission heard that Chief Hinga Norman monitored the early fluctuations in the Pujehun District closely during his original personal exile in Monrovia. The first major encroachment of Kamajor fighting forces into AFRC-held territory was a raid on Zimmi in the final days of July 1997. Hinga Norman had conveyed details of this operation to President Kabbah in two separate conversations: first through his secretary on 29 July 1997; then to him in a personal conversation on 2 August 1997.³⁷⁶ Both parties appeared to regard the raid as a harbinger of further military operations; in a transcript excerpt from the latter conversation, President Kabbah's reaction to news of the capture of Zimmi was recorded simply as: "Congratulations, Chief Norman."

784. The President's laudatory tone was somewhat premature, however. The Kamajors were repeatedly dislodged from Zimmi on each occasion they made ostensible gains in these early skirmishes. Thus the fighters based at Gendema developed a similarly backs-to-the-wall attitude to the one maintained by their counterparts on 'Base Zero' in Tihun. One of the Kamajor commanders who came to Gendema from elsewhere in the South described the impact on the will of his fighters as follows:

"After a while we realised that the whole of loyal Sierra Leone had been reduced down to the area of Gendema. My fighters and I resolved not to accept rule by these junta boys; we decided that we would not stand for such a state of affairs any longer. That was the point at which all of us regrouped and vowed to start the war afresh... We fought the war with renewed strength; it was fiercer than the one we had started earlier."³⁷⁷

785. Accordingly, knowledge of these two strategic bases began to spread among the members of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy across the Southern and Eastern Provinces. Pre-existing civil militia groups from Bo, Moyamba, Kenema and Kailahun Districts began to divide themselves into 'defensive' and 'offensive' units: the former would stay in their villages to protect them against possible raids by AFRC or RUF forces, while the latter

³⁷⁵ TRC Confidential Interviews with former Kamajor combatants in the Pujehun and Kenema Districts; interviews conducted between July and September 2003.

³⁷⁶ Transcript excerpts from two telephone conferences, involving SLAM-CDF, Chief Hinga Norman, President Kabbah and the Presidential Secretary, Isatu; telephone conferences held on 29 July 1997 and 2 August 1997; details given to the Commission by Reverend Alfred M. Sam Foray.

³⁷⁷ TRC Confidential Interviews with former Kamajor combatants in the Pujehun and Kenema Districts; interviews conducted between July and September 2003.

headed for Bonthe or Pujehun to seek common co-ordination with other Kamajors and a potential link-up with Chief Hinga Norman. A senior CDF member from Bo District described his own part in this movement of manpower in October 1997:

"We heard that Chief Norman usually came to Gendema, but with the situation at that time, nobody could walk on these roads except if you have a paper [pass] from the AFRC; you know they were very 'tense'. So we decided to say: 'Okay, how do we go to this place?' There was no vehicle, so we took the Tikonko Road by-pass and headed for Tihun (Sogbini) to cross the river to go to Gendema.

Fortunately, as we arrived at Tihun, which was at that time called 'Base Zero', we learnt that Chief Norman usually came to that place too; and he was [due to be] coming in two days' time, so we stayed there... So that was how we contacted Base Zero. We were there up to two days and two nights, then Chief Norman came. Now we told him all about what was happening in Bo. AFRC had been with our people and in the surroundings. So we were there [from that point], going and coming, planning how to put all our efforts together to take these people out of power."³⁷⁸

786. Hinga Norman, who by that time had returned from his visit to Conakry, was in fact shuttling between the bases in Gendema and Tihun, while retaining a preserve in Liberia at the ECOMOG base. According to other Kamajor commanders, Hinga Norman gauged the nascent trends of activity across the South and East as the first step towards mobilisation against the AFRC.³⁷⁹
787. In order to embolden the masses and to signal the intent of the Kamajors to fight, it was decided that an announcement should be made over the international media. Thus, the Commission heard testimony from Al-Hassan Jalloh that in October 1997, the Kamajors set out their stall in the following manner:

"It was in the hands of our spokesman at that time, Eddie Massallay. We instructed him that he would vow to fight over the BBC; so it happened when [BBC correspondent] Jonathan Paye-Layleh came to our Gendema Base to interview us. We said to him that we the CDF in Sierra Leone do not recognise the Government of the AFRC and we will never allow them to work in this state. So [Massallay said]: 'We will 'rush' them and we will follow them until they will all get lost into the sea'.³⁸⁰

³⁷⁸ TRC Confidential Interview with former Member of the CDF War Council at Base Zero; interview conducted in Bo Town, Bo District; 10 August 2003.

³⁷⁹ TRC Confidential Interviews with members of the Kamajors who worked together with Chief Sam Hinga Norman at Base Zero; interviews conducted in Bo, Kenema, Pujehun and Freetown, July to November 2003.

³⁸⁰ Al-Hassan W. Jalloh, former Kamajor and Battalion Commander for the Civil Defence Forces; TRC Interview conducted in Freetown; 06 August 2003.

MOBILISATION OF THE KAMAJORS AS AN ATTACKING FORCE IN THE RESTORATION OF DEMOCRACY

788. The newly-proclaimed stance added an attacking dimension to the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy. In spite of the diplomatic efforts being undertaken by ECOWAS towards the Conakry Peace Plan, the Government in Exile, through its agent and Deputy Minister of Defence Chief Sam Hinga Norman, had opted for a military-driven restoration effort.
789. The Commission heard several testimonies that spoke of a meeting of the joint CDF-ECOMOG 'Planning Committee'. This Committee convened both in Liberia and in Gendema to agree upon the modalities of joint military operations.
790. The Planning Committee decided upon a two-pronged approach to the CDF's involvement in the restoration effort. From Gendema Base, Pujehun District, Kamajors of the Pujehun, Kenema and Kailahun Districts would lend infantry support to ECOMOG in its efforts to liberate the Eastern Regional Headquarter Town of Kenema. From Base Zero, Bonthe District, Kamajors of the Bonthe, Moyamba and Bo Districts would accompany
791. As the MRD transformed into an armed struggle against the AFRC, Chief Hinga Norman selected a new site to become the hallowed turf of the Kamajor Society. In this regard, the Commission heard again that rites and ceremonies were in fact ordained by human instruction. The traditions of peace-time secret societies through the ages were done a terrible disservice by the cruel and aggressive interpretation they were given by Hinga Norman and the initiating cadre. The town of Talia, Yawbeko Chiefdom in Bonthe District was chosen to accommodate the massed ranks of the Kamajors. The name given to the new stronghold was cribbed from its predecessor base in Tihun, slightly to its north: **'Base Zero'**.

Organisation and Conduct of Training at the New 'Base Zero'

792. The new Base Zero was sited at Talia, Yawbeko Chiefdom, Bonthe District. It was situated in a clearing among the forested swamplands of Sierra Leone's coast, which offered protection from ground attack. Here a massive new camp was to be built for the training of the Kamajor fighters and the direction of the war effort. Chief Hinga Norman assumed effective command and control.

"Whatever building we might see around us, we were ordered to destroy and demolish it; Hinga Norman's instruction was that even if a school should be destroyed, no worry."³⁸¹

793. As news of the establishment of the new base spread, Kamajor fighters and many leaders in the communities of the south and east sought to go to Base Zero to join up with the efforts to liberate the country from military rule.

"Almost the entire South of the country was converting to the Kamajors – Kondewah managed to assemble a huge number of men in a very short

³⁸¹ TRC Confidential Interview with former Kamajor fighter for the Civil Defence Forces; interview conducted in Bo Town, Bo District; 5 June 2003.

space of time; the speed with which enlistment was being carried out grew exponentially over time.”³⁸²

794. From Base Zero, Chief Norman began immediately directing operations, sending Kamajor fighters out to engage the AFRC/RUF in pitched battles. According to many of the young men at Base Zero, there was very poor planning and coordination going on. They didn't have much confidence that the movement would survive for long if they continued with Chief Norman's style of managing the war effort. Many of the supporters of the elected government were in hiding in the bushes around their home communities. Some of them like Alhaji Daramy-Rogers established their own form of communication with the government in exile and the team at Base Zero. He testified to the Commission that he sent "emissaries to both Conakry and to Talia, Base Zero, where Norman was."

"I was the main link, because I had some money. I was financing young men to go to Guinea and then sending them also with that information to Base Zero." These young men were undoubtedly engaged in a perilous exercise, since travelling anywhere under the noses of the junta was highly dangerous – "when you send those boys and they don't come back, I can't sleep. I was not only there: I was co-ordinating things with top people."³⁸³

795. The young men at Base Zero apprised Alhaji Daramy-Rogers of the need for him to join those at base Zero, "we would want you to join Hinga Norman; we don't think he's doing much in terms of planning – it would be better for you to go to Base Zero and join him there."
796. Many of the elders and chiefs who wanted to join the war effort were also making their way to Base Zero. It was certainly not easy to get from Bo to Bonthe during the period of junta rule, and it was particularly difficult to get to Talia because of the nature of the operation that was based there.

"Several times I dressed as a woman, until we were sure that I could not be recognised as a male. Then I rode on the back of a motorbike to somewhere near to Bumpeh and made the rest of the journey on foot."³⁸⁴

797. Long trips on foot were commonplace for the committed members of the communities of the South and East who wanted to make it to Base Zero.
798. Alhaji Daramy-Rogers enjoyed a very friendly relationship with Hinga Norman – he had given two shotguns to Chief Norman upon the latter's assumption of chieftaincy in Jaiama Bongo – the two men saw themselves at the outset as political affiliates, native "brothers", fellow elders and friends. But Daramy-Rogers was also particularly close to the President. He presented himself to

³⁸² TRC Confidential Interview with a member of the Kamajors who worked together with Chief Sam Hinga Norman at Base Zero; interview conducted in Pujehun District; July 2003.

³⁸³ Alhaji Daramy-Rogers, former Member of the CDF War Council at Base Zero and later Regional Co-ordinator (South) of the CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 24 – 29 October 2003.

³⁸⁴ Alhaji Daramy-Rogers, former Member of the CDF War Council at Base Zero and later Regional Co-ordinator (South) of the CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 24 – 29 October 2003.

the Commission as a supporter of the Government in general and was eager to see democracy win over the junta.

799. The base was indisputably well protected. For Daramy-Rogers, arriving at Base Zero did not pose any particular problems – “they had got the news that I was coming”. He was therefore warmly welcomed by Chief Norman and the others.

800. There were also many paramount and other chiefs as well as elders at Base Zero. The problems at the base quickly became apparent to them. According to Daramy-Rogers:

“Base Zero now had made itself into a demi-God. There were very dangerous commands in it... they would sing war-songs; and they don't see any positive role in organising the boys. They just initiate them; first of all he would try for them to get guns to engage the AFRC; sometimes they are ill-equipped and he sends them. You know, in the process they kill them ... so nothing was properly organised there; and we lose a lot of boys from Base Zero. That was actually what we were doing. It made me worried. Especially when they attacked Koribondo, on two occasions, the men were not equipped – so how can they face them [a professional Army]?”³⁸⁵

801. Chief Norman apparently placed a lot of trust and confidence in his initiators to develop a set of fighters who needed minimum or no training to be able to do battle with the RUF/AFRC troops. The chief initiator, the High Priest Allieu Kondewah was described to the Commission as:

“a drunkard; a dancer; a gambler; a herbalist; a man with magical powers.”³⁸⁶

Although he had no ostensible connections to the SLPP Government, Kondewah was apparently highly valued by members of the administration and was initially taken off into exile with the President when the overthrow by the AFRC took place.³⁸⁷

The Act of Initiation into the Kamajor Society

802. High Priest Kondewah with his assistants, Kamoh Brimah and Kamoh Lahai, established an initiation ceremony that promised “bullet proof” protection to the combatants in battle. The initiation contained a lot of rituals, including cannibalism as well as a fearful outing in a grave yard at night that served to create some mysticism around the process. The act of initiation was derived from traditional ceremonies associated with secret societies in Sierra Leone. They were perverted and manipulated by the initiators to achieve the aims of institutionalisation and whatever other purposes they had.

³⁸⁵ Alhaji Daramy-Rogers, former Member of the CDF War Council at Base Zero and later Regional Co-ordinator (South) of the CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 24 – 29 October 2003.

³⁸⁶ TRC Confidential Interview with former Kamajor fighter for the Civil Defence Forces; interview conducted in Bo Town, Bo District; 5 June 2003.

³⁸⁷ TRC Confidential Interview with former Kamajor fighter for the Civil Defence Forces; interview conducted in Bo Town, Bo District; 5 June 2003.

803. The acts of cannibalism at Base Zero came as a rude shock to some of the elders and chiefs gathered there:

“At one stage a boy even woke me up and said: ‘Alhaji you are sleeping... that’s why you don’t even know what is happening here... Do you know that we’re doing cannibalism here?.. If you don’t believe, I will take you secretly to see everything... we have pans (banda in Mende); you go there, they put the chops to dry; one day I will take you there.’ I was afraid – I never imagined that a human being can ‘chop’ [eat] another human being. I didn’t solicit it; he came by himself as a true confession to me. I didn’t sleep the whole night.”³⁸⁸

804. After the initiation, the potency of the ritual was usually tested with the firing of a “loaded” gun at the initiate. The bullet either hit the person and fell to the ground, or completely went off target. This was followed with loud chants to demonstrate that the initiation had indeed been successful. All the persons present at Base Zero were then requested to undergo initiation. In September 1997, an initiation ceremony was organised for all of them, including the paramount chiefs and elders. It was only subsequently that they came to know that the tasty dish they consumed as part of the initiation ceremony contained human flesh. Alhaji Daramy Rogers considers the avowed powers conferred by the initiation as a hoax.

“I went into that society – but it’s not even true that you have charms that can make you bullet-proof. He [Hinga Norman] believed that; and that was how they were killing innocent children because of that.”

And besides that, if they say they should test you, when they are testing you... a lot of people used to die. It’s all deception. Sometimes, if they want you to believe, they’d remove all the shells – all the pillets [the cartridges and their casing] – from these shotguns that we use. So they’d remove the bits, close it, to make it appear real... and believe me, if you shoot it, it will be as loud as just the actual thing.”

It was [a fraudulent conspiracy] and that was our worry. If you do that to one or two people then they will say it is true. But to say that there was any charm? To be very frank, from the word go I did not believe that. I could not stand to be shot, believing that I have some charm that could make me invincible.”³⁸⁹

805. To discerning minds, the initiation ceremony was a cleverly manipulated process that duped the mass of the membership into believing that they were the chosen ones blessed by the gods and ancestors to liberate their people:

“I will be telling you a lot of things that happened there. It was all about believing... If you make a man’s mind, then you can make him feel that something has happened when in fact it does not exist.

³⁸⁸ Alhaji Daramy-Rogers, former Member of the CDF War Council at Base Zero and later Regional Co-ordinator (South) of the CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 24 – 29 October 2003.

³⁸⁹ Alhaji Daramy-Rogers, former Member of the CDF War Council at Base Zero and later Regional Co-ordinator (South) of the CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 24 – 29 October 2003.

There was nothing like magical powers; nothing like magical powers...
They used basic deception to win people over."³⁹⁰

806. The process of initiation and the powers it supposedly conferred elevated the status of the initiators among the Kamajors. They became extremely powerful.
- "Why one cannot divorce the initiators from the Co-ordinator is because of their relationship; because, to be very frank, the relationship was so cordial that 'they never do bad'... if you correct them, it angers him. And what I found out, deliberately in my mind, was that he was very superstitious; and superstition can take you to a lot of things you don't even imagine doing. He was so superstitious and he believed Kondewah, whatever he told him. How can you believe that?"³⁹¹
807. The initiators' assistants were those responsible for 'preparing' the materials for the ceremony. They learned the tricks of the trade from their masters and went on to use them alone in other, often unlicensed ceremonies that took place later.
808. Raw greed began to dictate the initiating policy of the High Priest. Self-enrichment was also apparently embraced almost universally by his subordinates in the initiating cadre. According to accounts gathered by the Commission from different parts of the country and pertaining to different years of the conflict, new 'phases' of initiation to accrue further financial gain met with mixed levels of implementation. On the one hand Initiators, both recognised and unlicensed, sometimes took up the schemes even more voraciously than Kondewah himself, to the extent that they embellished elements of it to yield further income. On the other hand, Initiators sometimes deployed the new techniques sparingly or not at all, leading to the scenario where some witnesses declared that they had never even heard of some of the phases on which they were questioned.
809. What is certain is that the initiators themselves made a considerable amount of money out of initiating and it was therefore in their interests to adopt new 'types' of initiation offering novel and more potent 'powers' to their subscribers. Yet every one of the apocryphal benefits bestowed upon Kamajors by such ceremonies can be seen to have precipitated ever-more irresponsible conduct on the part of those who paid for them.
810. The Initiators consistently 'doctored' the cartridges they loaded into their shotguns, removing a component of the ballistic composition known as the 'pillet' and upon pulling the trigger released a projectile that had been reduced to effectively nothing more than the plastic casing or 'skin'. Such an item, even when fired at close range and pointed directly at the target, ought to have posed no threat of injury to the initiate. Indeed the most frequently-recorded outcome of such a performance was that the human subject of the demonstration would walk away unscathed, convinced of his own immortality. Several Kamajors who spoke with the Commission professed to have been

³⁹⁰ Alhaji Daramy-Rogers, former Member of the CDF War Council at Base Zero and later Regional Co-ordinator (South) of the CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 24 – 29 October 2003.

³⁹¹ Alhaji Daramy-Rogers, former Member of the CDF War Council at Base Zero and later Regional Co-ordinator (South) of the CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 24 – 29 October 2003.

fired at and to have survived. The gathered masses of Kamajors in attendance at any given initiation, sometimes numbering several hundred, would marvel at the powers of the Initiator and themselves subscribe to the 'bullet-proof' myth. Other statements collected by the Commission suggested that bullets had 'turned to water', 'failed to fire' or 'flown over the head' of the man at whom it was fired.

811. Upon consideration of the ramifications of this practice, the Commission is apt to condemn it in and of itself. Although a quantitative measurement of the phenomenon is impossible, the Commission's qualitative evidence suggests that the majority warfront casualties incurred by the Kamajors were attributable at least in part to the misplaced gusto, akin to what is sometimes referred to as 'Dutch courage', with which their combatants went into battle. Put simply, as a direct result of their initiation ceremonies, they did not think they could be killed by bullets. The tally of deaths caused by the war would in all likelihood have been lower without the background charade of invincibility against which much of it was fought.
812. In any case, it cannot be permissible for figures of authority, whether their leadership is political, factional, spiritual or moral, to so wilfully abuse the rights of those who look up to them. The Commission refuses to slight the integrity of any of those who were killed during an initiation process, for they participated in most instances to earn themselves what they saw as the power, but which was actually the right, to defend themselves, their families and their communities in a country whose state security apparatus had collapsed or turned against them. The responsibility for their deaths lies squarely with the initiating cadre of the CDF under the leadership of High Priest Allieu Kondewah.
813. The Initiators and their apprentices brought the whole concept of civil defence into disrepute. Collectively, under the direction and following the example of their High Priest, they extorted and exploited the membership of the Kamajor movement in a seemingly insatiable pursuit of their own self-enrichment. Moreover, Initiators were responsible both directly and indirectly for the commission of human rights violations on an alarming scale, particularly in the South and East of Sierra Leone. For every death that took place during an initiation ceremony in the country, of which the Commission has recorded multiple cases but suspects the number to be much higher, the Initiators bear the responsibility.
814. The Commission is unsatisfied with the explanations conjured by Initiators and loyal recruits alike for this mode of killing, since they essentially attempt to exonerate the perpetrators of due culpability. The Commission instead condemns this perversion of the sacred and long-standing tradition of initiation and rites of passage. The Initiators of the CDF deliberately targeted the social and cultural fabric of this nation. We implore that nobody, whether in a group or individual capacity, should ever again be allowed to engage in destruction and exploitation under the false pretences of a 'secret' society.
815. This state of affairs created a sense of panic among the chiefs and elders also gathered at the base. They felt like bystanders, yet by their progeny and station in life, they believed they had a lot to offer. They therefore consulted with Chief Norman and insisted on a bigger role for themselves in the operations of the movement. Chief Norman was running the operations of the base, only in

consultation with his initiators. It was then agreed that a War Council be constituted.

816. Among the members of the War Council at Base Zero were:

1. PC J.W. Quee – Chairman of the War Council
2. PC W. Tucker – Vice Chairman / Representative for Bonthe District
3. Chief Vandi Soka – Member / Representative for Kenema District
4. Robert F. Kombe-Kajue – Member / Representative for Moyamba District
5. Ibrahim F.M. Kanneh – Member / Representative for Bo District
6. M.S. Dumbuya – Member / Representative for the Northern Province
7. Francis Lumeh – Logistics Officer/Member/Representative for Pujehun District
8. Alhaji Daramy-Rogers – Executive Officer / Member
9. Mohammed O. Musa – Executive Officer / Member
10. George Jambawai – Executive Officer / Member

Other Members at Base Zero included:

1. Chief J.D. Muana – Resident Paramount Chief
2. Chief Francis Gormor – Logistics Officer
3. Joseph A.S. Koroma – National Director of Operations
4. Ruphus M. Collier – Battalion Commander / Bonthe District
5. Yaya Kamara – Store Keeper
6. Paramount Chief Caulker – Bonthe District

817. The Council was composed of representatives who were drawn in from each District in order to ensure some kind of geographical spread and balance. However, there was no person from the Western Area, nor from the North... apart from Dumbuya. There is some argument as to whether Dumbuya was a member of the War Council at Base Zero or not. He vehemently denied being a member of the Council, arguing that he was not accepted since he was not Mende and that he disagreed with the practices going on there (a clear reference to the cannibalism that was widely practised). He claimed instead that he was a member of the War Council in Conakry. Members of the War Council at Base Zero have testified to the Commission that "Dumbuya was also involved in the decision-making".

818. The Commission had understood that some of those who formed the War Council had been to Guinea immediately prior to coming to Base Zero; and that they had been part of a delegation there who had met with members of the Government in Exile before travelling down to Talia.

819. However, members of the War Council were adamant that the Government did not have any input into the formation of the War Council at Base Zero.

820. The Council immediately directed the training of the combatants. "We thought it was necessary for the boys to have some training; because you cannot send somebody who does not have military training and give him just a gun." They

sent word to Freetown to Maxwell Khobe, ECOMOG commander who despatched former SSD commander, M. S. Dumbuya to train “the boys”.

821. The training was designed to complement ECOMOG efforts:

“Already ECOMOG was on the move to advance. So we were just training to complement the efforts of ECOMOG, so that in terms of the fact that they don’t have the manpower, our boys would have had some knowledge, so that they could join them.”³⁹²

822. Everyone was supposed to participate in the training, including the chiefs and elders. It was a rigorous military training, not just the bare physical exercises suggested by Dumbuya’s testimony to the Commission. People were even reported to have died during the training at Base Zero, as a result of its intensity. Dumbuya however told the Commission that the Kamajors were disinclined to participate in the training. They believed that the initiation ceremony offered them sufficient preparation to go to war. He was compelled to train only the chiefs and elders, some of whom were well over 70 years old.³⁹³ He claimed further that he was not invited to participate in the discussions that took place in planning the war effort. All the discussions took place in Mende language with which he was not conversant. He perceived that the environment was becoming oppressive.

823. The members of the War Council had tried to assert their authority, particularly after they became aware of the extent of cannibalism being practiced at the base, and the deployment of fighters to missions without prior consultation with them. The circumstances indeed beg the question as to why none of the other senior Kamajors at the base saw fit to hold a frank and candid discussion with Chief Norman in order to understand what he had in mind with his often secretive endeavours. A combination of fear and a deep-lying sense of vulnerability appear to have accounted for the silence. A tense relationship therefore developed between them and Chief Norman and the initiators. They were seen as interfering. Subtle threats began to be directed their way:

“Even when we [were] trying to correct the boys, they told us at one point that even our lives were... that they could not guarantee our safety. So why can’t we be afraid?”

I thought it was a threat. I thought it was a threat – and that was a serious threat. We were all afraid – ask any one of us and they will tell you that.”³⁹⁴

824. The War Council made one last feeble attempt to wrest control of the movement. A rumour had spread that the movement had become so strong that it could even take over the government whenever the AFRC was expelled from power. A whispering campaign developed that perhaps that was the way to go. The Council convened a meeting of all persons present at Base Zero. Speaker and after speaker warned the boys to desist from contemplating such

³⁹² M. S. Dumbuya, former Commanding Officer of the Northern CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 21 October 2003.

³⁹³ M. S. Dumbuya, former Commanding Officer of the Northern CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 21 October 2003.

³⁹⁴ Alhaji Daramy-Rogers, former Member of the CDF War Council at Base Zero and later Regional Co-ordinator (South) of the CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 24 – 29 October 2003.

thoughts, and that all their efforts and resources should be deployed to restoring the legitimate government to power. When it got to his turn to speak, Chief Norman denied any plans to replace President Kabbah and wondered why the meeting had to be convened in the first place since his loyalty to the President was not to be doubted by anyone.

825. This last act of the Council seemed to have drawn the line between it and Chief Norman. Its members claim that they were no longer consulted on operational or other issues. They stayed on at the base passing their time as they saw fit, and picking up snippets of information from local commanders ready to blow the whistle on the movement. For M.S. Dumbuya he perceived that his life was no longer safe at the base. It was to his great relief when General Khobe sent a helicopter to evacuate him after six weeks at the base. He never returned to the base till the government of President Kabbah was restored to power.³⁹⁵

826. The initiators became so powerful that they began directing military operations, sending the combatants out on missions without consultation with any of the chiefs and elders present at the base.

“I told you that the Priests were more effective because they had armed men. If it was only meant to initiate people – make them ‘disappear – then it was okay. But the question was: why should they have a contingent of armed men? We knew for sure that some of them were using those arms to intimidate, or even to loot people – dispossess their properties. It is an open secret that Kondewah was one of those who had a contingent of armed men at his disposal. Each of them had arms; Mama Munda too. Mama Munda was initiating independently outside of Base Zero.”³⁹⁶

827. The Initiators refused to be cowed by the War Council and ignored it most of the time. They had their own armed men to respond to their commands:

“I considered it a parallel command structure; but Hinga Norman was in command of the initiators. They were never loyal to the War Council. In fact they took us as a threat; that we had eroded their powers; that we tried to neutralise them. They were calling us some nickname...something council. They said they had all the powers – that whatever they said would happen; when we came we tried to take that power from them.”

828. There were however no real attempts to impose any codes of conduct, discipline or official restraint on the actions of the Initiators. Whilst it may have been raised at War Council meetings no substantive decision was taken. The War Council issued an instruction that the initiators needed to be curbed, but the power to take away this grip on power lay squarely and solely in the hands of Hinga Norman. On the inability of the War Council to exercise control, it has been argued on its behalf that:

³⁹⁵ Alhaji Daramy-Rogers, former Member of the CDF War Council at Base Zero and later Regional Co-ordinator (South) of the CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 24 – 29 October 2003. See also: M. S. Dumbuya, former Commanding Officer of the Northern CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 21 October 2003.

³⁹⁶ Alhaji Daramy-Rogers, former Member of the CDF War Council at Base Zero and later Regional Co-ordinator (South) of the CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 24 – 29 October 2003.

“It ought to have been the case [that we were in control] but it was never the case. For instance the arrangement to attack Koribondo, they left before we knew about it. That is one vivid example. Nor was it routine for the Council to receive briefings or reports on what had taken place during a front-line operation. Not to the War Council, but to individuals who were members of the War Council. But to say as a Council: I never saw once that we deliberated on such a matter.”³⁹⁷

829. Relationships between learned people in the War Council and the initiators – who were ‘Kamohs’, or learned in Islam – were strained in both directions. They were treated with something of a haughty derision by the conventionally educated members of the War Council, who flinched at engaging them and sneered at their indulgence in ‘native magic’. “The man was drunk almost every day, so how can you have a healthy discussion with him?” The initiators in turn regarded the War Council as a quibbling group of people.
830. The Commission sees a fundamental contradiction at the heart of some of the explanations tendered by members of the War Council. There were grave organisational flaws in the structure of the Civil Defence Forces of which each of these men was a senior executive member. Many of these deficiencies in fact relate to a lack of coherent leadership, a dearth of sensible co-ordination, a disjunction between the initiating cadre and the administrative cadre and an incessant problem in exerting effective control over the rank and file, or the masses. Whilst the Commission recognises that with hindsight members of the War Council might see such shortcomings as anomalous and even comical, it remains the case that there are very serious issues intertwined within them that ought to have been resolved at the level of the War Council. The Commission finds that the senior citizens of the Kamajors were hapless and hopeless in the paramount task of living up to their responsibilities. They did nothing to prevent the mayhem that unfolded around them; in fact they lent legitimacy and their implicit endorsement to the acts of atrocity that were taking place by staying in a movement that had become a systematic violator of human rights.

“It’s easy to say as you are speaking in normal times. It was true that the whole thing was chaotic. Where illiterate people are given arms and ammunition; there was no command structure; they were a law unto themselves. It was difficult, let me tell you; it was difficult. Because as I explained to you, when Mr. Kombe was molested: an old man over 70; a young boy with a gun, telling him ‘you sit down there’; and he sat there. We made a report – nothing happened and the boy was not punished. We knew the situation was chaotic, we knew that. Why honestly [did I do nothing]? This was a jungle; it wasn’t normal times. If you see one big man humiliated and nothing came out of it, you must be afraid. I am not speaking for the others, but for myself: I was actually afraid for my life.”

This is why I didn’t wait – I was one of the first people who left Base Zero when we heard that ECOMOG was coming. Even when we went to another place, a base called Base Dasam that was nearer Bo, when we heard that the Kamajors had been repelled in the first attack,

³⁹⁷ Alhaji Daramy-Rogers, former Member of the CDF War Council at Base Zero and later Regional Co-ordinator (South) of the CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 24 – 29 October 2003.

and we were ordered to go back to Base Zero, I refused to go; I stayed at that point. Because once God saved my life I left that village; I did not go there again – I have not even been there even at this peace-time. Oh yes; I was very scared.

The movement was in fact uncontrollable and you were constantly in a state of fear that prevented you from taking action to correct that. ECOMOG and the Government were now in control – I felt that I could make a useful contribution based on the respect I commanded. I said to myself enough is enough. I vowed to make my own role one of an advisory capacity.³⁹⁸

831. Thus power struggles broke out between commanders who owed their loyalties to different leaders within the movement; in the public perception there is a fine line between the activities of troops acting on behalf of Kondewah and the enforcement squad instructed by Alhaji Daramy-Rogers to retrieve vehicles.

“At the time we came when I was Regional Co-ordinator we used to get supplies directly from ECOMOG; I cannot say it was abundant supply, but we were supplied. Even if they carried guns, these were their own guns – they had come back to Bo from Base Zero with guns.”³⁹⁹

832. There were in fact a number of testimonies given to the Commission that spoke of pitched battles between armed forces acting on behalf of various individuals in the CDF organisation including Allieu Kondewah and Alhaji Daramy-Rogers.
833. After the Government was restored to power, it put out as many as three statements instructing the Kamajors to cease initiations for fear that it had escalated out of hand, but it was to no avail. Initiation still went on for a considerable period of time thereafter.
834. In the management of the war effort, Chief Norman appeared to have given prominence to the initiators. They began to determine operations, missions and tactics. This the ground commanders resented. Putting the two segments of the movement together into one organogram created unanticipated problems.
835. Monitoring and reporting was particularly weak – hence those who were supposed to authorise or plan such attacks were effectively bypassed by commanders who acted unilaterally. The conflict between the two cadres (initiation Vs hierarchy) would be the crux of the power struggles in the movement) and it was all down to the poorly-defined parameters of initiation as against organisation; and due to the ill-discipline of a fighting force that had received hardly any formal training and many of whom once were farmers.

³⁹⁸ Alhaji Daramy-Rogers, former Member of the CDF War Council at Base Zero and later Regional Co-ordinator (South) of the CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 24 – 29 October 2003.

³⁹⁹ Alhaji Daramy-Rogers, former Member of the CDF War Council at Base Zero and later Regional Co-ordinator (South) of the CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 24 – 29 October 2003.

The Kamajors' Operation Black December

836. Base Zero was construed by some members to have been established purposely for the carrying out of Operation Black December:

“Black December was an all-out offensive against any stumbling block towards the development of Pa Kabbah’s Government. Wheresoever an RUF or AFRC man stays, we should attack that position; and whosoever has food that could assist in our war effort, we should take that food from them – and we did that.

[...] Purposefully it was a ritual – people did a lot to succeed on that [operation]... ceremonies, burials, rituals, sacrificing; it included much sacrificing of human beings. We did that purposely for the good of this Government. People were handled without their own knowledge, but all the Ministers of the Government knew about it.”⁴⁰⁰

837. There is compelling evidence before the Commission that Operation Black December was debated at the level of the War Council in Exile.⁴⁰¹ Those who participated in discussions around it included Ambassador James Jonah, the President, ECOMOG commanders in Freetown and Government Ministers, including Hinga Norman, Patrick Foyah, Foday Sesay, Harry Will, Momoh Pujeh, and M. B. Daramy. The main objective of the operation was to choke the supply routes of the AFRC and thereby hasten its collapse.

838. The means by which Operation Black December was to be carried out were described to the Commission in the following terms by one of those who was tasked with its implementation:

“We would go all out to cut off the roads, mostly by setting up roadblocks and checkpoints so that the roads could not be used to transport materials or otherwise assist the AFRC in the big towns. Two flags were used: red and white. The red was for danger; the white was for peace.

The Black December operation was so nasty that it could turn your stomach. Children were taken in handcuffs, everyone was put under our will.”⁴⁰²

839. An anonymous survivor of the conflict gave the following statement to the Commission pertaining to the Kamajors' practice of summary executions and other violations at checkpoints during the period of the Black December operation. The statement-giver indicated his belief that Chief Sam Hinga Norman was personally responsible for ordering the violations and abuses he described:

⁴⁰⁰ TRC Confidential Interview with a Kamajor combatant who participated in the Black December operation in his own District and other parts of the country; interview conducted in August 2000.

⁴⁰¹ In this regard see, *inter alia*: ‘Operation Black December – Summary of Conversations held with Civil Defence Force leader Sam Hinga Norman’; document marked ‘Exhibit IV’ among the exhibits submitted to the Commission by Reverend Alfred M. SamForay, former Secretary-General of the Sierra Leone Action Movement for the Civil Defence Forces (SLAM-CDF); written statement and supporting documentation submitted to the Commission by e-mail; 10 December 2003.

⁴⁰² TRC Confidential Interview with a former Kamajor fighter; interview conducted in Bo District; June 2003.

“On 2 November 1997 I was travelling from Kenema to Bo in a Government bus... I was in the bus with other passengers whom I didn’t know, including about thirty pilgrims, both male and female. On the journey, we did not know that the Kamajors had set a one-mile ambush.

When we reached Gembeh at 10.00 a.m. an RPG was launched on the edge of the bus and cut off the driver’s head; he died on the spot. The bus was then moving uncontrolled and finally [was] blocked by a big tree.

[...] The Kamajors then came in their hundreds and surrounded the bus and asked everybody to come down, including me. The Kamajors took us to the bridge and their commander, whom I know facially, took out a Motorola [mobile phone] handset and communicated to Hinga Norman, who was in Monghere at that moment. According to their conversation, I understood that Hinga Norman gave them the order to execute everybody.

[...] By the other side of the bridge there was a big pit; the commander told all the men to stand in one line and the women in another line. Four of the Kamajors stood in front of the rows and began to slaughter the people with their swords and daggers and dump them into the pit.

[...] I was the last person in the men’s row. As they were about to kill me, I used mystical power and disappeared.”⁴⁰³

840. The Black December operation lasted at the most a few months. It reached its climax in terms of intensity and the number of sub-operations conducted during the month of December 1997, which was to become the country’s blackest month during the AFRC’s reign in power.

841. The duration of the Black December operation would seem to indicate that it had been envisaged and designed as an integral prerequisite to the full-scale intervention that was to be launched by ECOMOG in February of 1998. CDF witnesses informed the Commission that the Government in exile was not only aware but participated in the planning of ‘Operation Black December’. To carry out the operation, ECOMOG supplied arms and ammunition to the CDF. The purpose of the training provided for Kamajors by M.S. Dumbuya and for the Gbethes by ECOMOG was to reinforce the civilian resistance to the AFRC. The high point of this resistance was supposed to be Operation Black December’ which was to be a forerunner to the expulsion of the AFRC from Freetown. It is therefore unfortunate that neither the government nor the leadership of the CDF took any substantive measures to curb the pervasive violation of the rights of civilians which occurred during these three dark months of the conflict named ‘Operation Black December’. There was massive looting, particularly of agricultural facilities and of harvests that had been the whole season’s work and planting on the part of the victim. “We were grabbing their harvests just for the Black December.”⁴⁰⁴

⁴⁰³ TRC Confidential Statement from a survivor of a Kamajor ambush in 1997; Commission Statement No. 4411; statement taken in Cole Farm, Freetown; 25 February 2003.

⁴⁰⁴ TRC Confidential Interview with a Kamajor combatant who participated in the Black December operation in his own District and other parts of the country; interview conducted in August 2000.

842. There was no public response from the government to the violations that occurred following the launch of 'Operation Black December'. Efforts had been made by members of the War Council at Base Zero to inform the President of the atrocities being committed by the Kamajors.

"We did not formally or informally advise him [the President] as a Council; maybe as individual members of the Council...I did not shirk my responsibility. I did not advise him, but I explained to him. I gave him some explanation. I said to him that all was not well in the CDF; that I said to him. Many things were not known to us at Base Zero... I said even the Nigerians didn't think that he [the President] was handling the Co-ordinator; because Hinga Norman was doubling as Co-ordinator of CDF and also as a Minister. I said that was not good. I said, they [ECOMOG] had said that. For instance, we didn't know; the only information we got from Hinga Norman was that he had a friend in Liberia who told him he was in the Army, the British Army or so, and this friend was the one that was supplying us food. And I felt that that was not the case

The President said he didn't want to open up another fight. He had attempted at one time to change this man and there was no good response from the CDF, the Kamajors. He said he got information from intelligence that if they remove this man, if they change him – because the President wanted to send this man to Nigeria – they said if they change him, there will be trouble. And we had had this peace, so he didn't want another diversion. If he had relied on my opinion, perhaps he would have made the changes I recommended. But he did not. So I cannot say per se that he relied on my suggestions."⁴⁰⁵

843. In consequence the Government did little to rein in the rampaging CDF troops who in places like Bonthe Island turned to "worse oppressors than the RUF rebels".⁴⁰⁶

844. Despite the above, the President continued to retain Chief Hinga Norman as CDF National Coordinator. One reason was that without an effective national Army, ECOMOG needed the capacities of the CDF to afford them inside knowledge of the countryside for purposes of dislodging the AFRC/RUF from their occupied areas. The President and his closest advisers were acutely aware of Hinga Norman's deficiencies and the violations his leadership had precipitated, but they also knew that it was only under his leadership that the CDF would remain a strong enough fighting force to overcome the AFRC/RUF and effectively liberate the country and win the war. They therefore kept him there in spite of their own and others' better judgement:

"I think it was the other way round. The President felt that if he removed Hinga Norman that would displease [the Kamajors]. You see the President... I could say he had the wrong conception. If he had done that, that would have saved the situation. Seriously – I'm not

⁴⁰⁵ TRC Confidential interview with a Member of the War Council at Base Zero; Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 24 – 29 October 2003.

⁴⁰⁶ Reverend Father Emmanuel Garrick; testimony before TRC Public Hearings held on Bonthe Island, Bonthe District; July 2003.

saying it because I wanted the job, honestly. I did not; I had even told the President that I didn't want him to make me Minister."⁴⁰⁷

POWER STRUGGLES IN THE CDF – THE EFFORT TO FIND A REPLACEMENT FOR CHIEF HINGA NORMAN

845. It is impossible to avoid the question of Hinga Norman's appropriateness for the leadership of the CDF in any serious discussion of the fighting forces in the conflict. President Kabbah found himself in utter desperation, knowing that something had to be done but unsure of which way to turn, he battled with several competing and conflicting dynamics central to the outcome of the war: a proposed restructuring of the CDF would have to encompass the following criteria: cut Hinga Norman out of the loop, replace him with someone who can engender a similar degree of respect and authority among the rank and file of the Kamajors, and does not compromise the war effort. The challenge was to find a suitable person to replace Chief Norman. It had to be somebody who had leadership – either innately or institutionally - within the movement who also had gravitas. A man who had influence and standing in the movement. The reason Hinga Norman commanded such control was because he had the respect of the boys as a fighting man himself.

"I told the President – the person should be someone with some military backing; he should have some respect. They wanted a trained soldier. There are Sierra Leoneans competent, who had also served the Army and left... some of them were Kamajors, like M. M. Koroma – I wonder whether he was not a Major in the Army; he was a Kamajor."⁴⁰⁸

846. In the end, Chief Norman was not replaced. The mutual suspicion between him and the President intensified and was to play an important part in the events surrounding the May 6-8 2000 demonstrations in Freetown. Even after the war had ended and the Kamajors were encamped at the Brookfields Hotel in Freetown, they became guns for hire, going out on private operations against perceived enemies of their hirers. The operations included targeted assassinations, looting or property, rape etc. In one particular instance, a group of Kamajors went to the residence of the former Vice President, and forcibly took away five cars as part compensation for their "war efforts". The Vice President not only did not upbraid them but "advised them that rather than take the cars by force, if they wanted cars, they should have come to him to give them cars voluntarily."⁴⁰⁹ A culture of impunity therefore took sway in the Kamajor camps:

"As a group, we cannot shy away and nobody can completely exonerate himself. I am very clear in my mind that what happened, all that you have said is true. If it is a question of blame, I cannot be exonerated. But to say as personal blame, I think in my own little way

⁴⁰⁷ TRC Confidential interview with a Member of the War Council at Base Zero; Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 24 – 29 October 2003.

⁴⁰⁸ TRC Confidential interview with a member of the War Council at Base Zero; Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 24-29 October 2003.

⁴⁰⁹ TRC Confidential Interview with former Kamajor fighter for the Civil Defence Forces; interview conducted in Bo Town, Bo District; 5 June 2003 corroborated by other interviews with ex-Kamajor combatants.

I tried to pacify things, but I had my limitations....This was a difficult situation. Most of those people who had arms were very illiterate.

Why did it happen? Well you know with human conflict. We knew that there were excesses, but I did not personally take part in those excesses... I saw them and sometimes I raised it. And in fact the problem I had with CDF was because I raised most of those issues. So they were not very comfortable with me and that was where I had my problem."⁴¹⁰

847. The usual voices of authority which in most of Sierra Leonean society belong to Chiefs, elders and respected senior men, had become marginalised in the CDF movement. They were replaced by those who had command over armed groups. For a senior man to have to subordinate himself to an armed commando is not in line with the norm in Sierra Leone. The Government and the leadership of the Kamajor movement including the chiefs, must bear full responsibility for all the atrocities that were committed by the Kamajors in the course of the war.

THE MANAGEMENT OF THE RESTORATION EFFORT

848. The Commission found multiple further indications of the importance of maintaining executive oversight and intra-Governmental communication during the exile period. Yet most of the evidence suggests that not enough was done in this regard, while what was done was often botched. In fact, as the preceding narrative demonstrates, the attempts at co-ordination by the Government in exile were generally ill-conceived, disorganised and highly defective.
849. Many of the most telling insights in this regard came from members of the two 'War Councils', which were parallel bodies established in Guinea and Sierra Leone. The Commission has found that the mandates of these Councils were in one sense complementary: they both sought to oversee certain operational and political elements of the effort to restore the SLPP Government. Yet according to testimonies they were established separately, administered differently and thus predestined to act inconsonantly. Both War Councils proved insufficiently courageous in enforcing their decisions.

⁴¹⁰ Alhaji Daramy-Rogers, former Member of the CDF War Council at Base Zero and later Regional Co-ordinator (South) of the CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; October 2003.

THE ECOMOG INTERVENTION TO RESTORE THE SLPP GOVERNMENT TO POWER

The Modalities of the ECOMOG Intervention into Freetown

850. At the level of Heads of Government in the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a three-pronged progressive policy for the restoration of President Kabbah was accepted. The founding principle upon which ECOWAS sought the reinstatement of Kabbah's Government was that the nascent, albeit imperfect democracy of Sierra Leone should be protected and bolstered.
851. The Commonwealth Conference, the OAU Summit and the United Nations General Assembly all gave their outright support for the policy of restoration. The Government of Sierra Leone had to be supported in its quest for speedy restoration on favourable terms, since anything less would have been a terrible condemnation of the low durability of democracy in the West African sub-region.
852. Promoting democracy assumed an added internal dimension in Sierra Leone because of the fluctuations in public opinion during the 1990s. The AFRC had come to power believing that the context which gave rise to the NPRC five years earlier still existed. However, as Colonel K. E. S. Boyah pointed out to the Commission, the whole social context by 1997 was predicated on an undertaking to keep the Army away from politics:
- “My version, the way I see it, the AFRC guys just miscalculated the whole situation when they thought that people wanted a change. In 1992, yes: the people wanted a change. Even when efforts were being made to stop that [coup]; people were rejoicing, people virtually led those boys to State House. We were all witnesses; they virtually led them [there] dancing.
- But 1997 was a different situation; a different scenario. People had gone through a lot of trauma by then; they were in the [mental] state that they were not ready for that kind of rubbish any longer. But they [the coup makers] also thought that they could come and make themselves comfortable and at the end of it they could still have an exit like the NPRC guys who left. I think that was what happened.”⁴¹¹
853. Indeed, in the case of the junior soldiers who seized power on 25 May 1997, there was a manifest desire to enrich themselves and enjoy the trappings of power as demonstrated by testimony from Maada Bio and other leaders of the NPRC regime. Therein lay an unwarranted extension of the culture of abuse of Government that their forebears in the NPRC had propagated. Yet the question of whether the AFRC would slip into exile with impunity at the end of their reign quickly became secondary to the question of whether they would be willing to relinquish power in the first place. It was for this reason that ECOWAS envisaged coercive measures of gradually increasing intensity.

⁴¹¹ Colonel K. E. S. Mboyah, long-serving officer in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), erstwhile Battalion Commander and Director of Defence Information; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 29 August 2003.

854. The first step was to elicit from the AFRC regime an undertaking to hand back power peacefully; this was to be achieved through direct dialogue and, if necessary, multilateral negotiations. The five-member contact group established for that purpose was given something of a cold shoulder by the AFRC leadership however. The initial declarations of intent by Johnny Paul Koroma suggested an intention to hold on to power for somewhere between two and four years.⁴¹²
855. Upon the apparent insistence of ECOWAS leaders, a strict embargo on international trade was imposed on Sierra Leone, along with a robust set of sanctions on the AFRC. While the enforcement of these measures was undoubtedly flawed, they seemed to have the effect of scuttling at least some of the AFRC's designs on longevity. The Conakry Peace Plan of 23 October 1997 grew out of the need for the AFRC either to embrace international mechanisms, or slowly to suffocate in economic segregation.
856. Thus the Government pursued a proactive policy of isolation, convincing the international community to sever all ties with the junta, deny the AFRC regime recognised status in international law and impose economic sanctions on the economy. Nevertheless, irrespective of these diplomatic efforts, the planning and implementation of a military-driven restoration operation took place in earnest. From an early juncture, a joint plan was envisaged in which ECOMOG would assault the power base in Freetown, as well as the Provincial Headquarter Towns of Bo and Kenema, with contingents of Kamajors for support where appropriate. The pledge of the AFRC leadership in the Conakry Peace Plan to hand over power on 22 April 1998 was given short shrift.
857. From analysis of the Review Document produced subsequently by ECOMOG, coupled with the inseparable evidence of intent to fight by the Kamajors noted in the previous section, the Commission finds that an armed intervention became inevitable from November 1997. During that month, 11 ECOMOG soldiers were reported to have been killed by land mines, which had been littered around the approach routes to Freetown from the East.⁴¹³ Skirmishes between AFRC forces and the Kamajors at various locations in the South were also interpreted as outward displays of hostile intransigence by the junta.⁴¹⁴
858. Moreover, an RUF troop launched several attacks on the ECOMOG position at Kossoh Town, purportedly to test the fighting strength of the Nigerians.⁴¹⁵ The RUF's persistent probing at that time added to the perception of ECOMOG that the People's Army was "belligerent and defiant", rather than compliant with the provisions of the Conakry Plan.⁴¹⁶

⁴¹² See BBC reports of interviews granted by Johnny Paul Koroma during this period.

⁴¹³ ECOMOG Deployment Review Committee, chaired by Colonel D. D. Oyebanjo; *The Participation of the Nigerian Contingent in the ECOMOG Operation in Sierra Leone*; undated document marked 'RESTRICTED'; provided to the Commission in hard copy; September 2003; at paragraphs 82 and 134.

⁴¹⁴ ECOMOG Deployment Review Committee, chaired by Colonel D. D. Oyebanjo; at paragraph 55.

⁴¹⁵ Abdulai Sesay, former commander of an RUF 'Small Boys' Unit' (SBU) and later commander in the Northern Province and Western Area; testimony before TRC Public Hearings held in Makeni Town, Bombali District; 30 May 2003.

⁴¹⁶ ECOMOG Deployment Review Committee, chaired by Colonel D. D. Oyebanjo; at paragraph 55.

859. Thus the third and last of the ECOWAS strategy materialised: “to use force to remove the regime from power where dialogue and sanctions fail.”⁴¹⁷ The armed intervention was code-named ‘Operation Sandstorm’. Its first phase, ‘Operation Tigerhead’, assumed a three-pronged approach into Freetown: each route in military jargon was known as an ‘axis’. The first axis moved directly into the East of the city from Jui through Calaba Town; the second proceeded along the peninsular road from Hastings through Waterloo; the third, known as the ‘Regent Axis’, crossed via Grafton and headed towards Wilberforce Barracks.⁴¹⁸
860. The Commission heard that each of ECOMOG’s three main Battalions in the operation was supported by a unit of the so-called ‘Sierra Leone Contingent of ECOMOG’. The contingent consisted of 172 loyal ex-policemen, military officers and university students who had been trained at Lungi Airport by M. S. Dumbuya.⁴¹⁹ These were the only Sierra Leoneans involved in the operation to oust the junta from Freetown, after Dumbuya’s involvement in training Kamajors at Base Zero had been unceremoniously aborted by Colonel Maxwell Khobe one month earlier.
861. The ECOMOG operation to conquer Freetown began on 2 February 1998 when the majority of the participating forces were airlifted to Hastings Airfield. The advance was hampered and hardly moved for over a week due to stout resistance, however. On all three of its routes, ECOMOG encountered heavy fortifications mounted by the AFRC, including a widespread presence of landmines. In addition, junta positions were initially defended by artillery support from elite mercenaries, apparently drafted in from the Ukraine. M. S. Dumbuya told the Commission of his participation in the offensive on the ‘Regent Axis’:

“Originally we were moving in on the main road, but we lost several men to landmines on our advance. There was a heavy concentration of trenches and bunkers all over the place. It was so late in the night when we finally took Regent that we deployed in Regent and waited until the following day.

[...] Our other troops were at Wellington fighting just as hard, because there was resistance everywhere. Apart from that I was told by my commander – the ECOMOG commander – that we had come into contact with some Ukrainians, mercenaries who were operating the SBG weapons... They were fighting alongside the juntas; and because of their expertise it was extremely difficult for us to move beyond that point. So from 2 February we were there for ten days: going forward to fight; coming back to fight; all just to weaken their defences.”⁴²⁰

⁴¹⁷ ECOMOG Deployment Review Committee, chaired by Colonel D. D. Oyebanjo; at paragraphs 52 and 78.

⁴¹⁸ ECOMOG Deployment Review Committee, chaired by Colonel D. D. Oyebanjo; at paragraph 132.

⁴¹⁹ M. S. Dumbuya, former Trainer of the Sierra Leone Contingent in ECOMOG and Commanding Officer of the Northern CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 1 July 2003.

⁴²⁰ M. S. Dumbuya, former Trainer of the Sierra Leone Contingent in ECOMOG and Commanding Officer of the Northern CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 1 July 2003.

862. Having successfully worn down the main military defences of the AFRC, ECOMOG was able to capture the majority of strategic points in Freetown within a further two days, the 12 and 13 February 1998. ECOMOG reported its operations as a resounding success, proclaiming the 'making of history' when 'the entire Freetown and its environs were liberated.'⁴²¹
863. Indeed, the seat of Government and its immediate environs were conclusively 'flushed' of the presence of AFRC and RUF fighters. Within one month of the conclusion of Operation Tigerhead, the Government of President Kabbah was reinstated in a ceremony at State House on 10 March 1998.

The Legacies of the ECOMOG Intervention to Oust the AFRC

864. The ECOMOG intervention bequeathed a number of legacies upon Sierra Leone. These were not of ECOMOG's making but their impact affected the restoration effort. Although democracy was restored in name, the exercise of executive power was to prove far more challenging for the Kabbah Government in its second sitting. In view of the effective vacuum in the state security apparatus that existed in the AFRC's wake, the preservation of law and order was a task that would require exceptional sensitivity and an upright sense of justice. Moreover, there was to follow a proliferation of hostilities in most parts of the country, involving an unprecedented number of different factions. The military and political equilibrium was more fragile than at any other point during the Sierra Leone conflict.
865. The ECOMOG-led intervention was prosecuted in the name of restoration. Its non completion divided the Regions of the country along faction controlled areas. With the exception of the Western Area, which was safeguarded by its ECOMOG 'liberators', and the Kailahun District, which once again became the preserve of the RUF, there were essentially two main theatres of conflict in the period after February 1998. These were the North and North-East, on the one hand, and the South and South-East, on the other.
866. The five Districts of the Northern Province,⁴²² as well as Kono District in the North-East, became hosts to the overwhelming majority of the ousted AFRC dissidents. Thousands of junta soldiers, as well as a considerable proportion of the fighting forces of the RUF, flooded into the North on their mass retreat from power. The AFRC and RUF factions, both separately and in tandem with one another, visited a sustained and unprecedented level of human rights abuse on the populace of the North and North-East in the year 1998.
867. Meanwhile the four Districts of the Southern Province,⁴²³ along with Kenema and parts of Kailahun in the South-East, were dominated by the enormous and growing Civil Defence Forces, nearly all of whom at that time were initiated as Kamajors. These Districts became unambiguously classifiable as heartlands of the Kamajor movement. These heartlands were not to be wrested from the control of the Kamajors by any other combatant faction for the entire remaining duration of the conflict.

⁴²¹ ECOMOG Deployment Review Committee, chaired by Colonel D. D. Oyebanjo; *The Participation of the Nigerian Contingent in the ECOMOG Operation in Sierra Leone*; undated document marked 'RESTRICTED'; provided to the Commission in hard copy; September 2003; at paragraph 188.

⁴²² The Northern Province comprises Port Loko, Kambia, Bombali, Tonkolili and Koinadugu Districts.

⁴²³ The Southern Province comprises Moyamba, Bonthe, Bo and Pujehun Districts.

868. The main factor in drawing out the battle lines in this manner was the astonishing flight of the ousted junta into the North of the country. Several members of the RUF and AFRC told the Commission that they had been unable to resist the ECOMOG intervention due to the sheer scale of the force brought to bear; yet they also reflected that their escape from the city was essentially unhampered:

“When ECOMOG came, they toppled us in a short time – they used jets, they used artilleries, armoured cars, tanks, everything. At that time the AFRC did not have those weapons, so for the sake of the civilians we decided to pull out.

I was trying to save my life – I knew I would be killed if I stayed in Freetown. If you are a victim and someone is trying to capture you, are you going to stand around and wait for them? [So] we went, thinking we would have to fight our way out. But we were surprised [when] it was free passage for us.”⁴²⁴

869. Had it been left to a matter of choice, there is little doubt that the AFRC soldiers and their RUF compatriots would have opted to beat their backward retreat through the North. Their fiercest rivals, the Kamajors, were so numerically strengthened and committed to the retention of territory in the South and South-East that the soldiers would not have been foolhardy enough to confront them.
870. Ultimately, though, the reason the junta was able to secure ‘free passage’ was because ECOMOG intentionally left open a ‘corridor’ of escape around the Freetown Peninsula. At the point of impact, this policy was commendable in principle at least. It sought to avert bloody head-on clashes between the junta and the pro-Government forces in and around the city of Freetown. It spared the urban population and the villagers in the immediate environs from the suffering of being caught in the crossfire between two warring factions. In particular, it avoided the public relations disaster of casting the international ‘peacekeepers’ as the ‘aggressors’ in a massacre in Freetown.
871. The Commission heard about the rationale behind this arrangement from M. S. Dumbuya, who was the Commanding Officer of the ‘Sierra Leonean Contingent in ECOMOG’ during the intervention. Dumbuya was intimately familiar with ECOMOG’s operational plans. In his evidence to the Commission, he described how he had perceived the corridor as a success:

“What we did was deliberately [to] avoid permanent and direct contact, which would have resulted in a lot of casualties on both sides. So we decided to open up one place for them to go out and that was the Peninsula route; they were allowed to pass freely through the Peninsula route. From what I know, they went to Tombo, then they went across to Masiaka and from there they went up country.

⁴²⁴ TRC Confidential Interview with a former officer of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who served as a ‘Brigadier’ under the AFRC and later became Leader of the ‘West Side Boys’; interview conducted in Freetown; 17 October 2003.

[...] You see, in war, after they had lost the ground, [our aim was] to avoid direct contact. After that we would aim to organise ourselves properly for the defence of the city. So we 'opened up' one axis... because you cannot clear the body in war. If we had blocked all of it we would have fought to the finish; just like what happened in [the battle for the Liberian capital] Monrovia.

It was actually part of the plan; to 'open up' one axis. It was the decision of ECOMOG's operational High Command. We were just there to comprehend it... That's how the main core of the junta and the rebels escaped. The planning was that we should leave an opening for them to pull out from Freetown; otherwise, as I said, we would have [had] direct confrontation and it would create a lot of civilian and military casualties."⁴²⁵

872. In that light, ECOMOG's own discussion of this operation in its Review Document was conspicuously sparse and obtuse. The Commission is in no doubt that this corridor was deliberately left open. There is considerable circumstantial evidence to support this position in the ECOMOG document itself, including the following excerpts:

"It was a result of the detailed and comprehensive planning that led to the successful conduct of the operations and the subsequent liberation of Freetown.

[...] One important thing that was borne in mind in the planning stage was the safety, security and protection of the loyal citizens, Key Points / Vulnerable Points and strategic installations. The city of Freetown was liberated with little or no destruction during the triumphant entry of ECOMOG troops on 13 February 1998. The Administrative arrangement for the operation was perfect.

[...] Although the sacking of the AFRC junta was successful, the enemy escaped from Freetown. It was observed that an escape route around the Peninsula was left unblocked. Had the Tombo Bridge been blown or a blocking force deployed in the general area of Tombo, the retreating rebels would have been trapped."⁴²⁶

873. In the Commission's view, a retrospective contemplation of this strategy will give precedence to its effect over its cause. In the first instance, the opening of a 'corridor' spared Freetown from the final acts in power of a junta that was enraged and liable to employ all available force in order to go down fighting.
874. ECOMOG effectively freed the combined forces of the People's Army from the immediate intensity of direct military confrontation. It inadvertently allowed the AFRC and the RUF to regroup and remobilise in the expansive, elusive and rugged territories of the North and North-East. All the characteristics that marked out the junta as a formidable enemy in February 1998 would only become more entrenched by allowing them this 'breathing space'.

⁴²⁵ M. S. Dumbuya, former Trainer of the Sierra Leone Contingent in ECOMOG and Commanding Officer of the Northern CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 1 July 2003.

⁴²⁶ ECOMOG Deployment Review Committee, chaired by Colonel D. D. Oyebanjo; *The Participation of the Nigerian Contingent in the ECOMOG Operation in Sierra Leone*; undated document marked 'RESTRICTED'; provided to the Commission in hard copy; September 2003; at paragraphs 127, 125 and 189.

Hence the interventionary strategy really served to set up the country for a renewed series of confrontations, all the more bloody for the fact that both parties harboured notions of unfinished business.

875. The defensive force in the North bore several vital different characteristics to the Kamajors in the South. First, there was really no CDF to speak of before the intervention itself took place. The nominal Northern Commander, M.S. Dumbuya had spent a full six months since his appointment co-ordinating the so-called Sierra Leone Contingent of ECOMOG. Only upon entry into a particular community or District did the joint intervention force go to the extent of selecting, training and equipping men to fill the ranks of the various Northern CDF units. The conditions of assembly were far from ideal: ECOMOG was pursuing its own operation 'Tiger Tail' through the North of the country and was certainly preoccupied with the fight, not to mention the various operational handicaps it had to overcome.
876. Furthermore the junta dissidents and the scrambled RUF forces were mingling and mixing together, mostly in the North-Eastern Districts of Koinadugu and Kono. They came into contact with some units of Gbethes, Kapras and Tamaboros, but largely managed to evade ECOMOG. ECOMOG's presence was concentrated in the more forgiving territory of the Headquarter Town, Kabala. ECOMOG's foreign troops were unable to charter the bush of the more outlying areas since its numbers were thinly spread. ECOMOG decided to conscript some of those SLA soldiers who had been serving the AFRC but who subsequently were captured or gave themselves up. A rudimentary process of screening was undertaken before these SLAs were kitted up and sent out alongside the ECOMOG deployments.
877. The Kamajors in the South refused to accept any such presence of SLA soldiers on their territory – not even loyal troops alongside ECOMOG – due to their suspicions that the soldiers would inevitably be disloyal and would harbour ulterior motives to re-attack Kamajor-held areas. They also saw themselves as competent to defend their communities. As a result these soldiers were only deployed in the Northern and North-Eastern Battalions of ECOMOG... and the unique 'baggage' of problems and challenges they brought with them was also confined to those areas.
878. The CDF High Command mirrored the suspicions of its Kamajors fighters on the ground. The CDF collectively did not trust the North. According to the commanders in the North, the attitude was attributable to both distant and proximate causes, the latest of them being the Temne ethnicity of the AFRC junta leader Johnny Paul Koroma. Hinga Norman repeatedly rejected petitions from his Northern counterpart MS Dumbuya to release arms and ammunitions to the North. Dumbuya testifies that he is certain that the supplies were denied because of distrust based on ethnicity and Regionalism. He also had an overt confirmation to that effect from a Nigerian commander Adeshini. In consequence the CDF units in the North were unable to reinforce strategic towns like Makeni, Lunsar and Masiaka; they were limited to putting up guidance or auxiliary efforts alongside ECOMOG.
879. The AFRC and the RUF therefore had very few encounters with any stout resistance from CDF fighters in the North and their path to Freetown was relatively unhindered. Accordingly, the invasion of Freetown could have been forestalled, but ethnic suspicions were put ahead of the security of the city.

The Operational Failings of ECOMOG

880. ECOMOG had swept into Freetown quite triumphantly and invested its initial operational thrust towards sealing off the Western Area in order to secure the seat of Government for the restoration of the President.
881. The further from Freetown the ECOMOG troops strayed, the more unfamiliar and unforgiving they found the terrain. This ran in inverse relationship to the junta leaders and RUF combatants, who were retreating back ever-closer to their native strongholds of the North and extreme East
882. The ECOMOG troops were able to flush the dissidents out of Masiaka (Port Loko), Makeni (Bombali) and even Kabala (Koinadugu). The large towns came under their control and demanded the focus of their attention; but the outlying villages became safe havens for members of the AFRC and RUF.
883. As the junta and RUF forces fled, they (the dissidents) engaged in numerous violations against the civilian population, apparently on an indiscriminate basis – the sheer fury of having been flushed out of Freetown by a foreign force is the only explanation tendered. Thus as ECOMOG entered communities on its 'liberation path', its soldiers were relatively warmly received by local residents – some of them publicly applauded their liberators into town.
884. The pace of ECOMOG's advance appears to have slowed remarkably as it reached the far North and East of the country. The simplest explanation for this stagnation is that human capacities began to wane: battle fatigue, blustery weather during the rainy season, hostile terrain and (consequently) low morale all started to take their toll. Many of the Nigerian troops had stayed in Sierra Leone for more than a year and had not been allowed to go on rotation. The more territory ECOMOG captured, the more thinly-spread became its troops.
885. Shortages of logistics became severe – and prospects of reinforcement seemed to lessen due to failing political will – Nigerian dictator Sani Abacha had died and was replaced by General Abdulsalami Abubakar who immediately began making promises of returning Nigeria to civilian rule. Other ECOWAS states were making statements of support "without actualising pledges". Personality clashes and questionable allocation of responsibilities among the ECOMOG commanders certainly compromised the authority and implementation of their orders.
886. The susceptibility of the ECOMOG troops to ambush and poor communications led to the isolation of the deployment in Kono and subsequent collapse of Koidu Town to the RUF on 18 December 1998. A flood of retreating troops, accompanied by large numbers of infiltrators, descended upon the ECOMOG Brigade Headquarters in Makeni, which succumbed amidst devastating operational confusion.

REINSTATEMENT OF THE SLPP GOVERNMENT AND 'JUSTICE' UNDER THE STATE OF PUBLIC EMERGENCY

The Flight of the AFRC Junta and the Emergence of Misplaced Notions of Justice

887. The ousting of the AFRC gave rise to an alarming haste among some sections of the population to see punishment meted out to those they felt were responsible for their perceived oppression. Within hours of the flushing of the junta from the seat of Government, there emerged signs of a tendency towards 'mob justice', whereby citizens took matters into their own hands and exacted punitive retribution.
888. ECOMOG assumed full control of the city of Freetown and its immediate environs on 13 February 1998.⁴²⁷ On and after this date, a diverse array of members of the public and soldiers of the Sierra Leone Army were subjected to the wrath of civilians who felt that these people were responsible for the oppression they suffered during the interregnum. There was widespread paranoia that the "collaborators" should be punished. ECOMOG did not know who the enemy was among the civilians and was therefore incapacitated in imposing its full authority on the city. In many cases, it arrived only after someone had been arrested, assaulted or killed for collaborating with the AFRC.
889. The majority of the AFRC's central role players, including the Chairman Johnny Paul Koroma, were allowed to escape from Freetown into the North of the country, as described above. One of the few well-known junta members who remained behind was its Spokesman and Public Relations Officer (PRO), Allieu Kamara. Kamara told the Commission of the circumstances that prevailed in the city at the time:

"The youths were targeting people after they expelled us [the AFRC]. They were killing people and burning them. Even the family members of the AFRC officers were not spared. Alhaji Musa Kabia, a sympathiser of the regime, was burnt alive at New England. Saccomah, another sympathiser, was burnt alive in front of the Clock Tower at the Kissy Road intersection. Sheikh Mustabah was burnt in front of his relatives at Fourah Bay in the East of the city.

[...] As for me, ECOMOG Personnel also arrested me in February 1998. I was tortured and badly beaten up by ECOMOG soldiers and some of the youths down at Lumley... I sustained a broken right leg, swollen eyes and a broken head. ECOMOG didn't make any effort to control the youths. They took me in a wheel-chair to Lungi, where I was detained for a week with other AFRC sympathisers. We were molested, humiliated, beaten by ECOMOG soldiers who were supposed to protect us at that time."⁴²⁸

⁴²⁷ ECOMOG Deployment Review Committee, chaired by Colonel D. D. Oyebanjo; *The Participation of the Nigerian Contingent in the ECOMOG Operation in Sierra Leone*; undated document marked 'RESTRICTED'; provided to the Commission in hard copy; September 2003; at paragraph 188.

⁴²⁸ Allieu Kamara, former Public Relations Officer for the Government of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC); TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, April 2003.

890. Sheikh Abu Bakarr Nabbie had acted as the Director of the State Lottery Company for three months after the signing of the Conakry Peace Plan. He told the Commission how mob violence and general hysteria masqueraded as notions of justice:

“As the search for AFRC men intensified, I left my house. On my way going I came across a group of youths stoning an AFRC man to death at Hope Street field. On reaching Eastern Police, I saw Haja Fatmata half-naked and Saccomah, a businessman, naked and burnt to death. From that scene I knew it was not a child’s play; therefore I hastened speedily to seek refuge at my younger brother’s house.

[...] I came from hiding on that day [to find] jubilating crowds at Sani Abacha Street where the Diplomats were passing. Unfortunately for me two youths from my neighbourhood saw me. They caught me and dragged me to a place to burn me. As the place became crowded I managed to escape from them [to go back into hiding].

[...] I remained in hiding for so long until at one time when I heard a Government press release through 98.1 FM radio station that everybody should go back to his or her previous work, and everybody is free to go about his business. I was happy with the news therefore I came out openly and headed towards the place I formerly lived. On reaching there, a former colleague grabbed my shirt and shouted: ‘I have captured Sheikh Nabbie whom we have been looking for!’

[...] A lot of people came out of their houses and gave me a thorough beating. They burst my head with stones; I bled and partially fainted. They handed me to an ECOMOG Corporal who attempted to kill me but no bullet was in his gun. One of them brought two tyres and a gallon of fuel and said: ‘Sheikh Mustabah has been burnt in Fourah Bay and we will also burn Sheikh Nabbie in Foulah Town’. In the process, a retired SLA Captain working at the State House intervened and told the ECOMOG to take me to CID instead of killing me.”⁴²⁹

891. The Commission recorded numerous acts of violence and abuse that followed a consistent pattern during the transitional period between the ECOMOG intervention of 12 February 1998 and the restoration of the SLPP Government on 19 March 1998. In essence the pattern also pervaded in the motivations for the acts, since they seemed to be carried out in pursuit of misplaced notions of ‘justice’.
892. Typically, a ‘suspect’ would be identified by a neighbour or other acquaintance and brought to a public place. In instances where the person was renowned or had been widely sought in a particular neighbourhood, his or her name was often called out to attract passers-by or to alert other residents of the ‘capture’.
893. Thereafter the person might be blamed or held responsible, usually publicly and arbitrarily, for some perceived act or misdeed during the rule of the AFRC. Such a declaration would be the trigger for violent punishment to be meted out to the ‘suspect’. The typical outcome of such a sequence of events would be

⁴²⁹ Sheikh Abu Bakarr Nabbie, former Director of State Lottery Company and accused in the Treason Trials of 1998; TRC Interview conducted in Freetown; 2 May 2003.

death for the suspect. In the few instances where 'survivors' of such incidents reported them to the Commission, they had usually been spared by fate or fortune, or by the intervention of a courageous dissenter, rather than by show of collective mercy on the part of a 'mob'.

894. This brand of 'mob justice' was disturbingly prevalent during the transitional period that preceded the restoration of President Kabbah on 10 March 1998. Despite quickly becoming known to law enforcement authorities, it was not sufficiently quelled or controlled. Many civilians were executed arbitrarily on allegations of so-called 'collaboration', many others beaten up, harassed or molested on similar grounds. A clear message or other assertion of control by the Government may have prevented such violations. Indeed there was no law.

The Role of the Radio Station 98.1 FM

895. During the rule of the AFRC, the Lungi-based radio station 98.1 FM was successful in providing a platform from which the President and members of his Government in Exile could communicate their views to the Sierra Leonean population. It had also aired 'alternative' perspectives to those propagated by the AFRC over the Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service (SLBS). In the contention of one of its broadcasters, Hannah Foulah, 98.1FM had justified its existence during junta rule in the following terms:

"[The public] needed to know that the situation was not going to be like that forever and what the UN, ECOWAS and the legitimate Government of Sierra Leone was doing to resolve the situation. They needed the truth of the whole issue and they were obviously not getting it from state radio or another station.

[...] Besides it was already clear that if they did not hand over peacefully, the whole matter would be resolved through a military intervention. We needed to prepare the minds of the people for the eventuality of that intervention."⁴³⁰

896. Hannah Foulah presented news items and discussion programmes on 98.1 FM under the supervision of Dr. Julius Spencer, the Station Manager, and Alie Bangura, who was responsible for information gathering and production. All three of them worked under pseudonyms in order to preserve their personal safety and the integrity of their sources. A number of 98.1 FM's flagship shows had become popular listening for many residents of Freetown. In particular, the show entitled 'News Briefs' was renowned for incisive insights into AFRC's performance in Government and the activities of those who associated with it.
897. In the wake of the ECOMOG intervention, however, the role of 98.1 exacerbated tensions within the society. Its presenters on 'News Briefs' and other shows resorted to reading out lists of perceived junta 'collaborators' over the air. The exact sources of these names remained somewhat unclear, although individual citizens were invited to submit information to the station if they thought it might be in the public interest. Such an information-gathering exercise was open to abuse by vindictive or malicious members of the public.

⁴³⁰ Hannah Foulah, presenter of news programmes on Radio 98.1 FM and later station manager of Radio Democracy; TRC Interview conducted in Freetown; 6 June 2003.

898. Inevitably there emerged rumours among the public, and particularly among persons who felt they were being persecuted, that the Government-in-Exile had compiled a 'black list' of names of those people it wished to see subjected to 'justice' once civilian rule had been restored. Equally, on a local level, the Commission heard that speculation was rife in Provincial towns like Bo and Kenema as to the identities of the persons whom the Government had 'listed' to be singled out by ECOMOG, the CDF or other law enforcement agencies.
899. Momodu Koroma, who was then the Spokesman for Presidential Affairs, confirmed in his testimony to the Commission that the Government in Exile did engage in drawing up a list of sorts.⁴³¹ However Koroma maintained that the list was intended purely to provide a basis for the imposition of a travel ban on the leadership of the AFRC and RUF by the Security Council of the United Nations. According to Koroma, the Security Council had expressly requested such a list from the Government of Sierra Leone.
900. The Commission nonetheless noted the view articulated by several witnesses⁴³² that there were considerably more names on the unofficial 'black list' than on the roster of persons affected by the travel ban that was subsequently imposed. It was apparently the latter, broader domain of names that was used by pro-Government operatives, and particularly the announcers on 98.1 FM, to disseminate and in some cases fabricate information about them that cast them in a negative light as the population prepared for the restoration of the Government.
901. Hence some of those who suffered beatings, detention and other human rights abuses at the hands of fellow civilians and the state squarely attributed their own suffering to the fact that their local rivals or civic enemies had fabricated some allegations about their connections with the AFRC regime. Donald Smith, a Freetown resident who was detained for some 16 months without charge by the SLPP Government, described in detail to the Commission the part played by 98.1 FM in instigating the targeting of his life and property as a 'collaborator':

"It had been alleged earlier, even before the troubles started proper, that Johnny Paul Koroma had slept at my house at Regent. This was stated over 98.1 FM time and time again and was used to whip up hate and malice and to 'teleguide' the rabble who later sacked and looted my properties and put my life in danger.

[...] It became very clear that those who said that Johnny Paul Koroma had slept at your house knew that they were passing a death sentence on you, waiting to be carried out when the 'mopping up' – which was the cliché used over and over again over 98.1 FM – caught up with you. If you were unlucky and unfortunate, as it happened with a few others and most definitely with Saccamah, you were shot dead if you were pointed out to ECOMOG as having been the host for even one night of Johnny Paul Koroma.

[...] I have since found out that hate, malice and jealousy led leading citizens in the area to lie that Johnny Paul slept at my house and this

⁴³¹ Momodu Koroma, former Minister of Presidential Affairs in the Government in Exile and current Minister of Foreign Affairs; TRC Interview conducted at state office, Freetown; 5 January 2004.

⁴³² See testimony of Victor Foe and others at public hearing of the Commission.

information was in turn dutifully passed through the grapevine and then passed to 98.1 FM, who in turn broadcast this information for people with hate to interpret the way they wanted it. Radio 98.1 FM repeatedly broadcast that Johnny Paul Koroma slept in my house at Regent, whipping up public hate towards me and effectively condemning me to death, thereby putting my life in grave danger.”⁴³³

902. The organisers and presenters of Radio 98.1 FM used their broadcasts to disseminate material that was unnecessarily incendiary and often focussed on vindictive comments against individuals. The broadcast of the names of alleged collaborators of the AFRC over the radio station created the context which often led to killings, beatings, looting, destruction of property and prolonged intimidation campaigns being committed against civilians who were alleged to have had affiliation to the AFRC.
903. During the invasion of Freetown, the broadcasts were in many respects misleading as they conveyed false information to the public about the location of RUF combatants within the city. Listeners who believed the broadcasts and came out to celebrate the liberation of their neighbourhoods inadvertently fell into the hands of marauding bands of AFRC and RUF combatants and were in many cases killed.
904. In his testimony before the Commission’s public hearings, Dr. Julius Spencer acknowledged that he received complaints that people were being killed as a result of comments aired on the radio station. Spencer notified the President of his intention to stop the broadcasts, but according to him he was instructed to continue.⁴³⁴ In the light of this testimony, the Government was aware of the impact of such broadcasts as potential catalysts for violent attacks on the persons they named. Yet the President refused to countenance the proposal to abate the broadcasts. Instead, by ordering their continuation, the President effectively encouraged mob justice and the attendant abuses of human rights.

The Creation of the ‘Task Force’ and the Lingering Vacuum in Law Enforcement

905. As a pre-emptory step towards the restoration of conventional law and order, ECOMOG set up an eleven member *ad hoc* administrative body to supervise the affairs of the Sierra Leone Government until President Kabbah’s return from exile. The body included among its members the ECOMOG Task Force Commander Colonel Maxwell Khobe, the Vice President Dr. Albert Joe Demby and the Attorney-General Solomon Berewa. This body, which became known simply as the ‘Task Force’, was the only entity authorised by President Kabbah to act on behalf of the Government until his return.⁴³⁵ According to Victor Foh, who subsequently stood trial for treason under the restored SLPP Government, the Task Force also included Julius Spencer and Alie Bangura of 98.1 FM on its panel and was in his view “engaged in settling scores and corruption.”⁴³⁶

⁴³³ Donald Smith, civilian resident of Freetown who was arrested and detained without charge by the Sierra Leone Government from March 1998 until July 1999; petition to the Commission; 12 March 2003.

⁴³⁴ Dr. Julius Spencer, testimony before Commission Public Hearings in Freetown.

⁴³⁵ See Sierra Leone web (17.02.98)

⁴³⁶ Victor Bockarie Foh, first accused in the first round of Civilian Treason Trials held in 1998; testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown; 4 July 2003.

906. President Kabbah's first broadcast to the nation after the intervention served to inform the public that members of the ousted AFRC regime would in no way benefit from the amnesty provisions of the Conakry Peace Accord because of their refusal to hand over power. The President said the amnesty provided by the Conakry Peace Accord might be re-evaluated, since both the AFRC and the RUF had refused to yield to peaceful overtures and co-operate with the implementation and terms prescribed in the document. The President was reported to have surmised that "it would have to be determined whether or not and to what extent the immunities to be accorded them under those agreements may have been forfeited."⁴³⁷
907. This view was also echoed by Vice President Demby, Attorney General and Minister of Justice, Solomon Berewa, Dr. Jonah, former ambassador to the UN and later finance minister, Julius Spencer, station manager of radio SLBS 98.1, aligned to the government in exile in Conakry and member of the interim task force and SLPP leader Prince Harding.⁴³⁸
908. In the apparent vacuum in law enforcement that directly followed on from the intervention, summary killings were carried out in public places in the major urban centres of the country. In Freetown, ECOMOG was unable to replace the civilian police with any great expediency, leaving mobs of vigilante law enforcers to carry out their will. A number of high-profile civilians who had performed civic duties under the AFRC regime were captured from their homes or on the streets. Eye witness accounts given to the Commission told of suspects being stripped naked and burned alive in retribution for having assisted the AFRC.
909. In Kenema, where the civilian populace had lived under the de facto rule of Sam Bockarie (alias "Mosquito") for approximately six months, those suspected to have provided services to the RUF, kept company with the RUF, or assisted the RUF in any other manner were also targeted. Eye witnesses reported to the Commission that 'lynch mobs', comprising members of the Kamajors and affiliated civilians, developed the practice of hanging tyres around the necks of suspected collaborators and burning them alive. One young member of civil society in Kenema, David Allieu, told the Commission of some of his observations in the following terms:

"So we went to the Kamajor zone; there we were until the Kamajors finally overcame them in [Kenema Town], they captured this town. Even when we came, some of the youths that were in this town that were school-going boys, some of them decided to just encourage the Kamajors; some of them joined the Kamajors and started pointing out collaborators that were thought to be with the RUF. That was the time now that this tyre on the neck – this 'necklaces with tyres' – started to be seen.

When they capture you as a collaborator definitely you are going to die; they cannot spare you whether you were with the rebels or not. As soon as somebody approves it that: 'this man, one time I saw him with these

⁴³⁷ See Sierra Leone web (17.02.98)

⁴³⁸ Sierra Leone Web (02 & 04.98)

[RUF] boys working in this town', then definitely you will lose your life. So, most of our fellow youths, lost their lives in such cases."⁴³⁹

Legal Basis for the State of Public Emergency and Attendant Provisions

910. On 10 March 1998, the same day of his reinstatement as President, Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah issued three distinct but related Public Notices. Their cumulative effect was to overhaul the legal parameters within which his Government required to operate. The first of them, entitled *Public Notice No. 1 of 1998*, was a Proclamation framed in the following terms:

"I, Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, President of the Republic of Sierra Leone... do hereby by this Proclamation declare that a State of Public Emergency exists in the whole of the Republic of Sierra Leone with effect from the 10th day of March 1998."⁴⁴⁰

911. The declaration of a state of public emergency by President Kabbah was an unprecedented step during the conflict in Sierra Leone. While both the military administrations, the NPRC and the AFRC, had at different junctures suspended the Constitution of 1991 and ruled by decree during their respective reigns, Kabbah became the first Head of State to make his Proclamation in accordance with Section 29 (1) of the Constitution. He thereby also became entitled to issue further Public Notices under Section 29(5) of the Constitution that would form Public Emergency Regulations, as well as other amendments to existing laws.

912. The Public Emergency Regulations were published in the same supplement to the Sierra Leone Gazette on 12 March 1998, as Public Notice No. 2 of 1998.⁴⁴¹ These regulations effectively set aside fundamental guarantees of the Sierra Leone Constitution and vested in the President a variety of executive powers. The Commission seeks below to draw attention only to those provisions of the Public Emergency Regulations that were to prove of the utmost importance in the detentions and trials that were to follow.

913. Section 2(a) of Public Notice No. 2 provided for emergency powers of detention in the following terms:

- "The President may, if in his opinion it is necessary... make an Order";
- He may make the order "for the purpose of maintaining and securing peace, order and good government in Sierra Leone";
- The Order may direct "that any person be detained or [should] continue to be detained" at the sole discretion of the President;
- A person detained under this Order "shall be liable to be detained in such place and under such conditions as the President may from time to time determine"; and
- For as long as an Order from the President is in force, any person "shall, while so detained, be deemed to be in legal custody".

⁴³⁹ David J. Allieu, civilian resident of Kenema Town and member of civil society; TRC Interview conducted in Kenema Town, Kenema District; 17 July 2003.

⁴⁴⁰ Public Notice No. 1 of 1998, Proclamation by H. E. Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, President of the Republic; published as a Supplement to the Sierra Leone Gazette, Vol. CXXIX, No. 13; 12 March 1998.

⁴⁴¹ Public Notice No. 2 of 1998, *The Public Emergency Regulations, 1998* under the Constitution of Sierra Leone (Act No. 6 of 1991); published as a Supplement to the Sierra Leone Gazette, Vol. CXXIX, No. 13; 12 March 1998.

914. Section 5 of Public Notice No. 2 further authorised the President to set aside particular laws and provisions from the rules governing the conduct of trials. It did so in the following terms:
- “The President may... make an Order”;
 - He may make the order for the primary purpose of “expediting the trials of offenders and appeals arising therefrom”;
 - His order will also be seen to be serving the purpose of “restoring, maintaining and securing peace, order and good government in Sierra Leone or any part thereof”;
 - His order may have the effect of “suspending the operation of any law, other than the Constitution of Sierra Leone, 1991”;
 - Alternatively, his order may suspend “some provisions of any law”;
 - Included among the statutory provisions the President may suspend are “the Criminal Procedure Act, 1965 and any procedural rules relating to appeals in criminal cases”.
915. Public Notice No. 4 of 1998⁴⁴² diluted the rules of criminal procedure and evidence in relation to trials in which the subject matter of which was connected to the AFRC and where the alleged offence took place between 25 May 1997 and 13 February 1998. The relaxing of these procedural and evidential protections also applied to trials of AFRC “collaborators”. The rules did away with the need for juries to reach unanimous verdicts. A two thirds verdict was deemed to be the verdict of the whole jury.

The Role of the Attorney General and the Use of the Word ‘Collaborator’

916. A collaborator of the AFRC was generally understood to be someone who supported or sustained the junta in power. The notion of ‘collaboration’ was often applied subjectively and arbitrarily by those who used it. It spread fear and suspicion. ‘Collaboration’ often became a premise upon which violations and abuses were carried out.
917. On 13 March 1998, just three days after the formal restoration of the Government of President Kabbah, the then Attorney General and Minister of Justice, Solomon Berewa, circulated a letter to Officers-in-Charge at District level, bearing his signature and the official stamp of the Attorney General’s Office. It was entitled ‘Present Position relating to the Collaborators of the AFRC Junta’. The letter set out the policy of the Government towards collaborators in the following terms:

“Take note that all persons who have evidence that any individual collaborated with the AFRC Junta should report that information to the nearest Police Station or to any member of the ECOMOG Forces whose responsibility is to take appropriate action including arresting such individuals...

[continued overleaf]

⁴⁴² Published on 9 April 1998 and made in terms of section 29(5) of the Constitution.

Members of the public are requested to co-operate in giving information relating to the activities of the AFRC collaborators in their area but are warned in the interest of good governance to desist from inflicting any punishment on such suspected collaborators. This should be left to the law enforcement agencies.

I wish you to bring the contents of this letter to all members of the Civil Defence Forces in your area and to ensure that they comply with what is stated herein."⁴⁴³

918. The use of language in this letter was ambiguous. It was open to misinterpretation by its recipients. The letter made no attempt to define who "the collaborators of the AFRC junta" or "the AFRC collaborators" actually were, whereas the phrase was highly prejudicial in legal terms.
919. The Attorney-General's instruction that the infliction of punishment on 'such suspected collaborators' should be left to "the law enforcement agencies" made no reference to the due process of law and presumed the guilt of persons in question. There was no requirement for interrogation of the 'evidence' that a member of the public might put forward before punishment could be inflicted.
920. There was also no clear definition of who "the law enforcement agencies" actually were. Members of the Civil Defence Forces could have construed themselves as fitting into both the category of "members of the public" and the category of "law enforcement agencies", in which case they could mete out punishment. They could also have construed themselves as acting on the instructions of the Attorney-General, since they were instructed, through their District Officers, to 'comply with what is stated' in his letter.
921. The letter was open to wide interpretation and consequently may have led to abuse on the ground. The Attorney-General appeared to have created a new category of criminal known as a 'collaborator' and sought to have all persons falling into that category detained in the custody of the state. This new category was not codified in law but it served to 'criminalise' thousands of Sierra Leoneans.

Arrests and Surrenders of Suspected Civilian and Military 'Collaborators'

922. The President also issued an instruction to all civilians who had served under the AFRC regime to submit themselves to the custody of the Sierra Leone Police or ECOMOG forces "for their own safety". Many of them were however arrested by 'community conscious' and well informed citizens.⁴⁴⁴ They were beaten and assaulted and some of them killed. According to the President, detainees were sent to Pademba Road prison for their own personal safety under the "safe custody" legislation and for fear of reprisal and mob justice.⁴⁴⁵

⁴⁴³ Solomon E. Berewa, Attorney-General and Minister of Justice; letter entitled "Present Position relating to the Collaborators of the AFRC Junta"; signed and stamped, sent to The Officer-in-Charge, Bonthe; 13 March 1998.

⁴⁴⁴ Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, current President of the Republic of Sierra Leone; testimony before the TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown; 5 August 2003.

⁴⁴⁵ Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, current President of the Republic of Sierra Leone; supplementary written submission provided to the Commission in response to a set of 'Questions for the President'; received by the Commission by delivery; August 2003.

923. Testimonies before the Commission indicated that even before the intervention itself, the Government had proclaimed its intention to prosecute role players and collaborators of the AFRC regime. The instruction for them to turn themselves in was therefore a means of bringing them into custody.
924. Following the President's order, as well as the letter from the Attorney General and Minister of Justice and the finger-pointing that was being orchestrated by 98.1 FM radio station, more than three thousand citizens were rounded up by ECOMOG and the CDF and detained at the Pademba Road Prison.
925. Subsequently, the President set up an Investigating Committee headed by Mr. Tejan Cole to examine the cases of the thousands of people detained under this preventive detention order and recommend those who didn't have any cases to answer so that they could be released. The records of this Commission indicate that most of the 'collaborators' were arrested by the police and ECOMOG rather than by any groups of community people. It is difficult not to conclude therefore that the government targeted sympathisers and persons affiliated with the AFRC following its reinstatement.
926. Civilians and officers of the SSD and the police also made several arrests.⁴⁴⁶ Many of those arrested were first taken to Kossoh, then Lungi and finally to Pademba Road where they were imprisoned for several months. Some junta members who managed to escape to Guinea later surrendered to or were arrested by the Guinean authorities, repatriated to Freetown and detained at Pademba Road. Among them were 156 pro-junta activists, -AFRC Secretary-General- Colonel Abdul K. Sesay, Sergeant Abu Sankoh, one of the 17 men who masterminded the coup and Captain Simbo Sankoh, Koroma's aide-de-campe.⁴⁴⁷ Senior officials of the junta travelling on board two helicopter gunships were extradited to Freetown after the aircrafts had been intercepted and forced to land at Monrovia's Spriggs Payne airport.⁴⁴⁸
927. More than three thousand citizens were rounded up and detained in the wake of the ECOMOG intervention of February 1998.
928. Moreover the Government of Sierra Leone deployed a 'catch-all' strategy to round up all persons associated with the AFRC regime, however loosely, and to imprison them arbitrarily without charge.
929. Responding to questions at the Commission's public hearings, the former Attorney-General and now Vice President Solomon Berewa pointed out that "according to the criminal act, every citizen has a right to effect arrest in respect of certain crimes known to have been committed... they [the arresting parties] didn't want those people to escape justice at all... civilians wanted justice and because of that they tried to make many arrests as possible."⁴⁴⁹

⁴⁴⁶ See interview with Philip Sankoh (16.07.03); submission from F. S. Conteh, Director of Prisons (15.07.03); and submission from the APC party (15.07.03).

⁴⁴⁷ See Sierra Leone web (19, 22&28. 03.98)

⁴⁴⁸ See Sierra Leone web (01.03.98)

⁴⁴⁹ Solomon Berewa, public hearing before the Commission, July 2003.

Conditions of Detention at Pademba Road Prison

930. Prison conditions were deplorable. Initially built to house a capacity of about three hundred inmates, the number in detention during this period was about three thousand by some estimates, like Donald Smith, five thousand) resulting in overcrowding of cells, and poor living conditions of detainees.
931. According to Hilton Fyle, who was one of those detained:
- “Each of the sixty-eight cells on each block had been built to accommodate two people; but now six or seven people were crowding into each one. On the left hand corner was the bucket into which you would empty your bladder or our bowels at night... the ground was bare, and up on the wall there was a large air vent with thick iron bars. There was no chair, no bench, and no mattresses. Prisoners were not allowed to sing, to whistle, to have pen or paper, to read newspaper, to write or receive letters, or be in possession of any instrument with which to communicate (like plain paper or writing book).”⁴⁵⁰
932. A similar description was provided to the Commission in the testimony of Victor Foh:
- “[The conditions were] abysmal, awful, hopeless, useless, degrading, wretched, oppressive, abhorrent and all such vices most inhumane. I and many others were selectively tortured. Pademba Road prisons were designed for about four hundred inmates. The period following the restoration of the Kabba government in 1998 saw an unprecedented large number of children of all ages stuffed into very untidy cells at Pademba Road. Whilst I and many others were charged for treason, the bulk of our unfortunate compatriots were dying by the hour in the cells at Pademba Road prisons. Our human rights were grossly abused.”⁴⁵¹
933. Another inmate, Philip Sankoh, was particularly critical of the attention paid to the detainees' health:
- “The food was almost without sauce. I never saw a piece of fish or meat in any food during the first six months of imprisonment. No salt and just a thin spread of oil at the top of the rice. The quantity was very small. Ration was once a day. They started preparing special diet for us after the treason trials commenced. During the six months I saw so many people die or fall ill because of the poor quality and quantity of food. We slept on the floor. One blanket on which to lie and the other to cover: no mattress, no pillow. We were eight in my cell.”⁴⁵²
934. The conditions of detention at Pademba Road Prison in the period between February 1998 and 6th January 1999 were deplorable and in breach of multiple provisions of both the Sierra Leone Constitution and applicable human rights instruments including the ACHPR and the ICCPR. These conditions had existed right from the APC regime and had changed little during the intervening years.

⁴⁵⁰ See *The Fighter from Death Row* (by Hilton Fyle 2000 p153)

⁴⁵¹ See interview with Victor Foh (03.06.03)

⁴⁵² See interview with Philip Sankoh (16.07.03)

935. In addition, the Commission has received substantial allegations of torture being practised against inmates in flagrant breach of the Constitution, even under a regime of Emergency Powers. The Commission was advised that these allegations were brought to the notice of the Government through the Tejan Cole Commission and the regular visits by a number of international actors. The Government failed to discharge its legal obligation to conduct rigorous investigations into all allegations of torture against agents of the State to ascertain the veracity of such allegations.
936. Detainees were later taken to the Criminal Investigations Department to give statements⁴⁵³ on diverse dates from March to May 1998. Those who were detained at Pademba road were escorted to the Criminal Investigations Department by ECOMOG personnel and prison guards to obtain statements from them.⁴⁵⁴ The investigations ended in June. (Most of these detainees who were initially detained for their own personal safety and security now had to face charges)* It was during this time that most of the detainees learnt that they were to be charged for treason: one interviewee however mentioned that he first knew they were going to be charged was when Dr. Spencer paid a visit to Pademba Road prisons.⁴⁵⁵

ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL PROCESS IN THE PROSECUTIONS LED UNDER THE STATE OF PUBLIC EMERGENCY

The Selection of Persons for Trial

937. The then Attorney-General and Minister of Justice and current Vice President, Solomon Berewa, in responding to questions at the Commission's public hearings, gave the following description of the steps he took to instigate the legal process:

"It was the absolute discretion of the Attorney General to decide who to prosecute and who not to... We set up mechanism for investigating those cases. It was necessary for an early action. I decided to concentrate on the cases of civilians in the first. I set up a large team of investigators. I relegated my powers to this committee. Because of the sensitivity of the matter I brought in all the groups that were very considerate – persons who were very objective in their assessment of facts (students, lecturers, members of the CCSL). Vast majority of them were not to be charged. We proffered those charges and took civilians to court."⁴⁵⁶

938. During the Government's period of exile in Guinea, Mr. Berewa had stated that:

"Those responsible for the coup in Sierra Leone will be called to account for their actions. We shall mount an in-depth investigation to bring these people to book and take steps to prevent a recurrence. There will be no vendetta and we shall try to be as fair as possible. Those who were not

⁴⁵³ See interviews with Victor Foh (03.06.03); D.S (12.06.03)

⁴⁵⁴ See submission by the Director of Prison (12.07.03)

*Berewa and Director of Prisons responding to questions at hearings (14 & 15 07.03)

⁴⁵⁵ See interview with Dennis Smith (15.06.03)

⁴⁵⁶ See Berewa's transcript (14.07.03)

active collaborators have nothing to fear, but those who caused the suffering to the people must be accountable for their deeds.”

Mr. Berewa had reported on 27 February 1998 that 145 civilians were in detention, “together with a large number of prisoners of war.”⁴⁵⁷

The Charging of Persons to Court

939. After the investigations, fifty-nine of the civilian detainees and thirty-seven soldiers were charged with treason and three treason courts were set up. The civilians that worked with the AFRC were arraigned before Justice Cowan (court no.1), Justice A.B Rashid (court no2) and Justice Sydney Warne (court no3).⁴⁵⁸ These persons were charged with treason under the Treason and State Offence Act of 1963. Those who had little connection with the AFRC were sent to the Tejan Cole Committee of Investigations, which was set up to look into the allegations made against persons who were not likely to be charged for treason, in order to reduce the number of persons detained.
940. The prosecution was headed by the then Attorney General and Minister of Justice Mr. Solomon E. Berewa, assisted by Messrs C.F. Edwards, Anthony Brewah, A.H. Charm and others.⁴⁵⁹
941. The first batch of accused, comprising twenty-one detainees, appeared in Magistrate Court Number One on 30 March 1998. Among those appearing were Sheku Bayoh, a former secretary to several civilian and military heads of state; Umaru Deen-Sesay, Secretary of State for Sports and one-time captain of the national football squad; Victor Brandon, Secretary of State for Development and Economic Planning; Hassan Barrie, a former engineer with the National Power Authority; Dennis Kamara, who was Deputy Head of Immigration before the coup; Mohammad Bangura, Commissioner for Tourism and later Secretary of State for Information, and former President of the National League for Human Rights and Democracy; Gipu Felix George, head of SLBS under the junta and a former freelance consultant to UNICEF; Dennis Smith, a former SLBS director; Olivia Mensah, a SLBS reporter; Maada Maka Swaray, a former SLBS reporter; William Smith of the newspaper *We Yone*; Dalinda Leppy; C.P.O. Samuel Sanpha "Major" Sesay, who was head of immigration under the AFRC; Claude Campbell, a lawyer and former attorney-general under the NPRC; Steve Bio, an arms dealer, relative of former NPRC leader Brigadier Julius Maada Bio, and associate of RUF leader Corporal Foday Sankoh; and Gibril Massaquoi, Sankoh's former spokesman. Bio and Massaquoi were arrested by the military junta in November on charges of plotting to overthrow the AFRC. Broadcaster Hilton Fyle's name was read out in court, but he was not present at the hearing.⁴⁶⁰ No charges were read at the hearing, and the proceedings were adjourned until April 6. On 6th April according to the prosecution, all 22 "participated in and promoted an endeavor to overthrow the legitimate government of Sierra Leone on May 25, 1997 by unlawful means." All of the accused were charged with treason, which carries the death penalty. Some of the defendants also faced additional charges of arson and murder. Sesay and Patrick were also charged with murder, while

⁴⁵⁷ See Sierra Leone web (27.02.98)

⁴⁵⁸ See submission by the director of prison (12.07.03); Interviews with military officers and Victor Foh (03.06.03), etc.

⁴⁵⁹ See 98.1 Daily News Briefs (25th August 1993)

⁴⁶⁰ See Sierra Leone web (31.03.98)

the two women, Olivia Mensah and Dalinda Lebbie, were accused of spying for the junta.⁴⁶¹

942. Pursuant to the declaration of a State of Public Emergency, Public Notice No. 4 was issued on 9 April 1998 in conformity with the powers conferred upon the President by subsection (5) of section 29 of the Constitution of Sierra Leone. It was issued after the first set of accused had made a second appearance at the magistrate court. By this Public Notice, the Criminal Procedure Act of 1965, No 32 of 1995 was amended and also certain aspects of the law of evidence and procedural rules relating to criminal trials in the country.⁴⁶² Rule two of this Notice amended the traditional practice in the country whereby the verdict of a twelve-member jury in capital criminal cases should be unanimous. This rule allowed the verdict of the jury to be qualified by watering it down to two-thirds, as the verdict of the whole jury.
943. According to Victor Foh, first accused in the first treason court, by promulgation of this notice and the rule of evidence, 'our human rights were grossly abused and those of us charged to court were robbed of our constitutional right of fair hearing.⁴⁶³ According to Abdulai Conteh, such fundamental change regarding the unanimity rule of the jury's verdict, must be brought about by an Act of Parliament and not 'emergency regulations and their exigencies'.⁴⁶⁴ Rules four, five and six of this notice unfairly prejudiced the trials of the accused persons by robbing them of their rights to fair hearing.⁴⁶⁵
944. The Public Notice could not easily be reconciled with some important provisions of the constitution, which guarantee the fundamental human right to a fair hearing. Moreover, this Notice offended the provisions of the Constitution that grant the President power to make emergence regulations and rules.⁴⁶⁶
945. On 14 April 1998, fourteen more persons appeared before Justice Claudia Taylor in Magistrate's Court in Freetown charged with treason in connection with the 1997 military coup. The defendants include former President Joseph Saidu Momoh, the Managing Director of WBIG FM 103 and former BBC presenter Hilton Fyle, AFRC Under Secretary of State for Information and former junta spokesman Allieu Badara Kamara, Secretary of State for Religious Affairs Rev. David Bangura, Ahmid Kamara, who was secretary to AFRC Chairman Lt.-Col. Johnny Paul Koroma, and Citizen newspaper managing editor Ibrahim B. Kargbo. No pleas were taken from the defendants, and the hearing was adjourned until April 21.
946. Some of the defendants faced difficulties in obtaining legal counsel. "Many lawyers in Freetown are saying that they are not going to represent some the accused because they encouraged looting, and also because of the public perception that by representing some of the accused persons, the public might

⁴⁶¹ See Sierra Leone web (06.04.98)

⁴⁶² See Essays on the Sierra Leone Constitution 1991 (chpt. 10).

⁴⁶³ TRC Interview with Victor B. Foh – APC party office (03.06.03). Rule 2 of Public Notice No. 4

⁴⁶⁴ Conteh A.O *The Treason Trials of 1998 and the Public Emergency Regulations 1991 – Criminal Procedure and Evidence Rules of Public Notice No. 4 of 1998 and the Constitution and the Laws of Sierra Leone* in Essay on the Sierra Leone Constitution, 1991 pg. 105-107.

⁴⁶⁵ Public Notice No. 4 of 9th April

⁴⁶⁶ Conteh A.O *The Treason Trials of 1998 and the Public Emergency Regulations 1991 – Criminal Procedure and Evidence Rules of Public Notice No. 4 of 1998 and the Constitution and the Laws of Sierra Leone* in Essay on the Sierra Leone Constitution, 1991 pg. 109

consider them to be AFRC sympathizers."⁴⁶⁷ On 21 April, 23 more people were charged with treason in Magistrate's Court one bringing to 58 the total number of those charged in connection with last year's AFRC coup and nine months of junta rule. The accused included AFRC Secretary of State for Internal Affairs Brigadier (Rtd.) Modibo I. Leslie Lymon, Central Bank Governor Christian Kargbo, politician Nancy Steele, a former mayor of Freetown, and a lawyer who allegedly helped to print a new denomination of Sierra Leone's currency.⁴⁶⁸

The Commencement of the Trials

947. The trials of 59 persons charged with treason in connection with the coup began on Wednesday 6th May, Thursday 7th May, and Friday 8th May. The accused were tried in three batches. Some of the accused also faced charges of murder and arson. "We are seeking to reestablish the principle and respect for the law," Chief Justice Desmond Luke said. Luke said that guilty verdicts will be automatically appealed, first to the Court of Appeals and, if the appeal is unsuccessful, to the Supreme Court.⁴⁶⁹

948. According to Solomon Berewa, Attorney General and State Prosecutor:

"No accused person or any of the observers (local and international) said any accused [was obstructed by]... way of presenting their case. We had a T.V. in courtroom played videocassettes of activities in which they were involved. They saw it, audience and the nation saw it. It took months not weeks for the matter to be concluded. The defence was given enough chance to put their defence."⁴⁷⁰

949. Nevertheless in the perception of many of the accused persons:

"The trials were a callous display of injustice and gross disregard for human rights. Untenable as the case of the prosecution was callously and without regard for judicial precedence and the law a verdict of guilty was recklessly handed down to our lot. Even before the trial, senior members of the Kabbah government made pronouncements that we were to be sent to the gallows because according to them we did not like the Kabbah government. ... and those of us charged to court (three treason courts and one court martial) were robbed of our constitutional rights of fair hearing by the promulgation of public notice No. 4 of 1998 issued on 9th April 1998. By this public notice, the constitution was substantially illegally amended by the Attorney General, now Vice President Solomon Berewa. In my view only parliament can amend the constitution but with vengeful inclination on the part of the Kabba government, they tampered with the Criminal Procedure Act of 1965, No. 32 of 1965. By that action, the age-old practice from time immemorial in this country whereby the verdict of the jury in capital criminal cases shall be unanimous, was illegally tampered with and watered down to eight and not twelve with the sole intent to slaughter our good."⁴⁷¹

⁴⁶⁷ See Sierra Leone Web (14.04.98)

⁴⁶⁸ See Sierra Leone Web (21.04.98)

⁴⁶⁹ See Sierra Leone web (05.05.98)

⁴⁷⁰ See Berewa's transcript (14.07.03)

⁴⁷¹ See interview with Victor Foh (03.06.03)

[and]

“With these I was charged for treason – capital treason the punishment being death. With God’s help at that time Berthan Macaulay senior came, scrutinized all the charges and my charges were changed from death to conspiracy which involved prison terms”.⁴⁷²

[and]

“On Monday the 13th April it finally happened. Over twenty others and I were ... charged with treason... for attempting to overthrow the government of President Tejan Kabbah. I had six counts to answer to: count one – treason; count two- treason; count three- aiding and abetting treason; count four – conspiring together with others known or unknown to prepare to overthrow the Tejan Kabbah government; count five – conspiring with others known or unknown to endeavor to overthrow the government of President Tejan Kabbah; count six – conspiring with others known or unknown to usurp the executive powers of the state. I was asked if I wished to say anything. This was my terse reply. Having heard the charges read to me ... I am not guilty of any of the counts of treason or conspiracy that have just been read to me. I consider them to be most unfair. Right from the start of the real action, it was clear beyond all reasonable doubt that the new trial judge Edmund Cowan who had replaced Sidney Warne, was biased in favor of the state...to me, the case had been decided even before it began”.⁴⁷³

[and]

“I was taken to the CID and detained for three days. I was taken to court and charged with Treason and Arson. I was convicted and waited to be hanged to the gallows.

During my trial, Marilyn Spaine and Amadu Koroma were my lawyers. I was denied the rights to a witness and Cornelius Davies and Omo Terry, two of the youths who had attempted to kill me, testified as witnesses against me.”⁴⁷⁴

950. While the trials of civilians were in progress, 38 soldiers accused of overthrowing the civilian government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah got underway. The 38 defendants were charged in a seven-count indictment with mutiny; failure to suppress a mutiny, and five counts of treason. The penalty for conviction was death.
951. The 38 accused include Cpl. Tamba Gborie, who announced the coup; PLO-1 Sgt. Alfred Abu "Zaggalo" Sankoh, Brig. Hassan Karim Conteh, Col. (Rtd.) James Max Kanga, Director of the National Relief, Rehabilitation and Demobilization Commission; AFRC Secretary-General Col. Abdul Karim Sesay, Squadron Leader Victor L. King, Secretary of State, Office of the Chairman; Director General of Defence Col. Daniel Kobina Anderson, Col. Samuel Francis Y Koroma, AFRC Chief of Defence Staff and older brother of AFRC Chairman Johnny Paul Koroma; Lt. Col. Saa Anthony Sinnah, Lt. Cdr. Samuel Kanu-Boy Gilbert, Lt. Col. David Boisy Palmer, Lt. Col. Anthony Bockarie Mansaray, Col. Alpha Saba Kamara, Col. John Amadu Sonica

⁴⁷² See interview with Philip Sankoh (16.07.03)

⁴⁷³ See Hilton Fyle's, *The Fighter From Death Row* (2000 p.86/7)

⁴⁷⁴ Sheikh Abu Bakarr Nabbie, former Director of State Lottery Company and accused in the Treason Trials of 1998; TRC Interview conducted in Freetown; 2 May 2003.

Conteh, Maj. Kula Samba, Secretary of State for Social Welfare, Children and Gender Affairs; Col. A. C. Nelson Williams, Major Abdul Masekama Koroma, Lt. Cdr. Francis Momoh Duwai, Maj. Augustine Fannah Kamara, Secretary of State, Southern Region; Maj. Tamba Anthony Abu, Maj. Bayoh Conteh, Capt. Albert Johnny Moore, Capt. Abu Bakarr Kamara, Aide-de-Camp Capt. Simbo Sankoh, Capt. Idrissa Keita Khemala, Lt. Jim Kelly Jalloh, Capt. Josiah Boisy Pratt, Flying Offr. Arnold H. Bangura, Capt. R. Beresford Harleston, Lt. Marouf Sesay, WO II Jonathan Dero-Showers, Pte. Gibril Din Sesay, Col. P. F. Foday, Lt. Cdr. L. D. Howard, Lt. A. M. Keita, Lt. Col. Bashiru S. Conteh, Lt. Cdr. Abdul Aziz Dumbuya, and Lt. A. B. S. Bah.

952. Members of the Court Martial Panel included Court Martial President Colonel Tom Carew, the Judge-Advocate Captain Godwin Ayamalechi, a Nigerian, Retired Lt. Col. P.M. Duwai, (father of accused - Lt. Cdr. Francis Momoh Duwai), Lt. Cmdr A.M Jalloh, Lt. Col. B. Conteh was prosecutor, Lt. Col. Thomas Gramby and Majors Bangura and Sherrif. The accused made daily appearances at the tribunal.⁴⁷⁵
953. Both the civilian courts and the court martial proceedings went on simultaneously after 22nd July, the former at the Law court Building and the latter at the City Hall, Wallace Johnson street.

The Issuance of the Verdicts

954. On 24 August 1998, Justice E Cowan, following several days of deliberations by the 12-member jury, read out the verdicts in the Treason Court No. 1. Sixteen persons received the death sentence: Victor B Foh, Hilton Ebenezer Fyle, Allieu B. Kamara, Christian Sheka Kargbo, Gipu Felix George, Denis Ayodele Smith, Olivia Mensah, Ibrahim Ben Kargbo, Bai Hinga Kooray Bangura, Sheku A.T. Bayoh, Mohamed Adkalie Bangura, William Sabana Bangura, Kaifen Saidu Tablay Kallay, Edward Akar, Ibrahim Mariti Foday Sesay, and Willie Ekundayo Taylor. Olivia Mensah, who gave birth in prison, was also convicted on an additional charge of murder. Dalinda Lebbie and Mohamed Kekuru Daramy were acquitted and released. The condemned had 21 days to appeal their sentences.
955. The next set of verdicts announced were those from the court martials. The Judge-Advocate Captain Godwin Ayamalechi, began his address Wednesday 7th October and conclude Thursday 8th, after which the court was adjourned to allow the panelists at least three days to deliberate over the verdict. On Monday 12th October, 34 officers were condemned to death by firing squad. Three other defendants were acquitted, and one defendant died during the two-month trial. "In the case of the 34 condemned to death, you will be taken to some public place where you will be executed by firing squad," Court Martial President Tom Carew told them. Sierra Leonean military law provided no mechanism for appeal.
956. Those found guilty and condemned to death were: Cpl. Tamba Gborie, Sgt. Alfred Abu Sankoh, Brig. Hassan Conteh, Col. James Max Kanga, Col. Abdul Karim Sesay, Sqn. Ldr. Victor L. King, Col. Daniel Kobina Anderson, Col. Samuel Francis Yariemeh Koroma, Lt. Cdr. Samuel Kandu-Boy Gilbert, Lt. Col. David Boisy Palmer, Lt. Col. Anthony Bockarie Mansaray, Col. Alpha Saba

⁴⁷⁵ Interview with Lt. Cmdr F. Duwai (08.08.03); reference also available through Sierra Leone Web.

Kamara, Col. John Amadu Sonica Conteh, Maj. Kula Samba, Col. P.C. Nelson Williams, Maj. Abdul Masakama Koroma, Lt. Cdr. Francis Momoh Duwai, Maj. Augustine Fannah Kamara, Maj. Tamba Anthony Abu, Maj. Bayoh Conteh, Capt. Albert Johnny Moore, Capt. Abu Bakarr Kamara, Capt. Simbo Sankoh, Capt. Idrissa Keita Khemolai, Lt. Jim Kelly Jalloh, Capt. Josiah Boisy Pratt, Flying Offr. Arnold H. Amadu, Capt. R. Beresford Harleston, Lt. Marouf Sesay, WO II Jonathan Dero-Showers, Col. P.F. Foday, Lt. Cdr. L.D. Howard, Lt. Col. Bashiru S. Conteh, and Lt. Cdr. Abdul Aziz Dumbuya. Lt. Col. Saa Sinnah was found not guilty on all charges and acquitted. Charges against Lt. A.M. Keita and Lt. A.B.S. Bah were also dismissed for lack of evidence.

957. Appeals for clemency were made by the international community and human rights organizations to President Kabbah, the only person who can grant clemency after confirmation of the sentences. The international human rights monitoring group Human Rights Watch released an open letter to President Kabbah on Friday calling on him to commute the death sentences of 34 soldiers accused of treason.

The Executions of 34 Soldiers

958. After deliberation by the Prerogative of Mercy Committee, (members which included the Vice President, the Attorney General and Army chief of Staff, Maxwell Khobe), on 18 October 1998 the Deputy Inspector of Police received orders for the execution of twenty- four officers who had been condemned six days earlier.
959. On the 19th October, the twenty-four officers all of them (apart from Kula Samba who had a white dress on), dressed in black with a big C (meaning Condemned) boarded a Police vehicle, which conveyed them from Pademba Road into the Goderich firing range where they were handed over to military personnel already on the ground. Present at the scene were the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Mr. K. Bangura, the Imam of Prisons, Assistant Superintendent of Prisons, Mr. I. Sankoh, the Chaplain of Prisons, Rev. Jesa Williams, the Prisons Medical Officer Dr. J. Sandy, and the Director of Prisons F. Conteh.⁴⁷⁶
960. The executions took place in the afternoon of that day, after the Chaplain and the Imam had offered prayers. It was carried out by men dressed in military uniforms, their faces coloured with charcoal and masked with green leaves. They took up their positions facing the convicts. After some brief instructions, they opened fire "and they were just shooting randomly at the prisoners who had been hooded and bound to execution stakes."⁴⁷⁷
961. Executed were: Cpl. Tamba Gborie (SLA 181643840); Sgt. Alfred Abu Sankoh (SLA 181632273); Brig. Hassan Conteh (SLA200); Col. Max Kanga (SLA 301); Col. Abdul Karim Sesay (SLA 207); Sqn Ldr. Victor L. King (SLA 448); Col. Daniel Aderson (SLA 144); Col. SFY Koroma (SLA 204); Lt. Cmdr. Samuel Gilbert (SLA 405); Lt. Col. David B. Palmer (SLA 223); Col. John AS Conteh (SLA 220); Major Kula Samba (SLA339); Major Augustine F. Koroma (SLA 465); Major Bayoh Conteh (SLA 495); Captain Albert Johnny Moore (SLA 462); Capt. Abu Bakarr Kamara (SLA 674); Capt. Simbo Sankoh (SLA501); Capt.

⁴⁷⁶ F.S. Conteh, Director of Prisons; submission made to the Commission in the context of Thematic Hearings on 'The Detentions, Trials and Executions of 1998'; 12 July 2003

⁴⁷⁷ Sierra Leone Web 19th October 1998

Idrissa Khemolai (SLA 439); Capt. Josiah B. Pratt (SLA 434); Lt. Jim Kelly Jalloh (SLA 650); Lt. Marouff Sesay (SLA 531); Col. PF Foday (SLA 272); Lt. Cmdr LD Howard (SLA 415); Lt. Cmdr. Abdul Aziz Dumbuya (SLA 412).

962. Of the twenty-four, only two - Tamba Gborie and Abu Sankoh were among the seventeen coup plotters: the rest simply worked for or with the junta either because they were forced to do so⁴⁷⁸ or as an indirect result of the pressure on the junta from the international community and the President to endeavour to include as many of senior officers as possible in the Government.
963. After the executions, twenty-four death certificates signed by the Inspector General of Police were issued to the Director of Prisons by the prisons medical doctor. The corpses were also handed over to the Prisons department for burial: they were placed in coffins and buried at the Kissy Mess Mess Cemetery.

Pardons and the Commuting of Death Sentences to Life Imprisonments

964. President Kabbah commuted the sentences of 10 others to life imprisonment. Those who benefited from this reprieve were Lt. Col. Bashiru S. Conteh (SLA 300); W.O. 11 Jonathan Showers (SLA 18163392); Capt. R. Beresford Harleston (SLA527); Flying Officer Arnold H. Bangura (SLA634); Major Tamba A. Abu (SLA 358); Lt. Cmdr. Francis M. Duwai (SLA 404); Major Abdul M. Koroma (SLA 417); Col. Claude Nelson Williams (SLA215); Col. Alpha Saaba Kamara (SLA 152); Lt. Col. Anthony B. Mansaray (SLA214).⁴⁷⁹

Further Issuance of Verdicts

965. The verdict for the second batch of persons facing treason charges was passed on the day following the execution of the twenty-four. Accused persons were transported to court in a blood strained vehicle, which had been used to convey the corpses of the soldiers for burial the previous day.⁴⁸⁰ Convicted were Brigadier (Rtd.) Modibo I. Leslie Lymon, Claude Victor Campbell, John Ajina Sesay, Eric Kwaku Dixon, Ahmed Charrid Dumbuya, Sorie Allie Fofanah, Samuel Sanpha Sesay, Tommy Anthony Patrick, Lawrence Loving Lamin, Mohamed Basiru Savage, Kainde Bangura, Mayilla Yansaneh, Phillip Sankoh, Harry Ben Alpha, former Freetown deputy mayor Nancy Steele, and Sorie Samuel Sesay. Those acquitted were Mabinty Scott, Winifred Cummings, and Alim Jalloh Jamboria. One defendant, Abdul B. Sankoh, died in prison.⁴⁸¹
966. Following four days of deliberations, a 12-member jury returned verdicts of guilty against 16 of 21 defendants who were facing charges of treason and conspiracy for allegedly collaborating with the ousted AFRC military junta. Among those convicted were former President Joseph Saidu Momoh, who was found guilty on two counts of conspiracy and was sentenced to two concurrent

⁴⁷⁸ The two named persons, Tamba Gborie and Abu Sankoh (alias Zaggallo) in fact rendered confessional statements before the Court Martial in which they explained their own individual participation in the coup plot and that of fifteen others. None of the fifteen others mentioned in this regard was apprehended and tried before the Court Martial.

⁴⁷⁹ F.S. Conteh submission to the Commission 12th July 2003

⁴⁸⁰ Interview with Philip Sankoh (Old Railway Line Tengbeh Town) 16th July 2003

⁴⁸¹ Sierra Leone Web 21.10.98

five year prison terms. Those sentenced to death were Attorney-General Ajbiola Emmanuel Manley-Spaine, Baila Leigh, Under Secretary of State for Health and Sanitation Dr. Matilda King, David Bangura, Saidu Daniel Bangura, Hamid Abdul Kamara, who served as secretary to AFRC Chairman Johnny Paul Koroma; John Tommy, Stephen Cathys Bio, a businessman and relative of former NPRC Chairman Julius Maada Bio; Under Secretary of State for Energy and Power Hassan Barrie, Secretary of State for Development and Economic Planning Victor Brandon, Sheik Abu Bakarr Nabie, former national soccer team captain and Secretary of State for Youths, Sport and Social Mobilisation Umaru Din-Sesay, Denis Kawuna Kamara, Secretary of State for Labour Abdul Salaami Williams, and Eben Victor Coker. . Those acquitted were Rev. Victor Ajisafe, former RUF spokesman Gibril Massaquoi, Alhaji Ibrahim Kargbo, Winston Crowther, and Alpha Omega Bundu Sr. Judge Sydney Warne advised the condemned prisoners that they had 21 days to appeal their sentences.

The Preferment of Further Charges

967. According to the Attorney General, fifty more detainees including 16 military officers were to face trial on charges that they collaborated with the AFRC military junta. The trial Berewa said would begin after the Appeals Court had dealt with the case of RUF leader Corporal Foday Sankoh, who was sentenced to death by Freetown's High Court.⁴⁸²

Appeal against the Sentences

968. All convicted persons appealed against their sentences. Yet these appeals and the trial on the fourth indictment were never completed. While the appeals of the accused persons sentenced to death were pending, the atrocities of the 6th of January 1999 leading to the huge massacre and destruction in Freetown occurred. All detainees who escaped from prison on 6th January were asked to surrender themselves or be considered as rebels. Some obeyed while some others escaped with the remnants of AFRC/RUF as they retreated into the jungle.⁴⁸³ In accordance with the provisions of Article IX.2 of the Lomé Accord, the government granted free pardon and reprieve to all combatants and collaborators of the RUF/AFRC. In order to benefit from this blanket amnesty, all convicts withdrew their appeals and were finally released from detention in July.⁴⁸⁴
969. There was considerable public sentiment for the soldiers to be executed and for all those associated with the AFRC to be punished. In succumbing to this sentiment, the Government inadvertently laid the foundation for the subsequent assault on Freetown by the combined forces of the AFRC and the RUF. In its desire to punish, the Government was unable to distinguish those who were part of the AFRC and others who were either forced to serve that government or were performing their formal functions as public servants. Everyone was tainted with the brush of collaboration. Many witnesses claimed before the Commission that in a broadcast from Guinea the President had charged that anyone who stayed behind in Freetown during the AFRC regime would be

⁴⁸² Sierra Leone Web (27.10.98)

⁴⁸³ Testimony (Public Hearing) of Victor Foh 15.07.03

⁴⁸⁴ Interviews with Philip Sankoh (16.07.03), Victor Foh (03.06.03), Lt. Cmdr. Duwai (08.08.03)

treated as a collaborator.⁴⁸⁵

970. It was therefore easy to label the Government's attempts at punishing those associated with the AFRC as political witch hunting. Many civil servants were detained for upwards of nine months.⁴⁸⁶ Allegations became rife that some of those in detention "bought" their way to Freedom and were released, while others who belonged to different political persuasions from the leaders in Government were allowed to languish in detention⁴⁸⁷. The prerogative to commute sentences rests with the President in accordance with the Sierra Leone Constitution. Some of the military officers who were convicted and sentenced to death had their sentences commuted to different years of imprisonment. The Commission heard allegations that these commutations were based on party affiliations. The Commission's attempts to solicit a response from the President on the basis for the exercise of this discretion were rebuffed as interference in presidential prerogative.

THE MILITARY ASSAULT BY THE AFRC AND THE RUF ON THE PEOPLE OF SIERRA LEONE

The Makings of the Attack on Freetown of January 1999

Mass Forced Recruitment Drive by the AFRC in the North-East of the country

971. An illiterate rice farmer from a village in Kono District later described to the Sierra Leone Police how he had been 'drafted' into the Army in order to participate in the advance to Freetown:

"I was captured by soldiers under the command of late Colonel Tito... They did nothing to me but only requested me to follow them... I was taken to Koinadugu Village in the Koinadugu District, where over one hundred captured civilians were trained on guerrilla warfare. We were also trained on weaponry and tactics for a period of five months. We were taught how to operate an AK-47 and an AK-58 rifle. It was after the training exercise that Colonel SAJ Musa had to enlist us as Sierra Leone Border Guards. The majority of us were given AK-47 rifles and were detailed to Colonel Tito as body guards. Our base was called Koinadugu Camp."⁴⁸⁸

972. Indeed it appears to have been a familiar pattern for civilians first to be abducted in the Kono District, then to be taken to the Koinadugu District for training before the launch towards Freetown. One of the most 'prolific' training instructors was CO 'Alabama', who went on to play a leading role in the assault on Freetown as the Chief Security to SAJ Musa as well as a commander in his own right.

⁴⁸⁵ Victor Foe, submission and testimony before public hearing of the Commission, May 2003.

⁴⁸⁶ See the petition to the Commission by Mrs. Sylvia Blyden, a senior civil servant during the AFRC regime; April 2003.

⁴⁸⁷ See the petition to the Commission by Mr. Donald Smith; April 2003.

⁴⁸⁸ Joseph Koroma, forced recruit into the Sierra Leone Armed Forces as a SL Border Guard; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at Central Prison, Pademba Road, Freetown; 28 June 2000.

973. The same testimony went on to describe how SAJ Musa soon thereafter led an attack on Kabala in which several houses were burnt down and “a lot of atrocities were caused.”:

“From Kabala we passed through the jungle to attack the city of Freetown. We passed through Mile 38 and attacked Waterloo township and had to engage the ECOMOG personnel detailed there in battle. We succeeded in repelling them. Several houses were burnt and a lot of atrocities committed by us. We eventually reached at Benguema Military Training Centre, where we launched another attack on the ECOMOG personnel deployed there. At Benguema, we lost our commander SAJ Musa, who was replaced by Brigadier Papa (alias Bomblast). We passed through the jungle and on 6 January 1999 we attacked Freetown.”⁴⁸⁹

Composition and Firepower of the Attacking Force

974. The fighting force that assembled in the bush near Kurubola, Koinadugu District in October 1998 numbered approximately 2,000 armed combatants. After rigorous investigation, the Commission has been able to conclude that the impetus for the attack on Freetown that began on the 6th of January 1999 came not from the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF), but from the dissident soldiers who had formed the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) and their irregular fighting colleagues. The evidence suggests that the two factions were not in fact acting in concert at the level of their respective High Commands; rather, the AFRC launched and led the assault through the North of the country and only later did certain combatants from the RUF join them from a separate flank.
975. The personal weaponry was mostly in the range of light firearms, such as AK-47s and General Purpose Machine Guns (GPMGs), of the calibre that had proliferated and dominated in the Sierra Leone conflict in the preceding seven and a half years. Many combatants carried RPG-launchers or hand grenades in addition to their personal guns, especially at the higher ranks, where it had become commonplace for a commander to handle up to four weapons at once.⁴⁹⁰
976. What distinguished this group from all other armed factions since the NPFL ‘Special Forces’ entered Sierra Leone in 1991 was its ‘support weaponry’. The troop was astonishingly well-equipped in terms of mounted or heavy artillery pieces, having acquired mortars and missile launchers from Ukrainian arms dealers illegally during the period of junta rule. According to M. S. Dumbuya, who encountered the dissident forces at several points during their assault on the North and West of the country, these weapons carried the most formidable firepower of any artillery used by ‘rebel’ forces in Sierra Leone:

“It was a top secret for them – and we were least expecting it. We were not fully aware of the types of weapons they were bringing in during their nine months in power. We knew they were bringing in artillery, but we

⁴⁸⁹ Joseph Koroma, forced recruit into the Sierra Leone Armed Forces as a SL Border Guard; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at Central Prison, Pademba Road, Freetown; 28 June 2000.

⁴⁹⁰ Foday Kallay, former ‘Honourable’ Member of the AFRC administration and later Leader of the West Side Boys; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police; September 2000.

least expected them to have brought in 'SBG' missile-launchers... These things have long tubes [and] barrels bigger than cannon 175s in size. They can fight equally like a tank; and a tank is next to a jet."⁴⁹¹

977. Dumbuya told the Commission that three such missile-launchers were captured in the effort to repel the attackers: one on the outskirts of Freetown; two on the axis around Port Loko. Apparently the dissidents managed to import and transport them with impeccable stealth, for there was not a single sighting of truck-mounted cannons reported to the Commission in nearly 10,000 statements gathered during its investigations.
978. The Commission was also unable to verify the origins of the artillery pieces in the possession of the dissident AFRC soldiers. Since the country was surrounded by porous borders and an unregulated coastline for most of the conflict, there are multiple possibilities as to the route of entry. Their captors testified that they were Russian-made missile-launchers that had been imported at enormous expense from the Ukraine.⁴⁹² In this regard, the Commission identified a possible source of the import as being an AFRC functionary named Saidu Turay (alias Saidu Moscow), whose name appeared in intelligence material provided to pro-Government forces in the run-up to the January invasion:

"Saidu Turay, alias Saidu Moscow, visited Conakry some time ago [before September 1998] and stayed with one of [former President] J. S. Momoh's loyalists called Sanfa Turay. The report states that while Saidu was in Conakry, he contacted a retired Brigadier in the Ukraine for arms, ammunition and other war logistics in order to increase the firepower of the AFRC/RUF and the training of their fighters. A Guinean businessman co-ordinated the arrangement and it has opened up a very lucrative business through which they [the AFRC dissidents in Guinea] now get their supplies and communications easily."⁴⁹³

979. The undisputed leader of and directional influence on this faction was Solomon A. J. Musa (popularly known as SAJ Musa), whose return to the battlefield had occurred less than a year earlier. SAJ inspired an overwhelming deference among the contingent. Most of whom held him in awe or were plainly fearful of him, largely because of the reputation he had earned during his tenure as Vice Chairman of the NPRC Government in the first two years of its existence. One of the younger soldiers who came under SAJ's command in October 1997 described him in the following terms:

"SAJ was strong and very brave. He was a good soldier – he was trying to reinstate the Army. Other soldiers with strong hearts were loyal to him. He was once the Vice President in this country; everybody knew him and we all loved him more than we loved our own commanders. It was like after ECOMOG attacked us, we felt so bad; morale was down

⁴⁹¹ M. S. Dumbuya, former Commanding Officer of the Northern CDF; Commission Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 21 October 2003.

⁴⁹² M. S. Dumbuya, former Commanding Officer of the Northern CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 21 October 2003.

⁴⁹³ CDF Intelligence Document, *Confidential Security Report Submitted to Chief Nagbanama Tande Sina while en route through Conakry*; Compiled by National Security Agent in Guinea, marked 'Unedited and Confidential', September to November 1998; received by facsimile by CDF Chief of Intelligence, Mustapha Sankoh, 30 December 1998; copy provided to the Commission by e-mail, December 2003.

too low at that time. SAJ was the only one who brought us up again to believe in ourselves.”⁴⁹⁴

980. The avowed and unambiguous objective of the group under SAJ Musa's control was to invade the capital city Freetown, overthrow the constitutional Government of Sierra Leone and resurrect a form of military junta in power. These aims were largely representative of the personal will of SAJ himself, who had retained an unquenched lust for power from the time of his membership of the NPRC administration. Yet he was able to make the mission a popular one by appealing to the soldiers' general sense of injustice and battered pride. One of those who took up a commanding role alongside SAJ explained the manner in which the mission was announced to the troop;

“SAJ Musa said to us: ‘Let's stand and fight this time; we'll use our tactics and defeat them’.

[...] We had stopped in Kabala, but when they attacked us there we went into the bush. There were thousands of them: Gbethes, Kapras and Kamajors, fighting with ECOMOG against us. They just attacked massively while there were a lot of civilians around.

[...] It was the first time I was in the bush for even one day. It was not easy. A lot of the soldiers ended up in Kurubola; some of the RUF were united with us, some of them went to Kono. But we just summarised everything together: we need to come to one, fight a common cause. [So] we set up in Kurubola and decided to go on the offensive, to hit them on the counter-attack. We knew we could attack them all the way to Freetown if we used the jungle.”⁴⁹⁵

981. The attacking group expanded dramatically in size as the advance towards Freetown gathered momentum. Existing captives were held under close surveillance in the bush in order to prevent their escape and brutal punishment was meted out to those who attempted to abscond. Moreover, with every civilian settlement the group passed through on its path to Freetown, civilians were abducted in large numbers, sometimes in their hundreds at one time. SAJ Musa ordered the capture of these civilians and their restraint by force. Operations were duly planned and executed so as to place a ‘net’ around the settlement under attack and deny the civilians an escape route.⁴⁹⁶
982. Abductions reached levels of unparalleled intensity in this period, as the invaders practised a deliberate policy to muster numerical bulk. The primary objective of this policy was to create such a burgeoning presence of human bodies that any defensive deployment would be at a loss to respond. First, the sheer mass of numbers was designed to create an impression that the hostile forces were larger in number than was actually the case. This impression, compounded by the AFRC's astute battlefield tactics and ballistics doctoring described below, was enough in itself to send most defensive deployments into flux or flight. Some troops, notably the ECOMOG contingent in the town of

⁴⁹⁴ TRC Confidential Interview with a former soldier in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who was recruited in 1992 under the NPRC; interview conducted in Freetown; 16 July 2003.

⁴⁹⁵ TRC Confidential Interview with a former officer of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who served as a ‘Brigadier’ under the AFRC and later became Leader of the ‘West Side Boys’; interview conducted in Freetown; 17 October 2003.

⁴⁹⁶ Although forced displacements of the type where civilians pack their bags and leave out of fear of attack might conceivably have gone up as well.

Hastings, were thus cowed into retreating before they had even properly positioned themselves.

983. Second, by sprinkling the 'real combatants' in among a crowd comprised mostly of innocent civilians, the troops succeeded in dissolving themselves into an indistinguishable mass. This tactic proved devastatingly effective in undermining the professionally-trained and better-equipped soldiers of ECOMOG because it deprived them of clear sight of enemy targets. It constituted a flagrant violation of the laws of war, whereby combatants were 'protected' from attack by the cover of non-combatants. The tactic is known in international humanitarian law as the illegal use of 'human shields'.

Motivating Factors for the Attack

984. Testimonies received by the Commission indicate that AFRC soldiers continued to fail to comprehend the gravity of the abuses they had committed against the people of Sierra Leone. This void of understanding manifested itself in the extent to which they claimed that they were highly aggrieved with the Government for refusing to recognise them as constituents of the national Army.
985. Accordingly, highly-placed among their motives for undertaking the attack on Freetown were the grievances of the disempowered. They were irked that the Government had seen fit to 'import' a foreign Army in the shape of ECOMOG, whom they had afforded priority at the exclusion of a conventional national Army in the sense envisaged by the Constitution. Thus they wanted recognition.

The Government made an announcement that the Army has been disbanded. That particular one made the Army frustrated. They didn't recognise us as soldiers; they didn't take us seriously. Any time Spencer came on, he just talked against us. We felt more disgruntled.⁴⁹⁷

986. Moreover, the AFRC and RUF were deeply embittered about the manner in which their sympathisers were dealt with after their flight from Freetown. In particular they cited the widespread resort to mob justice that had accounted for several hundred deaths in Freetown in the wake of the ECOMOG intervention. Their disdain however also extended to principled dissent about the trials and executions of their fellow soldiers. The AFRC spokesman Allieu Kamara described these proceedings as warranting no more constitutional legitimacy than summary executions – he openly criticised them as 'kangaroo trials'.⁴⁹⁸ Thus they wanted revenge.
987. The apparent most proximate cause for the attack to take place when it did was the confirmation of the deaths of twenty-four (24) soldiers in the Special Court Martial proceedings of 1998. SAJ Musa was known to repeat a single refrain to motivate his men on their march westwards: "They are killing our brothers." The widely-held belief was that the executions were certainly not at

⁴⁹⁷ TRC Confidential Interview with a former officer of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who served as a 'Brigadier' under the AFRC and later became Leader of the 'West Side Boys'; interview conducted in Freetown; 17 October 2003.

⁴⁹⁸ Allieu Kamara, former spokesman of the AFRC; TRC Interview conducted in Freetown, April 2003

an end, as further trials and indeed Court Martials were foreseen by the Government. Hence, many testimonies referred to the attackers' motives of freeing those who remained in Pademba Road Prison in an act of rescue. Allieu Kamara the spokesman for the AFRC who was in the Central Maximum Prison on the day of the invasion said

“When the invaders came to Pademba Road prison their message was that they had come purposely to free us because we were there [on account of having] worked for them. It was planned by SAJ Musa, that they should not allow the Government to execute us. It was planned for that very reason by SAJ Musa.”⁴⁹⁹

Thus they wanted redemption. However it must be borne in mind that the leaders of the AFRC wanted power. Having been expelled from Freetown, it was logical that they wanted to come back to power.

988. The identities of these detainees are a matter of note, for they included SAJ Musa's wife and several relatives of other members of the attacking group.
989. The last line of defence at Kossoh Town was literally abandoned as it had become indefensible by the limited numbers of ECOMOG troops there.
990. By the time the city of Freetown was in the sights of the attackers, ECOMOG was shell-shocked and in disarray.
991. The shortcomings of ECOMOG as an intervention force had become patently clear to Sierra Leonean fighting factions from as early as the moment of their deployment.
992. Through early encounters with ECOMOG Battalions, the AFRC and RUF fighters had come to know their enemy well.
993. ECOMOG was also hampered by its unfamiliarity with the chameleonic character of the fighting forces in Sierra Leone. The Nigerian Battalions were too trusting in accepting national soldiers back into the fold of national service, irrespective of whether they had served the AFRC junta or not. In the first place, ECOMOG thereby opened itself to unscrupulous and disloyal behaviour by some of those whom it had hoped were there to support its efforts. This point was highlighted in the subsequent Review Document produced by ECOMOG:

“The local arrangement to co-opt a number of Sierra Leonean soldiers to join the NIGCON (Nigerian Contingent) troops as a way of making up for manpower shortage later proved very disastrous. In a shocking act of treachery and betrayal, the SLA soldiers not only deserted in large numbers to join the rebels, they later fought actively against the increasingly demoralised NIGCON soldiers.”⁵⁰⁰

⁴⁹⁹ Allieu Kamara, former spokesman of the AFRC; TRC Interview conducted in Freetown; April 2003.

⁵⁰⁰ ECOMOG Deployment Review Committee, chaired by Colonel D. D. Oyebanjo; *The Participation of the Nigerian Contingent in the ECOMOG Operation in Sierra Leone*; undated document marked 'RESTRICTED'; provided to the Commission in hard copy; September 2003; at paragraph 86.

994. As well as actual switching of sides, though, the redeployment of SLA soldiers alongside ECOMOG troops precipitated a wholesale blurring of lines. Since the integrity and trustworthiness of individual Sierra Leonean soldiers could not be absolutely guaranteed, ECOMOG soldiers confronted with large numbers of unfamiliar faces in military uniforms tended to panic. There was in fact very little to distinguish the Sierra Leoneans who were with ECOMOG from the Sierra Leoneans who were their enemies. M. S. Dumbuya explained the complexities of this problem to the Commission:

“What happened after the liberation of Freetown, I told you some of the military men joined us who were not in the AFRC intentionally; and in the process as time went on we started bringing a lot of them into the ECOMOG fold, to an extent that they composed about three Battalions. They rejected them in the South; I mean the Kamajors did not allow them to be deployed there. But when they came to the North we welcomed them to join ECOMOG.

So these Battalions of the Sierra Leonean military were redeployed in areas like Makeni, Kono and Kabala. But when the actual body of the AFRC junta came to start their attacks, these men were pulling out of their deployments in Kono [in the East of the country] to come for safety in areas like Makeni [in the central North of the country]. It was these movements that caused the confusion that made ECOMOG not to effectively defend Makeni. While these men were coming to Makeni a lot of the rebels and juntas join[ed] in the crowd and you just see them all as military men. As a result of that, ECOMOG had no alternative but to pull out.”⁵⁰¹

995. In determining the responsibility of various parties for this protracted period of suffering, serious scrutiny must first be afforded to the utter ineffectualness of those who held positions of military and political power in Sierra Leone at the time and who might have pre-empted or prevented the entry of an armed force numbering thousands of fighters into the city of Freetown.
996. Militarily, there were two main components to the pro-Government troops that were charged with patrolling and securing the strategic towns, roads and installations of the state.
997. First, the core of the ECOMOG contingent that had led the intervention force to restore President Kabbah remained stationed in Freetown and at various other points of strategic importance. Officially ECOMOG was empowered to provide a 'peace-keeping' or 'peace-monitoring' presence that would bolster the defences of the legitimate Government against attacks by insurgent or rebel forces. In effect, though, and in the light of the President's declaration that the Sierra Leone Army had been 'disbanded', ECOMOG constituted the only entity even remotely close to a conventional military force that the Government had at its disposal. In apparent acknowledgement of the principal role assigned to ECOMOG in the state security apparatus, a Nigerian commander, Brigadier-General Mitikishe Maxwell Khobe, had been appointed as Sierra Leone's Chief of Defence Staff.

⁵⁰¹ M. S. Dumbuya, former Trainer of the Sierra Leone Contingent in ECOMOG and Commanding Officer of the Northern CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 1 July 2003.

998. Second, in an unlikely alliance, the predominantly Nigerian professional soldiers of ECOMOG were accompanied on most of their infantry operations and in many of their defensive positions - including checkpoints - by militia men of the Civil Defence Forces (CDF). The steadily increasing reliance on the CDF by the Kabbah Government had culminated in a situation where Chief Samuel Hinga Norman was directing the military operations of the CDF not only in his capacity as National Co-ordinator of the CDF but also, crucially, in his capacity as the Deputy Minister of Defence.
999. Several CDF functionaries who held administrative responsibilities for their respective community forces have testified to the Commission that the main hindrance to their *own* capacity as a fighting force was the failure of the Government and its agents to provide them with the weapons they had promised them. On the other hand, though, the CDF was able to rely on ECOMOG for many of its logistical needs and fighters were at times given weapons and ammunition for their use in specific operations. This joint force ought to have been in a position to repel a threat to Freetown through stout resistance in an outlying location, rather than letting the urban environment become a battleground.
1000. The political stance of the SLPP Government appears to have been one either of horrendous complacency, or of irrationally misjudged propaganda. In particular, the strategy of the erstwhile Minister of Information, Dr. Julius Spencer, in attempting to downplay the size, strength and character of the attacking force seems to have had an awful incendiary effect.
1001. Some of the worst instances of violence against civilians occurred on the path to Freetown, in the direct wake of Spencer's pronouncements on radio news broadcasts that the 'rebels' comprised no more than a couple of hundred 'deranged boys' in the bush. His contentions that pro-Government troops were able to contain any threat comfortably were patently misguided or deliberately disingenuous.
1002. The fragility of an ECOMOG-secured democracy and the climate of uncertainty and suspicion that prevailed in the wake of the 1998 treason trials might be proffered as mitigating factors in the condemnation of pro-Government forces for allowing an attack on the capital city. However, coupled with the veritable collapse of the defences assigned to Koidu Town, Kono District in the preceding month, this breach of state security and simultaneous evaporation of all measures to protect civilian life and property in Freetown amounted to the exposing of innocent victims to harm.
1003. The composition of the force that entered the city has been widely misreported in the international media. Rather than an operation led by the RUF, this was a violent backlash against the Government of the state led by some of the key commanders of the AFRC junta that had been overthrown in February 1998. The troops they commanded comprised not only their 'own men' that is, dissident soldiers who had fled into the bush along with the junta rulers after the intervention of ECOMOG - but also several hundred Freetonian and Provincial youths who had joined with them in order to re-stake their claim to recognition and a place in the urban life of the country. Among the commanders just as among the ground forces there were unconventional fighters who had never been soldiers in the Sierra Leone Army nor undergone any guerrilla training with the RUF. Indeed, their involvement in the AFRC was apparently at the level of auxiliary staff on military barracks or in the

'urban support network', which included supplying drugs to the members of the junta or carrying out operations on their behalf, such as late-night attacks, lootings, burning of houses and killings. Their conscription, or absorption, into the AFRC group that took flight from Freetown was partly in recognition of their status as 'main men' [reference a sociological observation], and partly inspired by their own fear of retaliatory action by those who had labelled them as 'collaborators'.

1004. Thus, the overwhelming majority of those who entered Freetown on 6th January 1999 saw themselves as returning to their rightful homes after having been purged from the city prematurely.
1005. The Commission's findings indicate that this particular attack cannot be attributed to the RUF as a faction, nor to any of its High Command as individuals. While a sizeable proportion - probably several hundred - of those who committed violent acts against property and human life in Freetown during the month of January 1999 had belonged to the RUF at one time, they were neither in the majority nor among the key commanders and decision-makers.

Tactics and Counter-Tactics to Misrepresent the Size and Strength of the Attacking Force

1006. Tactics deployed by the AFRC troops, which included the removal of the ballistics controls on their personal weapons to amplify the 'bang' upon firing a bullet, played a major part in instilling a sense of fear into their adversaries and in convincing any group they encountered, whether civilian or military, that their fighting forces were more formidable and of greater combat prowess than was actually the case.
1007. Moreover, their numerical strength was bolstered by the addition of thousands of abductees to their ranks as they advanced onto Freetown. The eventual size of the entourage that descended upon the city from the surrounding hills has been estimated at up to 10,000 persons - among them were captive senior citizens, women, children and newborn babies, who in normal circumstances could not conceivably pose any threat to a professional peacekeeping force like the Nigerian ECOMOG deployment, but who in the prevailing confusion and panic of the moment constituted a deluge of hostile bodies onto the city they were supposed to be protecting.
1008. Several accounts from both combatants and non-combatant civilian captives attest that key strategic positions on the path into Freetown were left exposed or abandoned by ECOMOG soldiers. The most poignant example seems to have been the desertion of the long, narrow bridge at Waterloo, which as a river crossing with very little prospect of cover from attack had been foreseen by many members of the entourage as a probable point of ambush to thwart the advance into the city in its final stretch.
1009. However, as testimony before the Commission indicates, there was apparently no resistance whatsoever to the attackers' march over the bridge, which suggests either a failure to acquaint with the topographical features of the route into the city, or an ill-fated miscalculation on the part of ECOMOG. ECOMOG reports indicate that a pull back became imperative following the massive numbers of civilians accompany the attacking forces. There would have been

too many civilian casualties had ECOMOG attempted to forcefully halt the invaders.

1010. It is unclear whether such miscalculation was based upon an assessment of the invading force that overestimated its strength, or alternatively upon a notion that better opportunities to put up a defence of Freetown, perhaps with reinforcements, would present themselves at a later stage; the Commission was unable to garner any explanation from those charged with making strategic decisions at that time as to the rationale behind leaving the bridge unprotected. What is certain, however, is that it was the decisive mistake among a catalogue of errors that left the nation's capital city - into which up to half of its population was squeezed - wide open to a catastrophic month of destruction.

1011. The Government and ECOMOG had received reports of RUF/AFRC collaborators filtering into Freetown in advance of the invasion on missions that ranged from reconnaissance to hoarding of arms and ammunition.

“The AFRC/RUF are daily sending their men and ‘Agents’ to Freetown [under the auspices of] the UN repatriation of refugees programme. The information gathered is that many of the AFRC/RUF rebels and their collaborators are infiltrating the repatriation camps and finding their way to Freetown without proper identification and screening.”⁵⁰²

1012. The Commission also received testimony from a group of young male residents of central Freetown who were placed ‘on alert’ in the weeks preceding the attack. Their stated intention was that they would take up arms to bolster the invading troops when it began to strike at strategic points in the city. As one of them told the Commission, several of those who supported the invasion were able to come to Freetown to give notice in advance:

“My boss came to this ghetto in Christmas week [in 1998] and said we should get ready. He was with the boys in the bush before they went into Makeni but he passed his gun to a small boy to bring to town and watch for him. He came on one truck with the civilians who were escaping. We kept getting more of us into the ‘camp’ [a hideout in central Freetown] in that same way; our supplies [of drugs] were plenty by then.

They [the invading troop from the bush] were supposed to come for Christmas but we heard that they couldn’t make it... [So] when they came in to town I was sleeping; but I was ready to join them. Lion gave me one AK [-47] back and told me: ‘Long time, brother, where have you been hiding?’”⁵⁰³

1013. ECOMOG reported that it was also in possession of information that predicted the attack on Freetown. Its review document gave details of a variety of

⁵⁰² CDF Intelligence Document, *Confidential Security Report Submitted to Chief Nagbanama Tande Sina while en route through Conakry*; Compiled by National Security Agent in Guinea, marked ‘Unedited and Confidential’, September to November 1998; received by facsimile by CDF Chief of Intelligence, Mustapha Sankoh, 30 December 1998; copy provided to the Commission by e-mail, December 2003.

⁵⁰³ TRC Confidential Interview with resident of Freetown who took up arms during the 6 January 1999 invasion; interview conducted in Freetown; 30 November 2003.

monitored activities, including the advance arrival of 'rebels' into the city, various means of reconnaissance and smuggling of arms and ammunition:

"There was ever-present information that which indicated that the rebels intended to attack Freetown. The rebels, in desperate need to disrupt the just concluded trials or at best cause sufficient confusion in the status quo, employed various means of infiltrating Freetown.

[...] Child combatants were used in large numbers to spy ECOMOG positions. It was also reported that arms and ammunition were smuggled through the use of trucks loaded with firewood and even sand, cargo vehicles and PAE vehicles were suspected to [have been] used by the rebels as well. These fears seem to have been ignored."⁵⁰⁴

1014. The incompetence of the state intelligence services was made apparent to the Commission by a variety of sources. The evidence before the Commission suggests that there was a collapse in the state security apparatus around the seat of Government at the time when it needed protection most.
1015. In his conclusion to one intelligence report that foresaw the means of attack pursued almost with precision, a Government Agent operating in Guinea stated the following:

"The rebel war in Sierra Leone is not yet over – far from that. The rebels have vowed to continue attacking the Tejan Kabbah Government until ECOMOG and the Kamajors are overstretched and their resources exhausted, during which time they will be ready to attack Freetown. It is also reported that SAJ Musa has been tipped to become the Leader if and when they succeed in their operational plans. Please do needful (sic) quickly to save Sierra Leone."⁵⁰⁵

The Military Dynamics of the Battle for Freetown in January 1999

1016. The military assault on the capital city, Freetown, quickly evolved into one of the most concentrated spates of human rights abuse and atrocities against civilians perpetrated by any group or groups during the entire history of the conflict. For over two weeks the populace of Freetown and its environs, among which were living thousands of displaced persons from the rest of the country, was subjected indiscriminately to a gamut of different crimes against their persons and destruction of their property.
1017. The invaders employed clinical tactics of urban warfare and were able frequently to use side streets and alternative routes to take the defensive forces by surprise and attack them at the rear. Naturally the combined forces

⁵⁰⁴ ECOMOG Deployment Review Committee, chaired by Colonel D. D. Oyebanjo; *The Participation of the Nigerian Contingent in the ECOMOG Operation in Sierra Leone*; undated document marked 'RESTRICTED'; provided to the Commission in hard copy; September 2003; at paragraph XX.

⁵⁰⁵ CDF Intelligence Document, *Confidential Security Report Submitted to Chief Nagbanama Tande Sina while en route through Conakry*; Compiled by National Security Agent in Guinea, marked 'Unedited and Confidential', September to November 1998; received by facsimile by CDF Chief of Intelligence, Mustapha Sankoh, 30 December 1998; copy provided to the Commission by e-mail, December 2003.

lost a number of their fighters in such operations, each death causing an amplified psychological impact, particularly on the ECOMOG forces, and ensuring that the remainder of the deployment fought with an enhanced sense of their own mortality. The invading force advanced up to Murray Town, Kingtom and Brookfields areas of Freetown.

The Role of the Kamajors in Defending Freetown

1018. The High Command of the Civil Defence Forces persisted in its operational bias towards the Kamajors when the realisation dawned that an attack on Freetown was unavoidable. Thus, in what was termed a state of “operational alert” by Chief Hinga Norman, it was the Kamajors who were drafted in as an envisaged last line of defence in the early days of January. They were airlifted from several locations across the South of the country and dropped at Hastings Airfield.
1019. The Commission heard testimony from Kamajors who participated in the operation, which tended to suggest that it stood an unlikely chance of success from its outset. There were fewer than two hundred (200) Kamajors airlifted to Hastings, albeit some of its most hardened fighters.⁵⁰⁶ They were promised by their commanders that they would receive arms and logistics immediately upon arrival,⁵⁰⁷ but in the event not a single weapon was forthcoming. At the point when the neighbouring ECOMOG Battalion of NIBATT 36 was removed without even engaging the enemy,⁵⁰⁸ these Kamajors were left exposed to bear the full brunt of the onrushing troop.
1020. According to M. S. Dumbuya, as soon as the Kamajors realised the magnitude of the threat they were meant to repel, a large number of them dispersed and removed themselves from the firing line. Alternative evidence received by the Commission indicates that what ensued was a massacre.⁵⁰⁹ The AFRC attackers deployed heavy artillery and a well-armed infantry force; they outnumbered the unarmed Kamajors by as many as ten to one. With the exception of only a handful who escaped in advance of the onslaught, almost the entire contingent of Kamajor fighters was wiped out.
1021. The Kamajors were dealt a further blow when attackers led by the AFRC broke through their defences around the Orugo Bridge near Jui. According to the subsequent ECOMOG review, the Bridge was held by Kamajors alone, despite its military classification as a “vital point.”⁵¹⁰ It succumbed in the space of a single day, leaving the surviving Kamajors to retreat in haste into the city and

⁵⁰⁶ TRC Confidential Interview with former Kamajor fighter for the Civil Defence Forces; interview conducted in Bo Town, Bo District; 05 June 2003.

⁵⁰⁷ TRC Confidential Interviews with members of the Kamajors who worked together with Chief Sam Hinga Norman at Base Zero; interviews conducted in Bo, Kenema, Pujehun and Freetown, July to November 2003.

⁵⁰⁸ ECOMOG Deployment Review Committee, chaired by Colonel D. D. Oyebanjo; *The Participation of the Nigerian Contingent in the ECOMOG Operation in Sierra Leone*; undated document marked ‘RESTRICTED’; provided to the Commission in hard copy; September 2003; at paragraph 195.

⁵⁰⁹ TRC Confidential Interview with former Kamajor fighter for the Civil Defence Forces; interview conducted in Bo Town, Bo District; 05 June 2003.

⁵¹⁰ ECOMOG Deployment Review Committee, chaired by Colonel D. D. Oyebanjo; *The Participation of the Nigerian Contingent in the ECOMOG Operation in Sierra Leone*; undated document marked ‘RESTRICTED’; provided to the Commission in hard copy; September 2003; at paragraph 195.

take refuge at the CDF Headquarters at the site of the former Brookfields Hotel.

1022. The morale among the young Kamajors was at an all-time low when the AFRC-led troop entered Freetown on 6 January 1999. The base at the Brookfields Hotel was attacked and ransacked within 24 hours of the initial entry and many of its Kamajor inhabitants were captured and killed.⁵¹¹ Thereafter the participation of the Kamajors in the defence of Freetown became something far more peripheral. Their deployment history and elementary training meant they were not suited to the travails of urban warfare in a built-up environment. As a collective force, their main contribution was reserved for the 'mopping up' phase that followed the main operation to liberate the city.
1023. One Kamajor recounted how he arrived at the Brookfields Hotel to discover a scene of disarray.⁵¹² Chief Hinga Norman was reportedly 'in hiding' in Pujehun District along with Eddie Massallay, far from the heat of the battle.⁵¹³ In his wake Hinga Norman had secured only an ad-hoc arrangement for the command and control of the Kamajors encamped in Freetown. Hence, ammunition boxes were being delivered sporadically by ECOMOG and then transported to various points in the city that were considered to be 'front lines' by self-appointed Kamajor commanders. The tasks on which the Kamajors were despatched within the city were often imprecise; rather than a controlled and co-ordinated operation, Kamajors told the Commission that it amounted to their simply being let loose on the city of Freetown:

"The only responsibility on the part of the High Command was to cater for us to be eating and smoking [marijuana]. They had no better plan for us to defend the city properly. We took orders from the commanders on the terms that: 'you feed us and give us djamba (marijuana); we'll go out on deployment'. With the djamba it was like they were taking a leaf from Hinga Norman's book... he told us to be smoking this thing so that we could be reaching our goal."⁵¹⁴

1024. Wilberforce – up Hill Cut beyond King Harman Road was under the command of M.S. Dumbuya and a group of Kamajors. Groups of AFRC/RUF stragglers had found their way up the Hill Cut Road and into Wilberforce but were quickly repulsed. The Kamajors under Dumbuya's command pursued them down to King Harman Road and then ran out of ammunition. They however managed to hold their territory despite constant barrages by the invaders. Meanwhile Hinga Norman had a large cache of arms at his house, most of them in the possession of the innermost security detail. M.S. Dumbuya told the Commission that he made repeated requests to Chief Norman for arms and ammunition to bolster his forces but was ignored.
1025. The battle raged all over the city. The invaders were very widely dispersed in small bands of fighters. They appeared at unexpected corners and places. It

⁵¹¹ TRC Confidential Interview with former Kamajor fighter for the Civil Defence Forces; interview conducted in Bo Town, Bo District; 05 June 2003.

⁵¹² TRC Confidential Interview with former Kamajor fighter for the Civil Defence Forces; interview conducted in Bo Town, Bo District; 05 June 2003.

⁵¹³ M. S. Dumbuya, former Commanding Officer of the Northern CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 21 October 2003.

⁵¹⁴ TRC Confidential Interview with former Kamajor fighter for the Civil Defence Forces; interview conducted in Bo Town, Bo District; 05 June 2003.

seemed in the first few days that the invaders would certainly overpower the ECOMOG forces and take over the city.

Repelling the January 1999 Invaders of Freetown

1026. Leadership tussle between Generals Shelpidi and Khobe - the latter, who knew the terrain and had familiarity with the types of operations required; and first, who commanded little respect and didn't have much of a grasp of the key priorities compounded the issues. Khobe was a junior officer, a colonel in the Nigerian army who was elevated to brigadier because of the mission. He proved hugely successful and was popular with the troops. He was however Chief of Defence Staff of the Sierra Leonean Military Forces, and strictly speaking had no real troops under his command. He needed Shelpidi, a much more senior officer and ECOMOG commander to agree to and approve any deployment of ECOMOG troops. Witnesses before the Commission testify that Khobe was envied by some of the ECOMOG commanders, who proved subsequently unwilling to assist him when the AFRC invaded Freetown.
1027. A number of factors account for ECOMOG's poor initial response to the invasion. Some have attributed it to Shelpidi being overwhelmed by the context; and his inability to defend a city that was also increasingly being flooded with refugees; others point to the patent divisions between key commanders in the ECOMOG contingent. Dr Julius Spencer testified to the Commission that on the day of the invasion, he had gone to the ECOMOG headquarters to find out what was being done to repulse the invaders. He found the whole place surrounded by an air of confusion. General Shelpidi was leaning heavily on his desk looking totally out of touch with what was going on and unable to articulate a coherent programme of response.
1028. General Khobe was eager to engage the invaders but was being thwarted by the Nigerian led ECOMOG high command. The Commission was told that President Kabbah had to personally appeal to the Nigerian leader, General Abdulsalami Abubakar who authorised the take over of the ECOMOG command by General Khobe. General Abubakar also despatched several battalions of Nigerian soldiers to Sierra Leone immediately. As quickly as the fresh soldiers got out of the aircraft at Lungi airport, they were thrust into the war front. The President had to be evacuated to Lungi airport to ensure his safety.
1029. By the fourth day of the invasion the tide began to turn in favour of the ECOMOG troops. Every street and corner had to be fought over. Using their superior knowledge of the streets, the invaders inflicted very heavy casualties on ECOMOG. In retaliation, ECOMOG troops began to indiscriminately attack and kill any person suspected of being an RUF/AFRC sympathiser or accomplice.
1030. The effort to flush out the invading forces was to a great extent concentrated on the Brookfields area. The turning point was reached when the major invading party was turned back at the Congo Cross bridge. From then on, they were in retreat. As it became increasingly evident to the invading forces that they would not be able to take over Freetown, they turned the battle into an orgy of looting, destruction, abduction, rapes and killings. The Eastern end of Freetown bore the brunt of the fighting and the destruction. Unofficial estimates were that more than 5000 houses were destroyed and close to 10,000 people

killed during the battle for Freetown. As the invaders departed Freetown, they embarked on a scotched policy of obliterating everything in their wake.

THE FORMATION OF THE WEST SIDE BOYS

1031. As the invaders left Freetown they returned to Makeni. What lay open to the expunged soldiers as available options were few and far between. After the split between the RUF and AFRC all the soldiers moved out of Makeni and set up their new base in the West Side – around October 1999 – which was a move back into the bush for some of the soldiers. It was because of that fight that the base at Okra Hills was set up. Brigadier Mani on the soldiers' side and Dennis Mingo and Issa Sesay on the other side. This group attracted the name 'West Side Boys' because they had found themselves in the Western Area. Mani stayed with the boys until a certain point; then he eventually moved off and returned to Krubola end – leaving Tamba Brima and Bazzy in charge at the Masiaka/ West Side axis.

1032. Many of the West Siders hoped that they would still be integrated into the army. When the peace negotiations started at Lomé, they all supported it and hoped that a peace agreement would lead to their reintegration into the army.

"The West Side Boys were soldiers, but some of them were civilians. The civilians wanted to join the Army - that was their plan. They thought that this was their best way into the Army."⁵¹⁵

1033. Some of the civilians from the prisons from the January 6 invasion – both soldiers and civilians were there. There were about one hundred people, 50 or 60 of whom were soldiers and who possessed weapons. Their main collective purpose was to gain acceptance back into the ranks of the Sierra Leone Army.

"We were well-disciplined. Everybody was just sitting down waiting for UNAMSIL to come in. We had no operations at that time. Everybody was free."⁵¹⁶

1034. The West Siders had free passage to most parts of the city. "At times ECOMOG would escort me. At times I would take my own security. I could bring anything in."

1035. The Chief of Defence Staff and the Army were providing them with supplies and had publicly contemplated turning the west side abode into a barracks for the Fifth Battalion.

1036. The notion that the West Side Boys were trying to establish their own foothold in the vicinity of Okra Hills was dismissed in testimony to the Commission by some of their most influential commanders. They claimed that they were all united behind a patriotic cause and were intent on reinstating themselves back into the Army in order to be able to serve the Government. However the West Side Boys continued to prey on the civilian population in the neighbourhood of

⁵¹⁵ TRC Confidential Interview with a former officer of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who served as a 'Brigadier' under the AFRC and later became Leader of the 'West Side Boys'; interview conducted in Freetown; 17 October 2003.

⁵¹⁶ TRC Confidential Interview with a former member of the West Side Boys; interview conducted in Freetown; 16 August 2003.

Okra Hills, culminating in their abduction of 1 British military observers and one Sierra Leonean soldier.

1037. They evidence their 'intentions' by reference to the role they played in averting another catastrophic attack on the city in the month of May 2000. Issa Sesay was said to have led an advance on Freetown in the wake of the incident at the compound of Foday Sankoh on 8 May 2000.

"We are the ones who stood up and stopped them attacking Freetown. We ambushed them right around our West Side base. They were plenty – many more than us – up to 500 or one thousand."⁵¹⁷

1038. With the failure of the attack on Freetown, it became obvious to the Government of President Kabbah that the war was unwinnable. Furthermore the new civilian government in Nigeria committed itself to a process of disengagement and withdrawal from Sierra Leone. There was alarm in Freetown that if the Nigerians withdrew, there would be no more impediment to the take over of the country by the RUF and its allies. The international community, in particular, the Americans mounted pressure of the Government to enter into negotiations with the RUF. It was in this weakened state that the Government went to Lomé, Togo, to negotiate a peace agreement with the RUF.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL FRAMEWORK FOR PEACE IN THE LOMÉ ACCORD

Preliminary Perspectives on the Implementation of the Lomé Accord

1039. Since the Lomé Accord was cast as a military and political solution to the conflict, its success depended on the implementation of both its military and political elements.
1040. The RUF was the signatory whose institutional future was most closely tied in with the implementation of the Lomé Accord. From its inception the RUF had harboured both military and political objectives. The appeasement of the RUF was therefore always likely to entail a balance between concurrent measures of pacification and inclusion.
1041. The RUF's military wing was to be neutralised and permanently dissolved through the process of Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR). Meanwhile its political wing was supposed to be reformed and strengthened through its incorporation into the mainstream of politics and Government in a process known as 'power sharing'.
1042. The military element would require the RUF to demonstrate a commitment to peace and a responsibility for the effective participation of its combatants in the DDR process. The political element would require meaningful concessions from the Government of Sierra Leone to build new national transitional institutions and assist the RUF in seeing through its transformation.

⁵¹⁷ TRC Confidential Interview with a former officer of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who served as a 'Brigadier' under the AFRC and later became Leader of the 'West Side Boys'; interview conducted in Freetown; 17 October 2003.

1043. Among the political elements of the Peace Accord was the conversion of the RUF into a political party, to be known as the Revolutionary United Front Party (RUFPP). The ethos behind this provision was drawn from an RUF position advocated strongly at the talks. It said that there could be no peaceful resolution in the longer term without addressing some of the political reasons for which the RUF took up arms. The RUF's original ideology had been based on the overthrow of a corrupt one-party regime. At Lomé, it was granted the opportunity to make a contribution to an effective Government of National Unity in a multi-party system.
1044. However, suspicion and exclusion of the other side have always plagued politics in Sierra Leone. The power-brokers of the SLPP and the APC were unused to the concept of compromise in forming governing administrations. Hence the introduction of the RUFPP was not popular with the 'establishment'.
1045. The volatility of the military situation in Sierra Leone was already at the highest point in its history when the Lomé ceasefire was agreed upon. The parties would require the utmost vigilance over the implementation of the political provisions of the Accord to ensure that any irregularities were not allowed to become the spark for further hostilities.
1046. The cease fire was to be bolstered by an expanded and diversified presence of peacekeeping troops in the country. The troops were envisaged to depart somewhat from the previous reliance on the West African regional force of ECOMOG. The 'moral guarantors' of the Lomé Accord were obliged to demonstrate a more broad-based support for the maintenance of Sierra Leone's security than had been perceptible in the wake of the restoration of President Kabbah's Government in 1998.
1047. Hence the leading peace-keeping presence was to be provided by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). The troops were to be accompanied by a greatly enlarged civilian mission. UNAMSIL would become an active party and stakeholder in most of the institutions created by the Lomé Accord.
1048. Foday Sankoh frequently expressed his own interpretation of the delicate balance between military and political implementation during and after the Lomé negotiations. The most vehement articulations of his public position came in his letters to the moral guarantors after the implementation had begun in earnest. One example was provided in a letter in February 2000:

"When I signed the Abidjan Peace Agreement, I did not request for any position. I only requested for the opportunity for the RUF to be transformed into a Political Party. That request was denied and a machination against me led to my arrest in Nigeria in 1997, whilst I was trying to ensure the proper and practical implementation of the Abidjan Peace Accord.

In signing the Lomé Peace Agreement and requesting key positions for members of the RUF and myself, I wanted to ensure that the RUFPP would interact within the system and personally give the people of Sierra Leone peace. This could only be achieved by the RUF being part and parcel of the system and changing the system from within, towards successfully democratic elections. The people of Sierra Leone and even Sierra Leone herself have been hurt by negative propaganda and I will

not stand by and allow the country to be destroyed again by any force, internal or external.”⁵¹⁸

RUF Attempts to Gain International Support for Implementation of the Lomé Accord

1049. Foday Sankoh and other high-ranking members of the RUF delegation toured the countries of the sub-region and beyond for some months after the signing of the Lomé Accord. One of the countries that offered assistance in the wake of the Lomé talks was Libya. Sheikh Abu Bakarr Nabbie, who acted as Sankoh's Chief Protocol Officer in Lomé, described to the Commission his own interactions in Libya in July and August 1999 with supporters, various members of the Sierra Leonean Diaspora and the leaders of both the RUF and Government factions:

“After the signing of the Peace Accord I went to Libya and held a meeting with a cross-section of Sierra Leoneans in that country. I explained to them how the peace was signed and how it would be implemented. I further held a consultation with Dr. Ali Triki, the Libyan Minister for African Affairs- that meeting was televised. The Islamic Call Society (ICS) in Libya offered me an appointment to spread the word of Islam in West Africa. They gave me \$27,000 (US dollars) as well as office equipment, medicine and other goods to set up my office in Freetown.

Pa Sankoh met me in Libya and the (ICS) offered us a private jet which took us to Mecca to perform Umbra. After we returned to Libya, Pa Sankoh went back to Lomé.

In August President Kabbah met me in Libya. I held a meeting with Kabbah; I notified him about my appointment through the ICS and made him aware of my funding. I told him that some of the money would be used to assist in setting up and organising activities for the RUF... I further told him that I had catered for 150 scholarships for Sierra Leonean ex-combatants to travel to different parts of the world. President Kabbah praised me and wished me success in all my endeavours.”⁵¹⁹

1050. Foday Sankoh also spent several weeks in Liberia during the preparatory phase of Lomé implementation, in the care of his long-standing ally President Charles Taylor. In order to arrange the modalities for the RUF's participation in the peace process, Sankoh summoned a host of senior RUF commanders to meet him at the Executive Mansion in Monrovia for a set of consultations with President Taylor and the Liberian Cabinet.

⁵¹⁸ Foday Sankoh, Chairman and Leader of the RUF; letter of complaint entitled “The Lomé Peace Agreement”, addressed to the Moral Guarantors of the Lomé Accord, Heads of State and members of civil society; 24 February 2000.

⁵¹⁹ Sheikh Abu Bakarr Nabbie, former Chief Protocol Officer to the Chairman and Leader of the RUF Foday Sankoh; TRC Interview conducted in Freetown; 2 May 2003.

1051. These meetings took place in August and September 1999. Some of those involved in the meetings included Sam Bockarie (alias “Mosquito”), Kaisuku Kaisamba, Rashid Sandi and Peter Vandy.⁵²⁰ The last of them, Peter Vandy, was informed whilst in Liberia that he would be one of the RUF’s nominees to a Ministerial post. Various other RUF members were also called over the border to Liberia to be informed of the roles expected of them in the implementation phase. Other than providing accommodation, it is not clear whether Taylor had any direct role in these consultations.
1052. Foday Sankoh was to continue to canvass for further financial and institutional support for the RUF well into the implementation phase. Sankoh also expanded his network of international contacts considerably in the wake of his new-found official status. It was during the latter part of 1999 that Sankoh formed a professional and romantic relationship with his wife-to-be, Madam Fatou Sankoh (née Mbaye). She was a US citizen of Senegalese origin who worked in humanitarian assistance projects in sub-Saharan Africa. The two would marry in February 2000. As Madam Sankoh explained to the Commission, their relationship was based on a notion of mutual support:
- “We were both adults – I wasn’t looking for a husband and he wasn’t looking for a wife, but he needed a partner to help him move forward his image and his political party; me too, I wanted to help him. That’s what allowed us to develop that love for each other.”⁵²¹
1053. Partly in the context of his proposed wedding, Foday Sankoh was able to undertake a short international trip in February 2000. According to Madam Sankoh, the priority objective of the trip was to secure a full medical check-up for Foday Sankoh before the couple married. The destination of the trip was South Africa, where a small RUF delegation stayed in the company of a South African businessman called Raymond Kramer, Chief Executive of the Kramer Group. In addition to Sankoh and his wife-to-be, the delegation included Gibril Massaquoi, Sankoh’s Special Assistant, and Babsy Coker-Gibbs, one of the RUF’s secretarial staff.⁵²² The trip culminated in the marriage of Foday and Fatou Sankoh on 26 February 2000 in Dakar, Senegal.⁵²³
1054. Beyond Sankoh’s wedding, the significance of this trip was found in the means by which Sankoh sought support for the RUF while in South Africa. It was widely alleged that the trip was organised by Sankoh for the purpose of dealing diamonds with a South African conglomerate headed by his host, Raymond Kramer; among others, the Attorney General Solomon Berewa was to make

⁵²⁰ Peter Borbor Vandy, former RUF commander and Minister of Lands, Housing, Country Planning and the Environment in the post-Lomé Government of Sierra Leone; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 2 to 7 June 2000.

⁵²¹ Madam Fatou Sankoh, member of the RUF and widow of the former Leader of the RUF, Foday Saybana Sankoh; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 07 to 09 November 2003.

⁵²² Madam Fatou Sankoh, member of the RUF and widow of the former Leader of the RUF, Foday Saybana Sankoh; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 07 to 09 November 2003.

⁵²³ A copy of the Sankoh marriage certificate was provided to the Commission. The wedding took place at the Grand Mosquée de Castors, Derklé, Dakar on 26 February 2000 as the RUF entourage returned to Sierra Leone from South Africa.

this claim later.⁵²⁴ There were rumours that he had imported weapons into the country as well as cars without paying customs duty on the cars. Yet in the Commission's own analysis of the materials recovered from RUF residences and now in the possession of the Sierra Leone Police, there is no conclusive evidence to support this version of events.

1055. Alternatively, according to Madam Fatou Sankoh, the visit to South Africa enabled Sankoh to lobby for material and financial support for the RUF from foreign investors.⁵²⁵ This portrayal of the trip was supported by a statement from one of its organisers, a Sierra Leonean business consultant by the name of Mory Kabba:

"A few of the South Africans wanted to know from Foday Sankoh about his commitment to lasting peace in Sierra Leone. Sankoh reassured them that the war was completely over in Sierra Leone and that as a matter of fact he was no longer a rebel leader but a leader of a political party. He encouraged the South Africans to come and invest in Sierra Leone and... represented the fact that his main priority was to consolidate his political party and organise himself for the upcoming campaign for the General Elections."⁵²⁶

1056. Foday Sankoh was unable to garner any international political support for the newly-founded RUF. Indeed, many RUF members lamented the fact that in the wake of promising beginnings after Lomé, the RUF was not afforded sufficient financial support to sustain any kind of publicity or other political party activity. The RUF that attempted to implement Lomé was only provisionally registered as a party and has never since grown into a fully-fledged Party in its own right.

Emergent Divisions in the RUF between the Political Wing and the Combatant Cadre

1057. In their negotiations at Lomé and beyond, the parties to the Peace Accord made the assumption that Foday Sankoh enjoyed sole and unfettered authority over all arms of the RUF movement. The inherent implication in this assumption was that Sankoh controlled and directed all the RUF's members and that he was answerable for all the acts of its commanders and their troops on the ground. In retrospect, this assumption appears to have been mistaken.
1058. Sankoh had been in prison – first in Nigeria and then in Sierra Leone – for over two years by the time he arrived in Lomé. For the overwhelming bulk of that period he had been out of contact with his field commanders and oblivious to most of their dealings. Indeed the tape-recorded message that caused the RUF to join the AFRC in May 1997 was Sankoh's last word of direct instruction to his men until he came back into the fray to endorse the Lomé cease fire in

⁵²⁴ Solomon Berewa, Attorney General; statement to the press, 13 May 2000; reported on the BBC Africa Service and available in the news archives of Sierra Leone Web (www.sierra-leone.org).

Berewa claimed that Sankoh had made deals in a "reckless manner" during his trip to South Africa.
⁵²⁵ Madam Fatou Sankoh, member of the RUF and widow of the former Leader of the RUF, Foday Saybana Sankoh; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 07 to 09 November 2003.

⁵²⁶ Mory Kabba, international business consultant who arranged Foday Sankoh's visit to South Africa in February 2000; statement given to Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 21 to 23 May 2000.

May 1999. After his absence, Sankoh's endorsement necessarily came from a position of uncertainty as to whether he was truly representing the consensus of the RUF on the ground.

1059. Only after the signing of the Lomé Accord did Sankoh have the opportunity to visit the RUF Headquarters in Sierra Leone, which was positioned at Buedu in the Kailahun District. According to testimonies from RUF combatants and administrators, it was from this point that Sankoh really staked his leadership on the success of the peace process:

"To start with, the combatants of the RUF were never interested in diplomatic means of bringing an end to the war. They had wanted fighting to continue until the SLPP Government was rooted from power. All they wanted [from the cease fire] was the release of Foday Sankoh.

[...] When Sankoh was released and met us in Buedu, he was told by his fighters in secret that he should stay in Buedu from that moment... The fighters said: 'we are ready to fight and capture Freetown and the whole of Sierra Leone; ECOMOG or no ECOMOG; UNAMSIL or no UNAMSIL!' But Pa Sankoh told them that he had signed peace with the Sierra Leone Government in the presence of the international organisations, non-governmental organisations and journalists of the world. So there was no way for him to subvert the arrangement.

[...] Sankoh tried to convince the fighters that no war can go on forever; it must end up at the peace table. When he saw that they were still adamant, he had no choice [but to do the following]: he authoritatively stated that he brought his war [to Sierra Leone] and as far as he was concerned, his war was over. Whosoever wanted to fight could fight for himself, but not for Foday Sankoh. At that juncture, everybody accepted the peace talks and agreed to work towards everlasting peace in this country... because Foday Sankoh has said so."⁵²⁷

1060. Accordingly, Sankoh's position was not universally accepted by the majority of the RUF members. It became divided into two wings with differing agendas. A political wing loyal to Sankoh and a combatant wing determined to undermine the peace process.

The Position of the RUF Political Wing

1061. The first group ("the political wing") looked up to Sankoh as the only person who could bring the struggle of the RUF to a decisive, peaceful and amicable resolution. Its members were largely educated recruits and administrators who were personally devoted to the RUF leader. By no small coincidence, Sankoh himself knew and had worked with most of them in previous years and had personally 'rescued' many of them, either from detention or other adverse circumstances.
1062. In assessing the biographies of the members of the political wing, the Commission identified commonalities between them in the reasons for which they joined and stayed with the RUF. Many, for example, had been brought on board out of personal moral compulsion – the notion that they owed Sankoh

⁵²⁷ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF commander who joined Foday Sankoh in Freetown as a member of the RUF; interview conducted in Freetown; 18 August 2003.

something. That contingent stayed on out of a sense of duty. Alternatively they had been 'convinced' to join by a vague promise, either spoken or implied, that through the RUF their lives would be improved. That contingent stayed on because its members were dependent on Sankoh for the fulfilment of such a promise.

1063. When the time came to implement Lomé, one of Sankoh's most important early tasks was to instigate the 'urbanisation' of the RUF and integrate its key office-holders in the city of Freetown. The majority of the political wing was still firmly behind Sankoh and agreed almost unconditionally to follow him on the path to peace, even as far as Freetown itself. Hence the RUF's appointments to Cabinet and Deputy Ministerial positions were drawn from this group, as were its nominees to central implementation bodies like the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC) and the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP). The political wing appeared genuinely to be in support of Sankoh and to believe in the Lomé Accord. Those asked to play an active role appear to have sought in good faith to implement its provisions.
1064. It was largely with the support of his political wing that Sankoh made crucial decisions as to how to see through the transition of the RUF into a political entity. Under the terms of the Lomé Accord, Sankoh himself was to take up residence in the seat of Government and head the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD).⁵²⁸ This step was in the first instance a signal that Sankoh was aligning himself and identifying most closely with the political wing. His next task, therefore, was to ensure that in the process he did not alienate the remaining section of the movement – its combatant cadre.

The Position of the RUF combatant cadre

1065. This second group ("the RUF combatant cadre") was composed largely of unsophisticated fighters who had been enlisted from rural areas across Sierra Leone during RUF attacks on their communities. Many of them had been forced to join the RUF through brutal means, or had become members in pursuit of their own interests. Of the forced recruits, most had never laid eyes on Foday Sankoh personally and had no grasp of the wider goals of the RUF movement. They knew an existence dominated by fighting and they were led by field commanders with little sense and even less sensibility.
1066. The field commanders of the RUF combatant cadre were mostly high-ranking vanguards who appeared to have lost sight of most of the original goals of the RUF. Importantly, they no longer seemed to believe that Sankoh was apt to secure their interests. Most of them were naturally wary of the proposal to subsume Sankoh and the RUF into the political environment of the capital city. Having witnessed the fate of the soldiers who were executed as a result of the 1998 treason trials less than a year earlier, they opposed the relocation of the High Command to Freetown on the principle of suspicion.
1067. This constituency was championed by the self-appointed Interim Leader of the RUF, Sam Bockarie (alias "Mosquito"). Mosquito insisted that it would be grave folly for the RUF to engage in politics without retaining a formidable military dimension. One RUF member who would later receive a political

⁵²⁸ Lomé Peace Agreement, Article IV, Section 3.

appointment from Foday Sankoh told the Commission of the differing approach to peace that Mosquito advocated:

“[Sam Bockarie] tried to convince Foday Sankoh not to come to Freetown but to stay in one of the Provincial or District Headquarter Towns under RUF control. Sankoh refused it. They talked to some of us not to take up the Ministerial and other positions given to us, just to sabotage the whole peace talks. But because of our love for the people of this country and also loyalty to Foday Sankoh who said the war was over, we did not accept their conviction.

[...] At last, Mosquito, who was the head of all those against the peace talks, told us that if we were to come to Freetown then we would not come with less than one thousand armed men. The reason he gave was that the Government of Sierra Leone was not sincere with the peace process and that the United Nations was in support of Kabbah. He reminded us of the Abidjan Accord and the Conakry talks, all of which failed [in his opinion] as a result of the behaviour of the SLPP Government.

[...] Gradually, Mosquito reduced the number to 500 armed men and that too Pa Sankoh said was too much. Pa Sankoh said he was not coming to Freetown for war but for peace and that UNAMSIL was there to protect all who were coming to Freetown. In the end it was agreed upon by all factions involved in the peace talks - RUF, SLPP, ECOMOG and UNAMSIL – that Foday Sankoh should come to Freetown with 45 armed men as his personal security. But even then, I was made to understand that he came with 30 armed men, but that all the arms were packed in the store as he was guarded by UNAMSIL.

[...] The conflict between Mosquito and Sankoh started from that point. Mosquito said that Sankoh was slowly selling the lives and fate of the combatants, as [I feel] it has happened to us today.”⁵²⁹

1068. Mosquito’s conception of disarmament was far removed from the principles that the exercise was supposed to embody. After one ‘sensitisation session’ conducted by the RUF’s advance implementation team in the wake of Lomé, Mosquito addressed a large troop of combatants under his command in the terms that ‘we are not a defeated army – we will not surrender to foreigners’.⁵³⁰ Mosquito successfully managed to convey his prejudices onto the larger RUF combatant cadre, who in turn were malleable enough to adopt them as their own thinking.
1069. Accordingly, a dangerous perception among the RUF combatant cadre was that the dividends of the Peace Accord were concentrated in the hands of their ‘political’ leadership, while the concessions associated with disarmament and demobilisation were all ‘military’ sacrifices that fell to be made by the combatants. In other words, they saw Sankoh and a select few around him decamping to a life of luxury in Freetown while they were being asked to give up their guns, which were the only claims they had on power.

⁵²⁹ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF ‘junior commando’ recruited on the Kailahun front, who subsequently became a ‘G-2’ Commander and investigator in the Internal Defence Unit; interview conducted in Freetown, 22 September 2003.

⁵³⁰ TRC Confidential Interview with a former RUF junior commando recruited in the Bonthe District in 1995; interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 15 July 2003.

1070. Many of the combatants therefore saw no reward in the disarmament process and refused to participate. Their strategy was to become one of 'stockpiling' weapons in secret locations or drifting out of the surveillance areas of the disarmament monitors.⁵³¹ As such the combatant cadre developed into a far more volatile and dangerous proposition in the peace process than its counterparts in the political wing could ever have been. Militarily and strategically, the combatant cadre was well-armed and well-positioned, with bases across most of the North of the country and unthreatened control of Kono and its mines. Their participation in the peace process was by no means certain and nor was Sankoh's ability to changed their minds.

Foday Sankoh's Appointment of ex-SLAs to his Security Operation

1071. In the midst of the emergent divisions in the RUF, Foday Sankoh was faced with the difficult task of selecting a personal security detail to accompany him to Freetown. In many respects, this was an unprecedented assignment for Sankoh, since he had largely lived in bush bases and militarised territories during the six years of the conflict that preceded his detention in Nigeria. He had never before had to assemble a security squad to guard an urban residence like the one earmarked for him in Freetown at No. 56 Spur Road.
1072. The only cadre of the RUF that had previously been concerned with the provision of bodyguards or security officers for the High Command was known as the 'Black Guards'. This unit comprised unconventional commando fighters. Most of them were forcibly enlisted, trained only in guerrilla tactics and offensive manoeuvres, and used to bearing firearms, which they would discharge indiscriminately or at the whim of their commanders. The most common scenarios in which the Black Guards were asked to mobilise involved repelling enemies from 'targets' or RUF camps in the context of combat with an enemy.
1073. Clearly a force of the nature of the 'Black Guards' was not suitable to provide security to Sankoh in his new capacity as a VIP living in the heart of Freetown. Additionally, Sankoh had begun to doubt the loyalties of some of his combatant cadres, including the Black Guards, on the basis of the trends of divergence noted above. He therefore turned to a different type of fighter to comprise his security personnel in Freetown.
1074. The typical profile of Sankoh's new security guards bore several identifiable elements. First and foremost, they were professionally trained soldiers or former soldiers of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA). The majority of them had been recruited into the SLA during the 1990s, either in the final batch of recruits under the APC in 1991, or in the massive recruitment drive under the NPRC in 1992. As with the bulk of the wartime SLA, these were mostly young men in their prime, aged between 25 and 30, many of them born and raised in Freetown. In short, they were urban youths.
1075. The means by which Sankoh came to select these new security officers appear to have been somewhat arbitrary. In their testimonies to the Commission, members of this group recalled that they had been fighting alongside the RUF since the merger of the AFRC and RUF into the 'People's Army' in 1997.

⁵³¹ TRC Confidential Interview with an RUF combatant, 'G-5' commander and former intelligence officer; interview conducted in Koidu Town, Kono District; 12 August 2003.

However, several of them had experienced acrimonious relationships with senior RUF commanders like Issa Sesay, Sam Bockarie (alias "Mosquito") and Morris Kallon. One of their number told the Commission that he and his colleagues were emphatically "not chosen because of any good understanding with the RUF strong men."⁵³²

1076. In fact, interestingly, it appears that many of those selected by Sankoh to be his 'particulars' were closer in their prior affiliations to the AFRC and Johnny Paul Koroma than they were to Mosquito and the RUF. Such were the anomalies of the relationship between the RUF and the AFRC, however, that there were also some among them who had received 'bush ranks' of Colonel, Major and Captain directly as a result of promotions by Mosquito.⁵³³
1077. The Chief Security Officer for Sankoh's personal detail was RUF Colonel Akim Turay. In his testimony to the Commission, Turay indicated that he was astonished to have been appointed because he had never even made Foday Sankoh's acquaintance before that point:

"In October 1999, I was asked to report to Kailahun by Mosquito, so I went there. Mosquito told me that Pa Sankoh had invited me to Liberia, so I went across the border and met with Pa Sankoh there. On meeting him I was too surprised when he told me I was going to be his Chief Security. That was the first time I had even seen him in the flesh. I stayed with him in Liberia for three days before we left for Freetown. I continued to stay with him and work with him because I wanted peace."⁵³⁴

1078. In total, the new security force for Sankoh's Freetown residence comprised at least 24 soldiers. All of them had at one time fought as part of the AFRC and the People's Army, but most of them had also at one time fought against the RUF.
1079. The implications for the RUF of the appointment of this new security cadre were not entirely foreseeable at the time. Certainly their presence among the RUF ranks made Sankoh's inner circle more closely assimilated in terms of its character to the soldiers who surrounded the former AFRC leader Johnny Paul Koroma.

⁵³² Alex George Williams (alias "Twin Barrel"), former soldier in the Sierra Leone Army and later a member of the RUF; TRC Interview conducted in Freetown; 2 May 2003.

⁵³³ See, inter alia, 'Colonel' Soriba Mansaray, former soldier in the Sierra Leone Army and later a member of the RUF; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at CID Headquarters, Freetown; 11 May 2000.

⁵³⁴ Akim Turay, former soldier in the Sierra Leone Army and later Chief Security Officer in the RUF; TRC Interview conducted in Freetown; 4 May 2003.

The relationship between Foday Sankoh / Johnny Paul Koroma and their respective Factions

1080. It should be recalled that Johnny Paul Koroma was the man in whom Foday Sankoh had vested the ultimate responsibility for directing the conflict in his absence. From 25 May 1997 until March 1998, Koroma was not only the Chairman of the AFRC, but also the Commander-in-Chief of the People's Army, which included the RUF. Yet Koroma subsequently fell dramatically out of favour with the RUF High Command when he attempted to abscond to Ghana.⁵³⁵ Koroma was placed under house arrest in Kailahun and he was widely despised at most levels in the RUF for his perceived betrayal of the movement.
1081. The RUF's alliance with the AFRC after that point became gradually more charged with tension and mutual distrust. This discord was evidenced by the divergent operations the factions pursued and by the perpetual power struggles in which their respective commanders engaged.⁵³⁶ Dissident units and splinter groups sometimes incorporated both members of the RUF and former soldiers of the AFRC in their ranks, but these groups were anomalous and quite anarchic.
1082. Koroma's own opportunism and unscrupulousness was widely blamed for the degeneration in relations between the RUF and the AFRC. Some senior members of the RUF testified to the Commission that they were yearning for a means by which to shackle the wayward combatant cadre, especially the units like the West Side Boys that were led by ex-AFRC commanders.⁵³⁷ They argued that this was the best means by which to reinstall order in the country and stop the wanton violence that had culminated in the invasion of Freetown in January 1999. They saw Sankoh's return as the best prospect of achieving an improved state of affairs for themselves and for the general security situation in Sierra Leone.
1083. Other RUF members sought to catalyse the break-up of the alliance with the AFRC and to exploit the resultant mayhem to their own benefit. These were the 'strongmen' of the combatant cadre, led by Sam Bockarie (alias "Mosquito"). Bockarie and his cohorts portrayed the RUF's chaotic position as a symptom of Sankoh's ill-judgement. They contended that Sankoh had erred in elevating Koroma unilaterally in the first place. This position was born out of disrespect for Sankoh, disregard for the well-being of the population of

⁵³⁵ Johnny Paul Koroma was alleged to have attempted to leave Sierra Leonean territory in 1998 in possession of a large amount of diamonds. According to a variety of confidential interviews conducted by the Commission with members of both the RUF and the AFRC, Koroma's own security guards revealed Koroma's intentions to one or more members of the People's Army High Command. As a result, Koroma and his wife were captured, searched and allegedly brutalised by RUF combatants under the command of Sam Bockarie (alias "Mosquito"). Mosquito found the diamonds and ordered Koroma's immediate detention.

⁵³⁶ By way of example, the prominent senior RUF commander Dennis Mingo (alias "Superman") engaged in a drawn-out series of confrontations with the AFRC strongman Solomon A. J. Musa ("SAJ Musa"). Superman and SAJ Musa apparently refused to undertake joint operations. Furthermore, troops under their respective command were reported to have clashed in direct military battles in certain areas of the North of the country, particularly in mid- to late-1998.

⁵³⁷ TRC Confidential Individual Interviews with members of the RUF 'vanguards' contingent; interviews conducted variously in Freetown, Makeni, Magburaka, Kailahun and Kono; June to December 2003.

Sierra Leone and insecurity in the knowledge that an end to the conflict would spell an end to their brutal domination.



Major Johnny Paul Koroma
Leader of the AFRC

Sam "Mosquito" Bockarie
Commander of the RUF

1084. At around the same time the RUF plan for participation in Government was being formed, the ex-soldiers of the AFRC also reformed themselves. Johnny Paul Koroma's absence on the ground for eighteen months had given rise to well-publicised disaffection among the former AFRC soldiers he had left behind.⁵³⁸ The AFRC High Command, including Alex Tamba Brima (alias "Gullit"), Santigie Kanu (alias "Five Five") and Foday Kallay, had advocated strongly for Koroma's participation in the Lomé Peace Talks.⁵³⁹ However, they were overruled by their RUF counterparts and Koroma was deliberately cut out from the Lomé talks at the behest, mainly, of Sam Bockarie (alias "Mosquito").⁵⁴⁰ The collective leadership of the AFRC faction thus contended that they had been "totally unrepresented, unrecognised and marginalised"⁵⁴¹ throughout the Lomé negotiations.
1085. The official delegate of the AFRC at Lomé was Idrissa Hamid Kamara (alias Leather Boot).⁵⁴² According to his ex-colleagues in the AFRC, he was in fact 'co-opted' as a candidate who would be favourable to the interests of the RUF.⁵⁴³ For that reason, Leather Boot was disowned by the AFRC. Moreover, the majority of the AFRC commanders declared their loyalty to Koroma and set

⁵³⁸ Lieutenant Colonel Johnny Paul Koroma (Chairman, AFRC), Brigadier Ibrahim Bazy Kamara (Head of Military Delegation, Okra Hills) and twelve others; "Grievances and Demands of Soldiers of the Sierra Leone Army with Regards to the Lomé Peace Agreement"; document circulated as a petition to the parties in the peace process; 3 September 1999.

⁵³⁹ Foday Kallay, former AFRC 'Honourable' who later became Leader of the West Side Boys; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at Jui Police Post, Freetown; 10 September 2000.

⁵⁴⁰ Captain (Retired) Moigboi Moigande Kosia, former officer in the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF) and later recruited into the RUF by Foday Sankoh as his first 'G-1' officer; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 07 May 2003.

⁵⁴¹ Lieutenant Colonel Johnny Paul Koroma (Chairman, AFRC), Brigadier Ibrahim Bazy Kamara (Head of Military Delegation, Okra Hills) and twelve others; "Grievances and Demands of Soldiers of the Sierra Leone Army with Regards to the Lomé Peace Agreement"; document circulated as a petition to the parties in the peace process; 3 September 1999.

⁵⁴² Idrissa Hamid Kamara (alias "Leather Boot"), former Deputy Minister of Labour, Industrial Relations and Social Security; statement given to Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 12 May 2000.

⁵⁴³ TRC Confidential Interview with a former 'Brigadier' under the AFRC; interview conducted in Freetown; 17 October 2003.

their stall out against the RUF as the implementation of Lomé unfolded. Their appeal to the Government for Koroma's inclusion in the peace process seemed to carry with it a mildly threatening tone.⁵⁴⁴

1086. As the most telling period in the implementation of the Lomé Accord began, the remnants of the AFRC felt moved to make the following statement, detaching themselves from the RUF:

"We want to emphasise that ours is an alliance of partners or stakeholders and not a firm union; so therefore the perceived imposition of [the RUF's] will on us [the AFRC] is unacceptable. The non-recognition of our leader, Lieutenant-Colonel Johnny Paul Koroma, as a stakeholder in his own right, representing the interest of the AFRC is not only unacceptable, but will no longer be tolerated."⁵⁴⁵

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE POLITICAL ELEMENTS OF THE LOMÉ PEACE ACCORD

The Formation of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP)

1087. The full composition of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP) was as follows:

1. Chairman [Presidential appointee]	Johnny Paul Koroma (AFRC)
2. Commissioner [Government nominee]	PC Charles Caulker (CDF)
3. Commissioner [Parliamentary nominee]	Honourable Manso Dumbuya
4. Commissioner [RUF nominee]	Charles Kamara
5. Commissioner [civil society nominee]	Dr. Dennis Bright
6. Commissioner [civil society nominee]	Abu Brima

1088. The Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP) was the principal body charged with overseeing the implementation of the Lomé Accord. It was agreed by the parties at Lomé that the CCP should have "the overall goal and responsibility for supervising and monitoring the implementation of and compliance with the provisions of the [Lomé] Agreement relative to the promotion of national reconciliation and the consolidation of peace."⁵⁴⁶

1089. Despite the stipulation that it should commence its work within two weeks of the 7 July 1999 signing, the CCP did not become formally operational until 15 November 1999, when the Commissioners received their letters of appointment.⁵⁴⁷ In accordance with its mandate, the CCP was comprised of five Commissioners. The Government, the RUF and Parliament nominated

⁵⁴⁴ Lieutenant Colonel Johnny Paul Koroma (Chairman, AFRC), Brigadier Ibrahim Bazy Kamara (Head of Military Delegation, Okra Hills) and twelve others; "Grievances and Demands of Soldiers of the Sierra Leone Army with Regards to the Lomé Peace Agreement"; document circulated as a petition to the parties in the peace process; 3 September 1999.

⁵⁴⁵ Lieutenant Colonel Johnny Paul Koroma (Chairman, AFRC), Brigadier Ibrahim Bazy Kamara (Head of Military Delegation, Okra Hills) and twelve others; "Grievances and Demands of Soldiers of the Sierra Leone Army with Regards to the Lomé Peace Agreement"; document circulated as a petition to the parties in the peace process; 3 September 1999.

⁵⁴⁶ Lomé Peace Agreement, Part 2, Article VI.

⁵⁴⁷ Honourable Manso Dumbuya, nominee of Parliament to the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP); TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 13 August 2003.

one representative each, while civil society put forward the remaining two.⁵⁴⁸ In addition, the President of Sierra Leone unilaterally appointed his own candidate as the 'Chairman' of the CCP. President Kabbah selected the former AFRC Head of State Johnny Paul Koroma to fill this post.

1090. It was thus through a remarkable and somewhat unlikely turn of events that Johnny Paul Koroma was reintroduced to the political arena. He had taken part in at least some of the above-mentioned consultations with Foday Sankoh and Charles Taylor in Monrovia but he was not appointed to any post under the auspices of an RUF nomination. Upon reuniting with other RUF delegates at Lomé, Sankoh had been informed of Koroma's alleged betrayal of the RUF in Kailahun. He treated him with great suspicion thereafter. He had set out to orchestrate Koroma's involvement in the peace process on terms that were favourable to the RUF.
1091. Sankoh's strategy proved to be somewhat flawed, however, for he was outdone and overruled by the intervention of President Kabbah. Kabbah had made the decision to engage Koroma in the peace process in the interests of national reconciliation. Towards this goal, he awarded Koroma a position that carried almost as high a profile as Sankoh's own. Koroma became the Chairman of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace.
1092. The RUF's nominee to the CCP, Charles Kamara, explained in his testimony how his own appointment transpired. He thereby also gave a valuable insight into the means by which Koroma was brought on board:

"After the Lomé Accord, Isatu Kallon [the wife of Sankoh's Adviser] told Foday Sankoh that I was in town. He sent for me; it was a happy reunion... It was then that they were asking for people to be nominated for positions in Government and the CCP. President Tejan Kabbah wanted Johnny Paul [Koroma] to be nominated by the RUF, but Foday Sankoh told him [the President] that he had a different candidate. He then submitted my name to Pa Kabbah. That was how I became the RUF nominee in the CCP.

[...] But after all the nominations were made, the President, in his own wisdom, appointed Johnny Paul Koroma as Chairman of the Commission. The President appointed him Chairperson and Foday Sankoh did not approve that. There was a lot of dissent, especially within RUF circles; they did not want him [Koroma] to have anything to do with the CCP."⁵⁴⁹

1093. There was equally disillusionment outside RUF circles at the President's move to bring back Johnny Paul Koroma. After all, Koroma was the man who seized power after the 25 May 1997 coup that had overthrown Kabbah. Kabbah's principle of inclusion behind the appointment was unquestionably laudable and the President was rightly praised for his effort to rebuild bridges. However, as the former NPRC Minister Sam Maligie testified to the Commission, there was certain bafflement about the invitation to Koroma to return to the peace process as a 'prodigal son':

⁵⁴⁸ Lomé Peace Agreement, Part 2, Article VI, Section 5.

⁵⁴⁹ Charles Kamara, former RUF nominee to the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP); TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 14 August 2003.

“We have a leader [in President Kabbah] whom, at one time, I was tempted to ask if he was fighting for the Nobel Peace Prize! Inasmuch as we are in a democracy, it is not democracy at the expense of your country or your leadership.

[...] I don't care what they say about peace; the peace [at Lomé] was actually with the RUF. Why bring in Johnny Paul? And look at the important position that was given to him! Let us say what we want to say. If we say APC was a big problem for this country, the fellow who relieved us from that trouble – Strasser – nothing has been done for him. Johnny Paul attempted a coup on Strasser and he even attempted a coup on Tejan Kabbah before he carried out the 1997 coup. He wanted power at all costs... Yet we made Johnny Paul to look like a hero of peace.”⁵⁵⁰

1094. Quite apart from the questions it raised over the credibility of the peace process, Koroma's appointment served to put in jeopardy the success of the CCP. The five other Commissioners held Koroma in low regard. Honourable Manso Dumbuya, who was nominated to the CCP by Parliament, testified that he found Koroma to be a 'difficult' man to work under; he stood opposed to the way Koroma conducted himself and to the decisions he made on a variety of issues.⁵⁵¹ This perspective was apparently shared by the other Commissioners, as Charles Kamara explained:

“Johnny Paul Koroma did not understand his role [as Chairman of the CCP]; he did not know what to do. I should say that he was incompetent to handle the position. He did not treat us as if we were all members of the Commission.

[...] Excepting the differences of names, we had all received the same letters of appointment. [But] as a soldier, Koroma thought that he was the boss and we were his juniors. We collectively told him that he was a leader among equals and that we should work as a Commission. Sometimes, we reminded him that his presence in the Commission was imposed [by the President] and not necessarily provided for... Why did the President appoint Koroma? Perhaps he needed a job; that is my guess... [In any case] we collectively worked together without him, most of the time.”⁵⁵²

1095. Perhaps the most significant impediment to peace presented by Koroma's appointment was the fact that it alienated the CCP from the RUF High Command. There was bitter resentment towards Koroma in the highest echelons of the RUF, which in turn gave rise to resentment on Koroma's part. Koroma and Sankoh were barely able to disguise their acrimony towards one another in the planning stages for the implementation of Lomé. Accordingly, Charles Kamara testified that he foresaw problems with the arrangement from the outset:

⁵⁵⁰ Dr. Samuel Maligie, former Secretary of State for Internal Affairs, Rural Development and State Security under the NPRC; TRC Interview conducted at private residence in Freetown; 31 March 2003.

⁵⁵¹ Honourable Manso Dumbuya, nominee of Parliament to the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP); TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 13 August 2003.

⁵⁵² Charles Kamara, former RUF nominee to the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP); TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 14 August 2003.

“We thought that things would not go well with Johnny Paul’s presence on the CCP. I personally said that things would not go well if Johnny Paul was made Chairperson, because Foday Sankoh would have nothing to do with that Commission; and I guessed rightly. In fact, Sankoh not only had nothing to do with it [the CCP]; he had nothing to do with him [Koroma] as well.”⁵⁵³

1096. The Commission heard that the CCP’s work was additionally constrained by overwhelming logistical and financial shortfalls. According to one of its Commissioners, Honourable Manso Dumbuya, the CCP was forced to hire vehicles for the majority of operations because the one official car assigned to it was commandeered by Johnny Paul Koroma for his own use. Furthermore, the support staff for the CCP never grew beyond one driver, one messenger and a sub-accountant; while a photocopier, a fax machine and a single computer comprised its equipment.⁵⁵⁴
1097. With hindsight it is scarcely believable that the CCP was intended to ensure that no less than nine other categories of Commissions or Committees were “operational and given the necessary resources for realising their respective mandates.”⁵⁵⁵ Among the bodies enumerated as being under the auspices of the CCP were the NCDDR, which led disarmament, the NCRRR, which was to institute programmes for resettlement and reconstruction, and even the then as yet unborn Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The CCP was, in short, impossibly overburdened and never stood a chance of fulfilling its mandate as foreseen in the Lomé Accord.

The Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC) for Ceasefire Violations

1098. The JMC, along with the Provincial and District Cease fire Monitoring Committees (CMCs) also fell under the auspices of the CCP. The JMC was one of the few CCP offshoots that managed to become fully operational within the calendar year of 1999. It was conceived as a forum of all parties to the peace in which members of the former combatant factions and their monitors would determine responsibility for a particular violation of the ceasefire and put measures in place to prevent its recurrence.
1099. Representatives of all factions sat on the JMC, including the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), Civil Defence Forces (CDF), the former AFRC, Government of Sierra Leone, Defence Headquarters (SLA) and UNAMSIL.
1100. Sheku Andrew Coomber and Samuel Lamboi (alias Ebony) were among the RUF representatives on the JMC. Coomber arrived in Freetown on 25 November 1999 to commence work almost immediately; he described the *modus operandi* of the JMC in the following terms:

“The purpose of the JMC was to receive all cease fire violation reports from the Cease fire Monitoring Commission members across the country, or their counterparts in the UN military observations. These reports were tabled in our weekly Tuesday meetings to be defended by

⁵⁵³ Charles Kamara, former RUF nominee to the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP); TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 14 August 2003.

⁵⁵⁴ Honourable Manso Dumbuya, nominee of Parliament to the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP); TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 13 August 2003.

⁵⁵⁵ Lomé Peace Agreement, Part 2, Article VI, Section 2.

each member representing the group which the report was against. There and then, the representative [may choose to] admit and apologise for the alleged crime committed by his group. In that case, where the representative is not sure, he can find out and give his findings in the next JMC meeting. [Alternatively] he can outrightly deny it, if he knows the alleged crime never occurred. But once the majority of the JMC members have the conviction that the alleged crime occurred, they will oblige that member to accept the allegation.”⁵⁵⁶

1101. The JMC ought to have strengthened the link between the various political delegations in Freetown and the combatants on the ground in their various deployments across the Provinces. However, in practice it had the opposite effect: it alienated those in Freetown from their erstwhile colleagues who were still carrying arms. Combatants, particularly among the RUF of the Northern and Eastern Provinces, voiced a common grievance that they were being ‘spied on’ by the members of the JMC and their co-workers in the Cease fire Monitoring Committee (CMC). Hence the monitors themselves were often subjected to harassment and physical abuse by members of their own factions, as one RUF representative explained to the Commission:

“I was working as a Cease fire Monitoring Committee (CMC) representative for the RUF and I was assigned to work with UNAMSIL in the Eastern Province. I used to travel frequently back and forth to receive allowances, attend meetings, or report to the JMC if called upon. Through all my journeys I was able to learn that those RUF members that were working on the peace programme, those representing the RUF in Government and those working directly with the Party Headquarters in Freetown were termed as collaborators with the SLPP Government and UNAMSIL, and betrayers of the RUF organisation by the combatants under the command of the Battle Field Commander Issa Sesay.

[...] I faced several confrontations [with my own RUF colleagues], which sometimes resulted in public disgrace to me, beatings, sometimes raiding my properties and alleging that I’m a betrayer of the RUF organisation by the combatant commanders. I was beaten in Makeni by six RUF combatants while I was on my way heading to Freetown. When they searched into my bag and found an identity card with ‘CMC Representative, RUF’ written on it, they accused me of being a collaborator and betrayer and beat me more.”⁵⁵⁷

1102. In this light, it is possible to surmise that appointment to one of the cease fire monitoring organs was actually more of a curse than a blessing for the members of the RUF political wing. They generally endured abuse and hostility from the combatant cadre they monitored, only then to come to Freetown and be asked to justify or excuse the actions of the same people. It was an impossible task.

⁵⁵⁶ Sheku Andrew Coomber, RUF Representative to the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC); statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at CID Headquarters, Freetown; 11 May 2000.

⁵⁵⁷ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF representative to the Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (CMC); interview conducted in Freetown; 22 September 2003.

1103. The Commission heard that similar ordeals were experienced by members of the Civil Defence Forces who attempted to assert some sense of adherence to the ceasefire among their own combatants.⁵⁵⁸ In particular, the wayward activities of the initiating cadre, who persisted in carrying out raids with units of armed men at their disposal, were difficult to rein in.⁵⁵⁹ In the territories of the Southern ‘heartlands’ of the Kamajors, particularly Bonthe and Bo Districts, there were multiple reports of armed raids on civilian communities and targeted thefts of vehicles and agricultural supplies by CDF units. In the event that a senior member of the CDF High Command should intervene to prevail upon the perpetrators, he opened himself to accusations of ‘opposition’ to the interests of the movement, or ‘collaboration’ with the international peacekeepers in pursuit of a subversive agenda.⁵⁶⁰

Appointment of RUF Members to Positions in Government

1104. The reshuffle of President Kabbah’s Government to incorporate the power-sharing provisions of the Lomé Accord occurred in October 1999. The political wing of the RUF had put forward candidates of somewhat diverse backgrounds as its nominees for appointment to four Ministerial and four Deputy Ministerial posts. As of 3 October 1999, the following persons assumed the following titles indicating offices of the state under the auspices of power-sharing:

Mike Lamin	Minister of Trade, Industry and State Enterprise
Peter Vandy	Minister of Lands, Housing, Country Planning and Environment
Alimamy Pallo Bangura	Minister of Energy and Power
Rtd. Cpt. ABS Jomo-Jalloh	Minister of Tourism and Culture [<i>appointed by the AFRC</i>]
Dr. Emmanuel Fabai	Deputy Minister of Rural Development and Local Government
Idrissa H. Kamara	Deputy Minister of Labour, Industrial Relations and Social Security
Francis M. Musa	Deputy Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Marine Resources
Susan Lahai	Deputy Minister of Transport and Communications

1105. The Lomé Accord had made provision for four Cabinet positions, one of which was to be a “senior” Ministry such as Finance, Foreign Affairs or Justice.⁵⁶¹ In the event, Mike Lamin’s post in Trade and Industry was the most senior awarded to the RUF. Moreover, the total size of Cabinet was supposed to be 18 posts;⁵⁶² yet, again in a departure from the terms of the Accord, 21 Ministerial positions were created by the President. Meanwhile, the foreseen positions in parastatals, diplomacy and other public bodies⁵⁶³ never materialised.

⁵⁵⁸ TRC Confidential Interview with former Member of the CDF War Council at Base Zero; interview conducted in Bo Town, Bo District; 10 August 2003.

⁵⁵⁹ Alhaji Daramy-Rogers, former Member of the CDF War Council at Base Zero and later Regional Co-ordinator (South) of the CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 24 – 29 October 2003.

⁵⁶⁰ Alhaji Daramy-Rogers, former Member of the CDF War Council at Base Zero and later Regional Co-ordinator (South) of the CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 24 – 29 October 2003.

⁵⁶¹ Lomé Peace Agreement, Article V, Section 3.

⁵⁶² Lomé Peace Agreement, Article V, Section 3.

⁵⁶³ Lomé Peace Agreement, Article IV, Section 3.

1106. Questions of status and spirit were also to the fore in assessing the extent to which power sharing was really achieved. First, in his position as Chairman of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMMRD), Foday Sankoh was supposed to be accorded the "status of Vice President".⁵⁶⁴ As Sankoh frequently made known to the international community, he felt that he was afforded considerably fewer luxuries and a far lower status than the incumbent Vice President, Albert Joe Demby.⁵⁶⁵
1107. Likewise the RUF consistently complained that its other political appointees were accommodated in dingy cellars and ill-equipped office space, hampering their ability to carry out their executive functions.⁵⁶⁶ Yet as Sankoh remarked in his letters to the moral guarantors in January and February 2000, there did not appear to be any political will on the part of the SLPP-led Government to equalise the *de facto* status of RUF functionaries with their SLPP counterparts of the same nominal positions. Instead, Sankoh remarked in his letter of 24 February 2000, the RUF was simply construed as the pariah of the peace process, a mantle for which he coined the phrase "goat's head".⁵⁶⁷
1108. The Commission holds that responsibility for this particular breakdown in the process must be shared by all sides. Certainly, the perception among senior RUF members was that the SLPP Government had negotiated the compromises of power-sharing in bad faith; its undertakings to incorporate RUF members into Government amounted, according to the RUF's Chief Protocol Officer, to nothing more than "sugar-coated words."⁵⁶⁸ The Ministers put forward by the SLPP party to form part of the same power-sharing Government indeed cannot point to any credible efforts to promote genuine solidarity with their RUF partners.
1109. Yet on the other hand, Foday Sankoh displayed a great deal of impatience and an apparently deliberate tendency to ruffle the feathers of his fellow senior Government officials. He seemed unwilling to countenance any shortcomings in the implementation of the Accord, even where they might quite legitimately have been caused by logistical constraints that affected all sides, not just the RUF.⁵⁶⁹ His first instinct, born out of deep-lying distrust, was to blame President Kabbah and the SLPP political elite and allege deliberate spoiling tactics.

⁵⁶⁴ Lomé Peace Agreement, Article V, Section 2.

⁵⁶⁵ Foday Sankoh, Chairman and Leader of the RUF; letter of complaint entitled "The Lomé Peace Agreement", addressed to the Moral Guarantors of the Lomé Accord, Heads of State and members of civil society; 24 February 2000.

⁵⁶⁶ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF office-holder in the post-Lomé Government of Sierra Leone; interview conducted on 28 August 2003.

⁵⁶⁷ Foday Sankoh, Chairman and Leader of the RUF; letter of complaint entitled "The Lomé Peace Agreement", addressed to the Moral Guarantors of the Lomé Accord, Heads of State and members of civil society; 24 February 2000.

⁵⁶⁸ Sheikh Abu Bakarr Nabbie, former Chief Protocol Officer to the RUF; TRC Interview conducted in Freetown; 15 August 2003.

⁵⁶⁹ The failure to create posts for RUF members in parastatals and diplomatic missions, for example, was said by the President in his responses to Sankoh's correspondence to have resulted from the inadequate levels of funding available to central Government to bolster the sizes of such bodies.

1110. Nevertheless, in the Commission's view, the power-sharing clauses of the Lomé Accord were just as important to the durability of peace in Sierra Leone as the provisions relating to disarmament. The Government of Sierra Leone accepted the principle of balance on paper when it appended its signature to the Accord. Yet when the litmus test of implementing its pledges at Lomé began, it appeared reluctant to put its principles into practice.

THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MILITARY ELEMENTS OF THE LOMÉ PEACE ACCORD

1111. The Commission heard that lawlessness and rule by military force continued to prevail in certain parts of the country, even after the signing of the Lomé Accord. The Northern Headquarter Town of Makeni and almost all the territories of the Northern Province were controlled wholly and solely by the RUF combatant cadre. The RUF had expelled soldiers and former soldiers of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) from there in June and July 1999 after a protracted armed confrontation. The dissident SLAs from that group relocated to their new base at Okra Hill, around Gberebana, which had become the West Side Jungle. The West Side Boys, as they became known, controlled the gateway between the Western Area and the rest of the country.
1112. During the initial phase of working towards the military elements of the implementation of the Peace Accord, the RUF despatched a confidence-building team from Lomé to Sierra Leone with a mandate to prepare the ground for peace. The four-man delegation comprised the Chairman of the RUF 'Peace Council' (formerly War Council) Solomon Y. B. Rogers, the Lomé delegate and former AFRC Minister Mike Lamin, Idrissa Kamara (alias Leather Boot) and Sahr Kangbajah.⁵⁷⁰ Its tasks consisted mainly of informing the combatant and non-combatant populations in the RUF-controlled areas of the terms and conditions of the agreement to which the RUF had put its signature.
1113. The West Side Boys signalled their intent with regard to the peace process by ambushing this RUF delegation in September 1999 as it was travelling into the Provinces to educate combatants about the imperative for disarmament. The above-mentioned members of the delegation were held for eight days, along with two of the most prominent combatant commanders in the RUF, Jackson Swarray (alias CO 'Wray') and Dennis Mingo (alias "Superman"). The RUF contingent was only released upon the intervention of the United Nations and other signatories to the Accord.⁵⁷¹ The bad blood in the relationship between the RUF and the West Side 'junglers' nevertheless lingered on.
1114. In addition to most of the Northern Province, the RUF also held the diamondiferous areas of Kono and Tongo, where several senior RUF commanders conceded that rampant illicit mining activities were taking place.⁵⁷² The diamonds procured from these mining activities were mostly

⁵⁷⁰ Mike Lamin, former RUF commander and later Minister of Trade, Industry and State Enterprise in the post-Lomé Government of Sierra Leone; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 2 to 7 June 2000.

⁵⁷¹ Mike Lamin, former RUF commander and later Minister of Trade, Industry and State Enterprise in the post-Lomé Government of Sierra Leone; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 2 to 7 June 2000.

⁵⁷² TRC Confidential Interview with an RUF combatant, 'G-5' commander and former intelligence officer; interview conducted in Koidu Town, Kono District; 12 August 2003.

being exported to Liberia through illegal channels controlled by RUF Battle Field Commander Issa Sesay. Sesay was by far the most prolific member of the RUF High Command in terms of accruing profits from diamond dealing,⁵⁷³ which many testimonies to the Commission have suggested was his underlying motive for trying to retain immunity from UNAMSIL monitoring in the areas where mining was taking place.⁵⁷⁴

1115. It was estimated by foreign dealers that approximately 90% of the proceeds of RUF illicit mining were going to state and non-state actors outside Sierra Leone,⁵⁷⁵ while a meagre 10% was finding its way to the Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD), under the Chairmanship of Foday Sankoh.⁵⁷⁶ This insight serves to attest to the broader dynamics of the RUF's involvement in the peace process. Out with the ranks of the movement itself, foreign businessmen and dealers saw benefits in the RUF combatant cadre's retention of a 'militarised' zone in the Provinces. It would allow the illicit business sector to engage in profiteering and unregulated transactions, which would evaporate if genuine peace and stability were restored.

RUF Retention of Control Areas and Resistance to the Disarmament Process

1116. In military terms, the RUF had entered the cease fire in a favourable position in terms of the amount of territory under its control. Almost the whole of the Kailahun District, where the RUF had retained its Headquarters, was concentrated with combatants awaiting disarmament. In the immediate aftermath of Lomé, Kailahun was the dominion of the RUF's overall Battle Field Commander, General Sam Bockarie (alias "Mosquito"), who was deputised by Colonel Momoh Rogers and Colonel Martin George.
1117. The Districts of Kono, Koinadugu, Tonkolili and Bombali constituted the control area of General Issa Sesay, the movement's second most senior commander. In land mass, Sesay's area represented approximately one third of the territory of Sierra Leone, including almost all its Northern infrastructure. Sesay was deputised by two further senior vanguard commanders, Brigadier Morris Kallon and Colonel Augustine Bao. Kallon's reputation as a wanton abuser of human rights preceded him into the peace process; Bao had also garnered a fearsome edge for himself during his tight grip on power as the RUF's Chief of Security.
1118. The RUF's hold over the entire Northern perimeter of Sierra Leone was completed by its command of the Kambia District. The Brigade Commander in Kambia was Colonel Komba Gbondema (alias Mon amie). He was

⁵⁷³ For more details of the specific diamond deals in which Sesay's personal involvement was alleged, see the chapter on Mineral Resources in the present volume of this report.

⁵⁷⁴ See, inter alia, Captain (Retired) Moigboi Moigande Kosia, former officer in the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF) and later recruited into the RUF by Foday Sankoh as his first 'G-1' officer; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 07 May 2003.

⁵⁷⁵ Again, for more details, see the chapter on Mineral Resources in the present volume of this report.

⁵⁷⁶ This estimate of the respective percentages of proceeds was included in a facsimile message sent to Foday Sankoh by a Belgian diamond agent named 'Michel'. The authenticity of the message was confirmed by Madam Fatou Sankoh, who was present upon its receipt: Madam Fatou Sankoh, member of the RUF and widow of the former Leader of the RUF, Foday Saybana Sankoh; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 07 to 09 November 2003.

supported by Colonel Abubakarr Jalloh (alias Bai Bureh) and a contingent of potentially several thousand combatants. The Kambia axis was to engage in combat operations on both the Sierra Leonean and Guinean sides of the border in its demonstration of obstinate resistance to the disarmament process.

1119. The compliance of the RUF combatant cadre with the terms of the disarmament programme was somewhat elusive. Even in areas where combatants expressed a readiness to disarm, they were often hampered by the lack of logistics, whereby disarmament monitors were not present in their deployment areas, or by the resistance of their commanders, who refused to comply in the DDR initiative on the terms stipulated in Lomé. Instead they engaged in persistent breaches of the peace, which spoke of a particular disregard for the status of the peacekeepers.
1120. One of the first significant violations of the post-Lomé peace took place in Kambia in October 1999.⁵⁷⁷ Its historical significance derived from the fact that it was the first occasion on which RUF combatants challenged the authority and free passage of foreign peacekeeping troops whose mandate was recognised by the RUF under international agreement. It involved an audacious assault by Komba Gbondema and his troops on the Guinean ECOMOG contingent as it returned overland to Guinea. At least six armoured vehicles were commandeered by the RUF and the ECOMOG peacekeepers were forcefully stripped off their arms.
1121. According to S. Y. B. Rogers, the most senior member of the RUF confidence-building team, the Guinean ECOMOG Commander sought redress by lodging his original report on Gbondema's violation directly with the RUF.⁵⁷⁸ Rogers instructed the immediate return by the RUF of all captured weaponry. However, his seniority in the movement counted for little with the combatant cadre and "never yielded any good response from Colonel Gbondema."⁵⁷⁹
1122. According to the Commission's investigations, the fracas in Kambia lasted for three months and was belatedly resolved in January 2000. In response to intense international pressure, Foday Sankoh was moved to order Gbondema in writing to release the full bounty of his seizure.⁵⁸⁰ Even then, it is impossible for the Commission to verify whether all materials were in fact returned.
1123. Kambia set the trend for other RUF-held Districts over the following months. The combatant commanders across the North and East appeared determined to thwart smooth monitoring and advancement of the disarmament of RUF combatants. They also acted in a manner that indicated their intention to be perceived as the *de facto* law enforcers on the ground. Commanders such as Gbondema, Morris Kallon, Issa Sesay and Augustine Bao displayed utter contempt for the ethos of the peace process in their areas of control.

⁵⁷⁷ United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL); "Summary of Ceasefire Violations: 1 November to 8 November 1999", recounting violations committed in the months of October and November 1999; Reference CF/VIO/ 41; dated October 1999.

⁵⁷⁸ Solomon Y. B. Rogers, former Chairman of the RUF War Council and later National Secretary General of the RUF; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 12 to 13 May 2000.

⁵⁷⁹ Solomon Y. B. Rogers, former Chairman of the RUF War Council and later National Secretary General of the RUF; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 12 to 13 May 2000.

⁵⁸⁰ Foday Sankoh, Chairman and Leader of the RUF; letter entitled "Release of Guinean Arms", addressed to Colonel Komba Gbondema, Brigade Commander, Kambia; 11 January 2000.

1124. Hence, in addition to their opposition to the presence and progress of peacekeepers, these commanders also imposed themselves as arbiters of summary justice against civilians and even their own combatants. On 25 February 2000, the UNAMSIL Force Commander, General V. K. Jetley, wrote to Foday Sankoh with the following complaint:

“On 22 February 2000, a team of UNAMSIL Military Observers and Civilian Police Officers reported to me that seventeen persons, including three women, were illegally detained under the control of RUF elements at Makeni Central Police Station... It appeared that these prisoners were detained and ‘sentenced’ by RUF elements to deprivation of liberty for reasons including petty crimes.

[...] Despite my sincere efforts to engage in a constructive dialogue with your local commanders on this issue, I was not able to speak to the prisoners, nor [to] secure their release from illegal and arbitrary detention... I was also informed that some prisoners were being held in detention for wanting to join the disarmament process – a process which you publicly continue to support.”⁵⁸¹

1125. Jetley had forwarded the same complaint directly to Issa Sesay on 24 February 2000, in which he had demanded that Sesay should “immediately effect unconditional release of the detainees, failing which you [Sesay] shall be entirely responsible for any consequences that may follow thereafter”.⁵⁸² Jetley’s interventions demonstrated the rising frustration present in UNAMSIL towards RUF commanders who not only regarded themselves as being above the law, but also took measures to present themselves as ‘the law’.

1126. Foday Sankoh was outwardly fiercely protective of ‘his boys’ in the field, particularly where he perceived the interventions or suggestions of others as unwelcome ‘interference’ in the internal affairs of the RUF. One example of this attitude came from Sankoh’s response to the complaints of General Jetley, in which he curtly dismissed UNAMSIL’s concerns as follows:

“I hereby remind you once again that the Command Structure of the RUF should on no account be interfered with. The RUF personnel under detention [in Makeni] are under discipline for breaking codes of conduct which would put the Lomé Peace Agreement in jeopardy... I thank you for your concern on behalf of the people of Sierra Leone, which is equally shared by all at the Revolutionary United Front Party.”⁵⁸³

1127. Sankoh’s persistent efforts to present a united front from within the RUF were however at odds with the real internal dynamics of the post-Lomé RUF. The analysis presented herein can only cast light upon some of the cracks that had started to appear within the RUF ranks, whereas in reality the rifts were too many and too complicated to reflect properly in their aftermath.

⁵⁸¹ General V. K. Jetley, UNAMSIL Force Commander, Letter to Chairman Foday Sankoh, Leader of the Revolutionary United Front Party (RUF), Freetown; 25 February 2000.

⁵⁸² General V. K. Jetley, UNAMSIL Force Commander, Memorandum to Brigadier Issa (RUF) Makeni entitled “Release of Illegal Detainees”; 24 February 2000.

⁵⁸³ Foday Sankoh, Chairman of the RUF; letter entitled “Re: Release of Illegal Detainees”, addressed to General VK Jetley, UNAMSIL Force Commander; 4 March 2000.

1128. Notably, members of the political wing had ceased to support Sankoh in his approach to dealing with the persistent violations of the combatants. Some of his closest allies in the RUF attempted to advise him of his responsibilities under the Lomé Accord. However, as the late S. Y. B. Rogers, Chairman of the RUF Peace Council, explained, such attempts were just as likely to incur Sankoh's wrath as his compliance:

“As an executive member of the RUF, I personally talked to Foday Sankoh alone in his office on so many occasions. I told him [of my concerns] by reminding him that the RUF had now transformed itself into a political party and that military options would no longer solve the problem in Sierra Leone. I further reminded him about the signing of the Lomé Peace Accord.

At this point, Chairman Foday Sankoh shouted at me that I am collaborating with His Excellency the President Tejan Kabbah and the Deputy Minister of Defence Chief Sam Hinga Norman by disseminating information to the Government of Sierra Leone about the [workings of the] RUF. From that moment, Foday Sankoh lost confidence in me; I was no longer consulted on any matter regarding the RUF or even called upon for decision-making. Sankoh continued to castigate me in the presence of RUF Executive members.”⁵⁸⁴

1129. There were nevertheless differing interpretations from RUF members as to the reasons why Sankoh did not seem to be effectively controlling the combatant cadre. Most of the testimonies received by the Commission agree on the issue that Sankoh was determined to prevent others from ‘interfering’ in his command of the troops. Yet while some saw this stance as a reflection of Sankoh's intransigence, there were others who believed that it was something of a charade. Sheku Andrew Coomber, for instance, suggested that Sankoh's apparent duplicity grew out of his own sense of insecurity:

“Sankoh's refusal [to reprimand his combatants] and other related incidents caused me to believe that Foday Sankoh was fearing his gun carriers despite his public pronouncements that he had control over them. Sankoh's attitude deceived myself and perhaps all well-meaning Sierra Leoneans who had been hoping of getting everlasting peace.”⁵⁸⁵

1130. Certainly Sankoh became personally ever-more detached from his combatants as the demands of the Lomé implementation wore on. Apparently inadvertently, he became distracted from some of his own avowed principles while he was based in Freetown. He ceased to pay close attention to the combatant cadre in the bush, let alone to cater personally for their needs. The result was that low-level fighters began to question Sankoh's commitment to them. Hence the RUF leader was viewed with greater suspicion and his natural authority diminished. High level fighters, meanwhile, perceived

⁵⁸⁴ Solomon Y. B. Rogers, former Chairman of the RUF War Council and later National Secretary General of the RUF; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 12 to 13 May 2000.

⁵⁸⁵ Sheku Andrew Coomber, RUF Representative to the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC); statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at CID Headquarters, Freetown; 11 May 2000.

Sankoh's position as being at the top of a slippery slope that "seemed destined to end in disaster."⁵⁸⁶

1131. The starkest manifestation of this attitude and the most significant blow to the unity of the post-Lomé RUF organisation came on 15 December 1999 when Sam Bockarie (alias "Mosquito") left Sierra Leone. He made it categorically clear to his fellow commanders that he was leaving the RUF on account of his personal differences with Sankoh. He mobilised a sizeable contingent of combatants loyal to him and crossed into Liberia with the blessing of Charles Taylor. Mosquito vowed never to return to Sierra Leone for as long as Foday Sankoh was the leader of the RUF.⁵⁸⁷
1132. Mosquito's move would have been unthinkable during the earlier years of the war when Sankoh was afforded complete respect and loyalty by all of the RUF commanders in the movement. That level of control was tied in with the notion of common destiny, whereby all the commanders relied on Sankoh for their empowerment or enrichment: without him they were nothing. By this latter juncture, though, Mosquito's personal contact with President Taylor in Liberia was sufficient for him to sustain a life of warlordism independently of the RUF. After his departure from Sierra Leone he continued fighting in Liberia and the Ivory Coast and was to evade justice all the way to his grave.⁵⁸⁸
1133. Among those left in the Provinces, there was still no evidence of a courageous military leadership who would embrace the disarmament process. The RUF combatant cadre did not appear ready to forfeit the power they had attained through brute force. On the contrary, some of the most senior commanders sought to consolidate their own control over civilian areas in the absence of armed assault on their positions from any 'enemy'. The Commission found that a major failure on the part of all the faction leaders was that they failed to inspire confidence and faith in Lomé as a fair and impartial process in the RUF combatant cadre.
1134. It was in this light that the fuse was lit for the final explosive episode in the military and political history of the conflict as it was directed by the RUF. The three most senior commanders left in the field were Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon and Augustine Bao. According to RUF members, the individual and collective opposition of these three men in particular had already been made apparent to the political wing through harrowing personal encounters. On one occasion, the Lands Minister Peter Vandy was stripped naked and beaten by Morris Kallon in Makeni.⁵⁸⁹ In a trip to Freetown to collect allowances in late April

⁵⁸⁶ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF 'vanguard' commander who was taken from detention in Liberia to become a member of the movement; interview conducted in Freetown; 19 September 2003.

⁵⁸⁷ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF commander who joined Foday Sankoh in Freetown as a member of the RUF; interview conducted in Freetown; 18 August 2003.

⁵⁸⁸ Sam Bockarie (alias "Mosquito") was indicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone in March 2003. At the time, he was believed to have been engaged in fighting in the border area between Liberia and the Ivory Coast. Within weeks of his indictment, Bockarie was reported to have been shot dead in a firefight at the border, while trying to enter into Liberia. A corpse alleged to be that of Bockarie was eventually brought to Freetown for forensic examination on behalf of the Special Court. In December 2003, the Special Court pronounced Bockarie dead and declared that the indictment against him was void.

⁵⁸⁹ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF representative to the Cease fire Monitoring Committee (CMC); interview conducted in Freetown; 22 September 2003.

2000, Augustine Bao had vowed that he was about to put a stop to the whole peace process.⁵⁹⁰

RUF VIOLATION OF THE LOMÉ PEACE ACCORD IN TAKING UNAMSIL PEACEKEEPERS HOSTAGE

1135. On Monday 1 May 2000 the RUF leader Foday Sankoh convened a press conference at his residence. Sankoh commented on an altercation between armed ECOMOG peacekeepers and West Side Boys that had taken place at Frederick Street, Freetown three days earlier and had left one AFRC soldier dead and another wounded. Sankoh publicly blamed UNAMSIL for the breakdown in relations between combatants in the city. He was perceived to have sent hostile impulses to RUF commanders nationwide as to how they should relate to the new units of UNAMSIL peacekeepers that were about to deploy in the country.
1136. Augustine Bao was reported to be in attendance at the 1 May 2000 meeting. According to the UN Secretary-General's Report⁵⁹¹, Bao was despatched by Foday Sankoh to return to Makeni with a letter, the contents of which were unspecified, for the attention of Issa Sesay. The Commission was unable to identify any link between the letter that Sankoh purportedly sent to Sesay and the events that subsequently unfolded. However, what is certain is that Bao's return to the Northern Province coincided exactly with the outbreak of hostilities between the RUF and UNAMSIL peacekeepers.
1137. The Commission heard from the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR) that it had opened a new 'reception centre' for the purposes of disarming combatants at Makoth, in the vicinity of Makeni, on 17 April 2000.⁵⁹² It was at this centre that ten RUF combatants presented themselves to Kenyan UNAMSIL troops for disarmament on the weekend of 29 April 2000. Apparently these ten combatants proceeded to the DDR camp without seeking the prior 'permission' of their commanders, the most senior of whom was Morris Kallon. Kallon responded to this news on 1 May 2000. He led an armed troop of RUF combatants to the DDR camp and demanded that the disarmed combatants and their weapons be returned to the RUF High Command.⁵⁹³
1138. There were shots fired between the Kenyan peacekeepers and the RUF at Makoth, as Kallon and his troop forcefully deployed inside the boundaries of the UNAMSIL reception centre. The upshot of the confrontation of 1 May 2000 was that four Kenyan peacekeepers and four UNAMSIL military observers from the UK and New Zealand were captured and detained by the RUF at its

⁵⁹⁰ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF 'junior commando' recruited on the Kailahun front, who subsequently became a 'G-2' Commander and investigator in the Internal Defence Unit; interview conducted in Freetown, 22 September 2003.

⁵⁹¹ See Fourth Report of the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the Security Council on the Situation in Sierra Leone; 19 May 2000.

⁵⁹² NCDDR, submission to the Commission in the context of Thematic Hearings held in Freetown; June 2003; also Dr. Francis Kaikai, Executive Secretary of NCDDR, TRC Interview held at NCDDR Headquarters in Freetown; 20 July 2003,

⁵⁹³ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF commander on the Northern Axis; interview conducted in Magburaka, Tonkolili District; 14 August 2003.

Brigade Headquarters in Makeni.⁵⁹⁴ According to Foday Sankoh's 'Special Assistant', Gibril Massaquoi, the RUF High Command in Freetown received a message about the tension in Makeni from Morris Kallon, although both the timing of this message and the veracity of Massaquoi's claim as to its content remain to be ascertained:

"The real thing started with Morris Kallon... who sent a message to Foday Sankoh complaining that UNAMSIL soldiers had forcefully disarmed RUF soldiers at a place called Makoth, some ten miles to Makeni... [Kallon said] that they were not going to agree to that; and that the latest information was that they had killed seven of their men – seven RUF men. He said UNAMSIL had killed them."⁵⁹⁵

1139. Information about the attack had also been relayed to Freetown through UNAMSIL channels, however, and its details were known to President Kabbah the same evening. Kabbah chose to express his concerns to the RUF Minister Mike Lamin rather than addressing Foday Sankoh himself. Lamin later explained his participation in a meeting with Kabbah to the Sierra Leone Police:

"I recall sometime in the early part of May 2000, I was summoned to the Lodge of President Kabbah for a briefing. At the [President's] Lodge, I met the President together with General Jetley, UNAMSIL Force Commander. Both President Kabbah and General Jetley told me that RUF combatants had attacked the DDR camp and UNAMSIL troops in Makeni. General Jetley further said that the RUF commanders in Makeni were demanding the release of ten RUF combatants who had already disarmed to UNAMSIL. To that effect, President Kabbah therefore impressed upon me to relay his concern to Foday Sankoh for the immediate settlement of that crisis... When I left that same night, I met Sankoh around 11.00 p.m. at his own Lodge at 56 Spur Road. I explained to him the development as was narrated to me by General Jetley and President Kabbah... Sankoh said he was going to send a message that same night to ascertain the situation."⁵⁹⁶

1140. The sequence of events from 1 May 2000 onwards has been reported to the Commission in a relatively consistent fashion from all sides. The most immediate development was that Morris Kallon and Augustine Bao proceeded to mobilise two further troops of combatants from nearby Magburaka under the respective command of the local Brigade Commander Sheriff Parker (alias "Base Marine") and the Operations Commander Amara Pelletto.⁵⁹⁷ The RUF troops attacked the UNAMSIL position in Magburaka and engaged in a lengthy gun battle with Kenyan peacekeepers deployed there. On the same day the

⁵⁹⁴ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF commander on the Northern Axis; interview conducted in Magburaka, Tonkolili District; 14 August 2003.

⁵⁹⁵ Gibril Massaquoi, former RUF Target Group and Battalion Commander, originally recruited as a junior commando in Pujehun and later 'Special Assistant' to former RUF Leader, Foday Sankoh; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; July 2002.

⁵⁹⁶ Mike Lamin, former RUF commander and later Minister of Trade, Industry and State Enterprise in the post-Lomé Government of Sierra Leone; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 2 to 7 June 2000.

⁵⁹⁷ Prince Mannah Kpaka, former RUF training instructor; TRC Interview conducted in Koidu Town, Kono District; 15 April 2003.

Kenyan unit based in Makeni was also attacked by the RUF and forced to retreat in the face of a much larger and better-equipped fighting force.⁵⁹⁸

1141. It was reported that all three of UNAMSIL's deployment companies in Magburaka were pulled out on the evening of 2 May 2000, each of them using a different route. All of the roads out of the town were ambushed by RUF forces. The company that attempted to reach Makeni was intercepted by RUF gunfire around a high bridge on the old railway line. When a UNAMSIL Armoured Personnel Carrier was forced off the road, it apparently tumbled onto the river bank; two Kenyans died and several others were injured. The report later presented to the UN Security Council stated that a total of four Kenyans were killed by the RUF in the Magburaka incident.⁵⁹⁹ Meanwhile three of the 60-man Kenyan unit in Makeni sustained injuries in the second attack.
1142. The highest numbers of violations committed by the RUF in these operations, however, were the rates of abduction of UNAMSIL peacekeepers. According to UNAMSIL sources, the RUF took more than 550 UNAMSIL peacekeepers as hostages in the space of barely one week, beginning on 1 May 2000.⁶⁰⁰ This total comprised: an estimated 92 Kenyan personnel from the Magburaka attacks;⁶⁰¹ up to 30 Indian peacekeepers at separate incidents around Kuiva, Kailahun District;⁶⁰² 226 Zambian troops on the road between Makeni and Magburaka;⁶⁰³ and over 300 peacekeepers of different nationalities in Yengema, Kono District.⁶⁰⁴ According to the preponderance of interviewees in the Commission's enquiries into these incidents, the UNAMSIL personnel were typically robbed of their uniforms, headgear and other personal effects, forced to parade in lines under armed supervision and detained in cramped conditions. Several official UNAMSIL vehicles in which the captured personnel had been travelling were also seized.
1143. The RUF's public presentation of the hostage-taking at the time remained resolutely removed from the realities on the ground. The briefings made by several senior officials, particularly Sankoh's 'Special Assistant' Gibril Massaquoi, were remarkable if only for their elusiveness. On 5 May 2000, Massaquoi's statement to the press was typical of the denials he released to the media: "We want to believe the peacekeepers alleged to have been held by RUF fighters may have got lost in the bush during the fighting in Makeni and Magburaka... [we are seeking] to organise a search party for the missing UN peacekeepers."⁶⁰⁵

⁵⁹⁸ See Fourth Report of the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the Security Council on the Situation in Sierra Leone; 19 May 2000.

⁵⁹⁹ See Fourth Report of the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the Security Council on the Situation in Sierra Leone; 19 May 2000.

⁶⁰⁰ Colonel Mutale, Personal Assistant to the UNAMSIL Force Commander; TRC Interview conducted in Freetown on 12 July 2003.

⁶⁰¹ See Fourth Report of the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the Security Council on the Situation in Sierra Leone; 19 May 2000.

⁶⁰² Alhaji Fomba Jaward and Bashiru Sheriff, former RUF commanders in Kuiva, Kailahun District; TRC Interviews conducted in Kuiva, Kailahun District; 17 April 2003.

⁶⁰³ Colonel Mutale, Personal Assistant to the UNAMSIL Force Commander; TRC Interview conducted in Freetown on 12 July 2003.

⁶⁰⁴ Prince Mannah Kpaka, former RUF training instructor; TRC Interview conducted in Koidu Town, Kono District; 15 April 2003.

⁶⁰⁵ Gibril Massaquoi, Special Assistant to the RUF leader Foday Sankoh; statement to the press quoted in the News Archives of Sierra Leone Web; 5 May 2000.

THE UNAMSIL HOSTAGE-TAKING EPISODE AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE DETERIORATION IN THE SECURITY SITUATION IN SIERRA LEONE

1144. The Commission readily concurs with the United Nations⁶⁰⁶ that the widespread and unprovoked abductions of UNAMSIL peacekeepers constituted a grave breach of the conditions of the Lomé cease fire. Moreover, the Commission finds that the hostilities against UNAMSIL peacekeepers, which culminated in their abductions, were instigated and commanded by Morris Kallon and Augustine Bao of the RUF, apparently in a joint and coordinated operation. According to Gibril Massaquoi, Issa Sesay also gave commands for the abductions to be carried out and participated in “the fight against UNAMSIL.”⁶⁰⁷
1145. From the evidence adduced, however, there is considerable unresolved controversy as to the exact means by which these abductions came about. Issa Sesay certainly played a part in perpetuating the crisis, for he met with delegates from both UNAMSIL and the RUF and gave false assurances that the situation was about to subside.⁶⁰⁸ Yet the internal dynamics of the RUF at the time must be put into proper context when analysing this episode. In particular, the roles played by Foday Sankoh and his Special Assistant Gibril Massaquoi warrant further scrutiny.
1146. The first point of contention concerns the question of whether a command was directly issued to Kallon and Bao from Foday Sankoh’s Lodge in Freetown. Certainly, as Mike Lamin and others intimated, Sankoh was apprised of the situation on the ground within 24 hours of the first altercation between the RUF and UNAMSIL in Makeni. The RUF leader was made aware by Lamin that RUF troops had contested the disarmament of the original ten combatants in the Makoth reception centre. One account of what happened thereafter was given by Sheku Andrew Coomber, RUF delegate to the Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC), who was present at Sankoh’s Lodge on the night of 1 May 2000:

“Sankoh instructed the signal operator Samuel Lamboi (alias Ebony) to invite Bao and Morris Kallon to explain the incident. That was to be done through the High Frequency radio. Gibril Massaquoi, Special Assistant to Sankoh, came and spoke with Morris Kallon on the issue. During the conversation between Kallon and Massaquoi, I overheard... [Kallon’s version of the UNAMSIL hostage-taking episode]. Kallon said Bao was not satisfied with UNAMSIL’s answer. Therefore a quarrel ensued between Bao and UNAMSIL. He concluded that Bao took one UNAMSIL Major as hostage in place of the alleged combatants held by UNAMSIL.

⁶⁰⁶ See Fourth Report of the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to the Security Council on the Situation in Sierra Leone; 19 May 2000.

⁶⁰⁷ Gibril Massaquoi, former RUF Target Group and Battalion Commander, originally recruited as a junior commando in Pujehun and later ‘Special Assistant’ to former RUF Leader, Foday Sankoh; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; July 2002.

⁶⁰⁸ TRC Confidential Interview with senior RUF member who attempted to assist in resolving the UNAMSIL hostage-taking crisis; interview conducted in Freetown; 17 August 2003.

[...] In my presence, Gibril Massaquoi left the communication set to explain the report received to Foday Sankoh. Few minutes later, Gibril [Massaquoi] came from Sankoh and informed Morris Kallon through the same set that Sankoh had instructed to arrest the remaining UNAMSIL soldiers and detain them. Gibril transmitted that message to Kallon in Mende thus: '*Pa yeh, wu ti kpelleh hu*'; which means 'Pa said to arrest all the UNAMSIL soldiers'. That was the end of the message."⁶⁰⁹

1147. In assessing the content of this account by Coomber, the Commission is obliged to make several observations. First, as various senior figures within the RUF political wing testified, there were numerous attempts to apply moral pressure on Sankoh to issue a firm order to the responsible parties to release the peacekeepers.⁶¹⁰ There is no evidence that Sankoh ever complied by issuing a deterrent order.
1148. Second, the combatants in the field had made it clear to Sankoh that they were prepared to take action beyond the abductions if their authority was again challenged in any way by the political wing. According to some of those who worked around him, Sankoh appeared to cower in the face of intimidation tactics by the combatant cadre.⁶¹¹ Mike Lamin capitalised on Foday Sankoh's perceived weakness in this regard to make a case for holding Sankoh responsible for the abductions:

"Foday Sankoh failed adequately and promptly to address the Makeni RUF arrest and detentions of peacekeepers. This is because he could have used the H. F. (high frequency) radio to instruct the release of the peacekeepers; more so when he is the signatory and possibly the only and highest leader of RUF whom every combatant fears. But if Sankoh never considered that [step] until the current break in the implementation of the Lomé Accord, he should be held responsible for any outcome whatsoever."⁶¹²

1149. Yet Gibril Massaquoi, in his own testimony to the Commission, implied that Sankoh's responsibility in the matter was mitigated by the allegedly deceptive tactics employed by Bao and Kallon on the ground. Massaquoi implied that the hostage-taking crisis was effectively sparked by a spontaneous action carried out by Bao and Kallon, who then duped the RUF leadership into 'playing along' with their 'plot' by portraying the UNAMSIL troops squarely as a military adversary:

"Sankoh was in a dilemma, especially when people were then pouncing on him. The actual stories never met Sankoh. They [Bao and Kallon in

⁶⁰⁹ Sheku Andrew Coomber, RUF Representative to the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC); statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at CID Headquarters, Freetown; 11 May 2000.

⁶¹⁰ See, inter alia, Peter Borbor Vandy, former RUF commander and later Minister of Lands, Housing, Country Planning and the Environment in the post-Lomé Government of Sierra Leone; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 2 to 7 June 2000; and Solomon Y. B. Rogers, former Chairman of the RUF War Council and later National Secretary General of the RUF; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 12 to 13 May 2000.

⁶¹¹ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF commander who joined Foday Sankoh in Freetown as a member of the RUF; interview conducted in Freetown; 18 August 2003.

⁶¹² Mike Lamin, former RUF commander and later Minister of Trade, Industry and State Enterprise in the post-Lomé Government of Sierra Leone; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 2 to 7 June 2000.

the North] were giving false information to him [Sankoh]. When we reached Makeni, we learnt that no UNAMSIL [troops] had killed any RUF soldier. It was just a plot. There was just one morning when Bao, Kallon and others stood on the street and said that that day, they would start riding in UNAMSIL vehicles. They forged all types of cliques who started attacking the people just to take some of their vehicles and other items from them. So that was how the whole thing had started.”⁶¹³

1150. In this area as in others, the Commission treats the testimony of Gibril Massaquoi with extreme caution. Massaquoi was unique in the RUF in that he remained an enigma to many of those around him throughout the war. He was well-educated and therefore able to pass himself off as an ‘administrator’ to the outside world, especially in the post-Lomé phase. Throughout his testimony to the TRC, he deflected questions as to his own role in combat operations and maintained that he was “working with [Sankoh] basically on administrative level.”⁶¹⁴
1151. Yet according to numerous testimonies from his former RUF colleagues, Massaquoi fought fiercely at the front line when he was away from the public eye.⁶¹⁵ He commanded units of combatants during phases when vital military operations were being conducted, particularly as a Target Commander on the Southern Front and as a Battalion Commander during the guerrilla warfare phase. He was the most senior combatant in the RUF movement who had not been trained in advance of the conflict.
1152. Massaquoi is all the more unique in that he successfully manipulated his way into Sankoh’s affections, despite the burning acrimony between him and other senior combatants, particularly the vanguards. In the prosecution of military and political strategy after Lomé, Massaquoi was Sankoh’s ‘Special Assistant’ in every sense. His position was the closest to a de facto second-in-command as there existed in the High Command of the RUF after the departure of Sam Bockarie (alias “Mosquito”).
1153. As will be demonstrated in the following section, Gibril Massaquoi performed a variety of functions at the Lodge of Foday Sankoh that went far beyond the public relations duties associated with most spokesmen. Several high-ranking RUF members testified to the police that Massaquoi was one of those in charge of administering the arms stockpile at Sankoh’s Lodge. Massaquoi was also the commander who collected deposits of diamonds from the combatant cadre and in exchange distributed food and logistics to the fighters. In his testimony to the Commission, Massaquoi conceded that this was one of his roles, but was eager to downplay the importance he had to the movement:

⁶¹³ Gibril Massaquoi, former RUF Target Group and Battalion Commander, originally recruited as a junior commando in Pujehun and later ‘Special Assistant’ to former RUF Leader, Foday Sankoh; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; July 2002.

⁶¹⁴ Gibril Massaquoi, former RUF Target Group and Battalion Commander, originally recruited as a junior commando in Pujehun and later ‘Special Assistant’ to former RUF Leader, Foday Sankoh; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; July 2002.

⁶¹⁵ See, inter alia, TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF ‘junior commando’ recruited on the Pujehun front, who subsequently became a Front-line Commander and Training Instructor; interview conducted in Freetown, 29 September 2003; and TRC Confidential Interview with a member of the RUF High Command who worked closely with Foday Sankoh after joining him in 1990; interview conducted in Freetown; 1 December 2003.

“We came back [after Lomé] and we were working together; Sankoh had said that we should forget about all our problems from the past. I used to meet Issa [Sesay] in Kono: I went with food for the soldiers; I went with machines, medication and so forth. Issa gave me diamonds, which I brought back to Sankoh.

[...] But I have never at any point in time controlled Sankoh's diamonds or his money. What I know is that I had received diamonds from his Field Commander [Issa Sesay] to be brought down to him [Sankoh] on two occasions: one from Magburaka and the other from Kono. That's all I knew.”⁶¹⁶

1154. The Commission finds that Gibril Massaquoi acted dishonestly and without integrity during the UNAMSIL hostage-taking crisis. He misrepresented the situation on the ground as it was reported to him. His motives for doing so were most likely premised upon his strained personal relationships with the field commanders in question and his enduring tendency to manipulate Foday Sankoh. He sought to disadvantage his allies and to improve his own lot.
1155. Massaquoi's role is afforded special attention because he presented what most observers believed to be the RUF position during a most controversial and explosive episode.⁶¹⁷ He acted as the Spokesman for the RUF and conveyed statements to a national and international audience. Moreover, though, Massaquoi was the conduit of information between Sankoh and the RUF field commanders: he relayed Sankoh's instructions in one direction and brought back the field reports of the commanders in the other direction. In this role, he was an integral part of the chain of command of the RUF.
1156. The success or failure of the Lomé Accord was riding on the preservation of a fragile relationship between the parties. The Government's stake in the process depended on the extent to which it trusted Foday Sankoh. In turn, Foday Sankoh's trustworthiness relied mostly upon the extent to which the RUF field commanders were responsive to him. Massaquoi's abuse of his position undermined the Government's trust in Sankoh. Moreover it deliberately drove a wedge between Sankoh and his field commanders. The Commission finds accordingly that Gibril Massaquoi bears an individual share of the responsibility for the deteriorating security situation in Sierra Leone.
1157. None of the foregoing should be allowed to obscure the responsibility of the RUF leader Foday Sankoh. He alone held the ultimate decision-making prerogative on the operations of the RUF. If his leadership as a peace-maker had been strong and sincere, he would have halted the hostage-taking crisis and served the cause of the Lomé Accord. He alone had the authority to influence the actions of Bao, Kallon, Sesay and Massaquoi and to divert them from their respective destructive agendas. He failed to do all of this. He had effectively lost control of his people once he decided to participate in the Lomé peace process.

⁶¹⁶ Gibril Massaquoi, former RUF Target Group and Battalion Commander, originally recruited as a junior commando in Pujehun and later 'Special Assistant' to former RUF Leader, Foday Sankoh; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; July 2002.

⁶¹⁷ See the various entries in the News Archives of Sierra Leone Web between 1 May 2000 and 7 May 2000 for evidence of the multiple misrepresentations Massaquoi made to the national and international media during the hostage-taking episode; available at www.sierra-leone.org.

1158. The Commission finds that Foday Sankoh deluded himself and deceived his fellow signatories to the Peace Accord by purporting to resolve the hostage-taking crisis. Sankoh forfeited his credibility in the RUF due to his lack of rectitude. Whatever the extent to which he felt himself constrained in his ability to issue orders of binding and unchallengeable force, he had nobody but himself to blame for the RUF's obstruction to the peace.
1159. Yet Sankoh continued to present a false impression to the international community by suggesting that his movement was not responsible for taking the UNAMSIL peacekeepers hostage. The Commission finds that in doing so, Sankoh further endangered the lives of the peacekeepers. He squandered any semblance of trustworthiness he previously had as a partner in peace. Cumulatively he served to aggravate the deteriorating security situation in Sierra Leone.
1160. It remains to be seen whether the RUF High Command collectively harboured an agenda to enhance its stake in power beyond the hostage-taking. Further analysis in this regard follows in the next section. At this juncture, it suffices to conclude with the viewpoint in retrospect of the RUF's representative on the Joint Monitoring Committee, Sheku Andrew Coomber. Coomber's testimony largely speaks for itself:

"In most RUF meetings, Gibril Massaquoi and Foday Sankoh were always at variance with the other members... These two people, I believe, were greatly responsible for the collapse of the Lomé Peace Accord. Gibril in particular [was] insisting that all the provisions mentioned and meant for the RUF [would have to be] provided before complying with the implementation of the Peace Accord. For instance, Chairman Sankoh was saying he was committed to the peace process but he was then giving underground instructions to the combatants in the field not to disarm.

[...] Lately it was the determination of Foday Sankoh to take peace by the use of force. That was most times echoed by Sankoh and Steven Williams: that the RUF must overthrow the SLPP-led Government. For that, after the Frederick Street episode [involving ECOMOG and the West Side Boys], it became apparent that Sankoh's determination was ripe. In one of the preparations for that, Gibril Massaquoi used the RUF High Frequency (HF) radio to instruct one commander that at anytime there was a loss of communication on the radio with them, let the troops move and attack Freetown. I do not specifically know with whom he was talking, but I suspected that he was talking with Brigadier Morris Kallon.

[...] Gibril [Massaquoi] and Sankoh were sure of overthrowing the SLPP-led Government from their pronouncements during those latter days until the Monday [8 May 2000] demonstration."⁶¹⁸

⁶¹⁸ Sheku Andrew Coomber, RUF Representative to the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC); statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at CID Headquarters, Freetown; 11 May 2000.

1161. In summary, the Commission finds that the hostage-taking of several hundred UNAMSIL military personnel in the early days of May 2000 was the gravest misadventure carried out by RUF cadres during the disarmament phase. There can be no justification for the use of armed force against observers and support staff whose neutrality and safety were imperative to the successful implementation of the Lomé Peace Accord.
1162. The RUF as an organisation inflicted irreparable discredit upon itself during the hostage-taking episode. The episode planted the seeds of hysteria in the minds of members of the public, who felt betrayed by the RUF. It also served to antagonise the RUF's partners in Government, including President Kabbah, who drew a great degree of vindication for his approach of never properly trusting the RUF in the first place. The public, the Parliament, the President and the RUF's other 'partners' in the peace process held a common viewpoint that the RUF had exhausted all its chances. These parties all united behind the principle that some form of demonstrative action would be warranted to put an end to the RUF's perceived threat.
1163. The hostage-taking saga in the provinces was to run relatively unabated for over a month, as the RUF combatant cadre spiralled totally out of hand. However, the lifespan of the RUF political wing was to be cut short abruptly as the conflict reached its breaking point in Freetown in the month of May 2000.

THE EVENTS OF MAY 2000 AND THE DECLINE OF THE RUF

The Military and Political Transition enters the Public Domain in Freetown

1164. The task of instilling accountability into the peace process was much more than simply an official duty vested in the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP) and the various other monitoring bodies. It was also an issue of public interest.
1165. The peace had been secured in the name of the people, so in turn the people considered themselves stakeholders in ensuring that the terms of the peace were upheld. The Sierra Leonean population was watching vigilantly to see whether the various undertakings made during and in the wake of Lomé were anything more than empty promises.
1166. Freetown was the city in which the outcomes of the post-Lomé political transition were most in evidence. The prominent personalities of Sierra Leonean politics had to make room on the hillsides of Western Freetown to accommodate leaders of the former fighting factions in houses, referred to as 'Lodges', that were just as large and lavish as their own. The most conspicuous newcomers to this particular club were the Chairman of the CCP Johnny Paul Koroma and the RUF leader Foday Sankoh. Their residences became 'bases' for the factions who identified these men as their leaders.

Johnny Paul Koroma's Juba Hill Residence

1167. Upon his official appointment by President Kabbah to the post of Chairman of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP), Johnny Paul Koroma assumed residence in the same grandiose, state-sponsored compound that had been occupied by General Joseph Saidu Momoh while he had been President under the APC.⁶¹⁹ This 'Lodge' was located at Juba Hill in the far West of Freetown, towards the peninsular settlement of Goderich.
1168. Within weeks of his return to the political scene, Koroma began to demonstrate the high level of risk that was incumbent in President Kabbah's strategy of including him. Specifically, Koroma started to assemble at Juba Hill a group of fighters whose track records in the conflict marked them out as being among the greatest threats to state security. The inner circle who joined Koroma in late 1999 included Santigie Kanu (alias "Five Five"), Alex Tamba Brima (alias "Gullit"), Ibrahim Kamara (alias 'Bazzy'), Samuel Kargbo (alias 'Sammy') and George Adams. Since their expulsion from Freetown in late January 1999, they were known collectively as the 'West Side Boys'.
1169. The irony is not lost on the Commission that through Koroma's actions, most of the ringleaders of the 6 January 1999 invasion of Freetown were returning to the city as 'protectors of the peace'. There was no evidence in their actions that these 'West Side Boys' warranted any role in helping to restore calm and confidence to the minds of the Sierra Leone population. They were not of a mind to reconcile their difference with the RUF; indeed the stance they put forward in their letter of 'grievances and demands' in September 1999 indicated that they had an axe to grind on account of the RUF's "unacceptable" treatment of their leader, Johnny Paul Koroma.⁶²⁰
1170. In a statement to the Sierra Leone Police, a West Side Boy named Samuel Bassie (alias 'Machiavelli') explained how the dissident soldiers were hand-picked by Johnny Paul Koroma to assemble in Freetown. Bassie also indicated that Koroma's original order was somewhat misinterpreted, as other AFRC members and West Siders came to 'deploy' in Freetown without having been invited:

"Chairman Johnny Paul Koroma and other members of the RUF/AFRC-SLA came to settle in Freetown. A message was despatched to the Okra Hill's [base] commonly called 'West Side' for a team of personnel to be selected to form Johnny Paul Koroma's security in Freetown. That order came from Chairman Johnny Paul Koroma himself.

[...] I was fortunate to be selected by Brigadier Ibrahim Kamara (alias 'Bazzy') as a bodyguard to my commander Brigadier Hassan Bangura (alias 'Papa' or 'Bomblast'), who himself was also to become one of the guards to Johnny Paul Koroma in Freetown. We were twenty-six (26) in number selected for the task; to name a few: Junior Johnston (alias

⁶¹⁹ See, *inter alia*: Ibrahim Bioh Sesay, former civilian auxiliary to the Sierra Leone Army who joined the AFRC and later became a commander of the West Side Boys; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Records Office of the Pademba Road Prison, Freetown; 29 July 2000.

⁶²⁰ Lieutenant Colonel Johnny Paul Koroma (Chairman, AFRC), Brigadier Ibrahim Bazzy Kamara (Head of Military Delegation, Okra Hills) and twelve others; "Grievances and Demands of Soldiers of the Sierra Leone Army with Regards to the Lomé Peace Agreement"; document circulated as a petition to the parties in the peace process; 3 September 1999.

'Junior Lion') as Chief Security Officer, Fodayba Marrah as Deputy CSO, 'Colonel Hashim' and others.

[...] Whiles on deployment at the Lodge... at Juba Hill, some SLA members from Okra Hill were deploying themselves at the Lodge [in addition to the existing cadre]. In fact, Chairman Johnny Paul Koroma was against the influx of SLA combatants at his Lodge."⁶²¹

1171. Another senior AFRC soldier who worked closely with Koroma told the TRC that the eventual number of West Side Boys who came to the Juba Hill Lodge grew to "more than double" the number that Koroma had originally called upon.⁶²² In the light of this evidence, the Commission believes that Koroma hosted as many as 50 men in his compound, including the 'influx' of gatecrashers. It is clear that some members of the expanded contingent were unwelcome even at the Juba Hill Lodge, not to mention among the Freetown populace as a whole.
1172. The Commission finds that the presence of such a rabble at the house of an esteemed office-holder in the Lomé peace process was an immediate and ever present danger to a successful transition to peace. It was destined to precipitate fear and suspicion among the residents of Freetown and to provoke clashes between and among factions over unresolved vendettas from the conflict.
1173. Johnny Paul Koroma was by no means blind to the potentially incendiary effect of the West Side Boys at his Juba Hill Lodge. Yet while he professed himself to be 'against the influx', he took no decisive action to quell it. Moreover, he allowed weapons to be kept in his house, many of them Army-issue rifles that he had accessed through those who were still loyal to him in the Sierra Leone Army.⁶²³
1174. The Commission finds that Koroma's credentials as Chairman of the CCP, an important peace-building institution, were seriously undermined by his assembly of a unit of West Side Boys around him. He acted as the *de facto* ground commander of a private Army of hardened fighters known for their propensity for excess and brutality.

Foday Sankoh's Spur Road Lodge

1175. Meanwhile Foday Sankoh and his RUFP entourage took up residence in a sizeable two-storey Lodge at No. 56 Spur Road. The Spur Road Lodge became something of a communal dwelling for the extended family, friends and associates of Foday Sankoh. It also served several other functions simultaneously: it was the Party Headquarters of the RUFP; Sankoh used it as his provisional office in his capacity as Chairman of the CMMRD; and it was the venue of countless formal and informal meetings that Sankoh held, variously, with Ministers, foreign Ambassadors, potential business partners, former commanders, journalists and members of the public.

⁶²¹ Samuel Bassie (alias "Machiavelli"), soldier in the Sierra Leone Army and former security guard to Johnny Paul Koroma; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at Pademba Road Prison, Freetown; 28 June 2000.

⁶²² TRC Confidential Interview with a former officer of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who served as a 'Brigadier' under the AFRC; interview conducted in Freetown; 17 October 2003.

⁶²³ TRC Confidential Interview with a former officer of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who served as a 'Brigadier' under the AFRC; interview conducted in Freetown; 17 October 2003.

1176. The Spur Road Lodge was renowned among RUF members as a place where they received hospitality and lodging whenever they were in need.⁶²⁴ Sankoh ensured that food and medical provisions were in abundant supply; according to his wife, Madam Fatou Sankoh, he sometimes catered for over a hundred people a day.⁶²⁵ At any given time, there were between 50 and 100 people 'on the ground' at the Spur Road Lodge.⁶²⁶ Among them were security guards, RUF employees, drivers, cooks and auxiliary staff as well as women, children and other dependants. Many of them lived and slept at the Lodge.
1177. As described in the previous section, Sankoh also kept a personal security detail on permanent watch at his Spur Road Lodge. It numbered approximately 30 men and comprised mostly former soldiers of the Sierra Leone Army, led by the RUF Chief Security Officer, Akim Turay.⁶²⁷ A small number of RUF 'ex-combatants' also played roles in the security set-up, calling themselves 'Black Guards', which had been the name given to Sankoh's RUF Security Unit during its combat operations. The erstwhile commander of the 'Black Guards', Jackson Swarray (alias 'CO Wray'), was among this contingent. However, Swarray was subordinate to several of the former soldiers at Sankoh's Lodge, including Akim Turay and Soriba Mansaray.⁶²⁸
1178. According to testimonies given to the Commission, as well as statements taken by the Sierra Leone Police, the security guards working at the Spur Road Lodge did not regularly carry firearms as part of their security remit.⁶²⁹ Each of them was assigned a personal weapon on paper, but these were in fact taken from them and placed in a common storeroom.⁶³⁰
1179. The guards were not, for instance, permitted to patrol the grounds of Sankoh's compound carrying weapons; they were rather expected to act as watchmen, or 'look-outs', on three separate shifts covering a 24-hour cycle.⁶³¹ Where their duties entailed accompanying Foday Sankoh on business outside the compound or indeed outside Freetown, they would move with Sankoh as his

⁶²⁴ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF commander who joined Foday Sankoh in Freetown as a member of the RUF; interview conducted in Freetown; 18 August 2003.

⁶²⁵ Madam Fatou Sankoh, member of the RUF and widow of the former Leader of the RUF, Foday Saybana Sankoh; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 07 to 09 November 2003.

⁶²⁶ 'Nominal Roll of Soldiers and Others on the Ground [at the] Residence of the Leader'; RUF document recovered from the Spur Road Lodge of Foday Sankoh by the Sierra Leone Police; May 2000.

⁶²⁷ Akim Turay, former soldier in the Sierra Leone Army and later Chief Security Officer in the RUF; TRC Interview conducted in Freetown; 4 May 2003.

⁶²⁸ See, *inter alia*, Idriss Ibrahim Sesay, former soldier in the Sierra Leone Army and member of the RUF; statement given to Sierra Leone Police at Central Prison, Pademba Road, Freetown; 7 to 8 June 2000.

⁶²⁹ See, *inter alia*, 'Colonel' Soriba Mansaray, former soldier in the Sierra Leone Army and later a member of the RUF; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at CID Headquarters, Freetown; 11 May 2000; Akim Turay, former soldier in the Sierra Leone Army and later Chief Security Officer in the RUF; TRC Interview conducted in Freetown; 4 May 2003; and TRC Confidential Interview with a senior RUF member who fled from Foday Sankoh's Lodge on 8 May 2000; interview conducted in Freetown; 19 August 2003.

⁶³⁰ Ibrahim Blango (alias "T and T"), former RUF combatant and security guard to Foday Sankoh; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at CID Headquarters, Freetown; 29 May 2000.

⁶³¹ Junior Momoh (alias "Junior"), former driver for the RUF and member of the security cadre at Foday Sankoh's Lodge; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at CID Headquarters, Freetown; 15 May 2000

personal bodyguards.⁶³²

1180. Several of the ex-SLA security guards at the Spur Road Lodge had in fact given up their weapons during high-profile disarmament ceremonies in Freetown. Some of them indeed participated in the very first such ceremony held in Freetown, at the SLA's Wilberforce Barracks.⁶³³
1181. In a meeting with the Ambassador of the United States, Joseph Melrose, Foday Sankoh had expressed his hope and intention that all of the ex-combatants based at the Lodge, including the 'Black Guards', should go through the DDR process.⁶³⁴ Yet Sankoh retained a firm principle that he would not send all of his men to disarm if he felt that in doing so he would jeopardise his own security. According to one of his close colleagues in the RUF, the main obstacle to Sankoh's total and permanent disarmament was his lack of trust in UNAMSIL: "he wanted them to monitor RUF disarmament just like the other parties, without making it a crusade against the RUF."⁶³⁵
1182. In this light, the Commission noted that the Deputy Force Commander of UNAMSIL wrote to Sankoh in April 2000 to raise a number of points about security at the Spur Road Lodge. In this letter, Sankoh was "requested to discontinue the retention of armed RUF cadres" on the basis that "only UNAMSIL and the armed SSD who operate under UNAMSIL are authorised to provide armed guards."⁶³⁶
1183. This letter strengthens the case for saying that as a Government official with a "status equivalent to that of Vice President,"⁶³⁷ Sankoh, like other VIPs including the President, was due to be afforded official armed protection by UNAMSIL peacekeeping troops.
1184. A platoon-sized unit of the Nigerian Battalion (NIBATT), comprising about 30 armed soldiers, manned a UNAMSIL checkpoint on the approach road to Sankoh's Lodge and patrolled the vicinity on a 24-hour basis. The commanding officers assigned to the Spur Road Lodge, first Captain Akibo and later Captain Abdullahi,⁶³⁸ participated in two-way briefings several times daily with Foday Sankoh or other senior RUF members like Gibril Massaquoi. To the Commission's knowledge, between July 1999 and April 2000, the UNAMSIL officers did not file any reports to their superiors about incidents involving firearms at the Spur Road Lodge.⁶³⁹

⁶³² TRC Confidential Interview with a former member of Foday Sankoh's security personnel at the Spur Road Lodge; interview conducted in Freetown; 20 August 2003.

⁶³³ Alex George Williams (alias "Twin Barrel"), former soldier in the Sierra Leone Army and later a member of the RUF; TRC Interview conducted in Freetown; 2 May 2003

⁶³⁴ Madam Fatou Sankoh, member of the RUF and widow of the former Leader of the RUF, Foday Saybana Sankoh; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 07 to 09 November 2003.

⁶³⁵ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF commander who joined Foday Sankoh in Freetown as a member of the RUF; interview conducted in Freetown; 18 August 2003.

⁶³⁶ Brigadier-General MA Garba, Deputy Force Commander of UNAMSIL; letter entitled "Security to VIPs", addressed to Chairman Foday Sankoh and marked 301/Sec/Ops/UNAMSIL; 17 April 2000.

⁶³⁷ Lomé Peace Agreement, Article V, Section 3.

⁶³⁸ J.D. Abdullahi, Captain in the 4th Nigerian Battalion of UNAMSIL and Head Security Officer in the UNAMSIL deployment attached to Foday Sankoh; "Statement by Captain J.D. Abdullahi (N/9528)"; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police by the Operations Officer, NIBATT 4 UNAMSIL, Freetown; dated 12 May 2000.

⁶³⁹ In this regard, the Commission has scrutinised all available documentation on Ceasefire Violations that occurred during the period in question. Mention is made, for example of incidents

1185. Sankoh largely complied with the instruction given by the UNAMSIL Deputy Force Commander, in that the only permanent armed security at the Lodge was the unit provided by UNAMSIL. Yet Sankoh had disclosed to several of his colleagues that he did not wish to rely upon the UNAMSIL contingent alone in the event that any 'incident' were to take place.⁶⁴⁰ Thus Sankoh kept a private stockpile of weapons at the Spur Road Lodge, including approximately 30 automatic rifles. These were locked up in a storeroom close to the Lodge's 'computer room'.⁶⁴¹ According to the RUF Minister for Lands, Peter Vandy, the man responsible for the arms was Foday Sankoh's Special Assistant Gibril Massaquoi:

"In Freetown, to be frank, I have not at anytime seen these [security] guards carrying weapons in their day-to-day activities. These arms brought by Chairman Sankoh to town were in the custody of Gibril Massaquoi and I cannot tell whether he surrendered them for the DDR programme or distributed them to the security guards."⁶⁴²

1186. Sankoh had informed members of the Government about the existence of the stockpile and, according to his colleagues in the RUF, he had secured the President's blessing to retain enough arms for 30 of his own men.⁶⁴³ Several RUF members later interviewed by the police corroborated this evidence of official acquiescence for the arms at Sankoh's Lodge. One of them narrated his understanding as follows:

"The said arms were brought to Freetown [from Kailahun] during the time Foday Sankoh made his first visit to Kailahun after signing the Lomé Peace Accord. The arms were brought to No. 56 Spur Road, Freetown with the consent of the ECOMOG commander and even the President, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah and the UNAMSIL boss General Jetley."⁶⁴⁴

1187. Madam Fatou Sankoh testified that the presence of arms in the Lodge was also made known to representatives of the moral guarantors in the diplomatic community. For example, she attended a meeting between Foday Sankoh and the US Ambassador Joseph Melrose in April 2000 at which the subject was raised:

involving firearms at Johnny Paul Koroma's residence, but not of Foday Sankoh's Lodge. See, *inter alia*, United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL); various editions of the monthly "Summary of Cease fire Violations", recounting violations committed in the months between September 1999 and April 2000; References CF/IO/--; diverse dates between 1 October 1999 and 30 April 2000.

⁶⁴⁰ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF office-holder in the post-Lomé Government of Sierra Leone; interview conducted on 28 August 2003.

⁶⁴¹ This information was corroborated by many of the witness statements given to the police: see, *inter alia*, Mayilla Yansaneh, statement given to Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 11 May 2000.

⁶⁴² Peter Borbor Vandy, former RUF commander and later Minister of Lands, Housing, Country Planning and the Environment in the post-Lomé Government of Sierra Leone; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 2 to 7 June 2000.

⁶⁴³ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF commander who joined Foday Sankoh in Freetown as a member of the RUF; interview conducted in Freetown; 18 August 2003.

⁶⁴⁴ Augustine Bonga, RUF member who worked with Foday Sankoh on the implementation of the Lomé Peace Accord; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Pademba Road Prison, Freetown; 20 to 26 June 2000.

"Foday told Melrose openly... he said: 'I have some arms here at the Lodge; President Kabbah knows about them and they are here as a contingency in case something happens to me; in case I have to defend myself'. I was there at that meeting [with Melrose]; Melrose cannot possibly deny that he knew [about the arms]."⁶⁴⁵

1188. It is worth reiterating that Sankoh was not alone in keeping significant quantities of arms and indeed fighters at his compound. The Deputy Defence Minister, Chief Sam Hinga Norman, retained a 30-man security detail at his own residence, comprising armed Kamajor fighters from the Civil Defence Forces (CDF).⁶⁴⁶ Equally, as noted above, Johnny Paul Koroma administered an effective arms reserve, which was made available to the contingent of West Side Boys who lived in his compound at Juba Hill.
1189. The Commission finds that each of the faction leaders played his part in brewing suspicion and apprehension in the city of Freetown. The fact remains, however, that Foday Sankoh's Spur Road Lodge was the focus of most of the public concern because its inhabitants were something of an unknown quantity in the public eye.
1190. The Government of Sierra Leone was remiss in allowing the proliferation of weapons to occur around the key players in the peace process in Freetown. The failure to impose appropriate conditions on the retention of arms supplies at the Lodges of Johnny Paul Koroma and Foday Sankoh, at Juba Hill and Spur Road respectively, was a fatal blunder in the transition into peace.

Foday Sankoh's Further Properties in Freetown

1191. Foday Sankoh also administered two further properties in Freetown. The first, located at Spur Loop, further up the same hillside as the Spur Road Lodge, was the lesser populated and lesser visited of the two; it became the residence of his wife, Madam Fatou Sankoh.⁶⁴⁷ The second, at No. 12 Josiah Drive in the Malama / Lumley area, was more strategically important, for it served a variety of purposes in effecting the transition from the RUF in conflict to the RUF in peacetime.
1192. The Commission noted that the Josiah Drive property was assigned various, differing descriptions by those who had visited it: Madam Fatou Sankoh called it a "clinic,"⁶⁴⁸ UNAMSIL soldiers referred to it as a "warehouse,"⁶⁴⁹ and one of

⁶⁴⁵ Madam Fatou Sankoh, member of the RUF and widow of the former Leader of the RUF, Foday Saybana Sankoh; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 07 to 09 November 2003.

⁶⁴⁶ Reverend Alfred M. Sam Foray, former Secretary-General of the Sierra Leone Action Movement for the Civil Defence Forces (SLAM-CDF); written statement and supporting documentation submitted to the Commission by e-mail; 10 December 2003.

⁶⁴⁷ Madam Fatou Sankoh, member of the RUF and widow of the former Leader of the RUF, Foday Saybana Sankoh; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 07 to 09 November 2003.

⁶⁴⁸ Madam Fatou Sankoh, member of the RUF and widow of the former Leader of the RUF, Foday Saybana Sankoh; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 07 to 09 November 2003.

⁶⁴⁹ J.D. Abdullahi, Captain in the 4th Nigerian Battalion of UNAMSIL and Head Security Officer in the UNAMSIL deployment attached to Foday Sankoh; "Statement by Captain J.D. Abdullahi

its temporary residents said it was “a kind of guesthouse.”⁶⁵⁰

1193. The three-storey building was home to as many as 50 RUF members, although the roster of inhabitants was not permanent.⁶⁵¹ A core group of about 20 staff lived and worked there permanently as security guards, drivers and domestic staff. According to the nominal roll of RUF members, there were also between 10 and 20 former child combatants attached there as a remnant of the RUF ‘Small Boys’ Unit’.⁶⁵²
1194. The Josiah Drive property also served as a hospital or rehabilitation centre for wounded RUF ex-combatants and some former soldiers.⁶⁵³ There was a full-time staff of medical nurses on duty, who received supplies of drugs and other medical provisions directly from Foday Sankoh. Their patients included a small number who were accommodated there permanently, and a majority who came in on an ad-hoc basis for treatment. Some senior RUF members were brought to Freetown during the post-Lomé phase to receive medical attention from the nurses at Josiah Drive for their wounds or other after-effects of the war.⁶⁵⁴
1195. There were nonetheless persistent rumours that the RUF residence at Josiah Drive was being used for subversive purposes. A former child combatant who resided there briefly would later tell the police that there were “guns under the beds” on one of the floors that was used to house ex-combatants.⁶⁵⁵
1196. The Government, through its Attorney General and Minister of Justice Solomon Berewa, was later to assert that the residents of Josiah Drive were in fact an integral part of a “coup plan.”⁶⁵⁶ This allegation, based on what the Attorney General called “circumstantial material,” suggested that weapons and potential participants in the plot were harboured at Josiah Drive in anticipation of an operation against other members of the Government, with the intention of capturing power for the RUF and Foday Sankoh.

(N/9528)”; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police by the Operations Officer, NIBATT 4 UNAMSIL, Freetown; dated 12 May 2000.

⁶⁵⁰ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF combatant who came to Freetown after the signing of the Lomé Accord; interview conducted in Freetown, 29 September 2003.

⁶⁵¹ See attachment to the document entitled ‘Nominal Roll of Soldiers and Others on the Ground [at the] Residence of the Leader’; marked ‘List of Manpower’, dated 24 April 2000; RUF document recovered from the Spur Road Lodge of Foday Sankoh by the Sierra Leone Police; May 2000.

⁶⁵² See attachment to the document entitled ‘Nominal Roll of Soldiers and Others on the Ground [at the] Residence of the Leader’; marked ‘List of Manpower’, dated 24 April 2000; RUF document recovered from the Spur Road Lodge of Foday Sankoh by the Sierra Leone Police; May 2000.

⁶⁵³ See, *inter alia*, Idriss Ibrahim Sesay, former soldier in the Sierra Leone Army and member of the RUF; statement given to Sierra Leone Police at Central Prison, Pademba Road, Freetown; 7 to 8 June 2000.

⁶⁵⁴ See, *inter alia*, Momoh Rogers, former RUF Battalion Commander; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 29 May 2000.

⁶⁵⁵ Ginnah Lansana Brima, former RUF child combatant; statement given to Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 23 May 2000.

⁶⁵⁶ Solomon Berewa, Attorney General; statements to the press, the first of which was made on 13 May 2000; reported on the BBC Africa Service and available in the news archives of Sierra Leone Web (www.sierra-leone.org). See also: Madam Fatou Sankoh, member of the RUF and widow of the former Leader of the RUF, Foday Saybana Sankoh; TRC interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 07 to 09 November 2003. Madam Sankoh recollected Berewa’s allegation in one of his statements that the medication and syringes found at Josiah Drive were evidence of the RUF’s ‘drug-taking’.

1197. The Commission was unable to determine definitively whether these allegations were accurate or not. What is certain is that the Josiah Drive property was unambiguously identified as a 'rebel house' by local residents and security forces alike. According to one of its inhabitants, groups of youths accompanied by armed SSD officers appeared at the house on several occasions chanting 'offensive slogans' and sometimes throwing stones.⁶⁵⁷ Josiah Drive was therefore another flashpoint on the Freetown landscape.

THE WEEK ENDING 6 MAY 2000 AND THE RISE IN NEGATIVE PUBLIC SENTIMENTS TOWARDS FODAY SANKOH AND THE RUF

1198. Public perception turned dramatically against the RUF and, in particular, Foday Sankoh as the first week of the UNAMSIL hostage-taking episode unfolded.⁶⁵⁸ There was a unanimous and unyielding belief among the public that Sankoh was responsible for the abduction and molestation of peacekeepers as it had been reported by various media outlets.

1199. Moreover, Freetown-based civil society was adamant that Sankoh should be brought to account for the actions of his men on the ground. The popular view was that until the RUF combatants achieved full compliance with the disarmament objectives of the Lomé Accord, Sankoh should be stripped of all political privileges afforded him under the power-sharing clauses of the agreement.⁶⁵⁹

The Passing of a Private Members' Motion by the Sierra Leone Parliament

1200. The negative public sentiments towards Foday Sankoh and the RUF were echoed in the chambers of the Sierra Leone Parliament. On Tuesday 2 May 2000, it was reported that after discussions in the Parliament a "private members' motion" had been adopted.⁶⁶⁰ The motion contained a number of resolutions, which cumulatively amounted to an outright condemnation of Foday Sankoh and the RUF for their perceived lack of "genuine commitment to the peace process."⁶⁶¹

⁶⁵⁷ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF combatant who came to Freetown after the signing of the Lomé Accord; interview conducted in Freetown, 29 September 2003.

⁶⁵⁸ CROSS-REFERENCE BACK TO THE UNAMSIL HOSTAGE-TAKING EPISODE in previous section.

⁶⁵⁹ See, *inter alia*, Festus Minah, President of the Sierra Leone Teachers' Union (SLTU) and one of the organisers of the 8 May 2000 demonstration march to Foday Sankoh's Lodge; TRC Interview conducted at SLTU offices, Freetown; 11 July 2003.

⁶⁶⁰ Sulaiman Momodu, Regina Thomas and Osman Benk Sankoh, reproduced in Africa News; "RUF Terror: 4 Kenyans Killed, Sankoh under House Arrest"; circulated on international news wires by All Africa, Inc.; 3 May 2000.

⁶⁶¹ See the excerpted contents of the Private Members' Motion adopted by the Sierra Leone Parliament on 2 May 2000; reported in the news archives of Sierra Leone Web (www.sierra-leone.org) and accredited to 'a parliamentary source'; 4 May 2000.

1201. In the motion, the Sierra Leone Parliament further called upon a number of distinct groups to take decisive action in response to the perceived “resumption of hostilities.” The motion framed the position of the parliamentarians in the following terms:⁶⁶²
- It called upon the Government to place Foday Sankoh, the leader of the RUF, under ‘house arrest’ at his Spur Road Lodge;
 - It advocated for restrictions to be imposed on the movement of RUF Ministers and other office-holders until the ‘hostilities’ were ended;
 - It demanded that all RUF combatants be disarmed within 45 days;
 - It called for the enactment of legislation suspending or retracting “some of the privileges accorded to Mr. Foday Sankoh and other elements of the RUF by virtue of the Lomé Peace Agreement;”
 - It motivated for the moral guarantors to “use their influence and good offices” to bring Foday Sankoh back into line;
 - It declared that the “series of co-ordinated attacks against UNAMSIL troops” was evidence that the RUF was “not interested in peace but [rather] committed to derailing the peace process and seizing power by force;” and
 - It announced the intention of the parliamentarians to stage a protest march against the RUF on either the Thursday or the Friday of the week ending 5 May 2000.
1202. The motion represented a bold statement of intent by the parliamentarians that they would not tolerate lapses in the implementation of the military aspects of the Lomé Peace Accord. Members of Parliament also signalled their conviction that the RUF was wholly and solely answerable for the ‘resumption in hostilities’.
1203. Parliament’s positions were adopted in spite of protestations from the RUF regarding various irregularities in implementation of other areas of the military and political framework for peace. In announcing details of the motion, the Presidential Spokesman, Professor Septimus Kaikai, cited financial constraints and ongoing efforts at dialogue with the RUF to provide a context for the problems in the process of power-sharing.⁶⁶³
1204. The demands made by the parliamentary motion were taken up with varying degrees of vigour and immediacy. Some aspects stood little chance of success: for example, the call for total RUF disarmament within 45 days was unrealistic and did not happen. Other aspects, like the request for international pressure, materialised almost immediately. The United Nations Security Council issued a statement through its President on the evening of 3 May 2000. The statement was in almost total consonance with the Sierra Leone Parliament: it “condemn[ed] in the strongest terms the armed attacks perpetrated by the RUF” and “consider[ed] Foday Sankoh, as leader of the

⁶⁶² All of the listed points are excerpted contents of the Private Members’ Motion adopted by the Sierra Leone Parliament on 4 May 2000; *Ibidem*.

⁶⁶³ Sulaiman Momodu, Regina Thomas and Osman Benk Sankoh, CONCORD TIMES; reproduced in Africa News; “RUF Terror: 4 Kenyans Killed, Sankoh under House Arrest”; circulated on international news wires by All Africa, Inc.; 3 May 2000. In defence of Government non-compliance with Lomé, Kaikai was reported to have said: that ‘a white paper will soon be out on how parastatals will be run’; that ‘President Kabbah has discussed on five different occasions with [Foday] Sankoh on diplomatic jobs for the RUF’; and that ‘Government does not have money at the moment’.

RUF, to be responsible for these actions, which are unacceptable and in clear violation of [the RUF's] obligations under the Lomé Agreement.⁶⁶⁴

1205. On the whole, the parliamentary motion appears to have been taken very seriously by the parties it addressed, particularly among the branches of Government and the national and international law enforcement agencies. In fact the motion became a blueprint for a series of co-ordinated actions against the RUF in the days that followed. These actions formed what President Kabbah would later describe as his “effective contingency plan”⁶⁶⁵ against the RUF.

Imposition of Surveillance and Restrictions on the Movement of RUF Members

1206. The SLPP-led Government acted swiftly to put in place measures of containment around the Freetown-based members of the RUF. Its first step towards realising the demands of the parliamentary motion was to identify the modalities that would be required to place Foday Sankoh under ‘house arrest’ and to restrict the movements of the other office-holders of the RUF.

1207. The Government enlisted the support of UNAMSIL to accomplish its containment strategy. The UN Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit later characterised the various militating factors that compelled UNAMSIL to participate in “swift, concerted remedial action” to restrain the RUF, as follows:

“[In May 2000] the United Nations involvement in Sierra Leone was under attack, literally and figuratively. The United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) was being humiliated by a rebel army of young thugs called the RUF, led by Corporal Foday Sankoh. Hundreds of UN peacekeepers were taken hostage, disarmed and even disrobed by the RUF. The international and local press carried daily condemnations of the UN and its inability to stop the rampage of the RUF through the country and all the way to its capital, Freetown. President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah’s Government, which had been unable to exercise any real authority since its election in 1996, was expressing extreme disappointment at UNAMSIL’s capitulation to the rebels.”⁶⁶⁶

1208. The Commission learned that the Government and UNAMSIL had already been working together for some time on joint monitoring and information-gathering activities concentrated on the RUF. In this regard, evidence given to the police by a long-standing member of the RUF named Sahr Sandy was particularly revelatory.⁶⁶⁷ Sahr Sandy first recounted how he forged a

⁶⁶⁴ United Nations Security Council, Presidential Statement to the 4134th Meeting of the Council, S/PRST/2000/14 of 3 May 2000; reproduced in UN Press Release SC/6852; “Security Council, in Presidential Statement, Condemns Actions of RUF in Sierra Leone [and] says Foday Sankoh ‘Must be held Accountable’; 4 May 2000.

⁶⁶⁵ President Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, Address to the Nation, broadcast on the Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service; reported in the news archives of Sierra Leone Web (www.sierra-leone.org); 7 May 2000.

⁶⁶⁶ United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UN-DPKO); Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit; “Lessons Learned from United Nations Peacekeeping Experiences in Sierra Leone”; part of the UN ‘Learning from Experience’ series; June 2003.

⁶⁶⁷ See: Sahr Sandy, former RUF combatant and ‘informer’ on RUF activities in Freetown after Lomé; statement given to Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 17 September 2000.

connection with the Vice President, Dr. Albert Joe Demby. He explained that this relationship came about as a result of two principal factors: first, Sandy's personal rift with Foday Sankoh;

"[When] I came to Freetown, I joined the RUF leader Foday Sankoh at his residence at No. 56 Spur Road, Freetown... I was with Pa Sankoh, whom I fell out with due to the bad treatment he was giving me;"

and second, a meeting with Demby in which Sandy and fellow RUF ex-combatants presented themselves as willing partners in peace;

"On 25 March 2000, I left Freetown for Kailahun [District] to collect ... thirty-nine (39) of my men who had disarmed to UNAMSIL personnel and they were in the DDR camp. I came to Freetown with the thirty-nine (39) men. I took them to the residence of the Vice President, Dr. Albert Joe Demby. We had a meeting with the Vice President, the then Minister of Agriculture Dr. Harry Will, the SLPP Chairman Maigoh Kallon, late Paramount Chief A. A. Mannie, the Chief Agriculturalist Mr. Tengbeh and the Permanent Secretary to the Vice President, Mr. Henry Gongor. At the meeting, I told the Vice President to accept us as his children and that we are no longer members of the RUF movement. The Vice President agreed and accepted us."⁶⁶⁸

1209. Sahr Sandy then went on to describe how Vice President Demby had engaged his services as an 'informant', who would provide valuable information to UNAMSIL and the Government about the activities of the RUF:

"[At the end of] March 2000, the Vice President Dr. Albert Joe Demby called me to his residence at Spur Road, Freetown wherein he handed me over to the Chief Military Observer (CMO) Brigadier-General Chadi Oduzi, to whom [he said] I should give information about Pa Sankoh in respect of his [Sankoh's] armed movement in the country. The following day Brigadier-General Chadi Oduzi led me to UNAMSIL Headquarters at Pademba Road, where we met the UNAMSIL boss General Jetley. On our arrival, Oduzi told General Jetley that I was the Mr. Sandy who would assist UNAMSIL to discover arms kept in the city and Provinces by Pa Sankoh and his men. With effect from that day I started giving information to UNAMSIL personnel... working directly with CMO Oduzi."⁶⁶⁹

1210. The importance of Sahr Sandy's role increased greatly in the wake of the above-mentioned parliamentary motion. The Government and UNAMSIL took heed of Parliament's call for conditions of 'house arrest' to be imposed on Foday Sankoh. They heightened the levels of surveillance of RUF members in Freetown and began joint operations to stifle the RUF movement. As Sandy later told the police, the weekend that began on Friday 5 May 2000 proved to be pivotal:

⁶⁶⁸ Sahr Sandy, former RUF combatant and 'informant' on RUF activities in Freetown after Lomé; statement given to Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 17 September 2000.

⁶⁶⁹ Sahr Sandy, former RUF combatant and 'informant' on RUF activities in Freetown after Lomé; statement given to Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 17 September 2000.

“On 5 May 2000 at about 12.00 noon I met General Jetley at the UNAMSIL Headquarters, Pademba Road. No sooner had I arrived than General Jetley called Brigadier Mohamed, the Jordanian Commander, and introduced me to him as an informant for arms concealed in the Western Area. [Jetley told Mohamed] that he should work with me.

[...] Straight away we started the operation. Brigadier Mohamed and I went to Colonel Boroh, the Nigerian UNAMSIL officer at Wilberforce Barracks. Brigadier Mohamed instructed Colonel Boroh to take all the armoured tanks and block Pa Sankoh’s house in order to prevent him from moving out of the house; [there was a further instruction] to arrest all the inmates of the house.

[...] Brigadier Mohamed and I [then] moved to Malama for me to show [him] the other locations inhabited by RUF personnel. No arrest was made. Later we moved to Lumley Beach area, where I showed him another RUF location. From there we moved to Cline Town where I showed him another RUF base before we returned to UNAMSIL Headquarters.

[...] Whilst there [at Headquarters], Brigadier Mohamed called Mr. Christopher John, who was in charge of police operations. On his arrival [Christopher John] was instructed by Brigadier Mohamed to alert the police in order to cordon the areas I located. As it was already late the two officers agreed to do the operation the following morning, but that plain clothes officers should be posted in those areas on surveillance. That particular night I did not sleep at home for fear that the RUF will harm me.”⁶⁷⁰

1211. Both UNAMSIL and the Sierra Leonean state security forces gained information as a result of Sahr Sandy’s ‘guided tour’ of RUF residences in Freetown and its environs. From Friday 5 May 2000 onwards, the police mounted permanent surveillance operations on the Josiah Drive building in Malama; the residents quickly noticed that ‘watchful strangers’ were present in the neighbourhood.⁶⁷¹ Within the space of 24 hours, Foday Sankoh had been made aware of at least two other houses elsewhere in the city that were being monitored, both of them occupied by RUF office-holders.⁶⁷² A co-ordinated containment operation was being put in place.

⁶⁷⁰ Sahr Sandy, former RUF combatant and ‘informant’ on RUF activities in Freetown after Lomé; statement given to Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 17 September 2000.

⁶⁷¹ TRC Confidential Interview with a former RUF commander who was residing at Josiah Drive, Malama when the residence was attacked in May 2000; interview conducted in Freetown; 24 August 2003.

⁶⁷² TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF office-holder in the post-Lomé Government of Sierra Leone; interview conducted on 28 August 2003.

Foday Sankoh's 'House Arrest'

1212. In the evening of Friday 5 May 2000, it was announced on the BBC Africa Service that Foday Sankoh had been placed under 'house arrest' at the behest of the Sierra Leone Government.⁶⁷³ This announcement was purportedly based upon the transfer of UNAMSIL personnel and vehicles into the direct vicinity of Sankoh's Spur Road Lodge, as was indicated in the testimony of Sahr Sandy.⁶⁷⁴ Yet the UNAMSIL Commander responsible for the security of Freetown, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Boroh, maintained that "there was no stationed Armoured Personnel Carrier or armoured tanks" assigned to the residence of Foday Sankoh at that time.⁶⁷⁵
1213. Furthermore there was a high degree of confusion on the ground as to whether there was an express measure in place to prevent Foday Sankoh from moving outside his compound. As it happened, Sankoh did remain in his house for the duration of the weekend. However, according to one of his associates, Sankoh's lack of movement was more attributable to his disinclination to move around town than it was to any order stopping him from doing so.⁶⁷⁶ Other senior members of Sankoh's entourage apparently moved in and out of the compound without impediment.⁶⁷⁷ Gibril Massaquoi, Dennis Mingo (alias "Superman") and Akim Turay were among those who entered and left Sankoh's Lodge freely whilst the 'house arrest' order was supposedly in place.
1214. The ambiguity surrounding the classification of Sankoh's status was also apparent in the somewhat confused press reporting of the time. One journalist described the restrictions on Sankoh's movement as "an informal version of house arrest."⁶⁷⁸
1215. Nevertheless, the containment measures implemented against the RUF under the combined auspices of UNAMSIL and the Sierra Leone Government from Friday 5 May 2000 onwards constituted a significant step up from the levels of vigilance that had existed in the preceding ten months since the signing of the Lomé Accord.

⁶⁷³ British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Focus on Africa; "Sierra Leone former rebel leader under house arrest"; broadcast on 5 May 2000; included in the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 7 May 2000.

⁶⁷⁴ Sahr Sandy, former RUF combatant and 'informer' on RUF activities in Freetown after Lomé; statement given to Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 17 September 2000.

⁶⁷⁵ Paul Boroh, Lieutenant Colonel in the 4th Nigerian Battalion of UNAMSIL in charge of security in Freetown; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Mammy Yoko Hotel, Freetown; 11 May 2000.

⁶⁷⁶ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF commander who joined Foday Sankoh in Freetown as a member of the RUF; interview conducted in Freetown; 18 August 2003.

⁶⁷⁷ See, *inter alia*, Junior Momoh (alias "Junior"), former driver for the RUF and member of the security cadre at Foday Sankoh's Lodge; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at CID Headquarters, Freetown; 15 May 2000.

⁶⁷⁸ Alexandra Zavis, Associated Press (AP); "Sierra Leone's peace process seems lost"; circulated on international news wires by Associated Press; 8 May 2000.

The Makings of a Mass Public Demonstration against the RUF

1216. Perhaps the most noteworthy element of the motion passed by the Sierra Leone Parliament was its clarion call for a protest march against the RUF. Originally this march was conceived as an outlet through which Members of Parliament themselves would vent their discontent. However, since the theatrics of the political transition were so openly on display in the city of Freetown, it was inevitable that members of the public would want to become involved as well.

1217. The vehicle for mobilising large numbers of people behind a civic agenda was the Sierra Leone Civil Society Movement (CSM). The Commission heard testimony from one of the foremost personalities in the CSM, Festus Minah. Minah described how a sense of outrage had grown among many civil society groups, including students' associations, traders' collectives and professional bodies like the Sierra Leone Teachers' Union (SLTU), of which Minah himself was President. According to Minah, there was such a formidable tide of opposition to the RUF's hostage-taking of UNAMSIL personnel that he and his colleagues in the CSM felt compelled to take action of their own:

"The RUF [was] holding to ransom, or holding hostage, 500 and more peacekeepers who were in this country and for no just reason had to face a situation of that nature. For us who believed that the presence of the peacekeepers in the country had brought relief to us... we thought that they ought not to have to go through such a hazardous experience.

[...] Our intention was merely to give a picture to Sankoh... that power cannot be attained or cannot be usurped using the barrel of the gun or by using force. It should be given freely by the will of the people. His attempt not to acknowledge this fact made the pillars of the Civil Society Movement to engage in strategising [on] means and ways by which we could get our message across to Sankoh."⁶⁷⁹

1218. The 'strategising' of the Civil Society Movement coincided exactly with the plans of the parliamentarians. It was upon recognition of this common agenda that the Chairman of the CSM, Hassan Barrie, established contact with the parliamentarians and managed to agree upon the basis for a collaborative venture.⁶⁸⁰

1219. The planning assumed an urgent dimension when the notion was introduced that Foday Sankoh was eager to make a grab for the Presidency. Festus Minah told the Commission that this notion was not taken lightly by the joint planners. He acknowledged that a public demonstration became the favoured option because it would symbolise the democratic will of a sheer mass of people against the perceived excesses of Foday Sankoh:

"About a week before our action, there were evidences from the forces, both military and police, particularly testified by our British-born

⁶⁷⁹ Festus Minah, President of the Sierra Leone Teachers' Union (SLTU) and one of the organisers of the 8 May 2000 demonstration march to Foday Sankoh's Lodge; TRC Interview conducted at SLTU offices, Freetown; 11 July 2003.

⁶⁸⁰ Davidson Kuyateh, teacher, trade unionist and Acting Secretary-General of the Civil Society Movement (CSM) in Sierra Leone; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 18 May 2000.

Inspector-General Keith Biddle... that Foday Sankoh had participated in a masked devil parade and had come to the police and said: 'The people are in my favour; they are in support of me; you must be careful! In the next few days, when I come to be the Leader of this country, you will have to account for the way your people are treating my people'.

I believe those were very serious statements, which got to us in the CSM office and, noting what the RUF can do – they do not only plan, but [they] execute what they say - led us to say: 'well, we must nip it in the bud; not allow him to even engage in a programme that will try to destabilise the situation'.

[...] These were the few circumstances that made the Civil Society Movement, in collaboration with the parliamentarians, think that 'enough was enough'... All these issues, when put together, formed a circumstance that forced us to take action in the form of demonstrating. We thought that Sankoh would see the multitude of people who were against him [and] at least appreciate the efforts of Sierra Leoneans in trying to make peace with him."⁶⁸¹

1220. One realisation that quickly dawned on both parties was that a joint public protest march would be a much larger undertaking than what either of them had originally envisaged. It would require planning and organisation over several days. Accordingly, the march was postponed from the week ending 5 May 2000 and rescheduled for the following Monday, 8 May 2000.
1221. With the new date in mind, the Chairman of the CSM, Hassan Barrie, assembled what he called a 'Task Force' to co-ordinate the various aspects of the organisation of the demonstration. According to the recollections of Festus Minah, this Task Force was divided into six sub-groups or committees, each of which took responsibility for a particular aspect of the planning of the event. The designations and basic functions of the six groups were as follows:⁶⁸²
- Resolutions Committee – to decide upon the content of the formal speeches that would be addressed to Foday Sankoh and the assembled demonstrators on the day;
 - Information and Sensitisation Group – responsible for making announcements on the radio, stimulating discussion and raising public awareness;
 - Mobilisation Group – to work with existing civil society groups and "get them to mobilise their membership for action";
 - Transportation Group – effectively to take over the public transport system for the day and assist people in moving to the assembly point at Victoria Park in central Freetown;
 - Security Group – to avoid putting the demonstrators or other residents in danger and to prevent damage to property or other inconvenience on the route; and
 - Finance Group – to generate and administer funds from sponsors and supporters.

⁶⁸¹ Festus Minah, President of the Sierra Leone Teachers' Union (SLTU) and one of the organisers of the 8 May 2000 demonstration march to Foday Sankoh's Lodge; TRC Interview conducted at SLTU offices, Freetown; 11 July 2003.

⁶⁸² Festus Minah, President of the Sierra Leone Teachers' Union (SLTU) and one of the organisers of the 8 May 2000 demonstration march to Foday Sankoh's Lodge; TRC Interview conducted at SLTU offices, Freetown; 11 July 2003.

1222. The roles played by some of these committees were self-explanatory and warrant mention only insofar as they contributed to the staging of a landmark event in history. Others have attained a more profound significance in understanding the dynamics of the demonstration that subsequently transpired.

1223. The Information and Sensitisation Group, for example, can lay claim to a quite incredible dividend, since it succeeded in instituting what was probably the largest mass demonstration in the country's history. It achieved the feat by bombarding the airwaves with advertisements and related discussion programmes for the whole weekend leading up to the demonstrations. As one of those who responded to the campaign later explained, these media announcements mixed the concept of protest with a certain patriotic imperative:

"On Friday 5 May 2000 I heard a radio announcement from the Radio Democracy 98.1 FM station that members of the Civil Society Movement (CSM) and parliamentarians would stage a peaceful demonstration march on Monday 8 May 2000. The march would end at the residence of the RUF leader Foday Sankoh, at Spur Road, Freetown. The announcement alleged that they are demonstrating against the RUF movement because the RUF arrested the UNAMSIL peacekeepers; they are tired with fighting in the country and now they needed peace forever. Finally, they said that all patriotic Sierra Leoneans must join the demonstration."⁶⁸³

1224. The Security Group was another that had a central part to play in the proceedings. Festus Minah sat on this particular committee and drew attention to the fact that upon the insistence of the police, the upper part of the Spur Road hillside was to remain 'off limits' to the demonstrators:

"We made sure that the demonstrators would use only the route that was lined up; because we had to ask permission from the police and the police guided us as to how we could move. Even though they did not support it; they guided us as to how we should move. We were not to use the Spur Road route, because that was the area of the diplomats and that was the route they used.

[...] So we had to use Wilkinson Road, up to Lumley and then move to [Sankoh's] residence, which was very close to Lumley. Myself and six others were involved in ensuring that no demonstrators used the [upper] Spur Road route, either from Spur Loop, or from Tengbeh Town... They only used the route that was prescribed by the police."⁶⁸⁴

1225. Finally, selected delegates from each of the committees were drawn into a seventh group that comprised a cross-section of both parliamentarians and civil society activists. It was an 'umbrella body' known as the liaison group, which would work with potential partners, including the police and the Government of Sierra Leone, towards the smooth running of the demonstration. Festus Minah was chosen as the liaison representative from

⁶⁸³ Donald Boston Mammah, baker in Freetown and participant in the May 2000 demonstrations; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at CID Headquarters, Freetown; 23 May 2000.

⁶⁸⁴ Festus Minah, President of the Sierra Leone Teachers' Union (SLTU) and one of the organisers of the 8 May 2000 demonstration march to Foday Sankoh's Lodge; TRC Interview conducted at SLTU offices, Freetown; 11 July 2003.

the security committee. In this capacity he helped to keep the demonstration on course for 8 May 2000 despite the apparent opposition of President Kabbah, which was premised on security considerations:

"I must say it here: as a member of the Security Group, I happen to have been part of the liaison delegation that went to meet the President. The President was not in favour of the demonstration; he had a fear that anything could go wrong. But indeed, the group was resolute.

[...] We spent close to three hours with [the President], trying to reason out with him on the issue of the demonstration; but I think his position was against the position of the Civil Society Movement. So there was very little he could do, but to [allow us] at least to go ahead with the action as planned, in the interests of stabilising the Sierra Leonean society."⁶⁸⁵

1226. All of the above testifies to the single-mindedness and sense of purpose that was present among the organisers of the 8 May 2000 demonstrations. After the Parliament and the Civil Society Movement had united behind the principle of a demonstration, they resolutely refused to be thwarted in their intention of making themselves heard by Foday Sankoh in the loudest and dearest terms. There was a definite element of stubbornness in the organisers' attitudes, but as they pointed out to the Commission, it was the stubbornness that Sierra Leoneans had developed "after several years of being subjected to rule by force and wanting finally to put a stop to it."⁶⁸⁶
1227. The organisers of the demonstrations generated an unprecedented level of interest and engagement in the post-Lomé political transition. This increased public scrutiny came at the exact time when the RUF movement had cast itself in a very negative light in the peace process. Foday Sankoh never ordered the responsible parties to release the UNAMSIL peacekeepers. Nor did he issue a public statement condemning the hostage-taking episode. The RUF movement led by Sankoh in fact did nothing to counter the perception that it was a belligerent and untrustworthy faction. In the circumstances, the unfavourable public perception of the RUF was more than justified. The RUF invited demonstrative action against itself.
1228. While the thrust of the demonstration remained peaceful, there were certain sentiments evoked by it that served to frighten or antagonise some members of society, particularly among the RUF. The Commission heard from one RUF office-holder who was residing in Freetown at the time that the prospect of the demonstration haunted him from the moment he heard the comments of a caller on a radio 'talk-show' programme:

"I was tuning in to 96.2 FM radio station when a certain caller made all kinds of threatening remarks that [seemed to be] a summary of the contingency plan against the RUF for the 8 May demonstrations. Abu Bakarr, a programmer on the 96.2 FM station, had organised a forum [with] Chairman Foday Sankoh to talk to the people of Sierra Leone on

⁶⁸⁵ Festus Minah, President of the Sierra Leone Teachers' Union (SLTU) and one of the organisers of the 8 May 2000 demonstration march to Foday Sankoh's Lodge; TRC Interview conducted at SLTU offices, Freetown; 11 July 2003.

⁶⁸⁶ Festus Minah, President of the Sierra Leone Teachers' Union (SLTU) and one of the organisers of the 8 May 2000 demonstration march to Foday Sankoh's Lodge; TRC Interview conducted at SLTU offices, Freetown; 11 July 2003.

the problem at hand in the country – the near collapse of the peace. Foday Sankoh had turned down this invitation to the forum.

[Sankoh's refusal] was the exploding point for the caller. He said: 'Come May 8th, we will march to Sankoh's house and destroy all the facilities he is enjoying: electricity, water and anything else that makes him too proud to refuse us! For ten years, Foday Sankoh has been ambushing us, so on that May 8th day, we too will surely ambush Foday Sankoh and just as surely he will not survive the ambush!'

[...] That caller's threat sent cold sweat running down my brows."⁶⁸⁷

The Staging of an Independent Women's Group Demonstration on 6 May 2000

1229. The organisers of the 8 May 2000 demonstration were beaten to the gates of the Spur Road Lodge by an independent group of protesters who gathered there two days earlier. This group was composed of up to 2,000 Sierra Leonean women, who wanted to convey their own hopes for peace and bring home to Foday Sankoh a sense of the particular suffering that women had endured as a result of the war.

1230. The Women's Forum was among the conglomeration of interest groups that led the noteworthy, albeit relatively minor demonstration on Saturday 6 May 2000. One of its members, Christiana Macfoy, was quoted in the press as having explained the motivations for this action in the following terms:

"We are tired. We are not only tired; we are fed up. We have reached the end of the road as far as taking all these atrocities that are being committed. And it is the women that are bearing the brunt of it."⁶⁸⁸

1231. From the side of the inhabitants of the Spur Road Lodge, there were mixed impressions of the arrival of the women. One RUF security guard later told the police that the protest was treated quite dismissively by Foday Sankoh and therefore concluded in a short space of time without making any significant impact:

"On Saturday 6 May 2000 during the morning hours I was in the compound at No. 56 Spur Road, Freetown when a group of women arrived and started singing provocative remarks against the RUF leader Foday Sankoh. The leader [Sankoh] called everybody in the compound and advised us to close the main gate, which we did. After a while, the women who were demonstrating had to return to their various homes."⁶⁸⁹

⁶⁸⁷ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF office-holder in the post-Lomé Government of Sierra Leone; interview conducted in Freetown; 28 November 2003.

⁶⁸⁸ British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Focus on Africa; "Sierra Leone women protest at the breakdown in the peace"; broadcast on 6 May 2000; included in the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 7 May 2000; also available in the news archives of Sierra Leone Web (www.sierra-leone.org).

⁶⁸⁹ Vea Kentiga (alias "Woineyeh Clott"), former RUF fighter and member of the ground staff at Foday Sankoh's Spur Road Lodge; statement given to Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 17 May 2000.

1232. The Chief Security Officer at Sankoh's Lodge, Akim Turay, told the Commission that he was sent out by Foday Sankoh to engage in a dialogue with the women and to 'thank them' on Sankoh's behalf for their concern. Turay described his discussion with the women as having been 'in good spirits' and 'totally peaceful', which led him to believe that the demonstration planned for Monday 8 May would assume the same character.⁶⁹⁰
1233. Certainly there were no incidents of violence during the visit of the women on 6 May 2000. After the gates to the Spur Road Lodge were closed by its inhabitants, the possibility of confrontation was so conclusively averted that the women had to resort to reading their prepared statements to Foday Sankoh over a megaphone.⁶⁹¹
1234. The women's statements focussed on the breakdown in the implementation of the military aspects of the Lomé Accord and the perceived violence of the hostage-taking episode. They called for the immediate and unconditional restoration of a ceasefire by the RUF in the name of achieving a more durable, longer-lasting peace.⁶⁹² It is unlikely that the statements were even heard by their intended recipients.⁶⁹³
1235. Madam Fatou Sankoh was not in Freetown on the weekend of 6 May 2000 but was keeping in touch with her husband Foday Sankoh by telephone from her permanent home in the United States. According to Madam Sankoh, the women's protest was perceived in RUF circles as a deliberate effort to 'shake the cage' of Sankoh and his entourage. She cited the prominent role played in the protest by the SLPP Minister of Development Kadie Sesay as evidence that the Government used the women's demonstration to continue the gradual build-up of tensions around the RUF presence in the city.⁶⁹⁴

⁶⁹⁰ Akim Turay, former soldier in the Sierra Leone Army and later Chief Security Officer in the RUF; TRC Interview conducted in Freetown; 4 May 2003.

⁶⁹¹ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF commander who joined Foday Sankoh in Freetown as a member of the RUF; interview conducted in Freetown; 18 August 2003.

⁶⁹² British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Focus on Africa; "Sierra Leone women protest at the breakdown in the peace"; broadcast on 6 May 2000; included in the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 7 May 2000; also available in the news archives of Sierra Leone Web (www.sierra-leone.org).

⁶⁹³ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF commander who joined Foday Sankoh in Freetown as a member of the RUF; interview conducted in Freetown; 18 August 2003.

⁶⁹⁴ Madam Fatou Sankoh, member of the RUF and widow of the former Leader of the RUF, Foday Saybana Sankoh; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 07 to 09 November 2003.

Changes in the Character of State Security and the Mobilisation of a 'Peace Task Force' by Johnny Paul Koroma

Raid on an RUFP Member's Residence on 6 May 2000

1236. The first human rights violations that were discernibly targeted against a Freetown-based member of the RUF took place in the evening of Saturday 6 May 2000. These violations were levelled against the Deputy Minister for Labour, Industrial Relations and Social Security, Idrissa Hamid Kamara (alias "Leather Boot"). Leather Boot would later explain to the police how he came to learn of the disturbing incident at his official residence:

"On Saturday 6 May 2000 at about 6.30 pm... I got a call from my wife through my mobile telephone set that a group of armed personnel led by Brigadier Santigie Kanu (alias "Five Five") went to my room at Cape Sierra Hotel and had looted all my properties and also molested my wife and two children, aged three and 14 respectively. She further went on to say that they were desperately looking for me; for what I don't know. I straight away drove to Chairman Foday Sankoh's residence... [Sankoh] advised that I should stay within his premises because he does not know the intention of those looking out for me."⁶⁹⁵

1237. This attack has come to represent the onset of a pattern of violations and abuses that took place in Freetown over the ensuing days. The perpetrators were identified as West Side Boys and other remnants of the AFRC regime. They were led by Santigie Kanu (alias "Five Five"), who was known to be assigned to the Juba Hill Lodge of Johnny Paul Koroma as part of the burgeoning security detail there. The Commission draws a direct link between 'Five Five' and Johnny Paul Koroma and holds the pair jointly responsible for the instigation of this particular raid.
1238. It is no coincidence that Leather Boot was singled out as the first target among the various RUFP office-holders scattered across Freetown. As noted in the previous section, Leather Boot had been the official, albeit unrepresentative delegate of the AFRC to the Lomé Peace Talks. He was jettisoned by the majority of his erstwhile colleagues in the AFRC on the basis that he had 'sold out' to the interests of the RUF. Thus, 'Five Five' and his troop attacked with an intra-factional axe to grind, quite apart from any other instructions they may have received from Koroma.
1239. In the prevailing climate, the loyalties of the soldiers in the Sierra Leone Army were closely aligned to Koroma and the likes of 'Five Five', against the RUF. Equally, the officers of the Sierra Leone Police, including those in the paramilitary Special Security Division (SSD) were generally hostile towards the RUF. The crises that had ravaged the Army and the police were attributable to the RUF in the first place. These elements of the state security apparatus would make life uncomfortable for the RUF if given any opportunity.

⁶⁹⁵ Idrissa Hamid Kamara (alias "Leather Boot"), former Deputy Minister of Labour, Industrial Relations and Social Security; statement given to Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 12 May 2000.

1240. Under the terms of the Peace Accord, Leather Boot ought to have been able to look to UNAMSIL as an intermediary in the event of an attack by a rival faction. Yet on that front the actions of the RUF combatant cadre and the UN's decisive attribution of blame to Foday Sankoh had made for a very tense *prima facie* relationship. The apparent 'house arrest' order and UNAMSIL's implication in other containment measures against the RUF presented further deterrents to the pursuit of that option.
1241. Hence, the last hope for Leather Boot was that Sankoh's Spur Road Lodge, the security of which was supposed to be a matter in the interests of all the parties to the Lomé Accord, would constitute a protective enclave. Sankoh, as Chairman of the CMMRD, was the only RUFP office-holder who was afforded official armed security at his residence from UNAMSIL officers.⁶⁹⁶ This arrangement had not been altered despite the RUF's ongoing mistreatment of the peacekeepers. Moreover, as leader of all wings of the RUF, Sankoh was the arbiter of what measures to take in the event that UNAMSIL's armed security could no longer be relied upon.

Johnny Paul Koroma's Call for a 'Peace Rally' on 7 May 2000

1242. The climate in Freetown became yet more heated on the morning of Sunday 7 May 2000. Johnny Paul Koroma called together a rally of former warring factions in his capacity as the Chairman of the CCP. The gathering was billed as a 'Peace Rally'. It began with a radio announcement on the Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service (SLBS), in which Koroma instructed that all 'loyal' men who wished to declare themselves in favour of peace should assemble at a large Government office block in downtown Freetown. The rally culminated in a series of public addresses to a crowd of several thousand in the National Stadium.
1243. The majority of those present at the so-called 'Peace Rally' were soldiers or ex-soldiers from Freetown: the same bulk of people who had remained loyal to Koroma since the days of the AFRC. Up to a few hundred of them had by now assumed the identity of West Side Boys, affiliated to the band of armed renegades who occupied the base at Okra Hills. Their 'strongmen' included the leaders of the 6 January 1999 invasion of Freetown, such as Alex Tamba Brima (alias "Gullit"), Ibrahim Kamara (alias 'Bazzy') and Santigie Kanu (alias "Five Five"). They were still malleable to Koroma's agenda and still motivated by notions of power largely centred on their recognition as professional soldiers.
1244. The 'Peace Rally' was not organised with the same degree of planning that is normally associated with an event of such a scale. It was hastily convened and quite ramshackle. An SLA soldier who answered Johnny Paul Koroma's call to the 'Peace Rally' described the scene that he encountered there as follows:

"On 7 May 2000 at about 9.30am over state radio, there was a broadcast made by Johnny Paul Koroma that all SLA, ex-SLA and combatants loyal to the Government should report immediately to the [site of Government offices known as the] Youyi Building. I hurriedly

⁶⁹⁶ Paul Boroh, Lieutenant Colonel in the 4th Nigerian Battalion of UNAMSIL in charge of security in Freetown; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Mammy Yoko Hotel, Freetown; 11 May 2000.

went there and I met a large crowd of soldiers converged there waiting for Chairman Johnny Paul Koroma.

[...] Koroma came a bit later and asked all of us to move to the National Stadium so that he could talk to us there. At the National Stadium, I stood at the Presidential Pavilion close to Chairman Koroma and his entourage.⁶⁹⁷

1245. A commander of the West Side Boys told the Commission that he had participated in the 'Peace Rally' having been informed of a threat posed by the RUF:

"Johnny Paul and the Chief of Defence Staff [Tom Carew] said that the RUF want to make a disturbance against the peace; they gave us the information in early May, before May 8th. At that time I was planning to come and collect my salaries, so I just came into town and suddenly they explained these things to me that the RUF want to disturb the peace process. I said: 'OK, don't worry about that'; and [suggested] we should try to get them under control. I said to myself: 'one day if they try it, we were sure that if the CDS gave us support we could get them under control'.

[...] The Peace Rally was on that plan of securing the peace; it was not bad – everybody wanted peace. The Kamajors were there too but they were just comfortable with us this time. Even some RUF boys were at the Stadium; even if they were not for peace. We were watching them closely; I had the confidence that we could put anything under control."⁶⁹⁸

1246. Johnny Paul Koroma was perhaps unique in his ability to engender a sense of common purpose among fighters who had previously lined up for opposing factions. Hence he was able additionally to invite a small but significant amount of Kamajors and other CDF to his 'Peace Rally'. The presence of the Kamajors came despite the numerical domination of SLA soldiers and SSD policemen, with whom the CDF had previously had relationships of animosity and rivalry.
1247. It is notable that the Kamajors who participated were members of CDF units with a well-established reputation for violence – among them was the 'hit squad' led by the former ULIMO fighter Morris Dolley (alias Opabenu).⁶⁹⁹ The central ground for their convergence with the soldiers under Johnny Paul Koroma was the idea of uniting against a common enemy in the shape of the RUF.
1248. The Commission holds some reservations as to whether the Peace Rally called by Johnny Paul Koroma was a gathering towards genuinely peaceful ends. There was an ominous portent in the composition of the participants,

⁶⁹⁷ Sullay Sesay, soldier in the Sierra Leone Army with the rank of Sergeant, participant in the 'Peace Rally' convened by Johnny Paul Koroma; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at Central Prison, Pademba Road, Freetown; 7 June 2000.

⁶⁹⁸ TRC Confidential Interview with a former officer of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who served as a 'Brigadier' under the AFRC and later became Leader of the 'West Side Boys'; interview conducted in Freetown; 17 October 2003.

⁶⁹⁹ TRC Confidential Interview with former Kamajor fighter for the Civil Defence Forces; interview conducted in Bo Town, Bo District; 05 June 2003.

namely warlords and thugs from different factions in the conflict, now united by their common antipathy to Sankoh and the RUF. Some of those who attended the rally made it clear to the Commission that they were encouraged to take part in the event by their superiors and were told that they would be mobilised for an 'operation' on behalf of the Government.⁷⁰⁰

1249. It is no coincidence that the uncertain status of the Sierra Leone Army in the peace process was raised during the Peace Rally. The greatest insecurities and grievances on the part of the soldiers revolved around their perceived marginalisation and lack of recognition in the peace process.⁷⁰¹ In order for them to be mobilised behind the Government with any sense of conviction, it was necessary to instil in them a renewed sense of worth. According to a soldier in attendance, parliamentarians and Johnny Paul Koroma made a concerted effort to win back the support of the SLA during the 'Peace Rally':

"[...] In that meeting, members of Parliament gave us a message from the President that the Army was not disbanded and that we will be reinstated. Chairman Johnny Paul Koroma made a request that all of us should join forces with the Government to defend the country from any attack by the RUF rebels."⁷⁰²

1250. These addresses were doubly significant in that they sought to lend legitimacy to the actions of the assembled soldiers in the context of the ongoing security clampdown. The soldiers were assured that they would be acting on behalf of the state, with the support of the Government, as they carried out further security measures against the RUF.
1251. The West Side Boys derived unprecedented endorsement from the Peace Rally. Although some of them had been on the official military payroll and collecting salaries to take into the jungle for about six months by May 2000, they were never previously assured that the Government would reinstate them. Thus they were emboldened by the message from the President and 'felt freer' with the Government behind them.⁷⁰³
1252. Members of the West Side Boys based outside of Freetown similarly received news of the Peace Rally as a positive sign that their faction was being supported to fight against the RUF. One young recruit who had participated in the attack on Freetown later gave his perspective to the police:

"I was there [at our base] when Johnny Paul Koroma summoned a meeting of SLA personnel at Siaka Stevens' [National] Stadium. At that

⁷⁰⁰ See, *inter alia*, TRC Confidential Interview with a private soldier in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who took part in the 'Peace Rally' organised by Johnny Paul Koroma; interview conducted in Freetown; 08 December 2003; and TRC Confidential Interview with a former officer of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who served as a 'Brigadier' under the AFRC and later became Leader of the 'West Side Boys'; interview conducted in Freetown; 17 October 2003.

⁷⁰¹ See, *inter alia*, Lieutenant Colonel Johnny Paul Koroma (Chairman, AFRC), Brigadier Ibrahim Bazy Kamara (Head of Military Delegation, Okra Hills) and twelve others; "Grievances and Demands of Soldiers of the Sierra Leone Army with Regards to the Lomé Peace Agreement"; document circulated as a petition to the parties in the peace process; 3 September 1999.

⁷⁰² Sullay Sesay, soldier in the Sierra Leone Army with the rank of Sergeant, participant in the 'Peace Rally' convened by Johnny Paul Koroma; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at Central Prison, Pademba Road, Freetown; 7 June 2000.

⁷⁰³ TRC Confidential Interview with a former officer of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who served as a 'Brigadier' under the AFRC and later became Leader of the 'West Side Boys'; interview conducted in Freetown; 17 October 2003.

meeting, we [the West Side Boys] were represented by our commanders, like Brigadier 'Bomblast' and Colonel 'Tiger', to name but a few. After the meeting, we were told that we should now fight alongside with the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) as the RUF had an intention to attack Freetown. The message was welcomed by us with good intentions now to defend our territory."⁷⁰⁴

1253. The 'Peace Rally' was used as a forum at which to brief the soldiers and their accomplices as to their proposed roles in bringing the RUF back into line after the eruption of the hostage-taking episode. Johnny Paul Koroma was determined to take the credit as the undisputed driving force behind this initiative, as he would later explain in an interview with a television journalist:

"Foday Sankoh held the peacekeepers, UN Peacekeepers, and delegations came from all over the world to plead to him. He was adamant. We also talked to him. But he didn't listen to anybody.

[...] So because I thought they [the RUF] wanted to do something that would jeopardise the whole peace process, I thought I should intervene. And I intervened. And I tried to stop that by mobilising all the forces, the CDF, the soldiers, the SSDs, the Civil Society group – mobilising all of them that if the RUF are not sincere for peace, we all have to stand very, very firm against them. And that is exactly what happened."⁷⁰⁵

1254. In media interviews on the day of the rally, with emotions running high, Koroma was quite gung-ho about the self-styled heroism of his role. Claiming in characteristically exaggerated fashion that he had roused a crowd of over 30, 000 people, Koroma gave the following assessment of the Peace Rally:

"We are taking a stand ready to defend the people. We don't want to resort to violence because that cannot solve the problem. We just have to find ways and means to defend the people and ourselves... We are saying that we cannot sit by and see this country be torn apart. I think we've had enough of this violence. And I'm sure with this message today, they [the RUF] would think twice and then they would try to comply."⁷⁰⁶

⁷⁰⁴ Joseph Koroma, forced recruit into the Sierra Leone Armed Forces as a SL Border Guard; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at Central Prison, Pademba Road, Freetown; 28 June 2000.

⁷⁰⁵ Johnny Paul Koroma, Former Head of State as Chairman of the AFRC and latterly Chairman of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP); interview conducted by a television journalist from Oxygen Media, on behalf of New-York based human rights group WITNESS; recorded on DVCAM (Tape Ref. R2003-0543) in Freetown; 5 November 2001.

⁷⁰⁶ British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Focus on Africa; "Interview with Johnny Paul Koroma, Chairman of Sierra Leone's Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP)"; broadcast on 7 May 2000; included in the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 7 May 2000; also available in the news archives of Sierra Leone Web (www.sierra-leone.org).

The Mobilisation of an Armed 'Peace Task Force' by Johnny Paul Koroma

1255. In the immediate wake of the Peace Rally, Johnny Paul Koroma called together another, smaller gathering that cast further doubt upon his conception and application of the word peace. Koroma assembled a group comprising West Side Boys (former AFRC), SLA soldiers and SSD policemen to take action against RUF members over the following 24 hours. He coined the name "Peace Task Force" for his group, which, as events unfolded over the course of 7 and 8 May 2000, proved to be something of a misnomer. The Commission notes that during this period people needed security and assurance that the war would not be re-started. In many people's minds, Johnny Paul Koroma's actions conveyed a sense of security to them.
1256. According to testimonies to the Commission, members of the 'Peace Task Force' were kitted out from military supplies. One soldier explained in his statement to the police how Johnny Paul Koroma's speech was the stimulus for them to be equipped and deployed:
- "Johnny Paul Koroma instructed all soldiers in the Sierra Leone Army to take up arms and defend our mother land as the RUF had planned to take over the city of Freetown. He [Koroma] also warned that the AFRC should work together with Government troops to fight against the common enemy that is the RUF.
- [...] As a result I was supplied with: one self-loading rifle (SLR); two magazines, each containing twenty live rounds of ammunition; and military fatigue attire for this operation."⁷⁰⁷
1257. A commander of the West Side Boys who was enlisted by Johnny Paul Koroma into the 'Peace Task Force' on 7 May 2000 told the Commission that he and his closest compatriots formed the core of this unit. He was under the impression that the unit was primed by Koroma on the orders of the President; he also claimed that the Peace Task Force was being resourced directly by the Sierra Leone Army:
- "We the West Side Boys were the leaders of the 'Peace Task Force' – just a few of us who our leader [Johnny Paul Koroma] knew he could rely on. The President gave the orders to Johnny Paul and Johnny Paul gave the orders to us. We were being supported by the military; anything we ask them [for], they give us."⁷⁰⁸
1258. The Commission viewed the establishment and proclaimed mission of the Peace Task Force with some circumspect. Like the Peace Rally, there was very little about this task force that was peaceful. It was a force of armed vigilantes tasked to raid, arrest and detain members of the RUF. It embarked on this task on Sunday 7 May 2000 before it had even properly been formed.

⁷⁰⁷ Samuel Kargbo (alias "Sammy Ragga"), former soldier of the Sierra Leone Army and prominent member of the West Side Boys; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 3 to 4 October 2000.

⁷⁰⁸ TRC Confidential Interview with a former officer of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who served as a 'Brigadier' under the AFRC and later became Leader of the 'West Side Boys'; interview conducted in Freetown; 17 October 2003.

The arrest of Honourable Mike Lamin on Sunday 7 May 2000

1259. The first member of the RUF to be detained in the turbulent events of May 2000 was the then Minister of Trade, Industry and State Enterprise, Mike Lamin. Lamin had performed a variety of roles for the RUF in the implementation of the Lomé Accord, including the monitoring and sensitisation of combatants in the Provinces. He described the circumstances in which he was apprehended in the following terms:

“On Sunday 7 May 2000, I decided to meet the Chairman of the CCP, Johnny Paul Koroma, to express to him the degenerating situation between the RUF combatants and the UNAMSIL peace-keepers. I also decided to suggest to him that he [should] provide people to be part of a delegation that was going to be sent by Foday Sankoh to visit Makeni in order to resolve the problem between RUF and UNAMSIL.

For that reason, I went to meet Johnny Paul at his office at Youyi Building, but I was told that he was at the National Stadium. I went to the National Stadium to meet him. Unfortunately, before I could reach him, I was grabbed by some ex-SLA combatants who manhandled me and stripped me of all my belongings. Johnny Paul Koroma then intervened and took me to his residence, along with his securities and the majority of the ex-SLA combatants. At his residence, some of the ex-SLA combatants demanded that I should be summarily executed.”⁷⁰⁹

1260. Lamin’s detention was reported to the inhabitants of Foday Sankoh’s Spur Road Lodge by one of Lamin’s security guards who had witnessed the incident at the National Stadium. Several of those present at Sankoh’s Lodge on the day recalled hearing the report and awaiting the response of Foday Sankoh as to what action ought to be taken.⁷¹⁰ Akim Turay, Sankoh’s Chief Security Officer, briefed Sankoh on the situation in the company of Lamin’s wife, Manella.
1261. According to Akim Turay, the conversation about Lamin’s detention was preceded by a number of unusual tensions in the relationship between him and Foday Sankoh. These were based on Akim’s feeling that Sankoh was concealing something from him. Akim told the Commission that in spite of the tense relationship he was requested by Foday Sankoh to lead the effort to negotiate with Johnny Paul Koroma:

“Pa Sankoh had told me to settle this problem [with the UNAMSIL peacekeepers]. I went to UNAMSIL headquarters, discussed the issue and got some papers from [Deputy Force Commander] General Garba. But for some reason I did not know, Pa Sankoh refused to let me go to Kono to mediate with the RUF boys; instead he sent Isaac Mongo and Lawrence Wormandia who travelled to Lunsar on 7 May 2000.

⁷⁰⁹ Mike Lamin, former RUF commander and later Minister of Trade, Industry and State Enterprise in the post-Lomé Government of Sierra Leone; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 2 to 7 June 2000.

⁷¹⁰ See, *inter alia*, Idriss Ibrahim Sesay, former soldier in the Sierra Leone Army and member of the RUF; statement given to Sierra Leone Police at Central Prison, Pademba Road, Freetown; 7 to 8 June 2000.

On the same day we heard news that Johnny Paul had called for all factions at the National Stadium. I went straight to Pa Sankoh and demanded that he hide nothing from me because I did not know what was happening. During that time there were rumours that the RUF wanted to attack Freetown again. Sankoh told me to ask Gibril Massaquoi. I refused, pointing out that he has made me his Chief Security Officer so he should talk to me directly. I left angrily.

When I returned to the Lodge after I was calmed down, I heard that Mike Lamin had been arrested. I went in and informed Pa Sankoh. Pa Sankoh asked me to go to Johnny Paul and resolve the situation, because I am a soldier and Johnny Paul will talk to me. So I went.”⁷¹¹

1262. At around noon on Sunday 7 May 2000, Akim Turay led a delegation of RUF security guards to the Government offices at the Youyi Building to determine the whereabouts of Mike Lamin and hear a justification for the arrest from Johnny Paul Koroma. At least twenty-four (24) guards travelled in two Toyota Hillux vans to Koroma’s offices at the Youyi Building. According to members of the delegation, none of them was armed.⁷¹²
1263. Upon arrival at the Youyi Building, the delegation came across a group of soldiers who had been participating in the earlier ‘Peace Rally’. This group included the former AFRC ‘Honourable’ Samuel Kargbo (alias ‘Sammy’), who informed Akim and the others that Lamin had been taken to Johnny Paul Koroma’s Juba Hill residence and was being held there ‘for his own safety’. Thus the full contingent of RUF security personnel, accompanied by ‘Sammy’, proceeded to Koroma’s residence in the same two vehicles. Their objective was to find out the reasons behind the detention of Mike Lamin and to secure his release.⁷¹³
1264. It is worth pointing out that this was not the first occasion on which RUF security guards had travelled to Johnny Paul Koroma’s residence with the potential of ‘squaring up’ for a confrontation. Earlier in the year 2000, Akim Turay had gone there in almost identical circumstances and become embroiled in a violent clash with his counterpart, Johnny Paul Koroma’s Chief Security Officer Junior Johnson (alias ‘Junior Lion’). On that occasion, Akim had been badly beaten up by several West Side Boys and sustained a deep cut in his head from being struck with an iron bar.⁷¹⁴ The West Side Boys attached to Koroma’s residence had been held responsible for that clash by ECOMOG Colonel Bohari Musa.⁷¹⁵ It is fair to surmise that there was a lot of bad blood between the West Side Boys and the RUF security personnel led by Akim

⁷¹¹ Akim Turay, former soldier in the Sierra Leone Army and later Chief Security Officer in the RUF; TRC Interview conducted in Freetown; 4 May 2003

⁷¹² See, *inter alia*, Alex George Williams (alias “Twin Barrel”), former soldier in the Sierra Leone Army and later a member of the RUF; TRC Interview conducted in Freetown; 2 May 2003; and Idriss Ibrahim Sesay, former soldier in the Sierra Leone Army and member of the RUF; statement given to Sierra Leone Police at Central Prison, Pademba Road, Freetown; 7 to 8 June 2000.

⁷¹³ ‘Colonel’ Soriba Mansaray, former soldier in the Sierra Leone Army and later a member of the RUF; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at CID Headquarters, Freetown; 11 May 2000

⁷¹⁴ Akim Turay, former soldier in the Sierra Leone Army and later Chief Security Officer in the RUF; TRC Interview conducted in Freetown; 4 May 2003

⁷¹⁵ Samuel Bassie (alias “Machiavelli”), soldier in the Sierra Leone Army and former security guard to Johnny Paul Koroma; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at Pademba Road Prison, Freetown; 28 June 2000.

Turay to Johnny Paul Koroma's residence on Sunday 7 May 2000; indeed, 'bad blood' may well be something of an understatement.

The Arrest of Foday Sankoh's Entire Personal Security Detail on Sunday 7 May 2000

1265. The face-to-face meeting between the respective security cadres of Johnny Paul Koroma and Foday Sankoh represented a convergence of two squads of men whose personal backgrounds and fighting histories were remarkably similar. The inhabitants of Koroma's residence at the time included several of the coup-makers of 25 May 1997, who had subsequently become 'Honourables' in the AFRC regime. Among the most prominent soldiers at the compound on 7 May 2000 were Ibrahim Kamara (alias 'Bazzy'), Santigie Kanu (alias "Five Five"), Hassan Bangura (alias 'Papa' or 'Bombblast'), George Adams, Ibrahim Kamara (alias 'Cobra'), Alex Tamba Brima (alias 'Gullit') and an SLA officer nicknamed 'Peggy'. The RUF security guards were also all ex-SLA soldiers and had served alongside many of those they went to confront during the AFRC regime and later in the bush.
1266. Koroma's guards insisted that no more than five RUF personnel should be allowed to enter Koroma's compound. Those who entered comprised four of the most senior and respected of the ex-SLAs in the RUF: Akim Turay, Soriba Mansaray, Alex George Williams and Ernest Ngegba; plus one bodyguard. Only Akim and Soriba were permitted to go inside the house to speak with Koroma and Mike Lamin in person.⁷¹⁶
1267. Whilst waiting in and around the compound, the other RUF personnel claim to have been molested and provoked by Koroma's West Side Boys.⁷¹⁷ One of the RUF security guards testified that Santigie Kanu (alias "Five Five") made threats to kill several of the RUF for their perceived defection to the side of Foday Sankoh:

"I was told by 'Five Five' that I had been a soldier and upon returning to Freetown I had been keeping too much of a low profile and not co-operating with them. Therefore, he told me he was going to 'deal with me'. I didn't put up any resistance because we were outnumbered and they had armed men on their side. I was instructed to get on board one of the vehicles where some of my colleagues had already been loaded. 'Five Five' said I was going to suffer and out of it I would learn a lesson."⁷¹⁸

1268. Another RUF member described how the SLA soldiers drew parallels between this scenario and the previous occasion on which the West Side Boys had detained Mike Lamin in the post-Lomé phase:

"One SLA soldier by the name of 'Elonguma' came downstairs and used remarks that Mike Lamin will not persuade them this time because the

⁷¹⁶ Akim Turay, former soldier in the Sierra Leone Army and later Chief Security Officer in the RUF; TRC Interview conducted in Freetown; 4 May 2003

⁷¹⁷ Idriss Ibrahim Sesay, former soldier in the Sierra Leone Army and member of the RUF; statement given to Sierra Leone Police at Central Prison, Pademba Road, Freetown; 7 to 8 June 2000.

⁷¹⁸ Alex George Williams (alias "Twin Barrel"), former soldier in the Sierra Leone Army and later a member of the RUF; TRC Interview conducted in Freetown; 2 May 2003.

last time he was arrested by them at Okra Hills and he was allowed to talk, he managed to secure his release. So this time, no chance was going to be given to him to talk and he was going to be executed. He further remarked that some of us that had come were spies and that all of us were going to be executed because we had betrayed their cause.”⁷¹⁹

1269. According to Akim Turay, Johnny Paul Koroma’s disposition was welcoming enough to entertain a “lengthy discussion” with those who entered the house. However, upon trying to depart, the RUF members were prevented by Koroma:

“We talked in confidence and Johnny Paul assured me that Mike Lamin is inside in one of his rooms in his house. So I went into the room to see Mike Lamin. Mike told me he went to stadium and soldiers jumped on him and arrested him. I told Johnny Paul I will not leave without Mike. He agreed and pointed that he was only putting Mike under ‘protective custody’. [But] when I attempted to leave his house with Mike he stopped me and told us that they had to take us to Cockrill Barracks.”⁷²⁰

1270. Indeed, as it transpired, neither Mike Lamin, Akim Turay nor any other member of the 24-man RUF security detail was allowed to leave Johnny Paul Koroma’s residence freely. According to Soriba Mansaray, who was also inside Koroma’s house, West Side Boys started a fight with the RUF members waiting in the forecourt of the Lodge.⁷²¹ In a sizeable scuffle, the RUF members were beaten up, tied with rope to restrain them and robbed of a host of personal belongings. The keys to the two Toyota vehicles they had arrived in were also taken from them.⁷²²

1271. Johnny Paul Koroma then called in a team of ‘loyal officers’ in the Military Police, who arrived in military land rovers and were led by a man named Emil Dumbuya (alias Sawimbi).⁷²³ Koroma ordered the arrest of Mike Lamin and all twenty-four (24) of the RUF security men who had arrived at his lodge. According to one of those arrested, Koroma made a point of emphasising to the group that he was taking this action with the authority of the President:

“Suddenly, three military land rovers came and surrounded us; they were full of armed Military Police. Johnny Paul [Koroma] took out his mobile handset and called President Kabbah in our full view and hearing. Johnny Paul said to the President: ‘I have arrested the coup plotters!’

⁷¹⁹ Idriss Ibrahim Sesay, former soldier in the Sierra Leone Army and member of the RUF; statement given to Sierra Leone Police at Central Prison, Pademba Road, Freetown; 7 to 8 June 2000.

⁷²⁰ Akim Turay, former soldier in the Sierra Leone Army and later Chief Security Officer in the RUF; TRC Interview conducted in Freetown; 4 May 2003.

⁷²¹ ‘Colonel’ Soriba Mansaray, former soldier in the Sierra Leone Army and later a member of the RUF; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at CID Headquarters, Freetown; 11 May 2000.

⁷²² ‘Colonel’ Soriba Mansaray, former soldier in the Sierra Leone Army and later a member of the RUF; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at CID Headquarters, Freetown; 11 May 2000.

⁷²³ Idriss Ibrahim Sesay, former soldier in the Sierra Leone Army and member of the RUF; statement given to Sierra Leone Police at Central Prison, Pademba Road, Freetown; 7 to 8 June 2000.

All of us were escorted to Cockerill where [Chief of Defence Staff] Tom Carew told us that we should be taken to the prisons for safe custody and that we would be released the following day... Although no verdict has ever been passed against me, I am still in detention until the present day."⁷²⁴

1272. Mike Lamin and the twenty-four (24) RUF security guards were held for just a few hours in the guardrooms at the RSLMF Headquarters, Cockerill Barracks. According to one of the RUF men, the only apparent discussion on their status was as to whether or not they should be allowed to be executed by the West Side Boys:

"There was no weapon in our possession but however the military personnel that came in were in possession of arms. We were all arrested by them and brought to the Military Headquarters [at] Cockerill. No reason was given to us for our arrest and while we were in custody at Cockerill, the former AFRC 'Honourable' [George] Adams arrived in and requested that we should be handed over to him for execution at Okra Hills. His request was not granted."⁷²⁵

1273. The Commission is moved to express its deep concerns about the manner in which these arrests were carried out. There is absolutely no evidence that the Constitution of Sierra Leone was adhered to in respect of the procedures that ought to be followed when depriving a person of his liberty;⁷²⁶ indeed, the arrests and subsequent detentions flouted several constitutional guarantees and represent grave breaches of the human rights of these men.

1274. In particular, Johnny Paul Koroma unilaterally ordered the arrests as if performing in the capacity of a military police commander. In doing so he acted *ultra vires*, i.e. outside the powers accorded him as the Chairman of the CCP. From the point of their arrests, these men were held in detention facilities administered by the state. No justification for the arrests was given to any one of the men.⁷²⁷ The Commission holds these arrests and detentions at Koroma's behest to be illegal.

1275. Koroma himself attempted to distort the truth about the arrests. In an interview with a television journalist in 2001 he falsified the reasons why the RUF men had been at his house and again invoked the justification of his acting in the interests of the state:

"The worst of it was that [Sankoh] was planning to take over by force again. We knew about that because some of his men were arrested

⁷²⁴ Alex George Williams (alias "Twin Barrel"), former soldier in the Sierra Leone Army and later a member of the RUF; TRC Interview conducted in Freetown; 2 May 2003.

⁷²⁵ Idriss Ibrahim Sesay, former soldier in the Sierra Leone Army and member of the RUF; statement given to Sierra Leone Police at Central Prison, Pademba Road, Freetown; 7 to 8 June 2000.

⁷²⁶ See the Constitution of Sierra Leone (Act No. 6 of 1991), at Chapter III – The Recognition and Protection of the Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms of the Individual; Section 17 – *Protection from arbitrary arrest or detention*.

⁷²⁷ Mike Lamin, former RUF commander and later Minister of Trade, Industry and State Enterprise in the post-Lomé Government of Sierra Leone; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 2 to 7 June 2000.

living in my house – because they had wanted to study operations here.”⁷²⁸

1276. Even at the time, Koroma was keen in his public statements to present himself as a champion of the peace. When he explained his motives for carrying out the arrests on the BBC Africa Service the following morning, he laid emphasis on having foiled a ‘coup’ and passed the buck to President Kabbah to resolve the status of the detainees:

“These people had planned a coup for today (8 May 2000). And there are some of my men who can testify to that, because they asked them to take part. So instead of sitting down, we decided to foil that by making those arrests. We did that with the consent of the President. And I cannot sit by and see this place be torn apart.

[...] We just got the key players: soldiers who defected to the RUF. We informed [President Kabbah] about it, and to get his blessing. He told us to contact Defence Headquarters so that they can take appropriate action... [Mike Lamin] is one of those held by the military police. If [the President] thinks the situation is not what we explained to him, is not correct, then he can go ahead and release [Lamin].”⁷²⁹

1277. Unsurprisingly, Koroma’s actions caused considerable consternation among the members of the RUF who were gathered at Foday Sankoh’s Spur Road Lodge. Sankoh himself learnt of the arrests of his entire personal security detail in the form of hearsay. Some of his commanders reported to him that they had seen George Adams and other members of the West Side Boys driving around the city in Sankoh’s Toyota Hilux vans.⁷³⁰ These were of course the same vans that Sankoh had sent out with Akim Turay and the other security guards earlier that afternoon. Sankoh was heard to proclaim a string of expletives when it dawned upon him what had happened.⁷³¹

1278. Foday Sankoh subsequently telephoned Johnny Paul Koroma and enquired after the reasons for the arrests. Koroma apparently rebuffed Sankoh with the refrain that he was acting with the consent of the President.⁷³² According to one of Sankoh’s close associates, Sankoh then decided to convey his grievance to President Kabbah himself:

“The leader [Foday Sankoh] told us he was going to inform the President about the ugly developments on his side. Indeed, he telephoned the

⁷²⁸ Johnny Paul Koroma, Former Head of State as Chairman of the AFRC and latterly Chairman of the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP); interview conducted by a television journalist from Oxygen Media, on behalf of New-York based human rights group WITNESS; recorded on DVCAM (Tape R2003-0543) in Freetown; 5 November 2001.

⁷²⁹ British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Network Africa; “Interview with Johnny Paul Koroma, Chairman of Sierra Leone’s Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP)”; broadcast on 8 May 2000; included in the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 14 May 2000; also available in the news archives of Sierra Leone Web (www.sierra-leone.org).

⁷³⁰ Momoh Rogers, former RUF Battalion Commander; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 29 May 2000.

⁷³¹ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF commander who joined Foday Sankoh in Freetown as a member of the RUF; interview conducted in Freetown; 18 August 2003.

⁷³² TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF commander who joined Foday Sankoh in Freetown as a member of the RUF; interview conducted in Freetown; 18 August 2003.

President and later informed us that the President had assured him of the release of Mike Lamin and others.”⁷³³

Implications and Aftermath of the Arrests of RUF members on 7 May 2000

1279. It is manifest that President Kabbah was the only person who had the power to order the release of the 25 men arrested and detained illegally on 7 May 2000. The status of the detainees remained illegal from the point of their arrests until the following morning, 8 May 2000, since there was no evidence of an executive order that might have brought them within the criminal law of the country. For that period, their fate lay *de facto* in the hands of Johnny Paul Koroma, for it was he who had ordered the arrests and he who had made it clear that he would not release them unless prevailed upon by the President.
1280. Nevertheless, the Commission is satisfied that the Government was aware of the presence of these men in its custody overnight from 7 May to 8 May 2000. Upon being transferred to Freetown Central Prison on the evening of 7 May, the detainees were paid a visit by a Government Minister, Dr. Julius Spencer.⁷³⁴ In addition to the evidence of Sankoh's telephone call to the President, Spencer's visit attests to full knowledge of the number and identities of the men locked up on the part of the Government. The detainees spent the night of 7 May 2000 in jail believing that they were certain to be released the following morning.
1281. Indeed, the nation awoke on 8 May 2000 to news of an official statement, broadcast on state radio, that the President had “ordered the immediate release of Mike Lamin and a few others.”⁷³⁵ Coupled with the assurances made privately to Foday Sankoh over the telephone, this announcement encouraged confidence among RUF members at Sankoh's Lodge that the President was going to reverse the actions taken by Johnny Paul Koroma the previous day.⁷³⁶
1282. However, the radio broadcast proved to be untrue. The RUF members' confidence proved to be misplaced. In fact the opposite scenario transpired, whereby the detainees were separated from one another and incarcerated in high-security areas of the prison, as Mike Lamin explained in his later statement to the police:

“On 8 May 2000 at about 9.00 a.m. the Officer-in-Charge of Pademba Road [Prison], whose name I cannot remember, told me and the others in my category that our detention was ‘purely for protective custody’. For that reason, I was transferred from the Wilberforce Block to the Clarkson Block, where I was placed in one of the cells downstairs. The others

⁷³³ Momoh Rogers, former RUF Battalion Commander; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 29 May 2000.

⁷³⁴ Akim Turay, former soldier in the Sierra Leone Army and later Chief Security Officer in the RUF; TRC Interview conducted in Freetown; 4 May 2003.

⁷³⁵ Agence France Presse, “Sierra Leone Government orders release of arrested Minister”; broadcast on 8 May 2000; also available in the news archives of Sierra Leone Web (www.sierra-leone.org).

⁷³⁶ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF combatant who came to Freetown after the signing of the Lomé Accord; interview conducted in Freetown, 29 September 2003.

arrested with me were placed in different cells in the same Clarkson House. There we remained...⁷³⁷

1283. According to the Public Emergency Regulations 1998, the power to detain persons in 'safe custody' or 'protective custody' was vested in the President alone.⁷³⁸ Under those regulations, only an express 'Order' from the President could direct "that any person be detained or [should] continue to be detained" in order for that person to be "deemed to be in legal custody".⁷³⁹ In prison records, this mass arrest was registered as having been effected by the 'Military Police', while the categorisation was indeed that of 'safe custody',⁷⁴⁰ apparently under the Public Emergency Regulations 1998.
1284. The Commission has ascertained that at least nine of the men arrested on 7 May 2000 remain in detention at Pademba Road Prison to the present day.⁷⁴¹ On the other hand, an unspecified number of them have been arbitrarily released, either as individuals or in groups.⁷⁴² Mike Lamin was released on 5 September 2001, apparently after a consultative process that involved officials from the Human Rights Section of UNAMSIL.⁷⁴³ There appear to have been no justifications given for the distinctions made between the men detained and the men released, particularly not on grounds of law.⁷⁴⁴
1285. The Commission finds that the 25 men arrested on 7 May 2000 stand as living examples of the abuse of the justice system that persists in Sierra Leone. Their continued detention beyond the morning of 8 May 2000 dealt a crushing blow to the causes of truth and reconciliation in Sierra Leone. President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah made private and public assurances that they would be released on the morning of 8 May 2000. Yet on that very morning they were transferred into maximum security detention at Pademba Road Prison under the category of 'Safe Custody', which the President alone had the power to authorise. There has been no transparency whatsoever in the disposal of 'justice' against these men.

⁷³⁷ Mike Lamin, former RUF commander and later Minister of Trade, Industry and State Enterprise in the post-Lomé Government of Sierra Leone; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 2 to 7 June 2000.

⁷³⁸ Public Notice No. 2 of 1998, *The Public Emergency Regulations, 1998* under the Constitution of Sierra Leone (Act No. 6 of 1991); published as a Supplement to the Sierra Leone Gazette, Vol. CXXIX, No. 13; 12 March 1998.

⁷³⁹ *Ibidem*, at Section 2(a).

⁷⁴⁰ Criminal Investigations Department (CID) of the Sierra Leone Police; files from the Department of Prisons included in the dossier pertaining to the 'Foday Sankoh / 8 May 2000' case; dossier provided to the Commission in July 2003.

⁷⁴¹ See: TRC Confidential Interviews with detainees at Freetown Central Prison, Pademba Road, Freetown; May to October 2003; and The Director of Prisons, Prisons Department, Freetown; "Information Required in respect of Investigations by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission"; letter to the Commission marked PS.3/104/11; dated 13 June 2003.

⁷⁴² Criminal Investigations Department (CID) of the Sierra Leone Police; files from the Department of Prisons included in the dossier pertaining to the 'Foday Sankoh / 8 May 2000' case; dossier provided to the Commission in July 2003.

⁷⁴³ TRC Confidential Interview with a member of the UNAMSIL Human Rights Section; interview conducted in Freetown; 19 November 2003.

⁷⁴⁴ Some of those who remain in detention allege that the release of Mike Lamin, a Mende, attests to a policy of ethnic discrimination in the prisons system, since the majority of members of the SLPP governing "political elite" are also Mende. See also: TRC Confidential Interviews with detainees at Freetown Central Prison, Pademba Road, Freetown; May to October 2003.

1286. In terms of their more immediate aftermath, the arrests of the twenty-four men (24) men who comprised Foday Sankoh's security detail were to have a profound impact on the denouement of the RUF. The enforced removal of the official security contingent from Sankoh's Spur Road Lodge weakened the safety of that compound in every sense. The detained men were replaced by members of the 'Black Guards', a group of RUF combatants who were not only more susceptible to danger from the outside, but who were themselves considerably more dangerous.
1287. First, the rounding up of all the RUF guards with a background in the Sierra Leone Army meant Sankoh was deprived of his only real sources of discipline and professionalism. The Black Guards were simply not conditioned to act with the same degree of restraint as the ex-SLA men. They had been used to participating in guerrilla warfare, in which their deployment instructions were rarely more sophisticated than 'spare no living soul', 'hit and run' or 'shoot on sight'. Almost all of their fighting had taken place in the jungle; few if any of them were familiar with the urban environment of Freetown.
1288. Moreover, by forcibly extricating the Chief Security Officer Akim Turay and other experienced members of the inner circle from Sankoh's Lodge, Johnny Paul Koroma had dented the co-ordination of Sankoh's security operations irreparably. Akim was the only person truly familiar with the security 'network' for the Spur Road Lodge, including the manner and extent of interaction necessary between the RUF guards and the members of the official UNAMSIL deployment. The commander of the Black Guards, Jackson Swarray (alias 'Wray'), had no such grasp of the organisational side of the operation, or indeed any rational concept of 'security': he was essentially an unrefined thug.⁷⁴⁵
1289. In sum, the arrests severely depleted Sankoh's protective unit. They left the security of Sankoh's Spur Road Lodge in an exposed and disarrayed state. From the night of 7 May 2000, the task of affording personal protection to Sankoh transferred to the hands of undisciplined, unconventional RUF commando fighters. They presented an incontrovertible public danger at the Spur Road Lodge.

⁷⁴⁵ Jackson Swarray (alias CO 'Wray') was mentioned in a number of statements received by the Commission as a wanton violator of human rights. His brutish behaviour extended to the rape and abduction of young girls, at least one of whom he forced to be his 'bush wife'; forcing children to carry loads on threats of death; and carving the initials 'RUF' into the chests of abductees. See, *inter alia*, TRC Confidential statements numbered 5906 and 5985 relating to Wray's activities in the Koinadugu District.

The Night of Violent Activity between 7 May and 8 May 2000

1290. On the night between 7 May and 8 May 2000, a series of co-ordinated attacks in Freetown were carried out by the newly-assembled 'Peace Task Force', which consisted of Johnny Paul Koroma's men, the West Side Boys, supported by 'loyal' members of the Sierra Leone Army and the Special Security Division (SSD) of the police. The attacks were spread out across all sectors of the city, concentrating on the residences of Cabinet and Deputy Ministerial office-holders, as well as those of RUF members living in 'communal' houses.
1291. The self-styled 'Peace Task Force' that perpetrated these attacks included notable hooligans such as Santigie Kanu (alias Brigadier 'Five Five'), Alex Tamba Brima (alias "Gullit"), Samuel Kargbo (alias 'Sammy'), Hassan Bangura (alias 'Papa' or 'Bomblast') and George Adams. It was largely the same rabble of individuals who had attacked Freetown on 6 January 1999 and who patrolled Koroma's compound as his security guards during the post-Lomé implementation period.
1292. One member of the 'Peace Task Force' explained to the Commission that he and his compatriots were equipped with "plenty" of firearms and ammunition, which he believed had come directly from the armaments store of the Military Headquarters, Cockerill Barracks on the authority of the Chief of Defence Staff, Tom Carew.⁷⁴⁶
1293. The Peace Task Force was given a series of 'targets' by Johnny Paul Koroma. These were locations, mostly houses, where they were told they would find RUF members residing or 'in hiding'. The 'targets' of their operations were identical to the RUF 'bases' and 'hideouts' that had been identified to UNAMSIL officers during the 'guided tour' by RUF informant Sahr Sandy on 5 May 2000.⁷⁴⁷
1294. It was unclear exactly what instructions the members of the Peace Task Force were given with regard to the use of their weapons against the inhabitants of their targets. However, the ultimate objective of their operations was described as being "to arrest everyone who was against the peace."⁷⁴⁸
1295. The Commission received testimony as to armed attacks by the Peace Task Force in Babadorie, Malama, New England and several other locations. The West Side Boys and their accomplices committed a host of violations and abuses in these raids. They systematically looted and vandalised the properties they attacked, and they arrested and detained a number of captives arbitrarily. One of those whose home was set upon explained the circumstances to the Commission:

"They attacked me, my wife, children and other dependants in a Ministerial Guest House in New England... They looted all my

⁷⁴⁶ TRC Confidential Interview with a former officer of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who served as a 'Brigadier' under the AFRC and later became Leader of the 'West Side Boys'; interview conducted in Freetown; 17 October 2003.

⁷⁴⁷ See: Sahr Sandy, former RUF combatant and 'informant' on RUF activities in Freetown after Lomé; statement given to Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 17 September 2000.

⁷⁴⁸ TRC Confidential Interview with a former officer of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who served as a 'Brigadier' under the AFRC and later became Leader of the 'West Side Boys'; interview conducted in Freetown; 17 October 2003.

belongings, right down to the carpet. My wife and children were arrested and taken to Pademba Road Prison; I escaped and went to Foday Sankoh's Lodge, where I met all the others who were chased out from their homes. All of us thought Sankoh's residence would be a safe haven, bearing in mind his status as Vice President."⁷⁴⁹

1296. Following its close surveillance for most of the weekend, the RUF residence at No. 12 Josiah Drive was central among the targets of the Peace Task Force on its night of violent activity. The following account received by the Commission was typical of the experiences recounted by those who lived there:

"The night of 7 May 2000 was a sleepless night for us [the RUF members] at No. 12 Josiah Drive, Malama. We spent the whole night running away from the house because of the constant raids by unknown armed men. Some people escaped and managed to reach to Pa Sankoh at Spur Road in order to explain the conditions to him. He sent some of his security detail and UNAMSIL personnel to investigate and secure the place until day-break, but unfortunately they returned to Spur Road before dawn.

[...] First thing in the morning of 8 May 2000, No. 12 Josiah Drive was attacked again at around 7.00 o'clock. I ran out of the house using the back door, but about ten metres away from the house I was arrested by armed and uniformed soldiers."⁷⁵⁰

1297. Another two residents of the same house at Josiah Drive described in their statements to the police how those who were unable to escape were forcibly rounded up and abused on the multiple occasions when the Peace Task Force raided the residence:

"At about 12.00 midnight I was at No. 12 Josiah Drive when Brigadier Bioh [Ibrahim 'Bioh' Sesay] and a group of soldiers on board two Toyota Hillux vans arrived [and] asked all the occupants to come out of the house with all our belongings. These soldiers forcefully took some of our belongings and they left. At about 1.30 a.m. some soldiers who were well-armed arrived and arrested me."⁷⁵¹

[and]

"At 2.00 a.m. on Monday 8 May 2000 I was at home when a group of SLA soldiers attacked our No. 12 Josiah Drive residence with heavy firing. I was arrested together with the Deputy Minister of Transport and Communications, called Susan [Lahai], as well as three RUF ex-combatants. The SLA brothers who arrested us were headed by one 'Gullit'; we [the ex-combatants] were taken to Cockerill Military

⁷⁴⁹ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF office-holder in the post-Lomé Government of Sierra Leone; interview conducted on 28 August 2003.

⁷⁵⁰ TRC Confidential Interview with a former RUF commander who was residing at Josiah Drive, Malama when the residence was attacked in May 2000; interview conducted in Freetown; 24 August 2003.

⁷⁵¹ Foday Kennie Lansana, former signaller for the RUF and resident of the house at Josiah Drive; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at CID Headquarters, Freetown; 31 May 2000

Headquarters and later to the Central Prison, where we were detained.”⁷⁵²

1298. Among the most appalling multiple violations committed by the Peace Task Force during its rampage through Freetown was the fate it inflicted upon the Deputy Minister for Transport and Communications, Susan Lahai. According to one of her close associates, Lahai was not transported to Cockrill Barracks with the other RUF captives; instead she was singled out, “arrested and taken to an unknown location.”⁷⁵³ Indeed, Susan Lahai’s name was not to appear on any of the records of those formally taken into state custody in the month of May 2000.⁷⁵⁴
1299. Susan Lahai’s captors were led by Alex Tamba Brima (alias Gullit);⁷⁵⁵ they included Samuel Kargbo (alias ‘Sammy’), Hassan Bangura (alias ‘Papa’ or ‘Bombblast’), George Adams, Ibrahim Kamara (alias ‘Cobra’), Ibrahim ‘Bioh’ Sesay, Ibrahim ‘Bazzy’ Kamara and the military police officer Emil Dumbuya (alias ‘Sawimbi’). This list certainly does not reflect all those involved because, as one of the Peace Task Force commanders testified: “there were plenty of us making that arrest.”⁷⁵⁶
1300. Susan Lahai was killed in the early hours of Monday 8 May 2000 by the West Side Boys.⁷⁵⁷ The full extent of the horror suffered by Susan Lahai was never properly disclosed to the Commission. It was confirmed that acts of violent sexual abuse were carried out against her, ‘probably’ by each of the above-named men and their accomplices.⁷⁵⁸ It was also confirmed that the media, apparently based on information from official sources, gravely misrepresented the incident and gave the impression that Lahai had been “among those arrested and subsequently freed.”⁷⁵⁹ Based upon an account from a source that is universally relied upon by members of the RUF, it was claimed to the Commission that Susan Lahai was “gang-raped to death and her body found in

⁷⁵² Junior Momoh (alias “Junior”), former driver for the RUF and member of the security cadre at Foday Sankoh’s Lodge; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at CID Headquarters, Freetown; 15 May 2000

⁷⁵³ Sheikh Abu Bakarr Nabbie, former Chief Protocol Officer to the Chairman and Leader of the RUF Foday Sankoh; TRC Interview conducted in Freetown; 2 May 2003.

⁷⁵⁴ See: Prisons Department, Sierra Leone Police; “Revolutionary United Front Suspects in Custody from 8 May to 14 May 2000”, plus addendum entitled “List of RUF Detainees from Military Headquarters to Central Prisons, Pademba Road on 17 May 2000; documents provided to the Commission upon request by Sierra Leone Police; July 2003.

⁷⁵⁵ Junior Momoh (alias “Junior”), former driver for the RUF and member of the security cadre at Foday Sankoh’s Lodge; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at CID Headquarters, Freetown; 15 May 2000

⁷⁵⁶ TRC Confidential Interview with a former officer of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who served as a ‘Brigadier’ under the AFRC and later became Leader of the ‘West Side Boys’; interview conducted in Freetown; 17 October 2003.

⁷⁵⁷ See, *inter alia*, Sheikh Abu Bakarr Nabbie, former Chief Protocol Officer to the Chairman and Leader of the RUF Foday Sankoh; TRC Interview conducted in Freetown; 2 May 2003.

⁷⁵⁸ TRC Confidential Interview with a former officer of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who served as a ‘Brigadier’ under the AFRC and later became Leader of the ‘West Side Boys’; interview conducted in Freetown; 17 October 2003.

⁷⁵⁹ See, *inter alia*, Agence France Presse, “Sierra Leone Government orders release of arrested Minister”; broadcast on 8 May 2000; also available in the news archives of Sierra Leone Web (www.sierra-leone.org).

a gutter.”⁷⁶⁰ This allegation was not denied when it was put to one of the West Side Boys.⁷⁶¹

1301. The Commission holds the West Side Boys and Johnny Paul Koroma responsible for the violent sexual abuse and murder of the RUF Deputy Minister for Transport and Communications, Susan Lahai. The Government’s failure to account for the sudden disappearance of one of its key office-holders is a shameful act of neglect that can not be tolerated in a democratic society. The moral responsibility for the tragic and silent death of Susan Lahai is shared by all parties in Government.
1302. Furthermore, the Commission condemns the executive decision to accommodate the West Side Boys as law enforcement agents. Many of those arrested and detained by the West Side Boys were subsequently kept in prison in the custody of the state under the ‘Safe Custody’ or ‘Protective Custody’ category created by the Public Emergency Regulations of 1998. As noted above, the President alone was statutorily permitted to authorise the detention of any person under this category.⁷⁶²
1303. Thus, for every person arrested by the Peace Task Force who was subsequently detained in the so-called ‘safe custody’ category, the Government lent further credibility to the self-proclaimed ‘heroic’ actions of the West Side Boys, which they claimed were carried out in the name of the state. The Commission finds that the effective creation of a new unit of paramilitary police was a wanton subversion of the rule of law. Indeed it allowed this band of brutal warlords to take the law into their own hands.
1304. The pattern of attacks on 7 May 2000 testifies to a systematic and co-ordinated campaign of violations against the office-holders of the RUF. It was a campaign that led to acute suffering by both RUF members and various civilians, who had no connection to the RUF but were unfortunate to be caught up in the operation.⁷⁶³ The campaign caused an unspecified number of deaths and disappearances; large-scale looting and destruction of property; blanket and arbitrary arrests and detentions; and a sudden, forced convergence upon Foday Sankoh’s Spur Road Lodge by all of those who managed to escape the mayhem.
1305. In the words of Idriss Hamid Kamara (alias “Leather Boot”), the RUF Deputy Minister of the power-sharing Government whose home had been raided the previous evening, the implications of these attacks were as follows:

“On 7 May 2000, all RUF Ministers in Government and senior commanders of RUF attached to the various Commissions residing in Freetown had their houses ransacked and their families molested by

⁷⁶⁰ TRC Confidential Interview with RUF member; interview conducted on 13 September 2003.

⁷⁶¹ TRC Confidential Interview with a soldier who joined the West Side Boys; interview conducted on 7 November 2003.

⁷⁶² Public Notice No. 2 of 1998, *The Public Emergency Regulations, 1998* under the Constitution of Sierra Leone (Act No. 6 of 1991); published as a Supplement to the Sierra Leone Gazette, Vol. CXXIX, No. 13; 12 March 1998; at Section 2(a).

⁷⁶³ Some of those arrested were, for example, domestic staff of the RUF members targeted, or were simply in the vicinity of the residence that was being targeted. In one document compiled by the Prisons Department, believed to have been produced at the end of May 2000, no fewer than seventy-seven (77) detained persons are listed under the heading ‘Those believed to be having little or no connection with RUF’.

Johnny Paul Koroma's men. Based on this development, all of them deserted their houses and went to Foday Sankoh's residence for safety. Towards the evening of that same day, the house of Chairman Sankoh was 'jam packed'.⁷⁶⁴

1306. The activities of the Peace Task Force would continue in essentially the same vein for the next 24 hours into 8 May 2000. They succeeded in completely transforming the character of state security in Freetown and in heightening tensions in the city to a level that was closer than ever to breaking point.
1307. Throughout these operations Johnny Paul Koroma was kept abreast of the situation through phone calls and situation reports from members of his mission squads.⁷⁶⁵ At no point did Koroma or any other party intervene to stop the descent of the city into chaos. Indeed Koroma maintained his position that he was acting "with the consent of the President"⁷⁶⁶ and nobody so much as challenged him.
1308. The Commission finds that the West Side Boys acted upon the instructions of Johnny Paul Koroma in their engagement as part of the 'Peace Task Force' between 6 and 8 May 2000. They carried out Koroma's instructions as to the targets and mode of their operations. Koroma in turn derived authority to command these operations directly from the President. It was thus that the West Side Boys became part of the state security apparatus for the particular period in question. Their participation signalled a complete turnaround in the alignment of their faction, which further vindicated the Commission's impression of the essentially chameleonic character of many combatants who fought in the Sierra Leone conflict.⁷⁶⁷

⁷⁶⁴ Idrissa Hamid Kamara (alias "Leather Boot"), former Deputy Minister of Labour, Industrial Relations and Social Security; statement given to Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 12 May 2000.

⁷⁶⁵ TRC Confidential Interview with a former officer of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who served as a 'Brigadier' under the AFRC and later became Leader of the 'West Side Boys'; interview conducted in Freetown; 17 October 2003.

⁷⁶⁶ Johnny Paul Koroma made statements declaring that he had the support of the Government for his Peace Task Force throughout Sunday 7 May and Monday 8 May 2000. See, *inter alia*: British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Network Africa; "Interview with Johnny Paul Koroma, Chairman of Sierra Leone's Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP)"; broadcast on 8 May 2000; included in the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 14 May 2000; also available in the news archives of Sierra Leone Web (www.sierra-leone.org). As if to prove the point, he continued to maintain the position without contradiction until his eventual flight out of Freetown in January 2003.

⁷⁶⁷ For further discussion of this, see the chapter of this report on the Nature of the Conflict.

A Last-Ditch Attempt by the RUF to Avert the Demonstration of 8 May 2000

1309. A four-man delegation of RUF office-holders paid a personal visit to the then Vice President, Albert Joe Demby, on the evening of 7 May 2000. The delegation was led by the Minister of Lands, Peter Vandy, who carried an influential personal sway over Demby on account of his being married to Demby's daughter.⁷⁶⁸ The other delegates were Sheku Andrew Coomber, RUF Representative on the Joint Monitoring Commission, Vandy Kosia, RUF Representative for Moyamba District on the Ceasefire Monitoring Committee, and one Corporal Bayoh of the Sierra Leone Army.
1310. The stated intention of the party was to petition Demby to call a halt to the proposed demonstration scheduled for the following day. However, as Coomber explained to the Commission, the Vice President instead painted a bleak picture for the RUF of the prevailing circumstances as they pertained to state security:
- “The Vice President told us that it was too late. He said that he had on his own accord ordered the two helicopter gunships to go to the RUF zones and bomb all physical evidence of people, houses and vehicles [and indeed] that from Rokupr, Kambia, Makeni, Kailahun, Pendembu and Tongo Field there were already some reports of satisfactory air bombings being carried out.
- [...] He told us that arrangements have been made so that no assault, abuse or trespass would be encouraged from anybody on the day of the demonstration. Government had instructed the Inspector-General of Police to detail the anti-riot police to move with the crowd so that they could not enter anybody's premises, nor attack anybody physically.
- [...] When we informed the Vice President that Johnny Paul Koroma and the AFRC men had already begun arresting and embarrassing RUF members and sympathisers... he assured us that [the detained RUF personnel] would be released without delay. But even though the President ordered their release, no heed was taken of his words.”⁷⁶⁹
1311. The visit of this RUF delegation to the Vice President was a last-ditch attempt to avert the demonstration for the following day in what appeared to be a climate of rising hostilities. The attempt failed. Thus the stage was set for a tumult to occur in Freetown on Monday 8 May 2000.

⁷⁶⁸ Peter Borbor Vandy, former RUF commander and later Minister of Lands, Housing, Country Planning and the Environment in the post-Lomé Government of Sierra Leone; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 2 to 7 June 2000.

⁷⁶⁹ Sheku Andrew Coomber, RUF Representative to the Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC); TRC Interview conducted in Freetown; 28 October 2003.

THE LANDMARK EVENTS OF 8 MAY 2000

Agreement to mobilise the CDF in the Pre-dawn Morning Hours of 8 May 2000

1312. The first genuine involvement of the institutional hierarchy of the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) in the intensified state security operations of May 2000 arrived in the pre-dawn morning hours of 8 May 2000. The President of Sierra Leone, Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, later acknowledged the importance of the CDF's deployment in his testimony to the Commission:

“The CDF continued to play significant roles in providing the necessary leverage at critical stages for Government to tilt the scale to its favour – [primarily] against the RUF... For this reason the CDF became a household name as people embraced it as the viable option.

[...] They [the CDF] provided the leverage when the RUF misbehaved again and again – notably during the May 8, 2000 problem; they helped to send a clear message to all renegades that the people meant to realise the peace promised by my Presidency sooner rather than later, by the end of 2000.”⁷⁷⁰

1313. The Secretary-General of the international support network SLAM-CDF, Reverend Alfred M. SamForay, was by this time one of the closest confidants of the National Co-ordinator of the CDF, Chief Samuel Hinga Norman. SamForay spent three months in Freetown as a guest of Chief Hinga Norman, ending on Friday 5 May 2000. Upon returning to his home in the United States, SamForay was told by Chief Hinga Norman that, in the light of “rumours of a rebel advance on Freetown” and the impending march by civilian demonstrators on the residence of Foday Sankoh, Hinga Norman would be “keeping to himself.”⁷⁷¹ Nevertheless, SamForay was given a telephone number where Hinga Norman could be reached “in case of emergency.”

1314. Hinga Norman had not provided his emergency contact details to the President, the Vice President or the Chairman of the National Co-ordination Committee of the CDF, Richard E. S. Lagawo. Thus SamForay was put in the familiar position of having to link the Deputy Minister of Defence with other members of the Government by means of an international conference call. Apparently the President was woken from his sleep at approximately 4.00a.m. in order to make an input to this conference call. SamForay testified in detail as to the contents of the lengthy negotiations between Chief Hinga Norman and Chairman Lagawo, in which SamForay personally participated for SLAM-CDF:

“I was made to understand that Hinga Norman was upset with Kabbah because the President [had] refused to arm the CDF to protect the city in the event the RUF invaded or if there was any violence at Foday

⁷⁷⁰ Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, current President of the Republic of Sierra Leone; testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown; 05 August 2003; at paragraph 48 of the transcript.

⁷⁷¹ Reverend Alfred M. Sam Foray, former Secretary-General of the Sierra Leone Action Movement for the Civil Defence Forces (SLAM-CDF); written statement and supporting documentation submitted to the Commission by e-mail; 10 December 2003.

Sankoh's home. Lagawo pleaded with Hinga Norman to deploy the CDF. Hinga Norman insisted on guarantees that the men would be provided with the necessary logistics before he could send them on a suicide mission. Lagawo indicated that it was late at night by then and that both President Kabbah and the Vice President were already in bed.

[...] We stayed on the phone from about 12.00 midnight to about 4.00 am Sierra Leone time in order to resolve this issue. Hinga Norman refused to relent unless Lagawo would get Kabbah to authorise the release of arms. Finally Lagawo told us to break off for about an hour so [that] he could try and reach the President.

[...] At about 4.00 am, we resumed the negotiations and Lagawo informed Hinga Norman that President Kabbah had agreed to release whatever Hinga Norman needed to defend the city. Hinga Norman was to report to the President early in the morning of 8 May 2000 to finalise everything."⁷⁷²

1315. The President authorised Chief Samuel Hinga Norman to undertake a large-scale mobilisation of members of the Civil Defence Forces in Freetown on the morning of 8 May 2000. The scale of the CDF deployment during that day, numbering "several hundred armed Kamajors,"⁷⁷³ indicated that the President approved the provision of weapons and ammunition sufficient to fulfil Hinga Norman's operational requirements. Kamajors were thus deployed as a supplement to existing arms of the state security apparatus.

1316. Reverend SamForay testified that in his view, the deployment of large numbers of CDF across Freetown was a sterling vindication of the leadership of Chief Hinga Norman:

"[...] The CDF units that participated in the 8 May 2000 incident included units of the Western Area CDF ('Ojeje') and the Organised Body of Hunting Societies (OBHS) as well as Kamajors from Brookfields Hotel and the thirty or so Kamajors who stayed with us at Hinga Norman's Spur Road residence.

[...] As I later learned, Hinga Norman, in spite of his hard bargaining the night before, had actually mobilised the CDF throughout the city. The CDF went into action on 8 May preventing general breakdown of security in the city. The feedback we received from Lagawo and Hinga Norman was that the operation was a success... Once again, Mr. Kabbah's mistrust of Chief Hinga Norman almost plunged the city and the country into chaos and destruction."⁷⁷⁴

1317. The agreement to deploy the CDF in operations on 8 May 2000 further multiplied the amount of lethal weapons in the hands of various fighting factions on the streets of Freetown. Armed CDF lined up alongside armed

⁷⁷² Reverend Alfred M. SamForay, former Secretary-General of the Sierra Leone Action Movement for the Civil Defence Forces (SLAM-CDF); written statement and supporting documentation submitted to the Commission by e-mail; 10 December 2003.

⁷⁷³ TRC Confidential Interview with former Kamajor fighter for the Civil Defence Forces; interview conducted in Bo Town, Bo District; 11 August 2003.

⁷⁷⁴ Reverend Alfred M. SamForay, former Secretary-General of the Sierra Leone Action Movement for the Civil Defence Forces (SLAM-CDF); written statement and supporting documentation submitted to the Commission by e-mail; 10 December 2003.

West Side Boys, armed soldiers of the regular Sierra Leone Army and armed policemen of the SSD. All of these groups were primed to participate in operations against the RUF on the orders of their respective commanders. The civilian demonstration was therefore destined to be overshadowed by the spectre of violence.

Preparations for the Demonstration among the inhabitants of Foday Sankoh's Spur Road Lodge

1318. On the morning of 8 May 2000 there was undoubtedly considerable panic among the inhabitants of Foday Sankoh's Spur Road Lodge. The population of the Lodge had swelled to more than double its normal size due to the influx of displaced RUF combatants, RUF members and their families, and various other residents of the locations that had been stormed by the Peace Task Force in the course of the previous night. The RUF Secretary-General, the late Solomon Y. B. Rogers, estimated that there were over one hundred and fifty (150) RUF and RUF personnel at the Lodge that morning.⁷⁷⁵
1319. With the exception of a few individuals who had slipped the net of the Peace Task Force and managed to escape to private hiding places in the city, almost the entire Freetown-based membership of the RUF and RUF was packed into two locations: the Spur Road Lodge and the Pademba Road Prison.
1320. In their accounts given to the Commission and to the Sierra Leone Police, the inhabitants of the Lodge cast differing portrayals and perspectives of the activities that took place there on the morning of 8 May 2000. One feature common to all the testimonies was the air of expectancy that had grown in anticipation of the mass demonstration.
1321. In most versions of events, the expectancy was laced with fear, particularly among the sizeable contingent of women and children at the Lodge. Foday Sankoh had a large extended family living with him, including sons, daughters, nephews, nieces and even grandchildren. One young member of Foday Sankoh's family, who was barely a teenager at the time, told the Commission how he had approached Sankoh the previous evening and suggested that the children should find a way out of the Lodge:

"The fear was hot for everybody in the house. More of the RUF [members] from the other points in town kept coming and asking Dad [Foday Sankoh] to let them stay with him. They were full of fear but Dad was just sitting them down, ask them: 'have you eaten?'; give them food. I wanted to get out, [so] I went and spoke to him: 'Dad, I want to leave the house with the other children'; but he would not let me go, because he said he was responsible for us and he would protect us. That Sunday, throughout the night we could not sleep."⁷⁷⁶

1322. According to an RUF member who had also expressed concerns about safety at the Lodge, Sankoh was still keen to present himself as a guardian and protector the following morning. Sankoh apparently tried to allay some of the

⁷⁷⁵ Solomon Y. B. Rogers, former Chairman of the RUF War Council and later National Secretary General of the RUF; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 12 to 13 May 2000.

⁷⁷⁶ TRC Confidential Interview with a young member of the Sankoh family who escaped from Foday Sankoh's Spur Road Lodge on 8 May 2000; interview conducted on 19 November 2003.

fears of those around him by declaring that the demonstration would be a joyous occasion to share with the demonstrators:

“Foday Sankoh said he was very happy that morning because he was seeing it as an opportunity for him to explain himself to the people and prove that he was not the obstacle to peace as most people thought. He slaughtered two cows to be cooked, bought enough drinks and many other food items.

[...] Sankoh spoke to us all to encourage us: ‘I am glad my people are coming to meet me today; let them come. I will make it clear that I am not the ‘stumbling block’... When they come we will all eat, drink and talk like family members. Even though it is politics, we are all Sierra Leoneans; the same people. So let them come!’ Some of us were just hoping that the scene would not turn ugly.”⁷⁷⁷

1323. There was nevertheless clear evidence that the combatants at the Lodge, especially the Black Guards, were developing a siege mentality: they were preparing to defend the Lodge against an armed attack. According to one of the former RUF commanders who were in the Lodge on 8 May, Foday Sankoh received ‘intelligence’ that the attackers who had raided the other RUF residences in the city had “decided to make Sankoh’s house the last target on their ‘hit list’.”⁷⁷⁸

1324. Foday Sankoh is said to have responded to these ‘intelligence’ reports by ordering the distribution of weapons among some of the combatants and commanders at his Lodge. While it is indisputable that these weapons were indeed handed out on Sankoh’s authority, the timing and the means of distribution are somewhat unclear. One of the senior commanders present at the Lodge on the day testified to the Commission that Gibril Massaquoi was responsible for arming the RUF men:

“Foday Sankoh had arms and ammunitions in his Spur Road Lodge to the full knowledge of the Sierra Leone Government; they were always there for security reasons. Some of us never asked where the arms were being taken from, but they were under the control of Gibril Massaquoi. I think Gibril was distributing the arms to the RUF bodyguards, like the Black Guards, for whenever there was a threat to the security of the Lodge. I saw Gibril passing arms to some of the boys on the morning of May 8th.”⁷⁷⁹

1325. Alternative accounts suggested that Mohamed Sandi (alias ‘I-Tay’) was the person responsible for distributing arms among the men. ‘I-Tay’ was a senior Black Guard commander, believed to be the effective second-in-command to Jackson Swarray (alias ‘CO Wray’) and the so-called ‘storekeeper’ of the arms

⁷⁷⁷ TRC Confidential Interview with a member of the RUF who took refuge at Foday Sankoh’s Spur Road Lodge on 7 May 2000 and escaped from there the following day; interview conducted in Freetown; 20 October 2003.

⁷⁷⁸ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF commander who joined Foday Sankoh in Freetown as a member of the RUF; interview conducted in Freetown; 18 August 2003.

⁷⁷⁹ TRC Confidential Interview with a senior RUF member who fled from Foday Sankoh’s Lodge on 8 May 2000; interview conducted in Freetown; 19 August 2003.

stockpile.⁷⁸⁰ In a statement to the police, a 12-year-old child combatant gave his perceived version of events as follows:

“On that day, 8 May 2000, in the morning hours, Foday Sankoh called together [a host of senior commanders and bodyguards] in a room and told them that he had learnt that some SLA soldiers were intending to come and attack his residence that day. He further said that he was going to arm them and that they should retaliate in the event that he [Sankoh] was attacked... At that point Captain ‘I-Tay’ took up a list of names and started calling them... to arm them with RPG, or AK-47 and AK-58 rifles. After these people have been armed, they were deployed in different areas around the compound.”⁷⁸¹

1326. The third perspective recorded was that Foday Sankoh himself supplied the guns to his men after delivering instructions to them as to how they should deal with the demonstration. George Baba Musa, who was working as a caretaker at a construction site near to Foday Sankoh’s Spur Road Lodge, gave the following statement to the police:

“Early in the morning of 8 May 2000 I was in my compound when I heard Chairman Foday Sankoh addressing the UNAMSIL security and his rebel bodyguards. He was talking in a loud voice to his men and I went closer in order to listen to what he was saying.

[...] From the point I was standing, I heard Foday Sankoh telling his men that he was expecting a large crowd of demonstrators who were to be led by a so-called civil society group to demonstrate against him. He then gave orders in no uncertain terms that none of the demonstrators were to be allowed into his premises and not even beyond the UNAMSIL checkpoint.

[...] A few minutes later in my full view, I saw Chairman Sankoh enter his house and come out with brand new guns, which he supplied to all his men with the instruction that they should be on the alert. At the time he was doing so, the UNAMSIL security personnel were standing close by and they saw what was happening.

[...] A few minutes later, about twenty (20) well-armed RUF men came out of the compound and took positions around the building... Looking at them, they appeared very desperate and determined.”⁷⁸²

1327. The Commission finds that Foday Sankoh authorised up to 30 RUF combatants in the compound of his Spur Road Lodge to bear arms on 8 May 2000. The most prominent among all those with arms were Gibril Massaquoi, Dennis Mingo (alias “Superman”) , Jackson Swarray (alias ‘CO Wray’) and Mohamed Sandi (alias Captain ‘I-Tay’). They were deployed around various positions in the compound. While most accounts suggest that the bulk of the men were

⁷⁸⁰ Momoh Rogers, former RUF Battalion Commander; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 29 May 2000.

⁷⁸¹ Ibrahim Conteh (alias “Creole Boy”), former RUF child combatant; statement given to Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 18 May 2000.

⁷⁸² George Baba Musa, caretaker of a building site situated close to Foday Sankoh’s Spur Road Lodge; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at Peter Kamaray’s Construction Site, Spur Road, Freetown; 12 May 2000.

armed on the morning of the demonstration, the most senior commanders, including the above-named men, had their firearms with them from the evening of 7 May 2000, right through until the following morning's activities.⁷⁸³

1328. Some RUF combatants staying at the No. 12 Josiah Drive residence were also equipped with arms on the morning of 8 May 2000. As recounted above, the residence came under attack on multiple occasions during the preceding night, when its residents were not armed. Many of its inhabitants fled or were arrested by the 'Peace Task Force' before dawn. A child combatant who was among those left in the house told the police the following information:

"On 8 May 2000 in the morning hours, I was at home [at 12 Josiah Drive, Lumley] when Dennis Mingo (alias "Superman") arrived aboard a Landcruiser vehicle and carried five AK-47 rifles. Superman handed over the rifles to [five of us] and then told all of us in the house to be on standby as there is going to be a fight soon in the city. He further told us that if anybody should shoot against us, we should do the same."⁷⁸⁴

Mobilisation of the Kamajors from the Upper Hillside of Spur Road

1329. It should be recalled that the route prescribed for the demonstration was purposefully chosen by the 'Security Group' of its organising committee in order to avoid traversing the upper hillside of Spur Road. The reason tendered for steering clear of this area was that it housed a number of important state functionaries, whose business was not to be disrupted by the demonstration. The residents of the upper part of Spur Road included the Vice President, Dr. Albert Joe Demby, and the Deputy Minister of Defence, Chief Samuel Hinga Norman.
1330. As the day of the demonstration arrived, however, residents of Wilberforce Village, located just up the hill from Spur Road, began to detect that the 'business' being conducted by state functionaries in that vicinity was something out of the ordinary. The upper part of Spur Road was being used as an assembly point for scores of Kamajors. From the compound of Chief Hinga Norman and from the house that was formerly inhabited by the ECOMOG General and erstwhile Chief of Defence Staff Maxwell Khobe, Kamajors were being despatched in the direction of Foday Sankoh's Lodge.
1331. These Kamajors began assuming their formations early in the morning. According to testimonies gathered from civilian residents in the Wilberforce area, Kamajors from Hinga Norman's compound started firing gunshots randomly in the direction of passing vehicles at approximately 8.30am.⁷⁸⁵ Some residents of the area attempted to move down the hillside to the access road leading to Foday Sankoh's Lodge, past the site of the British High Commissioner's residence. As they approached the access road in question,

⁷⁸³ Momoh Rogers, former RUF Battalion Commander; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 29 May 2000.

⁷⁸⁴ Ginnah Lansana Brima, former RUF child combatant; statement given to Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 23 May 2000.

⁷⁸⁵ TRC Confidential Interviews with civilian residents of Wilberforce Village who witnessed the build-up to the 8 May 2000 demonstration at Foday Sankoh's Spur Road Lodge; interviews conducted in Freetown; November 2003.

they were frightened off by gunshots from the Kamajors and had to return back to Wilberforce Village.⁷⁸⁶

1332. Nonetheless, shortly afterwards they tried again. According to one resident, “almost the whole population of Wilberforce started making its way to the Sankoh compound” in order to assert their right to participate in the demonstration; many of them were chanting “they are coming, they are coming” as they neared the point where the Kamajors were deployed. The Kamajors had to hold fire in the face of the large swell of civilians coming down from the upper hillside of Spur Road. Statements from members of the civilian crowd expressed concern as to the sight that greeted them when they saw the Kamajors:

“The Kamajors were holding all sorts of ‘military hardwares’ – they had tied their heads with leaves and they had weapons with them like cutlasses, automatic weapons and RPGs.”

[and]

“The Kamajors were coming down the hill like bees; [they were] coming through the bushy area at the back of the [Sankoh] compound, waving leaves and shouting ‘heh-heh-heh’. Their presence was too heavy.”⁷⁸⁷

1333. Members of the crowd from Wilberforce Village also laid eyes on an array of parliamentarians, including some Government Ministers, gathered alongside other dignitaries outside the gates of the compound of General Khobe. One young man expressed to the Commission his disillusionment at the roles he witnessed certain Members of Parliament and the Government performing at the scene:

“Abdul Karim Koroma [a politician from Tonkolili District] was there; Okere Adams [SLPP Minister of Agriculture] was there; Shirley Gbujama [SLPP Minister of Social Welfare] was there – some of these people were standing there at Khobe’s compound... They were really inciting the [Kamajors] boys who were coming, pushing them forward, making their hands in a sweeping gesture like this [*makes motion with his hands as if urging cattle into a pen*].

[...] That’s how I got the experience that this was really well-planned and orchestrated by some Government officers. The Government know how they planned that so-called demonstration and yet they tell the world that this was all an action by Sankoh’s people to kill civilian people. It’s rather unfortunate.”⁷⁸⁸

⁷⁸⁶ TRC Confidential Interviews with civilian residents of Wilberforce Village who witnessed the build-up to the 8 May 2000 demonstration at Foday Sankoh’s Spur Road Lodge; interviews conducted in Freetown; November 2003.

⁷⁸⁷ TRC Confidential Interviews with civilian residents of Wilberforce Village who witnessed the build-up to the 8 May 2000 demonstration at Foday Sankoh’s Spur Road Lodge; interviews conducted in Freetown; November 2003.

⁷⁸⁸ ‘Andrew’, a civilian who joined the crowd from Wilberforce Village to move down the Spur Road Hillside towards Foday Sankoh’s Lodge on 8 May 2000; TRC Interview conducted at private residence in Freetown; November 2003.

The Mass Public Demonstration of 8 May 2000

1334. The demonstration organised jointly by parliamentarians and the Civil Society Movement brought the entire city centre of Freetown to a standstill on 8 May 2000.
1335. Communal taxis and other public transportation vehicles had been briefed by the various drivers' unions that they should carry passengers only to the main congregation points for the march. Many Freetonians made the spontaneous decision to join the march as it moved through their neighbourhoods. As noted above, the Information and Sensitisation Group had succeeded in mobilising the masses from among all sectors of the population. The consequence was that a "mammoth crowd, over a hundred thousand people and more"⁷⁸⁹ paraded on the route from Victoria Park to Foday Sankoh's Spur Road Lodge.
1336. According to one of those who participated in the demonstrations, many of the protestors carried placards with inscriptions directed at Foday Sankoh, such as 'No Violence Sankoh', 'Enough is Enough' and 'Sankoh: Our People are Dying'.⁷⁹⁰ Thousands of t-shirts were made purposely for the event and were handed out to representatives of the various groups involved as well as to members of the public.
1337. In most of the testimonies from demonstrators, two common characteristics were emphasised: the participation of people from all walks of life; and the predominantly pacific nature of the marchers. One of the main organisers of the demonstration described it as follows:

"Nearly all civil society groups including trade unions, professional and academic organisations, youth and women's groups, farmers; associations and NGOs joined the march. Even members of the general public associated themselves with the cause. It was a non-violent, peaceful march; in fact, nobody sustained any injury or molestation along the route of the march... Because there were thousands and thousands of people, the whole of Spur Road and [the adjoining] Lumley roundabout was jam-packed."⁷⁹¹

1338. A small segment of the demonstrators, mostly young men, joined in the march out of a somewhat over-zealous 'mob mentality'. One young man told the Commission that he "had nothing personal against Foday Sankoh", but that he was "interested" to see how the "anger" would be resolved upon arrival at Sankoh's Spur Road Lodge:

"There was a vengeful taste in town at that time; some people really wanted Sankoh's blood."⁷⁹²

⁷⁸⁹ Festus Minah, President of the Sierra Leone Teachers' Union (SLTU) and one of the organisers of the 8 May 2000 demonstration march to Foday Sankoh's Lodge; TRC Interview conducted at SLTU offices, Freetown; 11 July 2003.

⁷⁹⁰ Gibrilla Turay, building electrician in Freetown and participant in the 8 May 2000 demonstrations; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 27 July 2003.

⁷⁹¹ Davidson Kuyateh, teacher, trade unionist and Acting Secretary-General of the Civil Society Movement (CSM) in Sierra Leone; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 18 May 2000.

⁷⁹² TRC Confidential Interview with civilian resident of Freetown who participated in the demonstration on 8 May 2000 at the Lodge of Foday Sankoh; interview conducted in Freetown; 12 September 2003.

1339. The main body of the march was led by Hassan Barrie (Chairman, CSM) and the late Deputy Speaker of Parliament, Mr. Bangura on behalf of their respective groups. Behind them were the majority of the peaceful protesters, including the civil society groupings and associations. However, this contingent, which can legitimately be seen as the 'official demonstration', was by no means the first band of demonstrators to reach the Spur Road Lodge.
1340. By the time the leaders of the 'official demonstration' arrived on Spur Road at approximately 1.00 p.m., there had been considerable activity and considerable commotion ahead of them for up to three hours hence.⁷⁹³

Commotion at the Spur Road Lodge and Foday Sankoh's Communications

1341. At approximately 9.00 a.m. on 8 May 2000 Foday Sankoh declared to a small group of his senior commanders his conviction that the Lodge was set to be attacked that day "by Government troops and Johnny Paul's men."⁷⁹⁴ The RUF leader's proposed course of action was to attempt to secure the release of his security guards in the prison, as the President had promised to him the previous evening and as had been announced on state radio that morning.
1342. The Nigerian Captain in charge of the UNAMSIL deployment at Sankoh's Spur Road Lodge described Sankoh's erratic behaviour as follows:

"On Monday 8 May 2000 at about 7.00 a.m. when I went to greet Chairman Foday Sankoh, he accused me of refusing to deploy soldiers at his warehouse at Babadorie... Not long after that we heard sporadic gunshots coming from that direction.

[...] Chairman Sankoh who was dressed in sleeping gown and pants, holding a pistol, entered a vehicle together with some of his fighters who were armed, with the intention of proceeding to town to release some of the boys held by the state security on 7 May 2000; but [he] was stopped by Dennis Mingo (alias "Superman") , who insisted that they should all remain in the house and die there. The Chairman agreed and entered his house, straight to his office."⁷⁹⁵

1343. The UNAMSIL deployment at Sankoh's Lodge was normally fixed at approximately twenty (20) armed personnel, but for the day of the demonstration it was due to be bolstered by an additional ten (10) men at the request of the Nigerian Captain in charge.⁷⁹⁶ The Captain explained in his

⁷⁹³ Festus Minah, President of the Sierra Leone Teachers' Union (SLTU) and one of the organisers of the 8 May 2000 demonstration march to Foday Sankoh's Lodge; TRC Interview conducted at SLTU offices, Freetown; 11 July 2003.

⁷⁹⁴ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF commander who joined Foday Sankoh in Freetown as a member of the RUF; interview conducted in Freetown; 18 August 2003.

⁷⁹⁵ J.D. Abdullahi, Captain in the 4th Nigerian Battalion of UNAMSIL and Head security Officer in the UNAMSIL deployment attached to Foday Sankoh; "Statement by Captain JD Abdullahi (N/9528)"; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police by the Operations Officer, NIBATT 4 UNAMSIL, Freetown; 12 May 2000.

⁷⁹⁶ Paul Boroh, Lieutenant Colonel in the 4th Nigerian Battalion of UNAMSIL in charge of security in Freetown; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Mammy Yoko Hotel, Freetown; 11 May 2000.

situation report that he had received the 10-man 'Rapid Deployment Force' at approximately 10.00 a.m. He used them to supplement his normal deployment, which was positioned "around the house, with emphasis on the main road leading to the house."⁷⁹⁷

1344. UNAMSIL's overall security commander arrived at Sankoh's Lodge along with the Rapid Deployment Force. He described the welcome he received:

"I saw Foday Sankoh, who was dressed in pyjamas. He called my attention, saying: 'Can you see what is happening?' [He was] referring to the large crowd that was coming up the road... I noticed that the demonstrators had moved towards the barricade leading to the house, shouting: 'We want peace! We want peace!' I was standing by the barricade when the group became violent and started throwing stones at me and my other officers.

[...] Among the crowd there were some soldiers armed with guns in full military uniform."⁷⁹⁸

1345. According to testimonies from those inside the Lodge, Foday Sankoh at this point engaged in a series of telephone calls with the three key faction leaders whose troops were deployed around the Spur Road Lodge on 8 May 2000. The three men with whom Sankoh spoke were: General V. K. Jetley, the UNAMSIL Force Commander; Johnny Paul Koroma, Chairman of the CCP and commander of the self-styled Peace Task Force; and the President of Sierra Leone, Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah.
1346. For every call he made, Sankoh turned on the 'speakerphone' function on the telephone in his parlour, which enabled his closest associates⁷⁹⁹ and some family members⁸⁰⁰ who were in the room to hear the full content of the conversations.
1347. According to those present in the room, Foday Sankoh first called General Jetley.⁸⁰¹ Sankoh sought to ascertain what kind of security assessment had been rendered by UNAMSIL in the light of the sporadic gunfire and sightings of armed military men among the demonstrators, both of which were reported by

⁷⁹⁷ J.D. Abdullahi, Captain in the 4th Nigerian Battalion of UNAMSIL and Head security Officer in the UNAMSIL deployment attached to Foday Sankoh; "Statement by Captain JD Abdullahi (N/9528)"; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police by the Operations Officer, NIBATT 4 UNAMSIL, Freetown; 12 May 2000.

⁷⁹⁸ Paul Boroh, Lieutenant Colonel in the 4th Nigerian Battalion of UNAMSIL in charge of security in Freetown; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Mammy Yoko Hotel, Freetown; 11 May 2000.

⁷⁹⁹ Among the close associates who sat in on Foday Sankoh's telephone calls on 8 May 2000 and heard their full content was Sankoh's 'Special Assistant' Gibril Massaquoi. See: Gibril Massaquoi, former RUF Target Group and Battalion Commander, originally recruited as a junior commando in Pujehun and later 'Special Assistant' to former RUF Leader, Foday Sankoh; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; July 2002.

⁸⁰⁰ At least three members of the Sankoh family, including one of Foday Sankoh's sons, were present in the room for all or part of Foday Sankoh's telephone calls on 8 May 2000. They heard the full content of these calls and described them in detail to the Commission. See: TRC Confidential Interviews with assorted members of the Sankoh family who were present in Foday Sankoh's Spur Road Lodge on 8 May 2000; interviews conducted in November 2003.

⁸⁰¹ TRC Confidential Interviews with assorted members of the Sankoh family who were present in Foday Sankoh's Spur Road Lodge on 8 May 2000; interviews conducted in November 2003.

UNAMSIL officers at the scene.⁸⁰² General Jetley told Sankoh that he (Jetley) had spoken with Johnny Paul Koroma earlier that morning and asked Koroma who had ordered him to deploy his West Side Boys to Sankoh's Spur Road Lodge. Jetley was then heard to tell Sankoh that Koroma, consistent with his news interviews, had advised Jetley that the orders for deployment came from President Kabbah.

1348. Foday Sankoh then called Johnny Paul Koroma.⁸⁰³ Koroma told Sankoh that he was indeed acting on the orders of the President.

1349. In perhaps the most important telephone conversation, Foday Sankoh called President Kabbah. Like the others, this conversation was broadcast to a roomful of people by the 'speakerphone' function on the telephone at Sankoh's Spur Road Lodge. Foday Sankoh's Special Assistant, Gibril Massaquoi, testified to the Commission that he heard President Kabbah denying any part in the attack in the course of this conversation:

"There was a phone call [on the morning of 8 May]. I was present. It was a phone call with Kabbah. At that time he was leaving. He was leaving for Conakry; he told Sankoh. The speaker phone [function] on the telephone was on; the receiver was lying [off the hook]. He [the President] told Sankoh that he was going to Conakry.

[...] Sankoh asked the President whether he had sent people to attack him. But he [the President] denied it and said that he was even trying to quell down the situation. I heard that dialogue between the two of them; I had been representing Foday Sankoh at meetings with President Kabbah."⁸⁰⁴

1350. Foday Sankoh again called General Jetley. In the light of the conflicting versions of events from Koroma and President Kabbah, Sankoh asked Jetley what action he was going to take. According to one of those who heard the response, General Jetley said:

"I've advised President Kabbah that he should put a stop to it; and [he knows] that if anything goes wrong it will be his responsibility."⁸⁰⁵

1351. Finally Foday Sankoh tried again to contact both Johnny Paul Koroma and President Kabbah. Sankoh was unable to reach either Koroma or the President again, despite several attempts.⁸⁰⁶

⁸⁰² For corroboration, see: J.D. Abdullahi, Captain in the 4th Nigerian Battalion of UNAMSIL and Head security Officer in the UNAMSIL deployment attached to Foday Sankoh; "Statement by Captain J.D. Abdullahi (N/9528)"; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police by the Operations Officer, NIBATT 4 UNAMSIL, Freetown; 12 May 2000; and Paul Boroh, Lieutenant Colonel in the 4th Nigerian Battalion of UNAMSIL in charge of security in Freetown; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Mammy Yoko Hotel, Freetown; 11 May 2000.

⁸⁰³ TRC Confidential Interviews with assorted members of the Sankoh family who were present in Foday Sankoh's Spur Road Lodge on 8 May 2000; interviews conducted in November 2003.

⁸⁰⁴ Gibril Massaquoi, former RUF Target Group and Battalion Commander, originally recruited as a junior commando in Pujehun and later 'Special Assistant' to former RUF Leader, Foday Sankoh; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; July 2002.

⁸⁰⁵ TRC Confidential Interview with an inhabitant of Foday Sankoh's Spur Road Lodge; interview conducted in November 2003.

⁸⁰⁶ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF commander who joined Foday Sankoh in Freetown as a member of the RUFFP; interview conducted in Freetown; 18 August 2003.

1352. Foday Sankoh received an incoming call from his wife, Madam Fatou Sankoh, who was in the United States. According to Madam Sankoh, her call was made at the equivalent of 10.00 a.m. GMT (Sierra Leone time). Her call coincided with the eruption of real commotion at the Lodge and the severance of Foday's Sankoh's telephone lines:

"I called to Papay [Foday Sankoh] at the Lodge at 5.00 a.m. by New York time. When Papay came on the phone, he was totally confused... [He said:] 'These people are demonstrating'. I asked him how many people were demonstrating and he just said: 'I don't know, I'm inside; but they have already looted the other house [at Spur Loop]'.

[...] While we were talking, I heard the children screaming in the background. He [Foday Sankoh] called out in Krio 'I don't like it, I don't like it'; and then he came back to me and said: 'My sister, let me call you back.' After ten minutes he still had not called me, so I picked up the phone and called his house – the line was dead."⁸⁰⁷

1353. Madam Sankoh testified that she also rang the house at Spur Loop that her husband had claimed was being looted:

"I called my own room in my own house [at Spur Loop] – where the door is so difficult to open and the only key was with Papay. Somebody picked up the phone and said: 'wrong number'. I checked my telephone records; I found that it was the right number and I dialled the right number again – the line was dead."

The Circumstances Leading to the Outbreak of Gunfire at the Spur Road Lodge

1354. RUF members who were huddled in various parts of the Spur Road Lodge described their impressions of the rapidly-growing crowd on the road outside:

"I was still in the compound until 11.00 a.m. when suddenly a group of demonstrators arrived towards Foday Sankoh's residence. The demonstrators were singing 'we want peace' and they started advancing towards the leader's house. At that juncture the UNAMSIL personnel deployed outside the gate of Foday Sankoh's residence tried to stop them. This made the demonstrators begin throwing stones towards Sankoh's residence."⁸⁰⁸

[and]

"I saw a large group of people with stones, bottles and sticks, but some others saw guns with some of the demonstrators. They damaged vehicles, windows and many other things with the stones, bottles and sticks they threw. UNAMSIL were trying very hard to stop them but they didn't stop. With all these, the Kamajors were still behind them, together

⁸⁰⁷ Madam Fatou Sankoh, member of the RUF and widow of the former Leader of the RUF, Foday Saybana Sankoh; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 07 to 09 November 2003.

⁸⁰⁸ Momoh Rogers, former RUF Battalion Commander; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 29 May 2000.

with the West Side Boys and the Government soldiers, firing in the air.”⁸⁰⁹

[and]

“I was at the house when the first batch arrived... They started throwing stones, hanging on the electric and telephone cables, cutting them off. They said they wanted Sankoh’s head, chanting offensive slogans... They threw a stone that hit me on the arm. They started forcing their way into the house.”⁸¹⁰

1355. Truckloads of people, consisting of a mixture of civilians and unidentified military personnel, were witnessed arriving in the vicinity of Sankoh’s compound from the upper hillside of Spur Road.⁸¹¹ This area was supposed to be ‘off limits’ to the official demonstration. Militia men of the Civil Defence Forces, many of them carrying firearms, were seen interspersing with the masses of civilians.⁸¹²
1356. Armed soldiers and West Side Boys co-mingled with the crowd of demonstrators who advanced on Foday Sankoh’s Spur Road Lodge. They attempted to incite ill-feeling among the civilians around them. A former soldier of the SLA testified that several fighters who were present on that day had tied bands of material around their foreheads, as had once been their trademark at the warfront.⁸¹³
1357. People among the crowd carried makeshift weapons like sticks, bricks, stones and agricultural cutlasses, which some of them wielded in a threatening fashion.⁸¹⁴ Its members were attempting to cut off power and communications lines to the Lodge. They were also throwing a barrage of ‘missiles’ in the direction of the Lodge. The few hundred demonstrators at the front of the gathering, most of whom were young men in their prime, surged forward deliberately. A boisterous group began thrusting against the UNAMSIL barricade that blocked the access road leading to Sankoh’s Lodge.
1358. Davidson Kuyateh, the Acting Secretary General of the Civil Society Movement (CSM), pointed out that the hostility in the atmosphere was enhanced by the provocative gestures of some of the RUF members visible in the Lodge:

“The armed RUF and their colleagues around Foday Sankoh’s house were making signs to the crowd that symbolised slaughtering a goat’s throat and amputation of the arm and leg. This infuriated the crowd and some others tried to make attempts to go to the residence of Foday

⁸⁰⁹ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF office-holder in the post-Lomé Government of Sierra Leone; interview conducted on 28 August 2003.

⁸¹⁰ Gibril Massaquoi, former RUF Target Group and Battalion Commander, originally recruited as a junior commando in Pujehun and later Personal Assistant to former RUF Leader, Foday Sankoh; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; July 2002.

⁸¹¹ TRC Confidential Interviews with civilian residents of Wilberforce Village who witnessed the build-up to the 8 May 2000 demonstration at Foday Sankoh’s Spur Road Lodge; interviews conducted in Freetown; November 2003.

⁸¹² Gibril Massaquoi, former RUF Target Group and Battalion Commander, originally recruited as a junior commando in Pujehun and later Personal Assistant to former RUF Leader, Foday Sankoh; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; July 2002.

⁸¹³ TRC Confidential Interview with a former soldier in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA); interview conducted in Freetown; 16 July 2003.

⁸¹⁴ TRC Confidential Interview with civilian resident of Freetown who participated in the demonstration on 8 May 2000 at the Lodge of Foday Sankoh; interview conducted in Freetown; 12 September 2003.

Sankoh. The UNAMSIL officers and the leadership of the CSM and Parliament who were present could not allow the marchers [to go] to the house.”⁸¹⁵

1359. Festus Minah, one of the leaders of the CSM delegation, told the Commission of his dismay that the march had been turned into a mob. He testified as to his own vain attempts to salvage the situation:

“In the course of the stone-throwing the demonstrators were struggling to remove the barrier that was protecting the compound, and at the same time trying to ‘drop’ the telephone poles – these were all the circumstances that made me come and begin to intervene.

[...] I rushed down to stop our people in the demonstrating group from throwing stones at the compound; but unfortunately, it was extremely difficult; it became out of hand. [My intervention] in fact provoked and irritated the demonstrators all the more.”⁸¹⁶

1360. Thus the crowd of demonstrators created a variety of exigencies for which the UNAMSIL contingent was simply not prepared. The official security briefings given to UNAMSIL⁸¹⁷ had underestimated the size of the crowd and downplayed its character. The event was treated simply as a peaceful civilian march. UNAMSIL saw fit in advance to deploy a total of only thirty (30) men and not a single armoured personnel carrier or armoured tank.⁸¹⁸

1361. The events of 8 May 2000 at the Spur Road Lodge of Foday Sankoh testify to a failure to communicate and co-ordinate effectively between the arms of the state security apparatus and the internationally-mandated UNAMSIL security force. President Kabbah was especially lacking in this regard, since he failed to apprise General Jetley, the UNAMSIL Force Commander, of the full extent of the multi-faceted security operation that would be carried out that day. UNAMSIL’s contingent on the ground was devoid of consultative input. The conglomerated domestic security forces endangered the lives of the UNAMSIL peacekeepers by attacking the Spur Road Lodge.

1362. In the early afternoon, the most senior UNAMSIL officer at the scene, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Boroh, was compelled to call to his Headquarters for the emergency despatch of an armoured personnel carrier. According to Lieutenant Colonel Boroh, he called for this vehicle to carry out a rescue mission because he felt his life was being threatened by the demonstrators:

⁸¹⁵ Davidson Kuyateh, teacher, trade unionist and Acting Secretary-General of the Civil Society Movement (CSM) in Sierra Leone; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 18 May 2000.

⁸¹⁶ Festus Minah, President of the Sierra Leone Teachers’ Union (SLTU) and one of the organisers of the 8 May 2000 demonstration march to Foday Sankoh’s Lodge; TRC Interview conducted at SLTU offices, Freetown; 11 July 2003.

⁸¹⁷ Mr. Christopher John, the Assistant Commissioner of the Sierra Leone Police, had briefed UNAMSIL about the ‘pending peaceful demonstration’ the previous evening, Sunday 7 May 2000.

⁸¹⁸ Paul Boroh, Lieutenant Colonel in the 4th Nigerian Battalion of UNAMSIL in charge of security in Freetown; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Mammy Yoko Hotel, Freetown; 11 May 2000.

“The group became violent and started throwing stones at me and my other officers. At this stage... I had to escape to the armoured personnel carrier for my dear life.”⁸¹⁹

1363. The protesters began actively to oppose the blocking tactics of the UNAMSIL officers at the barricade about 50 yards from the Lodge. They made chants of “we dae go, we dae go” (meaning “we are going” or “we will pass”) in defiance of the express instructions given to them to hold back.⁸²⁰ The official patrol report of the UNAMSIL deployment described how the crowd eventually broke through the barricade:

“Our attention was now turned to the crowd who insisted on entering the house to speak to the Chairman. All attempts to limit them to the main road proved abortive as we were outnumbered. Instead the crowd shoved us to the direction of the house.”⁸²¹

1364. The UNAMSIL deployment at Foday Sankoh’s Spur Road Lodge capitulated on 8 May 2000. The UNAMSIL officers were overcome by unruly elements in a crowd of demonstrators and the combined armed assailants of Johnny Paul Koroma’s ‘Peace Task Force’. The Commission finds that the responsibility for this capitulation lies squarely with the UNAMSIL High Command. UNAMSIL was detailed to defend the residence of RUF leader Foday Sankoh, the security of which was vital to the implementation of the Lomé Peace Accord. Yet a paltry contingent of 30 men was expected to secure the Lodge in the face of a threat that was known in advance would comprise at least several thousand angry demonstrators. UNAMSIL showed itself to be woefully ill-prepared.

1365. Once the UNAMSIL barricade had fallen, there was no averting an armed confrontation. Nonetheless, according to sources from all sides, a UNAMSIL officer fired a warning shot into the air in a final, futile attempt to restore order. The CSM organisers of the demonstration described the outbreak of gunfire from their perspective:

“The first warning shot was perhaps to make the people stop whatever they were doing – [to stop] the stone-throwing.”⁸²²

[and]

“We were [trying to stop the demonstrators] when suddenly a gun was fired from the house of Foday Sankoh, followed by sporadic firing. While UNAMSIL was firing in the air, the RUF boys were firing directly into the crowd. The people dispersed, running in different directions, while many

⁸¹⁹ Paul Boroh, Lieutenant Colonel in the 4th Nigerian Battalion of UNAMSIL in charge of security in Freetown; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Mammy Yoko Hotel, Freetown; 11 May 2000.

⁸²⁰ Festus Minah, President of the Sierra Leone Teachers’ Union (SLTU) and one of the organisers of the 8 May 2000 demonstration march to Foday Sankoh’s Lodge; TRC Interview conducted at SLTU offices, Freetown; 11 July 2003.

⁸²¹ UNAMSIL, 4th Nigerian Battalion; “Statement / Patrol Report on the Incident that occurred at Chairman Foday Sankoh’s Residence on 08 May 2000”; report submitted to the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Sierra Leone Police by the Operations Officer, NIBATT 4 UNAMSIL, Freetown; dated 12 May 2000.

⁸²² Festus Minah, President of the Sierra Leone Teachers’ Union (SLTU) and one of the organisers of the 8 May 2000 demonstration march to Foday Sankoh’s Lodge; TRC Interview conducted at SLTU offices, Freetown; 11 July 2003.

others fell on the ground... When the shooting continued and people were shouting and crying with pain, I sought a way to [escape].”⁸²³

1366. The view from inside the Spur Road Lodge was expressed to the Commission in the following terms:

“One of the UNAMSIL soldiers who was guarding Sankoh fired a warning shot into the air in an attempt to disperse the crowd... [then] some of them ran to the back of the house. Little did we know that there were armed groups among the crowd: CDF and the Army. So automatically they started firing [into] our camp.”⁸²⁴

[and]

“The West Siders and the Kamajors suddenly became more [in number] than the civilians, and they were now aiming their weapons towards the Lodge.

[...] The UNAMSIL commander ordered one of the Nigerian soldiers to fire a shot in the air. As soon as he fired that shot, it was the beginning of the end of the whole thing.”⁸²⁵

1367. The Commission finds that the demonstration organised by parliamentarians and the Civil Society Movement on 8 May 2000 was allowed to get out of hand. There were advance warnings given to the Government about the likelihood of further unrest. However little was done to prevent the occasion from descending into a violent tumult.

Inter-factional Violence and the Killings of Civilians

1368. The UNAMSIL warning shot was followed swiftly by further firing from both sides of the compound walls. The civilians among the demonstrating crowd and those inside Sankoh’s Spur Road Lodge were instantly trapped in the crossfire of a fierce inter-factional battle.

1369. The UNAMSIL captain deployed to Sankoh’s Lodge, J. D. Abdullahi, explained in his patrol report that the RUF gunmen in the compound opened fire once the UNAMSIL barricade was breached. Abdullahi’s report also confirmed the prominence of the West Side Boys at the scene, attacking Sankoh’s Lodge in the same Toyota Hillux van they had seized from Sankoh’s security detail the previous day:

“Gunshots were released by the Chairman’s boys, who were already armed by the Chairman, as they saw the crowd and one of the Chairman’s confiscated vehicles loaded with people dressed in military fatigues, armed and coming close to the house after overpowering us. From there every one started running in all directions.

⁸²³ Davidson Kuyateh, teacher, trade unionist and Acting Secretary-General of the Civil Society Movement (CSM) in Sierra Leone; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 18 May 2000.

⁸²⁴ Gibril Massaquoi, former RUF Target Group and Battalion Commander, originally recruited as a junior commando in Pujehun and later Personal Assistant to former RUF Leader, Foday Sankoh; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; July 2002.

⁸²⁵ TRC Confidential Interview with an inhabitant of Foday Sankoh’s Spur Road Lodge; interview conducted in November 2003.

[...] I being close to the [neighbouring] uncompleted building, charged through it into the gutter by the main road and entered [a Nigerian Colonel's] quarters. I sheltered for some time [and] gathered some of my men before proceeding to my NIBATT Headquarters."⁸²⁶

1370. It is clear that most of the Nigerian UNAMSIL troops took flight, rather than participating in the gunfight. Nevertheless there was a host of reports about the unbecoming conduct of UNAMSIL personnel at the scene. It was not suggested that they actually shot at anybody, but their deployment was exposed as having been flawed and their behaviour unrefined. A 15-year-old RUF child combatant who was watching the scene from the upper floor of Sankoh's Lodge described his observations as follows:

"At the point where the firing started, there were some UNAMSIL personnel [in and around the compound]. There were also some UNAMSIL personnel at the parlour with Pa Sankoh and others. [From] the position where I was standing around the compound, there was a UNAMSIL personnel lying on the ground shooting up in the air. As they continued to fire they were told to cease fire by one of the UNAMSIL soldiers, which they complied [with]."⁸²⁷

1371. The armed SLA soldiers and West Side Boys fired on Sankoh's compound from within the crowd of demonstrators.⁸²⁸ The Commission finds that they exposed the civilians around them to grave danger by failing to allow distinction between military and civilian targets.
1372. Essentially these soldiers were deploying the same tactic of 'shielding' themselves that they had used when they invaded Freetown under the auspices of the AFRC on 6 January 1999. The difference between the 6 January 1999 invasion and the 8 May 2000 operation was in the nature of the resistance these attackers faced. ECOMOG officers had held their fire on 6 January 1999 to avoid civilian casualties. The ad-hoc RUF security guards in Sankoh's Lodge showed no such restraint on 8 May 2000.
1373. George Baba Musa, the caretaker from a nearby construction site, told the police that in his view the RUF commandos in Sankoh's Lodge fired indiscriminately against the mass of people before them:

"I heard sporadic gunfire from all directions of Foday Sankoh's house and there was panic among the demonstrators, who were in their thousands. From the point I was standing, I heard people crying in pain and I saw several of the demonstrators lying on the ground. There was total pandemonium and as the demonstrators were running away, I saw

⁸²⁶ J.D. Abdullahi, Captain in the 4th Nigerian Battalion of UNAMSIL and Head security Officer in the UNAMSIL deployment attached to Foday Sankoh; "Statement by Captain JD Abdullahi (N/9528)"; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police by the Operations Officer, NIBATT 4 UNAMSIL, Freetown; 12 May 2000.

⁸²⁷ Samuel Joseph Kellie, former RUF child combatant present at Sankoh's Lodge on 8 May 2000; statement given to Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 11 May 2000.

⁸²⁸ TRC Confidential Interview with civilian resident of Freetown who participated in the demonstration on 8 May 2000 at the Lodge of Foday Sankoh; interview conducted in Freetown; 12 September 2003.

several of the RUF men who were earlier armed by Chairman Foday Sankoh firing at the crowd.”⁸²⁹

1374. A 12-year-old child combatant in Sankoh’s Lodge recollected that armed RUF men in the compound gunned down an unspecified number of demonstrators:

“One of the bodyguards to Foday Sankoh shot from his AK-47 rifle at the demonstrators. The other body guards and armed men at Sankoh’s house also opened fire on the demonstrators, as a result of which I saw several people among the demonstrators falling down.”⁸³⁰

1375. Another child combatant, who claimed that Foday Sankoh was his biological father, made the following revelations as part of a confessional statement to the Sierra Leone police:

“I was holding a pistol... I was deployed inside the house with one Abu, who is my special body guard. He was holding an AK-47 rifle... It was I who gave orders to the security to fire against the crowd. I was firing up, trying to find way to escape as the crowd was advancing towards us.

[...] It is true that I was among those who fired against the demonstrators and killed some of them. I am pleading to the Government to forgive me for my act as I am a small boy and I have a brighter future.”⁸³¹

1376. As pistol shots and automatic weapons fire were unleashed by RUF members in the direction of the crowd, the West Side Boys and soldiers among the crowd reciprocated by continuing their own firing at the Lodge. RUF Deputy Minister ‘Leather Boot’, who was inside Sankoh’s compound, expressed a sense of desperation about the escalating intensity of the barrage on the compound:

“We were expecting the UNAMSIL personnel to take control of the situation but it did not happen that way. The situation became very serious when we started getting rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) exploding into the premises of Chairman Sankoh. [Then] what made it worse was when tear gas was fired into the compound... which made it very much unbearable and that left us with no alternative but to pull out of the house.”⁸³²

1377. Gibril Massaquoi, who was said in the majority of statements to be one of those carrying arms on the RUF side, told the Commission that he had been cowed into escaping from the Lodge by the incoming weapons-fire:

⁸²⁹ George Baba Musa, caretaker of a building site situated close to Foday Sankoh’s Spur Road Lodge; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at Peter Kamaray’s Construction Site, Spur Road, Freetown; 12 May 2000.

⁸³⁰ Ibrahim Conteh (alias “Creole Boy”), former RUF child combatant; statement given to Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 18 May 2000.

⁸³¹ Ibrahim Koroma (alias ‘Junior Daddy’), former RUF child combatant; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Central Prison, Pademba Road, Freetown; 26 to 28 June 2000.

⁸³² Idrissa Hamid Kamara (alias “Leather Boot”), former Deputy Minister of Labour, Industrial Relations and Social Security; statement given to Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 12 May 2000.

"I had to run away during that process; especially when I saw one of our boys lying down dead from RPG shrapnel. I had to run away and leave them."⁸³³

1378. However another senior RUF combatant described how Massaquoi, who was carrying an AK-47 rifle, had in fact been the person who gave him a similar weapon to carry:

"When the firing died down I came out of my hiding place and walked out of the gate; there I met Gibril Massaquoi dragging a wounded RUF combatant. Gibril Massaquoi then took the AK-47 rifle from the wounded RUF combatant, whose name I don't know, and gave it to me and told me to defend myself."⁸³⁴

1379. In any case it was maintained by most RUF members that the shootings were not planned in advance. Rather, as the RUF Secretary-General Solomon Y. B. Rogers told the police, the exchange of fire came about spontaneously, contrary to the orders of Foday Sankoh, as a result of immense 'provocation' from the demonstrating crowd:

"It was not a pre-arrangement by the RUF to shoot live bullets on the civilians who were demonstrating for peace on that day. At the time when the demonstrators were throwing stones at Foday Sankoh's residence, I heard Sankoh give command to his combatants who were well-armed not to shoot at the demonstrators. He [Sankoh] told his RUF combatants not to open fire at the demonstrators because [the RUF combatants] were intending to open fire or shoot at the demonstrators when they were halted by Foday Sankoh."⁸³⁵

1380. Based on the preponderance of the evidence before it, the Commission finds that RUF combatants in the compound of Foday Sankoh's Spur Road Lodge unleashed firing from pistols, automatic weapons and at least one RPG in the direction of the demonstrators who had broken through the barricade. As will be analysed below, the RUF killed at least ten civilians and potentially twice that number. The RUF also shot and injured several further civilians.
1381. As it transpired, however, these shootings by the RUF did not constitute the whole story. The disruption of the demonstration was in fact the signal for the full force of the state security apparatus to be brought to bear against the RUF.

⁸³³ Gibril Massaquoi, former RUF Target Group and Battalion Commander, originally recruited as a junior commando in Pujehun and later 'Special Assistant' to former RUF Leader, Foday Sankoh; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; July 2002.

⁸³⁴ Momoh Rogers, former RUF Battalion Commander; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 29 May 2000.

⁸³⁵ Solomon Y. B. Rogers, former Chairman of the RUF War Council and later National Secretary General of the RUF; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 12 to 13 May 2000.

Mobilisation of 'Reinforcements' from the Kamajors based at the Brookfields Hotel

1382. The base of the Civil Defence Forces in Freetown was at the site of the former Brookfields Hotel, on Jomo Kenyatta Road, New England. The majority of the Freetown-based leadership were residing there in May 2000, with the exception of Chief Hinga Norman.⁸³⁶ The combatants accommodated at the Brookfields Hotel were mostly Kamajors from the Southern and Eastern Provinces. They had been transferred to Freetown upon the orders of Chief Hinga Norman, or on their own volition due to personal connections with comrades who were already in the city.⁸³⁷ At any given time there were potentially several hundred Kamajors living in the Brookfields Hotel and approximately 20 more working there as part of the CDF High Command.⁸³⁸
1383. On 8 May 2000, in the early afternoon, a small contingent of personnel from the Sierra Leone Army arrived at the Brookfields Hotel with considerable urgency. A member of the CDF testified to the Commission in a closed hearing that the SLA contingent was accompanied on this mission by M. S. Dumbuya, the former Head of the SSD and Northern Commander of the CDF.⁸³⁹ Dumbuya denied that he was present in his testimony to the Commission.⁸⁴⁰ The SLA soldiers informed the Kamajors that their contingent had been sent directly by Hinga Norman. Their task was to collect a select few Kamajor combatants and transport them to the scene of Foday Sankoh's Spur Road Lodge in order to participate in a 'reinforcement operation'.⁸⁴¹
1384. One of the Kamajors who joined this operation testified to the Commission that he was among only a handful of 'specialist fighters' who joined the soldiers in their vehicle:

"Everybody within the Brookfields Hotel knew what I was capable of doing, so when the soldiers came, they asked for me by name. Hinga Norman had requested the best men to take part in the operation; we were only told: 'There is a Special Task Force emerging to deal with a situation – they have started killing people at Sankoh's house'.

[...] So we joined them without even a proper situation report. We were up to seven men in the vehicle, soldiers as well as Kamajors."⁸⁴²

⁸³⁶ See, *inter alia*: Reverend Alfred M. Sam Foray, former Secretary-General of the Sierra Leone Action Movement for the Civil Defence Forces (SLAM-CDF); written statement and supporting documentation submitted to the TRC by e-mail; 10 December 2003.

⁸³⁷ TRC Confidential Interview with a Kamajor combatant who resided in Freetown at the Brookfields Hotel; interview conducted in Freetown; 21 September 2003.

⁸³⁸ The CDF did not make many of its institutional and operational documents available to the public, so it is impossible to be precise about the number of CDF personnel who resided and worked in the Brookfields Hotel. However, an indication of the scale of the operation was given in the *CDF Calendar 2001*, which documented the organisation's main office-holders and depicted the layout of the base at the Brookfields Hotel. A copy of this document was given to the TRC in September 2003.

⁸³⁹ TRC Confidential Testimony from a member of the CDF; testimony given at TRC Closed Hearings in Bo Town, Bo District; 3 May 2003.

⁸⁴⁰ M. S. Dumbuya, former Commanding Officer of the Northern CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 21 October 2003.

⁸⁴¹ TRC Confidential Interview with a Kamajor combatant who resided in Freetown at the Brookfields Hotel; interview conducted in Freetown; 21 September 2003.

⁸⁴² TRC Confidential Interview with a Kamajor combatant who participated in the operation on 8 May 2000; interview conducted in August 2000.

1385. The Kamajors were immediately equipped with brand new automatic weapons, the like of which they had only used fleetingly in the past. They were given no detailed deployment instructions, nor any indication of the conditions that awaited them at Sankoh's Spur Road Lodge. Upon querying the soldiers as to the military objective of the mission, one of the Kamajors was informed by an SLA Captain only that the "RUF was the target" and that they were enlisted "on the orders of the President". The Kamajor was further told:

"You are a Special Task Force; that's why you are here in Freetown – for this special purpose. You are auxiliary forces for Tejan Kabbah's Government."⁸⁴³

1386. Upon reaching the Wilberforce Military Barracks at the top of the upper Spur Road Hillside, the SLA Captain declared that he would go no further without express clearance from his commanding officer. The Kamajors at this point assumed control of the operation, emboldened by having consumed 'morale boosters' and convinced that they should see the mission through to its conclusion:

"It was an order from the President and Hinga Norman to go to Sankoh's place to do this; so we said [to the SLA Captain]: 'Young man, just get down from the vehicle. You brought us here for this purpose as a Captain; why are you now telling us to get command first? Let's go and waste no more time!'

[...] We were given rum and cannabis sativa when we were leaving for this mission. Now we just took up the initiative to perform the mission ourselves. We saw so many civilians running in the crowd... we were now coming to liberate them from the trouble."⁸⁴⁴

1387. These Kamajors were adding a further armed presence to the assorted mix of hostile groups who were already active in the vicinity of Sankoh's Lodge. They posed an augmented threat to the lives of innocent civilians on both sides of the compound's walls.

1388. The Government's decision to mobilise this reinforcement squad in favour of deferring to the internationally-recognised UNAMSIL troops was most irresponsible. It revealed much about the Government's *modus operandi* with regard to its state security operations against the RUF. The deployment of these Kamajors served to perpetuate, rather than alleviate, the suffering of the many innocents caught in the crossfire.

1389. Morris Dolley (alias 'Opabenu'), a Liberian former ULIMO fighter, led the Kamajors in their 'reinforcement operation' from the Brookfields Hotel. Opabenu ordered that the Kamajors should disembark at the house of Vice President Demby and head to the scene of the gunfight on foot.⁸⁴⁵ Upon arrival at the access road to Sankoh's Lodge, the Kamajors witnessed eight UNAMSIL personnel taking cover in a trench-like security post while West Side

⁸⁴³ TRC Confidential Interview with a Kamajor combatant who participated in the operation on 8 May 2000; interview conducted in August 2000.

⁸⁴⁴ TRC Confidential Interview with a Kamajor combatant who participated in the operation on 8 May 2000; interview conducted in August 2000.

⁸⁴⁵ TRC Confidential Interview with a Kamajor combatant who participated in the operation on 8 May 2000; interview conducted in August 2000.

Boys and RUF guards exchanged fire. The Kamajors also encountered a number of dead bodies and wounded persons lying on the tarmac. Opabenu was the first to order the clearance of some of the dead bodies and their transportation to the mortuary.⁸⁴⁶

1390. The Kamajors assumed an offensive position just off the main road and prepared to attack Sankoh's Lodge. Further support from the Government arrived in the form of a vehicle laden with arms and ammunition, driven by unidentified military personnel. The Kamajors were invited to re-stock their supplies, which they duly did by accumulating further automatic rifles and a rocket-propelled grenade launcher (RPG). The RPG was given to a Kamajor named 'Thirty-Forty', who was a member of the unit that usually operated under M. S. Dumbuya. The Commission received the following testimony as to the use to which this RPG was put:

"'Thirty-Forty' was having his RPG. I gave orders [to him] to launch at a large, unfinished house at the side of the main road. Some RUF were based there; they had some standby rooms already at this unfinished house... [So] I ordered 'Thirty-Forty' to launch there and they scattered – but then again, all the people in the shop next door were killed. [The shop] belonged to one Fullah Pa [a trader]. But all of his people have died out during that cause.

[...] The RUF were sheltering close by, while others were still inside the Sankoh house; but the unfinished house cleared after our launching and we were able to gain entry unopposed. Some of the RUF were killed too, but it is difficult to be specific."⁸⁴⁷

1391. The Kamajors killed an unspecified number of civilians with their RPG strike on the shop owned by the Fullah trader. They then immediately moved forward into the unfinished house they had cleared and renewed their assault on Sankoh's compound with automatic rifles. The Kamajors joined forces with West Side Boys and other SLA operatives at this point, apparently because "when the soldiers saw our performance, they rushed to the scene."⁸⁴⁸ The attack was also bolstered by more armed Kamajors from further up Spur Road:

"As soon as they saw that we were getting the chances, the boys from Hinga Norman's place started coming down to join us. That's when we rose up to a greater number."⁸⁴⁹

1392. One young RUF member described how he perceived the move made by the combined Government forces from his vantage point inside Sankoh's compound:

"During the shooting, some people were lying down dead, whilst others had sustained gunshot wounds... Then came a group of Kamajors and SLA fighters armed with heavy artilleries and deployed at an unfinished

⁸⁴⁶ TRC Confidential Interview with a Kamajor combatant who participated in the operation on 8 May 2000; interview conducted in August 2000.

⁸⁴⁷ TRC Confidential Interview with former Kamajor fighter; interview conducted in Bo District; June 2003.

⁸⁴⁸ TRC Confidential Testimony from a member of the CDF; testimony given at TRC Closed Hearings in Bo Town, Bo District; 3 May 2003.

⁸⁴⁹ TRC Confidential Interview with former Kamajor fighter; interview conducted in Bo District; June 2003.

house opposite the house of Chairman Sankoh. Eventually the SLA soldiers and the Kamajors were engaged in heavy firing with the RUF fighters who were in Sankoh's house. At the peak of the firing between Government troops and the RUF fighters, the UNAMSIL soldiers left the scene through the backyard of Sankoh's house."⁸⁵⁰

1393. From the perspective of the Kamajors, the Commission heard that the resultant confrontation was the fiercest head-to-head firing in which the two sides engaged that day. The only lull came due to an unusual observance of protocol to permit UNAMSIL to escape from the vicinity:

"It developed into an all-out war at one point; fighting deliberately took place now, being that the RUF guys had been 'suspended', waiting on what can happen there thereafter. Immediately we saw the UN [passing us], we stopped the firing; we recognised their presence. Then immediately they went back, firing started again."⁸⁵¹

1394. The military impact of the Kamajor 'reinforcements' was crucial in shaping the outcome of the events of 8 May 2000. The Kamajors decisively overstepped the thresholds of an operation assigned ostensibly to secure the safety of civilian demonstrators. By catalysing the departure of the UNAMSIL contingent, the Kamajors opened the way for Government forces to attack Sankoh's Lodge more forcefully, with the overt intention of 'capturing' the territory and all those RUF members who were occupying it.
1395. The intervention of the Kamajors helped to prevent the RUF from harming any more civilian demonstrators. However, the Kamajors themselves committed further violations and abuses, including civilian killings. Thus the Commission finds that the Kamajors were a further scourge to human rights during the landmark events of 8 May 2000.

Mobilisation of Further 'Reinforcements' from the 'Peace Task Force'

1396. The prime perpetrators of the raids of 7 May 2000, collectively known as the Peace Task Force, were moving and operating as several smaller units on 8 May 2000. Some of the West Side Boys and their accomplices in the Sierra Leone Army had moved in on Sankoh's compound furtively as part of the crowd of demonstrators. Others had attacked on board the vehicle they had seized from Sankoh's security detail the previous day. A third and final contingent was lying in wait for the command from the Government to launch them into action.
1397. This third contingent was a small but notorious 'hit squad' led by the popular West Side commander Hassan Bangura (alias 'Papa' or 'Bomblast') and his henchman Lansana Bangura (alias Colonel Tiger). One of its members gave the following account of how the unit came into action on 8 May 2000:

"We were at Jack's Relaxation [Guest House] at Kingtom... when we saw people moving in a hurry down the streets. This attracted us; we

⁸⁵⁰ Samuel Joseph Kellie, former RUF child combatant present at Sankoh's Lodge on 8 May 2000; statement given to Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 11 May 2000.

⁸⁵¹ TRC Confidential Interview with former Kamajor fighter; interview conducted in Bo District; June 2003.

then asked what happened and we learnt from the people that were running that when the demonstrators visited the Lodge of Chairman Sankoh they were attacked by armed men.

[...] As a result of the information that firing was still going on there, we decided to check at the Military Headquarters... There was information of some people killed during the shoot-out... Some soldiers were in preparation to visit the scene.”⁸⁵²

1398. The Commission notes that the West Side Boys had become frequent visitors to Cockerill Barracks, the Military Headquarters, as their participation in official state security operations had increased between 6 May and 8 May. They appeared to be welcomed as a result of the legitimacy newly bestowed upon them by the President’s announcement that they would be reinstated into the Army. Tom Carew, the Acting Chief of Defence Staff, was one of those who participated in the mobilisation of Government troops as further reinforcements on 8 May 2000. Carew placed the leadership of this operation in the hands of the West Side Boys.⁸⁵³

1399. This mission was to obliterate the chances of a peaceful resolution to the day’s landmark events. Yet in his testimony to the Commission, one of the West Side Boys again tried to characterise the participation of his cadre, alongside the Kamajors, as being an indication of their ‘peaceful’ objectives:

“During that time they were supposed to demonstrate – Sankoh didn’t want peace; we wanted peace. The President called Johnny Paul; then Johnny Paul called Tom Carew [the then acting Chief of Defence Staff]. They called us to go to the Lodge of Sankoh and secure the peace.

Hinga Norman came to Cockerill that morning with two vans of Kamajors. Those were our partners in the peace operation. It was about fifty (50) of all of us. We are the ones who restored peace.”⁸⁵⁴

1400. Various testimonies indicated that Tom Carew and M. S. Dumbuya were jointly responsible for despatching the ‘Peace Task Force’ unit from Cockerill Barracks to Sankoh’s Lodge.⁸⁵⁵ Dumbuya admitted to the Commission that he had indeed assembled and helped to equip “a platoon of Government forces” on that day, but maintained that he did so under an illusion of good intentions:

“I even participated in advising them to go in defence of the nation.”⁸⁵⁶

⁸⁵² Samuel Bassie (alias “Machiavelli”), soldier in the Sierra Leone Army and former security guard to Johnny Paul Koroma; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at Pademba Road Prison, Freetown; 28 June 2000.

⁸⁵³ TRC Confidential Interview with a former officer of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who served as a ‘Brigadier’ under the AFRC and later became Leader of the ‘West Side Boys’; interview conducted in Freetown; 17 October 2003.

⁸⁵⁴ TRC Confidential Interview with a senior member of the West Side Boys who participated in the provision of military reinforcements on 8 May 2000; interview conducted in October 2000.

⁸⁵⁵ See, *inter alia*: TRC Confidential Interview with a former officer of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who served as a ‘Brigadier’ under the AFRC and later became Leader of the ‘West Side Boys’; interview conducted in Freetown; 17 October 2003.

⁸⁵⁶ M. S. Dumbuya, former Commanding Officer of the Northern CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 21 October 2003.

1401. The Peace Task Force unit travelled in a small convoy of Government military vehicles, using a route that brought it down from the upper hillside of Spur Road. At the front of the convoy was an SLA Landrover with a single-barrelled Anti-Aircraft missile launcher mounted on the back. This weapon was the heaviest artillery piece used by any of the forces during the inter-factional violence at Sankoh's Spur Road Lodge. Almost immediately upon arriving at the scene, the West Side Boys released an Anti-Aircraft missile at Sankoh's Lodge,⁸⁵⁷ registering a direct strike and causing an enormous explosion that was heard "for miles around."⁸⁵⁸
1402. According to witness statements, the moment that the West Side Boys began shelling the compound of Foday Sankoh spelt the defeat of the RUF gunmen in the Lodge:
- "One Landrover carrying an Anti-Aircraft (AA) gun came from the area of Wilberforce Barracks and started shelling. Because of that, the firing that was coming from the area of the rebel leader's house stopped."⁸⁵⁹
1403. Cumulatively, the West Side Boys and soldiers of the SLA unleashed sustained automatic weapons fire as well as at least one Anti-Aircraft missile at Foday Sankoh's Spur Road Lodge on 8 May 2000. Certainly at the point when they began their attack, there were still a large number of civilians in Sankoh's compound. The range from which the West Side Boys were striking and the type of artillery they were using rendered their barrage totally indiscriminate.
1404. The Commission finds it impossible to regard the role of the Peace Task Force in this operation as having been peaceful or constructive. The West Side Boys killed many civilians in and around the compound of the Lodge.

The Escape of Foday Sankoh and other Inhabitants of the Spur Road Lodge

1405. The RUF gunmen positioned at the perimeter of the compound and in the neighbouring buildings were gradually killed or flushed out by the heavy onslaught from the combined pro-Government forces of the Kamajors, the SLA and the West Side Boys. While the Commission was unable to ascertain the exact number of RUF combat casualties, it is certain that practically the entire 'front line' of the defence of the Spur Road Lodge was eliminated. In the process, it is most likely that the RUF men who fired at the demonstrators were killed. The most senior ground commanders, Gibril Massaquoi and Dennis Mingo (alias "Superman"), were forced to revert to a strategy of escape:

"At this juncture, the RUF fighters that were defending Sankoh's premises retreated from the gate into the compound. However, Gibril

⁸⁵⁷ TRC Confidential Interview with a senior member of the West Side Boys who participated in the provision of military reinforcements on 8 May 2000; interview conducted in October 2000.

⁸⁵⁸ TRC Confidential Interviews with civilian residents of Wilberforce Village who witnessed the build-up to the 8 May 2000 demonstration at Foday Sankoh's Spur Road Lodge; interviews conducted in Freetown; November 2003.

⁸⁵⁹ Alimoh Fornah, Sergeant in the Sierra Leone Army; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at Ministry of Defence Headquarters, Freetown; 13 May 2000.

Massaquoi instructed the RUF fighters together with Superman to collect Chairman Foday Sankoh and leave the compound.”⁸⁶⁰

1406. It was later revealed to the police that Foday Sankoh spent most of the period of the gunfight hiding in a bedroom along with a Togolese lady he had invited to join him as a guest at his Lodge. The lady, named Victoria Bataba-Ena, explained to the police what happened:

“Corporal Sankoh joined me in the upstairs bedroom and [we both] laid flat on the floor following persistent gunfire outside the house. I saw bullets streaming into our (Corporal Sankoh’s and my) bedroom from outside. I never knew who precisely were shooting at us in the house.

[...] Corporal Sankoh was by then dressed in a black, long gown lying flat on the room floor close to me. Not too long [after] I saw a certain young man who hurriedly entered the said bedroom and took Corporal Sankoh by the hand... [Sankoh] hurriedly moved down the stairs with the gentleman in question, leaving me alone in the bedroom... That was the very last time I ever set eyes on the RUF rebel leader Corporal Foday Saybana Sankoh.”⁸⁶¹

1407. According to testimonies from RUF members, Sankoh was led out of the back gate of the Lodge and through the compound of a neighbouring building, owned by a Lebanese family. Sankoh’s escorts were some of his most senior commanders and associates, including Gibril Massaquoi, Superman, Pa Daniel Kallon, Pa Mansaray, Idrissa Kamara (alias Leather Boot), Eldred Collins, Momoh Rogers and Kenneth Macauley.⁸⁶² They were able to remove him from the immediate vicinity of the escalating gunfight and found an unmonitored route at the back of the compound that led towards the hills.

1408. This account of Sankoh’s means of escape was corroborated by George Baba Musa, the caretaker of a nearby construction site. However, Baba Musa recalled seeing men in UNAMSIL uniforms among those who escorted Sankoh:

“From the point I was standing at an open window of an unfinished house, I clearly saw Chairman Sankoh, whom I had seen many times, dressed in black attire and having a silver-coloured pistol hanging from his waist.

[...] [Sankoh] was being escorted by two men dressed in UNAMSIL uniforms, [who] were Africans. I saw them hurriedly coming out of the compound through the main gate and running towards the back of the house followed by a group of his [Sankoh’s] rebel body guards, who were fully armed and firing in all directions. I believe that it was about

⁸⁶⁰ Samuel Joseph Kellie, former RUF child combatant present at Sankoh’s Lodge on 8 May 2000; statement given to Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 11 May 2000.

⁸⁶¹ Victoria Bataba-Ena, Togolese national who came to Sierra Leone on a private visit to Foday Sankoh and got caught up in the events of 8 May 2000; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 5 to 9 June 2000.

⁸⁶² Idrissa Hamid Kamara (alias “Leather Boot”), former Deputy Minister of Labour, Industrial Relations and Social Security; statement given to Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 12 May 2000.

this time that Foday Sankoh made his escape out of his house, through the assistance of men dressed in UNAMSIL uniforms.”⁸⁶³

1409. The Commission noted the strong belief held by many members of the attacking forces, both Kamajors and soldiers, as well as members of the public, that Foday Sankoh’s escape was facilitated by actual officers of the UNAMSIL deployment at the Lodge. For example, Reverend SamForay testified that it was universally understood among the Kamajors that “a UNAMSIL armoured vehicle whisked away Foday Sankoh as the CDF closed in on his residence.”⁸⁶⁴

1410. The rumour of official UNAMSIL involvement was refuted by the UNAMSIL commander at the scene in his statement to the police:

“I don’t know how Foday Sankoh escaped from the house. It would have been my pleasure to carry Mr. Foday Sankoh in my armoured personnel carrier in order to save him, as I am charged with the responsibility of his security. [But] the armoured personnel carrier was parked about 100 metres from his house and there was no chance for me to go inside and collect Mr. Sankoh. The said carrier took me to the Wilberforce Headquarters and I did not release it to go anywhere again.”⁸⁶⁵

1411. Based on the preponderance of the evidence before it, the Commission takes the view that UNAMSIL’s Nigerian officers deployed at the Lodge were not the ones who led Sankoh away. There are numerous accounts from RUF members, in particular, which present a different sequence of events in a manner that speaks of factual consistency. The Commission finds that Sankoh escaped the scene on foot and in the company of his own men.

1412. The Commission does not however rule out the possibility that some of the men who escaped from the Lodge with Foday Sankoh were wearing UNAMSIL uniforms. It was reported to the Sierra Leone Police that the RUF had access to UNAMSIL uniforms in relative abundance.⁸⁶⁶ It was also apparent that the RUF sought to gather more such uniforms when it disrobed the UNAMSIL officers it had abducted during the previous week.

1413. The RUF had mastered the tactic of disguising its fighters in the uniforms of other forces during the conflict.⁸⁶⁷ It had deployed that tactic on many occasions to deceive enemies and onlookers alike. Thus, while some of those who ran away at the same time as Sankoh were later found wearing civilian clothes, others named as Sankoh’s escorts, including Gibril Massaquoi and

⁸⁶³ George Baba Musa, caretaker of a building site situated close to Foday Sankoh’s Spur Road Lodge; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at Peter Kamaray’s Construction Site, Spur Road, Freetown; 12 May 2000.

⁸⁶⁴ Reverend Alfred M. SamForay, former Secretary-General of the Sierra Leone Action Movement for the Civil Defence Forces (SLAM-CDF); written statement and supporting documentation submitted to the Commission by e-mail; 10 December 2003.

⁸⁶⁵ Paul Boroh, Lieutenant Colonel in the 4th Nigerian Battalion of UNAMSIL in charge of security in Freetown; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Mammy Yoko Hotel, Freetown; 11 May 2000.

⁸⁶⁶ This statement was made, *inter alia*, by some of the RUF combatant cadre subsequently detained in so-called ‘safe custody’ at Pademba Road Prison.

⁸⁶⁷ For further information on this tactic, please refer to the earlier section in Phase II of this chapter entitled ‘The role of the RUF in the relationship between the SLA and civilians’, at paragraph 537.

'Superman', were never apprehended. Although it is not possible to be conclusive, the Commission finds it conceivable that RUF commanders may have appropriated the insignia of UNAMSIL in order to camouflage their identities while escaping.

1414. Nonetheless, UNAMSIL officers did nothing to slow down or obstruct Sankoh's escape when some of them were suddenly confronted by him at the rear of the Lodge. Sankoh was reported to be extremely flustered by the events at his compound. Members of his inner circle maintain that Sankoh had no inkling of the attack before it took place and was indignant as he left the scene.⁸⁶⁸ Thus a Nigerian Sergeant who was deployed in the back-up deployment on 8 May 2000 recounted how Sankoh confronted a small pocket of UNAMSIL soldiers who had retreated from the firing line:

"We withdrew across the road [at the rear of the Lodge] and took cover behind one house. While there I saw Chairman Sankoh and his men coming. They met us and he started shouting at us that we, UNAMSIL, are useless. He said that we wanted the Government troops to come and kill him.

[...] He [then] sat down behind that house on a pipeline and he was saying that he wanted to talk to the President [by phone]... but one of his strongmen held his hand and told Chairman Sankoh to forget, let them continue with their journey; so they left and I myself ran to a hiding place for safety. [Sankoh] followed the pipeline and they went away."⁸⁶⁹

1415. Sankoh together with up to 20 others then continued into the bush towards the hillsides at Malama, which involved passing through at least some inhabited areas. As one of those who escaped from the Lodge told the Commission, the group eventually divided into different parts to continue its flight:

"After I had left, not too long after, I saw a crowd of RUF members including Pa Sankoh himself. As they passed on their way going towards the hillside, I followed them. But firing was also coming from the direction we took. That was the moment Pa Sankoh said: 'Let everybody choose his own way, as the group can be a target'. I took the direction to the left with a few others... All those who were carrying guns followed Pa Sankoh."⁸⁷⁰

1416. Sankoh became jaded and disaffected. He told the commanders around him that he could not manage to undertake the journey through the hills on foot at the sustained pace required to make a clean getaway.⁸⁷¹ Thus, Sankoh took one personal bodyguard, known as Pa Mansaray, with him to an obscure and private hiding place in the nearby bush.

⁸⁶⁸ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF commander who joined Foday Sankoh in Freetown as a member of the RUF; interview conducted in Freetown; 18 August 2003.

⁸⁶⁹ Zakka Yusuf, Sergeant in the 4th Nigerian Battalion of UNAMSIL; "Statement from Zakka Yusuf on the Incident that happened at Chairman Foday Sankoh's Residence on 08 May 2000"; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police by the Operations Officer, NIBATT 4 UNAMSIL, Freetown; dated 12 May 2000.

⁸⁷⁰ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF member who escaped from the Lodge of Foday Sankoh on 8 May 2000; interview conducted in Freetown; 3 May 2003.

⁸⁷¹ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF commander who joined Foday Sankoh in Freetown as a member of the RUF; interview conducted in Freetown; 18 August 2003.

1417. One of the younger members of the party that escaped from the Lodge explained how the remaining members of the RUF were thereafter left largely to fend for themselves under the direction of some of the other ground commanders:

"I ceased seeking Chairman Sankoh; however I went with the armed men to the other part of the hill where we were instructed to camp for a while. We were there until night, when [our commander] told us to come down in search of Superman and his team. When we came down we only saw Gibril Massaquoi, who told us that Superman and others had gone in search of Chairman Sankoh up the hills where they had left him. Whilst I was with Gibril Massaquoi, then came Superman and told us that he had not seen Chairman Sankoh, Leather Boot, Colonel 'Wray' and others,

[...] Eventually Superman and Gibril Massaquoi gave commands to move to the jungle towards the area of Masiaka Town... On our way heading to Masiaka, Gibril Massaquoi and Superman took some of their armed men and went a different direction I did not know."⁸⁷²

1418. It is worth pointing out that while many persons unconnected to the shootings of demonstrators at Sankoh's Lodge were imprisoned, many of them *prior to* the events of 8 May 2000, and have never since been released, the two main men who commanded the fighters at the Lodge became fugitives. Gibril Massaquoi and Superman escaped with total impunity while innocent parties have suffered in their stead. Gibril Massaquoi was in fact afforded temporary refuge on the evening of 8 May by Vice President Demby. According to Massaquoi, he went to Demby's residence and was 'sheltered' while scores of soldiers, West Side Boys and Kamajors were out hunting for him.⁸⁷³
1419. Back at the Spur Road Lodge, the last inhabitants to leave the house were civilians, mostly young children, who had been huddled in the cellar while the gunfight raged above them. They were 'smoked out' shortly after 2.00 p.m., when a canister of tear gas was fired in through one of the windows by the attacking military personnel.⁸⁷⁴ In the panic of their attempt to escape, this group too became divided. While the stronger, older children leapt the back fence to safety in neighbours' houses, some of the younger ones were gunned down in cold blood by Kamajors, West Side Boys and other Government operatives.⁸⁷⁵
1420. The remnants of armed defence in Sankoh's compound were finished off when the West Side Boys engaged them in close combat. The two contingents of West Side Boys – those who attacked during the demonstration and those who arrived as 'reinforcements' – had by this stage united as one force. Some of them were in SLA uniforms, some in civilian clothes, which bore testament to

⁸⁷² Samuel Joseph Kellie, former RUF child combatant present at Sankoh's Lodge on 8 May 2000; statement given to Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 11 May 2000.

⁸⁷³ Gibril Massaquoi, former RUF Target Group and Battalion Commander, originally recruited as a junior commando in Pujehun and later 'Special Assistant' to former RUF Leader, Foday Sankoh; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; July 2002.

⁸⁷⁴ TRC Confidential Interviews with assorted members of the Sankoh family who were present in Foday Sankoh's Spur Road Lodge on 8 May 2000; interviews conducted in November 2003.

⁸⁷⁵ TRC Confidential Interview with a young member of the Sankoh family who escaped from Foday Sankoh's Spur Road Lodge on 8 May 2000; interview conducted on 19 November 2003.

the tactics they had earlier deployed to infiltrate the civilian crowd.⁸⁷⁶ One of the last RUF combatants to leave Sankoh's Lodge was a 12-year-old child, who described his escape as follows:

"I came out from my hiding place in the compound and went to the place where the demonstrators were. I found three male and one female bodies lying there. I then returned to [Foday Sankoh's] compound when I saw some SLA soldiers coming to the scene of the incident. As soon as the SLA soldiers arrived at the scene, [an] exchange of fire started between the remaining RUF armed men still at Pa Sankoh's compound and the SLA soldiers. I then ran and jumped over the fence to the Lebanese compound... and followed the bush path as the SLA soldiers were chasing [me]."⁸⁷⁷

1421. The senselessness and human tragedy of the landmark events of 8 May 2000 are perhaps best represented by the testimony of Victoria Bataba-Ena, the only person who stayed in the Spur Road Lodge until the last shot was fired. Bataba-Ena, a young Togolese lady who met the RUF delegation during the Peace Talks in Lomé, had come to Sierra Leone on a private visit to stay with Foday Sankoh. Sankoh, as far as she knew, held a status equivalent to Vice President of the country. She became an innocent victim of the armed assault on Sankoh's Lodge by Government forces. She was arrested by soldiers and West Side Boys that evening and has been held in the custody of the state ever since. This extract from her statement to the police portrays the helplessness of her plight:

"[Eventually] I had to hide in one of the downstairs bedrooms, where I stayed for over three hours. At about 5.00 p.m. on Monday 8 May 2000 I was arrested by one man in plain clothes. It was under the bed of the said bedroom I was arrested. I was taken from the bedroom by the man in question, who I later learnt to be a Sierra Leone Army personnel who was a Captain. I heard his men call him 'Captain' and to my dismay I saw so many armed military personnel in the compound by then. I did not set eyes on any UNAMSIL personnel in the compound. I also saw some men in plain clothes but they were very strange to me.

[...] I explained to the SLA Captain that I am a stranger from Lomé, Togo but this only fell on deaf ears. The Captain and his armed military personnel started to beat me up with their rifles and I continued to cry bitterly."⁸⁷⁸

⁸⁷⁶ TRC Confidential Interview with a former officer of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who served as a 'Brigadier' under the AFRC and later became Leader of the 'West Side Boys'; interview conducted in Freetown; 17 October 2003.

⁸⁷⁷ Ibrahim Conteh (alias "Creole Boy"), former RUF child combatant; statement given to Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 18 May 2000.

⁸⁷⁸ Victoria Bataba-Ena, Togolese national who came to Sierra Leone on a private visit to Foday Sankoh and got caught up in the events of 8 May 2000; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 5 to 9 June 2000.

Analysis of the Killings carried out on 8 May 2000

1422. Approximately forty (40) persons were killed in the inter-factional violence that ensued around Foday Sankoh's Spur Road Lodge on 8 May 2000. Almost all of them were killed by gunshots or rocket-propelled grenades fired between the RUF, the West Side Boys, the Kamajors and other security forces. At least one man was crushed to death in a stampede.⁸⁷⁹ As the following analysis confirms, over half of the deceased were civilians, on both sides of the compound's walls. At least a further fifteen (15) persons were wounded by gunshots or shrapnel and hospitalised as a result of the same incident.
1423. The information made available publicly by state authorities in relation to the deaths and injuries that resulted from this incident is substantially incomplete. Moreover it is unbalanced and unsatisfactory to the Commission for the purposes of its impartial historical record. This section attempts to present the evidence of the violations and abuses committed on 8 May 2000 in a more accurate light.

Casualties sustained on the side of the Demonstrators

1424. According to the Pathology Laboratory in the 'Mortuary Department' of Freetown's Connaught Hospital, nineteen (19) persons were registered by 11 May 2000 as having been "killed on the 8 May 2000 during the peaceful demonstration."⁸⁸⁰ The figure later increased to twenty-two (22) persons, a full list of whose names, ages and occupations was presented to the Commission by the Civil Society Movement.⁸⁸¹

	<u>Name of deceased</u>	<u>Age</u>
a.	Harding Kallon	32 years
b.	Kabba Bangura (Junior)	21 years
c.	Foday Brima	60 years
d.	Abu Bakarr Conteh	16 years
e.	Alhaji Sesay	24 years
f.	Peter Kargbo	52 years
g.	Musa Kamara	26 years
h.	Mariama Gassama*	21 years
i.	Saio Marrah	47 years
j.	Ballah Turay	27 years
k.	David Jusu	28 years
l.	Komba Brima	31 years
m.	Saoman Conteh	48 years
n.	E. T. Kamara	32 years
o.	Pa Kemoh Jusu	39 years
p.	Lamin Massaquoi	42 years

⁸⁷⁹ A 52-year-old man named Peter Kargbo died on 8 May 2000 as a result of "crushed chest injuries". His death was recorded on 11 May 2000. See: Republic of Sierra Leone, Office of the Chief Registrar of Births and Deaths – *Medical Certificate of Cause of Death*; 11 May 2000.

⁸⁸⁰ Dr. S. O. Walker, Specialist Pathologist; *List of Casualties*, Mortuary Department, Connaught Hospital, Freetown; 11 May 2000.

⁸⁸¹ Festus Minah, President of the Sierra Leone Teachers' Union (SLTU) and one of the organisers of the 8 May 2000 demonstration march to Foday Sankoh's Lodge; TRC Interview conducted at SLTU offices, Freetown; 11 July 2003. Mr. Minah provided a series of documents to the Commission as part of his submissions, including a full list of deceased as registered by the Civil Society Movement.

q.	Lucy Cole*	35 years
r.	Josephus Conteh	29 years
s.	Manso Sesay	38 years
t.	Foday Bangura	47 years
u.	Sulaiman Bah	32 years
v.	Alie Koroma	Unknown

[* denotes female]

1425. It was noted by Festus Minah, one of the main organisers of the demonstration, that a number of those who lost their lives were innocent civilians with little or no conception of the reasons for the protest outside Foday Sankoh's Spur Road Lodge:

“Some of those killed did not even know what had brought about the demonstration – they only knew that there was going to be a demonstration because of the radio announcements.”⁸⁸²

1426. The Commission's attention was also drawn to the fact that nine (9) of the original list of people killed were soldiers or other auxiliaries attached to the Sierra Leone Army.⁸⁸³ It is unclear what role these military personnel were playing in the demonstrations, or indeed how many of them were carrying firearms.

1427. The Commission holds the view that some of the deceased military personnel were present as combatants, particularly in the light of the testimony of a member of the Kamajors that among the dead bodies his unit removed from the scene of the gunfight were “some corpses in military uniforms.”⁸⁸⁴ In six instances, the deceased were identified as soldiers before their names were even known,⁸⁸⁵ which indicated that they were in uniform or carried other military identification on their persons when they arrived at the mortuary.

1428. In addition to the deceased, the Commission heard from the Civil Society Movement that there were at least fifteen (15) persons registered as wounded and hospitalised on the side of the demonstrators.⁸⁸⁶ With the exception of one young girl, the wounded persons were all males between the ages of 17 and 50. Indeed, the overwhelming majority of them fitted into the category known in Sierra Leone as ‘youths’, i.e. adult men in their prime.

⁸⁸² Festus Minah, President of the Sierra Leone Teachers' Union (SLTU) and one of the organisers of the 8 May 2000 demonstration march to Foday Sankoh's Lodge; TRC Interview conducted at SLTU offices, Freetown; 11 July 2003.

⁸⁸³ Dr. S. O. Walker, Specialist Pathologist; *List of Casualties*, Mortuary Department, Connaught Hospital, Freetown; 11 May 2000.

⁸⁸⁴ TRC Confidential Interview with a Kamajor combatant who participated in the operation on 8 May 2000; interview conducted in August 2003.

⁸⁸⁵ Dr. S. O. Walker, Specialist Pathologist; *List of Casualties*, Mortuary Department, Connaught Hospital, Freetown; 11 May 2000. This document included among the deceased six persons whose medical certificates stated simply: ‘unknown adult male (soldier)’.

⁸⁸⁶ Festus Minah, President of the Sierra Leone Teachers' Union (SLTU) and one of the organisers of the 8 May 2000 demonstration march to Foday Sankoh's Lodge; TRC Interview conducted at SLTU offices, Freetown; 11 July 2003. Mr. Minah provided a series of documents to the Commission as part of his submissions, including a full list of wounded as registered by the Civil Society Movement.

1429. Most of the wounded persons were given the opportunity to make statements to the Sierra Leone Police in the wake of the shootings. None of them was able to identify a particular gunman responsible for firing the shots, although in several instances a suspicion was stated that ‘the rebels’ or ‘RUF securities’ were responsible. Other demonstrators referred more ambiguously to ‘rapid gunfire’ from a variety of directions.⁸⁸⁷ Donald Boston Mammah, who was shot quite some distance from Sankoh’s Lodge in the part of the city known as Tengbeh Town, attributed his wound to “a stray bullet.”⁸⁸⁸ Mammah claimed he had not participated in the demonstration nor gone near to Sankoh’s Lodge for any other reason.
1430. The statements of the wounded were valuable in validating and corroborating the sequence of events described in the foregoing analysis. The statements confirmed that the violence erupted because demonstrators were allowed to get out of hand: first, they cast stones and other objects maliciously towards the Lodge; second, they deliberately broke through the UNAMSIL barricade in spite of warnings that they would be shot at if they did so.
1431. The following anecdotes from wounded demonstrators help to portray the circumstances in which the shootings occurred:

“We were about to enter the road that goes to Foday Sankoh’s residence when the UNAMSIL personnel on duty blocked us. Some of the crowd became offended and started throwing stones into the compound of Foday Sankoh.”⁸⁸⁹

[and]

“I was at the forefront of the demonstration... Whilst the procession was going on, we the demonstrators were chanting: ‘We Want Peace! We Want Peace!’ Sometimes we were clapping our hands to suit the chanting, while others were beating drums... Chairman Foday Sankoh’s RUF fighters were outside his compound... about 25 yards from Spur Road.

[...] Whilst we were chanting, we could see the rebels making signs to us that if we advance to the compound, they will kill us. On seeing the attitude of the rebels we the demonstrators decided to advance. The UNAMSIL force then put up a resistance for us not to cross their barricade post; but... they found they could no longer resist the crowd.”⁸⁹⁰

[and]

“Arriving at [Sankoh’s] residence, we were blocked by UNAMSIL personnel attached to Foday Sankoh not to enter the compound. My group, including myself, used force to enter the compound. The sooner

⁸⁸⁷ See, *inter alia*: Lawrence Fawundu, 27-year-old male demonstrator who sustained a gunshot wound to the foot during the 8 May 2000 shoot-out at Foday Sankoh’s Spur Road Lodge; statement given to Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 11 May 2000.

⁸⁸⁸ Donald Boston Mammah, 21-year-old baker in Freetown who sustained a gunshot wound to his stomach; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at CID Headquarters, Freetown; 23 May 2000.

⁸⁸⁹ Sulaiman Barrie, 46-year-old male demonstrator who sustained statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at CID Headquarters, Freetown; 11 May 2000.

⁸⁹⁰ Alie Daramy, 26-year-old male demonstrator who sustained two bullet wounds in his leg; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at CID Headquarters, Freetown; 10 June 2000.

we entered the compound, some members of the RUF who were in the compound with arms opened fire on us.”⁸⁹¹

[and]

“As the firing intensified I had cause to run and jump a fence next door to Foday Sankoh’s Lodge to seek refuge. It was at this point I was shot.”⁸⁹²

1432. The Commission notes that the demonstration ceased to be a peaceful affair after it was hijacked by the armed thugs of the West Side Boys and their accomplices. Several of those who were wounded had become carried away by the influence the armed thugs had on the crowd. Some elements of the crowd deliberately provoked and antagonised the RUF gunmen by charging at the compound with makeshift weapons⁸⁹³ accompanied by armed men. This potentially threatening mob drew a terrible, violent response from the RUF personnel on duty.
1433. The Commission holds the RUF as a faction responsible for the shootings of members of the demonstrating crowd and, as far as they killed or wounded unarmed civilians, for the human rights violations they represent. The Commission however cautions against the hasty categorisation of all those persons killed or wounded into one group, for example by describing them all as ‘civilians’ or ‘peaceful demonstrators’.
1434. The President of Sierra Leone, Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, presented his own analysis of the events of 8 May 2000 in his testimony before the public hearings of the Commission on 5 August 2003:

“It was... inevitable that the harassed, brutalised and dehumanised citizens of Sierra Leone would finally rise against the excesses of the AFRC/RUF, which were in flagrant violation of what the people considered as the final peace settlement in the form of the Lomé Peace Agreement.

[...] The people organised a peaceful demonstration and marched on the residence of Foday Sankoh, the rebel leader, to insist on his observing the terms of the Agreement and to refrain from continuing with activities which obviously threatened the peace; activities such as the continued taking as hostages of UN Peace Keepers and the persistent laying of ambushes on the highways for unsuspecting civilian travellers. His [Foday Sankoh’s] response to this peaceful demonstration was the cold-blooded murder of 21 of the demonstrators.”⁸⁹⁴

⁸⁹¹ Ballah Turay, 27-year-old male demonstrator who sustained a bullet wound in his stomach and later died; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at CID Headquarters, Freetown; 10 May 2000.

⁸⁹² Mohamed Mansaray, 17-year-old male demonstrator who sustained gunshot wounds in his back and shoulder; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at CID Headquarters, Freetown; 10 June 2000.

⁸⁹³ The foremost throng of the crowd who surged towards the compound included a number of young men who wielded implements, including cutlasses and long sticks. See, *inter alia*: TRC Confidential Interview with civilian resident of Freetown who participated in the demonstration on 8 May 2000 at the Lodge of Foday Sankoh; interview conducted in Freetown; 12 September 2003.

⁸⁹⁴ Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, current President of the Republic of Sierra Leone; testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown; 05 August 2003; at paragraph 37 of the transcript.

1435. The Commission notes again that among the deceased and the wounded there were those who carried weapons⁸⁹⁵ and who therefore fall to be classified as combatants. The combatants among the crowd by their actions precipitated armed defensive action on the part of the RUF guards. These combatants bear a share of the responsibility in precipitating the human rights violations against others that stemmed from the armed defensive action.
1436. It has not been proven to the Commission that Johnny Paul Koroma or the members of the SLPP Government, did anything to prevent the clash between different combatant factions at the scene of a civilian demonstration. Indeed Koroma and others thrust their combatants into action among the demonstrators. As such, Koroma and the SLPP Government are also morally accountable for the killing and wounding of civilians among the demonstrating crowd.

Casualties sustained on the side of the Inhabitants of Foday Sankoh's Spur Road Lodge

1437. The Commission learned of numerous deaths among the inhabitants of Foday Sankoh's Lodge on 8 May 2000. The Commission also heard testimony as to the deaths of bystanders who had no connection to Sankoh or to the demonstrating crowd. The deceased persons in these cases were killed during the fierce inter-factional fighting that characterised the day. Their deaths went unacknowledged by the Government.
1438. Through a variety of interviews and corroborative submissions, the Commission has compiled a list of those inhabitants of Foday Sankoh's Spur Road Lodge known to have died on 8 May 2000. In the absence of proper records from an official coroner or mortuary, it was impossible for the Commission to determine accurately the ages of those killed; nevertheless, where details of background or occupation were provided to the Commission, they have been noted in the list that follows:

<u>Name of deceased</u>	<u>Details known</u>
a. Juliet 'Julie' Sankoh*	Student at Laura Dove Secondary School
b. Fatmata Sankoh*	Infant granddaughter of Foday Sankoh
c. Adama Sankoh*	Niece of Foday Sankoh
d. Adama Koroma*	Nurse and child-minder at the Lodge
e. Hawa Sankoh*	Nurse
f. Hawa Lebbie*	--- no details known ---
g. Haja Sankoh*	--- no details known ---
h. Mikhail Khalilu Sankoh	Electrician and nephew of Foday Sankoh
i. Mohamed Turay	--- no details known ---
j. Musa Koroma	--- no details known ---

⁸⁹⁵ See, *inter alia*: TRC Confidential Interview with a former officer of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who served as a 'Brigadier' under the AFRC and later became Leader of the 'West Side Boys'; interview conducted in Freetown; 17 October 2003; and TRC Confidential Interview with civilian resident of Freetown who participated in the demonstration on 8 May 2000 at the Lodge of Foday Sankoh; interview conducted in Freetown; 12 September 2003.

- | | | |
|----|---|---|
| k. | ‘Ibrahim’ (surname unknown) | An amputee missing the lower part of one leg |
| l. | ‘American’ (real name unknown) | A driver for the RUF |
| m. | ‘Tupac’ (real name unknown) | Bodyguard to RUF Colonel Gibril Massaquoi |
| n. | Mohamed Koroma | Tailor in the tailor’s shop near to the Lodge |
| o. | Ibrahim Kamara (alias ‘Heavy D’) ⁸⁹⁶ | A driver for Foday Sankoh |

[* denotes female]
Sources in footnote⁸⁹⁷

1439. In attempting to ascertain the manner in which these persons died, the Commission heard eye-witness testimony from members of Foday Sankoh’s family who narrowly escaped from the Lodge on 8 May 2000. One young member of the Sankoh family gave his insights as follows:

“We lost a good number of our Sankoh family members. Most of them were killed as they were trying to escape from the Lodge and they couldn’t make it. Some of the small, small children were killed when they could not jump the fence. There were other small children who were caught later in the bush and thrown in prison; like one seven-year-old girl.”⁸⁹⁸

1440. Other inhabitants of the Spur Road Lodge later confirmed in their statements to the police that they had indeed been forced to leave some of the younger ones behind. Mayilla Yansaneh was the foster mother of several children with the surname Sankoh. She testified that she had been unable to carry along all of her six adopted children, who were between two-and-a-half (2½) and ten (10) years of age:

“While on the ground [in the compound], tear-gas was fired into the compound, which started burning my eyes. It was at this stage I jumped over the fence with the children. I was unable to jump the second fence with the children. I left the children in the compound and escaped for my dear life.”⁸⁹⁹

⁸⁹⁶ In one list provided to the Commission by the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Sierra Leone Police, believed to have been compiled in May 2000, Ibrahim Kamara (alias ‘Heavy D’) is listed under the heading “Those believed to be members of the RUF.” This list appears to indicate that Ibrahim Kamara (alias ‘Heavy D’) was taken into custody in May 2000. According to RUF in-mates of Pademba Road Prison, this information is inaccurate, as they ‘left Heavy D for dead’ in Sankoh’s compound and have never seen him since. By the time the Commission enquired officially as to the identities of those in custody, Heavy D’s name no longer appeared on the list; see: The Director of Prisons, Prisons Department, Freetown; “Information Required in respect of Investigations by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission”; letter to the Commission marked PS.3/104/11; dated 13 June 2003. Nor has the Commission received any explanation as to what happened to him, if indeed he was ever in the custody of the state. Accordingly his name is included among the casualties on the side of the inhabitants of Foday Sankoh’s Spur Road Lodge.

⁸⁹⁷ See, *inter alia*: TRC Confidential Interviews with assorted members of the Sankoh family who were present in Foday Sankoh’s Spur Road Lodge on 8 May 2000; interviews conducted in November 2003; and TRC Confidential Interview with a senior RUF member who fled from Foday Sankoh’s Lodge on 8 May 2000; interview conducted in Freetown; 19 August 2003.

⁸⁹⁸ TRC Confidential Interview with a young member of the Sankoh family who escaped from Foday Sankoh’s Spur Road Lodge on 8 May 2000; interview conducted on 19 November 2003.

⁸⁹⁹ Mayilla Yansaneh, statement given to Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 11 May 2000.

1441. The Commission notes that none of the ‘Sankoh children’ who were left behind in the compound subsequently appeared on the lists of those taken into Freetown Central Prison and other detention facilities. Indeed, they were never seen again by their guardians and relatives.
1442. These children, who were mostly young girls and all of them unarmed, were killed by the attacking pro-Government forces that rained heavy gunfire and RPGs into Sankoh’s compound, namely the West Side Boys and the Kamajors. The killings of children attest to deliberate and merciless targeting of civilians by these forces. It exposes their collective moniker of ‘Peace Task Force’ to be cruelly out of place.
1443. The Commission heard testimony from one of the Kamajors who admitted to having carried out killings on 8 May 2000. The Kamajors stormed into Sankoh’s compound in the immediate wake of the shootings and briefly surveyed the carnage. The following testimony indicates that there were casualties even beyond the named list above, including the Fullah trading family whose shop was struck by the Kamajors’ rocket-propelled grenade:
- “There were no dead bodies inside the Sankoh house as such... [but] there were plenty of dead bodies on the balcony and the terrace surrounding it; and at the shop where we had fired that RPG. We came to know that one of the bodies was the owner of the Fullah shop. They said that some of the others were civilians who had been living in the Sankoh compound as staff or [as] Sankoh’s dependants.”⁹⁰⁰
1444. The Kamajors did not remove or cover the dead bodies they found in the compound. In fact they proceeded instead to carry out a massive looting spree without heed for the lives lost around them. The Commission heard that the Kamajors, led by the Liberian commander Opabenu, ransacked the Lodge and retreated in the cars that had been abandoned in Sankoh’s yard:
- “I did not enter into the room of Foday Sankoh, not even the parlour, but I was within the campus. I was the second man from the Government fighting force to enter into the campus, after Opabenu... I took one vehicle from there to Chief [Hinga Norman]’s house and parked it there. John Sonny took a LandCruiser. There were up to eight or nine vehicles there, some of them vans, Landcruisers, jeeps... Others took away the [bags of] rice, the furniture, documents, and even some computers.”⁹⁰¹
1445. The Commission is moved to express its dismay at the revelations of ill-gotten gains accrued by the Kamajors and their political masters as a result of their 8 May 2000 attacks. The Deputy Minister of Defence, Chief Samuel Hinga Norman, was among those who accepted looted properties from the house of Foday Sankoh with total disregard for the rule of law; indeed, according to one member of the CDF, Hinga Norman made official use of certain items, including a vehicle that belonged to Sankoh.⁹⁰² In particular, the following

⁹⁰⁰ TRC Confidential Interview with former Kamajor fighter; interview conducted in Bo District; June 2003.

⁹⁰¹ TRC Confidential Interview with a Kamajor combatant who participated in the operation on 8 May 2000; interview conducted in August 2000.

⁹⁰² TRC Confidential Testimony from a member of the CDF; testimony given at TRC Closed Hearings in Bo Town, Bo District; 3 May 2003.

excerpt of testimony from a Kamajor alarmed the Commission for its suggestion of grave misconstruction of the concept of 'amnesty':

"The Article in the Lomé Accord covered us – whatsoever somebody had acquired during the war, it should remain to him. That article had been preached by the authorities all over. For my own part, I presently have money with me that was given to me for being part of the Foday Sankoh operation."⁹⁰³

1446. The various military personnel who later 'patrolled' the premises also acted in a manner devoid of respect for human dignity by failing to dispose of or otherwise deal with the corpses in the vicinity of the Lodge. The task was left to a unit of Police Inspectors attached to the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Sierra Leone Police, who went to Sankoh's compound on the morning of 9 May 2000. The officer who headed this unit filed a statement with the police about his discoveries at the compound:

"On arrival at No. 56 Spur Road and its environs, we observed that it was the residence of Foday Sankoh, the RUF leader. A further observation [we] made was that an unspecified number of corpses and RUF documents were scattered all over in and around the premises of No. 56 Spur Road. In view of this [discovery], the coroner's officers attached to the Prosecution Division of the Sierra Leone Police were contacted; [they] later came and collected the corpses for the Connaught Hospital Mortuary, Freetown."⁹⁰⁴

1447. Despite the purported transportation of the corpses from Sankoh's compound to the mortuary, the Commission received no evidence that they were recognised by the Government of Sierra Leone as casualties of the inter-factional violence of 8 May 2000.
1448. While the deaths on the side of the demonstrators, including those of some combatants, were mourned in a state ceremony on Friday 12 May 2000, the deaths at the hands of pro-Government forces were kept silent. The Commission condemns this latent selectivity in honouring the loss of civilian lives, for it undermines basic respect for human life in a democratic society.
1449. The Commission holds the West Side Boys directly responsible as factions for the killings of civilians on the side of the inhabitants of Sankoh's Lodge. The Peace Task Force led by Johnny Paul Koroma carried out the most grievous abuses of all and were allowed to act with the utmost impunity because their acts were 'hushed' by the Government.
1450. Based on the clear and corroborated evidence above, President Kabbah approved of the mobilisation of the CDF, through Chief Samuel Hinga Norman. The Commission wrote to the President about the use and deployment of Kamajors on this date seeking his explanation. In his response to the Commission the President replied:

⁹⁰³ TRC Confidential Interview with former Kamajor fighter; interview conducted in Bo District; June 2003.

⁹⁰⁴ Komba Kemoh, Police Inspector who headed the unit that inspected the premises of Foday Sankoh's residence on 9 May 2000; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police, Freetown; 23 May 2000.

"No Kamajors were sent to Foday Sankoh's house during the demonstration on May 8, 2000. As I have explained [in previous testimony], the demonstration which moved to Sankoh's residence on that day was organised by the Civil Society Movement and Parliamentarians, and it was made up of persons from all walks of life. I cannot therefore see the basis for holding the Kamajors responsible for the outcome of that demonstration."⁹⁰⁵

1451. UNAMSIL must also take a share of the blame. The contingent of UNAMSIL troops at Sankoh's Lodge underrated the gravity of the situation. It was no surprise that they deserted their duties at the time when their presence was most required. The UNAMSIL High Command singularly failed to provide its own reinforcements, which opened the way for deplorable warlords and their henchmen from the West Side Boys and Kamajors to wreak further havoc.
1452. The security provided by the peace keepers at Sankoh's residence and to other RUF personnel was poor. Two RUF Deputy Ministers of the Government, as well as other key stakeholders in the peace process, were left to suffer at the hands of the mob. This poor reading of the security situation allowed UNAMSIL to pull out its own men using an Armoured Personnel Carrier. The peaceful civilians in the Lodge, who had put their faith in UNAMSIL for protection, were emphatically let down.
1453. The Commission wishes to highlight the fact that several RUF combatants were also killed on 8 May 2000. In the enforced absence of Sankoh's entire personal security detail, an ad-hoc and unlikely group of persons had been armed by Sankoh as his own last line of defence. This line of defence was called upon to act in the face of exigencies, which included the capitulation of the UNAMSIL presence, on 8 May 2000. Its members responded by opening fire against the demonstrators and the attackers who accompanied them.
1454. The sole threat from the Lodge came from the RUF combatants in the last line of defence. Yet that threat was eliminated as the RUF combatants were overcome militarily and most of the individual gunmen were killed.
1455. There are two profound implications attendant to the killings of the main gunmen at Sankoh's Lodge. First, even after their deaths, the pro-Government forces continued firing on inhabitants of the Lodge, indicating their callous disregard for civilian life. Second, those who were chiefly responsible for the civilian deaths on the side of the demonstrators were now dead. The prospect of securing 'justice' for this incident in itself was severely diminished. Yet the pro-Government forces launched into a reckless blanket strategy of arresting and detaining everybody else who had even the remotest connection with Foday Sankoh and the RUF.

⁹⁰⁵ Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, current President of the Republic of Sierra Leone; supplementary written submission provided to the Commission in response to a set of 'Questions for the President'; received by the Commission by delivery; August 2003.

The Whereabouts of Foday Sankoh in the Wake of 8 May 2000 and his Eventual Capture

1456. The UNAMSIL Patrol Reports prepared in the days after the events of 8 May 2000 were clear in their portrayal of the escape of Foday Sankoh from the Spur Road Lodge. UNAMSIL maintained that Sankoh, along with his key commanders, followed the pipeline through the bushy areas at the back of the Lodge and headed towards Malama and Regent Village.⁹⁰⁶ The UNAMSIL officers who gave statements said that they were effectively incapacitated by the unexpected hostility of the demonstrating crowd.⁹⁰⁷ Apparently they neither 'captured' nor 'sheltered' Foday Sankoh.
1457. The last official word from UNAMSIL on the whereabouts of Foday Sankoh seemed to correlate with the testimonies given by various RUF members who escaped from the Lodge. UNAMSIL based the following report on its interview of a local resident in the vicinity of Regent Village:
- "It was revealed that Corporal Sankoh was 'fagged out' and could not continue to move; hence he is taking refuge in the forest while waiting for his men to come to his rescue."⁹⁰⁸
1458. On 10 May 2000, UNAMSIL further reported on its participation, alongside SLA troops and CDF militiamen, in a search patrol through the areas where Sankoh was thought to be hiding. The objective of the patrol was to find Foday Sankoh, but the purpose of finding him was rather ambiguous. The report first stated that the patrol was "despatched to locate and rescue the Chairman [Foday Sankoh];" yet at its conclusion it spoke of "apprehending the escaping men."⁹⁰⁹
1459. President Kabbah made a speech on the evening of 8 May 2000 in which he condemned the killings of "innocent and unarmed civilians by RUF rebels stationed at Corporal Sankoh's residence." With regard to the disappearance of Foday Sankoh, the President remarked: "As I speak to you, the exact whereabouts of Corporal Foday Sankoh have not yet been determined. A thorough investigation is, however, now being undertaken to determine where he is."⁹¹⁰

⁹⁰⁶ See: UNAMSIL, 4th Nigerian Battalion; "Statement / Patrol Report on the Incident that occurred at Chairman Foday Sankoh's Residence on 08 May 2000"; report submitted to the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Sierra Leone Police by the Operations Officer, NIBATT 4 UNAMSIL, Freetown; dated 12 May 2000.

⁹⁰⁷ See, *inter alia*: JD Abdullahi, Captain in the 4th Nigerian Battalion of UNAMSIL and Head security Officer in the UNAMSIL deployment attached to Foday Sankoh; "Statement by Captain JD Abdullahi (N/9528)"; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police by the Operations Officer, NIBATT 4 UNAMSIL, Freetown; dated 12 May 2000.

⁹⁰⁸ UNAMSIL, 4th Nigerian Battalion; "Statement / Patrol Report on the Incident that occurred at Chairman Foday Sankoh's Residence on 08 May 2000"; report submitted to the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Sierra Leone Police by the Operations Officer, NIBATT 4 UNAMSIL, Freetown; dated 12 May 2000.

⁹⁰⁹ S. O. Ali, Captain in the 4th Nigerian Battalion of UNAMSIL; "Patrol Report of 10 May 2000"; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police by the patrol leader, NIBATT 4 UNAMSIL, Freetown; dated 12 May 2000.

⁹¹⁰ President Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, Address to the Nation, broadcast on the Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service; reported in the news archives of Sierra Leone Web (www.sierra-leone.org); Monday 8 May 2000.

1460. The stakes were raised on Saturday 13 May 2000, when Solomon Berewa, the then Attorney-General and Minister of Justice, made a presentation to the media to allege that Foday Sankoh had been plotting “to stage a very violent and bloody coup.”⁹¹¹ Berewa’s presentation, based on what he called “circumstantial material” that he never subsequently disclosed, prepared the ground for Sankoh’s arrest. Berewa built his case as follows:

“We have materials on the coup plan [hatched by Foday Sankoh]. This is not a speculation. Some of his [Sankoh’s] associates are giving us more details and telling us what Sankoh had in mind... Foday Sankoh was anxious to have power.”⁹¹²

1461. Members of various fighting factions and large sectors of the Sierra Leonean population continue to believe in a theory that Foday Sankoh was held in the custody of UNAMSIL for over a week after 8 May 2000. This theory was also the one propagated by RUF commanders at the time of Sankoh’s disappearance. Augustine Bao, who was based at RUF Headquarters in Makeni, gave an interview to the BBC on 16 May 2000 and called upon UNAMSIL to co-operate:

“They [UNAMSIL] should release our leader so that we should revisit the Lomé Peace Accord. They don’t have regard and respect for the leadership of RUF. What about more when we are disarmed? They will just arrest us; put us in a container and chuck us into the sea. That is the aim of the UN and [President] Kabbah presently.”⁹¹³

1462. The Commission was given a plausible alternative version of events by Madam Fatou Sankoh, who claimed to have discovered accurate details of what happened to Foday Sankoh from close confidantes she consulted in the RUF.⁹¹⁴ Madam Sankoh dismissed the notion of UNAMSIL custody and insisted that Foday Sankoh had in fact evaded capture altogether by taking refuge in a humble hideout in the hills behind his Lodge. He was accompanied there by just three of his closest associates.

1463. One of Foday Sankoh’s original companions in his hideout was apparently Dr. Steven Sahr Williams, the so-called humanitarian co-ordinator of the RUF, who was to surrender himself to UNAMSIL troops at the Mammy Yoko Hotel.⁹¹⁵ Another was Foday Sankoh’s personal bodyguard, known to Madam Sankoh only as ‘Pa Mansaray’. The third was Mariama Morrison (“Mariama”),

⁹¹¹ Solomon Berewa, Attorney General; statement to the press, reported on the BBC Africa Service and available in the news archives of Sierra Leone Web (www.sierra-leone.org); Saturday 13 May 2000.

⁹¹² Solomon Berewa, Attorney General; statement to the press, reported on the BBC Africa Service and available in the news archives of Sierra Leone Web (www.sierra-leone.org); Saturday 13 May 2000.

⁹¹³ British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Network Africa; “Interview with Colonel Augustine Bao, a commander of Sierra Leone’s RUF”; broadcast on 16 May 2000; included in the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 May 2000; also available in the news archives of Sierra Leone Web (www.sierra-leone.org).

⁹¹⁴ Madam Fatou Sankoh, member of the RUF and widow of the former Leader of the RUF, Foday Saybana Sankoh; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 7 to 9 November 2003.

⁹¹⁵ Steven Sahr Williams, former RUF Humanitarian Co-ordinator, statement given to Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 14 to 16 May 2000.

a female former member of the kitchen staff at Sankoh's Lodge.⁹¹⁶ According to testimony from Madam Fatou Sankoh, Mariama inadvertently became an advantage to the Government in the game of hide-and-seek that led to Foday Sankoh's final capture. The narrative given to the Commission by Madam Sankoh is summarised in the following paragraph.⁹¹⁷

1464. Apparently Foday Sankoh and his three companions essentially went without food or proper drinking water for approximately one week. Thus the RUF leader sent Mariama off to find water on or around 14 May 2000. He gave her an ultimatum that she should return to him within three days; if she did not return, then he would know that she had either encountered difficulties or fallen into the wrong hands. Mariama was trusted by Foday Sankoh beyond question. Members of the RUF maintain that she did not betray Foday Sankoh by revealing his whereabouts deliberately, but rather was apprehended in Freetown by somebody who recognised her and was prevented from returning to Sankoh's hideout within the stipulated time.
1465. On 17 May 2000, Foday Sankoh and his bodyguard Pa Mansaray came out from their hideout at dawn and re-entered the public domain. Foday Sankoh was captured and arrested almost immediately. The BBC reported the circumstances of the capture based on interviews with local residents, summarised in the following paragraph.⁹¹⁸
1466. As Foday Sankoh and Pa Mansaray moved along a footpath just behind the Spur Road Lodge, they encountered a man named Kabba Sesay who was on his way to take early morning prayers with his son. Although Foday Sankoh asked to be assisted to take transport to the Nigerian High Commission, Kabba Sesay instead tipped off a former soldier nicknamed 'Scorpion'. Scorpion fired at least one gunshot in the process of arresting Foday Sankoh, apparently killing Pa Mansaray and injuring Sankoh on the lower leg. Scorpion is reported to have declared to a civilian crowd who arrived at the scene:

"Today I am a hero. Today the Scorpion catches the lion. The war is over."⁹¹⁹

1467. The Commission did not receive testimony from Scorpion or any other eyewitness as to the means by which Foday Sankoh was captured, or as to whether he in fact emerged from a simple hideout. Equally, there is no concrete evidence before the Commission to support the contention that Foday Sankoh was held by UNAMSIL in the wake of 8 May 2000. The Commission is unable conclusively to dismiss the latter possibility however.

⁹¹⁶ Mariama Morrison is listed as one of six cooks in the 'Nominal Roll of Soldiers and Others on the Ground [at the] Residence of the Leader'; RUF document recovered from the Spur Road Lodge of Foday Sankoh by the Sierra Leone Police; May 2000.

⁹¹⁷ Madam Fatou Sankoh, member of the RUF and widow of the former Leader of the RUF, Foday Saybana Sankoh; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 7 to 9 November 2003.

⁹¹⁸ See: BBC News Online, Africa News; *The strange tale of Sankoh's capture*; posted on the internet on Thursday 18 May 2000, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/752036.stm>.

⁹¹⁹ Scorpion is reported to have made this statement in the following account: BBC News Online, Africa News; *The strange tale of Sankoh's capture*; posted on the internet on Thursday 18 May 2000, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/752036.stm>.

1468. In particular, there remains some ambiguity as to whether the gunshot wound on Foday Sankoh's leg was sustained at the point of his capture. In a statement given to the police on 13 May 2000, four days prior to Sankoh's being brought into custody, RUF Secretary-General Solomon Y. B. Rogers said the following:

"I have no knowledge whether in fact Foday Sankoh escaped from his residence, but two days after the incident I was informed by [RUF] Radio Operator [Samuel] Lamboi at Cockerill Defence Headquarters that he was in the hands of UNAMSIL personnel with a shot in his leg."⁹²⁰

1469. Notwithstanding the uncertainty surrounding the circumstances of Sankoh's arrest, the Commission is assured that he was not admitted into the custody of the Sierra Leone Police under the same classification as the scores of other men and women whose arrests in May 2000 are analysed above. Foday Sankoh's name does not appear on any of the prison records presented to the Commission pertaining to detentions during May 2000.⁹²¹

1470. Perhaps inevitably, Johnny Paul Koroma heralded the arrest of Foday Sankoh as the culmination of his almost single-handed quest to 'restore peace' through the actions of his 'Peace Task Force'. In an interview on the day of the arrest, Koroma again portrayed himself and his men as heroes acting in the interests of the SLPP Government:

"[Sankoh] was arrested somewhere behind his house, just by the hills, and he was taken to Lumley Police Station and then finally brought to me. It was because my men made the arrest, and they... took him to the police station, and they in turn sent him to me, and I handed him over to the Government."⁹²²

1471. The responsibility for Foday Sankoh's custody and security appears to have been vested in the hands of the British Army from 17 May 2000 onwards. According to reports on the BBC, Sankoh was transferred from RSLMF Military Headquarter, Cockerill Barracks to a 'secure location' by British paratroopers in a Royal Air Force helicopter.⁹²³ The Government of Sierra Leone kept the whereabouts of Sankoh for the most part a tightly-guarded secret.

⁹²⁰ Solomon Y. B. Rogers, former Chairman of the RUF War Council and later National Secretary General of the RUF; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 12 to 13 May 2000.

⁹²¹ See, *inter alia*: Prisons Department, Sierra Leone Police; "Revolutionary United Front Suspects in Custody from 8 May to 14 May 2000", plus addendum entitled "List of RUF Detainees from Military Headquarters to Central Prisons, Pademba Road on 17 May 2000; and an untitled document, believed to have been produced at the end of May 2000, listing "Those believed to be Members of the RUF"; documents provided to the Commission upon request by Sierra Leone Police; July 2003.

⁹²² British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Network Africa; "Interview with Johnny Paul Koroma..."; broadcast on 17 May 2000; included in the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 May 2000; also available in the news archives of Sierra Leone Web (www.sierra-leone.org).

⁹²³ The circumstances of this transfer and Sankoh's destination were discussed extensively by the then BBC correspondent Mark Doyle in his reports for the BBC in the weeks following Sankoh's arrest; see, *inter alia*: BBC News Online; *Wife's Writ to Locate Sankoh*; posted on the BBC website on 3 August 2000, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/865010.stm>.

1472. From the outset, the only detail about Foday Sankoh's detention that was universally agreed upon was its classification as another instance of 'safe custody' or 'protective custody'.⁹²⁴ The Commission notes that in accordance with the Emergency Regulations of 1998, the President of Sierra Leone thereby ordered Sankoh's detention without charge. Foday Sankoh was never subsequently released from detention. In March 2003 he was transferred to the custody of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, where he remained until his death on 29 July 2003.

ANALYSIS OF THE ARRESTS AND DETENTIONS CARRIED OUT ON 8 MAY 2000 AND IN ITS AFTERMATH

1473. The Commission has come to understand that the Government of Sierra Leone deployed a 'catch-all' strategy in its efforts to secure the elimination of the RUF as a military and political adversary. Having closed the net around Sankoh's Lodge in the days immediately prior to 8 May 2000, the assorted pro-Government forces proceeded to apprehend every suspected RUF member or affiliate they could find.

1474. In their testimonies to the Commission, suspects and witnesses alike described captures at gunpoint and threats of death that were strikingly similar to the events recorded in the period of 'mob justice' that followed the ECOMOG intervention of 1998. The arresting authorities included West Side Boys, Kamajors, Sierra Leone Army officers and members of the Special Security Division (SSD) of the Sierra Leone Police. This ad-hoc state security force effectively took the law into its own hands. Having already killed, wounded and looted, the pro-Government forces engaged in armed pursuit, intimidation and torture, followed by arbitrary imprisonment of their captives in a variety of locations.

1475. The Government of Sierra Leone authorised and formalised these captures retrospectively, essentially drawing a veil over the abuses that took place. The official records obtained by the Commission simply show that between 7 May and 17 May 2000, 180 persons who were suspected to be members of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) were arrested and detained.⁹²⁵ The Commission regards this figure as an unreliable reflection of the actual numbers detained. As explained below, testimonies and later documents indicate that many more than 180 persons were put in prison, some of them for a matter of days, others for several years.

1476. In the absence of proper police records pertaining to these arrests and detentions, it has been left to the Commission to compile anecdotal evidence to convey the circumstances in which they took place. Certainly, almost immediately after having 'cleared out' Foday Sankoh's Lodge, the state

⁹²⁴ On the day of Sankoh's arrest, Minister of Information Dr. Julius Spencer was quoted as describing the classification of Foday Sankoh's detention as 'protective custody'; see, *inter alia*: British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), Network Africa; "Interview with Julius Spencer..."; broadcast on 17 May 2000; included in the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 May 2000; also available in the news archives of Sierra Leone Web (www.sierra-leone.org).

⁹²⁵ Prisons Department, Sierra Leone Police; "Revolutionary United Front Suspects in Custody from 8 May to 14 May 2000", plus addendum entitled "List of RUF Detainees from Military Headquarters to Central Prisons, Pademba Road on 17 May 2000; documents provided to TRC upon request by Sierra Leone Police; July 2003.

security forces began a massive 'manhunt'. Most of the RUF members who managed to escape from the barrage at Sankoh's Lodge had fled into nearby bush terrain towards the Freetown suburb of Malama. Lacking sufficient bearings or knowledge of the area, many RUF members became lost and tried in vain to find hiding places. Others inadvertently moved in the direction of the Wilberforce Military Barracks and fell back into the hands of their pursuers.

1477. In statements given to interrogators at Pademba Road Prison in the weeks after 8 May 2000, many inmates gave detailed personal accounts of the events leading to their detentions. A fairly typical sequence of events was described by the then Deputy Minister of Labour, Industrial Relations and Social Security, Idrissa Kamara (alias Leather Boot):

"I took refuge within the vicinity of the Ghanaian High Commissioner's residence at a neighbouring Government quarter where I hid myself. I was there when I heard sporadic shooting coming towards my hidden direction and eventually I was arrested and placed under gunpoint by SLA soldiers.

[...] It was at this point that a Second Lieutenant ordered one of his men to open fire at me, [from] which I sustained three gunshot wounds on my left leg. From this point I was brutally manhandled and stripped naked and later dragged to their immediate commander, one Lieutenant Kandeh (alias 'Big Joe') whom I know very well. He in fact rescued me because his men were intending to execute me instantly."⁹²⁶

1478. Kamajors were prominent among those scouring the West of Freetown, determined to catch perceived key figures of the RUF movement. The Commission found it remarkable that throughout the operation, the Kamajors appeared to work in harmony with the West Side Boys, their once arch enemies. Several testimonies from captives mentioned more than one faction involved in single arbitrary arrests accompanied by brutal physical violations. The following example comes from an RUF member who had fled in fear from Sankoh's Lodge on 8 May 2000:

"I ran out of the house with a few others. I escaped and on my way I came along some Kamajors and some West Side Boys. I was caught around Wilberforce and they put me under gunpoint. Fortunately for me they did not kill me, but [they] stripped me naked without briefs and I was beaten mercilessly.

One of the Kamajors bit my left ear, cut part of it off with his teeth and ate it raw in my presence. They asked me to walk forward because they were going to kill me.

[...] Fortunately a Lieutenant [from the Sierra Leone Army] came and stopped them. I was dragged to the Military Headquarters at Cockerill and dumped – locked in a cell. So many others were treated in the way I was

⁹²⁶ Idrissa Hamid Kamara (alias "Leather Boot"), former Deputy Minister of Labour, Industrial Relations and Social Security; statement given to Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown; 12 May 2000.

treated and taken to Cockerill. The way in which we were arrested is out of the Constitution.”⁹²⁷

1479. Potentially scores of people were tortured in a similar fashion by the Kamajor arrest squads during the afternoon of 8 May 2000 and in the following days. Members of these units themselves confessed to the Commission that they had used aggressive tactics to carry out the arrests. In one testimony, a Kamajor commander explained how he dealt with one of the RUF’s ‘strongmen’:

“I said to [one group of] people: ‘If you don’t surrender I will kill you all’. As soon as their strongman saw me, he went down; I said to him: ‘If you don’t come up, I will kill you’. Then he came up and I disgraced him – I flogged him and I had a ‘smash-up’ with him. He was arrested, beaten, undressed, but I did not kill him. I decided to hand him over to the Sierra Leone Army, who took him to Cockerill [Military Barracks]. From there he was handed over to the authorities in concern.”⁹²⁸

1480. No explanation of the reasons for arrest was given to any one of the prisoners with whom the Commission spoke, either among those who have subsequently been released or among those who remain imprisoned. Nor was the legal basis for the arrests made clear. The only possible legal correlation is that the arrests were carried out on the orders of the President and the State’s intention was that they should be justified under the Public Emergency Regulations 1998. Once again, therefore, the arrests and subsequent detentions in ‘safe custody’ constituted multiple denials of the captives’ human rights and flagrant abuses of executive power.

1481. A variety of civilians were detained on the basis of patently spurious connections with the RUF, such as having resided with a member of the RUF, or even having performed household chores for a member of the RUF.⁹²⁹ The Commission further discovered the following specific instances of a ‘catch-all’ strategy against the RUF, in which the named individuals had at one time been members of the movement but had no ostensible connection to any of the events surrounding 8 May 2000:

- Christian ‘Junior’ Boltman was arrested far from the realms of any of the RUF residences – he was staying at Kissy, Eastern Freetown with a relative and was arrested “on 7 May 2000 when a group of ex- SLAs headed by Sammy and ‘Five-Five’ waved to him and stopped him... Subsequently he was arrested and taken to an unknown destination”,⁹³⁰
- Mohamed ‘Major’ Bockarie was living on a displaced persons’ camp; he was arrested by a group of CDF men from the same camp; according to a

⁹²⁷ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF commander who joined Foday Sankoh in Freetown as a member of the RUF; interview conducted in Freetown; 18 August 2003.

⁹²⁸ TRC Confidential Interview with former Kamajor fighter for the Civil Defence Forces; interview conducted in Bo Town, Bo District; 11 August 2003.

⁹²⁹ Some of those arrested were, for example, domestic staff of the RUF members targeted, or were simply in the vicinity of the residence that was being targeted. In one document compiled by the Prisons Department, believed to have been produced at the end of May 2000, no fewer than seventy-seven (77) detained persons are listed under the heading ‘Those believed to be having little or no connection with RUF’.

⁹³⁰ Charlotte Conteh, businesswoman in Freetown; statement given to Sierra Leone Police at CID Headquarters, Freetown; 14 June 2000.

witness, the CDF men were acting on a tip-off by an informant that Bockarie was an RUF man;⁹³¹

- Bobby Fumba had disarmed and sought safe haven at a UNAMSIL Security Centre in Port Loko District from 5 to 8 May 2000; he had no knowledge of the incident at Sankoh's Lodge. He was arrested and imprisoned along with other ex-combatants a full month after the event, despite having never moved away from the Security Centre.⁹³²

1482. Tellingly, the majority of those arrested in May 2000 remain in the custody of the state to the present day. Four years have passed since their arrests. None of them has been afforded a fair trial. According to interviews, none of them has yet been properly charged with any offence before a magistrate of the criminal courts in an open and transparent hearing. The continued detention of these persons in relation to the conflict in Sierra Leone is tantamount to a continuation of the conflict. It is corrosive to the prospect of national reconciliation. For every day that passes, the violation of their human rights is further entrenched. The Commission finds that each of these persons is presently and continuously being denied justice by this Government of Sierra Leone.

1483. Additionally, many of those arrested and detained during the month of May 2000 have been subjected to torture and inhuman and degrading treatment during their time in state custody. The Commission has conducted hours of interviews with present and former prisoners at Freetown Central Prison, Pademba Road. The following account is a conglomeration of several individual testimonies that provide a comprehensive overview of the plight of RUF detainees, as well as a damning indictment of the human rights record of the present Sierra Leone Government.⁹³³

“To start with, we were locked up for complete six months, both night and day, from May to November without seeing the sunlight... except wherein somebody was fortunate enough to be called upon to go to the CID Headquarters for statement-taking. The food is very poor; the medical facilities are inadequate as the hospital is always lacking drugs. In some cases, two months can pass before we are given one bathing soap, one laundering soap and one tube of toothpaste. For a long time many of us were sleeping on bare ground.

[...] On 14 March 2001, CID police officers unexpectedly came to conduct ruthless searching of our cells. There was no sign of the prison wardens. We don't know why the CID came that day – since being in prison, we were only ever searched by prison wardens. During the searching by CID, many of us were grossly molested. All hell broke loose; fighting was all over the place. The incident resulted in the opening of fire, a shoot-out in the Pademba Road Prison. Ten of our brothers were seriously maltreated to the point of near death.

⁹³¹ Pa Brima Mansaray, CDF Chief at Displaced Persons' Camp; statement given to Sierra Leone Police at Kissy Police Station, Freetown; 9 May 2000.

⁹³² Bobby Fumba, former RUF member and now a detainee in state custody; statement given to Sierra Leone Police at CID Headquarters, Freetown; 14 June 2000.

⁹³³ The following excerpts are put together from TRC Confidential Interviews conducted in various locations throughout Sierra Leone; May to November 2003. The identities of the individual statement givers and their locations are not disclosed in order to preserve their personal safety.

[...] It was rumoured that these ten prisoners were to be executed, but UNAMSIL intervened. Instead, on 17 March 2001, they were carried to a special detention facility, an old mortuary at Jui that was being used as an armoury dump. They were kept there for five months, with no explanation given for the arbitrary transfer, or for the selection of inmates.

Most of the RUF who were left at Pademba Road Prison were seriously tortured. They were kept under tight lock-up for complete three weeks. Twenty-one (21) RUF prisoners died during the time of this lock-up, in addition to the late Secretary-General of the RUF, S. Y. B. Rogers, who had earlier died as a result of the same maltreatment – ‘steady batting’ as it is commonly called among prisoners.

[...] The release of some RUF prisoners in late July and early August 2001 gave us hope that we were all going to be released within the shortest possible time. Instead, all of a sudden, many prisoners were transferred out of the blocks and into condemned separate cells.

Then, after the midnight of 11 August 2001, at about 3.00 am, some armed SLA, SSD Police, Prisons and UNAMSIL personnel forcefully took us out of our separate cells and gave us a good beating. There were up to 300 officers involved, including ‘Eighty-Eighty’, ‘Scorpion’, ‘One Mohamed’ and Major Ray England.

They handcuffed our two hands at our backs, plastered our mouths with heavy tape, covered our heads down to our necks with black execution bags and plastered our mouths again. We were dragged out of the prison yard and thrown into waiting trucks just outside the prison gates. We received more severe beatings before we were thrown into the trucks and even while inside the truck.

Everybody was treated the same way. Some sustained very deep cuts and broken bones as a result of being hit by the security men. Some prisoners toileted on themselves, while others urinated on themselves, because we all thought we were going to be killed.

Eleven (11) prisoners were at that time brought to the Mammy Yoko helipad and later transferred into a helicopter and loaded as cargoes; they were flown to Pujehun and spent nine months in Pujehun Prison. Seven (7) other prisoners were treated the same way and transferred to Bonthe Prison. The majority of the transferred prisoners were later brought back to Freetown for further detention.

Any time we have been visited by [human rights] NGOs, we put our problems to them as to how the Government has been violating our fundamental human rights. According to Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and other NGOs, they have taken up our case with the Government on so many occasions and have appealed for us to be set free, but to no avail. The message always returned that this SLPP Government is very difficult to deal with and formidable when it comes to RUF matters.”

1484. Detainees have been beaten with weapons, assaulted and routinely subjected to excessive force. Detainees have had their mouths taped and their heads forcibly 'bagged' in executioners' bags. Detainees have been denied their human rights with regard to their conditions of detention. Protracted periods of solitary confinement and transfers to alternative detention facilities in undisclosed locations have been imposed on many of them. The Government is responsible for this litany of human rights violations against detainees presently in its custody. The Government is also responsible for the deaths of at least 21 RUF prisoners in state custody.

Results of the Commission's Investigations into the Circumstances of Persons Detained in the Custody of the State as a Result of the Conflict in Sierra Leone

1485. The Commission stands opposed to all forms of human rights abuse, irrespective of the identities of those responsible for them or those against whom they are carried out. Above any other principle, it opposes human rights abuse that endures to the present day.

1486. The continued practice of acts or measures that originally derived their legitimacy from the existence of a State of Emergency is unacceptable in a democracy. For example, there is no place for the arbitrary imposition of limitations on the freedom of the press. Retention of Public Emergency measures authorised in relation to the conflict in Sierra Leone is tantamount to a continuation of the conflict.

1487. The Government of Sierra Leone today continues the practice of detention in the category of 'safe custody'. There are currently at least 17 persons detained in the custody of the state under this category. The 17 individuals whose names were given to the Commission in this regard are all rank-holding members of the Sierra Leone Army or the Sierra Leone Border Guards. Their detention is illegal. Their immediate release is imperative. The retention of 'safe custody' as a category of detention is a stain on the rule of law in Sierra Leone. The category must be removed immediately and permanently from all statute books and other legal instruments.

1488. Beyond the 'safe custody' prisoners, there are also other categories of detainees at Pademba Road whose detention is unlawful. For instance, there are those who were arrested and deposited in state custody on 7 May 2000, but who have been charged *ex post facto* with 70-count indictments for the murders of 8 May 2000. Moreover, there are thirteen (13) RUF prisoners from May 2000 against whom charges were first preferred on 3 May 2002, which was 63 days after the lifting of the State of Emergency on 1 March 2002. The 63-day period directly contravenes the Constitution of Sierra Leone⁹³⁴ and invalidates the Government's right to detain them.

1489. In the absence of any legal basis for the detention of a particular person, that person falls to be described as a political prisoner. Moreover, where the legal basis advanced for the detention of a particular person is found to be

⁹³⁴ See the Constitution of Sierra Leone at Sections 17(2)(a) and (b); Chapter III. After the lifting of a State of Emergency, a detainee held under Emergency Powers legislation must be released or charged promptly with a criminal offence. The charges ought then to be prosecuted in accordance with standard Sierra Leonean criminal procedure.

mala fides, or in bad faith, then that person may also be considered a political prisoner. By the Commission's best estimate, there remain in the region of 150 political prisoners at Freetown Central Prison, Pademba Road at the time of writing.

1490. The Commission endeavoured throughout its investigations to obtain a full and accurate list from the Prisons Department of those detained under the RUF classification, or under other classifications related to the conflict in Sierra Leone. For example, the Commission wrote to the Director of Prisons on 10 June 2003 requesting the following information:
- i. The full names and, where applicable, aliases of all persons in your custody detained in relation to the conflict in Sierra Leone;
 - ii. The dates on which these persons were detained and a description of the act(s) each of them is alleged to have committed;
 - iii. An accompanying list of those inmates who are detained in connection with the 8 May 2000 incident at the residence of Foday Saybana Sankoh;
 - iv. A full list of all criminal charges levelled against these inmates, as well as the date(s) and nature of any and all court appearance(s) made by any of these inmates since detention began;
 - v. The exact locations in which these inmates are detained; and
 - vi. The attendant classifications or categorisations pertaining to the status of all these detainees.
1491. The Commission found that the information returned to it in response to this request was most unsatisfactory. In a memorandum dated 13 June 2003, the Director of Prisons intimated that that he had provided the Commission with a "comprehensive list."⁹³⁵ The list contained the following attachments:
- "A Comprehensive List of Safe Custody Prisoners (in relation to the conflict in Sierra Leone) Incarcerated at Freetown Central Prison, who have not yet been charged to court up to [the present] date"; containing the names of seventeen (17) inmates, all of them carrying ranks in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) or Sierra Leone Border Guards (SLBG)
 - "A Comprehensive List of RUF Prisoners (in relation to the 8 May 2000 incident at the compound of Foday Saybana Sankoh) Incarcerated at Freetown Central Prison, who have not yet been charged to court up to [the present] date"; containing the names of 49 inmates, including three females
 - "A Comprehensive List of West Side Prisoners (in relation to the conflict in Sierra Leone) Incarcerated at Freetown Central Prison, who have not yet been charged to court up to [the present] date"; containing the names of 34 inmates, including four females.
1492. Subsequent enquiries by TRC investigators proved that there were numerous prisoners in the Maximum Security Unit at Freetown Central Prison whose names were in fact omitted from all three of these lists. There has been no official effort on the part of the Prisons Department or the Ministry of Justice to clarify the status of the remaining prisoners, despite the Commission's requests. The Commission nevertheless conducted interviews with several detainees whose names do not appear on any of the lists. The only apparent reason for their detention is that they have been accused of offences related to the 8 May 2000 incident. The accusations remain thus far completely unsubstantiated.

⁹³⁵ The Director of Prisons, Prisons Department, Freetown; "Information Required in respect of Investigations by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission"; letter to the TRC marked PS.3/104/11; dated 13 June 2003.

1493. The Government of Sierra Leone has been uncooperative and unhelpful to the Commission in its efforts to establish the full extent of human rights abuses that persist in the justice system to the present day. Some requests by the Commission to the Prisons Department were met with petty obstructionism. What were described as 'comprehensive' lists of detainees provided to the Commission were flawed and incomplete. Justice in Sierra Leone must not only be done; it must be seen to be done.
1494. Moreover, there has been a series of inexcusable delays in the operation of the justice system, which have culminated in a woeful breakdown of the rule of law. More than four years after the 8 May 2000 incident occurred, there have been no trials or preliminary proceedings to determine the guilt or innocence of the men and women detained. Justice delayed is most certainly justice denied.
1485. Many of those in Pademba Road Prison were not present at Sankoh's Lodge on 8 May 2000. Many of them have never carried firearms, let alone fired shots into a crowd of demonstrators. Statements taken by the Sierra Leone Police from the suspects themselves, as well as from witnesses and other interested parties, vouch for the fact that a considerable number of the detainees have no more than tenuous, superficial connections with the RUF. With a few choice exceptions, whose cases could be distilled from the majority of others by means of a rigorous analysis of the evidence, there is no legal basis on which to proceed with prosecutions against the majority of these suspects.
1486. One inmate drew the TRC's attention to a particular anomaly by which certain senior members of the RUF have been released from detention, while the bulk of the junior, non-office-holding members remain locked up:

"May I inform the Government of Sierra Leone and the international community, through the TRC, that the notion of holding the presently-detained RUF members responsible for the hiccups in the peace process in this country is a miscalculation.

[...] It is very disheartening to spare the 'heads' of an institution and hold onto its 'tail'. In May 2000, almost all Ministers of the RUF and the other original vanguards who took decisions were rounded up by the Government and kept in jail. The snag now is that the Government has released the ringleaders of the RUF, especially the top cadres of the late Foday Sankoh like Mike Lamin, Eldred Collins and Peter Vandy, yet they continue to hold onto the inferior members or subordinates... These are all indications of the abuse and violations of the fundamental human rights of the members so affected in prison. There is no country in the whole world where peace, love and unity shall hold firmly without equal rights and justice."⁹³⁶

⁹³⁶ TRC Confidential Interview with member of the RUF incarcerated at Pademba Road Prison after the events of 8 May 2000; interview conducted in Freetown; 19 September 2003.

1487. The inescapable impression conveyed by a preponderance of these detainees in their testimonies to the Commission is that they are being held as political prisoners. The justice system in the country remains rotten to its core, to the prisoners' enormous disadvantage. Yet the TRC received a host of reconciliatory messages from the remaining RUFP detainees, both in the course of their interviews and submissions, and in their contributions to the Commission's National Vision project. In concluding this section of the present chapter and providing a basis for recommendations made elsewhere in the Commission's report,⁹³⁷ it is appropriate to reproduce some of the most poignant testimony:

"To the people of Sierra Leone we say sorry for all the wrongs we committed and plead for mercy. We are the children of the SLPP government. When the war started it was against the APC members and their Government at the time. I hailed from Kailahun and the leaders of this country know that my home town is the heart of the SLPP government. That was one of the reasons why some of us supported the war in the first place. Now that there is peace we have no evil intention for the President and the nation. So please we beg that the Government release us and let us work together as one for the future of the country."

[and]

"Yes, we have been imprisoned unlawfully and have been maltreated. But we don't wish bad upon any person or any other party. We simply want the Commission to recommend to the Government to give us justice; because injustice was the root of our war."⁹³⁸

⁹³⁷ See Recommendations, Chapter 3, Volume 2

⁹³⁸ TRC Confidential Interviews members of the RUFP who have been in state custody for the past four years; interviews conducted in Freetown; May 2003.

THE DECISIVE DECLINE OF THE RUF AND THE CONCLUSION OF THE SIERRA LEONE CONFLICT

1488. Whilst the RUF's political wing, the Revolutionary United Front Party (RUF), was neutralised by the landmark events of 8 May 2000, the combatant cadre still boasted a sizeable presence of troops in the Provinces and control of a number of key strategic territories. The same commanders who had precipitated breaches of the cease-fire in the year since the Lomé Accord and, to a great extent, led the hostage-taking of United Nations peacekeepers, remained the RUF's key leaders in the field. They included Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon, Komba Gbondema (alias "Monamie") and Augustine Bao.
1489. Within hours of the barrage at Foday Sankoh's Lodge on 8 May 2000, the combatant cadre was notified of the operations by pro-Government forces against the RUF leader. Hundreds of RUF troops were therefore summoned to Freetown to provide reinforcements. According to UNAMSIL officers who witnessed Sankoh's flight from his Lodge that afternoon, Sankoh himself made the call to Issa Sesay by mobile or satellite telephone.⁹³⁹ Sankoh's instruction to Sesay was apparently to come and 'rescue' him from Freetown.
1490. The RUF force that advanced toward Freetown in response to the 8 May 2000 incident was estimated by one of those who joined it to be about the size of a full Battalion – one thousand men strong.⁹⁴⁰ This contingent moved in vehicles and on foot at a remarkable pace along the Makeni axis. Within 24 hours, a considerable amount of RUF manpower had arrived at Newton on the main highway into Freetown and was engaging the ECOMOG troops stationed there in active combat.
1491. The pro-Government forces in Freetown soon joined what was to become a decisive inter-factional battle in the final phase of the war. Buoyed by their offensive operation against the RUF in Freetown, the members of the self-styled 'Peace Task Force' were once again mobilised. Many of the same unlikely combination of pro-Government combatants – the Sierra Leone Army, the West Side Boys and the Kamajors – collaborated to form a force of at least one Battalion in strength. They were given all necessary logistics, including vehicles, out of Government military supplies.⁹⁴¹ They began to move out to Newton on the evening of 8 May 2000 to bolster the ECOMOG deployment in countering the threat.

⁹³⁹ UNAMSIL, 4th Nigerian Battalion; "Statement / Patrol Report on the Incident that occurred at Chairman Foday Sankoh's Residence on 08 May 2000"; report submitted to the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Sierra Leone Police by the Operations Officer, NIBATT 4 UNAMSIL, Freetown; dated 12 May 2000.

⁹⁴⁰ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF commander on the Northern Axis; interview conducted in Magburaka, Tonkolili District; 14 August 2003.

⁹⁴¹ TRC Confidential Interview with a former officer of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who served as a 'Brigadier' under the AFRC and later became Leader of the 'West Side Boys'; interview conducted in Freetown; 17 October 2003.

1492. The Commission heard that the pro-Government forces were placed under the Joint Command of Tom Carew, the Chief of Defence Staff, and M. S. Dumbuya, the erstwhile Northern Commander of the CDF.⁹⁴² According to Dumbuya, by the time his troops reached Waterloo, the ECOMOG contingent, under severe attack from the RUF, was preparing to retreat because “they had been exchanging gunfire and at a point they were running out of ammo.”⁹⁴³ Hence Dumbuya’s men immediately entered into combat. Their arrival was the prelude to several days of intensely fierce fighting.
1493. The express purpose of the Government deployment was to prevent the RUF from entering Freetown. For many of the combatants involved, however, the battle took on an added psychological dimension, because a victory for the pro-Government forces would prove to the RUF that its adversaries were serious about ending the war. According to one of the Kamajors who fought in the battle:
- “We were co-ordinated now; all the factions that wanted peace were moving together. We thought that ‘this is the right time now for us to stop this trouble! Let the RUF realise that we are no longer going to allow there to be fighting in Sierra Leone!’ We were ready to stop them anywhere they started.”⁹⁴⁴
1494. In terms of weaponry, the pro-Government forces were well equipped: they boasted twin-barrelled as well as single-barrelled missile launchers, in addition to a stockpile of light weaponry.⁹⁴⁵ Meanwhile the RUF claimed to have captured a considerable haul of logistics and munitions from the UN peacekeeping units they had taken hostage, and were prepared to utilise these weapons in combat.⁹⁴⁶ The initial contribution from the pro-Government forces was significant, as they strengthened the ECOMOG defensive deployment at Waterloo and successfully repelled the RUF. They were subsequently able to counter-attack and push the RUF back out to Songo under Dumbuya’s leadership.⁹⁴⁷

⁹⁴² M. S. Dumbuya, former Commanding Officer of the Northern CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 21 October 2003.

⁹⁴³ M. S. Dumbuya, former Commanding Officer of the Northern CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 21 October 2003.

⁹⁴⁴ TRC Confidential Interview with former Kamajor fighter; interview conducted in Bo District; June 2003.

⁹⁴⁵ TRC Confidential Interview with a former officer of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who served as a ‘Brigadier’ under the AFRC and later became Leader of the ‘West Side Boys’; interview conducted in Freetown; 17 October 2003.

⁹⁴⁶ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF commander on the Northern Axis; interview conducted in Magburaka, Tonkolili District; 14 August 2003.

⁹⁴⁷ M. S. Dumbuya, former Commanding Officer of the Northern CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 21 October 2003.

1495. At Songo there was pocket resistance, in which a number of Kamajors were killed on the pro-Government side.⁹⁴⁸ However, the real clash was to take place around the strategic junction town of Masiaka. It became a pivotal battle, which in retrospect represented something of a 'last stand' on the part of the RUF. There was massive fighting and considerable destruction in the township, as each faction attempted to assert itself and make territorial gains over the other. The pro-Government forces were at an advantage in being able to call upon 'back-up', including that of international troops,⁹⁴⁹ and it was this advantage that was to prove decisive.

1496. Ironically, though, the most memorable enlistment of reinforcements, according to testimonies from all sides, came in the shape of additional fighters from among the West Side Boys. Although the West Side Boys were known to have committed extensive attacks against the civilian population and were regarded as renegades by most of the Sierra Leonean population, the military hierarchy saw fit to invite this group to join the battle on the side of the pro-Government forces. They were thus called out by radio from their base at Okra Hills and converged with the existing troops under the command of Dumbuya and Carew in time for the final thrust to claim Masiaka.

1497. According to M. S. Dumbuya, there was considerable suspicion on the part of the 'loyal' serving SLA soldiers about the decision to co-opt the West Side Boys. It was thought, with some justification, that their allegiances would waver and may eventually lead to in-fighting among the different factions in the pro-Government 'coalition':

"We didn't want to work with them [the West Side Boys]. We thought there would be a fracas with our own men. The arrangements were made by others and I just realised they were going to join us... They were issued [Government] weapons, purporting that they had completely come in on the side of the military. And indeed there was a fracas, in which we lost two of our Special Forces [ex-ULIMO] men."⁹⁵⁰

1498. The West Side Boys who testified to the Commission were adamant that they played a vital role in the eventual thwarting of the RUF's plans to reach Freetown. This senior commander's contention is typical of the bravado they displayed in claiming victory over the RUF and with it the unwarranted mantle of 'protectors of the peace':

"We are the ones who stood up and stopped them [the RUF] attacking Freetown. We ambushed them right around our West Side base. They were plenty – many more than us – up to 500 or one thousand. [But] we are the ones who made peace."⁹⁵¹

⁹⁴⁸ TRC Confidential Interview with former Kamajor fighter; interview conducted in Bo District; June 2003.

⁹⁴⁹ In addition to United Nations peacekeeping troops numbering over 11,000, a newly-arrived contingent from the British Army was on standby to deploy into defensive operations out of Lungi.

⁹⁵⁰ M. S. Dumbuya, former Commanding Officer of the Northern CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 21 October 2003.

⁹⁵¹ TRC Confidential Interview with a former officer of the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) who served as a 'Brigadier' under the AFRC and later became Leader of the 'West Side Boys'; interview conducted in Freetown; 17 October 2003.

1499. The battle over Masiaka in May 2000 constituted the last prolonged sequence of fighting between the main factions in the Sierra Leone conflict. The Sierra Leone Army (SLA) and the Kamajors (CDF) combined with the West Side Boys and received support from Indian UNAMSIL troops to expunge the RUF from Masiaka and push them up to Lunsar. It was an almighty battle and signalled the largest consolidated onslaught against the RUF alone since the very earliest years of the war. At Lunsar there were further skirmishes, and at Gbere Junction there were multi-factional clashes that led to the break-up of the pro-Government force and the return of the West Side Boys to their Okra Hills base. Yet the city of Freetown was spared another assault by anti-Government militias and the RUF was sent into a military decline from which it would never recover.
1500. One further noteworthy set of military dynamics after May 2000 surrounded the confrontation between the remaining combatant cadre of the RUF and the Guinean Armed Forces (GAF) in early 2001. The understanding of this confrontation conveyed to the Commission by authoritative witnesses⁹⁵² is that the RUF combatants deployed over the border into neighbouring Guinea from the Sierra Leonean District of Kambia. The RUF's objective was apparently to bolster the defences of Liberia's then President Charles Taylor against the growing threat of a Liberian opposition group called LURD – Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy – which was thought to be training in Guinea. The Guinean Armed Forces (GAF) mustered a full-scale military response to the destabilising forays of the RUF into Guinean territory. GAF deployed ground troops against the RUF combatants, supported by the Kono-based Donso militias who once formed part of the CDF, on the front lines near to the Sierra Leone border. GAF also unleashed artillery and air strikes against perceived key RUF positions along the border, both in Guinea and in Sierra Leone's northern Kambia District.
1501. The effectiveness of GAF's military operation was so crushing that the RUF was pushed back into Sierra Leone in a matter of days and suffered untold destruction to its internal infrastructure and organisation on the ground. The battles with GAF led to the deaths of some of the RUF's most influential field commanders. Those killed included: Dennis Mingo (alias "Superman"), who was said to be the leader of the RUF operation in the North and into Guinea; Komba Gbondema (alias "Monamie"), one of the Northern Battalion Commanders; and John Peters (alias "Scorpion"), a former overall RUF artillery commander. The main military capabilities and prowess of the RUF were almost entirely eliminated in one fell swoop. Many commentators consider the Guinean confrontations to represent the dying breaths of the RUF as a serious military menace.⁹⁵³

⁹⁵² Notably, the following witnesses gave conforming accounts of the incident: Captain (Retired) Moigboi Moigande Kosia, former officer in the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF) and later recruited into the RUF by Foday Sankoh as his first 'G-1' officer; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 07 May 2003; and TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF commander on the Northern Axis; interview conducted in Magburaka, Tonkolili District; 14 August 2003.

⁹⁵³ See, inter alia: Lansana Gberie, Partnership Africa-Canada; in BBC News Online, Africa News; *Analysis: Rebels without a Future*; posted on the internet on Monday 21 May 2001, available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/1343113.stm>.

1502. Hence, the Abuja peace process that had been instigated in November 2000 suddenly attained a greater degree of viability for all parties and an enhanced prospect of success. Issa Hassan Sesay took on the Interim Leadership of the RUF movement after a nomination letter was prepared by Foday Sankoh in a meeting at Lungi with President Kabbah of Sierra Leone, along with Presidents Obasanjo of Nigeria and Konare of Mali.⁹⁵⁴ Sesay was recognised by other parties to the peace process as somebody who held real sway with the RUF combatant cadre. In Sesay's expression of his desire to lay down arms and negotiate a reintegration settlement for the RUF, the pro-Government constituencies were said to have "sensed a genuine attempt on the part of the RUF to accept peace."⁹⁵⁵ The original Abuja Cease-Fire Agreement of 10 November 2000⁹⁵⁶ (sometimes referred to as 'Abuja I') was thus tabled for review.
1503. A Sierra Leone Government delegation, including the Attorney General Solomon Berewa and the Deputy Minister of Defence Chief Samuel Hinga Norman, met with members of the RUF in the presence of the United Nations and the ECOWAS Committee of Six on 2 May 2001. This second conference also took place in Abuja, Nigeria and is popularly referred to as 'Abuja II'. The central compromise required from the RUF was the relinquishing of its 'control areas' in order that governmental authority could be restored in all parts of the country with a view to holding fresh elections. Although the RUF had originally stipulated that there could be no deal without a commitment from the Government to release Foday Sankoh and the other RUF detainees, such an objective was to prove illusory. The RUF ultimately agreed to participate in the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme without securing Sankoh's release. Thousands of RUF ex-combatants were to benefit from initiatives run by the National Committee for DDR (NCDDR)⁹⁵⁷, including opportunities to institute their own agricultural and small-scale business projects.

⁹⁵⁴ Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, current President of the Republic of Sierra Leone; supplementary written submission provided to the TRC in response to a set of 'Questions for the President'; received by the TRC by delivery; August 2003.

⁹⁵⁵ These words are attributed to Chief Samuel Hinga Norman, National Co-ordinator of the Civil Defence Forces (CDF), as part of his justification for participating at the second round of Abuja Peace Talks; see Reverend Alfred M. Sam Foray, former Secretary-General of the Sierra Leone Action Movement for the Civil Defence Forces (SLAM-CDF); written statement and supporting documentation submitted to the TRC by e-mail; 10 December 2003.

⁹⁵⁶ The original Abuja Cease-Fire Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF, signed on 10 November 2000, is available at <http://www.sierra-leone.org/ceasefire1100.html>.

⁹⁵⁷ At January 2002, according to the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR), 24,352 ex-RUF combatants were disarmed. Approximately one tenth of that number was recruited into the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF), while thousands of others were given money to assist them in their efforts to resettle, opportunities for short-term employment and job training, and access to a referral and counselling service. See: National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR), written submission to the TRC in the context of Thematic Hearings held in Freetown; June 2003; also Dr. Francis Kaikai, former Executive Secretary of NCDDR, TRC interview held at NCDDR Headquarters in Freetown; 20 July 2003.

1504. In the wake of Abuja II, the final instruments of the Cessation of Hostilities between the RUF and pro-Government forces, including the CDF, were formally signed on 14 May 2001 at UNAMSIL Headquarters, Mammy Yoko Hotel, Freetown. The RUF's so-called 'Legal Representative', Omrie Michael Golley, signed on behalf of the RUF, while Chief Samuel Hinga Norman appended his signature for the pro-Government factions. The Commission regards the signing of this landmark agreement as the signal conclusion of the war that had blighted the nation for over a decade.
1505. On 18 January 2002, a gathering near Lungi International Airport brought together all of the factions in the Sierra Leone conflict to underscore the achievement of peace. Alongside President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, a host of international dignitaries attended this ceremony. President John Kuffour of Ghana expressed the solidarity of African nations and a makeshift bonfire was set alight, composed of thousands of weapons collected by UNAMSIL during the disarmament process. In destroying the instruments of war, the fire stood for the collective determination of Sierra Leoneans never again to wage war on one another. It was christened the 'Flame of Peace'.
1506. In the Commission's view, the date of the symbolic burning ceremony at Lungi ought to be commemorated in future years with a unifying annual celebration – a National Day of Reconciliation.⁹⁵⁸ While the Commission does not underestimate the struggle that lies ahead for the people of this nation, it is gratified to acknowledge that since that day there have been no further military hostilities in Sierra Leone. 18 January 2002 saw the closing of this turbulent chapter and its consignment to history: the military and political history of the conflict.

⁹⁵⁸ The Commission's recommendation for a National Day of Reconciliation, to be held annually on 18 January, is included in the chapter on 'Reconciliation' in Volume Three B of this report.

CHAPTER FOUR

Nature of the Conflict

TRC

**Save
Sierra Leone
From
another war.
Reconcile now,
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Can help**

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CHAPTER FOUR

Nature of the Conflict

Introduction

1. The Commission is required by its enabling legislation to determine whether the conflict was a result of deliberate planning, action or authorisation of any person or government, and what roles external or other actors may have played in the conflict.
2. The conflict started as an attempt to overthrow a dictatorial and tyrannical regime. It was unable to mobilise support among the people to prosecute the revolution. It resorted to abductions, forced recruitment and other violations and abuses to increase its numerical strength. Community militias were established to resist the purveyors of revolution. In no time, the militias themselves began to attack the civilian population that they were established to protect.
3. The defining character of this conflict was its radical departure from other armed conflicts in terms of targets. This was a conflict waged against the civilian population. The combatant factions did not target conventional military targets. There were very few accounts of direct confrontation between the combatant factions. In consequence, civilians bore the brunt of the violations and abuses that marked the conflict.
4. The conflict was also notable for its chameleonic nature. Factions and groups changed sides frequently culminating in the wholesale transfer of loyalty from a national army to a renegade fighting force established by an illegal government. The confusion among the civilian population led to the sobriquet, “sobels,” soldiers who became rebels at night in order to loot and plunder the resources of the people.
5. What shines through in the rest of this chapter is the plethora of violations and abuses to which the people were subject. The chapter analyses the fighting forces and identifies the strands in their composition and behaviour that enable an understanding of the violence they deployed against the civilian population.
6. Using qualitative testimony and quantitative analysis, the Commission captures the roles played by the armed factions in prosecuting their campaigns and ascribes responsibility for the violations and abuses to the different combat groups including the ECOMOG peacekeeping forces.
7. The Commission has researched the influence of external actors and factors in starting, and fuelling the many thousands of violations that took place during the conflict. Indeed there are specific examples of foreign involvement that attest to a war with significant international, particularly sub-regional, dynamics and reverberations. The overwhelming majority of abuses recorded by the Commission were carried out by Sierra Leoneans against Sierra Leoneans. The patent truth is that for eleven years the people of this country effectively waged armed conflict against themselves. In its essence, it was a self-destructive civil war.

8. The nature of the conflict is better understood in terms of its complexities and ambiguities than through the lens of any single, defining cause of ill intent. What this chapter shows is the multiplicity of causes and effects that permeate the violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law as well as the institutional fluidity of the violators themselves.
9. There are notable paradoxes at the heart of this analysis, which the time and resources available did not permit the Commission fully to resolve. One of our most important observations is that in spite of all the malice and suffering of the conflict period, Sierra Leone has returned in peacetime to what appears to be a climate of tolerant and harmonious co-existence. Sierra Leoneans demonstrated tremendous courage, resilience and desire to put the past behind, through accepting many of those who committed violations against them back in their home communities.
10. However, a propensity for conflict continues to exist among the people. Many of the root causes of the malice and violence remain unaddressed. To a large extent, the purpose of this chapter is to pose a deterrent to the recurrence of armed conflict by recording the full extent of the violations and abuses that have taken place and analysing the context that enabled the perpetration of such violations. The chapter also reports on two further features identified by the Commission as characteristics of the conflict:
 - (a) *particular malice*, whereby violations and abuses are found to have occurred as a result of deliberate targeting, planning or policy on the part of their perpetrators; and
 - (b) *particular suffering*, whereby the specific ordeals of communities, groups or single persons demand to be given a voice in the hope that we might all learn lessons from them and unite to ensure that such things never happen again.
11. Based upon the tenets outlined above, this chapter has been divided into four main sections. The first section outlines the Nature of the Violations by describing the framework for the categorisation of violations adopted by the Commission. The second deals with the victims of the conflict, noting certain characteristics of the violations and abuses perpetrated, and focusing on the patterns of abuse and evidence of targeting. The third section profiles those who committed the violations, that is, the perpetrators and perpetrator groups. It includes an assessment of the character and conduct of each of the militias and armed groups involved in the prosecution of the conflict. The fourth section titled, 'Characteristics of Context' elaborates the general trends that underpin the conflict. Each of these sections is supported, where necessary, by qualitative and quantitative data identifying patterns and peculiarities in the conflict.

TRC



Commissioner Sylvanus Torto leads an offering of prayers for the dead in front of one of the mass graves identified in Port Loko District.

NATURE OF THE VIOLATIONS

12. The violation categories used by the Commission are the violations known to have occurred frequently during the conflict in Sierra Leone. These are quite different from those that occurred during outbreaks of mass human rights abuse in other conflicts and countries. By using these common violations, the Commission hopes to comprehensively describe the common experiences of the Sierra Leonean people during the conflict.
13. The list is deliberately short, numbering 16 violations. Each is precisely defined to avoid ambiguity, ensuring a common understanding of the violations recorded by the Commission. While the list is short, there is scope for a broad analysis of each one. For example, acts of rape should be considered as not only happening in the context of abduction as sex slaves or “bush wives”; but as a violation perpetrated against women during attacks on villages or as part of encounters at checkpoints or in the bush. Furthermore, the burning of property should be understood, not just as an economic crime, but on occasion, as a means of murdering the persons detained within the property.

Data Framework

14. In order to grasp the context in which the violations took place, the Commission organised the different violation types into a framework. Some violations such as amputation, forced cannibalism and forced displacement stand alone, because of their specific character and the patterns in which they were committed. The remaining violations have been divided into three sections: violations perpetrated in the context of abduction; violations without prior abduction; and economic violations. It was a major characteristic of the conflict that economic violations were accompanied by other violations, such as beatings.
15. Abduction is violation by itself. In the context of the war, it was carried out with other violations and/or provided a foundation for other violations. Abduction is defined by the Commission as the *capture and forced/unwilling removal from current location, in the control of person/s defined as perpetrators*. The Commission recorded 5968 cases of abduction.
16. Certain violations occurred specifically in the context of abduction. Abductees experienced abuse for an extended period, often for many years, whereas the experiences of non abducted victims were in the context of encounters with perpetrators. These experiences represented “events” in the lives of the non abducted victims. They occurred mostly during attacks on villages, village occupations, check point encounters, ambushes on the road and bush encounters. For those who were abducted, life was a continuous state of fear, within a rigid hierarchical command structure based on terror. The consequences on the lives of these two categories of victims varied accordingly.
17. It is important that we do not forget the common experiences of thousands of Sierra Leoneans who suffered during chance encounters with perpetrators. This created a climate of general terror within the country, as people never knew when they would be abused and their rights violated, in their village, in their home, etc.

TRC



Three amputees prepare to testify before a TRC public hearing in Freetown in April 2003.

18. The violations occurring in the context of abduction are dealt with more specifically in the chapters of this report dealing with Women, Children and Youth respectively. Indeed, sexual slavery was perpetrated mostly against women and girls. Forced recruitment was targeted at children and youths by the RUF, the AFRC and the CDF. The targeted age group for forced recruitment violations were those 10-14years.¹
19. Following from the above, the Commission developed the following framework for categorising the violations recorded in its database:
- 1 Amputation
 - 2 Forced Cannibalism
 - 3 Abduction and subsequent long term Detention and Mistreatment
 - 3.1 Forced Recruitment and Sexual Slavery with particular reference to children (including the Drugging violation), Forced Labour
 - 3.2 Assault, Torture and Rape of both children and adults that accompany or follow from Abduction
 - 4 Mistreatment without Abduction
 - 4.1 Forced Labour, Assault, Torture and Rape
 - 4.2 Short term Detentions
 - 5 Economic Violations
 - 5.1 Looting and Property Destruction
 - 5.2 Extortion
 - 6 Forced Displacement
 - 7 Killing
20. The purpose of the framework was to make the organisation and analysis of data collected practical. If the Commission had used the hundreds of categories of violations available in the legal or international instruments, the incidents would have been too few for relevant analysis or for the identification of patterns.
21. The examples provided throughout this chapter come from witnesses who made statements to the Commission and serve to illustrate the nature and the circumstances of each violation. However, it is important to understand that in the majority of the situations, victims suffered a combination of *several* violations from the same perpetrators in one incident. 63% of the victims² suffered two or more violations. While the Commission deals with the specificity of each violation, it also provides an account of how these violations were interrelated. For example, looting and destruction of property were usually carried out together and are therefore treated together.
22. The following testimony provides an example of this interrelation. The events described relate to the invasion of Moyolo village in Moyamba district, on the 18th of February 1996:
- “The RUF told us that they are divided into 4 groups. The first group was called the Killers. The second group was responsible for amputations, the third was responsible for stabbing people to death

¹ See the Children’s Chapter of this Report in Volume 3B.

² 9440 out of the 14,995 violations recorded in the database

and the last group responsible for burning.

Ten people were captured. They divided empty gallons into half, placed them on these people, sprinkled fuel and set them on fire. These people were burnt to ashes. As we were all locked in a room, the RUF started to kill people from this room one after the other. They would call you from the room, you would be taken out and be killed. The killing lasted for hours.

After, they said they were going to start cutting off hands. Many people were severely wounded. Six people had their hands finally chopped off. Amputation stopped and they started stabbing. Many people were again severely wounded and later died. That stopped and they started beating. Many people were beaten to death and survivors are still suffering from serious pain as of today.

I am a victim of the amputation group. I was seriously beaten and severely wounded on my hands for they had wanted to amputate me. I managed to escape from them, went into the bush and managed to reach Moyamba the next day.”³

23. This testimony included numerous incidents or acts of violations and no less than six *categories* of violations: torture, arbitrary detention, killing, amputation, assault and forced displacement. The testimony also demonstrates the planned and structured character of the abuses that were perpetrated, a topic that will be addressed later in this chapter.

Violation Categories

24. The following violations are captured in the database: amputations; forced cannibalism; abduction, forced recruitment, sexual slavery; drugging; forced labour; assault; torture; rape, arbitrary detention; looting and destruction of property; extortion; forced displacement; killing and cannibalism. A general characteristic of these violations is the indiscriminate manner in which they were committed. There was no respect shown to traditional norms, or vulnerable groups. The percentage of each violation committed by the armed factions shows that none of the violations was a peculiar characteristic of any group. They all seemed to be competing to outdo themselves on who would commit the most violations against civilians. Even the government soldiers who had gone through formal training did not seem to have felt themselves bound by the laws of war. Terror became the main tool for the armed groups. Even those groups set up to defend the communities against attack made no distinction between friend and foe. This chapter is therefore very painful reading of how armed groups claiming to act on behalf of the common man turned their guns on the very people in whose name they claimed to be acting.

³ John Williams, TRC statement number 947, Moyolo, Moyamba, 14 December 2002

1. Amputation:

25. The Commission has compiled statistical data only on those acts of amputation that involved the chopping off of a limb. The decision in this regard was to reflect more accurately how many victims were “disabled” by the violation. Therefore, the Commission defines amputation as *the removal of one or more hands, feet, arms or legs*.
26. The Commission finds that amputations occurred in “sets” or “spates” during the conflict; in other words they were not a constant or underpinning feature to the prosecution of the war, but rather came in the form of campaigns. Some of the notable campaigns for which amputations were carried out include the 1996 elections, the expulsion of the AFRC from power, the January 1999 attack on Freetown.⁴ While data in the database does not contain the total number of amputees in the country, they do reflect the general trends that during the conflict.⁵ The graph below captures the level of amputation committed by the armed groups during the war.⁶

Source: TRC database

⁴ See the chapter of this Report on the Military and Political History of the Conflict for a discussion of these campaigns.

⁵ See the Statistics Chapter of this Report for an analysis of the database.

⁶ Of the 378 amputations documented by the Commission, the month of violation was reported in only 40% (152 violations).

Peaks in amputation are believed to have occurred at the following times and places:

- a. From November 1995 to June 1996, abuses were concentrated in Bo, Kono, Moyamba, and Port Loko. This was the period covered by the elections that led to the disengagement of the military from power. Many of the young soldiers were unwilling to give up power. The Chief of the army claimed that he could not guarantee security for the elections. This alleged inability was exploited by renegade elements in the army and by the RUF to commit amputations against the civilian population.
 - b. The second quarter of 1997, from April to June. This period marked the entry of the RUF into the Government of the AFRC in Freetown. Their entry to Freetown was followed by particular brutality and ferocity.
 - c. The first half of 1998, from February to May. This was the period when the Nigerian led ECOMOG expelled the AFRC from power by. Abuses were concentrated in Bombali, Koinadugu and Kono – the route taken by the AFRC as they fled Freetown. To a lesser extent, abuses also occurred in Kenema and Tonkolili.
 - d. The first quarter of 1999 (January to March). The AFRC with a rag tag of RUF elements marched on Freetown in January 1999. The entry was marked with wanton attack on civilians. Abuses concentrated in Western Area. Having failed to keep Freetown, they laid waste to the city as they departed under heavy casualties from ECOMOG bombardment. Their resentment at the civilian support for ECOMOG was marked by the highest peak in amputations throughout the war.
27. The peaks mark separate campaigns. The motivations for the various campaigns differ. While the RUF campaign before and during 1996 was in protest against the elections and terrorising the people to stop them from voting, the purpose of the AFRC/RUF amputation campaigns of 1997, 1998 and 1999 was revenge on the population for failing to support them. The more the people kept away from the AFRC, the more they were punished by AFRC/RUF combatants through amputations and other violations perpetrated against them.
28. The RUF was responsible for the majority of the amputations carried out during the conflict in Sierra Leone. The percentage of amputations attributed to the RUF is 40.7% (154). The RUF conducted a campaign of violence in and around 1996 known as "Operation Stop Elections" which entailed the chopping of hands and arms as a way of preventing people from voting. One specific circumstance surrounding the cutting of limbs was for the victims to be told to go to President Kabbah for a new hand or that the amputations were a message to the President that the elections were meaningless without the RUF.

29. Tamba Amara, an adult farmer, had his limb amputated in his village Bo Ngleya in 1996:

“People armed and in combat uniforms attacked our village and killed many people. They went all round and shouted that we, in the village had voted for President Kabbah as President of the Republic of Sierra Leone and because President Kabbah is a proud man they are going to cut off our arms so that we will never vote for him again. It was in 1996 and they said that we should go to him to treat us and give us another hand. Four of us were amputated, two men and two women.”⁷

30. Morlai Conteh had her hand amputated by the RUF in 1995 in Kainu town:

“After they cut off my hand, they gave it to me and told me to take it to the government.”⁸

31. Mohammed Kallon encountered armed men on Election Day in 1996:

“I was on my way from Njopewahun with my children to Bo for elections. We fell into rebel ambush at Falaba. They then asked us our reasons for travelling and where were we going to vote. We then told them we were going to Bo. Then I was tied, laid on three “mortar pestles” and they cut off my right arm.”⁹

32. In the RUF, a significant proportion of those who wielded the “implement of amputation” and actually performed the cutting off of limbs appear to have been children. Many of the testimonies collected by the Commission indicate that the perpetrators themselves were acting under strictly enforced orders or other forms of compulsion. For example, the children were instructed that they would be killed if they did not act as their commanders wished. This applied to all violations, but was more prominent in amputations where the children were given different *nommes de guerres* such as “Cut Hand”.

33. The amputating implement in most cases was a local agricultural machete known as a cutlass, but on occasions also included knives, axes and other forms of crude cutting blades, picks and crowbars, and broken glass from smashed windows or bottles.

34. The AFRC demonstrated a specialisation in amputations in the period 1998 to 1999. While the AFRC was responsible for 3255 of all violations committed during both years¹⁰, they committed 44% of the amputations that took place between 1998 and 1999¹¹.

⁷ TRC confidential statement number 113, Kenema town, Kenema, 4 December 2002

⁸ Morlai Conteh, TRC statement number 1134, Freetown, 7 December 2002

⁹ Mohamed Kallon, TRC statement number 733, Kalanda, Bo, 9 December 2002

¹⁰ 11,874 violations

¹¹ 85 out of 190 violations

35. The amputations carried out by the AFRC were all part of campaigns. One AFRC abductee recalls the following event in 1998:

“About 28 of us who were all abducted were taken to the camp. The AFRC sobels we were with were expecting some ammunition for an attack on Koidu Town but, most unfortunately, a letter came through to the effect that they have to handle with care the ammunition they have left; they should not use their ammunition at all until they were back from the raiding trek. Instead, any enemy being captured – Kamajor, civilian or ECOMOG – must have his hands chopped off. This letter was signed by most of the AFRC PLO’s and top officials. I was cooking for them while they met to discuss it.”¹²

36. With ammunition scarce, it was considered cheaper to amputate victims’ limbs and save the ammunition for confrontations with the government. Any person captured by the AFRC risked having their limbs chopped off during this period. Mohamed Kanu became a victim of amputation by the AFRC/RUF in his village Baba Foindu in 1999:

“One of them threatened to kill me and some others but it was stopped by another soldier. Rather, that soldier that prevented us from being killed told us that they should give us letters that will be taken to His Excellency Tejan Kabbah. After they left my wrist shaking, they told me, ‘that is the letter we have given you to be taken to Kabbah’.”¹³

37. People were often lined up and their limbs amputated in turns with the choice of having their right or left hand amputated. Single and double amputations of hands were routine, like the following event that occurred in Calaba town in the Western Area in 1998:

“They announced to us that the time has come to display amputated hands. First was Mr. Tickim. His hand was cut off with an axe, and they also macheted him in several places. He fell down and was dumped into the gutter, he was presumed dead. Second was Pa Jolloh, his hand was amputated. Third was me. My left hand was amputated and then they told me to put the right hand again. I did but when he hit it with the machete, not all the bones and veins were cut. They did this to all ten of us. Some were doubly amputated, others single. One Mamie Sampa did not survive the amputation. She died shortly after. They told us to go to Tejan Kabbah to give us hands.”¹⁴

¹² Excerpt from TRC statement taken in Moyamba District, relating to events in the Kono District in 1998; TRC Statement Code Number 3922.

¹³ Mohamed Kanu, TRC statement number 5521

¹⁴ Isata Kamara, TRC statement number 7170.

38. On other occasions, civilians were asked if they wanted “long or short sleeves”. If they answered short, their arm was amputated above the elbow; if they said long, it was amputated below the wrist:

“I was brought to a small boy called “Burn House.” He placed my right hand on a stick and asked me whether I wanted long sleeve or short sleeve, not knowing what to say, my hand was cut from the elbow area and I was asked to go and clap for Tejan Kabbah.”¹⁵

39. All the armed factions carried out amputations against the civilian populace. Even children as young as one year old and very old people had their limbs amputated. They were indiscriminate. The first case of amputation recorded by the Commission was against a SLA soldier by the RUF in July 1991 in Kailahun. In October of the same year, an automobile mechanic in Pujehun had his hand amputated by the SLA for rendering service to the RUF. Since then, amputation became a popular tool used by all the armed factions against perceived opponents irrespective of the laws of war. The amputations have become the clearest manifestation of the brutality of the RUF. In many of the cases reported to the Commission, the perpetrators were exacting punishment on the civilian population for policy actions of the Government or the ECOMOG forces. For the 1996 elections, those whose hands were amputated were told to ask the President to give them new hands. Some were told that they would give letters to the president, only to have their limbs amputated. One of the poster campaigns for the 1996 elections read, “let’s put hands together to create a new future”. Figuratively, the RUF was collecting thousands of hands to prevent people from voting. The targeting of civilians was clearly in breach of the Geneva conventions. Even the leadership of the army did not seem to have made serious efforts to dissuade the targeting of civilians for amputation or punish those who were responsible. One amputee said the commander of an AFRC troop contingent told him in Kono in 1998 just before they amputated both his hands, “you want Kabbah and not the AFRC. We have been kicked out of power and you are going to pay for that. Those hands that were used to vote for Kabbah, you will not use them again. For those who survive, Kabbah will give you hands.” Another commander said, “you don’t want us, it is democracy you want. You are going to pay for that.”¹⁶
40. It is difficult to determine where the idea of amputation in the conflict came from. There are however examples from different parts of the world that could have motivated the combatants who used amputations to devastating effect. During the colonial period in the Democratic Republic of Congo (former Zaire), the Belgians cut off the hands of workers who didn’t bring home enough rubber. Mozambique’s RENAMO rebels also carried out amputations during the 70s and 80s, and in Uganda, the Lord’s Resistance Army has amputated ears, particularly, and tongues. Nazi Germany was also reputed for terrible medical experiments on victims that included amputations and mutilations. What makes the Sierra Leone case unique is that people elsewhere usually lost limbs to land mines. In Sierra Leone, they were hacked off by human beings using an ax or a machete. What is more, the amputees elsewhere typically lost a leg or sometimes two legs, which though horrible still allows the victim to function with crutches or a wheelchair. In Sierra Leone, most amputees have lost an arm, and many are what technicians call “double upper-limb amputees.”

¹⁵ Foday Kabbah, TRC statement number 2068.

¹⁶ Testimony of Tamba Finnoh, TRC Public Hearings, April 2003.

41. The World Food Programme registered 1,128 amputees in the amputees camp in February 2002. Since then, the numbers in the camp have drastically reduced, because of the voluntary resettlement of many of the amputees in their home communities.¹⁷ It should be recalled however that thousands of the amputees didn't have access to medical care in the communities where their limbs were amputated. Many of them have probably died from lack of care.

2. Forced cannibalism:

42. Throughout the conflict, various factions forced their captives to eat the flesh and body parts of human corpses, cooked and uncooked. The Commission defines forced cannibalism as the act of *forcing a person to eat human flesh, body parts or drink human blood by threat, intimidation, force or violence*. This particular violation also manifested itself in the forced drinking of (one's own or another's) blood, and the forced chewing of body parts, especially parts of one's ears. The Commission recorded 19 forced cannibalism violations in its database. While this number may seem small in relation to the total number of violations in the Commission's database, the extraordinary character of the violation and the purpose it served warrant a closer look at the circumstances under which it was perpetrated. The Commission recognises that many more cases of forced cannibalism and other violations may not have been recorded during the statement taking exercises and hopes that further inquiries into the war will unearth the full plenitude of violations committed against the people of Sierra Leone.
43. Forced cannibalism was a means of inflicting psychological torture on the victims, who were often relatives or neighbours of the person they were forced to eat. Cecilia Caulker's son was murdered by the RUF in 1992 in Bonthe:

"They cut my son in pieces alive. I was under gun point and all actors were in uniform and caps [which] were very low over their eyes, I did not detect anybody. They cut him in pieces with a knife and when they opened his chest, they took out his heart and cut a piece of it and pushed it into my mouth, saying you first eat of it, but then when they have cut his head, they laid it in my hand saying go and breast feed your son and they started dancing."¹⁸

¹⁷ TRC Interview, March 2003.

¹⁸ Cecilia Caulker, TRC statement number 1262 obtained in Bonthe

44. These acts were also perpetrated on children. The following account was given to the Commission by a girl who was 8 years old at the time of the events:

“On the 6th of January 1999 RUF/SLA rebels attacked my house at 3 Kissy Road Mental Hospital. The rebels captured me and my sister and they put my sister on the top of my head and they told her they were going to kill her if she did not give them money. My sister was not able to meet their demands and the rebels stood by their words and they shot at my sister on the top of her head and all her blood spilled over my body. I had wanted to cry but they told me that if I do they will kill me also. The rebels further gave me human flesh to eat. After they killed my sister they cut off her head and they told me to dance and laugh.”¹⁹

45. On many occasions, victims were forced to eat parts of their own body, or drink their own blood. This was a means to humiliate the victims. The two following victims were forced to drink their own blood:

“Corporal Blood came with a dagger and a block and cut off one of my finger, but the remaining one he did not cut off, he only cut them half way, he cut off my right ear and gave me my blood to drink. Whilst he was doing this exercise one of his comrades was pointing a torchlight for him. They also cut the hands and ears of the other six people.”²⁰

46. The following victims narrated to the Commission how they were forced to eat parts of their own bodies by the Kamajors and the RUF respectively:

“One of the Kamajors dragged me outside and cut off my left ear and told me to chew it under gun point.”²¹

“I told them there was nothing more and I kept pleading for mercy. Still one of them came from among their lot and cut off my left ear and then put the half into my mouth to eat. As I chewed, the blood oozed out of my mouth. But as I wanted to take it out he hit me with a gun. Still I was pleading to [them to] show mercy. They told me that the next operation was going to be my penis, which they were going to cut off. I was then held, tied up and dropped to the ground. They opened my legs and put them apart. My scrotum was first held and pierced open. The penis was then held as well and chopped off using the same knife. After that they left me and went away to my village where they assembled in their numbers.”²²

47. The CDF and the RUF account for the majority of the forced cannibalism violations.²³ For every other violation category, the majority of that violation type are attributed to the RUF.

¹⁹ TRC confidential statement

²⁰ Alusine Turay, TRC statement number 5006, Murray Town Amputee Camp, Western Area, 20 March 2003

²¹ Moriba Junny, TRC statement number 4612, Talia, Bonthe, 21 February 2003

²² Statement to the TRC. Statement Number 7079

²³ The database records 6 violations against each of them.

48. It is difficult to understand the logic of forced cannibalism outside the desire for psychological torture of the victims. It is more baffling in the case of the CDF, which was a community response to the inability of the army to protect the populace. Some of the CDF targets were soldiers and members of their families. The targeting of soldiers was a response to their perceived collusion with the RUF. What this violation demonstrates is that this was a war without rules. Nothing was sacrosanct.

3. Abduction, forced recruitment and sexual slavery:

49. These violations have been dealt with comprehensively in the chapters of the report on women and children respectively. Forced recruitment is the forced or unwilling recruitment of any individual to an armed group or organisation by threat, or intimidation to self or family members and /or violence, while sexual slavery is where the perpetrator exercised all or any of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over one or more persons, such as by purchasing, selling, lending or bartering such a person or persons or by imposing on them a similar deprivation of liberty; and where the perpetrator caused such person or persons to engage in one or more acts of a sexual nature.²⁴ The victim often known as a “bush wife” is held by one or more perpetrators.

4. Drugging:

50. Most of the young people who testified before the Commission complained of forcible drugging by local commanders within the armed factions. Women, abducted and converted to “bush wives” were injected with the psychotropic substances or forced to consume them. In a drugging violation, the victim takes a substance, which alters, temporarily, or permanently, their mental state. The taking of the substance was also be achieved by devious means such as lacing drinks or food with the drugs. The drug may result in permanent physical and/or mental injury. Drugging was used mainly against children forcibly recruited into an armed faction to make them more inclined to fight.
51. One witness before the Commission who was abducted as a little girl gave the following testimony:

“I don’t remember from where [I was abducted] but I spent ten years with them. I don’t know my parents or their whereabouts. My commander was colonel Kontobi. I was raped many times. I also cooked for them. I was injected the first time I complained of sickness. I felt cold immediately and sat quietly under the sun for a long time. My body would rise and I became hyperactive. I felt this way for almost two months. One day I was stabbed on the breast by junior and I was told to shoot him. I couldn’t. They gave me cocaine to sniff saying I won’t be afraid. I tried it and started laughing. My eyes felt watery. I opened fire where junior was standing. He ran into the bush and I ran after him firing everywhere until someone held me from the back.

Other times we were injected with a red liquid. Sometimes it was yellow. They said it would give us strength. Then they will disperse us

²⁴ See Elements of Crimes of the International Criminal Court 1

to go 'jaja'. If you refused to take the injection, you will be starved. The effect of this drug is dangerous. We were merciless. I was given a human liver to roast and I did and we shared it. We were given blood to drink and we did.

We most times go 'jaja' after eating. There is always a different feeling after you eat. I came across a pregnant woman who strayed into our camp. I threatened to stab her with my knife. The others came around and were curious to know the sex of the baby she was carrying. I said male and others said female. The boys opened her up a front of me and brought out a boy. I jumped with joy that I had won.

We called our Doctor Samuel. He administered drugs on everyone when sick or when on the verge of a mission. Sometimes we are told to go to the car park to collect items including boxes of medical drugs, rice, clothes, and cows. I am not sure where they came from but I guess it was from Guinea through Kabala.

We could hunt dogs and catch them with knives and kill them. This we cooked for every one to eat. We threw grenades to scare the inhabitants of a village away always. Then we would go in to "jaja". A person is re-injected when they know that the previous effect is wearing off. I used to wonder how come they knew when it was wearing off. But when we were given it, we are recharged."²⁵

52. Another witness recounted his abduction as a little boy by one commando, Osman, alias 'Kill man no blood'. He acquired this nickname because he drank the blood of his victims. Osman was one of Rambo's commandos.

"I was called 'kill man blood small' since I was his boy. Marijuana was boiled and given to us to drink. They said it will make us wild, unafraid. When I take it I was not afraid to confront anybody. Under its influence I could shoot anyone without being ordered to do so. Cocaine was first administered to me through a cut on the arm. I loved the effect on me. I felt very happy, playful with the fun. We called it coffee or coco. I beat kids younger than I am. Sometimes we were injected. This is normally a blue liquid. After taking it, I once slapped my boss and he locked me up. We had Brown Brown and tablets like Valium 10 or Blue Boat. Sometimes we won't pay and fighting would break out. We could fire and people are killed. Rambo on the other hand could just walk in and take whatever drugs he wanted. When hungry we also used to open up to 60 bullets and empty the powder on a leaf or piece of cloth. This we would chew and later drink water believing it would make us strong. When food was cooked, our commander would sprinkle a white substance into it, we [had no] sauce but it had a bitter taste. Afterwards, I normally felt dizzy but I didn't want to sleep. Then we were sent out to 'jaja'."²⁶

²⁵ Confidential interview with the TRC, Freetown October 2003.

²⁶ Confidential interview with the TRC, Freetown October 2003.

53. The widespread use of drugs within the armed factions demonstrates that it was condoned and promoted by the leadership of the factions. Many of the children who consumed hard drugs within the factions are now suffering from all kinds of mental health problems presenting an immediate challenge to the health authorities.

5. Mistreatment Violations

5.1 Forced labour:

54. The Commission defines Forced Labour as *forced/unwilling labour by a victim that occurs whilst they are detained*. It excludes the labour implied by being the victim of a “Forced Recruitment” or “Sexual Slavery” violation.
55. Forced labour occurred either without or in addition to abduction. Abductees were forced to do all kinds of domestic work, including cleaning, cooking, and so on, for their abductors²⁷. They were forced to carry loads to various locations, engage in agricultural labour and work in the diamond mines²⁸.
56. Outside abduction, forced labour occurred when villagers were forced to engage in agricultural activities in their own farms, the proceeds of which were given to the RUF or the CDF²⁹. Town chiefs were asked under the threat of death to provide a determined quantity of agricultural products, usually cocoa or coffee, within a specified period. Failure to comply led to the punishment of either the chief or the entire town population.
57. According to one witness, Fomba Mohammed:
- “I was at Sefadu in Kono district when the war came. I had tried to escape to Guinea but it was not possible. I went to stay with an uncle at Giema. When the RUF first entered Giema they did not harm anybody. After a while they gathered all the strong men and they elected a Town Commander. The next day they took us to their training base. ...After we finished training, we were given guns [and] sent to the war front. This did not last long as a separation occurred in the movement between the Gio RUF and the Junior commandos who were trained here in Sierra Leone. I was appointed the master farmer responsible for food. I would order civilians to brush and plant rice for them and it was the food that we would use anytime they have visitors.”³⁰
58. Upon entering a town or village, the factions usually recruited all the able-bodied men and women as forced labour. The civilians had to cook and carry looted property for them back to their base or to another town, and to perform sundry other services for them. The following account involved the SLA in Yele in 1994:

“These soldiers were bullies. They used to take the wives of

²⁷ These violations are described extensively in the Women and Children chapters of this Report.

²⁸ Examples of these violations are described in the Mineral Resources chapter.

²⁹ See Mineral Resources chapter for details.

³⁰ TRC statement Number 4299.

community people to sleep with them, cook for them as well as launder their clothes.”³¹

59. A witness told the Commission about the RUF attack on his village in 1991:

“They made us sit on the ground and ordered us to cook for them. Chickens were caught and slaughtered and food cooked by the women. We were all forced to eat the food with the rebels because they feared that they would be poisoned by the civilians.”³²

60. The RUF is responsible for the majority of the forced labour violations recorded in the TRC database amounting to 68.2%, while 11% is attributed to the AFRC. The remaining perpetrators were each responsible for less than 7% of the forced labour violations.³³

5.2 Assault:

61. An assault violation consists of *physical harm inflicted on a victim by punching, kicking, and/or striking with an object or objects over a period of time. It also includes whipping, lashing, stabbing and the shooting a victim.*

62. Assault was used to punish civilians, compel victims to do things or hand over goods. The following statements relate to incidents involving the AFRC in 1998:

“One day, rebels asked me to carry a bag on my head to Makeni. When I refused, they started beating me with sticks. Five rebels beat me with sticks. They hit me on all parts of my body. They released me later.”³⁴

“I was stopped by some soldiers who were well armed. I refused to stop and one of them chased me and later gave me a hard hit on the side. My two-month-old child got loose on my back and fell while the soldiers took the bag of rice I was carrying. I was then commanded to go with them. As I wanted to take my child, the soldier told me to go away and leave him there. So I had to leave my child crying.”³⁵

63. The RUF also used beatings to force civilians to comply with orders:

“They insisted on us producing food and meat. When we failed to comply with their demand, two men took out their belts and started beating us at random. They beat me and I fell down. They continued to beat me until I became unconscious. I sustained a deep wound on my head.”³⁶

³¹ TRC confidential statement number 633, Yele, Tonkolili, 14 December 2002

³² Bockarie Lewis Kartewu, TRC statement number 164, Kenema town, Kenema, 12 December 2002

³³ The Commission recorded 1834 forced labour violations.

³⁴ TRC confidential statement number 2592, Bombali Bane, Bombali, 28 January 2003

³⁵ Margarete Lagowa, TRC statement number 7404, Moyamba town, Moyamba, 7 June 2003

³⁶ Ansumana Allieu, TRC statement number 2172, Garama, Kailahun, 22 January 2003

TRC



A victim who was beaten and lacerated with a machete by the RUF displays the wounds on his head and upper body.

64. Suspected collaborators were beaten. Those who were perceived to be sympathetic to the Government of the CDF were singled out and severely punished.

“They gathered everybody under the barrie. Our children suffered beatings. This group was headed by CO Manawai who ordered the boys to beat themselves. People started beating each other. We asked them what wrong have we done? They answered that we had allowed our sons to run away and that they had gone to the Kamajors.”³⁷

65. The Commission also received numerous testimonies of assault by the SLA and the ECOMOG forces. Assaults were often combined with other violations, especially looting, extortion and physical torture. The number of assault violations attributed to the RUF is 1883 or 58%. For the other groups, the numbers of assault violations are as follows: SLA 245 or 7%; ECOMOG 53 or 1.6% and the AFRC 320 or 9.9%.³⁸

5.3 Torture:

66. Torture is *the intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody of or under the control of the accused*, except that torture shall not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.³⁹ The method of torture may be unspecified. The torture could lead to bruising, bleeding, internal injury or severe pain. It includes mutilations such as cutting off ears or breasts.

67. Torture was a means of terrorising the population and breaking down their resistance. Public acts of torture were extensively used to humiliate victims in front of their communities and/or relatives. The following victim was stopped in a village by the RUF in March 1997. She was carrying her husband’s gun in a basket, without knowing that the weapon was there. When they found the gun, she was tortured:

“They stripped me naked, laid me on the ground and told me to roll on the ground. As I was rolling on the ground, they got buckets of water and poured them on me, laid me under the sun and told me to look at the sun for several hours. When they brought me to Mobai naked, there was an RUF commander named Tidda who passed the order that 8 of his men beat me to death. Commander Tidda also gave the command that they should put me in a deep hole. I was put into a deep cemented hole and padlocked until the morning of the next day.”⁴⁰

68. Instances of torture carried out by the CDF were brought to the attention of the Commission. A witness described how alleged members of the RUF were tortured and killed by the Gbethes in the North:

³⁷ Mariama Sesay, TRC statement number 2723, Woroma, Kailahun, 30 January 2003

³⁸ The Commission recorded a total of 3246 assault violations in its database.

³⁹ See article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.

⁴⁰ Sounah Coomber, TRC statement number 1736, Mobai, Kailahun, 13 January 2003

“Between October and December 1998, I was in Port Loko. The Gbethes were using a house as their base, with their commander Mr. Dumbuya. Normally, he and his boys would go on raids. When they returned, they would come with six to ten men, whom they accused to be rebels. They blindfolded them, tied their hands and locked them in a dark room where they used to torture them. In the night, he would take the victims out and summarily execute them in a secret place. He carried these exercises every four days until December 31st 1998, when the rebels attacked the township.”⁴¹

69. The following account illustrates how torture was used by the AFRC, in this case, to humiliate civilians, leaving them with scars for the rest of their lives:

“He ordered the operation to start. He started by cutting my two ears. He had wanted to cut the man close to me but he ran away. So the third man’s ears were cut off.”⁴²

70. The elderly were also tortured. This was part of the RUF strategy to break down the social fabric and communal norms.

“My grand-father was too old to run when there were attacks on the village. He was always left in the village alone. One day, these rebels captured him and brought him out of the house. They tied him up and seriously beat him. One of them stabbed him on the eye, which resulted in the loss of his eye. As a result of the torture, he became very sick. He couldn’t bear the pain and died.”⁴³

71. The AFRC and the CDF are responsible for 235 or 11.5% and 217 or 10.6% of the acts of torture recorded in the Commission’s database respectively. The RUF is responsible for the majority of torture violations in the database, accounting for 1136 or 55.4%.⁴⁴

6. Rape:

72. The Commission has defined *rape* as *where the perpetrator invaded the body of a person by conduct resulting in penetration, however slight, of any part of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or any other part of the body. The invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear or violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment or the invasion was committed against a person incapable of giving genuine consent.*

⁴¹ Haja Mariama Kamara, TRC statement number 2913, Freetown, 6 February 2003

⁴² TRC confidential statement number 7140, Panlap Amputee Camp, Bombali, 26 April 2003

⁴³ Sahr Morie, TRC statement number 2165, Pujehun town, Kailahun, 21 January 2003

⁴⁴ The Commission recorded 2051 torture violations in its database.

73. While victims who were abducted and turned into sex slaves or bush wives suffered numerous rape violations⁴⁵, hundreds of other rape violations were reported to the Commission outside of the context of abduction, during encounters on the road or in the bush, or during village attacks.
74. Male combatants did not use rape merely as a weapon against female civilians. It was a devastating tool of terror wielded intentionally to strike a sense of vulnerability into the wider society. It became the crux of a whole-scale assault on belief systems and traditional norms; a medium through which entire families or communities were “punished” in revenge acts; and a crime against humanity. The very nature of the forced sexual acts forced upon the civilian population was an aberration to the individual and collective sense of self.
75. Civilians were often forced to rape family members, under the threat of being killed if they refused. The NPFL used this strategy to devastating effect at the beginning of the conflict:

“We were here when the Liberian rebels entered the country in 1991. The rebels came and they met me on the road with one girl by the name of A; they captured us and demanded to know where we were going. We told them that our people had sent us to collect food for prayer. When they asked me about my relationship with A I told them that she was my sister. They ordered that I must have sex with her by force. After the sex they threw plenty of dirty water on us and allowed us to go.

I left for another nearby village in search of salt. It was that same night that the rebels entered this village and commanded us all to come out of our various houses and homes. They ordered us to undress ourselves naked, both men and women, and to dance, men on one side, women on the other. The rebels then ordered the women to lie down on the ground on their backs.

The rebels then made the men to identify their relationships with these women on the ground. Each time when a man points to one lady or girl to identify her as his sister or mother those rebels will force him by the gun to have sex with her. We did this for over one hour.

One man lost his life during this process because he refused to have sex with his mother; he was brutally beaten. The next day we saw only his dead body.”⁴⁶

76. On occasion, civilians were forced to witness the rape of a family member, a mother, sister or daughter. This was aimed at stigmatising family members thereby weakening the bonds of the family, since it is the most basic component of society.

“It was during the dry season in 1998 at Romendi village in the Bombali district when a group of RUF rebels headed by Superman attacked the village. One of the rebels arrested my daughter Fatmata and raped her in front of my naked eyes. I went to his colleagues after the attack and reported him. This rebel was taken to Lunsar to their

⁴⁵ Those experiences are fully captured in the Women’s chapter of this Report.

⁴⁶ TRC Confidential statement 0855; place and date of statement undisclosed.

commander Superman for further punishment.”⁴⁷

“In January 1999, RUF/SLA attacked my village called Rokou. They raped my wife in my presence and they abducted her. Since the abduction, I have not set eyes on her.”⁴⁸

77. The RUF used rape to destroy the social respect and standing for pregnant and older women. A victim narrated an experience in 1991:

“One fearful thing they used to do was when they got hold of old women, they raped them. Some of these grand mothers died from sex with these young men. Sometimes, a woman who had just given birth would be used for sex until she dies.”⁴⁹

In traditional Sierra Leonean society, men did not have sex with pregnant or lactating women. It was a social taboo. The rape of such women during the conflict was aimed at destroying the traditional social fabric, stigmatising the old and pregnant women and nullifying the boundaries of acceptable behaviour within the community.

7. Arbitrary detention:

78. Arbitrary detention is defined as *detention in a single location such as a prison, guardroom, or civilian building adapted to use as a detention place. The detention is illegal and the detainees are not charged with an offence.*

79. Arbitrary detention was used extensively to punish civilians who disobeyed orders, or suspected of being allied with the “enemy”:

“On the 6th of January 1999, I was at home with my children [when] I saw a group of Kamajors and ECOMOG soldiers coming to our area. I ran inside with my children and they opened fire on us. They were shooting directly at our house. We all laid down on the floor to avoid being hit by the bullets. I found out that two of my children had been shot. I heard the ECOMOG soldiers telling the Kamajors to stop shooting. They came to our house and they saw what they had done, but they did not care. The ECOMOG soldiers told us that if we don’t like President Kabbah, they will make sure that they kill all of us. We told them that we liked Tejan Kabbah and that we voted for him. They locked us in a house for three days without food. On the fourth day, they released us and I managed to take care of my children.”⁵⁰

80. Detainees were often beaten and tortured while in detention. They were denied basic utilities such as water:

“One day in 1997, I was caught by the ECOMOG forces. They misconceived me as a rebel and I was taken to the Daru barracks where I was detained. I was given a serious beating. I was detained in the guardroom for four days without food and water.”⁵¹

81. Many of the cases of arbitrary and illegal detention occurred in the period after

⁴⁷ Confidential statement to the TRC, Amputee Camp Aberdeen Road, 20 March 2003

⁴⁸ Confidential statement to the TRC, Rokou, Western Area, 12 March 2003

⁴⁹ Gbassey Musa, Statement 4282, Kailahun town, Kailahun, 20 February 2003

⁵⁰ Yeabe Conteh, TRC statement number 4395, Freetown, 20 February 2003

⁵¹ Fomba Kamara, TRC statement number 2161, Ngegbema, Kailahun, 21 January 2003

the restoration of President Kabbah to power in 1998. 18.2% of all recorded detentions occurred in 1998 and 15.7% occurred in 1999.⁵² 1998 and 1999 are the first and second highest years, respectively, for reported cases of arbitrary and illegal detention.

82. The graph below shows the annual pattern of reported detentions, and the 1998-1999 peak is higher and sustained longer than any other period.

83. People suspected of being sympathisers of the AFRC were attacked at will, severely beaten and detained. In a number of instances the detentions were orchestrated by ECOMOG as a means of protecting people from rampaging bands of Kamajors attacking Northerners and AFRC “collaborators”. However the detentions became prolonged even after the threat level had minimised. According to records at the CID obtained by the Commission, more than 3000 people were detained at the Pademba Road prison in the period after the restoration of the president to power.

⁵² Many testimonies given to the Commission did not specify in which month the violations occurred, and consequently, we cannot be specific about the temporal pattern of detentions. However data for the year in which the violation occurred is given in 86.2% of detentions,

84. Hundreds of civil servants who had served in one capacity or another during the AFRC regime, and others with connections to leaders of the AFRC were detained under the state of emergency declared by the government. A subsequent inquiry established by the Government declared that many of them had no cases to answer and should be released. Despite this recommendation, many of them languished in detention for several months thereafter.
85. Hundreds of people, many of them former soldiers of the RSLMF with no connections to the AFRC other than that they were soldiers and who had not supported the AFRC were detained first at Lungi and subsequently at the Pademba Road prisons, until the Government determined that they had no relationship with the AFRC and ordered their release.
86. Following the events of May 6-8 2000 in Freetown, leaders of the RUF were ordered to report at the police stations nearest to them. All those who did were detained. The explanation offered then was that the detention was protective since mob justice after members of the RUF was on the prowl. Till date, no less than 16 of those persons are still in detention at the Pademba Road prisons without any charges having been preferred against them.

8. Economic violations

8.1 Looting and Destruction of property:

87. Looting consists of *theft of personal or commercial goods with the victim absent, or present under threat, intimidation, force or violence.*
88. Destruction of property is defined as the *destruction/damage to private/public property through burning, mining, bombing, shelling, and arson or by other means. Property means a home or other building or personal effects.*
89. The looting and destruction of property violations are often interrelated. In most cases of attack on towns and villages, movable properties of civilians were looted and the remaining items, such as houses and other fixed assets were burnt down or otherwise destroyed.
90. The Commission recorded 3044 looting violations and 3404 property destruction violations in its database. Of these, the RUF committed 56.4% of the property destruction and 60.5% of the looting violations. The AFRC committed 12% and 8.3% respectively while the CDF committed 3.2% and 5.7% of the property destruction and the looting violations respectively.

“It was in January 1999 when about 5 RUF/AFRC rebels came into our compound. We were so frightened. They came into our house and demanded money, but my stepfather begged them telling them that we do not have money in the house. They did not believe him. They went into the rooms, ransacked everywhere; they took the video, television, clothes and many other things. They told us to come out of the house and put us together in a corner of the compound and ordered us not to move an inch or else they would shoot us. They took petrol, sprinkled it on the house and set the house on fire.”⁵³

⁵³ Noella Hamid, TRC statement number 1394, Freetown, 14 January 2003

91. The Commission received many testimonies of people being locked up in a house and the house set on fire with the people burnt alive. An old woman described how her granddaughters were killed:

“I am explaining a sad story. This was at the early stage of the war in 1991. The rebels invaded Rotifunk and went to the house where my granddaughters were living. All four of them were ordered to enter into the house. They closed them in and set the house ablaze. They all died in the fire.”⁵⁴

92. Another witness had his properties stolen and his house burnt down on three occasions:

“I returned to the village and discovered that my house had been burnt down. Also, all my possessions that were in the house were burnt down [by the RUF]. We went to Bandajuma Sowa. While there, I built another house, which I occupied with my family. Later in 1997, the Junta soldiers drove us from Bandajuma, stole all properties in our houses and again burnt down my house. We returned home to Kobeibu and built huts there. One day in 1998, the AFRC Junta soldiers came and burnt them down.”⁵⁵

93. Many people in Sierra Leone are still living in displaced camps or in shanty-towns in Freetown because they lost their houses and properties. The fighting factions used looting of property to finance their war effort, thereby transferring the fiscal costs of the war to the civilian population.

8.2 Extortion:

94. Extortion is as an incident during which *perpetrators use intimidation and/or threats to attempt to compel the victim to surrender goods, cash or services, including sexual services.*

95. The armed factions used checkpoints to extort property from civilians. Instances include the NPRC looting petty traders' merchandise⁵⁶ in Freetown, and the ubiquitous RUF check points wherever they entered.

“In November 1998, the RUF rebels attacked my house in Yengema. They demanded Le500,000 from me or else I would lose my life. I gave them half of that money and I begged them not to kill me as that was the only cash I had. Because there was an argument among them on whether they should accept the money or kill me, they decided to cast a vote. Fortunately for me, they accepted the money.”⁵⁷

96. Numerous incidents of extortion occurred along the roads in ambushes:

“I was stopped by RUF rebels on the highway towards Gbetgbo. I was removed from my car and my money amounting to Le500,000 was

⁵⁴ Fatmata Tejan, TRC statement number 1631, Dworzak farm, Western Area, 21 January 2003

⁵⁵ Borbor Bao, TRC statement number 3826, Kobeibu, Pujehun, 14 February 2003

⁵⁶ Abdul Bundu, TRC statement number 4951, Funkia, Western Area, 15 March 2003

⁵⁷ Kabineh Conteh, TRC statement number 4362, Waterloo, Western Area, 19 February 2003

taken from my pocket. I was asked by the rebels to choose between my life and my car. My driver who resisted was beaten. I chose my life and left the car.”⁵⁸

97. Extortion was also common place when fighting factions invaded or occupied villages. Corporal punishment was used to compel people to give money or other goods:

“When the RUF came, they started writing letters for contributions in cash and kind. They also used to lock up people in a box for failing to contribute. One of such people was X. He was placed in the box for almost three hours. He was only released after the sum of Le 5,000 was paid.”⁵⁹

9. Forced displacement:

98. Forced displacement is s the *forced/unwilling departure or movement from one's property/home by threat, intimidation, force, violence, fear, suspicion or due to conflict. The move may be due to perception of danger, rather than actual abuse.* It was the most frequently reported violation to the Commission. There were 7983 instances reported. Of these violations 63.8% and 12.5% were attributed to the RUF and ‘rebels’ respectively

99. The climate of fear created from attacks by all the combatant factions all over the country made thousands of people flee their homes. Upon hearing rumours that the “rebels” were planning an attack or gaining ground, villagers would pack some of their property and leave their houses. They would either run to hide in the bush, or escape to a neighbouring village. On many occasions, they would be attacked in the bush, or an attack would be launched on the village they escaped to, forcing people to flee again and again. The following account describes this climate of fear created by the RUF:

“The war spread rapidly. Civilians fleeing the war from Tongo Fields and Dodo began to enter Boajibu with bundles on their heads. We began to feel concerned about our security. Letters were often found on the streets about the rebels’ intention to attack Boajibu. All the roads leaving the town became vulnerable so we remained to live in fear. On the 17th of March 1994, the RUF attacked Boajibu.”⁶⁰

100. Some civilians were permanently displaced or at least displaced for several months or years at a time. After the RUF had stayed in the community of Gofor (Pujehun) for three months in 1991:

“One day, the chief who was in charge of this community called us all and told us that the government soldiers will be coming around to fight the rebels and whosoever they meet here will be considered as rebels. This was a very big shock for the community and we all vacated the town, I was partially paralysed, so the community people helped by groups to convey me. We went as far as Dia. There we were stopped not to cross [the border to Liberia]. We spent 6 days and

⁵⁸ Alusine Koroma, TRC statement number 351, Makeni, Bombali, 13 December 2002

⁵⁹ TRC confidential statement number 6161, Sumbuya, Kambia, 14 March 2003

⁶⁰ Nancy Matia, TRC statement number 2457, Komende, Kenema, 25 January 2003

later were allowed to cross. We stayed at Gbaoma Lumeh where the ULIMO soldiers met us and brought us back to Sierra Leone. We were taken to Kenema because our town Gofor was a complete bush. My house and all the houses in the town were burnt.”⁶¹

101. On many occasions, the destruction of people's houses led to their being displaced, sometimes outside of Sierra Leone:

“The day following the attack, I was told by fleeing civilians that my house in Falaba had been burnt down by SAJ Musa's men. I found that the area was not safe and I decided to head for Guinea.”⁶²

102. But crossing the border did not mean being safety, because of cross border attacks and disastrous living conditions in the refugee camps:

“We decided to seek refuge in Shekia in neighbouring Guinea. At about 3 am, the rebels launched an attack on the village of Shekia. They arrested my nephew and, using their bayonets, they impaled his throat. They also shot my elder brother in the foot. I fled the village into the bush. I later decided to take my family to the supposed safe haven of the refugee camp at Forecariah. It was there that my son fell ill and passed away.”⁶³

103. Many of these refugees stayed abroad in refugee camps for years. Some of them are yet to return. One of the most dramatic and painful experiences involved in the events surrounding forced displacement is the separation of family members. The Commission received numerous testimonies of people losing their children, their parents or their siblings while escaping an attack. Many of these family members left behind are dead, and many others are yet to be reunited with their family.

104. The following statement giver left his village because of fears of RUF attack and stayed in the bush for two months, carrying his blind brother who was an old man. After two months, they went to Levuma:

“Two days after our movement to town, the RUF rebels launched an attack on Levuma. I again ran into the bush. I was not able to carry my brother. He was blind and could not find his way. He was left in the town. When I went back to see what had happened, I saw my brother lying dead with seven other people.”⁶⁴

10. Killing:

105. The Commission considers a killing as causing death. In addition to intentional killing, a person's life was taken in the course of other abuses and violations.

106. Many civilians were killed in crossfire through encounters between government and “rebel” forces which occurred on numerous occasions within villages and towns. While killing arising from cross fire is generally regarded as collateral damage and therefore not a violation, the Commission considers that collateral

⁶¹ Iye Massaquoi, TRC statement number 1888, Gofor, Pujehun, 22 January 2003

⁶² Jeneba Samura, TRC statement number 3639, Falaba, Koinadugu, 20 February 2003

⁶³ Kompolo Sorieba Sumah, TRC statement number 3608, Bubuya, Kambia, February 2003

⁶⁴ Momoh Abdulai, TRC statement number 4007, Vaania, Kenema, 15 February 2003

damage in the context of the Sierra Leonean conflict was in many respects arbitrary. The combatants were in the main reckless and negligent in avoiding civilian casualties.

107. Sometimes people were killed intentionally to satisfy the innate desires of the combatants:

“I came across a pregnant woman who had strayed into our camp. At first I threatened to stab her with my knife. Then the others came around and asked what we should do with her; they were curious to know the sex of the baby she was carrying. I suggested male while others said female. The boys opened her up in front of me and brought out a baby boy. I jumped with joy that I had won.”⁶⁵

108. Killing or the threat of killing was used extensively to punish disobedient civilians and terrorise the population into obedience by “giving the example” of what happened with those who failed to obey orders.

109. The following witness’ brother in law was in hiding. He was punished when he was caught:

“My brother in law was captured from his hiding place and was brought to town. He was placed before us and shot. He fell down and one of the RUF men went closer and fired at his head. He died on the spot and was thrown into the bush.”⁶⁶

110. People were killed as human sacrifice to bring luck to the fighting factions. The following account relates events that happened in Koinadugu town in August 1998. The CDF had attacked the town but were repelled by the AFRC forces:

“When the fighting ceased, Superman called on the civilians and informed us that he was about to make a sacrifice. Many people were then forced to be present, although in fear. At first, he maintained that he was making the sacrifice in the name of peace while he had planned to massacre civilians. He blamed the civilians for giving intelligence information to the CDF at Kabala, which resulted in the attack of Koinadugu.

Several people were locked up in a room and burnt alive. They included my wife, my uncle, my grand-mother and several other people.”⁶⁷

111. Another account relates a similar event in Bumpeh Tabbay, Bo district, in 1997. The AFRC massacred about 50 people in the same way:

“The rebels went from house to house searching for people. They got hold of my grandfather and grandmother who were too old to run away, and also of other old and young men and women, nearly 50

⁶⁵ Excerpt from a confidential TRC interview with a female RUF ex-child combatant, conducted on 09 September 2003 in Makeni, Bombali District.

⁶⁶ Vandi Momoh, TRC statement number 2157, Jenneh, Kailahun, 21 January 2003

⁶⁷ Ferenkeh Marah, TRC statement number 3250, Koinadugu town, Koinadugu, 4 February 2003. Also corroborated by James Lebbie, TRC statement number 507, Kabala, Koinadugu, 19 December 2002

people. They were all put inside our house and locked up. They sprinkled petrol on the house and set it on fire. They went afar to watch the house burning so that no one could attempt to put off the fire. Everyone in the house was burned down to ashes.”⁶⁸

112. Ritual killings were practised on enemy fighters or on civilians, including children:

“The most fearful event I saw was when fifty babies were punched on an iron alive, as sacrifices for the war.”⁶⁹

113. Another account, was of killings by the AFRC in Kono in 1998:

“They decided that one person should be sacrificed. I was pointed out to be slaughtered. They brought one Limba woman who could not speak Krio; she was just crying and begging them in Limba. Since the woman was crying, they said the woman was causing noise so that ECOMOG could hear her. For that, they will release me and slaughter the woman in exchange. The woman was stripped naked and slaughtered and a pestle was inserted into her vagina.”⁷⁰

114. The Commission received reports of the killing of 4514 people. The RUF were named as perpetrators of 58% of the deaths, and AFRC were identified in 11.3%. Killing were concentrated in 1991, 1994-1995 and in 1998-1998 with relatively less violent periods in between.

11. Cannibalism:

115. The first emergence of the practice of cannibalism the Sierra Leonean conflict appears to have been attributable to the contingent of Liberians, predominantly from the Geio and Mano tribes, who fought for the NPFL, under the auspices of the RUF,⁷¹ in the first two years of the conflict. A woman who witnessed the killing of her husband narrated the incident to the Commission:⁷²

“I had to hide myself in the nearby bush from where I could see the body of my husband where he lay. I then saw Johnson coming up to him, he came to where the body was, stood by it and with the knife he had opened up Kamanda’s stomach. He removed most of the internal organs and gave them to some of the captives to cook. Johnson rubbed Kamanda’s blood all over his body. They cooked it for him and ate every thing.”

⁶⁸ TRC confidential statement number 2195, Fallah, Kenema, 24 January 2003


⁶⁹ Joseph Mava, TRC statement number 7054, Baoma, Bo, 14 March 2003

⁷⁰ TRC confidential statement number 7140, Panlap Amputee Camp, Bombali, 26 April 2003


⁷¹ Although fighters of the NPFL did not appear to unite themselves behind a common command structure with the ‘vanguards’ or the junior forces of the RUF/SL movement, they appear to have identified themselves as RUF ‘revolutionaries’ in the communities they entered. Accordingly, they were perceived by most of those they encountered to be part and parcel of the same, single movement headed by Foday Sankoh; in the recording of human rights abuses by the TRC, victims of abuses in Kailahun District that appear in fact to have been committed by NPFL fighters were widely, if not universally, attributed to the RUF.

⁷² Statement to the TRC. Statement Number 4243

Selected violations categories according to age / sex of victims
(number of violations documented in TRC database)



Selected violations categories according to year / perpetrator faction
(number of violations documented in TRC database)



116. Some members of the RUF/SL were vehemently opposed to the practice and upon that premise there developed severe hostility between the two component factions of the original incursion force.
117. The Commission recorded instances from Kailahun District in 1991 of the establishment of 'eating areas' in which fighters would gather habitually to devour the flesh of their victims. Killings were committed in order to acquire 'human meat'. Even in instances where those who subsequently cannibalised the corpse were not the killers, the families were deprived of their right to respectful burial of the deceased.
118. The Kamajors, who constituted the CDF of the Southern and Eastern Regions, founded their existence partly upon a ceremony known as 'initiation', in which recruits were marshalled through a rigorous series of physical and psychological challenges. This veiled form of psychological torture bears striking parallels with the RUF/SL's strategy of 'de-institutionalising' its forced recruits.
119. Organs, tissue, blood and flesh from the bodies of dead persons – some of them relatives of Kamajors – were used in the ceremony of initiation. Civilians from communities surrounding the initiation site and even would-be recruits were killed for the express purposes of 'sacrificing them to the cause'.
120. The Commission recorded testimony that pregnant women were killed by the Kamajors in order to extract parts of their bodies for use in initiation ceremonies. Furthermore some Kamajors carried 'charms' or 'fetishes' with them which were constituted of human remains, including the mutilated genitalia of women.
121. In some of the cases recorded by the Commission, the Kamajors who participated in initiation ceremonies that involved the eating of human flesh were unaware of the 'materials' that had been used in preparing the 'ceremony', or indeed the manner through which they had been acquired. Thus, added to the incidence of human sacrifice, some Kamajors participated unwittingly in cannibalism. Testimony before the Commission indicated that they became aware of this only subsequently, yet they also didn't do anything to stop the practice. This was a perversion of people's perceptions of the 'justness' of the cause, or the nature of the initiative, and smacks of deceit and exploitation by the leaders of the Kamajors.
122. The 'Initiators' of the Kamajor Society in concert with their assistants, or 'apprentices', prepared the 'food' for initiation ceremonies and also indoctrinated the 'initiates', most of who were illiterate, with the 'belief' that certain supernatural powers would be bestowed upon them through the practice of cannibalism and human sacrifice.

"In fact, some AFRC 'sobel' captives who were held in prison were at the same time handed over to the Kamajors. One AFRC captive was brought out of his prison cell and laid on the ground; he had his chest split open with a cutlass, divided into two halves. The Kamajors took out his heart, kidney and liver, which I saw 'respiring' or beating, and I saw the Kamajor man starting to eat the above-named organs, and the intestines, raw – without cooking them or roasting them – publicly, in the open, before everyone. This induced the town and chiefdom

elders into making arrangements for the feeding, transportation and all other necessary logistical support for the Kamajors so that all courage would be given to them to defend the township. From this point, things started going on fine, as normal, everyday activities were resumed.”⁷³

123. In particular, the High Priest of the Kamajor Society, self-styled King Dr. Allieu Kondewah, played a key role in the practice of cannibalism and human sacrifice. Evidence available to the Commission indicates that these violations were carried out with the full knowledge of the National Co-ordinator of the Civil Defence Forces (CDF), Chief Samuel Hinga Norman, who appears in fact to have actively encouraged them.⁷⁴
124. Witnesses told the Commission that the practice of such violations by the Kamajors was brought to the attention of the President, Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, who neither sanctioned nor condemned those responsible, and who in fact continued to endorse the activities of the CDF thereafter.⁷⁵ The witnesses stated that the President organised a meeting at his office after his restoration to power in 1998 where members of the War Council at Base Zero gave him a comprehensive briefing of their activities. Furthermore, many of them subsequently came to see the President privately where they notified him of the terrible practices going on within the Kamajor camps. The witnesses claimed that the President lamented his inability to call Chief Norman to order for fear that he might incite the Kamajors to revolt against the Government. However, the president was alleged to have issued an order banning further initiations within the Kamajor movement. The order was however largely ignored by the initiators.
125. A woman testified to her husband being eaten by the Kamajors:

“The Kamajors brought the head of my husband, gave me the head cut off and said I should give them money to buy tomato paste, magi, onions for them to cook the head and eat. I gave them the sum of one thousand Leones. They hit my hands, stripped me naked and took from me the sum of 50,000 Leones. I have the scar marks on my left hand near to my wrist. Further more they went with the head to town dancing with it while his flesh was in the pot in front of my house cooking for them to eat.”⁷⁶
126. All the combat groups engaged in cannibalism. The RUF had demonstrated a clear propensity for attacking the very people in whose name it claimed to be carrying out the revolution. It was no surprise to the people that the RUF also engaged in cannibalism. What was shocking to the people was that the Kamajors also engaged in it, for no ostensible reason. A group within the Kamajors, called the “yarmotor” is reputed to be a cult of warriors in traditional Sierra Leonean society. Witnesses claim that this group carried out most of the cannibalism violations. As legend has it, eating the remains of a conquered foe

⁷³ Excerpt from TRC statement taken in Moyamba District, relating to events in the Kono District in 1998; TRC Statement Number 3922.

⁷⁴ TRC confidential interview with a member of the War Council at Base Zero, TRC office, Freetown, November 2003.

⁷⁵ TRC confidential interview with a member of the War Council at Base Zero. TRC Office Freetown December 2003; also M.S. Dumbuya, TRC Offices, Freetown, 2003.

⁷⁶ Statement to the TRC. Statement Number 150

imbued the warrior with the strength of the vanquished. This fable has existed from ancient times, providing the basis for cannibalism in some of the great wars in different parts of the world. It has no scientific basis and remains unproven. The leadership of the Kamajor militia and of the RUF were grossly remiss in preventing their members from participating in cannibalism or punishing those who did.

THE IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT ON FAMILIES

127. As the smallest unit of social organisation, the family felt the most impact of the war in Sierra Leone. Household heads were targeted, brutalised and killed in the presence of their children. Young girls most of them not yet at puberty were raped and taken away to become “bush wives”. Boys, some of them as young as eight years old, were taken away to be trained to fight for the combat groups, some of them never to return. In most cases, their links with their families were deliberately severed through forcing them at the pain of death to commit incest and horrendous atrocities against family members. The following testimonies before the Commission capture the tragedy that befell the average family during the war.

128. A witness from Magbotoso village was forced to watch the rape and killing of his blind mother by “men in combat attire” in January 1999.

“As we reached the town my mother was raped right in front of me. I covered my face so as not to see, but one of them gave me a slap saying I should see what was happening. Three of them raped her, one after the other. The fourth one was about to rape her when my mother pushed him. He immediately removed a knife from his pocket and stabbed her in the chest. They were in disarray when they heard the helicopter gunship. I carried my mother on my back to a nearby village. She died later that day.”⁷⁷

129. Nothing seemed to attract the respect or deference of the RUF soldiers. Even pregnant women were beaten and raped.⁷⁸

“During the war in 1999 the rebels captured me. At that time I was pregnant. The rebels stabbed me in the leg with a bayonet. They beat me with a stick on my head until I bled from the nose. The rebels took me back to their base at Burkina in Kailahun district. The rebels raped me on the way to their base. I was with them when I gave birth, but I lost the child because of the serious pain. When I gave birth I was seriously sick because of the way the rebels beat me when I was pregnant.”

⁷⁷ Mohammed Fofanah. Statement to the TRC. Statement Number 2556.

⁷⁸ Statement to the TRC. Statement Number 1830

130. John Lamboi was a resident of a village that was attacked by the RUF on January 4 1995. He was detained at gunpoint, denied food and water. His house was burnt and he witnessed the raping of his young daughter:⁷⁹

“My daughter was a small girl and knew nothing about sexual affairs. But it was that night that the rebels inaugurated her against her wishes. She was shouting and crying but they didn’t listen to her and went ahead and raped her in my presence.”

131. Adama Gribow, of Moyamba town, fled to the bush with part of her family when the RUF first attacked her town. They stayed in the bush for two months until the rebels captured them and other displaced women. She was forced to watch the torturing to death of her mother and aunt. She was also made to sing and dance as the atrocities were taking place.⁸⁰

“One morning the rebels met us in the forest. They threatened to shoot anyone who attempted to run. We were asked to line up in groups, children in one line, women in another. They later separated pregnant women from us. My mother’s younger sister, Moinya, was pregnant. She was made to stand in front of all the pregnant women. An argument erupted among the rebels. One rebel argued that Moinya was carrying a baby boy, while the other denied and maintained that the baby was a girl. They bet 10,000 Leones on who was correct. The argument lasted for nearly twenty minutes. A young rebel boy was appointed as a judge, and four other young rebel boys were appointed to split the stomach of Moinya. The rebels split her stomach and removed the baby while my aunt was crying in pain. While they were splitting her stomach they told us to sing and dance. My mother refused to dance. She too was arrested. She was forced to lie on the ground. They beat her with sticks. They also kicked her in the stomach until she started bleeding. We stood around them singing and dancing until both my mother and her sister died. No reasons were given as to why my mother and my aunty were killed.”

132. The AFRC soldiers who had revolted against the elected government were no different from their RUF colleagues in their treatment of civilians.⁸¹ AFRC soldiers abducted Miss X during the January 6 invasion of Freetown. She was used as a slave after refusing to submit to rape. She watched her cousin being raped.⁸²

“When we came back to their base three of the men raped my cousin, but my elder sister and I refused. They put my sister’s left foot into boiling water and later she could not walk for days.”

⁷⁹ Confidential Statement to the TRC.

⁸⁰ Statement to the TRC. Statement Number 2550

⁸¹ The relationship between the RUF and the AFRC is explored in detail in the chapter on youths in this report.

⁸² The name of the witness has been removed to protect her identity.

133. Miss Y had a similar experience. She was forced to watch the rape of her elder sister by “soldiers”⁸³

“During the January 6th invasion we were also abducted. One soldier used to rape Fatima (elder sister) every day in my presence. He said that I should start to learn how to have sex.”

134. A paramount chief recounted the rape of his nephew’s pregnant wife by members of the SLA in 1995:⁸⁴

“In early 1995 my nephew was passing by the brigade with his wife, when they were intercepted by soldiers. Both were alleged to have passed by without greeting them. They were taken into the brigade. The woman was forcefully taken to a room and the husband was asked to stay outside. The woman, who was a month pregnant, was raped. The husband informed them of his wife’s pregnancy. Because of this statement he was severely beaten and almost killed.”

135. According to Lamin Mauranay, his pregnant daughter was raped and murdered in his presence by AFRC soldiers in 1998⁸⁵:

“Later in the night another group of AFRC came from Sandia road on a mission statement saying ‘operation no living thing.’ They killed 17 civilians, raped one of my daughters who was pregnant at the time and later killed her in cold blood.”

136. “Satu”, 32 years of age and a mother of four, was abducted by “Sobels” retreating from Freetown in January 1999. Pregnant at the time, she was repeatedly raped while in captivity⁸⁶.

“I was two months pregnant. During the time of my stay with the Sobels I was appointed as one of their cooks. I was raped three times per night by different Sobels. Three Sobels were raping me not even thinking I am a pregnant woman. The Sobels forced me to have sex with them and if I failed to do so I would have been killed, leaving behind my four children. The Sobels were not allowing us to watch at their faces, they only came from the Bengurnia barracks at night and they forced us to have sex and later they returned to their barracks.”

⁸³ The name of the witness has been removed to protect her identity.

⁸⁴ The name of the paramount chief has been removed in order to protect the identity of the woman.

⁸⁵ Statement to the TRC. Statement Number 2064

⁸⁶ The real name of the witness has been removed to protect her identity.

TRC



A photograph taken by a TRC investigator inside the notorious "Slaughter House" of the RUF in Kailahun District, where people were tortured to death, including having their heads smashed against the wall.

137. The targeting of families was not restricted to the RUF and its allies. The pro government militia, the CDF also targeted the families of those they suspected of being collaborators to the AFRC/RUF.⁸⁷

“The Kamajors stormed our house again claiming that my brothers had dug a hole [in the back of the compound] and had hid arms there. My brothers denied this, telling the Kamajors that it was not arms they kept in the pit but fuel and money. My brothers even told them that they would go dig up the hole so that the Kamajors would believe what they were saying. But the Kamajors did not listen saying that as long as they have got that information [from an informant] they know it is true and will act on it. It was then that they chopped off the ear of Abu, one of my brothers. After that they put my brothers in a vehicle with five other men and drove away. After sometime they appeared again in our area and told us that everybody should come out and identify their relatives. When we came out we were under gunpoint, and they took us to the vehicle, where we saw seven human heads they had just chopped off. We identified our brothers, and they told us that we should laugh over their heads and dance, which we did for fear that we would be killed if we refused.”

138. “Kadi” was hiding in the bush with her young son when 3 Gbethes stopped her. She was pregnant at the time.⁸⁸

“One of the men asked me where the people were hiding. I told him that I didn’t know because I was a stranger in the village. They said that if I failed to direct them to where the people were hiding they would kill me. They were with me the entire day walking in the bush. One of the men raped me in the bush. In the evening when they came to the town with me another two men raped me. At the time I was five months pregnant. They were about to give me some load to carry, but one of the men who raped me in the bush appealed to his colleagues to set me free. I was then released.”

139. The targeting of families was designed to remove all vestiges of respect and dignity in the people abused. Such conditioning makes people very malleable and easy to control. It however led to the break up of families, as the trauma was too great for many to bear.

140. One characteristic of the conflict was the familial connection between prominent actors on both sides of the conflict. One notable family was the Bio family of Tihun, Bonthe district. A prominent member of the family, Steve Bio was a reputed supplier of arms and ammunition to the RUF and the AFRC. His nephew Julius Maada Bio was the mastermind of the April 29th 1992 coup that brought the NPRC to power. An in law of the Bio’s, Ibrahim Deen Jalloh was a teacher at the Bunumbu Teachers College in 1993 when the RUF attacked the college and abducted him and his wife, Agnes. Subsequently, he was converted into a believer in the RUF cause. All through the conflict however, his wife was detained and compelled to provide sexual services to Foday Sankoh as a means of keeping her husband in check. After the AFRC was kicked out of Freetown, Steve Bio was arrested and detained at the Pademba Road prison.

⁸⁷ Mamodu Kamara. Statement to the Commission. Number 1017

⁸⁸ The real name of the witness has been removed to protect her identity.

Steve Bio was in prison with Gibril Massaquoi and other associates of the RUF and AFRC including former President Joseph Momoh and Alex Minty. They all attempted to escape from Freetown following the January 6 1999 attack. Hiding around the Guma Valley premises in the days after the attack and looking for a safe exit from Freetown, Steve Bio was killed by an ECOMOG shell. Gibril Massaquoi subsequently took Steve Bio's wife Edna under his wings to offer solace and protection and made her his "wife".⁸⁹ Because of the involvement of the Bio family with the different factions during the conflict, Brigadier Maada Bio was accused of colluding with the RUF. The Commission's investigations demonstrate that this was not the case. When Maada Bio became Head of State, he sent photographs of his sister Agnes to all military formations to try and track her as they launched attacks on RUF positions. A witness reported to the Commission how he broke down and wept uncontrollably when he was finally reunited with his sister. Tihun, their home town, was attacked in January 1996 because Maada Bio was the Head of State. That attack has entered the conflict folklore as the 'Tihun Massacre'. Several members of the family including Josepo Bio were killed in the attack. It is to the credit of Julius Maada Bio that he did not allow family tragedy to becloud his pursuit of peace with the RUF.

141. The linkage between family members and the different factions again came to the surface in the aftermath of the May 8 2000 demonstrations and attack on the residence of Foday Sankoh in Freetown. While all the leaders of the RUF were ordered to report to the nearest police stations or at ECOMOG headquarters, Gibril Massaquoi claimed to the Commission that he hid himself at the residence of the then Vice president, Dr. Joe Demby who he said is an uncle of sorts to him. Another prominent member of the RUF, Peter Borbor Vandy who became the Minister of Lands and Country Planning after the Lome Peace Agreement was married to Georgina Demby, daughter of the then Vice president. One of the accused officers during the treason trials of 1998 was one Lieutenant Commander Francis Momoh Duwai. He was convicted and sentenced to death. One of the members of the Court Martial Board that convicted him was his father, Lieutenant Colonel P. M. Duwai (Rtd.). His sentence was subsequently commuted to life imprisonment. He also broke out of Pademba Road prison following the January 6 1999 attack on Freetown, and is currently serving in the armed forces.
142. Another of the treason convicts was Reginald Halston, head of the military police during the AFRC regime. He was also sentenced to death. In the weeks after his conviction, his father was involved in a ghastly motor accident with ECOMOG at the Congo Cross Bridge in Freetown, from which he died. The Commission has received testimony that then Head of the Sierra Leone Armed Forces, Nigerian born Brigadier Maxwell Khobe lobbied very hard for his sentence to be reduced to avoid the double tragedy that would result for the family. His sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. The Commission does not consider it part of its mandate to interrogate the exercise of the discretionary power of prerogative of mercy by the president.
143. One of the leaders of the NPRC regime whose roles in the conflict is discussed in the chapter on military and political history is Captain Tom Nyuma who claimed that he is a nephew of Foday Sankoh. After the overthrow of the government on May 25 1997, a lot of effort was invested by the government in

⁸⁹ Confidential interviews with ex-RUF combatants in Bo, Kenema and Pujehun August 2003.

exile, in bringing him back to Sierra Leone from the United States to take over from Chief Hinga Norman as commander of the CDF forces. All testimonies received by the Commission about Tom Nyuma point to a relationship between him and the different combat groups and a multiplicity of roles by him in each of them.

THE IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT ON COMMUNITIES

144. The RUF “revolution” was launched to dislodge the dictatorial regime of the All Peoples Congress from power. During the early contacts with people in the Kailahun and Pujehun districts, the movement tried to explain its purpose, promising emancipation for the people. Their tactic of co-opting support and forcibly appropriating property belonging to the people as well as the targeting of prominent and educated people showed the people that this was anything but a revolution. Communities were captured for the basis of plunder, where the movement sought to replenish its stock of food and other materials from community resources. In the targeting of communities lay the basis for the widespread displacement of people that took place during the conflict.

145. In many respects this strategy by the RUF speaks volumes about the misconstrued platform on which the ‘revolution’ was launched. The very acts that the attackers believed to be emancipatory were received by the populace as oppressive and offensive. Moreover, such acts contributed significantly to the siege mentality prevalent in many communities of the Southern and Eastern provinces. One of the most direct manifestations of the siege mentality was the subscription to the concept of civil defence and the consequent mobilisation of local militias.

146. ‘Rebels’ held Loretta Sesay held captive in her house for three days, beginning on January 6, 1999.⁹⁰

“They put us under gun point and asked us to sing and dance for them. The song they asked us to sing was ‘we want peace’. They also forced us to use obscene language on the Tejan Kabbah government. They rebels took all my belongings. They tortured me with guns and sticks. They also restricted my movement by putting me under siege for three days. They forced us to sing and dance for them both day and night. On the third day, the rebels told me and the others who were under siege that they were going to amputate people’s hands. Upon hearing that I and others started begging them to have pity on us...As God would have it, one of the rebels decided to take pity on us and told his colleagues not to implement their plans, but that they should let us evacuate the house so that they could burn it. Before they finally freed me and the others they gave each of us forty strokes.”

147. Sei Tham witnessed abuses committed by the Kamajors against the people of his village,

“I cannot remember the dates of all the events, but Kamajors visited us at 8.00pm and gathered all the people in our village, locked the women up in a house and then asked the men to come outside and

⁹⁰ Statement to the TRC. Statement Number 1389

dance for them. The men were beaten up while dancing.”

148. John Abdallah, son of Lebanese and Sierra Leonean parents, was a resident of a township in Kailahun, which was attacked by the RUF on 27 April 1991.⁹¹

“About thirty six people jubilated and came out to stand for peace since the APC was overthrown. Sankoh who was the RUF leader instructed his boys to boil palm oil and dump it on all thirty six people who jubilated for peace.”

149. One of the communities to feel the direct impact of the war was Koribundo in Bo district. There was a military garrison in the town, which during the AFRC regime was occupied by the renegade soldiers. The town was fought over between the CDF and the AFRC several times with control seesawing between the groups. The Kamajors accused the towns’ people of supporting the AFRC. When the AFRC finally evacuated the town, several contingents of the Kamajors led by Joe Timide and Joe Nunie came on revenge missions. The Commission’s investigations revealed that the Kamajors committed so many atrocities during this and subsequent visits to the town. The Commission therefore decided to organise a public hearing on the destruction of Koribundo by the Kamajors.

150. Koribundo residents told the Commission that the SLA soldiers who occupied the town treated the towns’ people decently. This was to change when the RUF joined them in a “peoples’ army” in 1997.

“Sincerely the soldiers didn’t do much destruction, but the people’s army did most of the looting in Koribundo. They were violent with us. They took our property without respect. They said they are not paid by the government. Anywhere they go they will just take what they want.”⁹²

151. Interviews and testimonies reveal that the order to attack and destroy Koribundo was given by no other than the National Coordinator of the CDF himself, Chief Hinga Norman. The attack was led by Joe Timede. Other Kamajor commanders who participated in the attack included Tommy Lahai, Bockarie Beloko, Slagie Rogers. They were alleged to have committed wicked and inhuman acts, ordering the deaths of many people who challenged their activities in the town.⁹³

“The Kamajors occupied the town and started firing or shooting for the rest of the day while I was inside my house. Heavy machine guns were used for the rest of the day. At 4.15 in the evening I got up and peeped. I saw more than 4000 Kamajors. They entered from one house to another. When they entered my house they cleared everything, including 15 bags of rice and 10 bags of groundnuts...they stayed for 2 months. Everyone ran away...majority of the houses were burnt, about 106 houses.

My blood brother was killed by the Kamajors. I was arrested and charged with making radios for the soldiers. They started dropping

⁹¹ Statement to the TRC. Statement Number 243

⁹² TRC Interview with Momodu Kijan, resident of Koribundo at Koribundo 3rd June 2003

⁹³ Ibid.

[burning] rubber on my body. They said that I should die.”⁹⁴

152. Following complaints by the chiefs and people of Koribundo, a meeting was subsequently called at which Chief Hinga Norman was to address the people.

“So majority of us went for that meeting. When everybody reached, both civilians and Kamajors, he [Chief Norman] said that the Kamajors didn’t do their work for which he sent them. He asked them, ‘what happened? Are you afraid to kill?’ he asked the Kamajors in front of everybody. He told the Kamajors that Kapras kill people, nothing come out of it; Tamaboros kill, nothing happened; the soldiers killed nothing happened; the rebels the same thing. Why if Kamajors killed. ‘Why are you afraid to kill?’ He said further, ‘look these rebels, why are you afraid to kill them?’ Then the Kamajors started shouting, ‘pa-pay pa-pay!’ I was afraid. I thought that the Kamajors would open fire at us. So I dived down and moved off from the barray. Many people didn’t sleep in that town because of that speech by Hinga Norman.”⁹⁵

153. Following the speech, a regime of terror was established in Koribundo. The Commission during the public hearing heard harrowing tales of atrocities committed against the towns’ people. The most notorious of the kamajor commanders was Tommy Lahai. He converted the hospital in the town to a “high court”. A high court judgement usually meant death for the unfortunate victim. The Commission was told that Lahai’s other name is Halai and that he is presently a member of the armed forces.

THE PARTICULAR SUFFERING OF THE ELDERLY, THE AFFLUENT AND THOSE OF STATUS

154. In terms of material loss, it is perhaps inevitable that people of affluence and status suffer inordinately in a conflict of this nature. The more one has, so the theory goes, the more one stands to lose. In a conflict in which forced displacement and looting violations were rife and constant throughout the period of fighting, property owners and those with assets such as expensive motor cars and large numbers of livestock were deliberately targeted by each of the fighting factions as they sought to accumulate wealth for themselves.
155. The particular suffering of the affluent and those of status attests to a great deal more about the dynamics of the conflict as a whole than simply the idea of material loss, however. In view of the character of the majority of the fighting forces, which appears to have been young, disgruntled and poor, the Commission considers that violations such as looting and destruction of property were as much an expression of the wretchedness of the plight with which so many of the perpetrators were familiar as it was any reflection of the particular identity of the victims themselves. Through those violations, they strove for a material existence better than that to which they had been conditioned.

⁹⁴ Interview with Mr. Ibrahim Bar, resident of Koribundo at Koribundo 3rd June 2003.

⁹⁵ TRC interview with Mr. Ibrahim Bah, resident of Koribundo, at Koribundo 3rd June 2003.

156. From the evidence available one conclusion could be that it was a recurring tendency on the part of marginalised groups in Sierra Leone to harbour resentment against those who did not seem to have struggled like they have for whatever small gains they can gather. Thus, when a poor farmer has lived on a knife's edge for many years, possibly even decades, and has watched as those in positions of power and privilege enrich themselves at his expense, then he will lash out when he attains the means to exact revenge, which during the conflict came through the barrel of the gun.
157. The members of society who were perceived to 'have everything' were therefore often the ones destined to 'lose everything'. Equally, those that took them to task for their wealth and status were those who perceived themselves to be the silent victims of their self-enrichment. It was not so much a case of targeting the individual as lashing out against what that individual symbolised.
158. From the statements made to the Commission, it becomes evident that the aggressor sometimes creates justifications for his actions in his own mind - including allegations of collaboration or support for the corrupt system. The attacks represented an attempt to "bring down the system". The system was perceived as oppressive and enabling only the well connected and affluent to prosper. By "bringing down the system", the attackers hoped to make a statement that the playing field was not equal and that a new and egalitarian system needed to be constructed.
159. On the part of those who carried out such violations, there is little sense of the moral outrage of his act. He perceived himself, in fact, to be acting out a divine justice, by 'equalising' the disparities that society had thrust unfairly upon him. In this regard, one can perhaps begin to understand the utterance of the abusers of an elderly lady in the Bonthe District that "it is only because you have called the name of God that we are going to spare you".
160. The stories of loss are plenty and pitiful. Foday Kamara lost all his property, which he values at millions of Leones, after fleeing his town of Kamasondo, following the arrival of "men in combat dress."⁹⁶

"I ran into the bush together with my wife and children. The following morning I went into the village to check if they had left. Indeed, none of them were around, but my two houses were burnt down to ashes. Also, my two stores with two hundred bushels of rice kept there, containers of palm oil, bags of groundnuts and bags of flour were burnt down. My twenty goats and ten sheep were looted too. Properties worth millions of Leones couldn't be recovered. Everything in my two houses was burnt down. My rice farm that was to be harvested that month was again burnt down. I was left with nothing except the clothes I had on."

⁹⁶ Statement to the TRC. Statement Number 2094

161. Cecilia Caulker, mother of Victor Caulker, former Secretary General of the SLPP, recounts the arrest and murder of her son at the hands of “the junta” on October 14, 1997.⁹⁷

“They said, ‘You are our bitterest enemy, both you and your son, because you worked so hard against us that it was announced on the radio that Bonthe District scored the highest percentage [during the elections], so you are the greatest enemies of us and when the enemy catches the other enemy that enemy must die’. They took us to the base and imprisoned us. Then they took us out and separated us.... They said, both you and your son have gold, diamonds and a lot of money in your compound. Therefore, we have come so that you can show us where they are because it isn’t yours any more because your son is dead.”

162. Bankole Isaac George Vincent is a retired senior civil servant who was forced to hand over all his money to the ‘rebels’ and to subsequently flee his house.⁹⁸

“I went into my room under escort and removed the 500,000 Leones I had in my box. Under great shock, I handed the money over to them. The Commando ordered one of his men to give me two slaps, which he did very brutally. The commando ordered his men to lock my family and myself in one room whilst they ransacked all the six rooms of the house and store. All the articles they looted were loaded inside of a lorry; before they departed they ordered me to dance and laugh and express my gratitude to them for looting my house and destabilizing my Mercedes Benz car beyond repairs. The rebels promised to come back in two days time and ordered me not to vacate the house as they would bring me some good gifts. However, knowing the notorious character of the rebels and the advice which an old lady gave me, my family and myself immediately left our house and sought refuge in different places.”

⁹⁷ Statement to the TRC. Statement Numbers 1262/1267

⁹⁸ Statement to the TRC. Statement Number 5992

THE IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT ON BELIEF SYSTEMS

163. The RUF forces showed scant regard for the institutions and symbols of the people's belief systems and cultural heritage. Barrie's, which were the community meeting places and served all kinds of purposes including as places for the settlement of disputes were randomly attacked and destroyed. Faith and community institutions were desecrated. Belief systems were mocked and people were forced to commit religious and other sacrilegious acts. Modibor Kaikai was present in Sahn Mahlen when the RUF arrived in 1991:⁹⁹

"The rebels then requested the townspeople to give them drinks (rum). At first the townspeople told them that they are Muslims and they don't have alcoholic drinks. But these elders were highly molested by the rebels and were forced to give them a "batta" of moley (rum). The rebels were so happy with this offer and said that they were going to dance with the town (bamba) people for the whole night and this they did. But before the dance started they asked those who could not drink to identify themselves. We were all given alcohol forcefully. A good number of elders and Muslims were disgraced that night since that was the first time they would take alcoholic beverages."

The 'rebels' who forced the villagers to drink the rum were dressed as civilians. They proclaimed their mandate to be "fighting for the comfort of Sierra Leoneans". Such ironic representation of the "revolution" was not lost on the ordinary people in whose name the "revolution" was being carried out. These attacks shocked the collective conscience of Sierra Leoneans who began mobilising within the communities to find ways of resisting the invaders.

The targeting of Chiefs and figures of traditional authority

164. Acts carried out against Chiefs, Speakers and their fellow elders in fact account for only a minute numerical percentage of the abuses inflicted on the civilian population during the conflict. Their suffering does not impact statistically to the same degree as, say, a consistent pattern of violations recorded against a certain ethnic group or an age group would do. Whilst there are several instances of deliberate targeting that are statistically more perceptible, however, there is none that is wrought with more symbolism than the singling out of social and cultural figureheads for humiliation and brutal maltreatment.
165. Essentially, the Commission has discovered two trends pertaining to the plight of local traditional authority figures whose communities were attacked in the opening year of the conflict. First, the attackers actively sought them out upon arrival in a town or village. Second, where they were found and identified, they were typically subjected to a particular and peculiar *nature* of abuse.
166. Tragically, most of the instances recorded by the Commission in which this category of persons fell into the hands of their attackers culminated in their being tortured to death or otherwise killed. The responsibility for these acts rests squarely with the advancing troops of the NPFL contingent who formed the bulk of the incursion force that entered the country at its Southern and Eastern borders with Liberia. Accordingly the brunt of this apparently

⁹⁹ Statement to the TRC. Statement Number 6494

deliberate targeting strategy was borne by those holding positions of authority in the Kailahun, Pujehun and Bonthe Districts.

167. Such was the impact of just a handful of killings of Chiefs and elders by the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), one might legitimately reflect upon why the numbers killed were not much higher. Rather than mercy or a change of heart, though, this anomaly is mostly attributable to the fact that there were very few Chiefs in Sierra Leone in the first place,¹⁰⁰ and even fewer who remained in their Chiefdoms long enough still to be there when the vicinity was attacked. News of early atrocities – and the identities of their victims – spread quickly through the country with the flow of displaced persons from the border areas towards the interior. The leadership elite, with finances and transportation at their disposal, was in the privileged position of being able to take flight almost at will, quite often out of the country. Thus, if the objective of such targeting was indeed to rid the territories captured of any effective traditional ruler (as a precursory step to putting in place alternative structures to fit with RUF/SL objectives), then it succeeded without reaping as high a death toll as its architects might have imagined would be necessary.
168. Nevertheless, attacks on Chiefs' properties and estates in their absence were commonplace. It is not surprising that Chiefs' compounds were among the first properties to be looted and destroyed when one considers that in any given township they are among the largest and most decorated residences. To a great extent, extortion and destruction violations against Chiefs followed an almost identical pattern to those against the foreign, affluent and well-heeled members of a community.
169. More significantly, when a Chief was physically abused, tortured and killed, often consecutively rather than in the alternative, the impact tended to be more profoundly and enduringly felt by his community than when similar abuses were meted out to less-exalted citizens. One statement giver Brima Amara Davowa witnessed the abuse carried out against the town chief of Sandayallu when the RUF first arrived in April 19991. The towns people were asked to gather at the barrie.¹⁰¹

“There was one lady in the group who was forced to show them the town chief, otherwise they would kill her. So with fear, she pointed at the town chief. Immediately, he was stripped naked in front of his subjects, including his wives and children. He was asked to run from where we were gathered to his store which was about 50 metres away. As an old man, he became exhausted and asked to lie down on the ground. He laid down, they asked him to open his mouth, he did, the commander took a single barrel gun loaded with bullets, put the gun in his mouth and pulled the trigger. His brains scattered all over the street.”

¹⁰⁰ There are 149 Paramount Chiefs in Sierra Leone, one for each of Chiefdom in the three Provincial Regions. Additionally, there are Section Chiefs and Town Chiefs, who can be afforded an equal status in many communities depending on disparate factors such as their age, family pedigree or simply their charisma.

¹⁰¹. Statement Number 4311. Statement obtained at Talia Section, Kailahun District on 23rd February 2003., corroborated by Statement Number 4313

170. Sally Katta was recruited by the SLA as a "vigilante". She found herself involved in the commission of atrocities:¹⁰²

"Chief Sanuka was asked to bring us fish two times a day. It was an order from me. He told us he had no fishermen. I said that we were only interested in fish, not excuses. One week later, he discontinued. I undressed him naked with his wives, took them to the riverside and told them to dance. One of us came and thought they were rebels. He shot the chief and released the women. I had no alternative but to jubilate over the chief's death. I get confused and don't feel like eating whenever I think of Chief Sanuka."

171. Haja Isata Mattia was "sick and confined" in her home in Sumbuya when the RUF attacked her town on May 4 1991. She witnessed the humiliation of her paramount chief¹⁰³

"The Paramount Chief Amidu Nallo was dancing before them under duress and the moment he proclaimed that he was the chief, they showered abuses and insult on him."

172. Al Haj Alpha Amaou Mansaray lost all his property to the RUF. He had anticipated being targeted because of his status as a Section Chief and a wealthy businessman.¹⁰⁴

"Being as I was the section chief I knew that I might be a possible target. This is also because I was a big business man with three houses, a very big shop and 272 cows. When they came, they set my houses ablaze, including other houses as well. I could not see a single cow later as all had been destroyed. My shop was completely looted. Even my safe was vandalised. They took away everything. So finally I was left with nothing."

173. The fate of the regent chief of Makayrembay was no different from that of other chiefs who were attacked. He was killed by 'rebels' in 1997, after being presented with a false choice between amputation and death. He was later hacked to death with a machete.¹⁰⁵

174. A Kono Chief, Kai Sarquee, lost his life when an SLPP identity card and a traditional dress was found in his possession as he was escaping fighting in his home town. He was stopped at a military checkpoint manned by soldiers and when searched, these things were found in his possession. He was tortured and burnt alive.¹⁰⁶

¹⁰² Statement to the TRC. Statement Number 871.

¹⁰³ Statement to the TRC. Statement Number 7220

¹⁰⁴ Statement to the TRC. Statement Number 2905

¹⁰⁵ Statement to the TRC. Statement Number 382

¹⁰⁶ Statement to the TRC. Statement Number 257

175. In 1991 Chief Kallon-Kamara, Section Chief of Bomaru was arrested by SLA soldiers after a counter offensive in Bomaru to dislodge the 'rebels'. He was accused of being a rebel collaborator. He was beaten and tortured till his body was all swollen. He was eventually taken away on board an armoured car supposedly to Freetown and to this day he has not been seen and is presumed killed.¹⁰⁷
176. In 1996 Chief Lagbenyor Lebbie of Konboya was killed by soldiers. Chief Lebbie was very outspoken about his doubts of the army and this made him a target. Most people in the chiefdom suspected that the army was unable to protect them and they preferred the Kamajors. He and his bodyguards were ambushed by SLA soldiers and shot dead.¹⁰⁸
177. The attacks on chiefs and other local authority figures gave the civilian populace the inescapable impression that their attackers had embarked on a calculated programme to destroy the tenets and symbols of their local culture. In many of the cases recorded by the Commission, the outcomes of such murderous missions – either the corpses or dismembered body parts of the victims – were then paraded through the communities themselves as a chilling confirmation of the terror that had struck.
178. There is little doubt that many of the Chiefs and elders killed in the early phases of the conflict had themselves been responsible for the systemic suppression of their townspeople during the preceding decades of bad governance under the APC, although the Commission was not able to substantiate such a supposition in any individual case. The evidence before the Commission suggests that the attackers harboured an ill-conceived notion that by humiliating, torturing and ultimately eliminating figures of traditional authority, they might actually gain some popularity among the indigenes of the communities they entered. In reality, though, this tragic miscalculation quickly came to form a major part of the basis upon which residents of the Kailahun and Pujehun Districts – and through them the population of Sierra Leone as a whole – were instinctively averse to and alienated from the self-styled revolutionaries.
179. One of the most shattering individual killings of the nascent months of the conflict was undoubtedly that of Paramount Chief Ernest Claudius Farma Mahalor IV, who met his death in his home village of Tei in the Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom, Bonthe District on the 11th of May 1991. According to first-hand accounts,¹⁰⁹ the heavily-armed, RUF-affiliated attackers – Liberians most likely fighting under the large contingent of NPFL troops – numbered eleven in total and were under the command of one CO Livingstone. Upon their arrival in Tei, they gathered all the villagers together at the court barray and, apparently acting on the personal vendetta of one local man named Sahr Gibrilla, began to interrogate them about the whereabouts of their Chief. Although the Chief was among the party, he remained unidentified during this interrogation; when he was himself questioned, however, he was shot on his ankle in an apparent act of warning, causing him partial paralysis and profuse bleeding that was later to

¹⁰⁷ Statement to the TRC. Statement Number 24

¹⁰⁸ Statement to the TRC. Statement Number 686

¹⁰⁹ See, in particular, TRC Statements 7352 and 7353, collected in Tei, Kwamebai Krim Chiefdom, Bonthe District; 08 June 2003. The Commission also recorded numerous second-hand accounts and related references to this killing from statement givers in Bonthe and several other Districts, all of which testify to its massive symbolic impact on the local populace.

prove his undoing. Despite having effected an initial escape from the rebels' captivity, Chief Farma left a trail of blood in his wake and was again apprehended due to the assistance of Sahr Gibrilla in tracing the blood to his hiding place. At that point he was firmly bound up with nylon twine, known locally as 'tabay', and dragged before his people at the court barray one final time to bid them farewell.

180. One of the last sights the Chief was forced to endure was that of his house being burnt down by his would-be killers. Still bound by the twine, he was then shot dead at Sahr Gibrilla's behest and subsequently his body was dismembered. The Liberian attackers later paraded the dead Chief's decapitated head through some of the communities of his erstwhile subjects, openly boasting that they had 'finished' him. As if further to destroy the Chief's legacy and the dignity of his family, the attackers abducted and raped one of his wives and later looted most of his properties from his relatives' homes. "Following the attack and brutal assassination of our Chief, the entire town of Tei was in a state of panic."¹¹⁰
181. The impact of such a killing on a local population cannot be overstated. In one fell swoop, the community loses its figurehead and its sense of security. The myriad practical and ceremonial functions of the Paramount Chief, many of which cannot be performed by anybody else, are suddenly unattended to. His dependents, commonly numbering twenty and more, are left to fend for themselves, often having been mercilessly victimised. In terms of the past, several generations of ancestral heritage are sullied; in terms of the future, the Chieftom can be rendered devoid of status and direction, at least in the short term.
182. Both the element of publicity and of averred complicity in the killing of Chief Farma are mirrored in multiple other examples of targeting of senior authority figures in the early stages of the war. Making the Chief bid farewell to his subjects before being killed is thoroughly offensive to the local culture because it represents an admission of the figurehead's vulnerability, or mortality; on the other hand, though, it was a rite of passage that few murdered chiefs were actually afforded.
183. The targeting of chiefs is significant because it became an antecedent to the formation of the Kamajors in the form they took, with the chiefs very much in the forefront of their operations. The targeting also provides a poignant human angle on the broader targeting of Sierra Leonean traditional and cultural norms that featured as a defining characteristic of the conflict.
184. The tradition of leadership in Sierra Leone is most definitely one premised upon notions of seniority. It would be inconceivable in most communities for an elder to be subordinated to an untried 'junior man', especially one who hails from another geographical area, or from another culture altogether. Yet that is exactly what the insurgents set out to achieve, fully aware that in overhauling the traditional leaders, they would be punishing the individuals themselves on the one hand and targeting the very institution of chieftaincy on the other.
185. To a great extent, though, the theory that to humiliate and undermine figures of authority in a particular community might actually serve to gain some popularity among the indigenes was horrendously ill conceived. Townspeople whose

¹¹⁰ TRC statement 7352, collected in Tei, Kwamebai Krim Chieftom, Bonthe District; 08 June 2003.

Chiefs were slaughtered invariably saw the attacks as an affront to themselves and their collective dignity. They were also left with an enhanced feeling of vulnerability, spawned by the realisation that if the Chiefs were not immune to this wave of terror then nobody would be. In many respects the strategy speaks volumes about the misconstrued platform on which the 'revolution' was launched.

186. The RUF leadership did nothing to prevent the targeting of chiefs and other community symbols. The Leader, Foday Sankoh, according to some accounts objected to certain acts committed by the insurgent forces, particularly by the NPFL fighters, on the basis that they were 'counter-revolutionary'. Among the objects of his alleged disapproval was rape, for which it was claimed that he introduced an express rule that anybody found to have committed rape would be executed. Sankoh himself committed rape and sexual slavery in the forcible detention and conversion of Agnes Deen Jalloh to his bush wife. On the issue of killing Chiefs, Sankoh remained conspicuously silent. Indeed he lent the practice his implicit endorsement by proceeding to keep a house in the same Sandeyallu Village in Kailahun District where the incumbent Town Chief had been so brutally and publicly murdered in 1991. It may have been that Sankoh was in favour of such tactics on the misplaced premise that they struck a blow against 'the system' he so despised.

TARGETING ON THE BASIS OF GRUDGES AND VENDETTA

187. One other common characteristic of the conflict was the targeting of individuals on the basis of pre-existing grudges and vendettas. People were also targeted on the basis of nationality, as Nigerians were during the AFRC regime. Several factors account for this. The study on the antecedents of the conflict¹¹¹ identified several local and district variables that gave the conflict a particular flavour in the communities. Many of the issues identified relate to the imposition of arbitrary fines and punishment by the chiefs in the local courts leading to exile (many times across the border into Liberia) by the convicted persons, conflicts arising from the imposition of unpopular candidates as chiefs and as members of the local councils and the legislature, conflicts over land and other communal resources. Many of those who lost out in these instances allied themselves to the RUF or the CDF and on many occasions to both groups when it suited them to revenge the punishment or loss they had suffered. There were also cases of targeting arising from rejected love and marriage overtures, the possession of resources over and above the perpetrator. The inexplicability of the targeting was captured in most of the testimonies of the victims who appeared before the Commission.
188. Mohammed Conteh, narrated to the Commission the roles played by the RUF, the SLA and the CDF in Bo during the conflict:¹¹²

“Later I came back to Bo but one of our neighbours at 14 Barima Road, Bo went to the ECOMOG peacekeepers and told them that I was one of the armed men in Bo and that I was responsible for the death of his wife. I learnt that his wife died in the Liberian war but he

¹¹¹ Palmer, Isaac. Dr. *The Antecedents of the Rebel War in Sierra Leone*. Research conducted for the TRC by the Research and Documentation Bureau of the Fourah Bay College, University of Sierra Leone, July 2002.

¹¹² Statement to the TRC> Statement Number 693

lied and said that I killed her. He made a statement to the police. The CPO said that is a murder case and that he could not handle it. I was sent to the ECOMOG peacekeepers. When I got there, they did not allow me to explain. They flogged me mercilessly from morning to evening. I was treated in this way for one week, and I was regularly flogged during that period.”

Mr. Conteh was later allowed to go home after the ECOMOG troops discovered that he was a “peaceful citizen”. In the end he left his former abode at Barima Road “because of the fear that I was a Temne and the angry Kamajors who are Mende would retaliate destructively and indiscriminately.”

189. Umu Jalloh, described how a group of Kamajors surrounded her house in 1999.¹¹³

“According to those Kamajor fighters, the house was owned by a SLA soldier. I told them that the house was built and owned by me. They said they would burn the house. I pleaded, crying bitterly, but they still insisted on burning the house down. They asked everybody in the house to vacate or they would burn us alive. My family and I had to leave the house and we weren’t allowed to remove a single item of property from the house before it was burnt down. They guarded the house until the entire building was razed to the ground. The next thing they did was to sell the land again to another person. That day, most houses owned by Temnes were burnt down. I wanted to take action but my life would be in a very risky position. During that time, the Kamajors were the voice of Bo”.

190. What the targeting signified was a wanton disregard for the common threads that bound people in the communities together before the war. In many cases attacks were led by people with whom the victims were previously acquainted or familiar. The attacks created distrust among people and undermined the foundations for co-existence in the communities.

Targeting of Soldiers

191. Throughout the first half of the 1990s, the RUF gained territory and the war spread to many parts of the country. As perceptions increased that the soldiers were colluding with the RUF, they were declared *persona non grata* in the Southern and Eastern provinces. Attacks on soldiers increased. It was risky for any person in military uniform to go to these regions, even if to visit their family members. The Commission heard harrowing tales of soldiers who went visiting their family members were arrested and butchered by the CDF. The lucky ones escaped with their lives but with physical scars of their experience:

“I was the last in the row and I had to hold the decapitated head of my brother until all life had drained from it. I was certain that I too would be killed in this manner. However, 'The Killer' declared that I would not be beheaded; instead, the rebels' commander named 'Scare the Baby' ordered a letter to be tied around my neck to send a 'warning' to my colleagues. 'The Killer' then took out his blunt sword and used it to hack at my arm until the bone broke; he used his hands to snap the

¹¹³ Statement to the TRC. Statement Number 5812

bone fully; then he severed the remaining veins and tendons entirely to finish the job. I passed out from the excruciating pain and re-awoke three hours later to find that my other hand had also been amputated. I stumbled around for several days in the forest without food or water, before eventually making it back to my soldier colleagues.”¹¹⁴

A presidential commission to review the relationship between soldiers and the CDF was unable to complete its assignment before the soldiers overthrew the Government in 1997.

Targeting of Nigerians

192. The relationship between Nigerians and Sierra Leoneans blossomed from the colonial era. The colonial authorities recruited many Sierra Leoneans as missionaries and civil servants in Nigeria. Many of them subsequently settled in Nigeria. Furthermore thousands of slaves who had been freed from the slave ships arrested on the high seas and resettled in Sierra Leone were able to trace their homes in Nigeria and re-establish contact with their family members. The links between both countries have therefore been very strong. Up until the start of the war, majority of the students at the Fourah Bay College were Nigerians. Inter marriage between both nations had been quite strong and thousands of Nigerians had settled in Sierra Leone carrying on legitimate business activities
193. It was no surprise therefore that Nigeria spearheaded the ECOMOG intervention in Sierra Leone. Following that intervention, thousands of Nigerian soldiers who had served in ECOMOG returned to Sierra Leone as civilians on completing their commission to engage in business activities. On the overthrow of the Tejan Kabbah Government, ECOWAS and the Organisation of African Unity charged the Nigerian dominated ECOMOG with ensuring the restoration of the civilian government to power. The AFRC regime therefore perceived Nigeria as the biggest threat to its hold on power. It began a campaign stigmatising Nigerians are responsible for the woes to which the populace was subjected as a result of the blockade of Freetown port. Mass hysteria against Nigerians was promoted, and it wasn't surprising when Nigerians began to be molested and attacked on the streets and in their homes by the civilian collaborators and the troops of the AFRC.
194. A Nigerian victim of the conflict, David Anyaele said, “the rebels isolated Nigerians from the other captives and began amputating their forelimbs. After amputating me, the rebels set me on fire and told me to go deliver their message to the Nigerian government”.¹¹⁵
195. Another victim, Emmanuel Egbuna who was lucky to have his mutilated limbs stitched together, also recounted his experience:

“They cut off the hands of my younger brother, Benedict, from beneath the elbow. They dumped him at the cemetery behind the house, and he bled to death in front of me and his pregnant wife. The machete cut

¹¹⁴ Excerpt from TRC statement taken in Western Area, relating to events in the Kono District in 1992; TRC Statement Code Number 7132.

¹¹⁵ Affidavit in a petition to a Nigerian High Court to have Charles Taylor tried in Sierra Leone by the Special Court for supporting the RUF. Reported by the Pan African News Agency, Monday July 14 2004.

through the flesh and the bones of my hands, but did not entirely severe them. With my hands dangling from my arms, the rebels dumped me at the cemetery.”¹¹⁶

196. During the evacuation of Freetown by members of the international community in May 1997, Nigerians who had sought safety at the Mammy Yoko hotel and other parts of Freetown were prevented from leaving unlike other nationals. Whenever groups of people were arrested, the Nigerians among them were separated from the rest, kept behind, and taken away into detention or killed without trial. Thousands of them suffered amputations, arbitrary detentions, killings, rapes and other sexual offences, looting and the destruction of their property. The material losses by Nigerians during that period have been estimated at more than \$5.5million.¹¹⁷

“[Following the 25 May 1997 coup] our shops, business premises and even our residences were vandalized and destroyed. Our women were raped, our Sierra Leonean wives were humiliated on the streets, and many of our people were killed. Some were maimed and rendered destitute. Some lost their properties and everything they possessed to the hoodlums. Some managed to escape into the bush where they lived miserable lives until 1998. Only the Almighty God, on whose mercies we relied, saved us and ensured our inexplicable survival. We lost less than 100 Nigerians within this period. Among many other pathetic and unforgettable experiences, the one at Mammy Yoko Hotel on the morning of June 2nd 1997 stood out. On that day, nearly all the Nigerian citizens in Freetown sought refuge at the hotel awaiting evacuation to Guinea. The only help the Nigerian government could render was for those who could make it to Guinea. On this day, AFRC/RUF forces attacked the hotel from the sea and land, launching heavy military artillery at the building with hundreds of Nigerians in there. A Nigerian army detachment was then lodged at the Mammy Yoko hotel. They put up a fight and the heavy firing went on till evening when the Nigerian Army surrendered after mediation by the RED CROSS, because of the consideration about the possibility of heavy civilian casualties. Civilians were then allowed to board an American helicopter on standby nearby. As the civilians (mostly Nigerians) left the hotel, they were stripped of virtually all they owned all their lives by AFRC/RUF fighters. Cash, jewelries and other priceless items were forcibly taken from Nigerians fleeing the country. Some were taken to Military headquarters for detention and to be used as human shield in case of a Nigeria-led attack on the military base.”¹¹⁸

197. The legacy of the conflict period still lingers in the relationship between Nigerians and Sierra Leoneans. In its submission to the Commission, the Nigerian National Union in Sierra Leone charged that Nigerians have become the proverbial fowl used for sacrifices in all occasions:

¹¹⁶ Affidavit in a petition to a Nigerian High Court, to have Charles Taylor tried in Sierra Leone by the Special Court for supporting the RUF. Reported by the Pan African News Agency, Monday 14th July 2004.

¹¹⁷ Nigerian National Union in Sierra Leone, Submission to the TRC, 9th May 2003.

¹¹⁸ Nigerian National Union in Sierra Leone, Submission to the TRC, 9th May 2003.

“The parties to the conflict on every occasion see us as enemies. We always bear the brunt of all clashes in the country. Even on the Streets, in the buses/taxis in Sports arena, markets, schools, residential areas, what we hear of Nigeria is incredible and unimaginable. People don't ever say any good thing about Nigeria. I don't know if those good Sierra Leoneans who value our activities and appreciate good things are afraid of speaking out. The voices of our detractors always overshadow that of our admirers (if any). All our genuine goodwill is turned into bad and evil.”¹¹⁹

THE ROLE OF ETHNICITY IN THE CONFLICT

198. The link between the conflict and ethnicity lies in the element of targeting, whereby ethnic origin was ‘instrumentalised’ by a particular leader or interest group against those whom they perhaps resented or wanted to eliminate. In numerous submissions to the Commission, it was averred that the motivation for such a strategy was power, self-preservation or self-enrichment. Moreover, the use of ethnicity as a ‘justification’ appears to have been a veil for quite different motives, for example: fear that the object group was ‘exploiting’ the natural resources of the country; suspicion about the success that a particular ‘outsider’ or group of ‘outsiders’ enjoyed in a particular community, for example as a businessman or a diamond miner/dealer; or indeed desire to preserve their positions (of power) in a certain social order (perhaps Government itself) and to ensure that those who participate in any criminal enterprise with them are people they can understand and trust – invariably their own tribal counterparts.
199. The implicit impact can give the impression, as many submissions to the Commission have intimated, that there is widespread ethnic intolerance and hatred among the individuals themselves, when this is not in fact the case.
200. In reporting such incidents of ‘instrumentalising ethnicity’, the Commission is not in fact finding that, for example, all Krios were vehemently anti-Mende in the years immediately after independence, nor that all Mendes were inherently anti Temne in the latter years of the conflict. In fact, Sierra Leone is a society that is founded upon a fair degree of ethnic tolerance, as evidenced by the various factors cited in submissions such as inter-marriage and cross-Regional co-operation.
201. The Commission’s research finds that it is rather the case that persons in positions of leadership or responsibility made vitriolic statements regarding the opposing ethnic group in order to promote their strategic objectives. The first such objective appears to have been that of giving the recipient audience a sense of vulnerability; statements against another ethnic group made them feel threatened by the object group and therefore more likely to act against them. The second such objective seems to have been creating and / or emphasising a notion of ‘otherness’ – which in itself is largely artificial – among the recipient audience. Such a strategy was intended to convince them that the object group is somehow different from them in terms of character, loyalty or interest (as manifested through traits over which the individual has no control, such as ethnicity) and is ‘plotting’ something unfamiliar against them.

¹¹⁹ Nigerian National Union in Sierra Leone, Submission to the TRC, 9th May 2003.

202. Targeting on the basis of ethnicity was mostly carried out in the South against victims of Northern origin. It is important to place this targeting in context. The targeting began against soldiers. By the onset of the war, majority of the members of the armed forces were of Northern origin. This had both historical and political foundations. Historically, the rank and file of the army was predominated by people from the North. Politically, one of the legacies of APC rule was the bastardisation of the finest tenets of the military in favour of ethnic and other considerations. Candidates into the army had to present a recruitment card issued to them by a politician. Without such a card, even the best qualified candidates stood the risk of rejection. Elevations and promotions went to those either from the north or who owed allegiance to Siaka Stevens and his successor, Joseph Momoh.
203. As the war wore on, allegations of collusion by the army began to dominate public discourse. Accusing fingers in the South and East, were pointed at Northerners in the army as providing support to the RUF. This distrust deepened during the AFRC rule when soldiers of Northern origin were suspected of sympathising with Johnny Paul Koroma, a fellow Northerner. This distrust even affected the CDF response to the war, as the national Coordinator of the CDF refused or neglected to provide logistics to the northern CDF for fear that it would divert those resources to the AFRC.
204. Although there might be alternative explanations for some of the violations committed against Northerners by Kamajor militia men in the South of the country, it is important nevertheless not to underestimate the ethnic undertones of such acts, particularly with a view to achieving meaningful reconciliation in the future.
205. One witness testifies to his experience in Bo town where he had lived for more than 27 years.

“The burning of houses belonging to Temnes or Northerners was only done in Bo Town, where 110 houses were burnt. No house belonging to a Mende or a Southerner was burnt in Makeni and all over the North. It [has planted] a bad seed for tomorrow... One of the main objectives of Kamajors or Civil Defence Forces in Sierra Leone [was] to defend the lives and properties of civilians in general. They should not have seized or looted or destroyed properties from peaceful civilians on a tribal basis that was not practised or done in other areas of the country, especially the North and East, but even the West. The people to whom I have addressed my complaints and cries have not done anything to remedy the situation; to save the Sierra Leone family from created troubles and divisions of minds against each other. We all have children who will become leaders of the nation tomorrow. Revenge is possible in the case the table of leadership turns and falls on the side of those children whose parents' homes and properties [were] destroyed in Bo by order of COs of the CDF in power today, under the SLPP family and under the same Sierra Leone nationality banner.”¹²⁰

¹²⁰ George S. Tarawally, resident of 27 years' duration in Bo Town, whose compound was ransacked and burnt by CDF forces under the command of Bo Commanding Officer Kosseh Hindowa; full account given in letter to the TRC dated 20 December 2002; at pages 2 to 4.

206. Mr. Abu Kamara,¹²¹ a Temne, worked as a farm and revenue collector. One day in 1998, while Mr. Kamara was in Fanima Sow in the Pujehun District to mine diamonds, the chiefs and natives of the town declared his presence along with that of a few others as unwanted because they were Temnes, “the natives alleged that as Temnes they expected us to be enemies”. As a result, they were asked to leave the town. The group of Temnes left Fanuma Sow for Bumpeh. After a few days in Bumpeh, the leader of the Kamajors asked the people of the town whether they had Temnes staying among them. They said yes. The Temnes were called upon and told to leave:

“He gave us only three days to leave the town. He commanded the Kamajors in the town to ensure that we complied with his order, otherwise he was going to kill them himself for not executing his orders.”

207. The group of Temnes decided to leave but requested a pass from the Kamajors to guarantee their safety along the way. They arrived at the Dandabu town checkpoint. There, they were accused of being rebels and were asked to disembark from their vehicle. All the Mende passengers were asked to re-board while the Temnes were left at the checkpoint. The commander of the checkpoint was one Mr. Kemoh:

“In presenting our passes, our names were called one after the other and we were asked to stand aside, while we were undressed leaving us only in our underpants. We were beaten up very seriously. One of the Kamajors pointed his gun at me and fired. God helped me as the bullet missed me. The Kamajors were pointing us out to passing vehicles as rebels. I was side kicked and fell to the ground. I sustained bruises from the hard surface of the ground. Statements were obtained from us and all our bags were emptied of our possessions which they took away.”

208. A disagreement arose among the Kamajors over whether they should kill the Temnes. In the end it was decided that they should not be executed but taken to their headquarters in Pujehun. As the Kamajors organised a car to take them to Pujehun, Mr. Kamara describes how he and others were treated. *“Five Kamajors were asked to escort us. They had loaded guns. As the Kamajors entered the vehicle, they beat us until my skin was thoroughly scraped.”* At the headquarters they were put in cells. Their hands were tied backwards to their feet, making it impossible for them to stand up and causing them tremendous pain in the joints. They were questioned by “Mr. Eddie” the leader of the Kamajors on the events that had taken place during the day. Mr. Eddie then scolded the Kamajors for disobeying his orders. He directed that their belongings be released to them. Mr. Kamara and his group proceeded to Bo. Upon their arrival in Bo, other Kamajors came to them and forced them to give up their accommodation. On why he believed that Temnes were targeted, Mr. Kamara said, *“Mr Eddie, the head of the Kamajors in Pujehun district told us that since Foday Sankoh is a Temne, they were no longer going to tolerate Temnes in their land as Temnes were against them”.*

¹²¹ Statement to the TRC. Statement Number 440

209. Fomba Korgie, a student in 1999 saw some Kamajors at the Old Railway Line in Freetown committing violations against Northerners.

“[I saw] Kamajors torture some Temnes on the allegation that they were collaborators of the RUF/SLA.”¹²²

210. Ibrahim Kamara, another Temne, told the Commission that in 1998, after the intervention and reinstatement of President Kabbah, Kamajors took to the streets of Bo on a house to house search for Temnes and Northerners:¹²³

“They said all Northerners, especially Temnes, should go back home. People were molested, harassed, and properties were looted. They came to my house and arrested me. I was severely beaten and laid to the ground for execution. I managed to sneak out and fled to the C.K.C. cemetery and hid there for three days without food and water.”

Mr. Kamara later went back to Bo to check on his property. He discovered that his shop had been looted and a Kamajor commander was occupying his house. When Mr. Kamara approached the vendor who sold the property to the Kamajor, he was told by the vendor that he sold the property because he assumed that he (Mr. Kamara) was dead and that in fact, because he was a Temne, he should go back to the North and that if he insisted that he owned the property, it would cost him three times as much to get back the house.

211. In Kono the war created a context for the assertion of rights over land, which was occupied by Temnes and other non-indigenes, for the mining of diamonds. Leaders of different local factional groups took advantage of the situation to attack Temnes and other groups. An inter ethnic conflict seemed imminent. According to one account, efforts were then made to pacify the feuding groups and prevent an ethnic bloodbath.¹²⁴

“Commissioner Val Bangura came, so the people moved from Kono to Masingbi and turned it into a tribal war. They started saying that the Konos were killing the Temnes and Mendes in Kono. We met with the chief together with the youths of MOCKY. The NGO’s told us they were leaving because their properties have been taken away including motorcycles etc. They arrested a police truck and a landrover of one chief and these things were taken away. Then I promised the chief that I would go to Masingbi where the Temnes had regrouped for the tribal war and I will stop them. I assured them that I am going to Masingbi to meet the chief who had led the regrouping and that I will bring them to Kono in order to bring stability. So they gave me Fomba and other Pakistani soldiers to go with me to Makeni. When we arrived, we saw so many cutlasses, machetes, single barrels, sticks and knives. I was with some policemen whom they wanted to attack. I came down and stopped everybody and asked them what was wrong.

They told me that the Konos have killed so many Temnes and Mendes that they were no longer going to accept it. So I showed

¹²² Statement to the TRC. Statement Number 5597

¹²³ Statement to the TRC. Statement Number 7291

¹²⁴ Abdul Razak Kamara, former youth leader and self-styled RUF/SL ‘peace ambassador’; testimony at TRC Public Hearings held in Koidu Town, Kono District, 26 June 2003.

them a Kono guy who was with me called Fomba. I told Fomba there and then to disarm all the Temnes and to put all the single barrels and knives together so that we could open the route to Makeni. I told Fomba that I am a son of the Temnes and Mendes and he is a Kono but he should disarm them of all their guns and knives. I told them all to lay down their sticks. I asked them to call the Konos for me. We went to Makeni and I called all the chiefs. I told the chiefs if anybody should inform them that there was a tribal war, they should not believe it. I said it was only a disagreement since some people did not want to respect the owners of the land. I then invited them to go to Kono with me and meet with the Kono chiefs. The chiefs agreed and the UN sent a helicopter for them. We went to Kono and signed a communiqué with the chiefs to open the Makeni road.”

212. The statistical patterns of perpetrators and victims in the testimony are consistent with the claim that there was targeting of people of Northern origin in the Southern Region during the war. Northern ethnic groups include the Temne, Koranko, Loko, Limba and Yalunka tribes. The targeting is more sharply illustrated by the table below, which depicts violations against victims of Northern origin in selected districts of the Southern and Eastern Regions and in the Western Area
213. For example, in Bo district, 5.9% or 145 of the 2475 violations committed by the RUF are against victims of Northern origin, whereas 19.5% or 43 of the 221 violations attributed to the Kamajors were against victims of Northern origin.

Figure 3.4.7: Percentage of Violations against victims of Northern origin

Perpetrator Faction	Percentage of Violations Against Victims of Northern Origin				
	Bo District	Kailahun	Kenema	Moyamba	West/Area
RUF	5.9	3.1	5.3	9.6	39.8
SLA	2.0	2.0	0.7	13.5	29.2
Kamajors	19.5	6.8	16.3	15.5	69.1

214. If the various perpetrator factions were choosing their victims at random, without any consideration of the victim's ethnicity, we would expect the proportion of Northern victims to be the same for all the factions. This is clearly not the case. So in interpreting the table, two possible conclusions can be drawn. Either the Kamajor faction was targeting Northern peoples or the RUF and SLA were targeting Southern peoples. Given the qualitative evidence describing targeting of Temne persons by the Kamajors, the data is consistent with the view that the Kamajors deliberately targeted Northern victims.
215. Bo is a Southern District. Despite migration, people of Northern origin living in Bo are a minority in what is historically a Mende district. Whilst 19.5% of the Kamajor violations in Bo had a Northern victim, it is unlikely that Northern people account for 19.5% of the population in Bo district. This is consistent with the claim that the disparity between the factions is explained by deliberate Kamajor selection of Northern victims.

216. The Western Area including the capital Freetown had become a cosmopolitan area with people from all over the country making it their home. Nonetheless, Kamajor violations focused on victims of Northern origin: 69.1% (67 out of 97 violations) of Kamajor violations in the Western Area were directed against Northerners. In the testimony of victims of attacks, there are frequent notes that their attackers told them they were targeted because they were Northerners.
217. Testimony before the Commission indicates that the motivation for the attacks include the fact that Foday Sankoh, a Temne and the leader of the AFRC, Major Johnny Paul Koroma, a Limba were both from the North. The North was therefore perceived as supporting the RUF rebellion and subsequently the AFRC overthrow of an elected government. The demagoguery of some of the Kamajor leaders propelled their followers into believing that attacks against Northerners were encouraged. The attitude of many in the country in the early years of the war had created a siege mentality in the east and the south. The war was described as "a Mende man's war", meaning that the rest of the country would not be affected by it. The implied statement was that the Mendes who inhabit most of the south and east should find a solution to the war themselves. A national emergency was confined to a sectional or ethnic problem. Such attitude was intensely resented in the south and east. The resentment seems to have accounted for some of the violations against Northerners.

Other cases of ethnic targeting

218. There were other cases of ethnic targeting in the conflict. Victims targeted by the RUF on the basis of ethnicity included the Lebanese, Fullahs, Madingos and Marrakas. These groups are essentially trading or mercantile communities who were targeted because of their perceived wealth and the opportunity to appropriate their property. The statements in the Commission's database on the numbers of persons from these communities targeted as a result of their ethnicity is quite small.
219. There are indeed terrible stories about the experiences of the people during the war that cannot be fully captured in this report. Subsequent research will hopefully enable Sierra Leoneans come to terms with the terrible tragedy that befell them for ten years. The thousands who were maimed, sexually violated and endured other sundry violations may live with the trauma of their experiences for the rest of their lives. Thousands of those who died could not be afforded a decent burial. Many were abandoned in the open fields and may have been devoured by vultures. Others are still missing because their families cannot account for their whereabouts. Thousands of children still roam the streets of Freetown and the regional capitals because they do not remember where they came from or cannot trace any family members. They are denied the love and affection of their biological parents and siblings. Many of those who in the past enjoyed a middle class existence have been impoverished by the war. There is no family in Sierra Leone that has not been affected by the war. In the end it is difficult to talk about the gains of the revolution. It may well be concluded that the years 1991 to 2000 represent the years of the locust in the lives of Sierra Leoneans and for their country.

THE PERPETRATORS

220. It is now necessary to discuss the armed groups that participated in the war in Sierra Leone. This discussion will first identify the groups and their various mutations, and attempt to construct some explanation for the roles they played during the conflict.

Perpetrator Aggregations

221. Based on its research and investigations, the Commission has identified the following groups as the main protagonists in the conflict, the Revolutionary United Front Sierra Leone; the Government of Sierra Leone; the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council and the Civil Defence Forces. Each of them had other groups associated or affiliated to them or where umbrella organisations for several groups, and these groups are included in the sections dealing with the main groups.
222. The RUF had different sub groups. These groups are examined in more detail in the chapter of this Report on the military and political history of the conflict. The main support for the RUF was the national Patriotic Front for Liberia, which constituted the main incursion force that invaded Sierra Leone in 1991. The NPFL was not markedly different from the RUF. For the people therefore it was difficult to distinguish one from the other. The major difference for a lot of the populace was that most of the NPFL fighters “spoke with a Liberian accent.” However, it should be noted that many of the RUF fighters were Sierra Leoneans recruited in Liberia. Speaking with a Liberian accent was not conclusive proof that the person was Liberian. For the people however, it was sufficient to distinguish the RUF fighters from their Liberian compatriots.
223. Throughout the Report, the Commission examined the RUF as a distinct group from the onset of the conflict to 27th May 1997. On this day, soldiers carried out a coup d’etat against the elected civilian government and established the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council. They then invited the RUF to join the government. The merger of the RUF with the AFRC led to the establishment of the “Peoples Army”. Attribution of responsibility for violations during the period May 1997 to March 1998 is generally to the AFRC/RUF since in most cases it was difficult to determine which wing of governing faction committed the violation.
224. On 10th February 1998, ECOMOG expelled the AFRC/RUF from power in Freetown. The group then dispersed to the North and East of the Country. In the course of the departure from Freetown, internal differences emerged within the AFRC/RUF coalition. These differences led to different commanders leading pockets of supporters to settle in different parts of the country, and pledging allegiance not to the larger coalition but to specific commanders. Loyalty split along the lines of their previous RUF or AFRC affiliations. Many of the AFRC soldiers were uncomfortable being led by RUF commanders whom they perceived as illiterate and not as professional soldiers. From this point to the end of the conflict, the Commission attempts as much as possible to attribute responsibility to the specific group that committed any violation.

225. With the coalition split along amorphous and clearly indistinguishable lines in the eyes of the public, it became extremely difficult for the public to identify with any certainty the group responsible for any violation in their communities. It should be noted that none of the armed factions in the conflict had any remarkable distinguishing gear with which they could be identified. Even the RUF had engaged in false flag operations wearing full SLA uniforms, leading the public to believe that the violations were carried out by the SLA and strengthening public perception of collusion between the SLA and the RUF. The public therefore attributed many of the violations committed during the period 1998 to 2000 to “rebels” because of the difficulty in determining the exact institutional affiliation of the perpetrators. The numbers of violations attributed to this group is therefore quite high in the Commission’s database. Any violation attributed to ‘rebels’ should be understood as referring to the RUF, the AFRC, both of them, or a group comprising of members of the AFRC and the RUF.
226. Many of the remaining AFRC soldiers who wanted to return to service in the army organised themselves into a group that occupied the Occra Hills in the outskirts of Freetown. From here they organised raids in the neighbouring communities, seizing food and other material possessions from people, and committing all kinds of violations. They however maintained their contacts in the army after the restoration of the Government. Increasingly they found more grounds of difference with the RUF and common purpose on a range of issues with the Government. On occasion therefore they became “guns for hire” for the army, and were deployed to devastating effect against the RUF by Johnny Paul Koroma during the May 6-8 2000 events in Freetown. Violations committed by this group are specifically attributed to it in the period 1998 to 2000.
227. Another perpetrator category of “unknown” is included by the Commission to cover violations and abuses where no mention was made of the person or institution responsible for the violation or in cases where the presence of several perpetrator groups make it impossible to distinguish which of them was responsible for a specific violation or abuse.
228. The Government of Sierra Leone underwent different mutations in the course of the conflict. These mutations reflect the different governments that were in power during the conflict. The Commission attributes violations to the specific government in power at the time the violations occurred. Consequently, violations by operatives of the Government such as the Civil Defence Units, the police, or that occurred outside a theatre of military action, between 1992 and 1996 are attributed to the NPRC, while violations that occurred between March 1996 and May 1997 (the first period of the SLPP in power) are attributed to the SLPP Government. Similarly violations by the amorphous civilian groups, such as neighbourhood vigilantes or groups of civilians acting on behalf of the Government or by the police or the loyal members of the army in the period February 1998 to 2000 are also attributed to the SLPP Government. However, violations that were committed by army personnel in the period 1991 to May 1997 while prosecuting the war (up to the AFRC coup) are attributed to the SLA. This is because the complexion and alignment of the SLA varied, being, to some extent, outside of direct government control. For example, there were substantial defections of SLA troops to the RUF during the conflict. Also elements within the SLA developed their own agendas, becoming involved in looting and other violations, rather than opposing the RUF as would be expected of a professional fighting force.

229. A number of civil militia groups sprang up to support the Government. They went by the generic name, "Civil Defence Forces". They were composed of the following specific groups: the Kamajors, Gbethes, Kapras, Donsos, Tamaboros and hunters. Violations committed by any of them are generally attributed to the CDF. The largest of them, the Kamajors controlled most of the Southern and Eastern provinces and committed the most violations. Where it was necessary, the Commission distinguished the Kamajors from other constituent groups in the CDF in attributing responsibility for violations.
230. A number of external actors supported the Government in prosecuting the war against the RUF. These included ULIMO (the United Liberation Movement of Liberia, an armed faction that eventually moved back to Liberia to fight Charles Taylor and his NPFL), the Ghurkhas and Executive Outcomes. Where any of these groups committed violations, these were specifically attributed to them.
231. The ECOWAS peace monitoring group, ECOMOG, in the course of its operations was responsible for a number of violations. While these violations were committed by troops from the troop contributing countries, the violations have been attributed to ECOMOG because it provided the institutional platform for the presence and participation of those countries in the Sierra Leonean conflict. The database of the Commission however contains the breakdown of the violations committed by troops from specific countries.

The Revolutionary United Front/Sierra Leone (RUF/SL)

232. The RUF was a revolution that was still born even before it started. It was born out of opportunism. The original leader of the movement, Allie Kabbah, and the Pan African Union, the group of ex-student radicals who wanted to actualise a revolutionary regime based on popular participation in governance, believed in a revolution anchored first on the political education of the people. Military action would be the culmination of other preceding revolutionary activities. Believing that these antecedent actions had not taken place, the Pan African Union late in 1988 pulled out of the revolutionary project. The likes of Foday Sankoh with his military background, believed that armed force was all that was necessary to carry out a revolution. With the departure of Allie Kabbah and his group from Libya, Sankoh exploited the leadership vacuum by claiming ascendancy. The remaining members of the movement deferred to him because of his age and military experience. Even at the conclusion of training in Libya, the RUF had no document that espoused its beliefs. It was only in 1995 that it released "Footpaths to Democracy".
233. Witnesses to the Commission claim that Footpaths to Democracy was a terrible corruption of an earlier PANAFU document which they themselves had participated in drafting, and which the RUF mutilated beyond logic.¹²⁵ The RUF document mouthed platitudes about how corrupt the system was and needed to be changed. There was nothing revolutionary about it. It had no ideological content and therefore is an unsuitable document for measuring the ideological foundations behind the RUF struggle. The man who recruited Foday Sankoh into PANAFU exclaimed his alarm and disappointment when he heard the BBC broadcast of Sankoh's ultimatum in 1991 giving the Government of Joseph Momoh 90 days to step down or be removed by force. To him, Sankoh did not

¹²⁵ See submission and testimony from Cleo Hanciles. TRC Public Hearings, Freetown, April 2003.

have the credentials to wage a revolutionary war¹²⁶. The assistance Sankoh received from Charles Taylor in launching his revolution compounded his problems. Taylor himself was no ideologue, but a crass opportunist. Within the RUF therefore, there was no inspirational or ideological thread that welded the leadership and membership of the movement.

234. In the absence of an ideological foundation, it is difficult to talk of a common cause among the members of the movement. There was some attempt to instil an ideology early on in the movement. This attempt was not widespread and stopped altogether with the death of Rashid Mansaray.
235. Without an ideology, there was no overriding consideration for the recruitment of members into the movement. People were recruited as long as they could carry a gun. In this context, it did not matter whether they believed in the cause or not. What mattered was numbers. All kinds of tools, including deception and forced recruitment would be deployed on a large scale by the RUF to get people into the movement. This was to have a terrible impact on the civilians as evidenced by the widespread violations committed by members of the movement against the very people they claimed they were fighting for.
236. Testimonies received by the Commission suggest that the violations carried out by the RUF fighters may be directly related to the methods of recruitment of the group, the widespread use of deception, and the rigorous training programmes to which young recruits were subjected. While these strategies and experiences were not peculiar to the Sierra Leonean conflict, outside an ideological foundation for the revolution, they provided the only context to the relationship between the fighters and the civilian population in captured territory.

'AWOL' – A Pre-RUF Case Study: Tajura Training Base, Tripoli, 1988

237. The prospect of a training seminar in Nigeria seemed to provide a rare opportunity of self-enrichment to a young man who had felt suppressed and devalued by the APC one-party rule in Sierra Leone. In the company of like minds and kindred spirits, AWOL had often sat around in '*potes*' and other people's stairwells, smoking marijuana, drinking beer and chewing over the complexities of revolutionary writings. His best friend was with him; they had both joined a PANAFU 'cell' in an effort to build up their knowledge of alternative systems of government, as well as the finer points of dialectics, rhetoric and finding the truth.¹²⁷ In April of 1988, he was given a handful of different currencies in order to make his way out of Freetown overland to Accra, from whence he would be flown to a 'Capacity-Building Seminar' in Lagos.
238. Having paid for a series of public vehicles through Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana, AWOL and his three comrades had made it to their first destination in decent spirits. The older man among them, who had joined them on the verge of departure, was quiet, not to mention a little eccentric,¹²⁸ but

¹²⁶ TRC interview with Victor Reider, Freetown, October 2003.

¹²⁷ These topics are merely three of the headings contained in a novel piece of literature entitled 'Ideology of the PANAFU' which was dictated to the members of the young man's revolutionary cell.

¹²⁸ These were the descriptions applied by other members of the group to the one man among them who had not been part of their discussion cell: his name to them was 'Sanks', better known as Foday Sankoh.

apparently no cause for concern. Their meeting point, an International Student Centre at the University of Legon in Accra, Ghana, was fairly non-descript and, since they arrived there late at night, there was nothing particularly unsettling about it. When men in military uniforms started ushering them around, however, there was a distinct feeling in AWOL's mind that something unsavoury was afoot. The subsequent appointment at the Libyan Embassy in Accra and double-quick transfer to a military airbase in the dusk of the same evening confirmed a deep, unspoken fear within him. He had been drafted against his will into a guerrilla training programme from which he had no easy means of escaping. He had been deceived into joining a revolution for which he was ill prepared.

239. From the military airbase in Accra, AWOL was flown directly to Tripoli, Libya and transported to a sizeable training camp where he was to be housed along with up to 700 'recruits' of diverse nationalities.¹²⁹ After observing a ceremony known as 'passing out', in which prior trainees demonstrated the skills and aptitudes they had acquired, the new recruits were themselves inducted into a physically and psychologically gruelling series of exercises over a period of several months.¹³⁰ Among the disciplines they were expected to master were such torturous and inhumane undertakings as the 'halaba',¹³¹ the 'black hole',¹³² and the murdering of a live animal by ripping its head off with their teeth.¹³³

¹²⁹ Among the other nationalities with whom Sierra Leoneans were trained in Libya were Liberians, Gambians, Senegalese, Congolese, Philipinos and Indonesians. Whilst it cannot be stated with any degree of certainty, it appeared to most of those recruits who spoke to the TRC that the fighters of other nationalities on the training base had arrived there voluntarily.

¹³⁰ The declared objective of the series of physical exercises to which trainees were subjected in Libya was to 'remove the civilian blood from inside' them. This metaphor was all too often extrapolated into the realms of the physical; many trainees shed blood whilst undergoing guerrilla training.

¹³¹ The exercise known by this name was originally conceived to be conducted on a circular 'running track' in a rough desert area on the outskirts of Tripoli. Recruits were given an onerous load to carry on their heads, such as a large plastic container filled with water or oil. They were then made to run (or stumble) around the circuit, the soles of their bare feet being torn open by the rough ground, whilst simultaneously kicking up sand and grit into their own and other trainees' faces. Trainers would stand on the edges of the circuit barking instructions at the trainees, sometimes slapping or kicking them to encourage greater speed. Any trainee who so much as tripped would be verbally lambasted and often physically beaten. If one should fall to the ground during the 'halaba', he or she would be mercilessly flogged using sticks and other implements, including the butts of guns. The use of 'halaba' was retained by Foday Sankoh and the other Libyan-trained Sierra Leoneans throughout their further participation in insurgency training and combat. Thus, it was used to train the 'vanguards' of the RUF/SL on their camp in Namma, Liberia, and indeed to train the recruits who were brought into the RUF/SL after its incursion into Sierra Leone. At some point, probably between Libya and Liberia, the name of the exercise was warped from 'halaba' into 'halaka'; accordingly those recruits who were trained in 1990/91 in Liberia, or after 1991 in Sierra Leone, know the exercise as 'halaka'.

¹³² The ominous-sounding 'black hole' exercise was purportedly designed to instil fearlessness and an aptitude for self-preservation at the battlefield into the trainees. It was conducted in a large, unlit building (or series of buildings) at night and entailed several 'checkpoint-style' traps where instructors would lurk in the shadows, armed with various weapons and ready to pounce when a trainee came upon one of them. The trainees were admonished to fight their way out of trouble, sometimes sustaining severe injuries in the process. They would emerge at an unspecified point 'into the light' to be told that they had completed the exercise.

¹³³ The examples given of this kind of exercise entail the murders of live fowl (chickens) and live frogs. The trainee would be given the animal to grasp in his fist, then, upon the order of the instructor, sink his teeth into its neck and rip its head off in his clenched jaw. Most trainees would spit out the head of the decapitated creature; on more than one occasion, however, some of the most fearsome trainees were seen to swallow what they had bitten off. The whole exercise made

The Head Instructor on the base, who was a Libyan known only by the derogatory term 'Haiwan',¹³⁴ apparently revelled in the suffering of his trainees and would often push them beyond their physical limits whilst 'laughing sadistically'.¹³⁵ AWOL's tolerance to this kind of torture withered over the months of his training. When he eventually suffered a fall during an exercise, which entailed walking through the flames of a raging fire, sustaining serious burns in the process, he was a broken man. To compound his dejection, he was taunted and humiliated by the instructors for the unavoidable limp he carried from his injuries, and on one occasion received a full-blown kick to the buttocks from Haiwan. Although he eventually secured safe passage away from the Tajura base in Tripoli and back to Sierra Leone,¹³⁶ AWOL was unable to resurrect anything resembling a normal life, or his former mental state. The promising life of an innocent young man had been ravaged by the ordeal of guerrilla training.¹³⁷

240. AWOL's story might initially seem somewhat incongruous with the military and political history of the conflict in Sierra Leone that was to unfold three years later. He never took part in that conflict, nor has he, to the Commission's knowledge, since perpetrated any human rights abuse against others. Upon closer inspection, though, his story is instructive in understanding the *nature* of the violations committed in the conflict in Sierra Leone. The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone (RUF/SL) is behind the majority of violations and abuses committed during the conflict.¹³⁸ Yet behind the majority of RUF/SL combatants in the conflict is a story of deception and forced recruitment. In turn, behind every forced recruit, including those who did not become combatants is a story of victimisation.
241. What lies beneath the victimisation of the many thousands of forced recruits in this conflict is uncertain; but testimonies to the TRC indicate that it can manifest itself in several ways: as a protracted psychological torment; as a burden on one's conscience and one's mind; and, most pertinently, as a tendency, or a capacity, to subject others to a victimisation akin to the one endured by oneself. Herein lay the recurring phenomenon of the *victim turned perpetrator*.

for a distressing spectacle and was known to induce vomiting and convulsions in even the non-participating observers.

¹³⁴ 'Haiwan' is an Arabic phrase meaning 'animal' or 'bastard'. The commander in question used to call every one of the trainees 'Haiwanat', which in loose interpretation from Arabic means 'son of a bitch', or 'spawn of a bastard'. According to one interviewee, "When you say 'Haiwan', it means 'you are a bastard', so everybody called him 'Haiwan'." Although this nickname would normally be considered derogatory, it appears to have been worn as something of a badge of honour by this commander. His real name is not known to anybody with whom the TRC has spoken.

¹³⁵ This chilling description stems from a TRC interview with men who trained under Haiwan's supervision.

¹³⁶ This element of AWOL's story is particularly relevant to the subsequent course that the conflict took and has been discussed in greater detail under the 'Military and Political History of the Conflict' chapter in the section entitled 'The Predecessors, Origins and Mobilisation of the RUF'.

¹³⁷ A real-life human tragedy lies at the heart of this narrative. None of AWOL's close friends or associates knows his present whereabouts, or indeed whether he is dead or alive. On the few occasions that he was spotted after his ordeal at the training base he displayed acute symptoms of trauma and no palpable lust for life. His friends suggest that his spirit was in fact totally drained from him by his 'forced recruitment'.

¹³⁸ According to a rough approximation conducted against the August batch of statements, around 70% of all violations recorded in the TRC's statement-taking phase are attributed to the RUF/SL.

Institutionalisation and De-institutionalisation in the RUF

242. After their recruitment, a culture of total dependency prevailed among most of the individual combatant units established in the RUF. Junior fighters, the overwhelming majority of whom were forced recruits, depended totally on their commanders for provisions, for their livelihoods, for privileges such as drugs and women, or girls, whom they raped and for their 'licence to kill'.¹³⁹ All of this was quite apart from the fact that if they disobeyed or deviated from the orders they were given, they would almost certainly be either beaten severely or (in the worst cases) killed.
243. The concept of institutionalisation appears to apply mostly to the entrenched practice within the RUF of ridding a particular forced recruit of all grounding in the society to which he or she previously belonged (including by subverting the moral and socio-cultural norms of that society) and then compelling (corrupting) the recruit to adopt a new, fundamentally warped set of standards and guiding principles. It was a form of inculcation, which included elements of physical and psychological torture as well as indoctrination.
244. Among the recurring insights into this process of 'conversion' deployed by the RUF is the use of mantras and chants in order to embed certain principles or perceptions into the minds of forced recruits. The most common format for such chanting would be during a muster parade, when the commander would stand at the front of a mass of ranks and lead them in a series of motivational shouts: "Arms to the People! Power to the People! Wealth to the People!"¹⁴⁰; or "COMMANDO! – Disciplined, Brave and Contented!"¹⁴¹ During the AFRC regime such mantras included, "Sierra Leonean People don't like themselves", "Kabbah is fooling the Native People", "No Sierra Leonean Army! No Sweet Sierra Leone", "Nigerians are not able to disband the National Army", "Tejan Kabbah caused this Problem for the Sierra Leonean People", "If ECOMOG don't leave Sierra Leone! Burning and Killing will never Stop".¹⁴²
245. Contrary to many of the declarations of wanting to enthrone an egalitarian society, particularly those made to civilian communities in the early days of the incursion, there does not appear to have existed any such thing as egalitarianism within the RUF. Combatant promotions were awarded on the basis of arbitrary factors like the 'business' a fighter demonstrated, the prowess he displayed in a particular battle, or the relationship he enjoyed with a senior commander. In the case of child combatants or junior commandos, promotions

¹³⁹ This phrase, which is drawn from an interview with an ex-child combatant, should be understood to indicate two central facets in the relationship between commanders and rank-and-file: first, the commanders would have total control over which of the junior commandos in their unit would be given access to firearms; second, most child combatants were disciplined strictly for acting beyond the direct commands issued to them – it seems that in reality, therefore, they could only fire their weapons upon the issuance of an express order to do so.

¹⁴⁰ This chant was known among most RUF members as the official motto of the movement, long before its incorporation into the propaganda pamphlet known as *'Footpaths to Democracy: Towards a New Sierra Leone, Vol. I'*, which was produced in 1996.

¹⁴¹ Among some of the child recruits, this mantra was recited almost mindlessly, since most of them had no idea of the meanings of the words they were using. In asking them what qualities they thought a commando was supposed to possess, many recruits reverted to more simplistic interpretations such as 'tough' or 'fearsome'.

¹⁴² Abdulai Barrie, Statement to the Commission at Kamakwie 1, Sella Limba, Bombali District on 26 March 2003. Statement Number 5758

were awarded as a form of morale-booster.¹⁴³

246. In any case, this institutionalisation process appears to have been clearly directed towards disorientating the recruits and detaching them from the conventional psycho-social norms on which their civilian lives were premised. Similarities with the concept of 'removing the civilian blood from inside', the ethos of the early training in Libya, are striking: it is thus eminently possible to trace a filter-down effect from one round of trainees to the next.

The transformation from RUF Detainee to Junior Commando

247. The Commission received reports from both the Kailahun and Pujehun Districts that upon entering into major towns, the insurgents typically demanded that the residents should identify any soldiers, policemen or those in the community who were thought to be APC representatives or powerbrokers. In the event that these persons had fled, attention would turn to their relatives, their friends, their acquaintances and those who were deemed to know 'where they were hiding'. Each of the persons pointed out in this manner, even where they denied any knowledge of the status they were alleged to hold, were arrested and placed in captivity. Accordingly, sizeable groups of local residents, sometimes up to 20 at a time, were detained in a local cell or guardhouse on the premise that they had connections to the APC regime, however tenuous the link.
248. These detentions are of special relevance to the composition of the RUF because many of the detainees were subsequently converted into members, in a similar mode of compulsory 'recruitment' to the recruitment of the Vanguardians in Liberia. One resident of Pendembu, Kailahun District described to the Commission how he was enlisted into the RUF after a two-week period of detention until 29 April 1991:

"Upon his first arrival in Pendembu, Foday Sankoh was made to understand that some people were jailed and that they were still in the cell. Immediately he sent for us and we were brought before him. We had been told the previous night that they were going to kill us next morning, so some of us thought Sankoh was going to do the killing. Rather fortunately he was our saviour.

He became very furious with the [NPFL] commanders; he told him that this was not what he had sent them on and that they should not treat his people in such a way... He apologised to us and begged us to accept it in good faith as it was wartime... He then picked me up as the youngest among those from jail and asked for my name, my occupation and my qualification. He told me that the revolution is for those of us who are educated but have no better jobs."¹⁴⁴

¹⁴³ One commander described this concept as a means of encouraging his combatants to participate in battles with more vigour and commitment; if a commando could be convinced that he was a 'senior man' (even if, paradoxically, he was actually a 'small boy', then he would be 'more able to carry out my instructions well'.

¹⁴⁴ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF/SL 'junior commando' recruited on the Kailahun front, who later became a G-2 / IDU commander; interview conducted in Freetown, 13 September 2003.

249. A similar story was recounted from the town of Gendema, Pujehun District, where Foday Sankoh appeared on 07 April 1991 and similarly lambasted his commanders for putting prominent functionaries of the authorities in a cell. Upon securing their release, Sankoh apparently embraced and praised the detainees for their courage and welcomed them, especially the soldiers among them, into his movement. According to testimonies, Sankoh described the men as “our brothers, not our enemies”; a popular refrain was that these people had no choice but to be working for the authorities because it was a one-party state. In Gendema as elsewhere, such displays by Sankoh in releasing detainees were reportedly greeted with rapturous ovations from the civilian crowds, from which Sankoh clearly drew valuable populist credentials.

250. As the following testimony from a vanguard indicates, Sankoh was notorious for exerting moral compulsion over individuals and communities by playing on the perceived indebtedness of those he had freed:

“He continuously reminded me of the fact [that he was my ‘liberator’], everywhere we went. Even when we first captured my hometown, he gathered my relatives from the area and asked me to tell them where he had found me... When I just said the place, he was not comfortable. He wanted me to say ‘in prison’, which I did; so as to make it clear to the people that he had rescued me.”¹⁴⁵

251. Sankoh in fact made pointed and often astute attempts to sensitise and mobilise particular groups in support of his averred ‘revolutionary’ objectives. By all accounts, he spoke passionately and convincingly in his public addresses and was apparently well received by his audiences in the early weeks of the conflict. In addition to being a generally compelling character, he would often adapt his style, or indeed his rhetoric, to play on the particular characteristics or insecurities of the local population who were receiving him. Thus in the Kailahun District, Sankoh’s addresses dealt with the plight of impoverished farmers and coffee or cacao harvesters who were historically prevented from receiving due compensation for their yields; in the coastal District of Pujehun he was reported to have spoken about fishery and marine resources, as well as the local undercurrents of social disgruntlement that had given rise to events like the Ndorgboryorsui rebellion in the early 1980s.

252. In the RUF’s recruitment of new members there was very often a very thin dividing line between purported ‘genuine subscription’ to the values of the RUF’s agenda and the opportunistic pursuit of personal gain or retribution based on grudges, grievances and vendettas. In short, many people claimed to be ‘revolutionary’ when they were actually nothing of the sort; they simply wanted to utilise the RUF as a means of acquiring a firearm and a vehicle for their own aggression. As the RUF’s former Adjutant General testified to the Commission:

“Some people felt that going on the base would give them a chance to revenge for anything that had happened to them.”¹⁴⁶

¹⁴⁵ TRC Confidential Interview with former RUF/SL ‘vanguard’ commander who was taken from detention in Liberia to become a member of the movement; interview conducted in Freetown; 19 September 2003.

¹⁴⁶ Jonathan Kposowa, former Adjutant General of the RUF/SL who worked closely with the Leader and other members of the High Command throughout the conflict; primary interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 25 June 2003.

The pitfalls of allowing such people into the movement should have been all too apparent to the RUF leadership from the very outset.

253. Hence the RUF ranks began to fill up not only with forced conscripts, but also increasingly with a potentially uncontrollable number of 'bogus revolutionaries', who had no interest in common objectives, seeking only the power of the gun to act out their suppressed feelings of rage and revenge, usually against innocent civilians from their own or other communities. This category of persons was obviously prone to human rights abuses, but was also highly dangerous to the RUF movement itself, since they were effectively beyond discipline and could be just as likely to turn their guns on fellow RUF members.
254. Many testimonies received by the Commission traced the path of individuals who were brow-beaten into joining the RUF because they simply could not survive outside the movement. Living conditions in a town or village situated within an NPFL or RUF 'target area' seemed in its initial throes to be manageable. Government functionaries, many of whom were loathed, were typically chased out or killed and the distribution of provisions, including agricultural produce, became for a time more liberal and equitable than it was under the unjust 'system'. However, without exception, these ostensible benefits would prove to be a false dawn once the rule of law descended into rule by force. Armed commandos were often reported to have arrived at civilians' houses unannounced and invariably in the middle of the night, forced entry and helped themselves to food wherever it was available. Moreover the NPFL and RUF forces extended their terrorising of families to the raping and gang raping of women and girls in their homes, often in front of their husbands, parents or other family members. One witness who testified at a public hearing in Kailahun captured the plight of many families:

"If they met you with food, they would take it and rape your wife in front of you. I was a victim. I was sleeping with my wife when four of them took me outside, under gun point, and took my wife and had sex with her."¹⁴⁷

In many other reports recorded by the Commission, men who resisted or opposed such grievous acts were habitually shot dead or tortured.

255. Through the continual wearing down of people's normal lives and levels of tolerance in this reprehensible fashion, but also commonly through more explicit means that included coercing them at gunpoint, the insurgent factions forced civilians to join them, either by making them take up positions within the 'administrative' cadre, or by sending them to training bases and turning them into combatants, whom the RUF referred to as their 'junior commandos'. Some of the persons recruited through these means in the early days and weeks of the war went on to play important roles in actual combat undertaken by the RUF. Gibril Massaquoi, an early recruit on the Pujehun front who would later become one of the few junior commandos to rival the vanguards in terms of battlefront prowess and commandership, described his enlistment into the RUF:

"Initially, I resisted joining them. I even had to escape, leave Pujehun

¹⁴⁷ A civilian resident of Pendembu and other parts of Kailahun District during the conflict; testimony before TRC public hearings held in Kailahun Town, Kailahun District; 13 May 2003.

and go to a village... Unfortunately for me, I met them, still looking for men whom they could train... Each and every member of the RUF, whether you were a civilian, you were working with them on civil service or whatever, you were always forced to take training. There were some people who were only taking ideological training, there were others who were taking the real physical, military training. We were taken to Zimmi to take our training.”¹⁴⁸

256. The early ‘mass recruitment’ intakes were dominated by children and, more especially, youths. These were vulnerable groups whose innocence or disaffection made them less likely to resist their enlistment into the RUF; some of them in fact would even start to embrace the ethos of the RUF wholeheartedly and later bring others on board under similar duress. They were certainly malleable to the will of the trainers, who would subject them to both rigorous physical exercises and what was known as ideological instruction, but which might more properly be referred to as indoctrination. It was a pattern of forced recruitment that was bringing more and more traumatised but subsequently hardened boys, girls and young men and women into the RUF. Its practice would only intensify as the conflict wore on, with increasingly brutal methods of enlistment and commensurately more adversely affected conscripts.

“The first day we arrived on the place they order[ed] us to lie flat on the floor. We had no idea and we lay down as if we were lying on a bed. They showed us how to lie down flat and if they saw your foot up they will use their foot to stamp your foot down. They will use the gun; they put it on the forehead of the first person in the line and fired! In that process if you are hit by the bullet you are killed. It you are not perfectly in line with the first person that is the end of your life. They were doing that so that we can get accustomed with the sound of a gun. They taught us how to fire guns for ourselves. They also taught us courtesy and discipline that will show us how to respect them. But even though you respect them they will not respect you. It was no formal training where you go to a classroom. With that kind of training if you are sent to the warfront only God will help you.”¹⁴⁹

257. After the first year of the conflict – and certainly after the transition to full-scale guerrilla warfare at the end of 1993 – the RUF/SL retained and increased its fighting force in both size and commitment predominantly through a wide array of compulsive measures that included abduction and forced recruitment.
258. The RUF/SL pioneered the concept of forced recruitment in the conflict. It bore a marked proclivity towards abduction, abuse and training of civilians for the purpose of creating commandos. Particular units, including those units that were expressly formed to comprise child combatants, were almost exclusively comprised of forced recruits. Unfortunately, the Commission’s database does not permit findings to be made as to whether forced recruits in fact constituted the majority of the RUF/SL fighting force as a whole.

¹⁴⁸ Gibril Massaquoi, former RUF/SL Target Group and Battalion Commander, originally recruited as a junior commando in Pujehun and later Personal Assistant to former RUF/SL Leader, Foday Sankoh; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; July 2002.

¹⁴⁹ TRC Confidential Testimony from an early recruit of the RUF/SL in Kailahun District; testimony before TRC closed hearings held in Kailahun Town, Kailahun District; 14 May 2003.

259. The experiences endured by these recruits were replicated in their relationship with the civilian communities with which they came into contact. It is therefore no surprise that the scale of violations increased as the war progressed. According to a child combatant:

“During my five years’ jungle life with the rebels I adapted to their barbaric activities. And I usually made trips (missions or patrols) to the surrounding villages where we broke people’s houses and loot whatever that was in our access. We captured their cattle, picked fruits and sometimes after the looting we set some houses ablaze and returned with the booty which we handed over to the commander.”¹⁵⁰

RUF Codes of Conduct / Internal Discipline

260. The RUF developed a code of conduct, which was taught to every recruit during training. It is indeed doubtful how much use the combatants made of the code of conduct in the light of the violations and abuses that have been attributed to members of the movement.
261. Acknowledging, perhaps, some of the limitations to the disciplinary system, particularly as it pertained to the obvious acrimony that existed between various high-ranking members of the movement, Foday Sankoh’s erstwhile personal assistant Gibril Massaquoi appeared to obscure the issue somewhat in his testimony:

“At one point in time, Sankoh told me that there was some offences which were committed and the people involved could not be disciplined for fear that there would be in-fighting; except at the end of the war, when he would have brought such people to book. For instance, the case of Rashid [Mansaray] who was killed in Kailahun; he said he never gave orders. He told Sam Bockarie to take Rashid and others from positions towards which the enemies were advancing to continue their prison sentences in another location. When Sam Bockarie took them to the front line, he killed all of them.”¹⁵¹

Indeed, Massaquoi himself was implicated on multiple occasions for his assassination of rival commanders in his native Southern Province.

262. As could be imagined in any organisation with such a diverse and essentially incompatible membership, bitter disputes took place at almost every level in the RUF/SL. Unsurprisingly most of the commanders felt intensely vulnerable to threats – real or imaginary – posed to their dominance. The senior ranks were almost universally suspicious of one another. Hence, it was frequent for bitter and often violent confrontations to break out between them, mostly premised upon territoriality or control of the movement’s fighting resources.¹⁵²

¹⁵⁰ Confidential Statement to the Commission. Statement Number 5761

¹⁵¹ Gibril Massaquoi, former RUF/SL commander and erstwhile personal assistant to Foday Sankoh; TRC interview conducted in Freetown, July 2002.

¹⁵² See *inter alia* TRC interviews with Moigboi Moigande Kosia, former GSO-1 in the RUF/SL; conducted in Freetown between XX May and XX June 2003. Kosia refers to the disagreements that resulted in armed confrontations between, among others, Superman and Issa Sesay, Superman and Maskita, and Gibril Massaquoi with various others.

263. Furthermore, there was apparently always something of a chasm in the RUF/SL between the well-educated, experienced, minority in the movement and the majority membership of unrefined, marginalised, angry young men. On the one side were those who believed somewhat naively that they could inject a degree of moral rectitude into the movement, perhaps through the examples they set or the good sense they talked. Many of this group would, under circumstances in which the traditional cultural norms applied, have ascended to positions of responsibility and authority in the movement because of their education and seniority if nothing else. Some of them did indeed harbour pretensions on the leadership of the movement, although any active efforts to achieve it invariably met with spectacular failure.¹⁵³
264. On the other side were the younger, more militant members who found their natural constituencies among the malleable combatant youths whose loyalty could be guaranteed based on factors such as local allegiance, raw compulsion, manipulative bra-ism, dependency syndrome or a combination of several of those. These *de facto* leaders – the commanders of the RUF/SL – mostly enjoyed reputations for using force to solve their problems, whether against civilians or their fellow combatants.
265. The prevailing attitude held by the RUF/SL combatant cadre towards the intellectual or educated members of the RUF/SL was one of resentment and suspicion. Elder members of the movement most of who occupied investigative or administrative roles, were invariably subjected to intimidation and violence by the ‘force men’ whose discipline they were charged with ensuring; accordingly, most internal rule enforcement was ultimately abandoned due to fear.
266. The Commission recorded numerous instances of physical violence, intimidation and harassment against those RUF/SL members who profess to have had an interest in pursuing an ideologically based revolution, with principles, objectives and reasons at its heart. Those who opposed them were largely the ones who stood to make material gains out of the wayward acts they carried out with utter impunity. The favourite refrain of a group of younger thugs beating up a better educated, typically older man was: “noto buk wo dis” (literally this is not a book war or this is not a war for educated minds).
267. The practice appeared to continue right up until the end of the conflict: as long as there were new members coming on board, there were longer-standing members who saw the need to dig in their heels; as long as there were moderates in the ranks who tried to appease or restrain the combatant cadre, there were combatants and commanders who would try to thwart them with force. Issa Sesay, whose rise up the leadership ladder in the RUF/SL was marked by outbursts of violence and long-standing personal vendettas, ordered a number of acts against those he perceived as threats to himself. One such example was the severe beating administered to a prominent youth from Tonkolili District named Abdul Razak Kamara, who testified to the Commission during its public hearings in the Kono District:

¹⁵³ The most pertinent example of such a failure was the attempt in 1996 by a small band of self-deluding RUF members led by Philip S. Palmer to squeeze Foday Sankoh out of leadership of the RUF and install a new set of figureheads who were more palatable to the ruling political classes.

“After three days, I was travelling to Masingbi to go to Makeni, not knowing that they had sent a radio message ordering my arrest. I was arrested in Masingbi and taken to Makeni; Issa then sent 50 people headed by Lion – Colonel Lion – to meet me in the jail. They came and met me in the jail. They then removed me from the jail and I was stripped naked and beaten. They said I was thinking that I was in an educated world; but now I have been ‘handled’ and taught a lesson. I was stabbed on my hand and Lion kicked me hard on my private part.”¹⁵⁴

268. The prevailing atmosphere of suspicion within the RUF/SL was perceived in the later years as a major cause of acrimony and a potentially fatal obstacle to peace:

“There was one thing in the RUF: you should never say the truth; when you do that you are going to have problems. And you should not challenge, neither question whatever thing they are doing. But I did not believe in those things. I believe that I have to question whatever thing the case may be so that I can know the truth and say the truth. And allegations against people with the RUF were very much common.”¹⁵⁵

269. From all accounts, the movement appeared to have lost focus from the very day the incursion was launched in to Sierra Leone. Without an ideological foundation, attacks on civilians were rationalised as necessary to consolidate the revolution, whatever that meant. It was no surprise that combatants attacked even family members of fellow combatants. It would take ten unfortunate years for the tragedy that was the RUF to play itself out and for the people to begin counting the costs of such a misadventure.

The Sierra Leone Army (SLA) and Dissident Military ‘Splinter Groups’

270. At the start of the conflict, the Sierra Leonean Army numbered less than 3,500. Within four years, the strength of the Army was to jump to as high as 12,000¹⁵⁶. The NPRC government embarked on a massive recruitment exercise to strengthen the human resources available to the army for the prosecution of the war.
271. The social origins of most of these new recruits into the army were the urban marginalised groups who lived on the fringes of society. The antecedents of this group have been eloquently captured in the chapter of this Report dealing with youths.
272. As a result of their social origins, this group historically had a grudge against the rest of society arising from their long years of deprivation and marginalisation. The conflict provided an opportunity to vent the bottled up frustrations against those perceived to have benefited more from the opportunities available within the system.

¹⁵⁴ Abdul Razak Kamara, former youth leader and self-styled RUF/SL ‘peace ambassador’; testimony before TRC Public Hearings held in Koidu Town, Kono District, 26 June 2003.

¹⁵⁵ Abdul Razak Kamara, former youth leader and self-styled RUF/SL ‘peace ambassador’; testimony before TRC Public Hearings held in Koidu Town, Kono District, 26 June 2003.

¹⁵⁶ Interview with Brig. Julius Maada Bio, private residence, Freetown November 2003.

273. People of means, public officials and public institutions were reminders of the “oppressive” regime of zero opportunity under which they had lived for a very long time. The conflict became an opportunity to level the playing field. They began preying on the very people they were supposed to protect. For the first time in modern history, a national army turned against its very public in a civil war.
274. The signs that the army would ultimately consume its benefactors were rooted in the history of the institution.
275. The Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces traces its history back to British colonial days. From its inception, the RSLAF has had series of title changes and underwent rapid transformation from the colonial days to date. The original name was the Royal West African Rifles. It was later transformed into the Royal Sierra Leone Rifles, and subsequently the Royal Sierra Leone Regiment. The army served with distinction in both first and second world wars gaining the battle honours of Cameroon, in what was then German West Africa, and Myohaung, in Burma in 1944. Following independence in 1961, the armed forces became known as the Sierra Leone Regiment and finally, the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF) after the attainment of republican status in 1971. In 1995, the NPRC military regime renamed it the Armed Forces of the Republic of Sierra Leone (AFRSL). President Kabbah on 21 January 2002 renamed it as the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF).
276. The RSLAF was founded on a sound tradition of discipline, professionalism, and valour.¹⁵⁷ As a primary organ of the security forces of this country, it is answerable and accountable to civil constituted authority. Article 165 (2) of the 1991 Constitution defined the constitutional role of the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces as follows:
- a. To guard and secure the sovereignty of the Republic of Sierra Leone and its citizens.
 - b. To preserve the safety and territorial integrity of the state.
 - c. To participate in the development of the state.
 - d. To safeguard the people’s achievement.
 - e. To protect the Constitution.
277. These provisions were not radically from those of the Independence Constitution of 1961. Yet, with the passage of time, instead of building on this enviable foundation, the entire institution deteriorated. Order and hierarchy are the noblest traditional foundations of any Army; when that structure is destroyed, chaos is bound to follow. Unfortunately, that was the path the Army was forced to follow in the period after independence. Things became so bad that the Sierra Leone Military completely lost all semblances of command and control. The appointment of the Army Commander to parliament, for example, was enough inducement to selfish, greedy and disgruntled soldiers dreaming to become president or ministers overnight instead of aspiring to become generals by rising through the ranks systematically and by merit. Some elite members of the society who sought to use the military to further their own personal

¹⁵⁷ Major General Tom Carew, Chief of Defence Staff. Submission to the TRC. May 2003.

ambitions and interests were also responsible for the decay of the institution. The decay of the institution was further compounded by other vices such as tribalism, sectionalism, lip service, indiscipline, loss of command and control and the lack of respect for the chain of command within the military.¹⁵⁸ It is therefore in the manipulation of the army by politicians that the roots of the terrible violations committed by the army during the conflict could be found.

278. A programme of 'africanisation' of the military in Sierra Leone started in 1964. It has been argued that the escalation of the 'africanisation' was political, premature and therefore deficient in professional judgment.¹⁵⁹ The recipient of such political largesse was not given the time to mature in any of the new commands he had been given. This was because the new positions were not merited outside the criterion of the need for 'africanisation'. According to Major Noah,

"It appeared then as if the programme was designed to put the most senior Sierra Leonean Officer in a position of trust as political insurance for the politician who introduced the scheme. In 1964, for example, the speech of the Governor General lauded the elevation of Lieutenant Colonel Lansana to the substantive rank of a Colonel and. I in 1965, he was promoted to the rank of Brigadier. As the time for elections drew nearer, the political atmosphere took on a new dimension. Tribalism was clothed in negativity and this led to the alienation of tribes: the south and east from the north and the west. It was a very disastrous divide which systematic demise of values and finally culminated in the crisis. It was that unfortunate phenomenon (negative tribalism) that catapulted the Force Commander into politics and consequently, led to the erosion of his grip on the army, as the alienated segment in that same army fossilized into a counter-poise to safeguard stability and continuity of sanity in the force."¹⁶⁰

279. The tribal and regional divide assumed a very catastrophic political dimension. The political parties exploited it to the extent that sycophancy became the order of the day. Professional promotions and other considerations that were hitherto meritorious in the military were politicised. The primary criterion for promotion, merit, became redundant and ostracized. The main criterion became 'The right tribe and the ability to pass on intelligence on fellow officers and men'. This system automatically made square pegs in round holes extremely prominent in telling abominable lies and calumnies about innocent, hardworking, more qualified, and competent colleagues. It completely negated and alienated such virtues as easy camaraderie, sharing, mutuality and permissiveness, which were the cohesive factors of the norms and traditions of the officer corps.
280. The slogan became "Survival of the fittest", meaning 'the most depraved liar was King'. Thus, depravity wedded the Army and as mediocrity assumed importance, the schism in the tribal divide widened. By 1967,

¹⁵⁸ Major General Tom Carew, Submission to the TRC. May 2003. See also submission to the TRC by Major Abu Noah (Rtd.) May 2003.

¹⁵⁹ Major Abu Noah (Rtd.) Submission to the TRC. May 2003.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid

the army was already consumed by the divide. Two clear groups emerged along the lines of the political divide. Officers from the North allied with those from the Western Area, while officers from the South were allied with those from the East.¹⁶¹

281. The disintegration continued to propel the army inexorably to a climax. Other senior officers perceived the Force Commander as a tool of the Prime Minister who depended on the Force Commander for his security and political victory in the impending election of 1967. With increased powers arising from his closeness to the Prime Minister, the Force Commander on a number of occasions had his colleagues retired or arrested and detained for all kinds of infractions, or assigned junior officers to administrative positions over and above other senior officers. This led to indiscipline as the senior officers refused to recognise the authority of the junior officers.
282. Mutual suspicion gripped the military about the role of the officers in the 1967 elections. When the Force Commander declared martial law on 21st March 1967, after the Prime Minister had lost the elections, the bonds of unity and esprit de' corps in the army finally snapped. A process of military intervention in politics had been unleashed on the country, with the new helmsmen awarding themselves military ranks they didn't deserve and which elevated them far above more senior, qualified and experienced army officers.¹⁶² Such an arrangement could only lead to an implosion. What it needed was a spark, which was provided by the onset of the conflict in 1991.
283. The return of Siaka Stevens in 1968 and his rise to power ushered in the final assault on the values and traditions of order, discipline and hierarchy in the Army. He rendered the Army impotent by a system of subtle but deliberate disarmament through fear, that when it was called upon to perform its constitutional role (to defend the sovereignty of the state), it was in no position to do so. Over politicisation of the Army had castrated the higher echelon, and entrenched those whose sole desire to get to the top led to their betrayal of their colleagues. They became *merchant-generals*, more interested in material acquisitions from the politicians than in a professional armed service. Therefore when war came, there was no officer corps to handle it.¹⁶³
284. By the beginning of the war in 1991, the rot in the army had become obvious. Discipline had collapsed. Training was non-existent and people had risen to the commanding heights of the army by simply doing desk jobs. Officers simply abandoned the war front or cowered in the face of the RUF onslaught. Junior officers developed disdain for their officers who were unable to show leadership at a critical time in the life of the country. The disdain culminated to the plan by the junior officers to overthrow the government. The coup of April 1992 was designed to arrest the collapse of the army and prosecute the war in a more professional

¹⁶¹ Ibid.

¹⁶² After the counter coup of 1967, the coup leaders elevate even private soldiers to Captains and Lieutenants. Siaka Stevens himself granted 21 Warrant Officers commissions as officers. The leaders of the April 1992 also approved fantastic promotions to themselves. All these elevations were intensely resented by other officers and destroyed the chain of command in the military.

¹⁶³ Major Abu Noah (Rtd.) Submission to the TRC. May 2003.

manner. The coup plotters assigned to themselves very important political offices as a result of their participation in the coup. During the NPRC era, it was common to see Brigadiers and Colonels saluting their juniors (mostly captains and lieutenants). The impact on morale and discipline in the army was devastating and negated the core foundations for executing the coup.

285. During the war years, the gates into the military were thrown open to good citizens, criminals, and hooligans alike in the hope of flooding the warfront with enough manpower to prosecute the war. These undeserving individuals quickly exploited their uniforms and guns for personal, sectional and other selfish interests. The ultimate result was the AFRC coup of May 25, 1997, which threw the entire nation into turbulence, lawlessness, chaos, anarchy and catastrophe. It was reported to the Commission that a colonel in the army even argued before his colleagues that there was nothing wrong for a colonel to pay compliments to a corporal during the era of the AFRC. "That was how discipline disappeared and the entire officer corps decomposed."¹⁶⁴
286. It wasn't surprising therefore that both the officer corps and the rank and file of the army began preying on the civilian population right from the onset of the war. There was no overriding national sentiment on which the army could be mobilised. The military was national only in name. By 1991 it was still hostage to ethnic and tribal sentiments. These deepened with the onset of party politics in 1996 when the well intentioned efforts of the Government at reform of the army were labelled as ethnic persecution of Northerners. The Sierra Leonean army has still not weaned itself of ethnic sentiments. Those who harbour such sentiments are however in the minority. The Government needs to move fast to consolidate the gains of the present restructuring and retraining efforts for the army.

The Civil Defence Forces (CDF)

286. The term "civil defence" is not construed here exclusively to mean the group that became known as the Civil Defence Forces, or CDF. In fact, the Commission identified numerous examples of groups that embarked upon initiatives to lend protection to their communities quite independently from the formal structures of the CDF and in many cases long before that institution was even conceived.
287. We must, of course, acknowledge that in the minds of many Sierra Leoneans the CDF faction was to become associated with most of the official 'operations' carried out towards the cause of defending civilians against their attackers or oppressors. A primary reason for this association is that the majority of those civil defence initiatives that had existed before the time of the CDF were eventually subsumed into the CDF's structures of co-ordination. Nevertheless, as a wealth of testimonies before the Commission confirm,¹⁶⁵ between different

¹⁶⁴ Major General Tom Carew, submission to the TRC. May 2003.

¹⁶⁵ The TRC has conducted statement-taking, public and closed hearings, investigations and research interviews in each of the twelve Districts of the country, as well as in the Western Area. In every District, the TRC heard from representatives of local civil defence groups, including – wherever possible – from the leaders of the relevant local arm of the CDF. One of the most striking points stressed by witnesses time and again was that the CDF was contrived as a formal endorsement, or an 'institutionalisation', of activities that had been undertaken at community level

Regions, between different ethnic groups and even between cultural sub-groups, there were substantial differences in the character and conduct of the respective CDF components, let alone of the autonomous civil militias and vigilante groups that had preceded them. This chapter shall however deal with the CDF. It is hoped that subsequent research will investigate the roles played by these other groups and the extent of their intervention in the conflict.

288. Civil defence evokes different images and memories depending on the part of the country from which one originates and the place or places in which one lived during the hostilities. At least in the first few years of the conflict, the local populace of most communities felt a strong sense of ownership over the persons they had entrusted with their protection and thus they developed nomenclature in their own native languages to refer to these groups.
289. Hence the people of the Koinadugu District in the Northern Province, who are predominantly Koranko, Limba and Yalunka by tribe, knew the warriors, soothsayers and guides who mobilised alongside the Army as early as 1991 by the collective term *Tamaboros*.¹⁶⁶ In the Temne-dominated Districts of Bombali, Port Loko and Tonkolili, there were *Gbethes*, the word having derived from the Temne term for hunters, which is also understood to carry an implied meaning of power or prowess,¹⁶⁷ and *Kapras*. The people of Kono referred to their local militiamen as *Donsos*, which also means hunters, but which was abstracted effectively to mean 'fighters', or any one who stood up in the face of the enemy.¹⁶⁸ Finally, the people of the predominantly-Mende Districts of the South and East of the country – Moyamba, Bonthe, Bo, Pujehun, Kenema and Kailahun – mostly spoke of their own 'local hunters' or *Kamajors*.¹⁶⁹
290. The last of these categories – the Kamajors – merits special attention in an analysis of the concept of civil defence during the conflict. At the point when the Commission began the pursuit of its mandate, there existed a great deal of ambiguity and contention in the popular understanding as to who or what the Kamajors actually were. To a great extent, it remained the case during the Public Hearings across Sierra Leone, as Kamajor witnesses proved to be incredibly reticent and in one District practically boycotted the Hearings on the suspicion that the TRC was simply a witch-hunt intended to expose their Society 'secrets'.
291. While such attempts to cast a veil of mystery over the character and conduct of the Kamajors were perhaps motivated out of a certain fear of the reception that a candid testimony might get from erstwhile compatriots or adversaries alike, they in fact did nothing to serve the cause of truth in Sierra Leone. Only a very

for many years previously. Moreover, the Regional and cultural differences between the ways in which different civil militia groups described their roles was also a noteworthy feature of the TRC's enquiries. It would thus be neither accurate nor impartial for the Commission to restrict its analysis of civil defence to the activities of the CDF.

¹⁶⁶ In interviews with the Commission, witnesses from the Koranko ethnic group translated the word 'Tamaboro' as meaning "come and take us out of trouble"; see for example James F. Koroma, elder of the community of Kondembaia, Diang Chiefdom; TRC interview conducted in Kondembaia, Koinadugu District, 15 August 2003.

¹⁶⁷ Sheikh Ahmed Tejan Sesay, former 'Tamaboro' and CDF District Commander for the Bombali District; TRC interview conducted in Makeni, Bombali District; 17 August 2003.

¹⁶⁸ Chief Augustine Safea Nyademo, Town Chief of Baiama and former 'Donso' commander; TRC interview conducted in Koidu Town, Kono District; 12 August 2003.

¹⁶⁹ Kekura Brima Gbau, prominent community stakeholder and former Kamajor; TRC interview conducted in Pangoma Township, Kenema District, 17 July 2003.

small handful of former Kamajors testified publicly about the full extent of their participation in the conflict; accordingly, the remainder of witnesses in that category did as much to confuse the Commission further with half-truths and convenient oversights as they did to assist in the creation of an impartial historical record. There was a marked absence of public testimony from Kamajors pertaining to their participation in actual combat or military operations. The Commission has depended largely upon closed testimony and confidential interviews to formulate its account of that aspect of the CDF's conduct. Moreover, very few witnesses were willing in any forum to discuss the details of their initiation ceremonies, which for many of them remain taboo.

292. Indeed, there has been a generally unproductive effort on the part of some Kamajors to obscure the character of their faction. They have tried to finesse a place for the Kamajors among the sacred secret societies that form an integral part of Sierra Leone's cultural heritage. This place is simply not their due: the Kamajors were created for the express purpose of war, albeit a war that they perceived themselves to be fighting in the name of a just cause. The secret societies, including the Poro and Bondo Societies for men and women respectively, are essentially peaceful unions of citizens premised on common belief in the powers of spirits that dwell mainly in the "bush."¹⁷⁰
293. There was undoubtedly an underlying integrity to the manner in which certain individual Kamajors engaged in the struggle to liberate their homeland from the unconstitutional stranglehold of the People's Army (comprising fighting forces from both the RUF/SL and the AFRC). However only through a nuanced analysis of the evidence can it be possible to garner an accurate understanding of how the Kamajors, abstracted out of, yet distinct from any pre-existing tribal militias, turned a noble cause into a presence that proliferated the armed conflict in its latter stages.
294. The word *Kamajors* was used in testimonies to the TRC in essentially two different contexts: first, to describe certain among the locally-organised Mende militia groups of the early 1990s – by all accounts consisting mostly of those who had actually been hunters;¹⁷¹ second and much more commonly, to apply to the dramatically-expanded CDF that mobilised *en masse* from 1996 onwards. There is, once again, an important disconnect between the two groups: the first attempted to capitalise upon pre-existing aptitudes among the local populace that would assist in rendering protection to the township; whereas the second has, upon rigorous inspection, proven to be a much more less discriminatory means of recruiting manpower with which to wage war.
295. The latter Kamajors group was not in fact a hunting society, nor did the majority of its members have any unifying pedigree as local hunters or traditional 'bush warriors'. On the contrary, the Kamajors of the 'mass mobilisation' era were mostly hurriedly assembled youths from rural communities; spirited into action

¹⁷⁰ The Truth and Reconciliation Commission made a principled decision not to undertake any of its own analysis regarding the possibility of violations and abuses of human rights taking place within secret societies in peace-time Sierra Leone, precisely because of the *de facto* detachment of these groups from the militias and armed factions that prosecuted the war. The role that such belief systems play in society in general was perceived to have been of greater relevance to the reconciliation component of the Commission's work; hence the production of the internal research paper entitled: *Traditional Belief Systems and Customs of Ethnic Groups and their implications for Reconciliation*; 26 March 2003

¹⁷¹ TRC interviews with Kamajors from the Kenema, Bo, Pujehun and Bonthe Districts; conducted in each of those four Districts of the country between July and September 2003.

through an initiation ceremony that made the illusory promise that they were endowed with supernatural powers; then sent to conduct sensitive and serious operations without adequate training or any recognised system of discipline. It is to this expanded group of Kamajors, comprising the overwhelming bulk of the CDF membership after 1996, that nearly all of the violations citing CDF in the Commission's database are attributed.

296. In addition to the above-listed geographically-specific groupings, there were also diverse mechanisms for civil defence that sprung up in different parts of the country under generic terms such as 'vigilantes', 'community defence units' or CDUs, 'auxiliaries' and 'watchmen'. Each of them played its own distinct role in Sierra Leone's history and the Commission is mandated to capture such contributions to the greatest extent possible.

Character and Conduct of the Kamajors

297. There is a great deal of merit in assessing the leadership of the Civil Defence Forces, particularly as regards the intricacies of its structures, according to a phased approach: first, from the attainment of power by the SLPP Government up to the point of the 1997 military coup and the establishment of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) [that is 10 March 1996 to 25 May 1997]; second, during the period in which the SLPP Government was in exile in Guinea, which is also known as the *inter-regnum* [that is, 25 May 1997 to 10 May 1998]; and third, after the restoration of the Government to power until the final cessation of hostilities [that is, 10 March 1998 to 18 January 2002]. These distinctions are vital in piecing together an accurate understanding of the means by which decisions were made and, either as a result of those decisions or due to other militating factors, operations were carried out during each of the periods in question.
298. The erstwhile National Director of Operations for the CDF, in his public testimony before the Commission in Pujehun, appeared with hindsight to belittle the importance of a title or official rank within the movement. His testimony – whilst couched in parables - further lends credence to the deduction that power and effective command in the CDF appeared to be relatively centralised.

"Giving me the power as National Director of Operations was like you giving me a goat and then you continuing to hold onto the rope; if you're going to hold onto that rope, what would be the point of giving me the goat in the first place – how could I benefit from it?"

You have to bear in mind that there were so many of us, all vying for power or position. There were certain people among us who always tried to interfere; to undermine; to grab the position of the next man. You can't work properly under those kinds of conditions; but those were the conditions in which we were being asked to work. Nobody was reporting to his compatriots or to his commanders further up the chain of command; our attitudes to leadership and organisation were negative."¹⁷²

¹⁷² Joseph A. S. Koroma, former CDF National Director of Operations and Member of the War Council at Base Zero; testimony before TRC Public Hearings held in Pujehun Town, Pujehun District, 24 June 2003.

299. On a somewhat lower level, Kamajor fighting units seem to have organised themselves around fairly arbitrary, ad-hoc criteria. It is indisputable that many groups of Kamajors, a substantial number of who had not been formally 'initiated' into the Society or who had been through false initiations, acted in excess of their collective mandate. The Commission's research suggests further, however, that on an individual level, combatants also acted beyond and often in direct contravention of their superiors' instructions. In the circumstances, effective command responsibility was vested in the commanding officers at the lower level; the unit commanders whose groups were smaller, well known to them and therefore more manageable. Several witnesses before the Commission used the terminology of gang violence to describe the ways in which Kamajors moved through the townships they patrolled.¹⁷³ According to one of those civilians who observed the Kamajors most closely in the Bonthe District:

"[A] battalion commander could conceivably be against a lot of the things that happened, but he [would not be the one] to have absolute control over 'his' Kamajors. It was something like a clan system; every group had its own identified leader."¹⁷⁴

300. The Civil defence Forces was established to defend the communities against attacks by the RUF. Its base of support was in the communities. For a group professing a "just cause", that of defending the communities against unprovoked attack, it was inconceivable that it would attack the very people it was established to protect. This was exactly what happened. It may be tempting to explain away the violations committed by the CDF as collateral damage in a war situation as some witnesses suggested to the Commission. However, such simplistic explanation does not contextualise how a just cause became indistinguishable from 'rebel' atrocities. The following paragraphs are insights discerned by the Commission as rationale for some of the violations that were committed by the CDF.

CDF Initiation and Training

301. The initiation process in the CDF was a very rigorous exercise that emphasised compliance with certain taboos that included sexual abstinence and non-appropriation of other people's property. Compliance with these taboos was expected to protect the combatant in battle, making him invisible to the enemy. With numerous initiation ceremonies going on all over the southern and eastern regions, and with all kinds of people welcomed into the group, it became difficult to enforce compliance with these taboos. The Commission received testimonies of harassment of the civilian population, especially those suspected of being RUF sympathisers. Subsequently to a lot of people, membership of the CDF became a passport to free passage in the communities. Membership became highly sought after. Many of those who joined were not initiated neither did they receive any training in the mores of the group. Initiation became a highly commercialised enterprise with people paying exorbitantly to go through the process. Initiation fees ranged from Le2000 to Le10, 000 per person. At times there were as many as 5000 men to

¹⁷³ Locate testimony in the database and refer further to Father Garrick and others.

¹⁷⁴ Reverend Father Emmanuel John Garrick; TRC interview conducted in Pujehun Town, Pujehun District, 26 June 2003; at page 7.

initiate. The initiators chose their times and locations. With such numbers being initiated on a regular basis, discipline and control became lax. The possession of a weapon became an important instrument for the new arrivals in settling old personal and family quarrels.

302. The establishment of the civil defence units in the communities had been on the initiative of the chiefs. In the early days, the chiefs selected able-bodied young men from their communities and sent them for “training”. With institutionalisation of the movement and the massive numbers that subsequently joined, it became impossible for the chiefs to control the membership. Furthermore, while the chiefs’ retained symbolic authority in the communities, the control of men in arms created new levers of power in the communities. The CDF was organised both as a military and an administrative entity. Each district and town had administrators who were in charge. The function of the administrator was to ensure the maintenance of law and order, settle disputes among people and encourage the people to continue with their daily lives. The administrators had supplanted the government appointed administrative officers. Increasingly the administrators supplanted the chiefs as points of authority and contact. The administrator could override the decision of a chief on any issue. He could punish a chief for “errant” behaviour or appoint a chief in any community or interfere in chieftaincy disputes in the community in favour of a disputant.¹⁷⁵ Many administrators became drunk with power and began sending the troops out against perceived opponents. The administrators wielded powers of life and death over people. Some of them like Kosseh Hindowa in Bo protected CDF militiamen accused of killing innocent people and shielded them from law enforcement officers. This created a culture of impunity that membership of the CDF put you above the law. The Commission has received testimony of CDF troops being sent out to murder opponents or seize their property, even after the conflict was over in 2001.¹⁷⁶ In a letter of complaint to the Commission, a petitioner accused Kosseh Hindowa of ordering the destruction by Kamajors of his compound in Bo valued at over Le50Million, and the removal of valuable property including steel windows and doors, roofing and other building materials which were then taken to the CDF store in Bo on 16th February 1998. The petitioner had complained to the CDF Coordinator in Bo at the time, Alhaji Daramy Rogers, the National Coordinator, Chief Hinga Norman and the then Vice president, Dr. Joe Demby. None of them intervened to facilitate the return of his property, pay him compensation for the destruction or punish Kosseh Hindowa for his actions.¹⁷⁷
303. After the expulsion of the RUF from power, the Kamajors launched an operation on the town of Koribundo in Bo district, “to punish the people for supporting the AFRC”. This support was an apparent reference to the fact that an army garrison had long existed in Koribundo. The town was completely destroyed. On the basis of reports made to the Commission, an event specific hearing was organised in Freetown on the destruction of the town. Witness after witness narrated to the Commission that after the destruction, the National Coordinator of the CDF, Chief Hinga Norman, visited the town and congratulated the boys for “a job well down”. When confronted by the town’s people he was alleged to have told them that his instruction was actually that no building in the town should be left standing, but that he noticed that his boys had spared the local church. He told the people that the destruction was a

¹⁷⁵ Testimony at Bo Public Hearings

¹⁷⁶ Confidential interview with an ex-CDF combatant in Bo, 5th June 2003.

¹⁷⁷ Petition to TRC dated 20th December 2002.

punishment for the support extended to the AFRC and warned them from such conduct in the future.

304. The CDF became a law unto themselves in all the districts and communities they controlled. While there were police stations in some of the districts, the police officers were hamstrung and could do nothing in the face of the overwhelming powers of the CDF. Police officers were summarily beaten for not obeying the orders of the Kamajors. Testimonies abound of people arrested on all kinds of charges and it was left to the district administrator or the local commander to determine the fate of the person. For such purely civilian matters, no code of conduct had been laid down for the rank and file. It all depended on the momentary idiosyncrasy of the local commander whether one lived or was killed if arrested on any charge by the CDF. As witnesses told the Commission:

“They take the laws into their own hands; they have the feeling that they are the people in charge in the country so they will act however they wish.”¹⁷⁸

“The complainant was a businessman who had lived in Bo for many years, with his family. The Kamajor leader in Bo without any lawful excuse or justification raided his house, beat him up and took up his goods on many occasions. He reported the matter to the police in Bo who tried to safeguard him and his properties, but the Kamajors in Bo repeatedly beat him up and took his goods away. Later the police decided to send him to the CID Freetown for “protective custody”. The CID Freetown decided to keep him in Pademba Road prisons without any justification or lawful excuse. He was there for six months without release when his wife and mother came to our office to complain.”¹⁷⁹

The police sent a citizen into detention for six months, yet it was their constitutional duty to offer him protection. The police authorities could not bring his persecutors to account even after the war had ended.

“The seizure of my Honda motorbike took place at Bumpeh, on the Bo – Mattru Road on the 17th October 1997. I met a Kamajor at a checkpoint in Bumpeh town with a gun. He stopped me and demanded the Honda keys from me. He then took me and the Honda bike to his boss, Mr. Moses Lamina alias Gbokambama. Moses Lamina told me that he acted upon the order of his boss, Mr. Allieu Kondewah, the Kamajor High Priest, that all vehicles used on that road should be confiscated and brought to him at his base – Talia in Bonthe district. I became helpless and my Honda bike was forcefully taken away. I continued my journey the next day walking 20 miles on foot from Bumpeh to Serabu.

In the attempt to retrieve my Honda and to test the veracity of Moses lamina’s allegation, my brother, James Farma of Kaniya and I walked 60 miles to Allieu Kondewah to his base at Talia on the 30th October 1997. He admitted passing the order to seize all vehicles and send them to his base. He promised to return the confiscated vehicles to their owners after the war but he never did.”¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁸ Rev. Fr. Garrick, testimony at TRC Public Hearings in Bonthe District, July 2003.

¹⁷⁹ Office of the Ombudsman. 1st Annual Report 2002. OMB 3921/2002 page 23-24.

¹⁸⁰ Mr. Henry Moriba, Petition to the TRC, dated 11th March 2003. As at the time of the petition, the motorcycle had still not been returned.

305. There were contradicting testimonies from members of the CDF on the nature and length of the training they received. Most of the witnesses talked of “a few days” for the initiation after which they were drafted to the war front. They also claimed that they were not even trained in how to handle a gun. A combatant was expected to learn how to use a gun himself. Other testimonies talked of training programmes lasting from between a week to one month. Such witnesses however could not recollect or discuss in detail the nature of the training offered them during that period. It seems obvious that some training was offered at least at Base Zero. It is however doubtful the nature of any training offered the combatants who underwent initiation in their various chiefdoms. Even while at Base Zero, the Commission was told that the combatants refused to undergo training considering it worthless or unnecessary.¹⁸¹ Without adequate training, it was no surprise that the combatants took liberties with people as they liked. The Commission was invited to compare the behaviour of the Kamajors with the Gbethes whose leader M. S Dumbuya invited the ECOMOG forces to train his men. It seemed therefore that for the Kamajors, a lot of emphasis was placed on the initiation as if it was the solution to all potential problems that might be encountered by the combatants.
306. For many CDF combatants, wielding a gun provided a context to appropriate property. Numerous testimonies before the Commission talk of Kamajor local commanders taking over the private property of individuals without the payment of compensation, and apparently for no cause. Many of the properties taken over have not been returned even now that the war is over. By 1999 the Chief Initiator, King Kondewah was telling the Kamajors that everything was over. This was interpreted to mean that they were freed from all injunctions and taboos, and further that from thenceforth, they were to fend for themselves.¹⁸² The scale of violations dramatically increased as the Kamajors began a spree of looting that was not markedly different from the RUF. Houses were unroofed and the materials converted to the personal property of the commanders.
307. The CDF had been very popular as a concept. It would have been logical to assume that its leadership at the communities would derive from an amalgam of all the groups and interests present in the communities. Many middle class persons and members of the political elite supported the movement in various ways. Yet it’s fighting forces and the administrative arm were led by people with very basic education or none at all. Lacking knowledge of human rights principles or the laws of armed conflict, it is not surprising that brazenness and arbitrariness subordinated common sense and intellect in decision making within the movement.
308. The government seemed unable or unwilling to rein in the CDF. Very prominent witnesses informed the Commission that they brought to the attention of the government the grave violations that were being perpetrated against the civilian population by the CDF. In one instance, a witness said the President confessed to him his inability to call the National Coordinator of the CDF, Chief Hinga Norman to order about the behaviour of the combatants for fear that he might turn the CDF against the government.¹⁸³ Hon. Richard Lagawo, majority leader

¹⁸¹ M.S. Dumbuya, interview at the TRC Office, Freetown, October 2003.

¹⁸² Confidential interview with ex-Kamajor combatant in Bo. 5th June 2003.

¹⁸³ Confidential interview with a member of the CDF War Council at Base Zero, TRC Office, Freetown, November 2003.

in parliament and former National Chairman of the CDF has described Chief Norman as “a strong man” who could not be controlled.¹⁸⁴ All of this took place in a situation where the national army had been effectively disbanded by executive fiat. Defence of the country and even peacetime defence activities fell to an armed faction that had not been trained in the basic rudiments of how to relate to civilians. This state of affairs could only worsen the climate of impunity that prevailed in Kamajor camps, as they were indeed beyond control by the government. In one instance it took the intervention of ECOMOG to arrest the Chief Priest, King Kondewah over the murder of a civilian.¹⁸⁵ After a few days in detention he was released and the matter has not been resurrected. The behaviour of the Kamajors provides important lessons in managing civilian militias when they deploy violence on behalf of a national government.

FACTIONAL FLUIDITY IN THE CONFLICT

309. To the extent that the violations committed by the RUF are a permanent, underpinning characteristic of the conflict, the Commission has identified the RUF/SL as the foremost single influence on the course of the conflict from its outset until its cessation. Indeed, due to the transient presence of some fighting factions on the territory - for example, the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) or the Ghurkhas, both of whom entered but subsequently left Sierra Leone - and to the initial non-existence of some factions which came to feature prominently in the conflict - for example, the Civil Defence Forces (CDF) and ECOMOG, the Sierra Leone-mandated Monitoring Group of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) - it is possible to surmise that the RUF/SL was in fact the only faction that featured in the conflict from start to finish.
310. Whilst certain combatants of other affiliations fought throughout, some of them continually against the RUF/SL, the capacity in which they were fighting changed, in some cases many times over, depending on such factors as shifts in political power or leadership, force of circumstance or sheer adversity. The biographies of individual fighters over the course of the conflict testify to its unfathomable complexity and an astounding factional fluidity. The Commission has, for example, heard from certain combatants who first took up arms as members of the RUF, later joined a civil militia group to fight against the RUF and now serve in the reformed Sierra Leone Armed Forces. Others began as soldiers fighting for the Government, later joined the junta and turned against the Government, formed their own splinter groups in the bush, found favour with the Government again to assist in eliminating the RUF and are now sitting in prison.
311. None of the above ought to imply that the Revolutionary United Front itself had anything akin to a fixed identity, or identities, from the point of its conception to the point of its effective elimination. On the contrary, the RUF is most fittingly described as a 'movement' - a set of loosely bound objectives, some of them divergent or even contradictory, afforded a military dimension and finding their expression in the actions of people from across a wide spectrum of backgrounds, many of whom associated themselves neither with the objectives of the movement, nor necessarily with one another.

¹⁸⁴ Interview with the Commission. TRC office, Freetown, May 2004.

¹⁸⁵ TRC Confidential interview with an ex-Kamajor combatant. Bo 5th June 2003

312. Indeed, as the ensuing analysis demonstrates, the scale and nature of atrocities committed by members of the RUF appear to have their roots as much in dissension within the ranks, the nature of their training and in any shared agenda among them. The RUF were not rebels without a cause, but nor can we ascribe a common cause to 'the rebels'. In reality the movement attains its defining character from the differences - sometimes subtle, sometimes fundamental - behind the various causes for which RUF members fought.¹⁸⁶

The Chameleonic Character of the Combatants

313. The conflict was prosecuted largely by unconventional fighting forces among and between themselves, certainly in its second and third phases. Even during the first phase, when the factions aligned themselves to a more conventional brand of warfare, there was a marked absence of head-to-head battlefield confrontations. Militias and armed groups, including the Sierra Leone Army in its various incarnations, generally concentrated their strategic planning and resources on carrying out 'operations'. Whether or not couched in the rubric of offensive and defensive missions, these operations were predominantly geared towards the destruction of life and property. Civilians, as individuals and in groups, were often the express targets of participant militias and armed groups rather than merely the unfortunate victims of 'collateral damage'.
314. To the extent that it retained at least a semblance of conventionality in its command structures, ranks and rules of engagement until the bulk of its soldiers were subsumed into the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) in 1997, the professional Sierra Leone Army was something of an exception in the conflict as a *de facto* conventional Army. The norm for the militias and armed groups whose formation or transformation was essentially premised upon participating in the conflict was to structure and organise themselves in a mode and manner that was irrevocably reflective of the social order that reigns in Sierra Leone.
315. The Commission identified an astonishing 'factional fluidity' among the different militias and armed groups that prosecuted the war. Both overtly and covertly, both gradually and suddenly, fighters switched sides or established new 'units' on a scale unprecedented in any other conflict of which the Commission is aware. These 'chameleon tendencies' spanned across all factions without exception; they say much about the character of the general 'breed' of combatant who participated in the Sierra Leone conflict.
316. On an individual level, the biographies of ex-fighters who testified to the Commission attest to the relative frequency of the peculiar scenario whereby combatants could be allied to a particular faction for several years before joining their proclaimed archenemies.

¹⁸⁶ It should be noted that compulsion was one of the most common causes that drove conscripted civilians into fighting for the RUF.

317. On a collective level, almost entire 'factions' switched 'sides' on at least two occasions during the conflict. First, after 1994, the membership of the so-called 'Action Group', a component of the RUF/SL in the Pujehun District, largely abandoned the RUF/SL and became Kamajors fighting for the pro-Government CDF. Second, upon the creation of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) as a junta regime, the majority of officers and private soldiers in the Sierra Leone Army transferred their allegiance away from the incumbent (*de jure*) Government of Sierra Leone to ally themselves with the RUF/SL under the banner of the 'People's Army'.
318. In every single case recorded by the Commission, including those cited above, the dynamics of factional fluidity were complex and somewhat anomalous, but nevertheless remarkable to even the most experienced of military observers. Research carried out by the Commission has been able to proffer the following possible explanations for such factional fluidity.
319. Broadly speaking, for each of the different factions, the composition of the ground forces was almost identical – young, impressionable, disgruntled 'youth men' eager for an opportunity to 'assert themselves' and see that no harm was done to their own people ('people' here to be understood restrictively to mean either immediate family or perhaps members of the same close-knit community) whilst fighting against perceived injustice.
320. Due in part to the prevalence of organised hierarchies in Sierra Leonean society – sometimes referred to as *bra-ism* and a related culture of dependency– groups of combatants were more inclined to remain loyal to particular commanders than to overarching causes or societal interests. Thus, where an influential commander (or a *bra*, a big brother figure) declared that the whole unit was now to follow orders from a new source, or to ally themselves with a different set of fighters from another 'faction', there would invariably be wholesale compliance without so much as asking questions. During the conflict, the declarations and suggestions of a *bra* carried all the more persuasive weight because they were backed up by threats of summary punishment for non-conformists.
321. Upon conducting a in-depth investigation into the circumstances, the Commission has found that there are subtleties to the collective switches (like the examples of the Action Group and the People's Army described above) that preclude their being described accurately as 'defections', 'sell-outs' or transformations of character.
322. On the contrary, chameleonic tendencies in the conflict are actually representative of the consistency of the underpinning objectives and motivations of the combatant factions. For example, where a local militia like the Momoh Konneh (Ndorgboryorsoi) component of the 'Action Group' (purportedly) sought sincerely to protect and/ or promote the interests of the indigenous people in the face of scourges like bad governance and corrupt leadership, they originally found a vehicle in the shape of the RUF/SL; after the RUF/SL reverted to guerrilla warfare and moved out of the communities in question, the 'Action Group' (Ndorgboryorsoi) members identified a new means of fulfilling their objective – through the local civil militia concept embodied in the CDF. A further example of the subtleties of an apparent collective 'switching of sides' is found in the case of the Sierra Leone Army and its various incarnations.

'Blurred lines': various phenomena relating to perpetrator identity

323. In the second phase of the conflict in Sierra Leone, there grew among the public a widespread subscription to the theory that soldiers of the Sierra Leone Army were 'behaving like rebels' or indeed 'working together with the rebels'. The concept that soldiers generally could not be trusted with the defence of the civilian population became popularly understood under the rubric of 'sobels'.
324. While appearing at first glance to be testament to the 'chameleonic character' of combatants (purporting to be one thing while acting like quite another; 'soldiers by day, rebels by night', etc.) these 'blurred lines' in fact reaffirm the adage that a 'soldier is a soldier'.
325. The loyalties of the soldiers have always been transient and malleable to the political agenda of those in power. The disharmonies and internal conflicts between soldiers in this conflict appear to have arisen primarily due to the mixing of military and political concepts of 'power' in an unsophisticated fashion.
326. The NPRC administration of Captain Valentine Strasser consistently caused offence to senior officers who resented having to receive directions from their 'juniors' who occupied State House.
327. 'Power' was sought and wielded in an even more crude form under the AFRC regime of Major Johnny-Paul Koroma; such was the unconventionality of the AFRC hierarchy and the lack of coherent (far less *unified*) military or political strategy that its reign in Government and, especially, the imposed state of flux that resulted from its dislodgement both created a propensity towards violence against civilians they identified as loyal to the SLPP Government.
328. In the end, it is difficult to answer the question, why the combatants fought the war. If they claimed any overriding agenda, the fluidity in their membership and their transient loyalties make it difficult to perceive, much less understand their agenda. The Commission is left with the regrettable and uncomfortable conclusion that the war was a naked pursuit of power clothed in the garb of revolution. The original agenda for radical system change had been aborted in 1988. What the people of Sierra Leone were served from 1991 was a counterfeit. They have paid a terrible price for a fake product.
329. It is easier to understand the motivations of those who engaged in a just war, to resist the enslavement of their people. However, the Commission is unable to understand or justify the whole scale condemnation of the civil populace as collaborators or supporters of the RUF by those who claimed to be liberating them from the RUF scourge. How else should the Commission interpret the indiscriminate attacks on people by the CDF? Despite the achievements of the CDF in the conflict, Sierra Leoneans must feel terribly disappointed and let down by the CDF record on human rights. Sierra Leoneans gave all their possessions denying themselves even basic services to feed and cloth their assumed liberators. Indeed, the thought must be shocking to them that between the CDF and the RUF, the difference on respect for people's human rights is marginal.

PERPETRATOR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE VIOLATIONS

330. In the statements received by the Commission, the AFRC is responsible for 14,646 or 36.4% of the total of 40,242 violations. These violations were committed primarily in the third phase of the conflict, with the greatest number occurring in early 1999. The second highest number of documented violations, 13,657 or 33.9% were attributed to the RUF/SL. These violations were carried out prior to the RUF alliance with the AFRC junta regime and include abuses by the NPFL. Smaller numbers of violations are attributed to the SLA (6.0%) and the CDF (6.0%) and other forces (1.5%).¹⁸⁷
331. The other perpetrators include local civil forces such as the police and SSD, and international parties such as the ECOMOG and the Guinean Armed Forces (GAF). Both the ECOMOG and GAF account for less than 1% of the recorded violations.

1991-1996: The First Phases of the Conflict

332. Throughout the first two phases of the conflict, the groups responsible for the highest number of violations were the RUF and to a lesser extent, the SLA. The RUF is responsible for 13,657 or 74.6% of the 18,308 documented human rights violations while the SLA accounted for 2,025 or 11% of the violations.

1997-2000: The Final Phase of the Conflict

333. In the final phase of the conflict, from 1997 onwards, the character of the war changed markedly. Though active previously, the CDF groups mobilised to a much greater extent, committing thousands of violations and abuses, especially in the South. In Bonthe the civil militia is the dominant perpetrator, with the statements describing more abuses committed by the Kamajors than by any other party. Furthermore the national army that had previously been charged with defending the country formed an alliance with the RUF after the AFRC coup. Both the GAF and the ECOMOG intervened more forcefully into the conflict in its final phase, with the latter driving the AFRC/RUF forces from Freetown. In the bush the AFRC soldiers adopted the behaviour patterns of the RUF fighters, committing atrocities on a massive scale in the Northern region.
334. Slightly more than two thirds, 14,646 or 66.8% of the documented 21,934 violations committed from 1997 onwards are attributed to the AFRC, the RUF or a combination of both. The next major perpetrator is the CDF accounting for 1893 or 8.6% of the violations.
335. Both the ECOMOG and GAF bear a measure of responsibility for the abuses during this final phase of the war. It is important to note that numbers for violations committed by ECOMOG troops do not purely relate to involvement in the fighting, but the alleged commission of violations against the civilian population. Thus, it is most unfortunate to record that forces intended to bring peace to the country, comprising professional soldiers, contributed to the violations against the people.

¹⁸⁷ It should be noted that many violations had no specific perpetrator attributed to them, while violations may have been shared among several perpetrators.

336. Many statement givers were unable to determine or recall those responsible for the violations against them. Consequently many abuses have unknown perpetrators. The proportion of violations and abuses without an identified perpetrator increases as the conflict progresses. Between 1991 and 1996, 2,342 or 12% of the 18,308 documented violations have unknown perpetrators. In the final period, they make up to 4,411 or 20.1% of the 21,943 documented violations. This is an indicator of how over time, it became increasingly difficult to distinguish between the various fighting factions.

CDF Militia Responsibility

337. The militia groups in the North of the country were not comparable to the Kamajors in terms of the scale of their abuses. The Kamajors account for 2188 or 90% of the 2419 violations attributed to the CDF. The next largest group, the Gbethes, accounted for 143 or 5.9% of CDF violations. The Tamaboros, Kapras, and the Donsos are responsible for 15 or 0.6% of the documented CDF abuses between them. In 78 or 3.2% of the violations, the statement giver indicated that the CDF was responsible but did not specify which militia.

ECOMOG

338. The violation with which ECOMOG forces were associated was killing. To comprehend the killings in which it is alleged that ECOMOG actors were responsible, a special coding exercise was undertaken. The total number of statements in the TRC database involving killings by the ECOMOG forces is 72. Out of these a random sample of 55 statements were studied. As such, the results can be considered as representative of ECOMOG violations in the TRC database.
339. The statements indicate that abuses by ECOMOG forces primarily occurred in the Western Area – 90% of the killings in the sample were in Freetown. This supports the notion that abuses by the ECOMOG force are concentrated in the Western Area. Taking evidence from the database as a whole, less than 1% of the abuses are attributed to the ECOMOG forces. However ECOMOG actors are blamed for less than 3% of the abuses in Freetown in 1999.

Indiscriminate Killing

340. Some of the deaths studied in the Special Coding exercises were indiscriminate, due to bombing, shelling or cases where the victims were caught in a crossfire. Of these 'accidental' killings, the majority (63.5%) were caused by stray bombs. The issue of cross fire has been discussed earlier in this chapter. It is now important to deal with the issue of bombing. In general it is forbidden to carry out aerial bombing in urban areas. The dangers of civilian casualties are just too great. It is important to set out the applicable international humanitarian law norms to the bombing of military objectives. Article 51 of the Geneva Conventions protects civilian populations against dangers arising from military operations. It sets out rules that give effect to this protection. The rules are additional to other applicable rules of international law, which should be observed at all times. The rules include that the civilian population shall not be the object of attack. Acts or threats of violence designed to spread terror and indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscriminate attacks are those not directed at a specific military objective; those which

employ a method of means of combat the effects of which cannot be limited as required by the protocol. In consequence such attacks could strike at military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without distinction. The article further defines indiscriminate attacks as an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a single military objective a number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, town, village or other area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects; and an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

341. Civilian objects are all objects, which are not military objectives as defined in paragraph 2 of the section. The attacks ought to be limited strictly to military objectives. Military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature, location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralisation, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offers a military advantage.
342. Any attack therefore must demonstrate that there was a clear military objective being sought, and that some 'collateral' damage to the military objective was inevitable, and that tactics and weapons were chosen in order to minimise such collateral damage. Where ECOMOG is unable to provide proof that military objectives were targeted, the aerial bombing of Freetown will be considered to be a violation of international humanitarian law. In the Commission's view, the use of bombs in largely urban areas violated the principle of proportionality. In consequence, ECOMOG's bombing campaign in Freetown did on occasion, kill entire families including children.¹⁸⁸

Summary Executions

342. Of all the sample deaths, 58.8% were deliberate executions. Of the 50 killings recorded, in the sampled statements, over three quarters involved some accusation that the victim was involved with the AFRC or RUF factions. Where such an allegation was made, 70% of the victims were accused of being a 'rebel'. The remainder were accused of being either 'rebel' collaborators or members of a family containing a 'rebel'. This is consistent with the argument that elements within the ECOMOG force targeted and summarily executed suspected rebels and collaborators. Regardless of the veracity of the allegation – or indeed the 'guilt' or 'innocence' of the supposed collaborator - such executions constitute a breach of international human rights law.
343. The method of killing was, primarily, execution by shooting at short range. The deaths mainly occurred in public places and were witnessed by civilians. The public nature of the violation suggests that it may have been intended as a warning to others. In some cases the victims were first abducted from their home or workplace and brought to the point of execution.¹⁸⁹ Summary executions constitute serious violations of international human rights law. They amount to arbitrary deprivation of life, which is prohibited by the major human rights treaties. In addition, they constitute serious violations of international humanitarian law. For example, Common article 3 to the Geneva Conventions, which applies specifically to non international armed conflict, prohibits the

¹⁸⁸ See statement Numbers 1156,2221,5041,5046.

¹⁸⁹ See statement Numbers 1116, 1352, 1420, 1686, 1942, 2586, 2593, 5409, 7134

carrying out of executions without previous judgment pronounced by a regularly constituted court, affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognised as indispensable by civilized peoples. The ECOMOG forces who perpetrated these acts are not sheltered by the amnesty of the Lomé Agreement, and should be prosecuted before the courts of their own countries in accordance with national and international law.

CHARACTERISTICS OF CONTEXT

Understanding the Violations

344. It has been argued that the conflict in Sierra Leone was the worst in recent history and cannot be explained by reference to any existing phenomena in the country. Many victims want to understand why the conflict was attended by so much violence and abuse. To provide an insight into the psychology of perpetrators, the Commission commissioned some monographic studies in the hope of finding some explanation.¹⁹⁰

Psychological perspectives on the process of enlistment

345. In the Sierra Leone conflict, various violent acts were perpetrated by individuals, all of who underwent a process of enlistment, which was basically conscription into any of the fighting forces. This process preceded the act of perpetration.
346. Specific procedures were methodically used to enlist and create a whole group removed from society. This process was open-ended; in that under-aged children, youths, males and females were no exception. The focus of enlistment is the destruction of specific social and psychological links between the individual and his community resulting in a bid to inculcate the new beliefs and ideas of the group in the individual.
347. There were diverse reasons why individuals were enlisted in the fighting forces during the conflict. Some volunteered as a way to carry out revenge for previous wrongs. Others were forcibly enlisted. Left with no choice they became active fighters. The reasons for enlistment were either personal, social, economic or political in dimension. But enlistment involves specific psychological processes that lead vulnerable individuals, especially young children, to commit atrocities.

“I was living with my father and mother and was the elder son of the family. At around 5.00am that day our village was attacked by the RUF in the South. One of the commandos who knew my parents entered our house with a group of teenagers. Three of us were captured since we were not able to escape. The commando who was called K ordered his boys to gang rape my mother before my father and me. They had to rape her by turns in front of my father. This was

¹⁹⁰ The TRC commissioned Handicap International to conduct a study of perpetrators to examine causal links between their initiation and the violence they subsequently perpetrate. The Commission also contracted a private consultant to examine the relationship between the use of drugs and the violations that occurred. The ensuing paragraphs draw upon the papers produced as a result of these studies.

done as a way of revenge because my mother refused to marry K who had earlier asked her hand in marriage.

After five of the boys have raped my mother, she became unconscious and asked my father for help. As the husband who was at this point under gun point attempted to move he was shot at point blank range. I saw my father drop dead. I cried for help but a gun was pointed at me. I do not remember how many of them raped my mother later. I was asked to follow them which I did. We left my mother close to my father's corpse. Later, I saw our house on fire. I cannot tell whether my mother also died after. A bag of looted items were given to me to carry for that night. I cried quietly along the way. Soon one of my colleagues in the village who was also captured told me to keep quiet or else I would be killed. This made me to stop crying."¹⁹¹

The traumatic transmission

348. It is important to note that the representations/images of the initiator are transmitted to the future soldier in a traumatic climate. This is not done unconsciously. Through how it is transmitted, the mechanism is automatically put in place. Victims of enlistment who have gone through the process therefore become representations of the same process like the one the torturer went through: a traumatic logic through traumatic initiations. One example of this is that when a victim of traumatic violence is narrating the event, it provokes deep and uncomfortable emotions to the person listening to it.
349. The individual abducted or initiated into a combat faction goes through a deliberate process of disruption of the links and the marks that constitute the individual's psyche. It happens in the "torture" process and in some initiation rituals in traditional societies¹⁹² such as the initiation processes organised around the testing of abilities through trials. The relationship between the future soldier and his leader/initiator is important to understanding the relation between torturer/victim.
350. There are two ways to transmit and to initiate: through pedagogy and through trials. In the context of perpetrators, to traumatically initiate, one goes through this duplication. The secret binds the initiated with his initiator¹⁹³, emphasising and perpetrating the traumatic aspect of the initiation. This aspect would therefore initiate the trauma, and push the initiated to transmit it by duplication, as a psychological way to cope with the traumatic image. The initiation takes place in a secret environment that has also a function of demarcation between those who are initiated and the others. It is as if it is conferring to the individual something additional, an "extra or supernatural power". However, it reinforces his identity with the group but also creates a gap between the two groups: those who were initiated and those who were not. Those who speak are those who are disrupting their affiliation with the initial group and are in a process of affiliation with another group. Finally there is often a need to finalize the initiation by perpetrating an act that they have been trained for. By this concrete act, they are concretising their affiliation to the body.

¹⁹¹ Statement from a child soldier, S.

¹⁹² T.Nathan (1994), *L'influence qui guérit*, Paris, Odile Jacob.

¹⁹³ L.Houkpatin et T.Nathan, « *Secret professionnel, secret initiatique. Deux modalités de constitution de groupe professionnel de soins* », Agora, 37, 1996.

The altering of the initial identity

351. This phase marks a deliberate process of disorientating and dissociating initiates from all previous attachments, beliefs or values. He is cut off from all his usual works, which totally disorientates him. One of the examples is that he loses all his contacts with his family or social marks (by being abducted).

“After a long journey we finally arrived at their base. This place was called “Burkina”, it was very far. I was so tired that I couldn’t recognise it. We were put in a sort of cage till the next morning. We were later called out and sent to the training field.”

352. He is also systematically cut off from his environment. They integrate him in another “mystic” and strange world that ex- combatants usually do not remember. The location of training camps is carefully selected. It is an excluded area, cut off from the rest of the society. This is to ensure that there is no escape and to be sure that they are cut off from all usual marks and bonds. Some of the ex-commandos called it “Burkina” or said that it is the training put in place in foreign countries: what this part of a myth, was it the part of the intentional disorientation?

“We were two dozen in number and each of us was given a cup of juice mixture to drink. This drink was to help us go through the training. During lunch a plate of porridge mixed with brown-brown was shared among us with gunpowder added to it. Our trainer commando “S” told us that it will strengthen us to face the enemy. On the training ground you are subjected to different exercises ranging from running, jumping, rolling and marching. You are also expected to stand in one place for hours on end. All this is done with the hope of testing your physical fitness and endurance. During this period, you are given different forms of punishment if you fail to take instructions from the trainer. Some of the girls are asked to carry out these punishments. I felt the punishment was inhuman but there is no training wherein somebody will not die. So any attempt by a trainee to escape is punishable by torturing you to death.”

353. Then, they are subjected to harsh and humiliating trials in a bid to put them in a position of vulnerability. New rules are introduced some of which can be illogical. Some of the humiliating acts could be carrying food and other support items for the initiators, wives being raped in the presence of their husbands or girl children being used as sex slaves. Some commented that in the training, they also had to walk naked during hours in the bush.

“The second phase is the use of the gun. This also entails dismantling, assembling and firing to the right target etc. You spend sleepless nights during this phase because the training instructor can give order any time for you to fire. Failure means punishment. We are also trained to lay down in one place for days without drinking neither eating nor moving. We all went through this training naked.”

354. As a way of making initiates more vulnerable they are deprived of any form of privacy. Every action of the initiate is watched and monitored to increase his sense of insecurity. For example, the doors were always open, everything belonged to everybody. To emphasise the effect, the act is accompanied with deliberate exaggeration of superiority over initiates. The initiate is reduced to

the level of universality making him believe that he is nobody. All the usual character marks of his individual identity are deleted. Every single difference between individuals are erased and not tolerated within the group. He is placed at the same level with other initiates. This is done to erase any previous link (with the family, community) be it formal or not. At this point it is clear that initiates are in a position of nakedness, totally dispossessed of all former ties and completely vulnerable.

355. The moment of natural selection is not ruled out wherein those who cannot survive the ordeal die. On the other hand, any form of emotional breakdown or resistance or escape warrants instant elimination. These fears suppress initiates and strengthen their resolution to move on. In this state of extreme vulnerability, the ideals are reinforced to boost the morale of new converts.

“SJ tried to escape from the training, he was captured back and it was decided that he should be killed. They covered his face with a bag and beat him. Fortunately, a friend came to rescue him, as he was about to die. Since that time, he had stopped crying each day he had the urge to undertake the training.”

356. Two approaches are used to integrate and inculcate the new ideals to converts. The psychology approach is based on the belief that the individual behaviour is influenced by subconscious and unconscious motivations. The perpetrator uses this approach to motivate an individual by disturbing the equilibrium of his personality, making him feel uncomfortable, then offering him some course of action that will dispel this uncomfortable feeling. The socio- cultural approach is by attempting to define or redefine the norms that are guidelines for the behaviour of groups. It takes place most easily in unstructured situations where the norms have not yet been formed. By these new approaches, new members are integrated and ideals/beliefs are resultantly inculcated. At this juncture the initiates experience a feeling of annihilation and are resolved to stay.

“We normally go through different phases of this training. Before each training period, you are asked to sing the national anthem of the movement. At the end of each phase you are told why this type of training is needed. Towards the end of the training you are frequently taken out of the camp to attack villages and towns.”

357. Initiates are linked to members through an oath of secrecy with rituals and initiations. They are based on traumatic rites, where the trials are to live or die. The trials of endurance and courage continue in the same degree until all humiliating tones disappear. This is a moment of total submission and a new person is formed. They are based on traumatic rites, where the trial is up to the point that you live or you die.

The final phase

358. New converts display their new identity in public through ceremonies. This goes with a symbol of identification usually a ‘tattoo’. These corporal marks which cannot be erased, explain their affiliation to this group. This new identity is also reflected in some cases in their dress and behavioural codes. The initiator will show some signs of recognition through acting also. The closing ceremony follows the period of traumatic ritual. This is done to recognise their ‘new identity’ that depicts values of ideal manhood. With their newly acquired rights

and powers the new converts begin to implement their beliefs. The individual is now focused on the full implementation of the ideas through continuous training and rehearsal for the execution of tasks and instrumental roles. They consider themselves above the law that governs humanity and civilisation. They act in very strange ways taking orders from above (commandos). Orders are also taken from external commands that have been integrated in order to ensure cooperation, solidarity and total affiliation with other group members.

359. Another symbol of identification for new converts is the dreadlocks. In times of their action, they are usually badly dressed with military trousers and T-shirts, worn out boots or slippers. They do not care about what they wear as long as they are filled with the notion of being in control of the situation. Everyone is under their command. In this position they can get what they want forcefully. Converts display sadistic behaviour to non-members. This explains the nature of atrocities committed against civilians, which range from amputation, mutilation, arson and rape.

“After three months intense training, we were distributed among the different groups with different commanders. Assignment made me to be brave. I was involved in massive killing, raping, looting properties and abduction of people, even specifically in my father’s village. In one of these missions, we faced an attack where my commando could not survive. I killed an ECCOMOG soldier whose gun and uniform shirt I used. I gave the short and boots to my other commando.”

360. The act is usually inflicted on targeted victims. The perpetrator consciously or unconsciously transfers all the humiliations and pains he has gone through to the innocent victim. These acts are climaxed by celebrations with group members. They rejoice at this moment because they feel that they are now above the common world, above its limits and laws and all codes of race and prohibitions that constitute it. They dance, drink, take drugs, gang rape and this final stage is celebrated by the whole group in extreme ways after this initiation. SJ explains this ceremony, which has to be understood as an effect of the traumatic aspect of the rite:

“I went through the training in front of the whole group, I was so proud. The test was on one of my members of the same age and consisted in a protection of bullet proof. I didn’t dare him at the beginning but he first shot me on the foot and on the ankle, (he shows the scar). I thought I was dead at a moment, but I realised that the bullet did not reach. I was stronger than now. So I decided to revenge when I realised that it was he or I. I killed him. I was so proud, I was now a rebel. Everybody was so enthusiastic, they screamed with joy (he makes an extreme face). The end of the training was marked by a lot of ceremonies. This I cannot explain because I took an oath.

They took me to a gorgeous party. We drank, we danced and sang. We were all so happy.”

He was now affiliated to the group, with his war ‘brand identity’.

361. New converts experience a sense of pride, fulfilment and purification having gone through the training successfully. They are now new persons totally disorientated from previous beliefs and ideals. They are part of a new set of beliefs and values, with a new identity.

362. The individual is now superhuman; he doesn't belong to the other world and is above all the laws, prohibitions and codes that used to structure the individual's marks. R.U.F. rebels used to say "civilians don't have blood", they are the bad objects, we do not belong to the same race, and we are coming from a superior group. This served to show their perception of humanity that they are above humans. Ex-commando children expressed this as a beautiful and enjoyable moment and state and as a sort of second state.

Downfall and the end

363. This is the breaking point of perpetrators, a moment to face reality and of retransformation. The feeling of super human, invulnerability is being questioned. They are now targeted and sought after. This is when they disguise themselves to mingle with civilians. This does not prevent them from flouting accepted codes of behaviour. They flee to areas where they could engage in savage activities. Those who resist the law are killed. Others surrender and are kept in seclusion where they are rehabilitated.

"I attacked the villages, killed people. I was the best, and especially with these drugs they used to give us or to directly inject in the brain. My bravery made our commando send me to Kono as a bodyguard to Colonel "C" who was also the spokesperson of the RUF. After a lot of involvement in different attacks and missions in which I played a leading role, I was made a commando at the age of 12 years. I had six girls that were my wives. Two were my uncle's daughters. As a commando, I had well over 10 adults, 10 boys who were my age group, 'elders' or adults; I was free to command, as I wanted. The more I caught, the more I had men under my command, and I had five girls, two of whom were bodyguards to my wives.

Most of my missions were always successful. This was due to the fact that I had a map of the country, which helped us. I was feared by most of my colleague commandos because of my bravery and attacking skills. That was why my colleagues called me young Rambo. Soldiers or ECOMOG forces always occupied most of the villages that I captured. These attacks were always bloody and horrible. However after the signing of the peace accord, the international committee asked that child soldiers be handed over to UNICEF."

364. This brings to an end the process of enlistment. From a position of passivity, the initiates gradually become active in implementing the group's beliefs and conducts. This is accomplished after a long period of disorientation, dehumanisation, brainwashing, integration and implementation of new beliefs and values akin to that of the initiator. At the end of this exercise a new human being is formed who implements what he has been trained to do based on the several traumatic stages that he went through, he will deal with these uncontrollable ways and act them on as a way to cope with it. There will be the displacement of all the anguishes and anger on the victims and the atrocities committed. He carries out atrocities with out remorse.

THE USE OF DRUGS

365. A number of researchers who have investigated the conflict have concluded that the only way to explain the violations that occurred must relate to the widespread use of drugs by the combatants. The Commission has also interrogated the use of drugs in the conflict. It must be noted that in every conflict, use of hard drugs is prevalent. The Commission therefore looked for peculiarities in the use of drugs in the Sierra Leonean conflict as a way of explaining the level of violence that attended. The Commission's conclusions are that hard drugs were widely used in the conflict. Each combatant group promoted the ingestion or injection of drugs to strengthen the endurance capacity of the fighters, make them bold and able to carry out orders. Some of the hard drugs used included cocaine, heroin, ephedrine etc. Hard drugs were widely administered on very young boys and girls. Since the majority of the fighting forces for all the combat groups were young people, the use of these drugs widely affected their behaviour not only in battle but in their relationship with the civilians they encountered in the communities.
366. An ex RUF female testified that she was captured in Kenema in 1991 together with her sister Mbalu and little brother Musa. They were taken to Kailahun. She and other older persons were given marijuana to smoke. Refusal meant serious beating or starvation. She attempted to run away once but was captured and injected with a green liquid. She felt "instant happiness and would go wild and become bold to challenge other rebels". She was raped multiple times, either sober or under the influence of cocaine. She used to cook for them and she was given marijuana to boil with the sauce. Her commander was called 'Major'. Under the influence of drugs they would raid villages and fire at will at civilians. She also drank blood passed around without protest. She was usually used as a decoy when they wanted to enter a village.¹⁹⁴
367. Abu Bakar Conteh was captured in Makeni in 1997 and forced to join the RUF. His commander was called "sufferer".

"We were given heavy boxes to carry. Those who dropped their load were shot and left behind. After three days all porters were lined up and injected with a white substance. We were told that it would make us strong and tireless. I suddenly became active and during the night journey never felt sleepy. When we rested I felt scared and jumpy at the slightest sound. I could be in this state for weeks. In my present state we could raid villages, take their food and any resistance would mean death. I wasn't afraid. I became bold. I was marked with the RUF symbol and I never felt it. They injected me saying I won't feel the pain. They rubbed cocaine into it saying it will disinfect the wound. I immediately felt like killing someone. They gave me some boys and asked us to go 'jaja' (loot)."¹⁹⁵

¹⁹⁴ Confidential Interview with the TRC. Freetown, October 2003

¹⁹⁵ Interview with the TRC. Freetown, October 2003.

368. Joseph Kamara was abducted on June 16 1997 at Wusum Lane. He couldn't run because of his partial deformity. His commander was Colonel Gold Teeth.

"I kept his pistol and ran his errands, such as getting his cocaine from his drawer. When I was captured, I was given a tablet that looked like 'super appetite'. I was sent to go and kill dogs for cooking. The drugs made me tireless and unafraid of dogs. I could grab a dog and strangle it. The drug gave me energy to do so. Colonel "gold teeth" gave me cocaine and under its influence I saw humans as 'chicken'. I can fire at will mercilessly. I used to beat women or shoot them. 'Colonel Gold Teeth' acted as our doctor. Whenever supplies were short, he would communicate by radio and someone would bring the drugs. Not always the same person. He spoke like a Liberian. They had tablets that would last a week, five days, six weeks in the system. When they want to go on the offensive they come to the doctor and select what they would need. If you need the tablet or 'injection' it is given to you. When under influence we could move from Kamalo to Sanda, Kamakwe and we clashed with Kamajors and took their food. Supply is brought from Liberia through Daru and is included in the boxes of ammunition. If you refused taking the drugs you are beaten by 'junior' (that's his job). The only thing that made us afraid of the Kamajors was the 'controller' an object fitted on top of their caps. This could send us running away."

369. A witness Richard Abdulai Kamara, described his use of a cocktail of drugs:

"I was captured in Makeni in 1997 and taken as a driver for Issa. We had abundance of cocaine and brown brown with us. We got this from Bo Waterside where we exchanged cocoa for cigarettes, cocaine, fuel, brown brown. We also took a tablet called 'blue boat' (because of its colour) which is mixed with 'mamanyini' a very hard alcoholic drink brought from Liberia. When these two are mixed, that is, blue boat and mamanyini the effect is drastic, instant intoxication. It makes you drunk or intoxicated for two or three days. In that state a lot of things could happen. We would fight among ourselves at the slightest provocation. we sniffed cocaine and talked a lot. We became sleepless, jittery. We could do anything under the influence of these drugs: kill villagers on impulse even where some of them cooperated with us. We were merciless. The injection was not administered on everyone. When a gallant male was captured, it is given to him to make him fall asleep. It depended on the dosage. Then when he wakes up he is no longer himself he does things our way. He becomes ruthless, kills mercilessly in raids on villages. The injection is sometimes blue or green in colour and the feeling is like being chloroformed."¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁶ Interview with the TRC, Freetown, October 2003.


370. Foday Sesay was captured at Wusum field by 'Captain Siwo'.

"They gave me a tablet to take and asked me to fire at women. I refused. They asked me to fire at a dog, I did. At Sanda I was given an injection. I was not myself after that. I shot people who looked to me like 'chickens'. After taking these drugs we would raid villages. We abused the villagers and took their goats, cows and food. The effect of the injection lasted for nearly two months in me. We were taken to kono, Kenema, Makeni, Sanda, and then Makeni. All this time we looted and killed. The injection given to us looked blue or green. There was also another white tablet which we took anytime we felt like it especially if we wanted to attack the Kamajors. It gave us the zeal to enter their territory without fear. I didn't even know what death was. I didn't care."¹⁹⁷

Generally, such injections were common with the RUF and administered to make the combatants tireless, sleepless, energetic, and hyperactive, traits, which were very much valued at the battlefield.

371. The picture that emerges above is that all the combat groups widely administered drugs and other substances to their fighters. In particular, the RUF bears overwhelming responsibility for the widespread use of drugs by its combatants. The widespread use of drugs within the combatant groups convinces the Commission that it was a deliberate policy on their part to administer drugs to their fighting forces with a view to making them fearless in battle. Unfortunately, there were very few battles between combat groups. Most of the "battles" were direct attacks on the civilian population. The leadership of the combat groups cannot claim ignorance about the potential impact of feeding thousands of their fighters with these mind twisting and hallucinogenic substances. It turned them into brutes who viewed and treated the civilian population, to use the words of one RUF witness, "as chickens" or "ants".

¹⁹⁷ Interview with the TRC, Freetown, October 2003.



WITNESS TO TRUTH:

Report of the
Sierra Leone
Truth & Reconciliation
Commission

VOL 3B

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ISBN 9988 -8097-6-X


Published by Graphic Packaging Ltd. GCGL
Printed and Bound at GPL Press, Accra, Ghana.


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
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
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

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Deputy Chairperson


Mrs. Ajaratou Satang Jow


Professor John Kamara


Ms. Yasmin Louise Sooka


Professor William Schabas


Mr. Sylvanus Torto

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CHAPTER ONE

Mineral Resources, their Use and their
Impact on the Conflict and the Country

TRC

**Tru at
fo tok
but na im
nomo go
bring pis**

Produced by the TRC Steering Committee with support
from the International Human Rights Law Group

CHAPTER ONE

Mineral Resources, their Use and their Impact on the Conflict and the Country

Introduction

1. The management of state resources is central to the quality of governance in any country. This is particularly the case in Sierra Leone, a country whose economy depends essentially on revenues from its mineral resources. The Commission deemed it important to examine how mineral resources were used by successive governments and how they may have contributed to the war. Furthermore, the Commission set out to explore the extent to which the combatant groups exploited mineral resources to sustain themselves and replenish their war-making supplies.
2. Despite its huge mineral resources, Sierra Leone has remained one of the poorest countries in the world.¹ Extensive alluvial and kimberlitic diamond deposits, as well as bauxite, rutile and gold, are found in the east and the south of the country. Gold, iron and more recently bauxite have been discovered in the north. Iron ore at Marampa was a major foreign-exchange earner until mining there was closed down in the mid-1990s. In the past, these resources have benefited a small elite group of Sierra Leoneans as well as Lebanese, Senegalese, Gambian, Guinean and Nigerian traders and a sprinkling of other groups from the sub-Saharan region.
3. The most important mineral resource in Sierra Leone is diamonds. This chapter will focus predominantly on diamonds and refer to other minerals where appropriate.
4. Throughout the world, diamonds are objects of desire and admiration. In Sierra Leone, diamonds were indirect causes and fuelling elements of the war. The misuse of diamond resources in an essentially single-product economy like Sierra Leone's has created huge disparities in socio-economic conditions. While the elite and their business associates in the diamond industry have lived in grandeur, the poor have invariably been left to rue the misappropriation of the collective wealth.
5. As a national resource, diamonds have been controlled and exploited largely by a non-Sierra Leonean community, the Lebanese, who have formed and maintained new centres of economic power in the country.

¹ Sierra Leone has ranked in last place out of more than 170 countries on the UNDP Human Development Index for the last three successive years from 2002 to 2004.

6. In the context of the Sierra Leone conflict, diamonds were highly coveted because they yielded tremendous revenues, which would enable the armed factions to procure additional weapons and ammunition. Possession of weapons conferred power upon the armed parties, as they could capture large areas of territory, which could in turn be exploited for economic purposes. The desire to expand “control areas” into parts of the country ripe for economic exploitation gradually became the main motivating factor for all the armed groups and many local commanders, thus triggering further conflict.
7. There is a widely held belief in the western world that the conflict in Sierra Leone was initiated and perpetuated because of diamonds, the country’s most important mineral resource. According to this version, the RUF, backed by Charles Taylor and the NPFL, initiated an armed rebellion in Sierra Leone to gain control of its diamond resources. In the years following the initial attack, it is alleged, the proceeds from an illicit diamond trade enabled the RUF to finance its war effort through the purchase of weapons abroad.
8. On the basis of its research and investigations, the Commission views this version of the conflict as simplistic. It fails to capture numerous complexities, the reasons for the decay of the state in Sierra Leone and the role minerals played prior to and during the conflict. It also does not reflect what unfolded on the ground in Sierra Leone. There were multiple causes of the conflict and reasons for the involvement of Liberian and other foreign actors. Although it is true that the RUF partly financed its war effort through diamond trafficking, diamonds did not yield significant revenues for the movement before 1997.
9. Using primary data gleaned from interviews, statements and hearings, along with secondary materials from reports issued by NGOs and international bodies such as the United Nations, the Commission will address the following issues in this chapter:
 - the political economy of mineral resources in Sierra Leone;
 - the role minerals played in the conflict, including their appropriation and use by armed factions;
 - the role of internal and external actors in the mining industry and its implications for the war;
 - the systematic targeting of communities in mining areas and the effect of the conflict on those communities;
 - government policies regarding the mining industry and their effect on the country; and
 - the weaknesses of the international diamond industry and the effect of the Kimberley Certification Process.
10. The Commission has divided the Sierra Leone conflict into three phases.² This chapter begins by examining the pre-conflict years with a view to setting the context for the conflict. Thereafter, the three phases are analysed as follows: first, the period of conventional “target” warfare from 1991 to late 1993; second, the guerrilla warfare phase from late 1993 up to March 1997; and finally the period from 1997 to 2002, encompassing the alliance between the AFRC and the RUF, the Lomé Peace Agreement, the resumption of hostilities and the eventual conclusion of the conflict.

² More detail on the Commission’s three phases, including a justification for the chosen parameters, can be found in the chapter on the Military and Political History of the Conflict in Volume Three A of this report.

TRC



Artisanal miners, including many children, dig for diamonds on the outskirts of Koidu Town in Kono District. Most of this mining is illegal and involves deplorable labour conditions.

The Political Economy of Mineral Resources

11. To understand the failure of the state in Sierra Leone and the role that minerals played in the conflict, we need to consider the nature of the state that emerged in 1961. At independence, there was euphoria that the new indigenous leadership would extend development and services to the people exponentially. In Sierra Leone, as in many other parts of Africa, the first few years following colonialism actually witnessed economic growth. Two key factors reversed this trend and set the country on a very different trajectory from the forward path desired by the people.
12. The first factor was the management of the economy. The popular expectation in the years before independence in many countries was captured by the Ghanaian Kwame Nkrumah in his refrain: "Seek ye first the political kingdom and all other things will be added unto you". The assumption was that political independence would free latent energies in the nation. The new state would churn out a host of policies to create and empower an indigenous entrepreneurial class, which was expected to be the engine of growth and development. In reality, however, the beneficiaries of these new policies turned out to be the political elite rather than the common people. Unfortunately for Sierra Leone, the indigenous elite preferred rent seeking rather than active economic participation and quickly ceded control of important economic activities to Lebanese and Syrian businessmen. Furthermore, the dominant economic management theories of the time favoured state intervention and centralised management of the economy. Leading members of the ruling elite sought to privatise state resources, thus depriving the nation of the benefits of its most valuable assets. Such "predatory domination" has been defined as the "conversion of political power and position into economic wealth for the benefit of the few at the expense of the many."³
13. Huge economic and development resources were placed in the hands of the new leaders. As the inheritors of power, the political elite acquired the tastes and behaviour of the departing colonialists. Such undisciplined control over resources opened the way for burgeoning corruption. Sierra Leoneans began to question the role and mission of the emergent political elite.
14. In 1978 a one-party state was imposed upon the people of Sierra Leone. This move by the ruling All Peoples' Congress (APC) followed the co-optation of civil society leaders into government and the crushing of dissent. Political power became a means to economic wealth, with personal rewards so high that politicians would resort to extreme measures to win and maintain power.⁴ The state became the primary avenue for private enrichment. Gradually, power became de-institutionalised and personalised, resulting in dysfunctional public institutions and random violence. It was in the interests of the political elite to promote disorder, as it provided further opportunities to misappropriate the economic resources of the state. As a direct result, public institutions could no longer provide vital services to the people.⁵

³ See Callaghy, Thomas; *The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in Comparative Perspective*, New York, Columbia University Press, at page 191.

⁴ See Ake, Claude; "Address to the Inaugural Meeting of the Nigerian Political Science Association", in *West Africa* magazine, 25 May 1981, at pages 162-163. The article is cited in Kandeh, J.; *Political Economy of Democratisation*, unpublished manuscript (hereinafter "Kandeh, *Political Economy of Democratisation*"); at page 2.

⁵ See Kandeh, *Political Economy of Democratisation*, at page 3.

15. The political elite had preferential access to the machinery of the state. Politicians, senior civil servants and military officers exercised a great deal of power over access to foreign and domestic capital and markets, which they used to accumulate large fortunes and to consolidate their control of the economy. Exploitation occurred through a burgeoning de facto market in government contracts, licences and offices. The productive and regulatory capacities of the state became severely eroded and compromised. This led to the “informalisation” of the state.⁶ The state was misappropriated for the private benefit of the political elite, just as it had been in colonial times.
16. This brief background helps us to understand why diamond smuggling has been a perennial, seemingly uncontrollable problem in Sierra Leone. Key members of the elite and successive governments have promoted and continue to benefit from diamond smuggling. Efforts to contain smuggling during the APC rule were a façade. Smuggling was indeed promoted by the Office of the President. Today, so high are the personal and political stakes involved in the fight against diamond smuggling that every individual effort to achieve accountability will be fiercely contested and require sustained application.⁷

The Diamond Industry before the Conflict

The colonial period

17. A variety of minerals, including gold, iron and diamonds, were discovered in Sierra Leone in the 1930s; rutile, or titanium ore, was discovered in the 1960s.⁸ Diamonds were discovered in the Kenema and Kono Districts. The colonial government, through the Consolidated African Selection Trust (CAST), established the Sierra Leone Selection Trust (SLST) in 1934. CAST was a corporation controlled by the Selection Trust Group of London, with a portion of the shares held by De Beers.⁹ The SLST was granted exclusive mining and prospecting rights throughout the country for 99 years.¹⁰ In 1933, an iron-ore mine was opened at Marampa in Port Loko District and was generating almost 30% of the colony's export revenue by 1938.¹¹
18. The mining sector became the major source of export for the country.¹² In 1930, minerals accounted for a mere 0.5% of total exports and even in 1951, agriculture still accounted for 66.8%. However, by 1961, minerals had come to account for 87% of exports (79% of which were diamonds).¹³

⁶ See Kandeh, *Political Economy of Democratisation*, at page 3.

⁷ A former Minister and Member of Parliament who was imprisoned in 2003 for dealing in diamonds was recently released by the Appeal Court on technical grounds. For further details on such cases, see the public testimony of the Minister of Mineral Resources before the Commission in July 2003.

⁸ See Gwynne-Jones D.R.G., Mitchell, P.K., Harvey, M. E. and Swindell, K.; *A New Geography of Sierra Leone*, Essex, Longman, 1978 (hereinafter “Gwynne-Jones, et al., *A New Geography of Sierra Leone*”); at pages 109.

⁹ See Zack-Williams, A. B.; *Tributors, Supporters and Merchant Capital: Mining and Underdevelopment in Sierra Leone*, Avebury, 1995 (hereinafter “Zack-Williams, *Tributors, Supporters and Merchant Capital*”); at page 50.

¹⁰ See Smilie, I., Gberie, L. and Hazleton, R.; *The Heart of the Matter*, Partnership Africa Canada report, Ottawa, January 2000 (hereinafter “Smilie, et al., *The Heart of the Matter*”); at page 4.

¹¹ See Pratt, D. (MP for Nepean-Carleton, Canada), Special Envoy to Sierra Leone; *Sierra Leone: the forgotten crisis*, Report to the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Honourable Lloyd Axworthy MP, 23 April 1999 (hereinafter “Pratt, *Sierra Leone: the forgotten crisis*”).

¹² The Sierra Leone economy had been based prior to that time on agro-based export crops. See Zack-Williams, *Tributors, Supporters and Merchant Capital*, at page 56.

¹³ See Zack-Williams, *Tributors, Supporters and Merchant Capital*, at page 56.

These shifts rendered the economy vulnerable to fluctuations in the international market. Moreover, since minerals were only extracted in Sierra Leone but transformed abroad, the revenues from the value-added services that multiplied the price of the products were not being returned to the country. The profits of the industry went mostly to non-Sierra Leonean diamond industry interests involved at other levels of the transaction.

19. Beginning in the 1930s and 1940s, the colonial government adopted the strategy of relying on local chiefs to exercise control over the expanding diamond industry. However, the central government in Freetown had little control over the chiefs' actions and therefore could not curb nascent illicit mining:

“As the state's chosen administrative and, increasingly, political intermediaries, chiefs also voiced a popular dissatisfaction with state attacks on illicit mining. The harder Freetown pushed reform, the greater the risk of upsetting the accommodations that enabled Freetown to rule the hinterland in the first place.”¹⁴

20. These “accommodations” with local chiefs widened the loss of state control over the diamond industry in the years leading up to the conflict. Government officials, as well as the chiefs, benefited from these unofficial deals:

“Informal accommodations between officials and chiefs and a tolerance of limited illicit mining maintained social order.”¹⁵

21. The diamond rush in the 1950s created security problems. The number of new miners was so great that control became difficult. Thousands of people started illicit mining on the SLST lease¹⁶, many of them abandoning the rice fields for the diamond mines. This resulted in a significant drop in rice production.¹⁷ In the early 1950s, Sierra Leone was self-sufficient in rice production whereas in 1963, the country had to import 21,000 tons of rice to feed its population.¹⁸

22. In 1955, illegal miners attacked the SLST security forces and a police station in Kono. In 1955 and 1956, popular dissatisfaction with what was perceived as excessive control by Chiefs and the state led to several riots in Kono District. Indeed, “most Kono residents believed that SLST's monopoly on diamond mining bestowed benefits upon Europeans and chiefs” only.¹⁹

23. The SLST and De Beers began hiring private security companies to police the mining areas. They hired the Diamond Protection Force, a private British security company managed by Sir Percy Sillitoe,²⁰ to guard the border areas against smuggling and the diamond areas against illicit mining. This was the first instance of the hiring of mercenaries in Sierra Leone, but many others would follow, especially during the conflict. SLST also had planes fly over mining areas to monitor illicit mining.

¹⁴ See Reno, W.; *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone*, Cambridge University Press, 1995 (hereinafter “Reno, *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone*”); at page 57.

¹⁵ See Reno, *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone*, at page 58.

¹⁶ See Reno, *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone*, at page 59.

¹⁷ See Smilie, et al., *The Heart of the Matter*, at page 41.

¹⁸ See Reno, *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone*, at page 74.

¹⁹ See Reno, *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone*, at pages 61-62.

²⁰ See Smilie, et al., *The Heart of the Matter*, at page 42.

24. In 1955, the colonial government terminated the SLST – De Beers monopoly and introduced the Alluvial Diamond Mining Scheme (ADMS), under which Sierra Leonean miners could buy licences. Previously, Sierra Leonean nationals had not been allowed to own mining concessions.²¹ Parts of the SLST Yengema concession that were unsuitable for large-scale mining were leased to local, small-scale miners,²² who were required to sell all their diamonds to SLST. By allowing Sierra Leonean miners to operate mines, the colonial government sought to curtail smuggling and restore security to the SLST lease area.²³ The colonial government also established the Mining Area Development Administration (MADA), a state development expenditure programme incorporating local authorities into the decision-making process.²⁴
25. This new system gave more power to the local chiefs to grant leases to mine diamonds. The chiefs began assigning plots and collecting surface rents. One Kono businessman complained that the unofficial payments (or bribes) to chiefs to obtain a licence rose 500% under the new ADMS.²⁵
26. The other effect of ADMS was to create a “supporter” artisanal system in which wealthy Lebanese businessmen would “look after” African miners, providing funding for licences and mining equipment and protecting miners against SLST security forces. In exchange, miners would sell their diamonds to the Lebanese. Most dealers engaged in both licit and illicit buying of diamonds, paying low prices to illegal miners and selling at higher prices to the SLST.
27. Despite the ADMS, smuggling did not stop. Rather, it increased dramatically. Due to its borderless nature, artisanal mining could not be effectively controlled and policed. Table 1, below, shows that in the three years following the introduction of ADMS, smuggling increased over the three years preceding its introduction.

Table 1: Diamond Production, Value of Export and Smuggled for Selected Years

28. YEAR	29. SLST	30. ADMS	31. TOTAL LEGAL	32. SMUGG LED	33. TOTAL
34.	35. In thousands of carats		36. In thousands of Leones		37.
38. 1953	39. 472	40. -	41. 2,396	42. 4,000	43. 6,500
44. 1954	45. 401	46. -	47. 3,399	48. 6,000	49. 9,500
50. 1955	51. 419	52. -	53. 2,800	54. 16,000	55. 19,000
56. 1956	57. 427	58. 126	59. 6,914	60. 20,000	61. 27,000
62. 1957	63. 506	64. 547	65. 12,850	66. 30,000	67. 43,000
68. 1958	69. 648	70. 781	71. 14,367	72. 30,000	73. 45,000
74. 1959	75. 660	76. 651	77. 13,617	78. 30,000	79. 44,000

Source for Table 1: Mitchell, P.K. and Swindell K.; “Recent Changes in Sierra Leone Mineral Industry”, in *The Bulletin: The Journal of the Sierra Leone Geographical Association*, Volumes 9 and 10.²⁶

²¹ See Martinez, I.; *Sierra Leone’s Conflict Diamonds*, in “Africa at the Crossroads: Current Themes in African Law”, *International and Comparative Law Review*, 2001 – 2002 (hereinafter “Martinez, *Sierra Leone’s Conflict Diamonds*”).

²² See Zack-Williams, *Tributors, Supporters and Merchant Capital*, at page 120.

²³ See Martinez, *Sierra Leone’s Conflict Diamonds*.

²⁴ See Reno, *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone*, at page 61.

²⁵ See Reno, *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone*, at page 63, based upon an interview with a diamond merchant conducted in Kono District in 1990.

²⁶ This source is cited in Zack-Williams, A. B.; *Mining Resources and Post-War Reconstruction in Sierra Leone*, unpublished manuscript (hereinafter “Zack-Williams, *Mining Resources and Post-War Reconstruction*”).

28. As shown in Table 2, below, ADMS became a significant contributor to the total production of diamonds, accounting for a minimum of 50% of annual production. From 1980 on, while the value increased, the total number of carats recorded began to decline. Zack-Williams has argued that this fall was the result not of mine depletion but of the informalisation of mining by a decaying state.²⁷ Most production was by illicit dealers who smuggled their products out of the country. The state was losing money, but the political elite was getting wealthier.

Table 2: Diamond Production Under SLST and ADMS for Selected Years

YEAR	ADMS (Carats '000)	ADMS (Le '000)	TOTAL ADMS and LST/NMDC (Carats '000)	Total Value SLST and ADMS (Le '000)
1961	1,406	22,655	2,045	31,938
1965	813	22,780	1,525	36,959
1970	1,048	26,182	1,955	52,803
1975	645	23,157	732	63,031
1980	-	-	592	127,944
1985	-	-	349	140,876
1986	-	-	315	88,430
1987	-	-	314	1,070,314
1988	-	-	175	106,646
1989	-	-	129	1,220,516

Source for Table 2: Mitchell, P.K. and Swindell K.; "Recent Changes in Sierra Leone Mineral Industry", in *The Bulletin: The Journal of the Sierra Leone Geographical Association*, Vol. 9 and 10.²⁸

From SLST to the NMDC

29. When Siaka Stevens came into power in 1968, he used populist rhetoric to gain support, claiming that small miners should have the opportunity to benefit from the diamond industry.²⁹ The government encouraged licensing of small-scale mining, proclaiming it as the small man's chance for success.³⁰ However, the government's unofficial encouragement of smuggling resulted in the theft of several shipments of diamonds belonging to the SLST. For instance, on 3 November 1969, the SLST's monthly production, worth US\$3.4 million, was stolen, allegedly on the orders of Stevens and Jamil Said Mohamed, a prosperous and influential Lebanese businessman with close links to Stevens.³¹

²⁷ See Zack-Williams, *Mining Resources and Post-War Reconstruction*, at page 8.

²⁸ This source is cited in Zack-Williams, A. B.; *Mining Resources and Post-War Reconstruction in Sierra Leone*, unpublished manuscript (hereinafter "Zack-Williams, *Mining Resources and Post-War Reconstruction*").

²⁹ See Smilie, et al., *The Heart of the Matter*, at page 44.

³⁰ See Smilie, et al., *The Heart of the Matter*, at page 44.

³¹ See Smilie, et al., *The Heart of the Matter*, at page 44.

30. The transformation of the diamond industry into an informal economy was complete with the “nationalisation” of the SLST and its replacement by the National Diamond Mining Company (NDMC) in 1970. In 1973, the government created the Cooperative Contract Mining (CCM) scheme, which allowed private mining operations within the NDMC lease. This initiative was presented as a concession to local miners. The main reason for this opening was the decrease in foreign revenues resulting from the government’s inability to curb illicit mining and smuggling, as well as the decrease in production arising from old equipment. CCM therefore did not really benefit the local miners. Rather, it strengthened Siaka Stevens’ underground economy.³²
31. Siaka Stevens had directed the state-controlled NDMC “to make land available for the people to mine”. In reality, this was a division of the diamond fields among the APC elite and their allies, including the chiefs in the diamond-producing areas and government officials, many of whom owned plots in other people’s names.³³ The then Minister of Finance, Tommy Taylor-Morgan, was quoted as warning that the country was losing more than US\$160 million of diamond income annually to smuggling.³⁴
32. Through the years, Siaka Stevens had allied himself with a group of powerful Lebanese merchants who controlled some of the official and much of the unofficial diamond trade.³⁵ The NDMC had a 51% share of the SLST lease, while Jamil Said Mohamed alone controlled some 12% through his company, the Precious Mineral Mining Company (PMMC).³⁶ Jamil Said Mohamed was very influential and controlled a large part of the industry, including the mining of other minerals, with the approval of Siaka Stevens. Corruption and smuggling reached such a level that official diamond production dropped significantly.³⁷
33. The CCM was designed to arrest the dramatic drop in NDMC production. In 1973, 94% of the legal non-alluvial diamond output was produced by NDMC. In 1980, the percentage had dropped to 29%.³⁸ This was coupled with the general decline in overall official production. In 1974, the government created the Government Diamond Office (GDO) to value diamonds and ensure the repatriation of profits from diamond sales abroad into the Bank of Sierra Leone. Although GDO was supposed to be a neutral institution, it was headed by Stevens and Jamil Said Mohamed, who tended to allow favoured people to repatriate only a portion of their profits. They also used GDO to undervalue diamonds, keeping the difference for themselves or for members of the elite close to the government.³⁹

³² See Smilie, et al., *The Heart of the Matter*, at page 6.

³³ See Zack-Williams, A. B.; “Sierra Leone: Crisis and Despair”, in *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 49, 1990 (hereinafter “Zack-Williams, *Sierra Leone: Crisis and Despair*”), cited in Zack-Williams, *Mining Resources and Post-War Reconstruction*, at page 9.

³⁴ See Zack-Williams, *Sierra Leone: Crisis and Despair*.

³⁵ See Pratt, *Sierra Leone: the forgotten crisis*.

³⁶ See Martinez, *Sierra Leone’s Conflict Diamonds*.

³⁷ Smilie, I.; *Motherhood, Apple Pie and False Teeth: Corporate Social Responsibility in the Diamond Industry*, Partnership Africa Canada, Ottawa, June 2003 (hereinafter “Smilie, *Motherhood, Apple Pie and False Teeth*”); at page 10. See also Reno, *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone*, at page 106.

³⁸ See Reno, *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone*, at page 106.

³⁹ See Reno, *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone*, at page 110.

34. The government cut its export tax on diamonds from 7.5% to 2.5% in 1977, ostensibly to reduce smuggling. However, in practice, the tax cut increased the share of diamond resources that went into the pockets of the political elite. By the end of the 1970s, NDMC was in decline. In 1983, SLST sold its remaining shares to Jamil Said Mohamed's PMMC.
35. Overall, Stevens established a system through which he controlled the diamond industry using a network of partners and without having to engage the government apparatus.⁴⁰ The survival of this system was ensured internally by the use of elite-accommodation practices, such as offering favoured treatment to APC sympathisers and local chiefs.⁴¹ Stevens and his clients relied on paramilitary forces such as the Internal Security Unit (ISU) to maintain social order through physical repression of opponents and illicit miners. This transfer of ownership from formal state institutions to informal networks personally controlled by Stevens helped intensify smuggling, depriving the national treasury of potential tax revenues.
36. The popular perception that the state was favouring elites and giving away the diamond resources led to riots in Kono in 1984 and 1985, in which miners attacked the property of the state and of politicians.

The establishment of the GGDO

37. President Momoh came to power in 1985 and created the Government Gold and Diamond Office (GGDO) to remedy the shortage of foreign exchange. This attempt was part of a series of reforms aimed at re-establishing Sierra Leone's borrowing capacity with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.
38. GGDO was originally supposed to buy and sell gold, and to stockpile diamonds to be used as collateral to raise external loans, but these functions were never carried out.⁴² Although GGDO never bought diamonds, it advertised diamonds internationally and facilitated export deals.
39. Sierra Leone's diamonds were fuelling the Middle East conflict. Prominent Lebanese dealers were some of the main financiers of the Islamic movements in the Middle East. To undermine this control, the Israeli government got involved in the diamond industry at a time when President Momoh was in desperate need of foreign exchange and support to prop up his failing economy. Momoh invited an Israeli firm called LIAT Construction and Finance Company to manage the diamond industry, thereby undermining Jamil Said Mohamed's control. The Israeli company was accused of trafficking in drugs and arms, using the Sierra Leonean diamond industry as cover, and its director, Shaptai Kalmanovitch, was arrested for fraud in London in 1987.⁴³ Under the control of the Israelis, however, diamond exports rose 280% between 1985 and 1986.⁴⁴ Another Israeli company, N.R. SCIPA Group, replaced LIAT after Kalmanovitch's arrest. The company was allegedly dealing in both legal and illegal diamonds.⁴⁵ The ever-growing demands of Momoh's cronies resulted in further drastic reductions in government revenues and popular dissatisfaction led to riots again in 1988 and 1989 in Kono District.

⁴⁰ See Reno, *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone*, at page 110.

⁴¹ For example, President Stevens waived the diamond license fee for Chiefs in 1981.

⁴² See Government Gold and Diamond Office (GGDO), Submission to TRC Thematic and Special Hearings on Mineral Resources, July 2003, at page 1.

⁴³ See Smilie, et al., *The Heart of the Matter*, at page 46.

⁴⁴ See Martinez, *Sierra Leone's Conflict Diamonds*.

⁴⁵ See Smilie, et al., *The Heart of the Matter*, at page 47.

Diamond smuggling

40. The rise in diamond smuggling during the Stevens and Momoh eras is explained by the rent seeking instincts of the political elite, which were furthered by the peculiar organisation of the international diamond industry. Inadequate monitoring of the origin of diamonds is one of the major problems in the industry. The Belgian Diamond High Council (HRD), on whose trading floors a large proportion of the international diamond trade takes place, records the origin of diamonds as the country from which they were last exported. Such recording tells nothing about where the diamonds were actually mined. For instance, a diamond can be smuggled from Sierra Leone into Liberia, then shipped to London, and be recorded as being of British origin, even if Britain does not produce diamonds.
41. Tables 3 and 4 and Figure 1, below and overleaf, show the discrepancy between the diamond production in some West African countries and diamond imports into Belgium. Throughout the conflict period, the HRD imported two or three times as many diamonds from Sierra Leone as the government of Sierra Leone officially exported. These numbers suggest significant smuggling. In 1999, official exports were worth US\$1.2 million, compared with a conservative industry estimate of US\$70 million in real commercial value.⁴⁶

Table 3: Diamond Production in Selected West African Countries for Selected Years ('000 carats)

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Sierra Leone	78	243	347	158	255	213	270	104	8.5
Liberia	100	100	150	150	100	150	150	150	150
Guinea	127	97	153	167	381	365	205	205	205
Ghana	650	700	656	591	740	632	715	830	800
Côte d'Ivoire	12	15	15	15	84	75	302	307	307

Sources for Table 3: Smilie, et al., *The Heart of the Matter*, Partnership Africa Canada Ottawa, January 2000: Data for Liberia, Guinea, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire for the years 1994 to 1998 from: Ronald F. Balazik, 'Gemstones', *1998 Annual Review* (United States Geological Survey, August 1999) at page EE 17. Remaining data for the same countries is from various mineral industry reports from 1990 to 1994 published by the United States Geological Survey. Sierra Leone data is drawn from the Government of Sierra Leone, Government Gold and Diamond Office (GGDO), Freetown, Sierra Leone, 1999.


⁴⁶ See USAID; *Sierra Leone Conflict Diamonds – Progress Report on Diamond Policy and Development Program*, New York, 30 March 2001 (hereinafter "USAID, *Sierra Leone Progress Report*, 2001"); at page 1.

Table 4: Belgian Imports of West African Diamonds ('000 carats)

Year	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998
Sierra Leone	331	534	831	344	526	455	566	803	770
Liberia	5,523	658	1,909	5,006	3,268	10,677	12,320	5,803	2,558
Guinea	287	374	526	1021	875	780	439	533	596
Ghana	597	675	689	526	498	643	608	531	N / A
Côte d'Ivoire	825	946	868	683	605	1614	2214	885	N / A

Sources for Table 4: Smilie, et al., *The Heart of the Matter*, Partnership Africa Canada Ottawa, January 2000; Diamond High Council, *1998 Annual Report*, Antwerp 1999, at page 1, and additional information supplied directly by HRD.

Figure 1: Graph demonstrating disparities in Belgian diamond imports from Liberia and Sierra Leone



Source for Figure 1: *Progress Report*, Diamond High Council, 2003

42. The figures for Liberia, represented graphically in Figure 1, are even more interesting. While Liberia has never produced more than 150,000 carats per year, HRD records show that 12.3 million carats were imported from Liberia in 1996. In fact, the import figures for Liberian diamonds are in the million-carat range for every year from 1990 to 1998, except 1991. Between 1995 and 1999, Belgium imported 33.6 million carats from Liberia.⁴⁷ The HRD therefore concluded that “imports recorded from Liberia bear no relationship to local production capacity”.⁴⁸
43. The diamonds found in Sierra Leone are mainly gemstones, while those mined in Liberia are mostly industrial diamonds. Gemstones are clear and colourless stones used in jewellery, while industrial diamonds are imperfect stones used in drills and other tools.⁴⁹ It is therefore fairly easy for experts to differentiate between diamonds of Sierra Leonean origin and those of Liberian origin.
44. Diamond smuggling from Sierra Leone into Liberia and neighbouring countries was not invented by the RUF or Charles Taylor. It started as early as the 1950s. After the tightening of control over the industry by the Sierra Leonean state in the 1960s and 1970s, Liberian diamond exports decreased considerably.⁵⁰ Such controls enabled key officials of the Sierra Leonean government to become real players in the industry and channel trade in diamonds to Lebanese and other friends within the country, who then exported them to Belgium and parts of the Middle East.
45. It is also important to note the figures for Belgian imports from Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea and Ghana. Although it has not been demonstrated that the RUF and Charles Taylor were responsible for smuggling diamonds through these countries, the figures show that in all probability their government officials colluded in the smuggling of diamonds out of Sierra Leone. Consequently it is likely that officials of the Sierra Leonean state have been doing business in diamonds with people in Liberia, including Charles Taylor, while he supported the pillage and plunder of Sierra Leone.
46. Côte d'Ivoire has virtually no diamond-production capacities, yet between 600,000 and 2.2 million carats were exported to Belgium each year between 1990 and 1998. The 2.2 million carats officially exported from Côte d'Ivoire in 1996 is equal to the entire volume produced in Côte d'Ivoire during the 30 years between 1948 and 1978.⁵¹ This comparison suggests the massive smuggling of diamonds into Côte d'Ivoire during the 1990s.
47. The import and export figures for Guinea also raise suspicion of smuggling. The UN Panel of Experts has indicated that diamond smuggling from Sierra Leone into Guinea and the use of Guinea as the country of origin for exported diamonds are the two factors that explain these figures.⁵²

⁴⁷ See Report of the United Nations Panel of Experts on Sierra Leone, New York, December 2000 (hereinafter “UN Panel of Experts report, 2000”), at page 21.

⁴⁸ Diamond High Council (HRD), *Witness statement of the HRD at the hearing on Sierra Leone convened by the UN Sanctions Committee*, New York, 31 July and 1 August 2000 (hereinafter “Diamond High Council, *Witness statement to UN Sanctions Committee*”); at page 3.

⁴⁹ See Gwynne-Jones, et al., *A New Geography of Sierra Leone*, at page 113.

⁵⁰ See Gberie, L.; *West Africa: Rocks in a Hard Place - The Political Economy of Diamonds and Regional Destabilisation*, Partnership Africa Canada, Ottawa, May 2003 (hereinafter “Gberie, *Rocks in a Hard Place*”).

⁵¹ Gberie, *Rocks in a Hard Place*.

⁵² See UN Panel of Experts report, 2000, at page 26.

48. A further discrepancy exists in the figures for The Gambia. Imports of Gambian rough diamonds into Belgium averaged US\$100 million per year between 1996 and 1999.⁵³
49. The Commission's research demonstrates that the RUF could not have earned all the money attributed to it in official reports from conflict diamonds alone. Except for a brief period in 1992 when the RUF occupied Koidu, the headquarters of the diamond-rich Kono District, it did not have access to the major diamond-producing areas of the country until 1995, when it occupied Koidu again for four months before being driven out by Executive Outcomes. RUF's diamond pickings in those areas could not have constituted the colossal amounts reflected in the literature. Figure 1 shows that, except in 1986, Belgian imports of diamonds from Liberia have always outstripped those from Sierra Leone. Yet Liberia is not reputed to have substantial diamond deposits and does not have gemstone-quality diamonds. The conclusion to be drawn from the above tables and Figure 1 is that diamond smuggling within the axis of Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire has been going on for more than 30 years, with Liberia being the principal conduit. This would suggest that those involved in diamond smuggling had developed networks and contacts in Liberia, which facilitated their smuggling and export of diamonds from within the region. Even in 1990, before the war in Sierra Leone started, Liberia exported more than 5 million carats of diamonds.
50. During the conflict, particularly between 1992 and 1997, control over Kono District seesawed between the RUF and government forces. Diamond exploitation and smuggling carried on unabated. Testimony to the Commission indicated that dealers continued to do business with whoever had control of the territory. Even the manager of Branch Energy in Kono tried to arrange a secure corridor to facilitate the continuation of his business.⁵⁴ It served the interests of both the RUF and members of the political elite to continue to use the same sources for laundering their diamond loot. Individuals laundering the proceeds from diamonds had direct connections to Charles Taylor, the alleged mastermind of diamond smuggling from Sierra Leone.⁵⁵ Control of the routes provided opportunities for rent seeking for both the RUF and the NPFL; it probably also yielded substantial revenues in "passage tax". An alarmed international community quickly outlawed business in what has come to be known as "blood diamonds".
51. The corruption in the Liberian diamond industry made "diamond laundering" extremely easy. Transactions and payments were made in U.S. dollars. This made Liberia a haven for diamond dealers. The UN Panel of Experts found the existence of several shelf companies whose given addresses in Monrovia turned out to be non-existent. These companies were used to legalise the diamonds exported. President Taylor controlled the trade through his Inspector General of Mines, who reported directly to him.⁵⁶

⁵³ See UN Panel of Experts report, 2000, at page 14.

⁵⁴ See Jan Joubert, Sierra Leone Country Manager, Branch Energy Ltd.; TRC Interviews conducted in Kono and Freetown, June 2003.

⁵⁵ See UN Panel of Experts report, 2000, at page 14.

⁵⁶ See UN Panel of Experts report, 2000, at page 14.

TRC



Sierra Leone researcher Dr. Lansana Gberie makes a presentation on the role of minerals in the conflict to TRC research and investigation staff.

52. Charles Taylor benefited enormously from the diamonds that passed through Liberia. His control was institutionalised when he became President of Liberia in 1997. The RUF also profited substantially from fines and charges it levied against diamond miners in the territories it controlled. The revenues from these activities were used to procure arms, ammunition and supplies for continuing the war against the Sierra Leonean state.
53. On 5 July 2000, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1306, imposing an embargo on the trade of diamonds from Sierra Leone. The UN Panel of Experts was created at the same time to monitor violations of the embargo and investigate diamond smuggling from Sierra Leone and its effect on the conflict. The Panel conducted several interviews with senior officials in different countries, including the then Liberian President Charles Taylor and senior officials in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Its report was published in December 2000 and provided great insights into the relationship between diamond smuggling and arms trafficking.

Other minerals

54. Other mineral resources are present in Sierra Leone, especially gold, bauxite and rutile. Although these minerals represent potentially important financial resources for the state, government focus so far has been on diamonds.
55. Mining of such minerals requires deep digging and therefore heavy machinery and substantial capital investment. The same is true of kimberlitic diamonds, found deep below the surface of the earth. Illegal mining of these minerals is difficult and therefore easily monitored by the government. On the other hand, the mining of alluvial gold and diamonds is easy and requires no investment in major equipment. It is therefore very difficult to control and regulate.

The role of non-Sierra Leonean communities

“The problem with us Sierra Leoneans is that we discriminate against ourselves. Any time an outsider comes in, we immediately give him everything.”⁵⁷

56. This quote essentially reflects the behaviour of the Sierra Leone political elite who exploited every opportunity for personal benefit, through networks and partnerships with non-Sierra Leonean businesses.
57. The Lebanese did not come to Sierra Leone for the diamonds; they were in the country long before diamonds were discovered. Beginning in the 1940s, however, members of the Lebanese community got involved in all aspects of the Sierra Leonean diamond industry, from funding licence holders to exporting diamonds. By paying higher informal taxes to the miners, they have assumed dominance over the industry.

⁵⁷ This quote is drawn from an interview with a merchant in Kono, conducted on 8 March 1990 and cited in Reno, *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone*, at page 116. The merchant was referring to various areas in which Sierra Leonean nationals are disadvantaged, including the fact that they have a hard time securing credits from local banks.

58. Bank loans have been far more accessible to non-Sierra Leonean communities than to Sierra Leonean nationals. Because of their wealth, members of these communities are widely perceived as being more capable of repaying loans. The result of such lending practices has been that non-Sierra Leoneans have taken advantage of opportunities for investment and business development, amassing tremendous resources from the diamond business and other industries. These captains of industry have allied themselves with the political elite as a means of protection. They have benefited enormously from doing business in Sierra Leone but they have returned little to the country in the form of investments. Most profits are sent to other countries.
59. Since the Lebanese possessed capital, they rapidly took control of the diamond industry, as well as much of the business sector in general. By 1966, 73% of all shops in the country belonged to Lebanese nationals.⁵⁸
60. In 1959, the government required joint ventures between the SLST and Sierra Leonean nationals to exploit aspects of the SLST lease. In 1961, a constitutional decree denied citizenship to anyone of non-African parentage, which meant that the Lebanese and members of other resident communities who had been in Sierra Leone for generations could not automatically obtain citizenship.
61. The combination of the new policy of indigenous participation in mining and the citizenship decree had two consequences. First, it consolidated the dependence of Sierra Leoneans - who did not possess the necessary capital - upon wealthier individuals, mainly the Lebanese, thus deepening the "supporter" system that had begun in the 1950s. Second, since the right to acquire a mining licence was now restricted to citizens of African descent, many Lebanese invested through the local chiefs, using the chiefs' names to get licences and sharing the profits.⁵⁹
62. This situation persisted for many years, creating a system in which Lebanese dealers associated with government officials and local chiefs dominated the diamond industry. These dealers supported the mine operators (also referred to as "diggers") who in turn hired labourers to dig the diamond plots. According to the 1963 census, there were 2,500 licensed and unlicensed diggers, most of them linked financially to Lebanese dealers. The diggers employed 25,000 to 30,000 labourers.⁶⁰ These links increased over the years, and in 1982, 80% of all Sierra Leonean nationals applying for a dealer licence listed the same address in Sefadu, which was connected to Jamil Said Mohamed.⁶¹
63. Directly or indirectly, the Lebanese are still dominant at every level of the process. At the extraction level, they create a "supporter system" and provide the mining tools and the money for the licence.⁶² The arrangement usually includes the sharing of profits on every diamond found. The Lebanese are also extensively involved at the dealer and exporter levels.⁶³

⁵⁸ See Reno, *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone*, at page 72.

⁵⁹ See Reno, *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone*, at page 64.

⁶⁰ See Report of the Census of 1963, published by the Government of Sierra Leone.

⁶¹ See Reno, *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone*, at page 113.

⁶² See Emmanuel Kargbo, committee member of the Tankoro Youth Organisation; TRC interview conducted in Kono District; 10 June 2003.

⁶³ See Patrick Tche, UNAMSIL Civil Affairs Officer; TRC interview conducted in Kono, 8 June 2003.

64. The Marakas (Gambian and Senegalese nationals) have also been involved at the dealing level since the 1950s. Unlike the Lebanese, they do not own shops; instead they conduct their transactions on the streets of Kono towns, especially Koidu. The Marakas are generally held in higher esteem than the Lebanese by Sierra Leoneans involved in the diamond industry. The Marakas have invested some of their profits in community development.⁶⁴
65. Leading Lebanese dealers were close associates of government leaders. Jamil Said Mohamed, for example, was a business associate of Siaka Stevens. His company was granted a licence to take over the NDMC. When he ran it aground, he sold it back to the government. When the government could no longer pay civil servants' wages, Jamil Said Mohamed "lent" money to the government to do so. The perception deepened that the Lebanese were and still remain the greatest beneficiaries of the diamond business.
66. Diamond smuggling is facilitated by the possession of a "dealer licence". A holder of a dealer licence is required to declare a certain minimum amount of transactions every year to the GGDO. Once this benchmark is attained, the dealer may legally deal in diamonds in his possession as he pleases. Although dealers cannot export diamonds officially without an export licence, they can deal in diamonds inside the country without declaring such sales to the GGDO. A popular hotel on Aberdeen Road in Freetown has been identified to the Commission as the rendezvous point for foreign speculators and merchants eager to buy diamonds.⁶⁵
67. Ordinarily dealers are supposed to buy diamonds from licensed miners only, but there is minimal oversight of the dealership level of the industry. Since the dealers are the prime promoters of the supporter system, they have hundreds of miners, not all of whom are licensed, on their support lists. Once a diamond is received at a dealer's office, it can be certified as having been produced by any of the supported miners and can be "officially" sold to the dealer. One of the foremost diamond dealers in the country told the Commission during a closed hearing in Freetown that he wouldn't insist on licences from miners before buying diamonds from them, because "I can legalise any diamond and then sell it".⁶⁶
68. There is a perception among Sierra Leoneans that the Lebanese keep all the profits from the diamond trade within the Lebanese community and invest only in their own businesses or export the profits to Lebanon. Many Lebanese, despite their long years in the country, have not integrated into Sierra Leonean society and are resented by Sierra Leoneans for their failure to do so.⁶⁷

⁶⁴ See Emmanuel Kargbo,; TRC interview conducted in Kono District; 10 June 2003. The TRC conducted additional interviews with several other miners on the same day.

⁶⁵ TRC Confidential Interview with a state intelligence officer; Freetown; 23 December 2003.

⁶⁶ TRC Closed Hearing involving a diamond dealer; TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 20 May 2003.

⁶⁷ See Emmanuel Kargbo, committee member of the Tankoro Youth Organisation; TRC interview conducted in Kono District; 10 June 2003.

69. Non-Sierra Leonean communities perceived by the RUF/AFRC as being wealthy were specifically targeted for attacks during the conflict. In the diamond industry, the Lebanese, Maraka and Fullah communities are involved in dealing and exporting. Their houses were often searched and their diamonds and money seized in surprise attacks.⁶⁸ One victim, a wealthy diamond exporter of Lebanese origin with business interests in Kono and Freetown was attacked several times. During one of the attacks on his house in Koidu, his family was only rescued by the intervention of Executive Outcomes.⁶⁹
70. The Ukrainian and Russian communities were involved in the conflict mainly as mercenaries, training men and flying supplies to whoever paid them, including the RUF and the government forces.⁷⁰ According to statements and interviews obtained by the Commission, they were also involved in diamond smuggling and arms trafficking, using helicopters to transport weapons and gems.⁷¹
71. Links have been alleged between Sierra Leonean diamonds and international terrorist organisations. The *Washington Post* published an article claiming that Charles Taylor had facilitated a diamond deal for Al Qaeda. Taylor was allegedly paid US\$1 million, and the diamonds originated in Sierra Leone.⁷² The Commission found no evidence to substantiate such allegations.

Mineral Resources and the Conflict Period

72. The lack of total state control over the diamond industry and other mineral resources had major repercussions for the conduct of the war in Sierra Leone.
73. Mining companies often contract with private security firms to provide protection in conflict areas where collapsing states are unable to provide security. In Sierra Leone, diamond-, rutile- and gold-mining companies entered into arrangements with private security firms, such as Executive Outcomes, Sandline International, Lifeguard Security and ArmSec International (SL). Some of these firms, notably Executive Outcomes and Sandline, have also provided security services to the government.⁷³

⁶⁸ See TRC Confidential Interview with an RUF combatant, 'G-5' commander and former intelligence officer; interview conducted in Koidu Town, Kono District; 12 August 2003.

⁶⁹ TRC Closed Hearing involving a diamond dealer; TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 20 May 2003.

⁷⁰ See International Crisis Group (ICG); *Sierra Leone: Report on the state of Security and Governance*, Brussels, September 2003, available at the website: www.crisisweb.org (hereinafter "ICG, 2003 Report on Security and Governance"); at page 28. See also Honourable Alhaji M.S. Deen, Minister of Mineral Resources; TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 9 October 2003.

⁷¹ See, *inter alia*, Neall Ellis, former Executive Outcomes helicopter pilot, TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 27 May 2003.

⁷² The reference to this article in the *Washington Post* newspaper is contained in the following report: Global Witness, *For a Few Dollars More*, Washington, April 2003.

⁷³ More detail on the role of private security firms in the conflict can be found in the chapter on External Actors, which follows directly in Volume Three B of this report.

Phase I of the Conflict: March 1991-1993

74. Phase I encompasses the start of the war in March 1991, the NPRC coup in 1992 and the RUF's efforts to regroup from the brink of defeat in 1993. Although this is a pivotal period in the history of the conflict, few significant events occurred in the diamond industry. The RUF started its military operations in 1991, but did not gain any significant control over any diamond area before 1992, when it first captured Kono. This period was characterised by the decline of NDMC and the retreat of GGDO from the diamond trade.
75. The NDMC shut its operations in Yengema in October 1992, its operations in Tongo Field in March 1993 and went into liquidation in October 1993. The demise of the NDMC left the government weakened by the loss of legal diamond revenues.
76. Throughout the conflict, the fighting factions used the tactic of diamond seizure to gain revenues quickly. Diamonds were looted or seized from individual miners and dealers and sold.
77. From 1991 to 1993, Kailahun District and parts of Pujehun District were under RUF control. In Kailahun, only two towns, Jojoima and Kotoma, were mining areas. Diamond mining was organised by the RUF in those towns on a very small scale and produced a modest quantity of diamonds.⁷⁴ These were handed over to a mining commander, who would record them and hand them either to Foday Sankoh or to NPFL fighters, who would take them to Liberia.⁷⁵
78. The RUF captured Kono for a brief period in 1992 and was in control of Koidu and the surrounding communities for four months between October 1992 and February 1993. However, some Chiefdoms in Kono District – Nimikoro, Nimiyyama and Sewafe – were under RUF control during almost all of the conflict.⁷⁶ The RUF mined diamonds on a small scale, seized mining equipment and abducted miners to operate it.⁷⁷ One former RUF commander witnessed the presence of Foday Sankoh, Issa Sesay, Sam Bockarie and Patrick Lamin in the Koidu area in late 1992 to oversee RUF mining activities.⁷⁸
79. The RUF attacked a diamond mine in February 1993 in Baakaar, Dama Chiefdom, in Kenema District,⁷⁹ but was forced from the area by the NPRC regime. Throughout the war, insufficient control on the ground prevented the RUF from organising large-scale mining in Pujehun District, where the Zimmi diamond mines were located.⁸⁰

⁷⁴ Moigboi Moigande Kosia, former RUF 'G-1' officer recruited in 1991; TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 24 May 2003.

⁷⁵ Moigboi Moigande Kosia, former RUF 'G-1' officer recruited in 1991; TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 24 May 2003.

⁷⁶ TRC Confidential Interview with an RUF combatant, 'G-5' commander and former intelligence officer; interview conducted in Koidu Town, Kono District; 12 August 2003.

⁷⁷ TRC Confidential Interview with an RUF combatant, 'G-5' commander and former intelligence officer; interview conducted in Koidu Town, Kono District; 12 August 2003. See also Moigboi Moigande Kosia, former RUF 'G-1' officer recruited in 1991; TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 24 May 2003.

⁷⁸ TRC Confidential Interview with an RUF combatant, 'G-5' commander and former intelligence officer; interview conducted in Koidu Town, Kono District; 12 August 2003.

⁷⁹ Kamoh Nyakoi, TRC statement number 5098, Baakaar (Kenema), 6 March 2003.

⁸⁰ TRC Confidential Interview with an RUF combatant, 'G-5' commander and former intelligence officer; interview conducted in Koidu Town, Kono District; 12 August 2003.

80. The situation worsened for the RUF from 1993 onwards. Military authorities told the BBC on 15 November 1993, that the Sierra Leone Army had recaptured Koindu after 13 months under RUF control. They also proclaimed the recapture of nine other towns in Kailahun and seven towns in Pujehun.⁸¹ By the end of 1993, the RUF had been largely pushed out of Sierra Leone into Liberia.
81. Army soldiers also engaged in diamond smuggling in Bo and Pujehun Districts from the beginning of the conflict. A miner was attacked by SLA soldiers in Sumbuya, Bo District, in 1991 and tortured because he refused to hand over the diamonds he had mined. A soldier assaulted him and raped his wife:
- “I was beaten by them severely until I was at the point of death. The reason was because I was a miner and they said I have never given diamonds. One of them raped my wife.”⁸²
82. This victim also witnessed the soldiers seizing diamonds from other miners. In the same year, in Gisiwulo village, Pujehun District, SLA soldiers forced villagers to guide them through the swamps where diamonds were found. Those who refused were tied up and left in the sun until they became co-operative:
- “The SLA soldiers used to gather the towns’ people and ask that we show them the swamps where big diamonds could be found. If we failed to cooperate, they would tie us up and bake us in the sun. One morning, Lieutenant Mallah ordered his men to tie me up because I was the town chief and I had refused to show them the swamps. I was held hostage for one whole day and night.”⁸³
83. In the town of Bo, in 1993, during a riot, a diamond digger was attacked and killed by an SLA soldier who had requested money from him. His employer witnessed the killing:
- “Hassan was stabbed and shot all over his body. I stood there for some time watching him, then his brothers came and joined me.”⁸⁴
84. The perceived wealth of diamond workers made them targets of armed factions throughout the conflict.

⁸¹ British Broadcasting Corporations (BBC), *Government troops reportedly recapture rebel-occupied town*, included in the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 15 November 1993.

⁸² Aruna Vandy, TRC statement number 2400, Sumbuya (Bo), 22 January 2003.

⁸³ Brima Kemokai, TRC statement number 1850, Gisiwulo (Pujehun), 21 January 2003.

⁸⁴ Mohamed Bangura, TRC statement number 4462, Konta Line (Port Loko), 31 January 2003.

Vigilantes and civil militias

85. From the first efforts at assembling civil militia forces in the south and east of the country, the collective resources of the host chiefdoms were typically gathered together to feed, fund or otherwise assist whatever force was present there. In chiefdoms with diamond and other mineral deposits, the young men were required to donate their finds to the community effort. In Pujehun District, where the RUF had allied itself with an amorphous body of militiamen known as the “Action Group”,⁸⁵ villagers in the Soro Gbema and Kpanga Krim chiefdoms provided fighters with shelter and the proceeds of their agriculture and industries.⁸⁶ This practice was reflective of the warm reception initially given to the RUF in the south. However, after the middle of 1991, there is evidence that locals ceased to contribute voluntarily and that the RUF then resorted to looting the resources they required, including diamonds and other minerals that people had in their possession.

Phase II of the Conflict: 1994-1997

86. Phase II of the conflict was characterised by a shift in the fighting strategy of the RUF to guerrilla warfare tactics. This change was effective: the RUF was able to gain significant territory and secure control over Kono for several months in 1995 and strike a decisive advance towards Freetown.⁸⁷ In the same year, the attacks on the SIEROMCO and Sierra Rutile Limited mines by the RUF had tremendous implications for the national economy and led to the destruction of the surrounding communities and the internationalisation of the conflict. The insecurity created by the attacks, coupled with the effectiveness of the RUF on the ground, led the government to hire the private security firm, Ghurkhas Security Guards.
87. The NPRC regime, in search of more revenue, opened the mining industry to “junior” diamond-mining companies. The term “junior” refers to “small prospecting and mining companies which work on the edge of the industry, discovering diamond fields, generating funds on international stock markets, sometimes selling diamonds directly but more often than not eventually selling out to larger companies”.⁸⁸ Such companies take risks to discover new resources and establish themselves in the world market.
88. These junior companies were associated with private security firms not just in Sierra Leone but throughout Africa. In conflict zones, such companies could not rely on the war-torn country to protect their mining operations. Therefore, to safeguard their profits, they turned to other means of security. The junior companies that entered Sierra Leone during the conflict period included those in the list overleaf.

⁸⁵ More detail on the “Action Group” and other local dynamics in the Pujehun District can be found in the chapter on the Military and Political History of the Conflict in Volume Three A of this report.

⁸⁶ TRC Confidential Interview with an RUF combatant and erstwhile mining supervisor; interview conducted in Pujehun District; September 2003.

⁸⁷ For a detailed discussion and analysis of RUF military gains during this period, see the chapter on the Military and Political History of the Conflict in Volume Three A of this report.

⁸⁸ See Smilie, et al., *The Heart of the Matter*, at page 51.

Rex Mining Company

89. Rex Mining Company NV acquired concessions in Tongo Field and Zimmi in March 1994. The leases were renewed by the government in August 1999 but were revoked in mid-October 2003 when the company failed to pay outstanding licence fees amounting to US\$282,000. The company claimed in 1999 to have close contacts with both government officials and the RUF. That claim was denied by Foday Sankoh. When the government's helicopter gunship was shot down in 1998, Rex's managing director and president provided the government with spare parts from Russia worth US\$3.8 million.⁸⁹

AmCan

90. AmCan came to Sierra Leone in 1993, and procured concessions for exploration in Kono District. Sierra Gold Limited, a subsidiary of AmCan, holds a 30-square-mile gold mine in Tonkolili District.⁹⁰ In 1996, AmCan purchased ArmSec International (SL), a private security company.⁹¹ It is not clear what role ArmSec played in the conflict, but it was used by AmCan to provide security for its mining concessions. As of 1999, David Quee was AmCan's lawyer and representative in Freetown as well as Chairman of the GGDO. Despite this apparent conflict of interests, the Ministry of Mineral Resources did not intervene.

Branch Energy, Diamond Works and Executive Outcomes

91. Branch Energy first entered Sierra Leone in 1995 and obtained a concession from the NPRC regime for mining kimberlitic diamonds in the Kono District. The lease was originally for 25 years and could be renewed. The contract was ratified by the Parliament in 1996. However, Branch Energy, which in 1996 became a subsidiary of Diamond Works, a mining company registered in Canada, decided to end its activities and evacuate its personnel after the May 1997 coup that led to the establishment of the AFRC.
92. The Commission travelled to Kono to visit the Branch Energy concession and conducted interviews with its employees. The company lost US\$15 million of its initial 1995 investment, because its equipment was looted or burnt. Jan Joubert, the company's country manager since 1995, arranged the evacuation of personnel after the May 1997 coup. After negotiations with the AFRC in Kono, the employees and other foreigners were finally evacuated by helicopter in August. However, Joubert stayed behind and managed to set up meetings between the military, the AFRC/RUF and the Kamajors. The ultimate aim was to achieve a secure climate in Koidu and in Kono District in general that would be safe enough to permit the resumption of the company's operations. Joubert succeeded initially in creating a forum for discussion with the AFRC but finally had to leave the country in September 1997 following the breakdown of negotiations.⁹²

⁸⁹ See Smilie, et al., *The Heart of the Matter*, at page 54.

⁹⁰ See Smilie, et al., *The Heart of the Matter*, in Annex 2.

⁹¹ See Smilie, et al., *The Heart of the Matter*, at page 55.

⁹² Jan Joubert, Sierra Leone Country Manager, Branch Energy Ltd.; TRC Interviews conducted in Kono and Freetown, 2003.

93. Executive Outcomes (EO) was part of a bigger group, called Plaza 107, which included Sandline International, Lifeguard Security and other security firms, as well as some mining companies such as Branch Energy. From its inception, EO had been providing security for diamond companies in conflict zones. It had performed such services for Anglo American, De Beers and Branch Energy in its diamond operations in Angola.⁹³
94. The ostensible links between Branch Energy, EO and Sandline International in Sierra Leone are denied by Branch Energy and Diamond Works. After the end of Executive Outcomes' operations in Sierra Leone, Eeben Barlow, the former director of Executive Outcomes, became a shareholder in Diamond Works.⁹⁴
95. Executive Outcomes was allegedly introduced to the government by Branch Energy through Tony Buckingham.⁹⁵ Its mandate was to repel the RUF and retake the diamond-mining areas in Kono District.⁹⁶ EO was paid by the NPRC partly in cash and partly in mining concessions granted to Branch Energy. According to Captain Valentine Strasser, former Head of State and Chairman of the NPRC, Ghurkhas Security Services was also paid in diamond concessions.⁹⁷ One month after Executive Outcomes pushed the RUF out of the diamond areas, Branch Energy⁹⁸ secured its 25-year lease in Kono District. Reginald Glover, then Minister of Mineral Resources, claimed that he was ordered by the Head of State to give diamond concessions to Branch Energy.⁹⁹
96. Branch Energy, Diamond Works and Executive Outcomes became important players in the diamond industry in Sierra Leone. Using contacts in government and acquiring protection from the RUF, they continued to engage in diamond exploitation.

The RUF, diamond smuggling and arms trafficking

“We have signed the Peace Accord on 29 November 1996, just so as to relieve our movement of the enormous pressure from the international community while I will use this opportunity to transact my business in getting our fighting materials freely and easily.”

Foday Sankoh, Leader of the RUF, 4 December 1996¹⁰⁰

⁹³ See Harding, J.; “The Mercenary Business: Executive Outcomes”, in *Review of African Political Economy*, 1997 (hereinafter “Harding, *The Mercenary Business*”).

⁹⁴ See Smilie, et al., *The Heart of the Matter*, at page 59.

⁹⁵ See UN Panel of Experts report, 2000, at page 43. See also Harding, *The Mercenary Business*.

⁹⁶ Jan Joubert, Sierra Leone Country Manager, Branch Energy Ltd.; TRC Interview conducted in Freetown, 11 June 2003.

⁹⁷ Captain (Retired) Valentine E. M. Strasser, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from 1992 to 1996; testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown, 30 July 2003.

⁹⁸ The company formerly known as “Branch Energy Limited” has undergone a name change since the conflict. At the time of writing it is called “Koidu Holdings Limited”.

⁹⁹ See Smilie, et al., *The Heart of the Matter*, at page 60.

¹⁰⁰ Letter from Foday Sankoh to Mohamed Talibi of the Libyan Peoples' Revolutionary Council, Accra, dated 4 December 1996; Criminal Investigations Department (CID) of the Sierra Leone Police; letter included in the dossier pertaining to the ‘Foday Sankoh / 8 May 2000’ case; dossier provided to the TRC in July 2003.

97. Before 1995, the RUF conducted diamond mining on a sporadic and unorganised basis. However, the Commission received multiple reports of civilians being forced to mine for the RUF dating back to 1994.¹⁰¹ In a letter allegedly sent to Mohamed Talibi of the Libyan Arab Bureau in Ghana, Sankoh stated in June 1996 that he had been able “to organise serious mining operations in precious minerals which [he] believes will help [them] generate the needed foreign exchange for [their] mission”.¹⁰²
98. In 1995, the RUF took control of the Koidu area and held it for about four months until being driven out by Executive Outcomes.¹⁰³ Witnesses recall several instances in which RUF fighters seized diamonds from civilians in Kono District, often beating or torturing them if they refused to hand the diamonds over. In Kelfala Chiefdom, Pujehun, in 1995, a miner was seriously beaten by RUF fighters when he refused to hand over his diamonds:
- “One rebel came with a mask and asked me to produce the diamonds. I told him I had nothing like diamonds in my possession. Failing to produce the said diamonds, I was severely beaten with a stick. He further threatened to kill me. I begged him not to kill me as I am a poor boy working for people. But he seemed not to care and continued beating me until the first stick was broken. He used a second stick until it was finished.”¹⁰⁴
99. A former RUF commander reported on RUF diamond-seizure tactics during the period when the RUF was in control of the Koidu area. Seizures were conducted during raids on towns and mining sites and also on individual miners and dealers.¹⁰⁵ Diamond seizures were also conducted in Pujehun District, often resulting in the death of civilians:
- “At Kpetewoma Lugbu in August 1995, we were in a hiding place mining when the rebels got to us. They surrounded us and got everybody to the mining site. We were asked to give them the diamonds we had. Because there was delay in giving them the diamonds, four miners were killed and others lined up to follow them. They took all we had in the huts plus our food.”¹⁰⁶
100. The tactic of diamond seizure was also used in Tongo Field throughout the war, but large-scale mining was not organised in that area during the period between 1994 and 1997.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰¹ TRC interviews and statements from Kailahun, Kono and Pujehun Districts; March to May 2003.

¹⁰² Letter from Foday Sankoh to Mohamed Talibi of the Libyan Peoples’ Revolutionary Council, Accra, dated 26 June 1996; Criminal Investigations Department (CID) of the Sierra Leone Police; letter included in the dossier pertaining to the ‘Foday Sankoh / 8 May 2000’ case; dossier provided to the TRC in July 2003.

¹⁰³ TRC Confidential Interview with an RUF combatant, ‘G-5’ commander and former intelligence officer; interview conducted in Koidu Town, Kono District; 12 August 2003.

¹⁰⁴ Abdul Karim Koroma, TRC statement 3709, Makali Junction (Tonkolili), 18 February 2003.

¹⁰⁵ TRC Confidential Interview with an RUF combatant, ‘G-5’ commander and former intelligence officer; interview conducted in Koidu Town, Kono District; 12 August 2003.

¹⁰⁶ Brima Bobor, TRC statement number 6668, Pujehun Town (Pujehun), 31 March 2003.

¹⁰⁷ TRC Confidential Interview with an RUF combatant, ‘G-5’ commander and former intelligence officer; interview conducted in Koidu Town, Kono District; 12 August 2003.

101. The RUF used diamonds to buy weapons and supplies.¹⁰⁸ As illustrated by the Foday Sankoh quote above, it appears that the RUF signed the Abidjan Peace Accord only to gain time and re-establish its control on the ground. Indeed, by the time of the Abidjan signing in 1996, the RUF had suffered a major military setback and lost control of the diamond-mining areas.
102. The RUF diamonds were smuggled mainly to Liberia and Guinea, over footpaths through the borders.¹⁰⁹ The diamonds were carried by RUF commanders across the border to Foya-Kama and Voinjama, and then on to Monrovia. The profits from diamond sales were used to purchase weapons, ammunition, food and equipment.¹¹⁰ Several reports and testimonies indicate that the weapons came mainly from Eastern Europe by air, were trans-shipped in Burkina Faso and Libya, then imported into Liberia, usually by air as well, in violation of the UN arms embargo on Liberia. The weapons were then transported into Sierra Leonean territory mainly by road in load trucks.¹¹¹ The material included ammunition, RPGs, grenades and AK-47s.¹¹²
103. The estimates of RUF revenues from diamond smuggling vary from US\$25 million to US\$125 million per year. De Beers' estimate for 1999 is US\$70 million.¹¹³ The estimates refer to the optimal value of the production capacity of the land under the RUF's control and not to the actual RUF revenues, which are extremely difficult to estimate. Nevertheless, these estimates seem very high and, if accurate, suggest a very important role for diamonds in fuelling the conflict. The fact that there is no evidence that supplies matching these levels of profits reached the RUF fighters on the ground, suggest that the estimates were overstated.
104. Two possible explanations can be offered for the discrepancy between alleged RUF receipts in diamond sales and the supplies to the fighters. The first is that corruption within the ranks of the RUF was high and individual commanders were keeping some of the profits. Another possible explanation is that Liberian officials and other business partners in Liberia, who received the diamonds from RUF commanders, retained a high level of the profits for themselves.

¹⁰⁸ TRC Confidential Interview with an RUF combatant, 'G-5' commander and former intelligence officer; interview conducted in Koidu Town, Kono District; 12 August 2003. See also Alhaji Conteh (alias Black Jesus), former RUF combatant; TRC interview conducted in Pademba Road Prison, Freetown, 20 May 2003.

¹⁰⁹ TRC Confidential Interview with an RUF combatant, 'G-5' commander and former intelligence officer; interview conducted in Koidu Town, Kono District; 12 August 2003.

¹¹⁰ See, *inter alia*, Alhaji Conteh (alias Black Jesus), former RUF combatant; TRC interview conducted in Pademba Road Prison, Freetown, 20 May 2003. See also Musa Bunduka, former SLA soldier and later RUF fighter; TRC interview conducted in Palima, Tongo Field, 15 June 2003. See also Report to Foday Sankoh by RUF Commander Issa Sesay, dated 27 September 1999; Criminal Investigations Department (CID) of the Sierra Leone Police; report included in the dossier pertaining to the 'Foday Sankoh / 8 May 2000' case; dossier provided to the TRC in July 2003 (hereinafter "*Report by Issa Sesay, 27 September 1999*").

¹¹¹ See UN Panel of Experts report, 2000, at page 38.

¹¹² See Alhaji Conteh (alias Black Jesus), former RUF combatant; TRC interview conducted in Pademba Road Prison, Freetown, 20 May 2003.

¹¹³ See UN Panel of Experts report, 2000, at page 14. See also Fred Marrafono, former Executive Outcomes officer, TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 4 June 2003.

105. On several occasions, senior commanders in various factions attempted to keep diamonds for themselves. Former Head of State Johnny Paul Koroma, after the removal of the AFRC from power, tried to keep some diamonds to pay for his escape from the country. He was placed under house arrest by senior RUF officers (including Issa Sesay and Mike Lamin) until he returned the diamonds. He handed over diamonds reportedly worth US\$15,000.¹¹⁴
106. On another occasion, Issa Sesay was given 14 diamonds by Sam Bockarie to take to Monrovia to a business associate of President Taylor's. The objective was to exchange the diamonds for military equipment. Issa Sesay went to Monrovia with the diamonds, but claimed to have "lost" them in a tea shop.¹¹⁵ He later explained to the RUF command structure what had happened, and a fight with Sam Bockarie and Mike Lamin ensued.¹¹⁶ Issa Sesay has been accused of dealing diamonds for his own benefit and covering up the deals:
- "Issa was in charge as the overall commander; if he had a diamond of about 10 to fifteen carats, he would take it to somebody who he knows has money, and he would say: 'Go and sell that diamond; go to such and such person.' That person would buy the diamond and later on Issa would come around with his vehicle and his boys and say: 'What about that diamond you bought? Bring it, I want it.' The person would then be forced to produce that diamond and pay for it again."¹¹⁷
107. The People's Army of Sierra Leone, a combination of the RUF and AFRC forces, had a mining unit complete with Mining Commanders. The unit suffered from internal power struggles with commanders stealing diamonds from one another. One investigation obtained by the TRC, conducted by the People's Army Joint Security Board, followed the "loss" of 82 pieces of diamonds. The investigation concluded that "the administrative set-up within the Mining Unit was very poor" and recommended the daily weighing of diamonds in the presence of all the mining commanders, the issuance of receipts signed by witnesses and an increase in security within the Mining Unit.¹¹⁸
108. The TRC received testimony about the involvement in diamond dealing of high-ranking government and military officers in Liberia, including former President Charles Taylor. One former RUF combatant claimed to have witnessed an exchange of diamonds and weapons between Foday Sankoh and Charles Taylor in 1994 at the Kangari Hills base.¹¹⁹ Although his account was uncorroborated, this combatant's testimony does accord with widely-held suspicions in the international community.

¹¹⁴ See UN Panel of Experts report, 2000, at page 13. See also *Report by Issa Sesay*, 27 September 1999.

¹¹⁵ See also *Report by Issa Sesay*, 27 September 1999.

¹¹⁶ "Unofficial transcript of a recorded discussion between Foday Sankoh and his RUF Cohorts upon his return from detention in Nigeria in 1999"; Criminal Investigations Department (CID) of the Sierra Leone Police; transcript included in the dossier pertaining to the 'Foday Sankoh / 8 May 2000' case; dossier provided to the TRC in July 2003.

¹¹⁷ Moigboi Moigande Kosia, former RUF 'G-1' officer recruited in 1991; TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 24 May 2003.

¹¹⁸ Letter to Brigadier Peter Vandí, RUF Overall Brigade Commander, from the People's Army Joint Security Board of Investigations, entitled "Summary of findings and recommendations on the missing of 82 pieces of diamond stones on 5 April 1999 in Kono"; document provided to the TRC by a former RUF administrator, April 2003.

¹¹⁹ See Alhaji Conteh (alias Black Jesus), former RUF combatant; TRC interview conducted in Pademba Road Prison, Freetown, 20 May 2003.

109. In the aftermath of the overthrow of the AFRC/RUF regime by ECOMOG in February 1998 and the subsequent withdrawal of the RUF to its stronghold of Kailahun District, diamond transactions were allegedly conducted with the “leader of Liberia” and “the brother in Burkina” in exchange for arms and ammunitions. According to a conversational excerpt attributed to Mike Lamin:

“Although he [Sam Bockarie] had already made some contacts with them, he needed some of the gem stones to give to the leader in Monrovia to facilitate these contacts. Before this, of course, we were aware that some transactions were going on as on several occasions he made visits to Monrovia through the help of one Benjamin Legon, a Liberian security personnel; in collaboration with the Adjutant General. The Adjutant General knows about some diamonds given to Benjamin Legon for onward handing over to the Leader in Liberia.”¹²⁰

110. There is some evidence of diamonds for weapons and supplies deals between the RUF and some Guinean individuals and military officers¹²¹. There is however no proof of the involvement of the government or any high-ranking military personnel. It is alleged, in one instance, that the RUF bought a BM-21 multiple rocket launcher from the Guinean Armed Forces just after the invasion of Freetown in January 1999.¹²²
111. Allegations of corruption were made against Foday Sankoh when he became Chairman of the Commission for the Management of Strategic Mineral Resources, following the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement in 1999. These allegations concern deals apparently made with the Integrated Group of Companies and BECA Company, the latter having signed a contract for exploitation of diamond and gold resources directly with the RUF and not with the Government of Sierra Leone.¹²³

The place of diamonds in the overall strategy of the RUF

112. Some of the RUF’s weaponry was acquired through purchases made abroad, paid with diamonds and other sources of revenue. However, this does not suggest that diamonds-for-arms exchanges was the only way, or even the primary way, in which the RUF acquired weapons; nor does it mean that diamonds were the only commodities used in such exchanges.

¹²⁰ Former RUF commander Mike Lamin was among the speakers attributed in the document entitled: “Unofficial transcript of a recorded discussion between Foday Sankoh and his RUF Cohorts upon his return from detention in Nigeria in 1999”; Criminal Investigations Department (CID) of the Sierra Leone Police; transcript included in the dossier pertaining to the ‘Foday Sankoh / 8 May 2000’ case; dossier provided to the TRC in July 2003.

¹²¹ See the document entitled *Report on a visit to some refugee camps in Gueckedou, Forest Region, Republic of Guinea, March 1995*; contained in confidential files compiled by the National Security Agency (NSA) of the NPRC Government, 1992 - 1996; presented to the Commission by the former NPRC National Security Adviser, Brigadier (Retired) Sam H. King; September 2003.

¹²² Neall Ellis, former Executive Outcomes helicopter pilot, TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 27 May 2003.

¹²³ See UN Panel of Experts report, 2000, at pages 16-17.

113. The Commission has received several testimonies from civilians forced to produce marketable agricultural produce for the RUF. All these events were reported from Kailahun District, which borders Liberia. In July 1998, the RUF came to an understanding with the authorities of Lofa County in Liberia for cross-border trade allowing the RUF to transport produce for sale in Liberia.¹²⁴
114. Villagers were forced to harvest cocoa and coffee and hand those products over to RUF commanders. Abu Yaku Gaima was the Paramount Chief for Dia chiefdom, Kailahun District, in 1993, when the RUF invaded the chiefdom:
- “Peter Vandy and Mohamed Ukulay (alias Mannawa), who was the RUF Brigade Commander, came to Baiwala and requested for 100 bags of cocoa to be produced in 5 days, as they urgently needed it to buy arms. He ordered me to register all civilians all over the chiefdom and that everybody should join efforts.”¹²⁵
115. Villagers were then forced to carry these items across the border to be exchanged for weapons, suffering many violations in the process, such as beatings and killings. The abductees would then be brought back to carry more items: *“I was subjected to forced labour to carry double bags with either cocoa or coffee to Liberia and back to Sierra Leone. This was done many times”*¹²⁶; or left behind upon reaching the destination:
- “When they entered into our hiding place and captured us, we had to carry one double bag loaded with either cocoa or coffee. But if they did not get the required amount, they would lock us in our houses until they get the quantity they wanted, after which they would open the door and ask us to carry these loads to Foyia in Liberia. When you reached your destination, they would abandon you and go for their business”.¹²⁷
116. From these testimonies, the focus appears to have been on the acquisition of coffee and cocoa, because they had a reasonably high market value.¹²⁸
117. Several witnesses speculated that the RUF acquired weapons mainly through the seizure of SLA equipment after taking over SLA bases. These testimonies are supported by evidence of the types of weapons and logistics that were used by the RUF: mainly SLA standard issue firearms rather than sophisticated weaponry imported from abroad. RUF weapons included small arms rather than mounted heavy artillery pieces. RUF vehicles were typically stolen vehicles rather than newly purchased trucks.

¹²⁴ See report of a meeting held on 16 July 1998 to iron out differences between the Joint Security of Lofa County (Liberia) and the RUF Movement; Criminal Investigations Department (CID) of the Sierra Leone Police; report included in the dossier pertaining to the ‘Foday Sankoh / 8 May 2000’ case; dossier provided to the TRC in July 2003.

¹²⁵ Abu Yaku Gaima, TRC statement number 47, Baiwala (Kailahun), 16 December 2002.

¹²⁶ Brima Amara Davowa, TRC statement 4311, Sandeyaru Town (Kailahun), 23 February 2003.

¹²⁷ Eddy Thomas, TRC statement 35, Kailahun Town (Kailahun), 20 February 2003.

¹²⁸ Further corroboration of the priority afforded to these goods came from Musa Bunduka, former SLA soldier and later RUF fighter; TRC interview conducted in Palima, Tongo Field, 15 June 2003.

Other minerals and natural resources

118. On 19 January 1995 the RUF attacked two important mines in Moyamba and Bonthe Districts. One was a bauxite mine owned by SIEROMCO, a subsidiary of Swiss Aluminium Company of Zurich. The second mine was owned by Sierra Rutile Ltd, a wholly owned subsidiary of Nord Resources of the United States. Sierra Rutile was then the largest producer of rutile, or titanium ore, in the world with a 25% share of the global market.¹²⁹ SRL employed 2,000 people and produced 150,000 tons of rutile per year.¹³⁰ The company was the largest private employer in Sierra Leone before the attack. The two mines accounted for 63% of export earnings in 1994 (with 48.7% for SRL and 14.5% for SIEROMCO), which represented US\$13 million of revenues for the government.¹³¹ The impact on the economy of these attacks was therefore disastrous.
119. Most of the employees of SIEROMCO and Sierra Rutile were evacuated, but the RUF took several foreigners hostage. The attack at Rutile was led by Mohammed Tarawallie, who was the RUF Battle Group Commander at the time. He was acting under the instructions of Foday Sankoh and is said to have communicated with him by telephone from the Sierra Rutile office.¹³²
120. One civilian witness told the Commission that many soldiers under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Tom Nyuma, Provincial Secretary of State under the NPRC, were brought in as reinforcements the day before the attack at Mokanji and Rutile in two helicopters. According to this account, the directors of Sierra Rutile Limited wanted to evacuate the employees, but were assured by Tom Nyuma that the area was secure and the advance of the RUF had been countered:
- “Tom Nyuma assured them of security since the soldiers were fully deployed; this same confidence he gave to the civilians. [The next day] we heard the information that the RUF had reached Kaibama. The township was full of panic as everyone wanted to leave but the soldiers deployed gave us confidence that nothing would happen.”¹³³
121. When Mokanji was attacked, the mother of this witness, Ibrahim Jusu, was shot dead by the RUF, along with other civilians. The employees of SIEROMCO were kidnapped. Witnesses before the Commission, including Ibrahim Jusu, accused Tom Nyuma in strong terms of collusion with the RUF.¹³⁴

¹²⁹ See *Sierra Leone*, in *The Mining Journal – African Mining*, 26 January 1996, at page 19.

¹³⁰ See *Bleak outlook in Sierra Leone*, in *The Mining Journal – Mining Week*, 15 September 1995, at page 190.

¹³¹ See *Sierra Leone*, in *The Mining Journal – Mining Annual Review*, July 1995, at page 152.

¹³² See the document entitled: “Rebels at Mokanji and Sierra Rutile”, dated January 1995; contained in confidential files compiled by the National Security Agency (NSA) of the NPRC Government, 1992 - 1996; presented to the Commission by the former NPRC National Security Adviser, Brigadier (Retired) Sam H. King; September 2003.

¹³³ Ibrahim Jusu, TRC statement number 2740, Taininihun Jakinah (Moyamba), 27 January 2003.

¹³⁴ Various perspectives regarding collusion between SLA officers and the RUF can be found in the chapter on the Military and Political History of the Conflict in Volume Three A of this report.

122. A number of reasons have been advanced to the Commission for the attacks at Sierra Rutile and SIEROMCO. One reason was that the attacks were aimed procuring equipment and stealing cash from the Sierra Rutile office, allegedly amounting to “thousands of dollars”.¹³⁵ Another objective was to cut off the government’s revenue by disrupting production activities at the companies. A further reason was that the attacks were part of the RUF’s terror tactics in order to create a general climate of insecurity among the population.

123. Two victims of the attacks claimed that the attacks were carried out by a combination of RUF and SLA fighters, acting together in the looting of civilian properties and the burning of houses:

“The RUF rebels who were controlling the Sierra Rutile Company used the route from Sierra Rutile through our village, Moselolo. They opened fire on us and all of us abandoned the village. They set fire to 27 houses and some people were captured, all of our belongings were looted and some burnt down. The RUF rebels and SLA combined themselves to attack us.”¹³⁶

124. The attacks and the subsequent hostage taking were certainly part of a strategy to gain international notice. The RUF simultaneously demanded the cessation of British military help to the NPRC regime.¹³⁷ The hostage taking was widely reported in the Western press, as European nationals were among the abductees. The negotiations for the release of the hostages also resulted in the Sierra Leonean conflict receiving international attention some four years after it had started. The hostage taking sent a message to international aid workers that the country was not safe and that they should pull out.

125. The attacks on the two companies resulted in the disruption of community life in the areas close to the mines. The Commission has received testimony from villagers of Moyamba and Bonthe Districts describing the violations committed against them by the RUF as including looting of property, abduction, including of young children¹³⁸, summary executions¹³⁹ and the burning of houses¹⁴⁰. These violations resulted in extensive displacement of civilians, as they fled to neighbouring villages and to the bush, trying to escape the attacks.¹⁴¹ Young girls were abducted and turned into “bush wives”:

“We were captured on Wednesday 25 May 1995 and taken to Kpetema where we stayed for about a month. An RUF rebel who apprehended me forcefully took me for his wife. I was 15 years of age by then.”¹⁴²

¹³⁵ TRC Confidential Interview with an RUF combatant, ‘G-5’ commander and former intelligence officer; interview conducted in Koidu Town, Kono District; 12 August 2003.

¹³⁶ Idrissa Conteh, TRC statement number 6846, Moselolo (Moyamba), 22 March 2003; and Gbessay Santigue, TRC statement number 3873, Mokeleh (Moyamba), 10 February 2003.

¹³⁷ Associated Press; *Rebels attack US-owned mine, threaten to kill foreigners*; 20 January 1995.

¹³⁸ TRC Confidential statement number 565, Magburaka (Tonkolili), 7 December 2002; TRC confidential statement number 4749, Mile 91 (Tonkolili), 26 February 2003; and TRC confidential statement number 2825, Moriba (Bonthe), 28 January 2003.

¹³⁹ Lansana Momoh, TRC statement number 2990, Jangalor (Bonthe), 5 February 2003.

¹⁴⁰ Massa Squire, TRC statement number 5383, Grafton (Western Area), 22 February 2003.

¹⁴¹ Lansana Momoh, TRC statement number 2990, Jangalor (Bonthe), 5 February 2003.

¹⁴² Female victim, TRC confidential statement 3047, Serabu Town (Bo), 3 February 2003.

126. A female witness was captured by the RUF with her two sisters on January 19th 1995 at Rutile:
- “One night, Edward Kaitibi (my RUF abductor) asked me to have sex with him but at that time I had no knowledge of sex. He forced me that night in the bush after which I saw blood all over me. It went on for about 30 minutes [...] I ended up with pregnancy.”¹⁴³
127. The towns of Rutile and Mekanji were specifically targeted, being closer to the mines. The Commission collected testimony regarding the looting and burning of the villages of Mata Gelema¹⁴⁴, Moselolo¹⁴⁵, Victoria¹⁴⁶, Nyandehun¹⁴⁷ and Mokeleh¹⁴⁸ during the months following the attacks at the mines. Civilians were displaced from these villages, sometimes for several months¹⁴⁹. The RUF conducted sporadic attacks, making it difficult for the population to return to the villages.
128. The attack at the Sierra Rutile plant itself was described by an employee as “tense, fearful and bloody”¹⁵⁰. The same employee witnessed the killing of many people, including his supervisor. After the attacks, several Rutile abductees were forced to become members of the RUF. The first contacts to secure their release were made with the help of the ICRC and the head office of SIEROMCO in Freetown. Fred Marrafono, a British citizen, was hired as a consultant by SIEROMCO to negotiate with the RUF.¹⁵¹ The contacts were made by telephone with RUF officers and the hostages were finally released.
129. As a result of the worsening security situation and the fear of losing control over the Moyamba area, the NPRC regime called in the Ghurkha Security Services. The arrival of the Ghurkhas opened the way for the involvement of private security firms in the conflict as mercenary forces for the government. Executive Outcomes and Sandline International soon followed the Ghurkhas. From that point on, various governments were to rely on the services of private security companies to provide security in mining areas, fight the RUF and provide logistical support to the Army and the Civil Defence Forces.¹⁵²
130. SIEROMCO resumed its activities after the crisis, but output declined drastically and production was finally ceased altogether. More recently Sierra Rutile Limited has begun initial steps towards resuming production. The plan for the renewal of operations was presented to the public at Mekanji in August 2003 and activities were about to resume at the time of writing in 2004. The project is expected to create 900 jobs at its inception, 90% of which will be for Sierra Leonean nationals.¹⁵³

¹⁴³ Female victim, TRC confidential statement 4312, Sandeyam (Kailahun), 23 February 2003.

¹⁴⁴ Fatmata Sandi, TRC statement number 1302, Bonthe (Bonthe), 13 December 2002.

¹⁴⁵ Idrissa Conteh, TRC statement number 6846, Moselolo (Moyamba), 22 March 2003.

¹⁴⁶ TRC Confidential statement number 3946, Victoria (Bonthe), 15 February 2003.

¹⁴⁷ Sharka Kamara, TRC statement number 3938, Nyandehun (Bonthe), 14 February 2003.

¹⁴⁸ Gbessay Santigue, TRC statement number 3873, Mokeleh (Moyamba), 10 February 2003.

¹⁴⁹ Kadie Sheriff, TRC statement number 3007, Gbangbama (Bonthe), 30 January 2003.

¹⁵⁰ TRC Confidential statement number 708, Bo II (Bo), 4 December 2002.

¹⁵¹ See Fred Marrafono, former Executive Outcomes officer, TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 4 June 2003.

¹⁵² More detail on the role of private security firms in the conflict can be found in the chapter on External Actors, which follows directly in Volume Three B of this report.

¹⁵³ See ICG, *2003 Report on Security and Governance*, at page 28. See also Honourable Alhaji M.S. Deen, Minister of Mineral Resources; TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 9 October 2003.

131. One witness testified to the Commission about combat training he received in 1997 from a security company called Cape International. Cape International is owned by Fred Marrafono, the British citizen who conducted the negotiations for the release of the hostages taken by the RUF at Rutile in 1995. The witness was trained, along with 33 others, in providing security for a gold mining company named Golden Prospect Mining Company.¹⁵⁴ The original aim of the training was to provide security for the company's assets and personnel from attacks. The witness and his fellow trainees subsequently fought with the Tamaboros, the Northern Region-based group that was part of the Civil Defence Forces.

Mineral resources and civil militias

132. By the end of 1995, a growing consensus existed among chiefs particularly in the South and East that the army could no longer be trusted to provide effective defence for the civilian population. In their place, most chiefdoms were seeking to install a form of civil or community defence force, consisting of "sons of the soil", bolstered by the chiefdom police. As part of their undertaking to support and supply such a force, the chiefs in areas endowed with natural resources would put forward "offerings" of those resources. The Commission has heard evidence of diamonds being given directly to the CDF mined from the diamondiferous banks of the Sewa River, Bo District; from the lucrative alluvial diamond mines around Tongo Field, Kenema District; and from the smaller mining fields North of Zimmi, Pujehun District.¹⁵⁵ In addition, chiefdoms that possessed mineral resources other than diamonds contributed towards the war effort. Gold, for example, was donated by chiefs in the Mongheri township in Valunia Chiefdom, Bo District.
133. In order to institute an efficient system of supply of items such as diamonds and gold, chiefs had to assemble a labour force from among their own people. In this regard, while the majority of those engaged in mining or auxiliary tasks appear to have worked on a voluntary basis, the Commission received testimony from aggrieved persons who claimed that they were forced into labour or otherwise disadvantaged by their participation. One such claim suggested that in the chiefdom they were "regimented" into performing different types of labour and heavily punished if they refused the "orders" of their chiefs.
134. It is not clear what happened to the valuable minerals in question once the local chiefs collected them. The intended purpose was to convert them into their equivalent value in food, logistics such as vehicles or fuel, or arms and ammunition for the local civil militia (mostly Kamajors). However, while the testimonies from those who mined seem to indicate a relatively high value of minerals extracted, testimony from the "foot soldiers" of the CDF seem to suggest a paucity of provisions in every respect.

¹⁵⁴ Abu S. Marrah, former local commander of the Tamaboros; TRC interview conducted in Kondembaia, Koinadugu District, 15 August 2003.

¹⁵⁵ TRC Interviews with Members of the CDF War Council; interviews conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown, October 2003.

135. This disparity suggests that there was a high degree of embezzlement among those in control of such resources in the CDF.¹⁵⁶ A Commission of Inquiry into allegations of corruption in the CDF in Bo District resulted in the resignation of the CDF Regional Co-ordinator for the South, Alhaji Daramy-Rogers in 1999. When questioned on this issue, Alhaji Daramy-Rogers testified that claims of embezzlement against him were fabricated.¹⁵⁷ In his submission to the Commission, a coordinator of a CDF support group based in the United States recalled a telephone conversation in which Chief Hinga Norman requested the President to permit the take over of the diamond mines at Zimmi for exploitation by the CDF in order to boost the war effort. The President turned down the request because this would amount to the “mortgaging the nation’s resources”, to which Chief Norman replied “that they were already mortgaged.”¹⁵⁸
136. Despite the President’s demurrer, the CDF engaged in substantial mining of diamonds and other minerals in areas under its control. The Commission was unable to establish definitively how the mined resources were taken out of the country, or who the buyers were. The Commission has however heard testimony that Chief Norman made trips to Monrovia to procure arms and ammunition for the CDF. Monrovia had become the regional hub for international diamond dealing. The dealers there are known to have purchased diamonds from all available sources, which can safely be said to have included the RUF, AFRC, CDF, NPFL and a variety of private operators.

Phase III of the Conflict: 1997 – 2002

137. The coup of 25 May 1997 marked a veritable turning point in the conflict. The AFRC junta invited the RUF to join it in a governing coalition. At this time the RUF and AFRC retained combined control over most of the diamond mining areas. From 1997 the RUF engaged in extensive mining and smuggling. This expansion of activity resulted in a significant increase in both the quantity and the quality of weapons and ammunition distributed to RUF fighters on the ground.¹⁵⁹
138. Between 1998 and 2002, RUF revenues from diamonds came in three main ways: organised mining, continued seizure from civilians in diamondiferous areas and “washing” of already mined gravel by abducted civilians.¹⁶⁰ Mining ceased when the RUF and AFRC retreated into the bush in the face of the ECOMOG intervention of February 1998. However, the RUF regrouped and was able to launch its largest ever assault on Kono District in December 1998.

¹⁵⁶ A tendency among those in positions of power to ‘take a cut’ of profits intended for the common good is commonplace in Sierra Leone. It is symptomatic of the culture of ‘bad governance’ discussed at length in the chapter on Governance in Volume Three A of this report. A similar brand of leadership seems to have prevailed in all the combatant factions, hence the prominent tales of embezzlement relating to the leaders of the RUF, AFRC and CDF at different points in the conflict.

¹⁵⁷ Alhaji Daramy-Rogers, former Member of the CDF War Council at Base Zero and later Regional Co-ordinator (South) of the CDF; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 24 – 29 October 2003.

¹⁵⁸ Reverend Alfred M. SamForay, former Secretary-General of the Sierra Leone Action Movement for the Civil Defence Forces (SLAM-CDF); written statement and supporting documentation submitted to the Commission by e-mail; 2-10 December 2003.

¹⁵⁹ TRC Confidential Interview with an RUF combatant, ‘G-5’ commander and former intelligence officer; interview conducted in Koidu Town, Kono District; 12 August 2003.

¹⁶⁰ TRC Confidential Interview with an RUF combatant, ‘G-5’ commander and former intelligence officer; interview conducted in Koidu Town, Kono District; 12 August 2003.

Prior to December 1998, the RUF had not had sufficient control over the most lucrative areas of Kono to organise large-scale mining operations. Upon capturing Koidu Town and its environs, though, the RUF and some elements of the AFRC were able to carry out large-scale mining across Kono District, as well as in parts of Kenema District, such as Tongo Field. Mining activity continued from late 1998 to 2002 and was especially concentrated from 2000 up to the 2002 elections. The best areas for mining were pointed out to the combatants by abducted civilians.¹⁶¹ The RUF relied on abducted miners for its mining operations, as most RUF commanders had no mining expertise.¹⁶²

139. Combatants even resorted to mysticism in their search for diamonds. The Commission received a report of a human sacrifice organised by AFRC soldiers in Tongo Field in July 1997. The sacrifice was aimed at providing mystical support to the search for diamonds:

“The soldiers arranged to perform a ceremony so that they can get more diamonds, but this ceremony must be performed on a human being. My husband was seriously tortured with a stick by the AFRC soldiers until he became hopeless. They finally beat him until he died.”¹⁶³

140. Towards the end of the war, some citizens of the diamond-producing areas resisted the mining of diamonds in their communities. There was a rebellion by the Kono people in the Koidu area in December 1998. The rebellion, led by the Movement of Concerned Kono Youth (MOCKY), was aimed at stopping the mining activities that were benefiting the RUF. A battle ensued between the civilians and the RUF forces with substantial casualties on both sides.¹⁶⁴

141. When Foday Sankoh was released from detention in Nigeria in 1999, he visited Kono and ordered the commanders on the ground to expand mining operations. Mining Units were created with one Mining Commander for each area. Mining Commanders registered all miners and ordered security forces to monitor all mining and ensure that the diamonds were not stolen.¹⁶⁵ According to one former RUF commander, any diamond found was handed over to the Mining Commander, then on to the Brigade Commander, the Battlefield Inspector and finally the Battle Group Commander, who in turn would pass it on directly to the “Leader” (Foday Sankoh).¹⁶⁶ The Battle Group Commander at the time was Sam Bockarie. RUF personnel had to deliver the diamonds to him in Buedu on foot, using the footpath between Koidu and Buedu.¹⁶⁷ There was one Overall Mining Commander for Kono and one for Tongo Field.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶¹ TRC Confidential Interview with an RUF combatant, ‘G-5’ commander and former intelligence officer; interview conducted in Koidu Town, Kono District; 12 August 2003.

¹⁶² Moigboi Moigande Kosia, former RUF ‘G-1’ officer recruited in 1991; TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 24 May 2003.

¹⁶³ Massah Brima, TRC statement number 4014, Foindu Mamaima (Kenema), 18 February 2003.

¹⁶⁴ TRC Confidential Interview with an RUF combatant, ‘G-5’ commander and former intelligence officer; interview conducted in Koidu Town, Kono District; 12 August 2003.

¹⁶⁵ Moigboi Moigande Kosia, former RUF ‘G-1’ officer recruited in 1991; TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 24 May 2003.

¹⁶⁶ TRC Confidential Interview with an RUF combatant, ‘G-5’ commander and former intelligence officer; interview conducted in Koidu Town, Kono District; 12 August 2003.

¹⁶⁷ TRC Confidential Interview with an RUF combatant, ‘G-5’ commander and former intelligence officer; interview conducted in Koidu Town, Kono District; 12 August 2003.

¹⁶⁸ Moigboi Moigande Kosia, former RUF ‘G-1’ officer recruited in 1991; TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 24 May 2003.

142. The people engaged in acquiring valuable resources for the RUF, including its miners and Mining Commanders, were strictly monitored. According to the same former RUF commander:

“There was one idea in the RUF: diamonds and foreign currencies were highly, highly needed. So whenever you captured these things, you should report them – no matter what quantities there were.”¹⁶⁹

143. There were several attempts by local RUF commanders and civilian miners to retain some of the diamonds and keep the profits for their own benefit. The Commission has received evidence of several investigations carried out by the RUF and by the People's Army into private appropriations of diamonds.¹⁷⁰ The diamonds were labelled “state property”. Sometimes, there were not even formal investigations. The accused were tortured on the spot. According to another RUF commander:

“When you are caught, then if you are lucky, they will say that they should investigate you. If you are unlucky, they will conduct their own jungle investigation, which means that they will torture you until you are dead.”¹⁷¹

144. During one investigation in January 2001, three civilians were arrested for allegedly stealing diamonds. The third accused, Fatmata Conteh, was tortured and beaten to death.¹⁷²

145. There are accounts of the RUF/AFRC forces attacking civilians for the purpose of diamond extortion. A miner was attacked in Kono in 1997 by the AFRC troops who stole his mining equipment.¹⁷³ Another witness claimed that he was arrested and tortured by the RUF in Tongo Field in July 2000 when he refused to hand over the diamond he found:

“During my arrest, I was seriously tortured, almost to death, for that diamond. The rebels burst my head and they made a deep cut in my fore head.”¹⁷⁴

146. The RUF destroyed many houses and buildings in Kono District to use the lands for mining.¹⁷⁵ In addition to the physical harm inflicted on civilians, was the displacement of the civilian population. The most striking example is Kono District. It was targeted throughout the war, by the RUF and by other armed factions, and many civilians have yet to return to the district after having escaped the attacks.

¹⁶⁹ TRC Confidential Interview with an RUF combatant, ‘G-5’ commander and former intelligence officer; interview conducted in Koidu Town, Kono District; 12 August 2003.

¹⁷⁰ Moigboi Moigande Kosia, former RUF ‘G-1’ officer recruited in 1991; testimony before TRC Public Hearings held in Freetown; 17 April 2003.

¹⁷¹ Moigboi Moigande Kosia, former RUF ‘G-1’ officer recruited in 1991; TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 24 May 2003.

¹⁷² “Report from the Mining Security Operations to the Office of the Overall Mining Headquarters, Koquima”, Revolutionary United Front (RUF), dated 15 January 2001; document provided to the TRC by a former RUF administrator, April 2003.

¹⁷³ Mohamed Foday, TRC statement number 5617, Calaba (Western Area), 29 March 2003.

¹⁷⁴ Alimamy Kamara, TRC statement number 1715, Kissy (Western Area), 22 January 2003.

¹⁷⁵ See TRC interviews with miners in Kono District, 10 June 2003. See also TRC Confidential Interview with an RUF combatant, ‘G-5’ commander and former intelligence officer; interview conducted in Koidu Town, Kono District; 12 August 2003.

147. According to one account, Kamajors were carrying out illicit mining in Dodo Chiefdom, Kenema District, in 2000.¹⁷⁶ There are also reports of Kamajors seizing diamonds from civilians, in Normiyama, Kono District, in 1999. The latter incident resulted in the witness being beaten, shot and detained, while six diamonds were taken from him.¹⁷⁷

ECOMOG

148. Allegations of diamond smuggling were made against the Nigerian troops of ECOMOG. According to some accounts,¹⁷⁸ high-ranking ECOMOG officials were involved in trading diamonds. Other accounts state that individual commanders were involved but the leadership was aware and did nothing to stop them.¹⁷⁹ The Commission has been unable to obtain sufficiently authoritative information to make decisive findings in this regard.

The Current Status of the Diamond Industry in Sierra Leone

149. The Ministry of Mineral Resources regained access to Kono District and control of the Tongo Field area in March 2002.¹⁸⁰ Mining began immediately and this has resulted in an increase in the level of legal diamond exports since 1999, as demonstrated by the figures in Table 5, below.

Table 5: Value of diamond exports from Sierra Leone since 1999

Year	1999	2000	2001	2002
Value of diamond exports (US \$)	1.5 million	11 million	26 million	42 million

Source for Table 5: Gberie, L. *West Africa: Rocks in a Hard Place - The Political Economy of Diamonds and Regional Destabilisation*, Partnership Africa Canada, Ottawa, May 2003.

150. The Government of Sierra Leone's target for 2003 was US\$ 60 million of diamond export value. As of 19 May 2003, the GGDO reported to the Commission that it had recorded an export value of US\$ 27.6 million.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁶ Senesie Conteh, TRC statement 4099, Kpendebu (Tongo Field, Kenema), 25 February 2003.

¹⁷⁷ Khalilu John-Bull, TRC statement number 256, Sahrquee Town (Kono), 13 December 2003.

¹⁷⁸ See Neall Ellis, former Executive Outcomes helicopter pilot, TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 27 May 2003. See also Fred Marrafono, former Executive Outcomes officer, TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 4 June 2003.

¹⁷⁹ Gberie, L.; Sierra Leone researcher for Partnership Africa Canada, TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown, 1 July 2003.

¹⁸⁰ See Honourable Alhaji M.S. Deen, Minister of Mineral Resources; TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 9 October 2003.

¹⁸¹ See Government Gold and Diamond Office (GGDO), Submission to TRC Thematic and Special Hearings on Mineral Resources, July 2003, at page 5.

151. Although the level of smuggling seems difficult to assess, the expected level of exports from Sierra Leone has been estimated at between US\$ 70 million to US\$ 300 million per year.¹⁸² This estimate indicates that high levels of exports are still unaccounted for and suggests that smuggling continues on a large scale. Valuable profits remain unavailable to help rebuild the economy or to provide resources for the communities.

Kimberlite diamond mining

152. Branch Energy / Diamond Works came back to Sierra Leone in 2003 and resumed its activities. It started rebuilding its installations at the beginning of the year and began operations in November 2003. The Kono concession (Koidu Property, four square kilometres) has estimated reserves of 6.3 million carats, with a potential to generate US\$ 2.5 million in monthly revenues.¹⁸³ The company hopes to repay its investment during the first two years of operation and generate substantive profits over the following two years.¹⁸⁴
153. Acquisition of diamond licences is by agreement with the chiefdom authorities and the central government. All land in the provinces is community owned. Companies and individuals cannot buy land. They can only rent it for a given period of time. The local authorities have the prerogative to decide who is issued a lease.
154. The chiefdom authorities may, for example, require that the company reinvest a part of its profits in community development, hire a percentage of its employees from the local people and conduct environmental assessments before starting operations.¹⁸⁵ Branch Energy agreed to hire most of its labour force from the local community, and reinvest part of its profits into community projects.¹⁸⁶ In June 2003, hundreds of youths demonstrated in Koidu to request the company to keep to this commitment. The situation was resolved by a series of meetings between community leaders and the management of the company.¹⁸⁷
155. The government will issue a licence after negotiations have been concluded with the community. At the time of writing, Branch Energy is currently paying an annual rent of US\$200,000 for its Koidu Property, an annual lease rent of US\$25 per acre, an annual surface rent of US\$10 per acre and a 5% royalty on diamond sales and 4% royalty on precious metal sales.¹⁸⁸ According to the *Sierra Leone Mining Code*, the government has the prerogative to negotiate special mining agreements with private companies to provide incentives for foreign investment. These special agreements can include tax cuts and royalty payments.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸² See ICG, *2003 Report on Security and Governance*, at page 26.

¹⁸³ Jan Joubert, Sierra Leone Country Manager, Branch Energy Ltd.; TRC Interviews conducted in Kono and Freetown, 2003.

¹⁸⁴ Jan Joubert, Sierra Leone Country Manager, Branch Energy Ltd.; TRC Interviews conducted in Kono and Freetown, 2003.

¹⁸⁵ See TRC interviews with Jan Joubert. See also Diamond Works, *Annual Report 2003*.

¹⁸⁶ Jan Joubert, Sierra Leone Country Manager, Branch Energy Ltd.; TRC Interviews conducted in Kono and Freetown, 2003.

¹⁸⁷ See ICG, *2003 Report on Security and Governance*, at page 28. See also Jan Joubert, Sierra Leone Country Manager, Branch Energy Ltd.; TRC Interview conducted in Kono, June 2003.

¹⁸⁸ See Diamond Works, *Annual Report 2003*.

¹⁸⁹ See Honourable Alhaji M.S. Deen, Minister of Mineral Resources; TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 9 October 2003.

TRC



The crumbling landscapes of the Kono District testify that alluvial diamond mining has led to the devastation of much of the natural environment.

Alluvial diamond mining

156. The government has never succeeded in establishing complete control over the alluvial mining of diamonds. Corruption of the state apparatus and the close relationships between diamond magnates and politicians has always undermined government control. Current regulations on alluvial mining are imposed by the national government and the chiefdom authorities. Since all land in the diamond producing areas is community owned, the plots are leased. The licence fee to government is set at Le 200,000, which is around US\$60. Le 120,000 is payable to the local Chief as surface rent.¹⁹⁰ Only Sierra Leonean nationals are permitted to buy mining licences.¹⁹¹
157. All alluvial diamond-mining licences are renewable every year and a miner is allowed to hold up to five licences. All applicants approved by the chiefdom authorities are granted licences by the government. Concerns relate to the manner in which selections are made and whether ruling families are favoured. The unregulated nature of the mining allows for corruption and abuse. Interviewees¹⁹² have alleged that the best parcels of land are allocated to privileged people in government and their associates. The procedure for the granting of licences by the chiefdom authorities needs to be revisited.
158. According to the district office of the Ministry of Mineral Resources in Kono, one thousand licences were issued in 2003.¹⁹³ Many Sierra Leoneans who do not possess the necessary capital to pay for the licence were “sponsored” by either wealthy Sierra Leoneans, Lebanese or Guinean dealers who control the mining operations through the intermediary of Sierra Leonean nationals. These supporters provide tools and food to miners, the cost of which is subsequently deducted from any diamonds that the miners sell to the supporters.¹⁹⁴ Alternatively the supporter receives all the diamonds mined and sells them with the miner receiving a portion of the sales.¹⁹⁵ Since all diamonds found are sold to the supporter, the supporter is able to fix prices and control market conditions unilaterally.
159. The monitoring system established by the government is composed of local offices in the diamond mining areas with Mines Monitoring Officers travelling to the chiefdoms to control illicit mining (plot owners who operate without licence) and illicit buying (dealers who do not possess licences and/or who buy from unlicensed miners). There are few Mines Monitoring Officers and their pay is low (less than US\$ 100 a month). Low remuneration encourages corruption, as Mines Monitoring Officers are tempted to supplement their low incomes with bribes.¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁰ TRC Closed Hearing involving a diamond dealer; TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 20 May 2003.

¹⁹¹ See Honourable Alhaji M.S. Deen, Minister of Mineral Resources; TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 9 October 2003.

¹⁹² See, *inter alia*, TRC Closed Hearing involving a diamond dealer; hearing conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 20 May 2003.

¹⁹³ Jonathan Sharkah, Government Mining Engineer, TRC interview in Kono District, 9 June 2003.

¹⁹⁴ TRC Interviews with miners in Kono District, 10 June 2003. See also USAID, *Sierra Leone Progress Report*, 2001, at page 6.

¹⁹⁵ Patrick Tche, UNAMSIL Civil Affairs Officer; TRC interview conducted in Kono, 8 June 2003.

¹⁹⁶ Steven Koroma, Senior Mines Monitoring Officer, TRC interview in Kono, 9 June 2003.

160. The Mines Monitoring Officers lack the necessary resources, such as vehicles, to patrol the mining areas. In November 2003, alluvial diamond resources were identified in at least six of the 14 chiefdoms in the Kono District: Nimiyama, Nimikoro, Gbense, Tonkoro, Kamara and Fiama Chiefdoms. There were less than 30 Mines Monitoring Officers to cover the whole area. This area represents half of Kono District. One government official interviewed by the Commission assessed the need for about 60 officers in the district.¹⁹⁷
161. UNAMSIL and the Ministry of Mineral Resources started a joint project in Kono District in July 2003 with the aim of improving monitoring on the ground. Military Observers conducted an aerial survey together with representatives of the Ministry to identify the areas where diamonds are mined. 485 mining sites were identified¹⁹⁸. This data was subsequently compared with the licence registry to identify illegal sites. UNAMSIL MILOBS personnel then accompanied Mines Monitoring Officers in land patrols to visit the illegal sites and impose reprisals.¹⁹⁹ The Ministry hopes to extend this monitoring project to other alluvial mining areas outside of Kono District.
162. A dealer licence costs US\$ 3,000.²⁰⁰ Illicit buyers offer slightly higher prices to miners because they don't pay licence fees and taxes. The higher prices are an incentive to miners to sell to illicit buyers.²⁰¹ The border areas have many bush paths that are not policed at all. UNAMSIL has recruited a border control specialist to advise the government on border policing issues. One solution proposed by the Government Mining Engineer in Kono District is to encourage the licensed dealers to buy diamonds from illegal miners. The diamonds enter the system at the dealer level and will be exported legally, under government control.²⁰² This proposal cannot be a solution because the dealers are also reselling the diamonds locally. The government therefore does not earn any revenues at any stage of the dealing process unless the diamond is exported.
163. Mines Monitoring Officers have no authority to arrest illegal miners. They must report the cases to the police, who often lack the necessary means to act on the spot.²⁰³ The police are not always able or willing to proceed with arrests and illegal miners. The diamonds that are actually confiscated from unlicensed miners are sold at an auction. Forty percent of the selling price goes to the person who confiscated the diamond (Mines Monitoring Officer) and 60% to the government treasury.²⁰⁴ This clause has been given legal status by the Mines and Minerals (Amendment) Act, 2003.

¹⁹⁷ Jonathan Sharkah, Government Mining Engineer, TRC interview in Kono District, 9 June 2003.

¹⁹⁸ Berhanemeskel Nega, UNAMSIL Governance and Stabilisation Policy Adviser, TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 9 October 2003.

¹⁹⁹ See Honourable Alhaji M.S. Deen, Minister of Mineral Resources; TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 9 October 2003.

²⁰⁰ TRC Closed Hearing involving a diamond dealer; TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 20 May 2003.

²⁰¹ Jonathan Sharkah, Government Mining Engineer, TRC interview in Kono District, 9 June 2003.

²⁰² Jonathan Sharkah, Government Mining Engineer, TRC interview in Kono District, 9 June 2003.

²⁰³ TRC Interviews with officials at the Ministry of Mines, Koidu, June 9th 2003. See also ICG, 2003 *Report on Security and Governance*, at page 27.

²⁰⁴ TRC Interview with Steven Koroma, Senior Mines Monitoring Officer, Ministry of Mineral Resources, Koidu, June 9th 2003

164. In the Mines and Minerals Decree of 1994, the punishment for offenders of the licence system is not more than one year's imprisonment or a fine not exceeding Le 200,000.²⁰⁵ The Amendment Bill approved by Parliament in 2003 removes the fine provision and provides only for sentences of a minimum imprisonment of three years.²⁰⁶ This measure was taken by the government to further dissuade illegal exporting.
165. The Mines Monitoring Officers can also confiscate illegal miners' implements and retain them until the miners obtain licences.²⁰⁷ Exporters need to have licences. The prices vary according to the nationality of the applicant, as the following comparison of annual prices demonstrates:²⁰⁸
- | | |
|------------------------------|----------------------------|
| i. Sierra Leonean nationals: | US\$ 1400 + 300,000 Leones |
| ii. ECOWAS citizens: | US\$ 1900 + 500,000 Leones |
| iii. Other nationals: | US\$ 3400 + 500,000 Leones |
166. Even if Sierra Leonean nationals pay a lot less than others, the export licence is still unaffordable to most of them. Accordingly, during the first half of 2003, 78.4% of the total diamonds exported were by foreigners and only 21.6% by Sierra Leoneans.²⁰⁹
167. It is forbidden for Ministers and Parliamentarians to hold licences. However when questioned on the issue at a Commission hearing, the Minister of Mineral Resources explained that many actually held licences through their relatives. It is not against the law for a Minister's wife or son to hold a diamond licence but it can engender a conflict of interest for the public official involved. The solution resides in the adoption of a code of conduct under which all civil and public servants will be restrained from getting involved in practices that are perceived as corrupt or that demonstrate a conflict of interest.
168. The export tax is determined by the value of the diamonds. The GGDO valuator establishes the export value of each parcel; then, an independent valuator gives his own estimate. If there is a discrepancy, the GGDO uses the higher estimate²¹⁰ and a tax of 3% is levied on the parcel. The distribution of the tax revenues is as follows.²¹¹
- | | |
|------|--|
| i. | 0.75% to cover GGDO costs of valuation and export processing |
| ii. | 0.35% to the Ministry of Mineral Resources for monitoring |
| iii. | 0.40% to the independent valuator |
| iv. | 0.75% to the Community Development Fund |
| v. | 0.75% to the government treasury |

²⁰⁵ See the Mines and Minerals Decree, Decree No. 5, 1994, section 118(2).

²⁰⁶ See the Mines and Minerals (Amendment) Act, 2003

²⁰⁷ TRC Interview with Steven Koroma, Senior Mines Monitoring Officer, Ministry of Mineral Resources, Koidu, June 9th 2003

²⁰⁸ Jonathan Sharkah, Government Mining Engineer, TRC interview in Kono District, 9 June 2003.

²⁰⁹ See Government Gold and Diamond Office (GGDO), Half-Year Report, 2003.

²¹⁰ See USAID, *Sierra Leone Progress Report*, 2001, at page 13.

²¹¹ See Government Gold and Diamond Office (GGDO), Submission to TRC Thematic and Special Hearings on Mineral Resources, July 2003, at page 3.

169. The 0.75% of the 3% tax that goes to the communities in the diamondiferous areas is released every six months, proportionally to the number of licences issued in each chiefdom.²¹² In Kono District, plot owners also pay Le 50,000 to the chiefdom authorities for infrastructural development projects.²¹³ The Community Development Fund was set up in January 2001 and a total of US\$ 786,481 has been returned to the communities as of June 2003.²¹⁴
170. The return of a portion of the tax to the local communities is an incentive to counter smuggling. Since the communities benefit from the legal export of diamonds, they may feel motivated to stop illegal mining practices. The fact that the revenues returned are proportional to the number of licences issued offers an incentive to issue more licences, which will in turn increase production.²¹⁵
171. There have been allegations from the communities that the revenues are being mismanaged.²¹⁶ The government should ensure that communities feel represented in the management of the revenues and that the process is transparent. Reports should be issued on a regular basis to assess the progress of the community projects being implemented, perhaps as part of the government's decentralisation strategy, thus empowering communities.
172. Between October 2000 and the end of the war, the independent valuator was responsible for determining the origin of the diamond parcels. Those that originated from areas under RUF control, i.e. "conflict diamonds", were confiscated.²¹⁷ The result was that exporters wanting to deal in conflict diamonds did not register them with the GGDO, but smuggled them out of the country outside of governmental channels. There is still confusion among miners and plot owners as to the role of the GGDO.²¹⁸ In the past, the GGDO used to facilitate the sale of diamonds. The current role of GGDO is to monitor the export process and the payment of taxes. GGDO does not organise the sales of diamonds anymore. More sensitisation needs to be done with miners so that they understand the process better.
173. The Lomé Peace Agreement provides for government revenues from gold and diamonds to be allocated to social projects and post-conflict reconstruction activities. As stated in Article VII, 6:
- "The proceeds from the transactions of gold and diamonds shall be public monies which shall enter a special Treasury account to be spent exclusively on the development of the people of Sierra Leone, with appropriations for public education, public health, infrastructural development, and compensation for incapacitated war victims as well as post-war rehabilitation and reconstruction. Priority spending shall go to rural areas."²¹⁹

²¹² See ICG, *2003 Report on Security and Governance*, at page 28.

²¹³ See Honourable Alhaji M.S. Deen, Minister of Mineral Resources; TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 9 October 2003.

²¹⁴ The returns are itemised year-by-year in the GGDO Half-Year Report. For 2001, the return was US\$ 195,165. For 2002, it was US\$ 312,988; and in 2003, it was US\$ 278,328.

²¹⁵ See Honourable Alhaji M.S. Deen, Minister of Mineral Resources; TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 9 October 2003.

²¹⁶ See Honourable Alhaji M.S. Deen, Minister of Mineral Resources; TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 9 October 2003.

²¹⁷ See USAID, *Sierra Leone Progress Report, 2001*, at page 20.

²¹⁸ Jonathan Sharkah, Government Mining Engineer, TRC interview in Kono District, 9 June 2003.

²¹⁹ The Lomé Peace Agreement, signed by the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front, Lomé, 7 July 1999, at Article VII, 6.

174. While provision for public education, health and infrastructural development can be made through the Community Development Fund, such provisions are presently disbursed only to diamond-mining areas. The benefits of the Fund should be extended to cover all rural areas.

The international diamond industry, “conflict diamonds” and the Kimberley Process

“Natural resources can be a source of great good or dreadful ill. The key element is not the resource itself, but how it is exploited. An orderly mining regime, operating within a transparent and predictable legislative and fiscal framework, can be a major source of prosperity for governments and people. Without it, mineral wealth will be a magnet for the greedy and corrupt to line their own pockets at the expense of the people.”

Nicky Oppenheimer, former CEO of De Beers²²⁰

175. Diamonds are sold almost exclusively in two places in the world: the Central Selling Organisation (CSO) in London and the Diamond High Council (HRD) in Antwerp. About 80% of all rough diamonds mined in the world and 50% of all polished diamonds transit through Antwerp.²²¹
176. Anglo American, the company that bought De Beers in 2001, controls roughly 65% of the worldwide diamond trade. De Beers has submitted to the Commission that it has not purchased diamonds from Sierra Leone since 1985.²²² Nonetheless De Beers maintained buying offices in Monrovia, Liberia and Conakry, Guinea.
177. The term *conflict diamonds* refers to “diamonds that originate in areas controlled by forces fighting the legitimate and internationally recognised governments of the relevant country”.²²³ In order to accurately describe the Sierra Leonean context, this definition must be refined to include areas where the RUF and AFRC were present on the ground, but not necessarily in full control of. For the Commission’s purposes conflict diamonds include diamonds that were seized, stolen or otherwise acquired by the fighting forces and not only diamonds that were mined under RUF/AFRC control.
178. It is generally estimated that between 5% and 20%²²⁴ of the international diamond trade is from illicit diamonds (that is diamonds that are exported outside of state control). The secrecy of the international diamond industry, established for security reasons, is partly responsible for making the smuggling of diamonds easy, by rendering the control and monitoring of transactions very difficult.

²²⁰ Oppenheimer is quoted in Smilie, *Motherhood, Apple Pie and False Teeth*, at page 10.

²²¹ See Diamond High Council, *Witness statement to UN Sanctions Committee*, at page 1.

²²² De Beers, Submission to TRC Thematic and Special Hearings on Mineral Resources, July 2003.

²²³ See UN Panel of Experts report, 2000, at page 27.

²²⁴ Conservative estimates put the percentage of “conflict diamonds” at 5% (De Beers). Other accounts speak of 15% (Partnership Africa Canada) and even of 20% (diamond expert consultant quoted by the UN Panel of Experts in 2000). Considering the value of the international diamond trade, even 5% would represent a very important amount of money.

179. In response to the problem of conflict diamonds and the smuggling of diamonds in general, South Africa initiated the Kimberley Process Diamond Certification Scheme in 2000. Coming into effect in early 2003, this process includes 70 countries, the High Diamond Council and international NGOs. It aims at developing a system of diamond export monitoring. Each member state is responsible for establishing its own export certification scheme. All diamonds exported must be accompanied by a *certificate of origin*, stating the country where the diamonds were mined. Diamonds exported without a certificate of origin are rejected by the international diamond industry. The purpose is to avoid the sale of diamonds that have escaped the control of the state where they were mined, and to tackle smuggling and the trade in conflict diamonds.
180. On July 5, 2000, the UN Security Council by Resolution 1306 imposed a ban on the import of Sierra Leonean diamonds. In response, the government of Sierra Leone created a certification regime, which in turn led to the granting of a Security Council exemption in October 2000. The exemption requires all diamond exports to be accompanied by a certificate of origin.²²⁵ Technical assistance was provided by the governments of the United States, United Kingdom and Belgium, and by the Diamond High Council, to assist in the design of the certification system. In March 2003, all sanctions against Sierra Leone were finally lifted.
181. Sierra Leonean diamonds are exported mainly to Belgium, the US, Israel and the UK, with the vast majority going to Belgium (over 95% for the years 2000 to 2003)²²⁶. This renders the co-operation between the governments of Sierra Leone and Belgium paramount in establishing transparent trade practices. The two governments established a customs procedure to monitor the trade that includes an electronic data transmission system based in Freetown to secure the transmission of the information to the Department of Economic Affairs in Belgium prior to the shipment of the parcels.²²⁷ This information includes digital photos of the diamonds.²²⁸
182. The Diamond High Council considers falsification of the Sierra Leonean certification form impossible. Therefore, the Sierra Leone export figures and the Belgian import figures for Sierra Leonean diamonds must balance.²²⁹ The problem with this system is that as long as the Diamond High Council does not implement similar arrangements with other exporting countries in West Africa, diamonds smuggled out of Sierra Leone are still likely to be imported into Antwerp.
183. There are currently three major problems with the Kimberley Process. Countries that have no diamond resources have been accepted into the process. This means that smuggled diamonds finding their way to these countries can be "legalised" through certification. For example, the Republic of Congo-Brazzaville has been accepted even though it does not have any diamond resources. The same is true for Burkina Faso, which has been accused of diamond smuggling and arms trafficking in the past.

²²⁵ See ICG, *2003 Report on Security and Governance*, at page 26.

²²⁶ See Government Gold and Diamond Office (GGDO), Submission to TRC Thematic and Special Hearings on Mineral Resources, July 2003, at page 9.

²²⁷ Diamond High Council (HRD), *Progress Report*, available at the website: www.hrd.be.

²²⁸ See Government Gold and Diamond Office (GGDO), Submission to TRC Thematic and Special Hearings on Mineral Resources, July 2003, at page 4.

²²⁹ Diamond High Council (HRD), *New Belgian control systems on diamond trade implemented in Sierra Leone*, Press Release, Antwerp, Belgium, 27 October 2000.

184. There is no system independently to monitor the implementation of the certification process by the respective countries. Therefore if governments are not rigorous in delivering their certificates, smuggling is liable to continue. The certification applies only to the import / export sector. There is no regulation at the mining and dealing levels, leaving room for corruption and smuggling.²³⁰
185. It was decided at a meeting of the Kimberley Process held in South Africa during October 2003 to establish a voluntary monitoring process. According to this agreement, diamond-producing countries can request independent monitoring visits. This provision is aimed at improving the credibility of the monitoring systems by allowing independent experts to evaluate them. So far, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lebanon and Mauritius have requested such visits. While increased monitoring is a step in the right direction, these independent monitoring visits should become compulsory for countries that are part of the process. There is also a provision for review missions for countries that demonstrate “significant indications of non-compliance”.²³¹
186. It has been suggested that the industry should get rid of the “middle-men”, a term referring to the diamond dealers. As was discussed earlier in the chapter, the “middle-men” can buy diamonds from anyone and resell them within the country. Their sale is not regulated. In order to reduce room for corruption, the miners should be encouraged to sell directly to the exporters, thereby removing a layer over which state authorities have little or no control.²³²
187. The process of issuing certificates of origin is managed in Sierra Leone by the GGDO. Four signatures are required for a certificate to be legal, including the GGDO expert, to certify the origin of the parcel; the Minister of Mineral Resources, to ensure that the exporter is licensed; the Governor of the Central Bank, to attest to the correct registration of foreign exchange; and the customs official to certify that export taxes have been levied.²³³ The actual form is in two parts: one stays in Sierra Leone; the other is sent back to GGDO by the authorities of the importing country.²³⁴ This is done in order to keep track of the parcels once they leave the country and to ensure that importers do not buy illicit diamonds. The procedure is completed by a *security slip* that is sealed and fixed on the box containing the diamonds and may only be broken by the importing authority.²³⁵ It seems that the process of issuing certificates of origin is well managed. However there is a long way to go before smuggling is brought to a halt at the mining and dealing levels.

²³⁰ Jonathan Sharkah, Government Mining Engineer, TRC interview in Kono District, 9 June 2003.

²³¹ TRC e-mail correspondence with Ian Smilie of Partnership Africa Canada, an NGO involved in the negotiations that established the Kimberley Process; October 2003.

²³² See Smilie, *Motherhood, Apple Pie and False Teeth*, at page 10. See also TRC Closed Hearing involving a diamond dealer; TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 20 May 2003.

²³³ See USAID, *Sierra Leone Progress Report*, 2001, at page 9.

²³⁴ Jonathan Sharkah, Government Mining Engineer, TRC interview in Kono District, 9 June 2003.

²³⁵ Diamond High Council (HRD), *Progress Report*; available at the website: www.hrd.be.

Labour conditions, diamond-related abuses and impact of mining

188. The defining feature of labour relations in the mining of diamonds is the “tributor” system. Wealthy businessmen and sponsors provide equipment and cash to the “san san” boys, illicit diggers who spread out over the fields engaging in alluvial mining using only shovels and sieves to separate the gravel. Conditions started deteriorating from the diamond rush of the 1950s. Workers were fed by their sponsors and worked without payment. Most of the profits went to the supporters.
189. The RUF used forced labour throughout the war for all kinds of work, including mining in the diamond pits. The workers were forcibly recruited in villages. The RUF fed them, but they did not receive any salary.²³⁶ They suffered mistreatment and torture, and were forced to mine “under gun point”, with armed men monitoring the washing of the gravel²³⁷. The following account describes abuses carried out near Tombudu, Kono District in 1997:

“The RUF organised their diamond mining operations and the manpower was provided by us [civilian abductees]. When they obtained 100 pieces of diamonds, then there was no trouble for us. But when they obtained only 10 or 20, we were accused of being witches and we were tied, beaten and stripped naked and put in prison for several days.”²³⁸

190. The same witness complained about mistreatment to Brigadier Issa Sesay, but the abuses increased after the complaint. Another witness described similar violations near Tombudu and in Sandoh, Kono District, in 1998. The witness was forced to spend 4 days cleaning the pump in the water, without rest. The group of abductees was forced to mine day and night, without rest and with very little feeding, for 2 weeks. They were released and replaced by a new group of abductees.²³⁹ This was a system of slavery used by the RUF. Instead of letting the workers rest, they used them to the point of exhaustion and replaced them, to improve productivity.
191. The Commission received testimonies on the use of forced labour in the mines by the RUF up to 2001. There are also accounts of the Kamajors using forced labour to mine diamonds from 1997 onwards. A villager from Limba, in Bo District, testified that a group of Kamajors forcibly organised villagers to mine in 1997. A percentage of the diamonds found was seized by the Kamajors. The witness was punished because he was doing agricultural work instead of mining:

“I was tied up, despite several pleas, for several hours. This made me partially paralysed. For me to be freed I had to surrender the few bushels of the rice I had harvested.”²⁴⁰

²³⁶ See Alhaji Conteh (alias Black Jesus), former RUF combatant; TRC interview conducted in Pademba Road Prison, Freetown, 20 May 2003.

²³⁷ TRC Confidential Interview with an RUF combatant, ‘G-5’ commander and former intelligence officer; interview conducted in Koidu Town, Kono District; 12 August 2003.

²³⁸ Tamba Ngekia, TRC statement number 1782, Tombudu (Kono), 11 January 2003.

²³⁹ Sahr Komba II, TRC statement number 230, Komandor (Kono), 10 December 2002.

²⁴⁰ Patrick Foday Koroma, TRC statement number 4529, Limba (Bo), 13 February 2003.

192. According to another statement, one mine supporter was stopped by a group of Kamajors in Kono District in 1999 and asked to hand over the diamonds he had in his possession. When he refused, he was arrested and shot. The Kamajors stole his diamonds and money.²⁴¹
193. In order to assess present labour conditions in the mining areas, the Commission made a trip to Kono District and interviewed several miners, plot owners and government officials. The conditions observed were very poor. The government regulations stipulate that the miners should work eight hours a day, six days a week. Any extra hour worked should be paid overtime.²⁴² In reality, the miners usually work seven days a week, 12 hours a day.²⁴³ They do not earn a salary. Plot owners use the “two pile system” that was established by the NPRC regime: all the gravel shovelled in a day is divided into two piles, one for the plot owner, and the other for the miners.²⁴⁴ The diamonds found in the plot owner’s pile are for the plot owner, while the diamonds found in the miners’ pile become the property of the miners. Another variant of this system is the “one man, one bucket”. If a miner finds a diamond in his “one bucket”, he can sell it and therefore receive payment for his work. If he finds no diamonds, the miner would have worked for free.
194. Among the problems identified by miners and plot owners are the miners’ lack of knowledge of diamond valuation and the price variations. They recommended training for miners to assist them able to assess the value of the diamonds.²⁴⁵ USAID, the US development agency, is currently implementing a training programme for miners and local communities. The training pertains to the valuation of diamonds. USAID is also implementing a credit programme to enable local miners afford the cost of the licence and the mining equipment.²⁴⁶ This measure is aimed at reducing the dependence of small-scale miners on supporters.
195. The Ministry of Mineral Resources is supposed to monitor the safety of the miners in the pits.²⁴⁷ The Mines Monitoring Officers have the power to withdraw a licence because of poor safety conditions in a pit. In practice, the Commission has found no evidence of such monitoring. Miners work under difficult and even dangerous conditions, as landslides are common, especially during the rainy season. Safety is left to the plot owners.²⁴⁸
196. There is a system in place at the Ministry for complaints on labour conditions. In practice though, very few miners complain. More sensitisation needs to be carried out to inform miners about the system and about their rights as workers.

²⁴¹ Khalilu John-Bull, TRC statement number 256, Sahrquee Town (Kono), 13 December 2003.

²⁴² Jonathan Sharkah, Government Mining Engineer, TRC interview in Kono District, 9 June 2003.

²⁴³ Mr. Kandeh, Chief Security Officer, Koidu mine, TRC interview in Koidu, 10 June 2003.

²⁴⁴ Mr. Kandeh, Chief Security Officer, Koidu mine, TRC interview in Koidu, 10 June 2003.

²⁴⁵ TRC Interviews with miners and plot owners in Kono District, 9 – 10 June 2003.

²⁴⁶ See USAID, *Sierra Leone Progress Report*, 2001, at page 4.

²⁴⁷ See USAID, *Sierra Leone Progress Report*, 2001, at page 4.

²⁴⁸ Mr. Kandeh, Chief Security Officer, Koidu mine, TRC interview in Koidu, 10 June 2003.

197. Alluvial diamond mining has several social and environmental consequences. The use and destruction of the land renders it unsuitable for agriculture. Even if the pits were refilled, the top soil is removed in the process of digging and therefore lost.²⁴⁹ This has a huge economic impact as it contributes to food shortages by disrupting agricultural production. The archaic nature of production also creates problems of deforestation, stagnant water (providing breeding ground for mosquitoes and other health hazards). These create tensions between mining and farming communities²⁵⁰. Diamond mining has created new communities that rely solely on the mines for their subsistence. It has also led to the loss of manpower in agricultural communities disrupting community life and leading to food shortages in the communities.

Women

198. Women are usually not miners. Their role is limited to providing food to the miners at the pits. But they are also plot owners and therefore are supporting miners.²⁵¹ One fifth of the total licences issued by the Ministry of Mineral Resources in Kono in 2003 went to women.²⁵² There appears to be no discrimination at the level of the Ministry. On the other hand, since the approval for the granting of licences comes first from the chiefdom authorities, discrimination is present at that level. If a family requests a licence, it would generally be granted to a male member of the family.

Child miners

199. Child abductees were forced to mine by the RUF throughout the conflict, as well as latterly by the AFRC and CDF. Most of the children were over 14 years old, since younger children were physically weaker and so less productive.²⁵³
200. Many children still work in the alluvial diamond mines. They are employed as miners, but also as food providers and cleaners.²⁵⁴ The international NGO, World Vision, conducted a survey in Kono District in August 2002 with 497 child miners, 454 parents or care givers and 495 mine supporters.²⁵⁵ The survey explored the reasons and the nature of the involvement of children in mining activities. The survey was limited to the Kono District. The children interviewed were mainly boys (90%) and the vast majority of them (97%) expressed their desire for alternative employment to mining.²⁵⁶
201. The reasons indicated by the children for their involvement in mining activities were to receive money payment (75%) and the absence of an alternative employment (15%).²⁵⁷ Similarly, 66% of the children interviewed declared that they would continue mining until they find something else to do. These children are subjected to hard labour conditions and long working hours. They are usually not attending school or any other form of alternative training.

²⁴⁹ See USAID, *Sierra Leone Progress Report*, 2001, at page 21.

²⁵⁰ See Zack-Williams, *Mining Resources and Post-War Reconstruction*, at page 7.

²⁵¹ Andrew Kandeh, Tankoro Youth Organisation, TRC interview in Koidu Town, 10 June 2003.

²⁵² Jonathan Sharkah, Government Mining Engineer, TRC interview in Kono District, 9 June 2003.

²⁵³ TRC Confidential Interview with an RUF combatant, 'G-5' commander and former intelligence officer; interview conducted in Koidu Town, Kono District; 12 August 2003.

²⁵⁴ TRC Interview with Mr. Kandeh, CSO, Koidu mine, June 10th 2003

²⁵⁵ See World Vision Sierra Leone and African International Mission Services SL, *Report on children in mining activities assessment survey, Kono District*, published in Freetown, August 2002 (hereinafter "World Vision et al, *Mining Assessment Survey*") at page 9.

²⁵⁶ See World Vision et al, *Mining Assessment Survey*, at page 36.

²⁵⁷ See World Vision et al, *Mining Assessment Survey*, at page 17.

202. Many children are sent to the mines by their parents or care givers in order to bring incomes to the household. When asked how they felt about their children's involvement in mining activities, 50% of the parents and care givers replied that they "liked it" and 17% declared that they "did not care"²⁵⁸. 80% of the mine supporters interviewed were relatives or parents of the children they employed.²⁵⁹ There is a clear need for a sensitisation campaign to inform families, mine supporters and communities about the consequences of child mining, such as the loss of educational opportunities and the physical damage done to young children's bodies. While organisations such as the Child Protection Agencies' Network have undertaken some sensitisation projects, there is a need for a consolidated approach by all stakeholders.
203. Many child miners in Kono are former child combatants and 18% of the mine supporters interviewed were former commanders employing their former child combatants.²⁶⁰ This continuity means that the patterns of abuse against children during the conflict are still in place. Many child ex-combatants are still displaced from their families and thus have to rely on their former commanders to provide their subsistence.
204. As part of the general strategy to monitor diamond-mining activities, the government introduced a new form (Form 19) that mining licence holders have to fill to declare the age of the miners they employ. The licence holder has to declare that he or she is not employing miners under the age of 18. While this is a valuable step forward in addressing the issue of child mining, the Commission believes that offenders should have their licences revoked.
205. The issue of remuneration of child miners presents the same problems as with adult miners. The mine supporters usually feed the children they employ and buy diamonds from them, but many children do not receive a salary.
206. Any strategy to combat child mining that does not address the root causes of why children go to the mines in the first place will not tackle the problem. Alternative opportunities have to be created for children, their families and their communities, such as education, skills training programmes and alternative employment.

²⁵⁸ See World Vision et al, *Mining Assessment Survey*, at page 33.

²⁵⁹ See World Vision et al, *Mining Assessment Survey*, at page 13.

²⁶⁰ See World Vision et al, *Mining Assessment Survey*, at page 27.

Conclusion

207. The exploitation of minerals and in particular diamonds did not cause the conflict but rather fuelled it. Diamonds were used by most of the armed factions to finance their war efforts. The sale of diamonds has contributed in large measure to the procurement and proliferation of small arms within the sub-region.
208. Successive post-colonial governments in Sierra Leone have mismanaged the diamond industry and placed its effective control in the hands of non-Sierra Leoneans in a way that has not benefited the majority of the people. The state never had effective control of the diamond industry prior to or during the conflict period.
209. The APC government abdicated its responsibility in ensuring effective control of the diamond industry. Other actors emerged who siphoned off the resources from the diamond industry to other countries and in the process denied the people of Sierra Leone the benefits of the country's mineral wealth. The political elite of Sierra Leone and of the neighbouring countries were complicit in this process.
210. Traditions of expropriation for personal gain have not been stamped out. While commendable efforts have been made to strengthen the regulatory regime, substantial weaknesses still exist. The Government of Sierra Leone is yet to win the war on diamond smuggling.

CHAPTER TWO

External Actors and their
Impact on the Conflict

TRC

**Learn from
Yesterday
for a better
Tomorrow**

Produced by the TRC Steering Committee with support
from the International Human Rights Law Group

CHAPTER TWO

External Actors and their Impact on the Conflict

Introduction

1. Non-interference of one state in the internal affairs of another state is a core principle of international relations. In reality, however, there has hardly been an intra-state conflict in the world that has not seen the involvement of external actors. These external actors typically provide military, political or moral support to one or a variety of competing factions, or they attempt to arbitrate and implement resolutions to the conflict.
2. There are many reasons and motivations behind the participation of external actors in intra-state conflicts. These parties may be lured into a conflict by a shared ideology with one of the factions, or by ethnic, religious or other identity sentiments. Furthermore, the strategic importance of the conflict-affected state, geo-political interests or economic considerations could also be taken into account before intervening in intra-state conflicts. The involvement of external actors could also result from compliance with obligations under international protocols or membership of regional or international institutions, like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the United Nations (UN). The conflict in Sierra Leone was not a war imposed from outside: it was an internal armed conflict in which certain external actors became involved.
3. As part of its mandate to unearth the antecedents, causes and nature of Sierra Leone's conflict, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission ("TRC" or "the Commission") recognised the importance of investigating the role of external actors. There were two main parties to the conflict in Sierra Leone - the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and the Government of Sierra Leone. It should be accepted at the outset that each of these parties underwent numerous changes of character in the course of the conflict and formed alliances with other factions that were neither predictable nor enduring. Nevertheless, all the other factions that took part in the conflict can be loosely placed under one of these two parties, including the various external actors who offered their support in the course of the war.
4. For the purposes of analysis, the Commission has divided the Sierra Leone conflict into three phases.¹ This chapter begins by examining the involvement of external actors in the pre-conflict years and the first phase of conventional "target" warfare from 1991 to late 1993. It then tracks these external actors, along with others who joined the conflict, throughout the second phase, from late 1993 up to March 1997, and the third phase, from 1997 to 2002.

¹ More detail on the Commission's three phases, including a justification for the chosen parameters, can be found in the chapter on the Military and Political History of the Conflict in Volume Three A of this report.

External Actors in the Pre-Conflict Period up to 1991 and in Phase I of the Conflict: March 1991-1993

Libya: preparing revolutionaries in pursuit of ideology

5. The involvement of external actors in Sierra Leone's conflict can be traced to the 1970s when attempts were made by different groups of Sierra Leoneans to undo Siaka Steven's decade-old hegemonic grip on the country. These efforts included the nation-wide student demonstrations of 1977, which largely failed in the face of a violent clampdown by state security forces. Since the demonstrations did not yield a regime change, the students resorted to political sensitisation on college campuses and among youths in greater Freetown.² Initially the sensitisation took the form of study groups. On the Fourah Bay College (FBC) campus of the University of Sierra Leone, a number of study groups sprang up. Prominent among these was the Green Book Study Group.³
6. The Green Book contains the political philosophy of the Libyan President, Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi, which is known as the Third Universal Theory. It advocates the creation of a Jamahiriya - a peoples' state. Ghaddafi claimed that the Third Universal Theory is instrumental to the emancipation of the human race. The spread of Ghaddafi's political philosophy became a key foreign policy objective of the Libyan state. Even before he began supporting revolutionary movements in different parts of the world, Ghaddafi offered diplomatic relations and foreign aid in furtherance of his aim of spreading his political philosophy. Libya gave financial assistance to Sierra Leonean Muslims in the late 1970s in order to perform the annual hajj pilgrimage to Mecca. The Libyan government also provided funds to assist the Sierra Leone government to host the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) summit in 1980.
7. As part of a wide range of foreign policy tools to influence events outside Libya, Ghaddafi provided a safe haven and weapons training for individuals who wished to instigate revolutionary struggle in their own countries. These were people who had been branded as terrorists, dissidents and insurgents⁴ by their own governments but who (in many cases) were engaged in resistance to overthrow dictatorial and colonial regimes. Ghaddafi also created front organisations for their operations in neighbouring states.⁵
8. A number of formal bodies were responsible for the execution of Libya's foreign policy. These included the Foreign Liaison Secretariat, the Secretariat for External Security, the Divisions of General and Military Intelligence, the Libyan Special Security Forces, and the Secretariat of Justice.⁶

² More detail on the pre-conflict phase and, in particular, on the rise of revolutionary thinking and the participation of Sierra Leoneans in training programmes in Libya can be found in the chapter on the Military and Political History of the Conflict in Volume Three A of this report.

³ Gibril Foday-Musa, former student of Fourah Bay College who attended a training programme in Libya in the 1980s; TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 26 September 2003.

⁴ Simons, G.; *International Ambitions – Libya: The Struggle for Survival*, Saint Martins Press, London, 2000 (hereinafter "Simons, *Libya: The Struggle for Survival*").

⁵ Simons, *Libya: The Struggle for Survival*.

⁶ Simons, *Libya: The Struggle for Survival*.

9. As part of Libya's foreign policy strategy, Libyan Peoples' Bureaus and Revolutionary Committees / Councils facilitated the setting up of revolutionary movements in a number of countries. In 1985, a renewed drive was undertaken to extend Libya's influence in the third world.⁷
10. Members of the Green Book Study Group at FBC had established contacts with Libyan authorities in the early 1980s. In 1985 three lecturers and 41 students were expelled from FBC following allegedly riotous conduct by students after a convocation ceremony, on and off the campus in Freetown. Alie Kabbah, the student union leader, along with some of the other students who were expelled, travelled to Ghana towards the end of 1985. The Commission received a variety of accounts of the steps that occurred next and the following descriptions can reflect only the experiences and perspectives of those cited.
11. The then President of Ghana, Flight Lieutenant John Jerry Rawlings, and his government had an avowed revolutionary posture. He was perceived as a proponent of pan-Africanism.⁸ The majority of the radical students who were expelled from FBC were members of the Pan-African Union organisation (PANAFU). Upon arrival in Accra, some of the students were received by the Chief of the Libyan Peoples' Bureau in Ghana.⁹ Some of the students gained admission into the University of Ghana at Legon to complete their studies. The Libyan government paid their fees and their up-keep on scholarships. While in Ghana, the student radicals were invited to attend seminars and conferences in Libya. Their trips were funded by the Revolutionary Council of Libya.¹⁰
12. Alie Kabbah and his colleagues in Ghana subsequently worked out a programme with the Libyan authorities to train Sierra Leonean revolutionaries to overthrow the All Peoples' Party (APC) regime. About 25 Sierra Leoneans participated in such training in Libya between 1987 and 1989.¹¹ In 1986 some of the students in Ghana travelled to Conakry to meet with members of PANAFU from Sierra Leone. It was resolved thereafter that four members of PANAFU would be sent from Sierra Leone for training in Libya. They travelled to Ghana where they stayed with Alie Kabbah and his colleagues in their hostel for a week before proceeding to Libya.¹² They were joined by three others who had been based in Ghana. All of these Sierra Leonean dissidents travelled to Libya without proper travel documents.¹³ This suggests that the Ghanaian authorities were aware of their presence and movement. The government however declined to comment on the issue on an invitation by the Commission.

⁷ Simons, *Libya: The Struggle for Survival*.

⁸ Gibril Foday-Musa, former student of Fourah Bay College who attended a training programme in Libya in the 1980s; TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 26 September 2003.

⁹ Gibril Foday-Musa, former student of Fourah Bay College who attended a training programme in Libya in the 1980s; TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 26 September 2003.

¹⁰ Gibril Foday-Musa, former student of Fourah Bay College who attended a training programme in Libya in the 1980s; TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 26 September 2003.

¹¹ Victor Reider, Sierra Leonean participant in training programmes in Libya in the 1980s, TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown, 21, October 2003. See also Cleo Hancilles, former lecturer at Fourah Bay College (FBC) who conducted ideological lessons for trainees in Libya, TRC interview in Freetown, 31 October 2003. See also Samuel Randolph Tenga, recruit of Foday Sankoh who participated in training in Libya, statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown, February 1999.

¹² Victor Reider, Sierra Leonean participant in training programmes in Libya in the 1980s, TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown, 21, October 2003.

¹³ Victor Reider, Sierra Leonean participant in training programmes in Libya in the 1980s, TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown, 21, October 2003.

13. The training in Libya was mainly premised on ideology. It commenced in around August 1987 and ended in January 1988.¹⁴ Sierra Leoneans who subsequently travelled to Libya received not only ideological training, but also military training. In 1988, another group of Sierra Leoneans was sent to Libya for training.

Liberia: assembling the RUF war machine and launching war

14. Liberians were undergoing military training during 1988 to begin a revolution of their own against President Samuel K. Doe.¹⁵ In the course of the training in Libya, a disagreement arose among the Sierra Leonean revolutionaries regarding the timing and manner of the proposed revolution in Sierra Leone. Contrary to what the Libyans and some Sierra Leonean radicals wanted, the group of student revolutionaries wanted a well-structured revolution that would be restricted to Sierra Leone. The student-led group became known as the Alie Kabbah group. The Alie Kabbah group wanted more time to plan such a revolution.¹⁶ The Libyans wanted the Sierra Leonean revolutionaries to join the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), in their revolution against Doe and then move on to Sierra Leone.¹⁷ Charles Taylor, who was leading the Liberians, was quick to take advantage of the split in the ranks of the Sierra Leoneans by aligning with Foday Sankoh, a former corporal in the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF), who emerged as the leader of the more militant faction.¹⁸ Sankoh had no prior prominence within the Sierra Leonean revolutionary movement, but was willing to go with Taylor's NPFL to Liberia.
15. After the training of the NPFL forces concluded in Libya in 1989, Charles Taylor travelled to Sierra Leone and requested President Joseph Saidu Momoh to allow him to use Sierra Leone as a launch pad for his revolution into Liberia. The request was not granted because of the Mano River Union (MRU) Protocol that disallowed the interference of one MRU Member State in the affairs of another. Not only was Taylor's request turned down, he was also arrested and incarcerated at the Sierra Leone maximum security prison at Pademba Road.¹⁹ Nevertheless, it was alleged by President Kabbah that the APC Government received money from Taylor to look favourably on his request to use Sierra Leone as a launching pad for war in Liberia.²⁰

¹⁴ Victor Reider, Sierra Leonean participant in training programmes in Libya in the 1980s, TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown, 21, October 2003.

¹⁵ Samuel Randolph Tenga, recruit of Foday Sankoh who participated in training in Libya, statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown, February 1999. See also Cleo Hancilles, former lecturer at FBC who conducted ideological lessons for trainees in Libya, TRC interview in Freetown, 31 October 2003.

¹⁶ Gibril Foday-Musa, former student of Fourah Bay College who attended a training programme in Libya in the 1980s; TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 26 September 2003.

¹⁷ Samuel Randolph Tenga, recruit of Foday Sankoh who participated in training in Libya, statement given to the Sierra Leone Police at the Headquarters of the Criminal Investigation Department (CID), Freetown, February 1999.

¹⁸ ECOMOG Deployment Review Committee, chaired by Colonel D. D. Oyebanjo; *The Participation of the Nigerian Contingent in the ECOMOG Operation in Sierra Leone*; undated document marked 'RESTRICTED'; provided to the Commission in hard copy; September 2003; at page 8.

¹⁹ More detail and analysis of the events around Taylor's incarceration in Sierra Leone can be found in the chapter on the Military and Political History of the Conflict in Volume Three A of this report.

²⁰ Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, President of the Republic of Sierra Leone (hereinafter "President Kabbah"); testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown; 05 August 2003; at page 3.

16. In 1990, the Economic Community of West Africa States Ceasefire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) undertook 'Operation Liberty' in an effort to quell the crisis in Liberia. Sierra Leone was used as a forward base and as a launch pad for subsequent ECOMOG operations in Liberia. ECOMOG's success in preventing the NPFL from taking over Monrovia in 1990 was regarded by Taylor as a calculated move to prevent his ascension as President of Liberia. Taylor saw Sierra Leone as a major player in the success of ECOMOG's operations in Liberia. In early 1991 Taylor, in an interview with the BBC, vented his disappointment with Sierra Leone and vowed that the country would "taste the bitterness of war".²¹ Taylor had captured territories in Liberia, which he made available for the further training of RUF fighters. On Sankoh's request, the NPFL began turning over Sierra Leoneans captured in Liberia for training.²² Taylor also provided trainers from among his NPFL commandos.²³ The recruits who received training from Taylor's men in NPFL territories in Liberia became known as the RUF "vanguards".²⁴
17. The RUF launched its insurgency without any independent direction or means, due to the sizeable presence of Taylor's men among them. As explained in the chapter on the Military and Political History of the Conflict, NPFL fighters outnumbered their RUF counterparts by four to one. In addition, as pointed out by one Sierra Leone researcher, "those Liberian NPFL fighters never took orders from Sankoh, but from Taylor or NPFL commanders".²⁵ Taylor and his men were in control of operations at the initial stage; indeed, it has even been suggested that the presence of Sierra Leoneans was merely designed to lend an indigenous flavour to the incursions.²⁶ It is perhaps best to relay the experience of local people on the ground at this time through excerpts from TRC statements in which Liberian or NPFL fighters are mentioned:

"... On 23 March 1991, there was a cross border attack on Bomaru town, Upper Bambara Chiefdom... The elders resolved to send a fact-finding mission to ascertain what happened...I led a team of seven men to Bomaru. On our arrival, we were shocked and dismayed about the killings of up to 13 civilians. We went to the point where Major Foday was killed. I met his body hanging through the roof and blood flowing freely on the ground. Among the 13 civilians killed were 7 men, 4 women and 2 children. They had bullet holes all over their bodies. We were informed that the conflict was...between the Sierra Leone Army stationed at Bomaru and rebels of the NPFL of Liberia....

²¹ BBC *Focus on Africa*; BBC Africa Service; "Interview with rebel leader Charles Taylor of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL)"; broadcast on 01 and 02 November 1990.

²² More discussion of the RUF's recruitment practices can be found in the chapter on the Military and Political History of the Conflict in Volume Three A of this report.

²³ Jonathan Kposowa, former Adjutant General of the RUF who worked closely with the Leader and other members of the High Command throughout the conflict; primary interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 25 June 2003.

²⁴ Jonathan Kposowa, former Adjutant General of the RUF who worked closely with the Leader and other members of the High Command throughout the conflict; primary interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 25 June 2003.

²⁵ Lansana Gberie, Sierra Leone researcher for Partnership Africa Canada, TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown, 1 July 2003.

²⁶ John Benjamin, former Chief Secretary of State and Secretary-General under the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC), from 1992 to 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 10 April 2003.

... Early in April, 1991, the Liberians launched the attack on a full scale... days later, the rebels attacked the chiefdom headquarter town of Pendembu. They entered the town firing and bombing from all angles... later they called the trapped residents to assemble at the town barray... The commander, speaking through an interpreter in Liberian pidgin English, explained the mission and their aim of taking on the APC Government. He announced his organisation as Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone... he was Colonel Sherita, a chartered mercenary for the mission..."²⁷

[and]

"...On the day my father was killed, he was at home discussing with his friends when the rebels attacked shooting indiscriminately with no specific target. These rebels were from Liberia...."²⁸

Burkina Faso: an early backer of the RUF's war efforts

18. Statements taken by the Commission show that fighters from Burkina Faso, known as Burkinabes, were involved in the early stages of the conflict. Burkinabes were fighting on the side of RUF. Sierra Leone military personnel found Burkina Faso identification cards on some members of the rebel fighters who were killed at battle front.²⁹

"It happened at Ngolawahun, Sorogbema in Pujehun district in May 1991 where Mr. Moseray was asked to hand over his cigarette to the Burkinabes who were part of the RUF. The rebels captured and killed him for refusing to give them his cigarette."³⁰

"It was in 1991 and I was staying with my aunt as a ward. When the RUF - Burkinabes - first entered Pujehun. I was at the stream with my companions. We were laundering clothes. We were caught and sexually abused by those rebels. I was eight years then and about three to four of them had sex with me. I was deflowered..."³¹

19. Although there were no suggestions that Burkina Faso was involved at state level, the relationship between Taylor and Blaise Campaore of Burkina Faso is noteworthy. The two were close friends. Campaore had introduced Taylor to Thomas Sankara and Ghaddafi in a bid to establish contacts for the rebellion in Liberia.³² In 1991, six Burkinabes, led by Captain Ndola Wasando, were captured by Sierra Leone Army personnel in Kailahun.³³

²⁷ Moijueh Kamara, TRC statement number 4772, Pendembu (Kailahun), 20 January 2003.

²⁸ Ibrahim Mansaray, TRC statement number 0614, Matotoka (Tonkolili), 8 December 2002.

²⁹ Brigadier (Retired) Julius Maada Bio, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from January to March 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 30 September 2003.

³⁰ Senessie Johnny, TRC statement number 5843, Bendu-Jaiama Bongor (Bo), 27 October 2003.

³¹ Female victim; TRC confidential statement 4524, Limba Bagbo (Bo), 12 February 2003.

³² An account of these meetings and the personal relationships between the men involved is provided in the autobiography of former NPFL General Prince Yormie Johnson.

³³ See Sierra Leone Daily Mail; *Foreign fighters captured in Kailahun*; 14 June 1991, at page 1.

20. The speed with which the RUF attacked other towns and villages after the attack on Bomaru on 23 March 1991 was greatly assisted by the involvement of Liberian NPFL fighters and the Burkinabes. The Liberians and Burkinabes were trained in guerrilla warfare and had prior experience in the war in Liberia. The Liberians and Burkinabes fighters devised the crude strategies around enlisting new fighters, including recruiting child combatants. Their intimidatory practices included forcing children to kill their parents in the full view of onlookers from community. The rationale was that those children, forever haunted by their actions, would then stay with the rebels. The Liberians and Burkinabes also committed atrocities ranging from systematic rape to cannibalism.³⁴
21. The initial response of the APC Government of President Joseph Saidu Momoh to the attack on Bomaru was to dismiss it as an act of banditry. However, when Pujehun District and other parts of the country came under attack, it was clear that a strong army was needed to curb the invasion of the RUF. The strength of the military in 1991 was about 3,500 (three thousand five hundred) men. The military had an almost empty armoury.³⁵ It was under these circumstances that the RSLMF requested military assistance from the Republic of Guinea.³⁶

Guinea: the first state to provide combat support for the Government of Sierra Leone

22. The bilateral defence pact between Sierra Leone and Guinea to provide defence assistance in times of crisis dates back to 1971.³⁷ In 1971, Guinean soldiers were in Sierra Leone to help the government of President Siaka Stevens quell an attempted coup. In 1982 upon the request of the Guinean Armed Forces, the RSLMF sent a medical team to help Guineans in the face of a natural disaster.³⁸
23. Guinean Armed Forces personnel arrived in Sierra Leone three weeks after the attack on Bomaru³⁹ and went straight to the battle front at Daru where: "the intervention of the Guinean forces at that time saved the lives of men and officers of the RSLMF who were at Daru barracks which had been surrounded by the rebel forces".⁴⁰ The Guinean Armed Forces supplied much-needed arms and ammunition to the RSLMF up to 1993.⁴¹

³⁴ More detail on the atrocities committed by NPFL fighters can be found in the chapter on the Military and Political History of the Conflict in Volume Three A of this report.

³⁵ Lieutenant Colonel Simeon N. Sheriff, officer in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), TRC interview conducted at Defence Headquarters, Freetown, 2 April 2003.

³⁶ Lieutenant Colonel Simeon N. Sheriff, officer in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), TRC interview conducted at Defence Headquarters, Freetown, 2 April 2003.

³⁷ The defence pact between Sierra Leone and Guinea certainly exists, according to officials contacted in the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs. However, despite prolonged efforts through various channels, the Commission was not able to obtain a copy of the agreement.

³⁸ Lieutenant Colonel Simeon N. Sheriff, officer in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), TRC interview conducted at Defence Headquarters, Freetown, 2 April 2003.

³⁹ Lieutenant Colonel Simeon N. Sheriff, officer in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), TRC interview conducted at Defence Headquarters, Freetown, 2 April 2003.

⁴⁰ Lieutenant Colonel Simeon N. Sheriff, officer in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), TRC interview conducted at Defence Headquarters, Freetown, 2 April 2003.

⁴¹ Lieutenant Colonel Simeon N. Sheriff, officer in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), TRC interview conducted at Defence Headquarters, Freetown, 2 April 2003.

ULIMO: united with the Government in opposition to RUF / NPFL

24. Since the initial invaders of Sierra Leone were predominantly Liberians, the personnel of the RSLMF had reasons to be suspicious of anyone who had a Liberian accent. Liberians living in refugee camps in Eastern Sierra Leone were not spared such suspicion and in some cases they were targeted by personnel of the RSLMF. Some Liberians were killed in the process.⁴² The situation in the Liberian refugee camps became deplorable. This resulted in a meeting between Momoh and General Kapeh, who was a former Liberian ambassador to Sierra Leone under President Doe. At that meeting, Kapeh expressed his government's willingness to help the Sierra Leone government prosecute the war. Doe's government saw the war as an NPFL invasion.⁴³ As a result of that meeting, Dar Youlou was asked by Kapeh to organise Liberians in the refugee camps and other parts of Sierra Leone into a fighting group to fight along side the RSLMF. Dar Youlou (alias D-Wah) named the group 'Liberian United Defence Force' (LUDF). The name LUDF was rejected and changed to United Liberation Movement (ULIMO). According to a senior officer of the group, the name LUDF was changed because they were not in Liberia and they were not fighting for the Liberian people, but for Sierra Leoneans.
25. ULIMO mainly recruited Mandingos and Krahnns. Mandingos and Krahnns were supporters of the Doe regime and therefore the main targets of the NPFL fighting forces:
- “...At one time in Monrovia, my father called me and told me that the names Koroma and Kanneh were the names the Liberians didn't want to hear. If you were in Liberia and you carried any of those names, you would be killed. My father was a twin; Koroma was his name. When we crossed the river, they killed my father and took away all his belongings...”⁴⁴
26. Some former soldiers of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), who fled from the war in Liberia, were also in the ULIMO group⁴⁵ and these soldiers were given guns and uniforms. One of the training camps of ULIMO was in an oil palm farm near Kpetema village along the Kenema and Zimmi highway in the East of Sierra Leone. Major James Yayah Kanu, who was the Brigade Commander in Kenema, was charged with the responsibility of overseeing the ULIMO training. After the training, ULIMO forces were put under his command.⁴⁶ The Liberian Roosevelt Johnson was named the field commander of ULIMO.

⁴² Philip Maxwell Cartos, Liberian former ULIMO fighter, TRC interview conducted at Mapeh Camp, Western Area, October 2003.

⁴³ Colonel M. S. Koroma, officer in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), formerly of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and later ULIMO; TRC interview conducted in Freetown, September 2003.

⁴⁴ TRC closed hearing featuring a Sierra Leonean former resident of Liberia, conducted in Kailahun Town, Kailahun District, 14 May 2003.

⁴⁵ Colonel M. S. Koroma, officer in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), formerly of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and later ULIMO; TRC interview conducted in Freetown, September 2003.

⁴⁶ Colonel M. S. Koroma, officer in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), formerly of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and later ULIMO; TRC interview conducted in Freetown, September 2003.

27. ULIMO was to set up a joint task force with the RSLAF at the war front to launch offensives against RUF positions and recapture RUF-controlled territories. However, from the outset ULIMO commanders were intent on establishing a corridor into Liberia to resume the war against Taylor's NPFL. A former ULIMO fighter told the Commission that the organisation also wanted to save the Liberians in refugee camps in Sierra Leone from the abuses of personnel of the RSLAF.⁴⁷
28. Internal ethnic divisions soon began to compromise the cohesion of the ULIMO force. In particular, fighters began to align themselves according to their allegiances to either the Mandingo or the Krahn ethnic groups, the two dominant tribes in the organisation. Ethnic Krahn fighters remained close to Roosevelt Johnson and formed a loyalist group called ULIMO-J. Meanwhile Mandingo financiers in Kenema and some Guinean officials rallied around rival commander Alhaji Kromah to create the splinter group ULIMO-K.⁴⁸ In 1993 ULIMO fighters from both sets crossed into Liberia to fight against Taylor's NPFL. The weapons supplied for the war against the RUF were instead used by ULIMO to carry out its own fight against Taylor and the NPFL in Liberia.
29. ULIMO troops under the command of Charles Collins, who went to protect the diamond fields in Tongo in 1991, executed hundreds of civilians accused of being members or collaborators of the RUF. Most of the executions were carried out on a hill between Lalihun and Giehun. This hill became known as 'Rebel Hill', a nickname that is still used by the locals today.⁴⁹ Although ULIMO succeeded in retaking some areas, including Pujehun, the RUF invasion of the country persisted. Greater military strength was required to protect Sierra Leone from the incursions.

Nigeria: intervening to assist the Government of Sierra Leone

30. At the request of the Sierra Leone government, Nigeria sent a small force in late 1991 and they guarded RSLMF bases and installations. Apart from formal requests or protocols for military assistance, officials of both Nigeria and Sierra Leone pointed to socio-cultural ties between the two countries as good reason for Nigerian support. Socio-cultural ties between Sierra Leone and Nigeria have their genesis in the end of slavery and the establishment of Freetown as a haven for freed slaves. Slaves from Nigeria bound for the New World, freed by British naval boats, were resettled in Freetown. These ex-slaves from the Americas and Britain became known as the Krios, with a cultural identity that drew much from Nigerian heritage. President Olusegun Obasanjo talked about this 'blood relationship' between Nigerians and Sierra Leoneans as the foundation and justification for Nigeria's military and diplomatic intervention in Sierra Leone.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Philip Maxwell Cartos, Liberian former ULIMO fighter; TRC interview conducted at Mapeh Camp, Western Area, October 2003.

⁴⁸ Bai Sidi, Liberian former ULIMO fighter; TRC interview conducted at Mapeh Camp, Western Area, October 2003.

⁴⁹ Chief Kini Lansana Charles, resident of Tongo Field, TRC interview conducted in Tongo Field, Kenema District, 3 August 2003.

⁵⁰ Brigadier-General R. A. Adeshina; *The Reversed Victory. The Story of Nigerian Military Intervention in Sierra Leone*, Heinemann Educational Books, Nigeria, 2002, at page 7.

31. The desire to give a regional outlook to ECOMOG in Liberia also accounted for Nigeria's deployment of troops in Sierra Leone. Nigeria also supplied direct support to Sierra Leone's own military efforts. It sent soldiers to Sierra Leone to protect military installations and other strategic facilities so as to enable Sierra Leone send a contingent of troops to the ECOMOG mission in Liberia.⁵¹
32. In April 1992 junior officers of the RSLMF moved to Freetown from the war front and overthrew the government of Momoh. They established the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) and promised to expel the rebels from Sierra Leone. In pursuit of this promise the NPRC embarked on mass recruitment into the army and thousands of youths who had little or no formal education found themselves in the army.⁵²
33. The NPRC continued the diplomatic and military relations between Nigeria and Sierra Leone, and a "Status of Forces Agreement" (SOFA) was signed with the Nigerian government, which led to the deployment of the Nigerian Armed Forces Training Group (NATAG). NATAG had a specific mandate to provide training to the Sierra Leone military. In spite of such support the fortunes of the Sierra Leone army at the war front did not change for the better and by the end of 1993 the RUF had taken much of the Southern and Eastern parts of the country.

Phase II of the Conflict: 1994-1997

Government of Sierra Leone searches for solutions through diplomacy and non-state private armies

34. By the beginning of 1994 disciplinary problems, due to factional fighting in ULIMO's ranks, began to take their toll on the organisation's prosecution of the war in Sierra Leone. There was a dispute between Kapeh and Youlou, commanders of ULIMO. Colonel Tom Nyuma , NPRC secretary of state for the Eastern province, called a meeting to settle the dispute. Youlou took the opportunity to express his anger and dislike for Kapeh. Following that, he ordered Mandingo fighters of ULIMO to kill Kapeh. Kapeh tried to escape, but was killed. Following this incident, in June and July 1994, all ULIMO personnel operating in Sierra Leone were disarmed by the SLA contingent at Waterloo and taken to the Allen Town camp in Mayami.
35. By the end of the year, the RUF had brought the war to the outskirts of the capital city, Freetown, when it captured Newton. The NPRC chairman, Captain Valentine Strasser , promising amnesty, asked the RUF to cease hostilities. The RUF turned down the request and continued hostilities.

⁵¹ Brigadier-General R. A. Adeshina; *The Reversed Victory. The Story of Nigerian Military Intervention in Sierra Leone*, Heinemann Educational Books, Nigeria, 2002, at page 7.

⁵² More detail on the NPRC's mass recruitment drive of 1992 can be found in the chapter on the Military and Political History of the Conflict in Volume Three A of this report.

The maiden intervention of the United Nations (UN)

36. In November 1994 the NPRC Chairman, Valentine Strasser, wrote a letter to the UN Secretary-General asking the UN to facilitate negotiations between his government and the RUF. The UN Security Council responded by sending an exploratory mission to Sierra Leone on 15 December 1994 and the team travelled across the country. Following the report of the Mission, Mr. Berhanu Dinka of Ethiopia was appointed Special Envoy to Sierra Leone two months later. The role of the UN Special Envoy included facilitating negotiations between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF and returning Sierra Leone to civilian rule. However, the presence of the UN Special Envoy in Sierra Leone did not stop the terror campaign of the RUF.
37. It was in these circumstances that Strasser's government hired the services of the Ghurkhas Security Group (GSG) in 1995.⁵³ The GSG was a privately owned British company formed in 1989 and specialised in recruiting former British army Ghurkhas officers and soldiers for security services. GSG was sub-contracted to the Sierra Leone mission by J&S Franklin Limited, a British manufacturer of non-lethal military equipment and a weapons sales agent.
38. The GSG was to train the presidential guards and the RSLMF in counter insurgency techniques and safeguard Camp Charlie - a military base at Mile 91. The GSG arrived in Sierra Leone in February 1995 with 58 Ghurkhas and three European managers. The NPRC had acquired two Russian Mi-24 helicopter gunships, manned by Belarusian mercenary pilots, and engaged in attacks on a number of RUF bases.⁵⁴ The GSG refused to conduct offensive operations against the RUF, arguing that it did not form part of their contract. On 24 February 1995 the GSG commander, Mackenzie, and other personnel were killed in an ambush by the RUF and two months later the GSG withdrew from Sierra Leone.⁵⁵ In their short stay, the Ghurkhas achieved nothing. The abrupt withdrawal of the GSG, at a time when the RUF had intensified its operations in areas close to the capital city, not only created a precarious security situation, but caused much embarrassment for the NPRC government which had promised to pursue the rebels by land, sea and air.
39. The NPRC government asked a former AFL soldier, Brigadier-General David Bropleh, to re-organise the disarmed ULIMO fighters so that they could fight on the side of government.⁵⁶ The NPRC government and ULIMO authorities agreed, among other things, to drop the name ULIMO and the fighters were to be constituted as part of the Sierra Leone Army as a new unit called the Special Task Force.⁵⁷ Members of the Special Task Force would serve under the laws and army rules of Sierra Leone. The recruited Liberians were issued with Sierra Leone military identity cards.⁵⁸

⁵³ See Captain (Retired) Valentine E. M. Strasser, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC); testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown, 30 July 2003. See also *Mercenaries, African Security Dilemma*, at page 87.

⁵⁴ For more discussion of the enlistment of private security and logistical support by the NPRC, see Vines, A.; "Ghurkhas and the private security business in Africa" and "Fighting for Diamonds - Private military companies in Sierra Leone" in Cilliers, *Peace, Profit and Plunder?*.

⁵⁵ See President Kabbah, testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings in Freetown, 05 August 2003; see also the secondary sources listed in the previous footnote.

⁵⁶ Colonel M. S. Koroma, officer in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), formerly of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and later ULIMO; TRC interview conducted in Freetown, September 2003.

⁵⁷ Colonel M. S. Koroma; TRC interview conducted in Freetown, September 2003.

⁵⁸ Colonel M. S. Koroma; TRC interview conducted in Freetown, September 2003.

40. On 5 May 1995 the first batch of Special Task Force personnel was re-armed and sent with Sierra Leone Army personnel to fight at the Waterloo front against the RUF.⁵⁹ On 10 June 1995 a second batch was re-armed and also sent to the war front in the Bo District area. The Special Task Force went on to score significant successes at its various war front deployments.⁶⁰ In spite of the successes, there were many areas that remained under the control RUF.

The enlistment of Executive Outcomes

41. The NPRC government secured the services of Executive Outcomes, a South African private security firm. Executive Outcomes was introduced to Strasser by Michael Grunberg and Anthony Buckingham of the mining company, Branch Energy.⁶¹ The contract required Executive Outcomes to provide between 150 and 200 soldiers, fully equipped with helicopter support. Executive Outcomes was to help repel the RUF from the Freetown area, secure government control of the diamond areas in Kono, help stabilise the whole country and retrain the army and the Kamajor militia.⁶² The company was to provide logistical support, sophisticated communications equipment and transportation for the army.⁶³
42. Executive Outcomes was set up in 1989 and was run by Luther Eben Barlow, previously a Lieutenant Colonel in the South African military intelligence unit and a senior member of the Civilian Cooperation Bureau (CCB).⁶⁴ Executive Outcomes, in its early days, developed a flourishing business relationship with the diamond-mining sector. In 1993 Executive Outcomes carried out its first significant military operation in Angola for the Angolan government against UNITA.
43. Between 1993 and 1995, Executive Outcomes changed its strategy and its company profile. It expanded and became a fully-fledged private army. British operations were established under Executive Outcomes (UK) Limited and registered in London in September 1993. Barlow registered Executive Outcomes as a private company in South Africa in 1994. Its men were mostly ex-commandos who had worked for the former apartheid government of South Africa.

⁵⁹ Colonel M. S. Koroma, officer in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), formerly of the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) and later ULIMO; TRC interview conducted in Freetown, September 2003.

⁶⁰ More detail on the successes of pro-Government forces during this period can be found in the chapter on the Military and Political History of the Conflict in Volume Three A of this report.

⁶¹ More background detail on the entry of Executive Outcomes into the conflict can be found in the chapter on Mineral Resources earlier in Volume Three B.

⁶² See Akinrinade, B.; "International Humanitarian Law and Conflict in Sierra Leone", in *Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics and Public Policy*, 2001. See also Francis, D.; *Mercenary Intervention in Sierra Leone: Providing National Security or International Exploitation?*, Third World Quarterly, No. 2, 1999.

⁶³ Contractual Agreement between the Government of Sierra Leone and Executive Outcomes, latest renewal of the contract signed on 1 July 1997, information provided to the Commission by President Kabbah in his supplementary written testimony, Freetown, 12 August 2003.

⁶⁴ The CCB was a covert unit of the South African military that conducted assassinations and dirty tricks operations against anti-apartheid activists.

44. Executive Outcomes was to be paid two million US dollars (\$2,000,000) a month by the Sierra Leone government.⁶⁵ Executive Outcomes financed its own activities at the beginning, hoping to be reimbursed by the government of Sierra Leone when control over the diamond mining areas was regained. Executive Outcomes encountered financial problems between 1996 and 1997 because of non-payment for its activities in Sierra Leone. In all, the company was only paid about a third of its total fees for the eighteen months it was in Sierra Leone. Part of these funds allegedly came from an IMF loan to the government.⁶⁶ Executive Outcomes was also partly paid in the form of diamond concessions offered to Branch Energy, a diamond mining company with close links to Executive Outcomes.⁶⁷
45. Executive Outcomes, with its reconnaissance capabilities, air power, and guerrilla warfare experience was able to beat back the RUF to Kailahun and the Liberian border. It retook Kono and destroyed Camp Zogoda, the RUF jungle base that acted as its headquarters. All of these military and strategic gains were accomplished in only a few months.

RUF seeks foreign assistance in the face of defeat

46. The RUF was thrown into disarray but it was not annihilated. In order to continue its campaign in Sierra Leone, the RUF fell back on external support. Libya, which had provided training for Sankoh and other Sierra Leoneans, continued to give support to the RUF. In a letter to Brother Mohamed Talibi, the Ambassador of the Libyan Arab Peoples Jamahiriya in Accra, Ghana, dated 26 June 1996, Sankoh wrote:

“I want to thank you and the other brothers at home again for the half million United States Dollars (500,000USD) which I received through you for the purchase of needed materials to pursue the military mission”.⁶⁸
47. In the same letter, Sankoh went on to make a further request for \$(US) 1 million to “purchase twice the listed materials for effective and smooth operation”.
48. By the end of 1995 the NPRC clearly had the upper hand in the war as the RUF had been pushed through Kailahun District into Liberia. At this time, the people of Sierra Leone were anxious for a return to democratic rule.

⁶⁵ Pech, K.; “Executive Outcomes - a Corporate Conquest”, in Cilliers, *Peace, Profit and Plunder?*.

⁶⁶ Jan Joubert, Sierra Leone Country Manager, Branch Energy Ltd.; TRC Interview conducted in Freetown, 11 June 2003.

⁶⁷ See Captain (Retired) Valentine E. M. Strasser, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from 1992 to 1996; testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown, 30 July 2003. More detail on the payment of private security firms in diamond concessions can be found in the chapter on Mineral Resources earlier in Volume Three B.

⁶⁸ Letter from Foday Sankoh to Mohamed Talibi of the Libyan Peoples’ Revolutionary Council, Accra; dated 26 June 1996; Criminal Investigations Department (CID) of the Sierra Leone Police; letter included in the dossier pertaining to the ‘Foday Sankoh / 8 May 2000’ case; dossier provided to the TRC in July 2003.

Elections and diplomatic initiatives to end the war

49. In February and March 1996, multi-party elections brought the Ahmad Tejan Kabbah-led Sierra Leone Peoples' Party (SLPP) to power. External involvement in Sierra Leone's war remained insignificant, mainly taking the form of international diplomacy and the occasional condemnation of human rights violations and abuses taking place in the country.

Britain and the West: strategic contributions towards stability

50. Britain provided financial support for the elections of February and March 1996 with a contribution of some £17 million. The EU, the Commonwealth, the US and the UN also provided funds and technical support. The emerging opportunity for stability in Sierra Leone saw other countries bolstering diplomatic initiatives to end the war.

Libya: bridging the gap to Peace Talks in 1996

51. The Commission heard that Colonel Ghaddafi admitted supporting the RUF when he was confronted on the issue by Julius Maada Bio, the second Chairman of the NPRC, in 1996. Moreover Ghaddafi provided Bio with vital information and direction as to how to get the RUF to the table for peace talks.⁶⁹ Ghaddafi's counsel led – directly or indirectly – to the first peace talks between the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF, which took place in Abidjan in 1996. Libya, which sent delegates to the peace talks, promised the withdrawal of its support to the RUF.⁷⁰ The opening of those discussions was partly facilitated by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the UN to Sierra Leone, Mr. Berhanu Dinka. Following the general elections of February and March 1996, the talks that had begun between the RUF and the NPRC Government of Sierra Leone under Bio were taken up by the newly elected SLPP Government of President Kabbah.

Côte d'Ivoire: a host and a catalyst for Peace Talks

52. Konan Bedie, the President of Côte d'Ivoire and his foreign minister, Amara Essé, were also instrumental in bringing the SLPP government and Foday Sankoh together in Abidjan. Essé went to the bush to persuade Sankoh to attend the peace talks. The Abidjan talks resulted in the signing of a Peace Accord on 30 November 1996. The main elements of the agreement included the total and immediate end of hostilities, disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of all combatants, the withdrawal from the country of all mercenaries and amnesty for RUF fighters.

⁶⁹ Brigadier (Retired) Julius Maada Bio, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from January to March 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 30 September 2003.

⁷⁰ Brigadier (Retired) Julius Maada Bio, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from January to March 1996; TRC Interview conducted at private residence, Freetown; 30 September 2003.

53. Sierra Leoneans were generally uncomfortable with the Abidjan Accord. They were displeased, for example, with the fact that Côte d'Ivoire had allowed the RUF to establish an office in Abidjan. This gesture was not without precedent, however. Côte d'Ivoire also permitted UNITA, which was waging war against the Angolan government, to set up an office in Abidjan.

The RUF regroupes and poses a renewed threat

54. According to Kabbah, the RUF's signing of the Abidjan Accord was a deception. A few days after the signing of the Accord, the government intercepted a message sent by Sankoh to his field commander, Sam Bockarie (alias Mosquito), in which Sankoh told Sam Bockarie that he signed the Accord to relieve international pressure on the RUF. In the same message, Sankoh was said to have ordered his men to resume hostilities on an even bigger scale. A month before the Abidjan Accord, Sankoh wrote a letter to Talibi indicating that he had earlier received US \$29,000 through a certain Daniel Kallon. Sankoh said in the letter that he would use the period after the signing of the Abidjan Peace Agreement to "transact (my) business in getting (our) fighting materials freely and easily". He further requested US \$700,000 to help purchase fighting materials.⁷¹
55. Kabbah, demonstrating commitment to the negotiated settlement of the war, terminated the contract of Executive Outcomes in accordance with the Abidjan Accord. The RUF had insisted on the early implementation of the clause that provided for the withdrawal of all mercenaries. This was to dramatically weaken the government's military position. Sankoh had refused to sign the document authorising the deployment of UN monitors. Although the Executive Outcomes contract was terminated several of the company's personnel stayed on in Sierra Leone and took up other security-related assignments.
56. After his election, Kabbah made requests to the international community for assistance in the areas of intelligence-gathering and training.⁷² The response of the international community was negligible. Kabbah's request to the US government to assist his government with weapons, when it became clear that the Abidjan Accord was not holding,⁷³ was turned down. Another request for assistance in training soldiers at Benguema to the US and British governments, resulted in these countries sending five soldiers, two Americans and three British. The highest-ranking soldier was a sergeant.⁷⁴ After a brief spell, the five trainers left without informing the Commander-in-Chief of the RSLMF.⁷⁵

⁷¹ Letter from Foday Sankoh to Mohamed Talibi of the Libyan Peoples' Revolutionary Council, Accra; dated 4 October 1996; Criminal Investigations Department (CID) of the Sierra Leone Police; letter included in the dossier pertaining to the 'Foday Sankoh / 8 May 2000' case; dossier provided to the TRC in July 2003.

⁷² See President Kabbah, testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings in Freetown, 05 August 2003.

⁷³ See President Kabbah, testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings in Freetown, 05 August 2003.

⁷⁴ See President Kabbah, testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings in Freetown, 05 August 2003.

⁷⁵ See President Kabbah, testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings in Freetown, 05 August 2003.

Phase III of the Conflict: 1997 – 2002

The coup of 25 May 1997

57. In the early months of 1997 there was an alleged coup plot against the Government of Kabbah. The government requested Nigerian assistance to investigate the coup plot, which resulted in Johnny Paul Koroma and other junior military officers being charged with treason. The trials were taking place when soldiers of the Sierra Leone Army and a handful of civilians staged a coup on 25 May 1997. Following the coup, Kabbah and his cabinet fled to Guinea and the plotters established themselves as the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC).

Greater international community involvement to end the coup

58. The coup took place in an optimistic post-Cold War decade that had seen the collapse of undemocratic one-party and military regimes across the world. The coup was received with shock by world leaders as a setback for the growth of democracy in Africa. It was swiftly condemned.

ECOWAS, OAU and the Commonwealth enter the fray

59. On 4 June 1997, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) at its annual meeting in Harare, only one week after the coup, called on Africa and the world not to recognise the military junta in Sierra Leone. At the same meeting the OAU appealed to ECOWAS to assist the people of Sierra Leone to restore constitutional order.⁷⁶ The OAU stressed the “imperative need to implement the Abidjan Peace Agreement” which, “continued to serve as a viable framework for peace, stability and reconciliation in Sierra Leone”.⁷⁷
60. Consequently, in June 1997, ECOWAS heads of governments put forward three objectives on the Sierra Leone conflict.⁷⁸ The objectives were: 1) *to ensure the early restoration of the legitimate government of Kabbah*; 2) *the return of peace and security to Sierra Leone*; and 3) *the resolution of the issues of refugees and displaced persons*. The OAU aimed to establish dialogue and negotiations with the AFRC junta. Failing persuasion it aimed to impose economic sanctions AFRC. The use of force to remove the junta from power was also considered. A committee of four was established to implement the action plan. The committee comprised the foreign ministers of Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Ghana and Nigeria. The foreign minister of Liberia was later added to the committee, making it a Committee of Five.
61. The Committee first sought and received the support of the UN Security Council for its initiatives in Sierra Leone. From 17 to 18 July 1997 the Committee met with representatives of the AFRC in Abidjan. The Committee and junta representatives agreed that the issues relating to the crisis in Sierra Leone should be peacefully resolved and a cease-fire was agreed upon. It was also agreed that the junta would be allowed to prepare to return the country to constitutional order. From 29 to 30 July 1997 the parties met again in Abidjan.

⁷⁶ OAU Heads of Government resolved in June 1997 that the military coup establishing the AFRC in Sierra Leone was unlawful and should be reversed by ECOWAS.

⁷⁷ See Resolutions of the OAU Heads of Government, agreed in Harare, Zimbabwe, June 1997.

⁷⁸ See Resolutions of the ECOWAS Heads of Government, published in June 1997.

While the meeting was in progress, the AFRC announced in Freetown that they would remain in power until 2001. This brought the renewed Abidjan negotiations to an abrupt end.

62. ECOWAS heads of government at the twentieth ordinary summit, in Abuja from 28 to 29 August 1997, proposed the imposition of economic and other sanctions on the junta. These sanctions covered weapons, petroleum and petroleum products, a travel ban on members of the AFRC and members of their families and an embargo on humanitarian aid. Recognising Article 53 of the UN Charter, which provides that “no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangement or by regional agencies without the authorisation of the Security Council”, the proposals were tabled before the UN Security Council for approval. The UN Security Council Resolution 1132 of 8 October 1997 endorsed the sanctions but declined to endorse the use of force to remove the junta from power or an embargo on humanitarian aid.⁷⁹ Under Article 7 of the ECOWAS decision, ECOMOG was mandated to “employ all necessary means to enforce the implementation of this decision”. Prior to the endorsement of sanctions and embargo, but after the coup of 25 May 1997, the UN Secretary-General appointed Mr. Francis Okelo of Uganda as the new Special Envoy to Sierra Leone.
63. The sanctions imposed by ECOWAS and the UN were broadly welcomed by Sierra Leoneans opposed to the AFRC. However, the measures took a heavy toll on the civilian population. The fact that ECOMOG targeted humanitarian aid in enforcing the sanctions partly contributed to the suffering of civilians. On 7 November 1997 the World Food Programme, warned that the health of thousands was at stake because humanitarian assistance had not been allowed to cross into Sierra Leone from Guinea.⁸⁰ On 11 November 1997 the ECOMOG Field Commander, General Victor Malu, announced that clearance would be given for food aid to be brought into Sierra Leone “within days”, but such clearance was not given until the end of the year. ECOMOG was also accused of sinking boats carrying food shipments as they entered the port of Freetown.
64. In spite of the worsening humanitarian situation, ECOMOG and the international community believed that the sanctions were vital to the success of the intervention. This was also the view held by most Sierra Leoneans. Peter Penfold, the former UK High Commissioner to Sierra Leone, remarked that “the people of Sierra Leone were resolved to undergo anything in exchange for democracy.”⁸¹
65. Testimonies to the Commission suggest that the sanctions and embargo greatly contributed to the junta's willingness to meet with the ECOWAS Committee of Five on 23 October 1997, in Conakry, Guinea for a fresh round of Peace Talks.

⁷⁹ See UN Security Council Resolution 1132 of October 1997.

⁸⁰ See the Integrated Regional Information Network (IRIN) of the UN-DHA; IRIN West Africa, *Background on The Conakry Peace Accord*, available at the website: www.reliefweb.org.

⁸¹ Peter Penfold, former High Commissioner of the United Kingdom to Sierra Leone; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 31 July 2003.

66. At the Conakry meeting of October 1997, the representatives of the junta and the ECOWAS Committee of Five agreed that the junta would hand over power to President Kabbah on 22 May 1998, but that the sanctions and embargo provided for in UN Security Council Resolution 1132 were to be maintained. Provisions were made for the immediate cessation of hostilities and the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of all combatants. Disarmament and demobilisation of combatants was to commence on 1 December and end on 31 December 1997. Humanitarian assistance, which would be monitored by ECOMOG and UN military observer operations, would recommence on 14 November 1997. All those involved in the coup were granted immunity from prosecution. This agreement came to be known as the Conakry Peace Plan. In a communiqué issued by the Committee, it was recognised that Sankoh was expected to return to Sierra Leone in order to support the peace process.
67. In November 1997, the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, invited President Kabbah to attend the Commonwealth summit in Edinburgh as his personal guest. President Kabbah was given the opportunity to put across the problem of Sierra Leone to the summit. The summit condemned the military dictatorship in Nigeria and its abysmal human rights credentials, but noted "the positive contribution the country was making through ECOWAS in support of democratic government in the region". The summit also condemned the military junta in Sierra Leone and called for the reinstatement of Kabbah's government. It suspended Sierra Leone from participating in the councils of the Commonwealth and Peter Penfold, British High Commissioner to Sierra Leone, went with Kabbah and his cabinet to Guinea to demonstrate the determination of the British government to support democracy in Sierra Leone. The British government also provided £250,000 to Kabbah and his cabinet while they were in exile in Guinea. These funds were used to run the government-in-exile. The British government also funded the setting up of Radio 98.1 FM. The radio station was an effective propaganda machine used by the government against the military junta.
68. The Conakry Peace Plan seemed like a viable framework for peace in Sierra Leone. In a press release issued on 5 November 1997, Kabbah stated that he found the peace plan acceptable and that the Conakry Peace Plan contained a number of positive elements, which would lead to the resolution of the crisis in Sierra Leone. Kabbah pledged that his government would do everything possible to co-operate with ECOWAS and its monitoring group, ECOMOG.
69. In spite of the acceptance of the Conakry Peace Plan by all the parties to the conflict, each gave it a different interpretation. Questions in relation to disarmament, the Army, the release of Sankoh, and Nigeria's dominance in ECOMOG became the subject of several unproductive meetings between the junta and ECOMOG.
70. At its seventh meeting in Abuja on December 1997 the ECOWAS Committee of Five maintained that the Conakry Peace Plan remained the best framework for the restoration of peace and constitutional order in Sierra Leone. The reality was that the Conakry Peace Plan was rapidly collapsing.
71. The international community was not enamoured with the Nigerian ruler, Sani Abacha, who while leading a dictatorship back home presented himself internationally as a fighter for democracy in Sierra Leone. In its desire to distance itself from Sani Abacha, the international community declined to provide much-needed support for the Nigerian-led ECOMOG.

Sandline International: Kabbah brings in a non-state private army

72. The period following the 1997 coup saw the biggest diplomatic engagement on Sierra Leone since the start of the conflict in 1991. However, it became clear that force would be needed to remove the junta. Kabbah and his government sought the services of a non-state, profit-making military outfit. Kabbah contracted the British private military company, Sandline International. It has been alleged that it was the British High Commissioner to Sierra Leone, Peter Penfold, who introduced Sandline to the President. In an interview with the Commission, Penfold denied this version of events but acknowledged that Kabbah did consult him on the terms of the Sandline contract. Kabbah's contact with Sandline was actually initiated in mid-1997 by Rupert Bowen, a former diplomat and intelligence operative. Bowen was Sandline's representative in the West African Region and a friend of Penfold. By the middle of July 1997, Tim Spicer, the head of Sandline International, had flown to West Africa to meet with Kabbah and ECOMOG.
73. Sandline was contracted in the sum of US\$1.5 million a month to provide training, arms and equipment support to the pro-government forces.⁸² Sandline International was also allegedly asked to plan, execute and co-ordinate an assault on Freetown.⁸³ Sandline's operations in Sierra Leone were reportedly financed by a Vancouver-based Indian national, Rakesh Saxena.
74. Sandline was registered in the Bahamas and had its headquarters in Chelsea, sharing its premises with Branch Energy and Heritage Oil. It also had offices in the USA headed by Bernie McCabe, a former officer in the US Army Special Forces.
75. The operations of Sandline International in Sierra Leone had no independent structure. Sandline depended on ECOMOG, which co-ordinated the activities of the pro-Kabbah forces within and outside of Sierra Leone.⁸⁴ Sandline may have been forced to operate covertly because of a UN arms embargo on the Government of Sierra Leone and the AFRC junta at the time.
76. By the end of 1997, the Conakry Peace Plan was in tatters. The Kamajors, a pro-government civil defence militia, had launched "Operation Black December", attacking several junta positions. The Kamajors succeeded in taking most of the major roads in the east and south of the country. By the beginning of 1998, skirmishes between the junta and ECOMOG personnel on the ground in Sierra Leone increased. As the security situation deteriorated, humanitarian assistance ceased. Rhetoric from the exiled Government, ECOMOG and the junta moved increasingly away from peace and back to war.
77. On 5 February 1998, the AFRC launched an attack on an ECOMOG patrol team. ECOMOG forces launched a full-scale attack and forcefully removed the military junta from power. On 10 March 1998, President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah was reinstated.

⁸² Peter Penfold, former High Commissioner of the United Kingdom to Sierra Leone; TRC Interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 31 July 2003.

⁸³ Background information on Sandline International has been drawn from the secondary source: *Mercenaries: African Security Dilemma*, at page 98.

⁸⁴ See Fred Marrafono, former Executive Outcomes officer, TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 4 June 2003.

78. ECOWAS deserves credit for its role in the Sierra Leone. Nigeria's role should be highlighted. It provided the bulk of the military resources deployed in Sierra Leone in the name of ECOWAS / ECOMOG. Many ECOWAS Member States, like Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, Niger and Benin, lacked the resources to do much beyond voting on resolutions at ECOWAS meetings. While there has been no suggestion that Ghana did anything to fuel the war, Ghana's contribution to the search for peace was not significant. Countries such as Burkina Faso and Liberia were covert backers of the rebels.

Liberia, Libya and Burkina Faso: the network of RUF backers coalesces around the AFRC

79. Although the ECOMOG military intervention succeeded in removing the RUF/AFRC coalition from power and reinstating Kabbah's government, it did not have the endorsement of the UN Security Council. On 16 March 1998, the UN Security Council, issued Resolution 1156 welcoming the return of Kabbah to power, followed by Resolution 1171 in June, prohibiting the sale of arms and related material to non-governmental forces in Sierra Leone. The Resolution included a travel ban on all members of the overthrown junta and their families.
80. When ECOMOG attacked Freetown, the junta forces and their RUF allies did not put up any resistance. They escaped through the Freetown peninsula to the northern part of the country and to the RUF stronghold in Kailahun in the east. This meant that the RUF and the AFRC did not lose significant manpower or equipment. Some nine months later the alliance was able to capture half of the country and occupy most areas of the capital for two weeks.
81. The war in Sierra Leone persisted during the third phase largely because the RUF controlled the diamond-producing areas. Taylor became the conduit for the sale of the diamonds on the international market. In return the RUF received arms and ammunitions through Taylor.
82. Liberia's involvement in the conflict was part of a wider network of outside support for the RUF, which also involved Burkina Faso and Libya. However, there is no evidence before the Commission that Libya and Burkina Faso shared Liberia's interest in the diamond resources of Sierra Leone. Although Libya had promised to withdraw its support for the RUF there are suggestions that following the coup of 1997, Libyan support for the RUF and its allies continued. Arms and ammunitions were flown from Libya via Burkina Faso and Liberia to the RUF.⁸⁵ In a statement given to the Sierra Leone Police, Yair Gal (aka Yair Galklein), an Israeli "businessman", testified that while travelling from Burkina Faso to Monrovia in December 1998, he witnessed the loading of rifles into an Air Burkina plane. The plane flew into Monrovia. Upon arrival the rifles were loaded into a Jeep, and driven to the border with Sierra Leone.⁸⁶

⁸⁵ Yair Gal (alias "Yair Galklein") Israeli businessman involved in diamond mining companies and dealerships in both Liberia and Sierra Leone during the conflict period; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police Force at RSLMF Headquarters, Cockrill, Freetown; 28 January 1999

⁸⁶ Yair Gal (alias "Yair Galklein") Israeli businessman involved in diamond mining companies and dealerships in both Liberia and Sierra Leone during the conflict period; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police Force at RSLMF Headquarters, Cockrill, Freetown; 28 January 1999

83. In December 1998 two Ukrainian planes loaded with arms and ammunition from Libya flew into Monrovia at midnight. The arms and ammunitions were then loaded into four trailer trucks belonging to Simon Rosenbloom, another Israeli. Three of the trucks went to Lofa country from where the arms and ammunitions were transported to the RUF base in Kono.⁸⁷ In his testimony to the Commission at the public hearings held in Makeni, Bombali District on 29 May 2003, Reverend Father Mario Guerra testified that, while he was in captivity, two hundred rebel soldiers – albeit mostly affiliated to the AFRC – received a large number of rifles of identical make.⁸⁸ This was in contravention of UN Security Council Resolution 1171, which prohibited the sale of arms and other related materials to non-government forces in Sierra Leone.⁸⁹
84. Although Liberia, Burkina Faso and Libya constituted a network of support for the RUF, they did not share the same motivations. Ideology accounted for Libya's involvement in the Sierra Leone conflict. Libya wanted a revolutionary regime in Sierra Leone but the RUF lacked the necessary organisational cohesion and revolutionary discipline. Many commentators have described Sierra Leone's civil war as one of the most brutish and deadliest wars in recent times. The RUF has been credited as one of the primary violators of human rights in Sierra Leone.⁹⁰ As the civil war unfolded these facts could not have been unknown to Libya. The regime in Burkina Faso claimed to be revolutionary. It would seem that the strong relations between Burkina Faso and Libya resulted in Burkina Faso's involvement in the Sierra Leone conflict as an 'errand boy' for Libya. Individual Burkinabes also benefited from the arms and diamonds trade.

Misuse of the Red Cross emblem

85. Humanitarian aid was another dimension of the involvement of external actors in the conflict. International organisations were pivotal in meeting the medical, food and shelter needs of people directly affected by the war.
86. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) was a leading agency in humanitarian intervention in the country. Under the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols, the ICRC is mandated to bring neutral and impartial assistance and protection to victims of war, regardless of their race, religion, origin or sex. In carrying out its work the ICRC maintains contact with all parties to a conflict. The Red Cross emblem, depicting neutrality and impartiality, is relied upon for the protection and safety of ICRC staff, facilities and equipment. Sierra Leone is a party to the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols.

⁸⁷ Yair Gal (alias "Yair Galklein") Israeli businessman involved in diamond mining companies and dealerships in both Liberia and Sierra Leone during the conflict period; statement given to the Sierra Leone Police Force at RSLMF Headquarters, Cockerill, Freetown; 28 January 1999

⁸⁸ Reverend Father Mario Guerra, Catholic priest and long-time resident of Sierra Leone who was abducted and held captive by the AFRC in late 1998, testimony before TRC public hearings in Makeni, Bombali District, 29 May 2003.

⁸⁹ See United Nations Security Council Resolution 1171.

⁹⁰ See the multiple reports produced by international NGOs documenting the human rights abuses carried out by the RUF; for example, both Amnesty International (www.amnesty.org) and Human Rights Watch (www.hrw.org) maintain web archives of their reports on Sierra Leone.

87. In 1992 the ICRC established a permanent structure in Freetown as a sub-delegation managed from Abidjan. In 1995 the Government of Sierra Leone authorised delegates of the ICRC to assess the humanitarian situation in Kailahun District, which was under RUF control at the time. In February 1996 the ICRC established an assistance programme for civilians in RUF territories in Kailahun District and in the course of the conflict, the ICRC extended its assistance to victims of the war all over the country.
88. In the events leading up to the 6 January 1999 invasion of Freetown, there were reports of a helicopter bearing ICRC insignia flying above Sierra Leone for non-humanitarian purposes. The helicopter with the Red Cross emblem was reported to be delivering arms, ammunition and other supplies to the RUF:
- “A helicopter was coming from Liberia to supply arms in Sierra Leone. I saw one of those helicopters. The helicopter was covered with ICRC flag so that people will not know....”⁹¹
- [and]
- “There were helicopters operating out of Liberia coming in to the rebels. We have fairly solid proof that the Red Cross helicopter was supplying weapons to the rebels. Now, if it was on behalf of the Red Cross or whether it was being used by individuals for Red Cross, or they chartered it, I am not too sure...”⁹³
89. Neil Ellis, a government helicopter pilot, informed the Commission that the government had received repeated warnings about the use of ICRC-marked helicopters to fly arms supplies to the RUF. On one occasion, he was instructed to tail the ICRC helicopter and to shoot it down if it deviated from its flight path. In that instance, the helicopter kept to its flight path to Mabang in the Moyamba District.⁹⁴
90. In an interview with Radio Democracy 98.1 FM on 9 December 1998, the Minister of Information, Dr. Julius Spencer, noted that the government was investigating allegations that the ICRC helicopter had been delivering materials to the RUF. On 13 January 1999, the government asked the ICRC to leave the country. The ICRC was allowed to return in May 1999 and resumed operations but was restricted to government-controlled areas.
91. The ICRC supplied the Commission with a detailed letter in which it pointed out that its helicopters had flown over Sierra Leone for several years during the conflict period. The organisation provided model names and even code numbers for each of its helicopters, as well as specific years in which they operated. Based on this assessment, the ICRC contended that the specific allegations about its involvement in arms trafficking during late 1998 could not have been true.

⁹¹ Reverend Father Mario Guerra, Catholic priest and long-time resident of Sierra Leone who was abducted and held captive by the AFRC in late 1998, testimony before TRC public hearings in Makeni, Bombali District, 29 May 2003.

⁹² Neall Ellis, former Executive Outcomes helicopter pilot who later transferred to the employment of the Government, TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 27 May 2003.

⁹³ See Neall Ellis, former Executive Outcomes helicopter pilot who later transferred to the employment of the Government, TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 27 May 2003.

⁹⁴ See Neall Ellis, former Executive Outcomes helicopter pilot who later transferred to the employment of the Government, TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 27 May 2003.

92. After this initial response from the ICRC, the Commission was obliged to invite ICRC officials for an interview because they had mixed up certain dates in their submission. The officials furnished the Commission with further explanations, which satisfied the Commission that the helicopter in question was not an official ICRC helicopter. Moreover, the ICRC had logbooks and pilot verification procedures that prevented helicopters chartered by the ICRC and bearing its emblem being used without its knowledge and approval.
92. The balance of probabilities, supported by perpetrator testimony, indicates that ICRC emblems were misappropriated and used on “alien” helicopters by one or more of the fighting factions. The misuse of humanitarian emblems can seriously compromise the activities of humanitarian organisations. Such misconduct is strictly prohibited under International Humanitarian Law by virtue of an express provision in the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions. The Commission calls upon peacekeeping forces and law enforcement authorities in conflict zones to be aware that those trafficking in arms may deploy vehicles or planes marked with the emblems of humanitarian organisations such as the ICRC. Extra vigilance and spot checks are required to stop this pernicious practice.

Charles Taylor’s personal influence on the RUF

93. In the aftermath of the invasion of Freetown, on Thursday 25 February 1999, former ECOMOG Field Commander, General Timothy Shelpidi accused Charles Taylor of Liberia and Blaise Campaore of Burkina Faso of planning to destabilise the entire sub-region. As long as Taylor was in power in neighbouring Liberia, he said, the crisis in Sierra Leone was never going to come to an end.⁹⁵
94. The Liberian Government repeatedly denied accusations that it was supporting the RUF. It did admit, somewhat reluctantly, that there were Liberians fighting on the side of the RUF, but claimed that they were doing so without the support or backing of the Liberian Government.⁹⁶ In a letter to the Secretary-General of the UN, dated 23 February 1999, President Charles Taylor wrote:

“Liberians have been used as mercenaries in Sierra Leone for a long time by all governments of Sierra Leone. They have always been there, about 3,000 of them. But they are there on their own.”⁹⁷

⁹⁵ See Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service (SLBS), 25 February 1999, included in the BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 26 February 1999.

⁹⁶ See Pratt, D. (MP for Nepean-Carleton, Canada), Special Envoy to Sierra Leone; *Sierra Leone: the forgotten crisis*, Report to the Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Honourable Lloyd Axworthy MP, 23 April 1999, at page 18. Also available on the web: www.sierra-Leone.org/pratt042399.htm.

⁹⁷ Letter from Liberian President Charles Taylor to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, dated 23 February 1999; available at the UN website: www.un.org.

95. Charles Taylor's and his Government's denials of support for the RUF appear nonsensical in the face of overwhelming testimonies and evidence given to the Commission, not least by the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Sierra Leone Police. In a letter from the Office of the President of Liberia addressed to the Leader of the RUF on 3 November 1998, Taylor expressed continued support for the RUF organisation and its aim of taking over the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone.⁹⁸
96. Taylor's influence over the RUF was demonstrated on a number of occasions. Taylor personally intervened to persuade the RUF to accept the terms of the Lomé Peace Agreement. In May 2000, when the RUF took over 500 UN peacekeepers hostage, Taylor was instrumental in negotiating their release. An ECOWAS delegation met Taylor on 19 June 2000 and asked him to help secure the hostages' release. The Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan, the Indian prime minister, Atal Bihari Vajpayee and the Nigerian president, Olusegun Obasanjo made a request on 21 June 2000 for Taylor to intervene in the hostage crisis in Sierra Leone.⁹⁹ He responded:
- "I have said to them that I will do everything within my own strength to help release the hostages in whatever way I can."¹⁰⁰
97. The Liberian Minister of Information, Joe Mulbah, told the BBC on 29 June 2000 that the hostages would be released "over the weekend". Before Mulbah's announcement, 139 Zambian peacekeepers held hostage by the RUF, were moved to Foya across the Liberian border and handed over to the Liberian authorities by Issa Sesay on 15 June 2000.¹⁰¹ On the day the announcement was made by the Liberian Minister of Information, 21 Indians were transported to Foya by Issa Sesay, who again handed the hostages over to the Liberian authorities.¹⁰²
98. It was not until November 2002, that Taylor openly admitted his involvement in the Sierra Leone conflict. Taylor maintained that:
- "In the Sierra Leone crisis, for example, Liberia was not the only country involved. The other countries got off the hook because other major countries protected them. We had good reason for our association with the RUF (Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone) at that particular period, purely for national security concerns."¹⁰³

⁹⁸ Letter from the Office of the President of Liberia to the RUF Leader, Foday Sankoh, dated 3 November 1999; Criminal Investigations Department (CID) of the Sierra Leone Police; letter included in the dossier pertaining to the 'Foday Sankoh / 8 May 2000' case; dossier provided to the TRC in July 2003.

⁹⁹ See the report on NewsMax.com; "UN Hostages May Be Free by Weekend", 22 June 2000.

¹⁰⁰ See the report on NewsMax.com; "UN Hostages May Be Free by Weekend", 22 June 2000.

¹⁰¹ See Sierra Leone web; news archives, June and July 2000, available at www.sierra-leone.org. See also the Eighth Report of Secretary-General on the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone, UN Doc. S/2000/751, 2000.

¹⁰² See Sierra Leone web; news archives, June and July 2000, available at www.sierra-leone.org.

¹⁰³ See *Washington Post* newspaper, 12 November 2002; at page A16, column 6.

An enhanced role for the United Nations

99. In July 1998, the UN Security Council established the UN Observer Mission to Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL). UNOMSIL had an initial strength of seventy military observers, fifteen medical staff and five civilians. Mr. Francis Okelo, the Special Envoy to Sierra Leone, was named the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) and Chief of Mission. Brigadier Subhash C. Joshi, from India, was the Chief Military observer. UNOMSIL's mandate under Security Council Resolution 1181 was to monitor the security situation and to advise on the disarmament and demobilisation of combatants. UNOMSIL never achieved full strength and is mostly remembered for its lack of impact.
100. It was no surprise that hostilities continued in spite of UNOMSIL's presence. By December 1998, the RUF/AFRC controlled a large portion of the country's territory. In January 1999, the mobs of thugs associated with the AFRC invaded Freetown inflicting widespread destruction and casualties. In the wake of these attacks, SRSG Okelo helped to initiate negotiations between the Government and the RUF/AFRC. On 18 May 1999, Kabbah and Sankoh entered into talks in the Togolese capital, Lomé. The United States, through its Embassy in Freetown, also assisted to bring the parties together in Lomé. On 7 July 1999, the Government of Sierra Leone and the RUF signed the Lomé Peace Agreement. The Lomé Agreement, among other things, made provision for a blanket amnesty for members of the warring factions; the establishment of a neutral United Nations group to monitor a cease-fire; and the creation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
101. While recognising that the amnesty provisions in Lomé were "difficult to reconcile with the goal of ending the culture of impunity", the UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, hailed the Lomé Agreement as "a great step forward for Sierra Leone".¹⁰⁴ Annan further intimated that amnesty may not apply to international crimes and instructed the UN SRSG to enter a handwritten reservation explicitly stating that the UN did not regard the amnesty provisions as applying to international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.¹⁰⁵
102. Although Lomé was heralded as the beginning of the end to the conflict in Sierra Leone, attacks on civilians recommenced almost as soon as Sankoh returned to Freetown. On 23 March 1999, the UN Secretary-General had recommended to the Security Council that it should authorise the deployment of a substantially larger peacekeeping force in Sierra Leone. On 22 October 1999, the UN Security Council authorised the establishment of the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL). The military and civilian components of UNOMSIL were transferred directly to UNAMSIL and the UNOMSIL mandate was terminated. The Secretary-General appointed Mr. Oluyemi Adeniji, a Nigerian diplomat at the UN, as his new Special Representative and Chief of Mission. UNAMSIL's brief included overseeing the implementation of the Lomé Agreement, establishing a security presence at key locations throughout the country and monitoring adherence to the cease-fire. In February 2000 the number of peacekeepers was increased to 11,100.

¹⁰⁴ Seventh Report of Secretary-General on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, UN Doc. S/1999/836, 1999.

¹⁰⁵ Eighth Report of Secretary-General on the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone, UN Doc. S/2000/751, 2000.

103. The hostage-taking incident seriously tainted the image of the peacekeepers and undermined the confidence of the people of Sierra Leone in the UN. However the UN did not give up on Sierra Leone.¹⁰⁶ Annan declared that ‘the situation in Sierra Leone remained tense and volatile under conditions that resemble civil war’.¹⁰⁷ On 19 May 2000, two days after the arrest of Sankoh, the UN Security Council authorised an increase in the strength of the peacekeeping force to 13,000 military personnel.
104. In June 2000 the Sierra Leone Government requested the UN Security Council to establish a tribunal in Sierra Leone to prosecute those in the RUF who had breached the cease-fire “in order to bring and maintain peace and security in Sierra Leone and the West African sub-region.”¹⁰⁸ In July 2000, the Sierra Leone Government approved and sent a draft resolution to the UN formally requesting the Secretary-General to set up a criminal tribunal. The Security Council unanimously adopted a resolution on 14 August 2000 and endorsed the Government’s request with the understanding that ‘the amnesty provisions of the Lomé Agreement did not apply to international crimes’.¹⁰⁹
105. One crucial element that aided the consolidation of the peace was the intervention of the British military. In the aftermath of the UN hostage crisis, Britain raised its security profile in Sierra Leone considerably. It sent more soldiers to the country and seconded a military adviser to the government. When the RUF threatened the Freetown International Airport at Lungi, British soldiers halted their offensive. British forces also dislodged a band of former AFRC soldiers known as the West Side Boys, who were threatening the security of the city. These combat actions and Britain’s military presence around the country may have convinced the RUF to opt for peace.
106. The Government and the RUF agreed to a renewed cease-fire on 10 November 2000. The cease-fire hardly held. The RUF continued sporadic attacks around the country. On 30 March 2001, the UN Security Council authorised the expansion of UNAMSIL to 17,500 military personnel. UNAMSIL became the world’s largest peacekeeping mission and peacekeepers were located all over the country. This helped to facilitate the return of refugees and internally displaced persons to their communities of origin.
107. In June 2001 the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Re-integration (DDR) programme was established. The peacekeepers provided security at the disarmament centres and for officials of the DDR programme.¹¹⁰
108. On 18 January 2002, President Kabbah declared that the war was over at a symbolic ceremony at Lungi Airport. Among those in attendance were numerous external actors, preparing themselves for participation in Sierra Leone’s fresh efforts to achieve sustainable peace and development.

¹⁰⁶ UNAMSIL, Submission to TRC Thematic Hearings on Governance, 1 March 2003.

¹⁰⁷ Eighth Report of Secretary-General on the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone, UN Doc. S/2000/751, 2000.

¹⁰⁸ Letter dated 9 August 2000, from the permanent representative of Sierra Leone to the UN, addressed to the President of the Security Council: UN Doc. S/2000/786.

¹⁰⁹ UN Security Council Resolution 1315, 5, 14 August 2000.

¹¹⁰ UNAMSIL, Submission to TRC Thematic Hearings on Governance, 1 March 2003.

CHAPTER THREE

Women and the Armed Conflict in Sierra Leone

TRC

**Truth
hurts but
war
hurts more**

Produced by the TRC Steering Committee with support
from the International Human Rights Law Group

CHAPTER THREE

Women and the Armed Conflict in Sierra Leone

Introduction

1. Sierra Leone sits on the beautiful west coast of Africa, facing out onto the Atlantic Ocean. It is bordered by Guinea to the north and Liberia to the southeast. Sierra Leone consists of a hilly western peninsula and a hinterland abundant in diverse natural riches, including agricultural and mineral resources. Mountains rise to over 6,000 feet in the northeast, while the territory is blessed with plentiful rainfall that yields dense forest vegetation interspersed with swamps. It is a land of staggering natural scenery and personality.
2. Sierra Leone is made up of seventeen different ethnic groups, the largest of which is the Mende of the southern and eastern regions. The second largest is the Temne, followed by the Limba, both of which are dominant in the north. Other groups include the Kono in the east, the northern Koranko, the Mandingo, Loko, Susu, Fullah and Yalunka. Smaller groups include the Bullom, Sherbro, Vai, Gola and Krim, with the Kissi in the eastern hinterland.
3. In the eighteenth century, the abolitionist campaign led to the decision in Britain to relocate freed slaves to Sierra Leone. The British government purchased land from a Temne King in order to settle freed slaves on and around the western peninsula. This new community took on the name "Freetown" and its population became known as Krios. In 1808, the British created the Crown Colony, centred on Freetown and its environs, and in 1896 made the outlying areas into a Protectorate. For over 150 years the British dominated all spheres of life in the country. It was during this period that the Freetown-based Krios advanced educationally and economically at the expense of the people in the hinterland. The Krios developed into a highly educated group of colonial subjects compared to their counterparts in the Provinces.
4. Sierra Leone celebrated its independence on 27 April 1961. However, stability and development were steadily undermined by a series of military coups and attacks on multi-party democracy. Siaka Stevens, who became Prime Minister in 1968, engaged in a systematic campaign to centralise power around his executive. Within ten years he had made himself the President of a One-Party Republic. During Stevens' rule, corruption and nepotism became entrenched. Rampant unemployment and poverty, coupled with violent suppression of all dissent and opposition, led the population to despise and distrust its ruling elite. Persistent bad governance created the conditions for the outbreak of conflict.
5. The conflict in Sierra Leone, which lasted from 1991 to 2002, was particularly horrific because of the scope and severity of atrocities targeted at civilians. Its other defining feature was its chameleonic character, whereby many of the role players changed sides and allegiances against a background of complex military and political dynamics. The conflict was essentially self-destructive in nature: towns and villages were ravaged; crops and economic installations were destroyed; and a whole generation of Sierra Leoneans was displaced, brutalised and traumatised.

6. Women and girls became particular targets of malice and violence during the conflict. They suffered abduction and exploitation at the hands of the various perpetrator factions. Their vulnerability was deliberately exploited in order to dehumanise them and perpetrate against them the most gross of violations. They were raped, forced into sexual slavery and endured acts of great sexual violence. They suffered mutilations, torture and a host of cruel and inhuman acts. They were taken from their homes and villages by force. Refusal to comply with the demands of their captors often met with death. For those fortunate enough to escape, there followed displacement and separation from families. While some went into exile, many were housed in camps in Sierra Leone and in neighbouring countries. Shockingly, women and girls were not safe even in these camps. Humanitarian workers – meant to offer them respite and protection – also violated their rights. Women and girls were compelled to barter their bodies in order to survive and access aid to which they were rightfully entitled. Girls as young as 12 were forced to pay for aid with sex to secure assistance for their families.
7. Statistics pertaining to the numbers of women affected by the conflict in Sierra Leone remain a huge concern. In 2003, Human Rights Watch published a report in which they stated that as many as 275,000 women and girls may have been sexually violated during the war.¹
8. While peace has returned to Sierra Leone, many of the wounds still remain open. Women and girls still bear the scars, both physically and psychologically. Many have borne children from their horrific experiences. These children are a daily reminder of their pain and suffering. Many women and girls are shunned and punished by members of a society who refuse to acknowledge that it is their failures that led to this conflict and their failure to protect women and girls that has led to the plight they find themselves in today. Women and girls who were violated throughout the conflict are ostracised from society for giving birth to children of “rebels”. It is the price they continue to pay, even today.
9. The UN Secretary-General, in his Twenty-first Report to the Security Council on the UN Mission in Sierra Leone, has stated that “violence against women, including sexual exploitation, as well as discrimination against women in law and in practice and the low rate of participation of women and youth in the political and administrative affairs of the country needs to be addressed.”²

Mandate of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission

10. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (“TRC” or “the Commission”) was founded by an Act of Parliament in February 2000 and its Commissioners were inaugurated in July 2002. Section 6(2)(b) of the TRC Act mandated the Commission to restore the dignity of victims. In this context, there was a duty to afford “special attention to the subject of sexual abuse”. While women are not explicitly mentioned in the TRC Act, given that they were the overwhelming victims of sexual abuse, the Commission interpreted this provision to mean that it should pay special attention to the experiences of women and girls.

¹ See Human Rights Watch, “*We’ll Kill You if you Cry*”, a report on gender-based violence during the conflict in Sierra Leone, Vol. 95, No. 1(a), New York, January 2003 (hereinafter “Human Rights Watch, *We’ll Kill You if you Cry*”). The full report is available at the website: www.hrw.org.

² See the Twenty-first Report of Secretary-General on the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), UN Doc. S/2004/228, 2004, at paragraph 45.

11. The Commission intends in this chapter to capture the experiences of both women and girls in respect of sexual violence, as well as their complete gendered experiences at a political, legal, health and social welfare level. While the majority of the women in Sierra Leone were victims, the Commission recognises that many women took on the role of perpetrators and / or collaborators, out of personal conviction or simply in order to survive.
12. While the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR) recorded that 4,751 girls entered the DDR process, actual estimates of female combatants are said to be much higher. Dyan Mazurana and Kristopher Carlson, for example, estimate that 12,056 of 48,216 child soldiers were girls. In their report they note that 44% of the girls they interviewed claimed to have received basic military and weapons training. The UN Secretary-General has also acknowledged that “women combatants did not adequately benefit from the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programme, particularly because the fast-tracking of the cantonment period resulted in a loss of focus on special programmes intended for women”. He reported that “no provision was made for female camp followers, most of whom had been abducted by the combatants.”³
13. While women played a strong role in peacemaking, only two women attended the negotiations that led to the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement in 1999. Nonetheless women are increasingly playing a more prominent role in the public life of Sierra Leone.
14. The Commission, primarily through the testimonies it received from women and girls, seeks to find answers as to why such extraordinary violence was perpetrated against women. Did the origins lie in the cultural and traditional history of Sierra Leone, where women were afforded a subservient status to men? Did the low status of women in socio-political life make them easy targets? Or is it because men still perceive women to be chattels, possessions belonging to them, symbols of their honour, making them the deliberate targets of an enemy determined to destroy the honour of the other? The answers probably lie somewhere in a combination between all of these factors.
15. The Commission believes that it is only when the legal, social and political system treats women equally that they will realise their full potential. Women must be given full access to economic opportunities, which allow for their complete, holistic development. They must be able to participate freely in both public and private life. Developing robust accountability mechanisms for those who perpetrate gender-based crimes is a necessary part of this evolution, in order to ensure that women are never again dehumanised the moment the rules of society break down.

³ See the Twenty-first Report of Secretary-General on the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), UN Doc. S/2004/228, 2004, at paragraph 45.

TRC POLICY AND METHODOLOGY

16. The TRC in Sierra Leone boldly confronted the task of dealing with its special mandate in respect of sexual violence by formulating policy and determining a methodology to reach as many women and girls as possible in order that their experiences could be documented. In formulating policy, the Commission was driven by several imperative needs: to protect the victims; to engender an atmosphere of trust in the Commission; to observe issues of confidentiality; to create a safe environment for women; and to ensure that women and girls would not be “retraumatised” or “revictimised” in the process.
17. The Commission decided, at the outset, that women, particularly those who had suffered rape and sexual violence, should make their statements to women statement-takers who would be trained specifically to deal with accounts involving rape and sexual violence. The Commission also decided that women themselves should have the option of deciding whether their statements should be regarded as confidential in terms of the provisions of the Act.
18. Once policy was formulated in respect of women and girls, the Commission had to consider how to implement this policy in the various aspects of its operations: raising awareness of the Commission’s mandate; statement-taking; hearings; report writing; findings; reparations; and recommendations.
19. In the “barray phase” – when Commissioners and staff held public meetings in local “barrays”, which are equivalent to town halls – the TRC reached out especially to women, women’s groups and agencies dealing with women, sensitising them to the aims and objectives of the Commission’s work. The Commission made it clear that it intended to “mainstream” gender in all its activities, that it would deliberately recruit women to be trained as statement takers and that it would welcome suggestions and assistance from agencies dealing with women and girls. At the outset, the Commission made an effort to recruit women into senior staff positions. In addition, it ensured that more than 40% of the statement-takers were women.
20. The Commission arranged for the training of all statement-takers on issues of rape and sexual violence, as well as helping them to cope with trauma. Two training sessions dedicated to this purpose took place in Bo and Kenema. In order to prepare the statement-takers as comprehensively as possible, the Commission also provided guidelines on how to deal with women who had suffered sexual abuse. In summary, these guidelines directed statement-takers to ensure the following conditions:
 - i. That statement-taking should always be on a one-to-one basis;
 - ii. That the presence of husbands and fathers should be discouraged during statement taking, unless insisted upon by the statement-giver; and
 - iii. That as a rule of thumb, when dealing issues of rape and sexual violence, female statement takers should take the statements. This policy did not preclude a preference being expressed by statement-giver that she was willing to make her statement to a male statement-taker.

21. The Commission trained its statement-takers to explain to women who were victims of sexual violence that they should be asked whether or not they would be willing to appear at a TRC hearing. The Commission also made it clear that if a woman preferred, she could appear at a closed hearing to give her testimony. The Commission advised that women should at all times be at liberty to choose for themselves the circumstances in which they testified.
22. Once training had taken place, the TRC embarked upon a pilot phase in December 2002, which saw statement-takers deployed to the various regions. The Commission was pleasantly surprised to discover that women and girls had come out in large numbers to participate in the statement-taking process during the pilot phase. At that early stage, however, women ex-combatants did not turn out in large numbers.
23. While the Commission held public hearings for all witnesses who chose to participate, including women who had suffered violations that were not sexual in nature, it was also decided that there should be special hearings for women and girls who had been sexually violated. These special hearings were "closed", which meant that members of the public were not allowed into the hearings venue. Accordingly, the Commission adopted a special hearings procedure.
24. The Commission decided that these hearings would be held *in camera* and would be presided over and attended only by female Commissioners and staff. The Commission through its reconciliation unit provided trained counsellors who would brief and debrief the women and girls who appeared at these special hearings. These counsellors also met with witnesses before their appearances at other hearings. The counsellors and staff members responsible for the hearings would go through the statements previously given by the witness to refresh the memory and ensure consistency.
25. Counsellors would also sit beside witnesses while they were giving testimony and provide assistance to them if they needed it. Immediately after each hearing, the counsellors would debrief and counsel each witness. Women Commissioners would explain to the women and girls who were to testify about what the process entailed and why their testimony was needed. They would then attempt to draw out the totality of each witness' experiences. If witnesses lost their composure or broke down completely, the Commissioners would assess the situation and would either adjourn the hearing to allow the witness to regain composure or counsel them until they indicated that they were ready to resume their testimony.
26. The Commission was intent on ensuring that victims would be treated with respect and dignity during hearings. Witnesses who appeared during the closed hearings were provided with food, drink and medical assistance whenever they needed it. They were also provided with transport to and from the hearings venues and, where necessary, overnight accommodation.

27. The Commission had expected that most women who were willing to testify would choose to do so *in camera*. Surprisingly this was not the case, particularly in the rural areas, where women wanted the community to hear their stories. Many women volunteered to testify in public. As far as girls under 18 years of age were concerned, the Commission employed a policy that all testimony would be given in camera and that mechanisms would be found to have this testimony heard without making identities public. Of course there were also many women who were content to make written statements only to the Commission and who chose not to appear before any hearings. Their statements were also of immense value to the Commission.
28. The TRC Legal and Reconciliation Unit worked quite intensively with witnesses and a number of counselling agencies in Sierra Leone. The unit provided witnesses with referrals to counselling agencies where appropriate. The reconciliation unit also ensured that follow-up sessions were provided by trained counsellors after the hearings. Counsellors visited the witnesses later in their homes and completed questionnaires that dealt with the impact and consequences of appearing before the Commission.
29. An event of great significance for the Commission was the session of Special Thematic Hearings on Women, which took place in Freetown from 22 to 24 May 2003. This session started with a march through some of the main streets in the city centre of Freetown, culminating at the hearings venue. The march was led by the Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs, accompanied by staff of the Ministry, women activists, Commission staff, many women's organisations and hundreds of supporters. The Minister of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs, Dr. Shirley Gbujama, then formally opened the Special Hearings session.
30. During the TRC Special Thematic Hearings on Women, the Commission received submissions from a number of women's groups, UNIFEM and other donor agencies. Testimony was heard from women who had suffered sexual violations. The Commission was careful to protect the identities of the women who gave testimony. While both male and female Commissioners were present, it was only the women Commissioners who asked questions.

Partnership with UNIFEM

31. The Commission entered into an important partnership with the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), which led to the launch of the "Initiative for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission" under UNIFEM'S Peace and Security Programme. The initiative made available training for Commissioners, staff and UNIFEM's NGO partners. UNIFEM also assisted the NGO community to make submissions on issues affecting women.
32. UNIFEM became involved in mobilising women's groups in Sierra Leone to participate in the Commission's activities by making submissions to the Commission, assisting with the hearings, providing witnesses to the Commission and attending the hearings. UNIFEM also spearheaded the organisation of the march through Freetown and provided funding for some of the items used in the Special Hearings, including refreshments. UNIFEM provided two international gender consultants to assist the Commission and women's organisations both with writing the report and formulating the recommendations.

TRC



A large audience gathers at the YWCA Hall in Freetown for the session of TRC Special Thematic Hearings on Women from 22 to 24 May 2003.

Partnerships with women's organisations

33. The Commission was keen to establish a working relationship with all of the women's groups in Sierra Leone when it began its work. A number of consultations took place where issues affecting women were discussed, providing valuable input for the Commission's work. Women's organisations also made an important contribution to the work of the Commission by calling upon the women of Sierra Leone to support its work.
34. The Commission is deeply grateful to UNIFEM, the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs and to all the agencies and women's groups for their assistance in realising its mandate as set out in the founding Act.

THE STATUS OF WOMEN BEFORE THE CONFLICT

WOMEN AND EDUCATION

35. Culture and tradition in Sierra Leone have in the past prevented women, particularly women in the rural Provinces, from accessing education. The practice in rural societies within Sierra Leone, where most people live below the poverty line, is usually to favour the education of men and boys at the expense of women and girls. Such traditional favouritism of males led to a great disparity existing between men and women in education prior to the war.
36. The Analytical Report on the 1985 Census confirmed that in 1985, 91.5% of all females in Sierra Leone aged five years and older were regarded as illiterate. While the average illiteracy level for the whole country for females exceeded 90% in all the districts, Kambia and Koinadugu were the worst at 97.7%. The illiteracy level for females in the Western Area was the lowest, at 68.7%. The 1985 report also confirmed that out of a total of 1.32 million of females aged five years and older, 1.02 million and 0.01 million had completed primary and secondary school respectively.⁴
37. The National Action Plan for Development made an analysis of the 1984 GCE 'O' level results and found that out of 641 entrants, 25% were females.⁵ It also noted with dismay the high rate of female school dropouts. Reasons advanced for this state of affairs included the general lack of access to schools, as 80% of people lived in rural areas whilst most schools were concentrated in the urban areas. The Western Area, including Freetown, housed the majority of schools despite its relatively small area of territory and its residents therefore fared somewhat better than those in the rest of the country.

⁴ See Kande, H. B. S. and Ramachandran, K. V. (eds.); *The Analytical Report, 1985 Population and Housing Census for Sierra Leone, Freetown, Central Statistics Office, 1985*, at pages 7 – 14.

⁵ See *Partners in Adult Education Women's Commission (PWC); Female Self-Perceptions and Attitudes, Report on a Survey of Sierra Leonean Women aged 15 years and above; Freetown; Adult Education House; 1998*, at page 6.

38. The Government of Sierra Leone had not “mapped” its schools in the Provinces efficiently or appropriately, which resulted in the location and establishment of many schools far away from the most needy rural communities. The great distance that children had to travel from their homes to get to school discouraged many parents and guardians from sending their children and wards to school. Such reluctance appears to have affected the enrolment and attendance of girls more so than boys, which has contributed to the particularly low level of education of women in the regions.⁶
39. According to the Analytical Report on the 1985 Census, of the four major administrative regions, the North showed the lowest levels of school attendance, attainment and literacy in English. The statistics were accompanied by an observation that perhaps school education was relatively unattractive in the Northern Province, due in part to the perceived influence of Islam in the region.⁷
40. Cultural and economic factors are also cited as contributing factors to the low levels of educated women. The economic crisis that Sierra Leone experienced in the 1980s meant that as resources became scarce and priorities were set, most families chose to educate their males rather than their women and girls. This preference is common in many African societies, where families believe that by educating their men they will support their own kin, whereas by educating their women they will benefit the families those women marry into. Women and girls are usually kept at home to attend to household chores, which, for a large number of them, is also preparation for early marriage.
41. The historical prevalence of early and forced marriages in Sierra Leone has also played a role in the decisions of parents on whether to educate their girl children or withdraw them from school, further compounding the illiteracy level of women. The high levels of illiteracy among women in Sierra Leone before the war have greatly disadvantaged them, particularly in the public arena. Women have been unable to participate fully in many sectors of public life and therefore have never mustered enough power to change the lives or social status of women for themselves.
42. High levels of illiteracy have also had implications at a political level, where women and women’s issues have generally been relegated to the back burner. There has always been a great lack of awareness of the need for women to participate in issues affecting their lives, even among women themselves. It was therefore relatively easy for successive governments before the war to ignore issues affecting women and girls. The low level of female participation in formal education has had negative consequences in terms of economic viability, politics, health and social welfare level for women.

⁶ See Kandeh, H. B. S. and Ramachandran, K. V. (eds.); *The Analytical Report, 1985 Population and Housing Census for Sierra Leone*, Freetown, Central Statistics Office, 1985, at pages 7 – 14.

⁷ See Kandeh, H. B. S. and Ramachandran, K. V. (eds.); *The Analytical Report, 1985 Population and Housing Census for Sierra Leone*, Freetown, Central Statistics Office, 1985, at pages 7 – 14.

WOMEN AND POLITICS

43. A paradox exists in Sierra Leone in the realms of women and politics: some women have been political pioneers, whilst the vast majority have languished on the sidelines. This paradox has its origins in the history of how women in Sierra Leone became involved in politics. At the end of World War I, women of Krio origin, born in the Colony,⁸ made their voices heard in the political arena. At the same time, in the Protectorate, a few women wielded political power by becoming Paramount Chiefs or Section chiefs. In Freetown, women of Protectorate extraction, e.g. Mende and Temne, served and still serve as both Section and Tribal Headmen.⁹
44. The activities of those first, feisty women politicians in the Colony resulted in some landmark events. In 1938, Constance A. Cummings-John became the first woman to stand for office in Freetown in the municipal elections, which she went on to win.¹⁰ In 1951, the Sierra Leone Women's Movement (SLWM), a non-political representative organisation, was established. Its goals were "to improve the status of all Sierra Leonean women, whether born in the Colony or in the Protectorate, and to seek female representation on government bodies concerned with education, social welfare and the economy."¹¹ Due to the formation of this group, in 1954, one of the founding members, Mabel Dove, became the first woman in West Africa to be elected to the legislature.¹² The SLWM had a broad base of membership, with about 2,000 members from the Colony and about 3,000 from the Protectorate.¹³ The movement has been described as the only mass-based organisation in the 1950s that actively worked to unite all ethnic groups within its structure and to inculcate a common national identity among Sierra Leoneans.¹⁴
45. Women made real progress in the political arena, which resulted in some of them holding political office in the 1950s in Sierra Leone. In the process certain politicians made history that impacted on a world beyond Sierra Leone. In 1958, three women – Constance Cummings-John, Lena Weber and Stella Ralph-James – became members of the municipal council while, in 1960, one woman was elected Deputy Mayor of Freetown and another, Nancy Koroma, was elected Mende Headman in Freetown.¹⁵
46. Women personalities continued to make their voices heard on political issues in Freetown right through to the time of independence, despite the fact that the vast majority of women were excluded. In the 1957 election, despite the apathy shown by most women, four women did contest for election under the auspices of the SLPP and the two contesting seats in the Colony won.¹⁶ It is instructive to note that neither of these two women ultimately took up their seats in Parliament, due to election petitions filed against them.

⁸ The "Colony", or the "Crown Colony", was the name given to Freetown during colonial rule. The remainder of the territory of Sierra Leone was known as the "Protectorate".

⁹ See Denzer, LaRay, "Women in Freetown Politics 1914 – 1961, A Preliminary Study", in Last, M., Richards, P. and Fyfe, C. (eds.); *Sierra Leone 1787 -1987: Two Centuries of Intellectual Life*, Journal of the International African Institute, Volume 57, No. 4, 1987 (hereinafter "Denzer, *Women in Freetown Politics 1914 – 1961*", at page 451.

¹⁰ See Denzer, *Women in Freetown Politics 1914 – 1961*, at page 444.

¹¹ See Denzer, *Women in Freetown Politics 1914 – 1961*, at page 447.

¹² See Denzer, *Women in Freetown Politics 1914 – 1961*, at page 447.

¹³ See Denzer, *Women in Freetown Politics 1914 – 1961*, at page 448.

¹⁴ See Denzer, *Women in Freetown Politics 1914 – 1961*, at page 448.

¹⁵ See Denzer, *Women in Freetown Politics 1914 – 1961*, at page 451.

¹⁶ See Denzer, *Women in Freetown Politics 1914 – 1961*, at page 450.

Nevertheless, the same election of 1957 saw the first and, eventually, the only woman to become a Member of Parliament in that term, Madam Ella Kblo Gulama, a Paramount Chief. She also became the first female Minister in Sierra Leone, although she was never in charge of any specific Ministry.¹⁷ Two women (Constance-Cummings-John and Etta Harris) were also made delegates to the constitutional talks that resulted in Sierra Leone's independence, having petitioned the then government against their exclusion from the talks. The petition, which was organised by the SLWM, resulted directly in the inclusion of women at the constitutional talks.¹⁸

47. Upon achieving independence, women were shocked when the men failed to share positions of power equitably. According to the historian LaRay Denzer:

“Naturally, [women] expected to reap the reward of their loyalty and service [by] obtaining party support for election and campaigning, appointments to decision making bodies and government committees, and reforms in discriminatory laws. Instead, they were shunted aside as male leaders monopolised the spoils of office. By and large, male leaders defaulted in their commitments to their female colleagues.”¹⁹

48. In spite of this kind of resistance, Cummings-John became the first black African woman to govern a capital city on the continent in 1961.²⁰ Alongside Cummings-John, notable women political leaders of this era included Adelaide Casely Hayford, Stella Thomas Marke, Edna S. Elliot-Horton, Lorine E. Miller, Lottie Black, Mabel Dove, Nancy Koroma and many others.
49. After independence and undeterred by the fractious political climate that ensued over the years, some women continued to forge on in politics, with interesting results. During the reign of the APC Government of Siaka Stevens, another women's organisation, the National Congress of Sierra Leone Women (NCSLW), headed by Nancy Steele, was formed based on a Marxist approach.²¹ This organisation enjoyed some measure of success but lost relevance as the APC became more and more distanced from the population and was eventually ousted from power.
50. Among its other accomplishments, the NCSLW raised the level of women's political consciousness and encouraged the appointment of women to high office. This continued momentum resulted in five women gaining office in Freetown City Council in 1975. In 1977, a woman again became the Mayor of Freetown.²² Also, from the Provinces, a woman Paramount Chief named Madam Honoria Bailor-Caulker represented Moyamba District in Parliament.²³

¹⁷ See Denzer, *Women in Freetown Politics 1914 – 1961*, at page 450.

¹⁸ See Denzer, La Ray; *Constance Cummings-John: Memoirs of a Krio Leader*, Sam Bookman, Ibadan, Nigeria, 1995 (hereinafter “*Cummings-John: Memoirs of a Krio Leader*”), at page 2.

¹⁹ See Denzer, *Women in Freetown Politics 1914 – 1961*, at page 450.

²⁰ See *Cummings-John: Memoirs of a Krio Leader*, at page 3.

²¹ See Denzer, *Women in Freetown Politics 1914 – 1961*, at page 451.

²² See *Cummings-John: Memoirs of a Krio Leader*, at page 66.

²³ See *Cummings-John: Memoirs of a Krio Leader*, at page 66.

51. Another women's organisation, the Women's Association for National Development (WAND), was established in 1987. A non-political movement, the stated main aim of WAND was:

"To ensure the participation of women in all aspects of the life of the nation."²⁴

52. During APC rule under Siaka Stevens, no woman held a Ministerial position, although women were members of the party's central committee. This situation improved slightly during President J. S. Momoh's tenure, with three women holding positions as Deputy Ministers.²⁵
53. While some women in Sierra Leone, especially the Krios, became deeply involved in politics quite early on in the post-independence period, it was much later that women from the Provinces were able to join the bandwagon. The Krios, on the whole, were better educated than those in the outlying areas and that disparity applied to Krio women as well. Their exposure to education led to their clear understanding of the need for women to be involved in the political process. Their links internationally meant that they were also exposed to the growing debates in the world on issues such as the suffrage of women, the abolition of slavery, the rise in African nationalism and the struggle for independence.
54. Women in Freetown had enjoyed access to various levels of education from as early as 1787. Their counterparts in the Provinces had access to only one secondary school, which was established in the 1940s. Women in the Provinces, mostly uneducated and affected by poverty, lacked awareness of their political rights and did not participate in any political activities. In short, women in the Colony enjoyed a head start on women in the Provinces in terms of both education and politics.
55. Tradition and culture also played its own role in inhibiting women in the Provinces from playing a role in politics. While it is true that women could be made Paramount Chiefs in some of the Provinces, their accession only took place on a hereditary basis. The prevailing system did not create any awareness of the need for women to participate in the political affairs of the day. Women in the Provinces have traditionally had a lower status than men and have not occupied any positions of genuine power other than those exceptions mentioned above. It was therefore much more difficult for women in the Provinces to break down traditional barriers and access political power as it would impact on the existing power structures in society.

²⁴ See *Cummings-John: Memoirs of a Krio Leader*, at page 67.

²⁵ Momoh Taziff Koroma, respected Sierra Leonean historian, anthropologist and linguistics lecturer, TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown, 8 May 2003.

56. The Krios, descended from an “immigrant culture,” did not have any such entrenched traditional belief systems that barred women from political participation. The Krios had come to Freetown to express their desire for freedom in all spheres of life. The culture of independence that they brought with them facilitated the participation of Krio women in modern politics.
57. Ironically of course, the voices of Krio women did not translate into more power for women more generally, or a greater awareness of the needs of women. While women had some token representation in government from the time of the nationalist era to the outbreak of the war, women politicians constantly struggled against the indifference or the outright opposition of their male colleagues.²⁶ Even in the final deliberations for self-government, male leaders would have ignored them had the women not raised a public outcry. According to one of the foremost female political activists of the time:
- “This pattern of unthinking oversight [from men] occurred repeatedly. Many savvy women abandoned active political work once they realised the paucity of rewards.”²⁷
58. Such was the prevailing situation before the conflict. While politics all over the world is a male-dominated field at the best of times, undoubtedly the inherently patriarchal nature of politics has exacerbated the exclusion of women. Sierra Leone is of course no exception. The participation of women in politics on a mass scale in Sierra Leone was largely limited to the provision of moral support, the raising and collection of party funds, voluntary labour and the organisation of catering or entertainment in their various political parties. Women leaders were often lent the somewhat patronising sobriquet “Mammy Queen”, indicating their aptitude in stereotypically “maternal” roles.
59. Needless to say such activities did not improve the position of women. They were still relegated to background positions after elections and as such could neither wield power nor benefit from the government when eventually it was constituted. Given the low numbers of women in positions of power, the much-needed “critical mass” of women leaders who could have made a difference was non-existent.
60. In the Provinces a strong cultural belief existed that “women should be seen and not heard”. Of course, economics played a part in marginalising women. More importantly, though, attempts by women to agitate for political positions or to improve the quality of their lives were often thwarted because they were largely seen by the male members of society and by political parties as being in contradiction to the traditional role that women were expected to play.

²⁶ See *Cummings-John: Memoirs of a Krio Leader*, at pages 51 – 56.

²⁷ See *Cummings-John: Memoirs of a Krio Leader*, at pages 52 – 53.

THE LEGAL STATUS OF WOMEN

61. Throughout the history of Sierra Leone, including the post-independence period before the war, women have not enjoyed equal status with men. To a large extent, the laws of Sierra Leone are discriminatory against women. While Sierra Leone is governed by a constitution²⁸ that prohibits the promulgation of discriminatory laws, women are not protected in the areas that affect them most, such as marriage, divorce and inheritance.
62. Examples abound of discriminatory laws: for example, the Matrimonial Causes Act 1960, which covers divorce and maintenance for married women; the Administration of Estates Act, which governs inheritance and the distribution of a deceased's estates; or the Citizenship Act 1973, which allows a Sierra Leonean husband to confer Sierra Leonean citizenship on his foreign wife, children and grandchildren but does not permit a Sierra Leonean wife to do likewise. The laws cited here were all originally adopted from English law. The cruel injustice is that they have long since been repealed in England and persist only in the Sierra Leonean legal system, to the great detriment of the country's women.
63. The absence of progressive legal reform in Sierra Leone has resulted in the continued application of discriminatory laws and leaves women largely unprotected. Rape continues to go largely unpunished. Legislation is necessary to protect women adequately from all forms of violence, particularly domestic and sexual violence.
64. Customary law, which is largely unwritten and applies to the majority of the population, also discriminates against women, precluding them from enjoying equal status or rights with men. In the area of inheritance, traditional customary law regards women as "chattels" to be inherited. In other areas, women are regarded as minors in need of guardianship from a male family member. While the law provides that the application of customary law should not offend the principles of equity, natural justice or fairness, its application and impact on women is usually unfair.
65. In the sphere of marriage, women have been denied equal rights with their spouses. Their subordination does not change on termination of marriage. Historically, laws did not provide a minimum age for marriage that was universally applied throughout the country and did not preclude the common practice of early marriage. Unequal power relations between spouses characterised marital relationships to the detriment of women. The contributions women made towards the family were scarcely taken into account during the marriage or at its termination.
66. Although women have provided the bulk of the agricultural labour force, they have never owned land and whatever user rights they had under the land tenure system were lost upon the death of their husbands. Such user rights are vulnerable during war and even more so when reconstruction begins in the post-conflict period. Land ownership is a necessary means of generating wealth for women, since land can act as collateral when seeking loans from commercial banks. Women's lack of economic power contributes to their vulnerability and to the "feminisation" of poverty.

²⁸ See the *Constitution of Sierra Leone 1991*.

TRC



Commission staff join civil society groups to march through the streets of Freetown before the TRC Special Thematic Hearings on Women.

THE ECONOMIC STATUS OF WOMEN

67. Economic opportunities for women in general were at best limited prior to the war, given that the persistent economic decline from the 1960s affected every Sierra Leonean irrespective of gender. According to a report from the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs in 1996, the country's performance had been one of long-term decline. Between 1965 and 1973 Sierra Leone registered an annual average real growth rate of over 4%, which declined gradually to 1.8% between 1974 and 1984. From 1984 onwards, the growth rate became negative until 1994, when it registered at 2%. Only in 1995 did growth briefly leap up to 10%.²⁹
68. Contemporary studies indicate that women bear the impact of an economic crisis more than men do.³⁰ The inevitable rise in unemployment generally puts already marginalised women at a great disadvantage. Austerity measures result in fewer resources and usually translate into increased workload for women so as to garner more resources. Such a situation does not allow room for gender equality or improved conditions, as women are primarily engaged in the struggle for survival. Hence the phenomenon known as the "feminisation" of poverty. It has an especially stark impact on women in the rural areas.
69. Women before the war constituted the majority of the rural labour force. They made vital contributions to the economy. They have always played a substantial role in the sustenance of the family. Women provided more than 60% of farm labour for food production, processing and distribution.³¹ It is indeed telling that while women were engaged in subsistence farming and provided the labour force for cash crop production, men had greater access to ownership and control of cash crop production.
70. Women have traditionally engaged in low-income activities such as petty trading. A Labour Force Survey conducted in 1988 and 1989 revealed that 69% of petty traders were women, whereas 86% and 67% of men were service personnel and professional / technical workers respectively.³² While many worked as traders, women did not record substantial growth in their economic activities as a result of inadequate skills, low educational status, low economic power and lack of access to substantial credit facilities and property. The disparity between the economic status of women and men has often resulted in economic dependency by women. Women become overly reliant on men for the provision of their needs. In many instances, men exploit this dependency to consolidate control over women, thus further perpetuating their poverty.

²⁹ See Ministry of Gender and Children's Affairs, *Country Report on Sierra Leone*, submitted to the "World Congress on Commercial Sex Exploitation of Children", 22 August 1996, at page 1.

³⁰ Partners in Adult Education Women's Commission; *Female Self-Perception and Attitudes, Report of a Survey of Sierra Leonean Women 15 years and above*; Freetown; 1998, at page 7.

³¹ See Women's Forum, Sierra Leone, Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation, May 2003 (hereinafter "Women's Forum submission to TRC"), at page 2.

³² See Women's Forum submission to TRC, at page 2.

WOMEN AND HEALTH

71. Before the onset of the war, less than half of the population had access to basic health services.³³ This travesty was attributed mainly to the unfavourable economic climate that Sierra Leone was experiencing. The cuts in spending in areas such as health and education invariably affected women disproportionately. According to a submission to the TRC from a group of women's NGOs,³⁴ decreases in public health spending and, in some cases, structural adjustment contributed to the deterioration of public health systems. The submission further stated that privatisation of health-care systems without appropriate guarantees of universal access to affordable health care, further reduced health-care availability. Women have long experienced unequal access to basic health services as well as different and unequal opportunities for the protection, promotion and maintenance of their health.
72. In the face of this plight, the Pan African Women's Association (PAWA) Sierra Leone used the platform of International Women's Day in 1992 to complain about the hardships women were enduring under the Structural Adjustment Programme.³⁵ They cited limited access to health-care facilities, especially in the rural areas, as well as the exorbitant costs attached to what little health care was available.
73. Due to early and forced marriages in Sierra Leone, early sexual activity was commonplace. Many young girls therefore started child bearing early and were exposed to risks and complications arising out of early pregnancy and childbirth.³⁶ Coupled with high illiteracy levels and a lack of awareness, these women and girls could not access adequate healthcare for themselves in such circumstances.
74. Traditional practices also impacted on the health of women in the period before the war. Practices such as venerating women because of their child-bearing capacities and encouraging them to increase the number of children they bear have put their health at risk so as to satisfy societal standards. The status of a woman is enhanced by motherhood, which pressurises many women into frequent child bearing, complete with its attendant health problems. Tradition and culture have also prohibited women from enjoying reproductive and sexual rights often through a lack of awareness of these rights. In those instances where they do know of them, they are not able to exercise them. Women do not have the power or the choice to refuse sex. They have no control, in most instances, over their bodies.
75. Escalating poverty, coupled with cultural practices such as giving the most nutritious part of the food to the man,³⁷ resulted in poor intake of nutrients for women, jeopardising their health and their ability to bear healthy children.

³³ See Women's NGO Coalition; Submission to the TRC Special Thematic Hearings on Women; Freetown, May 2003 (hereinafter "Women's NGO Coalition submission to TRC"), at page 10.

³⁴ See Women's NGO Coalition submission to TRC, at page 4.

³⁵ See Partners in Adult Education Women's Commission; *Female Self-Perceptions and Attitudes Report of a Survey of Sierra Leonean Women 15 years and above*, Freetown, 1998; at page 8.

³⁶ See Planned Parenthood Association of Sierra Leone, Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, June 2003 (hereinafter "Planned Parenthood Association submission to TRC"), at page 1.

³⁷ Momoh Taziff Koroma, respected Sierra Leonean historian, anthropologist and linguistics lecturer, TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown, 8 May 2003.

76. The dismal economic situation, poor medical facilities and lack of access to the few existing health facilities put women at risk even before the war started. This situation was only to be compounded during the war years.

THE SOCIO-CULTURAL STATUS OF WOMEN

77. Cultural practices and traditional beliefs relating to women have “socialised” some Sierra Leoneans into stereotyping the role of women. The effects of “socialisation” on perceptions of gender identity and roles are of great significance because they continue to impact on behaviour throughout one’s life, including in the way that one interacts with the opposite sex. The outcomes of the socialisation process are exhibited in the attitudes and behaviour of members of society in all aspects of life including gender identity and roles.
78. In this regard, the social and cultural factors that have determined societal perceptions and attitudes towards women in Sierra Leone can be examined against the background of the violations they have suffered.

Socio-cultural mores

79. Sierra Leone society is made up of seventeen different tribes or ethnic groups, who mainly follow the Islamic faith and indigenous belief systems. The country also has a significant Christian population.³⁸ Given the predominance of Islam, the Islamic way of life generally colours people’s social or cultural mores. This is particularly true for the ethnic groups located in the northern part of the country, where the adherents of indigenous religions equally bring their own belief systems, which before the advent of Islam and Christianity were the dominant belief systems of the people.
80. Sierra Leone’s social and cultural mores are a blend of Traditional or Indigenous, Islamic and Christian belief systems, all being buffeted by a Western value system. Many of these cultural beliefs are examined in order to understand how women are treated in Sierra Leone in certain circumstances and to determine whether any such treatment had correlation to the conflict.

Considerations of women’s sexuality

81. Virginity is revered across ethnic lines³⁹ and is of considerable importance for a woman and her family. Virginity was used to determine the status of not only a mother and her daughter but also that of the family. If a girl was found not to be a virgin, the shame fell on her mother and ultimately her family as her behaviour was thought to be a measure of the extent to which the prevailing social mores had been instilled in her.⁴⁰ Thus the virginity of a woman “belonged” to the family and constituted the honour of the family.

³⁸ Statistics provided by the US State Department indicate that up to 30% of Sierra Leoneans are Christians. According to State Department reports, the rough breakdown of the population according to religion is as follows: Muslim 60%, Christian 30% and Animist 10%. More detail can be found at the following website: <http://www.state.gov/rpa/ei/bqa/5475.htm>.

³⁹ See TRC interviews with local social and anthropological commentators, including Alie Kamara, Abdul Sesay and Radcliffe Williams, Freetown, 2 May to 8 June 2003. See also Momoh Taziff Koroma, TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown, 8 May 2003.

⁴⁰ Bondu Manyeh, psychosocial counsellor and member of several women’s groups in Sierra Leone, TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown, 16 June 2003.

Consequently, a woman's sexuality rested on her being a virgin until marriage. In many of the ethnic groups in Sierra Leone, the honour of the family "name" rested on the issue of virginity.⁴¹

82. In some cultures in Sierra Leone, a woman's sexuality was linked to her association to a man. In the Mende worldview, for example, every woman must be affiliated to a man if she is to find acceptance in the community. This insistence is rooted in the belief that a woman's prayer goes to God through a man. Consequently, a woman without a man is not considered to be "complete" by other members of the community.⁴²
83. Today, the values around virginity have changed somewhat and no longer carry as much significance as they did in the past. It can be argued that a new value system has emerged. Women are no longer beholden to their communities and families to uphold their chastity. Ironically, virginity has become a casualty of war due to the atrocities women suffered in the conflict.

Appropriate ages for marriage and sex

84. For women and girls, there is no official age for marriage in Sierra Leone. Traditionally among some ethnic groups, a girl is considered of marriageable age when she has attained puberty (i.e. she has developed breasts and started menstruating) and has been initiated into the women's secret society. Therefore girls as young as twelve, providing they met these conditions, were eligible for marriage. The entrenched nature of tradition helps to explain why early marriages were and still are practised routinely by some ethnic groups in the country.⁴³ Today though, some women and girls make their own decisions concerning marriage and sex independently.
85. The abductions and use of young girls and women as bush wives and sex slaves by armed groups during the war could be attributed to the traditional beliefs that governed this issue prior to the war. Some of the armed groups did not consider it an aberration to rape young women or use them as sex slaves. A testimony to the Commission from a girl child who went fishing with other children and was captured during the conflict illustrates this point:

"I was a small girl and could hardly recall or have the experience of what was going on around me at that time... Unfortunately I and my sister were captured. At Mende Boima, I remained to be under the guardianship of Morrie Sellu who later sponsored my initiation into the Bondo society. He turned me into his wife afterwards..."⁴⁴
86. It is useful for several reasons to examine how Sierra Leonean society has traditionally dealt with sexual offences.

⁴¹ Ibrahim Bah, Sierra Leonean social commentator, TRC interview in Freetown, 11 June 2003.

⁴² Momoh Taziff Koroma, respected Sierra Leonean historian, anthropologist and linguistics lecturer, TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown, 8 May 2003.

⁴³ Alie Kamara, Sierra Leonean social commentator, TRC interview in Freetown, 2 May 2003.

⁴⁴ TRC confidential statement from a female victim, recorded in Gbangbatoke, 5 February 2003.

Dealing with rape and other acts of sexual violence

87. Sexual offences in Sierra Leone are usually dealt with by recourse to traditional means of resolution, or occasionally legal channels. Certain figures in the affected community, such as chiefs, community elders, relatives and family members, typically come together to form a dispute resolution group.
88. One mechanism available is the use of fines. Among the Mende, Temne, Limba, Kono, Mandingo, Kissi, Loko, Sherbro and Koranko ethnic groups, the levying of fines on male culprits is one of the primary means of addressing sexual offences.⁴⁵ If the woman victim is married, the fine imposed on the male culprit is known as “woman damage” among the Temne and Loko.⁴⁶
89. Another means of resolution is the resort to physical punishment, whereby a culprit is beaten in retribution. The Fullah, Mandingo and Susu ethnic groups practice such punishments.⁴⁷ In the case of the Mandingos, the culprit is tied up even as adjudication is in progress.⁴⁸
90. Marriage between the man and the woman is another means through which some ethnic groups deal with sexual offences, especially if the offence is rape. The Fullah and Mandingo groups are known to conduct such marriages.⁴⁹ It is important to reiterate that the marriage in question is imposed or forced.
91. Another method of addressing sexual offences is by performing purification rites. The Kono and Yalunka are among the tribes that perform purification rites, which are seen as an act of “cleansing” the sexual offence committed.⁵⁰
92. Legal channels require that the perpetrator of a sexual offence is reported to the police for investigation and possible prosecution. In many instances, the matter is “settled” by the police without referred to court.
93. Aside from traditional or legal means, religious leaders are also known to adjudicate in such matters. The Creoles and Sherbros sometimes call upon their religious figureheads to intervene in dealing with sexual offences.⁵¹
94. All of these solutions depend on the acts of sexual violence having been “publicly” declared. In a society where silence around sexual violence holds sway, the notion of a “public declaration” is problematic. In addition, fear of shame, ostracisation, stigma, bureaucracy the disappearance of witnesses and a lack of financial capacity to take a case forward all militate against the victim making the violation known publicly. Hence out-of-court settlements are common. A pervasive “culture of silence” around rape and other acts of sexual violence tends to discourage women and girls from coming forward.

⁴⁵ See Manifesto '99; “*Traditional Methods of Conflict Management / Resolution of Possible Complementary Value to the Proposed Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission*”; report presented to the TRC, Freetown, July 2002 (hereinafter “Manifesto '99, *Traditional Methods of Conflict Management / Resolution*”), at pages 33 and 34.

⁴⁶ See Manifesto '99, *Traditional Methods of Conflict Management / Resolution*, at pages 33 – 34.

⁴⁷ See Manifesto '99, *Traditional Methods of Conflict Management / Resolution*, at page 35.

⁴⁸ See Manifesto '99, *Traditional Methods of Conflict Management / Resolution*, at page 34.

⁴⁹ See Manifesto '99, *Traditional Methods of Conflict Management / Resolution*, at pages 33 – 34.

⁵⁰ See Manifesto '99, *Traditional Methods of Conflict Management / Resolution*, at pages 33 – 34.

⁵¹ See Manifesto '99, *Traditional Methods of Conflict Management / Resolution*, at page 34.

95. Despite the existence of a number of mechanisms to address sexual violations, most of them continue to go unreported or undeclared. In addition to the culture of silence there has emerged a culture of impunity, which enabled the armed groups to sexually violate women during the conflict with no thought or fear of accountability. Society's reaction to sexual violations is generally lukewarm and rather passive. It remains to be seen whether there will be successful prosecutions of those who have committed rape and other acts of sexual violence during the conflict.

Dealing with violence at the level of the family

96. Violent behaviour within the family in Sierra Leone is usually also surrounded by a "culture of silence". Displays of violence in the family are considered "normal", at least up to a particular "point". The determination of that "point" is interpreted idiosyncratically – only if and when the "point" is passed can intervention be expected. Most interventions still emanate from within the community, employing mediation most of the time to address the offending behaviour and its implications.
97. It is generally considered an aberration by the wider society to involve "outside parties", such as the police or social welfare services, in mediation sessions. Violence in the family is considered a private problem and more often than not people are encouraged to settle the dispute in-house, or with adjudicating bodies, even when these matters are taken to "official" establishments.⁵² Acts of assault are rarely dealt with by courts and are usually resolved by the agencies or persons involved.

The chastisement of wives and / or members of their families

98. Amongst all ethnic groups in Sierra Leone, it is accepted practice for husbands to chastise or beat their wives or female relatives. Under customary law, a husband has the right to "reasonably chastise his wife by physical force".⁵³ Tellingly, significant numbers of women believe that it is appropriate for men to beat their wives. During a study of gender-based violence by the NGO Physicians for Human Rights, more than half of the women interviewed agreed with the view that a man has the right to beat his wife.⁵⁴

⁵² The term "official" here is intended to denote the police or social welfare authorities. At the time of writing, the newly created Family Support Unit of the Police is the body with the primary brief to adjudicate over cases of domestic violence.

⁵³ See Joko Smart, H. M.; *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*; Freetown, 1983, at page 152.

⁵⁴ See Physicians for Human Rights; *War-Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone: A population-based survey*; report produced by an NGO based in Washington, DC, January 2002 (hereinafter "Physicians for Human Rights, *War-Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone*"), at page 9. The report sampled 1,048 households in three IDP camps and one community with a large number of IDPs. A total of 991 female heads of household participated in the study.

How has Sierra Leonean society responded to domestic violence in the past?

99. While it is customary for a man to be able to beat his wife or daughter, it is not acceptable for such an act to become habitual. It is generally agreed among ethnic groups that an overtly violent man is abhorrent.⁵⁵ In the past, different ethnic groups had developed ways and means of dealing with such a person. Responses could range from moral persuasion, the levying of a fine, or a warning, which could be both public and private, to the offender being asked to leave the community.⁵⁶ Amongst the Krios, pressure could be put on the person, through such institutions as “lodge societies” (fraternal societies) of which the person was a member, or the church. Peer pressure also played its role in reining in such a person.⁵⁷ As noted above, it has been common for a culture of silence to prevail in respect of domestic violence in Sierra Leone, as it is considered undue interference when “outsiders” attempt to intervene. It is only when such behaviour becomes “uncontrollable” that an intervention is seen as unavoidable and some remedying action takes place.
100. According to Rehn and Sirleaf⁵⁸, the extreme violence that women suffer during conflict does not arise solely out of the conditions of war, but is directly linked to the violence that exists in women’s lives during peacetime in the society in question. The authors state that “throughout the world, women experience violence because they are women.”⁵⁹ They mostly attribute this situation to women’s lack of political rights and authority. They conclude by stating that:
- “Because so much of this persecution goes largely unpunished, violence against women comes to be an accepted norm, one which escalates during conflict as violence in general increases.”⁶⁰
101. Domestic violence as well as sexual violence is usually condoned or tolerated particularly in traditional societies. This is usually because of unequal power relations. In addition, conditioned by culture and status to be subservient to men, some African women especially the rural and poor ones have less safety mechanisms to combat violence leading to an acceptance of violence in the society.
102. A contributory factor is the ingrained perception held by many African women that complaining to persons or authorities may lead to the exposure of “family secrets”. This perpetuates the culture of silence around domestic and sexual violence. During conflict periods the usual safety mechanisms no longer function and violence spirals out of control. It has a direct effect on women and girls who bear the brunt of it.

⁵⁵ See TRC interviews with local social and anthropological commentators, including Alie Kamara, Sheku Kanu, Memunatu Turay and Radcliffe Williams, Freetown, 2 May to 8 June 2003. See also Bondu Manyeh, psychosocial counsellor and member of several women’s groups in Sierra Leone, TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown, 16 June 2003.

⁵⁶ See TRC interviews with local social and anthropological commentators, *Ibid.*, May to June 2003.

⁵⁷ See TRC interviews with Emily King and Alfred Thompson, Freetown, 17 and 18 June 2003.

⁵⁸ See Rehn, E. and Johnson Sirleaf, E.; “*Progress of the World’s Women, 2003*”, Volume 1: *Women, War and Peace – The Independent Experts’ Assessment on the Impact of Armed Conflict on Women and Women’s Role in Peace-building*”, United Nations Development Fund for Women; New York; 2002 (hereinafter “Rehn and Sirleaf, *Women, War and Peace*”), at page 13.

⁵⁹ See Rehn and Sirleaf, *Women, War and Peace*, at page 13.

⁶⁰ See Rehn and Sirleaf, *Women, War and Peace*, at page 13.

TRC



Dr. Shirley Gbujama, Minister for Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs, leaves the podium after testifying at the TRC public hearings on women in Freetown.

103. The prevalence of an existing culture of violence in Sierra Leonean society and the silence that surrounds it may explain in part the brutality experienced by women during the conflict period. If violence existed against women at a time when there were some, albeit insufficient safeguards for women in place, the moment they were removed, the level of violence escalated. The contempt in which women were held prior to the conflict also exacerbated the way they were treated during the war. A report concluded in Freetown in 1998 found a correlation between the culture of condoning domestic violence in Sierra Leone and the prevalence of violence in general. In one of its conclusions the report stated that:

“It is perhaps not surprising that a culture that has spawned such apparently high rates of war-related sexual violence also suffers from high rates of domestic partner abuse.”⁶¹

104. It is clear that women did not enjoy a high status in Sierra Leonean society before the war. Regrettably, the subordination of women has not changed up to the present day. It is a prognosis corroborated by Dr. Shirley Gbujama, the Minister of Social Welfare, Gender and Children Affairs, speaking in Freetown in October 2003:

“The low status of women is steeped in deep cultural tradition. In traditional Sierra Leonean society, the wife and children are at the mercy of the family. Women have little control or influence over decision-making. Certain socio-cultural practices provide the leading cause of gender disparity and the inferior status of women as evidenced by [such factors as]: high fertility rates; high infant and child mortality rates; high adult female illiteracy rates; exclusion of women from receiving certain services and instruments in rural areas such as land, extension services, credit and farm inputs; and the disproportionate amount of the workload in agriculture (estimated at 60-80%) allocated to women.”⁶²

⁶¹ Coker A. and Richter D.; “*Violence Against Women in Sierra Leone: Frequency and Correlates of Intimate Partner Violence and Forced Sexual Intercourse*”, in *Africa Journal of Reproductive Health*, Vol. 2, No.1, 1998, at page 65.

⁶² Gbujama, Honourable S. Y., Minister of Social Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs; “*Gender Mainstreaming: Sierra Leone Poverty Reduction Strategy 2004-2006*”; 9 October 2003, at page 2.

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW PERTAINING TO WOMEN IN SIERRA LEONE

WOMEN AND NATIONAL LAW IN SIERRA LEONE

105. The following section explores the national laws in Sierra Leone that impact on the rights of women, as well as the relevant international law. The Commission sets out to review whether the existing legal regime has a positive or negative effect on the rights and lives of women and girls.

The 1991 Constitution

106. The laws of Sierra Leone, as defined in Section 170 of the 1991 Constitution, comprise the Constitution itself, along with laws made by or under the authority of Parliament, statutory instruments, the existing law and the common law. The common law includes the English common law and customary law. Customary law, which is largely unwritten, means those rules and regulations that are applicable by custom to particular communities in Sierra Leone.⁶³ Customary law is also defined as any rule, other than a rule of general law, having the force of law in any chieftdom of the Provinces.⁶⁴ The application of customary law must not be repugnant to equity, natural justice and good conscience.⁶⁵
107. Chapter II of the 1991 Constitution details the fundamental principles of State Policy one of which is safeguarding the rights of vulnerable groups such as women.⁶⁶ The fundamental principles however do not confer any legal rights and are not enforceable in any court of law.⁶⁷ Notwithstanding the fact that they lack the force of law, they are fundamental in the governance of the State and Parliament is under a duty to apply them when making laws.⁶⁸
108. Section 15 of the Constitution provides for a bill of rights guaranteeing fundamental human rights and freedoms of the individual irrespective of sex.⁶⁹ This provision represents an important guarantee and should, appropriately understood, be a basis for challenging laws that discriminate against women.

⁶³ See the *Constitution of Sierra Leone 1991*, at Section 170.

⁶⁴ See the *Local Courts Act 1963*, Act No. 20 of 1963, in the Laws of Sierra Leone, at Section 2.

⁶⁵ See the *Courts Act 1965*, in the Laws of Sierra Leone, at Section 75.

⁶⁶ See the *Constitution of Sierra Leone 1991*, at Section 9(1)(a) and (b).

⁶⁷ See the *Constitution of Sierra Leone 1991*, at Section 14.

⁶⁸ See the *Constitution of Sierra Leone 1991*, at Section 14.

⁶⁹ The *Constitution of Sierra Leone 1991*, at Section 15, provides as follows: "Whereas every person in Sierra Leone is entitled to the fundamental human rights and freedom of the individual, that is to say has the rights, whatever his race, tribe, place of origin, political opinion, colour, creed, or sex, but subject to respect for the rights and freedom of others and for the public interest, to each and all of the following:

- (a) life, liberty, security of person, the enjoyment of property, and the protection of the law;
- (b) freedom of conscience, of expression and of assembly and association;
- (c) respect for private and family life; and
- (d) protection from deprivation of property without compensation;

the subsequent provision of this Chapter shall have effect for the purpose of affording protection to the aforesaid rights and freedoms subject to such limitations of that protection as are contained in those provisions, being limitations designed to ensure that the enjoyment of the said rights and freedoms by any individual does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of others, or the public interest."

Furthermore, Section 27 of the Constitution provides that no law shall contain any provision that is discriminatory, either of itself or by its effect, and prohibits discriminatory treatment by any person acting by virtue of any law or in the performance of the functions of any public authority. Section 171(15) of the Constitution provides that the Constitution shall be the supreme law and that any other law found to be inconsistent with any provision of the Constitution shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be void and of no effect.

109. The Constitution however nullifies much of the promise of the equality provisions in Section 27(4)(d) by making an exception to the prohibition of discriminatory laws with respect to laws dealing with marriage, divorce, inheritance, or other interests of personal law.⁷⁰ The effect of these exceptions is to shield the laws that apply throughout Sierra Leone that most discriminate either of themselves, or in their effects, or both, against women. Consequently, all of the most significant laws that are discriminatory against women still apply, rendering the equality provision in Section 15 seriously flawed and ineffective.
110. In addition, by prohibiting discrimination by persons in the public sector only, the Constitution appears to permit persons in the private sector to pursue discriminatory policies against women in important areas of their lives, including employment and promotion. With regard to the area of protection from violence, Section 15(a) of the Constitution provides for the right to life, liberty and security of person, while Section 20 provides that no person shall be subject to any form of torture or punishment or other inhuman or degrading treatment. These express constitutional provisions ought to provide a basis for the Government to protect and promote the rights of women to be free from violence and ensure that its laws, policies and programmes reflect these provisions in practical terms.

⁷⁰ The *Constitution of Sierra Leone 1991*, at Section 27, provides as follows:

(1) Subject to the provision of sub-section (4), (5) and (7), no law shall make provision which is discriminatory either of itself or in its effect.

(2) Subject to the provision of sub-sections (6),(7) and (8) no person shall be treated in a discriminatory manner by any person acting by virtue of any law or in the performance of the function of any public office or any public authority.

(3) In this section the expression "discriminatory" means affording different treatment to different persons attributable wholly or mainly to their respective descriptions by race, tribe, sex, place of origin, political opinions, colour or creed whereby persons of one such description are subjected to disabilities or restrictions to which persons of another such description are not made subject, or are accorded privileges or advantages which are not accorded to persons of another such description.

(4) Subsection (1) shall not apply to any law so far as the law makes provision:

... (c) with respect to persons who are not citizens of Sierra Leone; or

(d) with respect to adoption, marriage, divorce, burial, devolution of property on death or other interest of personal law; or

(e) for the application in the case of members of a particular race or tribe or customary law with respect to any matter to the exclusion of any law with respect to that matter which is applicable in the case of other persons; or

...(g) whereby persons of any such description as mentioned in subsection (3) may be subjected to any disability or restriction or may be accorded any privilege or advantage which, having regard to its nature and to special circumstances pertaining to those persons or to persons of any other such description, is reasonably justifiable in a democratic society

(h) for the limitation of citizenship or relating to national registration or to the collection of demographic statistics

111. While the Constitution prohibits specific discrimination based on sex, there are certain exceptions or “claw back” clauses that particularly affect women. Section 27(3) defines discrimination as follows:

“In this section the expression “discriminatory” means affording different treatment to different persons attributable wholly or mainly to their respective descriptions by race, tribe, sex, place of origin, political opinions, colour or creed, whereby persons of one such description are subjected to disabilities or restrictions to which persons of another such description are not made subject, or are accorded privileges or advantages which are not accorded to persons of another such description.”

112. The definition of discrimination includes “according privileges or advantages, which are not accorded to persons of another description”. This definition poses a serious challenge to women: on the one hand, they may challenge laws that discriminate against them because their male counterparts are not subject to the same laws; on the other, they do not appear to have the means to redress the historical legacies of gender imbalance on the same basis.
113. Paradoxically, the Constitution outlaws positive discrimination or affirmative action that may sometimes be necessary for the achievement of equality for all individuals, especially women. Section 27(4)(g),⁷¹ which appears to include affirmative action, is vague and remains to be tested or brought for interpretation in the Supreme Court. Constitutional provisions that readily allow laws, measures or policies temporary or otherwise are very necessary as a basis to redress the historical imbalance that exists in the society. Examples of such provisions can be found in other African constitutions.⁷²
114. Notwithstanding the equality provision in the 1991 Constitution, the majority of women in Sierra Leone do not enjoy equal status with their male counterparts. Aspects of statutory laws grounded primarily in English law adopted in Sierra Leone and influenced to a great extent by customary and Mohamedan law are still discriminatory against women.
115. Customary law, as practiced in certain communities, clearly discriminates against the interests of women in areas such as marriage, inheritance, property rights and political participation. These laws and practices are a challenge for the enjoyment of women's rights, their advancement in the family and contribution to the political, economic and social development in Sierra Leone. Women are the victims of many forms of violence, yet the legal system does not provide adequate remedies to protect women and punish their violators. Traditional and cultural mores perpetuate gender stereotyping and greatly impact on the legal framework and practice relating to women.

⁷¹ See the *Constitution of Sierra Leone 1991*, at Section 27(4)(g).

⁷² See the *Constitution of the Republic of Ghana*, Ghana Publishing Corporation, 1992, as follows: “Section 17(4)(a): Nothing in this article shall prevent Parliament from enacting laws that are reasonably necessary to provide... [for] the implementation of policies and programmes aimed at redressing social, economic or educational imbalance in the Ghanaian society.” Furthermore, see the *Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996*, Act 108 of 1996, which provides as follows: “Section 9(2): Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. To promote the achievement of equality, legislative and other measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, disadvantaged by unfair discrimination may be taken.”

Different marriage systems applicable in Sierra Leone

116. There are four types of marriage systems in Sierra Leone: Christian marriage,⁷³ Civil Marriage,⁷⁴ Mohamedan Marriage,⁷⁵ and Customary Law marriage. The Christian civil marriage and the Mohamedan marriage are required to be recorded by the Registrar-General in Freetown. Elsewhere, local courts sometimes register customary marriages. Currently, no minimum age of marriage is applicable throughout Sierra Leone. Under Mohamedan and Customary laws, even girls below the age of ten may be given in marriage. Early marriage impacts negatively on a young woman's life by affecting her full development, particularly in terms of education, economic autonomy and physical and psychological health.

Women's reproductive health rights

117. The inferior status of most women, along with prevailing customs and traditions, makes it difficult for a woman freely to exercise her reproductive rights. There is barely any recognition for the right to plan one's family, the right to freedom from interference in reproductive decision-making, or the right to be free from all forms of violence, discrimination and coercion that affect a woman's sexual or reproductive life.
118. International treaties define the right to plan one's family as the right to determine freely and responsibly the number and spacing of one's children and to have the information and means necessary to do so. Governments are obliged to ensure that men and women have access to a full range of contraceptive choices and reproductive health services and that they have adequate information about sexual and reproductive health. These principles are linked to the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right to privacy.⁷⁶
119. Maternal mortality is a deprivation of the right to life and Government has a responsibility to improve its health-care system so that women can enjoy safe motherhood. There is also a need for the enactment of laws relating to marital rape, which must include an offence of knowingly infecting a partner with HIV / AIDS. Presently in Sierra Leone, marital rape is not classified as a crime.

⁷³ See the *Christian Marriage Act Cap 96, Laws of Sierra Leone 1960*.

⁷⁴ See the *Civil Marriage Act Cap 97, Laws of Sierra Leone 1960*.

⁷⁵ See the *Mohamedan Marriage Act Cap 96, Laws of Sierra Leone 1960*.

⁷⁶ See the Centre for Reproductive Rights and University of Toronto, International Programme on Reproductive and Sexual Health Law; *"Bringing Rights to Bear An Analysis of the Work of UN Treaty Monitoring Bodies on Reproductive and Sexual Rights"*, Toronto, 2002, at page 16.

Women's rights to property and land ownership

120. Land ownership in the Western Area is based on English property laws from prior to 1925 and allows for individual ownership. In the Provinces, land ownership is governed by Chiefdom Councils and allows only for group ownership. Equal land ownership and inheritance laws and practices are necessary to achieve sustained development in any country. In post-war Sierra Leone, they are also essential for women's economic, social and political survival.⁷⁷ The argument for land ownership for women is not only one based on personal need, family security or national development; it is also a question of basic human rights.⁷⁸ Women can acquire land through purchase, but often lack resources to do so. Most landowners acquire land through inheritance, and because of discrimination in the laws of inheritance that apply throughout the country, far fewer women than men own land in Sierra Leone.

Inheritance rights

121. Inheritance rights become problematic where intestacy arises. While individuals can make a will under the different systems of personal law, in reality only a small fraction of the population make a will.⁷⁹ The individual's "personal law" governs inheritance in Sierra Leone. This is determined by a person's ethnic origins, as a "native" from the Provinces, or as a "non-native" from the Western Area, or as a Muslim and not by his place of current residence.⁸⁰ Inheritance is governed by three different sets of laws: customary law; Mohammedan law; and one set of statutes, which applies to persons who are not Mohammedans or whose personal law is not customary law. The inheritance rules of distribution discriminate against women under each of the three different laws.

The Administration Of Estate Act (Chapter 45 of the Laws Of Sierra Leone 1960)

122. The Second Schedule in the Administration of Estates Act provides for rules of distribution for the property of deceased persons, where customary law or Mohammedan laws do not apply. The Rules provide that, on the death of a wife, the husband is entitled to all of her property.⁸¹ On the death of a husband, the wife is entitled to one-third of the estate and the children are entitled to the remaining two-thirds of the estate.⁸² If the husband has no children, the wife will be entitled to half and the other half shall be divided among the husband's nearest relatives or next of kin.⁸³ The Act does not provide for unmarried couples living together to benefit from the estate of their respective partners.

⁷⁷ See King, Jamesina; "Women's Land Ownership and Property Rights in Sierra Leone", unpublished manuscript, Freetown, 2002 (hereinafter "King, Women's Land Ownership and Property Rights"), at pages 20 – 23.

⁷⁸ See King, *Women's Land Ownership and Property Rights*.

⁷⁹ See the *Wills Act 1837* and the *Mohammedan Amendment Act 1998*, at Section 2.

⁸⁰ See Lisk, I. E. P. and Williams, B. L.; "Marriage and Divorce Regulation and Recognition in Sierra Leone", 29 *Family Law Quarterly* 665 (1995).

⁸¹ See *Second Schedule of the Administration of Estates Act, Laws of Sierra Leone 1960*, Rule 1.

⁸² See *Second Schedule of the Administration of Estates Act, Laws of Sierra Leone 1960*, Rule 2.

⁸³ See *Second Schedule of the Administration of Estates Act, Laws of Sierra Leone 1960*, Rule 4.

Inheritance under customary law

123. The rules of inheritance under customary law vary from one ethnic group to another. Widows do not have inheritance rights in some ethnic groups; indeed some groups regard a widow as a chattel and part of the estate to be inherited by the deceased's elder brother, or in his absence his eldest son.⁸⁴ In Mende customary law a widow cannot inherit the husband's estate. In the case of *P. C. Bongay v Macaulay* (1920-26),⁸⁵ the court supported the position that a woman cannot have any interest in land as of right, or acquire land through her husband. This discrimination is quite anomalous, as the Mende women are allowed to become Chiefs and hold other leadership positions in society.
124. Similarly in Temne customary law, the widow is not entitled to any interest in the house where the married couple lived, although the husband's family may compensate a wife who has contributed towards the building of the house.⁸⁶ Under traditional customary law the husband inherited the deceased wife's entire property whether or not the deceased wife had any children. In modern times, the inheritance practice appears to be evolving to allow the wife to have a share of her husband's estate. Nonetheless, a son receives a larger share than the wife. Daughters also receive a lesser share than sons.⁸⁷

Inheritance under Islamic law

125. The property of a Muslim who dies without leaving a will is distributed according to the Holy Quran. Section 9(2) of the Muslim Marriage Act of the Laws of Sierra Leone 1960, provides that only the eldest son or eldest brother of the Official Administrator can take out letters of administration to administer the deceased estate. Wives, sisters and daughters i.e. the female members of the family are thereby deprived of a similar right to take out letters of administration to administer the deceased property. This is still the case even when the deceased is a woman and she is the sole owner of property.
126. While the Act makes no provision for the distribution of the estate of a deceased person, it does allow the Official Administrator who holds the letters of administration to consult the tribal headman of the deceased, to ascertain the law governing the distribution of the estate. The Act gives the deceased sons and eldest brother the right to administer the estate of the deceased without providing the rules they should follow in distributing the estate, thus there are instances where wives and daughters have been deprived of any share in their deceased husband or father's estate. There are rules of distribution in the fourth chapter of the Quaran-Sura-tul Nisa applied by some Muslim communities, but its application give men more inheritance rights than women. This Act has the widest application in the country but because it does not contain any provisions guiding distribution it is seriously flawed. It is not surprising that the distribution of a deceased's estate usually impacts negatively on women and are hardly challenged.

⁸⁴ See Joko Smart, H. M.; *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*; Freetown, 1983, at pages 190-196.

⁸⁵ See *P. C. Bongay v Macaulay* (1920 – 26), in *African Law Reports* (Sierra Leone), at 171.

⁸⁶ See Joko Smart, H. M.; *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*; Freetown, 1983, at pages 190-196.

⁸⁷ See Joko Smart, H. M.; *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*; Freetown, 1983, at page 197.

127. The different rules of distribution under each of these legal systems allowing men better inheritance rights than women are a clear discrimination on the basis of sex. The application of these rules sometimes exposes widows to forceful eviction without consideration to their contribution to the assets acquired during marriage. They also contravene a cardinal right of equality in marriage and at its dissolution. They also affect the children of the deceased who may be deprived of care and education as a result of these inheritance rules.
128. In instances under customary law where the deceased brother inherits the wife and then forces her to marry him. This practice deprives women of their right to freely choose who and when they wish to marry, and is repugnant to “equity, natural justice and good conscience.”⁸⁸ As in the case with other African societies, the daily struggle, contribution and effort of women in Sierra Leone is often overlooked and not given any monetary value. Ghana is one very positive example of a country in the same sub-region as Sierra Leone that has made several attempts to amend its laws on inheritance.⁸⁹

The importance of land ownership for women

129. The war in Sierra Leone created many female-headed households. However, women still experience great difficulty in accessing housing. While many women have the resources to rent a house, landlords refuse to rent their houses to women unless a man carries out the negotiations. Many war widows complain of being forced out of farmlands that belonged to their husbands. Law reform law particularly in the area of property and inheritance rights is important to redress the grievances of these widows. This problem is even more prevalent in the rural areas where land held by the Chiefdom Council in trust for their community is allocated mainly to male family heads.
130. The Commission notes that most land allocation projects carried out by government or traditional authorities in Sierra Leone still tend to benefit men more than women.

⁸⁸ See the *Courts Act 1965*, in the Laws of Sierra Leone, at Section 76.

⁸⁹ In Ghana, which shares a similar background to Sierra Leone, multiple inheritance laws applied, including customary inheritance laws, Mohamedan inheritance laws and inheritance laws under statutory law, most of which were similar to the laws that apply in Sierra Leone presently. The Government of Ghana recognised that the nuclear family, which was gaining importance, was not reflected in the laws on inheritance, nor was the wife’s involvement in the husband’s economic activities. Customary law did not provide any protection for the surviving spouse and there was tension between the surviving spouse and the traditional family unit that encompassed the extended family. In 1985 a new succession or inheritance law was enacted, aimed at removing anomalies in estate succession and to provide uniform estate succession laws throughout the country. The law applied to all those who died after 14 June 1995 and covered persons from all religious and ethnic background who did not leave a will at the time of their death. The law used the words “surviving spouse”, a gender-neutral term that helped eliminate distinctions on the ground of sex, thereby maintaining equality. The Government of Ghana also enacted the Customary Marriage and Divorce (Registration) Act 1985, Administration of Estate (Amendment) Act 1985, Head of Family (Accountability) Act 1985 and the Estate Succession (Amendment) Act 1991.

131. Land ownership is needed to enable women to achieve economic empowerment. Land is needed not only for agriculture, a sector in which women make up the majority of the workforce, but also to be used as collateral for loans. In the Western Area, if the names of the couple are on the title deeds of the property acquired during marriage, they are regarded as joint owners. Neither party can convey or transfer the property to the detriment of the other. However in cases where the property is only in the name of the husband, the wife is disadvantaged, as she cannot challenge a sale or gift of that property to a third party.⁹⁰
132. Given the present increase of single mothers and female-headed households because of the war, land is desperately needed to enable women to achieve economic empowerment and provide for their families. Women can have the same access to credit as men if they are landowners, because land can be used as collateral for a loan.⁹¹ The courts in Freetown regularly impose presentation of title deeds as a condition when granting bail to accused persons for certain offences, thus making it difficult for any woman to secure bail for her relatives or herself because she does not own property. Securing greater access to land for women through legal reform in the areas of inheritance and land allocation, particularly after the war, is a pressing priority.

Divorce

133. The Matrimonial Causes Act of 1960 provides for divorce, judicial separation and restitution of conjugal rights for persons married under the Civil or Christian Marriage Act. The grounds for divorce are cruelty, adultery or desertion, which are matrimonial offences requiring a higher standard of proof and based on the guilt or innocence of either party to the marriage. Divorce proceedings are very expensive and time-consuming. Most women do not apply for divorce because they lack the means to do so and the rules themselves are discriminatory against women.⁹² Thus men – who may not necessarily be the innocent party in the marriage – institute most divorces.
134. Divorce under customary law is very difficult to obtain because of the multiple variations in the laws of the different ethnic groups and the diverse grounds on which divorce can be obtained. The husband may terminate the marriage unilaterally, driving the wife from the matrimonial home or returning her to her parents. Either party to the marriage may also initiate divorce proceedings in the local court or an arbitration tribunal.⁹³

⁹⁰ If a woman decides to challenge the transfer of land to a third party when her name is not on the title deed, she faces an uphill task to gain redress. She will be obliged to prove that it was the intention of the parties that the property should be owned by both of them, or that she had contributed to or provided the money for the purchase of the property and that the husband held the property in trust for her. See King, *Women's Land Ownership and Property Rights*.

⁹¹ See King, *Women's Land Ownership and Property Rights*, at page 23.

⁹² Section 22(1) allows the Court to order a settlement of a wife's separate property for the benefit of the "innocent party", i.e. the husband or children or both, if she is found to have committed any one of the matrimonial offences. No similar provisions apply in favour of a wife when her husband is found to have committed adultery, cruelty or desertion.

⁹³ See Joko Smart, H. M.; *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*; Freetown, 1983, at page 147.

135. Under Mohamedan law, Muslim religious leaders usually grant divorces. However, a husband can also divorce his wife simply by saying "I divorce you" three times in Arabic; a wife in contrast cannot end a marriage nearly so easily. A wife under customary and Mohamedan law encounters additional barriers if she initiates divorce proceedings and must satisfy the religious leader or arbitration tribunal due to issue her with a divorce certificate that her application is approved by her spouse. The division of property upon separation and divorce creates unequal rights between the spouses. The division of property during dissolution of any of the three forms of marriage is not mandatory and the non-financial contribution of the wife is never taken into account.

Domestic violence

136. Under Sierra Leonean Law, there is no specific legislation to prosecute domestic violence. However domestic violence may be prosecuted under the common law, for example as murder or manslaughter if it leads to death, or under the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 if it results in assault or wounding. In the past prosecutors have demonstrated reluctance to prosecute such offences where they take place in the home and are committed by a partner or acquaintance, incorrectly interpreting them to be matters of a private nature. While the police or family members can sometimes mediate on such matters, a resolution in favour of the victim is seldom arrived at. Indeed, the odds are stacked against the victims because so few of them have alternative accommodation or support mechanisms to turn to in the event of crisis; temporary shelters for victims are non-existent.
137. Where a woman is physically abused by her partner and makes a report, the perpetrator is rarely called to account and the woman is encouraged to return home to where the crime was committed. At best the perpetrator may be invited to the police station and warned not to repeat the crime, after which both parties then return to the same violent situation. Such dismissive treatment of domestic violence perpetuates a culture of impunity, where violators go completely unpunished.
138. There are frequent reports in Sierra Leone of violence that has resulted in death, permanent disability or serious injuries to women. In each such case, the woman's right to health, liberty and security of person, as well as her right to physical integrity, are severely undermined. In a case where a woman dies as a result of physical injury inflicted by her partner, despite having made multiple reports to the police, the Government should be held accountable for having breached its duty of care to protect its citizens' human rights.
139. Once a violation is proved, the Government has an obligation to provide a legal remedy to stop the violation, punish the violators or compensate the victim or both. If the violation occurs as a result of a discriminatory law or customary practice, or as a result of the absence of a protective law,⁹⁴ then one part of the remedy should be to seek legal reform or the passage of a new law to improve the observance and protection of the right in question.

⁹⁴ In addition to the absence of laws specifically addressing domestic violence, Sierra Leone also lacks laws on sexual harassment (albeit that if an assault occurs it can be prosecuted under different statutes). The laws of Sierra Leone do not adequately deal with the various forms of sexual harassment women face at work, in school, during their use of recreational facilities, or in any other public or private places.

Sexual and gender-based violence

140. The horrific and brutal experiences of women during the war make it necessary to examine whether the laws of Sierra Leone offer adequate protection in relation to sexual and gender-based violence. In 2001, Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) conducted a population-based assessment of the prevalence and impact of sexual violence and other human rights abuses among internally displaced persons in Sierra Leone. PHR found that internally displaced women and girls in Sierra Leone suffered an extraordinary level of rape, sexual violence and other gross human rights violations during the country's civil war, with half of them indicating that their contact had been with the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) forces.⁹⁵

Rape

141. Rape is an offence under the common law in Sierra Leone, defined as having sexual intercourse with a woman without her consent, by force, fear or fraud.⁹⁶ While rape is in theory punishable as an offence throughout Sierra Leone, it has always been under-reported and relatively few prosecutions of rape or crimes of sexual violence have taken place. Victims have been reluctant to report sexual crimes for fear of stigma. Many victims are suffer intimidation and are thus prevented from reporting crimes or insisting on the prosecution of their perpetrators. In addition, there is often little incentive to pursue an onerous prosecution in a judicial system that is not conducive to "just" outcomes.
142. The rules of procedure in Sierra Leone's courts, which require corroboration and cross-examination by formidable defence lawyers, discourage women from instigating legal proceedings. Such a perceptibly hostile environment in the courts has often had the consequence of making victims, most of them without legal representation, feel that they are responsible for the crime they have suffered. Even where cases are reported, most of them end up not being prosecuted, as those responsible for prosecution prevail upon the victim to settle the matter out of court. The approach of the police and judicial officers suggests that they regard rape and other gender-based crimes as lesser crimes not worth prosecuting.

⁹⁵ See Physicians for Human Rights, *War-Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone*.

⁹⁶ See Archibald, *Pleading Evidence and Practice in Criminal Cases*, 35th edition, at page 1146.

*Protection Of Women And Girls Act
(Chapter 30 Of The Laws Of Sierra Leone 1960)⁹⁷
Procuring Girls and Women for Prostitution within and without
Sierra Leone*

143. Under the Protection of Women and Girls Act, any person who procures or attempts to procure a girl or woman under 21 years who is not a common prostitute or of known immoral character to have sex with another person within or without Sierra Leone commits a crime and shall be imprisoned for a period not exceeding two years. Any person who uses threats or intimidation to do such an act commits a crime and shall be imprisoned for the same period. The Act does not define a “common prostitute” or a “person of known immoral character”, which means the provision is too open to abuse and denies adequate protection to women and girls.
144. Sexual offences that are linked with the “moral character” of the victim are not gender sensitive and are a violation of the right to be free from sexual violence and the right to physical integrity. Perpetrators can escape punishment by alleging that the victim is a prostitute or a woman of immoral character. The punishment of two years’ imprisonment under this Act is inappropriate and unlikely to deter offenders from committing such crimes. In particular, in view of the widespread rape and sexual slavery that characterised the conflict in Sierra Leone, there is a high risk that victims of the conflict who attempt to prosecute rape or crimes of sexual violence in peacetime may be challenged and dismissed because of their experiences during the war.
145. The complex provisions of the general law have been misinterpreted to the detriment of minors who have been raped or sexually assaulted, resulting in perpetrators being charged with unlawful carnal knowledge of a child, for which the sentence is lighter than rape.⁹⁸ Another area of concern is the need for corroborating evidence relating to these offences, which is extremely unlikely considering their nature and the circumstances in which they are typically committed. Until recently there was only one police doctor in Freetown who was competent to provide medical services to victims and furnish the courts with the requisite medical reports. The police and judicial officers remain outwardly reluctant to prosecute sexual offences and the legal system that is supposed to serve women remains unfriendly to them.

⁹⁷ See the *Protection of Women and Girls Act (Chapter 30 of the Laws of Sierra Leone 1960)*, as amended by *Protection of Women and Girls Amendment Act 1972*.

⁹⁸ See Coalition on Women’s Human Rights in Conflict Situations; Submission to the TRC Special Thematic Hearings on Women; Freetown, June 2003 (hereinafter “Coalition on Women’s Human Rights submission to TRC”), at page 7.

Sexual offences under customary law

146. During the conflict, women were targeted by the different perpetrator groups and systematically raped and sexually violated. Rape was used as a weapon of war to dominate and humiliate women to undermine traditional cultural values and community relationships. Women and girls were raped and sexually attacked in front of their families, mothers, fathers, husbands and children, as a means of heightening the crime against them, torturing their loved ones and terrorising the community.⁹⁹
147. Under traditional customary law, the consent of the woman or girl for the purposes of sex is immaterial. If a girl is raped or indecently sexually assaulted, her parents can bring an action under customary law for compensation.¹⁰⁰ If the girl is a virgin the amount of compensation includes “virgin money”. The same situation applies where the offender is a prospective husband of the victim. If the girl is married her husband can bring an action for compensation commonly referred to as “woman damage”.¹⁰¹ The fact that communities were in no position to demand compensation for these crimes when they were committed against women and girls during the war has further degraded the status of women. There is no doubt that the reduction of a sexual offence from a heinous crime to a mere action for damage money has contributed to the low status that women occupy in traditional society.

Access to justice for women facing sexual violence under general law and under customary law

148. Women victims of sexual violence in Sierra Leone face considerable challenges in seeking to achieve justice. Some of the problems they face are as follows:
- i. The prevailing culture of silence;
 - ii. Reduced sentencing for offenders;
 - iii. Difficulty in getting a conviction as a result of the strict evidentiary requirements of proof;
 - iv. Short staff and institutional inefficiency in the law officer's department;
 - v. Absence of legal aid for women;
 - vi. Absence of laws on marital rape;
 - vii. A woman's consent to sex is not considered to be an issue of legal relevance under customary law;
 - viii. Laws on evidence and procedure on crimes of sexual violence are not gender sensitive; and
 - ix. Absence of temporary shelters for victims of sexual or domestic violence.

⁹⁹ See Joko Smart, H. M.; *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*, Freetown, 1983, at page 5.

¹⁰⁰ See Joko Smart, H. M.; *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*, Freetown, 1983, at page 182.

¹⁰¹ See Joko Smart, H. M.; *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*, Freetown, 1983, at page 5.

Application of National Law to Violations during the Conflict

149. Women suffered a multiplicity of violations during the war, including abduction, forced recruitment, detention, forced displacement, forced labour, assault, torture, forced drugging, amputation, forced cannibalism, forced cannibalism, rapes, sexual slavery, sexual abuse, extortion, looting, destruction of property and killing.¹⁰² Many of these violations constitute crimes under Sierra Leone's criminal law. Torture, forced drugging and amputation may be prosecuted as assaults under the Offences Against the Persons Act 1861. The killing of women may be prosecuted as murder or manslaughter. Detention may be prosecuted as false imprisonment. The acts of extortion, looting and destruction of property may be prosecuted under the Larceny Act 1916 or the Malicious Damage Act. The national laws of rape under the common law, indecent assault and procuring for prostitution could be applied to crimes of sexual violence committed during the war.
150. While it is reassuring to know that such crimes can technically be prosecuted under national law, it will not happen because of the amnesty provisions in the Lomé Peace Agreement of 1999. Notwithstanding this amnesty, the existing criminal justice system would in any case be totally inadequate to handle cases of this nature. It is further highly unlikely that a criminal justice system that fails to deal properly with crimes of this nature during peacetime could be in a position to prosecute crimes against humanity and war crimes. A major problem for victims is the fact that the evidentiary burden is high and the onus is on the victim to offer corroborating evidence.
151. In addition, the crimes of rape, unlawful carnal knowledge, indecent assault, abduction for immoral purposes and procurement for the purposes of prostitution as provided for in the national law are primarily based on a notion of crimes against the honour, dignity and chastity of the victim, her family or the community. The existing criminal laws are totally inadequate when dealing with crimes of this nature that occur during a conflict situation, as they focus on a narrow definition of morality that would further stigmatise and traumatise the victim.
152. On 23 February 2003 the Sierra Leone Parliament established a Standing Committee for Human Rights and related issues to promote respect for human rights in Sierra Leone. If this Committee is to succeed in its mandate, it will have to pioneer and lobby for legal reform to promote and protect women's rights. A relevant consideration in its work must be the application of national law to sexual violations that may occur in a future conflict situation.

¹⁰² More detail on violations rates and the levels of different violations experienced by women can be found in the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN SIERRA LEONE

A brief overview of the international instruments on women and the level of their incorporation in Sierra Leone national law

153. The ratification and incorporation of international human rights instruments into national law is crucial to the advancement of women's rights as it imposes on states an obligation to interpret national law in a manner consistent with the state's international or legal obligations. International human rights standards can be regarded as the minimum standards of protection, which all systems of national laws should strive to attain.
154. Sierra Leone became a member of the United Nations in 1961 and ratified most of the major human rights instruments. Sierra Leone is a signatory to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),¹⁰³ the International Covenant on Economic Cultural and Social Rights (ICECSR),¹⁰⁴ the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),¹⁰⁵ the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT),¹⁰⁶ the Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC),¹⁰⁷ the African Charter on Human and People's Rights¹⁰⁸ and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.¹⁰⁹

¹⁰³ See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted 16 December 1966, G.A. Res 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), entered into force on 23 March 1976; Sierra Leone acceded on 23 August 1996.

¹⁰⁴ See International Covenant on Economic Cultural and Social Rights (ICECSR), adopted 16 December 1966, G.A. Res 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), entered into force on 3 January 1976; Sierra Leone acceded on 23 August 1996.

¹⁰⁵ See the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), adopted 18 December 1979, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. U.N. Doc. A/34/46, entered into force on 3 September 1981; Sierra Leone signed on 21 September 1988 and ratified on 11 November 1988.

¹⁰⁶ See the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted 10 December 1984, G.A. Res. 39/46 U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984), entered into force on 26 June 1987.

¹⁰⁷ See the Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC), adopted 20 November 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25, UN Doc. A/44/49 (1989), entered into force on 2 September 1990.

¹⁰⁸ See the African Charter on Human and People's Rights, adopted 27 June 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev.5, entered into force on 21 October 1986; Sierra Leone signed on 27 August 1981 and ratified on 21 September 1983.

¹⁰⁹ See the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered into force on 29 November 1999. Sierra Leone signed the Charter on 14 April 1992 but has not yet ratified it.

A general overview of the major international instruments

155. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognises the right to life liberty and security¹¹⁰; the right to be free from sex discrimination;¹¹¹ the right to marry and found a family; equal rights for women as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution;¹¹² the right to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment¹¹³; and provide that marriage shall be entered with the free and full consent of the intending spouses.¹¹⁴
156. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, also guarantees the right to life;¹¹⁵ to liberty and security of the person,¹¹⁶ to privacy;¹¹⁷ to be free from sex discrimination;¹¹⁸ to marry and found a family¹¹⁹; to not be forced to enter marriage without the free and full consent of the intended spouses;¹²⁰ to equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage during marriage and at its dissolution¹²¹; to be free from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment¹²²; to be free from medical or scientific experimentation without free consent¹²³ and to public health, medical care, social security and social services.¹²⁴ It also provides that governments must establish a minimum age for marriage and make the registration of marriages in an official registry compulsory.¹²⁵
157. The ICECSR, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) are also instruments that recognise: the right to life;¹²⁶ to privacy;¹²⁷ to be free from sex discrimination;¹²⁸ to the highest attainable standard of physical health;¹²⁹ to health care services;¹³⁰ to decide on the number and spacing of their children and to have access to the information and means to do so,¹³¹ to the elimination of discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations;¹³² and to be free from sexual violence, abuse, exploitation, prostitution and trafficking.¹³³

¹¹⁰ See the Universal Declaration Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948) (hereinafter "UDHR"), at Article 3.

¹¹¹ See UDHR, at Article 2.

¹¹² See UDHR, at Article 16(1).

¹¹³ See UDHR, at Article 5.

¹¹⁴ See UDHR, at Article 16(1).

¹¹⁵ See the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (hereinafter "ICCPR"), at Article 6(1).

¹¹⁶ See ICCPR, at Article 9(1).

¹¹⁷ See ICCPR, at Article 17(1).

¹¹⁸ See ICCPR, at Article 2(1).

¹¹⁹ See ICCPR, at Article 23(2).

¹²⁰ See ICCPR, at Article 23(3).

¹²¹ See ICCPR, at Article 23(4).

¹²² See ICCPR, at Article 7.

¹²³ See ICCPR, at Article 7.

¹²⁴ See ICCPR, at Article 7.

¹²⁵ See also the Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age of Marriage and Registration of Marriage 1964.

¹²⁶ See CRC, at Article 6(1).

¹²⁷ See CRC, at Article 16(1).

¹²⁸ See CEDAW, at Articles 1 and 3. See also ICECSR, at Article 2(2).

¹²⁹ See ICECSR, at Article 12(1). See also CRC, at Article 24(1).

¹³⁰ See CRC, at Article 24(1).

¹³¹ See CEDAW, at Article 16(1).

¹³² See CEDAW, at Article 16(1).

¹³³ See CEDAW, at Articles 5(a) and 6. See also CRC, at Articles 19(1) and 19(3).

158. These instruments require Government to commit itself to develop preventive health care, guidance for parents and family planning education and services; prenatal and postnatal and to ensure access to information, counselling and services concerning family planning;¹³⁴ to appropriate services to ensure safe pregnancy;¹³⁵ Government undertakes to eliminate traditional practices prejudicial to the health of children.¹³⁶

The African Charter on Human And People's Rights

159. The African Charter on Human and People's Rights entered into force in October 1986. Article 18 (3) of the charter states that "the state shall ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women and also ensure the protection of the rights of women and the child as stipulated in international declarations and conventions". By this Article, the African Charter has incorporated all of the international declarations and conventions that relate to women. There is a protocol on the Rights of African Women approved in July 2003 that offers wide protection for the rights of women. Sierra Leone needs to ratify this protocol, which will allow the rights provided in it to be enjoyed in Sierra Leone.

The Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW)

160. Article 1 of CEDAW defines "discrimination against women " to "mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field".
161. Article 2 of CEDAW requires Governments to pursue all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating discrimination against women and to embody the principle of equality of men and women in their constitutions or other appropriate legislation and to ensure that this principle is practically realised. Governments are further called upon to adopt appropriate legislation and other measures including sanctions prohibiting discrimination against women by any person organisation or enterprise and to repeal all laws that constitute discrimination against women.

¹³⁴ See CEDAW, at Articles 10(h), 12(1) and 14(2).

¹³⁵ See CEDAW, at Article 12(2).

¹³⁶ See CRC, at Article 24(1).

162. Article 5(a) of CEDAW provides that State parties shall take all appropriate measures to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of inferiority or superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women. CEDAW also prohibits dismissal on the grounds of pregnancy, maternity leave or marital status.¹³⁷
163. Article 4 of CEDAW requires states to adopt temporary special measures aimed at accelerating equality on a practical basis between men and women, which shall not be considered as discrimination under the Convention and which shall be discontinued when the objectives of equality of opportunity and treatment have been achieved. Other provisions of CEDAW are focussed on education, employment, health care, equality before the law, same legal capacity in contracts, administration of property and choice of residence.

General Recommendations by CEDAW committee on marriage and violence against women

164. General Recommendation 21 of the CEDAW Committee on Marriage recognises that common law principle and religious and customary laws contribute to the persistence of gender stereotypes and women's inequality. The Committee calls for governments to bring traditional practice in line with existing law. It recognises 18 as the appropriate age for marriage and rejects arguments of an earlier age for girls because of the associated health risks.
165. General Recommendation 19 dealing with violence against women advocates for the enactment and enforcement of legislation to prevent and punish acts of domestic violence. The Committee has also criticised State parties who place undue emphasis on marital reconciliation, particularly in cases involving violence. It calls on governments to suppress all forms of trafficking in women and exploitation of the prostitution of women. It further recognises that economic factors such as poverty adversely contribute to prostitution and the trafficking of women. The Committee has also identified sexual harassment as a form of violence against women, particularly in school or work environments, and has recommended that state parties enact sexual harassment laws.
166. General Recommendation 14 specifically addresses female genital mutilation. It recognises the cultural, traditional and economic factors that perpetuate the practice of FGM. It also identifies the health related consequences and makes recommendations to State on how to eliminate it. FGM is also specifically mentioned in General Recommendation 19 equating the practice as a form of violence against women committed by private or state actors. General Recommendation 24 recommends the enactment and effective enforcement of laws that prohibit genital mutilation.
167. Under the optional Protocol of CEDAW, which entered into force in 2000, the Committee is empowered to receive communication from individuals or groups about violation of rights protected in the Convention. It also creates an inquiry procedure enabling the Committee to initiate inquiries into situations of grave or systematic violations of women's rights.

¹³⁷ See CEDAW, at Article 11(2).

International instruments prohibiting violence

168. There are several international instruments that seek to protect the rights of women and prohibit violence particularly during armed conflicts.¹³⁸ The use of national, regional and international human rights mechanisms in responding to the egregious crimes and horrific events that occurred in Sierra Leone during the war has significantly developed international human rights law and continues to do so. Sierra Leone is a party to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and to their Additional Protocols. Common Article 3, which applies to all parties in internal conflicts such as Sierra Leone's, prohibits violence against life and the person, in particular murders of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment and torture and outrages upon personal dignity such as humiliating and degrading treatment.¹³⁹ Additional Protocol I, which regulates international armed conflict, specifies: "women shall be the object of special respect and shall be protected in particular against rape, forced prostitution and any other form of indecent assault".¹⁴⁰ Additional Protocol II, which applies in certain internal armed conflicts, expands upon the previous provision and explicitly forbids "violence to the life, health and physical well being of persons, in particular murder as well as cruel treatment such as torture, mutilation"¹⁴¹ and "outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, rape, enforced prostitution and any form of indecent assault".¹⁴²
169. The jurisprudence of the two ad-hoc tribunals, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), has reinforced the principle that grave violations of these provisions constitute war crimes. Accordingly, the violations committed against women in Sierra Leone constitute war crimes and are likely to be prosecuted as such by the Special Court for Sierra Leone.

¹³⁸ See, *inter alia*, the following instruments and declarations prohibiting violence and promoting justice for victims of crime: Women and Armed Conflict 1995, Beijing +5 (2000); Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict (1976); Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of crime and Abuse of Power G.A.40/34 (1985); Fourth World Conference on Women: Women and conflict (1985); Security Council Resolution 1325 (2000); and the Commission on Human Rights, *Basic Principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law*, published as an Annex to E/CN.4/2000/62.

¹³⁹ See Physicians for Human Rights, *War-Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone*, at page 84.

¹⁴⁰ See Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions, at Article 76(1). More detail can be found in Physicians for Human Rights, *War-Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone*.

¹⁴¹ See Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, at Article 4(2)(a).

¹⁴² See Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, at Article 4(2)(e) More detail can be found in Physicians for Human Rights, *War-Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone*.

*Rape and sexual violence*¹⁴³

170. Rape remains the silent war crime in Sierra Leone and in the world: throughout history, the rape of hundreds of thousands of women and children in all regions of the world has been a bitter reality.¹⁴⁴ Reversing this legacy remains the obligation of every transitional justice institution charged with examining or prosecuting crimes committed during conflict. It is critical to ensuring inclusive and non-discriminatory justice as well as to combating the stigma and blame that are at the core of the shame, isolation and abandonment suffered by women in post-conflict situations. Whilst international humanitarian law has long prohibited rape, it was characterised as an offence against honour and dignity¹⁴⁵. The Fourth Geneva Convention continued the practice of characterising rape as an attack on women's honour. The list of grave breaches of Common Article 3 does not refer explicitly to rape. Again in 1977, in Protocol II while offences of sexual violence were explicitly included, they were characterised as offences against dignity and honour or humiliating and degrading treatment as listed as rape, forced prostitution and any other form of indecent assault. As a consequence, women whether combatants or civilians, have been consistently targeted for sexual violence such as rape, sexual mutilation and sexual slavery, while for the most part their attackers go unpunished.
171. The 1993 World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna recognised violence against women as an issue of priority and noted the need to end impunity for sexual violence in war and conflict. The ad hoc Tribunals have contributed substantially to the development of jurisprudence on rape and sexual violence culminating in the codification of sexual and gender based crimes in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court providing the basis for examining and prosecuting these crimes as international crimes today.

¹⁴³ Most of this section has been taken from the Coalition on Women's Human Rights submission to the TRC, which to a large extent is based on the findings of the report by Human Rights Watch, *We'll Kill You if you Cry*, from page 35 onwards.

¹⁴⁴ Preliminary Report submitted by the U.N. Special Rapporteur on *Violence Against Women, Its Causes and Consequences*, *Commission on Human Rights*, Fiftieth Session, November 1994, U.N. Document E/CN.4/1995/42.p.64

¹⁴⁵ This characterisation is based, however, on the notion of women as property and sexual violence as a moral affront described in largely moralistic terms. The word honour thus alludes to chastity, sexual virtue and good name and refers equally to the honour of the male – the husband or father – with whom the woman is related. Thus, the traditional view of rape as an offence against honour has failed to treat rape and sexual violence as a crime of violence, an attack on women's physical and mental integrity. The notion of honour has also obscured the atrocious nature of the crime and further contributed to the widespread misperception of rape as an "incidental" or "lesser" crime by comparison to killing, torture or enslavement.

172. The Statutes of ICTY and the ICTR explicitly listed rape as a crime against humanity under their jurisdictions and have convicted defendants of these crimes.¹⁴⁶ Both tribunals have also prosecuted rape and sexual violence as war crimes and treated rape as torture and sexual violence, such as forced nakedness, as inhuman treatment.¹⁴⁷ The ICTR prosecuted and adjudged rape as a crime of genocide in the case against Jean-Paul Akayesu, the former mayor of Taba commune in Rwanda. This verdict marked the first time an international court found rape to be an act of genocide.
173. In 2001 in the Kunarac case involving the Foca prison, the ICTY convicted the Bosnian-Serb defendants of rape as a crime against humanity and treated rape as also torture, along with enslavement committed in Foca. The severity of rape and other forms of sexual violence has been emphasised by the fact that in several instances, the ICTY has devoted entire cases exclusively to sexual violence.¹⁴⁸ Barriers in the prosecution of sexual offences, as experienced in national jurisdictions including Sierra Leone,¹⁴⁹ because of the strict rules of procedure and evidence have been overcome by the adoption of rules that are gender sensitive and effective. Rule 98 of the ICTY provides:
- “In cases of sexual assault: (i) no corroboration of the victim’s testimony shall be required; (ii) consent shall not be allowed as a defence if the victim (a) has been subjected to or threatened with or has had reason to fear violence, duress, detention or psychological oppression, or (b) reasonably believed that if the victim did not submit, another might be so subjected, threatened or put in fear; (iii) before evidence of the victim’s consent is admitted, the accused shall satisfy the Trial Chamber in camera that the evidence is relevant and credible: (iv) prior sexual conduct of the victim shall not be admitted in evidence.”¹⁵⁰
174. Sierra Leone is a signatory to the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC). The Rome Statute of the ICC¹⁵¹ does not apply to the events occurring in Sierra Leone, as the treaty is not retroactive. The Rome Statute of the ICC lists a significant range of sexual crimes as both war crimes and acts constituting crimes against humanity. These acts include rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisation and any other form of sexual violence. In addition, the Rome Statute has recognised persecution based on gender as a crime against humanity. In addition to the explicit naming of these crimes of sexual and gender violence, the ICC encompasses the principle of gender integration implemented by the ad-hoc tribunals,

¹⁴⁶ The Prosecutors of the ICTY have issued indictments treating rape as a crime against humanity in several cases, for example: *Prosecutor v. Meakic and Others*, Indictment as amended 2 June 1998, Case No. IT-95-4; *Prosecutor v Jankovic and Others*, Indictment Case No. IT-96-23, as amended 7 Oct 1999; for the ICTR, see *Prosecutor v. Emanza*, Indictment, Case No ICTR-97-20.

¹⁴⁷ *Furundzija and Celibici Judgements* of the ICTY, *Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic*, IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Appeal Chambers, 12 June 2002; on rape as torture and forced nakedness as inhuman treatment see *Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu*, Trial Judgement, case ICTR-96-4-T, Ch.1,2 Sept 1998, at paragraphs 687 and 697.

¹⁴⁸ *Furundzija and Celibici Judgements*, *Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic*, IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Appeal Chambers, 12 June 2002.

¹⁴⁹ In Sierra Leone almost all alleged sexual offences require corroboration.

¹⁵⁰ See the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, Rules of Procedure and Evidence U.N.Doc. IT/32/Rev.17, Rule 96 (1994).

¹⁵¹ See the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, UN DOC. No. A/CONF.183/9,37 I.L.M 999, entered into force on 1 July 2002.

meaning that to avoid discrimination, these crimes may also be prosecuted as non-sex specific crimes of violence; for example rape is clearly recognised and prosecuted as the crime of torture.

175. The Elements of Crime document annexed to the Rome Statute designed as a non-binding guide to the Court, which details the suggested elements for each crime, makes it clear that crimes of sexual violence can also be prosecuted as other crimes of violence, such as torture or mutilation, thus adopting the approach of the ad-hoc Tribunals.
176. The Statute of the Special Court in Sierra Leone gives the Court jurisdiction to try cases occurring since 30 November 1996. Crimes the Court will prosecute are crimes against humanity, which includes gender-based crimes of rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy any other form of sexual violence when committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack against civilian population.¹⁵² Rape, enforced prostitution and any other form of indecent assault can be prosecuted as violations of humanitarian law in Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II. The Special Court Statute ignores the more forward-looking provisions of the Rome Statute, instead utilising the wording of Article 4(2)(e) of the Additional Protocol II.

Applying international law to the Sierra Leone conflict

177. It is necessary to reiterate that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission is not tasked with establishing criminal guilt for the violations committed during the conflict. This task forms the core mandate of the Special Court of Sierra Leone, whose aim is “prosecute those who bear the greatest responsibility” for the above categories of crimes. However, upon reviewing the acts of sexual violence committed in Sierra Leone, the TRC assesses that in all probability these acts meet the elements of war crimes and crimes against humanity.
178. There is no doubt that sexual violence against women was closely associated with war in that it occurred as part of the rewards of war and as a weapon of war – it was committed to achieve the humiliation and degradation of women, and of the enemy, men and of the community. The war provided the opportunity for the most grotesque and brutal forms of violence against women.

Crimes of sexual and gender-based violence

179. The Rome Statute and the Statute of the Special Court of Sierra Leone list the sexual crimes of rape, sexual slavery, forced pregnancy, enforced prostitution, enforced sterilisation and other sexual violence. While the Rome Statute includes these crimes as both crimes against humanity and war crimes, the Statute of the Special Court does not explicitly recognise any of these sexual violence crimes, except for the crimes of rape and enforced prostitution, as war crimes. The Commission has dealt with sexual violence on the basis of internationally recognisable crimes.

¹⁵² See the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, at Article 2. A copy of the statute and further detail on the tribunal can be found on the website: www.sc-sl.org.

Definitions of crimes of sexual violence

Rape¹⁵³

180. The ICTR and the Celibici Trial Chamber of the ICTY have defined rape as a physical invasion of a sexual nature.¹⁵⁴ The ICC Elements and other ICTY jurisprudence have added more detailed descriptions of the invasion.¹⁵⁵ Under the more detailed definition, rape involves penetration however slight of the vagina or anus by a penis, object or other body part or of any other body part by a penis.
181. The definition of rape (as well as of forced prostitution and other sexual violence) includes a broad concept of force including threat thereof and coercion, “such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or the invasion was committed against a person incapable of giving genuine consent.”¹⁵⁶ Coercion can result from threats to harm the victim or to harm a third party, including but not limited to a family member, with the knowledge that it will operate as coercion for the victim. The force/ coercion element is intended to be broad and the jurisprudence indicates that in certain circumstances, for example, armed conflict, or in the case of the military presence of militiamen or combatants exercising, coercion may be inherent.¹⁵⁷ Thus, the presence of armed combatants in a village exerting temporary power and control will be sufficient to meet the coercive element. The Kunarac Trial and Appeal Judgements added that it is sufficient if shown that the invasion was against the woman’s will.¹⁵⁸ Examples of rape in the Sierra Leone conflict abound.
182. In terms of the element of force or coercion, the examples of rape in Sierra Leone reflect both situations of both force and coercion. The Rome Statute, echoing the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals, provides in its Rules relating to the evidence of sexual violence and applicable to rape and to other crimes of sexual violence, that even if the victim agrees or fails to object, rape is committed so long as the coercion undermines the victim’s capacity to give genuine consent.¹⁵⁹ Sexual invasion of minors, so prevalent in Sierra Leone, is *per se* rape.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵³ See the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, at Articles 7(1)(g) (crimes against humanity) and 8(2)(e) (non international war crimes). See also the ICC Elements, Article 7(1)(g)-1 and 8(2)(e)(vi)-1. See also the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, at Article 2(g).

¹⁵⁴ See the *Celibici Judgement* of the ICTY.

¹⁵⁵ See the ICC Elements, at Articles 7(1)(g)(i) and 8(2)(b)(xxii) and 8(2)(e)(vi). See also the *Furundzija Judgement* of the ICTY.

¹⁵⁶ The concept of “invasion” is intended to be broad enough to be gender-neutral. It is understood that a person may be incapable of giving genuine consent if affected by natural, induced or age-related incapacity. See the ICC Elements of Crime and Procedure, UN Doc.Off ICC-ASP/1/3, at Article 7(1)(g)(i).

¹⁵⁷ See *Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu*, Trial Judgement, case ICTR-96-4-T, Ch.1, 2 Sept 1998, at paragraph 688.

¹⁵⁸ See *Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic*, IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Appeal Chambers, 12 June 2002.

¹⁵⁹ See the ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ICC-ASP/1/3, Rule 70 (a),(b),(c).

¹⁶⁰ As a final point on the question of rape, it should be noted the ICC Rules contain very strict provisions against the admission of prior sexual conduct of the victim in considering the crime.

Sexual slavery¹⁶¹

183. The two essential elements unique to the crime of sexual slavery are the “exercise of any of all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over one or more persons...” and the forced participation in one or more acts of sexual violence.¹⁶² The ICC adds the requirement that this be accomplished by such acts as “purchasing selling, lending or bartering such a person or [persons, or by imposing on them a similar deprivation of liberty” which can include reducing a person to a servile status under the international law or forced labour. Sexual slavery is a form of enslavement identified by the fact that the perpetrator must cause the victim(s) to engage in one or more acts of a sexual nature.
184. Forced “marriage” is a form of sexual slavery as is the detention of women in “rape camps” or any circumstances under which women are subjected repeatedly to rape or the threat of rape or any other sexual violence. In Sierra Leone, as well as in many other conflicts, women and girls were given as “wives” to commanders and combatants. These sexual slaves are widely referred to as “bush wives”. When “forced marriage” involves forced sex or the inability to control sexual access or exercise sexual autonomy, which, by definition, forced marriage almost always does, it constitutes sexual slavery, as recognised by the Special Rapporteur for Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-Like Practices during Armed Conflict.¹⁶³

Forced pregnancy¹⁶⁴

185. As a result of the highly contentious negotiations, both the Rome Statute and the ICC Elements provide an excessively narrow definition of forced pregnancy: “The perpetrator confined one or more women, forcibly making them pregnant, with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of any population or carrying out other grave violations of international law.”¹⁶⁵ In the case of Sierra Leone, there are reported examples of women who became pregnant and were not permitted by their rapist or another to obtain abortion. The concept of “forced pregnancy,” first articulated officially in the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action¹⁶⁶ referred however to the confinement or other means of preventing pregnant women from obtaining abortion.

¹⁶¹ See Enslavement (crimes against humanity) in the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, at Articles 7(1)(g) and 7(2)(c). See also the ICC Elements, at Articles 7(1)(g)-2 and 8(2)(e)(vi)-2. See also the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, at Article 2(g)-2.

¹⁶² See the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, at Article 7(2)(c). See also the ICC Elements, at Articles 7(1)(g)-2 and 8(2)(e)(vi)-2.

¹⁶³ See McDougall, G., Special Rapporteur for Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices during Armed Conflict, final report produced as UN Document E/CN.4/sub.2/1998/13, 12 June 1998, at paragraph 45.

¹⁶⁴ See the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, at Article 7(1)(g). See also the ICC Elements, at Articles 8(2)(e) and 8(2)(e)(vi)-3.

¹⁶⁵ See the ICC Elements, at Article 7(1)(g)-4f.

¹⁶⁶ See the Declaration and Programme of Action, U.N World Conference on Human Rights, adopted in Vienna on 25 June 1993, A/Conf.157/23.

Enforced sterilisation¹⁶⁷

186. The ICC Elements define enforced sterilisation as follows: “The perpetrator deprived one or more persons of biological reproductive capacity” and “the conduct was neither justified by the medicine or hospital treatment of the person or persons concerned nor carried out with their genuine consent.”¹⁶⁸ It includes acts committed upon women including during the war in Sierra Leone, such as the removal of foetus, uterus, castration, destruction of reproductive organs, as well as medical sterilisation without consent. Although this crime is not listed in the Sierra Leone Special Court Statute, the mutilation of Sierra Leonean women by disembowelling them, the cutting open of the uterus which leads to the removal of the foetus results in sterilisation should be recognised as enforced sterilisation at the same time as these acts also qualify as “other sexual violence.” The numerous acts of violence on pregnant women that were reported include the cutting open of a pregnant woman’s uterus and the removal of the foetus, the mutilation of her organs thus constitute enforced sterilisation as well as mutilation and cruel and inhuman treatment.

Other forms of sexual violence¹⁶⁹

187. Sexual violence as a war crime must be “serious” in dimension or, as a crime against humanity, of “comparable gravity” to the other crimes against humanity.¹⁷⁰ The ICC Elements define sexual violence to encompass both involuntary sexual assaults and sexual performance. The definition thus applies to coercion resulting in sexual entertainment or nakedness.
188. The scope of sexual violence is broad. The Akayesu Trial Chamber of the ICTR stated that, “sexual violence is not limited to physical invasion of the human body and may include acts which do not involve penetration or even physical contact.”¹⁷¹ It relates to the lack of sexual autonomy, which is violated wherever the person subjected to the act has not freely agreed to it or is otherwise not a voluntary participant.”¹⁷² It could include biological and medical experimentation of sexual nature or experimentation on reproductive capacities, sexual mutilations, harassment and threats of rape or other sexual violence. Forcing a woman to lick a penis (which might also constitute rape) or to perform sexual acts that are not rape, such as cutting or sexual touching of the body or breasts, are forms of sexual violence.

¹⁶⁷ See the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, at Articles 7(1)(g) (crimes against humanity) and 8(2)(e) (non international war crimes). See also the ICC Elements, Article 7(1)(g)-5 and 8(2)(e)(vi)-5. See also the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which does not list this act as a crime.

¹⁶⁸ See the ICC Elements, at Article 7(1)(g)-5. The deprivation is not intended to include birth control measures ,which have a non-permanent effect in practice. It is understood that “genuine consent” does not include consent obtained through deception.

¹⁶⁹ See the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, at Articles Article 7(1)(g) and 8(2)(e)(vi); ICC Elements supra Article 7(1)(g)-6 and 8(2)(e)(vi)-6; and SC-SL statute Article 2(g)-5

¹⁷⁰ The ICC Elements require that the sexual violence be of comparable gravity to the other sexual and reproductive crimes. To the extent that might result in a lower standard for inhuman treatment than for sexual violence, this addition in the ICC Elements would either be discriminatory or the lesser form of sexual violence, would have to be prosecuted as inhuman treatment.

¹⁷¹ See *Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu*, Trial Judgement, case ICTR-96-4-T, Ch.1, 2 Sept 1998, at paragraphs 687 to 697.

¹⁷² See *Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, et al* before the ICTY Trial Chamber, at paragraph 457.

189. Most acts which constitute sexual violence today were historically incorporated in the concept of offences against honour and humiliating and degrading treatment, now independently codified as a war crime in the Rome Statute, Article 8(2)(c)(iii).¹⁷³ The adoption of the clause describing the crime of sexual violence in the war crimes articles – “also constituting a grave breach of [or for non-international armed conflict, a “serious violation of article 3 common to the four”] Geneva Conventions”¹⁷⁴ – was specifically intended to declare the status of the sexual violence crimes as comparable to grave breaches, which are the most serious violations recognised under humanitarian law.¹⁷⁵ While sexual violence can be charged under both rubrics, it is important not to utilise the rubric of humiliating or degrading treatment to diminish the understanding that all forms of sexual violence, whether or not they involve touching, constitute physical and/or mental violence against the person rather than offences based on morality and honour. The Rome Statute rightly recognised the historic failure to treat sexual offences as crimes of the most severe violence and has now named them explicitly as crimes of violence.
190. Sexual and gender based crimes constitute crimes against humanity through gender neutral qualifications when they meet all the elements of crimes or torture, enslavement, persecution, other inhuman act in crimes against humanity (widespread or systematic attack, against civilians with the knowledge that the crimes constitute a part of the attack). This “gender integrated’ understanding of gender-based violence has been accepted by the ICTR and ICTY and is a critical protection against gender-based discrimination.

Torture (crime against humanity and war crime)

191. In the international criminal instruments, the crime of torture is codified as both crimes against humanity (Article 7 (1)(f) of the Rome Statute) and war crimes (Article 8 of the Rome Statute). In the Rome Statute, the *actus reus* of torture as a crime against humanity requires only “the infliction of severe physical or mental pain or suffering on one or more persons.... [who] were in the custody or under the control of the perpetrator.” Torture as a war crime requires in addition that the severe pain or suffering be “for such purposes as: obtaining information or a confession, punishment, intimidation or coercion for any reason based on discrimination of any kind.” In this sense the latter definition is more similar to the purpose requirement contained in the UN Convention Against Torture.¹⁷⁶ It should be noted that the purpose requirement is not a specific intent requirement, but is to be objectively determined as was originally intended to broaden beyond interrogation the recognised goals of torture. It should also be noted as well that the right not to be tortured is one of the fundamental rights of a non-derogable nature, i.e. it is a *jus cogens* norm.¹⁷⁷

¹⁷³ For definition of this crime, see the ICC elements, at Article 8(2)(c)(ii). The ICTY has also defined the crime in similar terms; “An outrage upon personal dignity is “any act or omission which would be generally considered to cause serious humiliation or otherwise be a serious attack on human dignity. The statute does not require that the perpetrator must intend to humiliate the victim, that he perpetuated the act for that very reason. It is sufficient that he knew that his act or omission could have that effect: See *Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, et al* before the ICTY Trial Chamber, at paragraphs 507 and 773-774.

¹⁷⁴ See the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, at Article 7(1)(h).

¹⁷⁵ See Steains, C.; “Gender Issues / Gender Crimes” in Lee, R. (ed.), *The International Criminal Court: the Making of the Rome Statute – Issues, Negotiations, Results*, Kluwer, The Hague, 1999.

¹⁷⁶ See the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Treatment or Punishment, 23 ILM 1027, entered into force on 26 June 1987.

¹⁷⁷ See the *Furundzija Judgement* of the ICTY, at paragraphs 153 and 154.

192. Rape and other forms of sexual violence also constitute torture under international human rights and humanitarian law. This is not only clear from other horrific examples provided heretofore, but it has been recognised explicitly in the ICTY and ICTR decisions as well as the Rome Statute, as discussed above. Most recently the Kunarac Appeal Chambers made clear that the severity of pain and suffering inflicted by rape constitutes torture. It should be noted that, despite error in an early ICTY opinion, there is no longer any requirement [as is required in human rights law] that the person committing the torture have official status when the torture is committed in the framework of war crimes or crimes against humanity.
193. It must also be underscored that torture may be inflicted against a person through the infliction or threat of infliction of sexual or other violence on a third person. When children or spouses or parents are sexually threatened or assaulted in front of another family member that is recognised as a form of torture. Thus in Sierra Leone, it is torture when daughters, including virgin daughters, are raped in front of their fathers or mothers, or when a breastfeeding woman is raped in front of her son. It has also been judged that forced observance of sexual violence inflicted on a woman engaged with a man caused him severe physical and mental suffering.¹⁷⁸ Torture is also committed when family members are killed while others are forced to observe. The seizing of a child from its mother and killing it in front of her is also a particularly gendered form of torture, targeted as it is at her role as mother.

Enslavement (crime against humanity)

194. Enslavement is named as a crime against humanity (Art. 7(1)(c) Rome Statute and Art. 2(c) Special Court Statute). It is also prohibited by numerous international human rights and humanitarian law instruments and is one of the original universally condemned crimes under customary international law. Enslavement is also a jus cogens violation.¹⁷⁹ The sexual form of enslavement is now codified as “sexual slavery”. Beyond that enslavement takes many forms, some of them gendered. Young girls and boys, men and women can be enslaved in one of many ways: in domestic labour, mining, arms factory, demining and medical experiments. It becomes a gender crime when an individual is enslaved because of his or her particular function in the society: women used for domestic labour (cooking, washing, cleaning, and serving, educating children), men for transport or fighting, young girls for spying, girls and women for sex and reproduction.

¹⁷⁸ See the *Furundzija Judgement* of the ICTY, at paragraph 267.

¹⁷⁹ See Bassiouni, C., “Sources and Theory of International Criminal Law” in *International Criminal Law*, Vol. I, Crimes, 2nd edition, Transnational, New York; at pages 79 - 80 and 663. See also ICJ, *Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company Ltd*, 1970 Report 3, 32, at paragraphs 32 – 34.

195. In the Kunarac Judgement, the ICTY recognised that both forced domestic labour and sexual services of women and girls constituted enslavement¹⁸⁰. The essential element of enslavement as discussed above the exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership. This has been elaborated by the Kunarac Appeals Chamber to include restriction or control of an individual's autonomy, restriction of freedom or choice or freedom of movement, extraction of forced or compulsory labour or service, often without remuneration though not necessarily, involving physical hardship: sex: and human trafficking. Enslavement may be accompanied by a claim of exclusivity; torture, cruel treatment and abuse including sexual; and other means of psychological as well as physical control. Enslavement does not require a showing to non-consent since the exercise of free will by the victim may be irrelevant or impossible because of the coercive environment. It does not require detention or the absence of any avenues of escape. It may also be the product of a commercial exchange, but this condition is clearly not required.¹⁸¹

Other inhuman acts (crimes against humanity)

196. Other inhuman acts are also categorised as crimes against humanity (Art.7 (1)(k) Rome Statute and Art.2 (i) Special Court Statute) and encompass acts that are of similar gravity and seriousness by comparison to the enumerated crimes. These will be acts or omissions deliberately causing serious mental and physical suffering or injury or constitute a serious attack on human dignity.¹⁸² Such acts need not amount to the severity of torture although the distinction is not a clear one and needs to be examined in context. To the extent there are serious sexual and gender crimes that are not mentioned in the Special Court Statute (e.g. enforced sterilisation and gender based persecution), they will clearly qualify as other inhuman acts.

Mutilation (war crime)

197. The crime of mutilation has been listed as a war crime by Art 8(2)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute and the ICC Elements explain mutilation as permanent disfigurement or permanently disabling or removing an organ or appendage under circumstances that are not medically justified. ICC Elements, Article 8(2) (c) (i)-2. Consequently, sexual mutilation includes disfiguring or removing a woman's breasts, face or other part of the body; removing the uterus or foetus of a woman; burning and cutting sexual organs and breasts, burning and cutting the vagina. It is clear that the reported cases of cutting open women to remove the foetus constitute mutilation as well as torture and enforced sterilisation.

¹⁸⁰ The elements have been developed in *Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, et al* before the ICTY Trial Chamber, at paragraphs 542 and 543.

¹⁸¹ See *Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic*, IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Appeal Chambers, 12 June 2002.

¹⁸² See *Kayishema Trial Judgement*, Case ICTR 95-1-T., Ch.II, 21 May 1999, at paragraph 151.

Cruel treatment (war crime)

198. Cruel treatment involves an act or omission that knowingly causes serious mental or physical suffering or injury, or constitutes a serious attack on human dignity.¹⁸³ Treatment that does not meet the purpose requirements of torture may constitute cruel treatment.¹⁸⁴ For example, the following acts constitute “cruel treatment”: forced nakedness and terrorising and threatening physical and sexual violence.
199. While the Commission is not charged with establishing criminal responsibility, nevertheless it has summarised the key elements of crimes of sexual violence as well as the threshold requirements for crimes amounting to war crimes and crimes against humanity.

EXPERIENCES OF WOMEN AND GIRLS DURING THE CONFLICT IN SIERRA LEONE

200. Women and girls in Sierra Leone were deliberately targeted by all of the armed groups involved in the conflict in Sierra Leone. They suffered a multiplicity of violations at the hands of their abusers. The violations included a range of sexual crimes such as rape, sexual slavery, forced pregnancy, and other crimes of sexual violence. Women and girls also suffered abductions, enslavement, torture and forced labour. Many women and girls were also killed in the most brutal circumstances. Many women and girls became displaced, many were forced to flee and become refugees. They also suffered extortion and looting. Despite their experiences, brutal though they were, many have managed to survive and have offered their testimonies to the Commission.
201. Of the 40,684 violations with gender recorded in the Commission’s database, 13318, or 32.7%, have female victims. The most common violation in the Commission’s database is forced displacement, which accounts for 23.5% of the violations against women but only 19.3% of the violations against men. Other common violations against women in the Commission’s database are abduction (15.7%) and arbitrary detention (12.0%).¹⁸⁵
202. In the main, women and girls experienced the conflict as victims. However, many women and girls were compelled to become perpetrators in order to survive. Many others chose to be willing collaborators and perpetrators. The Commission’s analysis of how women made choices is that, in the main, they rose to the challenge of staying alive, looking after loved ones, protecting and assisting others, often at great risk to themselves, and still display the courage to tell of their experiences. The Commission explores the whole array of different experiences effecting women and girls in the sections that follow.

¹⁸³ See the *Celebici Trial Judgement* of the ICTY, at paragraph 552. See also ICC Elements, at Article 8(2)(c)(i)-3.

¹⁸⁴ See the *Celebici Trial Judgement* of the ICTY, at paragraph 552.

¹⁸⁵ More detail on violations rates and the levels of different violations experienced by women can be found in the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

VIOLATIONS AND ABUSES AGAINST WOMEN

203. Women and girls in Sierra Leone suffered specific offences on account of their gender. In terms of the Commission's statistics, more than 32% of the violations recorded by the Commission were perpetrated against women.¹⁸⁶ The testimonies given to the Commission by women and girls clearly demonstrate that there was a deliberate strategy to target them because of their gender for violations of a gender-based nature.

204. The violations that women and girls experienced were characterised by the most extraordinary, inexplicable acts of violence, leaving many of them permanently scarred. Many witnesses told the Commission of how they still relive the horror of it all in their minds. One of the victims who came before the Commission told of what she witnessed:

“At Christmas time, I decided to spend it in the village of Konima since that was my husband's home. About morning time, the RUF attacked the village; I escaped, but they killed several people... An old blind woman was given cassava to eat; they (RUF rebels) caught her and beat her to death... Mariama Kalilu was a pregnant woman... When they met her in the room, they split her stomach open and abandoned her until she completely decomposed. They also caught one of my daughters who was a scholar and sexed her to death as she kept screaming until she was dead... Another suckling mother was shot dead and her baby kept playing with her remains for four days and by the time elders could decide to come back for the baby, she too was now dead. They were not buried but left for birds to help themselves...”¹⁸⁷.

205. Another victim recounted the experience that led to the death of her son:

“We hid and left the town and reached a village called Fabu where we rested. We took the route to Senehun, a town on Bo highway, to get transport for Bo town. Upon reaching the town, we saw a crowd of people standing in a line: everyone was asked to dance. Sons-in-law were to dance with their mothers-in-law and sons with their mothers, so my son and I started dancing. The instruction was we should hold each other's private parts and ask it how it was doing. There was a song for this exercise. My son, being shocked and filled with shame, couldn't follow the instructions properly. I danced properly so that the rebels won't take notice of my son's stubbornness and kill him. However, after the dancing exercise my son was slaughtered right in front of me. They gave me his head, which I refused to hold. At this point I fled with other people and the rebels started shooting behind us, but as God could have it we managed to cross the river.”¹⁸⁸

¹⁸⁶ More detail on violations rates and the levels of different violations experienced by women can be found in the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

¹⁸⁷ Theresa Blackie, TRC statement, Bo Kakua, 16 December 2002.

¹⁸⁸ TRC confidential statement recorded in Bo District, 24 March 2003.

206. Women and girls constituted a particularly vulnerable group who could be exploited and brutalised. While they were themselves the victims of multiple violations and abuses, they were also forced to witness family members, neighbours, friends and relatives being killed, raped and tortured.¹⁸⁹ Torture in international law may be inflicted against a person through the infliction or the threat of infliction of violence on a third person. Age was not respected; neither did it offer any immunity from being violated. Both young and old were abused in the most egregious fashion, as is shown by this testimony of a 70-year-old woman who made a statement to the Commission:

“During the 1998 attack on Baybema, I was captured together with my grand children and my daughter-in-law... One day, to my surprise as an old woman, my two hands were tied together, my braid on my head was scrapped, pepper rubbed in my eyes and I was gang-raped... If I can recall well, about four men used me forcefully.”¹⁹⁰

207. Testimonies before the Commission confirmed that all the major armed groups in the conflict perpetrated violations against women. Government security forces, civil militia and opposing armed factions were all at different times in the conflict responsible for violations against women.¹⁹¹ A female health worker shared this experience of the conflict with the Commission:

“It was in 1991 in Golahun Tunkia, Tunkia Chiefdom, Kenema district... when RUF rebels attacked the town in the morning. The RUF rebels went purposely for me; they came to take me as a commander’s wife, because the boy I was working with had told them I was a beautiful woman for their commando... The inhabitants of that town escaped with me through the bush to a town called Baoma Koya... On hearing about me, my husband hired a vehicle to bring me to Kenema with my three children... On my way to Kenema, there was a checkpoint called Teoma between Kenema and Gofor... I was stripped naked with my husband... Then in 1993, I was posted to Nongowa chiefdom, Kenema district. I was there for a year when combat uniformed men again attacked the village... In 1997 during the junta rule, we were threatened that we were informants. And on 8 February 1998 during “Operation Pay Yourself” the Kamajors entered the house and took our belongings, money and everything and they went away. Three sets of factions wearing combats came to our house the very day. They took off the door from the house and the house was left opened... we lost everything. Kamajors also threatened to kill us. They stole a generator from the Merlin hospital and put it in front of my house. We begged them to return it but they refused, so my husband reported them to the ECOMOG. This made the Kamajors threaten us for several nights. There was no one to be trusted.”¹⁹²

¹⁸⁹ See, for example, Sayo Koroma, TRC statement, Freetown, 1 March 2003.

¹⁹⁰ TRC confidential statement recorded in Kono District, 4 March 2003.

¹⁹¹ See, for example, Tity Koroma, TRC statement, Bonthe Town, 13 December, 2002; TRC confidential statement from a female victim, recorded in Gbangbatoke, 5 February 2003; and Mariama Sam, TRC statement, Ngordohun Gbameh, Kono, 27 February 2003.

¹⁹² TRC confidential statement recorded in Kenema District, 7 December 2002.

ABDUCTION

208. Abductions have become a major characteristic of the recent conflicts in Africa, with armed perpetrator groupings kidnapping young girls and boys with the express purpose of compelling them to become combatants and / or to use them for a number of different purposes. Most of the armed perpetrator groupings in Sierra Leone were responsible for the crime of abduction, with the RUF being the major violator. A characteristic of abduction in Sierra Leone was that you were likely to have suffered this violation if you were a young boy or young girl.
209. The violation of abduction placed the abductees under the absolute control of their perpetrator grouping, which then gave the perpetrators a licence to commit a range of further violations against the abductees. These violations included being coerced into becoming a combatant, being compelled to perform forced labour, or forced into sexual slavery and forced marriage. In terms of testimony collected by the Commission, a total of 6,054 abductions were recorded in the Commission's database. Women account for 2,096 of recorded violations.¹⁹³ While all the armed groups stand accused of perpetrating this violation, the Commission has found that the RUF was responsible for the highest number of abductions.¹⁹⁴ The RUF is responsible for 1,368 (65,3%) of the Commission's recorded violations against women and 2,337 (59,3%) of the Commission's recorded violations against men.¹⁹⁵
210. The act of abduction placed the victim under the total control of the perpetrator grouping. Women were particularly vulnerable, as they were deliberately abducted in order to be exploited for the purposes of sexual violence, forced labour and sexual slavery.¹⁹⁶ Young girls were deeply traumatised by the experience as they were snatched from the bosom of their families, forced to endure separation from family members and the society they belonged to, raped and sexually brutalised and forced to endure a brutally savage life to which they were unaccustomed. Many died in captivity.
211. A former abductee of the RUF testified to the Commission of her experiences:

"I was forcefully conscripted into the rebel army to become a sex instrument for the rebel commanders, though I was a virgin... during our stay in the camp, we were visited by Corporal Foday Sankoh, whom we referred to, as "Popay"... My duties were to prepare food and to satisfy my "bush husband" anytime he needs me. After six months my "bush husband" Captain Kemokai left me to fight... he got missing in action. At that time I was four months pregnant... Later I became wife to another Commander named Mohammed. As usual, my duties were to prepare food and to satisfy him sexually, any time he needs me."¹⁹⁷

¹⁹³ More detail on violations rates and the levels of different violations experienced by women can be found in the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

¹⁹⁴ More detail on the violations rates of the particular perpetrator factions can be found in the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

¹⁹⁵ See the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

¹⁹⁶ See the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

¹⁹⁷ TRC confidential statement from a female victim, recorded in Gbangbatoke, 5 February 2003.

Another former abductee described her ordeal to the Commission in the following terms:

“In Bongeh, I was repeatedly raped by groups of rebels coming from different localities. I was nursing mother of a two-month-old baby at that time and I was abducted for two months and two weeks. During my period of abduction I was also beaten on several occasions and whenever I resisted their sexual harassment, I was threatened with their guns. At one time, one of the rebels fired his gun through my legs... I later got forcefully married to “DU-DU Boy” as my “bush husband”. I was then assigned to the responsibilities of doing all the laundry, cooking their food, ironing their clothes and many other household duties. Most of their clothes had blood stains on them. Some of the female abductees who refused to have sex with them were killed. That gave me the cause to yield to their sexual demands in order to save my life. My child had died during my abduction.”¹⁹⁸

212. Women were abducted in a myriad of places, including their homes in villages or towns, from the bush or while they were walking along the road,¹⁹⁹ or during ambushes. Abductions kept the numbers high in the armed groupings and became a mechanism for armed groups like the RUF to service various needs besides swelling the ranks, as abductees served as porters, advance troops, sexual slaves and forced labour. Abductees were also required to carry items that had been looted.²⁰⁰ As a result of the war, a large number of women were separated from children and spouses and also suffered years of horrendous abuse in the hands of their abductors even as some died in the process and never made it back to their families. Young girls were separated for many years from their families and many did not make it back.
213. The Commission finds that all of the armed groups pursued a deliberate strategy of targeting women and young girls between the ages of 13 and 22, abducting them for the sole purpose of keeping them under their control, exercising rights of ownership over them and exploiting their vulnerability, coercing them into becoming combatants, using them as sexual slaves, sexually violating them and using them for the purposes of forced labour and servicing the needs of the armed group. The RUF, of all the armed groups, is found to have been the major perpetrator of abduction and related violations.

¹⁹⁸ TRC confidential statement recorded in Upper Banta Chiefdom, 15 February 2003.

¹⁹⁹ See, for example, Mariama Sam, TRC statement, Ngodorhun Gbaneh, Kono, 27 February 2003.

²⁰⁰ See, for example, TRC confidential statement recorded in Port Loko District, 30 April 2003.

FORCED RECRUITMENT

214. Flowing from the violation of abduction, a number of other violations occurred including forced recruitment. The Commission was not able to compile accurate statistics on the number of women ex-combatants involved in the conflict.²⁰¹ However according to the NCDDR, 513 girl ex-combatants below the age of 18 years went through the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Process.²⁰² This represents 5% of the total number of ex-combatants who participated in the DDR process.²⁰³ The NCDDR recorded a total of 5,058 adult female ex-combatants.²⁰⁴ It further broke down the figure amongst the major fighting forces for women (adult female) as follows: RUF – 3,922; AFRC – 400; CDF – 296; and SLA – 107.²⁰⁵
215. The NCDDR statistics also do not accurately reflect the number of women who joined voluntarily or those who were forcibly recruited into becoming combatants. There are a number of reasons for this omission. At the end of the conflict, many women were reluctant to be identified as ex-combatants, as they were fearful of the reaction that it might evoke from the civilian population. Another reason was the failure of those in charge of the demobilisation process to make appropriate arrangements to include women and girl ex-combatants in their programmes. Many women and girls ex-combatants were therefore excluded, as well as not being properly identified and correctly registered in the DDR programmes.
216. Women were routinely abducted during attacks and during routine patrols. Once abducted women and girls were coerced into handling arms and taught to fight. The following victim gave a typical account of what happened next:

“They took away everything we had including me. My mother begged them in vain to release me but “Sergeant Small Soldier” – for that was the name of the rebel that abducted me – refused... he took me to Walihun... which by then was their headquarters... then the Kamajors attacked us, so we moved to Jimmi Bagbo and Koribundo area... That was the camp where the girls and women were separated from the boys and men. We were left to the command of women rebels who maltreated us greatly... we were all trained to fight as rebels. We were only given a handful of gari (empty and dry) per day. We were sent to raid neighbouring villages to loot food and bring it back. If anybody disobeyed, you were cruelly beaten.”²⁰⁶

²⁰¹ See the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report for a discussion of areas on which the Commission's database cannot provide definitive figures and projections.

²⁰² See Executive Secretariat of National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR), Monitoring and Evaluation Unit; *Report on numbers of Children and Women that went through Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration Process*; 9 September, 2003 (hereinafter “NCDDR, *Numbers of Women and Children that went through DDR*”).

²⁰³ See NCDDR, *Numbers of Women and Children that went through DDR*, at page 3.

²⁰⁴ See NCDDR, *Numbers of Women and Children that went through DDR*, at page 4.

²⁰⁵ See NCDDR, *Numbers of Women and Children that went through DDR*, at page 4.

²⁰⁶ TRC confidential statement recorded in Bo District, 9 December 2002.

217. In April 1998 this woman was forcefully recruited by the RUF. She recounted her story in her statement to the Commission:

“I was about to go to town, when suddenly four men appeared before us holding guns and knives in their hands. They said they were RUF from Kailahun... after a month we were taken to Kailahun to be trained. Now I am a victim, a witness and a perpetrator... Superman forced me to go with others to attack Kono. We went but later we retreated.”²⁰⁷

MUTILATION

218. Women and girls abducted were compelled to remain with the fighting forces throughout the conflict. It was only with disarmament that they were able to leave. A number of women and girls told the Commission how they tried to escape. Punishment was harsh if they were recaptured. They suffered even further when the fighting force to which they belonged deliberately marked them on their chests by carving the initials of the particular fighting force on it. This was a deliberate strategy on the part of the RUF and the AFRC.²⁰⁸ Marking abductees in this way prevented their escape, as to run the risk of being identified as a member of the RUF or AFRC would be to risk death. A girl who was 13 years old at the time she was abducted by the RUF told the Commission her story:

“I was captured together with five other girls and taken to their base at Matru Jong. I was captured by a man called “Delawey” (a Sierra Leonean), who also had been captured and sent to Liberia for training... When we attempted to escape, we were caught by another set of RUF members, who beat us and brought us back to base. At the base we were trained to become fighters for six months... if any one becomes tired they shot the person dead... After the training, they forced people to take up guns and attack villages... All those who attempted to run were caught and labelled RUF with knife, blade or a very sharp stick. Also in the bush, I got a man whom I gave birth for. He is still my husband.”²⁰⁹

219. The Commission’s statistics confirm that there was a deliberate policy on the part of the RUF and AFRC to target girls and women between the ages of 13 and 24 and forcibly “brand” them with the acronyms of the fighting forces.²¹⁰ Mutilation has been listed as a war crime under Art 8(2)(c)(i) of the Rome Statute. The ICC elements define mutilation as a permanent disfigurement or permanent disabling or removing an organ or appendage under circumstances that are not medically justified. The Commission finds that the RUF and the AFRC were responsible for the mutilation of women and young girls in that they carved the initials of their particular armed faction on the chests of women and girls with the intention of permanently disfiguring them, holding them hostage and discouraging them from escaping.

²⁰⁷ TRC confidential statement recorded in Kailahun District, 14 December 2002.

²⁰⁸ See, for example, TRC interviews with two former RUF junior commandos who stayed in the movement from 1991 until the end of the conflict, interviews conducted in Kailahun, July 2003.

²⁰⁹ TRC confidential statement recorded in Cline Town, Freetown, 13 January 2003.

²¹⁰ See the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

DETENTION

220. In terms of statements made by women and girls to the Commission, more than 1,061 violations of detention during the conflict were recorded in the Commission's database.²¹¹ Detainees were forced to move with the fighting forces and were held in many locations under the most terrible conditions.²¹² One victim described to the Commission the conditions in which she and others found themselves:

"...They instructed other rebels to escort us to Bumpeh, then they took us there. They packed all of us in a very small house, and held us where we could not even sit down, so we all stood up with all our children..."²¹³

221. A victim detained with her husband in 1994 also told of her experience:

"In 1994, we experienced the first attack on our village by the rebels. We fled for our lives to escape death; unfortunately when another attack was made, we could not escape into the bush and all of us were captured... I and my husband were invited by the rebels to their residence where they locked both of us in a big box and poured dirty water on us ..." ²¹⁴

222. Women reported to the Commission that they were often beaten and tortured while detained for the flimsiest of reasons:

"One evening, the rebels SK and AB came to me... A small boy who held the gun hit my buttocks and he said I talked about the war they were fighting... They had soldiers and they took me away. I told them that I was not the one who said those words but they said I was the one and as a result, they were going to kill me...I was beaten and later he put me in their cell..."²¹⁵

223. One of the most common reasons for being detained was if a spouse or a relative belonged to the opposing forces. Women in these situations were often accused of being collaborators and were detained, beaten and tortured. A 70-year-old victim who was detained at Bayama in Ngorama Chiefdom by the CDF told of her ordeal:

"I was captured together with my children, stripped naked, detained unlawfully and beaten. While in captivity one of the CDF by the name of Tamba Johnny killed my son on sight and the man is in town here while I am talking to you. After killing my son another CDF man went and cut his ears, by then I was still under torture and detention... my mind was not with me"²¹⁶

²¹¹ See the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

²¹² TRC confidential statement from a female victim, recorded in Gbangbatoke, 5 February 2003.

²¹³ Confidential testimony received before TRC Closed Hearings, Pujehun District, 25 June 2003.

²¹⁴ TRC confidential statement from a female victim, recorded in Bonthe, 17 April 2003.

²¹⁵ TRC confidential statement recorded in Tonkolili District, 13 January 2003.

²¹⁶ TRC confidential statement recorded in Tankoro Chiefdom, Kono District, 17 December 2002.

224. A victim whose father had tended to injured members of the CDF Kamajors testified to the Commission:

“...The same year 1998, when they attacked Segbwema town, all my family were scattered. I was caught by the SLA / RUF rebels. They told me that they would kill me because my father gave medical treatment to the CDF Kamajors when they were wounded in the conflict. I was stripped naked, all my belongings taken away and almost killed except when a Jet plane came around to kill them, then they ran away.”²¹⁷

225. The Commission finds that all of the armed perpetrator groupings pursued a strategy of deliberately targeting those whom they believed to be relatives and supporters of the opposing forces with the intention of detaining them and violating them because members of their families belonged to the other side or because they had some dealings with the opposing forces.

FORCED DISPLACEMENT

Internal displacement

226. Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) are persons or groups of persons who have been forced or obliged to flee or leave their homes or places of habitual residence, in particular as a result of, or in order to avoid the effects of, armed conflict, situations of generalised violence, violations of human rights, or natural or human made disasters, and who have not crossed an internationally recognised State border.²¹⁸ Issues raised by internal displacement are the duty of the state to protect those displaced. Armed groups also have the legal and moral responsibility not to assault civilians or subject them to human rights abuses and to protect the rights of displaced persons living in areas under their control.
227. A major consequence of the war in Sierra Leone was the forced displacement of hundreds of thousands of civilians from their homes and villages. The Commission recorded 8,397 violations of this nature, with women accounting for 3,128 (or 37,3%) of the victims.²¹⁹ One female victim recounted her story of forced displacement to the Commission:

“When the RUF rebels from Liberia attacked and occupied Jojoima town in 1991, we were harassed to the point that I could no longer bear. Every day they asked us for food such as rice, meat and other items. Whosoever could not produce what they requested for would be beaten. I decided to escape. On our way, I and others came across government soldiers at Madina. They told us to wait for them at Gbogeima village while they went in search of other displaced people. A soldier came back in the evening; he came with people from the bush. The people were so many that he alone could not protect all of us. In the early morning two senior imams were in the mosque, Alhaji Fei-Kamo Kanneh and Alhaji Maldieu Kanneh.

²¹⁷ Nabeli, Musu; Kenema, Nongowa Chiefdom; 16 December 2002.

²¹⁸ See Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General, “Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Persons”, policy note, A/56/168; 21 August 2002.

²¹⁹ See the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

They saw the rebels passing clandestinely and they returned and told us... we were all assembled in the centre of Gbogeima village... the rebels told the crowd that as from that moment nobody will live any longer. They opened fire on the crowd. A lot of people died. I lay on the ground flat with my children who had been shot. The firing on the crowd continued until there was a voice from the bush shouting about the arrival of the soldiers. When they heard that, the rebels ran into the bush. I then took my children with other relatives to Nyeyama."²²⁰

228. One strategy that the RUF employed was the indiscriminate burning of houses and villages. Many victims were burnt to death in their homes, while others were forced to flee from their residences, thereby forcibly displacing them.²²¹
229. Many villagers abandoned their homes when they heard of an impending attack and fled to the bushes or into the mountains. Some fled to other villages and in some cases "Bondo houses" for fear of what the armed forces would do.²²² The war in Sierra Leone was particularly devastating for those in the rural areas, as people became part of a moving population always on the run from the various armed forces. People were forced to leave the safety of their homes, the fruit of their crops and their possessions. In most instances, they left in a hurry to avoid the impending attacks and were forced to live and forage in the bush.
230. The Commission finds that all of the armed perpetrator groupings and in particular the RUF violated the rights of civilians in that they were forced to flee from their homes, leaving everything that they possessed behind, causing them not only economic loss but also the loss of security and enormous trauma. The Commission also finds that each of the armed groups failed to protect the displaced persons in the areas under its control, thus sanctioning the violations of their rights.

Refugees

231. In international law as applied by the Commission, a refugee is described as a "person who, as a result of a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his or her nationality and is unable, or owing to such fear is unwilling, to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country."²²³

²²⁰ Madiana Kanneh, TRC statement, Jojoima, Kailahun District; 25 January 2003.

²²¹ See, for example, Mamie Mambu, TRC statement, Kpanda-Kemo Chiefdom, 16 February 2003.

²²² TRC confidential statement recorded in Fullah Town, Gbangbatoke, 4 March 2003.

²²³ See the Geneva Convention on the Status of Refugees 1951, at Article I-A-(2).

232. Women and young girls constituted a large number of the refugees that fled to neighbouring countries during the conflict. A victim who was forced to flee to Liberia after the death of her two sons recounted her experience to the Commission:

“I was in my village in 1991 when one morning a group of armed men dressed in rags attacked the village. They were shooting at random. These men told us that they have not come to kill us neither destroy us. But this was the opposite of it because they started killing and unfortunately for me my two sons Bockarie and Saffa Koroma were shot one morning and killed. The whole village could not withstand this so we finally went into hiding as far as in Liberia. After going through a lot of constraints for over four years we came back to settle in our village in 1996.”²²⁴

233. There is a growing recognition of the vast numbers of people who are internally displaced and who are forced to become refugees. In 1992, the Secretary-General appointed a Special Representative on Internally Displaced Persons to develop a framework to protect their rights. Dr. Francis Deng, the expert, developed guiding principles on internal displacement. A positive development for women has been the fact that the Guiding Principles call for the specific recognition of the needs of women. They acknowledge the situation of female heads of households; emphasise women’s physical and psychological needs; reaffirm their need for access to basic services; and call for their participation in education and training programmes.²²⁵
234. The Commission has made several recommendations in respect of improving the plight of internally displaced persons and refugees. These measures can be found under the relevant heading in the recommendations chapter²²⁶

Violence against women in camps

235. The Commission found that many Sierra Leonean women had their rights violated in the refugee camps. It is regrettable that those meant to protect the vulnerable were often responsible for further victimising them. In April 2002, the UNHCR and Save the Children-UK issued a report on Sierra Leonean Refugees in Guinea detailing the violations which women and girls amongst others suffered while refugees in Guinea.²²⁷ Young girls and women were forced to have sex in return for food and assistance. Many of them were forced to become prostitutes in brothels established in the camps. More than 1,500 people were interviewed and told similar stories. Men complained of how they were not given access to food because they had no wife or daughter to barter for food or supplies.

²²⁴ Fodei Saffa Koroma, TRC statement, Gbahama Kengo Section, 23 January 2003.

²²⁵ See Kofi Annan, UN Secretary-General, “Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Persons”, policy note, A/56/168; 21 August 2002.

²²⁶ See the chapter entitled Recommendations in Volume Two of this report.

²²⁷ See Save the Children – UK and UNHCR, “*Sexual Violence and Exploitation: The Experience of Refugee Children in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone*”, April 2002.

236. Women and girls told of how their names would be taken off lists for food and aid if they refused to have sex with peacekeepers and humanitarian workers. The Commission finds it absolutely reprehensible that those who are meant to assist and render humanitarian aid to the most vulnerable women and girls used the very fact of their vulnerability to exploit them and violate their rights. In this regard, the Commission finds that those responsible should be prosecuted. Also in this regard, the Commission intends to make recommendations in order to prevent this kind of abuse taking place in the future.

FORCED LABOUR

237. Abductions in modern warfare provide armed forces with a new source of labour that does not have to be paid for, which can be fed on scraps and is completely at the mercy of the group that assembles it. The armed perpetrator groupings in Sierra Leone, particularly the RUF, relied to a great extent on those who had been abducted to perform slave labour. Forced labour was used for both military and civilian tasks. Arms and ammunition had to be carried to the front. Looted items had to be carried back to the camp. Wood was needed and ordinary tasks of a domestic nature required free labour of which abductees constituted the main source.²²⁸ Captives were forced to take drugs to ensure that they endured the pain and the hardship of the labour they were assigned to do. A female victim, who was a mother of one when she was abducted in 1992 by fighters she suspects were ULIMO, told the Commission:

“When they captured my son and me, they gave me a heavy load to carry on my head. I was with them for a very long time, say about seven months. During my stay with these men we travelled from place to place, carrying loads for them. Before then when they captured me, they gave me seed rice to pound; afterwards I was given drugs, marijuana to smoke. I smoked it to the end then my head became heavy; I could not feel any pain. Then they placed the bundle of things on my head which they ordered me to carry from one distant place to another.”²²⁹

238. Another woman who was captured in 1999 at Kambia Town recounted her ordeal:

“In 1999 again, the town of Kambia was attacked. It was around 10.00 p.m. ... the voice of a male ordered me to stand up... they came and surrounded me... then they took me to their base near the hospital towards the school compound in Kambia Town. At their base, I met several other older women, whom they had captured. I and these women were given orders to collect and pack mud and cement block, which they used as a checkpoint...”²³⁰

²²⁸ See, for example, Aminata Marrah, TRC statement, Fadugu Town, 17 January 2003.

²²⁹ TRC confidential statement recorded in Kambia District, 14 December 2002.

²³⁰ Isatu Kaula Kamara, TRC statement, Magbema Chiefdom, Kambia, 5 December 2002.

239. Women were coerced into forced labour by all of the armed forces. They were subjected to even further violations as they carried out their duties.²³¹ A victim who suffered in the hands of some “sobels” in her village and later was abducted by them described her experiences:

“On our arrival at the court barray in the centre of the town, they told the town elders to appoint the town commander and the town mother. Mr. Osman Kortor and I were “appointed” by the town elders... One day, they forcefully tasked us to prepare food for them and at that time there was a shortage of salt, but I managed to cook the food. When they found out that there was no salt in the soup, they commanded me and some other women to eat the food. After eating the food, they gave us the dirty water that we used to wash the basin to drink – if not they will kill us. Three weeks later, they took us to Gbangbanlia in the Lugbu chiefdom and we stayed there for four months carrying their loads and pounding rice for them. They also took us to Jimmi Bagbo and we were later sent to the bush around the village to process gari for them.”²³²

240. Abducted women civilians were compelled to live with the armed groupings and were forced to carry out traditional domestic functions such as fetching firewood, preparing food and doing laundry.²³³ A female victim testified as to what took place in her village when it was occupied by soldiers:

“The soldiers we met in Bumpeh were ULIMO soldiers. We lived with them in the town for about seven months, during which they harassed us a lot. In fact we used to pick rice for them and even wood, we were fetching it for them. Our husbands were providing palm oil for them and also hunting animals for them. Such was the condition we were undergoing...”²³⁴

241. In effect, women constituted the largest category of victims compelled to do forced labour. Many victims who made statements to the Commission conveyed a traditional acceptance of what constitutes the tasks of women, in most instances accepting this role and not seeing fit to report it as a violation. Women accounted for 497 violations of forced labour from a total of 1,878 reported to the Commission. However a reading of the statements submitted to the Commission reveals that almost all of the women and girls abducted were compelled to perform forced labour, usually continuously throughout their period in the captivity of an armed group.²³⁵

242. The Commission finds that all of the armed perpetrator groupings coerced women and girls under their control into doing forced labour and notes that, in terms of the Rome Statute for the ICC, such abuse becomes a gender crime when an individual is enslaved because of her particular function in society.

²³¹ Lucia Kamara, TRC statement, Fairo, Soro Gbema, Pujehun District, 16 December 2003.

²³² Gbessay Santigie, TRC statement, Mokeleh Chiefdom, 10 February 2003.

²³³ Abie Walters, TRC statement, Mosenesie, Gbangbatoke Chiefdom, 4 February, 2003.

²³⁴ Confidential testimony received before TRC Closed Hearings, Pujehun District, 25 June 2003.

²³⁵ The Commission’s database was unable to record every instance of forced labour as a violation, particularly as most statement givers passed over the nature of the chores that women and girls were made to perform and instead placed emphasis on different violations, such as killings, rapes and acts of torture. Nonetheless, the Commission regards the fact that people are “conditioned” to take such treatment of women and girls for granted as testament to the widespread practice of the violation of forced labour.

ASSAULT

243. Life for women with the armed groups was brutal. They were treated savagely and were constantly humiliated. Assaults and beatings were commonplace and were doled out for the slightest infraction. The frequent assaults and beatings were meant to sow terror, fear and complete insecurity of person. Women were cowed into submission. One of the victims indicated her sense of vulnerability in her statement to the Commission:

“They (RUF) gave me a very serious beating... then I was stripped naked. I only had a pant on.”²³⁶

244. Women were beaten with sticks, guns and sometimes with bayonets, which resulted in severe injuries to their bodies. No regard or consideration was given to those who were ill or expecting a baby. A victim who was pregnant at the time of her ordeal recounted her story to the Commission:

“On our arrival at Fonima, one of the rebels said ‘send them all to hell, send them all to hell’... they stripped us naked again and it was during the rainy season. The place where they told us to lie down and roll was muddy and they took the cane stick from the table that they made, then they gave us a merciless beating and some parts of my skin peeled off... even the foetus in my womb shifted from its position and came up towards my chest and I was also wounded.”²³⁷

245. Beatings were arbitrary with the deliberate intention of inflicting cruelty, humiliating and degrading the person concerned.²³⁸ An abducted girl-child who lived with an RUF combatant couple testified to the Commission:

“The rebel wife I was staying with used to flog me everyday and even requested for her husband to kill me as she did not want to see me. At that time they had already killed my mother and my father.”²³⁹

246. Of the 3,281 cases of assault recorded by the Commission, where the gender of the victims is known, 914 cases recorded women victims.²⁴⁰
247. The Commission finds that women and girls were subjected to cruel and inhuman treatment by all of the armed perpetrator groups, with the deliberate intention of inflicting serious mental and physical suffering or injury.

²³⁶ Amie Kallon, TRC statement, Yoni, Kpanga Kabondeh Chiefdom, 26 February 2003.

²³⁷ Confidential testimony received before TRC Closed Hearings, Kenema District, May 2003.

²³⁸ See, for example, Mariama Sam, TRC statement, Ngordohun Gbameh, Kono, 27 February 2003.

²³⁹ Confidential testimony received before TRC Closed Hearings, Tonkolili District, 9 July 2003.

²⁴⁰ More detail on violations rates and the levels of different violations experienced by women can be found in the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

TORTURE

248. Acts of torture, carried out on a systematic scale, are regarded as both a crime against humanity and a war crime. The requirements though are different. The right not to be tortured is one of the fundamental rights of a non-derogable nature, in other words it a *jus cogens* norm. Rape and other forms of sexual violence are recognised both under international human rights law and humanitarian law as torture. Women experienced intense mental and physical torture in the hands of the armed forces, particularly the RUF. The intention was to strip them of any sense of identity or self worth. They were treated like animals with the clear purpose of dehumanising them. Cruel and degrading treatment was extensively practiced on women and girls. A girl-child who lived with the RUF described some sordid acts she witnessed:

“...They used to cook a lot of food and at the end of the day after they had eaten their own food, whatever remains, they will mix it with toilet and give it to the civilians in the villages... if you refuse to eat, they will in turn kill you. Those who will eat the toilet food they will ask them to carry their loads...”²⁴¹

249. When she was asked whether she had been forced to do this, she replied as follows:

“Yes, the wife of the Colonel wanted for me to eat her faeces but fortunately the Colonel was there who stopped her from giving me the toilet to eat.”²⁴²

250. Women because of their nurturing instincts were singled out for a particular kind of torture. They were forced to watch their children and spouses being violated and ultimately killed. An elderly woman at Bonthe recounted to the Commission how her only son was killed. His head had been cut off and she was then forced to hold his head and breastfeed it.²⁴³ Women were in many instances compelled to exhibit mock high spirits by laughing and clapping at the torture or death of family members. Torture was often accompanied by acts that were intensely degrading and cruel. A female victim testified to the Commission about the attack at Bumpeh Gao:

“...The rebels then started the massacre of civilians. For example, my grandmother Martha was tortured to death... I was compelled to sit on the tarred road and forced to drink my own urine... I was undressed by the rebels naked and forced to drag on the tarred road.”²⁴⁴

²⁴¹ Confidential testimony received before TRC Closed Hearings, Tonkolili District, 9 July 2003.

²⁴² Confidential testimony received before TRC Closed Hearings, Tonkolili District, 9 July 2003.

²⁴³ Cecilia Caulker, TRC statement, Bonthe District, 8 December 2002.

²⁴⁴ TRC confidential statement recorded at Tikonko, Bo District, 14 January 2003.

251. Torture took a number of different forms. Women were put into a hole in the ground, which was filled with water that covered a greater portion of their bodies. They were made to stay like that for a number of days. Some women were forced into cages smaller than their bodies.²⁴⁵ Others had hot oil poured over them, burning the skin away. Others had their bodies and faces mutilated. A female witness described this disturbing incident:

“I witnessed where a rebel named David captured two women and said their buttocks were not equal. He took a cutlass and sliced the fat woman’s buttock and stuck the flesh to the other woman’s buttock. The fat one was bleeding seriously. I don’t think she made it.”²⁴⁶

252. Of the 2,086 torture violations recorded in the Commission’s database, women accounted for 538 violations where the gender of the victim is known.²⁴⁷
253. The Commission finds that all of the armed perpetrator groupings pursued a deliberate strategy of inflicting torture on women and girls, by inflicting or threatening to inflict sexual violence, other acts of violence and cruel and inhuman acts upon them or on a third person or persons close to them.

FORCED DRUGGING

254. Statistics in terms of the violation of forced drugging, like forced labour, remain inadequate because it was generally under-reported by women. A major reason for the failure to report the abuse is that drugging became part of many women’s daily experiences and assumed a semblance of normality. However, a close reading of statements made by women and girls, as well as almost of all of the hearings testimony, confirms that forced drugging became the norm.
255. At the Special Hearings on Women held in Freetown, many women testified to the fact that in the course of their abduction and whilst living with the rebels they were given drugs every day. They also confirmed that drugs were on a daily basis added into their food.²⁴⁸ Their abductors would add marijuana into some of the sauces normally eaten with rice, such as cassava or potato leaves. Marijuana and other drugs such as cocaine, heroin and “brown-brown” were administered to women in a number of different ways, including forced inhalation, or making incisions on their bodies and rubbing the drugs into the wounds. Gunpowder was also administered to women, presumably as a stimulant. A woman abducted during the January 1999 invasion of Freetown told her story to the Commission:

“...I was forced to make sex with several rebels. The rebels did not only abuse me sexually but they also introduced me to drugs like cocaine and marijuana. In fact what they usually did was to have me properly drugged before they will have sex with me. The rebels also used me and some other ladies whom they abducted as human shields each time the ECOMOG soldiers attacked them.”²⁴⁹

²⁴⁵ TRC confidential statement from a female victim, recorded in Gbangbatoke, 5 February 2003.

²⁴⁶ Kaiyada, Sai Tefaya Town, Sandor Chiefdom, 4 March 2003.

²⁴⁷ See the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

²⁴⁸ “First Witness” and “Second Witness” – confidential testimonies received before the TRC Special Thematic Hearings on Women, Freetown, 22 to 24 May 2003.

²⁴⁹ TRC confidential statement from a female victim, recorded in Freetown, 29 January 2003.

256. Another women abductee who lived with the rebels for almost a year described how various substances were administered to her and other abductees:

“As a captive I was taken to Gbangbatoke town along with other captives... the next morning we were assembled in the open air and were informed that we would be leaving for Moyamba town. Before we left, I was given some black thing similar to powder to swallow, which I later learnt was gunpowder... some of us were called to assemble by Commander Murray. In the assembly I was injected with cocaine and was given one set of military uniform and a knife. After the injection and distribution of uniform, we were informed that we will be going to fight alongside the rebels.”²⁵⁰

257. Medical practitioners in Sierra Leone confirm that in the aftermath of the war, a major problem facing Sierra Leone is how to deal with the long-term consequences of prolonged drug abuse. Many women who appeared before the Commission complained of mood swings, unexplained anger and feelings of intense hopelessness. In most instances, these symptoms are not addressed properly and contribute to an already violent and disturbed society showing signs of even greater dysfunctionality.
258. In this regard, the Commission finds that the armed forces and particularly the RUF were responsible for coercing victims and those over whom they had control into using a number of dependence-inducing substances with the deliberate intention of causing them to lose control both mentally and physically and with the intention of exploiting their vulnerability. The Commission is of the view that if the legacies of drug abuse and forced drugging are not addressed, they have the capacity to impact negatively on the rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-combatants, their partners and their victims into society and thereby threaten the prospects for continued and sustained peace.

KILLING

259. Scores of thousands of Sierra Leoneans, including thousands of women, lost their lives in the conflict. There was a deliberate policy by certain of the armed forces, particularly the RUF and the AFRC, to target civilians in campaigns of killings. Many families and communities were massacred. One example is this mass killing of a family at Kono Kangana, Gorama Chiefdom in 1994:

“...The soldiers started asking my sisters, uncle and mother’s mate under threat to give them all that they had or they should buy them marijuana to smoke. My sisters in turn refused giving them anything. So the soldiers killed my mother’s mate and my sisters; in all seven people were killed. Only two of us narrowly escaped the massive killing.”²⁵¹

²⁵⁰ Isatu Turay, TRC statement, Fullah Town, Gbangbatoke, 4 February 2003.

²⁵¹ TRC confidential statement recorded in Kenema District, 7 December 2002.

260. The RUF devised several special “operations” in which the primary objective was mass killing. A notorious example was “Operation No Living Thing”, which was intended to leave nobody alive who crossed the path of the RUF. A woman in Mokonde town told of the private pain she experienced after witnessing the killing of her sister:

“While she was going back to search for her thing, I decided to wait under a tree until she returned... I heard men’s voices questioning somebody along the footpath. I recognised the voice of my sister and immediately, I raised my head to see more. I saw my sister and two armed men in military uniform standing opposite a big tree. After some questioning by these men, I saw one of them raise his gun and hit her on her head. She immediately fell down and one pulled out a long knife, which was hidden in a long packet, and used it to split open her head into two. At this point, I saw blood flowing down her body and she was crying and calling our family name in Mende. I bowed my head crying silently...late in the evening, I came out to bid her farewell; I saw her lying in a pool of blood and I wept bitterly at her side as I was alone...I managed to drag her corpse from the road to the bush where I can identify her...”²⁵²

261. A distraught mother described the death of her daughter, who was a nursing mother at the time:

“It was on a Monday during the time when rebels took over the city in January 1999. The incident took place in my house. We were all in the house on that day hiding in different positions when we noticed that it was prayer time. So I called on my daughter who was also a suckling mother to join me in prayer. We were now kneeling down for the first part of the prayer when her head was shot and she fell down dead. She was bleeding from the head and nose up to the time of her burial.”²⁵³

262. The Commission finds that all of the armed perpetrator forces pursued a deliberate policy of killing civilians, often in an indiscriminate fashion. In the course of pursuing this policy, the factions took the lives of many women and girls. The Commission finds that the RUF in particular pursued a strategy of mass killings under campaigns such as “Operation No Living Thing”. In terms of both international human rights law and humanitarian law, the killing of civilians is strictly prohibited.

²⁵² Mariama Kebbie, TRC statement, Koni Chiefdom, Moyamba District, 23 January 2003.

²⁵³ Marie Kamara, TRC statement, Freetown West I. 7 December 2003.

DISEMBOWELMENT OF PREGNANT WOMEN

263. Disembowelment was a gruesome violation perpetrated on women during the conflict expressly because of their gender. What is particularly repugnant is that many pregnant women had their stomachs disembowelled because members of the armed forces wanted to place bets as to the gender of the unborn baby.²⁵⁴ Some witnesses gave these testimonies to the TRC:

“...The captain of the RUF placed a bet with his colleague that the woman was having a baby girl whilst the colleague insisted that it was a boy. The pregnant woman’s stomach was then dissected to prove who was right. After opening the pregnant woman’s stomach, they saw a baby girl who was later left to die and the pregnant woman had already died from the act. This is one of the worst violations I have ever witnessed in life and when ever I think about it, I become more traumatised.”²⁵⁵

[and]

“...The rebels captured a pregnant woman and they argued among themselves whether she was carrying a boy or girl. To prove who was right they decided to kill the woman. They opened up her stomach and realised she was carrying a girl. They removed the baby from her womb and killed the baby and divided it among them.”²⁵⁶

264. The Commission recorded only a few incidents of disembowelment,²⁵⁷ but strongly suspects that the figure is not indicative of the actual number of women who suffered the violation or those that witnessed it during the conflict. Specialist consultants to the Commission on gender-based crimes spoke of the tendency of victims and witnesses of such crimes to “suppress” memories of the event, which may explain why more people did not come forward to the TRC to speak about it. Interviews conducted by the Commission also unearthed the story of a woman who nearly suffered disembowelment but was saved because the induced trauma of the fear of disembowelment forced her into immediate labour where she gave birth to the child in the bush where the disembowelment would have taken place.²⁵⁸ Some disembowelments of pregnant women took place in front of family members, leaving behind deep scars in the minds of the living. One witness described, among other violations, the gruesome manner in which her pregnant sister was killed with her child:

“...My sister Nancy was pregnant. Her stomach was first split open with a cutlass and the baby removed from her. The foetus was cut into two. The two dead bodies were taken into the house before setting the house on fire.”²⁵⁹

²⁵⁴ Theresa Blackia, TRC statement, Bo Kakua, 16 December 2002.

²⁵⁵ Nbalu Turay, TRC statement, Massabendu, Nimgbema Chiefdom, 25 February 2003.

²⁵⁶ Menie Boima, TRC statement, Waterloo, 12 February 2003.

²⁵⁷ See the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

²⁵⁸ See TRC Interview with Agnes Sesay; Internal Displaced Persons’ Camp, Lunsar, July 2003.

²⁵⁹ Aminata Momoh, TRC statement, Pejebongre Chiefdom, 11 May 2003.

265. The Commission has found that most violations in this category are attributable to the RUF. Given that the RUF was responsible for the highest number of abductions, they are also found to be responsible for the highest number of gender-based violations perpetrated against women.²⁶⁰ One young victim-turned-perpetrator of the RUF explained a situation in which he took part in a disembowelment violation:

“...I was captured in 1997 as a teenager and a primary school pupil of class two in Mattru Jong, Bonthe District. I was forced to carry their loads to unknown destinations... After some time, one of their bosses came... and asked that we be trained and get enrolled in the RUF... a few days after, they gave me my own gun. One day, they brought a pregnant lady and asked us to kill her and remove the foetus from her womb. We did so under duress as little boys and that was my first experience with the RUF.”²⁶¹

266. Another former combatant from the RUF testified to having seen a similar act:

“...My mother was a business woman... she took me to a village to sell some goods... in the night it was attacked by RUF rebels. I was captured and abducted by Komba Gbondema... at the age of six. Commander Gbondema took me to Camp Zogoda for training. Due to my braveness and technique of fighting, CO Gbondema promoted me to Corporal Highway... At one time we attacked Mile 91 and CO Gbondema ordered a rebel to butcher the belly of a pregnant woman. To know whether she is carrying a boy or a girl.”²⁶²

267. The violation of disembowelment invariably led to a horrific death for both mother and child. According to one testimony to the TRC:

“...They were snatching babies and infants from their mother’s arms and tossing them in the air. The babies would free fall to their deaths. At other times, they would also chop them from the back of their heads to kill them, you know like you do when you slaughter chickens... One time, we came across two pregnant women. They tied the women with their legs spread eagled and took a sharpened stick and jabbed them inside their wombs until the babies came out on the stick.”²⁶³

268. The Commission notes that the ICC elements define “enforced sterilisation” as “depriving one of more persons of biological reproductive capacity, neither justified by medicine or hospital treatment nor carried out with their genuine consent”. This definition includes acts committed upon women during war such as the removal of the foetus, castration, destruction of reproductive organs as well as medical sterilisation without consent.

²⁶⁰ More detail on violations rates and the propensities of particular factions to commit certain violations can be found in the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

²⁶¹ TRC confidential statement recorded in Bo Kakua, 4 March 2003.

²⁶² Saidu Kargbo, TRC statement, Lakka, Western Area, 28 March 2003.

²⁶³ TRC confidential statement recorded in Kailahun District, January 2003.

269. The Commission finds that all of the armed groups were responsible for the enforced sterilisation, torture and mutilation of women and girls. In particular, the Commission finds the RUF – through its practice of disembowelling pregnant women – responsible for the violations of “enforced sterilisation”, torture and mutilation of women and young girls for no reason other than to torture and inflict cruel and inhuman treatment on them.

AMPUTATION

270. The conflict in Sierra Leone is most visibly associated with amputations. Pictures of amputees have been shown on television screens and newspapers all across the world. Amputation is also the violation that has had the most devastating effect on the morale of the population. Due to a variety of factors, the Commission has found that it has not been able to establish absolutely reliable statistics on how many people suffered amputations or died from their injuries. In terms of alternative sets of figures, the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) has relied in its reports on the statistics of the Norwegian Refugee Council, which estimates that there are currently 1,600 surviving amputees in Sierra Leone, with more than 40% of them being women.²⁶⁴ Figures available for 2002, estimate that 19% of the 225 registered amputees in the Southern region were women.²⁶⁵

271. Amputation was a deliberate strategy on the part of the RUF, designed to sow terror in the hearts and minds of civilians.²⁶⁶ The Commission has found that this deliberate strategy was on occasion aimed at preventing civilians from voting. Many amputees testified that the RUF ordered them, after amputating their hands, to take the amputated hand to the elected President of Sierra Leone, Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. The RUF had adopted the strategy of “Peace before Elections” and the call of the President-in-waiting for “Elections before Peace” had infuriated the RUF leadership. Thus the RUF resorted to targeting civilians and amputating their limbs. During the campaign of amputations known as “Operation Stop Elections” in 1996, the right hand of victims, being the hand symbolic of voting, was cut off and handed back to the victim with the direction that it should be delivered to Tejan Kabbah. One of the female amputees recalls the incident:

“I begged them, calling the name of God... because I called God before them, they said they are going to cut off my hands. They immediately held my hands and placed them on a cement block and cut off my hands. They asked me to go to Tejan Kabbah to give me hands, because we voted for him.”²⁶⁷

272. After amputating a woman victim’s finger, the RUF rebels gave the amputated finger to the daughter of the amputated woman saying:

“Go and give it to Tejan Kabbah who is your god to replace it.”²⁶⁸

²⁶⁴ See United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL); “*Amputee Report 2000*”, produced using data from surveys conducted by the Norwegian Refugee Council.

²⁶⁵ See United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL); “*Amputee Report 2000*”, produced using data from surveys conducted by the Norwegian Refugee Council.

²⁶⁶ See TRC testimonies from multiple former RUF operatives, including: Moigboi Moigande Kosia, RUF ‘G-1’ officer; testimony before TRC Public Hearings held in Freetown; 17 April 2003.

²⁶⁷ Tenneh Conteh, TRC statement, Aberdeen Amputee Camp, Freetown, 22 March 2003.

²⁶⁸ Kumba Komba, TRC statement, Tombodu Town, Kono District, 11 January 2003.

273. As the conflict progressed, the nature of amputations changed and took on a number of different forms, including single or double amputations of the arms or lower legs.²⁶⁹ It was also carried out in varying ways ranging from being amputated at the wrist or the upper arm, to being amputated at the ankle, or the knee or above the knee for those whose legs were amputated. A female victim described her ordeal:

“I was captured alone in the village by many rebels. They asked me to choose between death and amputation and I was unable to reply. They began to decide among themselves what to do to me. They finally agreed to cut off one of my feet. They brought a bulky stick and placed my foot on it; they first used a cutlass but it was blunt. They finally used an axe to amputate my right foot and went away.”²⁷⁰

274. The vast majority of amputations resulted in the loss of the victim's hands.²⁷¹ No category of victims was spared this gruesome and inhuman act. Children and pregnant women were also affected. A witness described to the Commission the amputation of a pregnant woman:

“One of the gunmen said Hawa should go to bed with him. Hawa refused and she pleaded not to be tampered with, as she had a pregnancy, which was three months old. Hawa persistently refused to have intercourse with him; the gunman removed a shiny cutlass and chopped off both her hands.”²⁷²

275. The Commission finds the act of amputation to be a particular inhuman act amounting to the mutilation and physical and psychological torture of those upon whom it was inflicted. The Commission finds the RUF and the AFRC to have pursued a deliberate strategy of amputations with the intention of torturing them and sowing terror throughout the civilian population.

FORCED CANNIBALISM

276. Cannibalism was another gruesome feature of the conflict in Sierra Leone. Cannibalism was forced on many of the women captured by the various armed groups. Women were given the dismembered body parts of family members and forced at gunpoint to eat them. Many women who were abducted told the Commission how, under threat of death, they were compelled to cook human parts for members of the armed groups to eat. In Bonthe in September 1997, an 83-year-old woman suffered this violation at the hands of AFRC soldiers:

“...They came back to me saying I should go and see what they were doing to my son... and they brought him to the field... and they cut my son to pieces alive. I was under gunpoint and all the soldiers were in uniforms... They cut my son to pieces with a knife and when they opened his chest, they took out his heart and cut a piece of it and pushed it into my mouth saying you must eat it... Then they cut off his head. They laid it in my hands saying ‘go and breast feed your son’ and they started dancing.”²⁷³

²⁶⁹ Kadiatu Koroma, TRC statement, Aberdeen Amputee Camp, Freetown, 21 March 2003.

²⁷⁰ Aminata Turay, TRC statement, Aberdeen Amputee Camp, Freetown, 24 March 2003.

²⁷¹ More detail on the types of amputation violations recorded by the Commission can be found in the Amputations Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

²⁷² TRC confidential statement recorded in Bombali District, 17 March 2003.

²⁷³ Cecilia Caulker, TRC statement, Bonthe District, 8 December 2002.

Meanwhile another witness recounted an act of forced cannibalism by the Kamajors in Kenema:

“...Apart from my friend, this same Sylvester has been a party to many killings including that of one Zachariah, who was disembowelled. His guts were removed right in front of his wife and handed over to her. Later Zachariah was used as a meal and his wife coerced to eat.”²⁷⁴

277. A young girl recounted her traumatic experiences in Freetown to the TRC:

“...They shot at my sister on the top of my head and all her blood spilled over my body. I had wanted to cry but they told me that if I do, they would kill me also. The rebels gave me human flesh to eat... I am suffering from mental injury... the human flesh that I ate made me become mentally tortured. With regards to the human flesh that I ate, I was introduced to cannibalism.”²⁷⁵

278. The Commission finds that all of the armed forces pursued a deliberate strategy of forced cannibalism with the intention of torturing victims by inflicting on them severe mental and physical pain with the sole purpose of intimidating and punishing them.

SEXUAL VIOLATIONS

279. A victim of sexual violence testified to the TRC about her experiences:

“After the attacks on Bandajuma Sinneh, around 12.00 noon, the RUF rebels entered my village. On my way to my house I was captured by an RUF rebel called Allieu. He then told me to go with him, but I refused to go. He said if I didn't go with him, he will kill me. My mother was afraid of the rebel, so for him not to kill me, she then persuaded me to go with him. When we arrived in Bandajuma Sinneh, two RUF rebels joined us... In Bandajuma, I was taken into a house, laid on the bare ground under gunpoint. All three of these rebels had sexual intercourse with me. They did it one after the other – it was gang rape.... They were doing it with impunity, telling me they will rape me to death. After that I became unconscious...”²⁷⁶

280. During the conflict in Sierra Leone, women were systematically raped and sexually violated. The Commission received more than 800 statements from women and girls reporting and describing acts of rape. Girls in the age group from ten to 18 years were most likely to be the victims of rape. Women were gang raped and suffered multiple rapes as well as being kept in sexual slavery. In instances where women and girls were abducted, their capture was often the prelude to being handed over to and assigned to one of the fighters with the sole purpose of being his sexual slave.

²⁷⁴ Mohamed Jalloh, TRC statement, Kingtom Police Barracks, Kingtom, 14 January 2003.

²⁷⁵ TRC confidential statement recorded in Kissy, Freetown; 14 February 2003.

²⁷⁶ TRC confidential statement from a female victim, recorded in Gbangbatoke, 5 February 2003.

281. In a large number of cases, women were handed over to combatants and became their “bush wives” for the purpose of satisfying not only their sexual needs but also to perform a host of different duties including domestic chores.²⁷⁷ Having analysed the systematic and widespread use of rape during the conflict period, the Commission came to the conclusion that all of the armed forces systematically raped and sexually violated women.
282. While rape was the major violation perpetrated against women, other acts of sexual violence were additionally carried out indiscriminately on women of all ages, of every ethnic group and from all social classes. In the views of many Sierra Leoneans who testified to the TRC, just being a woman in Sierra Leone during the conflict period was enough to create the likelihood that you would be raped and sexually violated in the most horrible ways, regardless of whether you were a pre-pubescent girl, an elderly woman or pregnant.²⁷⁸

RAPE

283. The conflict in Sierra Leone is characterised by the vast number of rape violations that were perpetrated. The Commission received more than 800 statements reporting and describing rape.²⁷⁹ A review of all the statements dealing with rape suggests that at least 58% of all rape victims suffered multiple rapes.²⁸⁰ An analysis of the rape statistics in the Commission’s database confirms that where the gender and age of the victims is known, 50% of them were 18 or younger, with 25% of them being younger than 13 years.²⁸¹ The youngest victim in the Commission’s statements was just four years old while the oldest was 69 years of age at the time of rape.²⁸²
284. While many of the women who made statements to the Commission did report that they had been victims of rape, rape as a violation still remains largely under-reported. Cultural taboos associated with rape and the societal stigma that attaches to women who disclose that they have been raped have constrained women from being completely open in their statements to the Commission. Women have been even more reticent about disclosing that they have been gang-raped, as they have not wanted family members or the society they live in to know the traumatic details. In a number of instances, spouses of women raped have not wanted their wives to disclose these details, fearing that it would bring shame on them and the family. A common feature of victims’ reactions to rape violations has been husbands and wives entering into a conspiracy of silence about what has happened.

²⁷⁷ See Physicians for Human Rights, *War-Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone*. See also Human Rights Watch, *We’ll Kill You if you Cry*. See also Mansaray, Binta; “The Invisible Human Rights Abuses in Sierra Leone”; Freetown, June 2002. See also Federation of African Media Women; “The Girl Child during the Civil War in Sierra Leone”; Freetown, October, 2002.

²⁷⁸ Theresa Blackie, TRC statement, Bo Kakua, 16 December 2002.

²⁷⁹ See the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

²⁸⁰ More detail on the manner and circumstances in which women suffered sexual violations can be found in the results of the Commission’s special coding exercises on sexual violations included in the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

²⁸¹ See the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

²⁸² See the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

285. Rape in international law, as developed through the jurisprudence of the ad-hoc tribunals, is defined as “penetration however slight of the vagina or anus by a penis, object or other body part, or of any other body part by a penis”. The definition of rape, as well as forced prostitution and other sexual violations, includes a broad concept of force including threat thereof and coercion, such as “that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power against such person or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment, or the invasion was committed against a person incapable of giving genuine consent”.²⁸³
286. International jurisprudence is clear that in the circumstances of an armed conflict or in the military presence of militiamen or combatants, coercion may be inherent. As such, the presence of armed combatants exerting temporary power and control over a community will be sufficient to satisfy the coercive element.²⁸⁴
287. The Commission conducted a “special coding exercise” using statements in its database, during which a random sample of statements involving rape was coded in greater detail in order to develop a more accurate picture of the kind of suffering women endured. Since the sample of statements was random, the results of this exercise can be considered to be representative of the TRC data.
288. The special coding exercise reflected a whole range of rape violations against women, including: women who suffered a single rape; women who suffered gang rape; women who were abducted and kept as a sexual slave or as a “bush wife”; and women who suffered rape or gang rape on more than one separate occasion.
289. In terms of the Commission’s special coding sample, more than 58% of all women raped by all of the armed groups suffered rape violations on multiple occasions.²⁸⁵ Some rape victims recounted their experiences to the TRC in the following testimonies:

“He grabbed my hand and announced: ‘this is my capture’... he asked if I am a suckling mother as he saw my young child...then he told me to leave my child and follow him...then finally they took me to a house where they put me under gunpoint and four of them raped me, one after the other. They went with me to another house where three different rebels raped me on the same day. They continued to move with me until we met a lone rebel, who stopped us and took me out, laid me on the floor in front of the other rebels and raped me... then he took me from among them and put me in a house where three other rebels raped me.”²⁸⁶

²⁸³ The concept of “invasion” used in this definition is intended to be broad enough to be gender neutral. It is understood that a person may be incapable of giving genuine consent if affected by natural, induced or age-related incapacity. See the ICC Elements of Crime and Procedure, UN, Doc.Off ICC-ASP/1/3, at Article 7(1)(g)-1.

²⁸⁴ See *Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu*, Trial Judgement, case ICTR-96-4-T, Ch.1, 2 Sept 1998, at paragraph 688.

²⁸⁵ More detail on the manner and circumstances in which women suffered sexual violations can be found in the results of the Commission’s special coding exercises on sexual violations included in the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

²⁸⁶ TRC confidential statement recorded at Grafton Camp for Displaced Persons, 25 February 2003.

“One morning, the juntas attacked the village. We fled into the bush to hide for our lives. The juntas met us in our hiding place and caught me. My mother begged them to free me but they did not. Instead, two of them held me tightly and threw me to the ground. They undressed me and raped me one after the other. One person held me to restrict my movement whilst the other raped me. I was then thirteen years old and a virgin. They deflowered me. The first one was called Mohammed and my mother tried to stop them from raping me but they shot her. She fell to the ground and bled to death. When they had finished what they were doing to me, they abandoned me there in a pool of blood for I was bleeding.”²⁸⁷

290. Women and girls were not safe from any of the armed groups, even those meant to protect them. Individual victims were raped in a multiplicity of different incidents over different periods of time, often by more than one different armed group, depending on whose hands they fell into.²⁸⁸ One rape victim testified to the Commission of her experiences of multiple rapes by different persons from different armed groups throughout the conflict and in the period beyond.²⁸⁹
291. The Commission was also told that a deliberate strategy of the various armed groups was to carry out rapes of the women on the “other side” of the conflict. As such, rape and counter rape of each other’s abducted women or “bush wives” during raids was said to have happened quite frequently.²⁹⁰ In addition to the “bush wife” phenomenon, where women were assigned to a combatant for the purposes of both sex and to perform domestic duties, another category of violation carried out on women was to keep them isolated for the purpose of being available to satisfy the sexual needs of several combatants. Whenever combatants had the urge, there was a ready-made harem of women to rape. A witness to the Commission revealed the following details of her experiences in the hands of her captors:

“The rebel soldiers took us to Ka Tamiyah and I was there with them for two weeks. The place was not suitable for us, the young girls. We were about a hundred in number, we who had been captured... They beat and raped us as often as they wanted to. When they want to rape you, you cannot resist, if you do, you are beaten.”²⁹¹

292. Testimony to the Commission has revealed that all of the armed groups, particularly the RUF and the AFRC, perpetrated a deliberate policy of abducting pre-pubescent young girls and raping them, breaking all cultural taboos. This tactic had a devastating effect on the young victims, particularly as they were not only raped but also subjected to harrowing and horrific experiences during the course of the rape. Often these young victims have been subjected to enduring, perhaps permanent ill-effects on their reproductive health because of their treatment during the conflict.

²⁸⁷ TRC confidential statement recorded in Bo Kakua, 16 December 2002.

²⁸⁸ TRC confidential statement recorded in Sanda Chiefdom, 4 March 2003.

²⁸⁹ Confidential testimony received before TRC Closed Hearings, Koinadugu District, May 2003.

²⁹⁰ “Second Witness” – confidential testimony received before the TRC Special Thematic Hearings on Women, Freetown, 22 to 24 May 2003.

²⁹¹ Confidential testimony received before TRC Closed Hearings, Koinadugu District, May 2003.

293. A victim, ten years old at the time, told of her capture and rape along with her seven sisters by rebels with whom they were forced to stay for two years:
- “It was after I had left the rebels that I began to have my period. When I left the rebels, I received medical treatment at a hospital and it was after that, that I began to have my periods.”²⁹²
294. The Commission cannot but draw the conclusion that the RUF and the AFRC deliberately set out to violate every norm and custom of the society to which they belonged.
295. Women were not only raped in the presence of their families but were forced on many occasions into committing incest. Brothers were forced to rape their sisters and mothers; fathers were forced to rape their daughters. In some communities, mass incestuous rape imposed on the residents. A witness testified to the Commission of an event that occurred in her village Bumpeh:
- “There was a young girl called Anni who was caught by the soldiers. She refused to go with them to be their bush wife, so they forced her brother to rape her and then the rebels killed them both.”²⁹³
296. Another victim told the Commission the following story:
- “In the morning, we saw many rebels coming towards us... we were about to run but they said if you move, we will fire on you and they started firing all about... they came back to us and surrounded us. They stripped us naked... we were over twenty that were stripped naked. They instructed us to lie down on the ground. Then the civilian men who were amongst us were divided out, one man to a woman, until it came to a time that there was no other man for the remaining women who were lying on the ground. So after the distribution, they instructed the men to rape us. The women who were left without civilian men, they dug sticks into their vagina.”²⁹⁴
297. Women were also made to endure the forced insertion of objects such as sticks, pestles, hot coal and oil into their genitalia.²⁹⁵ An ex-combatant with the RUF gave this account to the Commission:
- “...We moved and attacked Tefeya where several creatures were looted and food was found in abundance. We were led by CO Bai Bureh... an old lady was met, she was beaten with sticks and then asked to lie down flat... a stick was pushed into her genitals...”²⁹⁶
298. Having considered the testimonies given by women, which include the most horrific details of rape, the Commission finds that all of the armed factions, in particular the RUF and the AFRC, embarked on a systematic and deliberate strategy to rape women and girls, especially those between the ages of ten and 18 years of age, with the intention of sowing terror amongst the population, violating women and girls and breaking down every norm and custom of traditional society.²⁹⁷

²⁹² Confidential testimony received before TRC Closed Hearings, Koinadugu District, May 2003.

²⁹³ Confidential testimony received before TRC Closed Hearings, Pujehun District, 25 June 2003.

²⁹⁴ Confidential testimony received before TRC Closed Hearings, Pujehun District, 25 June 2003.

²⁹⁵ Multiple incidents of each of these forms of rape were recorded in the TRC database.

²⁹⁶ Sesay, Sarah; Gbawuria 2, W/W/Yagala Chiefdom, Koinadugu District; 11 December 2002.

²⁹⁷ More detail on the manner in which various factions deliberately attacked cultural and traditional norms can be found in the chapter on the Nature of the Conflict in Volume Three A of this report.

SEXUAL SLAVERY

299. In terms of international law, the two essential elements unique to the crime of sexual slavery are the “exercise of any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership over one or more person” and the “forced participation in one or more acts of sexual violence”.²⁹⁸ In Sierra Leone, hundreds of abducted women and girls were compelled to endure the violation of “sexual slavery”. The Commission identified the act of “forced marriage” as synonymous with “sexual slavery”. This violation is colloquially referred to by Sierra Leoneans as being forced to become a “bush wife”. In describing the experiences of what the Commission has termed “sexual slavery”, the pattern that emerged was as follows: women were captured and abducted; they became part of the entourage of the armed group to which their captors belonged; and they were continuously sexually violated as their captors moved along with them. Again this violation was particularly prevalent for the RUF and the AFRC, who kept women as sexual slaves under what could only be termed “roaming detention”, which could last for time periods ranging from one or two days to several months and years.
300. Another pattern identified as part of this violation was for women to be detained and kept locked up in a specific place, in order that their captors could violate them at any time they had the urge to do so. This pattern of violation was particularly characteristic of the SLA and the CDF factions, who were not as mobile as the RUF and the AFRC. CDF units were typically attached to specific towns and villages, while the SLA would normally be stationed in barracks or assigned to specific locations. The RUF and the AFRC on the other hand were highly mobile and as offensive forces were constantly on the move. A former abductee of the RUF, who was seven years old at the time of her first encounter, recounted her second encounter with the faction, which led to her abduction in 1994 at Pendembu:

“In March 1994, on a Sunday at about 10 o'clock in the morning, I was at the house waiting to see my mother return. Immediately I saw so many RUF rebels that I cannot state their number... five of them ran after me and held me... later I was taken away and I was kept in a locked room always ready for me to be sexed by the commander. Sometimes when he was away, his junior boys will come and open the door sometimes three, sometimes four men. They will force me, telling me if I refuse them they will kill me.”²⁹⁹

²⁹⁸ See the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, at Article 7(2)(c).

²⁹⁹ TRC confidential statement recorded in Upper Bambara Chiefdom, 24 January 2003.

301. In the course of the violation of “forced marriage”, or the “bush wife” phenomenon, abducted women and girls abducted were also given out to combatants, commanders or superiors for the purposes of sex and domestic duties.³⁰⁰ Women assumed the traditional role of “wives” to the combatants who captured them. In many instances, these abducted women lived with their captors until the cessation of hostilities in Sierra Leone.³⁰¹ In terms of international law, “forced marriage” is as much a form of sexual slavery as is the detention of women in “rape camps” or any other circumstances under which women are subjected repeatedly to rape or the threat of rape or other sexual violence. “Forced marriage” involves forced sex or the inability to say no or control sexual access or exercise sexual autonomy. The Special Rapporteur for Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery, and Slavery-Like Practices during Armed Conflicts recognised “forced marriage” as a form of “sexual slavery”.³⁰²
302. The manner in which “bush wives” were treated varied. While in the majority of instances they were protected by their “bush husbands” from being raped by other combatants, there were many instances where they were not. The absence of a “bush husband” left a woman vulnerable and easy prey for combatants who were predators.³⁰³ In other instances, women’s so-called “husbands” would offer them to fellow combatants for sexual purposes. One witness and victim told the Commission of this practice:
- “Every woman was supposed to be picked by someone – a rebel – and we were supposed to sleep with them. So in actual fact, I believed it could be one man today and a different one tomorrow. So if there is a bachelor amongst them, those that didn’t have women were free to go and pick any woman to make them happy for the night.”³⁰⁴
303. Another victim told of her particular experience with the rebels:
- “On 6 January 1999, rebels (RUF, SLA, AFRC) captured me on my way from Brima Lane market. When the rebels saw me they told me ‘Madam just join us if you want to save your life.’ We went to Lunsar... Every night I was made to sleep with more than three rebels. In fact, when the rebels are ready to have sex with me, they tie my hands and they open my legs wide. After they have opened my legs wide, they usually invite one or two of their colleague rebels to have a glance at us whilst having sex with me. I was forced to make sex with several rebels. The rebels did not only abuse me sexually but introduced me to drugs like cocaine and marijuana. In fact what they usually did was to have me properly drugged before they will have sex with me... The rebels really harassed me sexually. The rebels did not even allow me to wear pants on the basis that if I do wear pants, I will interfere with their sexual operations.”³⁰⁵

³⁰⁰ TRC confidential statement from a female victim, recorded in Gbangbatoke, 5 February 2003.

³⁰¹ See TRC confidential statements from multiple female victims, January to April 2003.

³⁰² See McDougall, G., Special Rapporteur for Systematic Rape, Sexual Slavery and Slavery-like Practices during Armed Conflict, final report produced as UN Document E/CN.4/sub.2/1998/13, 12 June 1998, at paragraph 45.

³⁰³ TRC confidential statement from a female victim, recorded in Gbangbatoke, 5 February 2003.

³⁰⁴ TRC confidential testimony given at hearings in Kono District, June 2003.

³⁰⁵ TRC confidential statement from a female victim, recorded in Freetown, 29 January 2003.

304. The RUF adopted a guerrilla mode of conflict during the period 1993 to 1996. Their fighters moved between bases in the bush. The AFRC was also a highly mobile force, initially fleeing Freetown towards Koinadugu in 1998 and then returning to invade Freetown in January 1999. It is this roaming character, common to both these perpetrator groups, which explains their tendency to abduct women and use women as “sexual slaves” and “domestic slaves”.

305. Tragically for many of the women, one of the consequences of this violation has been an upsurge in unwanted pregnancies and babies born to “rebel” fathers.³⁰⁶ A woman victim testified to the Commission of her plight:

“...We were at Sogboleh when the rebels attacked us. Four of us went into one house... they met us in that house, then they told us that they were going to have sexual intercourse with us. We refused and they wounded me on my right hand with a knife. Eight of them came and stripped me naked and all of them raped me. Immediately, my vagina was swollen up and they said they were going to carry us to their base. We were now with them; then I started getting serious abdominal pain. Then one of their big men asked that if he makes people to treat me [better], would I marry him? ... When I was with him, I became pregnant and gave birth to a child.”³⁰⁷

306. Many women, horrified at the prospect of giving birth to the babies of “rebel” fathers, tried to terminate pregnancies and abort their babies.³⁰⁸ A victim who fell into the hands of a second bush husband explained:

“... I was later made to be a wife (illegally) by one RUF called Saidu after Ray was nowhere to be seen. Saidu also impregnated me and I tried to abort the pregnancy. When Saidu heard about it, he said he will kill me if I dare to abort.”³⁰⁹

307. Abducted women and girls who lived with the armed groups for long periods of time were subjected not only to the trauma of living in captivity, forced to endure sexual slavery and daily humiliation, but were also compelled to live under the constant fear of attack from opposing armed groups. Moreover, even if they managed to escape the combatant group, they experienced hostility from civilians and were ostracised from society.³¹⁰ One victim began recounting her ordeal to the Commission in the following terms:

“Immediately the Kamajors caught me, they wanted to kill me because I was married to a rebel commander.”

³⁰⁶ TRC confidential statement from a female victim, recorded in Gbangbatoke, 5 February 2003.

³⁰⁷ Confidential testimony received before TRC Closed Hearings, Matru Jong, Bonthe, July 2003.

³⁰⁸ “First Witness” – confidential testimony received before the TRC Special Thematic Hearings on Women, Freetown, 22 to 24 May 2003.

³⁰⁹ TRC confidential statement from a female victim, Koinadugu District, 11 December 2002.

³¹⁰ Various submissions to the Commission listed some of these factors as the consequences of sexual slavery violations that women suffered during the conflict. Among the noteworthy submissions in this regard were from the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs, the Women’s Forum and the Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE), as well as those received during the TRC Special Thematic Hearings on Women, Freetown, 22 to 24 May 2003.

308. The same victim went on to tell the Commission that:

“From the time I came back home, people used to provoke me, humiliate me, whatever boyfriend that comes my way will be discouraged about me. That is why I decided to leave the town.”³¹¹

309. Another victim had this to say after escaping from the rebels:

“... My aunt advised me that I should not disclose to anyone that I had once been captured by rebels... I stayed there but again I was afraid that someone else would come who knew that I was staying with the rebels and they would identify me. So I decided to leave Moyowa for Matru Jong... When I returned, my former husband left me. He said it was because I had been taken away by rebels. I was now here with no husband...”³¹²

310. Pressure from society, anxiety about being identified and fear of being ostracised has led to women being extremely reticent about reporting this category of violation.

311. Given the testimony of the women who came to the Commission, the Commission finds that all of the armed perpetrator groupings were responsible for the sexual slavery of women and girls. The Commission finds that the RUF and the AFRC were the major perpetrators of sexual slavery and forced marriage of women and young girls.

SEXUAL ABUSE

312. The Commission interpreted all sexual violations other than rape as ‘sexual violence or sexual abuse’. Sexual abuse took many different forms and accounted for 486 violations recorded in the Commission’s database, nearly half of which were perpetrated against women.³¹³ The ICC elements define sexual violence as “encompassing both involuntary sexual assaults and sexual performance”, which also applies to “coercion resulting in sexual entertainment or nakedness”.

313. The scope of sexual violence is very broad and “is not limited to physical invasion of the human body and may include acts which do not involve penetration or even physical contact.”³¹⁴ Sexual abuse could include biological or medical experimentation of a sexual nature or experimentation on reproductive capacities, sexual mutilations, harassment and threats of rape or other sexual violence. Forcing a women to lick a penis or to perform sexual acts that are not rape, such as cutting or sexual touching of the body or breasts, are forms of sexual violence. The Rome Statute has recognised acts of sexual abuse or sexual violence as belonging to the category of the most severe violence.

³¹¹ Confidential testimony received before TRC Closed Hearings, Matru Jong, Bonthe, July 2003.

³¹² Confidential testimony received before TRC Closed Hearings, Matru Jong, Bonthe, July 2003.

³¹³ More detail on violations rates and the levels of different violations experienced by women can be found in the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

³¹⁴ See *Prosecutor v. Jean Paul Akayesu*, Trial Judgement, case ICTR-96-4-T, Ch.1, 2 Sept 1998, at paragraphs 687 to 697.

314. During the conflict in Sierra Leone, acts of sexual violence or abuse took many forms and included forcing women to go naked in public or in private in front of their family members.³¹⁵ A woman in Freetown recounted her story to the Commission:

“On 6 January 1999 rebels attacked my house in Freetown. The rebels vandalised my house and demanded that I should give them money. They demanded pounds sterling and dollars. They said if we did not give them money they would kill me... On 7 January 1999, the rebels came again to my house. They stripped me naked and tortured me with their guns all over my body. On 8 January, they came to my house and took away all that I had and they lit the house.”³¹⁶

315. Another victim from Talia town, Yawbeko Chiefdom told a part of her story:

“... They took the rice from me. Instead of leaving me alone, they got hold of me, undressed me naked, tied both of my hands together one on top of the other and said I should follow them.”³¹⁷

316. Sexual abuse violations also included acts of indecent touching or groping of women’s bodies and genitalia, putting sharp objects into their genitalia as well as forcing their genitalia into the mouths of other victims. Often these cruel acts led to the death of women victims as is testified to by a witness who saw her sister-in-law being killed:

“In March 1991, there was an attack by RUF rebels in Kuiva village in the morning hours. I managed to escape, narrowly, into the bush where I hid for safety. One of the junior workers for the women’s secret society (Bondo) was captured by the rebels. She was the wife of my elder brother, the town chief of Kuiva. She was stripped naked, hair shaved with cutlass and then beaten seriously. They then took her to the secret society bush for men, where the rebels finally shot her.”³¹⁸

317. Incidence of sexual abuse was widespread and has led to many women and girls suffering long-term gynaecological problems.³¹⁹

³¹⁵ More detail on the manner and circumstances in which both men and women suffered sexual abuse violations can be found in the results of the Commission’s special coding exercises and accompanying commentaries in the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

³¹⁶ Marie Jalloh, TRC statement, Freetown, 13 December 2003.

³¹⁷ Isata Vao, TRC statement, Talia, Yawbeko Chiefdom, 21 February 2003.

³¹⁸ Yatta Demby, TRC statement, Mandu Chiefdom, Kailahun District, 15 January 2003.

³¹⁹ More detail on the long-term effects that women have suffered as a result of sexual abuse violations can be found in the results of the Commission’s special coding exercises and accompanying commentaries in the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report, as well as in the chapter on Reparations in Volume Two of this report.

COMMENTARY ON THE CONTEXT OF VIOLATIONS AGAINST WOMEN AND GIRLS AND THEIR EFFECTS

318. Women and girls suffered immensely during the conflict. They were humiliated and dehumanised based on their gender. The trauma of their experiences has left many women and girls psychologically and physically scarred. The impact of the conflict has been unfathomable, the damage immeasurable; and it is the women and girls who are bearing the brunt of it. From a wider societal perspective, the Commission has identified a total breakdown of all morality and norms, along with levels of cruelty that are quite frightening in terms of their long-term effects. A woman who had just given birth to a baby during the January 1999 attack on Freetown told this chilling story:

“They (AFRC and RUF attackers) commanded me afterwards to cover my newborn baby with an empty bowl, which I did after much threat and intimidations. I begged them to spare the life of my kid... I left my baby in the same position and fled. My husband tried to rescue the baby but was unable... The baby died.”³²⁰

319. Women were forced to watch helplessly as their children and husbands, suffered human rights violations, which in many instances led to their death.³²¹ Many women became victims of violations while trying to protect their children. An example was given by this woman, who became an amputee through trying to protect her child:

“When we reached a forest-like area, I suspected from their action that they wanted to kill me or my child. So I kept my gaze on them. Not long after, one of the rebels forcefully took my child, held her on one of her arms and cut her open on her spinal cord. Before he could do this, I rushed to hold his hand and when he turned around with his cutlass, he also cut me open on my head. He threw my then dead child in one corner whilst I laid in the other...”

Despite my condition that time, I stood up to collect my dead child. Again he turned around and saw me, he said to me that I was stubborn; he came back and told me to put my hand on a stump or else he would kill me there and then.

I put out my hand, which he amputated with just one hit of his sharp cutlass. All the wrist bones were cut except the two sides of the wrist skin, which connected the amputated wrist with the rest of my hand.”³²²

³²⁰ Balu Janneh, TRC statement, Freetown, 21 January 2003.

³²¹ See, for example, Marie Kamara, TRC statement, Makoba, 26 February 2003.

³²² Adamsay Bangura, TRC statement, Masiaka Amputee Camp, Port Loko, 1 May 2003.

320. Rape and sexual violence in the conflict have left many women and girls in Sierra Leone suffering from gender-specific medical problems such as Vesico Vaginal Fistula (VVF), Recto Vaginal Fistula (RVF), incontinence and prolapsed uterus, among others. The Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE), an NGO working with women after the conflict, reported the following anecdotes in its submission to the Commission:

“55.4% of the abductees [in FAWE assistance programmes] were raped and some of the girls were raped by one, two, three or even ten men. Two women particularly were raped by 15 and 30 rebels respectively. The former had only given to a baby two weeks before being raped. Both patients suffered from prolapses of the uterus (the womb descending out of the vagina). The former woman had a repair to replace the uterus in its proper position. The latter woman had a major degree of prolapse and therefore the uterus had to be taken out (a total hysterectomy was done).”³²³

321. Women and girls have had their lives broken and shattered by the loss of family members, the breakdown of family structures and the total loss of dignity. Emotionally and psychologically, they suffered to an incomprehensible degree. The social fabric of society in Sierra Leone was torn apart and the rules of civilised society meant to protect women and girls were discarded. In analysing the conflict, its aftermath and its impact on women, the Commission has had to confront the question of why women became such a specific target of the war. The answers to this question are complex and difficult to pinpoint.

322. Binta Mansaray, who appeared as a witness before the Commission, has made the following comment about the cruel irony of Sierra Leone’s “revolutionary” war:

“The ‘Revolution’ of the RUF was not at all redemption for women. On the contrary, the RUF committed unspeakable crimes.”³²⁴

323. The war from inception was a self-destructive conflict that consumed its own. Attacks on unarmed civilians by the RUF and its accomplices started from the very beginning of the war and continued unabated until its conclusion, with violation rates escalating and the nature of violations becoming ever more grotesque. In terms of the violations recorded in the TRC database, the Commission estimates that women make up 34% of victims of all violations throughout the conflict and that the average female victim suffered approximately three violations.³²⁵ This percentage testifies to the startlingly unconventional nature of the war, whereby civilians were the prime targets of all factions. Had the conflict in Sierra Leone assumed a more “conventional” character of battles between armies, then fewer civilians, especially women and children, would have met face-to-face with the various factions and suffered such levels of atrocities.

³²³ Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE), Submission to the TRC Special Thematic Hearings on Women, Freetown, 22 May 2003 (hereinafter “FAWE submission to TRC”), at page 14.

³²⁴ See Mansaray, Binta; “*Women against Weapons: A Leading Role for Women in Disarmament*”, in Ayissi, A. and Poulton, R-E.; *Bound to Co-operate: Conflict, Peace and People in Sierra Leone*, United Nations Publications; Geneva, Switzerland, 2000 (hereinafter “Mansaray, *Women Against Weapons*”), at page 142.

³²⁵ More detail on violations rates and the levels of different violations experienced by women can be found in the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

324. It is also important to note that the major armed groups in the conflict, fighting both for and against the government, all committed gross human rights violations against women. In essence, the conflict did not offer any respite for the women from any of the armed groups, including those who were fighting for the government and who were supposed to protect civilians. On the side of government, the fluctuating nature and loyalties of the national Army that gave rise to the “sobel” phenomenon³²⁶ meant that the government lost any substantial control of the Army and as such forfeited a mechanism through which to protect all civilians, women included. Therefore, women were rendered vulnerable to attacks and abuses without any reliable institution of state to turn to for their protection.
325. During the conflict, no attempts were made by any of the major armed groups to address or tackle impunity among its members for violations against women.³²⁷ Consequently violations against women grew rife and violators rather revelled in them as they were not called to order. In fact, contrary to expected standards of accountability, it could be said that some of the major armed groups, at the level of their respective High Commands, saw women as “war booty” and actively ignored the violations that their members committed against women.
326. Prior to the war, the status of women in Sierra Leone at almost every level was low. Their low status meant that issues concerning women and women themselves were not of paramount importance in society. Consequently, it was easy for armed combatants to treat women with disdain and appropriate a sense of ownership of women’s bodies for themselves, as they probably were wont to do, albeit to a lesser extent, in peacetime. The patriarchal hegemony that had existed in Sierra Leone continued and worsened during the conflict, evolving in the most macabre manner. The cultural concept that a woman was “owned” by a man played itself out in many of the violations that women suffered during the conflict.
327. The use and abuse of drugs was widespread among the various armed factions. Many perpetrators lost all sense of reason and had no regard for human life, women’s included. In a drug-affected state, combatants committed atrocities without feeling and with total impunity. While drug use cannot excuse the conduct of perpetrators or the atrocities they committed, it is factor to consider, particularly in the case of child and youth perpetrators, as drugs have been proven to alter minds and affect reason.³²⁸
328. All of the above may not better explain the reasons for the atrocities committed against women and girls during the conflict, but they are some relevant considerations of the context in which so many women were violated and in which the survivors must now come to terms with the aftermath.

³²⁶ “Sobel” is a sobriquet derived from a combination of the words “soldier” and “rebel”. The term emerged among the civilian population as a name for government soldiers who were suspected of joining or collaborating with the RUF rebels during the course of the conflict.

³²⁷ Jonathan Kposowa, former Adjutant General of the RUF and present Secretary General of the RUF; TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 23 June 2003. Mr. Kposowa stated that the RUF at its inception meted out death as punishment for rape. He said he saw only three persons punished in this manner throughout his time with the RUF during the conflict.

³²⁸ Dr. Edward Nahim, Sierra Leonean psychiatrist and commentator on use of drugs during the conflict, TRC interview conducted at Kissy Mental Hospital, Freetown, 30 July 2003.

THE PERPETRATORS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND GIRLS

329. The main armed groups accused of perpetrating sexual violence against women and girls during the conflict were the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the Civil Defence Forces (CDF), the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) and the Westside Boys.
330. Given the widespread nature of rape and sexual violence by the armed groups mentioned above, it is clear that there were deliberate policies systematically to target women and girls and systematically to rape and sexually violate them. This section examines policies and parts played by each of the major factions.

REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT (RUF)

331. The Commission's records reflect that the RUF was the major belligerent group in the conflict and dominates accounts of having committed the most savage acts against the civilian population. While it not only holds the record for the highest number of violations, the RUF is also responsible for most of the acts of rape and sexual violence recorded by the Commission.³²⁹ As reflected in the Commission's narrative of the conflict, the RUF by 1994 switched from conventional warfare to guerrilla warfare. With the change in tactics, there was a corresponding change in behaviour towards women and girls. The number of women abducted began to rise. The TRC estimates that the number of victims abducted and kept in sexual slavery in 1995 was double that in 1991.

NPFL / RUF in Pujehun District in 1991

332. During the early part of the conflict, the joint NPFL / RUF contingent moved into the Pujehun district. The following statement describes the harrowing experiences endured by a whole community in the Pujehun District in the first year of the war, 1991. The perpetrators were said to be "from Liberia", which in the context of the Commission's research indicates that they were probably comprised of a combination of NPFL and RUF members. They included both men and women; they were drawn from a variety of ethnic groups. The male statement giver describes sexual violations to which he was subjected both individually and as part of his community in his home village. The statement indicates a policy of using rape to terrorise the people and systematically to break down their sacred familial and cultural taboos:

"We were here when the rebels entered this country in 1991. They met me on the road with one girl... They captured us and they asked us to show them where we were going. We told them that they sent us for food for prayer..."

... When they asked me about my relationship with [the girl], I told them that she was my sister. They said I must have sex with her by force. After the sex they threw plenty of dirty water on us and they allowed us to go..."

³²⁹ More detail on violations rates and the propensities of particular factions to commit certain violations can be found in the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

[...] We went for the rice and when we brought it they seized it from us and gave us a very serious beating. [The girl I was with] met her death as a result of the heavy beating we got from these rebels.

[...] It was at night that these rebels entered [the village] and they asked us all out of the various houses and homes. We were told to strip ourselves naked, both men and women; [we were also told] to dance, men on one side, women on one side.

[...] The rebels told the women to lie down on the ground. These rebels then asked the men to tell them their relationships with these women on the ground.

[...] When a man says or points to one lady or girl as his sister or mother, the rebels will ask him to have sex with her. We did this for over one hour. One man lost his life during this process because he refused to have sex with his mother. He was seriously beaten and the next day we only saw his dead body.³³⁰

333. On further occasions, victims reported to the Commission that RUF commanders had given orders to their troops to carry out acts of sexual violence. For example, in the following extract, a girl who was 19 years old when the conflict began described the ordeal she suffered at the hands of a group of approximately ten RUF combatants. This gang rape took place in the Jaiama Bongor Chiefdom in Bo District. It is also believed to have happened in 1991. The perpetrators were presumably Sierra Leoneans, since they were talking Krio:

“While I was at Telu Bongor, RUF rebels attacked the town. We ran into the bush for safety. While in the bush, a rebel group led by a rebel commander named ‘Mosquito’ came around. [...] ‘Mosquito’ was the first person that raped me. Then he ordered his men to continue the act. Nine other men continued to rape me. This made all the civilians run away and I was in the midst of rebels. [...] After misusing me to their satisfaction, the rebels left me alone in a very hopeless condition... Even now the pain is still in me, which is creating problems in my marital home, because my husband drives me from my home and says that I am barren.”³³¹

334. Another statement giver reported that RUF and NPFL attackers carried out rape and torture systematically in the first year of the war. She was in her home in the Moyamba District when “rebels” raided the village from the direction of the Soro Gbema Chiefdom in Pujehun District. She was abducted in 1991 at the age of eleven. The reference to an “operation” entitled “Ask No One” in the extract overleaf seems to indicate that the practice of rape was part of a deliberate policy of violations:

³³⁰ TRC confidential statement from a victim and witness of systematic sexual violence, recorded in Yonni Town, Pujehun District, 10 December 2003.

³³¹ TRC confidential statement from a victim of sexual violence, recorded in Soro Gbema Chiefdom, Pujehun District, 14 January 2003.

"I came across a group of men dressed in civilian attire, who commanded me to halt. When they came to me... they told me to accompany them to [a place] nearer to the border [with Liberia]. I told them that I am eleven years old; how can they take me from my parents? As soon as I told them these words, two of them started torturing me, forcing me to go with them. They gave me some of the loads to carry.

[...] The following day, they took me to a house where two of them raped me. They told me to come outside, as they listed all names of those that had been taken as captives... After the registration, they chose eight persons and killed them with gun. At night, they took a 'makabo' lamp and went to the round house that I was in. When they entered the house, they told us to strip ourselves naked, both old and young, telling us that they were going to do their operation called 'Ask No One'. After saying these words, they raped all of us that were in that round house."³³²

335. In terms of statements recorded by the Commission, the RUF and AFRC were the groups most likely to coerce women and girls into sexual slavery and forced marriages. A possible reason for this was that from 1993 to 1994, the RUF adopted a guerrilla mode of warfare and so its units were constantly on the move between bases in the bush. The fighters demanded women to perform domestic chores and to perform sexual services for them. Women and girls were vulnerable in their communities, so it was quite easy for a fighter to abduct them, force them under his immediate control and compel them into sexual slavery and forced labour.
336. While victims experienced some degree of protection as the exclusive property of one perpetrator through a "forced marriage", the relationship in most instances was entirely abusive. Most victims who spoke to the Commission nevertheless suffered some manifestations of the so-called "Stockholm syndrome", i.e. they tended in their testimonies to identify with their perpetrators and would insist that they had been treated well even though many of the experiences they were describing tended to be abusive. The economy of war also required that women make themselves useful to their captors or "bush husbands" in order to survive.
337. It is also clear from many of the victims' testimonies that being a "bush wife" to a member of the RUF did not necessarily protect them from being handed over to another combatant or multiple perpetrators to be gang raped.
338. The role of "bush wife" in the RUF included domestic as well as sexual servitude.

³³² TRC confidential statement from a former abductee and victim of sexual violence, recorded in Dasse Chiefdom, Moyamba District; 27 January 2003.

Responses of the RUF to allegations of sexual violations

339. The Commission called for submissions by all political parties and groupings. The Commission had access to official statements and a number of submissions made to it by the RUF. The Commission has noted with considerable surprise the failure of the RUF in its submission to address issues of sexual violence, including rape and other sexual abuses. Testimony gathered by the Commission reveals that the RUF commanders were not only aware of what was going on, but that the majority of them participated in the violations.³³³ Many victims named their perpetrators, including high-level commanders, in their statements.³³⁴
340. The NGO Physicians for Human Rights has reported that, during their survey of a sample population of survivors of sexual violence, 34 out of 94 survivors believed that the commander of the person who attacked them had knowledge that they were to be attacked.³³⁵
341. In terms of the testimony provided to the Commission, it is clear that the RUF had a policy deliberately to target women and girls with the clear intention of abducting them and holding them for various purposes described in this report. One of the main reasons for abduction was to violate women and girls by raping them and holding them as sexual slaves. The RUF cannot deny this *modus operandi* in the face of overwhelming evidence that, immediately after an attack, women seized in a raid were assigned to either commanders or combatants for the purposes of using them as “bush wives”. The TRC did not receive any report of an RUF commander who attempted to return abducted women and girls to their families, nor was any effort made by the RUF High Command to condemn this practice or to stop it. The RUF leadership must therefore accept that they are responsible for the violations that took place.
342. Immediately after the Abidjan Peace Accord in November 1996, there was a call for the cessation of hostilities from Foday Sankoh to RUF members. While there was a brief lull in the conflict in terms of RUF armed attacks, frankly there was no cessation in respect of the violence perpetrated against women. The ceasefire offered an opportunity to the RUF movement to deal honestly and conclusively with the issue of sexual violence and yet it did nothing.
343. Human Rights Watch in its report notes that the RUF made occasional efforts to declare rape a crime in certain areas under its control and in a few incidents even endeavoured to punish “ordinary combatants” who had contravened orders to this effect.³³⁶ The Commission has also gathered testimony from witnesses who indicated that some commanders prohibited rape and sexual violence against women, particular where the abductee was very young.³³⁷

³³³ In this regard, numerous entries in the Commission’s database are corroborated by the following testimony: TRC Confidential Individual Interviews with members of the RUF ‘vanguards’ contingent; interviews conducted variously in Freetown, Makeni, Magburaka, Kailahun and Kono; June to December 2003, and Captain (Retired) Moigboi Moigande Kosia, former officer in the Republic of Sierra Leone Military Forces (RSLMF) and later recruited into the RUF by Foday Sankoh as his first ‘G-1’ officer; testimony before TRC Public Hearings held in Freetown; 17 April 2003.

³³⁴ The Commission’s database allowed for the entry of perpetrator and commander names along with the description of the violations committed. Far more names were recorded for the RUF than for any of the other combatant factions.

³³⁵ See Physicians for Human Rights, *War-Related Sexual Violence in Sierra Leone*, at page 54.

³³⁶ See Human Rights Watch, *We’ll Kill You if you Cry*, at page 46.

³³⁷ Confidential testimony received before the TRC Special Thematic Hearings on Women, Freetown, 22 to 24 May 2003.

However this kind of attitude to rape was not the typical one held by most RUF commanders, so perpetrators of violations against women and girls were not too concerned about possible punishment or repercussions.

344. In his submission to the Commission, a former high-ranking RUF official stated that rape was considered a punishable offence by the RUF and that he witnessed an RUF member being punished for it. In spite of these claims, the Commission has not been able to establish many cases of punishment or any signs of remorse for what happened.
345. The Revolutionary United Front Party (RUF)³³⁸ in its submission to the TRC stated that the RUF High Command was not aware of the high prevalence of rape and sexual violence during the conflict and had a practice of executing those found guilty of rape through its “People’s Court”. The RUF apologised to the country for these and other violations committed by the RUF.³³⁹
346. The Commission finds the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) responsible for pursuing a deliberate strategy of abducting women and girls with the express intention of keeping them under their control, exploiting their vulnerability and sexually violating them either by raping them and causing them to be harmed by acts of sexual violence, using them as sexual and domestic slaves, torturing them and practicing a range of cruel and inhuman acts upon them.

CIVIL DEFENCE FORCES (CDF)

347. The Civil Defence Forces (CDF) was a network of civil militiamen created in 1996 from several different units, including Kamajors, Gbethes, Donsos, Tamaboros and Kapras, organised according to ethnicity and District of origin. Many CDF combatants laid claim to being traditional hunters with origins in their secret societies that predated the conflict. However, the overwhelming bulk of the fighters, particularly Kamajors, were in fact disaffected youths who were crudely enlisted into combat through illusory ceremonies of “initiation”.
348. In terms of the evidence before the Commission, it is clear that the predecessors of the CDF, most of whom were vigilantes and hunters, did not commit sexual violations or rape systematically. The Commission’s records reflect scarcely any sexual violations attributed to “CDF” in the years before 1996. A major reason that at the beginning of the conflict, the traditional initiates of the hunters’ secret societies tended to respect and uphold the rules and regulations that governed their society membership. Breaking any of the rules was taboo.
349. Secret society rules prohibited men from having sexual intercourse with women while performing their society duties, as they believed that sex or sexual contact with women before a battle would diminish their powers of immunity to withstand attacks or wounds.

³³⁸ The RUF was created in the wake of the Lomé Peace Agreement in 1999 as a political party designed to replace the RUF military movement. In reality it spent several years as a “political wing” of the RUF movement, while a combatant cadre continued to carry out military operations. More detail on the evolution of the RUF after Lomé can be found in the chapter on the Military and Political History of the Conflict in Volume Three A of this report.

³³⁹ Jonathan Kposowa, former Adjutant General of the RUF and present Secretary General of the RUF; TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 23 June 2003.

350. In terms of the CDF code of practice after 1996, many witnesses claimed that a similar set of rules and taboos applied and that, additionally, all CDF members were obliged to protect civilians, particularly women and children.³⁴⁰
351. As the conflict escalated, the CDF was compelled to increase the number of men in its fighting forces. The rapidity with which this expansion happened meant that recruitment standards lapsed, numbers became unmanageably large and the purported code of ethics and practices was overlooked. The effect of this was that newer “initiates” into the CDF did not feel bound by age-old traditions and practices. Indeed, the new generation of CDF, especially Kamajors from the south and east, adopted a different ethos that was entirely geared towards war and perceived benefits it could yield. Ethnic differences also came into play, particularly as many of the CDF forces were deployed in areas not belonging to their immediate communities.
352. In the latter period of the conflict, from 1997 onwards, the Commission has noted a massive increase in the number of violations attributed to the CDF. From anecdotal testimony received by the Commission, it appears that CDF forces acted with almost the same amount of savagery as the RUF towards women and girls.³⁴¹ According to the Commission’s database, the CDF was responsible for 6% of the total violations recorded.³⁴² It is worthy of mention that for sexual violations recorded in the Commission’s database, the percentage of allegations against the CDF is as follows: rape 12%; sexual slavery 0.8%; and sexual abuse 7.3%.³⁴³ These figures indicate that the CDF perpetrators whose violations were recorded in the Commission’s database demonstrated twice as high a propensity to commit rape than their propensity to commit violations overall. The figures support the theory that, at least as far as the Commission’s database can indicate, elements of the CDF made a point of committing rapes in the latter period of the conflict.³⁴⁴
353. As CDF units were usually attached to a specific town or village for a specific period of time, they were not as mobile as the RUF or the AFRC. Thus in contrast to the “roaming detentions” of the RUF and the AFRC, the preferred *modus operandi* of the CDF in terms of sexual violations was to abduct women and girls and take them prisoner. They would then be confined to a single secure location, usually in a village or town where they were freely available to be used as sexual slaves. They would be held under the custody and complete control of the CDF and would be raped, either singly or gang raped, in a multiple number of ways. They would often be held naked and had to be freely available for sex.³⁴⁵

³⁴⁰ See, for example, Hassan Jalloh, former CDF commander of the Kamajors on the eastern border, TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 8 August 2003.

³⁴¹ TRC confidential statement from a female victim, recorded in Gbangbatoke, 5 February 2003.

³⁴² More detail on violations rates and the propensities of particular factions to commit certain violations can be found in the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

³⁴³ See the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

³⁴⁴ More detail on violations rates and the propensities of particular factions to commit certain violations can be found in the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

³⁴⁵ See TRC confidential statements from multiple female victims, January to April 2003.

Responses of the CDF to allegations of sexual violations

354. The Commission has recorded many statements in its database and has heard testimony that women and their families reported CDF members for both rape and sexual violence to their commanders. The response was telling. Nothing happened and in many instances it became clear that rape and sexual violence was condoned, particularly where the women were thought to have spent time with or rendered assistance to the RUF or AFRC. No consideration seems to have been given to the possibility that women had been forced into these roles in order to survive. No evidence exists that the CDF took any action against its members who were accused of rape or sexual violence. On the contrary, such acts appear to have been condoned, particularly if the women were labelled “rebel collaborators” or “rebels”, or if they had family members who were associated with the RUF, the SLA or the AFRC.
355. The Commission finds that the CDF, particularly in the latter period of the conflict, pursued the deliberate strategy of abducting civilian women and girls believed to be in any way connected to the RUF or who had collaborated with them, and detained them in a cruel and inhuman way, with the intention of deliberately violating them, either by raping them or using them as sexual slaves. The Commission finds it particularly reprehensible that the CDF behaved in this manner when it was duty-bound to protect the civilian population and prevent violations being perpetrated against them.

ARMED FORCES REVOLUTIONARY COUNCIL (AFRC)

356. The Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) led by Johnny Paul Koroma came into being after the overthrow of the government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah on 25 May 1997. Following the coup, the leadership of AFRC called upon the RUF to join them in government. The two factions referred to their alliance as “The People’s Army”.
357. Together the alliance of the RUF and the AFRC were incredibly brutal and savage in their conduct. They were responsible for the many atrocities and violations women and many others suffered during the infamous invasion of Freetown on 6 January 1999. It is worthy of mention that, in the Commission’s database, the percentage of sexual violations recorded against the AFRC is as follows: rape 12,6%; sexual slavery 3,5%; and sexual abuse 31,8%. Overall, the AFRC is accountable for 11,1% of the sexual violations recorded in the Commission’s database. The fact that the AFRC is responsible for three times as many sexual abuse violations recorded in the Commission’s database as overall violations recorded in the Commission’s database supports the theory of a deliberate plan to commit sexual abuses.³⁴⁶ While the Commission has not been able to obtain the precise statistics of the numbers of women that were tortured and sexually violated during this period, the NGO group FAWE (Forum for African Women Educationalists) in partnership with Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) provided medical treatment and counselling to 1,862 female survivors of sexual violence.³⁴⁷ According to the TRC database, the AFRC alone is responsible for 7% of all violations recorded by the Commission.³⁴⁸

³⁴⁶ More detail on violations rates and the propensities of particular factions to commit certain violations can be found in the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

³⁴⁷ See FAWE submission to TRC.

³⁴⁸ See the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

Responses of the AFRC to allegations of sexual violations

358. The AFRC experienced the same kind of complexities and challenges with commandship as the RUF did, with many different combatant groups declaring allegiance only to a particular commander. During the conflict, some commanders acquired the reputation of being especially vicious in their targeting of women and girls. They became known by name and reputation among victims and Sierra Leonean society in general. In many statements and testimonies given to the Commission, women responded to the question of perpetrator identity by identifying the name of an individual perpetrator. A prominent example of an individual name that appeared frequently was "SAJ Musa", also recorded as "SAJ Musa's group".³⁴⁹ Many statements and testimony confirm the presence of the commander known as SAJ Musa at the scene of AFRC violations, particularly during the prolonged assault on the north of the country that culminated in the invasion of Freetown on 6 January 1999. Multiple violations, including sexual violations, were attributed to SAJ Musa personally and to other senior AFRC commanders in his unit.³⁵⁰
359. The AFRC did not institute any measures to address complaints in respect of rape and sexual violence. Its remaining members, whose factional allegiance is in any case difficult to ascertain, have never addressed this issue despite the numerous accusations.
360. The Commission finds the AFRC to have pursued a deliberate strategy of targeting girls and women with the specific intention of violating them by abducting them, raping them, perpetrating sexual violence upon them, torturing them as well as perpetrating cruel and inhuman acts against them. The Commission also finds that the AFRC together with the RUF were responsible for the rape and sexual violations perpetrated upon civilian women and girls during the January 1999 invasion of Freetown.

SIERRA LEONE ARMY (SLA)

361. The SLA³⁵¹ is reported to have committed violations including rape and sexual violence.³⁵² In terms of the Commission's database, the SLA was responsible for 5.2% of all rapes and sexual violations recorded by the Commission.³⁵³
362. SLA units, like their CDF counterparts, were typically attached to a specific town or village. SLA soldiers would be garrisoned in barracks or assigned to protect a location for several months. They were not mobile and thus tended to target women and girls by abducting them with the intention of detaining in a confined, secure location to be used at their whim and fancy as sex slaves. The Commission heard that women and girls detained in this way by the SLA were often kept naked to be available freely for sex or other abuses.

³⁴⁹ The Commission's database allowed for the entry of perpetrator and commander names along with the description of the violations committed. The name "SAJ Musa" (the popular name for the late AFRC commander Solomon A. J. Musa) appeared more times than any other combatant outside the ranks of the RUF. See the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

³⁵⁰ See the commentary on perpetrator names in the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report. Interviewees also testified about individual violators in the AFRC: see, for example, Agnes Sesay, TRC interview at Internal Displaced Persons Camp, Lunsar; 8 August, 2003.

³⁵¹ For the purposes of the TRC database, AFRC abuses are not included in the category of "SLA".

³⁵² See the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

³⁵³ See the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

363. Some deployments of the Sierra Leone Army were by 1994 engaging in the same patterns of behaviour that had characterised the earlier NPFL and RUF presence in towns and villages in the Eastern Districts. The SLA, understandably for a national Army, was present across a much broader geographical area than the RUF. In particular, the SLA tended to be stationed in more of the towns, whereas the RUF was establishing and consolidating its jungle bases in remote and heavily forested areas.

364. The maltreatment of civilians by SLA deployments included persistent acts of sexual abuse and general disregard for the dignity of the womenfolk. A farmer in the town of Yele, Gbonkolenken Chiefdom, Tonkolili District gave the following account of abuses by SLA soldiers under the command of one Captain Koroma:

“These soldiers were bullies. They used to take the wives of community people to sleep with them, cook for them as well as to launder their clothes. My wife was heavy with pregnancy and was asked to fill a forty-four gallon drum with water by the soldiers.”³⁵⁴

365. In the same manner as in other categories of abuse, sexual violence was often meted out randomly by the SLA. In Moyamba District in 1995, the Commission recorded violations by the SLA that were completely unconnected to the defence of communities against RUF attack. In the following statement, a whole community of forcibly displaced people was attacked in its new location in the bush:

“They captured our sisters and women and used them to their satisfaction. When using them, they sometimes inserted steel irons or the sharp edge of a stick into their vaginas and abandoned them. They also amputated some of their hands.”³⁵⁵

366. The tragedy of the impact of the conflict on the family was illustrated not only in the statements of victims, but also in the testimonies given by their family members and loved ones. The following statement was given by a man who testified solely as a witness to the rape of his wife at the hands of men dressed in SLA uniforms in January 1995:

“I saw people in SLA uniforms knocked my door. As I opened my door they pushed me. [These] uniformed men raped my dear wife. I saw two of these uniformed men raping my wife. She was not happy over that but she was forced to do so.”³⁵⁶

³⁵⁴ Santigie Koroma, farmer from Yele, Gbonkolenken Chiefdom, Tonkolili District, TRC statement recorded in Tonkolili District; 14 December 2002.

³⁵⁵ Joseph Smart, farmer from Bauya, Moyamba District, TRC statement recorded in Moyamba District, 4 March 2003.

³⁵⁶ Ibrahim Yayah, farmer from Kasama, Tikonko Chiefdom, Bo District, TRC statement recorded in Bo District; 15 January 2003.

Responses of the SLA to allegations of sexual violations

367. While the SLA had a clearly defined command structure, as well as reputedly operating structures to deal with allegations of rape and sexual violence, it does not appear that the Army dealt in any conclusive way with allegations of rape and sexual violence made against its soldiers, or with the alleged perpetrators themselves. The Army has not been able to show that any SLA soldier was punished for having committed this kind of offence.
368. When they appeared before the Commission, senior officers of the Army were asked questions pertaining to the numerous allegations of torture, rape and sexual violence made against them during the conflict. In addition to oral answers given at Commission hearings by officers including the erstwhile Chief of Defence Staff, Major-General Tom Carew, the RSLAF provided a set of written responses to TRC questions about violations. This document contained the following response to allegations of sexual violations:
- “[The acts of sexual violence committed by SLA soldiers during the conflict are] widely condemned by all members of RSLAF. Troops are however being sensitised on UN Conventions concerning these issues to prevent future occurrence.”³⁵⁷
369. Army officials were at great pains to assure the Commission that they have instituted new mechanisms to deal with rape and sexual violence:
- “The legal branch has been established to co-ordinate criminal prosecutions. There is also the Joint Provost Unit to investigate such cases. The COURT MARTIAL is also about to be established. The Army now has a qualified lawyer ready to carry out prosecutions. His Excellency the President has also signed the rules of Procedure for the Court Martial.”³⁵⁸
- [and]
- “In the absence of an established Court Martial, there is a good liaison between the Police and Provost Unit for the prosecution of these cases [of sexual violations].”³⁵⁹
370. The Commission finds that the SLA, which was primarily responsible for protecting the state and the civilian population, also pursued a strategy of abducting women and girls, particularly those believed to belong to the RUF or who had collaborated with the RUF / AFRC. The SLA deliberately detained women and girls in cruel and inhuman conditions with the intention of raping them and perpetrating other acts of sexual violence upon them.

³⁵⁷ See Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces (RSLAF), *Written responses to questions posed by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)*, Freetown, August 2003 (hereinafter “RSLAF written responses to TRC questions”).

³⁵⁸ See RSLAF written responses to TRC questions.

³⁵⁹ See RSLAF written responses to TRC questions.

WEST SIDE BOYS

371. The Westside Boys, a perpetrator grouping that included serving Sierra Leonean Army officers, including AFRC Ministers such as Santigie Kanu, members of the Sierra Leonean Border Guards and civilians had their headquarters at Gberegama in Port Loko District. They emerged in the aftermath of the ECOMOG putsch of rebels from Freetown after the 6 January 1999 invasion of the city and its environs.³⁶⁰ The civilians included those abducted on the dissidents' retreat from Freetown in such areas as Wellington and Calaba Town, as well as some unemployed youth living in the ghettos and who had aligned themselves and fought with the invading rebel forces during the 6 January 1999 invasion. These youths became afraid of reprisals when the rebels were repelled and consequently fled with them.³⁶¹ The third category of civilians who became part of West Side Boys comprised the inhabitants of the communities where the West Side Boys had settled. They were abducted and forced to become part of them.³⁶²
372. The Commission received statements and testimony implicating the West Side Boys in rape and sexual violence against women. They have been described as a gang of bandits rather than credited as a politically motivated fighting force.³⁶³ Many of the statements the Commission received came from young girls who were forced to become "bush wives" to some of the members of this group.³⁶⁴ TRC statements also confirm that the Westside Boys continued to carry out abductions, rape and other violations against women right up to 10 September 2000, when they were wiped out by a dawn raid on their Okra Hills base involving Sierra Leone security services and British paratroopers.³⁶⁵

Responses of West Side Boys to allegations of sexual violations

373. The Commission did not receive any response to allegations of sexual violations made against this faction. Most of those who could claim to have been members of the West Side Boys are presently in detention, including three who are indicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone and a significant number who are held in so-called "safe custody" in Pademba Road Prison in Freetown. With access to these persons severely restricted by the respective detaining authorities, the Commission was left to gather information on this faction from low-level members, police statements and victim testimonies.
374. The Commission finds the West Side Boys responsible for pursuing a policy of abducting women and girls, holding them against their will in forced marriages, raping them and using them as sexual slaves, perpetrating a range of cruel and inhuman acts upon them.

³⁶⁰ See Karimu, E.; investigator into the enlistment and abduction strategies of militias and armed groups in the Sierra Leone conflict; TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 6 October 2003.

³⁶¹ See Karimu, E.; investigator into the enlistment and abduction strategies of militias and armed groups in the Sierra Leone conflict; TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 6 October 2003.

³⁶² See Karimu, E.; investigator into the enlistment and abduction strategies of militias and armed groups in the Sierra Leone conflict; TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 6 October 2003.

³⁶³ See, *inter alia*, BBC News online, *Who are the West Side Boys?*, report of 31 August 2000, available at the following website: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/africa/901209.stm>.

³⁶⁴ Confidential testimony received before TRC Closed Hearings, Freetown, May 2003.

³⁶⁵ See Karimu, E.; investigator into the enlistment and abduction strategies of militias and armed groups in the Sierra Leone conflict; TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 6 October 2003.

OTHER VIOLATIONS SUFFERED BY WOMEN

375. In addition to the specific categories of violations covered above, women suffered a multiplicity of different experiences and were subjected to a plethora of economic violations, which had an enormous impact on them during the conflict period and on their lives and livelihoods since.

EXTORTION

376. Women were frequent victims of extortion. In the TRC database, women account for 351 of the 1,314 counts of extortion where the gender of the victim is known to the Commission.³⁶⁶ The database records that all of the major armed groups perpetrated this violation against women. Extortion mostly took two forms. In the first instance, armed groups demanded money from persons illegally detained or from their family members. If family members failed to comply with such demands, the person held in custody was on occasion killed.³⁶⁷ In the second instance, armed groups imposed levies on communities for their upkeep. Beyond these two main types of extortion, there were numerous random acts in which combatants simply demanded money and took it by force.³⁶⁸ If individuals resisted such demands, they were subjected to further violations. Some of the victims told their stories to the TRC:

“Sometime in 1991, I was in the town of Blama when the RUF rebels attacked that community... we were forced to give them money and food as a sign of welcoming them; but I told them that times are rough and we gave them only five chickens. They came again with threatening remarks that if we do not give enough food that day, they will kill everybody in the town. We gave them all our food that day. As they left for the other community, I left the town with the rest of the people...because we could no longer stand the harassment.”³⁶⁹

“...I was sitting in my house when I saw people running. It was sometime in 1999 after the invasion of Makeni. It was getting to 4.00p.m, time for the afternoon prayers. I too ran towards the river, as it was the place that everybody was heading for... the place I went to hide was where I was captured... I was taken to a village called Rosos... they later took all my belongings from me. That same day, I returned to the town with other people thinking that all was over. On our return, another group of combatants came. They were rebels... They came to stay in the village but we were asked to feed them from contributions. We used to contribute 60 cups of rice, two gallons of palm oil, fish, pepper, groundnut and maggi daily for six months.”³⁷⁰

“On 6 January 1999, AFRC / RUF rebels attacked my house in Freetown and put me under gunpoint. They sprinkled petrol around the house and said they were going to burn the house... they focused their attention that I should give them money. They first demanded the sum of 20,000 Leones from me, which I gave in a hurry as a way of saving my life. After I had given them, they left.”³⁷¹

³⁶⁶ See the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

³⁶⁷ TRC confidential statement from a female victim, recorded in Gbangbatoke, 5 February 2003.

³⁶⁸ See, for example, Adama John, TRC statement, Mbelleh, Yangtoke, 30 January 2003.

³⁶⁹ Massah Koroma, TRC statement, Blama Massaquoi, Pujehun District, 24 February 2003.

³⁷⁰ TRC confidential statement from a female victim, recorded in Batkanu, 4 December 2002.

³⁷¹ TRC confidential statement from a female victim, recorded in Freetown, 11 December 2002.

377. Women were often the main targets of extortion, as they were considered more vulnerable to this kind of demand than men. According to the TRC database, the CDF accounts for the most acts of extortion of all the armed factions perpetrated on the civil population under its areas of control. A victim told the Commission of what she and her husband experienced at the hands of the CDF Kamajors in Kabati village:

“Both my husband and I were residing in Kabati village... according to Mr. Gbessay (CDF commander) his purpose of visiting us was to arrest my husband to an isolated area in Kabati village known as “TONGO FIELD”. This Tongo Field was the field where these Kamajors normally killed people who refuses to pay fines levied on them... On the next day, a boy by the name of Musa came and told me that the Kamajors under the command of Mr. Fomba wanted to see me immediately and both of us went to these Kamajors. I was told by their boss...to pay a fine of fourteen thousand Leones, a bag of husk rice and seven chickens... I paid all these fines levied on me without reasons as I was under gunpoint. I had to pay all the fines levied on me after they had killed my husband for his properties... I want the Commission to know that all of these people are currently in Kabati village in Jong Chiefdom.”³⁷²

378. Another victim also told of her experience with the CDF:

“I was flogged by Kamajors at Bo. In 1999, I was captured by the Kamajors; we were twenty in number. In the first place when they captured me, I was having one hundred and fifteen thousand Leones in my bosom. I was stripped naked as I was born and they saw the money and they took it from my bosom. I felt stressed and uneasy, then I urinated on myself. They tied me up and I saw some of the civilians hands chopped off and others killed I was just waiting for my turn to be killed. Then the commander of the Kamajors told them not to kill me but to properly flog me.”³⁷³

379. Armed groups, particularly the CDF set up checkpoints and proceeded to extort money from passers-by, including women. Women traders were particularly targeted in this fashion.³⁷⁴ The setting up of checkpoints heightened tensions considerably in many communities. It became a major point of contention between communities in the south and the CDF forces stationed there.

380. A resolution only came when the Government of Sierra Leone, DFID (a British Development agency) and the European Union engaged the CDF and some interest groups in the various communities in dialogue on this issue. The outcome was the CDF / Community Reconciliation Workshop held on 17 and 18 June 1999 at the Bo town hall where some measures, such as the dismantling of some checkpoints, were agreed upon.³⁷⁵

³⁷² Kamah Joseph, TRC statement, Bonthe District, 3 March 2003.

³⁷³ Aminata Sesay, TRC statement, Bombali District, 17 December 2002.

³⁷⁴ See the Report from the Regional Reconciliation Committee Meeting – Southern Region, facilitated by DFID and European Union, including discussion of CDF violations, 8 August 1999.

³⁷⁵ See the Report from the Regional Reconciliation Committee Meeting – Southern Region, facilitated by DFID and European Union, including discussion of CDF violations, 8 August 1999.

LOOTING

381. The Commission recorded 931 counts of looting perpetrated against women, amounting to 30,1% of all acts of looting that were reported to the TRC.³⁷⁶ In this category the RUF accounts for most of the violations reported (59,7% for women and girls; 58,4% for men and boys).³⁷⁷ Individual RUF commanders sent combatants on missions to find food. These missions led to looting and pillaging of the targeted communities. RUF members have in their testimonies stated that children were included in these missions as they were very good at foraging out what they could get when they went out on looting sprees.³⁷⁸ The RUF had a deliberate strategy of targeting the property of civilians. In RUF parlance, looting was known as "jaja". A woman in Pujehun told the Commission of her experiences:

"I was in the town of Pujehun in April 1991... when the RUF rebels came to our community. They dressed like radicals with red bands and were telling us that they have come to free us from our poverty in Sierra Leone, but in the same gathering I saw one of them taking away my uncle's wrist watch and some other items were forcefully taken from people...

After their address, they started taking our properties and were loading them into a very big vehicle. Among their group were Pellejor and Eddie Kassay, whom we knew. When we asked them why they are taking our things, they told us that it was just the beginning and they would be doing worse than what they have started."³⁷⁹

382. At different times in the conflict, the RUF and other factions carried out specific military operations against civilians, which invariably resulted in widespread human rights violations. The objectives of these operations on occasion specifically included looting. In particular, the campaign of attacks known as "Operation Pay Yourself" resulted in large scale looting by RUF and AFRC combatants eager to gain a personal dividend from their participation in the war. A female health worker who was working with MSF at Kenema in 1997 described how her possessions were looted by members of the AFRC junta:

"In 1997, during junta rule, we were threatened by juntas that we were informants. It was on 8 February 1998 that they launched "Operation Pay Yourself" and there was heavy firing in the township... They came to my compound and started knocking on my door... they then entered the house, took our belongings, money and everything and they went away. Three groups wearing combat with their faces masked came to our house that very day... we lost everything."³⁸⁰

³⁷⁶ See the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

³⁷⁷ More detail on violations rates and the propensities of particular factions to commit certain violations can be found in the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

³⁷⁸ See, for example, Jonathan Kposowa, former Adjutant General of the RUF and present Secretary General of the RUF, TRC interview at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 23 June 2003.

³⁷⁹ Mariama Sheriff, TRC statement, Pujehun Old Town, 29 March 2003.

³⁸⁰ TRC confidential statement recorded in Kenema District, 7 December 2003.

383. Looting raids were often directed against entire villages. A woman reported to the Commission what happened in her village:

“I was having a store at Gissiwolo Makpele comprising of tape recorders, cement and a lot of necessary things. It was set up for me by my husband, who was in Liberia... The juntas at Zimmi got to us on a Thursday afternoon and all the town was turned upside down. We fled for months and came back later, meeting Gissiwolo a ghost town with all properties looted.”³⁸¹

384. Allegations of looting in its various guises were made against each of the armed groups that participated in the conflict. Members of the Guinean Armed Forces were accused of looting.³⁸² Inhabitants of the border areas such as Kambia District complained of the looting of their properties, goods and money whenever there was an attack by the Guinean Armed Forces. Many witnesses told the Commission that in many areas, special markets existed in Guinea where these looted items were sold.³⁸³
385. Combatants also looted the property of women and gave them to wives and girlfriends. A common feature of the conflict was the fact that businesswomen and traders often fell into ambushes of the different armed forces and lost their goods. The Market Women’s Association of Sierra Leone testified to this in their appearance before the Commission.³⁸⁴

DESTRUCTION OF PROPERTY

386. A major feature of the conflict in Sierra Leone was the wanton destruction of property by the various armed forces. All of the major armed groups were responsible for the destruction of property belonging to civilians, including women.³⁸⁵ Women accounted for 1,009 of the 3,469 violations with gender recorded in the Commission’s database.³⁸⁶ This amounted to women suffering nearly 30% of all property violations.³⁸⁷ A woman told of the attack on Moselolo village by the RUF in 1995:

“ ...After the firing, I decided to come and check on the village. I saw flames of fire rising up from the thatch roofed houses and some of the zinc houses. I decided not to go further but to return to my people... We spent three days and three nights in the old farm. On the third day, in order to go and find out about the damage done, I and other villagers went without our families. On reaching our compound, I found out that all houses had been burnt down and our properties either looted or burnt; even our mosque was also burnt down.”³⁸⁸

³⁸¹ Kula Kuyateh, TRC statement, Gissiwulo-Makpele, Pujehun District, 21 January 2003.

³⁸² Aside from looting, very few violations in the TRC database were attributed to the Guinean Armed Forces (GAF). More detail on the propensities of particular factions to commit certain violations can be found in the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

³⁸³ See excerpt from security document entitled *Observations on Guinea Markets*, 2000: “There are gigantic warehouses where looted properties are sold in the Guinea markets and towns: Nongoa, Wau Jibba, Gueckedu Central Markets, Macenta, Kenema-Wonda and Koundo-Twi.”

³⁸⁴ See Sierra Leone Market Women’s Association, Submission to the TRC Special Thematic Hearings on Women, Freetown, 22 to 24 May 2003 (hereinafter “Market Women’s Association submission to TRC”), at page 3.

³⁸⁵ Adama Musu, TRC statement, Mateboi, Sanda Tendaren, 5 March 2003.

³⁸⁶ See the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

³⁸⁷ See the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

³⁸⁸ Thiam Kamara, TRC statement, Batkanu, Leibesayeahun, 4 December 2002.

387. In Gerihun, a woman who had already suffered a previous displacement told of the destruction of the new home in which she and her family had settled:

“One morning I went to the lorry park to go to Bo on a Sunday in 1995. Then I saw military uniformed men who I could not distinguish at all... There was heavy firing and a loud sound of guns. The whole town was confused, everybody trying to get away. I rushed to my camp, got my children and then fled the town. By the time I could get my children, most of my property had been taken away, but I did not mind at all. Some other things were even drowned in the River Bebeh.

In the distance, I saw dark smoke rising into the sky from the direction of our camp. Later, I learnt that there was a fierce fight between the loyal SLA / SSD and the RUF rebels. Soon enough they disappeared, but the camp was destroyed.”³⁸⁹

WOMEN AS PERPETRATORS AND COLLABORATORS

388. While women and girls bore the brunt of the violations as victims, they also played a multiplicity of roles including those of “perpetrator” and “collaborator”. While these experiences are not widely documented, it is not surprising that women also took sides in the conflict. Often their participation is driven by socio-economic needs, the need to protect themselves and their families or to improve the quality of their lives. They assumed varied roles, including becoming armed combatants, providing medical assistance, feeding armed groups and supplying opposing forces with intelligence information often at great risk to their lives. Taking on an active role in the conflict placed a woman in even greater danger than normal, as opposing forces treated women associated with enemy factions more brutally than their male counterparts.
389. Many women voluntarily joined the war for a variety of reasons including personal conviction and belief in the cause of the group or faction they belonged to. Others were enraged and angered by what they witnessed and chose to play an active role in an attempt to rectify perceived wrongs. Many women experienced personal losses, which hurt them a great deal and led them into enrolling in the Army to avenge their loved ones.³⁹⁰
390. Women who joined forces opposed to the legitimate government were regarded as perpetrators. Major Kula Samba, a soldier in the Sierra Leone Army who served under the AFRC, was charged and convicted of treason by the reinstated government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. She was tried by Court Martial, sentenced to death with no right of appeal and executed in October 1998.³⁹¹ Other women accused of treason and put on trial were civilians among the large group charged to court in 1998, including Matilda King (third accused) Kaindeh Bangura (eleventh accused) and Mayilla Yansaneh (twelfth accused). They were all convicted of treason and sentenced to death

³⁸⁹ Manyeh, Alimatu, Walihun, Jaiama-Bongor Chiefdon, 27 February 2003

³⁹⁰ See, for example, Inter Press Services, article by Ruby Oforil, 18 December 1992. The article includes an excerpt from an interview in which a female soldier says that she joined the Army “because the rebels killed my dad at Benguema...about a year ago”.

³⁹¹ See Mansaray, *Women Against Weapons*, at page 144. Major Kula Samba served as the AFRC’s Secretary of State responsible for Social Welfare, Gender and Children Affairs.

but were lucky to escape being executed.³⁹² Nancy Steele, a veteran activist who was 75 years old at the time, was also convicted of treason in 1998 and died in the stampede from the detention cells when the rebels broke into Pademba Road Prison in January 1999.³⁹³

391. Another woman perpetrator of note was Tina Musa, the wife of the late SAJ Musa, an AFRC commander of fearsome repute. Tina Musa, perhaps inevitably given her husband's central role in the AFRC, herself became embroiled in the conflict. While her initial role was purely one of connection to her husband, upon his death she came to wield enormous influence over his renegade group. A similar scenario of power dynamics was reported of women who were originally abducted and forced to become members of the other fighting forces.
392. A major characteristic of the conflict in Sierra Leone was that in the vast majority of cases, women abductees were compelled to take on active perpetrator roles. Most of the major armed groups used these tactics in order to impose a sense of factional affiliation and identity on their civilian abductees.
393. Some of the armed groups established special units solely staffed by women and girls. The RUF, for example, had a unit consisting solely of women known as the Women Auxiliary Corps (WACS), which was also charged with running the Small Girls' Unit of the RUF.³⁹⁴
394. Women involved in the conflict as perpetrators also committed notable human rights violations. Female commanders were often given appellations that characterised the forms of behaviour for which they were notorious: Adama "Cut Hand"; Lieutenant "Cause Trouble"; Kumba "Blood"; Lady "Jungle Law"; and Hawa "Two Barrel", for example. Killing, maiming, looting, burning and amputations were among the violations attributed to females in the TRC database. One female perpetrator gave the following personal testimony:

"During the first attack in Masiaka... [a male commander] took me along with him. When we reached their base, around Bo, inside a forest, I was injected inside my mouth on my last tooth. That injection made me to become fearless. I was not afraid to do anything when we were in the front. I was the one who always led the group...

When others were afraid, I would go and offend government troops and later come and inform them and we would go and attack, that is why I was called Cause Trouble. I took part in many attacks in this country, including the one in Freetown. I harassed people for their goods and threatened to kill them if they don't give me what I am demanding for. One day we laid an ambush at Mange Bureh Bridge. I was leading... we attacked one truck which was carrying government soldiers and we succeeded...

³⁹² See Mansaray, *Women Against Weapons*, at page 44. Matilda King, Kaindeh Bangura and Mayilla Yansaneh were freed from detention when invading forces stormed the Pademba Road Prison during the 6 January 1999 attack on Freetown. They were later pardoned as part of the amnesty provisions in the Lomé Peace Agreement of 7 July 1999.

³⁹³ See Mansaray, *Women Against Weapons*, at page 44. Nancy Steele founded the National Congress of Sierra Leone Women (NCSLW), affiliated to the All Peoples' Congress (APC) party.

³⁹⁴ See Patrick Beinda, former RUF G-2 commander and prominent RUF representative in the Eastern Province, TRC interview at TRC Headquarters, Freetown, 18 June 2003.

During the attack on Freetown on 6 January 1999, I was among those sent to open Pademba Road Prison to free our colleagues... One day we attacked Pamalap and it was very tense, because our main aim was to capture Guinea because we have been paid for it... The fighting was very tense and I got afraid and was retreating back when I was caught by Guinean soldiers and I was taken to their prison where I stayed for one year with hard labour...³⁹⁵

395. Another female ex-combatant, from the RUF faction, testified as follows:

“One morning after our arrival in Camp Zogoda, some of us were called to assemble by Commander Murray. In the assembly, I was injected with cocaine and given one set of military uniform and a knife... We went out to fight from Saturday to Wednesday, every day except on Thursdays and Fridays.”³⁹⁶

396. Women perpetrators sometimes held positions of authority in the various factions. The late Major Kula Samba famously became the Secretary of State for Social Welfare, Gender and Children Affairs in the AFRC regime.

397. Other prominent women included Agnes Mani of the RUF, who was part of the RUF contingent to the Abuja Peace talks,³⁹⁷ and Memuna Sesay, who took charge of training for the RUF's Women Auxiliary Corps.³⁹⁸ The RUF was also said to have had as many as five women members on its War Council from 1992 to 1994.³⁹⁹

398. Many women struggle to understand why women took up arms and committed violations in the Sierra Leone conflict. However war and conflict force women into many different roles, which are not monochromatic in nature. Survival is paramount for women in times of conflict. Once involved, the nature of women's involvement is little different from that of men. Violence became glorified during the conflict in Sierra Leone. Male and female combatants alike were celebrated and revered by their peers the more brutal and violent the violations they committed. The Commission heard that, in a perverse way, a combatant could only receive adulation and respect from his or her comrades by attaining a certain level of sheer ruthlessness and notoriety.⁴⁰⁰

399. Many women combatants simply yearned to belong to the group and not to be perceived as weak or exhibit signs of femininity. These yearnings often led to women perpetrating even more cruel and violent behaviour than that carried out by men in their efforts to qualify for “inclusion” and “recognition”.

³⁹⁵ Marie Kargbo, TRC statement, Old Police Barracks, Kambia, 4 February 2003.

³⁹⁶ Isatu Sesay, TRC statement, Fullah town, Gbangbatoke, 4 February 2003.

³⁹⁷ Patrick Beinda, former RUF G-2 commander and prominent RUF representative in the Eastern Province, TRC interview at TRC Headquarters, Freetown, 18 June 2003.

³⁹⁸ See Mansaray, *Women Against Weapons*, at page 45.

³⁹⁹ See Mansaray, *Women Against Weapons*, at page 46. Two of the names given as female members of the RUF War Council are Mama Kombey and Mamei Abu.

⁴⁰⁰ See Patrick Beinda, former RUF G-2 commander and prominent RUF representative in the Eastern Province, TRC interview at TRC Headquarters, Freetown, 18 June 2003. See also Jonathan Kposowa, former Adjutant General of the RUF and present Secretary General of the RUF; TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 23 June 2003.

400. The question of “survival” also profoundly motivated and influenced women perpetrators in their involvement in gross human rights violations. Engaging in acts of violence provided women with a guarantee of security and survival from their own colleagues.⁴⁰¹ Women had to prove themselves to their peers, as well as their individual commanders, by carrying out violations without flinching or displaying any outward signs of weakness.
401. While most societies tend to ascribe to women a certain aversion to acts of violence, the conflicts taking place around the world suggest otherwise. According to Goldblatt and Meintjes, understanding that women are capable of perpetrating violence enables us to see that women are not monolithic in their outlook as a group and are not bearers of certain essential qualities such as kindness and compassion.⁴⁰² Gender stereotyping is certainly upset by the multiplicity of roles women take on in conflicts.
402. Some military psychologists subscribe to a theory of crowd psychology as another reason for women having committed violations.⁴⁰³ By this theory, people lose their individuality to the group and act according to the dictates of the collective. Individuals experience a feeling of “almost limitless power”, promoting a kind of automatism that allows people to carry out acts without conscious thought, all the time supported by the formidable presence of the group. In this state a person can commit the most vile and gruesome violations. Often those in the group are vulnerable to this kind of pressure because of their own peculiar physiological make-up, whereas without a crowd they might not have the guts to carry out such actions in normal circumstances.
403. Drugs also played a major role in altering the mindset of many perpetrators, including women, thus allowing for the most horrible violations to be carried out.
404. In addition, many women, while not serving as combatants, took on collaborative roles. In a number of instances, women allegedly performed as spies on behalf of armed factions on both sides of the spectrum, acting both for and against the government.⁴⁰⁴ Women reputedly established relationships with some ECOMOG soldiers, which allowed them to garner information about ECOMOG’s military strength. They also gained first-hand knowledge of garrisons as well as the deplorable conditions under which surrendered soldiers were kept and passed on this information to the AFRC.⁴⁰⁵

⁴⁰¹ See Women’s NGO Coalition submission to TRC, at page 10.

⁴⁰² See the citation in the Women’s NGO Coalition submission to TRC, at page 10.

⁴⁰³ The theory of crowd psychology has among its proponents Gustave Le Bon and Wilfred Trotter, both military psychologists. The theory states that humans are herd animals with strong gregarious impulses. Therefore in a crowd, the group mindset, supported by the formidableness of the group, takes over from the autonomy of the individual and precipitates uncharacteristic forms of behaviour.

⁴⁰⁴ See Sulaiman Momodu, “Women Spies”, article in the *Concord Times* newspaper, Freetown; 1 June 1998, at page 2. See also Hassan Jalloh, former CDF commander of the Kamajors on the eastern border, TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 8 August 2003.

⁴⁰⁵ See TRC confidential interviews with female participants in the conflict who performed “reconnaissance” roles on behalf of the AFRC and RUF, Freetown, September 2003.

405. Women were additionally accused of assisting with the war efforts of some of the armed groups by buying and selling looted goods. Some female traders were even captured and charged to court on allegations that they trafficked small arms under the guise of trading their goods.⁴⁰⁶
406. The market women were the group most affected by these allegations. The Sierra Leone Market Women's Association responded to the allegations during its appearance before the Commission and stated that its members had in fact risked their lives to go beyond rebel lines to buy goods in order to support their families.⁴⁰⁷
407. According to Binta Mansaray, another witness before the Commission, attempted to capture the many dimensions to women's involvement with the different factions in the conflict:

"Pro-rebel women collaborators also helped rebels to infiltrate communities... providing rebels with food and shelter... on the other hand, pro-government women identified rebel collaborators and this at times resulted in the lynching and extra-judicial killings of alleged collaborators... Some women acted as spies and encouraged pro-government forces... they [also] provided food and shelter for ECOMOG and the Civil Militia".⁴⁰⁸

408. Women also suffered because their family members belonged to various combatant groups and they were labelled "collaborators". Labelling women in this manner was a dangerous and sometime malicious ploy, more often than not making the women increasingly vulnerable to being violated. A woman whose son was an SLA soldier told the TRC of her ordeal of being arrested as a "collaborator" at Maboima in 1999:

"I was taken to the Commander of the Kamajors, Mr. Moses Sam, and he ordered his Kamajors to tie me up with twine rope. I was then asked to pay a fine of two thousand Leones. I was unable to remove the money from my clothes, not until when my daughter Aminata came to my rescue and removed the money to pay it to the ground commander. I was then asked by the chiefdom ground commander [to identify] who was taking care of me. I pointed at one Mr. Bangura... No sooner had I pointed to him, the ground commander imposed a fine on me of two million Leones. I pleaded until I paid forty thousand Leones, otherwise I would have been killed....

Later, the ground commander ordered his fellow Kamajors to come with one leaf of zinc so that they could lay me on it and slaughter me but one Mr. Dauda advised them not to kill me. I was again fined one hundred thousand Leones, which I paid to save my life before I was released."⁴⁰⁹

⁴⁰⁶ Dr. Julius Spencer, former Minister of Information and prominent commentator on the Sierra Leone conflict, TRC interview conducted at private residence, Freetown, 26 March 2003.

⁴⁰⁷ See Market Women's Association submission to TRC.

⁴⁰⁸ See Mansaray, *Women Against Weapons*, at page 149.

⁴⁰⁹ Adama Conteh, TRC statement, Bauya Kongbora Chiefdom, Moyamba District, 5 March 2003.

409. Collaboration in war is often a result of the fact that women actively work to improve their situation and thus effectively support the efforts of one or the other side. Many conflicts, including the Sierra Leonean conflict, have arisen as a result of socio-economic inequalities, so it is not surprising that women become collaborators in order to survive. Ethnic allegiances, personal affinities and private loyalties also contribute to why women take sides.
410. The Commission notes that it experienced great difficulties in accessing the testimonies of women ex-combatants and collaborators. The Commission has endeavoured to tell their story from the statements made by other witnesses and also submissions made to the Commission. However their story has not been told in its entirety. While the TRC has attempted to report faithfully on the impact and consequences the conflict has had on the lives of women, including those of women combatants, it is necessary to caution that the plight of women ex-combatants and their families is fairly precarious.
411. Women have been extremely guarded in their responses and have tried to avoid being identified as combatants or collaborators for fear of being targeted and stigmatised. Common wisdom has it that it is not easy to live in Sierra Leonean society as a woman who was part of one of the armed factions. Many women consider that being identified in such a capacity would lead to negative reactions from their communities, or even from their families and relatives. Women thus suffer a “double victimisation”: having been compelled by circumstances to join the armed forces, they are further victimised by the same society for having done so. Non-disclosure facilitates their assimilation into their society and is yet another survival mechanism. Living under the fear of being recognised and identified then becomes a perpetual nightmare, however.
412. Given that some women were not able to come forward to the TRC for fear of ostracism, society as a whole has lost a unique opportunity to understand fully the role played by women in the war. Sadly women are still constrained by societal norms from talking about what happened to them. Society “re-victimises” women and appears unwilling to accept that women, just like everybody else who suffered during the conflict, had little to no control over what happened to them.
413. Women who have come forward to the TRC have testified about their own anguish at being identified, ostracised and mocked, or at being made social outcasts at for having been associated with the armed factions. This plight stands to be compared to the relative ease with which many of their male counterparts have been accepted back in society. The Commission finds that women in Sierra Leone have had no option other than to bury their past so as to be accepted back into society.

TRC



Representatives of women's non-governmental organisations arrive at the YWCA Hall in Freetown for the TRC Special Thematic Hearings on Women.

WOMEN AS MEDIATORS AND PEACE MAKERS

414. Women played a major role in the peace process that led to the end of the conflict. After enduring years of destruction and chaos, women began to assume constructive roles as mediators and peacemakers.
415. At the beginning of 1994, rural and urban women of all classes and ethnic affiliations organised protest marches and peace rallies across the country. From 1994 onwards, pioneering women of the likes of Amy Smythe, Elizabeth Lavalie, Dr. Kadie Sesay and Zainab Bangura, along with women's groups such as the Mano River Women's Peace Network (MAWOPNET), Women's Movement for Peace, Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE), the Women's Forum, Sierra Leone Women's Movement for Peace and many others, took the lead in rallying society towards the cessation of hostilities.
416. Women activists organised seminars, embarked on public marches, held conferences and worked tirelessly towards the elections of 26 February 1996. They educated civilians on electoral proceedings, recruited and trained observers and pressured the military rulers to respect the results of elections. Women's groups also figured prominently in influencing Brigadier Maada Bio's National Provincial Ruling Council (NPRC) military government to hold democratic elections in the first place. These efforts were led by the group known as Women Organised for a Morally Enlightened Nation (WOMEN). The Women's Forum, an umbrella body for women's NGOs in Sierra Leone, organised a march on 9 February 1996 to petition the then Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) concerning the upcoming elections. Eventually, women helped monitor the conduct of the polls on 26 February,⁴¹⁰ which led to the assumption of office by President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah.
417. The overthrow of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah in 1997 caused many Sierra Leoneans to go into exile. Many of the women mentioned above who had worked to secure a democracy also fled from the country. While in exile, some women continued their efforts to fight for justice and peace in Sierra Leone. Based in Guinea, Mrs. Zainab Bangura set up a field office of the Campaign for Good Governance (CGG). This office would serve as a focal point for civil society working for the restoration of democracy in Sierra Leone.⁴¹¹
418. The late Mrs. Patricia Kabbah made trips to United States of America and Belgium, seeking support for the restoration of democracy. The First Lady also presented a radio programme on Radio Democracy 98.1 FM, which she used to counter AFRC propaganda.⁴¹²
419. After the invasion of Freetown in January 1999, women also participated in the National Consultative Conference convened by the National Commission for Democracy and Human Rights (NCDHR), headed by Dr. Kadie Sesay. The conference was charged with collating civil society's views on the peace talks due to take place in Lomé later that year.⁴¹³

⁴¹⁰ See the Women's Forum, Sierra Leone; informational brochure explaining the organisation's objectives and some of its past activities, produced in Freetown, at page 3.

⁴¹¹ See Mansaray, *Women Against Weapons*, at page 149.

⁴¹² See Mansaray, *Women Against Weapons*, at page 150.

⁴¹³ See Mansaray, *Women Against Weapons*, at page 155.

420. Interventions by women in the post-Lomé peace process invariably tipped the balance in favour of the restoration of peace in Sierra Leone. In May 2000, a group of women belonging to various churches and mosques in Freetown requested and were granted an audience with RUF leader Foday Sankoh. Sankoh was reported to have treated the women with disdain upon their arrival at his residence. The women, angered by Sankoh's attitude, vented their displeasure. Christiana Macfoy of the Women's Forum told the BBC that:

“We are tired; we are not only tired, we are fed up. We have reached the end of the road as far as taking all these atrocities that are being committed. And it is the women who are bearing the brunt of it.”⁴¹⁴

421. The women's meeting turned out to be a prelude to a much larger demonstration of opposition to the RUF on 8 May 2000, when a broad cross-section of the entire populace, including as many as 2,000 women, marched on Foday Sankoh's Spur Road Lodge in Freetown. A chaotic breakdown of public security ensued, with members of the RUF and other armed factions opening fire on civilians, leading to the deaths of up to 40 people.⁴¹⁵ Foday Sankoh was captured some ten days later and taken into custody until his death in 2003.

422. There is no doubt that in the midst of the conflict and in the face of limited resources and continuing threats, many women in Sierra Leone worked relentlessly for peace. While most of the women involved had experienced the horrors of the conflict at first hand and were traumatised, they nonetheless rose above their personal circumstances to help to bring peace to their nation. They fought long and hard for normality to return to their lives, families and nation. In the process, some of them lost their lives.

423. The conflict has shown that while women are predominantly victims, they also play the roles of perpetrators and collaborators to armed groups. As combatants, they commit violations in the same way that men do. Militarisation and the presence of weapons create a culture of violence that often forces combatants to commit violations, sometimes as a means of survival, especially for women who still remain vulnerable even as combatants. Women have collaborated with the armed groups, serving in various capacities.

424. Throughout the world, while women often play a major role in the cessation of hostilities, they are routinely ignored and under-represented at peace negotiations and in the peace-building institutions that come into existence thereafter. Such was the case in Sierra Leone. Although two women representatives were involved in the Lomé negotiations, the only woman whose signature was appended to the Lomé Peace Agreement was Miss Coleman, who was a representative of the Organisation for African Unity (OAU).⁴¹⁶ It is sad to note that no Sierra Leonean woman was a signatory to the agreement and, further, that none was included on any of the various Commissions established to oversee or build upon the peace, such as the Commission for the Consolidation of Peace (CCP), Commission for the Management of Minerals and Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMMRD) or the Council of Religious Leaders.

⁴¹⁴ For the context of this quote and more detail on women's role in the events of May 2000, see Mansaray, *Women Against Weapons*, at pages 150 – 159.

⁴¹⁵ More detail on the landmark events of 8 May 2000 can be found in the chapter on the Military and Political History of the Conflict, in Volume Three A of this report.

⁴¹⁶ See Mansaray, *Women Against Weapons*, at page 159.

425. Despite the efforts of the many women's groups that have asked for more women to be included in government, there are currently only three women cabinet Ministers out of twenty-two, three deputy Ministers out of thirteen and sixteen women parliamentarians out of 120. These figures are insignificant in terms of the numbers of women in the country.
426. According to Dr Theo-Ben Gurivals at the debate leading to the first UN Security Council Resolution on Women, Peace and Security in October 2000:
- "Women are half of every community... Are they therefore, not also half of every solution?"⁴¹⁷
427. President Anwarul Chowdury of Bangladesh, who chaired the First UN Security Council Meeting on Women, Peace and Security stated that:
- "Members of the Security Council... affirm that the equal access and full participation of women in power structures and their full involvement in all efforts for the prevention and resolution of conflicts are essential for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security."⁴¹⁸
428. Women played a major role in ensuring that the conflict in Sierra Leone came to an end. However, they were marginalised in the peace talks and even more so in the various Commissions established after the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement. Such exclusion, whether direct or indirect, deliberate or inadvertent, is characteristic of most countries where women's voices are not heard or taken into account. It is a situation that must not be allowed to persist in Sierra Leone. In this regard, the Commission considers UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, passed on 21 October 2000, to be pertinent.⁴¹⁹ It is important to locate the struggle for a strong women's voice in Sierra Leone in the broader struggle for women's inclusion in peace initiatives around the world. The institutions and processes of peace, security and development, as well as societies at large, are made stronger and more effective by the full and equal participation of women.

⁴¹⁷ See Rehn and Sirleaf, *Women, War and Peace*, at page 78.

⁴¹⁸ See Rehn and Sirleaf, *Women, War and Peace*, at page 78.

⁴¹⁹ See United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security, S/RES 1325/2000, 21 October 2000.

IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT ON WOMEN AND GIRLS

429. Elizabeth Rehn and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf argue in their report entitled “Women, War and Peace” that the extreme violence women suffer during conflict does not arise solely out of the conditions of war but is directly related to the violence that exists in women’s lives during peacetime. They go on to say that “women experience violence because they are women, and often because they do not have the same rights or autonomy that men do”.⁴²⁰ Women are subjected to gender-based persecution, discrimination, sexual violence and oppression. Since they lack political rights or authority, they generally have no recourse. Women also lack access to the same resources that men have and have little or no control over their environment. The militarisation of societies during conflicts and the proliferation of small weapons lead to greater violence against women and, because men escape largely unpunished, greater impunity. Impunity in turn leads to greater levels of instability, thereby escalating the levels of domestic violence and sexual violence. The escalating violence leads to a new norm, which according to Rehn and Johnson continues long into the post-conflict period.⁴²¹
430. In the State of the World’s Mothers Report of 2003, Sierra Leone had the ignominious distinction of standing alongside four other countries as one of the worst places on earth in which to be a woman.⁴²² The Commission explores in the sections that follow what the consequences of the conflict have been for women in Sierra Leone. The consequences have been divided into various categories of impact, including socio-cultural factors, health considerations and changes to the economic and legal status of women after the war. The consequences described are both short-term and long-term in nature. Many of them have had a knock-on effect for the society at large. Wherever possible, the Commission has attempted to discuss also the various interventions from government and other actors designed to address these consequences.

SOCIO-CULTURAL IMPACT

431. In most traditional societies, socio-cultural norms and values are regarded as sacred. Those who flout the rules are usually cast out of their societies. In Sierra Leone, many of the norms and customs have as their core value the protection of women and girls. In addition many norms and customs exclude women from performing certain tasks and functions. The conflict in Sierra Leone shattered most of the norms and customs sacred to Sierra Leoneans, thus desecrating the value system underpinning their society.
432. Traditional society in Sierra Leone demands that women be cherished and looked after. In addition, women are customarily forbidden from taking up arms and becoming involved in warfare. Thus, those armed groups who targeted women and children, abducted them and sexually violated them broke all taboos of society. Women who became combatants in the conflict found themselves flouting all the normal rules and negating the cultural value system.

⁴²⁰ See Rehn and Sirleaf, *Women, War and Peace*, at page 13.

⁴²¹ See Rehn and Sirleaf, *Women, War and Peace*, at page 13.

⁴²² See Save the Children, *The State of the World’s Mothers 2003*, annual report into the conditions for motherhood and the advancement of women in selected countries around the world. The full report can be found at the website: www.savethechildren.org/mothers/report_2003/index.asp.

The Kamajors did not initially allow its members to harm women, children and unarmed civilians.⁴²³ However as the conflict progressed and less attention was paid to initiating new recruits in an ethical manner, previous undertakings were disregarded and the Kamajors also committed human rights violations against women and children. The conflict has had the effect of eroding the traditional conception of hunters' societies, thus resulting in the denigration of the original Kamajor society. A much-venerated cultural institution has been tarnished by the malicious and manipulative acts of the CDF leadership, especially its initiating cadre, during the course of the conflict.

433. Sexual violence and the kind of sexual violations that women suffered are themselves acts regarded as taboo in Sierra Leone. Sexual acts involving children, violations against older women, rape and disembowelment of pregnant women, rape and sexual abuse of pre-pubescent girls and virgins were all widespread in the conflict. These acts were carried out everywhere, defiling places regarded as sacred such as mosques, churches and the secret society "bushes" of the Bondo society. To carry out such heinous acts in highly sacred places is to undermine cultural and religious values yet further. Incest is regarded as a major crime and the forced acts of incest by many of the armed groups broke one of the major taboos not only of Sierra Leone but also in the wider world.⁴²⁴ The Commission finds that the RUF and the AFRC, in particular, deliberately engaged in strategies designed to destroy all the norms and values of traditional Sierra Leonean society.
434. There is no doubt the violation of women has led to the erosion of the mainstream value system in Sierra Leone. The consequences of the conflict are thus being seen in the high numbers of women and girls who continue to be raped and violated even in peacetime. Domestic violence is also on the increase. The consequences of the conflict have therefore been life altering not only for the victim but also for the wider society.

STIGMATISATION, OSTRACISATION AND ISOLATION

435. Rape and sexual violence as well as acts of extreme violence carried out on women and girls carry with them a price which women inevitably pay. Perversely women in most traditional societies are regarded as the custodians of the honour of men and society. Raping and violating them have come to symbolically represent the violation of the man and the society he belongs to. The bodies of women become the battleground over which opposing forces fight.⁴²⁵ In Sierra Leone women were raped and sexually violated often in front of their loved ones, humiliating and denigrating them. Women were forced to bear children belonging to the enemy. They are doubly victimised, they bear the burden of being raped which itself carries with it a stigma 'that of family honour being desecrated'.

⁴²³ See Hassan Jalloh, former CDF commander of the Kamajors on the eastern border, TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 8 August 2003.

⁴²⁴ Confidential testimony received before TRC Closed Hearings, Kailahun District, April 2003.

⁴²⁵ Rehn and Johnson-Violence against women, page 12

436. Women who are identified as having been raped or who disclose that they have been raped are regarded in Sierra Leone as bringing shame to their families. In addition to the pain and anguish of the rape and sexual violence, they mostly carry with them the pain of not being able to disclose their status for fear of being ostracised. In cases where women have made the rape and sexual violence known to families, efforts are frantically made to hush up the “disgrace”. The anguish and perceived shame is understandably even worse where the victim has borne the child of her rapist or captor. Many young mothers have been forced to give their children up to adoption.
437. Despite the pressure to bury the issue and to lapse into silence, some women in Sierra Leone have been brave enough to disclose their experiences publicly. Again it is the large number of women who experienced sexual violations in Sierra Leone that brought the issue to the fore. Women have complained to the TRC of stigmatisation in their various communities because some people have labelled them “rebel wives”.⁴²⁶ Re-integrating into their societies is difficult for those who have been forced into sexual slavery and in reality they are being penalised by society for matters totally out of their control and which occurred as a result of the conflict. Negative reception by family or community tends to accentuate their feelings of dislocation and social exclusion. Many women have expressed to the TRC their extreme sense of “rejection” and their “fear that they may never be able to lead a normal life”. Many would like to get married and have children and yet feel that no one will want them.⁴²⁷
438. In those instances where women have borne children from abusive relationships, the children remain a living reminder of a past their mothers would rather forget. Women and girls in this position face severe trauma and psychosocial problems, which has not yet begun to address.⁴²⁸

DISRUPTION TO FAMILY LIFE

439. Women who were the victims of sexual violence throughout the conflict in Sierra Leone have also suffered further blows. In attempting to resume normal family life, they have found that their husbands and in-laws reject them, precisely because of the violations they have experienced. Marital relationships have broken down dramatically, with most spouses unable to deal with the fact that their wives have been sexually violated.⁴²⁹ Many of the women who were displaced and separated from their husbands lived in rebel-held areas and are now unable to return to their original relationships because they have been “other men’s wives”.⁴³⁰ A victim who was raped and subsequently made a sexual slave testified to the Commission as follows:

“When I returned, my former husband left me. He said it was because; I had been taken away by rebels. I was now with no husband.”⁴³¹

⁴²⁶ “First Witness” – confidential testimony received before the TRC Special Thematic Hearings on Women, Freetown, 22 to 24 May 2003.

⁴²⁷ “Second Witness” – confidential testimony received before the TRC Special Thematic Hearings on Women, Freetown, 22 to 24 May 2003.

⁴²⁸ See Women’s NGO Coalition submission to TRC, at page 12.

⁴²⁹ “Second Witness” – confidential testimony received before the TRC Special Thematic Hearings on Women, Freetown, 22 to 24 May 2003.

⁴³⁰ See Women’s NGO Coalition submission to TRC, at page 12.

⁴³¹ Confidential testimony received before TRC Closed Hearings, Matru Jong, Bonthe, July 2003.

440. The plight that many women emerging from the conflict experience was also highlighted in an address by a woman community leader during the closing ceremonies of TRC hearings in the Kono District:

“From the stories you have heard, I am sure that you know how much our women and our children have suffered... especially the women: some of the men do not want to have them again as wives or friends...”⁴³²

441. The war has led to many women being divorced by their husbands. The consequences of divorce do not only impact on the lives of those directly affected but also impact on children and the extended families. Families traditionally bound together experience strained relationships as marriages bind families and not only the immediate the parties in African society. Women experience again a “double victimisation”, as they now have to bear the economic and social consequences of divorce.
442. The war also led to the total breakdown of family structures and the social fabric. Displacement, social dislocation and the breakdown of normal family life that occurred because of the war has also created new social problems. The extended African family system which has traditionally been a bulwark in preserving social norms and rules and which has provided safety net for large number of persons has been stretched thin and in some instances does not exist at all. The lack of guidance for young people particularly young girls at family and community level caused by the death of parents and the removal of the safety net has exposed many young girls to risky sexual behaviour. Family disintegration has been highlighted as a phenomenon that has provided a pathway to commercial sex work in Sierra Leone.⁴³³

PROSTITUTION AND SEXUAL EXPLOITATION

443. The legacy of the conflict on the already beleaguered women of Sierra Leone is extreme poverty and limited opportunities to engage in economic activities. The absence of viable employment opportunities and the need to survive has compelled many women to become commercial sex workers. In this regard, the Commission notes that a clear link exists between economic impoverishment and the increase in prostitution and sexual exploitation in post-conflict Sierra Leone. According to a report on commercial sex workers produced from a study by the NGO Goal Ireland, poverty is the primary cause that leads to prostitution. This trend was observed not only internally in Sierra Leone but also among women and girls who had fled the country as refugees to neighbouring countries:⁴³⁴

“Poverty, in all its paradigms (meanings) and perspectives is the main culprit for the female entering into commercial sex work.”⁴³⁵

⁴³² See the closing statement by the Chairlady of KSMTC, Kono community organisation, made at the conclusion of TRC public hearings in Koidu Town, Kono District, April 2003.

⁴³³ See Lebbie, S. H.; “*Survival Strategies of the Girl-Child and Young Women: Commercial Sexual Exploitation in the streets of Freetown*”; Goal Ireland, Freetown, February 2000, at page 7.

⁴³⁴ See Save the Children – UK and UNHCR, “*Sexual Violence and Exploitation: The Experience of Refugee Children in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone*”, April 2002, at page 25.

⁴³⁵ See Lebbie, S. H.; “*Survival Strategies of the Girl-Child and Young Women: Commercial Sexual Exploitation in the streets of Freetown*”; Goal Ireland, Freetown, February 2000, at page 37.

444. Prostitution and sexual exploitation have many devastating consequences, not least health problems, societal rejection, violent assaults and an increase in the risk of contracting disease. Prostitution and sexual exploitation have also become aligned with other criminal acts such as theft and drug addiction. A frighteningly high number of young girls have become sexually active at a young age and have fallen into prostitution in order to survive. They are exposed to the mercy of their “clients” and are powerless to negotiate safe sex or control the relationship. They are extraordinarily vulnerable to sexually transmitted infections, HIV/AIDS, early pregnancy and unsafe abortion.⁴³⁶ They live on the edge of society.

HEALTH

445. Armed conflicts always impact negatively on the health of civilians. In addition to fatalities and injuries experienced as a direct result of the conflict, there are also consequences attached to the complete breakdown of public health systems and the displacement and movement of the population. The outbreak of infectious diseases in refugee camps, stress and mental health disorders and the trauma of experiencing violence are all often overlooked.
446. While both men and women are affected by the breakdown of the health system, women are affected in ways directly attributable to their gendered experiences of the conflict. This is particularly true in the area of reproductive health, which includes life-threatening pregnancies, lack of access to birth control measures and injuries arising from sexual violence.

REPRODUCTIVE HEALTH

447. Pregnancy and delivery of normal healthy babies are difficult and dangerous at the best of times. During a conflict, they are life-threatening. It has been estimated that in poor countries, maternal mortality rates are nearly forty times those in the industrialised world.⁴³⁷ In Sierra Leone, the MICS Survey of 2000 reported a maternal death rate of 1,800 out of every 100,000 births. Over 60% of these maternal deaths were considered to be due to preventable causes.⁴³⁸
448. During the conflict, many pregnant women, finding themselves in the most repressive conditions, were not able to access medical help. In the case of those who were forced to live with the armed forces, being constantly on the move prevented them from accessing any health-care facilities. Many women and girls were also deprived of health services due to the fact that the armed forces had destroyed or looted them during the conflict.⁴³⁹ Many women also found themselves experiencing malnutrition, particularly in rural areas where they were unable to grow vegetables or engage in farming activities due to the war. In these circumstances, women died in inordinately high numbers.⁴⁴⁰

⁴³⁶ See *World's Women, Trends and Statistics 2000*, report on issues affecting female development globally. See also the website: <http://unstats.un.org/unsd/demographic/ww2000/health2000.htm>.

⁴³⁷ See *World's Women, Trends and Statistics 2000*, including the website in the above footnote.

⁴³⁸ Government of Sierra Leone; Report on the Status of Women and Children; November 2000.

⁴³⁹ See Women's NGO Coalition submission to TRC, at page 4. According to this submission, by 1997 only 70% of all health facilities in Sierra Leone were functioning. The rest had been looted, damaged, burnt down or abandoned as a result of the war.

⁴⁴⁰ See *World's Women, Trends and Statistics 2000*, including the website in the above footnote.

449. While access to proper medical care and proper nutrition are major factors in reproductive health, the constant exposure to violence and death during the conflict also took its toll on pregnant women. They suffered enormous mental trauma from the experiences and exigencies they were subjected to. Women's groups report that in many emergency situations, spontaneous abortions occurred as a result of the extreme mental and physical stress. As no immediate medical assistance was on hand in the bush many women died under these circumstances. While no accurate data exists, anecdotal evidence to the Commission suggests that many women died under these circumstances.
450. Access to information and a proper reproductive health system empowers women to take charge of their lives and makes it possible for them to have a safe sex life. They have the right to make choices as to whether they wish to reproduce and have the freedom to do so when they wish. All of this was taken away from them during the conflict. Chaos and mayhem reigned and as a result thereof, women were negatively impacted upon by the lack of access to proper health care, the lack of choice and the loss of freedom to make choices. This has severe negative implications for their continued development in both public and private spheres. Opportunities for education, economic and political empowerment have been lost.⁴⁴¹

SEXUAL VIOLENCE INJURIES

451. Women in Sierra Leone are severely affected by the injuries they have sustained as a result of the sexual violations they have experienced. Gynaecological problems that many suffer included a prolapsed uterus and Vesico-Vaginal Fistula (VVF) lesions.
452. According to a submission made by FAWE,⁴⁴² the gang rape and multiple rape of two women who were raped by 15 and 30 rebels respectively, where one of the victims had only given birth two weeks before being raped, led to both victims suffering from a prolapsed uterus. In the case of the first victim, repairs took place, which focused on the uterus assuming it proper position. For the second, the severity of the prolapse required the uterus to be taken out.⁴⁴³
453. These anecdotes testify to the continuing consequences for women. The loss of the uterus effectively renders a woman infertile and further leads to the destabilisation of her whole life, as Sierra Leonean society attaches a stigma to infertility. Some women are suffering from incontinence due to Vesico / Recto Vaginal Fistula (VVF / RVF), which has made life for them very unbearable.⁴⁴⁴
454. FAWE reports that in terms of the work it has done with women victims, injuries have ranged from small scars to big lower abdominal laparotomy wounds. The latter category results from women having their stomachs opened by the armed forces while pregnant.⁴⁴⁵

⁴⁴¹ See Women's NGO Coalition submission to TRC, at page 11.

⁴⁴² See FAWE submission to TRC, at page 14.

⁴⁴³ See FAWE submission to TRC, at page 14.

⁴⁴⁴ A TRC statement taker reported the case of a female VVF patient from whom she had endeavoured to take a statement, but was ultimately unable to do so due to the extreme discomfort and persistent medical problems experienced by the female in question.

⁴⁴⁵ See FAWE submission to TRC, at page 14.

UNPLANNED AND UNWANTED PREGNANCIES

455. Another consequence of the conflict in Sierra Leone has been the numerous unplanned and unwanted pregnancies that affected the vast majority of women abducted and forced into sexual slavery and who suffered sexual violence. Unwanted children are an aspect of this legacy.⁴⁴⁶ For many women already affected by the stigma of association with the RUF and the AFRC, the children born from these unions are a further burden on them. The circumstances around the conception of these children turn what should be a desirable human experience into an unbelievable and life-long nightmare. Women and girls who have borne children in this way face not only the humiliation and pain they suffered from rape and sexual violence, but also a living reminder of what happened. The stigma ensures further social dislocation, prohibits reintegration and causes further trauma. It poses severe economic and psychosocial problems for the mothers, their children and their families.
456. Many of women who testified to the TRC admitted that their feelings towards their children were ambivalent. While they associated the children with the brutality meted out to them by the perpetrator and resent having to look after them, the children are also part of them and need their care and attention. In some instances, the children have been accepted in their mother's families but there are a number of cases where mothers with children born under these circumstances have been forced to leave their family and immediate society altogether as they met with such reluctance to absorb them. The virtue of forgiveness, so deeply rooted in African culture, is at odds with the traditional society's feelings of repugnance towards children born in this way, particularly in Sierra Leone. However in many societies, the culture of silence about children born from acts of sexual violence has also silenced any rumblings over children born from "forced marriages".
457. In most conflicts, women raped face the possibility of children being born from such acts of violence. While abortion is one mechanism to deal with such unwanted pregnancies, it is not always an option open to every woman. In Sierra Leone abortion is considered illegal. While it is possible to have a "back street" abortion, for most women this course is undesirable as it is expensive and the risks associated with it are enormous.
458. Another prohibiting factor has been the destruction of health services facilities, coupled with the flight of some health professionals, which has made abortion almost unavailable in Sierra Leone. Abortion has been driven underground and has thus been placed practically out of reach. The vast majority of women in Sierra Leone have thus had no choice but to carry their babies to full term.
459. Many of the women who testified to the Commission indicated that their children themselves were unaware of the circumstances of their birth. Society has not dealt with the issue in any honest or transparent fashion. What is clear is that education is needed to help society confront the problem openly and sensitively.

⁴⁴⁶ See FAWE submission to TRC, at page 3.

SEXUALLY TRANSMITTED INFECTIONS – STIs

460. It is a fact that in situations of armed conflict women are often extremely vulnerable to contracting sexually transmitted diseases or infections (STDs or STIs), given the indiscriminate sexual violations to which they are subjected. High rates of STDs and STIs are likely to occur among internally displaced populations and refugees, as studies have linked moving populations from conflict zones with their spread and the escalation of HIV/AIDS.⁴⁴⁷ The high prevalence rate of STIs among military populations around the world (estimated at between two and five times the rate for civilians), together with the extensive contact between civilians and combatants in times of conflict, lead to high levels of infection.⁴⁴⁸
461. Poor countries like Sierra Leone are even more liable to experience the spread of STIs upon the cessation of hostilities. The lack of access to medical care and assistance for women in the post-war environment makes them an even more vulnerable group. The breakdown of health facilities during the conflict and in its aftermath often means that women have no access to medicines, reproductive health care services, contraceptive services or counselling. Many women in their statements and testimonies to the Commission stated that they are presently suffering from vaginal discharges, which they attribute to the sexual violations they suffered in the conflict.⁴⁴⁹ Experts who have made submissions to the Commission attribute such complaints to the untreated STIs that women have contracted out of the sexual violations they have suffered. Often STIs go untreated as a result of ignorance, lack of adequate health care facilities, poverty and social instability, all of which are legacies of the conflict in Sierra Leone. The implications of STIs are profound, as a simple infection can easily develop into pelvic inflammatory disease and eventually cause infertility. In most African societies – and Sierra Leone is no exception – an enormous social stigma is attached to infertility.
462. Again, there is insufficient data on how many women suffer from STIs in Sierra Leone. Lack of access to information on safe sex and how to prevent the spread of STIs as well as poverty and powerlessness impact on the ability of women to take charge of their own lives. Several submissions to the Commission picked out women's enforced subordination in terms of sexual and reproductive health as a major issue that will need to be addressed in the near future.⁴⁵⁰

⁴⁴⁷ See Rehn and Sirleaf, *Women, War and Peace*, at page 41.

⁴⁴⁸ See Rehn and Sirleaf, *Women, War and Peace*, at page 52.

⁴⁴⁹ More detail on the long-term effects that women have suffered as a result of sexual abuse violations can be found in the results of the Commission's special coding exercises and accompanying commentaries in the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report, as well as in the chapter on Reparations in Volume Two of this report.

⁴⁵⁰ See, for example, Planned Parenthood Association submission to TRC, at page 2.

HIV / AIDS

463. In general, gender inequality is a major force behind the HIV/AIDS epidemic. According to Lee Waldorf in a study on HIV/AIDS and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), commissioned by United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), a wide range of power imbalances and inequalities between men and women – rooted in economic relations, in family structures, in differences in education and experience, in exposure to violence and in cultural expectations – have placed many women in the position of being unable to negotiate safer sexual practices with their partners. It is a fact that women and adolescent girls are more vulnerable to HIV/AIDS than men and boys.⁴⁵¹
464. While the conflict in Sierra Leone has been largely responsible for the increased numbers of women and girls who live with HIV/AIDS, cultural practices such as female genital mutilation and early marriages are also thought to have had a significant impact on the problem.⁴⁵² In the main, the total powerlessness of women to negotiate safe sex or avert abuses during conflict situations, coupled with the deliberate strategy of the armed forces to rape and sexually violate women, have contributed to the spread of HIV/AIDS amongst women.
465. Conflicts are a major factor in spreading HIV/AIDS. Women are denied control over the partners they have sex with. In Sierra Leone this problem has been exacerbated because of the nature of the conflict, especially the high levels of rape and gang rape to which women and girls were subjected. Systematic violations, along with low awareness of HIV/AIDS and the breakdown of vital services in health and education, contribute to the rapid growth in the number of people who contract HIV/AIDS. In the aftermath of the conflict, many women have turned to commercial sex work as a means of survival, because of the complete devastation of the economy and the needs of their impoverished families. Prostitution too has led to an increase of HIV/AIDS amongst the Sierra Leone population.
466. Transmission from mother to child and lack of access to proper health care are further major reasons for the increase of HIV/AIDS infection.
467. Finally but importantly, the abusive parts played by some peacekeepers in post-conflict Sierra Leone have accelerated the epidemic. Peacekeepers have contributed significantly to the increase in the commercial sex trade, as they have favourable economic resources, which make them an attractive option for the local sex workers. In many instances, a sex worker's earnings are relied upon as a source of income for her entire family, who thus encourage her to ply her trade. It is common knowledge in Sierra Leone that sex workers earn higher fees for sex without condoms and this perilous practice itself contributes to the spread of HIV/AIDS.

⁴⁵¹ See Waldorf, L., Study of the impact of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on women, using the analytical framework of CEDAW, study commissioned by UNIFEM. See also the UNFPA report available on the following website: <http://www.planetwire.org/files.fcgi/2137-women.pdf>.

⁴⁵² See the UNFPA report: <http://www.planetwire.org/files.fcgi/2137-women.pdf>, at page7.

468. There is no doubt that women have been placed in a precarious and vulnerable position in terms of HIV/AIDS epidemic in Sierra Leone because of the conflict. The 2002 report by the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) on the global AIDS epidemic estimated that “by the end of 2001 there were 170,000 persons between the age 15 and 49 living with the virus in Sierra Leone”. UNAIDS estimates that more than 50% of this total, which is about 90,000 sufferers, are women and girls.⁴⁵³
469. The consequences of the HIV/AIDS epidemic on women are far reaching and have been referred to as the “triple jeopardy”, as HIV/AIDS affects the productive, reproductive and community roles that only women can play.⁴⁵⁴ Their positions as reproducers, mothers and caregivers are all affected.
470. Stigmatisation and ostracisation are another consequence of HIV/AIDS. Women living with the virus, experience high levels of stigma and discrimination on the basis of their HIV/AIDS status. This prevents any discussion on publicly discussing the causes of HIV/AIDS and from seeking appropriate responses to the disease. Those affected are often unable to seek treatment or assistance in case their status is discovered. In conflict situations, matters are further exacerbated by the general state of anarchy that is prevalent. Even in post-conflict situations, issues are prioritised and attentions are focused more on reconstruction than on other issues such as HIV/AIDS.
471. The depressed post-war economy has meant that Sierra Leone has not been able to prioritise either the reconstruction of the health system or the management of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. It does not possess the necessary purchasing power to buy anti-retroviral drugs, even where available. The lethal combination of poverty and a non-functional health sector means that the infected women do not have a chance at survival. The statistics speak for themselves. According to the NGO Save the Children, Sierra Leone is no different to other post-conflict countries where the response to dealing with HIV/AIDS in the aftermath of the conflict has been poor.⁴⁵⁵
472. HIV/AIDS devastates families and makes orphans of children. As mothers and caregivers, the death of women through HIV/AIDS has a devastating impact on the family, particularly on children. Children become adults overnight, engaging in economic activities for survival, thus perpetuating child labour and poverty. Some degenerate into drugging, commercial sex work, stealing and other acts that are inimical to their lives and progress in the short as well as long term.
473. An emerging problem is the new dependence on the aged to take care of those living. This is a reversal of a pattern in African societies such as Sierra Leone where children are the usual support structures for the aged. The death of women and children through HIV/AIDS has led to untold hardship for the aged as they have lost the comfort of being taken care of. They have also had to take on the role of providers and caregivers to their children living with HIV/AIDS and on their death to assume same role for their grandchildren. It is important to note that most caregivers or providers are women.

⁴⁵³ See Joint UN Programme on HIV/AIDS, *Global Report 2002*; also at: www.unaids.org.

⁴⁵⁴ See Bennett, O.; *Triple Jeopardy: Women and Aids*; Panos Institute; London. Also available at the website: <http://www.eldis.org/gender/dossiers/stigma.htm>.

⁴⁵⁵ See Save the Children, *HIV and Conflict: A Double Emergency*, report also on the website at: http://www.savethechildren.org.uk/temp.scuk/cache/unsattach/212_hivconflict.pdf.

474. At a national level the loss of person-power affects the economy. Given the role of women in subsistence farming in countries like Sierra Leone, the effect of HIV/AIDS on the economy is profound. Sierra Leone lacks accurate statistics of how many women contracted HIV/AIDS during the conflict and how many are living with the virus or have died as a consequence of contacting the virus.

THE IMPACT OF AMPUTATIONS ON WOMEN

475. Women were as much the victims of amputations as men. The effects of the amputations on their lives have been manifold, ranging from health, social to economic. After the war, Handicap International and MSF provided assistance to amputees and ran medical services at the Aberdeen Amputee camp. While MSF no longer provides any services, Handicap International has continued to provide some services to amputees. Women amputees told the Commission that they were not able to access the services presently provided by Handicap International.⁴⁵⁶
476. While amputations of all kinds have a devastating effect on women and girls, it is important to note that the degree of social and economic dependence of an amputee is determined by the type and level of loss of limb. In an agrarian economy like that in Sierra Leone, amputated women and girls lose the ability to actively engage in farming activities. This affects their ability to earn a living and also to provide food for the family. Many women and girls in Sierra Leone have been reduced to begging for their sustenance and that of their families.
477. The state in Sierra Leone does not have at present the capacity to rehabilitate amputees, particularly women and girls. In those instances where young girls have had their limbs amputated, their futures have been completely compromised. Coupled with poverty, they face a future without any opportunity or hope. The fate therefore of many girls who suffered amputations in the conflict presently hangs in the balance. Women who through amputations have lost their ability to earn have in many instances lost their husbands. In other instances, men who are unable or unwilling to care for their amputee wives have left them.
478. The social impact of amputations is equally far reaching. It ranges from lifestyle change, loss of social interaction and loss of self-esteem, to effect on family members. For women, the transformation of their bodies has had an effect on their self-esteem. Many amputee women expressed the view that they felt incomplete, ashamed and not worthy of being loved. Amputations have had a profound impact on relationships they have had before the amputation. Many women state that they have become social recluses, refusing to interact with other members of society. Many have become depressed and talk about taking their own lives. Amputations also impact on other family members as it puts an added strain on the resources of the family in trying to cope with the situation. Role changes occur in the family, which cause diverse sentiments of resentment among family members. For women amputees the inability to carry out their previous functions is a particularly bitter pill to swallow.

⁴⁵⁶ "First Witness" – confidential testimony received before the TRC Special Thematic Hearings on Women, Freetown, 22 to 24 May 2003.

479. Women amputees expressed to the Commission their anguish at their loss of privacy, particularly with regard to carrying out their bodily functions. Women who are double amputees, either of the legs or hands, are profoundly affected. Being dependent on others to assist them with intensely private functions, they consider themselves stripped of dignity and a burden to others.
480. Amputations affect not only the individual concerned but have knock-on effects on the entire society. Perfectly healthy normal individuals now need care and assistance. They impact on the economy for a whole generation.

THE WIDE-RANGING EFFECTS OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE

481. Sexual violence has had both physical and psycho-social consequences. The physical wounds seen in sexual violation cases range from genital trauma, bruising, lacerations, abrasions, mutilations and damages to surrounding pelvic structures. According to a medical practitioner attached to Connaught Government Hospital in Freetown, in treating the many victims of sexual violence after the war doctors have noticed the following:

“Sexual violence also led to unwanted pregnancies, risky abortions, STIs, HIV/AIDS, sexual dysfunctions, infertility, miscarriages, stomach pains, nausea, vaginal pains, irritable bowel syndrome, still births, itching, burning, traumatic stress disorder, death, urinary tract infections, and many other desperate health problems.”⁴⁵⁷

Psycho-social consequences

482. Some of the psycho-social consequences that victims of sexual violence exhibit are anxiety, depression, flashbacks, shame, anger, guilt/self-blame, fear, suicide, post traumatic stress disorders, inferiority complex and general hopelessness. In Sierra Leone as in most African societies, the psycho-social problems of victims are not properly discussed or dealt with. People have been largely unable to express their views or their personal thoughts in the aftermath of the conflict. A myth that prevails in African societies is that there is no need for counselling as traditional structures exist that allow those affected to deal with trauma. While such a statement may have been true in the past, the conflict has left society broken and fragmented. No mechanisms exist for women in particular to deal with their feelings of anger, humiliation and shame. In many of the hearings before the Commission, rape victims expressed shock, anger, resentment and a general sense of loss at their plight. Most of them were also given to weeping fits during their testimonies.⁴⁵⁸
483. At an emotional level, most sexual victims exhibit such symptoms as being prone to depression, anxious, fearful and resentful of other people. They also exhibit changes in behavioural patterns, for example generally peculiar behaviour, expressions of guilt, loss of self-worth, inability to function as before and signs of withdrawal symptoms. Victims and their families require urgent and full access to trauma counselling.

⁴⁵⁷ Kamara, R. (Dr.); Medical practitioner attached to Connaught Government Hospital, TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 27 June 2003.

⁴⁵⁸ See, for example, “First Witness” and “Second Witness” – confidential testimonies given before the TRC Special Thematic Hearings on Women, Freetown, 22 to 24 May 2003.

Mental health

484. The conflict in Sierra Leone has left a marked impact on its peoples. Many have been left deeply traumatised. The massive violence to which the population has been exposed will inevitably leave a lasting impression on the national psyche.
485. While both sexes have suffered terrible violations, women's experiences have been exacerbated by gender-based violations. Recent studies suggest that women and men respond differently to trauma. These studies suggest that women run twice the risk of developing post-traumatic stress disorders as certain types of trauma may have a deeper and longer-term psychological impact on women.⁴⁵⁹
486. Sierra Leonean women were exposed to traumatic events such as rape and sexual violence, the killing of close family members and the burning and looting of their properties, as described earlier in this chapter. Many women had to leave their homes to live as displaced persons or refugees in foreign countries, without any support systems. Such dislocation and emotional freefall again precipitate enormous trauma. A recent survey on mental health and substance abuse in post-conflict Sierra Leone showed that more than 90% of the sample population had a significant traumatic exposure. Between 50% and 75% of the sample demonstrated "moderate symptoms" of trauma, while between 15% and 25% showed "severe symptoms".⁴⁶⁰ The survey included both sexes.
487. Sierra Leone has only one psychiatric hospital with one trained and qualified psychiatrist to provide psycho-social counselling to trauma victims after the conflict.⁴⁶¹ Trauma counselling services have been provided through the services of non-state institutions and organisations, such City of Rest and Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI), who were working on seventeen categories of traumatic experience including eating disorders associated with forced cannibalism. Other organisations such as MSF Holland, FAWE and IRC have also provided psycho-social counselling.
488. It is important to note that Sierra Leoneans do not ascribe as much importance to treating mental health conditions as they do to treating physical afflictions. The psychological effects of the conflict, especially the effects on women, are generally underplayed if not dismissed altogether.
489. Armed conflicts have a profoundly negative impact on the health of women. Factors such as the destruction of family and community networks and support systems, poverty and the loss of livelihood reduce the capacity of individual women to protect their own and their families' health for decades to come.

⁴⁵⁹ See Barreslau, N.; "Gender Differences in Trauma and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder", in *Journal of Gender Specific Medicine*, Vol. 5, No. 1, January – February 2002, at pages 34 to 40.

⁴⁶⁰ See Jemsen, B. S.; "Mental Health and Substances Abuse in Post-Conflict Sierra Leone", published by the World Health Organisation, October 2002, at page 10.

⁴⁶¹ See Dr. Edward Nahim, Sierra Leone's only qualified psychiatrist, TRC interview conducted at Kissy Mental Hospital, Freetown, 30 July 2003.

490. Women and girls have been hugely disadvantaged by the complete deterioration of existing health services and the lack of access to properly trained personnel. Of particular immediate concern is the non-existence of services to deal with physical problems, but the total lack of skilled counselling professionals is just as ominous because of its longer-term effects. Had it not been for the non-governmental sector, women and girls in Sierra Leone would have had no recourse to any assistance.

POST-CONFLICT MECHANISMS FOR INTERVENTION IN RESPECT OF WOMEN AND GIRLS

INTERVENTIONS IN RESPECT OF SEXUAL VIOLATIONS

491. A number of agencies took specific measures after the conflict to address problems generated by sexual violence. An intervention that had a major impact on women was the programme run by the Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE), with support from Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). FAWE had discovered that a large number of girls had been sexually violated during the January 1999 invasion of Freetown.
492. The programme that FAWE devised was called Operation Freedom.⁴⁶² In collaboration with MSF and Sierra Leone Association of University Women (SLAUW), FAWE trained a team of specialist in counselling, case management and referrals. FAWE used partnerships with other agencies to raise awareness of the services they were providing to sexual violence victims, including the availability of free medical services. They also carried out sensitisation campaigns for the broader society in order to deal with the negative attitudes that victims of sexual violence were experiencing. The programme provided more than 2,000 victims of sexual violence with access to micro-credit schemes and educational assistance. In spite of the huge success of Operation Freedom, it stuttered to a halt due to lack of funding. After funding from MSF stopped, the UNHCR provided funding for an additional two months. This emergency contribution was insufficient to allow the programme to continue.
493. The Christian Children's Fund Sierra Leone, in collaboration with the Sierra Leone Association of University Women, embarked on a similar initiative, which took the form of a community-based initiative to train health care workers, teachers and community representatives in basic therapeutic skills to deal with victims of sexual violence. More than 600 people were trained. However, funding problems also forced this programme to be ended prematurely.
494. The Council of Churches of Sierra Leone and Campaign for Good Governance have established programmes to provide legal support to victims. At the same time, they embarked on campaigns to improve the prosecutorial process by providing the following services: case management to survivors and their families; sensitising lawyers and members of the judiciary about gender-based violence; and advocating for improved legislation.⁴⁶³

⁴⁶² Christiana Thorpe, Founding President, Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE), TRC interview conducted in Freetown, March 2003.

⁴⁶³ More detail can be found at the following website: www.womensCommission.org/pdf/ifnotaf.pdf.

495. Currently, the International Rescue Committee (IRC) maintains a gender-based violence (GBV) programme in the country, which it started in 1999 as a component of an emergency reproductive health programme. According to IRC, the need for this programme became necessary due to the realisation that:
- “The health programme recognised that the specific health and psycho-social needs of the women and girls raped and sexually assaulted during the war were not being adequately addressed.”⁴⁶⁴
496. The IRC programme is holistic in nature and seeks to address not only preventative mechanisms but also to improve the quality of response from the health, psychosocial, legal/justice and security sectors. While initially the GBV programme was meant to provide emergency health and psychosocial service to survivors immediately after the conflict, it has developed to the point where it now deals with problems of the post conflict period. It currently operates in Kono, Kenema, Kailahun and Freetown.
497. According to the IRC, as at June 2003, it has assisted over 800 survivors of conflict and post-conflict related gender-based violence. In the Provinces, the programme works with communities to establish Women’s Action Groups (WAGs). The groups are provided with training on gender-based violence issues and according to IRC, serve as agents of change in their respective communities. A development of the IRC gender programme is the establishment of a Sexual Assault Referral Centre named the “Rainbo Centre” situated at Princess Christian Maternity Hospital in Freetown. They hope to start off two more Sexual Assault Referral Centres in Kenema and in another location to be yet determined.
498. A National Sexual Violence Committee was established and is currently chaired by the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs. It includes UNICEF and a number of other non-governmental organisations involved in the provision of services dealing with sexual violence.

Effectiveness of interventions in respect of sexual violence

499. While the efforts of these bodies are to be lauded, attitudes in the country have not changed greatly. Victims of sexual violence still experience the stigma of disclosing the violation. Sierra Leonean society has not really woken up to issues of sexual violence and a culture of silence still prevails. Structures meant to deal with issues of sexual violence do not take the crime seriously. As a consequence, victims of sexual violation under-report these crimes.
500. Police attitudes towards the victims of sexual violence are problematic. In many instances women do not report the crime, as they are aware of the fact that they will receive very little sympathy from the police. The government is aware of the problem and has tried to address it through the establishment of Family Support Units within the police force, designed to deal sensitively with women. The government has also begun to provide training for the police in the handling of domestic and sexual violence.

⁴⁶⁴ See International Rescue Committee (IRC); Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 18 June 2003 (hereinafter “IRC submission to TRC”), at page 2.

501. Despite these initiatives, according to the IRC, police personnel in the Provinces receive inadequate training to conduct interviews with survivors of sexual violence who are mainly girl-children. They complain that interviewing techniques are harsh and judgemental of the victims. In addition, police investigations are often poorly conducted. This is due to insufficient training and insufficient resources.⁴⁶⁵ An example of this is the requirement that a police doctor or medical doctor identified by the Ministry of Health issue a medical certificate which allows a forensic examination to be carried out. Presently, only one doctor is available in each of the districts and only one of them is a female based in Freetown.⁴⁶⁶ According to IRC, it is not clear what the criteria for choosing the doctors are. In addition, the absence of a doctor from his location creates a problem, as the victim is unable to obtain the requisite "P-3" form.⁴⁶⁷
502. The financial resources required to prosecute rape cases are prohibitive for the victim and often serve to deter taking the matter further. The costs associated with the obtaining "P-3" form required by rape victims serves as a deterrent. In addition, the legal system is slow with adjournments being the order of the day..
503. The Justice system itself militates against victims of sexual violence taking their matters further. GBV cases are heard in open courts, with perpetrators being allowed to cross-examine victims. Justice officials have little or no understanding of the trauma associated with cases of sexual violence. The courts have too few officials who are trained to deal with these cases. Victims have no access to legal aid.
504. Reflecting on the inadequate judicial response to cases of gender-based violence, the Honourable Minister for Social Welfare, Gender and Children Affairs made the following remarks:
- "Prevailing attitudes towards gender-based violence against women and rape issues are not treated with the importance they deserve. Factors such as lack of protection of witnesses and victims, lack of forensic evidence and subjecting women to humiliation in court also hinder the course of justice in such cases."⁴⁶⁸
505. Current programmes targeting gender-based violence are directed at girls and not women. Women are generally disadvantaged by the complete focus on girls. The United Nations Rapporteur on Violence against Women, during her visit to Sierra Leone, lamented donor apathy towards the cause of women as well as the fact that that most programmes of sexual violence are tilted heavily in favour of children.

⁴⁶⁵ See IRC submission to TRC, at page 2.

⁴⁶⁶ See IRC submission to TRC, at page 2.

⁴⁶⁷ The "P-3" form is a document that victims of rape and sexual violence require to fill out as part of the reporting process. Only registered medical practitioners have the authority to distribute "P-3s".

⁴⁶⁸ Gbujama, Honourable S. Y., Minister of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs; "*Gender Mainstreaming: Sierra Leone Poverty Reduction Strategy 2004-2006*"; 9 October 2003, at page 2.

506. Statistics are a major problem for GBV service providers. It is extremely difficult to plan appropriate responses where no statistics exist to indicate the scale of the problem. Sadly, the government has no programme in place to generate these statistics and neither has it demonstrated any desire to generate one. For proper programmatic planning not just for government but also to assist donors and NGOs, the gathering of statistics is essential.
507. To date, the country lacks a mandatory national health policy that spells out standards of treatment for survivors of sexual violence. The establishment of a national policy framework would go a long way to addressing the problems that victims of sexual violence experience. It would also assist with eliminating many of the problems described above which lead to an under reporting of rape and incidents of sexual violence.
508. A further problem that exists is the differentiation between services available in Freetown and the Provinces to disadvantage of those that live in the Provinces. The paucity of services effectively prohibits women in the villages from accessing them. Even more debilitating is the fact that the vast majority of women are not even aware of the services that exist. There is an urgent need for massive sensitisation campaigns to make women aware of the existence of services that exist and how to access them.
509. Sierra Leone has a number of local and international agencies working on issues emanating from the conflict. There are also a significant number of local and international NGOs working on aspects affecting civil society. The impact of the conflict and the poverty it has engendered as well as the inability of government to take on all aspects of reconstructing society has meant that civil sector initiatives have become very pronounced in all areas.
510. A major factor that hinders significant progress in the field is the lack of effective co-ordination. Many NGOs work with limited resources. In order to avoid a duplication of services, it would be useful to establish a register listing local and international NGOs, local and international agencies, as well as government agencies working on programmes dealing with gender-based violence. Government itself should take the lead on this matter and also take responsibility for the co-ordination of such a service. A choice few strategic interventions would improve the quality of services to a significant degree and lead to greater use of limited financial resources.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT FOR WOMEN AND RELATED INTERVENTIONS

ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT

511. The conflict in Sierra Leone has had devastating consequences not only on human life but also on the economy and the infrastructure of the country, both of which need to be rebuilt in its aftermath. Most war-torn countries undergo similar economic challenges and questions of priority. According to the World Disasters Report 2001, the poor have suffered disproportionately, with the economies of war-affected states being severely eroded, if not completely collapsed.⁴⁶⁹ War undermines development in complex and multi-dimensional ways as the economically active lose their lives, people are displaced and those who live by farming are unable to yield any produce. Natural resources are depleted, while business and industry are destroyed.
512. The worst-case scenario is true of Sierra Leone. The ravages of war have proved to be a major constraint on economic development. Sadly most of the developing world's poorest countries are locked in conflict. The World Bank states that eighty percent of the world's 20 poorest countries have suffered a major civil war in the past 15 years, Sierra Leone included.⁴⁷⁰ Describing the economic impact of the war, a group of Sierra Leonean women submitted:

“During the war, people were forcibly evicted from their houses, many houses and public buildings were burned down, looted, vandalised, furniture removed, savings forcibly taken from people and all livestock consumed. The livelihood system of people was severely disrupted, there was loss of source of income, economic activities ceased, thereby increasing the level of poverty. Women and children were hardest hit. They were totally dispossessed of their worldly possessions and meagre savings. Spouses and other male breadwinners were killed, made redundant or separated from their families.”⁴⁷¹

513. Madam Koloneh Jusu, leader of an association of women farmers at Peacock Farm in Wellington, near Freetown testified in the same submission as follows:

“Our house was burnt down during the war. We stayed in a displaced camp for six months. When we came back, we put up a temporary structure where we started rebuilding our lives again. It was the same story for most of the women in this association. We had no means of livelihood. Our husbands were either killed in the war or made redundant, because the industrial estate that employed them has closed down due to the wanton rebel destruction.”⁴⁷²

⁴⁶⁹ See USAID, *World Disasters Report 2001*, citing the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies; see the website: <http://www.usaid.gov/democracy/profs/conflict.pdf>.

⁴⁷⁰ See Women's NGO Coalition submission to TRC, at page 16.

⁴⁷¹ See Women's NGO Coalition submission to TRC, at page 16.

⁴⁷² See Women's NGO Coalition submission to TRC, at page 16.

514. The war denied women of any genuine prospect of economic advancement. The Sierra Leonean economy in the pre-conflict period was already survivalist in nature particularly in the rural parts of Sierra Leone. The majority of women live in the rural areas and are engaged in subsistence farming, which forms the bedrock of food production in Sierra Leone.⁴⁷³ The RUF began the war by first occupying the rural areas in the Provinces, which immediately affected food production in the country and resulted in food insecurity.⁴⁷⁴ In many of the rural areas, those who farmed were compelled to supply food to the RUF on pain of death. At the same time the occupying forces had a devastating effect on output. In some areas, rural infrastructure was damaged and agricultural production was reduced, with food processing, storage and distribution systems being destroyed.
515. Women were also affected by the fact that their men – sons, husbands and fathers – either took up arms voluntarily or were compelled to do so. As a result of subsequent male combat losses, many women have become household heads. The wanton killing and destruction that took place during the course of the conflict therefore had an enforced impact on the status of women.
516. Women began to take on additional roles and responsibility as heads of households, not only providing for their own needs, but those of the extended family and the wider community as well. The conflict also forced women to become decision makers and to determine how resources should be used. These strategic tasks had traditionally been the exclusive preserve of men.
517. Women in terms of custom and tradition had played a subservient role. The conflict eroded these traditional customs and practices that had placed constraints on women in the past and restricted their mobility. Given the lack of statistics, establishing the current number of female-headed households is now a priority.
518. As the conflict spread in Sierra Leone, families became displaced, with many women becoming internally displaced persons. Many others fled into exile, particularly those with the resources to do so. According to the UNHCR, there are approximately 50 million refugees in the world, with 75% to 80% of them women and children.⁴⁷⁵ For the most part, they are civilians. In recent decades, civilian refugees have accounted for more than 90% of all refugees. Educated Sierra Leoneans left the country in massive droves as the conflict escalated. This latest exodus has only worsened the massive brain drain from the country. While many took refuge in neighbouring countries, a large number settled in Europe and the USA. Many refuse to come back as their memories of the conflict are bitter. This loss of human power has translated into huge economic loss for Sierra Leone.

⁴⁷³ See Women's Forum submission to TRC, at pages 2 and 6.

⁴⁷⁴ See Women's NGO Coalition submission to TRC, at page 17.

⁴⁷⁵ More details on the global situation relating to refugees, including up-to-date statistics, can be found at the UNHCR website: www.unhcr.org.

SURVIVING POVERTY

519. Surviving poverty in post-conflict Sierra Leone has forced unpalatable choices on many families. In order to boost meagre family incomes, children, particularly older children, have been forced to join their parents in commercial enterprises belonging to the family at the expense of going to school. Aligned to this trend has been the increase in the cost of education in Sierra Leone. Even in the public education system, where the government bears some of the costs in terms of providing schoolbooks and paying examination fees, it has been difficult for some families to send their children or wards to school due to financial constraints. Where families have had to prioritise which of their children's schooling they pay for, it is usually the girl children who will be kept away from school and put to work elsewhere.
520. Many girls in post-conflict Sierra Leone have thus been deprived of the right to acquire education, in effect jeopardising their future prospects even further. Although the access and retention rates have increased for school-going children over the years,⁴⁷⁶ there are still acute weaknesses in the system, such as the poor availability of secondary school education for girls. By way of example, there are some districts in the northern and eastern Provinces of Sierra Leone where the percentage of girls accessing secondary school is as low as 4% and 3% respectively.⁴⁷⁷

LEARNING NEW SKILLS

521. In the post-conflict era, Sierra Leone women have opted to learn new skills in order to establish new means of livelihood. In addition to subsistence farming, which they still practice in the Provinces, women have learnt new skills such as brick making, hair dressing, soap making, tie-dyeing of fabrics and weaving. Such skills training programmes as well as micro credit schemes have in the main been provided by Government through its various agencies, bolstered by donors, local and international agencies and local and international NGOs.
522. The National Commission for Demobilisation, Disarmament and Rehabilitation (NCDDR) provided skills training for some of the demobilised women and girls with the fighting forces. This training was provided to women in the internally displaced persons' camps and it is still ongoing today in some parts of the country for other categories of women. Some of the government bodies involved in providing this assistance were the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children Affairs (MSWGCA),⁴⁷⁸ the now dissolved National Commission for Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (NCDDR) and the present day National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA), which was formerly National Commission for Reconstruction, Resettlement and Rehabilitation (NCRRR).

⁴⁷⁶ See the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology; Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, September 2003 (hereinafter "Ministry of Education, Science and Technology submission to TRC"), at page 7.

⁴⁷⁷ See Ministry of Education, Science and Technology submission to TRC, at page 7.

⁴⁷⁸ See the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children Affairs, TRC interview conducted at the Ministry building, Freetown, July 2003.

POVERTY REDUCTION STRATEGY PROGRAMME (PRSP)

523. The MSWGCA stated that in 1999 the government instituted a Poverty Reduction Strategy Programme, originally named the Social Action and Poverty Alleviation (SAPA) scheme.⁴⁷⁹ The main thrust of this programme has been a micro-credit scheme, which started with an initial sum of Le 150 million from the Sierra Leone government. The programme also provides training for women leaders, training of petty traders in management skills and adult literacy classes.⁴⁸⁰ The implementing body for this programme was the National Commission for Reconstruction, Resettlement and Rehabilitation, now renamed as the National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA).
524. NaCSA confirms that the scheme has benefited more than 6,500 poor persons as recipients, of which at least 95% are women.⁴⁸¹ The scheme has successfully progressed with a loan-recovery rate of over 90% and it has received additional funding to the tune of Le 159.25 million from the African Development Bank.⁴⁸² The SAPA scheme has so far disbursed over Le 1.5 billion.⁴⁸³
525. The major economic activities undertaken with the 4,390 loans obtained so far from the SAPA micro-credit scheme are the following:
- Gardening / sale of agricultural produce: resale of agricultural produce and backyard gardening.
 - Processed foodstuffs: cooked foods, rice, cakes, groundnuts, fish preservation and sale of products.
 - Commerce: petty trading in manufactured / household goods; clothing and textiles.
 - Small-scale industries: soap making; gara / batik.
 - Others: firewood.⁴⁸⁴
526. Another government body that ran a micro-credit scheme was the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (NCDDR). This programme was targeted primarily at ex-combatants and their partners, as well as the handicapped. Micro-credit loans of Le 300,000 were given out to various categories of people. Regrettably a poor recovery rate and the tendency of many ex-combatants to collect the money forcibly from their wives led to the collapse of the programme.

⁴⁷⁹ See the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children Affairs, TRC interview conducted at the Ministry building, Freetown, July 2003.

⁴⁸⁰ See the Social Action and Poverty Alleviation (SAPA) programme, discussion of the SAPA Micro-Finance Scheme, 1999 to 2001 (hereinafter, "SAPA, *Micro-Finance Scheme*") at page 1.

⁴⁸¹ See SAPA, *Micro-Finance Scheme*, at page 1.

⁴⁸² See SAPA, *Micro-Finance Scheme*, at page 1.

⁴⁸³ See SAPA, *Micro-Finance Scheme*, at page 2.

⁴⁸⁴ See SAPA, *Micro-Finance Scheme*, at page 2.

527. Besides the government's micro-finance schemes, a number of local and international NGOs have also been involved in the provision of micro-credit for women. These agencies include GTZ, Action Aid, Agrisystems and FAWE. Such schemes are thought to have been generally successful, with few obvious shortcomings. In evaluating the government financed micro-credit program, the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children Affairs made the following observations:

“A lot of women groups benefited. Groups testified that the micro-credit scheme worked for them. It elevated them. An example is that one of the women groups in the Western area went into transportation and was quite successful.”⁴⁸⁵

528. Skills training has undoubtedly assisted and equipped many women with skills that they can use to earn money. In many instances women have been empowered not only to sustain themselves but also their families. In women-headed households, it is often this money that forms the only source of income.

529. While there is much to applaud about the skills training programmes that have been provided, it is also necessary to comment on some of the problems experienced. Hitches have included the non-availability of start-up kits after the training, bureaucracy surrounding the release of resources to the recipients and interference from corrupt officials, who illegally demanded that the recipients pay them money before they are issued with their start-up kits.⁴⁸⁶ An unavoidable consequence of the skills training has also been those recipients who sell their kits for much-needed cash as soon as the training is complete.

530. A more general structural problem has been the dearth of analysis done on the economy and its requisite skills and products needs beyond the short term. Since nobody really knows what level of capacity the economy needs in different sectors, a plethora of agencies might provide skills training for women in the same field of production, resulting in a glut of these products. The economy does not have a high purchasing power amongst the citizenry. Consequently, the market for the products of skills training is very limited. Besides having no market for some of the products produced, service skills acquired, such as hair dressing and tailoring, have also failed to attract enough patronage as a result of the poor economic situation.

531. There is a need for the government to create sustainable opportunities for women who have received training in these skills to sell their products and use their service skills appropriately. At present, many of the newly acquired skills are going to waste and many women told the Commission that they are deeply frustrated.

532. While women desperately need assistance in the form of micro credit, it is equally imperative to retain positive perceptions of micro-credit schemes among the public. Many women who partook in the most recent micro-credit scheme advised the Commission that they felt that they had been set up to fail and that long-term economic growth was not possible given the amounts of the loans and the time period they were given for repayment of the loans.

⁴⁸⁵ See the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children Affairs, TRC interview conducted at the Ministry building, Freetown, July 2003.

⁴⁸⁶ See, for example, Kadiatu Brima, TRC interview at IDP Camp Lunsar, 8 August 2003.

Women have cited the Social Action and Poverty Alleviation (SAPA) micro-finance scheme being run by the government as one of the starkest examples of insufficient loans. The initial amount of SAPA loans ranged from Le50, 000 to Le100, 000 (about US \$30). In disbursing the loans, Le100, 000 was given out on 3,185 occasions. Another batch of Le200, 000 was given out on 1,035 occasions. The third set of loans of Le300, 000 each were given out on 160 occasions while the last batches of Le400, 000 were given out on 10 occasions. The loan period ranged from three to six months. Subsequent disbursements were based on satisfactory performance after previous loan receipts. A report on this programme stated that more than 6,500 persons benefited from the scheme and that the scheme had recorded a 90% repayment rate.⁴⁸⁷ The low amount of the final loan payments suggests that the repayment rate may not accurately reflect the reality of the situation. It is unlikely that loans were repaid at the rate indicated by SAPA.

533. Many beneficiaries complained that the period of repayment was too short to really allow beneficiaries the maximum use of these loans. The issue of repayment is traditionally problematic, in that most beneficiaries have in past not repaid their loans. This has meant that loan benefits cannot devolve to other equally needy persons who would otherwise have accessed the facility. The non-repayment of loans has led to many donors being reluctant to invest in such schemes.
534. The kind of business ventures in which most women beneficiaries engage also affect their ability to repay their loans. In the case of the SAPA micro-finance scheme, women had taken out loans to engage in food-based businesses. The returns on these kinds of businesses have not been very profitable.
535. There have been many positive features to the micro-credit scheme. Many women emerging from a conflict situation have been able to step out from poverty. However given the negative aspects of the “practical mechanics” of the micro-credit schemes, there is also some disquiet that many women are falling into a “micro-credit finance ghetto”.⁴⁸⁸ According to Rehn and Sirleaf,⁴⁸⁹ small loans limit women to small purchases, which can generate immediate income but without larger loans, the business cannot grow.
536. A major problem associated with micro-credit schemes is that it feeds into the perception that women are supplementary wage-earners rather than entrepreneurs. Women are thus convinced to pitch their efforts at household and cottage industry levels. The widely held belief that micro-credit programmes represent the tool to address the root causes of women’s poverty locks women out of larger financial markets and leaves them in the domestic sector. At many levels, micro-credit can actually therefore reinforce women’s marginalisation. While micro-credit programmes address a particular need, there is a major need to find mechanisms to introduce women into the broader economy by helping them to access the larger financial markets and institutions.

⁴⁸⁷ See SAPA, *Micro-Finance Scheme*, at page 2.

⁴⁸⁸ See Rehn and Sirleaf, *Women, War and Peace*, at page 131.

⁴⁸⁹ See Rehn and Sirleaf, *Women, War and Peace*, at page 132.

OWNERSHIP OF LAND

537. Women also face legal and cultural barriers in acquiring ownership of land. Accessing land belonging to their spouses is a major problem that many women in Sierra Leone face where their husbands have died in the conflict. Once they have lost the male in their families, women- or girl-headed households are not able to retain and cultivate the land previously farmed by the family. Many Sierra Leonean women have raised this issue with the Commission:

“... The land tenure system and inheritance laws are crucial to returning displaced people, especially in the cases of women who might have lost their husbands.”⁴⁹⁰

538. The same is true of property left behind by the dead spouse. Under Sierra Leonean customary law,⁴⁹¹ women only own property through their husbands and children. If the husband is killed or dies and the wife does not have an older son who can claim the property, she often must yield to her husband's family who hold her fate in their hands by deciding effectively whether she can keep her own property.

539. Despite the various interventions towards economic reform since the end of the conflict, most women in Sierra Leone still live below the poverty line.⁴⁹² In submissions made by women, various reasons are cited for the heightened state of poverty that exists in Sierra Leone: bad governance and economic mismanagement, increased vulnerability from the civil war, unemployment and under-employment and lack of access to basic social services are but a few.

540. Women and girls suffer the impact of poverty most profoundly because they lack income-generating skills, land, family labour force and start-up capital for business. A significant problem is the inadequate access to financial resources that could provide for items such as seeds, tools and technical assistance for those involved in farming. Given that the majority of rural women in the country are involved in agricultural production, the shortfall of resources constitutes a crippling setback in their quest to become economically self-sufficient.

541. The Women's Coalition stated insightfully in their submission:

“...Without access to economic means, the poverty experienced may create grounds for renewed tension and conflict.”⁴⁹³

⁴⁹⁰ See Women's NGO Coalition submission to TRC, at page 22.

⁴⁹¹ See Joko Smart, H. M.; *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*; Freetown, 1983, at page 152.

⁴⁹² See Women's NGO Coalition submission to TRC, at page 17.

⁴⁹³ See Women's NGO Coalition submission to TRC, at page 16.

EFFORTS AT REINTEGRATION AND REHABILITATION

542. The NCDDR defined “reintegration” as “assistance measures provided to former combatants that would increase the potential for their economic and social reintegration into society.”⁴⁹⁴ While the NCDDR confined its programme to former combatants, the Commission considers the issue of “reintegration” to apply to the context of women and girls generally, not only to the former combatants among them.
543. The NCDDR was tasked by its mandate with the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration of ex-combatants. While its chosen approach mostly impacted on male ex-combatants, the reintegration programmes contained some elements of economic and social reintegration for female ex-combatants and the wives of male ex-combatants. The NCDDR has done incredible work in this field and accomplished the goal of disarming and demobilising thousands of ex-combatants and increasing security in the country. However a major criticism of the programme has been that the plight of women and girls was not specifically addressed by the DDR programmes and that women and girls did not therefore benefit in a substantial way from these programmes in Sierra Leone. A question the Commission has yet to address is why this oversight happened.
544. The Commission came to the conclusion that the issues of gender and the specific needs of women were not taken into account when the programme was planned. In particular little or no attention was given to an issue which has primarily affected women, that of stigmatisation in communities once they have been identified as being ex-combatants.
545. The DDR programme also failed to carry out sensitisation programmes in communities in order to deal with the negative perceptions attached to women and girls identified as ex-combatants. A further problem was the fact that the eligibility rules for admission into the programme did not cater for the different roles played by women and girls during the war. The criteria established for access were quite restrictive and deterred many women from even trying to access the DDR programme.

⁴⁹⁴ See Kai-Kai, F.; “*Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration in Post-war Sierra Leone*”, in Ayissi, A. and Poulton, R-E.; *Bound to Co-operate: Conflict, Peace and People in Sierra Leone*, United Nations Publications; Geneva, Switzerland, 2000 (hereinafter “Kai-Kai, *DDR in Post-war Sierra Leone*”), at page 127.

TRC



Recent graduates gather around their sewing machines at a skills training centre for war-affected women and girls in Bo District.

546. Another criticism of the programme has been the issue of relevance and appropriateness in preparing ex-combatants to participate once more in the social and economic life of Sierra Leone. The reintegration aspects of the DDR programme have been criticised as not being in sync with the economic and social recovery needs of the people. In many instances, the livelihood skills acquired through DDR were irrelevant to the recipients' realities, hindering family reunification and community acceptance.⁴⁹⁵ The DDR programme also failed to taken seriously the issues of reconciliation at a community level. The head of the NCDDR said the following:

"...Another very important strategic consideration that was not adequately planned for, namely, reconciliation at community level... there are many cases of ex-combatants encountering difficulties of acceptance. Even for former child-combatants, most child protection agencies have complained about parents refusing to accept their own children back during family tracing and reunion interventions."⁴⁹⁶

547. Resettlement in Sierra Leone followed the declaration of safety by two months and took place in three phases. The first phase for Internal Displaced Persons (IDPs) and returnee refugees was in April 2001 after the south, west and some parts of the east of the country were declared safe. As at September 2001, a third of the country was considered safe for resettlement. The safe areas were predominantly in the southern and eastern parts of the country. By December 2001, the last of the country's districts was opened up. The third phase started by April 2002 with the movement of people back to the eastern part of the country. By the end of 2002, the IDP resettlement programme was officially completed. In all close to 215,000 persons were given assistance with resettlement. The assistance provided for the resettled consisted of transportation costs, two months of food and household supplies.

548. While the official resettlement programme is over, there are many displaced persons in internal displacement camps. In many instances, those who had resettled chose to come back to the camps rather than to their new houses, as they preferred living in the camps.⁴⁹⁷ Many stated that their homes had been destroyed, they had lost family members and that they lacked the capacity to continue with their previous livelihoods in the resettled areas. Many displaced persons complained that they had not been able to benefit from resettlement due to not having been issued an IDP number prior to the start of the resettlement exercise.⁴⁹⁸ Many camp inmates have indicated a willingness to be resettled if such an opportunity should arise in the future.

⁴⁹⁵ More analysis of this issues can be found in the Women's NGO Coalition submission to TRC.

⁴⁹⁶ See Kai-Kai, *DDR in Post-war Sierra Leone*, at page 127.

⁴⁹⁶ See Zubaitu Browne, Executive Secretary of the 50 / 50 Group, TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 17 November 2003.

⁴⁹⁷ See, for example, Ramatu Conteh, TRC interview, IDP Camp Lunsar, 8 August 2003.

⁴⁹⁸ See, for example, Phina Dumbuya, TRC interview, IDP Camp Lunsar, 8 August 2003.

549. A large number of women did not benefit from the resettlement process. They argue that the workers charged with handling the registration process for resettlement exercises did not do their jobs competently. Another factor that prohibited registration was the cumbersome nature of the process, which took a longer time than many women could afford to spend when they were also concerned with providing food for their families. Many widowed women and women who head households found it especially difficult to register.

ACCESS TO HOUSING

550. While women did benefit from some of the programmes for reintegration, in most instances these programmes have benefited men and not women-headed households or widows. The Norwegian Refugee Council provided amputees and war wounded with housing. In this programme the NGO received support from the Catholic Mission in Sierra Leone. The houses for the amputees and war wounded have been designed around the needs of amputees and war wounded. They consist of a two-bedroom structure, with a big living room and veranda, outside toilet, bathroom and kitchen.⁴⁹⁹
551. As at December 2002, there were 239 primary beneficiaries together with an additional 1,800 family members and dependents who benefited from the Norwegian Refugee Council's housing project. Of the 239 primary beneficiaries, 82 fall into the war-wounded category, with 157 in the amputee category. Of the latter number only 55 women are primary beneficiaries.⁵⁰⁰ These houses have been built in every district in the country with the exception of Pujehun and Bonthe.
552. The beneficiaries to the houses have also received two beds and mattresses, one table and four chairs. In addition in order to facilitate the reintegration process for the beneficiaries and their families, NRC organised sensitisation seminars in the communities in which the amputees were to be resettled. The sensitisation seminars targeted the leadership in districts and chiefdoms, including community leaders, teachers, social and health workers, as well as possible neighbours. The aims and objectives of the seminars were to prevent stigmatisation and to inform the community of the needs of the amputees / war wounded at an early stage.⁵⁰¹
553. The NRC is hopeful that it will be able to provide housing to an additional 70 amputees / war wounded as well as their family members and dependents totalling in all 560 persons. Construction has started on 35 houses, 10 have been completed and handed over to NRC. The NRC through UNHCR has also been able to construct three water wells for the housing beneficiaries in Kono.
554. The NRC programme has been a major factor in the resettlement of both the amputee and war-wounded communities. The programme has not been without problems, however, not least in the area of core funding. The initial grant awarded by the Norwegian government was exhausted at the end of 2002. The NRC has been optimistic of raising further funding. The acquisition of land, particularly in places such as the Western Area, Bo and Kenema, is becoming ever more difficult. Finding suitable labour for the construction of these houses has also been also problematic in areas like Kono.

⁴⁹⁹ See Norwegian Refugee Council, Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Freetown, 31 July 2003 (hereinafter "Norwegian Refugee Council submission to TRC"), at page 6.

⁵⁰⁰ See Norwegian Refugee Council submission to TRC, at page 6.

⁵⁰¹ See Norwegian Refugee Council submission to TRC, at page 5.

555. Cause Canada, another agency working in the field of reintegration since 2001, has provided assistance to resettled beneficiaries in the form of skills training, micro-credit schemes, physiotherapy and other services. Allied to the standard reintegration package given, Cause Canada has also provided beneficiaries with a resettlement package based on their individual needs. Cause Canada also ensured that there would be social workers available in resettlement areas so as to assist the beneficiaries and their families with becoming independent and self-sufficient.⁵⁰²
556. In many communities, a level of social reintegration has taken place following the organisation of ritual cleansing ceremonies by the communities, especially for the ex-combatants.⁵⁰³ On the back of these ceremonies, even several female ex-combatants have been accepted back into their various communities. In a number of cases, graduation ceremonies are organised at the end of the skills training course that the girls and women have undergone. With the help of some NGOs or agencies of government, the community is brought together at these graduation ceremonies and can join as one in accepting war-affected women and girls back into its midst.⁵⁰⁴
557. A number of NGOs and government agencies, working in conjunction with UN agencies, offer family reunification services for children, with an emphasis on the girl-child. Particular mention should be made in this regard of the work of UNICEF, along with such NGOs as Caritas Makeni, Christian Brothers and World Vision.
558. Despite these efforts, social reintegration in Sierra Leone has been fraught with problems. The stigmatisation of women and girls associated with the various armed factions remains a huge stumbling block to reintegration. The fragmented sensitisation programme being carried out by different organisations across the country has not had an ameliorating effect on the issue. Women and girls are wary of being identified with any of the belligerents. Yet at the heart of the recovery process is the need for acceptance of the wrongs of the past to make a more stable society in the future. It is a process that must necessarily involve ex-combatants, who should become constructive contributors to peaceful and progressive communities. The head of the NCDDR posed this pertinent question:

“How shall enemies become reconciled and accept to live together?”⁵⁰⁵

⁵⁰² See Norwegian Refugee Council submission to TRC, at page 7.

⁵⁰³ See Rosalind Shaw, anthropologist and author who has extensively studied the traditions of cleansing and reconciliation in Sierra Leone, TRC interview in Freetown, June 2003.

⁵⁰⁴ See Rosalind Shaw, anthropologist and author who has extensively studied the traditions of cleansing and reconciliation in Sierra Leone, TRC interview in Freetown, June 2003.

⁵⁰⁵ See Kai-Kai, *DDR in Post-war Sierra Leone*, at page 123.

559. Integration remains one of the most important aspects of post-conflict work. It is also a necessary component of the reconciliation process. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission has kick-started the reconciliation process in all the districts during its public hearings phase. In addition, the Commission, through its reconciliation unit, has galvanised civil society and religious leadership into taking up the reins of the process. The Commission assisted with training personnel and helped District Councils to take on aspects of its administration.

THE LEGAL STATUS OF WOMEN AFTER THE WAR

560. There is no doubt that the participation of women in the peace process as well as in civil and political affairs has contributed to the relative stability of the country in the aftermath of the conflict. The transition now provides women with an opportune moment to demand changes that will improve their status in all areas that affect them. While legal reform has been slow, the increased awareness by women of their rights has catalysed positive developments on a number of fronts affecting them. Some of these developments are listed below:
- The establishment of the Family Support Unit (FSU) within the police force, which includes trained personnel who deal with cases of alleged sexual offences and domestic violence.
 - The establishment of the “Rainbo Centre” (a sexual violence referral centre) by the International Rescue Committee (IRC),⁵⁰⁶ which provides free medical attention, counselling services and, to a limited extent, some forms of legal assistance where required to victims of rape or sexual assault.⁵⁰⁷
 - A marked increase in the number of awareness campaigns and workshops offered by civil society groups, non-governmental organisations and the government, which address the rights of women, the abuses women suffered not only during the war but also before the war, endeavouring to break the culture of silence and impunity in Sierra Leone that inhibits these crimes from being reported and or prosecuted.
 - A marked increase in the reporting, investigation and prosecution of sexual violence and related offences within the home.
 - The International Human Rights Law Group in its current “Access to Justice” programme in Kono, Koinadugu and Kailahun continues to inform the populace on the laws of Sierra Leone in an effort to bring justice close to the people.
 - The Law Reform Commission, working together with the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs and other partners, has included women’s rights in its reform agenda.

⁵⁰⁶ The International Rescue Committee (IRC) is an international non-governmental organisation that conducts a variety of development and humanitarian assistance projects across Sierra Leone. More detail about the IRC can be found at its website: www.theirc.org.

⁵⁰⁷ See International Rescue Committee (IRC), Sierra Leone; *A Handbook about the Rainbo Centre*, information booklet produced and distributed in Freetown, 2003.

- The Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs, in conjunction with UNIFEM, is embarking on a series of consultations with the aim of incorporating the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) into national law.
- Accountability mechanisms for crimes committed against women during the war have come into being, in the shape of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone.

WOMEN IN POLITICS AND DECISION-MAKING

561. Women in Sierra Leone are starting, slowly but surely, to make an impact on the political landscape in the country. While not yet totally satisfactory, the most visible change has been the increased number of women contesting political office. In the May 2002 general elections more than 165 women contested in various capacities, with 46 women running for parliamentary seats.⁵⁰⁸ Seven of the eight political parties contesting the 2002 general elections and chieftaincy positions fielded women.
562. The last election also saw the emergence of the first woman Deputy Speaker of the House of Parliament, the first woman Presidential candidate and the first two women Presidential running mates. In total the election saw 18 women, two of whom are Paramount Chiefs, become Members of Parliament. The previous parliament had only eight women in total. The current government has, at the time of writing, three women cabinet Ministers and three deputy Ministers compared to only two cabinet Ministers and two deputy Ministers in the previous administration.⁵⁰⁹
563. There is little doubt that these changes would not have not come about without the combined efforts of women and NGOs involved in advocacy work for women's involvement in politics. One such NGO is the 50 / 50 Group, which was formed in November 2000 with the objective of empowering women and enabling them to participate effectively in politics. Its stated mission is to increase the level of female participation in government and to ensure gender parity in all walks of life.⁵¹⁰ It has been involved in the training of both old and budding new women politicians. The funding for its training has come from the National Democratic Institute and the Westminster Foundation for Democracy, administered locally through the British Council of Sierra Leone.⁵¹¹
564. The 50 / 50 group has been able to conduct training sessions all over the country on issues relating to gender and politics. Many beneficiaries of such training have gone on to run for political office. For the local government elections of 2004 – the first of their kind in several decades – the group stated its intent also to provide training for women who wished to stand as municipal council candidates.

⁵⁰⁸ Comprehensive information relating to the May 2002 elections in Sierra Leone can be found on the *Sierra Leone Web* website at: www.sierra-leone.org/documents-elections.html.

⁵⁰⁹ See Zubaitu Browne, Executive Secretary of the 50 / 50 Group, TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 17 November 2003.

⁵¹⁰ See the "50 / 50 Group", Submission to the TRC Special Thematic Hearings on Women; Freetown, 24 May 2003 (hereinafter "50 / 50 Group submission to TRC"), at page 2.

⁵¹¹ See 50 / 50 Group submission to TRC, at page 1.

565. The 50 / 50 group is also involved in lobbying government and political parties for the adoption of conditions that would encourage and enable women to participate in politics. To this effect, they advocated for the “zipper system”⁵¹² in the 2002 general election, which helped in getting some more women into office. At the time of writing, the group was lobbying the political parties for the reservation of a certain percentage of political seats for women during the 2004 local government elections.⁵¹³

566. In spite of the increase in the number of women participating in the political arena, there has been no dramatic “multiplier effect”. The 50 / 50 Group noted that although women are always the best campaigners, they are not the decision-makers in their parties and only a handful hold executive positions. The use of women as “Mammy Queens”⁵¹⁴ during election campaigns exemplifies the use to which politicians put women. Women leaders are used to co-ordinate the women during electioneering for party members. These women mostly serve as cooks, “cheerleaders” and general rabble-rousers. In its submission to the TRC, the Sierra Leone Market Women’s Association lamented the perceived manipulation behind their roles:

“Most governments only recognise us market women when it is time for elections, campaigning and using us as instruments to get political power. We will then be assembled like herds of sheep and masqueraded for the public and the international community as cooks and “ashobi dancers”. Elaborate promises will be made to us about the education of our children, [or] providing housing and health care for us – promises that have never been kept... Over the years we have become pawns in a game of politics that we do not understand... This behaviour over the years has humiliated and demeaned us as women.”⁵¹⁵

567. While women do feature in politics, it is important to note that significant obstacles prevent them from participating as they should. The 50 / 50 Group identifies domination of politics by men and under-representation of women as a major obstacle to change, since it prevents women’s views from being heard and considered.⁵¹⁶ Another obstacle stems from the cultural practices that discriminate against women in some parts of the country. In the north of Sierra Leone, women are not allowed to be Paramount Chiefs, which debars them from representing any seats in that are contested exclusively by Paramount Chiefs.⁵¹⁷

⁵¹² The so-called “zipper system” is a means of equalising the number of male and female candidates who stand for a political party. The names of men and women alternate equally in the list of top names in the party, thus resembling the alternating teeth of a “zipper”. More detail on this policy and other aspects of the work of the 50 / 50 group can be found in its Internet entry to the Sierra Leone Encyclopaedia for 2004: http://www.daco-sl.org/encyclopedia2004/4_part/4_5ffg.htm.

⁵¹³ See Zubaitu Browne, Executive Secretary of the 50 / 50 Group, TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 17 November 2003.

⁵¹⁴ The term “Mammy Queen” indicates a female leader of considerable seniority who is responsible for organising and taking care of a group, usually comprising other women and girls. The term has connotations of a “maternal” figure, or Chairwoman, and is considered by many women to be used in a quite patronising manner by men. See Market Women’s Association submission to TRC.

⁵¹⁵ See Market Women’s Association submission to TRC, at page 2.

⁵¹⁶ See 50 / 50 Group submission to TRC, at page 6.

⁵¹⁷ See 50 / 50 Group submission to TRC, at page 6.

568. However the biggest stumbling block to enhanced women's participation lies in the outlook of women themselves. Due to culture and tradition, women have been socialised into accepting that they should neither participate in politics nor seek to occupy positions of power, as these domains are "reserved" for men. It is an attitude that not only prevents women from attaining positions of political representation and leadership, but also in a perverse way discourages them from voting for and supporting the few women who do seek office.
569. Participation in politics of course also requires access to financial resources, which most women lack. Women have identified a lack of access to finance as a major impediment to their effective participation in politics. This phenomenon is not unique to Sierra Leone; it is rather a worldwide trend that requires to be addressed through sustained, concerted efforts.
570. Despite the various remaining obstacles, women in Sierra Leone are no longer willing to be passive onlookers in the political arena. Their determination to improve the participation of women in politics can be seen in the activities of NGOs such as the 50 / 50 Group and the Network of Women Ministers and Parliamentarians (NEWMAP). The latter is a caucus of women Ministers and parliamentarians who are working in league to put issues concerning women forward in every facet of the society. According to the 50 / 50 Group:
- "Sierra Leone women are not only asking for a slice of the pie, they are saying that they have learnt the lessons of the past and now want to make a difference to how the pie is shaped."⁵¹⁸

PRESENT INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN

571. The Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs supported by UNICEF provided two policies in 2000, the National Policy on the Advancement of Women and the National Policy on Gender Mainstreaming. The National Policy on the Advancement of Women is an all-encompassing policy seeking to improve the status of women and remove discrimination, as it is perceived to exist in various sectors.
572. The National Policy on Gender Mainstreaming acknowledges that the lower status of women in comparison to men is due to gender imbalances that arise from unequal opportunities and access to and control over productive resources and benefits. The policy sets out the Government's commitment to pursue a gender-sensitive approach in all its programmes and development activities in the country. The Government is yet to implement these policies and turn the promises they offer to the women and the nation into a reality.
573. These documents are, of course, only policies and have not been enacted to lend them any force of law. Even as policies the political will appears to be absent to implement them, but they are proof that the Government acknowledges the dire need to ensure that women enjoy equal rights and opportunities and that these rights must be protected. The Government must show its commitment by making reference to these policies in the Constitution. The policies are very significant to the Law Reform Commission,⁵¹⁹ as they present a strong case for women and provide a broad basis for legal reform.

⁵¹⁸ See 50 / 50 Group submission to TRC, at page 7.

⁵¹⁹ See *Law Reform Commission Decree No.17 of 1994*

CONCLUSION

574. Women and girls suffered terrible atrocities in the Sierra Leone conflict. Many died and their stories remain untold. And yet, many brave and courageous women and girls survived and were able to come forward to tell the Commission of the brutality they experienced and of how they were stripped of humanity and dignity. Others told of how they were afraid to reveal their stories because of the way in which they will be shamed by their loved ones, families, friends and communities. Many women have borne children and are outcasts because of it. They are doubly punished, because society has let them down and because of vile deeds perpetrated against them in the first place.
575. The Commission, while not a court of law, has made findings of responsibility against those who committed these atrocities. While these do not amount to findings of guilt, they are important as they represent in the Commission's view an account of those responsible for the violations. In the Commission's view, it was necessary to name organisations and individuals where the evidence presented itself. The full set of findings in respect of women and the armed conflict can be found in the dedicated Findings chapter in Volume Two of this report.
576. At the same time, many women have come together to help each other. Many agencies have provided succour and assistance to women and girls. Their efforts have been recorded and many women and girls continue to appreciate the efforts to help and assist them.
577. The Commission believes that an opportunity exists in this transitional period to address the plight of women and girls at the highest levels. For example, giving effect to the provisions of CEDAW and to other international human rights instruments, which provide inspiration and the impetus to improve the quality of life for women and children, would be a tremendously symbolic step.
578. The Commission has made recommendations on how the lives of women can be improved. They involve legal, political, social and economic reforms, which have the potential to offer women and girls an opportunity to have a better life. The recommendations are contained in the dedicated Recommendations chapter in Volume Two of this report. The Commission has set out in the Recommendations chapter those measures it regards as imperative and those the country should strive towards achieving. It also suggests who should be responsible for implementing these recommendations.
579. The Commission is of the view that this Government of Sierra Leone and successive governments are responsible for keeping faith with the Lomé Peace Agreement and for ensuring that the recommendations of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission are carried out, if the women and girls of Sierra Leone are indeed to enjoy a better life in the future.

CHAPTER FOUR

Children and the Armed Conflict in Sierra Leone

TRC

**Bush no de
fo trowe
bad pikin!**

Produced by the TRC Steering Committee with support
from the International Human Rights Law Group

CHAPTER FOUR


Children and the Armed Conflict in Sierra Leone

Introduction

1. Sierra Leone is one of the smallest countries on the African continent, but also one of the most richly endowed. Seasonal rainfalls make the terrain of its hinterland lush and green; its inland perimeter is characterised by rolling mountains and dense forests; and its coastline is dotted with idyllic beaches. Several parts of Sierra Leone boast rich seams of mineral resources, including gold, bauxite, titanium ore and, famously, diamonds in the east and southeast.
2. The abundant potential of Sierra Leone's natural landscape is mirrored in its population of just 4.5 million people. The inhabitants of the Provinces represent a culturally and demographically diverse heritage, with seventeen indigenous ethnic groups spread across 149 chiefdoms. The capital city, Freetown, originally a settlement for emancipated slaves, hosts the oldest university in the region and gained a reputation as the "Athens of West Africa". Most important of all, despite the trials and tribulations of history, Sierra Leoneans are resilient and resourceful, such that each new generation of children of Sierra Leone brings with it fresh hope, fresh direction and fresh human resources for the country.
3. British colonial rule in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries divided Sierra Leone into two entities: the Colony, which was the name assigned to Freetown and its environs; and the Protectorate, which encompassed all the Provinces in the interior. There was a degree of unease in relations between the inhabitants of these two entities, partly premised on the stark inequalities in access to education, social services and economic resources that British rule had created in favour of the Freetown-based Krios. As independence was attained on 27 April 1961, however, political disagreements soon became the main reason for rivalries. Within little more than a decade of self-rule, Sierra Leone had seen fiercely controversial elections, poisonous "personality politics" and various successful and unsuccessful military coups.
4. The country's longest-serving Head of State, Siaka Stevens of the All Peoples' Congress (APC) party, epitomised bad governance during his 17 years at the helm, from 1968 to 1985. Stevens entrenched his own executive power in a one-party state and suppressed opposition from any quarter. The entire political elite played a part in the desperate decline of Sierra Leone, seeking personal patronage and profit rather than advancement in the common national interest. It was during the 30 years immediately after independence that Sierra Leone sunk to being one of the least developed countries in the world.
5. After a handful of violent flashpoints in the 1970s and 1980s, arising out of elections, anti-government demonstrations and local uprisings, conflict finally broke out in Sierra Leone in March 1991. The eleven years of brutal war that followed saw this beautiful country and its people torn apart.

6. At the onset of the conflict in 1991, Sierra Leone was quite literally a nation of children. The graph at Figure 1, below, illustrates that approximately half of the estimated 4.5 million population was composed of children, i.e. males and females under 19 years of age. The graph shows a considerable “tapering off” in the size of the adult population between the ages of 29 and 79, which reflects the high adult mortality rate and results in astonishingly low average life expectancy. When war began in Sierra Leone, children formed the largest category of people in the population, while adults constituted a minority.¹

Figure 1: Population of Sierra Leone in 1991 (in thousands) divided according to age category and sex



Source for Figure 1: US Census Bureau, International Data Base, available at the following website: <http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbnew.html>.

7. The conflict in Sierra Leone impacted heavily on children, as their rights were systematically violated by all of the armed factions. Children suffered abduction, forced recruitment, sexual slavery and rape, amputation, mutilation, displacement and torture. They were also forced to become perpetrators and carry out aberrations violating the rights of other civilians. In assessing the experiences of children in the conflict in Sierra Leone, the United Nations Children’s Fund, UNICEF, submitted as follows:

“Particularly vulnerable to abuse were children, as they were violated in deep and lasting ways, some too awful to be adequately described... In some ways, it is as if a new level of cruelty has been attained in this war, setting the bar lower than ever imagined...”²

¹ The statistics used in Figure 1 emerge from population estimates maintained by the United States Bureau of the Census. The Bureau uses existing censuses along with health and other data collected by international NGOs. See the website: <http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idbnew.html>.

² See the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), Submission to the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission on the occasion of TRC Thematic Hearings on Children, 17 June 2003 (hereinafter “UNICEF submission to TRC”), at page 2.

8. Children themselves made the following statement to the Commission:
- “... Concerns amongst us children in Sierra Leone are that the war was targeted at us. A brutal conflict which we did nothing to bring about but suffered and lost everything in it.”³
9. There are no accurate statistics to determine the number of children associated with the fighting forces, either as child soldiers or utilised in other capacities. According to a local NGO, Caritas Makeni, more than 5,000 children under the age of 18, of both sexes and with some as young as five years old, were combatants in the conflict.⁴ The United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) puts the number at 10,000 who were associated with the fighting forces in one form or the other.⁵ The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) estimated that more than 6,000 children were conscripted into the fighting forces over the years.⁶ The discrepancies in these numbers are probably explained by the different criteria used by these organisations in arriving at their figures.⁷ The National Committee for Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration (NCDDR) confirmed in its submission to the Commission that more than 6,774 children entered the DDR programme.⁸
10. While the total number of children associated with the fighting forces will in all probability never be completely accurate, the submissions of the various agencies to the Commission attest to the widespread use of children in this conflict, in total contravention of the rules applicable to conventional warfare.
11. The parties to the peace talks at Lomé in 1999 recognised that the children of Sierra Leone were vulnerable as a result of the armed conflict. Accordingly the Lomé Peace Agreement declared that children are entitled to special care and that their rights to life, survival and development are in need of protection in accordance with the provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.⁹
12. The Lomé Peace Agreement laid the foundations for the Act establishing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (“TRC” or “the Commission”). Article 30 of the Lomé Peace Agreement explicitly provides that the Government of Sierra Leone shall accord particular attention to the issue of child soldiers and that the special needs of children should be addressed in the disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration process. The TRC Act 2000 provided that the Commission would be required to give special attention to the experiences of children within the armed conflict.¹⁰ The Sierra Leone TRC is the first truth commission that has been required explicitly to do so.

³ See Children’s Forum Network (CFN) Sierra Leone; Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission on the occasion of TRC Thematic Hearings on Children, 16 June 2003 (hereinafter “Children’s Forum Network submission to TRC”), at page 1.

⁴ See Caritas Makeni; Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission on the occasion of TRC Thematic Hearings on Children, 16 June 2003, at page 3.

⁵ See the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission on the occasion of TRC Thematic Hearings on Children, 16 June 2003, at page 5.

⁶ See UNICEF; *Child Protection Programme Report*, February 2003, at page 2.

⁷ Some of these organisations estimated only on the basis of children who were actual combatants, while others added all the children associated with the fighting forces in various capacities such as cooks, porters, spies, sex slaves, manual labourers and others.

⁸ See the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR); submission to the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 4 August 2003, at page 3.

⁹ See the Preamble to the Lomé Peace Agreement of 7 July 1999.

¹⁰ See the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000, at Section 6(2)(b).

13. This chapter will examine the traditional place of children in Sierra Leone and explore their status before and since the war in all the major spheres that affect them, such as education and health, as well as economic, legal and socio-cultural issues. A brief overview of the national and international human rights instruments impacting on and protecting children's rights is included. More importantly, the chapter will also attempt to convey the impact of the armed conflict on children, as well as their diverse experiences within the various armed groups, in the terms that children testified about them to the TRC. The status of children since the conflict will also be described, together with interventional measures taken by both state and non-state actors in attempting to respond to their needs. The chapter will also highlight the Commission's main findings and recommendations on children.¹¹

Interpreting the Commission's mandate

14. In interpreting its mandate the Commission wanted to ensure that the voices of children would be heard and taken into account at every stage of its proceedings, in the various versions of the final report and in the recommendations it made in respect of the future well being of children. The Commission also wanted to ensure that the identity of children who testified would remain confidential. The Commission thus faced a delicate balancing act, which required the development of a number of policies guiding its work.
15. The Commission was fortunate enough to have recourse to a report prepared by UNICEF, reflecting the outcomes of a consultative process that UNICEF had organised in 2001 to consider the participation of children in the work of the Commission. The report confirmed the support within the children's sector for children's experiences to be fully accounted for in the work of the Commission. It also highlighted challenges and areas of concern and proposed a variety of measures designed to protect children. The Commission took these proposals into account when designing its operational policies.
16. The Commission resolved that it would reach out proactively to children so as to ensure their full participation in all aspects of the Commission's work. This approach would include sensitising children as to the role of the TRC, taking statements from them, having them participate in hearings and involving them in special hearings on children. The Commission's main objective in respect of children was to ensure that their voices should be heard, particularly in the final report and recommendations. The Commission also enacted policies to protect the security and well-being of children.
17. The Commission decided as a matter of policy that all children would be treated equally as witnesses whose experiences needed to be captured by the Commission, irrespective of whether they had perpetrated violations.

¹¹ The Commission's comprehensive findings and recommendations on children can be found under 'Children' in the chapters on Findings and Recommendations in Volume Two of this report.

Methodology

18. The Commission then had to devise a methodology to implement the policies it had agreed upon. It trained its statement-taking staff on how to take testimonies from children, with particular guidance on how to deal sensitively with those who had been sexually violated and those who had been combatants in the conflict.
19. The Commission also decided that it would hold special public hearings that would focus on the experiences of children, as well as *in camera* hearings for children under the age of 18 and victims of sexual violence.
20. The Commission then began a series of discussions with UNICEF and the Child Protection Agencies (CPAs), which culminated in an agreement that was signed in 2002. Under the terms of the agreement, UNICEF and the CPAs provided technical assistance to the Commission during statement taking as well as assisting with children during the hearings phase. A fundamental principle underpinning the agreement was that the physical and psychological security of the children should be paramount at all times. In this regard, counsellors from the CPAs assisted the Commission in all its activities.
21. The Commission decided quite early on that it would keep disaggregated data on children as well as on victims of sexual violence and that it would in its final report have a special section dealing with the experiences of children. The Commission also decided to publish a special “child friendly” report. Both reports would contain recommendations on how to improve the quality of life of children in the country.
22. In implementing these decisions, the Commission was assisted by the Special Assistant to the SRSG for Sierra Leone,¹² as well as UNICEF and the Child Protection Agencies in Sierra Leone.
23. In terms of the agreement between the Commission and the CPAs, the practice of the Commission was to hand over a list of child witnesses to the CPAs before a hearing was held. The CPAs conducted vulnerability and safety assessments and consulted with the children and their families. If approval was obtained from the families and the child was willing to testify, the children were prepared for the hearing. Social workers would also be present at hearings ready to offer emotional support if necessary. Once a hearing had taken place, the social workers would conduct further visits to the children in order to ensure that they had not suffered any adverse effects due to their participation in the Commission's processes.

¹² The Commission wishes to acknowledge the consistent support and guidance it received from Mr. Bert Theuermann, former Special Assistant to the SRSG for Sierra Leone on children's issues. Mr. Theuermann and his colleagues in the Child Protection Unit at UNAMSIL were instrumental in ensuring that children's issues were treated appropriately by all parties in the TRC process.

THE STATUS OF CHILDREN BEFORE THE CONFLICT

CHILDREN AND EDUCATION

24. The Commission received numerous submissions on the nature of the education system that prevailed in Sierra Leone before the conflict. The current Minister of Education commented in his submission that:

“At independence, Sierra Leone inherited a western type of education system aimed largely at the urban middle class. The system was biased... In essence the system was aimed at nurturing civil servants and government administrators in the colonial and independent government. Yet the majority of Sierra Leoneans, unable to afford formal education, were excluded from the education system... Given the exclusive nature of the country’s education system, it is not surprising that literacy levels remained as low as 8% at independence, or that in the 1970s fewer than 15% of children aged between 5 and 11 years attended school, or that only 5% of children between 12 and 16 years were in secondary school.”¹³

25. Historically, the colonial government had mainly concerned itself with educating the sons of Chiefs in the provinces and the sons of the elite and the Krios in the western areas, as these groups were intended to provide future civil servants for the colonial government. The majority of the population was largely left to remain illiterate. The unforeseen consequence of this kind of policy meant that the majority were not able to access education.
26. The decline in the economy during the 1970s and the imposition of the structural adjustment policy in the 1980s impacted on spending and led to a further deterioration in education levels. The corresponding rise in school fees had a negative effect on the accessibility of education. Primary school enrolment declined from an average annual increase of 6% between 1970 and 1985 to only 2% between 1985 and 1990.¹⁴ By 1990, of the total number of girls who qualified as the potential school going population, only 12% were enrolled at secondary schools. In the case of boys, only 22% of all boys of school going age were enrolled. In the case of tertiary education, according to figures for 1996, only 13% of both girls and boys made it through.¹⁵

¹³ See *Closing the Gap: Access, Inclusion, Achievements*; supplementary submission of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, November 2003 (hereinafter “Ministry of Education, *Closing the Gap*”), at page 1.

¹⁴ See Ministry of Education, *Closing the Gap*, at page 2.

¹⁵ See UNESCO Statistical Yearbook 1996, at page 49.

27. A number of other factors including corruption and unsound governance, as well as political and cultural factors, also contributed to the decline in education. Education policy in Sierra Leone determined where schools were cited and built. Self-interested government officials and corrupt politicians routinely ignored the prevailing policy, however, resulting in schools being built with scant regard to issues of need or efficacy. Instead, schools were placed according to cynical political ploys to advance the individual interests of politicians who sought to gain votes from their constituencies.

Building of Schools

28. In order to encourage the building of schools, the Government provided development grants to private individuals or organisations that built schools. While in essence this was a good practice, it became rife with abuse. Many unscrupulous persons abused the practice and misappropriated the funds that had been allocated to them. The funds were regularly not used for the purposes for which they were intended. Many of those who had been allocated grants built schools in unsuitable locations, without the approval of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEST), only to foist these schools on government at a later stage without having regard to areas of need or the financial implications. Such recklessness caused increasing frustration on the part of the children and youths of school-going age. An official in the employ of the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology (MEST) made the following remark to the Commission:

“Some schools were built which were ultimately inhabited by cockroaches and rats.”¹⁶

The teaching profession

29. The teaching profession itself was in disarray. Teachers' strikes intensified due to several factors: first, the general economic malaise in the country; and second, as administrative blunders led to the elimination of their names from the teachers' payroll, thus leading to lengthy periods of delay or non-payment of salaries. All of these factors contributed to the growing rot in the system.
30. The standard of teaching varied between the urban capital and the provinces. The standard of education in Freetown was fairly high, while that in the provinces lagged behind. In part, the disparity was due to the fact that government was unable to attract and retain qualified teachers to schools in the rural districts.
31. The enrolment of girls in schools was affected by both economic and cultural pressures, which favoured the education of male children to the exclusion of girls. Many families, compelled by economics to choose which of their children they would educate, chose to educate boys, believing that education was wasted on girls as they would eventually get married into another family. In addition, educating boys improved the earning abilities of future breadwinners. This was certainly characteristic of the Northern and Eastern parts of the country where the education of boys over girls was preferred. Sadly this state of affairs in these two regions prevails even today.

¹⁶ See TRC interviews with officials of various ranks in the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology; interviews conducted in Freetown, 20 August 2003.

32. When the conflict broke out, illiteracy in Sierra Leone was at an all-time nadir of 88.75% for girls and 69.3% for males.¹⁷ Less than 45% of all children of school-going age entered primary schools, of which only 9% entered secondary schools and 1% made it through to tertiary institutions.¹⁸
33. The state of education in Sierra Leone before the conflict was unmistakably in decline. In the words of the Minister:
- “The period of the late 1970s, but more the 1980s, was characterised by a nosedive of the Sierra Leone economy, largely as a consequence of bad governance, corruption and the Breton Woods structural adjustment programmes... Living standards of the poor masses and poverty generally were ignored. Education, like other sectors, was not spared the general malaise, as the education budget shrank from an average 21% to 12% to 8% in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s respectively.”¹⁹
34. A major factor that the RUF has cited as a reason for starting the conflict was the inability of the government to provide free education to all children in Sierra Leone. This accusation resonated in the hearts and minds of much of the population and partially accounts for the initial acceptance of the RUF by some communities. The irony, of course, is that it is the very conflict started by the RUF that led to the complete destruction of the education system, as the RUF destroyed schools and educational facilities all over the country.

THE SOCIO-CULTURAL STATUS OF CHILDREN

35. Socially and culturally Sierra Leone is typical of most African countries where children sit, at best, on the fringes of decision-making. Usually in African societies, hierarchy and authority determine how decisions are reached. In the case of children, adults make decisions for them. In the African context, which in this instance is certainly true of Sierra Leone, an explanation often offered is that it is borne of a desire to protect children and to guide them into adulthood rather than to injure them or take away their rights.
36. This practice has led to many children having their lives shaped for them by adults, who are well meaning and who honestly believe that they are acting in the best interests of the child. While this may be true in the majority of cases, it is also clear that decisions made on the basis of patriarchy and authoritarianism have affected many children's lives negatively.
37. One cultural practice in Sierra Leone perceived to be particularly abhorrent is the inclination not to educate girl children, a practice that is prevalent in the north and east of the country. Coupled with the practice of early marriages for girls and the practice of female genital mutilation, this denial of educational opportunities to girls has negatively impacted on their future prospects.

¹⁷ See Plan Ireland, “The Importance of Education in Disaster Rehabilitation – Rapid Education Programme in Sierra Leone”, found at the website: www.plan-ireland.org/pdfs/childrenindisasters.

¹⁸ See Plan Ireland, “The Importance of Education in Disaster Rehabilitation – Rapid Education Programme in Sierra Leone”, found at the website: www.plan-ireland.org/pdfs/childrenindisasters.

¹⁹ See the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology; Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, September 2003 (hereinafter “Ministry of Education submission to TRC”), at pages 4 and 5.

38. In Sierra Leone children are not allowed to speak for themselves before the elders and chiefs. In the course of its work, the TRC received testimony from many youths who had been sanctioned for contravening this rule. The offenders were not allowed to speak in their own defence and became embittered at the exceedingly onerous punishments often imposed on them by the Chiefs and elders for defying this custom. Punishment often included the levying of exorbitant fines and resulted in many offenders working as slave labour in order to defray the costs. Many discontented youth fled their villages in order to avoid such punishments and when the conflict broke out became easy converts to the cause of the RUF. Their embitterment also manifested itself in acts of revenge against elders and Chiefs during the conflict.

CHILDREN AND HEALTH

39. The state of health in Sierra Leone has been on a steady decline throughout the post-colonial period. In 1960, the infant mortality rate stood at 220 per 1,000 live births, while by 2000 the under-five mortality rate was 390 per 1,000 children.²⁰ The decline in economic growth in the 1980s affected the health sector negatively. The surge in 1983 of both the infant and under five mortality rates, as well as other negative indicators for the country, led the United Nations to classify Sierra Leone as the least developed country in the Human Development Index of that year²¹. Sierra Leone has had the dubious distinction of holding this title consecutively from 1983 to 2004. According to the World Bank:

“While the recent conflict exacerbated the situation by destroying health facilities and displacing (or worse) staff, the public health sector has not performed well for more than a decade; with inadequate financing. The Ministry of Health and Sanitation (MOHS) could not supervise and support technically the public health facilities country-wide.”²²

40. It is clear however that while the conflict in Sierra Leone impacted on the health sector, this was not the only reason for the decline in the public health system. Endemic mismanagement, corruption and inadequate strategies also contributed to the failure of the public health system in the country long before the conflict began.
41. A declining health system almost always affects children and women with devastating effect. This was certainly true of Sierra Leone before the conflict.

²⁰ See UNICEF, *The State of the World's Children 2000*, annual report into the conditions for the upbringing and advancement of children in selected countries around the world, available at the following website: <http://www.UNICEF.org/sowc/>, at page 86.

²¹ See Ministry of Gender and Children's Affairs, *Country Report on Sierra Leone*, submitted to the “World Congress on Commercial Sex Exploitation of Children”, 22 August 1996, at page 1.

²² See World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Grant in the amount of US\$20 Million Equivalent to the Republic of Sierra Leone, for a Health Sector Reconstruction and Development Project; 22 January 2003, at page 5.

THE ECONOMIC STATUS OF CHILDREN

42. Sierra Leone had endured two decades of economic and social decline before the conflict. The net effect of corruption and mismanagement resulted in depleted national institutions with hardly any programmes to address the poverty the population was experiencing. Not surprisingly, women and children were the most vulnerable. In most traditional societies, children are expected to carry out certain domestic tasks such as cooking, shopping, cleaning, laundry duties, fetching water and caring for younger children. Helping out in the fields is also commonplace.²³ The use of children in this way should not be perceived as exploitative, but should rather be seen as doing one's bit to assist family and community, thus contributing to the total functioning of the family. In African societies, enhancing the family's social and economic status has a positive impact on the whole family. The roles and responsibilities of children in African societies help to entrench a sense of family and community rather than individualism. This outcome was certainly true for Sierra Leone as well.
43. Notwithstanding the above, the decline in the economy in the 1980's and the resulting poverty that most families found themselves in compelled many children to work out of necessity. The employment of children has had an adverse effect on them both educationally and socially.
44. The position of children in Sierra Leone at all levels – education, health and socio-cultural – was already in decline before the outbreak of the conflict. This backward trend gave rise to huge dissatisfaction amongst the youth, many of whom became disenchanted with successive governments and their poor delivery. Sierra Leone had become a place where many had lost hope long before the outbreak of a conflict. Marginalisation and exclusion from society led many youth to take up arms. In many TRC hearings, youth who took up arms testified to the Commission that their dissatisfaction with their social and economic conditions led them to join the RUF.

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW PERTAINING TO CHILDREN IN SIERRA LEONE

45. The eleven-year conflict in Sierra Leone involved the systematic violation of the rights of children in Sierra Leone. The violations that children suffered included abductions, forced conscription, rape, sexual violence and abuse, forced slavery, torture, slave labour, amputations, mutilations, killings, forced displacement and cruel and inhuman treatment. Having examined the violations committed against children, it is clear to the Commission that most of the armed factions pursued a deliberate policy to target children and violate them. The Commission in this section highlights national and international law that has specific application to children.

²³ See Government of Sierra Leone; "Survey Report on the Status of Women and Children in Sierra Leone at the end of the Decade – A Household Survey (MICS-2)", November 2000, at page 61.

46. Children in Sierra Leone did not fully enjoy their basic human rights even before the war broke out. The breakdown of democratic institutions, the collapse of the rule of law and the mismanagement of the country's resources impacted on the rights of the children of Sierra Leone. Laws relating to children were outdated, uninformed and grossly inadequate to guarantee the protection and promotion of their rights. Crimes against children including rape and sexual violence generally went unpunished, further contributing to the culture of silence and impunity that prevailed.
47. Given that the war has ended and with the systematic manner in which the rights of children were violated, there is an urgent need to review national law with a view to ensuring that the Government of Sierra Leone fulfils its obligations in terms of international law. National law must be brought into line with international law and custom and, in particular, the Convention on the Rights of the Child. There is a great need to ensure the effective implementation of appropriate laws and customs, procedures and policies in respect of children, which are necessary for the restoration of the dignity of children in post-war Sierra Leone.

CHILDREN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN SIERRA LEONE

A brief overview of the international instruments on children and the level of their incorporation in Sierra Leone national law

48. The use of regional and international human rights mechanisms in responding to the egregious crimes that occurred in Sierra Leone during the last decade is significant to the development of international human rights law. Sierra Leone became a member of the United Nations in 1961 and is a signatory to most of the major human rights instruments including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),²⁴ the International Covenant on Economic Cultural and Social Rights (ICECSR),²⁵ the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),²⁶ the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT),²⁷ the Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC),²⁸ the African Charter on Human and People's Rights²⁹ and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child.³⁰

²⁴ See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), adopted 16 December 1966, G.A. Res 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), entered into force on 23 March 1976; Sierra Leone acceded on 23 August 1996.

²⁵ See International Covenant on Economic Cultural and Social Rights (ICECSR), adopted 16 December 1966, G.A. Res 2200A (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), entered into force on 3 January 1976; Sierra Leone acceded on 23 August 1996.

²⁶ See the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), adopted 18 December 1979, G.A. Res. 34/180, U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. U.N. Doc. A/34/46, entered into force on 3 September 1981; Sierra Leone signed on 21 September 1988 and ratified on 11 November 1988.

²⁷ See the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, adopted 10 December 1984, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984), entered force 26 June 1987.

²⁸ See the Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC), adopted 20 November 1989, G.A. Res. 44/25, UN Doc. A/44/49 (1989), entered into force on 2 September 1990.

²⁹ See the African Charter on Human and People's Rights, adopted 27 June 1981, O.A.U. Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3 Rev.5, entered into force on 21 October 1986; Sierra Leone signed on 27 August 1981 and ratified on 21 September 1983.

³⁰ See the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990), entered into force on 29 November 1999. Sierra Leone signed the Charter on 14 April 1992 but has not yet ratified it.

49. The Government of Sierra Leone has ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the optional protocol. The ICECSR, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) are also instruments that recognise: the right to life;³¹ to privacy;³² to be free from sex discrimination;³³ to the highest attainable standard of physical health;³⁴ to health care services;³⁵ to decide on the number and spacing of their children and to have access to the information and means to do so;³⁶ to the elimination of discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations;³⁷ and to be free from sexual violence, abuse, exploitation, prostitution and trafficking.³⁸ These instruments require Government to commit itself to develop preventive health care, guidance for parents and family planning education and services; prenatal and postnatal and to ensure access to information, counselling and services concerning family planning;³⁹ to appropriate services to ensure safe pregnancy;⁴⁰ Government undertakes to eliminate traditional practices prejudicial to the health of children.⁴¹

The African Charter on Human And People's Rights

50. The African Charter on Human and People's Rights entered into force in October 1986. Article 18 (3) of the charter states that "the state shall ensure the elimination of every discrimination against women and also ensure the protection of the rights of women and the child as stipulated in international declarations and conventions". By this Article, the African Charter has incorporated all of the international declarations and conventions that relate to women. There is a protocol on the Rights of African Women approved in July 2003 that offers wide protection for the rights of women. Sierra Leone needs to ratify this protocol, which will allow the rights provided in it to be enjoyed in Sierra Leone.

The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)

51. The Government of Sierra Leone by ratifying the Convention of the Rights of the Child is obliged to ensure that the children of Sierra Leone enjoy the rights in the Convention, which include civil and political, economic, social and cultural rights. Four important principles in the Convention are: non-discrimination; the best interests of the child; the right to life, survival and development; and respect for the views of the child.⁴²

³¹ See CRC, at Article 6(1).

³² See CRC, at Article 16(1).

³³ See CEDAW, at Articles 1 and 3. See also ICECSR, at Article 2(2).

³⁴ See ICECSR, at Article 12(1). See also CRC, at Article 24(1).

³⁵ See CRC, at Article 24(1).

³⁶ See CEDAW, at Article 16(1).

³⁷ See CEDAW, at Article 16(1).

³⁸ See CEDAW, at Articles 5(a) and 6. See also CRC, at Articles 19(1) and 19(3).

³⁹ See CEDAW, at Articles 10(h), 12(1) and 14(2).

⁴⁰ See CEDAW, at Article 12(2).

⁴¹ See CRC, at Article 24(1).

⁴² See CRC, at Articles 2, 3, 6 and 12.

52. The government is also obliged to take all appropriate legislative, administrative and other measures in order to ensure implementation of the rights recognised in the Convention. In respect of the economic, social and cultural rights the government is obliged to undertake such measures to the maximum extent of the available resources and, where needed, within the framework of international co-operation.
53. The President of Sierra Leone is responsible for the execution of all treaties, agreements or conventions in the name of Sierra Leone but if they are within the legislative competence of Parliament or alter any existing law, they must be ratified by parliament by an enactment or a resolution.⁴³ International law is operative in Sierra Leone by two processes of ratification, one by the executive and the other by the legislature.⁴⁴
54. There is presently in existence a draft bill incorporating the provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child into national law. The draft was prepared and discussed nationally even before the end of the war. The Government of Sierra Leone should honour its obligations to the children of Sierra Leone by having this bill passed into law immediately.
55. There are two Optional Protocols to this Convention: the Optional Protocol on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict and the Optional Protocol on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography. There is a Committee on the Rights of the Child that monitors States' compliance with the Convention and considers the periodic report States are obliged to submit to the Committee on measures they have adopted to give effect to the provisions of the Convention and progress made in the enjoyment of these rights.⁴⁵

Children and the transitional justice institutions in Sierra Leone

56. Children were explicitly referred to in the Lomé Peace Agreement and have been explicitly referred to in the mandates of both transitional justice institutions created afterwards, namely the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court for Sierra Leone. An earlier section of this chapter sets out how the Commission has resolved to include children in its work and how it interpreted its mandate.

The role of children in the Special Court for Sierra Leone

57. The Parliament of Sierra Leone, following an agreement on 16 January 2002 between the Government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations, enacted the Statute of the Special Court.⁴⁶ This court was established to try those that bear "the greatest responsibility" for the atrocities committed in Sierra Leone after 30 November 1996. The court deals with war crimes committed against children, as well as violations of international humanitarian law. The recruitment of child soldiers and crimes of rape and sexual violence will be among the crimes prosecuted. While children also perpetrated crimes against the people of Sierra Leone, the Special Court will not prosecute children under the age of 18. The major role for children in proceedings will be to testify to the atrocities they witnessed and experienced both as victims and perpetrators.

⁴³ See the *Constitution of Sierra Leone 1991*, at Section 40(1)(d).

⁴⁴ See the *Constitution of Sierra Leone 1991*, at Section 40(1)(d).

⁴⁵ See CRC, at Articles 43 and 44.

⁴⁶ See the Special Court Agreement (Ratification) Act 2002.

Other international instruments impacting on children during armed conflict

58. Both the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child contain provisions that apply to children seeking refugee status or who are considered a refugee or internally displaced.⁴⁷ Under Article 34 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, as well as Article 27 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of Child, all states have an obligation to protect children from sexual abuse or exploitation. They also have the right to be free from sexual exploitation and other hazardous forms of labour.
59. Sierra Leone is a party to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Additional Protocols. The conduct of all combatants is governed under this international humanitarian law, also known as the laws of war: the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their two Protocols. A cardinal principle of humanitarian law is that civilian persons who are at the mercy of a party to the conflict are entitled to be treated humanely in all circumstances and to benefit from a series of fundamental guarantees without any discrimination. Under the laws of war the following acts in particular are prohibited: murder, torture, corporal punishment and mutilation, outrages upon personal dignity in particular humiliating and degrading treatment, enforced prostitution, rape and any form of indecent assault, the taking of hostages, collective punishment and threats to commit any such acts.
60. There are a number of other international instruments that seek to protect the rights of children, particularly during armed conflicts.⁴⁸ The jurisprudence of the ICTY and ICTR has reinforced the principle that serious violations of these provisions constitute war crimes. The violations committed against women and children in Sierra Leone have been documented by a number of agencies and NGOs. While a few of the major perpetrators are likely to be prosecuted by the Special Court, the vast number of them who committed these violations are likely to go unpunished.

The International Criminal Court (ICC)

61. Sierra Leone is also a signatory to the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC). The Rome Statute of the ICC⁴⁹ does not apply to the events occurring in Sierra Leone, as the treaty is not retroactive. The Rome Statute of the ICC lists a significant range of sexual crimes as both war crimes and acts constituting crimes against humanity. These acts include rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilisation and any other form of sexual violence.

⁴⁷ See CRC, at Article 22, and African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, at Article 23.

⁴⁸ International Instruments, and or declarations prohibiting violence and promoting justice for victims of crime include: the *Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed Conflict* (1976); the *Declaration of Basic Principles of Justice for Victims of crime and Abuse of Power* G.A.40/34 (1985); and the *Commission on Human Rights Basic Principles and guidelines on the right to a remedy and reparation for victims of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law* Annex to E/CN.4/2000/62.

⁴⁹ See the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, UN DOC. No. A/CONF.183/9,37 I.L.M 999, entered into force on 1 July 2002.

62. The Elements of Crime document annexed to the Rome Statute designed as a non-binding guide to the Court, which details the suggested elements for each crime, makes it clear that crimes of sexual violence can also be prosecuted as other crimes of violence, such as torture or mutilation, thus adopting the approach of the ad hoc tribunals.

CHILDREN AND NATIONAL LAW IN SIERRA LEONE

63. The laws of Sierra Leone include the 1991 Constitution, the English common law and customary law.⁵⁰ Customary laws, largely unwritten, are the rules of law, which by custom are applicable to particular communities in Sierra Leone.⁵¹

Defining and understanding 'when one is considered a child'

64. The laws and customs relating to children are in urgent need of reform, as in many instances they are archaic and inconsistent. Both law and custom relating to children and are in conflict with international law on the rights of children, particular in their definition and understanding of when one is considered a child.

Age of Majority

65. The age of majority in Sierra Leone is 21 years old, based on the common law, which was adopted from English law under colonial rule and maintained after independence to present day.⁵² Under the 1991 Constitution a citizen who is 18 years old has voting rights.⁵³ Criminal responsibility starts at ten years of age. The Children and Young Persons Act Chapter 44 of the Laws of Sierra Leone, the main legislation on children and juvenile justice, defines a child as a person under the age of 14 years and a young person as a person who is above 14 years and under the age of 17 years.⁵⁴

⁵⁰ The laws of Sierra Leone, as defined in Section 170 of the 1991 Constitution, comprise the Constitution itself, along with laws made by or under the authority of Parliament, statutory instruments, the existing law and the common law. The common law includes the English common law and customary law. Customary law, which is largely unwritten, means those rules and regulations that are applicable by custom to particular communities in Sierra Leone.

⁵¹ See the *Constitution of Sierra Leone 1991*, at Section 170.

⁵² Section 74 of the *Courts Act 1965* (Act No.31 of 1965) provides that: "Subject to the provisions of the Constitution and any other enactment, the common law, the doctrines of equity and statutes of general application in force in England on the first day of January 1880 shall be in force in Sierra Leone". The *Interpretation Act* No.8 of 1967 of the Laws of Sierra Leone, at Section 4 defines an "infant" as "a person who has not attained the age of twenty-one years, and does not include a corporation".

⁵³ See the *Constitution of Sierra Leone 1991*, at Section 31.

⁵⁴ See the *Children and Young Persons Act*, Chapter 44 of the Laws of Sierra Leone, at Section 2.

66. Under customary law⁵⁵ the age of majority is not fixed. It varies depending on the purpose for which it is considered and from one ethnic group to another. A common practice and belief that exists in traditional society is to perform traditional initiation ceremonies on boys who have reached puberty, marking their entry into the male society and into full adulthood.⁵⁶ However a girl child who has reached puberty and has been initiated into the female society does not attain the status of full adulthood, as she is always under the guardianship of the male members of her family while unmarried, or of her husband when married.⁵⁷ Modern customary practice has seen some departure from the views of traditional customary law to a certain extent to adapt with current trends. Such departure of course depends on how progressive a family or community is and is therefore rather arbitrary.
67. Given the numerous definitions around what constitutes a “child”, a great deal of uncertainty exists in law as to whether a particular law is applicable to children or not. This uncertainty affects the legal capacity of children both at a civil and criminal level as it is not clear whether they are entitled to receive protection as children or be treated as adults.

State policy on the welfare of children

68. One of the fundamental principles of state policy set out in the 1991 Constitution is that the State should direct its policies towards ensuring that the care and welfare of the young are actively promoted and safeguarded.⁵⁸ The fundamental principles of State policy impose a duty on every citizen to ensure the proper upbringing of his children and wards.⁵⁹ Another fundamental principle is that the Government should strive to eradicate illiteracy and direct its educational policy to ensure that there are equal rights and adequate educational opportunity for all citizens at all levels by, among other things: safeguarding the rights of vulnerable groups such as children; securing educational facilities; and directing its educational policy towards achieving free compulsory basic education at primary and junior secondary school level.⁶⁰
69. While these provisions in the Constitution provide a basis for the Government to promote and advance the rights and welfare of children through its laws, policies and programmes, they have largely remained unused and ignored.
70. Since the 1991 Constitution came into effect, successive Governments in Sierra Leone have paid little or no attention to addressing the welfare and the interests of children in Sierra Leone. The Commission heard often that successive governments and political parties pay attention to the plight of children and, more especially, youths only during election periods when they are campaigning.

⁵⁵ Section 2 of the *Local Courts Act 1963*, Act No. 20 of 1963, defines customary law as: “any rule, other than a rule of general law, having force of law in any chiefdom of the Provinces”.

⁵⁶ See Joko Smart, H. M.; *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*; Freetown, 1983, at page 43.

⁵⁷ See Joko Smart, H. M.; *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*; Freetown, 1983, at page 98.

⁵⁸ See the *Constitution of Sierra Leone 1991* (Act No. 6 of 1991), at Chapter II.

⁵⁹ See the *Constitution of Sierra Leone 1991*, at Section 13(h).

⁶⁰ See the *Constitution of Sierra Leone 1991*, at Sections 9(1) (a) and (b).

Laws relating to the general welfare of children

71. Violence against children constitutes a crime under the general law which applies to all persons irrespective of age, and includes murder under the common law, assault, wounding and other crimes other the Offences Against the Persons Act 1861. There are also laws specifically prohibiting cruel treatment and violence against children.

Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act (Chapter 31 of The Laws Of Sierra Leone 1960)

Cruelty

72. This Act applies throughout Sierra Leone⁶¹ and defines a child as a person under the age of 16 years.⁶² The Act makes it a criminal offence to commit acts of cruelty to children, including sexual and other related offences against children. Under this Act it is a crime punishable by imprisonment or a fine if any person over the age of 16 years who has the custody, charge or care of any child, "wilfully assaults, ill-treats, neglects or abandons, or exposes such a child or causes or procures such a child to be assaulted, ill-treated, neglected abandoned or exposed, in a manner likely to cause such child unnecessary suffering or injury to health (including injury to or loss of sight, hearing, or limb or organ of the body and any mental derangement)...".⁶³
73. A parent or other person who is legally liable to maintain a child and who neglects the child in a manner likely to cause injury to the child's health can be punished under this statute. A guardian also commits an offence if he or she fails to provide adequate clothing, medical aid and lodging for the child.⁶⁴

Unlawful carnal knowledge and abuse of girls

74. It is a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment for a period not exceeding 15 years if anyone is found to be guilty of unlawful carnal knowledge or abuse of any girl under the age of 13 years, with or without her consent.⁶⁵ Anyone found guilty of committing this same crime in respect of a girl above 13 years but less than 14 years, with or without her consent, is liable to be punished with imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years.⁶⁶
75. Usually in Sierra Leone, perpetrators who rape children are prosecuted under this law. The distinction between the punishment of the offenders of girls under age 13 and the offenders of girls above 13 but under 14 is not clear and is not consistent with the objectives of justice. It has contributed to the trivialisation of sexual crimes committed against girls and is an example of the Government's breach of its obligation to prevent the sexual abuse of children. The two years' penalty for perpetrators found guilty of raping a girl who is above 13 but under 14 is inappropriate and insufficient to deter the commission of such crimes.

⁶¹ See Prevention of Cruelty to Children (Amendment) Act 1963 (Act No.29 of 1963), at Section 4.

⁶² See the *Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act 1960*, at Section 2.

⁶³ See the *Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act 1960*, at Section 4.

⁶⁴ See the *Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act 1960*, at Section 4.

⁶⁵ See the *Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act 1960*, at Section 6.

⁶⁶ See the *Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act 1960*, at Section 7.

Allowing children to be in brothels

76. It is a criminal offence punishable by a fine or imprisonment not exceeding six months if anyone allows a child above the age of four to reside in or frequent a brothel.⁶⁷

Indecent assault and attempt to have carnal knowledge

77. It is a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years if any person commits an indecent assault on or attempts to have carnal knowledge of any girl under 14 years.⁶⁸

Prostitution

78. It is a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years if anyone procures or attempts to procure any child, not being a common prostitute, or of known immoral character, to have unlawful carnal knowledge of any girl under 14 years.⁶⁹ The problem with this legal provision is that by exempting “common prostitutes” and “immoral” girls from the protection of the law it implies that those deemed to fall into these categories are not entitled to the protection of the law. Perpetrators have been able to use this loophole in the law to deny guilt, by imputing the character of the complainant.

Abduction of a girl for immoral purposes

79. It is a criminal offence punishable by a period not exceeding two years if anyone intentionally removes an unmarried girl under 16 years from the possession and against the will of her father or mother or any other person having the lawful care or charge of such a girl for immoral or carnal purposes.
80. Further provisions under this Act include an acknowledgment of the right of a parent, teacher or other person under the lawful control of the child to administer punishment to the child⁷⁰ and the arrest and protection of children.⁷¹ Other crimes provided for by the Act are the encouragement of seduction by guardian, procurement of a child for immoral purposes, owning or occupying or acting or assisting in the management or control of premises used for immoral purposes.
81. Before the war, abduction, while not a common occurrence, was under-reported. The under-reporting and limited prosecution of this crime may not have reflected its prevalence. The consent of the victim is not necessary to prosecute this crime. The aftermath of the war has left many girls and women who were abducted still living with their captors, which technically constitutes a crime under this Act.

⁶⁷ See the *Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act 1960*, at Section 8.

⁶⁸ See the *Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act 1960*, at Section 9.

⁶⁹ See the *Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act 1960*, at Section 10.

⁷⁰ See the *Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act 1960*, at Sections 3, 9, 11 and 13.

⁷¹ See the *Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act 1960*, at Part III.

Evidence required to prove the sexual offences in this Act

82. The evidentiary rules regarding the prosecution of sexual crimes under this Act, provides that the evidence of one witness is insufficient and requires corroboration⁷² In the context of rapes committed during the conflict it would be almost impossible to prosecute those who committed these crimes as the prevailing rules of evidence set thresholds which victims or complainants would be unable to satisfy.

Defences to crimes under this Act

83. The consent by a child under the age of 14 does not constitute a defence to a charge of indecent assault on a child under 14 years. However the Act was amended in 1963 to include the following provision:

“Section (9)(a): Where a marriage has been formally concluded either under customary law or otherwise, the invalidity of the marriage does not make the husband guilty of an offence under Section 6, 7, or 9 because he has or attempts to have sexual intercourse with a girl or indecently assaults her, if he believes her to be his wife and has reasonable cause for that belief.”⁷³

84. This provision legitimises the rape of a young girl by her husband in law or custom. It also legitimises early marriages involving girls who are under the age of 13 years. This provision is therefore a violation of the right of the girl child to be free from physical and sexual violence and is a clear violation of the provisions of CEDAW and the Convention on the Rights of the Child.

Rape

85. Rape is an offence under the common law in Sierra Leone. Rape consists in having unlawful sexual intercourse with a woman without her consent by force, fear or fraud.⁷⁴

Sexual offences under customary law

86. Under traditional customary law, the consent of the woman or girl for the purposes of sex is immaterial. Consequently if a girl is raped or indecently sexually assaulted, her parents can maintain an action under customary law for compensation.⁷⁵ If the girl is a virgin the amount of compensation includes “virgin money”. It is immaterial if the offender is a prospective husband of the victim. If the girl is married her husband can maintain an action for compensation commonly referred to as “woman damage”.⁷⁶

⁷² See the *Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act 1960*, at Section 14.

⁷³ See *Prevention of Cruelty to Children (Amendment) Act 1963 (Act No.29 of 1963)*, at Section 4.

⁷⁴ See Archibald, *Pleading Evidence and Practice in Criminal Cases*, 35th edition, at page 1146.

⁷⁵ See Joko Smart, H. M.; *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*; Freetown, 1983, at page 182.

⁷⁶ See Joko Smart, H. M.; *Sierra Leone Customary Family Law*; Freetown, 1983, at page 5.

Protection Of Women And Girls Act

(Chapter 30 of The Laws Of Sierra Leone 1960)⁷⁷

Procuring Girls and Women for Prostitution within and without Sierra Leone

87. Under the Protection of Women and Girls Act, any person who procures or attempts to procure a girl or woman under 21 years who is not a common prostitute or of known immoral character to have sex with another person within or without Sierra Leone commits a crime and shall be imprisoned for a period not exceeding two years. Any person who uses threats or intimidation to do such an act commits a crime and shall be imprisoned for the same period.
88. The current provision both in the common law and under customary law in Sierra Leone reduce sexual crimes and the crime of rape to a civil action in which damages can be claimed without any regard to the victims/ complainant. Many of the laws also place a premium on the morality of a victims or a complainant and allow defences that impute honour. The laws relating to punishment are also contradictory and inconsistent as can be seen from the following example: the punishment for a violator of unlawful carnal knowledge of a girl under 13 years is liable to face imprisonment not exceeding 15 years but a perpetrator of the same offence committed against a girl above 13 years will only face imprisonment for a period not exceeding two years. Similarly an indecent assault committed on a girl or an attempt to do so is punishable only by a period not exceeding two years that in my humble opinion is inappropriate to cause a deterrence of these sexual offences.
89. The evidentiary rules relating to the prosecution of rape and sexual violence are also problematic. They are onerous and will lead to prosecutors making decisions not to prosecute, as they cannot meet the high evidentiary burden that is set. Corroboration of crimes of rape and sexual violence is impossible given the nature and the context in which the crime is carried out. In addition, until recently there was only one police doctor providing medical services to victims and the required report to the court. The reluctance of the police to prosecute these offences has perpetuated the culture of impunity and silence to the extent that most violations of this nature go unreported.
90. Sierra Leone also does not have a law that specifically makes incest a crime. In addition, the laws relating to sexual offences in most instances refer to girls. Sexual assaults against boys are not expressly provided for in the same way as sexual assaults against girls.
91. Custom and tradition in Sierra Leone have permitted the practice of female genital mutilation, which is performed on girls from the age of four onwards. This practice constitutes a violation of the rights of girls and young women and could conceivably be interpreted as constituting cruelty against children and prosecuted under the Prevention of Cruelty to Children Act as assault under the general law. If death results it could be prosecuted as murder or manslaughter under the general law.

⁷⁷ See the *Protection of Women and Girls Act (Chapter 30 of the Laws of Sierra Leone 1960)*, as amended by the *Protection of Women and Girls Amendment Act 1972*.

92. Girls have a right to be free from all forms of gender discrimination, the right to life and physical integrity and the right to health. Young girls are not able to make choices about gender discriminatory practices and cannot make informed decisions about this practice and that is why it becomes necessary for States to enact legislation to protect them. In terms of international law, signatories to the Convention on the Rights of a Child and the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against women, oblige governments to enact laws which will protect children from all forms of violence including gender based violence.
93. Since 1995 several countries in Africa have passed legislation that criminalises the practice of female genital mutilation. In 1999, Senegal amended its penal code to provide that “any person who violates the integrity of the genital organs of a female person.... shall be punished by imprisonment from six months to five years”.⁷⁸ The Government of Sierra Leone needs to enact legislation to protect girls from this cruel practice.

JUVENILE JUSTICE

Children and Young Persons Act

(Chapter 44 of The Laws of Sierra Leone 1960

94. Here again is an area of Sierra Leone law that requires urgent reform, as it is out of date with modern developments in law relating to children and juveniles. A further problem is that the justice system does not adequately cater for the rehabilitation of juvenile offenders in Sierra Leone. There is only one approved school and remand home to service the entire country. It is in a deplorable condition and does not cater for the needs of the juvenile accused or offender. Many of the juveniles accused of crimes have been abandoned by their parents or guardian and even when granted bail, they have nobody to give them the support and assistance they need during trial.

Adoption Law

95. In Sierra Leone adoptions take place under both law and custom. The Adoption Act does not recognise adoptions carried out under customary law. In effect, practices that have existed under customary law for a number of years do not have any effect in law. The effects of adoption under customary law are different to that under the common law system as they confer no rights and no protection to either adoptive parents or the children adopted.
96. A further problem is the practice of fostering which involves a child becoming the ward of a person regarded as a guardian. The guardian or foster parent has custody of the child but in the absence of a law specifically providing for this process, their rights are rather tenuous.
97. After the war thousands of children were orphaned, leading to the establishment of many orphanages and foster homes in the country. However most of these facilities are private enterprises not regulated by law. In order to avoid abuse and trafficking in children, it is important to regulate this new industry and to ensure that the rights and responsibilities of the proprietors are set out to protect the best interests of the child account properly for donor funds. Law reform in this area is needed desperately.

⁷⁸ See the *Criminal Code of Senegal (CRLP –R)*, as amended in 1999.

Marriage and family law

Early Marriages

98. Early marriages pose a major challenge to the government of Sierra Leone as early marriages are permitted under customary law systems in Sierra Leone and involve the marriages of girls under the age of 18. There are four types of marriage in Sierra Leone: Christian marriage⁷⁹, Civil Marriage⁸⁰, Mohammedan Marriage⁸¹ and Customary law marriage. There is no minimum age of marriage applicable throughout Sierra Leone. Under Mohammedan and customary law even prepubescent girls below the age of 10 may be given in marriage.
99. Studies confirm that early marriages impact negatively young girls by affecting her full development, particularly in terms of education, economic autonomy, and physical and psychological health. Most adolescents who marry young are pressured to begin child bearing prior to psychological maturity, which contributes to the high levels of maternal and infant mortality. Furthermore when a child or adolescent is compelled to marry at a young age and she refuses to consent to sexual relations or is too young to consent, such marriages may result in sexual violence.
100. In terms of customary law, girls as young as ten are permitted to marry and are capable of consenting to marriage, given their levels of maturity. Families usually coerce them into these marriages. There is often a significant difference in age between these young girls and the spouses chosen for them.
101. The Commission has found that the practice of early marriage has contributed to the high levels of sexual abuse of girls and has led to society's condoning of a practice that is detrimental to the development of young girls. It is also in clear contravention of international law to which the government of Sierra Leone is signatory to. The Commission finds that the different legal systems need to be harmonised and brought into line with international law. The Commission addresses the issue of early marriages and the age of consent in its recommendations.

Economic and social rights of children

Child Labour

102. The Employers and Employed Act Chapter 212 of the Laws of Sierra Leone 1960 determines a minimum age of employment for children. The Act prohibits the employment of children who appear to be under the age of 12 years, except where they have been employed by a family member and approved by a competent authority, in agriculture, horticultural or domestic work as a member of the family.⁸²

⁷⁹ See the *Christian Marriage Act* in the Laws of Sierra Leone, at Cap 96.

⁸⁰ See the *Civil Marriage Act* in the Laws of Sierra Leone, at Cap 97.

⁸¹ See the *Mohamedan Marriage Act* in the Laws of Sierra Leone, at Cap 96.

⁸² See the *Employers and Employed Act* (Chapter 212 of the Laws of Sierra Leone), at Section 51.

103. Even when children are legally permitted to work, the hours of work are restricted and the work must not be of a nature that will cause injury to the child. Children under 15 years are prohibited from working in any public or private industry or in a vessel unless it is one in which family members are employed. The Act prohibits the employment of a girl or woman or a boy under 16 in a mine.⁸³ The Act prohibits employment of children under 18 for employment at night in any public or private place. These laws are hardly enforced or implemented given the prevalence of children engaged in street trading and mining.
104. The Military Forces Act 1961 prohibits the recruitment of a child below the age of seventeen and a half unless the person's parents or guardian or other competent authority gives consent.⁸⁴ In terms of the Geneva Conventions, the conscription of persons who are below 15 is prohibited.
105. Both the pro government forces and the opposition forces forcibly recruited children as combatants in clear contravention of international law. The Commission urges that this practice be reviewed and that those violating international law be held accountable.
106. The Commission finds that the Government of Sierra Leone before the conflict broke out did not monitor the practice of employing children below the minimum age prescribed by the Act and in so doing has violated the rights of children. A further abuse is the failure to remunerate children appropriately. An exception is in the mining field where the government has taken some measures to regulate the employment of children.

Inheritance law

107. Under the general law children born within marriage are entitled to one third of their father's estate.⁸⁵ They are not entitled to anything from their mother's estate, as the husband is entitled to all of her property. This distribution operates on intestacy where neither parent has made a will. Children whose parents are unmarried are not entitled to property, as they are considered illegitimate. While there have been some challenges to this position, no law reform has taken place in this area. The President did make certain pronouncements about doing away with the concept of illegitimate children but has failed to take the matter further.
108. Under customary law and Mohammedan law, male children have more rights of inheritance than their female counterparts and in some customs female children do not have any right of inheritance. The Commission finds that the practice of discriminating against children on the basis of illegitimacy is in clear violation of international law and that urgent law reform in this area is desperately needed to ensure that the rights of children are not violated.

⁸³ See the *Employers and Employed Act* (Cap 212 Laws of Sierra Leone), at Sections 47(1) and 54.

⁸⁴ See the *Sierra Leone Military Forces Act* (Act No. 34 of 1961), at Section 16(2).

⁸⁵ See rules of distribution in the second schedule of the Administration of Estates Act Chapter 45 of the Laws of Sierra Leone 1960

Maintenance of children

109. A father of an illegitimate child does not have a legal obligation to maintain that child without a court order to this effect, unless he has adopted that child. The Bastardy Laws Amendment Act 1872 enables the mother of an illegitimate child to apply to a Magistrate court for an affiliation order against the man alleged to be the father of that child for weekly payment to be made to her to maintain the child. Presently the applications for an affiliation order are under the Bastardy Laws (Increase of Payment) Act 1988. This Act entitles the court to order the father to pay an amount not exceeding Le100.00 a week for the maintenance of that child until he is 16 years.
110. The Commission finds that the Bastardy laws are discriminatory and in clear violation of the Government's obligations to protect children and treat them with dignity. The Commission recommends that this law be abolished with immediate effect and that laws be enacted which do not discriminate against children on the basis of birth or marriage.

Application of National Law to Violations during the Conflict

111. Children suffered numerous violations during the war. These include abduction, forced recruitment, detention, forced displacement, forced labour, assault, torture, forced drugging, amputation, forced cannibalism, forced separation, rapes, sexual slavery, sexual abuse, and death. While most of these violations constitute crimes under Sierra Leone's criminal law, it is unlikely that national prosecutions will ever happen given the amnesty provision in the Lomé Peace Agreement and the capacity of the current judicial system to taken on perceived political crimes.
112. It is unlikely that accountability would be achieved even if prosecutions took place, though, as it would be extremely difficult to prosecute under such a high evidentiary burden. Sexual crimes would be even more difficult to prosecute under the current laws, especially as these crimes were committed in the context of a conflict. These crimes were committed in period of incredible violence by multiple groups of perpetrators making it very difficult for women to identify their perpetrators.
113. The national legal system shifts the evidentiary burden to the complainant for crimes of sexual violence and rape. In addition, the high evidentiary threshold renders conviction almost impossible. Under national law, the crimes of rape, unlawful carnal knowledge, indecent assault, abduction for immoral purposes, and procurement for prostitution are inherently crimes against the honour, dignity and chastity of the victim, her family or the community. They do not adequately present the violence involved in these crimes, particularly when committed during a conflict situation. They rather focus on the moral aspect, which could lead to a further stigmatisation of the victim. It is highly unlikely that prosecutions would take place given that the national legal system did not manage to prosecute these crimes even during peacetime.

CONCLUSION ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF CHILDREN

114. The Commission finds that the laws in force for the protection of the rights of a child are hardly enforced or implemented. In addition, the laws relating to the definition of child are confusing and contradictory. No uniform age of majority applies throughout the country.
115. The Commission finds that while legislation exists to cover adoptions, the practices of adopting under custom and tradition, as well as the practice of fostering, are not regulated by law. Lack of regulation gives rise to abuse and a lack of protection for children and the adoptive parents. During the conflict, these loopholes led to many children being taken out of the country without going through a proper legal process. The government needs to pass legislation to regulate the private institutions that have been established as orphanages and homes for children. Urgent law reform is required in this area.
116. The laws relating to the welfare of children do not adequately provide for their needs. Employment practices and law need to be brought in line with the provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child.
117. Regrettably the laws on sexual violence are not comprehensive and also place the evidentiary burden on the victim, or complainant. Customs and practice also contribute to the culture of silence and impunity that prevails in the country. Prosecutors of these crimes encounter great difficulty in prosecuting them because of the high evidentiary burden that needs to be satisfied.
118. The dual legal system existing in Sierra Leone since before the conflict has impacted negatively on the rights of children. In many instances, both law and custom are in clear contravention of international law, particularly the Convention on the Rights of the Child. Traditional customs and practices have also exacerbated the position of children, particularly girl children. The conflict and the cleavages in the society led to the complete debasement of children, the effects of which are being felt in Sierra Leone today. However the aftermath of the conflict presents civil society with an opportunity to lobby government for wholesale reforms, which are necessary at the level of both law and custom.
119. The Commission is of the view that the Child Rights Bill needs to be passed into law as a matter of urgency.

ROLES AND EXPERIENCES OF CHILDREN DURING THE CONFLICT IN SIERRA LEONE

VIOLATIONS AND ABUSES AGAINST CHILDREN

120. Children in Sierra Leone suffered immeasurably during the eleven-year conflict that engulfed the country. The conflict was characterised by wanton destruction, loss of life and massive violations of human rights. The violence was pervasive, with children of all ages throughout the country suffering horrible and unimaginable atrocities. The levels of violations endured throughout the conflict period. A 15-year-old girl testified to the Commission during closed hearings in Freetown of the following acts:

“When the rebels attacked Kingtom, we ran into hiding but unfortunately, someone told the rebels that we were in the mosque.... They located us, killed six people, chopped off my sister’s head, raped me, tied me up and amputated my foot... for four days I was there alone and maggots started coming from my foot... Later I was rescued by some ECOMOG soldiers who took me to the hospital where I learnt I had become pregnant and had to do an abortion.”⁸⁶

121. Submissions to the Commission confirm that the majority of human rights violations committed against children during the conflict took place under circumstances where the perpetrators had absolute control over their victims and had them totally at their mercy.⁸⁷ While these violations were mainly meted out against children by their adult captors, in many instances the violations were carried out by children themselves against friends and family members. The conflict was responsible for producing child perpetrators. One of the horrors of the conflict took place in Pujehun in 1991, when pupils of St. Paul’s Secondary School, who had been abducted and drugged, were forced to slaughter their own parents.⁸⁸

122. Describing the experiences of children in Sierra Leone, UNICEF stated:

“Children have been forcibly abducted from their families and held in abominable conditions, mistreated both physically and sexually, and denied basic human needs. They have been forcibly conscripted into military and paramilitary activities and forced to commit heinous acts against others, often drugged, all the while undergoing brutal treatment by their superiors. Girls have been captured as sex slaves to serve as “wives” to combatants who treated them with the utmost cruelty. Children of all ages have been separated from their families, in many cases never to be reunited. Many children have grown up in abominable conditions, both in Sierra Leone and in neighbouring countries.”⁸⁹

⁸⁶ Confidential testimony received during TRC Closed Hearings, Freetown, 23 April 2003.

⁸⁷ See, for example, the UNICEF submission to TRC.

⁸⁸ This event is recounted in secondary sources, including: *Africa Development*, “Lumpen Youth Culture and Political Violence: Sierra Leoneans Debate the RUF”, Vol. XXII, 1997.

⁸⁹ See UNICEF submission to TRC, at page 3.

123. During the conflict, all of the armed factions, including the pro-government forces, committed gross human rights violations against children. In its submission, UNICEF noted that:


“The RUF and the AFRC were responsible for the bulk of violations committed against children. Nonetheless, systematic and horrific abuses were committed by the pro-government CDF and their powerful Kamajors, as well as by ECOMOG forces.”⁹⁰

124. In a submission made by a children’s group to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, children themselves made this poignant statement:

“Every child in this country has got a story to tell: a heartbreaking one. Unfortunately, only a handful of these stories will be told and made known to the world. But the devastating impact lingers and endures all the time. It continues to linger in the minds and hearts of young people.”⁹¹

125. The TRC database recorded violations against children in every one of its violations categories. In certain categories, children suffered disproportionately high levels of violations, leading to the conclusion that children were deliberately targeted. These categories included abduction, forced recruitment, rape and sexual slavery, as illustrated by the graphs in Figure 2, below.

Figure 2: Selected violations categories in which children were targeted (violations reported to TRC, according to age / sex of victims)



⁹⁰ See UNICEF submission to TRC, at page 6.

⁹¹ See Children’s Forum Network submission to TRC, at page 2.

ABDUCTION AND FORCED RECRUITMENT

126. A unique feature of the conflict in Sierra Leone was the forcible enlistment and use of child soldiers by all of the armed factions, including the pro-government forces. Among the chief perpetrator factions were the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC), the Sierra Leone Army (SLA) and the Civil Defence Forces (CDF).
127. The RUF was the first to abduct and forcibly recruit child soldiers.⁹² With the passage of time, the RUF established a separate children's unit known as the Small Boys Unit (SBUs) and Small Girl's Unit (SGUs) under various commanding officers. The government soon followed suit during the NPRC regime of Captain Valentine Strasser (1992-1996), significantly expanding the Army in part by bringing in children as recruits.⁹³ Certain units of the Civil Defence Forces (CDF), the pro-government militia, also made use of children in their prosecution of the war.
128. Thousands of children were abducted in villages and towns during raids and attacks carried out by the RUF. In the month of January 1999, it has been estimated that more than 4,000 children were abducted during the AFRC-led incursion into Freetown.⁹⁴ Many children were also conscripted into the CDF on the basis of "patriotism". In the case of the CDF, parents volunteered and paid for the initiation of their children into the Kamajor militia. While in most instances parents volunteered their children, many were also forced into putting them forward out of fear of very powerful initiators.⁹⁵ They were told that initiation would confer upon their children mystical powers, which would make them impervious to bullets and would protect them from the enemy.
129. Abduction was often the first violation committed against a child and was usually followed by forced recruitment or another form of "adoption" into a faction. Children were abducted and removed from their families or communities to locations under the control of an armed group. A ten-year-old boy told the Commission of his experiences at the time of his abduction:

"During the NPRC period, one early morning, my mother and I were on the farm. Six armed men entered the farm and hid themselves in the hut. We entered... and saw them dressed in SLA uniforms. We were captured and detained with their guns against our heads... The commander of the group was Colonel Mohammed Sesay... he said to me that I should join them or they will kill my mother and myself. I choose to join them since I had no option... I joined them unwillingly at an early age of 10 years. On our way to Kailahun I was given a weapon called AK-47 and taught how to shoot on sight. We attacked so many villages I could not remember their names, until we reached Kailahun, which was the headquarter town of the RUF."⁹⁶

⁹² More detail on the emergence of the violation of forced recruitment in the RUF can be found in the chapter on the Military and Political History of the Conflict in Volume Three A of this report.


⁹³ See Zack-Williams, A. B.; "Child Soldiers in the Civil War in Sierra Leone", in *Review of African Political Economy*, No.87 73 82, 2001, at page 74.

⁹⁴ See the UN Special Report on Children in Armed Conflict, with its extensive mention of the Sierra Leone conflict, available at the website: <http://www.un.org/special-rep/children-armed-conflict/>.

⁹⁵ More detail on the roles and violations of initiators within the CDF can be found in the chapter on the Military and Political History of the Conflict in Volume Three A of this report.

⁹⁶ TRC confidential statement recorded in Freetown, 12 January 2003.

TRC



A poster displayed at TRC Headquarters in Freetown describes the dangers of the trade in small arms and the increasing involvement of children in armed conflict.

130. Abduction and forced recruitment were also followed by other violations, as illustrated by the testimonies of these child witnesses:

"In 1993, I was abducted by rebels and taken to the bush... My sister and I were taken away from my grandmother... I cannot tell for now whether my grandmother and sister are alive... I went to stay with the rebels in a village... I used to carry loads on my head, such as looted properties, for long distances. I was taken with others to be trained in another rebel base, for about two months... we were then sent to different areas. They used to kill us SBUs, or small soldiers... we used to go out on food-finding trips to villages. When we brought the food, it was only for the commanders and we were given just cassava to eat. I and other abductees were not getting enough food to eat... they told us that if we attempt to escape they will kill us... they used to beat me and others if we failed to carry out their orders... I was with them till 1999..."⁹⁷

[and]

"...I was attending the St. Francis Primary School Makeni, I was in class three... During the 1998 intervention period, RUF Colonel Kole Boot came with five armed men to my house, they started beating all of us and raping my mother, sisters and aunts in front of me. When they finished, the Colonel turned to me and said I should choose between death and following them. I followed them to Kamakwe; there he injected me, cut my face with a blade and plastered the drug into the wound. I became unconscious and fell on the ground. When I regained my consciousness, he showed me how to fire, dismantle and couple up a gun... he took me to Colonel Alabama for training. I trained for two months and passed out... I later joined SLA Major Palmer, who led me in several battles..."⁹⁸

[and]

"...We were taken to another house where we were raped... they gave us their luggage to carry to Fadugu. On the way they flogged us. Upon our arrival we were distributed to different rebels to be married to. When we refused, they flogged us. We were raped by two or three men daily... we eventually got married to them. They gave us drugs like marijuana to smoke... they looted properties whilst we carried their ammunitions..."⁹⁹

131. Children soon found that gender and age did not matter to their perpetrators as they were used in various roles for the war effort. In addition to being used as fighters, girl-children were also used as sex slaves and domestic labour. A ten-year-old girl told her story of capture at the time of an attack:

"It was sometime in 1997 during the first attack in Fadugu... I was in the house when the door was broken open and three of us including a boy and a girl were abducted. I was taken by one Amadu Koroma, an RUF member, to be a helper to his wife, who was pregnant... in Kono..."

⁹⁷ TRC confidential statement recorded in Makeni, Bombali District, 12 December 2002.

⁹⁸ TRC confidential statement recorded in Freetown, 22 December 2002.

⁹⁹ Confidential testimony received during TRC Closed Hearings, Koinadugu District; 14 May 2003.

On the way going, the elder brother called Mohammed said he wants me to be his wife. Amadu then said the girl is small. When Amadu left for the usual patrol, his brother raped and virginated me... I was used as a domestic labourer for the wife of Amadu Koroma... we were then recalled to Makeni by Superman. I was then given an ammunition box to carry on my head..."¹⁰⁰

132. Younger children were not initially used to fight and instead were used as load carriers and domestic labour. Later on they graduated to becoming sex slaves and fighters in the case of girls, or fighters in the case of boys.

133. Some of the children abducted by the RUF, from Yambama (Bo), Ngegbema (Kailahun) and Njagbwema Faima (Kono) respectively, recounted their experiences in the following terms:

"Every morning there will be a roll call to share duties between different groups: one group to find food for them; another group to carry out fishing; others to cook; others were sex workers. Little children were responsible to carry loads, whether heavy or not. After all the day's work, we don't eat their food; we only live on cassava."¹⁰¹

[and]

"When I was sent on missions, I used to capture young boys and girls and train them as child soldiers... After all my successes; I was called Merciful Killer and later transferred to join the RUF high commander Colonel Issa Sesay."¹⁰²

[and]

"I was captured by the RUF at a very small age (seven years) in 1994. No sooner was I given my own weapon, I was forced to go to the war front with my colleagues to attack our enemies. Sometimes I was under drugs, because it is not easy for somebody to join the movement if you are not introduced to drugs."¹⁰³

134. Child soldiers lived in a hostile and extremely violent environment. They became conditioned to violence and committed heinous crimes, often under the influence of dependence-inducing substances.

135. Child soldiers were often forced by their captors to commit heinous atrocities in order to demonstrate loyalty to them and their cause. Atrocities often included carrying out the killings, amputations and rape of loved ones, community members, relatives and peers. Atrocities against family and community made it extremely difficult for child soldiers to escape and return home. Unsuccessful escapes met with swift and violent reprisals intended to ensure that no child combatant attempted escape in the future. Some of the child witnesses testified to the commission of their experiences:

"In the evening, they gathered all of us youngsters and we were put in chains. We were taken to the secondary school for training. Later, I escaped with a brother called Juana. He was caught and shot on sight..."¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁰ TRC confidential statement recorded in Fadugu Kasunko Chiefdom, 14 January 2003.

¹⁰¹ TRC confidential statement recorded in Bo District, 28 January 2003.

¹⁰² TRC confidential statement recorded in Kailahun District, 21 January 2003.

¹⁰³ TRC confidential statement recorded in Kono District, 15 January 2003.

¹⁰⁴ TRC confidential statement recorded in Freetown, 7 December 2003.

"I was captured together with five other girls at Sierra Rutile and taken to a base at Mattru Jong... I was thirteen years old at the time... Later we tried to escape but we were caught, beaten and brought back to the base. We were then trained for about six months."¹⁰⁵

[and]

"I was captured by the RUF whilst my parents and I were trying to escape from Kailahun. I was taken to a base outside Kailahun for training and I decided to escape. When they caught me, I was stabbed on the head with a military knife, beaten and taken back to the training base."¹⁰⁶

136. Most of the armed factions used children at checkpoints. They set them up and manned them in conjunction with adults. This trait was one violation the RUF and the CDF had in common. Many civilians who came before the Commission told of their fear of the children at checkpoints.

137. Another aspect to the forced recruitment of children was "re-recruitment" after the disarmament process. During 1998 when the disarmament process commenced, many of the children disarmed were re-recruited back by the same armed groups. This was especially true of children who did not have a safe and secure home environment, even before the war. Children who fell into this category often had no safe place to go following demobilisation, particularly when their allotted times in the Interim Care Centres (ICCs) were up.¹⁰⁷ The failure to take this factor into account impacted negatively on the demobilisation and disarmament process.

138. Many of the abducted children often had siblings and relatives who had also been abducted. All family members learnt very quickly not to expose their relationships to their captors as the possibility existed that they might be held responsible for the actions of the other, especially if the other escaped. In such instances they would be severely punished. A child witness testified as follows:

"The rebels attacked Serabu and we fled into the bush... I ran away with my brother and sister. Unfortunately for us, we were captured and taken to the town... the following morning, one of the rebels came into search for us but he did not see my brother and sister. They threatened to kill me because they thought I had incited them to escape. I understood later that my brother had escaped... I was singled out and asked to lie down under the sun... Whilst standing outside, I was shot on my left foot..."¹⁰⁸

139. Statistics in Sierra Leone are problematic to obtain. The exact number of children who were abducted and forcibly recruited is difficult to ascertain. According to the TRC database, 28,3% of the victims who suffered forced recruitment were 12 years or younger at the time of abduction; 52,5% were 15 years or younger; and 63,1% were 18 years or younger.¹⁰⁹ The number of children who made statements to the Commission is not, however, reflective of all the children whose rights were violated during the conflict period.

¹⁰⁵ TRC confidential statement recorded in Cline Town, 13 January 2003.

¹⁰⁶ TRC confidential statement recorded in Kailahun District, 19 February 2003.

¹⁰⁷ See UNICEF submission to TRC, at page 18.

¹⁰⁸ Confidential testimony received during TRC Closed Hearings, Kenema District, 28 May 2003.

¹⁰⁹ More detail on violations rates and the levels of different violations experienced by children can be found in the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

140. The Children's Forum Network in its submission to the Commission expressed children's current plight in the following excerpt:

"Adults, who were disgruntled and acted through the senseless and indiscriminate atrocities, were unable to reach what was supposed to be their real targets and decided to take advantage of our vulnerability to exploit and destroy the future base of this nation, which they claimed to have been fighting for... It goes without saying that we the children bore the brunt of the conflict and witnessed the worst episode of man's ruthlessness probably ever in man's history."¹¹⁰

FORCED DISPLACEMENT

141. The fear of attack and subsequent violations, as well as widespread intimidation during the conflict, resulted in people fleeing their homes for more secure areas both in and out of the country. The mayhem and confusion that always accompanied attacks led to massive forced displacement within communities, towns and villages, as well as forced separation of families. Forced displacement in Sierra Leone during the conflict period was not a one-off occurrence, but rather became a way of life for many victims:

"I was living in a village at Jawi Chiefdom in Kailahun District when RUF rebels attacked us in 1991. At that time I was staying with my father, my mother and other relatives... we moved to Tongo and stayed there for one year. In 1992, RUF attacked Tongo Town, at that time my mother had an eight months pregnancy, and she was killed by a stray bullet. After that, I and my father ran to Kenema Town"¹¹¹

[and]

"...I was living in Kawoya village, Moyamba District with my parents. One day the RUF rebels attacked our village in 1995. I left our village with my parents and went to smaller villages to hide. We were also attacked in one of these smaller villages, my parents, sisters and brothers fled to the bush to hide. I was captured alone in the village by plenty of rebels..."¹¹²

142. The people worst affected by sudden and forced displacement were usually in the most vulnerable groups: children, women and the aged. As these testimonies illustrate, families were often broken up as they sought safety:

"It happened in the year 1997 when there was a series of factions attacking Koindu. Unfortunately... one afternoon the attack that happened by the group of SLA caused my separation from my family members, that is my father and my mother. It was very much sorrowful at the time I was separated from my mother. It was not easy at all and by then I was just 11 years old, very immature... I finally separated from my family members and went into the jungle..."¹¹³

¹¹⁰ See Children's Forum Network submission to TRC, at page 1.

¹¹¹ TRC confidential statement recorded in Freetown, 14 January 2003.

¹¹² TRC confidential statement recorded in Aberdeen Amputee Camp, 24 March 2003.

¹¹³ TRC confidential statement recorded in a refugee camp in Kissidougou, Guinea, 27 May 2003.

[and]

“Rebels attacked us in this town, Kunnandu, and I ran for my life with my mother and sister. On our way going to Guinea... we met another rebel group RUF at Kulumbaya town, which is located along the border of Sierra Leone and Guinea... After capturing us, they instructed my mother and sister to go and leave me because the C. O. was not going to release me. He attempted to kill my mother when she refused to go... the man then took me to Koidu and my mother was headed for Guinea...”¹¹⁴

143. The Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children Affairs (MSWGCA) estimates that more than 15,000 children suffered separation from their families and communities during the eleven-year war.¹¹⁵ Separation resulted in children becoming refugees in countries such as Liberia, Guinea, Gambia, Ivory Coast, Nigeria and other West African states. Many became internally displaced persons within the country.¹¹⁶ The Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children estimated that by 1996, there were more than 700,000 internally displaced persons in IDP camps across Sierra Leone.¹¹⁷

“I was staying with my parents when the RUF attacked us here in Koidu Town. My father took us to Njagbema Fiama bush... we were again attacked in the bush by RUF rebels and captured... All of us were given loads to carry, including my dad. On our going my other sister was given load not equivalent to her strength... the sooner she announced it to them that she cannot continue, her hand was amputated... because of the nature of her profuse bleeding, we were given passage to cross to Guinea...”¹¹⁸

144. UNICEF has estimated that the war displaced 1.8 million Sierra Leoneans from their homes. This of course only refers to that category of displaced persons who could be counted in refugee or IDP camps. It did not count the remaining 2.4 million people who fled to parts of the “bush”. They were affected and displaced “in the bush”.
145. Many children found themselves alone without kith or kin in both refugee camps and camps for the internally displaced. Their experiences were very harrowing. The lack of a normal family structure amidst the difficult new environment was a bewildering experience for children. Sadly many suffered even further violations in these camps perpetrated by those meant to protect them. Many children did not survive these experiences. The sexual exploitation of Sierra Leone children in refugee camps has been well documented in the UNHCR and Save the Children UK report of February 2002.¹¹⁹ In addition, they also suffered other violations such as economic exploitation and slave labour. Children were forced into adulthood before their time.

¹¹⁴ TRC confidential statement recorded in Kunundu Town, Lei Chiefdom, 27 January 2003.

¹¹⁵ See the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children’s Affairs, Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission on the occasion of TRC Special Thematic Hearings on Children; 16 June 2003 (hereinafter “Ministry of Gender and Children’s Affairs submission to TRC”).

¹¹⁶ Ministry of Gender and Children’s Affairs submission to TRC

¹¹⁷ Report by Women’s Commission for Refugee Women and Children

¹¹⁸ TRC confidential statement recorded in Samandu, Gbense Chiefdom, 4 February 2003.

¹¹⁹ See Save the Children – UK and UNHCR, “*Sexual Violence and Exploitation: The Experience of Refugee Children in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone*”, April 2002, at page 25.

FORCED LABOUR

146. Children were also used as forced labour by the armed groups. They were used as porters in both military and civilian capacities. The role of porters, or “human caravans”, included moving the properties of the armed groups, carrying looted properties away after raids and carrying arms and ammunitions to and from the war front. This practice began with the RUF and, in the jargon of the RUF, these children were part of what was referred to as “manpower”:

“...Each time they went to go and fight, we were forced to go with them... we were forced to carry the ammunition boxes and cartridge boxes on our heads...”¹²⁰

147. Children were often made to carry heavy loads for long distances, making escape difficult, especially for younger children who could not trace their way back home. In many instances, children were abducted and immediately used as forced labour:

“I was in Kono when the RUF attacked Kono. It was the time when the South Africans were in Kono...I was among some thirty-seven girl-children who was captured by Superman’s boys...I was given load to carry on my head from Kono to Makeni. I used to carry loads every day from Kono to Makeni”¹²¹

[and]

“I was in Fadugu in November 1999 when rebels of the AFRC attacked the town... I was captured and abducted... During my stay with Savage and his troops, I was used as a porter for their looted items. They raided several villages and farms on looting missions... in the process, they captured creatures such as goats, cows, sheep, fowls and food stuffs like rice, groundnuts and others.”¹²²

148. Children were forced to carry out domestic chores and would be assigned to “wives” of Commanders and to work for them on a daily basis.

“... While we were at Lunsar; I used to work with the women in the kitchen. I used to go and fetch water...”¹²³

¹²⁰ TRC confidential statement recorded in Pendembu Town, Kailahun, 24 January 2003.

¹²¹ TRC confidential statement recorded at Check Point, Magbenma, 12 December 2002.

¹²² TRC confidential statement recorded in Kabala Town, Koinadugu District; 17 December 2002.

¹²³ TRC confidential statement recorded at Check Point, Magbenma, 12 December 2002.

149. Many children testified to the Commission of how hard they had to work, often on an empty stomach. They were punished for the slightest infraction and any perceived “misdemeanours”. They then suffered further violations. It was mostly girls and very young children who were used in this way. Some of the children testified of their experiences as load carriers and domestic slaves:

“Rebels got to Tarinahun Pesseh one afternoon in 1993, on a Wednesday... I was caught, tied and given a big bag of things to carry to Pujehun... As a small boy, I suffered under the load from Tarinahun to Pujehun... At Pujehun... they used to beat me every morning, I had barely enough food to eat... I used to launder for them and their girl friends. I was taken to almost all of the nearby villages to get food and fowls for them. I was punished if I failed... one day I was sent to find food together with a few others... on our way, I was bitten by a snake. Only God knew how I was cured...”¹²⁴

150. Children were later used by many of the armed factions to work in the diamond mines under the most appalling, back-breaking conditions.
151. Children generally worked in conditions that were extremely violent and where the slightest mistake was severely punished, often resulting in death.

SEXUAL VIOLATIONS AGAINST CHILDREN (RAPE, SEXUAL SLAVERY AND SEXUAL ABUSE)

152. The Commission has not been able to establish conclusively how many children were raped or suffered sexual violence and sexual slavery due to the difficulties with statistics in Sierra Leone. However the Commission’s database and the testimonies recorded during TRC hearings confirm that all of the armed forces perpetrated rape, sexual slavery and sexual violence. The Commission’s database points to the systematic nature of sexual violence during the conflict period and how it affected mostly girl children.
153. From the commission’s data, 25% of rape victims with ages documented were 13 years of age or younger and 25% of sexual slaves with ages documented were children aged 12 or under.¹²⁵ Also, 50% of sexual slaves with ages documented were children aged 15 or under at the time they were abducted.¹²⁶ The most targeted age range for this violation comprised girls and women aged between ten and 25 years.¹²⁷
154. While women who have been sexually violated usually bear a stigma all over the world, it is even worse in a country like Sierra Leone where the prevailing culture is a deeply traditional and secretive one. Victims tend not to disclose their experiences, as they fear stigmatisation from family members and their communities. Historically women in Sierra Leone did not disclose rape. This pattern has remained true even for the conflict period and its aftermath.

¹²⁴ TRC confidential statement recorded in Pujehun Town, 28 February 2003.

¹²⁵ More detail on violations rates and the levels of different violations experienced by children can be found in the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

¹²⁶ See the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

¹²⁷ See the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

155. Had it not been for the efforts of FAWE and other women's NGOs, as well as the sheer number of girls and women who suffered sexual violations, particularly during the invasion of Freetown, there would not have been much exposure of this category of violations. Despite all efforts to date, full disclosure has still not been achieved. It is important to note that the Commission's data is only a small representation of the problem and does not do justice to the total number of women who have suffered sexual violence.

RAPE

156. During the conflict, girls were subjected to indiscriminate rape as a matter of course. They were raped whenever and wherever a member of an armed group encountered them, if the opportunity presented itself. Rape took place everywhere, both in and outside houses and in the bushes. The circumstances of rape depended on the whim or mood of the perpetrator and whatever pleased him. Girls suffered crushing dehumanisation in the course of even the most familiar daily routine situations:

"When the RUF rebels captured us, they took us to Kailahun... They beat us and sent us to fetch firewood and food... when we went to fetch fire wood, the rebels that went with us raped me... After the signing of the peace, the rebel Colonel Akim told his men to take all the children they have captured back to their people... on our way the man that captured me raped me again."¹²⁸

157. Girls were raped at times when they were highly vulnerable, left without proper protection and taken advantage of:

"...At one time, Mummy Peoples went on a journey and left me in care of another lady called Marion. While she was away, a rebel called Abdul virginated me. We were over 20 in number. All of us were virginated by different rebels. I became seriously ill and paralysed..."¹²⁹

158. Several girls testified that they had become lost in the forest after ambushes, captured and raped:

"In 1998, in the forest at Yardu Sandor, the rebels captured me and my sister...At midnight one of the rebels enter into the room and said "let us have sex". So we told him that we do not know what he is talking about. He went outside and brought his gun... he then entered to us again, with his gun and raped three of us. I was bleeding seriously..."¹³⁰

159. A man from Kailahun told the Commission of his role in rape violations:

"I was appointed to lead the civilians as town commander. Rebel soldiers of the RUF informed me that they needed girls to have sex and sleep with. With not much ado, I collected ten girls including a 14 year old."¹³¹

¹²⁸ TRC confidential statement recorded in Boroma Gbense, 7 December 2002.

¹²⁹ TRC confidential statement recorded in Kissy, Freetown, 12 February 2003.

¹³⁰ TRC confidential statement recorded in Gbense Chiefdom, 4 February 2003

¹³¹ TRC confidential statement recorded in Kailahun District, 20 February 2003.

160. A victim of rape testified of her ordeal as she was attacked in what ought to have been the safety of her own home:

“During the war when the rebels entered Madina a man met me sleeping. This man woke me up from sleep and told me he was going to rape me. This man asked me to choose whether he was to rape me or to kill me. Indeed, he raped me.”¹³²

161. Girls were subjected to individual or gang rapes by their captors. The Commission’s database also confirms that a significant number of these girls suffered multiple rapes.¹³³ Rape was not a violation suffered in isolation as it was often committed in the presence of others and perpetrated together with other violations.

“We were attacked on the road, on a vehicle and I was captured again... along with some other people, we were taken into the bush... afterwards they went to attack and we were left with some other rebels. These rebels forcefully had sex with us. All the women and girls were raped...”¹³⁴

162. Girls were also tortured and assaulted before being raped. Many died of injuries sustained because of the rape.

“In 1992, my village Foindu Mawie was attacked by the RUF rebels... on their way going; they captured a young girl called Musu who was newly initiated into the women’s society. She was taken to a village called Juhun in the Upper Bambara chiefdom, where she was raped by the rebels. Her vagina became swollen and there was no medical treatment at that time. She later died of pains because she was newly initiated...”¹³⁵

163. Many of the girls raped were also forced into becoming fighters for the armed factions. Becoming part of the fighting forces did not protect them from being raped or from falling pregnant. A girl who suffered rape at Koinadugu at the hands of an RUF member testified thus:

“I was taken in 1998 by a boy called lieutenant Put Fire, who I later came to know as Edward Kamara. He raped me under threat. By then I was only 14 years old and I had just been involved in sexual intercourse, but was not used to it. I was with them for three months. We the captives were trained to fire guns and I also witnessed the attack on Fadugu the second time; several people were killed and houses burnt down. I became pregnant later on and got a baby boy.”

¹³² Confidential testimony received during TRC Closed Hearings in Bombali District; 28 May 2003

¹³³ More detail on the manner and circumstances in which girls suffered sexual violations can be found in the results of the Commission’s special coding exercises on sexual violations included in the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

¹³⁴ TRC confidential statement recorded at Check Point, Magbenma, 12 December 2002.

¹³⁵ TRC confidential statement recorded at a secret society house, Peje Bongre, 11 March 2003.

164. Girls were not only viciously raped, but also suffered further violations and harm by having objects such as sticks, bayonets, pepper and burning coals inserted into their vaginas by depraved perpetrators. Many of the girls suffered even more horrible injuries because of the insertion of objects into their vaginas. In many instances this kind of rape led to their deaths or permanent vaginal and uterine injuries.
165. Displaced children in refugee camps and displaced camps were also vulnerable to rape and sexual violence. According to the UNHCR / Save the Children UK report on sexual violations and exploitation, children were most vulnerable and experienced attempted rapes in locations such as the toilet and bathroom areas in the camps. Bathing and toilet areas, while divided on gender lines, were usually communal and were often located in the same vicinity. Adult male predators usually lay in wait for the girls, followed them and raped them. Children hawking goods or running errands such as fetching firewood were also attacked and raped. Sadly many of the children were attacked and raped by their adult guardians. Humanitarian workers meant to protect the children carried out the most deplorable violations.¹³⁶
166. A major characteristic of sexual violence in Sierra Leone, including rape, has been the systematic breaking of all taboos by the perpetrators. They have respected neither age nor custom. Many of the children raped were pre-pubescent and had not begun menstruating. Yet they were still raped and taken as sexual slaves. Acts of rape and sexual violence were often carried out in the presence of helpless family members, who in turn were forced to watch. In other instances, family members were forced to commit such acts against one another.
167. A victim who attempted to oppose being raped invariably met with more violations. Perpetrators did not heed calls for mercy and often treated refusal with utter contempt, not only committing the rape but also following it with acts of greater violence. Family members who tried to stop such acts usually met with brutal reactions and often ended up being killed.
168. According to a girl who left Freetown with her family for safe haven in Tikonko:

"When the junta attacked our village, we fled to the bush for hiding and were caught. Two men took me aside and deflowered me. When my mother tried to stop them, she was shot dead."¹³⁷
169. The lowest age of a rape victim recorded by the Commission's database was four years old.

¹³⁶ More detail of the gross violations perpetrated against children in refugee camps, including rape by their adult guardians, can be found in the following report: Save the Children – UK and UNHCR, "Sexual Violence and Exploitation: The Experience of Refugee Children in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone", April 2002.

¹³⁷ TRC confidential statement recorded in Sakiema Dea Chiefdom, 19 December 2002.

SEXUAL SLAVERY

170. Girls were captured, abducted, detained and used as sexual slaves throughout the course of the conflict in Sierra Leone. Many of the girls were detained for longer periods and were forced to move around with their captors. In many instances they were compelled against their will to become members of the armed groups. Most girls abducted by the RUF and the AFRC were forced by their captors to be "sexual slaves". Armed combatants would be assigned a woman who had been captured to use for the purposes of sex. These girls were compelled to be available to their captors for sex. This form of sexual slavery was peculiar to the RUF and AFRC and resulted in the "bush wife" phenomenon. Even girls who were detained for short periods of time by their captors were forced into sexual slavery. The Commission reveals testimony given to it by some of the girls who suffered this experience:

"On 6 March 1994, on a Sunday morning at about 10 am, I was in my house... Immediately, I saw so many rebels which I cannot state their number... at least, five of them ran after me and held me... one of their commander called C.O Koroma...said he the C.O was going to have me as his wife..."¹³⁸

[and]

"It happened during the January 1999 rebel invasion, on a Friday... I was a virgin little girl that time. We went and hid in a mosque. From there, I was captured by the juntas. When they went to our mosques, they took us away..."¹³⁹

171. While some of the girls were assigned and attached to one partner, such attachment did not prevent other perpetrators from using them, particularly if the combatant they were attached to was not a senior commander. As the following testimony indicates, sexual slaves had to be available to all:

"On our arrival we were assigned to the wives of commanders and later given to commanders or fighters to be their bush wives. As a bush wife, my duties were to provide for him anything he requested, including sex at any time of the day. I was used as a sex slave for each commander when they came to our camp, especially because my bush husband was not a senior commander. I was with them for six years."¹⁴⁰

¹³⁸ TRC confidential statement recorded in Pendembu Town, Upper Bambara; 24 January 2003.

¹³⁹ TRC confidential statement recorded in Freetown, 5 December 2002.

¹⁴⁰ TRC confidential statement recorded in Moyamba Town, Kaiyamba Chiefdom, 14 June 2003.

172. "Bush wives" suffered sexual abuse at the hands of third party perpetrators, particularly when their assigned "husbands" were away. In other instances abuse by others took place with the agreement of their captors. Girls soon lost their innocence and were robbed of their childhood. One young girl had this ordeal to report to the Commission:

"I lost my virginity to this C. O. Koroma, who was 45 years old. I was kept in a locked room always ready for him to sex me. Sometimes when he is away, his junior boys will come and open the door, sometimes three, sometimes four men. They will force me, telling me if I refuse them they will kill me. As a small girl I will allow them to satisfy themselves till they leave me hopelessly..."¹⁴¹

173. A girl often found herself being passed around to other fighters if her "partner" was killed in battle. Testimony given to the Commission by girls who were forced to become "bush wives" speaks of a desperate existence:

"When I was captured, we used to go on attacks and food raids... whenever my husband was not around, his colleagues would come and rape me... sometimes five, even up to ten of them would rape me for the day... They used to give me cocaine... we had to fight and kill people before we could get food from them... sometimes we ate mud and drank human blood."¹⁴²

[and]

"...On our way going, some of our companions died...its only God and sacrifices that saved my life... The boy that abducted me to Makeni impregnated me, but he was killed by another rebel..."¹⁴³

174. Many of the girls became pregnant and had children from their captors. Pregnancy did not protect them from suffering violations at the hands of their perpetrators, however. Many girls testified that their ill treatment at the hands of their captors if anything intensified during their pregnancies. A girl who was 12 years old at the time of her capture told the commission of her experiences:

"The second bush husband who took me was too jealous. He used to sex me all the time and the day I said I was unable or tired, he would beat me up mercilessly. I was denied food each time there was confusion between us. I stayed with Morray Kamara until the year 2000. While I was pregnant, he would beat me up and at one time when I tried to run away from him, he chased me, caught me and dragged me up. My left hand wrist got sprained, up till now. I finally escaped from him, leaving the two children behind."¹⁴⁴

¹⁴¹ TRC confidential statement recorded in Pendembu Town, Upper Bambara; 24 January 2003.

¹⁴² TRC confidential statement recorded in Moyamba District, 18 March 2003.

¹⁴³ TRC confidential statement recorded in Freetown, 5 December 2002.

¹⁴⁴ TRC confidential statement recorded in Limba, Bagbo Chiefdom, Bo, 10 February 2003.

AMPUTATION

175. Amputation is the violation that most of the world associates with the conflict in Sierra Leone. The Revolutionary United Front and the AFRC became notorious for carrying out amputations, which became their gruesome trademark. Neither of these perpetrator groups paid any heed to the age or gender of their victims, as even the hands and limbs of young children and babies were hacked off. The youngest baby amputee recorded on the Commission's database was only four months old.¹⁴⁵ Some were made single amputees, others double amputees of either hands or legs. Children testified to the Commission of their experiences of amputations as follows:

"At about 2.00 a.m. the rebels attacked our town Batkanu... We were asleep...as I woke up, I wanted to run away but unfortunately I met a rebel at the door ... they continued to capture other girls...they had to put us all in the same place... they sent one boy who was just a little taller than me... to go and bring a mortar... I was the third person they called... they said I should lay my hand on the mortar... I placed my right hand and they chopped off the hand... they asked me to lay my left hand and they chopped it three times; the fourth time I had to remove it by force. The machete was dull, otherwise the hand would have come off...I was twelve years old then."¹⁴⁶

[and]

"I was attending the Ahmadiyya Muslim Secondary School, I was in Form 1. I was 14 years old. On 8 January 1999, RUF and AFRC soldiers came to my house... they captured me and some boys... They used a fence stick and hung me up like a goat. The handicapped rebel among them used a blunt axe and struck it twice on my left hand and broke my bone... one of the rebels came with a dispenser who cut off my hand without anaesthetic. My hand was given to my mother and she threw it into the sea..."¹⁴⁷

[and]

"...I was captured alone... by plenty of rebels. They asked me to choose between death and amputation. I did not reply them. They began to decide among themselves what to do to me. They finally agreed to cut off one of my feet. They brought a bulky stick and placed my foot on it... they first used a cutlass but it was blunt, they finally used an axe to amputate my right foot and went away. I was left lying on the ground unconscious until when my parents came in the morning..."¹⁴⁸

176. As medical care during this period was generally unavailable anywhere in the country, many of the children who suffered amputations, particularly in the provinces, did not survive their injuries.

¹⁴⁵ More detail on the manner and circumstances in which amputations were carried out can be found in the Amputations Report produced as an Appendix to this report. See also the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report for details of the scope of victims of each violation.

¹⁴⁶ Confidential testimony received during TRC closed hearings in Makeni, 28 May 2003.

¹⁴⁷ TRC confidential statement recorded in Aberdeen Amputee Camp, 19 March 2003.

¹⁴⁸ TRC confidential statement recorded in Aberdeen Amputee Camp, 24 March 2003.

177. Amputation has had a significant impact on its victims, affecting them physically, psychologically and economically. A common sight on the street corners of Freetown is the presence of limbless children begging as a means of obtaining daily sustenance. A boy who was 14 years old at the time of his amputation told the Commission of the effect on him today:

“...When I was discharged [from hospital], I was ashamed to go to my area, I always lock myself up in my house so that people could not notice me. I have also stopped attending school...”¹⁴⁹

178. In a country where poverty, unemployment and disaffection afflict even the able-bodied youth, the plight of amputees is compounded by severe physical discomfort, emotional turmoil and discrimination from others.

MUTILATION

179. Mutilation was another form of abuse inflicted by the fighting forces on the children of Sierra Leone. The acronyms of the armed factions, most commonly in forms such as “RUF”, “AFRC” and “Ex-SLA”, were branded or carved on children’s bodies, including on their chests, foreheads, arms and backs. A number of children testified to the Commission of their experiences:

“After we had been captured and trained, they forced us to take up guns and we attacked several villages... All those who tried to run away were caught and labelled “RUF” with knives, blades or sharp sticks”¹⁵⁰

[and]

“One Saturday night, I was sleeping when the rebels attacked Bafodia at about 6.30 am in the morning. They surrounded the village and they knocked on our doors... the rebels asked for the children... they forced the door open and captured eight of us... in the morning they took us to another house where they inscribed “RUF” on our bodies.”¹⁵¹

180. The Commission is of the view that the main purpose of mutilation in this fashion was to mark children in order to prevent them from escaping from their captors. The branding served as an identification mark, as armed groups used it to identify and recapture children who escaped. Moreover, children with such marks came to know that if they fell into the hands of the opposing forces, they would be identified as enemy combatants and often end up being killed. Many children also died as a result of the act of branding, when their scars became infected and did not heal.
181. A major problem for many children after the war was the stigma attached to their being marked in this way. Families and communities shunned them as having belonged to the “rebels”. They were stigmatised, causing them great long-term shame and fear.¹⁵² Even today, many children hide these scars by wearing clothes that cover them.¹⁵³

¹⁴⁹ TRC confidential statement recorded in Aberdeen Amputee Camp, 19 March 2003.

¹⁵⁰ TRC confidential statement recorded in Cline Town, Freetown, 13 January 2003.

¹⁵¹ Confidential testimony received during TRC closed hearings in Koinadugu District, 14 May 2003.

¹⁵² See TRC interviews with former child combatants, Family Homes Movement, 7 August 2003.

¹⁵³ See TRC interviews with former child combatants, Family Homes Movement, 7 August 2003.

TORTURE

182. Children were subjected to both mental and physical torture during the conflict. Severe beatings and punishment were inflicted on them, resulting in physical injuries, bleeding and internal injuries, permanent disability and in some cases death. Mothers suffered the mental anguish of watching their children being tortured and killed. A mother told the Commission of her experiences:

“Rebels attacked us in Teblahun on 19 January 1995... from that point we became their captives... At Baoya, we met heavy fighting. During that fighting, my daughter Soffie’s fingers from both hands were cut off. Three fingers from one hand and two from the other; by then she was only twelve years old... After that, they took us to a place called Lekono. On our arrival, we were all told to enter one house, which we did and they set it on fire... two of my children were burnt in it. Both of them were girls, one was three and the other was five years old... At another time, my grandchild, a boy of about seven years old called Mustapha, was stabbed in the stomach and his intestines came out...”¹⁵⁴

183. Children were tortured when caught and detained. In those instances when their parents were detained, they were detained with them. They also suffered torture whilst in detention. A child described his experiences in detention to the Commission:

“...We were all captured, by the RUF and were taken to Congo Bridge. I was stripped naked, tied up and put into their “detention container”. We were there for two days, naked and without food. I was beaten severely with the butts of guns by three men... I managed to escape...but I was again caught... I was then beaten even more severely...”¹⁵⁵

184. Children also testified to the Commission of the inhuman and degrading treatment to which they were subjected. They were forced to eat human excrement, drink human blood and participate in forced cannibalism. Some of the victims of these aberrations testified to the Commission:

“I was at Mordavies with my father... I was sitting in front of the house when I saw a lot of people coming led by my father’s brother Usman Kamara... I was then tied together with my father... they took a stone and hit the face of my father and he was then killed and they removed his blood and put it in a cup and said “drink this blood or else we will kill you”; so I have no alternative but to drink the blood...”¹⁵⁶

[and]

“When I was captured, I was given toilet to eat and when they saw that I had developed a swollen stomach, one of them said they should bayonet me, which they did on my navel”¹⁵⁷

¹⁵⁴ Kangboi Nyallay, TRC statement, Sahn Bumpe, Bo District, 4 February 2003.

¹⁵⁵ TRC confidential statement recorded in Koidu Town, Kono; 12 December 2002.

¹⁵⁶ Confidential testimony received during TRC closed hearings in Moyamba District, 11 June 2003.

¹⁵⁷ Confidential testimony received during TRC closed hearings in Makeni Town, 28 May 2003.

185. Children testified of the horrors of being forced to participate in cannibalism:

“On 6 January 1999, RUF and SLA rebels attacked my house near Kissy Mental Hospital... they shot my sister at the top of her head and all her blood spilled over my body. I had wanted to cry, but they told me that if I do they would kill me also. The rebels also gave me human flesh to eat. After they have killed my sister, they cut off her head and they told me to dance and laugh; having done that, they released me.”¹⁵⁸

[and]

“On 17 June 1999, my friends and I went to Sittia to buy cassava. I was fourteen years old then. We were caught by the Kamajors on the way... while we were there they told us to sit under the sun... they questioned us, asking “why did our parents send us to buy cassava at a time of war?” We said it was because of hunger... While we were sitting a Kamajor by the name of Mboi came and took one of our brothers under a palm tree in a corner and killed him, cooked his body and served it as food. They gave it to us to eat, but we refused their food... they said they would kill us...”¹⁵⁹

186. Many children died while undergoing combat training in the hands of the armed factions. While the acts entailed in training were presumably meant to toughen children up as soldiers, they also doubled as forms of punishment for perceived wrongdoings. Children told the Commission of how they were forced to undergo various ordeals, including lying face up in the mid-day sun, crawling on the ground and having bullets whiz past one's head if it was raised even slightly, being made to go hungry for days on end and enduring sustained beatings and assaults.¹⁶⁰ One former child combatant told the Commission about his experiences with the RUF during training:

“I was captured in Kambia Town in 1999 and then taken to Madina and from there to Makeni. We the captives were held in Makeni for three months... we left for Madina-Wuke... we were to go for more training before proceeding further... We were not allowed to sleep in a house and had to wake up early in the morning as we also acted as their guards... Even during the course of the training, we were mercilessly flogged... all sorts of treatment were meted out to us. For instance, they hit us on our backs with sticks and kicked us all over our bodies...”¹⁶¹

187. Children also suffered psychological torture from the many atrocities they witnessed and were themselves forced to commit. They witnessed the killing of parents, siblings, peers, relations, community members and also strangers. Driven often into being the perpetrators, many of them have been damaged indelibly and will need long-term therapy to help them heal.

¹⁵⁸ TRC confidential statement recorded in Kissy, Freetown, 14 February 2003.

¹⁵⁹ TRC confidential statement recorded in Bonthe Town, 9 December 2002.

¹⁶⁰ See TRC interviews with former child combatants, Family Homes Movement, 7 August 2003.

¹⁶¹ TRC confidential statement recorded at Kambia Check Point, Magbema, 14 December 2002,

188. UNICEF, in its submission to the TRC, made the following comments about the legacies of torture against children:

“The wounds, both physical and psychological, inflicted upon children will leave permanent marks on them and their families, as well as on the entire Sierra Leonean community and indeed all of humanity. In some ways it is as if a new level of cruelty has been attained in this war, setting the bar lower than ever imagined...”¹⁶²

KILLING

189. Thousands of children were killed during the conflict in Sierra Leone. Given their physical weaknesses and their vulnerability, they were often the first to die. While children were deliberately targeted by the armed forces, hunted down and killed, many also died in the crossfire. Others died because of their injuries and the fact that they had no access to any health care. A witness who testified before the Commission said the following:

“It was during the January 1999 invasion of Freetown, in the evening of a Wednesday. There was a curfew and we were all sitting together as a family in our house. We were discussing on how to get a safer place to hide, when we heard the sound of gunshots coming from the Mabela end where the rebels and ECOMOG soldiers were fighting... We were about to dash down on the floor, when I noticed that [my sister] Adamsay had been shot. After we went to rescue her, she died a few minutes later.”¹⁶³

190. According to UNICEF, in its commentary on the killing of children:

“Children were routinely and relentlessly targets of summary killings by rebel forces and pro-government troops throughout the war, in flagrant violation of the international law... Children became victims of both deliberate and arbitrary killings, which often were the final steps in a barrage of other violations they suffered. Abducted children were tortured, sexually abused, forced to commit heinous violations against others, mutilated or amputated and finally killed.”¹⁶⁴

191. UNICEF cited the following examples of mass suffering on the part of children in its submission:

“Between 15 and 24 February 1998 alone, 111 children were killed in the Bo area during rebel RUF / AFRC attacks. 1 April and 20 June 1998, out of 265 war-wounded patients brought to Connaught Hospital in Freetown, one quarter were children.”¹⁶⁵

¹⁶² See UNICEF submission to TRC, at page 2.

¹⁶³ TRC confidential statement recorded in Freetown West I, 7 December 2002.

¹⁶⁴ See UNICEF submission to TRC, at page 7.

¹⁶⁵ See UNICEF submission to TRC, at page 7.

192. Many children died as a result of the chaos that ensued when the armed factions launched attacks, either on their villages or on the diamond fields. A family member who testified of her son's death had this to say:

"Since the start of the war, I never had any problem that directly affected me until when the Kamajors took over Tongo Field and killed my son Gibril, who was 17 years old, in 1998. This occurred as a result of an attack made by the Kamajors against Tongo diamond fields... we decided to run... my son suggested that he go to our house and collect my belongings and money... According to one old man, Pa Santigie, with whom we were all residing in the same house, my son succeeded in reaching and packing some of the properties... just on the height of leaving, the Kamajors came along and cutlashed him until he died."¹⁶⁶

193. When villages were attacked, most of the villagers would flee from the conflict as their houses were burnt. Many lost their lives in the midst of trying to escape. A witness who testified to the Commission had this to say:

"I was living in a village called Mamusa... On 2 December 1998, we heard that rebels had attacked a village called Kabata... by then my wife was pregnant and at that time she was with her grandmother and our first child... As I was about to sleep, I heard the first gunshot, which was my first time to hear of a rebel attack in that village... Because I was in a panic state, my first intention was to run to my wife in the next village... On the way I met my wife in the bush, I asked her for the baby and she told me that the baby was with her grandmother... At 9 am the following day, I was able to see the grandmother, and I asked her for the child... I went to the house and found out that the house had been burnt down. When I entered the house, I saw chaff and some tiny bones. The child was burnt in the house. The child was exactly 10 months old at that time. He was born on 3 February 1998 and killed on 3 December 1998."¹⁶⁷

194. Many families attempted to stop the killing of their children upon being attacked, often losing their own lives in the process. Children were also forced to witness the brutal killing of their own family members. A young girl, who was only eight years old at the time, described the brutal killing of her family members:

"One day in late 1991, we were hiding together with my step-mother, my brothers, my father and many other people. The rebels attacked us by surprise, selected people among us... together with my brothers, father and step mother, making a total of eight, took them away few yards from us... and fired them all... buried them in one place. Even today, I can remember where they were all buried..."¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁶ TRC confidential statement recorded in Masongbala Chiefdom, 13 January 2003.

¹⁶⁷ Hassan G. Kanu, testimony during TRC public hearings in Port Loko District; 30 April 2003.

¹⁶⁸ TRC confidential statement recorded in Telikoro Refugee Camp, 4 April 2003.

FORCED DRUGGING

195. Most members of the armed factions have admitted that they took a variety of dependence-inducing substances by habit. The Commission also received testimony of how children were forced into taking drugs, particularly before the onset of a battle or an attack. Testimony confirms that almost all of the commanders in most of the armed factions ensured that children were continuously drugged in order to keep control of them:

“...At the age of six, Commander Gbondema took me to Camp Zogoda for training. After my passing out, I began to go to the front... Before I was sent on the front, C.O Gbondema used to inject me with cocaine on my forehead; he also gave me marijuana and alcohol to drink...”¹⁶⁹

196. The dependence-inducing substances prevalent in the conflict included cocaine, heroin, cannabis, hallucinogenic drugs, gunpowder, “brown-brown” and an assortment of others. Children who appeared before the Commission told of how they were introduced to drugs and constantly kept in a drug-affected state. Many of them also testified to the acts they committed while under the influence of drugs:

“One night in 1997 armed SLA soldiers entered our house in Makeni and took me away. I was aged 7 at the time. I was injected with cocaine on my right hand by my commander Col. Martin. I still have the scar on my hand”¹⁷⁰

[and]

“Sometimes in 1995, whilst in the bush fetching wood, the rebels captured me together with some other girls. I was drugged with cocaine and asked to murder some villagers. I was also raped several times.”¹⁷¹

197. Most of the testimonies made to the Commission confirmed that children carried out the most atrocious violations while under the influence of these drugs. The capacity of children to take responsibility for their acts remains an issue open for debate.
198. The Commission has deliberately chosen to treat children neutrally as witnesses, seeking to understand their experiences as both victims and perpetrators. Both roles are reflected in the following statement:

“In May 1996, I was captured by the RUF in Koya and taken to Masiaka; I was given a heavy load to carry, and later an AK-47 gun and was trained to shoot by my boss. In Warayma, he ordered me to kill people and I did... I was later given a tablet, which made me see people like birds. I then became perfect in using the gun and killed a lot of people in every attack.”¹⁷²

¹⁶⁹ Confidential Statement; No. 4/150/7130 ; St Michaels Lodge, Lakka; 28 March 2003

¹⁷⁰ Confidential Statement; No. 1/150/994; Saw pit, Long Step, Freetown; 7 December 2003.

¹⁷¹ Confidential Statement; No. 7/143/7436; Moyamba Town, Kayamba Chiefdom; 29 March 2003.

¹⁷² Confidential Statement; No. 3/78/4507; Caritas, Falaba Road, Mafarki, Port Loko ; February 26 2003.

199. It can be argued that many child combatants still committed violations without having to be drugged. The heat and tension of the conflict, the group violence already present in the conflict and peer pressure could also act as powerful narcotics. Nonetheless, the issue of diminished capacity remains a key factor to be considered.
200. In most countries, children under the age of 18 are not regarded as having the legal capacity to be responsible for their actions (*doli capax*). The Rome Statute of the ICC uses 18 as the age of legal capacity and children's rights advocates argue that most national jurisdictions should be adjusted accordingly. It is highly unlikely that children under the age of 18 fully comprehend the consequences of their actions.
201. There is no doubt that the drugs did have an impact on children who have a lower threshold to withstand the effects than adults. Coupled with the conflict situation, peer pressure and fear of death, drugs are powerful inducements to commit the most heinous crimes.
202. Describing the violations that children generally suffer in conflicts, the United Nations has given the following analysis:
- “...More and more of the world is being sucked into a desolate moral vacuum. This is a space devoid of the most basic human values; a space in which children are slaughtered, raped, and maimed; a space in which children are exploited as soldiers; a space in which children are starved and exposed to extreme brutality. Such unregulated terror and violence speak of deliberate victimisation. There are few further depths to which humanity can sink.”¹⁷³
203. In examining the violations of which children were the victims during the conflict, there can be little doubt that the children of Sierra Leone suffered the most cruel and inhuman experiences at the hands of the armed factions. They were robbed of their youth, their innocence and their hope for the future. Many of them will never return.
204. Rape and sexual violence have scarred many of the girls for life. Amputations have ensured that many of them will never be able to lead a normal life. The Commission and the country are faced with serious overarching questions: Why the children of Sierra Leone? What did they do to deserve such fate? Their only crime was being children.
205. Many of those who have helped the Commission in seeking answers to these questions have advanced as reasons the innate characteristics of children: their vulnerability; their malleability; their capacity to be manipulated through peer pressure; the easy availability of light weapons which they can carry and their extraordinary ability to imitate adult behaviour. Of course a major reason is the fact that their lives were cheap and expendable to the cynical breed of war profiteers who drove the conflict forward.

¹⁷³ See United Nations Special Report; “The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children”, available at the following web address: <http://www.un.org/special-rep/children-armed-conflict/>.

206. Children, by virtue of being in a developmental process at their age, are very malleable. The transition from childhood to adulthood is a learning process that happens through teaching and also observation. Humans are conditioned to learn through these processes, which comes with the expectation that one eventually fits into society. Thus children are guided and moulded until they attain this desired state of social conformity.
207. The malleability and vulnerability of children were exploited by the different fighting forces in the country during the conflict period. Thus armed groups deliberately engineered children into becoming perpetrators, forcing them to commit atrocities or themselves be killed. Once they committed the violations, there was almost no way of turning back. Children were compelled into flouting accepted social behaviour and practices.
208. Children make obedient soldiers who ask fewer questions, generally follow orders and do as they are instructed because they are easily intimidated. Older soldiers are more independent and often hold opinions that are contrary to those of the leadership of the armed groups. They may question superiors, disobey orders or even desert.
209. Children, however, rarely exercise such options and under most circumstances seek to please their elders, for a variety of reasons. These include issues of safety, as well as attracting affirmation and attention. Their desire to please has often been exploited by commanders, who force children into committing the most egregious violations. Children have been rewarded by being given the most bizarre names, a sign of the warped nature of many of their commanders. Most of the names given to children glorified their actions and goaded them into committing even more atrocities. Some of the names of child combatants reported to the Commission included: "Merciful Killer", "Small Pepper", "Burn House", "Cut Hand", "Kill Man No Blood", "Dirty Box" and "Dead Man No Count".
210. Young children have no real sense of danger. Their immaturity also encourages them to take on additional risks. Their oblivion to the danger in a situation coupled with drug abuse meant that children could easily be exploited by using them in the most hazardous situations during the conflict. Commanders testified that small children were routinely used as scouts and in the front lines. Many lost their lives in this way. Some of these children have testified that when under the influence of drugs they had no fear or inhibition and committed many atrocities.
211. Children were easier to manage and maintain, especially in that they made fewer demands of their captors. They were also less likely to escape. Since many children were separated at a young age from their parents and familiar surroundings, the only home for many of them was the base of their particular armed faction.

212. Many of the abducted children cannot recall where they come from. The only family they have are the members of their unit or armed group. Their commanders took the place of their parents. Thus between these children and their commanders, as well as the fighting force to which they were affiliated, this nucleus had become their only “family”:

“By drawing children into their military organisations, the RUF and the national army deprived them of the protection, sustenance and authority of their families, communities and social institutions... the institution thus became their surrogate parents... Once within military institutions, the children came under the heavy and despotic hand of older soldiers and combatants... The military institutions took over the role of “disciplining”, or more exactly, manipulating these young minds to serve a variety of purposes.”¹⁷⁴

213. The proliferation of light weapons such as the Soviet-made AK-47 or the American M-16 has been advanced as a further reason for why children are used as soldiers. Long gone are the heavy weapons of the past that weighed tonnes and were very cumbersome, needing adults to manipulate and handle them. UNICEF has described the new, lighter weapons in the following terms:

“These weapons are very easy to use. The AK-47 can be stripped and reassembled by a child of ten years old. The rifles have also become much cheaper and more widely available. Since they have fewer moving parts, they are extremely durable and have steadily accumulated in war zones.”¹⁷⁵

214. In the particular case of Sierra Leone, child soldiers displayed an amazing aptitude and dexterity in using these light weapons, as evidenced during the demobilisation and disarmament period. In addition, easily available, locally manufactured instruments were used by the different fighting groups in the conflict, such as cutlasses, axes and knives as well as inflammable liquids such as petrol and kerosene. These local instruments and some of the inflammable liquids were quite familiar to many children, as they used them in their daily activities prior to the war. These everyday objects were converted into instruments of terror by the fighting forces. The ability of children to handle these instruments explains why, with very little training, children could become effective combatants during the conflict period.

215. Adults usually have the maturity to think through survival mechanisms in difficult situations. It is therefore possible for adults to attempt to escape when captured. Escaping is usually considered difficult for certain children and nearly impossible for the younger ones to conceive or carry out. As the war dragged on and the adults witnessed the senseless violations committed by the armed groups, it then became an increasingly attractive option for adults to attempt to escape notwithstanding the repercussions when recaptured.

¹⁷⁴ See Abdullah, I and Rashid, I.; “*Smallest Victims; Youngest Killers: Juvenile Combatants in Sierra Leone’s Civil War*”, in Abdullah, I. (ed.), *Between Democracy and Terror: The Sierra Leone Civil War*, CODESRIA, Dakar, 2004 (hereinafter “Abdullah and Rashid, *Smallest Victims, Youngest Killers*”), at page 243.

¹⁷⁵ See UNICEF, *The State of the World’s Children 1996*, annual report into the conditions for the upbringing and advancement of children in selected countries around the world, with a special focus on war, available at the following website: www.UNICEF.org/sowc96/2csoldrs.htm (hereinafter “UNICEF, *State of the World’s C*”, at page 2.

216. The death of adult combatants required that the numbers in the armed factions be maintained. Children became a useful alternative source from which to replenish soldiers, so that the prosecution of the conflict could continue. Thus, children became a ready and easily accessible pool of potential soldiers for the different armed groups. Some academics have corroborated this view:

“Why did the RUF and the RSLMF (or the Sierra Leone Army) use children in support and combat roles? What were the reasons they gave to support the recruitment of children? The first reason was the shortage of able-bodied male to fight for the RUF and the RSLMF. The high death toll, the wretched conditions of service, the meagre salary that forced some soldiers to augment their pay through looting or mining, the summary executions, and above all, the senselessness of the war, discouraged responsible adults from enlisting on either side. Unable to tap the labour of the adult population, the two main fighting factions turned to children and the under-aged. As the war progressed, more children and under-age combatants were recruited to serve in various capacities, so that by 1998, close to about 25% of the fighting forces were children and the under-aged.”¹⁷⁶

217. Most of the armed factions were deeply criticised for their use of child soldiers. Many have complained of the high level of indiscipline exhibited by them and the scant regard they had for international rules regarding the conduct of war and the treatment of civilians in war situations. It is highly unlikely that any of the armed forces that deployed child soldiers would have taken the time to deal with the laws of war and how civilians should be treated:

“The RUF, the National Army (SLA) and the CDF share one thing in common: they were highly undisciplined. They lacked clear ideological focus, *esprit de corps* or guidelines on the conduct of war. For the RUF, its membership, long-marginalised and alienated from mainstream society, felt no compulsion to conform to internationally agreed standards of war which protect innocent civilians, especially women and children... as the rate of its attrition among its combatants increased with the prolongation of war, the RUF gradually lowered the age-range of its recruits... There were no child soldiers amongst its ranks when the RUF entered Bomaru in 1991. Yet by 1997 when they occupied Freetown in alliance with the AFRC, half of their combatants were under-aged. The National Army (SLA) which was supposed to be the professional standing army of the country, behaved no better than the RUF... Like the RUF, the SLA also recruited under-aged boys to create an auxiliary army of irregulars... In character and behaviour, these irregulars were no different from the combatants of the RUF. The morale and professionalism of the army declined... The irregulars prosecuted the war with the same brutality and disregard for the civilian population as the RUF combatants. They became “sobels”: soldiers by day and rebels by night.”¹⁷⁷

¹⁷⁶ See Abdullah and Rashid, *Smallest Victims, Youngest Killers*, at page 242.

¹⁷⁷ See Abdullah and Rashid, *Smallest Victims, Youngest Killers*, at page 241.

218. Many children, particularly those belonging to the pro-government forces, have indicated that they wanted to fight to preserve their communities and their cultural identities. Many of the children, not unlike the adults they modelled themselves on, saw themselves as fighting for social justice, for patriotism as well as their religious beliefs. Many others also fought in order to revenge the deaths of their parents, brothers or sisters.¹⁷⁸
219. Such analysis is particularly true for the CDF, the pro government forces who also recruited children to fight during the armed conflict. During recruitment by the CDF, quotas were given to various communities to fill, as they were perceived to be carrying out their mission in defence of their communities and the country.
220. Children were made to feel that they were obliged to assist in the defence of their communities. In some instances, parents volunteered their children to the CDF, not only on “patriotic” grounds but also as a means of ensuring protection for their children.¹⁷⁹ Nonetheless, according to the United Nations:
- “It is misleading to consider [such forms as enlistment] voluntary. While young people may appear to choose military service, the choice is not exercised freely. They may be driven by any one of several forces, including cultural, social, economic or political reasons.”¹⁸⁰
221. In long, drawn-out conflicts, joining an armed group is sometimes the only way to survive the conflict. The adage “if you can’t beat them, join them” becomes the reality for unprotected children in conflict situations. The irony of this course of action is that armed groups did not provide the expected solace for children, because even as members they continued to suffer violations.
222. The Commission points out that the notion of children “volunteering” their services as part of war effort, as some of them did in the case of the CDF and the SLA, cannot be condoned and constitutes a violation of international law.
223. It is important to reiterate that children, as the most vulnerable group in any conflict situation, are entitled to be protected from war. In particular, they are not meant to participate in the conflict themselves as child soldiers or in any other capacity.
224. Regrettably, the armed factions in Sierra Leone violated the rights of children by forcibly recruiting them as child soldiers and compelling them to carry out acts of incredible violence. In addition children’s rights were continuously violated in a myriad of ways.¹⁸¹

¹⁷⁸ See UNICEF, *State of the World’s C*.

¹⁷⁹ See Simon Arthy, former DFID and EEC Reintegration Officer in the Southern Region, TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 8 August 2003. Mr. Arthy, who worked as a consultant for the UK Government’s development agency in the Southern Province of Sierra Leone, talked about his project to normalise relations between civilians and the CDF in the Southern Province. He stated that some parents had their children, especially male children, initiated into the CDF (Kamajors) because they felt that the magical powers that initiates were said to acquire on initiation, such as the non-penetration of bullets into their bodies, would help secure their children’s lives.

¹⁸⁰ See UNICEF, *State of the World’s C*, “Impact of Armed Conflict on Children”.

¹⁸¹ See Abdullah and Rashid, *Smallest Victims, Youngest Killers*, at page 241.

CHILDREN AS “VICTIM-PERPETRATORS”

225. The conflict in Sierra Leone forced children into assuming “dual identities” of both victim and perpetrator. While the Commission chose to treat children who had been involved in the conflict as neutral witnesses, the Commission was also determined to explore the fullness of their experiences in order to understand the motivations for what they did and whether they had the capacity to understand all of it. Examining their role as perpetrators is an important step in this direction. The Commission is not seeking to explore guilt; on the contrary, it strives to understand how children came to carry out violations as part of an important learning curve in preventing future conflicts.
226. In their roles as perpetrators, children became direct participants in the conflict and were involved in all aspects of modern warfare, ranging from serving as human shields, spies, messengers and porters to wielding guns as soldiers on the front lines and commandos in the jungles of the countryside.
227. Children witnessed the perpetration of violations during the conflict and in turn perpetrated gross human rights violations against others. Initially, they had to be coerced into committing abuses but soon many of them began to initiate heinous atrocities without having to be compelled to do so. After being absorbed into an armed faction, children often behaved absolutely without inhibition. Living in the violent reality of conflict soon deadened their senses, which were already impaired by continued drug abuse.

NATURE OF VIOLATIONS PERPETRATED BY CHILDREN

228. Child perpetrators carried out many of the same human rights violations to which they themselves had been subjected. They committed violations including killing, abduction, amputation, mutilation, extortion, looting and destruction, rape and sexual violence, abduction and forced recruitment, forced displacement, forced detention, assault, torture, beating and forced labour.
229. The commission of these violations by children needs to be put in context against the turmoil of the conflict-ridden world they lived in. They were compelled to carry out such violations in order to survive. Refusal to carry out an order was simply not countenanced. Death or other violent reprisal for refusal to carry out the order was almost instantaneous. Thus most children were forced to carry out violations or become the victims of violations. Their physical size and their incredible vulnerability made them succumb quite easily.
230. One recurring pattern to emerge from testimonies is that children often had to become even more ruthless than their captors in order to survive. Given the violent nature of the members of the armed group, a ruthless streak usually guaranteed safety and “respect”. Children learnt very quickly that the more violently they behaved, the more they would be assured of protecting themselves within their group and surviving. This was particularly characteristic of the loosely bound, unconventional armed groups such as the RUF, AFRC and the West Side Boys.
231. Many of the adults within the armed groups were incredibly depraved and used the children to play out some of their sick fantasies which had the effect of forcing the children into committing these violations watched by the adults, who derived a macabre amusement from it.

TRC



TRC researcher Gavin Simpson interviews a former RUF child combatant known as “Base Marine” near the town of Magburaka in Tonkolili District. Having participated in the disarmament and demobilisation process in Sierra Leone, “Base Marine” now runs an agricultural project for ex-fighters.

232. Peer pressure also played a major part in the violations committed by children. The need for group acceptance and affirmation ensured that many of these children committed violations. Conformity gave them a sense of belonging and pride, as their peers and their superiors lauded them for proving that they were not afraid to confront violence.
233. In any heterogeneous society, there are always certain groups of persons who are more vulnerable than others. They are characterised as “vulnerable” because they are more likely than others, to suffer negative consequences in the event of severe emotional trauma.¹⁸² Children are usually a class regarded as vulnerable as they are usually subject to greater risks in any conflict irrespective of which side they belong to. There is no doubt that the new characteristics and patterns of contemporary armed conflicts have increased the risks for children. Again this is certainly true of the conflict in Sierra Leone which destroyed the lives of children.
234. The Commission has found that the abduction of children by the armed groups and in particular the RUF and the AFRC and their forcible recruitment as child soldiers constitutes a grave violation of international law for which the leadership must be held accountable. The Commission also finds that the notion of children ‘volunteering’ to join the armed groups such as occurred mainly with the CDF but also in the SLA completely unacceptable as children do not have the ability or the capacity to ‘volunteer’. Simply put ‘they have no choice’. The Commission finds that the recruitment of children within the armed factions as soldiers constitutes a violation of international law for which the leadership must be held accountable. In the course of recruiting children as child soldiers, the rights of children have been violated.
235. The Commission condemns in the strongest terms the forcible recruitment of children as combatants. According to the United Nations:


“War violates every right of a child – the right to be with family and community, the right to health, the right to development of the personality and the right to be nurtured and protected. Many of today’s conflicts last the length of a “childhood”, meaning that from birth to early adulthood, children will experience multiple and accumulative assaults. Disrupting the social networks and primary relationships that support children’s physical, emotional, moral, cognitive and social development in this way, and for this duration, can have profound physical and psychological implications.”¹⁸³

¹⁸² See World Bank, “Empowering Vulnerable Groups” Empowerment Community of Practice Newsletter, December 2003 to January 2004. More detail can be found at the following web address: <http://www.worldbank.org/empowerment>.

¹⁸³ See United Nations Special Report; “The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children”, available at the following web address: <http://www.un.org/special-rep/children-armed-conflict/>.


EXPERIENCES OF CHILDREN WITHIN ARMED GROUPS

Figure 3: Annual rates of forced recruitment violations reported to TRC (comparing the violations of the four main perpetrator factions)



236. It is widely acknowledged that each of the armed factions, to differing extents, forced their abductees, including children, to become combatants. The graph in Figure 3, above, illustrates that the RUF forcibly recruited the highest number of combatants throughout the ten years for which the TRC recorded statistics. In the latter years of the conflict, the amount of reported incidents of forced recruitment attributed to both the AFRC and the CDF showed small increases.

Figure 4: Numbers of forced recruitment violations reported to TRC (according to the age category and sex of the victims)



237. The most relevant point about forced recruitment is that its victims were predominantly children. This aspect of the violation becomes most vividly clear from the graph in Figure 4, above. Boys between the ages of 10 and 14 years were disproportionately targeted for forced recruitment. The disproportionate rate of victimisation among boys in this age category leads to the conclusion that the armed groups deliberately sought to enlist them as fighters.¹⁸⁴
238. This section aims to paint a broad picture of the kind of life that a child combatant endured during the conflict within the main armed groups.

¹⁸⁴ More detail on violations rates and the levels of different violations experienced by children can be found in the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

REVOLUTIONARY UNITED FRONT (RUF)

Recruitment

239. The RUF was the first of the fighting forces to utilise child combatants in the conflict in Sierra Leone. In fact, there were even a few children among the RUF “vanguard” combatants who trained in Liberia in advance of the insurgency in March 1991.¹⁸⁵ Children had been abducted and enlisted by the NPFL faction to swell its own numbers as it fought the war in Liberia. The RUF copied many of the NPFL’s tactics and patterns of behaviour as its fighters were trained to enter Sierra Leone. Thus, from before the first shots were fired in 1991, Sierra Leonean children were drawn directly into the conflict. Having come into the country, the RUF deployed a strategy of “enlisting” civilians, including children, from the areas it entered.¹⁸⁶ However the RUF really stepped up this policy at the end of its ill-fated first phase of conventional warfare, when it transformed into a guerrilla force. From late 1993 until early 1996, the RUF conducted a massive campaign of abductions and the forced training of civilians and children to become armed combatants.
240. The Commission has encountered during its research some children who were so young at the time of their abduction that they could not recall how old they were. According to statements included in the TRC database, some of those abducted were as young as five at the time of their capture.¹⁸⁷
241. The RUF is responsible for the highest number of abductions of children reported to the Commission. It is also responsible for the largest number of children who were forcibly recruited into any armed faction.¹⁸⁸ The tally of 3,710 children who belonged to the RUF and who were disarmed and demobilised by the National Committee for Demobilisation, Disarmament and Rehabilitation (NCDDR) seems to validate the Commission’s figures. The RUF had the highest number of children amongst all the factions who participated in the programme.¹⁸⁹ Former high-ranking officials of the RUF have also confirmed the RUF’s policy of using children as soldiers.¹⁹⁰ M. M. Kosia, the RUF’s first senior General Staff Officer, gave the Commission an account of the RUF’s training that took place in Koindu and in various other areas of Kailahun District in 1991:

“When these areas were taken under control by these [RUF] people, a lot of civilians were captured or abducted and they were forced to undergo training... men, women – even old people and children”.¹⁹¹

¹⁸⁵ See TRC Confidential Interviews with former RUF “vanguard” commanders; Freetown, Bo and Kailahun Districts, June to September 2003. More detail on the involvement of “small boys” in the original RUF insurgency and in various other armed groups can be found in the chapter on the Military and Political History of the Conflict in Volume Three A of this report.

¹⁸⁶ See S. Y. B. Rogers, late Secretary-General of the RUF, excerpts of an interview contained in the “Children and War Newsletter” in *Africa Confidential*, 26 May 2000.

¹⁸⁷ See the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

¹⁸⁸ More detail on the violations rates of the particular perpetrator factions can be found in the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

¹⁸⁹ See the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR); submission to the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 4 August 2003.

¹⁹⁰ Jonathan Kposowa, former Adjutant General of the RUF and present Secretary General of the RUF; TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 23 June 2003.

¹⁹¹ Moigboi Moigande Kosia, former General Staff Officer-1 of the RUF, TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, 30 May 2003.

242. The primary *modus operandi* of the RUF in gathering child recruits was to raid the civilian population and separate the children, who would then be taken to the various training bases of the RUF.¹⁹² The RUF also attacked and abducted children from schools, especially in the provinces. Another strategy employed by the RUF, when they attacked and looted towns and villages, was to take children along with them as porters to carry looted goods. These child porters would eventually become child soldiers.¹⁹³ According to a former RUF official:

“Every time a town is newly captured, we expect them to bring back captives. Most of these captives they bring back are people they use as porters, and when once they came to the rear... that is the liberated zone... they would not allow them to go back to their area.”¹⁹⁴

243. Former RUF members have claimed that, at the initial stages of the conflict, many young boys voluntarily joined the RUF because of their beliefs in the cause of the RUF’s “revolution”.¹⁹⁵ Another reason advanced by the RUF was that many of the enlisted children were attracted and enticed by the looted goods they saw their peers in the RUF taking and keeping.¹⁹⁶
244. However most of the interviews conducted by the Commission with ex-combatant children in fact confirmed that the majority of them were abducted and forcibly recruited into the RUF.¹⁹⁷
245. The former Adjutant General of the RUF, Mr. Jonathan Kposowa, reluctantly confirmed the realities of abduction when testified to the Commission:

“These RUF commanders were so many that they needed small boys to be behind them or to use them as you know... or shall I say ... doing their odd jobs and just to follow them... or either their wives or concubines will ask them that they should capture or abduct small girls... to assist them in their houses.”¹⁹⁸

Training

246. The RUF organised child soldiers by gender into units, which they then called “Small Boys Units” (SBUs) and “Small Girls Units” (SGUs). Training of child soldiers was sometimes carried out at officially designated training camps. While some jungle bases like Camp Zogoda lasted for the duration of the RUF’s guerrilla warfare campaign, from 1993 to 1996, many other camps were temporary or transient in nature, set up purely to train a new batch of recruits and then disbanded when the combatants were sent to the front.

¹⁹² See, for example, TRC confidential statement recorded in Gbonkowallie, 20 February 2003.

¹⁹³ TRC confidential statement recorded in Freetown, 18 February 2003.

¹⁹⁴ Moigboi Moigande Kosia, former General Staff Officer-1 of the RUF, TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, 30 May 2003, at page 42 of the manuscript.

¹⁹⁵ Jonathan Kposowa, former Adjutant General of the RUF and present Secretary General of the RUF; TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 23 June 2003.

¹⁹⁶ Jonathan Kposowa, former Adjutant General of the RUF and present Secretary General of the RUF; TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 23 June 2003.

¹⁹⁷ See TRC interviews with former child combatants, Family Homes Movement, 7 August 2003.

¹⁹⁸ Jonathan Kposowa, former Adjutant General of the RUF and present Secretary General of the RUF; TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 23 June 2003.

247. The RUF seemed not to possess a standard training course or module. While by all accounts the RUF was said to possess a training manual that included ideological training, little evidence exists of children being trained using this manual or given lessons in the ideology of the RUF, particularly among the recruits of the later years of the conflict. In most instances, former child combatants have stated that they were taught only the RUF's reasons for starting the conflict, while other children have indicated that they were completely in the dark about the motives for their collective actions.¹⁹⁹ Of all the child ex-combatants interviewed by the Commission, only a handful have mentioned being given "ideology" lessons in between training. Ideological input and direction was always fairly arbitrary within the ranks of the RUF.²⁰⁰
248. In contrast, all of the former child combatants interviewed have confirmed that they were given some form of military training.²⁰¹ Their courses consistently involved being taught how to dismantle and assemble guns, as well as how to use them. Some of the children described the training they received:
- "At Madina in the Tonko Limba Chiefdom, we were given tough training. I trained along with the others... we used to run with heavy sticks on our shoulders. I was personally trained by RUF Colonel Emmanuel to operate a G-3 weapon with the Third RUF Battalion. After the training, which was very short, we do the hard running..."²⁰²
- [and]
- "We were taught a few things that included how to make an ambush, how to dismantle and reassemble your weapons in case of any blockage and how to shoot your weapon. It was after this brief training session that we proceeded to attack Madina-Wula in neighbouring Guinea."²⁰³
249. Mock battle scenes were sometimes simulated for the recruits. Again this element was not as a matter of course but remained fairly arbitrary. A female ex-combatant described some aspects of the training she received as a child:
- "After taking us to their base in Matru Jong, we were trained to become fighters for six months... in the mornings and evenings, we jogged for about 45 minutes... we were also taught how to crawl and other war techniques... and if anyone made as if they were tired, he or she was killed".²⁰⁴
250. There have been some reports of child soldiers receiving little or no training whatsoever before being forced into battle. Such cruel abuse on the part of the perpetrator groups contributed to the death of many children, as they were thrust into the heat of battle without understanding how to protect themselves.²⁰⁵ This situation was quite rare among the former RUF fighters who testified to the Commission, but occurred in all the factions at certain points, particularly when an urgent need for manpower at the warfront outweighed all other considerations.

¹⁹⁹ See TRC interviews with former child combatants, Family Homes Movement, 7 August 2003.

²⁰⁰ See TRC interviews with former child combatants, Family Homes Movement, 7 August 2003.

²⁰¹ See TRC interviews with former child combatants, Family Homes Movement, 7 August 2003.

²⁰² TRC confidential statement recorded in Rokupr, Magbema Chiefdom; 22 January 2002.

²⁰³ TRC confidential statement recorded at Kambia Check Point, Magbema, 14 December 2002.

²⁰⁴ TRC confidential statement recorded in Wardu Town, 5 March 2003.

²⁰⁵ TRC confidential statement recorded in Freetown, 27 February 2003.

251. Training seems to have been ad hoc and arbitrary, particularly with regard to its duration. While some RUF functionaries have alluded to a training manual stating that training was to last for six months, evidence received by the Commission suggests this timeframe was a very loose guide. Training depended on the particular conditions the RUF found itself in and could last anywhere between one week and six months.²⁰⁶ For instance if the RUF was under attack, training would be cut short as everybody would be sent out to the front line.²⁰⁷
252. The lack of organisational structure within the RUF was also evidenced by the arbitrary manner in which some commanders brought children for training. According to a former RUF official, individual commanders who abducted children could bring them singly or in groups for training. At completion of training, the same commanders would come to fetch them.²⁰⁸ One peculiarity of the hierarchy within the RUF was that the larger the number of child combatants a commander had under his control, the greater the prestige the commander enjoyed among his peers.
253. The RUF made no distinction in its training practices as to age or gender, so young boys and girls as well as adults were trained in the same manner. The general conditions that existed during these trainings were fairly spartan and only children who were really tough survived. According to a former high-ranking RUF official, children slept on bare floors, went without bathing for weeks and wore torn and tattered clothes. Also, feeding during this period was reduced to scavenging, since part of the training required the children to demonstrate that they were able to fend for themselves. The RUF training regime restricted food intake even where they had the children locked up:
- “Most times, these people are being starved... I can definitely tell you that they have to find their own food, even when they are locked up, there is nothing like food to give them... So the boys were starved on the base, even the SBUs... and then somebody had a leaf or paper wherein you just put one spoon for the boys... so some of them died... some were so thin ...²⁰⁹
254. The training was harsh and brutal and accounted for the deaths of a large number of children.

Command structure

255. The two children's units were run on a similar basis with very slight variations. In the case of the SBUs, on becoming full-fledged combatants, they were put under the immediate command of a fellow child commander.²¹⁰ The child commander would in turn report to the Town or Ground Commander,²¹¹ who was the overall supervisor of all the fighters in the area in which the particular SBU existed.

²⁰⁶ Jonathan Kposowa, former Adjutant General of the RUF and present Secretary General of the RUF; TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 23 June 2003.

²⁰⁷ Moigboi Moigande Kosia, former General Staff Officer-1 of the RUF, TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, 30 May 2003, at page 42 of the manuscript.

²⁰⁸ Moigboi Moigande Kosia, former General Staff Officer of the RUF, TRC interview, 30 May 2003.

²⁰⁹ Moigboi Moigande Kosia, former General Staff Officer of the RUF, TRC interview, 30 May 2003.

²¹⁰ Moigboi Moigande Kosia, former General Staff Officer of the RUF, TRC interview, 30 May 2003.

²¹¹ Moigboi Moigande Kosia, former General Staff Officer of the RUF, TRC interview, 30 May 2003.

256. The Town or Ground Commander liaised with and passed on orders to the Commander of the SBUs. Needs and instructions were subsequently passed down the line. The overall responsibility for running the entire group including the SBUs was vested in the hands of the regional or field commander for that territory, who had overarching powers. All authorisations and orders to the SBU emanated from him with the exception of the authorisation for an attack, which would be in the domain of the central command.²¹²
257. By all accounts, elevation within the RUF from the rank of ordinary member to an SBU Commander was based mostly on account of being recognised as a “ruthless fighter”, or in the jargon of the RUF “a wild boy or hard boy.”²¹³ In reality this recognition signalled the ability to commit human rights violations with complete abandonment. When asked the conditions for appointing a child as an SBU Commander, an erstwhile member of the RUF delicately described it as depending on when the child became:
- “... more criminally minded, that is, able to take care of certain issues that are required of a group, he is made a commander”.²¹⁴
258. According to a former high-ranking official of the RUF²¹⁵ there were other requirements that had to be satisfied before an SBU could be elevated to commander status. First was long-standing membership of the RUF and a demonstrated ability to carry out the mandate of the RUF. It is entirely unclear what constituted “carrying out the mandate of the RUF”, however. Finally, obedience and loyalty to existing commanders could guarantee an elevation.
259. The Small Girls Units (SGUs) were structured along the same lines as the SBUs. Both units received the same training as adult combatants, with girls being treated in the same way without any regard for their gender. The only apparent structural difference between SBUs and SGUs was that the SGU Commanders were drawn from among the older women of the Women Auxiliary Corps (WACS), rather than from among the girls themselves.²¹⁶
260. According to the testimony of a female former child combatant:
- “After the Kamajors attacked us, we moved to Jimmy Bagbo and were left in the hands of older women commanders who greatly maltreated us.... we were all trained to fight and given only a handful of dry gari per day... we were also sent to raid neighbouring villages to loot food... If anyone disobeyed you were cruelly beaten up.”²¹⁷

²¹² Moigboi Moigande Kosia, former General Staff Officer-1 of the RUF, TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, 30 May 2003.

²¹³ See TRC interviews with former child combatants, Family Homes Movement, 7 August 2003.

²¹⁴ Patrick Beinda, former RUF G-2 commander and prominent RUF representative in the Eastern Province, TRC interview at TRC Headquarters, Freetown, 18 June 2003.

²¹⁵ Jonathan Kposowa, former Adjutant General of the RUF and present Secretary General of the RUF; TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 23 June 2003.

²¹⁶ Jonathan Kposowa, former Adjutant General of the RUF and present Secretary General of the RUF; TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 23 June 2003.

²¹⁷ TRC confidential statement recorded in Bo District, 9 December 2003.

261. The WACS commanders also took orders from the ground or town commanders, who in turn took orders from the central command. Command responsibility for the violations and abuses carried out by child combatants lay with the adult commanders in the High Command of the RUF, given that almost every operation and military order, including those in which SBUs and SGUs participated, was directed by them.

Nature of discipline

262. "Discipline" within the RUF did not follow any all-encompassing rules and regulations. Former RUF officials have alluded to attempts to produce a manual for discipline, which failed due to a number of reasons connected to the general sense of indiscipline that pervaded the movement.²¹⁸ Thus, there were no clear-cut directives as to what constituted offences in terms of RUF rules and no evidence to suggest that there were regulations governing the conduct of child combatants, far less adult combatants.
263. The experience of child combatants was that they were punished arbitrarily for perceived transgressions. In their testimonies many children have indicated that punishments were arbitrarily applied in the guise of discipline.²¹⁹ Punishments took the form of beatings, torture, starvation, mutilation or branding and others. Killing was also a form of punishment, but it was supposedly reserved for grave offences such as desertion if apprehended.
264. The treatment of child combatants in the RUF was characterised by extreme cruelty. Living in an environment of total paranoia and oppression, where survival depended on being even more brutal than one's captors, led to the kinds of atrocities that Sierra Leone witnessed on such a terrifying scale. In the process, many children became hardened and immune to the savagery they were inflicting on others. They experienced a deep sense of dislocation and disjuncture from society. The scars that have been left lie deep and need urgent and concerted efforts to help them heal.

CIVIL DEFENCE FORCES (CDF)

265. The Civil Defence Forces (CDF) incorporated various ethnic groups of fighters into a national militia network supported by the SLPP Government of President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. The Kamajors, a reinvented secret society that recruited thousands of fighters across the south and east of the country, comprised the bulk of the CDF membership. Other CDF units included the Tamaboros in Koinadugu District, the Gbethes and Kapras in the other northern Districts, the Donsos in Kono District and the Organised Body of Hunters' Societies in the Western Area. CDF militiamen were initially deployed in and around their own local communities, but as the conflict dragged on they increasingly operated in other areas, sometimes far from their origins.

²¹⁸ Jonathan Kposowa, former Adjutant General of the RUF and present Secretary General of the RUF; TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 23 June 2003.

²¹⁹ See TRC interviews with former child combatants, Family Homes Movement, Lakka and Calaba Town, 7 and 8 August 2003. Most of the child combatants interviewed said that they were punished arbitrarily, perhaps when they did do something wrong but equally also when they did not. Thus an example could be for them to be punished for not carrying out an order (including an order to commit violations) or punished as a sort of vicarious entertainment for older combatants.

Recruitment

266. The presence of children as members of the CDF, particularly the Kamajors, has always attracted attention and has been a bone of contention for the Kamajors. The Kamajors have denied that they ever had child soldiers in their midst, although these denials have always been qualified.²²⁰ According to a high-ranking CDF official in the north, the Gbethes and the Tamaboros asserted that they too did not use children in their groups.²²¹
267. The Kamajors' claim that they did not train children as fighters was debunked during the post-conflict demobilisation and disarmament process. The NCDDR, which co-ordinated the registration of disarmed fighters, listed 2,026 children as having belonged to the Civil Defence Forces.²²² The overwhelming majority of this total was made up of child Kamajors. Indeed, the CDF put the second largest number of children of all the factions through the DDR process.²²³
268. Even before the DDR process began, efforts were made at leadership level to stop the CDF from using children as soldiers, further validating the presence of children in the armed group. In a public statement issued by the then Deputy Minister of Defence, Chief Hinga Norman, who was also a member of the National Co-ordinating Committee of the CDF, it was made clear that the initiation of children, which was a precursor to their becoming Kamajors, should cease altogether. Hinga Norman also demanded that children who had already been initiated as soldiers should no longer be used in battle.²²⁴ He further ordered that weapons should be taken away from children and the use of children by the CDF in undertaking security duties should be discontinued.²²⁵ All of these calls for remedial action put to rest the denial by the CDF that there were child soldiers in their ranks.
269. According to UNICEF, child recruitment within the CDF was often instigated at the behest of village elders, who were politically pressured to hand over a certain "quota" of children as soldiers or risk damage to their credibility within the community. The children themselves were often brainwashed into believing that fighting to defend their communities was their "civic duty".²²⁶

²²⁰ See Hassan Jalloh, former CDF commander of the Kamajors on the eastern border, TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 8 August 2003. See also Dr Albert Joe Demby, Former Vice-President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, submission to TRC Thematic Hearings on Militias and Armed Groups, August 2003.

²²¹ See M. S. Dumbuya, Northern Commander of the Civil Defence Forces, TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters in Freetown, 1 July 2003.

²²² See Executive Secretariat of National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR), *Total Number of Children Disarmed*, 9 September 2003.

²²³ There is a high degree of scepticism around the numbers of combatants who disarmed under the auspices of having fought for the CDF. Many writers speculate that the Kamajors purposely swelled their ranks at the time of the DDR process in order to obtain maximum possible benefits.

²²⁴ See Simon Arthy, former Sierra Leone-based consultant with DFID, the UK Government's international development agency, TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 8 August 2003. Mr. Arthy provided the Commission with a variety of documents reflecting Hinga Norman's public statements on actions to be taken to eliminate the use of child soldiers in the CDF.

²²⁵ See Simon Arthy, former Sierra Leone-based consultant with DFID, the UK Government's international development agency, TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 8 August 2003.

²²⁶ See UNICEF submission to TRC, at page 20.

270. Many male children were initiated into the Kamajor faction of the CDF at the request of their parents.²²⁷ The Commission noted that parents were often compelled to provide their children to the CDF, as they feared the wrath of the initiators and their Chiefs. Some children have indicated in their testimonies to the TRC that they “willingly” joined so as to protect their villages and towns from attack by opposing forces, but authoritative witnesses have confirmed that in most cases great pressure from their elders was brought to bear on them.²²⁸
271. In order to join the CDF and its Kamajor Society, both children and adults had to pay the initiation fee. According to a Kamajor member, some of the children paid a sum of four or five thousand Leones (approximately \$2) to undergo the initiation rites. In some cases, the initiation fees were partly paid in kind with items such as palm oil, chickens and rice by the parents. On completion of the initiation rites, the children and others were given amulets, which were believed to bestow magical powers of protection upon their holders.²²⁹

Training

272. While CDF combatants carried out most of their “training” in their respective home communities, the CDF faction also established major training bases such as Base Zero and the Gendema base during the effort to restore the SLPP Government in 1997 and early 1998. A unique feature of the recruitment and training of the Kamajors was the initiation ritual, which all prospective members had to undergo. The components for this Kamajor initiation did not derive from the age-old spiritual and cultural beliefs of the traditional hunting societies, as many Kamajors claimed. On the contrary, the Kamajor society represented a cynical abuse of the good faith of its initiates, using techniques of physical and psychological manipulation for no other purpose than to assemble a fighting force. The leadership of the CDF, especially its initiators, created hysteria around the need for communities and their people to “protect themselves” by initiating their men folk into the Kamajors. People responded in their droves by putting themselves and their family members forward for initiation, sometimes even multiple initiations. Children in particular were coerced into joining the Kamajors, innocent of the fate that awaited them as combatants at the warfront.
273. While members of the CDF received rudimentary instruction in the handling and care of weapons such as machetes, knives and small arms, they often forfeited proper military training in favour of acquiring “protections”. Thus Kamajor initiates were tutored in the art of “magic” and herbs as part of their rituals, which promised various special powers when they went into battle.²³⁰ In reality these tactics were foolhardy and put many young lives in danger.
274. The phenomenon of initiation for the purposes of conflict was the creation of the Kamajors. None of the other CDF constituent groups had their own such ceremonies,²³¹ but some militiamen from non-Kamajor parts of the country, including the north, underwent initiations in their desire for “protections”

²²⁷ See Simon Arthy, former Sierra Leone-based consultant with DFID, the UK Government’s international development agency, TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 8 August 2003.

²²⁸ See Dr Albert Joe Demby, Former Vice-President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, submission to TRC Thematic Hearings on Militias and Armed Groups, August 2003.

²²⁹ See Simon Arthy, former Sierra Leone-based consultant with DFID, the UK Government’s international development agency, TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 8 August 2003.

²³⁰ Allieu Moseray, former combatant in the Kamajors, TRC interview at Telu, 13 September 2003.

²³¹ See M. S. Dumbuya, Northern Commander of the Civil Defence Forces, TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters in Freetown, 1 July 2003.

Command structure

275. Children in the CDF had no official command responsibilities within their units. They were usually placed under the command and supervision of older combatants who assigned various duties to them. A major complaint from civilians was that children were frequently deployed in general security duties, such as the manning of checkpoints.²³² Their adult supervisors in these roles would goad them into committing arbitrary abuses, particularly beatings, against civilians who tried to pass while going about their daily business.
276. Most Kamajors were loyal to the powerful initiators who brought them into the society, rather than to the commanders under whom they served. Inevitably a dual leadership structure emerged, which led to rivalries between initiators and commanders and eventually threatened the whole command structure. As the conflict progressed, some of the initiators became so powerful – at least in the eyes of those they initiated – that they began openly to flout the law and disregard the authority of the constituted chieftom authorities. They became involved in arresting people, holding kangaroo courts and arbitrarily punishing people. They used their Kamajor initiates, including children, as conduits or agents for these acts.²³³ Aside from the erratic orders of initiators, the children lived in an environment devoid of rules and directions. It proved difficult for the Commission to relate the violations and abuses of child Kamajors to any express strategies or policies from a coherent command structure.
277. Away from their duties in conflict, Kamajor children presented a whole range of challenges to the wider community, largely connected with their warped ideas of authority and their self-perceptions of power. Testimonies to the Commission told of school pupils who were Kamajor members refusing to take orders from their teachers to perform chores such as sweeping the classroom. The children would advance a reason connected to their society membership, for instance that it was taboo for a Kamajor to touch or come in contact with a broom. It is understandably problematic for communities to reintegrate such children into the normal structures and institutions of peacetime.

Nature of discipline

278. The Kamajors within the CDF had their own belief system, rules and regulations, which governed their conduct and to which they were usually bound by oath. Flouting these rules would incur a consequence or punishment, usually administered by initiators. Kamajors have testified that such punishment would extend to children as well. In serious cases such as killings, the cases were referred to higher quarters.²³⁴ Another Kamajor member stated that in his unit, unlawful killing of civilians led to arrests and jail for every member.²³⁵ Later in the conflict, however, initiates were not sanctioned for acts such as arbitrary killings, rape and looting, providing they paid to undergo a further initiation ceremony to “cleanse” them of their misdeeds. Such a response to abuses made a mockery of Kamajor claims to a disciplinary code.

²³² See Simon Arthy, former DFID and EEC Reintegration Officer in the Southern Region, TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 8 August 2003.

²³³ See Simon Arthy, former DFID and EEC Reintegration Officer in the Southern Region, TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 8 August 2003.

²³⁴ TRC confidential interview with a junior Kamajor commander, Pujehun District, 7 August 2003.

²³⁵ TRC confidential interview with a former Kamajor combatant, Bo District, 7 August 2003.

SIERRA LEONE ARMY (SLA)

Recruitment

279. The recruitment of children into the Sierra Leone Army started during the rule of President Joseph Saidu Momoh, who advocated for the use of vigilante groups in the prosecution of the war. President Momoh advised chiefs and other traditional leaders to organise the civilian population into vigilante groups to defend their localities, based on his prognosis that the Sierra Leone Army was not able to prosecute the war on its own.²³⁶ Communities were supplied with guns and ammunition accordingly. Vigilante fighters, including the so-called Sierra Leone Border Guards (SLBGs), were later integrated into the Army. The Commission heard the view that this method of recruitment was inappropriate and allowed unprofessional, unconventional soldiers to serve the SLA.²³⁷
280. However the major recruitment of child soldiers into the Sierra Leone Army took place during the reign of the NPRC government, whose military leaders felt that the “national emergency” at the warfront warranted it:
- “During the NPRC, the strength of the military was small and the strategy of the RUF was one that really wanted to allow it to spread its activities all over the country... and that definitely required the NPRC as a government to respond by heavily populating the Army...”²³⁸
281. A primary source for recruitment was those vigilante groups in existence from the time of President Momoh, most of whose members were no older than 15 years. The incorporation of teenage vigilantes into the Army was completely at odds with the standard policy of recruiting at the age of 18 years.²³⁹
282. Proper recruitment procedures were not followed given the urgency of the conflict situation and the need to bolster the numbers of soldiers dealing with the insurgency. The NPRC government responded with a massive recruitment drive, drawing mainly upon youths and children from the urban sprawl of Freetown.²⁴⁰ One of the main reasons for the recruitment of children was the failure of Army headquarters to prescribe a minimum age for recruitment.²⁴¹ The absence of proper screening procedures meant that children found their way into the service of the state, just as many RUF infiltrators and other unscrupulous characters also became soldiers.
283. Children joined the Army for a variety of reasons. For some, it was a means of finding some form of employment in a time of extreme hardship and poverty. Others were swept into service by the surge of youthful “patriotism” that accompanied the NPRC’s coming to power. By some estimates, up to 16,000 recruits, including children, joined the Army under the NPRC regime.²⁴²

²³⁶ See Honourable Mrs. Elizabeth Lavallie, Deputy Speaker of Parliament, submission to TRC Thematic Hearings on Militias and Armed Groups, Freetown, 19 June 2003.

²³⁷ See Honourable Mrs. Elizabeth Lavallie, Deputy Speaker of Parliament, submission to TRC Thematic Hearings on Militias and Armed Groups, Freetown, 19 June 2003.

²³⁸ Lieutenant Colonel Simeon N. Sheriff, officer in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), TRC interview conducted at Defence Headquarters, Freetown, 12 September 2003.

²³⁹ Lieutenant Colonel Simeon Sheriff, SLA officer, TRC interview, Freetown, 12 September 2003.

²⁴⁰ More detail on the NPRC recruitment drive can be found in the chapter on the Military and Political History of the Conflict in Volume Three A of this report.

²⁴¹ Lieutenant Colonel Simeon Sheriff, SLA officer, TRC interview, Freetown, 12 September 2003.

²⁴² Lieutenant Colonel Simeon Sheriff, SLA officer, TRC interview, Freetown, 12 September 2003.

284. During the conflict period, children continued to be recruited into the Army in the most bizarre circumstances. One method of identifying child recruits was through their participation in school sports or other physical exercise.²⁴³ Children would be subjected to activities such as long-distance running. Their ability to finish in an impressive time would see them awarded a place in the Army, as they were considered sufficiently energetic and fit for the job.
285. There were also reports of the Army capturing civilians, including children, and sending them into action against their will. Children were commonly deployed on logistics duty in warring zones.²⁴⁴
286. According to an Army officer who testified to the TRC, children were also recruited upon the death of existing soldiers and given the official roll numbers of the deceased without going through proper procedures of recruitment.²⁴⁵ Such “back-door” enlistment was one of the prime means through which senior military officials embezzled money during the war: the children were not paid for their illegal roles in the Army, so the salaries and benefits of the “ghost soldiers” whose places they filled were appropriated by the officers and top administrators who recruited them:

“By 1993, the war had become a profitable business for the senior military officials in the NPRC. Millions of dollars were requisitioned and allocated for the Army, which never found its way to its intended recipients. Some of them were “ghost soldiers, many of them irregulars who had never been formally registered as recruits into the Army... Apprenticed to an Army officer, these child soldiers never got paid or received any benefit. And the senior military officials rarely accounted for the allocations set aside for the irregulars who included the child soldiers, who were officially not on the Army pay roll.”²⁴⁶

Training

287. Most children who joined the SLA during the conflict period did not receive proper regimental training. The batch that entered under the NPRC received a three-month “crash course” instead of the nine months of training that was the standard minimum in the Army before the outbreak of the conflict.
288. The training regime was the same irrespective of age and included the handling and firing of weaponry. Training camps were situated in major centres such as Bo, Pujehun, Kenema, Zimmi, Daru, Kailahun, Baiwala and Freetown.²⁴⁷

Command structure

289. Child soldiers were absorbed into the normal Army hierarchy as private soldiers and as such did not have any responsibility for commanding other soldiers. On the contrary, as low ranking, vulnerable new recruits, many children were made to perform the dirty work of others and, if anything, suffered harsher application of the rules and procedures that applied to other SLA soldiers.

²⁴³ See, for example, the article in *The New Breed* newspaper entitled “Protests at Army Recruitment”, Freetown, 8 July 1992 (hereinafter “*New Breed*, Protests at Army Recruitment”).

²⁴⁴ See *New Breed*, Protests at Army Recruitment.

²⁴⁵ Lieutenant Colonel Simeon Sheriff, SLA officer, TRC interview, Freetown, 12 September 2003.

²⁴⁶ See Abdullah and Rashid, *Smallest Victims, Youngest Killers*, at page 233 and 234.

²⁴⁷ Lieutenant Colonel Simeon N. Sheriff, officer in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), TRC interview conducted at Defence Headquarters, Freetown, 12 September 2003.

Nature of discipline

290. There is no doubt that the lax and inconsistent recruitment procedures of the Sierra Leone Army, particularly under the NPRC regime, allowed people of dubious character to enlist. The influx of unruly urban youths and the departure from the tenets of military professionalism inevitably had an impact on levels of discipline in the Army. SLA officers testified as to the context in which these shifts in the character of the Army took place:

“During the war years also, the cherished gate of the military was thrown open to good citizens, criminals and hooligans alike... in the hope of flooding the war front with enough manpower to prosecute the war. These undeserving individuals quickly exploited their uniforms and guns for personal, sectional and other selfish interests.”²⁴⁸

[and]

“Like I said, you really need to look at the age target of the recruits... and at the time we did not really have a mechanism in place to filter people, to screen people. We only looked at people who were willing... and those who came forward to say: “we can go”... Characters were not questioned at all...”²⁴⁹

291. This kind of recruitment brewed indiscipline throughout the Army. Military personnel complained that some of the recruits were very difficult to control and that the behaviour of the rebels against whom the Army was fighting also affected the conduct of soldiers at the warfront.²⁵⁰ A copy-cat syndrome developed in the conflict, whereby government soldiers started behaving in the same manner as their insurgent enemies.²⁵¹
292. Nevertheless military personnel up to the then Commander-in-Chief have claimed that despite all the problems of recruitment they were able to maintain combat discipline throughout the NPRC regime.²⁵² The Commission also received testimony that child soldiers were punished according to their physical size and that the punishments meted out were designed to be “corrective” in nature.²⁵³

²⁴⁸ Major-General Tom. Carew, Chief of Defence Staff, Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces, submission to TRC Thematic Hearings on Militias and Armed Groups, Freetown, 10 June 2003.

²⁴⁹ Lieutenant Colonel Simeon N. Sheriff, officer in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), TRC interview conducted at Defence Headquarters, Freetown, 12 September 2003.

²⁵⁰ Lieutenant Colonel Simeon N. Sheriff, officer in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), TRC interview conducted at Defence Headquarters, Freetown, 12 September 2003.

²⁵¹ Sergeant Jonathan Showers, officer in the SLA and formerly in the AFRC, TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown, 31 July 2003.

²⁵² See, for example, Captain (Retired) Valentine E. M. Strasser, Former Head of State and Chairman of the National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) from 1992 to 1996; testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown, 30 July 2003.

²⁵³ See Sergeant Jonathan Showers, officer in the SLA and formerly in the AFRC, TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown, 31 July 2003.

USE OF DRUGS AND OTHER SUBSTANCES

293. One prominent characteristic of the conflict that is often related to children was the apparent widespread use of drugs by each of the combatant groups. In particular, the Commission learned early in its operations of the wide scale on which drugs were administered to child soldiers, mostly against their will. In many quarters, the atrocities committed by child soldiers have to a significant extent been attributed to the influence of these drugs. The only specialist psychiatrist in the country, who witnessed the war and remained in the country throughout the conflict period, was responsible for treating many of the former combatants affected by drug abuse. He had this to say to the Commission:

“Drug abuse was used by all the warring factions and those controlling them as a sort of mind control [tactic]... wherein these young people... they give them drugs and tell them to commit the atrocities which they actually committed.”²⁵⁴

294. Numerous testimonies like these from ex-combatant children provide anecdotal evidence to corroborate the psychiatrist’s viewpoint:

“I was abducted in Makeni, injected with cocaine and sent for training at Kabala... After the training, I was sent on a mission to attack the Guinean troops in Kalia.”²⁵⁵

[and]

“... Before I was captured, the rebels shot my father and mother in front of me... and having killed them, one of the commandos grabbed me by the throat, tied both of my hands, cut parts of my body with blade and placed cocaine in it... I had no option but to join them because I no longer had parents”²⁵⁶

TYPES OF DRUGS AND OTHER SUBSTANCES

295. Some of the known drugs used include heroin or “brown brown”, cocaine, crack, cannabis sativa or marijuana or “jamba”. Cannabis was the drug most commonly used according to the Commission’s enquiries.²⁵⁷ The use of alcohol was also widespread during the conflict. Combatants commonly drank palm wine, beer, liquors such as whisky and brandy, locally manufactured “omole” and mixtures of these in great excess. A senior administrator confirmed that alcoholic drinks and drugs were staple fare in the RUF.²⁵⁸
296. Drugs were administered to child soldiers in various ways. Some were smoked, others added into food without the child’s knowledge. Various substances were snorted, interjected and drunk. Cocaine was administered by interfusion, which entails cutting open the skin and placing the drug into the flesh wound. Heroin was smoked and snorted. Other drugs such as pills were forced down children’s throats. Even gunpowder was administered to children, by mixing it into their food or through cuts made in their skin.

²⁵⁴ See Dr. Edward Nahim, Sierra Leonean psychiatrist and commentator on use of drugs during the conflict, TRC interview conducted at Kissy Mental Hospital, Freetown, 30 July 2003; at page 5.

²⁵⁵ TRC confidential statement recorded at Saw Pit, Freetown, 7 December 2002.

²⁵⁶ TRC confidential statement recorded at Lumpa Displaced Persons Camp, 6 February 2003.

²⁵⁷ See Dennis Luseni, *The Use of Drugs by Combatants in the Sierra Leone Conflict*, internal report prepared for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Freetown, 2004 (hereinafter “Luseni, *Use of Drugs by Combatants in the Sierra Leone Conflict*”), at page 4.

²⁵⁸ See Jonathan Kposowa, former RUF Adjutant General; TRC interview, Freetown, 23 June 2003.

AVAILABILITY OF DRUGS

297. The high levels of consumption during the conflict suggested that drugs were fairly readily accessible to the various armed groups. Dr Edward Nahim, the psychiatrist in charge of the government's mental hospital, attributed the quantities of drugs on the market to a total breakdown of regulatory institutions:

"These drugs were easily available... easily available in the sense that... because of the war, people smuggled a lot of drugs into the country... and then there was no control. The police couldn't function and the customs also couldn't function. So it was more or less like a free-for-all situation. Those who wanted drugs got them easily... sometimes even for free..."²⁵⁹

298. Drugs were brought into the country through the air and seaports, as well as through the overland border entry points from Guinea and Liberia. Sierra Leone became a transit point for drugs to be shipped onwards to Europe and America.²⁶⁰ Traffickers allegedly paid for shipping services with drugs, which was one of the means through which drugs came into the hands of members of the armed groups.²⁶¹ The primary alleged route through which drugs passed, though, was by land transport from neighbouring countries. A brisk barter trade was said to be in existence in places such as "Bo Waterside" and Kabala for drugs from Liberia and Guinea respectively.²⁶² Natural produce such as cocoa, as well as looted goods and diamonds, were exchanged from Sierra Leoneans for drugs, medicines, rice, livestock and other items from over the border.²⁶³ In addition, the Nigerian soldiers who arrived under ECOMOG were said to have brought various drugs, especially cocaine, with them into Sierra Leone.²⁶⁴

299. Describing the different scenarios, a confidential source told the Commission:

"I think some of the combatants brought in drugs, sold the drugs to the rebels in exchange for diamonds and money. So it was more or less an internal as well as an external trade. Internally, drugs were sold to the combatants and paid for with diamonds or money. Externally, the drugs were brought in and out as a transit point... to be sold overseas in Europe and America. So it was quite prevalent... and I think those engaged in the drugs trade made huge sums of money."²⁶⁵

300. Marijuana was grown and harvested on different farms all over the country by the different fighting forces. Cultivation of marijuana in some cases supplanted crops that could have provided a source of food for a largely starving population. It was easy to grow and became readily available and cheap throughout the conflict period.²⁶⁶

²⁵⁹ Dr. Edward Nahim, Sierra Leonean psychiatrist and commentator on use of drugs during the conflict, TRC interview conducted at Kissy Mental Hospital, Freetown, 30 July 2003; at page 6.

²⁶⁰ Dr. Edward Nahim, Sierra Leonean psychiatrist and commentator on use of drugs during the conflict, TRC interview conducted at Kissy Mental Hospital, Freetown, 30 July 2003; at page 7.

²⁶¹ Dr. Edward Nahim, Sierra Leonean psychiatrist and commentator on use of drugs during the conflict, TRC interview conducted at Kissy Mental Hospital, Freetown, 30 July 2003; at page 2.

²⁶² See Luseni, *Use of Drugs by Combatants in the Sierra Leone Conflict*, at page 13.

²⁶³ See Luseni, *Use of Drugs by Combatants in the Sierra Leone Conflict*, at page 13.

²⁶⁴ See Luseni, *Use of Drugs by Combatants in the Sierra Leone Conflict*, at page 14.

²⁶⁵ TRC confidential interview with a state security official, conducted in Freetown, 22 August 2003.

²⁶⁶ See Luseni, *Use of Drugs by Combatants in the Sierra Leone Conflict*, at page 2.

USE AND EFFECTS OF DRUGS

301. The Commission documented many instances of the violation of forced drugging, where a captive or child combatant was made to ingest narcotics, alcohol or another substance that altered his or her state of body or mind. According to the Commission's database, 25% of victims of forced drugging whose ages were reported were 10 years or younger at the time of the violation; 50% of victims with age documented aged 13 or younger; and 75% of victims with age documented were 17 years or younger.²⁶⁷
302. The Commission received a number of statements and testimonies at hearings regarding drug usage. According to a 14-year-old ex-combatant girl she "used to take about thirty 'blue boats' (pills), ate 'jamba plasas' (marijuana mixed in a sauce with local vegetables) and drank 'jamba tea' (marijuana distilled as tea) every day, except if they ran out of supplies."²⁶⁸
303. The Sierra Leonean doctor who treated drug users during the conflict and in its aftermath recounted some of his experiences:
- "... I admitted many patients. There were ECOMOG soldiers, there were Sierra Leone soldiers... child soldiers, civilians and most of them had drugs problems... During the January invasion and before any operation... that was a special operation... all of the frontline combatants were given drugs, either to eat, drink, smoke... or through injection, so that it will enter the blood stream directly... those that came to Freetown had cuts on their foreheads, which they rubbed with heroine and cocaine..."²⁶⁹
304. While drugs were initially administered to children by force, it is quite likely that the scenario changed later on in the conflict. Many children began taking drugs voluntarily, as a matter of habit or dependency. They were guaranteed easy access and their commanders were likely only to encourage them. The former Adjutant General of the RUF testified that as the conflict continued, so the trend evolved, with commanders forcing children to keep taking drugs after introducing them to the habit.²⁷⁰
305. In all probability the intention of commanders who administered drugs to children was to keep control of them so as to ensure compliance with orders regarding combat and the commission of violations. Drugs made the children more malleable and, in some instances, more liable to carry out acts of horrendous violence. Of greatest importance appears to have been the altered state of reality in which children found themselves. Having been abducted and removed from familiar surroundings, subjected to brutality and denied the chance to express themselves as children, their experiences were already cruelly intoxicating. Drugs merely enhanced the sense of emotional isolation and oppression that most children felt in the captivity of the armed factions.

²⁶⁷ More detail can be found in the Statistical Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

²⁶⁸ See TRC interviews with former child combatants, Family Homes Movement, 7 August 2003.

²⁶⁹ Dr. Edward Nahim, Sierra Leonean psychiatrist and commentator on use of drugs, TRC interview conducted at Kissy Mental Hospital, Freetown, 30 July 2003; at pages 8 and 9.

²⁷⁰ Jonathan Kposowa, former Adjutant General of the RUF and present Secretary General of the RUF; TRC interview conducted at TRC Headquarters, Freetown; 23 June 2003.

306. The doctor at Sierra Leone's state mental hospital shared his diagnosis of the problems that drug use during the conflict has caused:

"Whenever you take drugs... it doesn't matter whether it is marijuana, alcohol, heroine or cocaine, the effect is the same. What happens is that you become confused... you cannot concentrate very well. Your attention is not sustained... orientation for place and time is disturbed. That means you cannot even understand where you are, you cannot tell the time of the day or even the month...

So as you can see many drug users are in a state of temporary insanity. They don't have any judgment at all... they just walk by instinct and during that time anything you tell them to do... they don't know that what they are going to do is wrong... They just blindly follow instructions. If you say go and shoot and kill... those under the influence of drugs wouldn't have censure in their mind and brains... so in such cases, those taking drugs suffer from what is known as drug-induced confusion or psychosis... Of all the patients admitted to the Kissy Mental Hospital during the last ten years, 88% of them have been admitted for drugs problems..."²⁷¹

307. The leadership of the armed factions, particularly the RUF, must take responsibility for the high rate of drug abuse in the country. Refusal to take drugs on the part of a child captive or combatant was often accompanied by brutal beatings and starvation.

308. Testimony from many child soldiers confirmed that they were given drugs and then told to commit the most horrendous atrocities. Drugs were administered with contempt for the safety of the users and the civilians around them:

"Gunpowder was cooked and put into their food and drinks were given to them... to make them feel high... Before any operation... most of these frontline fighters were young children... they are either injected with drugs like heroin or cocaine and given gunpowder to drink... and some of them carry drink, which they rub on wounds in their foreheads and so on. So in that state... the drug is affecting their brains and in a state of temporary mental insanity... their concentration is poor, they cannot think or reason properly. They committed atrocities like burning of houses, mutilating people, killing and raping."²⁷²

309. While drug abuse in the RUF was the result of compulsion, drug abuse was a more entrenched problem in the SLA. Many child soldiers had indulged in drug use of their own accord in the urban ghettos before joining the conflict and they simply continued upon entering the Army.²⁷³

²⁷¹ Dr. Edward Nahim, Sierra Leonean psychiatrist and commentator on use of drugs during the conflict, TRC interview at Kissy Mental Hospital, Freetown, 30 July 2003; at pages 7 – 8.

²⁷² Dr. Edward Nahim, Sierra Leonean psychiatrist and commentator on use of drugs during the conflict, TRC interview at Kissy Mental Hospital, Freetown, 30 July 2003; at page 5.

²⁷³ Lieutenant Colonel Simeon N. Sheriff, officer in the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), TRC interview conducted at Defence Headquarters, Freetown, 12 September 2003.

310. The impact of drug abuse has been varied and destructive. The violations committed by child soldiers under the influence of drugs represent the worst of its manifestations. It must be remembered that drugs were administered to children, whose sense of reasoning is not fully developed and who are already fairly susceptible to manipulation, peer pressure and fear. No sanction existed for commanders who pursued the practice of drugging child combatants.
311. The Commission finds that all of the armed factions deliberately pursued a policy of forcibly administering drugs to children in order to loosen their inhibitions, spur them on to commit gross human rights violations and to participate in the conflict without fear. The Commission finds further that many of the children committed the most heinous violations while under the influence of drugs. The Commission finds that none of the armed factions has acknowledged the widespread use of drugs, nor expressed any remorse for the long-term consequences of prolonged drug abuse on individuals and on the future prospects of the country as a whole.

IMPACT OF THE CONFLICT ON CHILDREN

312. In analysing the diverse effects of the conflict, the Commission has found that wanton violence impacted profoundly on the lives of the entire population of Sierra Leone. However its impact was most detrimental on children.
313. Children were not able to escape the most devastating negative effects of conflict. They found themselves assuming centre stage as both victims and perpetrators. Children have been affected at all levels in the fields of education and health, socio-economic considerations and the political sphere. Children lost the opportunity to enjoy their childhood. At a time they should have been playing and having fun, they were handling guns and were forced to endure the most awful violence. The United Nations has offered this analysis:

“Many of today’s conflicts last the length of a “childhood”, meaning that from birth to early adulthood, children will experience multiple and accumulative assaults. Disrupting the social networks and primary relationships that support children’s physical, motional, moral, cognitive and social development in this way, and for this duration, can have profound physical and psychological implications.”²⁷⁴

314. According to UNICEF, which has worked with children in Sierra Leone for several years:

“The extent of the damage has yet to be assessed. When we speak of children and the impact of such violations upon them, we cannot talk only of statistics or of apparent physical consequences. We talk about attempts at destroying the very humanity that these children have been born with. We talk about not only violating their rights as enshrined in international law, but about denying them the very right to exist as what they are – children. We have an obligation to protect them against future brutality, to protect their basic human rights, and if at all possible, to bring back their hope in a better future.”²⁷⁵

²⁷⁴ See United Nations Special Report; “The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children”, available at the following web address: <http://www.un.org/special-rep/children-armed-conflict/>.

²⁷⁵ See UNICEF submission to TRC, at page 3.

DISPLACEMENT AND SEPARATION

315. One of the first consequences of any conflict is the massive migration of people that occurs as they try to flee from areas of violence to relative safety. In the course of this movement, enormous numbers of the population are uprooted. Those uprooted usually fall into two categories: internally displaced persons and refugees. Internally displaced persons, or IDPs, usually find temporary camps or safe havens within the country, while those who cross borders into neighbouring countries become refugees. Current figures estimate that more than fifty percent of all refugees are children.²⁷⁶
316. Displacement during conflict situations inevitably erodes and weakens many of the social and political structures designed to protect community members. When families are in flight, they can become separated easily. During the conflict in Sierra Leone, many children were separated from their parents in the chaos that followed attack or the threat of attack. A further cause of separation from family was the deliberate policy of abducting children practiced by all of the armed groups. Sadly many children have not been reunified with their families since the conflict ended. Many of them were taken away at such a young age that they do not remember who their family members are.²⁷⁷
317. UNICEF described the situation that many children found themselves in:
- “Particularly despondent were the children who had been recruited as young as seven and demobilised as teenagers. These children often were confused, disoriented, conveyed facts and information wrongly, and were frequently unable to tell the difference between fantasy and reality... one 10-year-old boy claimed he himself was twenty years old. Others gave conflicting and confused information about their places of origin or the last known location of their relatives.”²⁷⁸
318. Sadly many refugees find themselves fleeing from one situation of violence to another. It has been estimated that more than 75% of the refugees that have so far left their homes have fled from one developing country to another.²⁷⁹ Refugees have placed an enormous strain on countries that already have problems caring for their own populations. They frequently attract a hostile or violent backlash from host communities and governments.
319. Sierra Leonean refugees have experienced such a backlash in Guinea. In September 2000, President Lansana Conté of Guinea made a public announcement accusing all refugees in Guinea of being rebels and/or harbouring rebels.²⁸⁰ This speech resulted in attacks and violations against Sierra Leone refugees, including children, by Guinean authorities and civilians alike. Refugee camps were attacked and non-camp –based refugees were detained en masse. Many refugee children were raped and many were killed or died in detention due to the abominable conditions in which they were held. Many refugees fled back to Sierra Leone, only to suffer further violations such as abductions and sexual slavery at the hands of the armed factions.²⁸¹

²⁷⁶ See UNICEF, *State of the World's Uprooted children*, at page 1.

²⁷⁷ TRC confidential statement recorded in Kono District, 7 December 2003.

²⁷⁸ See UNICEF submission to TRC, at page 18.

²⁷⁹ See UNICEF, *State of the World's Uprooted children*, at page 1.

²⁸⁰ See UNICEF submission to TRC, at page 24.

²⁸¹ See UNICEF submission to TRC, at page 24.

320. Life in the refugee camps in Guinea was fraught with violations such as arbitrary arrest and detentions, police abuse and lack of freedom of movement. A major problem in the camps was the commission of sexual violations against refugee women and girls. According to UNICEF:

“Throughout their time in these camps, refugee girls as young as five became victims of rape and other forms of sexual violence at an astonishing rate considering the ostensible civilian nature of the camp.”²⁸²

321. Refugee camps are often squalid and inmates face severe deprivation. In this environment, children are most at risk to disease, hunger and human rights violations. In the camps children often suffer malnutrition and diseases such as scurvy, beriberi and pellagra. All of these factors contribute to high mortality rates.²⁸³ While no statistics are available as to how many children died during the conflict as a result of malnutrition, the UN Human Development Index has ranked Sierra Leone consistently in last place over recent years, particularly with regard to its infant and under-five mortality rates.

322. While displaced children are at greater risk than adults during conflict periods, unaccompanied minors face even greater risks. “Unaccompanied minors” are those who have been separated, lost or orphaned in the course of flight. UNICEF estimates that they probably account for more than 5% of the refugee population. While some children were taken in at the end of the war by extended family members, many others have found themselves languishing on the streets of Freetown.

323. Displacement is a harrowing experience for any human being. It is even more traumatic for children. In all cultures, one of the most important factors of societal existence is the cohesion of the family and community, and the degree of nurture and support that children are accorded. When support structures are threatened and subsequently destabilised, the foundation of the lives of children is put in serious jeopardy. According to UNICEF:

“Indeed, one of the most significant war traumas of all, particularly for younger children, is simply separation from parents... often more distressing than the war activities themselves.”²⁸⁴

324. Children in Sierra Leone not only experienced separation and displacement but also suffered related violations of an intensely harrowing nature, which compounded their trauma. These experiences have left scars both mental and physical. Regrettably many children do not have access to social and economic resources that could possibly assist them to deal with their lives and heal the scars of the past.

²⁸² See UNICEF submission to TRC, at page 24.

²⁸³ See UNICEF, *State of the World's CUprooted children*, at page 1.

²⁸⁴ See UNICEF, *State of the World's CUprooted children*, at page 1.

ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES ON CHILDREN

325. Internal conflicts usually have even more harmful effects on the country than international conflicts. Factors affecting the level of damage to the country include the duration of the conflict, the magnitude and geographical spread of hostilities and the nature of the warfare that has taken place.²⁸⁵ The eleven—year war affected the infrastructure of the country dramatically: the agriculture industry was destroyed; the wealth of the mineral resources was diverted and did not benefit the population; and the workforce was torn apart and incapacitated. In sum the war devastated the economy of Sierra Leone.
326. The conflict seriously affected economic activity, severely damaged the export base of the country, destroyed physical infrastructure and drained resources both human and capital, which were used to support war efforts. As such, there was a collapse in the revenue base of the country. Due to the war, by 1997, there was an 18% contraction in GDP, virtual stagnation during 1998, and a further fall of 8% in GDP in 1999.²⁸⁶
327. The capacity of the population to cope with the dire economic situation in the aftermath of the conflict is significantly based on the characteristics of the economy before the war. In a sense, it is necessary to look at the situation of people before the conflict and whether they were above the poverty index.²⁸⁷ Unfortunately in the case of Sierra Leone, the economy was already precariously placed in the 1980s, a state of affairs that was not helped by the adoption of the structural adjustment programme, which destroyed most of the social services being provided by government. The conflict has only served to make the poor even more impoverished.
328. Most vulnerable groups in the face of severe economic pressure, devise “household survival strategies”,²⁸⁸ or coping strategies. These strategies often rely on what is known as “job diversification”, a shift onto the labour market of household members who were previously not necessarily needed to work. Such a process causes changes in traditional roles within households. Children of course are always affected, as their parents send them out to contribute to the family income. Almost as a matter of course, children find themselves doing paid labour during and after conflict periods.
329. Traditionally in Sierra Leone, children have been involved in domestic work, which includes household chores in towns and agricultural work in rural communities. The conflict has led to the loss of breadwinners through death, disability or sickness, so children have been forced to become economic contributors and in some cases providers for their families. The presence of so many children engaged in trading and other commercial activity on the streets of Freetown and other large towns is a clear indication that children have taken an active role in income generation for themselves and their families.

²⁸⁵ See the War-torn Societies Project (WSP-International), an initiative supported by the United Nations, for a more detailed analysis of conflict damage indicators. The website includes links to a Sierra Leone case study at the following address: www.wsp-international.org/.

²⁸⁶ See the Institute for Security Studies, South Africa; *Profile of the Sierra Leone Economy*, including essential data on GDP and other economic indicators for the conflict period and beyond. More detail can be found at the website: www.iss.co.za/AF/profiles/SieraLeone/Economy.html#top.

²⁸⁷ See the War-torn Societies Project (WSP-International): www.wsp-international.org/.

²⁸⁸ See the War-torn Societies Project (WSP-International): www.wsp-international.org/.

330. According to the “multi-indicator cluster survey” conducted in 2000 in Sierra Leone, 48% of children were found to be engaged in unpaid work for someone other than a household member and 10% of these children spent more than four hours a day on such tasks.²⁸⁹ It was also revealed that in the same year, 72% of Sierra Leonean children were working in some capacity: the figure includes those involved in domestic and agricultural work.²⁹⁰ Clearly the war has forced many children into joining the workforce of the nation.
331. Other survival strategies utilised by vulnerable groups involve the sale or pledge of their subsistence and production assets, such as land and livestock, or their personal assets, such as jewellery. In a post-conflict period, many families also resorting to pledging their children as labour.²⁹¹
332. The practice of using children for the purposes of labour is not new in Sierra Leone. A custom had developed long before the conflict of poor or illiterate parents sending their children away, to be brought up by relatives or friends whom they perceived as being better off, or better placed to care for the children. It is similar to fostering children to people the parents believe have more to offer than they have, largely for material reasons. Local jargon refers to this practice in Krio as “mehn pikin”.
333. This system has being criticised because of the huge potential for exploitation:
- “...Generally [fostered children] do receive more severe beatings than children living with their mothers, and they perform the most physically arduous work. They receive less medical care compared to children with their mothers and their complaints of illness are often dismissed as faking to avoid work. Many receive little animal protein from their caretakers and are given food of poorer quality, such as the crusty, burnt rice at the bottom of the cooking pot. They must share a basin of food with large groups and with older, more competitive eaters... they receive few snacks, whether intentionally or through oversight. Foster children are punished frequently by food deprivation... leading many to forage largely for themselves... picking wild fruits, stealing... rates of malnutrition and deaths are highest among younger ones.”²⁹²
334. This informal practice of fostering in Sierra Leone is not strictly regulated. Its incidence is on the increase because of the conflict. In particular, children from the provinces, which include the most impoverished areas, are fostered to families in Freetown. According to the Government’s survey of 2000, 10% of all children do not stay with their parents even though they are alive. This issue needs to be further investigated in order to ensure that the rights of children are not abused in the process of trying to find better care for them.²⁹³

²⁸⁹ See Government of Sierra Leone; *Report on the Status of Women and Children in Sierra Leone at the end of the Decade*, November 2000, at page 60.

²⁹⁰ See Government of Sierra Leone; *Report on the Status of Women and Children in Sierra Leone at the end of the Decade*, November 2000, at page 61.

²⁹¹ See the War-torn Societies Project (WSP-International): www.wsp-international.org/.

²⁹² See Zack-Williams, A. B.; “Child Soldiers in the Civil War in Sierra Leone”, paper presented at the conference of the Development Studies Association, University of Bath; September 1999; see also the website: www.devstud.org.uk/publications/papers/conf99/dsaconf99zackwilliams.pdf.

²⁹³ See Government of Sierra Leone; *Report on the Status of Women and Children in Sierra Leone at the end of the Decade*, November 2000, at page 61.

335. While children were used as labour in the diamond-mining industry even before the war,²⁹⁴ there has been a noticeable growth in the use of children in the mines both during and after the conflict. Having tracked this worrying trend, the NGO World Vision made the following submissions to the Commission:

“The war aggravated the involvement of children in mining activities. In Kono District and elsewhere, many children were captured and conscripted into the RUF and AFRC fighting forces. Those children captured... were forced to engage in mining activities, where they were used to provide slave labour. These child combatants and other abducted children were ultimately seeking fortunes for their commandos. Many of the children and youth who escaped capture by the RUF were later recruited by the CDF, the Kamajors. The children who were with the Kamajors were later to become miners too.”²⁹⁵

336. As at June 2003, there were more than 1,300 children between the ages of 11 and 18 working in the mines. At least 8% of those registered as working in the mines by World Vision were aged eight or younger. World Vision also found that 91% of mining labourers were males, mostly engaged in the digging and washing of the gravel, while less than 10% of them were girls, who did the cooking and other chores.²⁹⁶
337. In its comprehensive survey produced in 2002,²⁹⁷ World Vision reported that 75% of the children stated that their main reason for working in the mining industry was to earn money. In terms of benefits that they had accrued, 43% said they were not realising much benefit from the mining activity, while 45% said they earned enough to meet their “basic needs”. When asked the type of problems they encountered at the mines: more than 40% of the children said they do not benefit much from the proceeds of the sale of the diamonds derived from their labour; 13% claimed that they did not get adequate food; 28% said they were overworked; 7% felt they were not being properly cared for; and 9% suffered frequent illnesses. When asked how long they planned to continue mining: 66% said they would continue until they found an alternative; 15% indicated that they would continue until they got enough money; 14% was unsure; whilst 5% wanted to continue until asked by their parents to discontinue. When asked other preferences they would pursue if given the opportunity: 44% were interested in schooling; 40% in skills training; and 8% in farming. Tellingly, only 3% were interested in mining.²⁹⁸

²⁹⁴ See World Vision; Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission on the occasion of the TRC Special Thematic Hearings on Children, 16 June 2003 (hereinafter “World Vision submission to TRC”), at page 3.

²⁹⁵ See World Vision submission to TRC, at page 3.

²⁹⁶ See World Vision submission to TRC, at page 5.

²⁹⁷ See World Vision Sierra Leone and African International Mission Services SL, *Report on children in mining activities assessment survey, Kono District*, published in Freetown, August 2002

²⁹⁸ See World Vision submission to TRC, at pages 10, 11 and 12.

338. The World Vision survey revealed that children are not benefiting from their continued stay in the mines. Describing the problems associated with the use of children as miners, World Vision has stated that:

“[Children] are clearly not in the mines on their own volition. This is clearly an act of child abuse bordering on exploitation. Many of these children have abandoned all educational pursuits, including acquiring vocational skills. There are children who are being used by their parents, other relatives and greedy crew bosses purely for their own selfish gains. These children have limited access to health care and educational facilities... most of the benefits from their mining activities will only benefit the financiers, who are in places far away from the mine pits. Ultimately, these children will be abandoned at a time when it will be too late to acquire any skills or return to any formal educational institution... thereby making them social burdens putting much demands on society.”²⁹⁹

339. Another direct result of the dire economic circumstances in which children find themselves is the number of young girls who have been forced into the sex trade as a means of survival. These girls largely account for the marked growth all over the country in the sex trade, which is still rife with abuses.

340. A major area of concern is the phenomenon of the child-headed household in Sierra Leone, which results from children having lost parents or guardians in the war. The loss of a breadwinner has meant that many children have had to become involved in economic activities at the expense of their childhoods. The government is so convinced of a high number of orphans in the country that it declared the relatively low figure produced by its own survey in 2000 as unrepresentative.³⁰⁰ Some of the reasons given for the low figure included the many orphans living in care systems or on the street without adult caretakers. Since the survey was a house-hold survey, these children were not counted. There are no accurate statistics on child-headed households in Sierra Leone.

341. The involvement of children in aggressive economic activities such as street trading, mining, domestic servitude and commercial sex work is disconcerting and impacts negatively on their rights to enjoy their childhood and access education. Not being educated will affect them dramatically in the future, as it will determine their future livelihoods. It is important for society as a whole to grasp the many adverse consequences of putting its children to work, as the government noted in the report on its household survey:

“Children who are working are less likely to attend school and more likely to drop out. This pattern can trap children in a cycle of poverty and disadvantage... Working conditions for children are often unregulated with few safeguards against potential abuse. In addition, many types of work are intrinsically hazardous and others present less obvious hazards to children, such as exposure to pesticides in agricultural work, carrying heavy weights and scavenging in garbage dumps.”³⁰¹

²⁹⁹ See World Vision submission to TRC, at pages 3 and 4.

³⁰⁰ See Government of Sierra Leone; *Report on the Status of Women and Children in Sierra Leone at the end of the Decade*, November 2000, at page 62.

³⁰¹ See Government of Sierra Leone; *Report on the Status of Women and Children in Sierra Leone at the end of the Decade*, November 2000, at page 60.

SEXUAL EXPLOITATION OF CHILDREN

342. Another aspect of economic exploitation suffered by girl children in Sierra Leone has been sexual exploitation. Sexual exploitation has included the exchange of sex for food, money and medicine. Sex has also been bartered in order to access humanitarian assistance, to which children are supposed to be legally entitled through the free provision of donor agencies and many of the United Nations organs. Sexual abuse by humanitarian workers has affected both internally displaced persons and those in refugee camps. A second aspect of sexual exploitation identified by the Commission is the wretched position that many girls find themselves in due to the conflict, forced to sell themselves for sex in order to make a living.
343. The Commission has noted the contents of the report on sexual exploitation in refugee camps as experienced by Sierra Leone girl-children and women, which was the result of the survey on sexual exploitation carried out by UNHCR and Save the Children UK.³⁰² The report found that sex in exchange for money or gifts appeared to be widespread. The majority of the victims indicated that it was the only option they had in order to access money or receive food and other basic necessities. The majority of the children involved in this racket were girls between the ages of 13 and 18 years. Girls between the ages of four and 12 were also reported as being sexually harassed, either verbally or through the groping of their buttocks, breasts or genitals.
344. In describing the scenario, UNICEF provided the following insight:
- “Each refugee camp contains several “ghettos” or drug bars... and brothels where men go to exchange money or goods for sex, often with minor girls.”³⁰³
345. The survey found that those most vulnerable to sexual exploitation were unaccompanied children, children in child-headed households, orphaned children, children alone or in foster care, children living with extended family members and children living with single parents.³⁰⁴
346. Items and services such as oil, bulgur, wheat, tarpaulin or plastic sheeting, medicines, transport, ration cards, loans, education courses, skills training, jobs and other basic services were exchanged for sex with girls.
347. The report indicates that it was the relatively prosperous elite, including the UN staff, peacekeepers, aid and NGO workers, whose resources were considerably more than those of the refugees, who frequently exploited the extreme disparity surrounding the refugee population by using the very humanitarian aid and services intended to benefit them as a tool for exploitation.³⁰⁵ These workers used their positions to withhold services that were meant to benefit children and others. Such services were held back and excuses made until sex was proffered, or demanded and given. Another group of persons that sexually exploited girls was, surprisingly, fellow male refugees who were appointed into caretaker or leadership positions among the refugees.

³⁰² See Save the Children – UK and UNHCR, “*Sexual Violence and Exploitation: The Experience of Refugee Children in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone*”, Geneva / London, April 2002.

³⁰³ See UNICEF submission to TRC, at page 24.

³⁰⁴ See Save the Children – UK and UNHCR, “*Sexual Violence and Exploitation: The Experience of Refugee Children in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone*”, Geneva / London, April 2002.

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

348. Other factors that contributed to sexual exploitation of refugee children were lack of livelihood options and consequent inability to meet basic survival needs, insufficient food rations and supplies, and pressure from peers and parents.
349. Outside the refugee camps, the main group of persons that sexually exploit girls are men in positions of power or influence, or those with recourse to enough resources to buy sex. Included in this group are teachers, religious leaders, NGO workers, government officials and expatriates.³⁰⁶
350. Describing this scenario, UNICEF commented as follows:
- “Sexual exploitation in Sierra Leone is far more common than documented in the report [by UNHCR and Save the Children UK]... The inherent power differential between a man with access to resources, however minimal, and a young woman or girl with less or none renders any sexual relationship between the two non-consensual sexual exploitation. In particular in the context of the horrors of war, the desperate poverty and hunger, and the consequent enormity of the needs of civilians, men in positions of power, both Sierra Leoneans and expatriates, have systematically taken advantage of this situation for their own sexual gratification. Hiding behind the cloak of words such as “prostitution” and “commercial sex work” lurks the reality of young women who are survivors of a sickeningly widespread pattern of exchange of desperately-needed goods and services for sex.”³⁰⁷
351. Many of the girls abused in Sierra Leone have suffered teenage pregnancies and have contracted sexually transmitted diseases as well as HIV / AIDS.³⁰⁸

IMPACT ON CHILDREN’S HEALTH

352. The health sector in the country was already in straitened circumstances before the war. It was further devastated by the conflict, with health care and delivery being steadily undermined as the general humanitarian situation worsened. Mass violations, coupled with the massive displacement of civilians, overwhelmed an already beleaguered health-care system. During the conflict, the country is estimated to have lost more than 50% of its health facilities, with the remaining facilities needing extensive repair and support.³⁰⁹
353. Describing the general state of health in the country in 2001, UNICEF said:
- “The protracted conflict has had a dramatic effect on the health of the country... Population movements, overcrowding and poor sanitary living conditions have exacerbated already high morbidity and mortality, and infectious disease, such as malaria, pneumonia, tuberculosis, bloody diarrhoea and HIV/AIDS... Routine childhood immunisation has almost completely collapsed in some areas of the country due to lack of access.”³¹⁰

³⁰⁶ See UNICEF submission to TRC, at page 23.

³⁰⁷ See UNICEF submission to TRC, at page 24.

³⁰⁸ See UNICEF submission to TRC, at page 24.

³⁰⁹ See World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Grant in the amount of US\$20 Million Equivalent to the Republic of Sierra Leone, for a Health Sector Reconstruction and Development Project; 22 January 2003, at page 5.

³¹⁰ See the UNICEF report on the conditions of public health and health care in Sierra Leone, 2001, available at the website: www.UNICEF.org/emerg/Emergencies_Sierra_Leone_CAP_2001.

354. The impact of the conflict on the health of children has been even greater than for adults due to children's innate vulnerability. Malnutrition was widespread because people were deprived of access to adequate food, clean water and health and sanitation facilities. Malnutrition continues to be a problem and is said to contribute significantly to the high infant mortality rates in the country.³¹¹ According to a report in 2001, 86% percent of pregnant women were anaemic, which has implications not only for safe motherhood, but also for immunity, growth and development of children. Due to lack of access to some parts of the country during the conflict, routine childhood immunisation almost completely collapsed leaving many children at the mercy of killer diseases.
355. Another impact of the war has been the massive destruction of the health infrastructure in the country, especially in the provinces, which have always been disadvantaged. Added to destruction is the lack of human resources due to the war. Some health providers left the unsafe provincial zones during the war for the relative safety of Freetown and to date have never returned.³¹² Their absence continues to impact on the welfare and survival of children, most of whom now lack access to health infrastructure and personnel.
356. Given the impact of the conflict on the economy, indigent families are finding it difficult to access basic health care for themselves and their children, even when it is available. The situation is most acute in the rural areas, where the greatest numbers of persons but also the poorest in the country reside. Thus health care has become one of the casualties of the conflict, placing the well-being of the country's children in constant jeopardy as its legacy.
357. All of these factors are responsible for the continuously high infant and under-five mortality rates, placed at 170 and 316 respectively per 1000 live births.³¹³ Furthermore, the country has an underweight, stunting and wasting prevalence of 27%, 34% and 10% respectively in children.³¹⁴ Finally low birth weights of below 2.5kg stand at 52.5% of children born in Sierra Leone.³¹⁵

Physical health

358. Another consequence of the war on the health of children has been on their physical and psychosocial health. Physically some children were wounded in the war with guns knives, axes and such like, which resulted in bodily injuries. Of particular importance in this category are those children who suffered amputations and mutilations in the hands of the armed groups. Some of these children presently experience pain and other general discomfort due to these injuries sustained, to the extent that some of them might need help for the rest of their lives. These children are the visible legacies of the impact of the war on the health of children.

³¹¹ See World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Grant in the amount of US\$20 Million Equivalent to the Republic of Sierra Leone, for a Health Sector Reconstruction and Development Project; 22 January 2003, at page 5.

³¹² See World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Grant in the amount of US\$20 Million Equivalent to the Republic of Sierra Leone, for a Health Sector Reconstruction and Development Project; 22 January 2003, at page 6.

³¹³ See Government of Sierra Leone; *Report on the Status of Women and Children in Sierra Leone at the end of the Decade*, November 2000, at page 11.

³¹⁴ See Government of Sierra Leone; *Report on the Status of Women and Children in Sierra Leone at the end of the Decade*, November 2000, at page 11.

³¹⁵ See Government of Sierra Leone; *Report on the Status of Women and Children in Sierra Leone at the end of the Decade*, November 2000, at page 12.

Psychosocial welfare

359. Children were subjected to many acts of violence and also witnessed horrific atrocities in the course of the conflict. Their experiences have impacted negatively on their psyche, leading to severe emotional and psychological suffering. Children's abilities to exhibit appropriate and acceptable social behaviour, rational thought, good memory, learning ability, clear perceptions and understanding will in many cases remain questionable.
360. According to the results of a survey carried out by a donor agency on a sample of children to assess the levels of violence and psychological trauma experienced as a result of the 6 January 1999 invasion of Freetown: 71% of the children saw pictures of their worst experience in their minds; 94% thought about their worst experience even when they did not want to; 72% were plagued by nightmares and bad dreams; and 76%, unsurprisingly, worried that they might not live to be adults.³¹⁶
361. According to UNICEF, some children in the Interim Care Centres were said to have exhibited intense fear, intrusive recollections, anxiety, sleep disturbances, nightmares, profuse sweating, hyper vigilance, lack of concentration and withdrawal from other persons because of their experiences. Other children displayed signs of aggression, were abusive, disruptive, troublesome, confrontational and found it difficult to form ties with people. There were also children who cared little for their appearance and personal hygiene.³¹⁷
362. In present day Sierra Leone, many children are suffering the social effects of altered relationships due to the death of family members, separation and estrangement from family. The breakdown in family and community structures and the loss of social values have affected children materially. Children have also felt the impact of destitution caused by economic loss and material devastation and the resultant loss of social status.
363. The psychosocial effects of the conflict have had a definitive impact on the children of Sierra Leone. The repercussions of their experiences are far reaching and long term and will require careful psychosocial support in order to help heal them. The overall development of the children of Sierra Leone has been affected and will need major intervention if they are to take their rightful place in the world. UNICEF indicated in its submission that:

"The long lasting repercussions on these children of the violations they suffered cannot yet be assessed."³¹⁸

³¹⁶ See Plan Ireland, Children in Disasters programme, "The Importance of Education in Disaster Rehabilitation – The Rapid Education Programme in Sierra Leone", 2000; available at the following website: www.plan-ireland.org/pdfs/childrenindisasters. In October 1999, Plan Ireland commissioned an assessment of the violence and psychological trauma experienced by 315 war-displaced children at four IDP camps in or near Freetown. In July 2000, it also carried out a "rapid" assessment of the psychosocial conditions of children in Moyamba District.

³¹⁷ See UNICEF submission to TRC, at page 19.

³¹⁸ See UNICEF submission to TRC, at page 17.

IMPACT OF SEXUAL VIOLATIONS ON CHILDREN

364. While many people knew of the war in the Sierra Leone and the amputations that had taken place, very few people knew that most of the affected women and girls had experienced sexual violations. The nature and extent of the sexual violations that women and girls suffered during the conflict remain as yet unknown. Most women and girls in Sierra Leone experienced sexual violations on account of their gender. UNICEF, in describing the impact of sexual violations on children, has stated:

“The precise number of child victims of sexual violence is extremely difficult to establish due to under-reporting and an absence of comprehensive medical statistics. Survivors may fear retaliation, stigmatisation or rejection, may experience guilt feelings, or may be psychologically unable to deal with the consequences of disclosure. What is clear however is that sexual violence during the Sierra Leone war was perpetrated on a horrifically wide scale, and in blatant violation of the precepts of international law.”³¹⁹

365. The consequences of the systematic sexual violations that girls suffered in Sierra Leone have ranged from trauma, unwanted pregnancies and abortions, the contraction of deadly diseases, physical and internal injuries, to miscarriages. Girls who fell pregnant not only gave birth to children, but also suffered the additional trauma of seeing their new-born babies dying. Many also lost their lives during child birth. A family member recounted the experience of a girl-child:

“On 6 January 1999... during that time, the rebels were on the run from ECOMOG troops who were clearing them out... the rebels took her away into the bush and she spent more than six months with them. On her return she was pregnant. She delivered the baby but the baby died...”³²⁰

366. Many of the girls were incredibly young when sexually violated. Many fell pregnant while not quite mature. One of the medical implications of pregnancy by persons whose bodies are not yet fully developed or matured are the injuries that can occur in the course of delivery. Examples of these injuries are Vesico or Recto-Vaginal Fistula (VVF or RVF), which entail a breakdown of the tissues between the bladder and the vagina, resulting in urinary incontinence. Unfortunately, this condition may become permanent if there is no access to surgical assistance. It is one of the greatest indignities that girl-children suffer as a result of the sexual violations in the conflict. Other injuries experienced include abrasions and tearing of internal tissues, which in turn increase the chance of infections.

367. According to a medical director who treated some of the girls who were raped and sexually violated during the conflict, many of the victims had contracted sexually transmitted infections or diseases (STIs or STDs), including gonorrhoea, syphilis, chlamydia and even HIV / AIDS.³²¹ For women and girls, all of these diseases, if left untreated, have grave repercussions.

³¹⁹ See UNICEF submission to TRC, at page 8.

³²⁰ TRC confidential statement recorded in Freetown; 16 December 2002.

³²¹ See Dr. Rashida Kamara, medical doctor based at Connaught Hospital, Freetown, TRC interview conducted in Freetown; 11 July 2003.

368. While there is an absence of statistical data to confirm the numbers of girls who contracted HIV / AIDS during the conflict, the existing information suggests that in all probability it is quite high. In addition, girls who have undergone female genital mutilation who have also been raped and sexually violated are at a greater risk of contracting HIV / AIDS due to the extensive genital damage done to them during the circumcision exercise.³²² The United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) has said that scarification caused by female genital mutilation increases the incidence of trauma and tearing during sex, which in turn exacerbates the possibility of contracting HIV / AIDS.³²³
369. It is estimated that altogether more than 16,000 children are living with HIV / AIDS in Sierra Leone.³²⁴ It is also estimated that there were 42,000 HIV / AIDS orphans under the age of 15 at the end of 2001, which is about 5% of the population and indicates a rise of 2% since 1997.³²⁵ The increase is attributed to several aspects of the eleven-year conflict: the migration of people, rape, the influx of peacekeeping forces, poverty, ignorance, aversion to discussing sex in some communities, unsafe sexual practices and the prohibitive costs of AIDS medication.³²⁶
370. Most girls have experienced the complete shattering of their lives because of the conflict. In the case of those girls who became mothers, early childbirth has prevented them from developing themselves in any meaningful way. They have been forced to stop schooling on account of their caring duties, which means that they do not acquire an education for themselves. Many girls have also stopped school because of early "marriage". Girls have been forced to curtail their own ambitions and aspirations because they have become wives and mothers before their time. Their childhoods have been unceremoniously cut short, as they have assumed adult responsibilities towards their children.
371. Sexual violations have therefore increased the level of poverty in which many girls live, as they have no training or opportunities to improve their earning skills due to the incapacities described above. They have been forced by circumstances to join the country's workforce as low-income earners, if at all. It is highly unlikely that their situations will improve, impacting adversely on their own lives and those of their children. The major effect of the conflict has been to plunge the girls into a never-ending cycle of poverty, which will attach from generation to generation.
372. In addition to all of the above consequences of sexual violations, most girls also have to face stigmatisation in their own communities. Girls have been rejected by their own families and have experienced their children being called "rebel children". The sense of rejection and isolation that such reception engenders in the minds of the affected girls has resulted in the re-traumatisation of many of them. Considerable numbers of girls choose to remain with their abductors due to rejection from their families and communities.

³²² See Dr. Rashida Kamara, medical doctor based at Connaught Hospital, Freetown, TRC interview conducted in Freetown; 11 July 2003.

³²³ See the United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), "Turning the Tide: CEDAW and the Gender dimensions of the HIV/AIDS Pandemic", New York, 2001, at page 7.

³²⁴ See the World Health Organisation (WHO), *Epidemiological Fact Sheet on HIV / AIDS and Sexually Transmitted Infections*, 2002 Update (hereinafter "WHO, *Fact Sheet on HIV / AIDS*").

³²⁵ See WHO, *Fact Sheet on HIV / AIDS*.

³²⁶ See WHO, *Fact Sheet on HIV / AIDS*.

373. UNICEF has attempted to put the impact of rape and sexual violations on children into context as follows:

“Gender-based violence committed against girls was more than an attack against the individual survivors; it was an attack against their families and communities. Indeed, it is an attack against their present and their future, destroying their ties with home, threatening if not destroying their hopes of normal family life and often taking away their possibility of having children. Gender-based violence is an attack against the survivors’ dignity, which they may never be able to regain. When committed on such a scale as was the case in Sierra Leone, it is indeed an attack against their very humanity.”³²⁷

IMPACT OF DRUG USAGE ON CHILDREN

374. According to the only psychiatrist in Sierra Leone, drug abuse in the country is out of control to the point that he considers it a medical emergency.³²⁸ Children between the ages of 17 and 18 are worst affected. The prevailing situation has been attributed to the failure of the police to clamp down on the trafficking of drugs in the country, particularly during the conflict period.
375. Particular mention has been made of the prevalence and widespread use of cannabis sativa or marijuana. According to Dr. Nahim:
- “Cannabis sativa is so commonly used or abused in Sierra Leone... that I don’t think people consider it a crime any more to use it... It is so easily available that all you want to do, if you want to smoke cannabis, you can go to any place where they drink alcoholic drinks. Nearby you can get cannabis easily available no deal... nobody will say any word. For less than Le 500, you can get a wrap that can make you feel high. As you can see, it is grown nearly everywhere in Sierra Leone today. You can get it anytime, anywhere, either for free or for a low fee.”³²⁹
376. The impact of the use of drugs in the conflict is reflected in the psychological, social and physical problems exhibited by those children who have become addicts. According to the doctor, the psychological impact of the drug has led to many children suffering from schizophrenia.
377. Socially, many of these children are having problems getting by at school, resulting in a decline in their performances attributable to their drug habit. Of particular concern are the adolescents in tertiary institutions whose schooling has been affected. Also, some children have become outcast and vagrants who sleep in the street, without money, employment or family care and who are likely to fall foul of the law.

³²⁷ See UNICEF submission to TRC, at page 7.

³²⁸ Dr. Edward Nahim, Sierra Leonean psychiatrist and commentator on use of drugs during the conflict, TRC interview at Kissy Mental Hospital, Freetown, 30 July 2003; at pages 2 to 19. The statistics and perspectives in this section are those of Dr. Nahim, unless otherwise stated.

³²⁹ Dr. Edward Nahim, Sierra Leonean psychiatrist and commentator on use of drugs during the conflict, TRC interview at Kissy Mental Hospital, Freetown, 30 July 2003; at page 17.

378. Physically, these drugs have affected one system or the other in the young person's bodies. A common example is the effect that persistent alcohol abuse, coupled with the use of a cocktail of drugs, has had on some young ex-combatants. Many of them display complaints relating to the malfunction of vital organs, such as the brain, heart and the central nervous system.³³⁰
379. In short, drug abuse has affected most children in the country, whether directly or indirectly, in an entirely negative way during and since the conflict.

STIGMATISATION, OSTRACISATION AND ISOLATION

380. A number of ex-combatant children are still bearing the brunt of their forced participation in the war. Their families and communities have rejected them because of their former affiliations with some of the armed factions and those violations they had committed while in the group. They are punished by their societies and "re-victimised" for having been forced into becoming soldiers in the conflict. Girls particularly have experienced both derision and rejection because they were forced to become "bush wives" or sexual slaves. In the case of those who came back with babies, both mother and child have been rejected and taunted. Ironically the society that failed to protect them from the violence of the conflict has revictimised them through not fault of their own. Sadly the fear of rejection has resulted in many of these children refusing to go back to their communities in the first place.
381. Many of the children victimised during the conflict have lost hope and faith in their society and have become enmeshed in a self-destructive lifestyle due to their total despondency. Others have ended up living rough and are now mired in the vices that accompany life on the streets. During the conflict, many children's lives became a constant struggle. Now, the war may be over, but for most children the struggle continues. An example lies in the experiences of this ex-child combatant, who was rejected by his father on his attempted return to the family in Freetown:

"When I came to Freetown, I tried to stay with my father... he rejected me and now I am staying in the streets. He said that he is no longer my father because I was a rebel... I tried to explain to him that it was not my fault... but he could not listen to me. I am now a chain smoker... I smoke cigarettes, cannabis sativa and have sex with prostitutes' everyday... I even drink alcohol."³³¹

³³⁰ Dr. Edward Nahim, Sierra Leonean psychiatrist and commentator on use of drugs during the conflict, TRC interview at Kissy Mental Hospital, Freetown, 30 July 2003; at page 18.

³³¹ TRC confidential statement recorded in Freetown, 5 February 2003.

THE IMPACT ON CHILDREN'S EDUCATION

382. The conflict fuelled the decline and disarray of what was already a dysfunctional education system. Armed groups attacked and destroyed schools and colleges, decimating the already weak infrastructure of education. In 1997 and for an entire academic year, children stopped schooling altogether due to the levels of tension in the country. By the end of the conflict, a significant number of school-going children had outgrown school age, while others had lost two to three years of schooling.³³² Today, many children ascribe their inability to access education to the protracted conflict:

“... We were with them until we were taken away from them by the Kamajors in 1996. Up to today, I did not get any education. I am a drop out in the village.”³³³

383. Inexplicably, schools and other infrastructural facilities were targeted and destroyed by armed groups.³³⁴ An assessment carried out by the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology in 1996 revealed massive physical damage to schools. Plenty of school buildings were burnt down, while others were looted leaving nothing behind. Furniture and fittings such as windows, doors and even sheet roofing were stripped off the buildings. Some of the armed groups used looted furniture was used as firewood. Other equipment and teaching materials were destroyed. The few buildings that survived the carnage deteriorated due to abandonment and lack of maintenance.³³⁵
384. Subsequently, another survey in 2001, entitled the National School Survey Report or NSSR, identified 3,152 schools with a total number of 4,854 school buildings.³³⁶ Out of these figures, the survey found that as many as 35% of classrooms needed full reconstruction, while 52% needed to be repaired or reconstructed.³³⁷ Only 13% were judged to be usable in the present condition in which they were found.³³⁸
385. The destruction of the conflict, particularly across the provinces, has therefore resulted in an inability to provide adequate school premises and facilities for children. As a result of their lack of infrastructure, some schools were forced to relocate from the provinces to Freetown and were only able to move back at the end of 2002. Schools were forced to operate on a platoon basis so as to cope with the number of children who had re-started schooling. The resultant chaos meant that most children in the provinces could not begin school on time. The phased return of normality after the war contributed to the late re-opening of schools in the provinces.

³³² See Plan Ireland, Children in Disasters programme, “The Importance of Education in Disaster Rehabilitation – The Rapid Education Programme in Sierra Leone”, 2000; available at the following website: www.plan-ireland.org/pdfs/childrenindisasters.

³³³ TRC confidential statement recorded in Pujehun Town, 28 February 2003.

³³⁴ TRC confidential statement recorded in Pujehun Town, 28 February 2003.

³³⁵ See World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Grant in the amount of US\$20 Million Equivalent to the Republic of Sierra Leone for a Rehabilitation of Basic Education; 2003.

³³⁶ See National School Survey Report (NSSR), 2001, as cited in World Bank, Project Appraisal Document for a Rehabilitation of Basic Education; 2003 (hereinafter “NSSR-SL report of 2001”).

³³⁷ See NSSR-SL report of 2001.

³³⁸ See NSSR-SL report of 2001.

386. The conflict also left in its wake extensive damage to teacher's accommodations, the free provision of which originally formed an incentive for teachers to go and teach in the provinces and the remote rural areas. Once again, children in these areas were short-changed, as it proved very difficult to attract trained and qualified teachers to live and teach in such areas without any accommodation or support structures. The area with the highest level of damage to staff houses was the Eastern district.³³⁹
387. The massive displacement that occurred during the conflict led to a situation where many people left the country, or migrated to areas of relative safety such as Freetown. Teachers were of course included among the exodus. In the NSSR report, the estimated number of displaced teachers accounted for 6% of the total teaching staff in the country.³⁴⁰ Therefore at the end of the conflict there was not only an imbalance in the concentration of teachers in certain areas but also complete loss of skills or "brain drain" due to forced migration.
388. Another negative feature in the aftermath of the war consists in the problems associated with the financial state of some parents and guardians. Many are unable to afford the cost of education for their children and wards. The devastation of the economy has virtually wiped out the earning and spending power of the average parents. As such children of school age were not able to attend school immediately after the conflict even where such areas were liberated. Currently there are thousands of children who are still unable to attend school for a variety of reasons.
389. It is impossible to measure the real impact of the conflict on children. In reality the consequences of the war are unimaginably diverse and widespread; they affect every facet of children's lives. While this section has attempted to examine the consequences on children, it is impossible to provide a complete picture of the effect on their lives. Nonetheless, anecdotal testimony and authoritative analysis can convey a sense of their experiences and provide us with an understanding of how best to shape our responses.
390. As expressed by the United Nations:
- "In countless cases, the impact of armed conflict on children's lives remains invisible. The origin of the problems of many children who have been affected by conflicts is obscured. The children themselves may be removed from the public, living in institutions or as is true of thousands of unaccompanied and orphaned children, exist as street children or become victims of prostitution. Children who have lost parents often experience humiliation, rejection and discrimination. For years, they suffer in silence as their self-esteem crumbles away. Their insecurity and fear cannot be measured."³⁴¹

³³⁹ See World Bank, Project Appraisal Document on a Proposed Grant in the amount of US\$20 Million Equivalent to the Republic of Sierra Leone for a Rehabilitation of Basic Education; 2003 (hereinafter "World Bank, *Project Appraisal on Rehabilitation of Basic Education*").

³⁴⁰ See World Bank, *Project Appraisal on Rehabilitation of Basic Education*, at page 8.

³⁴¹ See United Nations Special Report; "The Impact of Armed Conflict on Children", available at the following web address: <http://www.un.org/special-rep/children-armed-conflict/>.

TRC



School children make play during a break from classes in Makeni Town, Bombali District. Sierra Leone's education system was ravaged by the conflict and there are many daunting challenges to overcome if the educational needs of the nation's children are to be met.

CONSEQUENCES OF THE CONFLICT FOR CHILDREN AND RELATED INTERVENTIONS

391. This final section of the chapter examines the responses and interventionary mechanisms devised by various state and non-state actors in addressing children's needs after the conflict. It includes line ministries and agencies under the umbrella of the Government of Sierra Leone, as well as its national and international partners such as the United Nations and the Child Protection Agencies (CPAs). The present status of children after accessing these interventionary measures will be included in the analysis.

DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILISATION AND REINTEGRATION – THE DDR PROCESS

392. Following the restoration of the democratically elected government of Alhaji Ahmed Tejan Kabbah in March 1998, a number of important reform initiatives were introduced. There was widespread recognition at the end of such a tumultuous period of the conflict that a need existed to put structures in place to begin the transition to peace. One of these structures involved the process of demobilising, disarming and reintegrating former combatants, which was considered to be of the utmost importance.
393. The DDR process, as it was popularly known, began in July 1998 and involved ex-combatants from all of the armed factions including the RUF, the AFRC, elements of the SLA and the CDF. The overall objective of the DDR process was "to disarm and demobilise 45,000 combatants from the RUF, AFRC, CDF and SLA factions and support their reintegration into society".³⁴² The National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR) carried out this operation in three phases, as well as an additional interim phase that came after the second phase was unexpectedly disrupted:
- August 1998 to December 1998 First phase
 - October 1999 to May 2000 Second phase
 - May 2000 to May 2001 Interim phase
 - May 2001 to January 2002 Third phase.³⁴³
394. In total, 6,774 children were put through the DDR process. Of this number 6,261 were male and 513 were female. Along factional lines, the division was as follows: 3,710 RUF; 2,026 CDF; 471 SLA; 427 AFRC; 84 from other factions; and 60 non-affiliated child combatants.³⁴⁴

³⁴² See the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR); submission to the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 4 August 2003, at page 3.

³⁴³ See the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR); submission to the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 4 August 2003, at page 3.

³⁴⁴ See Executive Secretariat of National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR), *Total Number of Children Disarmed*, 9 September 2003.

395. After disarmament and demobilisation, the reintegration process started in February 2000. Children were divided into two groups. First, those below the age of 15 were sent to interim care centres in the care of UNICEF and their Child Protection Agency partners. These children were provided with services such as family tracing, psychosocial counselling, basic health care and, where possible, fostering and / or reunification. After reunification with their families or fostering, they were integrated into formal educational projects under the UNICEF-assisted Community Education and Investment Programme (CEIP).
396. Second, those between the ages of 15 and 17 were put in “group homes” or allowed independent living. They were provided skills training under the NCDDR’s Training and Employment Programme, which could last for up to nine months. During training they were provided with a basic monthly allowance of Le 15,000.00 and were also given training materials. At the end of their training, start-up kits were distributed to them. Some children were also put to work in agriculture and community-based initiatives. Although the offerings under agriculture were designed to cover crop production (food as well as cash crops), animal husbandry and fisheries, children were said to have opted only for upland farming and animal husbandry.³⁴⁵ In addition, referral and counselling services were provided. According to the NCDDR, children preferred to opt for skills training, primarily because most of them had never been to school or had very little education prior to the war. Some were also influenced by their parents to opt for skills training, whilst for others there was no formal school system in their area of reunification.³⁴⁶
397. There is no doubt that the DDR programme succeeded in its main goal of disarming and demobilising thousands of ex-combatants from all of the different factions in the conflict, thereby promoting peace and security in the country. Nevertheless there were problems with the programme in certain areas. The most glaring of these problems was the absence of girls in significant numbers from the DDR process.
398. It was estimated that about 30% of the child soldiers in the Sierra Leone conflict were girls, but that only 8% of them benefited from the demobilisation and reintegration programmes of the NCDDR.³⁴⁷
399. While many reasons have been advanced to explain the absence of girls from the programme, the reality of the way in which the programme unfolded did not allow for girls to participate properly. Most of the ex-combatant girls were considered to be “camp followers” and were not recognised as combatants in their own right. Accordingly they were not permitted to enter the DDR programme. Many other girl combatants, fearful of public exposure during demobilisation, refused to participate for fear of stigmatisation.³⁴⁸

³⁴⁵ See the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR); submission to the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 4 August 2003, at page 13.

³⁴⁶ See Executive Secretariat of National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR); Child Reintegration; 8 January 2004, at page 12.

³⁴⁷ See Legrand, J-C. Child Protection Senior Regional Advisor for UNICEF, West and Central Africa; “*Demobilisation and Reintegration of Child Soldiers: Why are we missing the girls?*”; paper presented to a conference on child protection, Bonn, Germany; March 2003 (hereinafter “Legrand, *Demobilisation and Reintegration of Child Soldiers*”).

³⁴⁸ See Dr. Kellah and Mr. Lansana, former officials of the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR), TRC interviews in Freetown, 8 January 2004.

400. Many commanders to whom the girls were attached deliberately prevented the girls from accessing the programme.³⁴⁹ It is clear when examining the practical side of DDR that gender was given scant regard by those who planned the programme. Between 1999 and April 2002, only 8% of the total number of released and demobilised children were girls and this number sank to 3% during the last demobilisation phase in November and December 2001.³⁵⁰ Commanders deliberately removed the guns from many of the girls and handed them to others whom they preferred, thus preventing the girls from entering the programme. One part of the requirements for accessing the benefits of the DDR programme was that you had to hand in your weapon first. Once weapons were taken away from the girls, they were sidelined.³⁵¹ Many of the girls therefore remained with their captors, unable to leave because of the lack of alternative sources of support, especially in cases where they had children.
401. Girls were marginalised from the DDR process, as it did not take into account the gender-specific roles played by many of the girls in the conflict. It was premised on the concept of male combatants and their roles. The girls with the armed factions were not merely “camp followers”, since many of them had been with the armed groups for lengthy periods and had performed multiple roles during that time. If one were to accept the definition of a child soldier in the Cape Town Principles, it would include “any person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to cooks, porters, messengers and anyone accompanying such groups, other than family members.”³⁵² Based on this definition, the majority of girls should have had full access to the DDR programme. While the girls had varying experiences, all of them had contributed in some way to the war. Many young girls started out as porters, later graduating to becoming fighters, as well as simultaneously acting as sex slaves, or “bush wives”, to their captors. Their very existence and the complexity of their situations were not considered in the conception of the DDR process and their needs were subsequently neglected.
402. Another contributing factor to the stereotyping that existed in the DDR process, leading to the exclusion of hundreds of females, was the nature of the images of war created and circulated by the media. It has been said, for example, that because young male children carrying weapons are visible, an immediate message about their plight can be conveyed, whereas young female victims of sexual violence are less immediately discernible and more difficult to relate to an existing image in one’s mind.³⁵³ The media has created a situation where we tend to associate the expression “child soldiers” with images of children carrying weapons and consequently to boys. Such one-track portrayals of the “child soldiers” issue in the media could also account for why girls in Sierra Leone were excluded from the DDR process.

³⁴⁹ See Dr. Kellah and Mr. Lansana, former officials of the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR), TRC interviews in Freetown, 8 January 2004.

³⁵⁰ UNICEF, Child Protection Report, April 2002

³⁵¹ See Dr. Kellah and Mr. Lansana, former officials of the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR), TRC interviews in Freetown, 8 January 2004.

³⁵² See Legrand, *Demobilisation and Reintegration of Child Soldiers*.

³⁵³ See Legrand, *Demobilisation and Reintegration of Child Soldiers*.

403. Logistics and geography also played a major role in the DDR process and contributed to the exclusion of many of the girls. In some parts of the country, children's camps were situated in close proximity to adult camps. One example of such a set-up was in Lungi in Port Loko District.³⁵⁴ Many girls had not been given permission from their commanders to demobilise, so they were understandably fearful of joining up in case their commanders should find out. Many commanders or "bush husbands" – deeply suspicious of the motives behind the NCDDR – declared their readiness to take up physical violence against these girls if they should disobey them and participate in the DDR process.³⁵⁵
404. Thus, while the DDR programme had a generally positive and rehabilitative effect on male ex-combatants, women and girls mostly lost out. While the DDR programme channelled assistance to selected combatants, it appeared to do so in a male-biased fashion. Meanwhile many of the girls who were designated "camp followers" found themselves in limbo between assistance programmes: they could not access DDR, yet they were also unable to access any services from the National Commission for Reconstruction, Resettlement and Rehabilitation (NCRRR), as they were not considered to be internally displaced persons. Unfortunately, girls in such a position were said to have outnumbered the "combatants" in the DDR process at a ratio of four persons to one.³⁵⁶
405. The absence of girls in such significant numbers from the DDR process contravened UNSC Resolution 1314 of August 2000, which demands that special attention be given to the needs of women and girls in the wake of armed conflict, including securing their rights, protection and welfare.³⁵⁷
406. A significant number of girls who were entitled to access education, skills training and other opportunities have sadly not acquired these skills or accessed potential educational opportunities. Their exclusion has compromised their reintegration into society. Their economic and social needs have not been addressed; their lives are especially difficult given the prevailing economic and cultural situation in the country. Socially, the girls would have stood a better chance of acceptance if they had acquired the necessary skills or education, as they would have been perceived as potential contributors to the development of their families and communities. Instead, they are often regarded as unwanted economic burdens on their families and society.
407. Based upon this analysis, there is a dire need on the part of the authorities to provide girl ex-combatants with fresh opportunities to acquire skills and education. While the Commission acknowledges that the NCDDR has now wound up its activities, it is essential that the government should take note of the omission of girls from its programmes and act swiftly to make amends. Other public sector offices, as well as international and local NGOs, should channel their activities to support the government in addressing the needs of these forgotten girls.

³⁵⁴ See UNICEF, Sierra Leone Country Office, *Child Protection in the Demobilisation and Reintegration of Children Associated with the Fighting Forces in Sierra Leone: Lessons Learned*, Freetown, 2003 (hereinafter "UNICEF, *Lessons Learned on Child Protection in DDR*"), at page 29.

³⁵⁵ See Dr. Kellah and Mr. Lansana, former officials of the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR), TRC interviews in Freetown, 8 January 2004.

³⁵⁶ See UNICEF, *Lessons Learned on Child Protection in DDR*, at page 30.

³⁵⁷ See United Nations Security Council Resolution 1314 on Women and Girls in Armed Conflict, S/RES 1314/2000, August 2000.

STREET CHILDREN

408. Another startling consequence of the war in Sierra Leone is the prevalence of orphaned, abandoned, unaccompanied and separated children, which has resulted in a dramatic rise in the number of street children in the country.³⁵⁸ Considering the widespread nature of violations such as displacement and killing in the conflict, one can only hazard a guess at the number of children whose families were destroyed by these violations. Thousands of children still do not have a home or family to go to and thus have found themselves in the streets. Unfortunately, there is no data on the number of children so affected.
409. Thousands more children live with their families but spend a large portion of their time in the streets. These children are mostly engaged in commercial activities and petty crime. Sometimes children are driven into the streets due to peer or family pressures, the latter often caused by disagreements with parents or guardians.³⁵⁹ A survey on street children and war-affected children found the following reasons for their presence on the street among its selected sample: 38% poverty; 24% displacement by the war; and 21% family pressure or disagreement.³⁶⁰
410. Two subtly different terms have emerged to capture the two principal categories of street children: children “in the street” and children “of the street”. The numbers of children “in the street” seems to increase steadily, especially in urban areas where children seek menial work, beg for cash and attempt to hawk their wares, ranging from cigarettes and face towels to fruit and drinking water. For children “of the street”, uncompleted buildings, markets, churches, mosques and other communal places have become their homes. They often compete with stray dogs for scraps of food. Street children are emerging as one of the major child protection issues in Sierra Leone, as their numbers appear to be remaining stable, if not growing, despite interventionary efforts.
411. In the survey sample of street children and war-affected children quoted above, about 80% of street children interviewed were male and 20% were female.³⁶¹ About 69% of street children and 8% of other war-affected children had at least one parent dead or missing, while 4.8% of the war-affected children were orphans with both parents dead.³⁶²
412. Life for children on the streets is unimaginably hard, continuously hazardous and prone to exploitation. The younger ones and the girls suffer from physical, sexual and psychological abuse. Children can be seen begging and hawking in the streets of Freetown and the provincial towns, which, in the case of girls especially, creates a pathway to involvement in other activities such as stealing and the sex trade. A study on commercial sexual exploitation reported that 60% of respondents to its survey of sex workers had been involved in street hawking or trading before they became involved in sex work.³⁶³

³⁵⁸ See Statistics Sierra Leone; *Rapid Assessment Survey for Street Children and other War-Affected Children*; report submitted to National Commission for War-Affected Children (NaCWAC), May 2003 (hereinafter “*Rapid Assessment Survey for War-Affected Children*”), at page vi.

³⁵⁹ See *Rapid Assessment Survey for War-Affected Children*, at page 47.

³⁶⁰ See *Rapid Assessment Survey for War-Affected Children*, at page ix.

³⁶¹ See *Rapid Assessment Survey for War-Affected Children*, at page vii.

³⁶² See *Rapid Assessment Survey for War-Affected Children*, at page vii.

³⁶³ See Lebbie, S. H.; “*Survival Strategies of the Girl-Child and Young Women: Commercial Sexual Exploitation in the streets of Freetown*”; Goal Ireland, Freetown, February 2000, at page 32.

413. Life on the streets can also lead children to engage in other forms of destructive behaviour, such as drug and substance abuse, criminal activity and confrontation with law enforcement officials. Many street children have been arrested during raids on urban hangouts. In addition, street children become prone to serious illness because of their exposure to infections in unsanitary living conditions and their limited access health-care facilities. Street life holds a certain irrational allure for some children, who believe that it guarantees independence from their often-troubled families and homes. Yet it is exactly this unbridled independence at such a formative stage of their lives that is the undoing of these children. The provision of guidance services to children and, of course, the concerted elimination of the factors that drive children onto the streets should be priority measures for the government and other stakeholders.
414. There is also a need for local councils, communities and faith-based organisations to be involved in the provision of support to these street children. Culturally, the African society has always been a communal society where children do not only belong to their parents but to the community at large. Such a sense of civic spirit was pre-eminent in Sierra Leone before the conflict. Individual Sierra Leoneans must endeavour to restore the communal ownership of children, so that street children can be nurtured into useful members of the communal instead of the perennial burden they are fast becoming.
415. The Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs (MSWGCA) told the Commission that it has established a taskforce for street children and a parallel programme on children in conflict with the law, to co-ordinate and monitor activities related to street children. However, there is no noticeable evidence of the impact or effect of these programmes at the time of writing.
416. A National Commission for War Affected Children (NaCWAC) has also been established under an Act of Parliament. It should be encouraged as it pursues its responsibility to facilitate the reintegration and rehabilitation of children affected by the war – especially street children – into normal community life.

THE NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR WAR-AFFECTED CHILDREN (NaCWAC)

417. The National Commission for War Affected Children (NaCWAC) was an initiative of the SRSG on Children, Mr. Olara Otunu, and was created in law in January 2001. It became operational upon the opening of its secretariat in March 2002. The major thrust of NaCWAC's work is centred on Advocacy and the Voice of Children, Policy and Institutional Links and Mechanisms for Children's Empowerment.³⁶⁴
418. To date NaCWAC has been involved in the provision of skills training and education for war-affected children identified by its implementing partners. It is also building what it has called "trauma healing centres" in different parts of the country. Laudable though these projects are, NaCWAC seems to have lost focus on the essence of its primary duties as enunciated in the Act that established it.

³⁶⁴ See the National Commission for War Affected Children (NaCWAC), Strategic Planning Workshop Report, Freetown, May 2003, at page 2.

419. NaCWAC has been duplicating the work that child protection agencies have been doing since the cessation of hostilities. The fact that NaCWAC announced only in 2004 that it was starting an advocacy project for street and amputee children is a clear indication that it had been preoccupied with issues unrelated to its primary duties before this time.³⁶⁵ NaCWAC needs to refocus on its primary objectives as they are spelt out in its empowering act and for which it was originally established.
420. An example of where NaCWAC, in collaboration with the MSWGCA and other stakeholders, can redirect its efforts is the issue of the urgent Child Rights Bill. The Bill presents an ideal platform for the streamlining and harmonisation of the nation's laws on children, in line with international standards. Advocacy towards the enactment of the Bill and sensitisation on other laws affecting children's rights in the country is presently lacking. It would be immensely helpful to the children and the country if NaCWAC were to fill the gap.
421. There is a need for both the MSWGCA and NaCWAC to define their respective roles vis-à-vis one another with a view to ensuring that no overlap exists. The two institutions must avoid any duplication of programmes and related wastage of funds, especially in the vital areas pertaining to war-affected children.

CHILDREN'S FORUM NETWORK

422. The Children's Forum Network (CFN) is an important tool for children's advocacy in Sierra Leone. Its members maintain a strong and influential voice on issues affecting children. The organisation ensures children's participation in national activities as is spelt out in the Convention on the Rights of a Child. Members of CFN were instrumental in producing the child-friendly TRC report.

UN ASSISTANCE MISSION IN SIERRA LEONE (UNAMSIL)

423. UNAMSIL is the first UN peacekeeping mission to have had staff deployed specifically in the fields of child protection and child rights issues directly in the office of its Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG). They comprise a department with a single, explicit mandate: the protection of children. The department became operational in January 2000 with a team headed by a Child Protection Adviser (CPA), joined later by a Child Protection Officer. The child protection office was placed within the SRSG's office specifically to ensure that children's issues would remain high on the mission's agenda throughout the different phases of peacekeeping and peace consolidation in Sierra Leone. Thus the CPA has direct access not only to the SRSG but also the Deputy SRSGs and senior UNAMSIL leadership.³⁶⁶
424. The CPA, through the medium of the SRSG's office, reports to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), UNICEF, and Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict (SRSG/CAAC) at UN Headquarters.

³⁶⁵ TRC interviews with Executive Secretary and senior staff of the National Commission for War Affected Children (NaCWAC); interviews conducted in Freetown, 9 January 2004.

³⁶⁶ Bert Theuermann, Special Assistant to the SRSG and Child Protection Adviser, UNAMSIL; TRC interview conducted in Freetown, September 2003.

425. The activities of the UNAMSIL child protection office have included the “mainstreaming” of child protection issues throughout UNAMSIL by: identifying key child protection issues; developing advocacy strategies on these issues; advising the SRSG; supporting the monitoring of violations of children’s rights by participating in the development and work of UNAMSIL’s conduct committee; and reviewing disciplinary standards and procedures for responding to allegations of sexual abuse and exploitation of children and others. The office also provides training in child rights and child protection, monitoring and reporting for all UNAMSIL troops. The office participates in the work of UNAMSIL Trust Fund, which includes monitoring existing projects and identifying new projects, as well as advising force contingents on activities and programmes beneficial to children. It is significant to note that the CPA is a member of the overall UNAMSIL Project Approval Committee.
426. The CPA as a focal point and an interlocutor has assisted government agencies, line ministries and child protection agencies in developing close co-operation with UNAMSIL in addressing children’s issues. The office has contributed to the shaping of the national agenda on children, for instance by providing support in strengthening the National Child Protection Network and NaCWAC and by assisting the MSWGCA in increasing its capacity in child protection at all levels. The CPA is a member of the Child Protection Committee and the Core Management Group of major Child Protection Agencies.³⁶⁷ The CPA contributes as a member of the National Steering Committee on Child Protection to training for the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces and Sierra Leone Police, with the main objective of ensuring that child rights and protection are incorporated into the regular training curricula of the RSLAF and the SLP.
427. UNAMSIL is involved through its outreach programmes in advocacy for the enhanced participation of children in the peace-building process. Thus the CPA is an ad-hoc member of the Advisory board for the Voice of Children. In conjunction with other stakeholders, UNAMSIL provides support and encouragement for children’s organisations like the Children’s Forum Network.
428. Finally, UNAMSIL has been providing technical advice and supporting the development of policies, procedures and activities for children’s involvement in the principal transitional justice mechanisms, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and the Special Court. UNAMSIL, with the help of the MSWGCA, UNICEF and other CPAs, was instrumental in providing logistics for children’s participation in the TRC Special Thematic Hearings on Children.

UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN’S FUND (UNICEF)

429. UNICEF has been the lead agency in Sierra Leone working with children in all circumstances and collaborating with other NGOs, CPAs and the Ministry of Gender, Social Welfare and Children Affairs. It has positioned itself as an advocate for the rights of children and as a conduit through which to deliver services for the fulfilment of these rights. UNICEF has always played a major and significant role in children’s development and has been supporting the government to plan, implement and monitor programmes relating to children.

³⁶⁷ See UNAMSIL, Office of the SRSG, Child Protection Programme Document, Freetown, 2000.

430. UNICEF runs child protection, education and health programmes for children throughout the country. In the course of the conflict, UNICEF ran various interventional programmes even in the face of grave danger and difficulties.
431. UNICEF's child protection interventions during and after the war have included: emergency care and reintegration of separated children; care, protection and reintegration of sexually exploited children; promotion of child rights; and monitoring and advocacy in the area of juvenile justice.³⁶⁸ In the midst of the hostilities, a child protection network partly co-ordinated by UNICEF and chaired by MSWGCA was formed. This network has been the focal point for co-ordination and collaboration in the area of child protection since 1996.³⁶⁹
432. Thus in 1998, UNICEF supported 54 agencies to form the Child Rights Violations Network to monitor, document and advocate against continuing human rights violations against Sierra Leone's children.³⁷⁰
433. UNICEF has been the key agency providing care for demobilised Sierra Leonean children involved in the conflict. It was also designated to serve as the major agency for children in the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programme by being a member of the Technical Coordinating Committee of NCDDR. Describing the functions it undertook in the DDR process, UNICEF submitted to the TRC as follows:
- “UNICEF and its child protection partners established structures for the demobilisation and reintegration of child soldiers... to identify, register, document and reunify unaccompanied children separated by war, poverty and abuse... and provide psychosocial support to children suffering psychologically and emotionally from their tragic experiences”³⁷¹
434. UNICEF has also been the key agency providing support in terms of funding and logistics for Family Tracing and Reunification of separated children with their families and communities under the office of the Child Welfare Secretariat of the MSWGCA. At the time of writing, the total recorded number of separated children is 7,311, of which 6,281 have been successfully reunified with their parents.³⁷² As for the remaining children, UNICEF has stated that it continues to provide care and support mechanisms for them.
435. Nonetheless, there have been times when a child cannot be reunified with his or her family, due either to the failure of the tracing mechanisms, to the ongoing insecurity in the child's region of origin, or to rejection of the child by his or her family. UNICEF and its partners have been doing their utmost to ensure proper and comprehensive long-term care for children in this tragic situation.³⁷³

³⁶⁸ See UNICEF submission to TRC, at page 1.

³⁶⁹ See UNICEF submission to TRC, at page 1.

³⁷⁰ See UNICEF submission to TRC, at page 1.

³⁷¹ See UNICEF submission to TRC, at page 1.

³⁷² See the Ministry of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs, Child Welfare Secretariat, *Documentation of Children*, project document provided to the TRC; 12 January 2004.

³⁷³ See UNICEF submission to TRC, at page 2.

436. UNICEF has also instigated vital interventions in the area of education in response to the desperate state of education in the country after the conflict. In 2000, UNICEF partnered with the government and the Norwegian Refugee Council to establish the Rapid Response Education Programme, composed of special classes on numeracy and literacy skills, with additional teaching in peace building, human rights, religion and moral ethics. The programme was designed to enable children to make the adjustment back into formal classes. It typically focussed on IDP settlements and communities that had just become accessible to human assistance, lasting for an intense period of six months.
437. Many school-going children experienced years of lost schooling during the conflict. It became clear that some children who had been in primary school before the outbreak of the conflict might not want to access education after the war because of the shame of going to school as relatively older children. Thus UNICEF sponsored the initiative known as Complementary Rapid Education for Primary Schools (CREPS). Allied to it was the Community Education Investment Programme (CEIP). This package of measures was designed to serve as an incentive for schools to take in ex-combatant children. It sought to help in facilitating the reintegration process for these children.
438. In a similar vein, UNICEF's Non-Formal Primary Education (NPFE) project reached out to children, particularly girls, without access to formal primary education with the simple goal of reducing illiteracy levels.³⁷⁴
439. In the area of health, UNICEF has also led several interventionary programmes. Due to the massive destruction inflicted on health infrastructure in the country, there was an immediate need to get substitute structures up and running. UNICEF has supported 352 Primary Health Units to become functional between 2000 and 2004.³⁷⁵ It has provided services in infant immunisation, measles vaccination and raising awareness on HIV / AIDS among adolescents and other vulnerable groups.
440. One of UNICEF's most significant post-war interventions in the health sector was its scar removal project, carried out in conjunction with the International Medical Corps (IMC) and USAID.³⁷⁶ UNICEF's implementing partner in the project was the Italian NGO Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI). Some of the armed groups had branded their initials on abducted children. Acronyms like "RUF" and "AFRC" were carved into various parts of children's bodies, including their foreheads, chests, arms and backs. It was an act of mutilation performed essentially for the purpose of preventing the children from escaping. At the close of the conflict, these markings became a source of danger for the scarred children, as opposing groups or members of their communities tended to regard them as dangerous members of the factions that had branded them. These physical scars hampered reintegration efforts and affected the children psychologically, as it seemed that they had been branded for life.

³⁷⁴ See UNICEF, Country Briefing on Sierra Leone, 2004, full report available at the following website: www.UNICEF.org/countrybriefingkits/sierraleone/programmes.

³⁷⁵ See UNICEF, Country Briefing on Sierra Leone, 2004, full report available at the following website: www.UNICEF.org/countrybriefingkits/sierraleone/programmes.

³⁷⁶ See UNICEF submission to TRC, at page 22.

441. Thus an initiative to perform plastic surgery to remove or transform these scars was born. UNICEF's scar removal project was implemented over a period of six months, beginning in August 2000.³⁷⁷ All the children involved were counselled by social workers before, during and after their operations. With the help of Child Protection Agencies, over 120 children with scars were identified, while 93 were recommended for the surgery.³⁷⁸ Eventually, 82 children, comprising 37 girls and 45 boys, successfully underwent the surgery and their scars surgically removed or transformed.³⁷⁹

INTERVENTIONS IN EDUCATION AND SKILLS TRAINING

442. After the war, the need to rehabilitate the education system from the battering it suffered during the war became obvious. The government and other agencies have been at the forefront of the rehabilitation efforts in the education sector during and since the conflict.
443. After the reinstatement of the SLPP Government in 1998, the sum of 6.75 billion Leones was made available for the commencement of education reforms in the country.³⁸⁰ The government worked together with the UN, the World Bank and its NGO partners to conceive a variety of education projects.
444. One such programme is the World Bank project on the Rehabilitation of Basic Education, which is in progress throughout the country at the time of writing. The sectoral issues addressed by this programme in its rehabilitation of the school system include: monitoring the quality of education delivered; ensuring availability of infrastructure and furniture; lowering the level of teacher-to-pupil and classroom-to-pupil ratios to 40 and 30 respectively; providing trained teachers and teaching aids; and setting up school management committees at local level to monitor the schools.³⁸¹
445. The World Bank programme also seeks to provide support to private sector providers of education, as 85% of the schools in the country are administered by non-state bodies such as religious missions.³⁸² Additionally, over 90% of the schools renovated since the war have received support from NGOs.³⁸³ The World Bank seeks to support the non-formal and emergency education programmes that have come about as a result of the war. School-based peace education and peace-building initiatives are also foreseen. Due to the threat that HIV / AIDS poses to education, the project offers support on a demand-driven basis to prevent and mitigate the spread of the disease. The project co-operates with the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology in building capacity for its planning and management of education services.³⁸⁴

³⁷⁷ See UNICEF submission to TRC, at page 23.

³⁷⁸ See UNICEF submission to TRC, at page 23.

³⁷⁹ See UNICEF submission to TRC, at page 23.

³⁸⁰ See TRC interviews with officials of various ranks in the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology; interviews conducted in Freetown, 20 August 2003.

³⁸¹ See World Bank, *Project Appraisal on Rehabilitation of Basic Education*, at pages 12 and 13.

³⁸² See World Bank, *Project Appraisal on Rehabilitation of Basic Education*, at page 12.

³⁸³ See World Bank, *Project Appraisal on Rehabilitation of Basic Education*, at page 12.

³⁸⁴ See World Bank, *Project Appraisal on Rehabilitation of Basic Education*, at page 12.

446. The World Bank education project started in the middle of 2003 and is meant to run for four years. Resources will be allocated to the districts on the basis of a formula that takes into account the level of damage to the local schooling infrastructure and population. The allocation may be revised occasionally based on project progress or evidence of population movement.³⁸⁵
447. Although the Commission cannot assess this programme comprehensively because it had commenced only six months prior to the writing of this report, the project has enormous potential to help in rejuvenating the education sector.
448. To encourage more access to education and to increase literacy levels, the government has initiated a programme of free education for all children at primary level and subsidies towards examination fees.³⁸⁶ The government has also been paying the school fees of all girls in junior secondary Class One who passed exams in the Eastern and Northern regions since September 2003. Finally teaching and learning materials, including furniture and textbooks, are now being provided to all government and government-assisted schools.³⁸⁷
449. The Complimentary Rapid Education for Primary Schools (CREPS) project, which started in Lungi in 2000, was meant to cater for displaced children and ex-child combatants who had missed out on formal primary education for different periods on account of the conflict.³⁸⁸ It is a compressed three-year programme, designed to complement a six-year conventional primary school education. CREPS was supposed to enable the target group of 10 to 14 year-old children to advance more quickly towards educational levels consistent with their ages. At the time of conception, an estimated 500,000 children fell within this category, but the objective set at commencement was to enable 25,000 children in this age group to commence or recommence schooling. CREPS also committed to ensuring a gender gap less than 30%.³⁸⁹
450. Recognising that children might be traumatised due to their experiences during the war and would therefore be ill-prepared for immediate formal schooling, the CREPS programme included in its curriculum such topics as psychosocial and health issues, including trauma healing, peace education, human rights, gender issues and HIV / AIDS.³⁹⁰
451. By the end of 2001, 6,733 children, made up of 3,883 boys and 2,850 girls, were enrolled in the CREPS programme in three districts, with another 3,552 children enrolled in the complementary RREP programme.³⁹¹ By 2002, the CREPS programme had spread to seven districts in the North and East and had a total enrolment in that year of 22,778 children. By the end of July 2003, a total of 26,646 children were enrolled in CREPS in these seven districts.³⁹²

³⁸⁵ See World Bank, *Project Appraisal on Rehabilitation of Basic Education*, at page 13.

³⁸⁶ See Ministry of Education, *Closing the Gap*, at page 2.

³⁸⁷ See Ministry of Education, *Closing the Gap*, at page 2.

³⁸⁸ See Government of Sierra Leone / UNICEF, *Complementary Rapid Education for Primary Schools (CREPS)*, documents provided to the TRC by UNICEF, including the *Detailed Teaching Syllabus for Level One*, (hereinafter "GoSL / UNICEF, *Information on Complementary Rapid Education for Primary Schools*") Freetown, 2000.

³⁸⁹ See GoSL / UNICEF, *Information on Complementary Rapid Education for Primary Schools*.

³⁹⁰ See GoSL / UNICEF, *Information on Complementary Rapid Education for Primary Schools*.

³⁹¹ See GoSL / UNICEF, *Information on Complementary Rapid Education for Primary Schools*.

³⁹² See GoSL / UNICEF, *Information on Complementary Rapid Education for Primary Schools*.

452. Additional support under the CREPS programme came in the form of training for 665 teachers and orientation for 113 head teachers in CREPS concepts and methodology.³⁹³ Provision was made for teaching materials and temporary shelter for 225 CREPS classes. Logistics such vehicles, motor cycles and more than 50 bicycles were provided to the Ministry and NGOs to facilitate their monitoring and supervision of CREPS by July 2003.³⁹⁴
453. The CREPS programme is still ongoing and a recent evaluation showed that demand remains very high. The quality of education is as good and in some cases better than in some of the formal schools.³⁹⁵ Nonetheless, the programme has had problems that have hampered its expansion and thus affected access for the many children who need its services.
454. These problems include the Ministry's reluctance to accept ownership and responsibility for the implementation of the CREPS project. The Ministry lacks commitment to recruiting teachers and paying their salaries, which are two major stumbling blocks to the expansion of the programme. The Ministry has also failed to deliver support in providing text materials and fee subsidies to host schools.³⁹⁶ In addition, weak supervision and delays in UNICEF funding have posed problems for the project.³⁹⁷
455. Apparently at the core of the Ministry's reluctance to show ownership of CREPS is its perceived notion it is a UNICEF programme.³⁹⁸ UNICEF and the MEST need to work out this issue speedily in the interests of all school-going children. Still, it is important to stress that the greatest responsibility for the education of the children of Sierra Leone lies with the Ministry of Education.
456. The expansion of CREPS will continue to help children in accessing education.³⁹⁹ The government's full and prompt payment of newly recruited teachers would be of immense help to the sustainability of the programme. Proper payment would in turn enhance the availability of teachers, as teachers are presently reluctant to join the programme due to non-payment of salaries.
457. Another key part of the reintegration process for children was the Community Education Investment Programme (CEIP). This programme was largely a response to growing demand from the children themselves, who stated that going back to school was their greatest desire.⁴⁰⁰ Initiated by UNICEF and run by some of its implementing partners such as Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC), International Rescue Committee (IRC), Cooperazione Internazionale (COOPI) and Caritas Makeni, the programme was designed to enable mainly ex-combatant children to return to school in a manner beneficial to the entire school. It was intended to facilitate reintegration and minimise stigmatisation for the ex-combatant children by assisting the communities as a whole.⁴⁰¹

³⁹³ See GoSL / UNICEF, *Information on Complementary Rapid Education for Primary Schools*.

³⁹⁴ See GoSL / UNICEF, *Information on Complementary Rapid Education for Primary Schools*.

³⁹⁵ TRC confidential interview with an official working in child protection, Freetown, October 2003.

³⁹⁶ See GoSL / UNICEF, *Information on Complementary Rapid Education for Primary Schools*.

³⁹⁷ See GoSL / UNICEF, *Information on Complementary Rapid Education for Primary Schools*.

³⁹⁸ TRC confidential interview with an official working in child protection, Freetown, October 2003.

³⁹⁹ TRC confidential interview with an official working in child protection, Freetown, October 2003.

⁴⁰⁰ See UNICEF, *Lessons Learned on Child Protection in DDR*, at page 50.

⁴⁰¹ See Government of Sierra Leone / UNICEF, background document on Community-Based Reintegration Programmes, provided by UNICEF to the TRC, January 2004.

458. The CEIP programme provides a “standard package of material assistance to communities to support education efforts.”⁴⁰² It gives supply packages rather than just money to schools that have accepted former child combatants as students. Schools were to choose from one of three options: a kit of recreational supplies for the entire school; a kit of teaching materials for 20 teachers; or a kit of learning materials for 200 students. Although CEIP was originally intended only to serve children who had DDR numbers, a group of the implementing partners wished to expand the programme to include other reintegrating children. As a result, CEIP was altered to provide educational access to about 10% of other children who were not ex-combatants.⁴⁰³
459. The CEIP programme reached a substantial portion of children who had been demobilised and, although it was started as a pilot programme, it has quickly expanded and now represents a national model. CEIP has operated in all 13 districts and had more than 3,000 ex-combatants and separated children registered in over 500 primary and secondary schools at April 2003.⁴⁰⁴ The fear in some quarters is that communities might become dependent upon the programme, as many imagine that the assistance from CEIP will continue indefinitely.⁴⁰⁵ It should be remembered that CEIP was only intended to help children to recommence schooling. As such, government should be gearing itself up to take over the role that CEIP is presently filling.
460. Education has seen significant improvements all round since the cessation of hostilities. There has been a significant increase in the availability of primary schools throughout the country. From 2,336 primary schools in October 2001, the number of schools had increased to 5,177 by the end of July 2003. For secondary schools, the number of schools has increased from 185 in October 2001 to 237 in March 2003. There also has been a significant increase in access, which has led to increments in overall school enrolment.
461. In spite of the achievements, there are areas that require further improvement in the delivery of qualitative education to children across the country. With regard to enrolment, there still is significant under-representation of girls as compared to boys, a situation that the Ministry intends to address in a “phased and prioritised manner”.⁴⁰⁶ The need to attend to this gender imbalance cannot be emphasised enough if the female population is to be part of the growth and development of this country.
462. There are still problems too with the provision of adequate infrastructure for schools. Most schools, especially those outside Freetown, consist of either temporary structures, partly-damaged buildings, converted private homes or simply clearings of land under trees.⁴⁰⁷ Schools lack classroom furniture, teaching and learning materials and in many cases adequate sanitary provisions. There is also a shortage of qualified teachers in the provinces, as well as a severe shortfall of secondary schools throughout the country.

⁴⁰² See UNICEF, *Lessons Learned on Child Protection in DDR*, at page 50.

⁴⁰³ See UNICEF, *Lessons Learned on Child Protection in DDR*, at page 51.

⁴⁰⁴ Community Based Reintegration Programme; Document provided by UNICEF

⁴⁰⁵ See UNICEF, *Lessons Learned on Child Protection in DDR*, at page 51.

⁴⁰⁶ See Ministry of Education, *Closing the Gap*, at page 2.

⁴⁰⁷ See United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), “*Proxy Indicators: Restoration of State Authority and Recovery*”; progress report as of July 2003; Freetown; 18 August 2003, at pages 9 and 10.

463. The government and all other stakeholders must ensure that the above-listed problems are addressed so that many more children than at present can benefit from the opportunity to access education in Sierra Leone.
464. It is imperative that improved literacy levels together with the need for education remain priorities, as these are major factors in rehabilitating societies emerging from conflict. Handing people the opportunity to be human again starts with re-educating their minds. For children, who represent the future, it is important to learn to deal with the horrors of the past in order to prevent a recurrence of the traumas they experienced. Government must educate the children – supporting them, guiding them and teaching them life skills – in order to catalyse the recovery of a society riven by conflict and poverty.

SKILLS TRAINING PROGRAMMES

465. Children over the age of 15 mostly opted for skills training over education when they demobilised under the Training and Employment Programme (TEP) of the NCDDR. The skills training programmes included lessons in carpentry, masonry, welding, blacksmithery, hairdressing, tailoring, auto mechanic work, driving, soap making, weaving, tie dying and other crafts. TEP offered a nine-month skills training programme supplemented with the payment of an allowance to every participant. Upon completion, each trainee was supplied with a start-up kit.⁴⁰⁸ By the time the TEP programme came to its end in 2003, a total of 2,658 children had benefited from the skills training.⁴⁰⁹
466. Besides the TEP programme, many donor agencies and NGOs were also involved in the provision of skills training for children, including World Vision, Caritas Makeni, Christian Brothers, COOPI and the IRC. While they ran programmes of their own, many such agencies also served as implementing partners for projects led by NCDDR, UNICEF and others.
467. Not surprisingly the various skills training programmes have thrown up a host of contentious issues. A major issue was the fixed period of training and the failure to allow for the variances involved in teaching different skills. Soap making, for instance, required far less training time than acquiring auto mechanic skills. Critics are of the view that more flexibility in the duration of the various skills training programmes should have been accommodated from the outset. Another issue was whether the trainees were able to acquire sufficient knowledge of any of the skills they were being taught in such a short time.
468. Many ex-combatants, including children, were found to have sold their start-up kits issued to them upon completion of their training. While it is not uncommon for ex-combatants to sell what they are given in order to obtain quick funds, the possibility cannot be discounted that the skills training period was inadequate and resulted in many trainees being unable to practice their acquired skills with any degree of confidence or expertise.

⁴⁰⁸ See Dr. Kellah and Mr. Lansana, former officials of the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR), TRC interviews in Freetown, 8 January 2004.

⁴⁰⁹ See Executive Secretariat of National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR); Presentation at the State of the Nation Symposium; October 2003.

469. A major factor that impacted on trainees was the incapacity of the economy. There is hardly a market for most of their skills because the economy has not yet recovered sufficiently. In planning and undertaking skills training programmes, an issue that is commonly overlooked is market access, which ultimately allows the trainees to utilise their skills. The Commission found that a lack of access to capital also prevented trainees from successfully putting their training into practice. While the DDR skills training initiative was well intentioned, it did not make provisions for either the participants or the country to reap maximum dividends from the trained skills. The gift of a start-up kit was on its own certainly not sufficient to start up a sustainable business. A female former child combatant presented her viewpoint to the Commission:

“I am begging the government to have mercy on us. We the children have suffered in the war. We have learnt the skills but haven’t got the capital to start to be self-reliant. We are appealing to the government to sympathise with our situation so that we cannot continue to suffer. We have learnt the skills but if we are not going to practice we will not benefit from it at all.”⁴¹⁰

470. Older children given skills training were not properly prepared to begin earning their own living. The programme was short-sighted and did not take into account the economic realities of post-conflict Sierra Leone.⁴¹¹

471. Skills training initiatives remain absolutely crucial to the development of youth affected by the conflict in Sierra Leone. However the sustainability of such initiatives must be given greater consideration. There is a need to locate skills training in the wider context of improving the economy. Skills training should be accompanied by carefully planned follow-up mechanisms, which would allow successfully trained to utilise their skills to their own economic advancement and the collective benefit of the nation.

CONCLUSION

472. Children deserve to be the single greatest priority for Sierra Leone. Notwithstanding the sterling efforts of UNICEF and the local and international agencies that form part of the Child Protection Network, a great deal still remains to be done to alleviate the problems children face and assist in their flourishing in the future. The Commission recommends that the Child Rights Bill be passed as a matter of urgency. This piece of legislation will go a long way to ensuring that a legislative framework exists to enhance and promote the rights of children. Moreover, government needs to give its own special attention to children’s issues when it ensures that the recommendations of the Commission are carried out. Implementation of the TRC recommendations in respect of children would represent a formidable commitment to improving the quality of life for Sierra Leone’s children, both today and in future generations.

⁴¹⁰ Confidential testimony received during TRC closed hearings in Bombali District; 28 May 2003.

⁴¹¹ See UNICEF, *Lessons Learned on Child Protection in DDR*, at page 52.

CHAPTER FIVE

Youth

TRC

Truth Today...

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Sierra Leone

Tomorrow

Produced by the TRC Steering Committee with support
from the International Human Rights Law Group

CHAPTER FIVE

Youth

Introduction

1. In Sierra Leone, the youth is the lifeblood of the nation. Every Sierra Leonean between the ages of 18 and 35 years old is considered to be a youth. According to a government paper of 2003, youths constitute forty-five percent of the country's estimated 4.5 million population.¹
2. In the conflict, youths were both victims and perpetrators of human rights violations on a massive scale. It was a dual role to which youths had become accustomed in post-independence Sierra Leone: on the one hand, they were abused; on the other hand they became the abusers. In the 1970s and 1980s, as the one-party system became increasingly tyrannical, youths formed the only viable opposition to the ruling All People's Congress (APC) because the other political parties had been co-opted and assimilated into the government.² When institutions and their leaders in so many sectors of society failed to speak out against the injustices of the APC regime, invariably it was the voice of youth that called for accountability. Conversely, though, youths were often the instruments of oppression, acting as vicious thugs to influence the outcomes of elections and put down anti-government demonstrations. In times of transition, Sierra Leone's youth has always struggled to find its rightful place in society.
3. Testimonies received by the Commission indicate that the majority of participants in the war were youths. Many of them were children at the time of their recruitment. Others joined voluntarily in protest against the social and political ills of the day, or in the name of defending their communities. They all lost their youth to a career of fighting and violence. Some are now exporting their combat "expertise" to neighbouring countries in conflict. The experiences and prospects of youth in Sierra Leone require careful consideration.
4. In the course of the war, youths committed brutal and malicious acts against their family members, communities and fellow Sierra Leoneans. Their experiences during the war have disrupted their lives and traumatised them. Many youths are currently drifting without direction, unable to access education or employment. Some are so disillusioned with their environment that they are desperately seeking a way out and would readily resort once more to violence.
5. Sierra Leone faces the daunting task of reclaiming a "lost generation" of youth. The "youth question" is therefore central to lasting peace and development in the country. This examination of youth participation in the war will enable the Commission to make detailed recommendations on how to respond to the challenges created by misguided youth in the past and how to restore youths as productive members of their communities.

¹ See Ministry of Youth and Sports, Government of Sierra Leone, *Sierra Leone National Youth Policy*, strategy paper published in July 2003, at page 5.

² More detail on the lack of credible opposition to the APC regime, as well as analysis of the failures of the wider society to hold the political elite to account, can be found in the chapters on Governance and the Historical Antecedents to the Conflict in Volume Three A of this report.

6. In his statement to the Commission, Brima Vandy, who was 30 years old at the start of the conflict in 1991, made this confession:

“When I was in the bush... I committed many violations and abuses. I killed innocent people, took away their property by force... asked them to leave their houses for me to sleep inside... and forced their women to make love to me.”³

7. In her testimony to a closed hearing of the Commission, a young woman in the Koinadugu District told of her experiences:

“Upon our arrival (at their base) we were distributed to different rebels to become their wives... when we refused, they flogged us. We were raped by two or three men daily... when we fought back, they threatened to kill us. We eventually got married to them. They gave us drugs like marijuana to smoke. When the roads were free, we pleaded for them to release us to go back to our relatives... but they refused. Commander Sofila pleaded with them to release us but they threatened to kill us if we tried to escape. Commander CO Ray inscribed RUF on our bodies. They looted properties whilst we carried their ammunitions.”⁴

8. Similar narratives by youths, both as victims and perpetrators, abound in the testimonies, statements and interviews gathered by the Commission. In addition, the youth question has stimulated considerable analysis and debate among academics and writers on the conflict. One Sierra Leonean historian, Ibrahim Abdullah, has described the war as the high point of a rebellious Freetown youth culture of “*rarray man dem*” that started in the 1940s.⁵ Another Sierra Leonean historian, Ishmael Rashid, has detected a strong impetus for the war in the convergence that took place in the 1970s and 1980s between these *rarray man dem* and groups of radical students influenced by leftist ideologies.⁶ British anthropologist Paul Richards has traced the cause of the war to a patrimonial crisis, sidelined intellectuals, violent films and a desire by youths to manage the resources of the rain forest more equitably.⁷ Finally Jimmy Kandeh, a Sierra Leonean political scientist, has noted that the atrocities committed by youths during the war stemmed from the “subaltern” appropriation of what was previously the violence of the elites.⁸

³ Brima Vandy, TRC statement recorded at 11 Battalion Headquarters, Kambia District, March 2003.

⁴ TRC confidential testimony received during closed hearings in Koinadugu District, 14 May 2003.

⁵ See Abdullah I.; “*Youth Culture and Rebellion: Understanding Sierra Leone’s Wasted Decade*”, in *Critical Arts* journal, Volume 16, Number 2, 2002 (hereinafter “Abdullah, *Youth Culture and Rebellion*”), at page 29. *Rarray man dem* are streetwise urban youths, subordinated by the system.

⁶ See Rashid, I.; “Subaltern Reactions: Lumpens, Students and the Left”, in Abdullah, I. and Bangura, Y. (eds.); *Lumpen Culture and Political Violence: The Sierra Leone Civil War*, Africa Development special edition on the Sierra Leone conflict, Volume XXII, Nos. 3 / 4, 1997 (hereinafter “Rashid, *Subaltern Reactions*”), at page 24.

⁷ See Richards, P.; *Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone*, The International African Institute, Netherlands / UK, 1995.

⁸ See Kandeh, J.; “Ransoming the State: Elite Origins of Subaltern Terror in Sierra Leone”, in *Review of African Political Economy*, No. 81, Roape Publications, 1999 (hereinafter “Kandeh, *Elite Origins of Subaltern Terror*”).

9. Combining these perspectives, it is possible to build a picture of the origins of violent behaviour among youths. Members of the political elite deployed “subalterns”, or *rarray man dem*, to silence their opponents during the days of the APC one-party state. Youths learned violence from their masters and developed violent reactions to the injustices and frustrations they encountered in their daily lives. As the conflict arrived, youths used brutality not to prop up the political elites, but to accumulate resources and power that had been denied to them previously, attacking the very foundations of the elites’ society. The major difference between elite-orchestrated violence and subaltern violence, however, was that the latter made no distinction between public and private property. The violence of the youths was largely indiscriminate.
10. This chapter builds on these perspectives and makes use of submissions, testimonies and interviews gathered by the Commission to analyse and report on: the nature, causes and extent of the violations and abuses perpetrated and suffered by youths; the context of these violations; and the impact on of the conflict on youths. The chapter concludes by considering current interventions geared towards addressing the youth question in Sierra Leone.

Youth Categories and Violence

11. Youth in Sierra Leone can be roughly divided into two categories: mainstream and marginalised youths. These categories can be further sub-divided to take into account the geographical locations and associated characteristics of youths. Thus there are mainstream urban youths and mainstream rural youths. The same distinction can also be made for marginalised youths.
12. The defining characteristic of mainstream urban youths has always been their access to formal western-type education. They would typically be secondary school or university students, expected to take up white-collar jobs upon completion of their studies.⁹ They belong to the world of the law abiding – those who play by the rules. Rural mainstream youths equally abide by long-standing traditions. They respect their elders and work on the farms.
13. In Freetown before the conflict, there was a particular category of marginalised youths, referred to above as the *rarray man dem*. They constituted a predominantly male-specific, oppositional sub-culture, prone to violence and other anti-social behaviour such as drug dealing, petty theft and riotous conduct. Mostly illiterates, they were economically insecure. They survived by moving in and out of casual jobs as domestic hands, night watchmen and labourers. They lived on the margins and were alienated from mainstream society. The violence they committed was mainly within their *potes* (enclaves or ghettos for marginalised youth) and on festive occasions when they moved around the city with their “masquerades”, or processions, known as *odelay*. Their violence mainly involved *chuk* (stabbing with a knife) and was of a non-political nature.
14. The utilisation of the violence of marginalised youths for political purposes started with the 1969-1970 by-elections, when the APC rallied soldiers, the police and *rarray man dem* to intimidate members of the opposition SLPP. The *rarray man dem* were mobilised by the APC strongman S. I. Koroma,¹⁰ who later became Vice President after the promulgation of the Republican Constitution in 1971. Koroma’s cynical tactics transformed *rarray man dem* into “thugs”.

⁹ See Abdullah, *Youth Culture and Rebellion*, at page 21.

¹⁰ See Rashid, *Subaltern Reactions*, at page 24.

15. In the common parlance of Sierra Leone at the time, “thugs” came to mean youths who were utilised for political violence. The word “youth” itself became a synonym for the unemployed young person who was vulnerable to manipulation. Youths were considered to be auxiliary troops for political parties. During elections, or crises, they did the dirty work for the politicians. Payment was often made in the form of drug supplies or token cash handouts. The violence offered youths an outlet for acting out their machismo, which although loathed by society was encouraged by the political elites.
16. A few leaders of the *rarray man dem* were eventually rewarded with high positions (one was made a minister, another an ambassador¹¹), but most thugs were unceremoniously dumped after the completion of their violent assignments.¹² The majority of youths remained unskilled and impoverished.¹³
17. In the provinces, marginalised youths were known as “san san boys” and “*njiahungbia ngornga*”. San san boys were marginalised youths eking out a living in the “sandpits” of the diamond mines. Most of them never fulfilled their dreams of becoming wealthy through diamonds. Instead, they became part of a harsh, greedy and adventurous way of life. Later they became easy prey as recruits for the purveyors of state and counter-state violence.
18. “*Njiahungbia ngornga*” is a Mende phrase meaning unruly youth.¹⁴ This group included semi-literate youths in the provinces who loathed traditional structures and values. They saw “the rebellion as an opportunity to settle local scores and reverse the alienating rural social order in their favour.”¹⁵ Freetown youths referred to the marginalised youths of the provinces who had adopted Freetown lifestyles and world-views as *bonga rarray man dem* or *upline savis man dem*.

¹¹ The *rarray man dem* who achieved high positions were: Alfred Akibo-Betts, who became a Minister of State in the Ministry of Finance; and Kemoh Fadika, who became Ambassador to Egypt.

¹² See Ngolo Katta, Director of the Centre for the Co-ordination of Youth Activities (CCYA), Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, April 2003 (hereinafter “CCYA submission to TRC”), at page 4. See also Dr. Dennis Bright, Minister of Youth and Sports, Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 8 July 2003. See also Victor Reider, Member of Parliament and former youth participant in a training programme in Libya, TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 23 October 2003. See also Abdullah I.; “Bush Path to Destruction: The Origin and Character of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF/SL)”, in *Lumpen Culture and Political Violence: The Sierra Leone Civil War*, Africa Development special edition on the Sierra Leone conflict, Volume XXII, Nos. 3 / 4, 1997 (hereinafter “Abdullah, *Bush Path to Destruction*”), at page 49.

¹³ See Dr. Dennis Bright, Minister of Youth and Sports, Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 8 July 2003.

¹⁴ See Muana, P. K.; “The Kamajoi Militia: Civil War, Internal Displacement and the Politics of Counter-Insurgency”, in Abdullah, I. and Bangura, Y. (eds.); *Lumpen Culture and Political Violence: The Sierra Leone Civil War*, Africa Development special edition on the Sierra Leone conflict, Volume XXII, Nos. 3 / 4, 1997 (hereinafter “Muana, *The Kamajoi Militia*”), at page 80.

¹⁵ See Muana, *The Kamajoi Militia*, at page 126.

The Increasing Marginalisation of Youths and the Convergence of Educated and Uneducated Youths

19. The country's deteriorating economic and political situation from the 1970s onwards saw an increase in the number of school dropouts. Education was no longer a right for all, but a privilege for the few. Employment and the grant of government scholarships were dependent on APC party allegiance and what Sierra Leonean youths referred to as "connectocracy", meaning personal connections to a political patron or senior public servant. Most youths could never fulfil their ambitions because they were not "connected" to the political system. Only the wealthy could provide a reasonable education for their children. The children of politicians and government officials attended private schools, often travelling overseas, while the government schools were totally neglected. The number of school dropouts increased annually as the education system deteriorated, swelling the ranks of the marginalised youths in the *potes*.
20. In the provinces, traditional political and judicial authorities served the interests of the local elites. Political marginalisation and harsh judicial penalties for the breaching of traditional norms pushed many youths to the margins of their societies. Some youths in provincial urban settings like Bo and Kono also set up *potes* akin to those of their Freetown counterparts.
21. The stagnating economy increased the numbers of even well educated youths who could not find employment. Western-type education no longer guaranteed employment. Graduates found themselves exposed to the same harsh economic realities that had long been experienced by the uneducated marginalised urban youth.
22. This convergence of the material conditions of educated (mainstream) and uneducated (marginalised) youths provided a basis for the convergence of their lifestyles and world-views. Many of the educated but unemployed youths started frequenting the *potes*. Unemployment induced in them the habits of the marginalised youth. They were frowned upon by mainstream society, but their visits to the *potes* gradually elevated their social status amongst their uneducated peers. With the increase in the number of marginalised youths came a corresponding increase in the number of *potes*. The peddling of drugs became a form of full-time employment for many youths.¹⁶ University students also joined the drift to the *potes*. Student activists began establishing *potes* on their campuses and the drug culture started to gain a grudging acceptance in the society – it became a *sine qua non* for radicalism and non-conformity.¹⁷
23. The newcomers to the *potes* were au fait with unfolding world events and were more politically conscious than the original marginalised youths. Many had read revolutionary texts from which they had developed new political ideas. They took it upon themselves to "conscientise" their "less fortunate brothers" while in return they were themselves gradually absorbing and adopting the style and language of the "ghetto".¹⁸

¹⁶ See Abdullah, *Youth Culture and Rebellion*, at page 29.

¹⁷ See Abdullah, *Youth Culture and Rebellion*, at pages 31 and 32.

¹⁸ See Dr. Dennis Bright, Minister of Youth and Sports, Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 8 July 2003.

24. This transformation was also influenced by contemporary music, particularly reggae music by Bob Marley, Peter Tosh and Bunny Wailer. The lyrics of their songs depicted realities of the day – hardship, degradation and oppression – in a style of social commentary known as “system dread”.
25. The new groups emerging out of the fusion of educated youths and their uneducated peers in the *potes* were not involved in petty theft or political thuggery, at least at first. The *potes* became rallying points for alienated, unemployed youths and an arena for political discussion centred on the corrupt practices of the dominant political class and the stifling political atmosphere under one-party dictatorship.

Repression of Student Demonstrations in the 1970s and 1980s and the Evolution of Revolutionary Thinking

26. Student leaders were conversant in theories of liberation and spiced up their discussions with quotes from revolutionaries like Kwame Nkrumah, Marcus Garvey, Wallace-Johnson, Fidel Castro, Malcolm X and Steve Biko. Students and school leavers read extensively and intensively outside their fields of study in order to contribute meaningfully to philosophical debates and discussions that lasted far into the night. Another significant influence was the presence of refugees from Zimbabwe, South Africa and Namibia on almost all campuses. Their experiences as freedom fighters made them influential in student circles and they occupied leadership positions in some student union executives.¹⁹
27. Student thinking and the campus climate were ripe for protest action. Hindolo Trye was elected president of the Fourah Bay College (FBC) student union in 1976. The student motto “The Self” implied the importance of self-esteem and dignity, the awareness of the right to liberate oneself and the right of the collective self to initiate liberation.²⁰ The students’ first direct confrontation with the APC came in 1977, when President Stevens was humiliated while delivering his speech at the annual university convocation ceremony.
28. The APC organised a counter-demonstration involving *rarray man dem* led by Kemoh Fadika. Supported by the armed Special Security Unit (SSD), these youths were brought in to flog, rape and brutalise students. The deployment of such a force foreshadowed events to come during the conflict, when youths were pitched against youths in an orgy of violence. The government’s backlash led to a nationwide demonstration by students in February 1977 following the arrest of their student leader Hindolo Trye. According to one participant:

“They sent thugs and members of the paramilitary to beat us up. They destroyed the campus, which led to a national uprising led by the students and sparked up by school children. It is what we called the “no college, no school” demonstration. It spread countrywide and became a national uprising, which lasted for several weeks.”²¹

¹⁹ See Dr. Dennis Bright, Minister of Youth and Sports, Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 8 July 2003, at page 6. See also Victor Reider, Member of Parliament and former youth participant in training in Libya, TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 23 October 2003.

²⁰ See Currey, J.; *The Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone: African Guerrillas*, 1998, at page 175. See also Dr. Dennis Bright, Minister of Youth and Sports, Submission to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 8 July 2003, at page 7.

²¹ See Olu Gordon, former student of Fourah Bay College in the 1970s who later became a lecturer and prominent participant in PANAFU, TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 11 March 2003.

29. The student protests, planned and led by radical students, received popular support and forced President Stevens to make certain concessions. A general election was called three months later. Violence by APC-sponsored *rarray man dem* resulted in a massive electoral victory for the APC. The hopes of the educated youths for an opening up of the political system were dashed.
30. The 1980s saw the emergence of well-organised radical groups and study clubs on university and college campuses, including the Green Book study club (promoting Ghaddafi's ideas of revolutionary mass participation from Libya), the Pan African Union (PANAFU), which called for a popular movement,²² and the Socialist Club. Unlike other campus clubs, PANAFU brought both categories of youth together and was concerned with educating its members about apartheid in South Africa and neo-colonialism in Africa. PANAFU operated outside the campuses and had revolutionary "cells" in central and eastern Freetown.
31. Following a student demonstration in 1984, the Fourah Bay College campus was closed down for three months and upon resumption of classes, students had to sign an agreement for re-admission into the university. This repressive act helped "contain" students and brought relative calm to campus. Then, in 1985, Alie Kabba, a keen member of several radical clubs, was returned unopposed as president of FBC student union on a platform of collective self-advancement that he referred to as "we-ism". Kabba's student union executive made no secret of its intentions to put its radical leftist ideologies into practice once in power. The student leadership was constantly at loggerheads with the university authorities, who perceived Kabba as a subversive firebrand.
32. Events reached a climax at the end of the second term in 1985 when students refused to hand in their dormitory keys. The authorities accused them of planning to bring in Libyan mercenaries to oust the APC government. The paramilitary SSD, again called in to put the students in their place, used undue force in restraining the students and beating them into submission.
33. The SSD's actions gave rise to a Freetown-wide demonstration. When the college reopened for the third semester in April 1985, forty-one students were declared ineligible to register, among them Alie Kabba. The student union protested against this decision. The campus demonstration spread to the city centre, where shops were looted and vehicles burnt down,²³ apparently by unemployed youths who used the political demonstration of the students as a chance to wreak havoc and enrich themselves. Such opportunism, to many differing degrees, would become a constant feature of the conflict in the 1990s.
34. Alie Kabba and five other students were arrested and detained for two months, while three lecturers – Cleo Hancilles, Olu Gordon and Jimmy Kandeh, the original founders of PANAFU – were summarily dismissed from the university without a proper explanation or compensation up to the present day.²⁴

²² See Cleo Hancilles, former lecturer at Fourah Bay College (FBC) who later conducted ideological lessons for trainees in Libya, TRC interview in Freetown, 8 April 2003. See also Abdullah, *Youth Culture and Rebellion*, at page 32. PANAFU wanted to link people across diverse social sectors.

²³ See Rashid, *Subaltern Reactions*, at page 36.

²⁴ See Cleo Hancilles, former lecturer at Fourah Bay College (FBC) who later conducted ideological lessons for trainees in Libya, TRC interview in Freetown, 8 April 2003. See also Olu Gordon, former student of Fourah Bay College in the 1970s who later became a lecturer and prominent participant in PANAFU, TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 11 March 2003. See also Gibril Foday-Musa, former student of Fourah Bay College who attended a training programme in Libya in the 1980s; TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 26 September 2003.

35. Some of the expelled students eventually found their way to Ghana and gained admission into the University of Legon. From Ghana, Alie Kabba made frequent visits to Guinea and Libya and was also a regular visitor to the People's Bureau (as the Libyan embassy was called) in Accra. According to Olu Gordon:

“The idea of the RUF actually came from the expelled students from Fourah Bay College, especially Alie Kabba. And the specific reason why it was called a “united front” was because they had attempted to draw several organisations into their plan, including the organisations belonging to the Pan African Union (PANAFU).”²⁵

36. Other witnesses, who were part of PANAFU, as well as some members of the RUF, have challenged the veracity of this testimony. Indeed, Gordon's account is not entirely accurate, since Alie Kabba's umbrella idea went by a different name altogether – the Popular Democratic Front, with the acronym PDF – and had a non-violent agenda for change at its heart. RUF members further pointed out that at the time the students were in Libya, no name had been chosen for the movement they joined. The name RUF was coined by others in Libya and had no direct connection to PANAFU, which had by that time become detached from the revolutionary project.

Divergence of Youths and the Spiral into Violent Rebellion

37. The exiled students raised the idea with PANAFU in Freetown of sending members of their revolutionary “cells” in the city to undertake training programmes in Libya. Four trainees nominated by PANAFU left for Libya during the rainy season of 1987. By the time they returned in 1988, leading members of PANAFU were no longer committed to the revolutionary project, which led to a split in the movement. One group went underground and carried on planning for new batches of trainees, recruiting mainly marginalised youths from the city.

38. PANAFU's withdrawal from the revolutionary project starved it of ideologically educated youths and turned it into what one writer has described as:

“an individual enterprise... any man (no attempt was made to recruit women) who felt the urge to acquire insurgency training in the service of the “revolution” [could join up]... This inevitably opened the way for the recruitment of lumpens.”²⁶

39. Alie Kabba had assumed the position of co-ordinator of the “revolution” because of his pre-existing links with Libya. Many trainees were opposed to Kabba's leadership, though. They objected to his personal refusal to undergo military training. They also accused him and his friends in Ghana of “sitting on millions of dollars” and benefiting from their recruitment for training in Libya. By the time Kabba left Ghana for Libya, most of the trainees had revolted. The bulk of them had returned to Sierra Leone by 1989 or 1990 and never assumed roles in the RUF movement, or indeed in any of the factions that fought in the conflict.²⁷

²⁵ See Olu Gordon, former student of Fourah Bay College in the 1970s who later became a lecturer and prominent participant in PANAFU, TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 23 March 2003.

²⁶ See Abdullah, *Bush Path to Destruction*, at page 63.

²⁷ See Cleo Hancilles, former lecturer at Fourah Bay College (FBC) who later conducted ideological lessons for trainees in Libya, TRC interview in Freetown, 8 April 2003. See also Abdullah, *Bush Path to Destruction*, at page 65.

40. Divergence of paths and purposes occurred during the time of the training in Libya. Sierra Leone's original student revolutionaries realised they had little in common with some of their countrymen who trained on the camps near Tripoli. Alie Kabba and Cleo Hancilles, the two ideological driving forces, grew wary of the direction their project had assumed and decided to opt out. Into the resultant leadership vacuum stepped Foday Sankoh, an aggrieved former soldier of the Sierra Leone Army who was an anomalous, older presence among the mostly youthful trainees. In Libya, Sankoh met Charles Taylor, the leader of the Liberian trainees on the camp. The two men forged a joint plan for insurgencies in their respective countries, starting in Liberia and moving into Sierra Leone. From that moment on, the course of the "revolution" – and with it the destiny of the sub-region's youth – changed irreversibly. Sankoh and a handful of cohorts made their way to Liberia and joined an insurgency alongside Taylor's NPFL. Among the youths involved, only Abu Kanu, a graduate of Njala University College, had reached a level of higher education comparable to the original PANAFU-led group of the mid-1980s.
41. Foday Sankoh began to assemble more fighters for his RUF rebellion in 1990. He used Charles Taylor's NPFL bases and logistics to train Sierra Leoneans from diverse backgrounds who had been caught up in the turmoil in Liberia. Some were migrant workers whom Sankoh plucked from prisons in NPFL control areas; others were marginalised urban youths and common criminals. They became known as the RUF "vanguards". In March and April 1991, the vanguards entered Sierra Leone with a troop of NPFL commandos who outnumbered them by about four to one. The Sierra Leone conflict had begun, with youths from unlikely and unsettled circumstances very much to the fore.²⁸
42. After the launch of the armed rebellion, most of the youths who joined the RUF, or who were compelled to join the organisation, were marginalised rural youths. Thus different categories of youths were involved at distinct stages of the conflict history of Sierra Leone. Educated youths were involved in the formulation of ideas for revolution and regime change, instigating the training in Libya. Marginalised urban youths were involved in the bulk of the military training and the launch of the insurgency. Thereafter the bulk of the growing manpower of the RUF consisted of marginalised rural youths.
43. Youths who joined the RUF could be further distinguished according to those who joined voluntarily and those who were forced to join. Some of the youths who joined willingly were won over by the simplistic rhetoric of the movement and believed that their involvement would help to reform "the system" that had oppressed them for so long. They were fed up with the APC and wanted a change of government. According to a resident of Pujehun District:

"We assembled at the barray and they addressed us... "We have come to make Sierra Leone a better Sierra Leone... Sierra Leoneans are suffering... education is expensive... we have come to get rid of the APC rule"... After their address, we were happy and prepared food for them... They appointed a town commander... Some of them left after they had finished eating."²⁹

²⁸ For the Commission's comprehensive account of the pre-conflict phase and the assembly of the armed force that launched the insurgency in Sierra Leone in 1991, see the chapter on the Military and Political History of the Conflict in Volume Three A of this report.

²⁹ Alusine Rogers, TRC statement recorded in Kpaka Chiefdom, Pujehun District, 22 March 2003.

44. However, whether by choice or against their will, practically all the recruits soon adopted forms of behaviour that characterised marginalised youths – drug addiction and violence. Involvement in the rebellion itself became an alienating and marginalising process. RUF and NPFL atrocities in Sierra Leone soon drew contempt and opposition from the communities they were attempting to win over. Youths who had joined the insurgency became completely alienated from their own people, either due to acts in which they participated personally or due to their association with the outrages perpetrated by the movement as a whole.
45. The involvement of youth in the conflict became infinitely more complicated in April 1992, when a band of youths in the Sierra Leone Army overthrew the APC in a coup and formed a military junta known as the NPRC. In an attempt to counter the insurgents at the warfront, the NPRC engaged in mass recruitment of marginalised urban youths into the Army. By 1992, therefore, almost the entire combatant population consisted of youths, on both sides of the battle.
46. It should be recalled that by the eve of the conflict most urban youth had lost all hope. They had sunk into an abyss of unemployment and disillusionment. In this state, fighting in the war seemed a viable alternative. It presented a means through which youths could possibly break out of their despair and transform their lives. Many youth aligned themselves with one or more of the factions and swiftly achieved what they considered progress: they were able to accrue “wealth” and “status” that otherwise would have been unattainable.
47. More youths joined the war when they saw how “profitable” the experience had proved for others. Instead of enduring long periods of unemployment, they looted money and goods. Rather than possessing no stake in society, no property and no hope for the future, they became “commandos” who could acquire guns, sex, food and drugs at their will. The opportunity cost of going to war was very low. War empowered them. Inevitably, such youths began to perceive personal benefits in the continuation of conflict. Across all factions they became the most vocal constituency resisting efforts to end the war.
48. Some youths joined the armed factions in order to carry out personal vendettas. Statements from Pujehun District indicate that some of the earliest recruits into the RUF on its Southern Front were militiamen who had participated in the so-called Ndorgboryosoi rebellion against the APC government in the early 1980s, but ultimately failed.³⁰ The Commission also heard testimonies from various parts of the country about youths who had been ostracised from their communities in the past, only to return during war to lead fighters into attacking their people, destroying their communities and humiliating their chiefs, elders and members of their traditional authorities.³¹

³⁰ More detail on the Ndorgboryosoi rebellion in Pujehun District in the 1980s can be found in the chapter on the Historical Antecedents to the Conflict in Volume Three A of this report. More detail on the incorporation of former Ndorgboryosoi militiamen into the RUF in 1991 can be found in the chapter on the Military and Political History of the Conflict, also in Volume Three A of this report.

³¹ See, for example, Ngolo Katta, Director of the Centre for the Co-ordination of Youth Activities (CCYA), TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 13 August 2003.

The Re-convergence of Youths

49. In the late 1970s and 1980s, there had been a convergence of the educated and the uneducated marginalised youths. This convergence initiated discourse on modes and means of resistance, or violence, that could be targeted at the perpetrator of their marginalisation – the APC government. Their discourse took place in the *potes*, against the background of a non-conflict environment.
50. In contrast, the re-convergence of youths in the 1990s took place in the course of the actual rebellion against the state. On this occasion the youths who converged were mainly uneducated and marginalised youths who had joined the RUF or the Army. Those in the Army were largely marginalised urban youths, whilst the RUF constituted mainly rural youths. It became a convergence of all the groups from the pre-conflict period described earlier in this chapter: *rarray man dem*; *upline savis man dem*; *san san boys*; and *njiahungbia ngornga*.
51. Youths in both the Army and the RUF shared common traits of marginalisation. Most were uneducated, heavy users of drugs and had been uprooted or alienated from their pre-war communities. The rebellion and counter-insurgency seemed to promise marginalised youths that they could continue to engage in their old habits while fulfilling the ambitions that were denied to them by society.
52. Towards this end youths were encouraged by the leadership of the various military and political factions. The elites were profiteering from war in different ways from the youths, but they had a similar interest in its perpetuation. Youths in turn utilised violence not only to please their masters, but also to fulfil their yearnings for material acquisitions. In other words, the youths appropriated elite-sanctioned violence for subaltern ends.
53. Thus the eventual re-convergence of marginalised youths in the midst of the brutality that characterised the conflict was perhaps inevitable. Some commentators believe that the neologism “sobel” captures this convergence, because soldiers behaved like rebels, and vice versa.³² The reality is subtly different, however, since the union of the RUF with the AFRC regime that seized power in May 1997 came about through a decision of their respective leaderships, rather than any organic merger of the two combatant cadres on the ground. Only upon their convergence did the two factions really appreciate that they were practically identical in their composition.
54. The leaders of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) came from subaltern social types (*rarray man dem*) who had become accustomed to deploying violence on behalf of the civilian political elites. In seizing power in their coup of 1997, these soldiers and civilians were carrying out violence towards their own ends and in doing so they made no distinction between public and private targets.³³
55. When the AFRC regime was joined by the RUF, itself composed mainly of marginalised rural youths, many ordinary people suspected that it reflected years of collaboration between the two factions at the battlefield. It was very common to hear Sierra Leoneans saying that they knew that the RUF and the Army were secret lovers and that they were now publicly celebrating the marriage. It was not so much a question of formalising an existing relationship, though, as of wondering why the two of them had failed to get together earlier.

³² See, for example, Abdullah, *Bush Path to Destruction*.

³³ See Kandeh, *Elite Origins of Subaltern Terror*.

Community Self-Defence and the Utilisation of Youths

56. In the mid to late 1990s, civilian communities largely lost faith in the national army and sponsored their own youths to become members of the Civil Defence Forces, a militia network dominated by Kamajors from the south and east. For many youths, joining the Kamajors was a way to earn respectability and honour. Others simply heeded the call of their elders to be initiated:

“The chieftom elders called upon the youths of all the surrounding villages and explained to us that since the situation was getting out of hand, they want some of the youths to volunteer to be initiated into the Kamajor society as a means of self-defence. Eighty people were registered for initiation.”³⁴

57. In his statement to the Commission, another youth said he joined the Kamajors to defend his people from soldiers and the RUF:

“The government soldiers who were supposed to protect us were the very ones who were killing and harassing our people. The RUF were also killing our people and burning our houses.”³⁵

58. The CDF militias started as a reaction to the abuses of the RUF and government soldiers. As the war progressed, though, the CDF was transformed into much more than a community defence force. This was particularly the case after the 1997 AFRC coup, when the CDF became an armed force dedicated to the restoration of the SLPP government. According to one CDF fighter:

“In addition to the carnage and destruction caused by the rebels to our people and the land, for these kind of people to rule us was a mockery and a shame... My first deployment (as a Kamajor) was to go and fight the RUF at their base in Koribundo.”³⁶

59. As tensions flared, many Kamajor members learned to use the war for private gain. Although they were under oaths, taboos and a disciplined code of conduct that forbade them from engaging in certain acts, they nonetheless looted, raped, killed innocent civilians and conscripted children into their ranks.³⁷

60. A farmer from Pujehun recounted his ordeal at the hands of the Kamajors:

“Eight Kamajors attacked me on my farm. They invited me to their base, but I refused to accompany them. They maltreated me and while I sat on the ground they fired shots around me. As if that was not enough, they went on to harvest my pineapple and other fruits. Finally, they looted all my property and burnt down my farmhouse.”³⁸

61. Membership of the Kamajors was in some areas the only way of avoiding such abuses. Many youths joined the militia to seek this protective cover:

“These Kamajors intimidated us so much as civilians that I decided to join them in 1997. I did it to gain the freedom of entering and leaving our village.”³⁹

³⁴ Borbor Rambo Kallon, TRC statement recorded in Mano Dasse, Dasse Chieftom, March 2003.

³⁵ Augustine Musa, TRC statement recorded at an unspecified location, February 2003.

³⁶ Brima Nallo, TRC statement recorded in Ngiehun, Lugbu Chieftom, January 2003.

³⁷ See, for example, Rugiatu Kamara, testimony to TRC public hearings, Freetown, 14 April 2003.

³⁸ Mohamed Kebbie, TRC statement recorded in Pujehun Town, 25 February 2003.

³⁹ Desmond Hindowa Momoh, TRC statement recorded in Tokwama village, 11 December 2002.

Youths as Collaborators in the Conflict

62. In addition to their active combat roles, youths instigated horrific atrocities by collaborating with the factions in times of social tension or when control of a particular area changed hands. Youths were often the first residents to be sought out for information or local knowledge. By betraying the confidence of their communities and pointing fingers, sometimes without any rational basis, they caused many deaths and untold suffering:

“When the soldiers recaptured Potoru... an indigene of Potoru showed the soldiers all the houses the rebels had been dwelling in... The houses were then burnt down by an SLA corporal...”⁴⁰

63. When the war broke out in the east and the south, some young men who joined the RUF pointed out to rebel forces certain individuals they perceived as their antagonists or oppressors. Often these persons were tortured and killed. During the ousting of the junta in 1998 by the ECOMOG intervention force, irate youths not only formed “mobs” to beat up and summarily execute civilians, they also identified suspected AFRC sympathisers or disclosed their hideouts to ECOMOG personnel and Kamajors, who dealt mercilessly with their victims. Philip Sankoh described what happened to him:

“Around 16 February 1998, a neighbour named Modupeh came with a group of Nigerian soldiers serving under ECOMOG... The soldiers attacked my friend and I... and held us at gun point ... That same night they went over to the place where I had gone to seek refuge... and harassed the people, looted their property.”⁴¹

The Impact of the Conflict on Youth

64. Instead of alleviating the neglect and marginalisation believed to be the prime causes of the war, the eleven-year conflict has actually compounded the problems faced by youths and had entirely negative consequences on their development. Many youths have been left disillusioned and frustrated.

Youths and education

65. A whole generation of youths lost their opportunity to advance their levels of education, which is so vital to the improvement of their status. Desmond Massaquoi recounted the circumstances that have denied him his schooling:

“I was attending Christ The King College when the war broke out; I was in form three. I went for holidays to my village Kanguma, near Serabu in the Bumpeh Chiefdom. Rebels attacked my village, burnt our houses, looted our property and killed some people. Amongst those killed were my father, my sister and her husband. These people were the ones paying my school fees... I want to continue my education but there is no one to support me as my sister and her husband who supported me are dead.”⁴²

⁴⁰ Lahai Kamara, TRC statement recorded in Potoru, Pujehun District, 24 January 2003.

⁴¹ Philip Sankoh, resident of Brookfields community in Freetown, TRC interview, 16 July 2003.

⁴² Desmond Massaquoi, TRC statement, Bo District, 10 April 2003.

66. Displacement of the population resulted in high levels of illiteracy and a massive drop in the standard of education. As civilians sought refuge in the big towns, overcrowding meant that schools had to begin operating double shifts. Class sizes increased and the quality of interaction in the learning environment deteriorated. Even the few youths who were able to attend school received a lower quality of education. Many had their education halted abruptly by their enlistment into the fighting forces or abduction by the RUF.
67. In post-conflict Sierra Leone many youths who lost out on schooling believe they are now too old to return to school. They are destined to remain unskilled. Many are not just unemployed; they are unemployable. They can be seen all over the country, many of them begging and stealing in order to survive.

Psychosocial effects of the conflict

68. Many youths were brutalised and transformed into killing machines. They have been deprived of the positive aspects of their youth. Some young people were abducted as children and stayed with their captors throughout the eleven-year conflict. Many others lost parents and benefactors. In general youths remain bereft of the stabilising ties of affection, intimacy and emotional support. Denied these ties, they are vulnerable to emotional and psychological insecurity.

Drugs

69. Before the war, most youths consuming drugs used cannabis. During the war, they were introduced to more dangerous narcotics such as cocaine and heroin. There has been a dramatic increase in the numbers of young drug takers and the types of drugs they are addicted to.⁴³

Loss of civic and social skills

70. The breakdown of community norms and socialisation during the ten-year civil conflict created youths without civic or social skills. Those in the fighting forces were inducted into a life of burning, looting and killing. They do not possess peacetime skills and are finding it difficult to accept and accede to authority. Refugees also had their lives disrupted. Thus many among them lack the social, civic and economic skills necessary for a disciplined peacetime life.
71. Youths have become been used to violence as a means of resolving problems. Many still hold onto the belief that they should resort to violence to get what they need.⁴⁴ They have been used to committing violations with impunity.

⁴³ See Dr. Dennis Bright, Minister of Youth and Sports, TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 12 November 2003. See also Allan Quee, Director of PRIDE, a non-governmental organisation dedicated to the reintegration of ex-combatants, TRC interview in Freetown, 21 November 2003.

⁴⁴ See Dr. Dennis Bright, Minister of Youth and Sports, TRC interview conducted in Freetown, 12 November 2003.

TRC



Youth groups and other civil society organisations join the National Reconciliation Procession organised by the Commission on 6 August 2003.

Limited livelihood skills

72. Destruction of infrastructure has impacted negatively on the range and availability of economic opportunities. Displacement meant abandoning farms and other commercial activities. Always on the run or in the fight, youths could not generate productive skills that were relevant to sustaining livelihoods in rural or urban settings. Many of them are at a loss as to how to rebuild their shattered livelihoods after the conflict. Lahai Kamara told the Commission:

“I am discouraged because I do not know when I will be able to rebuild my life and be able to recover from my loss.”⁴⁵

Unemployment

73. Unemployment among the youth remains a major problem. The economy was destroyed during the ten-year conflict and as a result few jobs are available. Even where jobs are available, many youths do not have the required skills.
74. Every year hundreds of young people graduate from the university and have to scrounge and scramble for the very few jobs on offer. Ex-combatants who have learnt skills cannot find employment and are eking out a living as petty traders. Many youths sit around the streets and motor parks idling their time away.

Post-Conflict Efforts at addressing the Youth Question

Ministry of Youth and Sports

75. At the end of the conflict the government decided to give prominence to the youth question by creating a separate youth ministry. The government de-linked the responsibility for Youth and Sports from the former Ministry of Education, Youth and Sports because the youth and sports component was being dwarfed by the education component. A specific ministry with specific responsibilities for Youth and Sports was created in 2002.
76. One of the initiatives taken by the new ministry was the publishing of the Sierra Leone National Youth Policy, which was approved and launched by the government in July 2003. Through this policy the government hopes to empower youths not only to make them responsible citizens but also as an investment in Sierra Leone's future.
77. A programme of action for youth development has emerged from the National Youth Policy. It focuses to a large extent on the economic empowerment of youths. The ministry has recognised the fact that many young people have missed out on their youthful years. The action plan is an effort to do something to restore to them some of the benefits of youth.
78. The programme is faced with a number of constraints, however. The first is the lack of financial support to realise its objectives. Second, there are few well-trained people involved in youth work and the ministry finds it difficult to attract skilled administrators and organisers. The ministry is further faced with the challenge of convincing people that the youth question is now, more than ever, a national priority that demands national mobilisation.

⁴⁵ Lahai Kamara, TRC statement recorded in Poturu, Pujehun District, 24 January 2003.

79. Although the youth question has been declared as a priority in the policy and in the public speeches of government officials, it has been very difficult to translate such declarative emphasis into practical impact. This deficiency is symptomatic of the continued marginalisation of the youth. What obtains is a prioritisation of youth at the abstract level, with few tangible benefits for youths themselves.
80. Youths had wanted the policy enacted into law in an effort to make its provisions binding on the government. The policy was however launched without an effort to give effect to this demand. A golden opportunity was therefore missed.

The National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR)

81. The NCDDR was established in July 1998 to disarm and demobilise combatants of the RUF, CDF and SLA (AFRC) and support their reintegration into society.
82. Disarmament and demobilisation of ex-combatants was completed in 2002. As a way of providing an alternative to the fighting life, make up for the time lost in the bush and in order to reintegrate them into society, the programme supported more than 25,000 ex-combatants to learn various trades and skills. More than 7,000 ex-combatants were placed in the formal education system at secondary, tertiary and technical vocational levels. Some of these youths are already using their acquired skills to help rebuild their communities, thereby promoting the reconciliation and reintegration aspect of the programme.
83. As part of its reintegration work, the NCDDR worked closely with implementing partners – community-based organisations and local NGOs – to curb animosity against ex-combatants through the implementation of various reconciliation projects. Consequently, community members have minimised their open animosity towards ex-combatants.⁴⁶
84. Nonetheless, a major constraint that is faced by many youths who have gone through the demobilisation and skills-building programme of the NCDDR is the poor state of the country's economy, which hinders the translation of their skills into practices that can sustain their livelihoods. The "crash course" nature of the skills-building exercise can be questioned. Many ex-combatants left the training programmes inadequately trained or lacking the necessary discipline to apply what they had learned. Many public transport users regard ex-combatants who qualified as drivers, the so-called "DDR drivers", as highly undisciplined.

Non-governmental organisations (NGOs)

85. Many NGOs sprang up in response to the acute humanitarian crisis in the country. Through education, sensitisation and awareness-raising programmes, they have been able to reach out and propagate constructive messages to a wide constituency across the country. Ex-combatants and non-combatants alike have benefited from a wide range of assistance and empowerment programmes. Of particular interest with regard to this chapter, a whole new sector of the NGO community has evolved around the youth question.

⁴⁶ See the National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (NCDDR); submission to the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 4 August 2003.

86. Many NGOs working with youth have specific aims and objectives (such as human rights, skills training and empowerment), but they all share a common goal – to transform youths into capable members of society. NGOs serving youths, however, must overcome a variety of obstacles in carrying out their work, including the perennial issue of resource shortages. Most NGOs access funds for programme implementation from donors outside of Sierra Leone. They have not been able to generate funds locally. Donor support in turn is inherently erratic. Donor priorities may change before the programme goals for youth work are met, leading to the abrupt end of the programmes.
87. Most NGOs depend on the services of volunteers because they lack funds to pay their staff adequate remuneration. Many volunteers have other commitments that make them less effective on the job. The youth NGO sector requires considerable further investment if it is to become a viable contributor to the social, political and economic development of the country's youths.

Conclusion

88. Sierra Leone has witnessed what the lethal cocktail of youth marginalisation and political manipulation can produce. Youths who had learnt to do the violent bidding of their masters soon applied these skills to further their own ends.
89. Hitherto mainstream youths – university students and graduates – were increasingly marginalised amidst the deteriorating political and economic environment of the 1970s. These youths linked up with the marginalised uneducated and unemployed youth, bringing with them ideas of “revolution” as a means of ending their marginal existence. Once the armed struggle had commenced many youths exploited the conflict for private gain. The war provided a useful cover for them to enrich themselves. Their looting campaigns made no distinction between private and public property, nor did their violence distinguish between combatants and ordinary civilians. As a result massive human rights violations and abuses were perpetrated by youths during the war.
90. Youths became participants in a conflict that entrenched their marginalisation. Inducted into a life of violent but unsustainable accumulation, they undermined the very attributes – schools, state resources, skills of civic interaction – they needed to escape their marginalisation.
91. In order properly to address the youth question, the means to escape youth marginalisation must be rebuilt and sustained. This national effort must include providing the skills to youths to participate productively in the economy. It also means encouraging the right attitudes. Youths themselves must be integral to the planning and implementation of youth-orientated policies and programmes. The construction of sustainable youth programmes can only be done through authentic dialogue between youths and their elders. As these processes unfold, it will become incumbent on the youth to demonstrate responsibility, leadership and accountability. In so doing, Sierra Leone's youth will at last come closer to finding its rightful place in society.

CHAPTER SIX

The TRC and the Special Court for Sierra Leone

TRC

Disarm your

Mind!

Tell the

Truth to

the TRC

Produced by the TRC Steering Committee with support
from the International Human Rights Law Group

CHAPTER SIX

The TRC and the Special Court for Sierra Leone

Introduction

1. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (“TRC” or “the Commission”) worked alongside an international criminal tribunal, the Special Court for Sierra Leone. In recent times, truth commissions have worked in tandem with national criminal justice processes and in one case a commission has functioned in parallel with a criminal tribunal established under UN regulations.¹ However the Sierra Leonean case has brought into sharp focus the different roles of these institutions and the potential pitfalls in their relationship.² There has been great interest in the issues that arise when two such institutions operate contemporaneously.
2. Most truth commissions have operated as an alternative to criminal justice systems, because criminal prosecution was either unlikely or inappropriate in the circumstances, or because an amnesty was provided for perpetrators. Given the pardon and amnesty provisions of the Lomé Peace Agreement, the Commission was proposed as an alternative to criminal justice in order to establish accountability for the atrocities that had been committed during the conflict.
3. The transitional justice initiatives of the TRC and the Special Court have been viewed by some as a unique experiment, which advances reconciliation through justice combined with reconciliation through truth. In reality, the two institutions were not created as part of a grand design. When the Commission was agreed upon, the Special Court was not under contemplation. Steps to create the Court only occurred following disturbances in Sierra Leone in the year 2000.
4. This chapter will relate the experiences of the Commission in working alongside the Special Court. It examines the contexts that gave rise to both organisations and tracks the course of developments between the two bodies as they operated contemporaneously. It analyses the nature of the relationship that emerged between the TRC and the Special Court and assesses the impact of this relationship on the Commission’s operations and on the people of Sierra Leone. The chapter pays particular attention to the issue upon which the relationship ultimately faltered, namely the right of detainees held in the custody of the Special Court to appear before the Commission. It was around this issue that the differences in approach between the two post-conflict bodies crystallised. Finally, an attempt is made to evaluate the appropriateness of having two such bodies working simultaneously in the context of post-conflict Sierra Leone.

¹ The Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) in Timor-Leste has functioned at the same time as the Serious Crimes Unit (SCU), which was mandated to prosecute perpetrators of the violence of the pre-independence referendum in 1999.

² See International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ), *The Special Court for Sierra Leone: The First Eighteen Months*, March 2004, at page 11. Available at the website: www.ictj.org.

LOMÉ, AMNESTY AND THE TRC

5. The signatories to the 1999 Lomé Peace Agreement agreed to amnesty in order to secure the peace. It was accepted, at the time of the signing of the Lomé Peace Agreement, that the RUF would not have signed the agreement if there had been any prospect of legal action being taken against its members.³ A truth and reconciliation process was seen as an alternative mechanism for accountability. The Commission was viewed as a means to address impunity so that violations and abuses of human rights would not simply be forgotten. Through its creation of an “impartial historical record” and its holding of public hearings and ceremonies, the Commission would promote a sense of restorative justice in Sierra Leone.
6. Perpetrators would be identified and held accountable in the report of the TRC. The origins and causes of the conflict, together with the contextual story of the conflict in all its nuances, would be told in order that the full horror of the war might be acknowledged by the country as a whole. Recommendations would be made to prevent the repetition of conflict. Impetus would be given to the process of national healing and reconciliation. Violations suffered by victims would be redressed through reparations.⁴
7. When the Lomé Peace Agreement was adopted on 7 July 1999, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (SRSG) appended a handwritten statement to his signature on the document. The statement read as follows:

“The United Nations holds the understanding that the amnesty provisions of the Agreement shall not apply to international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.”⁵

This disclaimer may very well have had the effect of sending a message to combatants and leaders of the armed factions that the amnesty provided by the Lomé Peace Agreement was not a secure amnesty.

³ See Solomon Berewa (former Attorney General, now Vice President of Sierra Leone); “Addressing Impunity using Divergent Approaches: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court”, in *Truth and Reconciliation in Sierra Leone: A compilation of Articles on the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission*, UNAMSIL, Freetown, 2001 (hereinafter “Berewa, *Addressing Impunity using Divergent Approaches*”), at page 55. See also Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, current President of the Republic of Sierra Leone; testimony before TRC Thematic Hearings held in Freetown, 5 August 2003, at paragraphs 34 and 35 of the transcript.

⁴ For a full account of the creation of the TRC see the relevant chapters of the present report: Volume One, Chapter One – “Historical Context”; and Chapter Two – “Setting up the Commission”.

⁵ The statement by the UN SRSG does not appear in the text of the Agreement as it was published by the United Nations (UN Doc. S/1999/777). The Commission was however given sight of a copy of the Lomé Peace Agreement to which the statement was appended in handwriting.

8. A little over two-and-a-half years earlier, when the Abidjan Agreement was signed, the United Nations did not make any similar declaration. Although it did not use the terminology of “amnesty” or “pardon”, Article 14 of the Abidjan Agreement of 30 November 1996 declared the following:

“To consolidate the peace and promote the cause of national reconciliation, the Government of Sierra Leone shall ensure that no official or judicial action is taken against any member of the RUF in respect of anything done by them in pursuit of their objectives as members of that organisation up to the time of the signing of this Agreement. In addition, legislative and other measures necessary to guarantee former RUF combatants, exiles and other persons currently outside the country for reasons related to the armed conflict shall be adopted ensuring the full exercise of their civil and political rights, with a view to their reintegration within a framework of full legality.”

9. The Special Envoy of the Secretary-General at the time, Berhanu Dinka, signed the Abidjan Agreement and acknowledged that the United Nations was a “moral guarantor” of the peace. The United Nations again assumed the status of a “moral guarantor” at Lomé in July 1999.

The Commission’s View on Amnesty

10. It is not clear why unconditional amnesty was accepted by the United Nations in November 1996, only to be condemned as unacceptable in July 1999. This inconsistency in United Nations practice seems to underscore the complexity of the problems at hand. The Commission is unable to condemn the resort to amnesty by those who negotiated the Lomé Peace Agreement. The explanations given by the Government negotiators, including in their testimonies before the Commission, are compelling in this respect. In all good faith, they believed that the RUF would not agree to end hostilities if the Agreement were not accompanied by a form of pardon or amnesty.
11. Accordingly, those who argue that peace cannot be bartered in exchange for justice, under any circumstances, must be prepared to justify the likely prolongation of an armed conflict. Amnesties may be undesirable in many cases. Indeed, there are examples of abusive amnesties proclaimed by dictators in the dying days of tyrannical regimes. The Commission also recognises the principle that it is generally desirable to prosecute perpetrators of serious human rights abuses, particularly when they ascend to the level of gravity of crimes against humanity. However, amnesties should not be excluded entirely from the mechanisms available to those attempting to negotiate a cessation of hostilities after periods of brutal armed conflict. Disallowing amnesty in all cases would be to deny the reality of violent conflict and the urgent need to bring such strife and suffering to an end.
12. The Commission is unable to declare that it considers amnesty too high a price to pay for the delivery of peace to Sierra Leone, under the circumstances that prevailed in July 1999. It is true that the Lomé Agreement did not immediately return the country to peacetime. Yet it provided the framework for a process that pacified the combatants and, five years later at the time of writing, has returned Sierra Leoneans to a context in which they need not fear daily violence and atrocity.

THE CREATION OF THE SPECIAL COURT

13. Following the taking hostage of some 500 UN peacekeepers by elements of the RUF and the outbreak of violence in May 2000,⁶ the political landscape in Sierra Leone changed dramatically when President Kabbah sent a letter of petition to the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Kabbah made the request that the United Nations Security Council establish a special court to bring prosecutions against members of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).
14. President Kabbah's letter to the United Nations, dated 12 June 2000, envisaged a court that would benefit from the strong enforcement powers of the Security Council. It noted the limitations of the national justice system and specifically requested that members of the RUF be tried in the proposed tribunal:

“...[W]ith regard to the magnitude and extent of the crimes committed, Sierra Leone does not have the resources or expertise to conduct trials for such crimes... [A special court is required] to try and bring to credible justice those members of the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and their accomplices responsible for committing crimes against the people of Sierra Leone and for the taking of United Nations peacekeepers as hostages.”⁷

One of the objectives of the Court was to break “the command structure of the criminal organisation responsible for the violence.”⁸

15. On 14 August 2000, the United Nations Security Council responded favourably to the request from President Kabbah. It mandated the Secretary-General of the United Nations to prepare a report on the subject within thirty days. The preamble to the resolution noted:

“also the steps taken by the Government of Sierra Leone in creating a national truth and reconciliation process, as required by Article XXVI of the Lomé Peace Agreement (S/1999/777) to contribute to the promotion of the rule of law...”⁹

16. The Secretary-General's report was issued on 4 October 2000.¹⁰ The report called for the establishment of a court not by Security Council resolution, as had been implied in President Kabbah's letter, but by agreement or treaty between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone. The court was to be of mixed composition, with both Sierra Leonean and non-Sierra Leonean jurists making up its three organs: the Chambers (or Judges); the Office of the Prosecutor; and the Registry.

⁶ The violence included the demonstration on 8 May 2000 outside the residence of the RUF leader, Foday Sankoh, which resulted in the deaths of more than 20 persons, as well as subsequent battles between the RUF and pro-Government forces around Masiaka. More detail can be found in the chapter on the Military and Political History of the Conflict in Volume Three A of this report.

⁷ Letter dated 12 June 2000 from President Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

⁸ Letter dated 9 August 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Sierra Leone to the United Nations, addressed to the President of the Security Council, Annex, UN Doc. S/2000/786.

⁹ See UN Doc. S/RES/1315 (2000).

¹⁰ See the “Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone”, UN Doc. S/2000/915.

17. Various jurisdictional and administrative aspects of the proposed court were to be similar to those of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). However, because the proposed court would not be created by Security Council resolution,¹¹ it would lack enforcement powers enabling it to compel other States to co-operate in the investigation of crimes and the apprehension of suspects.
18. The mission of the Special Court for Sierra Leone is essentially punitive, as set out in the Agreement that was eventually signed between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone for its establishment:

“[To] prosecute persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996; including those leaders who, in committing such crimes, have threatened the establishment of and implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone.”¹²

AMNESTY AND THE CREATION OF THE SPECIAL COURT

19. The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone purports to withdraw the Lomé amnesty with respect to persons accused before it. Article 10 of the Statute says:

“An amnesty granted to any person falling within the jurisdiction of the Special Court in respect of the crimes referred to in Articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute shall not be a bar to prosecution.”

20. In agreeing to the Statute, the Government of Sierra Leone had in effect declined to be bound by its undertaking in the Lomé Peace Agreement. Initially, it was not clear whether this was the intent of President Kabbah when he wrote to the United Nations in June 2000 seeking the establishment of an international tribunal. Nevertheless, the President made reference to the amnesty provision in the Lomé Agreement, describing it as “a prize” that was conceded by his government in exchange for peace. He said that the RUF had since “reneged” on the agreement.¹³ In a speech delivered a year later, the then Attorney General, Solomon Berewa, remarked that, in June 2000, the Government of Sierra Leone had “reassessed”¹⁴ its position with respect to the amnesty. Moreover, the October 2000 report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations on the establishment of the Special Court for Sierra Leone states:

“While recognising that amnesty is an accepted legal concept and a gesture of peace and reconciliation at the end of a civil war or an internal armed conflict, the United Nations has consistently maintained the position that amnesty cannot be granted in respect of international crimes, such as genocide, crimes against humanity or other serious violations of international humanitarian law...

¹¹ In this respect, the Special Court differs from both the Rwanda (ICTR) and Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) tribunals. See the report of the International Crisis Group (ICG), *The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Promises and Pitfalls of a 'New Model'*, ICG Africa Briefing, 4 August 2003.

¹² See Article I (1), Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, Freetown, 16 January 2002.

¹³ See the letter dated 12 June 2000 from President Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah to the United Nations, addressed to the Secretary-General Kofi Annan.

¹⁴ See Berewa, *Addressing Impunity using Divergent Approaches*, at page 56.

With the denial of legal effect to the amnesty granted at Lomé, to the extent of its illegality under international law, the obstacle to the determination of a beginning date of the temporal jurisdiction of the Court within the pre-Lomé period has been removed.”¹⁵

21. At the time the Lomé Peace Agreement signed, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Sierra Leone was instructed to append a disclaimer to his signature on behalf of the United Nations, to the effect that the amnesty provision contained in Article IX of the Agreement (“absolute and free pardon”) shall not apply to international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law. This reservation is recalled by the UN Security Council in a preamble paragraph of Resolution 1315 (2000).
22. In the negotiations on the Statute of the Special Court, the Government of Sierra Leone concurred with the position of the United Nations and agreed to the inclusion of an amnesty clause, which would read as follows:

“An amnesty granted to any person falling within the jurisdiction of the Special Court in respect of the crimes referred to in Articles 2 to 4 of the present Statute shall not be a bar to prosecution.”
23. In the view of the Commission, the argument whereby the amnesty provision in the Lomé Peace Agreement had lapsed because the RUF had not respected other terms of the treaty is not tenable. Article IX of the Lomé Agreement clearly applies to “all combatants and collaborators”, not just those of the RUF. More specifically, it refers to fighters from the RUF, ex-AFRC, ex-SLA and CDF. It is wrong in principle and legally unsound to suggest that one party to the agreement could, by its subsequent actions, deprive individuals belonging to a number of other groups, some of them not even parties to the Lomé Agreement, of the benefit of amnesty. The resort to the argument that the amnesty had been forfeited for all parties by the actions of the RUF seriously undermined the legitimacy of national and international initiatives following the alleged breaches of the Lomé Agreement in the year 2000. It is noteworthy that the UN Secretary-General did not rely on the grounds put forward by President Kabbah. Instead the Secretary-General pronounced the position that the amnesty provision of the Lomé Agreement was illegal under international law.
24. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission is concerned at the consequences of the withdrawal of the Lomé amnesty. In repudiating the amnesty clause in the Lomé Peace Agreement, both the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone have sent a message to combatants in future wars that peace agreements containing amnesty clauses ought not to be trusted.

¹⁵ See the “Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone”, UN Doc. S/2000/915, at page 5.

25. Henceforth, combatant organisations will regard amnesty clauses with suspicion; they will hold them to be uncertain and unreliable. For those who consider that amnesty cannot be granted under any circumstances, this outcome is desirable. However the Commission has already stated that it cannot condemn the grant of amnesty in the Lomé Peace Agreement, taking into account all of the circumstances. Nor can the Commission rule out the more general proposition that there will be conflicts in future for whose resolution a trade of peace for amnesty represents the least bad of the available alternatives. By repudiating the amnesty in the Lomé Peace Agreement, the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone have inadvertently undermined future peace negotiations where amnesty is contemplated.
26. Nonetheless the Commission is mindful of the fact that parties to a peace agreement should not be permitted to breach its provisions with impunity. The Commission recommends that future peace agreements in which an amnesty is included should also contain an agreed “amnesty revocation” clause. Such a clause should, in the event of a breach of the agreement, specifically revoke the protection of amnesty in respect of the party or individuals responsible for that breach.

JURISDICTION OF THE SPECIAL COURT CONTRASTED WITH THE MANDATE OF THE TRC

Temporal Jurisdiction

27. The Special Court has a mandate that is defined as being “since 30 November 1996”. There is no end-point to its temporal jurisdiction, although the Statute can be amended by agreement between the two parties.¹⁶ The reference in Article 1 of the Statute of the Special Court to jurisdiction over those who have “threatened the establishment of and implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone” is an indication that the Court may continue to exercise jurisdiction over events until the completion of the “peace process”.¹⁷
28. The date at which the temporal jurisdiction of the Special Court begins – 30 November 1996 – coincides with the signature of the Abidjan Peace Agreement, reached between the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).¹⁸ The Secretary-General had recommended that this date be chosen so as not to impose a “heavy burden” on the Court, although the conflict is generally agreed to have begun in March 1991. In mid-2001, the Government of Sierra Leone unsuccessfully requested the United Nations to extend the temporal jurisdiction to the beginning of the conflict in 1991.

¹⁶ See the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331, 1979, at Article 39.

¹⁷ In a recent report, the Secretary-General listed a number of benchmarks that need to be accomplished as part of the “peace process”. See the “Fifteenth report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone”, UN Doc. S/2002/987, at paragraph 13. The issue of the end-point for the mandate of the Special Court is also discussed by the Secretary-General in the “Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone”, UN Doc. S/2000/915, at paragraph 28.

¹⁸ See the Peace Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone, Abidjan, 30 November 1996.

29. In contrast the mandate of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, set out in Section 6(1) of the Truth and Reconciliation Act 2000, is to prepare an impartial historical record of the conflict from 1991, when the war began, until the Lomé Peace Agreement of 7 July 1999. However, the Act also required the Commission to investigate and report on the “antecedents” of the conflict.¹⁹ Moreover, the Commission is also charged with addressing impunity, responding to the needs of victims, promoting healing and reconciliation and preventing a repetition of the violations and abuses suffered. This aspect of the mandate has no precise temporal framework. Accordingly, the Commission inquired into events both prior to 1991 and subsequent to 7 July 1999. The Commission took a broad view of its temporal framework, given the delay in its establishment and the clear relevance of events subsequent to signature of the Lomé Peace Agreement in the fulfilment of its mandate.

Territorial Jurisdiction

30. Article 1(1) of the *Statute of the Special Court* refers to violations “committed in the territory of Sierra Leone”. Article 6(1) of the Statute allows prosecution of any person who “planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution of a crime”. Such secondary participation or inchoate crime may well have taken place outside Sierra Leone. The ability of the Prosecutor or the Defence to gather evidence outside Sierra Leone depends upon the co-operation of foreign governments.
31. The mandate of the Commission refers to “violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law related to the armed conflict in Sierra Leone”. The Truth and Reconciliation Act of 2000 encouraged the Commission to look abroad. Section 6(2)(a) of the Act enjoined the Commission to investigate “the role of both internal and external factors in the conflict”. The Commission had to inquire into whether the conflict was “the result of deliberate planning, policy or authorisation by *any* government” (italics added).²⁰

Personal Jurisdiction

32. The Special Court's jurisdiction is defined in Article 1 of its Statute as encompassing “persons who bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996, including those leaders who, in committing such crimes, have threatened the establishment of and implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone”. The January 2002 Planning Mission for the Special Court speculated on prosecutorial strategy, but conceded that the selection of those bearing the greatest responsibility “necessarily entails a measure of discretion on the part of the Prosecutor, both as to the identification of individual indictments and to any priority that may be assigned to them”.²¹

¹⁹ See the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000, at Section 6(2)(a)(1).

²⁰ See the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000, at Section 6(2)(a)(1).

²¹ See the “Report of the Planning Mission on the Establishing of the Special Court for Sierra Leone”, UN Doc. S/2002/246 (2002).

33. The jurisdiction of the Special Court is not limited by the nationality of the perpetrator.²² Unlike the Commission, which can also examine the responsibility of “groups”, the Special Court’s jurisdiction is confined to “persons”.²³ The Special Court will make no determinations about the existence of “criminal organisations”.²⁴
34. The question of how to deal with child offenders has generated much debate. The Statute of the Special Court gives it jurisdiction over persons who were at least fifteen years old at the time of the crime.²⁵ The issue was one of considerable controversy during the drafting of the Statute of the Special Court.²⁶ Subsequently, Special Court Prosecutor David Crane indicated that he would not prosecute child offenders.²⁷ The UN Security Council, the Secretary-General and the SRSG frequently expressed the view that the TRC was a better venue for dealing with child or juvenile offenders. The Statute of the Special Court itself refers to “alternative truth and reconciliation mechanisms” for these purposes.²⁸
35. The Truth and Reconciliation Act 2000 refers in several places to “victims and perpetrators”, suggesting that these two groups make up the Commission’s principal constituency. Special attention is focussed on children, including child combatants, as well as victims of sexual abuse.²⁹ The Commission is also given a role in determining responsibilities, in identifying the “causes”³⁰ and the “parties responsible”,³¹ and in assessing the parts played by “any government, group or individual”.³² At the core of the Commission’s mandate is the concept of “violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law”.

²² In the case of foreign peacekeeping troops there is a rule of “complementarity” corresponding to the concept set out in Article 17 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Only when the “sending State”, which is presumably the state of nationality of the peacekeeper suspected of criminal acts, is “unwilling or unable genuinely” to prosecute may the Special Court exercise jurisdiction. See the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, at Article 1(3).

²³ The reference to “persons” in the Statute of the Special Court is not explicitly confined to physical persons, and the possibility of prosecution of corporate bodies cannot be ruled out.

²⁴ In this regard the Sierra Leone court differs from the situation at Nuremberg. On the usefulness of the concept of “criminal organisation” for contemporary prosecutions of violations of international humanitarian law, see Nina Jorgensen, “A Reappraisal of the Abandoned Nuremberg Concept of Criminal Organisations in the Context of Justice in Rwanda”, 12 *Criminal Law Forum* 371, 2001.

²⁵ See the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, at Article 7. This jurisdiction contrasts with that of the International Criminal Court, which sets a minimum age of eighteen. See the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, UN Doc. A/CONF/183/9, at Article 26.

²⁶ For the Secretary-General’s position, see “Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone”, UN Doc. S/2000/915, paragraphs 32-38; and “Letter dated 12 January 2001 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council”, UN Doc. S/2001/40, paragraphs 7-9. The Security Council considered it “extremely unlikely” that juvenile offenders would come before the Special Court: “Letter dated 31 January 2001 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General”, UN Doc. S/2001/95. Also: “Letter dated 22 December 2000 from the President of the Security Council addressed to the Secretary-General”, UN Doc. S/2000/1234.

²⁷ See, for example: ‘*Sierra Leone: Special Court will not indict children – Prosecutor*’, UN Integrated Regional Information Network, Abidjan, 4 November 2002. The categorical undertaking by Prosecutor Crane not to indict persons of less than 18 years of age was based on his assertion that juveniles were not among those who bear the greatest responsibility.

²⁸ See the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, at Article 15(5). On this subject, see also: Amann, D.M.; “Calling Children to Account: The Proposal for a Juvenile Chamber in the Special Court”, 29 *Pepp. L. Rev.* 167, 2002; and Bald, S.; “Searching for a Lost Childhood: Will the Special Court for Sierra Leone Find Justice for its Children?”, 18 *Am. U. Int’l L. Rev.* 537, 2002.

²⁹ See the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000, at Section 7(4).

³⁰ See the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000, at Section 6(2)(a).

³¹ See the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000, at Section 7(1)(a).

³² See the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000, at Section 6.

Subject-matter jurisdiction

36. The reference to “international humanitarian law” is common to both the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act and the Statute of the Special Court. The Commission is to examine “violations and abuses” of international humanitarian law, while the Special Court is to prosecute “serious violations” of international humanitarian law. The somewhat more limited subject-matter jurisdiction of the Special Court is further restrained by the specific enumeration of the crimes it may prosecute. Borrowing the wording used by the Security Council in Article 3 of the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda,³³ the Statute of the Special Court contemplates “serious violations” of Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and of Additional Protocol II. Furthermore, the Statute lists three additional “serious violations”: intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population; intentionally directing attacks against peacekeepers; and recruiting child soldiers. These three crimes are drawn from Article 8(2)(f) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.³⁴ Yet a comparison with the Rome Statute indicates clearly that the list of war crimes in the Statute of the Special Court is confined in its scope: it does not permit prosecution of all offences in non-international armed conflict that are punishable elsewhere under international law.
37. Moreover, it would appear that the Special Court has no jurisdiction over war crimes to the extent that these were committed in an international rather than a non-international armed conflict. The Sierra Leone conflict was essentially an internal armed conflict, so the issue may only be of theoretical interest. Nevertheless, there were significant international dimensions to the conflict.³⁵ For example, considerable attention has been paid to the role of mercenaries in the Sierra Leone conflict. The issue of mercenaries only arises in international humanitarian law with respect to international armed conflict.³⁶ Accordingly, such matters fell within the remit of the TRC but appeared to be outside the scope of the Special Court.
38. The Special Court also has jurisdiction over crimes against humanity and certain specified violations of the laws of Sierra Leone. The latter category encompasses specific crimes of sexual abuse of girls and destruction of property, which are not normally defined as serious violations of international humanitarian law.

³³ See the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), UN Doc. S/RES/955, 1994, Annex, at Article 3.

³⁴ With some adjustment, due to what the Secretary-General describes as the “doubtful customary nature” of the provision in the Rome Statute that prohibits recruitment of child soldiers during non-international armed conflict. See the “Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone”, UN Doc. S/2000/915, at paragraph 18.

³⁵ The international dimensions to the Sierra Leone conflict included the participation of diverse external actors and the occurrence of crucial military and political events outside Sierra Leone. More detail and analysis on these dimensions can be found in the chapter on the Military and Political History of the Conflict in Volume Three A and the chapter on External Actors in Volume Three B of this report. On the role of foreign forces in Sierra Leone see, for example: “Guinean Forces Kill, Wound Civilians in Sierra Leone”, Human Rights Watch Press release, 28 February 2001.

³⁶ See the Protocol Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1125 UNTS 3, 1979, at Article 47.

39. The Commission was charged with examining “violations and abuses of human rights and international humanitarian law”. It was mandated to “create an impartial historical record” of such violations and abuses³⁷ and to “investigate and report on the causes, nature and extent” of the violations and abuses.³⁸ The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000 provides no further guidance on the scope of the terms “human rights” and “international humanitarian law”.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TRC AND THE SPECIAL COURT

40. The Secretary-General's report of October 2000³⁹ noted that “relationship and cooperation arrangements would be required between the Prosecutor [of the Special Court] and the National Truth and Reconciliation Commission, including the use of the Commission as an alternative to prosecution, and the prosecution of juveniles, in particular.”⁴⁰ Special attention was thereby given to the question of whether or not to prosecute suspects aged between 15 and 18 years of age. The Secretary-General further noted that one of the options was to have “children between 15 and 18 years of age, both victims and perpetrators, recount their stor[ies] before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission or similar mechanisms, none of which is as yet functional.”⁴¹
41. The Security Council welcomed the Secretary-General's report, making a number of suggestions about the specific features of the proposed court. It insisted that the court should focus on those in leadership roles and sought to discourage the prospect of prosecution of offenders aged less than 18 when the crime took place. The Security Council said: “It is the view of the members of the Council that the [Truth and Reconciliation] Commission will have a major role to play in the case of juvenile offenders, and the members of the Security Council encourage the Government of Sierra Leone and the United Nations to develop suitable institutions, including specific provisions related to children, to this end.”⁴² The Secretary-General responded to the Council, noting:

“As pointed out by the Security Council, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission will have an important role to play in the case of juvenile offenders and I will endeavour, in co-operation with the Government of Sierra Leone and other relevant actors, to develop suitable institutions including specific provisions related to children to that end.

I am also of the view that care must be taken to ensure that the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission will operate in a complementary and mutually supportive manner, fully respectful of their distinct but related functions.”⁴³

³⁷ See the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000, at Section 6(1).

³⁸ See the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000, at Section 6(2).

³⁹ See the “Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone”, UN Doc. S/2000/915, issued on 4 October 2000.

⁴⁰ See UN Doc. S/2000/915, at paragraph 8.

⁴¹ See UN Doc. S/2000/915, at paragraph 33.

⁴² See UN Doc. S/2000/1234, at page 1. The Security Council went on to make a similar comment in UN Doc. S/2001/95.

⁴³ See UN Doc. S/2001/40, at paragraph 9.

42. The Planning Mission, sent by United Nations headquarters in early 2002 to make preparations for the work of the Special Court, recalled that the two institutions were to “perform complementary roles” that would be “mutually supportive” and “in full respect for each other’s mandates”.⁴⁴
43. In November 2000, an international workshop held in Freetown and organised by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) had proposed the establishment of a consultative process “to work out the relationship between the TRC and the Special Court”.⁴⁵ During 2001, the Secretary-General reported that UNAMSIL and the OHCHR would be preparing “general guidelines” for the relationship between the Commission and the Special Court.⁴⁶ In December 2001, as part of its activities to prepare for the establishment of the TRC, the OHCHR and the Office for Legal Affairs convened an expert meeting in New York. The meeting was described as follows in the report of the OHCHR:

“The expert meeting on the relationship between the TRC and the Special Court was organised by OHCHR and the Office for Legal Affairs (OLA) of the United Nations in New York on 20 and 21 December 2001. The participants discussed the important issue of an amicable relationship between the two institutions that would reflect their roles, and the difficult issue of whether information could and should be shared between them. The pros and cons of a wide range of possibilities regarding co-operation between the Commission and the Court were examined. Based on those discussions, the participants agreed on a number of basic principles that should guide the TRC and the Special Court in determining modalities of cooperation. These principles include the following:

- The TRC and the Special Court were established at different times, under different legal bases and with different mandates. Yet they perform complementary roles in ensuring accountability, deterrence, a story-telling mechanism for victims and perpetrators, national reconciliation, reparation and restorative justice for the people of Sierra Leone.
- While the Special Court has primacy over the national courts of Sierra Leone, the TRC does not fall within this mould. In any event, the relationship between the two bodies should not be discussed on the basis of primacy or lack of it. The ultimate operational goal of the TRC and the Court should be guided by the request of the Security Council and the Secretary-General to “operate in a complementary and mutually supportive manner fully respectful of their distinct but related functions” (S/2001/40, paragraph 9; see also S/2000/1234).
- The modalities of co-operation should be institutionalised in an agreement between the TRC and the Special Court and, where appropriate, also in their respective rules of procedure. They should respect fully the independence of the two institutions and their respective mandates.”⁴⁷

⁴⁴ See the “Report of the Planning Mission on the Establishing of the Special Court for Sierra Leone”, UN Doc. S/2002/246, Annex, at paragraphs 49 and 53.

⁴⁵ See UN Doc. E/CN.4/2001/35, at page 13, paragraph 41.

⁴⁶ See the “Eleventh Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone”, UN Doc. S/2001/857, at paragraph 47.

⁴⁷ See UN Doc. E/CN.4/2002/3, paragraph 70.

44. In addition to these United Nations-sponsored meetings, some international NGOs, including Human Rights Watch and the International Centre for Transitional Justice, developed proposals on the underlying principles and the type of provisions that might merit consideration in a relationship agreement.⁴⁸ While there was some rumination in these proposals over the possibilities of joint or common efforts in the areas of witness protection, translation and public awareness, most of the reflection on how the two bodies might co-operate tended to dwell on what was called “information sharing”. From the outset, information sharing was seen as a “difficult issue”. Interestingly, none of the expert meetings or discussion papers appears to have anticipated what would eventually become the main difficulty in the relationship between the two bodies, namely a request by a person accused and detained by the Special Court to testify before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

A Failure to Define the Relationship

45. Notwithstanding all the above-mentioned deliberations, the relationship between the two bodies was never actually set out or defined. Indeed, there is not a single reference⁴⁹ to the TRC in any of the enabling instruments⁵⁰ that established the Special Court. This omission was surprising given the UN Secretary General’s statement to the United Nations Security Council that:

“care must be taken to ensure that the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission will operate in a complementary and mutually supportive manner, fully respectful of their distinct but related functions.”⁵¹

46. The Commission finds that it might have been helpful for the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone to lay down guidelines for the simultaneous conduct of the two organisations.⁵² The Commission finds further that the two institutions themselves, the TRC and the Special Court, might have given more consideration to an arrangement or memorandum of understanding to regulate their relationship.

⁴⁸ See Human Rights Watch, *Policy Paper on the Inter-relationship Between the Sierra Leone Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission*, 18 April 2002; at www.hrw.org. See also International Centre for Transitional Justice, *Exploring the Relationship Between the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission*, 24 June 2002; available at www.ictj.org.

⁴⁹ There was only a passing reference in the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone to the use of unnamed “truth and reconciliation mechanisms” to assist with cases of juvenile offenders; there was no specific mention of the TRC.

⁵⁰ See the following documents: Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone for the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone, 16 January 2002; Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone; and The Special Court Agreement (Ratification) Act 2002.

⁵¹ See UN Doc. S/2001/40, at paragraph 9.

⁵² The provisions governing the conduct of the post-conflict institutions in Timor-Leste, the Commission for Reception, Truth and Reconciliation (CAVR) and the Serious Crimes Unit (SCU), regulated the appearance of perpetrators before the two bodies. The two bodies operate simultaneously at the time of writing and were established under UN Regulations, which outlined certain aspects of the working relationship between the two bodies, including which perpetrators may appear in CAVR events and which are liable for prosecution by the SCU. The Timor-Leste Commission began operations in January 2002. See the International Centre for Transitional Justice, *The Special Court for Sierra Leone: The First Eighteen Months*, March 2004, at page 11.

THE COMMENCEMENT OF OPERATIONS

47. At the early stages of their operations, the two institutions approached one another with respect and deference. There was mutual recognition that the two bodies both had an important contribution to make in dealing with the truth, with accountability and with impunity. Senior officials from both organisations made public statements in support of the other's mandate and objectives. On 2 December 2002, The Prosecutor of the Special Court and Bishop Humper, the Chairperson of the TRC, made a joint public appearance in Freetown, where each expressed support for the role of the other institution. Nevertheless, neither institution demonstrated any particular interest in attempting to establish areas of co-operation nor anything resembling a "relationship", as had previously been proposed. Both seemed to feel, implicitly at least, that it was important that they should retain clear boundaries between the two institutions.
48. When the two bodies began to operate contemporaneously, in mid-2002, neither appeared particularly eager to establish a "relationship agreement" with the other. From the outset, suggestions of "information sharing" between the Commission and the Special Court threatened to have a chilling effect upon the willingness of perpetrators to testify before the Commission. It appeared that many perpetrators would only participate meaningfully in the activities of the Commission if they could be reassured that the information they provided would not be channelled to the Special Court.

"Information Sharing" and Public Perception

49. Section 7(3) of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000 states that "[at] the discretion of the Commission, any person shall be permitted to provide information to the Commission on a confidential basis and the Commission shall not be compelled to disclose any information given to it in confidence". In addition to Section 7(3) of the Act, Section 7(4) suggests that the Commission has a positive duty to prevent disclosure of certain information, requiring it to "take into account the interests of victims and witnesses when inviting them to give statements, including the security and other concerns of those who may wish to recount their stories in public".
50. The TRC sought to reassure all its potential witnesses that if they were to provide evidence to the Commission pursuant to an undertaking by the Commission that they were doing so on a confidential basis, then their identities and other sensitive information would never be disclosed. The TRC considered that it had such a prerogative as a result of the applicable provisions of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000. The Commission further believed it necessary to exercise its prerogative rather broadly, especially given the numerous indications that perpetrators were fearful that evidence they might give to the Commission would subsequently be communicated to the Special Court.

51. The Commission was ostensibly given some sense of security in this regard by the public undertakings of various members of the Special Court's Office of the Prosecutor (OTP). The Prosecutor, David Crane, was among those who asserted that the Court would not make use of any evidence presented to the Commission. In an interview in November 2002, OTP Chief Investigator Allan White made the following remarks:

"We strongly support the TRC. We are on record saying that we do not plan to use *any* information at all from the TRC. We do want to encourage people to come and tell their story so the nation can begin the healing process...

[...] We will not concern ourselves if you come before the TRC. Nor do we necessarily want to know who comes before the TRC. It is a separate and distinct operation, and it should be. We do not plan on asking the TRC for any information whatsoever..."⁵³

52. Notwithstanding the efforts of the Commission and the undertakings of the Prosecutor to distance themselves, a perception developed throughout the country that information provided to the Commission would make its way to the Special Court. A rumour even started circulating that there was an underground tunnel that ran between the two institutions. It did not help in elucidating public perception that both bodies were situated on Jomo Kenyatta Road in Freetown, in close proximity to one another. It is not surprising that many people in Sierra Leone were not able to distinguish between the roles of the two bodies: they both dealt with impunity; they addressed accountability for atrocities committed during the war; and they focussed on violations of international humanitarian law.
53. The fact that an investigator worked in both institutions served to fuel the perceptions of collaborative work. The example in question entailed the recruiting by the Special Court of a member of the Commission's investigations team. This recruitment was apparently done on the basis that the investigator would not be employed to work on any cases he had dealt with in the Commission. In particular he was not to be used to locate witnesses he had previously identified for the Commission.
54. A Commission research team working in the vicinity of Magburaka Township (Tonkolili District) during August 2003 came across the investigator in question while proceeding to a follow-up interview with a Commission witness. It turned out that the investigator had led a Special Court investigation team to the same witness, known as "Base Marine". Only a few weeks earlier he had been in the area under the auspices of the Commission, working with the local community to arrange witnesses for hearings and interviews. At this time, he was introduced to Base Marine and was known to the witness as a TRC investigator. The investigator's return to the Magburaka area to visit the witness on a second occasion, this time wearing a Special Court cap, served to deepen suspicion in the minds of residents.

⁵³ See All Africa News Service, www.allafrica.com; *Sierra Leone's Special Court: Will it Hinder or Help?* – Interview with Special Court Chief Investigator Allan White, 21 November 2002.

55. As a follow-up, the Commission Research Team counselled Base Marine. He was in the company of Mohamed Muxon Sesay, Director of the organisation “Peace, Reconciliation and Development” based in Mile 91 (Tonkolili District). Sesay had the following to say in relation to Base Marine’s predicament:
- “After making the statement with the TRC, then later the Special Court seems to have got some clip of that information. So to me, it is confusing; maybe it’s just a trick between the TRC and the Special Court. Even the idea of not sharing information between the TRC and Special Court – it is today a big doubt... Because it’s the TRC that we know... and we have confidence in the TRC operation. There are so many things, sensitisation [about the TRC] done before this time and we have seen their activities and we feel satisfied with the TRC... But the Special Court, we are yet in the line of process.”⁵⁴
56. It would have been desirable if staff, particularly those holding sensitive posts, had not moved from one organisation to the other. The Special Court, for its part, might have refrained from employing the investigator in question.
57. The Commission often detected a climate of deep-seated suspicion among people it interacted with in the course of sensitive research and investigations. Disturbing allegations were put to the Commission, often as a means of explaining why a particular community was tense or uncooperative. By way of example, it was alleged that there had been improper conduct by a policeman investigating on behalf of the Special Court in the Kenema District. The man in question, apparently connected to the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of the Sierra Leone Police, had masqueraded as a TRC statement-taker in order to obtain evidence from witnesses for Special Court investigations.⁵⁵
58. TRC investigators and researchers were sometimes accorded somewhat frosty receptions in the course of their enquiries in the field. Staff members had to make continual assurances about personal independence and impartiality, as well as advocating the merits of the truth and reconciliation process in general.
59. The Commission finds that there is evidence to support the conclusion that some people were reluctant to participate in the truth-telling process out of fear of prosecution by the Special Court for Sierra Leone. This was one of the unfortunate costs of the parallel and simultaneous existence of the two bodies. There were certainly other reasons why some perpetrators did not come forward to tell their stories. Some presumably feared reprisal or simply saw no personal advantage to themselves in speaking publicly about their own actions. In the light of the two initiatives many perpetrators living in the bush, particularly the young combatants, felt much uncertainty and confusion surrounding their future. What can be said is that the threat of prosecution by the Special Court was one factor in the decision-making process of some of those who refused to testify. The Commission’s ability to create a forum of exchange between victims and perpetrators was unfortunately retarded by the presence of the Special Court.

⁵⁴ Mohamed Muxon Sesay, Director of Peace, Reconciliation and Development, Mile 91, TRC interview conducted at private residence near Magburaka, Tonkolili District, 13 August 2003.

⁵⁵ Formal complaints made to TRC research and investigation staff while on field missions in the Kenema District, July to August 2003.

The Question of Primacy

60. A view was expressed in some public settings that the confidentiality provisions in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000 would not shelter the Commission from a request by the Special Court to provide it with information obtained in confidence. Several arguments were invoked to justify this position. Some relied on the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which indicates that the Court has “primacy”.⁵⁶ Some mistakenly concluded that this clause subordinated the Commission to the Special Court.
61. The principle of “primacy” exists to govern conflicts between courts with concurrent jurisdiction. It pertains to the preferring of charges and the taking over of trials. “Primacy” was included in the Statute of the Special Court because the Special Court’s jurisdiction would at least partially overlap with that of the national courts of Sierra Leone. Any suggestion that there was a hierarchy between the Court and the TRC would have been alarming, given the prior statements from various United Nations sources to the effect that the two bodies were mutually supportive and complementary.
62. Nevertheless, a January 2002 discussion paper prepared by the Office of the Attorney General and Ministry of Justice of Sierra Leone, with the technical co-operation of the NGO ‘No Peace Without Justice’, erroneously concluded that the Commission was subordinate to the Special Court:
- “The legal relationship between the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission is clear. The Special Court is an international judicial body whose requests and orders require no less than full compliance by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, as by all Sierra Leonean national institutions, in accordance to [*sic*] the international obligations agreed to by Sierra Leone.”⁵⁷
63. The basis of these obligations, according to the discussion paper, was Article 17 of the Agreement between Sierra Leone and the United Nations with respect to establishment of the Special Court. Article 17 refers to obligations of the “Government”, requiring it to co-operate with the Court and to comply with its requests. It mentions nothing of the TRC, which is a body independent of the Government of Sierra Leone. In any event, the Agreement between Sierra Leone and the United Nations could in no case prevail over the legislation establishing the TRC. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000 was adopted by Parliament and could only be overridden by the Constitution, or by another subsequent Act of Parliament.

⁵⁶ See the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, at Article 8(1).

⁵⁷ See the Office of the Attorney General and Ministry of Justice Special Court Task Force, ‘Briefing Paper on Relationship between the Special Court and the TRC, Legal Analysis and Policy Considerations of the Government of Sierra Leone for the Special Court Planning Mission’, available at: www.specialcourt.org/SLMission/PlanningMission/BriefingPapers/TRC_SpCt.html.

64. The only legislation enacted by Parliament with regard to the introduction of the Special Court came on 25 April 2002 in the form of the Special Court Agreement (Ratification) Act 2002.⁵⁸ This legislation did no more than give effect to certain provisions of the Agreement between Sierra Leone and the United Nations and the Statute of the Special Court in national law. The very enactment of this legislation proves the error in the Attorney General's discussion paper, for it demonstrates that potential areas of disagreement between international treaties and national statutes must be resolved by the passing of further national legislation. For the discussion paper to have had any basis for its claim that the international Agreement took precedence over the powers of the TRC, further legislation specifically on that point would have had to be enacted. No legislation was ever passed to require "full compliance" of the TRC with the "requests and orders" of the Special Court.
65. Some observers attempted to suggest that the Special Court for Sierra Leone was empowered to compel the Commission to handover confidential evidence. They relied upon a rather ambiguous provision in the Special Court Agreement (Ratification) Act 2002. Section 21(2) of the Act said: "Notwithstanding any other law, every natural person, corporation, or other body created by or under Sierra Leone law shall comply with any direction specified in an order of the Special Court." This provision was construed in some quarters to mean that the Court had been given an overriding power, to which all existing legislation in Sierra Leone would have to give way.
66. Such an interpretation of Section 21(2) would have had as its consequence the effective elimination of all forms of privilege and confidentiality governed by the laws of Sierra Leone. In effect, it would have cancelled all diplomatic immunities, as well as the privileges that exist in well-recognised relationships of confidence, such as those between doctor and patient, solicitor and client or priest and confessor. It would have rendered meaningless one of the most important prerogatives of the TRC, namely the power to withhold confidential evidence from any party. The annulment of all forms of confidentiality in Sierra Leone could not have been the intention of Parliament when it passed the Special Court Agreement (Ratification) Act.
67. The potential legal conflict surrounding a request by the Special Court for evidence taken by the Commission on a confidential basis never materialised in practice. The Prosecutor, David Crane, made public declarations during September 2002 indicating that he would not seek evidence from the Commission.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ See the Supplement to the Sierra Leone Gazette, Vol. CXXXIII, No. 22.

⁵⁹ See the International Centre for Transitional Justice, *The Special Court for Sierra Leone: The First Eighteen Months*, March 2004, at page 12. However, the Registrar of the Special Court, Robin Vincent, indicated to TRC staff in a meeting held on 4 September 2003 that the Prosecutor would contemplate a change in his public position depending on certain circumstances. The meeting was held to discuss possible TRC access to Special Court detainees. Mr. Vincent told the TRC delegates that he had been advised by the Prosecutor that "all bets are off" if one of the detainees should admit his guilt or implicate someone else in his testimony to the TRC. The Registrar again reminded TRC staff of this comment in a follow-up meeting held on 11 September 2003.

68. The Commission cannot rule out the possibility that, at some time in the future, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, or for that matter any other court, national or international, will seek to obtain information from its archives held under condition of confidentiality. The Commission is confident that, under the current state of the laws of Sierra Leone, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000 fully prohibits any such disclosure. Any attempt to change the legislation so as to enable access to such confidential information would have disastrous consequences. In the case of vulnerable witnesses, it would seriously breach their right to privacy and possibly expose them to reprisal or persecution. In the case of perpetrators, it would set a dangerous precedent. The Commission recommends that Parliament should never authorise access by criminal justice mechanisms, either directly or indirectly, to information in the archives of the Commission that was provided on a confidential basis.

“Use Immunity” of Information Provided to the Commission

69. It was of course desirable that perpetrators who were considering providing information to the Commission should do so in public and, ideally, in the presence of their victims, where possible. The concern expressed by perpetrators – that evidence they gave in TRC public hearings might be used by the Special Court in subsequent prosecutions – could have been addressed by a rule establishing that such evidence would be inadmissible in a subsequent prosecution. The legislation establishing the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission specified that self-incriminating evidence given before the Commission could not be used in criminal prosecutions before the courts of South Africa. There was a similar provision in Ghana’s truth commission statute.
70. Although the Commission had the power to compel perpetrators to testify under oath, subject to prosecution for perjury in the case of dishonest testimony and for contempt of court in the case of refusal to testify, it did not exercise these powers. To do so might have created an extremely unfair situation for a witness who might subsequently have been exposed to prosecution before the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
71. The Commission recommends that future international criminal tribunals make provision for the “use immunity” of testimony provided to a truth and reconciliation commission, even when the information is provided in a public hearing.

THE SOURING OF RELATIONS: ACCESS TO DETAINEES

72. Persons who played a central role in the conflict, including Government Ministers, faction leaders, high-level commanders and persons accused of grave criminal conduct, appeared in both public and in closed hearings of the TRC. These individuals either sought an appearance of their own accord or were requested by the Commission to make an appearance. The testimonies generated by the appearances of these key players contributed to a rich and multi-sided discourse in society. Viewpoints and versions of events were exchanged and debated.
73. Absent from the Commission's list of witnesses were the men indicted by the Special Court on charges that they "bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November 1996". For most of the duration of the Commission's period of operations, there were nine indictees in the custody of the Court, each of them charged with multiple-count indictments alleging their responsibilities in the conflict.⁶⁰ The nine men were: Issa Hassan Sesay, Augustine Ato Bao and Morris Kallon (members of the RUF, formerly the RUF); Chief Samuel Hinga Norman JP, Allieu Kondewah and Moinina Fofana (members of the CDF); and Alex Tamba Brima, Ibrahim 'Bazzy' Kamara and Santigie Borbor Kanu (members of the former AFRC). Four of these men had been detained since 10 March 2003;⁶¹ the other five were arrested and detained on diverse dates between April and August 2003.⁶² It was only a matter of time before these role players in the custody of the Special Court would seek to tell their versions in the forum provided by the Commission.
74. The names of the indictees emerged in multiple testimonies of witnesses before the TRC. The investigative arm of the Commission had made approaches to the Special Court during the months of May and June 2003 in order to access some of the men among the first set of detainees and engage them in the TRC's information-gathering activities, including its public hearings. At that time, the Commission was advised by the Registrar of the Special Court, Robin Vincent, that the requests had been transmitted to the detainees, via their legal representatives, and that none of them wished to speak with the Commission while their trials before the Special Court were pending.⁶³ The Commission received correspondence directly from some of the legal representatives in which co-operation was welcomed; but the consensus was that any interview or hearing would have to be at the instigation of the defendants themselves.⁶⁴

⁶⁰ More detail on the various indictments, arrest warrants and transfer orders relevant to the nine indictees can be found on the website of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, at: www.sc-sl.org.

⁶¹ The four men indicted and taken in to the custody of the Special Court on 10 March 2003 were Sesay, Kallon, Tamba Brima and Hinga Norman.

⁶² Bao was formally indicted on 16 April 2003; Kamara on 24 May 2003; Kondewah and Fofana on 26 June 2003; and Kanu on 15 September 2003. Some of them were detained in the custody of the court for a period up to 30 days before being formally indicted.

⁶³ See for example the letter of 17 June 2003 from Mr. J. B. Jenkins-Johnston, legal representative of Chief Hinga Norman, to the Registrar, notifying the Special Court that he considers it inappropriate for his client to appear before TRC while he remains an indictee of the Special Court.

⁶⁴ See for example the letter of 11 June 2003 from William Hartzog, legal representative of Issa Hassan Sesay, notifying the Commission of his mandate to represent Sesay in negotiations with the Commission but cautioning that no appearance before the TRC would be possible without first being sure of his client's willingness to participate.

75. It was only in August 2003 that indicted defendants in the custody of the Special Court formally began to give notice of their desire to appear before the Commission. On 26 August 2003 Chief Samuel Hinga Norman, the former National Co-ordinator of the CDF, wrote a letter requesting his legal counsel to facilitate an appearance before the TRC:

“I have long been in receipt of copy of your letter referenced JBJJ/ZYS dated 17 June 2003, expressing the inappropriateness for me (your client) to appear before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission while I remain an indictee before the Special Court.

Well, I was arrested, charged and detained on the 10th March 2003, thinking that by now, 25th August 2003, my trial would have started long ago; but I thought wrongly. Since there is no news about the start of the trial and there are signs that the TRC may soon close its sittings, I would prefer to be heard by the people of Sierra Leone and also be recorded for posterity especially where my boss, The President of Sierra Leone, who appointed me and under whom I served as the Deputy Minister of Defence and National Coordinator of the Civil Defence Force (CDF/SL), has already testified before the Commission.

As my SOLICITOR, I am applying through you and requesting you as a matter of urgency to please inform the necessary parties of my willingness to appear and testify before the TRC without any further delay.”⁶⁵

76. Norman's application to testify to the TRC was followed by those of Augustine Bao⁶⁶ and Issa Sesay,⁶⁷ both members of the RUF, formerly the RUF.
77. Given that the defendants had regular contact with their own counsel and that they had been provided with mobile telephones enabling them to communicate with persons outside the Special Court prison, the defendants faced no difficulty in passing information to the TRC. There was certainly nothing to prevent them recording their full testimonies in writing and submitting them through their lawyers. What these detainees were seeking, however, was a hearing; an opportunity to present testimony in person to the Commission and to answer questions posed by staff of the TRC. They were asserting their rights to be heard in a manner like that accorded to all other Sierra Leoneans who had so requested and so desired.
78. The Commission considered it desirable to attempt to facilitate any request from a detainee of the Special Court to testify before it. The detainees in question had already been identified and indicted by the Prosecutor of the Special Court as individuals belonging to the category of “persons who bear the greatest responsibility” within the terms of the Court's jurisdiction.⁶⁸ Their indictments had been reviewed and approved by a judge of the Court, who had necessarily determined “that the allegations in the Prosecution's case summary would, if proven, amount to the crime or crimes as particularised in the indictment”.⁶⁹

⁶⁵ See the letter of 17 June 2003 from Chief Samuel Hinga Norman, detainee of the Special Court, to Mr. J. B. Jenkins-Johnston, legal representative of Chief Hinga Norman.

⁶⁶ See the letter of 16 September 2003 from Augustine Ato Bao, detainee of the Special Court, to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

⁶⁷ See the letter of 19 September 2003 from Issa Hassan Sesay, detainee of the Special Court, to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

⁶⁸ See the Statute of the Special Court, at Article 1 and the earlier section on issues of jurisdiction.

⁶⁹ See the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, Rule 47(E)(ii).

79. There is nothing unusual about a prisoner, either awaiting trial or convicted, testifying in proceedings in other cases and even in proceedings between other bodies. Such an occurrence happens regularly in national judicial systems and procedures exist in Sierra Leone and elsewhere to facilitate it. Indeed, the Special Court apparently gave its approval for certain detainees in its custody to give evidence in ongoing proceedings in the Sierra Leonean courts pertaining to charges of treason against other individuals.⁷⁰
80. More specifically, there is considerable precedent to be drawn from other truth and reconciliation commissions. In the South African Commission, both “awaiting-trial” and convicted prisoners appeared before hearings of the Human Rights Violations Committee in order to supply their versions of events. Prisoners and detainees also appeared before the Amnesty Committee of the South African Commission for purposes of having their amnesty applications heard. Indeed some prisoners and detainees appeared before both Committees. The Sierra Leone TRC was entrusted by the Parliament of Sierra Leone with the responsibility of hearing all relevant evidence and information concerning its mandate. Had Chief Hinga Norman or the other detainees been in prison in Sierra Leone awaiting trial before a national court, there can be no doubt that arrangements would have been made to have enabled them to be heard by the Commission. The TRC succeeded in gaining access to several persons held in Freetown Central Prison in exactly this situation.
81. As a first step towards realising Chief Hinga Norman’s request, the Commission addressed a letter to the Registrar of the Special Court (“the Registrar”), Mr. Robin Vincent, requesting him to facilitate an interview with Chief Hinga Norman on 4 September 2003. On that day, a delegation of Commission staff members attempted to interview Chief Hinga Norman but was denied access to him by the Registrar. The Registrar advised the Commission delegation that no mechanism was in place to facilitate interaction between detainees and the Commission.⁷¹ Such a mechanism was said to be under contemplation by the Special Court. According to the Registrar, once key members of the Special Court, including its President, its Judges and its Prosecutor, had agreed upon a mechanism to regulate such contact, the Special Court’s intention was to have the terms of the agreement set out by the Registrar in the form of a “Practice Direction”.⁷² The Commission was advised that the production of this Practice Direction was imminent.

⁷⁰ At the time of writing, there remained some ambiguity as to whether detainees in the custody of the Special Court would in fact be permitted to testify in ongoing proceedings before the national courts. Specifically, a request to the Special Court from the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), Mr. Brima Kebbie, asked for the release of two RUF indictees, Issa Hassan Sesay and Morris Kallon, to testify before the Freetown High Court No. 2 in the case of *The State v. Corporal Daniel Sandy and 16 Others*. According to the local press, the Court had “formally approved” the DPP’s request, but the “defence teams for both indictees [were] reluctant to give [their] consent for the release of [their] clients” to participate in this high-profile treason trial. See, for example: *The African Champion*, ‘Issa Sesay, Morris Kallon in Hot Waters’, Freetown, 21 January 2004, at page 1.

⁷¹ See the minutes of the meeting held in the Office of the Registrar between a TRC delegation and representatives of the Special Court, 4 September 2003.

⁷² Rule 33(D) of the Special Court’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence authorises the Registrar “in consultation with the President of the Special Court, [to] issue Practice Directions addressing particular aspects of the practice and procedure in the Registry of the Special Court and in respect of other matters within the powers of the Registrar”.

82. So began the efforts of the TRC to secure the appearance of the Special Court detainees. It was an episode that would draw to an end barely four weeks before the formal closure of the Commission's operations. On 28 November 2003 – three months after Hinga Norman's original request for a hearing was made known to the Special Court – the President of the Court, Judge Geoffrey Robertson, ruled that the detainees could only engage with the Commission by way of written statements.

THE SPECIAL COURT'S PRACTICE DIRECTION

83. The Practice Direction was adopted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone on 9 September 2003.⁷³ It was framed as a set of procedures to be followed by either the TRC or a "National Authority" who might request access to persons in the custody of the Special Court ("the Practice Direction"). No consultations or discussions were held with the TRC Commissioners or staff members in advance of the issuance of the Practice Direction. No effort was made to solicit the views of the Commission on what the Commission would consider to be acceptable and reasonable terms of access to the detainees.
84. Notwithstanding the provisions of the TRC Act of 2000, the Practice Direction required the Commission to make a substantive application before a Special Court Judge who would decide on the merits of the application.⁷⁴ Such an application had to include a list of all the specific questions the Commission wished to pose to the detainee.⁷⁵ The Practice Direction provided for any Commission interview to be "supervised" by a legal officer who had the power to intervene to stop questions and even to stop the interview.⁷⁶ All interviews were required to be recorded and transcribed.⁷⁷ The transcripts would be handed over to the Prosecutor for use at trial.⁷⁸
85. In requiring the Commission to make a substantive application to a Special Court Judge for permission to interview a detainee, the Practice Direction was inconsistent with the mandate and powers granted to the Commission under its founding statute. The Commission was granted the power to interview any individual within Sierra Leone at any place in the fulfilment of its mandate. There were no limitations, exceptions or qualifications on this power contained in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000.
86. The Commission recognised the Special Court had the power to regulate access to accused persons in its custody. In particular, the Special Court had a legitimate interest in regulating contact in order to prevent the escape of the detainee, to prevent harm being done to the detainee and to maintain good and orderly conduct in the detention facility.

⁷³ See the "Practice Direction on the procedure following a request by a National Authority or Truth & Reconciliation Commission to take a statement from a person in the custody of the Special Court for Sierra Leone"; signed by the Registrar Robin Vincent, adopted 9 September 2003, (hereinafter "Practice Direction of 9 September 2003").

⁷⁴ See the Practice Direction of 9 September 2003, at paragraph 5.

⁷⁵ See the Practice Direction of 9 September 2003, at paragraph 2(g).

⁷⁶ See the Practice Direction of 9 September 2003, at paragraph 6.

⁷⁷ See the Practice Direction of 9 September 2003, at paragraph 8(b).

⁷⁸ See the Practice Direction of 9 September 2003, at paragraph 8(c).

THE RESPONSE OF THE TRC TO THE PRACTICE DIRECTION

87. The Commission responded to the issuance of the Practice Direction by way of a letter addressed to the Registrar, dated 9 September 2003.⁷⁹ Extracts from this letter are reproduced below:

“Witnesses who appear before the TRC are expected to contribute towards truth telling which in turn forms the basis of national healing and reconciliation. In this process a witness may incriminate himself. Where the interview is conducted on the basis of confidentiality (as provided by the Act) the TRC will naturally not disclose any information to another body for purposes of criminal prosecution. This principle has been established and respected in other jurisdictions and indeed it is established in this country.

The TRC routinely interviews awaiting trial prisoners before the criminal courts of Sierra Leone and there has been absolutely no question of monitoring our interviews or for that matter forwarding information to prosecutors. Indeed to do so would be regarded as an outrage. Our hope is that the Special Court, a body established through international co-operation and which subscribes to international human right standards, will not conduct itself in this way.

The Direction is in the circumstances a denial of the Accused’s right not to incriminate himself. This right is enshrined in your own Statute for the Special Court of Sierra Leone by virtue of Article 17, subparagraph (4)(g).

The burden of proof in a criminal trial rests with the prosecution. The Direction in our view constitutes an improper attempt to procure evidence from the Accused. In effect the Accused who wishes to appear before the TRC is penalised and his right to a fair trial undermined for no other reason than his desire to exercise his rights under the Act. The Practice Direction then has a “chilling effect” on those detainees who may wish to appear before the TRC. Many will in the circumstances decide not to exercise their rights in this regard and those that do are effectively punished for doing so...

We are of course respectful of the important role the Special Court plays in Sierra Leone in addressing impunity. The TRC would not engage in any activity that would undermine the objectives of the Special Court...

The Direction is dismissive of the spirit and purpose behind the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. It would be a highly regrettable development between our two important institutions.”

⁷⁹ See the letter of 9 September 2003 from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to the Registrar of the Special Court, Robin Vincent.

88. TRC staff members met again with the Registrar on 11 September 2003.⁸⁰ The Registrar undertook to place the Commission's concerns and its suggestions for revisions to the Practice Direction before the President of the Court and the Prosecutor. One of the Special Court representatives present, Mr. Sylvain Roy, Acting Head of the Special Court's Defence Office, raised what he described as a "very practical concern". He stated that:

"Some of the detainees might want to avail themselves of the opportunity to testify before the TRC in order to take a public platform."⁸¹

Mr. Roy suggested that the detainees were "looking for publicity" and that the "TRC [was] a conduit to the population."

89. The Commission supplied its suggestions for a revised Practice Direction in a letter to the Registrar dated 12 September 2003.⁸² Among its detailed suggestions for revision, the Commission proposed that the following paragraphs be inserted into the preamble of the Practice Direction:

"ACKNOWLEDGING the unique role of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in promoting healing and reconciliation in Sierra Leone; and

NOTING that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000 accords the TRC certain powers and functions to create an impartial historical record for Sierra Leone."

The Special Court declined to insert any such text in the preamble of its revised Practice Direction acknowledging the unique role of the TRC or its powers and functions under the Act.

90. The Registrar was advised that the Commission had to wind up its activities before the end of the year 2003. This meant that the Commission had to act expeditiously. In its letter of 12 September 2003, the Commission requested the Registrar to provide the Court's feedback by 16 September 2003. As it turned out the Commission would only receive the revised Practice Direction on 6 October 2003.⁸³

⁸⁰ See the minutes of the meeting held in the Office of the Registrar between a TRC delegation and representatives of the Special Court, 11 September 2003.

⁸¹ Sylvain Roy, Acting Head of Special Court Defence Office; meeting held in the Office of the Registrar between a TRC delegation and representatives of the Special Court, 11 September 2003.

⁸² See the letter of 12 September 2003 from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to the Registrar of the Special Court, Robin Vincent.

⁸³ See the *Practice Direction on the procedure following a request by a State, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, or other legitimate authority to take a statement from a person in the custody of the Special Court for Sierra Leone*; signed by the Registrar Robin Vincent, adopted 9 September 2003, amended 4 October 2003. While the revised Practice Direction was adopted on Saturday 4 October 2003, it was not received by the Commission until Monday 6 October 2003.

91. By the end of business on 16 September 2003, the Special Court had not responded as requested. The Commission was anxious to resolve the impasse and sought the intervention of the Acting Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General (SRSG), Mr. Alan Doss, to mediate between the Commission and the Court. Mr. Doss participated in a meeting with two Commissioners (including the TRC Chairman, Bishop Joseph Humper) and TRC staff members on 18 September 2003.⁸⁴ A detailed dossier was handed to the SRSG with the specific request that he should attempt to secure the participation of the Special Court in the mediation. Mr. Doss undertook to take the matter further and to revert back to the Commission.
92. The Commission never heard from the office of Mr. Doss again, notwithstanding telephone calls to his office. Informally, the Commission was advised that the request had been referred to the UN Office of Legal Affairs at its Secretariat in New York. This office apparently supplied an opinion in which two propositions were made: that the Special Court held “primacy” over the Commission; and that no mediation could take place without the involvement of the Special Court. The point on primacy represented a misreading of the Special Court statute. With regard to the second point the writer of the opinion appeared to overlook the fact that the Commission had requested the SRSG to secure the participation of the Special Court in the mediation. While the Commission was generally disappointed with the failure of the UN structure to act expeditiously, the Commission wishes to recognise the constructive support provided on this issue by individual staff members of the Human Rights Section at UNAMSIL.

REQUESTS TO THE TRC FROM AUGUSTINE BAO AND ISSA SESAY

93. Another Special Court detainee, Augustine Ato Bao of the RUF, wrote to the TRC on 16 September 2003 requesting a public appearance before the Commission.⁸⁵ Mr. Bao wrote:

“It has been my ardent desire to appear and testify before the TRC, which is the only legitimate body that the Lomé Accord, The Pivotal for the successful conclusion of the conflict, empowered to look into the cause or causes that warranted the conflict and its effect or effects.

My arrest and Detention by a body that never took part in the negotiation that brokered the peace impeded my efforts to appear before the TRC, and [I have] been held for six (6) months without seeing the shadow of a trial emerging.

The Lomé Accord and ECOWAS put into being the TRC for all Sierra Leoneans to speak nothing but the truth, as the truth is the only vehicle that can accommodate us as people of a nation.

[...] It is in this spirit that I write to request that I want to appear before the TRC as a Sierra Leonean and a member of the former RUF now RUF to contribute my own quota to this historic document for posterity.”

⁸⁴ See the record of the meeting held at UNAMSIL Headquarters between a TRC delegation and representatives of UNAMSIL, including the Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Alan Doss; meeting held at UNAMSIL Headquarters, Freetown, 18 September 2003.

⁸⁵ See the letter of 16 September 2003 from Augustine Ato Bao, detainee of the Special Court, to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

94. Another RUF detainee, Issa Hassan Sesay, wrote a letter to the TRC dated 19 September 2003, although it was only received by the Commission on 16 October 2003.⁸⁶ Mr. Sesay wrote:

“... I have been in detention for six months now and trial is nowhere to be seen. I have therefore decided to renew my commitment for peace by fulfilling my obligation as a Sierra Leonean and as a RUF now RUF member to appear and testify before the TRC, which the absolute Lomé Accord set up to investigate the causes of the conflict and the effects of the conflict.

[...] The absolute Lomé Accord authorised the TRC to recommend solutions that will avert future conflict and solutions that will create a nation void of callousness and hatred; a nation where love will be discovered once again, where deceptions and other awful tactics for political power and wealth can no longer be part of our lives again; where respect for the Constitution and for one another is restored and where the truth will take us from the darkness to the light of God.

It is therefore my burning desire to appear and speak nothing but the truth as the truth is the hinge for permanent peace and reconciliation.”

95. Legal counsel for Mr. Sesay, Mr. William Hartzog, indicated to the Commission that his client was potentially interested in both a confidential interview and a public hearing before the Commission. Detailed questions for Mr. Sesay were prepared and passed on to Mr. Hartzog. Counsel and the Commission agreed to prepare a joint challenge to the provisions of the Practice Direction preventing confidential interviews. A legal opinion was prepared⁸⁷ and the Commission awaited instructions to emerge from Mr. Issa Sesay through his legal counsel. Sadly this joint challenge never materialised as the events to be described below overtook this initiative.

⁸⁶ See the letter of 19 September 2003 from Issa Hassan Sesay, detainee of the Special Court, to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission; letter entitled: “Request to Appear and Testify before the TRC”.

⁸⁷ A comprehensive legal opinion was prepared by Mr. Peter Rosenblum of Columbia Law School. The TRC wishes to express its appreciation to Mr. Rosenblum and his research team for the legal advice they supplied. Legal advice on other aspects was supplied by Neil Boister of Christchurch University, Jeremy Sarkin of Western Cape University, Clare da Silva, Anne-Marie Corominas, Megan Carpenter and Vivienne O'Connor.

DEVELOPMENTS IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER 2003

96. The month of September passed without further word from the Special Court. Chief Hinga Norman was becoming increasingly impatient with the delays. He addressed a letter dated 2 October 2003 to the Commission entitled "Reminder to Testify before the TRC".⁸⁸ He wrote:

"While still looking forward to hearing from you on the issue of testifying before the TRC, I have come by a copy of an interesting document (PRACTICE DIRECTION) copy attached, compiled and signed by the Registrar–SCSL, with a series of illegal conditions, all intending to obstruct my appearing before the TRC. I am not sure who the Practice Direction is struggling to protect – the prosecution, Accused, or who?

I am sure the reason for the establishment of the TRC was to encourage the speaking of the TRUTH. In demonstration, but not limited to the attached document ("I HAVE A DREAM etc."), I intend to reveal a lot more so this Country and the entire World could know the truths that are being presently concealed. In the efforts to bring out the facts, I am not in the least afraid of any of the conditions indicated in the illegal document, which the Registrar has now produced as hind sight.

Since I do not know the reason for the obstruction and the long delay in testifying and also the denial of a speedy trial, I have by letter authorised my daughter to organise a Media conference and to release all relevant documents that have trans-crossed between the SCSL, TRC and myself, to the attention of the National and International public for justice and fair play."

Hinga Norman's letter was copied to several embassies, as well as to media institutions in Sierra Leone and abroad. The attachment to the letter revealed Hinga Norman's account of events leading up to the coup by renegade soldiers in May 1997. Hinga Norman claimed that he had presented evidence of the impending coup to President Kabbah, who chose to ignore the warning. This information was subsequently reported widely in the local press.⁸⁹

97. As the weeks slipped away without the production of the Special Court's revised Practice Direction, the Commission seriously considered its options. One option was an urgent application to the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone for a declaratory order.⁹⁰ The Commission commenced with the drafting of legal papers for such an application. These legal papers sought a declaration on two key issues: first, whether the TRC had the right, by virtue of the provisions of the Truth and Reconciliation Act 2000, to interview detainees held in the custody of the Special Court and, at its discretion, to conduct such interviews on a confidential basis; and second, whether awaiting trial prisoners held at the detention facility of the Special Court had the right, by virtue of the provisions of the Act, to appear before the TRC. Both of these rights would be sought subject only to reasonable security and administrative conditions as imposed by the Special Court.⁹¹

⁸⁸ See the letter of 2 October 2003 from Chief Samuel Hinga Norman, detainee of the Special Court, to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission; letter entitled: "Reminder to Testify before the TRC".

⁸⁹ See, for example: *New People*, "If permitted to testify... Hinga Norman to expose Kabbah at TRC", Friday 9 October 2003, at page 1; and *The Democrat*, "Uncomfortable Reality! Hinga Norman Speaks from Jail", Wednesday 7 October 2003, at page 1.

⁹⁰ A declaratory order (also known as a "declarator") is essentially a declaration of rights by a court.

⁹¹ See the draft Notice of Motion for a Declaratory Order and accompanying legal papers prepared internally by the TRC, 19 September 2003.

98. The Commission decided in principle to proceed with its application for a declaratory order. However, the Commission was also advised to exhaust all its remedies before the Special Court prior to approaching the Supreme Court.⁹² Accordingly, Commission staff began simultaneously to prepare legal papers to challenge the validity of the Practice Direction before the Special Court. While this process was underway, the revised Practice Direction was issued by the Special Court. Subsequent time constraints prevented the Commission from proceeding any further with its proposed application to the Supreme Court.

THE SPECIAL COURT'S REVISED PRACTICE DIRECTION

99. On 6 October 2003, the Registrar forwarded a copy of the Special Court's Revised Practice Direction, which had been adopted two days previously.⁹³ While the Revised Practice Direction altered the earlier Practice Direction in some respects, it did not take matters much further. The main change was that the record of the interview with a detainee would no longer automatically be transmitted to the Prosecutor. The transcript would instead be lodged with the Court Management Section (the Registrar) and could be made available to any party to the criminal proceedings, including the Prosecutor, upon order by the Presiding Judge.⁹⁴ Even in the event that the Commission were to exercise its prerogative to classify the interview as confidential, there was to be no genuine "use immunity" for the contents of such an interview. Instead, any party, again including the Prosecutor, could apply to the Court for an order that the "confidential" information be disclosed in the interests of justice.⁹⁵
100. The Revised Practice Direction provided something of a presumption in favour of granting permission for access:

"The Presiding Judge shall grant approval (conditional or otherwise) if the said Judge is satisfied that the detainee agrees to the questioning and has been fully advised...

[...] In such circumstances, the request for questioning will only be rejected if the Presiding Judge is satisfied that a refusal is necessary in the interests of justice or to maintain the integrity of the proceedings of the Special Court."⁹⁶

⁹² On the question of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone to deal with the matter, the founding affidavit of the legal papers prepared by the TRC asserted that the TRC Act, which governed appearances by persons before the Commission, was of application to all Sierra Leoneans and all persons in Sierra Leone. The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone to determine these rights in relation to Chief Samuel Hinga Norman was not excluded by the fact that he was held in the physical custody of the Special Court, a quasi or hybrid national and international body.

⁹³ See the *Practice Direction on the procedure following a request by a State, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, or other legitimate authority to take a statement from a person in the custody of the Special Court for Sierra Leone*; signed by the Registrar Robin Vincent, amended 4 October 2003. (hereinafter "Revised Practice Direction of 4 October 2003").

⁹⁴ See the Revised Practice Direction of 4 October 2003, at paragraphs 4(b) and 4(c).

⁹⁵ See the Revised Practice Direction of 4 October 2003, at paragraph 4(c).

⁹⁶ See the Revised Practice Direction of 4 October 2003, at paragraph 5.

101. The balance of the Revised Practice Direction remained largely the same as the original Practice Direction. The Commission recorded its objections in a letter to the Registrar dated 8 October 2003.⁹⁷ In this letter the Special Court was advised that it was impossible for the Commission to interview detainees on a confidential basis under the conditions set out in the Practice Direction:

“The Practice Direction constitutes an effective denial of the right of detainees under the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act 2000 (“the Act”) to be interviewed on a confidential basis.

The TRC will not place in jeopardy the rights of the detainees under the Act, nor will it be party to the potential undermining of their rights to a fair trial by engaging in a process in which the Commission is not permitted to guarantee strict confidentiality. Accordingly, the TRC hereby gives notice that it will not make use of the Practice Direction, as it is presently formulated, for the purposes of conducting confidential interviews or closed hearings.”

102. The Commission notified the Court that it would make use of the Practice Direction only to apply for and arrange public hearings with the detainees. As it turned out the first of the detainees to write to the Commission had asked to give his testimony in the form of a public hearing. Hence the Practice Direction would be used to apply for a TRC public hearing with this detainee, namely Chief Samuel Hinga Norman.
103. The Registrar, corresponding from New York City, stated on 17 October 2003 that he was:

“... deeply disappointed at [the TRC’s] refusal to make use of the revised Practice Direction, in so far as it relates to the conduct of confidential or closed hearings...”;

and

“also disappointed that so much of the correspondence with the Commission on this issue has been couched in somewhat aggressive language which could be seen to be both inappropriate and counter productive, given that both institutions have difficult tasks to perform and expectations to meet.”⁹⁸

⁹⁷ See the letter of 8 October 2003 from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to Robin Vincent, Registrar of the Special Court; letter entitled: ‘Objections of the TRC to the Revised Practice Direction’.

⁹⁸ See the letter of 17 October 2003 from Robin Vincent, Registrar of the Special Court, to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission; letter entitled: ‘Objections of the TRC to the Revised Practice Direction’.

REQUEST FOR CHIEF SAMUEL HINGA NORMAN JP TO APPEAR BEFORE THE COMMISSION IN A PUBLIC HEARING

104. On 7 October 2003, the Commission submitted its application to hold a public hearing with Chief Hinga Norman.⁹⁹ The Commission made the following statements in setting out the purpose for its request:

“The TRC perceives Chief Samuel Hinga Norman JP to have played a central role in the conflict in Sierra Leone. The Commission’s report – insofar as it purports to present an impartial historical record – would not be complete without hearing from Chief Hinga Norman the particular details of his role in the conflict and his insights and views into its causes, course and character.

On 26 August 2003 Chief Hinga Norman stated in a letter to the TRC that he wishes to appear before the Commission in order to give testimony pertaining to the conflict in Sierra Leone. Since Chief Hinga Norman’s letter, the TRC has sought to arrange such testimony under conditions satisfactory to all parties. The present request represents the Commission’s unerring effort to secure such testimony.”¹⁰⁰

105. With time running out, the Commission also put forward the strongest possible case for the matter to be treated with special urgency:

“The Commission is operating under considerable time pressures. Section 5(1) of the Act provides for the operation of the TRC for a period of one year. The period of one year expired on 4 October 2003, although agreement has been secured from the President of Sierra Leone to extend the period by virtue of the aforesaid section until the end of December 2003.

Funding for the TRC is provided only until the end of December 2003. In practice this means that the report of the Commission must be finalised and sent to the printers during November. This in turn means that the report itself should be completed towards the end of October or early November. All interviews and hearings should thus be concluded without delay.

Every day that passes without the commencement of interviews or hearings with the detainees held by the Special Court constitutes a potential denial of their rights under the Act. Moreover, any further delay in resolving this matter will severely undermine the ability of the TRC to complete its mandate under the Act...

In the circumstances the TRC has outlined a clear case to have this request expedited with the utmost urgency. The Commission requests respectfully that the Special Court make the necessary arrangements to hold a hearing of Chief Hinga Norman on Monday 13 October 2003 or as soon thereafter as is conveniently possible.”¹⁰¹

⁹⁹ See Request SHN 001 of 7 October 2003; *Request by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone to Conduct a Public Hearing with Chief Samuel Hinga Norman JP*, submitted on 7 October 2003 (hereinafter “Request SHN 001 of 7 October 2003”).

¹⁰⁰ See Request SHN 001 of 7 October 2003, at paragraphs 8 and 9.

¹⁰¹ See Request SHN 001 of 7 October 2003, at paragraphs 12 to 15.

106. The Special Court did not respond to the Commission's request for the hearing of Chief Hinga Norman to proceed on 13 October 2003. The Deputy Prosecutor, acting on behalf of the Prosecutor, only filed his objections to the application in an inter-office memorandum dated 21 October 2003,¹⁰² a copy of which was received by the TRC late on 22 October 2003.
107. Meanwhile, following consultations with a member¹⁰³ of the Bao legal defence team, the Commission submitted an application on 10 October 2003 to conduct a public hearing with Augustine Ato Bao.¹⁰⁴ The Bao legal defence team, surprisingly and without reference to the Commission, filed their own response to the Commission request on 17 October 2003 in which they stipulated a number of conditions to the proposed hearing.¹⁰⁵ This action on the part of the lawyers was to provide the Court with sufficient grounds to form the view that Mr. Bao "was uncertain as to whether to testify before the Commission".¹⁰⁶

Objections of the Prosecutor to a Public Hearing with Chief Samuel Hinga Norman

108. In his two-page memorandum of 21 October 2003,¹⁰⁷ the Prosecutor divided his objections to a public hearing with Chief Hinga Norman into three sub-headings, namely: the interests of justice; the integrity of the proceedings; and other concerns relating to possible civil unrest.
109. Under the heading of "The interests of justice", the Prosecutor submitted that a hearing before the Commission:
- a. could be considered "*sub judice*";¹⁰⁸
 - b. could be "contrary to public policy" in that it could defeat the interests of justice to allow an accused to litigate or plead his case in the public when he would be entitled to a fair and public trial in due course; and
 - c. could weaken the "institution of justice" as guaranteed by the Statute of the Special Court by "a defendant exploiting the occasion".¹⁰⁹

¹⁰² See the Inter-Office Memorandum of 21 October 2003 from Desmond de Silva QC, Deputy Prosecutor (on behalf of the Prosecutor), to Judge Bankole Thompson, Presiding Judge of the Trial Chamber; memorandum entitled: "Samuel Hinga Norman and the TRC".

¹⁰³ Professor Andreas O'Shea, assigned legal counsel to Augustine Ato Bao.

¹⁰⁴ See Request AAB 002 of 10 October 2003; *Request by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone to Conduct a Public Hearing with Augustine Ato Bao*, submitted on 10 October 2003 (hereinafter "Request AAB 002 of 10 October 2003").

¹⁰⁵ See the document entitled "*Defence Agreement and Response to the Request by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone to Conduct a Public Hearing with Augustine Ato Bao*", filed with the Registry on 17 October 2003.

¹⁰⁶ See the *Decision on the Request by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone to Conduct a Public Hearing with Augustine Ato Bao*; decision rendered by Judge Bankole Thompson, Presiding Judge of the Trial Chamber, dated 3 November 2003 (hereinafter "Thompson Decision on the Bao Request"), at paragraph 8.

¹⁰⁷ See the Inter-Office Memorandum of 21 October 2003 from Desmond de Silva QC, Deputy Prosecutor (on behalf of the Prosecutor), to Judge Bankole Thompson, Presiding Judge of the Trial Chamber; memorandum entitled: 'Samuel Hinga Norman and the TRC' (hereinafter "Objections of the Prosecutor").

¹⁰⁸ The *sub judice* rule is designed to prevent publication of matters that would directly affect the outcome of a pending trial.

¹⁰⁹ See the Objections of the Prosecutor, at paragraph (a).

110. The Prosecutor's "integrity of proceedings" objections can be summarised as follows:
- a. The mere act of Chief Hinga Norman testifying before the TRC could stir up public feelings and frighten victims and potential witnesses from the proceedings. Indeed the public nature of the hearing would enable Chief Hinga Norman to intimidate victims and potential witnesses, probably through subtle means, which would irreparably damage the integrity of the proceedings.
 - b. Such a forum would provide Chief Hinga Norman with the opportunity to incite violence or threaten the security of the Special Court.
 - c. As some of the evidence to be used in the prosecution has been formally disclosed, any intimidation may have a direct impact on victims and witnesses. The Presiding Judge had already ordered protective measures against Chief Hinga Norman to ensure that victims and witnesses were sufficiently protected.¹¹⁰
111. Finally, the Prosecutor submitted under his "Other concern" heading that peace in Sierra Leone rested upon a "fragile equilibrium", which could be put in peril by the holding of the hearing.¹¹¹

ARGUMENT BEFORE JUDGE BANKOLE THOMPSON

112. The Hinga Norman matter was set down for argument on 24 October 2003 before the Presiding Judge of the Trial Chamber, Judge Bankole Thompson.¹¹² The Commission in its submissions¹¹³ dealt with each of the Prosecutor's objections.¹¹⁴

The Interests of Justice

113. In relation to the *sub judice* objection, it was pointed out that, in law, any impugned public act or publication must create a real and substantial risk of prejudice to the administration of justice and it must be made with the specific intent of prejudicing a fair trial. The claim that the mere holding of a Commission hearing in advance of a trial would in itself violate the rule had no basis in law. The Prosecution did not supply any factual grounds to support a contention that there was any danger of the *sub judice* rule being violated.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁰ See the Objections of the Prosecutor, at paragraph (b).

¹¹¹ See the Objections of the Prosecutor, at paragraph (c).

¹¹² Judge Bankole Thompson is a Sierra Leonean who had served as a High Court Judge in the 1980s. Prior to his appointment at the Special Court he taught criminal justice at Eastern Kentucky University in the United States, where he also served as Dean of its Graduate School.

¹¹³ See the *Response By The Truth And Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone to the Objections from the Prosecution to the TRC's Request to hold a Public Hearing with Chief Samuel Hinga Norman JP*, before Judge Bankole Thompson, dated 24 October 2003. (hereinafter "TRC Submissions before Judge Thompson")

¹¹⁴ The TRC's submissions were presented by Mr. Howard Varney. The Prosecutor was represented by Mr. Desmond de Silva QC, Deputy Prosecutor.

¹¹⁵ Paragraph 4(d) of the Revised Practice Direction specifically prevented the Special Court from being influenced by any conclusion or comment that might be made by the Commission arising from a hearing with a detainee. The Prosecutor's *sub judice* assertion was in any event moot, as the Commission had already agreed with the defence team not to canvass Chief Hinga Norman on the specific elements of the charges against him.

114. The Prosecution's contention that it would be against public policy for an Accused to plead his case in public when he will be entitled to a fair and public trial was academic given the agreement reached between Defence Counsel and the TRC not to canvass issues forming part of the charges against Hinga Norman. Nonetheless, the Commission's representative pointed out that, in the absence of a specific allegation, it could not be assumed that a mere appearance before the Commission would jeopardise the "interests of justice".

115. The Commission noted that the Court was obliged when assessing the "interests of justice" to take into account a range of factors across a broad spectrum of interests. The Commission specifically pointed out that:

"The Special Court for Sierra Leone does not operate in a vacuum, but rather as one integral part of the post-conflict landscape in this country and as the standard bearer for wider principles of justice on a national and international level."¹¹⁶

The Commission submitted that the Court ought to be the guardian not only of the right to a fair trial, but also of other human rights, including freedom of expression. In the Sierra Leone context, there was an additional factor to consider, namely the right of Chief Hinga Norman, a prominent Sierra Leonean, to speak in a public forum before the TRC, to present his version of and perspectives on a critical period in the country's history. It was submitted that any objection to the TRC's request would have to strike a balance, weighing the effects of banning Chief Hinga Norman from speaking against the damage done to his freedom of expression and his right to appear publicly before the TRC. No such proportional assessment was undertaken by the Prosecution.

116. The Commission submitted that it was likely that Hinga Norman would feature in the TRC Report on account of testimony received from other sources. Fairness demanded that he be given an opportunity to provide his version of the conflict and to do so publicly.

117. Numerous other central role players in the conflict had been afforded their rights of testifying publicly before the Commission. Since there were examples of individuals¹¹⁷ in "comparable situations" to that of Chief Hinga Norman who had been granted the opportunity of a public hearing, the denial of an equal opportunity to Chief Hinga Norman in the absence of clear, substantial and reasonable grounds would constitute discrimination against him. It was contended that the harmful effects of a ban on Chief Hinga Norman from exercising his statutory and human rights far outweighed the speculative concerns raised by the Prosecution.

118. The Prosecution's final "interests of justice" objection was that the institution of justice could be weakened by a public hearing before the TRC if a defendant were to exploit the occasion. The Prosecution did not allege that Chief Hinga Norman himself would exploit the situation, but rather claimed in the abstract that "a defendant" might do so. The TRC pointed out that it had already conducted a high-profile public hearing with an Accused before the criminal courts of Sierra Leone, namely Colonel (RUF) Vandy Kosia. No party made a claim that Kosia's appearance at the TRC, on 24 May 2003, weakened the institution of justice.

¹¹⁶ See TRC Submissions before Judge Thompson, dated 24 October 2003, at paragraph 2.3.3.

¹¹⁷ Reference to TRC Public Hearing with Colonel (RUF) Vandy Kosia, Freetown, 24 May 2003. At the time of his public hearing, Kosia was an "awaiting-trial" prisoner at Pademba Road Prison.

Integrity of the Proceedings

119. Under this heading, the Prosecution inferred that Chief Hinga Norman's appearance before the Commission in an open manner may in itself stir up public feelings and pose a threat to the security of the Special Court. The Prosecution alleged that the security of its protected witnesses might be compromised by an appearance by Hinga Norman before the Commission. It was suggested that a public hearing would enable Chief Hinga Norman to intimidate victims "through more subtle means". The suggestion was made without indicating what such "subtle means" might be.
120. The Commission invited the Judge to dismiss these suggestions as conjecture. The Judge was reminded that witness protection was essentially about keeping the identities of protected persons and in particular their locations secret. No allegation was made against Hinga Norman that he had breached standard protective measures apparently imposed to safeguard the identity of witnesses, even though he was granted reasonably unrestrained access to the outside world through communications with visitors and the use of his mobile phone.

Threats to National Security

121. The Commission argued that the Prosecutor's assertion that a public hearing for Hinga Norman could threaten the "fragile" peace was without foundation. It was pointed out to the Judge that the Commission had conducted many public hearings with key faction leaders and the process had never precipitated an adverse reaction from any group among the Sierra Leonean population.

Emergent Norms in National and International Law

122. In an attempt to highlight the profound importance of the issue at hand, the Commission submitted that developments in national and international law created a presumption in favour of permitting Hinga Norman to appear before the Commission. Nationally, the established practice of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission had led to the recognition in national law of a *de facto* right to testify before the Commission. With regard to international practice, the Commission asserted the following:

"In the light of developments in post-conflict societies in the late 20th and early 21st centuries in dealing with past human rights violations, there exists on the part of victims a right to know the truth. Truth Commissions have been created in several countries around the world to meet that recognised obligation. There is considerable weight to the argument that establishing the "truth" is an essential component of the universally recognised "right to an effective remedy." The Special Court is duly bound to consider such a right in respect of the Sierra Leone population in its determination of the parameters of this request "in the interests of justice".¹¹⁸

¹¹⁸ See TRC Submissions before Judge Thompson, dated 24 October 2003, at paragraph 6.1.2.

123. The Commission concluded its representations by suggesting that the historic moment had arrived whereby a decision had to be made as to whether these two institutions were indeed going to work together on a complementary basis or not.

“Sierra Leone finds itself at a special moment in its history. Indeed Sierra Leone has the potential to offer the world a unique framework in the difficult process of moving from conflict to peace. We have two complementary institutions, namely the Special Court and the Commission, that are central to this process. Indeed the President and the Prosecutor of the Special Court are on record stating that the two institutions will work together to uncover the truth and provide the most comprehensive benefits to a post-conflict state.

The outcome of this proceeding will in large measure determine whether two such institutions can in fact be complementary. The consequences for the people of Sierra Leone – and indeed for the people in all conflict zones which envisage similar mechanisms of transitional justice – will be far reaching.”¹¹⁹

124. On 29 October 2003, representatives for the Commission, the Prosecutor and Augustine Bao argued before Judge Bankole Thompson on the question of Bao’s appearance before the Commission. The arguments of the Commission and the Prosecution were largely the same as those put forward in the Hinga Norman matter.¹²⁰ Mr. Girish Thanki, who spoke for the Bao defence team, submitted in his representations to the Court that while many international commentators talk about the Sierra Leone conflict as a “war over diamonds”, there is another view that prevails at ground level. It is a view, Mr. Thanki continued, which reveals the “friction between rural Sierra Leone and urban Freetown” and which says much about “how the RUF came into existence, how it operated and how the conflict impacted on this nation”. Stressing the importance of the public appearance of his client before the Commission, Mr. Thanki concluded that the real story of the conflict, including these alternative views, “belongs to the people of Sierra Leone”.¹²¹

¹¹⁹ TRC Submissions before Judge Thompson, dated 24 October 2003, at paragraph 6.1.3.

¹²⁰ The TRC’s submissions were again presented by Mr. Howard Varney. The Prosecutor was represented by Ms. Boi-Tia Stephens. The Bao Defence Counsel was Mr. Girish Thanki.

¹²¹ See the minutes of the Oral Representations regarding the Request by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to conduct a Public Hearing with Mr. Augustine Ato Bao; before Judge Bankole Thompson, 29 October 2003.

THE DECISION OF JUDGE BANKOLE THOMPSON

125. On 29 October 2003, Judge Bankole Thompson denied the request by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for a public hearing with Chief Hinga Norman.¹²² Judge Thompson reasoned that the Commission had prejudged the matter and was therefore violating Hinga Norman's presumption of innocence.¹²³ Judge Thompson's reasoning hinged upon the part of the request where the Commission had said that it was important for Chief Hinga Norman to testify because he had "played a central role" in the conflict. In short, Judge Thompson's reasoning was defective.
126. The Thompson Decision precipitated considerable disillusionment among members of local civil society.¹²⁴ Whilst it was not to be the final word on the question of whether Chief Hinga Norman would appear before the Commission, it represented the first public departure by the Special Court from the previously co-operative position it had adopted towards the Commission's work. Whatever potential remedial measures stood to be rendered subsequently on appeal, Judge Thompson's denial of the request heralded a significant turning point in the public appraisal of the relationship between the two institutions.
127. The Commission had been advised by the Registrar that the Special Court's Revised Practice Direction contained a presumption in favour of granting a request.¹²⁵ Judge Thompson's decision however afforded little regard to such a presumption. In fact the Judge limited himself to "two alternative judicial options", which he characterised as unconditional approval or flat refusal.¹²⁶ He failed to consider a third option, namely the approval of the request subject to conditions. This narrow interpretative approach, which was apparent throughout the Thompson Decision, reflected unwillingness on the part of the Trial Chamber to accept that the interests of justice in Sierra Leone in fact hinged upon the successful fulfilment of the mandates of both the TRC and the Special Court.
128. The fact that Chief Hinga Norman played a central role in the conflict should not have been contentious. After all, it was the Prosecutor who brought an indictment against Hinga Norman and a Judge of the Special Court who authorised that indictment. If there was no credible suggestion that Hinga Norman had played a central role, then he ought not to have been indicted in the first place. As it was, the indictment of Hinga Norman had been approved over six months earlier by the Special Court in the following terms:

¹²² See the *Decision on the Request by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Sierra Leone to Conduct a Public Hearing with Samuel Hinga Norman*; decision rendered by Judge Bankole Thompson, Presiding Judge of the Trial Chamber, dated 29 October 2003. (hereinafter "Thompson Decision on the Hinga Norman Request")

¹²³ See the Thompson Decision on the Hinga Norman Request, at paragraph 12.

¹²⁴ In the week following the issuance of the Thompson Decision, a number of local civil society groups made statements to the press expressing their dissatisfaction and calling upon the TRC to appeal the Decision. See, for example: Press Conference convened by John Caulker on behalf of the TR Working Group on 4 November 2003; and Press Conference convened by Ngolo Katta on behalf of the CCYA on 5 November 2003.

¹²⁵ See the letter of 17 October 2003 from Robin Vincent, Registrar of the Special Court, to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission; letter entitled: 'Objections of the TRC to the Revised Practice Direction'.

¹²⁶ See the Thompson Decision on the Hinga Norman Request, at paragraph 8.

“Samuel Hinga Norman was the National Co-ordinator of the CDF. As such he was the principal force in establishing, organising, supporting, providing logistical support [for] and promoting the CDF. The Accused was also the leader and commander of the Kamajors and as such had *de jure* and *de facto* command and control over the activities and operations of the Kamajors.”¹²⁷

Based on the terms of this indictment alone, it was entirely reasonable for the TRC to conclude that Hinga Norman’s testimony would be relevant to its mandate and appropriate for airing in a public session of the Commission.

129. The presumption of innocence is a right belonging to Chief Hinga Norman until proven guilty. Even if he should wish to give up this right, it would be done entirely within his own discretion. In refusing the request for a hearing, Judge Bankole Thompson violated Chief Hinga Norman’s freedom of expression, as well as his right, as a person presumed innocent, to continue to participate in the reconciliation process in his own country.
130. In the Commission’s view, the learned Judge strayed beyond the parameters of his decision-making prerogative. He concerned himself with what he perceived to be the interests of the Accused and appointed the Court as the guardian thereof. Indeed, he surmised, without any reference to rights or to the close engagement of Defence Counsel, that the Court was the “very forum to which he looks for the protection of his due process rights and ultimate vindication.”¹²⁸ He further saw fit to criticise what ought to have been the unfettered right of Chief Hinga Norman to exercise his fundamental and statutory rights to testify before the Commission, where he concluded that:

“I would be grossly remiss, if not derelict, in my judicial duty if I failed to place on record my strong judicial reservations about the proposed course of action, on the part of the Accused.”¹²⁹

131. The learned Judge adopted what he referred to as a “contextual reading” of the TRC Act 2000. He equated “perpetrators” with offenders who are “willing to confess their guilt.” Building on this platform, he averred that the word “perpetrator” had to be given a “restrictive connotation” and “therefore, cannot properly be applied to an ‘indictee’ who has pleaded not guilty.” Finally the Judge made a conclusion in which he stated his view of the application of the TRC Act 2000:

“[The TRC Act 2000] is predicated upon the notion of restorative justice which aims at the reconciliation of *self-confessed perpetrators, victims, and the state as a whole*. Once a person has been indicted, he does not fall within the statutory ambit of the Act.”¹³⁰

¹²⁷ See *Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman* (Case No. SCSL-2003-08-I), Indictment before the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 7 March 2003, at paragraph 12.

¹²⁸ See the Thompson Decision on the Hinga Norman Request, at paragraph 14.

¹²⁹ See the Thompson Decision on the Hinga Norman Request, at paragraph 16.

¹³⁰ See the Thompson Decision on the Hinga Norman Request, at paragraph 12.

132. The Judge tendered such reasoning apparently as a means of excluding the detainees from the TRC process. Yet not even the most accommodating reading of the TRC Act 2000 would permit the novel interpretation constructed by Judge Thompson. To have confined the meaning of “perpetrator” to the definition suggested by the Judge would necessarily have excluded the vast majority of perpetrators in the Sierra Leone conflict from the ambit of the Commission.¹³¹ The reality of the Commission’s work was that most perpetrators were not willing to disclose their involvement in atrocities, at least not in advance of a hearing or interview; yet their participation in the TRC process was vital to developing understanding, to recording historical facts and to opening the accountability debate to the Sierra Leonean public.
133. Having legally excised the detainees from the purview of the Commission, Judge Thompson concluded that the institutional role of the Commission must yield to the other “societal interest” at stake, namely the Accused’s right to a fair and impartial trial.¹³² In support of this contention the Judge proposed that persons facing international crimes enjoyed what he called “super due process rights”:
- “In the overarching scheme of things, it is the duty of International Judges to safeguard the interest of the International Community that persons charged with international crimes are accorded what may be characterised as “super due process rights” in vindicating themselves regardless of national considerations, however compelling.”¹³³
134. Judge Thompson did not explain the meaning of “super due process rights”. He simply offered a single, un-sourced “perception” that international indictees are not afforded “adequate procedural justice” due to “the horrendous nature and enormity of the crimes” for which they have been indicted.
135. As far as the Commission has been able to determine, it seems that the notion of “super due process rights” in international criminal law was a novel construct of the Judge himself. The expression “super due process rights” was in fact an abstraction from the system of “strict review” applied at the sentencing phase of capital cases in the United States of America. Under that system, “super due process” is invoked in order to intensify the scrutiny lent by a court to the review of procedures undergone to reach a sentence of death. As such, even in the United States, “super due process” applies to the so-called “penalty phase” of a court’s adjudication, not to the trial phase and certainly not to the pre-trial phase. It was a wholly inappropriate notion for Judge Thompson to introduce into a decision of this nature.
136. Judge Thompson did not ascribe any significance to the arguments made by the Prosecution in its objection to the Commission’s request. The Judge in fact expressed his displeasure at the suggestion of the Prosecution’s representatives that they would “reserve their option to investigate further crimes if the Accused were to testify before the Commission”. He stated that this suggestion “was not necessary and does not accord with our profession’s respect for the doctrine of fundamental fairness.”¹³⁴

¹³¹ The same error was made by the President of the Special Court, Judge Geoffrey Robertson, at paragraph 42 of his Decision on appeal.

¹³² See the Thompson Decision on the Hinga Norman Request, at paragraphs 14, 15 and 16.

¹³³ See the Thompson Decision on the Hinga Norman Request, at paragraph 15.

¹³⁴ See the Thompson Decision on the Hinga Norman Request, at paragraph 15. In the appeal of this matter, Judge Robertson stated firmly that the Prosecution would have been well within its rights to adopt such a course.

137. The decision of Judge Bankole Thompson left the Commission with much discomfort. The rights of Hinga Norman and indeed the other detainees to appear before the Commission had been dismissed on the basis of a novel but untenable reading of the TRC Act. Judge Thompson apparently sought to disqualify all detainees who had pleaded not guilty from coverage by the TRC Act.
138. Judge Thompson's decision included another inventive but equally unsustainable contention: that due process rights – transformed into “super due process rights” – trumped the other rights of detainees and the wider society. The actual wishes of the detainee and the fact that he was represented by a team of highly qualified and experienced local and international lawyers were of little consequence to the learned Judge. In the wake of the Thompson decision, the Commission resolved to move the matter on to appeal before the President of the Special Court in its Appeals Chamber, Judge Geoffrey Robertson.

THE APPEAL BEFORE THE PRESIDENT OF THE SPECIAL COURT

139. On 4 November 2003 the Commission and Chief Hinga Norman filed their joint grounds of appeal against the decision of Judge Bankole Thompson.¹³⁵ The appellants noted some twenty-two (22) different grounds of appeal, setting out the individual questions of law and interpretation upon which the learned Judge had erred. The appeal was set down for the following day, 5 November 2003. Staff representing the Commission prepared written “short heads” of argument, which outlined the Commission's objections to the Thompson decision.¹³⁶
140. The Commission submitted that the institutions of the Special Court and the TRC both had important roles to play in reaching the truth and addressing impunity in the context of post-conflict Sierra Leone. The Special Court seeks to prove and establish beyond reasonable doubt the elements of specifically-framed charges against individuals who are alleged to bear the greatest responsibility. It endeavours to reach the truth in relation to the role of those individuals. In so doing it would hopefully provide a deterrent against future abuses.
141. The TRC, on the other hand, endeavours to establish the wider truth in relation to the roles of all key players and factions in the conflict. It was averred on behalf of the Commission that it was only when the full truth (or as close to the full truth as possible) was placed squarely before the public that society is able to examine itself honestly and robustly. It was this exercise that would permit society to take genuine measures to prevent repetition of the horrors of the past.

¹³⁵ See the *Grounds of Appeal by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone and Chief Samuel Hinga Norman JP against the Decision of His Lordship Judge Bankole Thompson delivered on 29 October 2003 to deny the TRC's Request to Conduct a Public Hearing with Chief Samuel Hinga Norman JP*; before Judge Geoffrey Robertson, The President of the Special Court, filed on 4 November 2003 (hereinafter “Grounds of Appeal against the Thompson Decision”).

¹³⁶ See the *Heads of Argument in the Appeal by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone and Chief Samuel Hinga Norman JP against the Decision of His Lordship Judge Bankole Thompson delivered on 29 October 2003*; presented on 5 November 2003 (hereinafter “TRC Heads of Argument in the Appeal against the Thompson Decision”). None of the other parties to the proceedings supplied written heads of argument.

142. The Commission submitted that the two institutions should do everything within their powers to ensure that the dual causes of truth and addressing impunity were served, both at the level of individuals who bear the greatest responsibility and at the level of society at large:

“We submit then that it cannot be a question of the role of one institution giving way to the role of the other. It can only be a question of how we arrive at a solution that permits Sierra Leone to reach the truth and address impunity at both essential levels.”¹³⁷

143. The Commission contended that Judge Thompson had failed to consider this critical question. He had failed to situate his decision in the appropriate context of Sierra Leone’s unique transitional justice arrangement. In particular it was submitted that the trial Judge had:

- a. misrepresented the institutional character of the TRC, particularly in his tendency to assign to the Commission the character of a court of law;
- b. failed to undertake any form of proportional assessment of the various rights and interests at stake in this matter; and
- c. erred in his characterisation of the Special Court as a guardian of so-called “super due process rights”.¹³⁸

The Bintumani Appeal

144. As it turned out, none of the matters raised by the Commission in its written heads of argument were canvassed in the appeal before Judge Robertson. The hearing was held in a conference room at the Bintumani Hotel in Western Freetown on the evening of 5 November 2003. The appeal turned out not to be an appeal at all but rather something of an unstructured discussion.¹³⁹
145. A few minutes prior to entering the appeal venue, the Commission’s team was surprised to learn from the Hinga Norman Defence lawyers that there would be no need to present any arguments, since Judge Robertson had advised them informally that he was inclined to let the hearing with Hinga Norman proceed. The Judge was simply interested in working out the “mechanics” of the hearing. There would accordingly be no appeal as such but simply a “discussion” to settle the details. The Defence¹⁴⁰ and Commission¹⁴¹ teams walked into the conference room with a modicum of relief. Their sense of security proved to be a false one.

¹³⁷ See TRC Heads of Argument in the Appeal against the Thompson Decision, dated 5 November 2003, at paragraph 1.5.

¹³⁸ See TRC Heads of Argument in the Appeal against the Thompson Decision, dated 5 November 2003, at paragraph 1.7.

¹³⁹ See the record of the Oral Discussion in the Appeal against the Thompson Decision; before Judge Geoffrey Robertson, President of the Special Court, held at the Bintumani Hotel, 5 November 2003 (hereinafter “Oral Discussion in the Bintumani Appeal”). All the excerpts contained herein, including quotes from Judge Robertson, are taken from the record of the Oral Discussion in the Bintumani Appeal.

¹⁴⁰ The two Defence lawyers present at the appeal on behalf of Chief Samuel Hinga Norman were Timothy Owen QC and Quincy Whitaker.

¹⁴¹ The TRC legal team comprised Howard Varney, Gavin Simpson and Sebastiaan Verelst. The Prosecution was represented by Jim Johnson and Mohamed Bangura.

146. While there was no appeal in the formal sense, the impression conveyed to the Commission by the Defence lawyers was not entirely correct. As the hearing progressed, it became clear that it was not simply a question of settling the mechanics for a hearing. Judge Robertson would instead swing from an apparently permissive position at the beginning of the hearing to a diametrically opposing position at the end of the hearing. At the close of the hearing the Judge, to the surprise of the Commission's representatives, proposed that the Commission ought to suspend its activities until the completion of the trials before the Special Court.
147. At the commencement of the appeal "hearing", Judge Robertson explained that he was "going to come at it from a different position". He explained that there would be no need for a formal appeal and that he intended to conduct the proceedings informally by way of a discussion. No objections were lodged at the time as the representatives for the Applicants had been primed to expect a positive outcome. Yet with hindsight there ought to have been no such striking departures from conventional procedure and from the Practice Direction, which referred to "an appeal".¹⁴²
148. Judge Robertson's novel approach did away with the rigours of standard appeal practice. The Judge confirmed his approach in his written decision. He conceded that he was not treating the appeal "strictly as an appeal" and went on to assert his choice to regard it as "a fresh hearing".¹⁴³
149. The substance of the Bintumani Appeal began with a lengthy overview of the background as seen through the eyes of Judge Robertson. Excerpts of the Judge's overview are set out below:

"... This problem is not really new. It's been discussed in the literature. We all thought it possible to avoid the problems that were predicted to arise. This problem was not foreseen but it has arisen... Lomé and the TRC Act did not make provision for the Special Court. Had it done so it would have made it clear what [the TRC] could and could not do. ... In respecting its missions [the TRC] must be placed in a position to establish a historical record. The Special Court would avoid, if it could at all, interfering with that first objective of the TRC.


[...] Here we have an indictee who has pleaded "not guilty." The first perspective is to give Hinga Norman his stand. In general it does not seem to me to pose any problems at first blush. Defence Counsel gave the client expert advice.

As far as Hinga Norman is concerned ... in some quarters he is a hero, in others, a villain. ... When the matter first arose the first consideration was "freedom of speech". An indictee retains such as is compatible within the constraints of Court... My main concern is not to inhibit anyone from giving testimony in any form but to let them know what they are letting themselves in for; particularly if [it is] going on public record. ... It's wrong to bar the prosecution. But [the] client [must] be aware of the risks."

¹⁴² See the Revised Practice Direction of 4 October 2003, at paragraph 5.

¹⁴³ See the *Decision on Appeal by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone and Chief Samuel Hinga Norman JP against the Decision of His Lordship, Mr. Justice Bankole Thompson, delivered on 29 October 2003 to Deny the TRC's Request to Hold a Public Hearing with Chief Samuel Hinga Norman JP*; decision of Justice Geoffrey Robertson, President of the Special Court, 28 October 2003 (hereinafter "Decision of Justice Robertson on Appeal"), at paragraph 3.

TRC



A soldier in the Sierra Leone Army carries a TRC poster during the National Reconciliation Procession through Freetown on 6 August 2003. The poster emphasises that real peace comes only from telling the truth.

150. The Judge appeared to be setting the scene for the granting of the appeal. He asked whether all the parties were in general agreement with the overview he had provided. The representatives of all parties reacted in the affirmative, agreeing, as Mr. Varney stated for the Commission, “in large measure”. The Judge then sought from Jim Johnson, the Prosecutor’s representative, certain background details on Hinga Norman, including his role in the current Government. He further raised the question as to whether Hinga Norman had the “approval of Government” when he was conducting operations. Mr. Johnson replied that he did. The Judge then turned to Defence counsel, Tim Owen, and asked whether this would be part of Hinga Norman’s defence, to which counsel replied that it would be. This answer brought the role of President Kabbah into sharp focus and the Judge added:

“If you establish a *prima facie* against him [President Kabbah], he’ll have to appear in the witness box.”

The Judge suggested that Hinga Norman had “reached the point where [he] had decided to take the risk of testifying to the TRC”.

151. Judge Robertson then began to consider the modalities of a proposed hearing and turned to Howard Varney, the Commission’s representative:

“[So effectively] you want to take over the Special Court for a few days and install TV cameras, etc.”

The Judge wished to know which television and radio studios would be present during the hearing. He enquired into details as to how the hearing would be portrayed on television and whether the Sierra Leone Broadcasting Service would be content to broadcast digested proceedings in a format he described as “highlights of the day’s play”. He wished to know details such as: who the Commissioners were; who would lead the evidence on behalf of the Commission; whether the evidence was under oath; how long the hearing would last; whether counsel would take Hinga Norman through his statement; and whether there would be cross-examination. Mr. Varney dealt with each of these questions as far as was possible, but stressed that the procedure for the Hinga Norman hearing was yet to be determined because it would ultimately rely upon an agreement between the Commission and the Defence team.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴⁴ Notwithstanding Mr. Varney’s clarification on this point, Judge Robertson later remarked: “My concern is that there doesn’t seem to be any settled procedure, but rather a certain sense of making it up as you go along.”

152. The Commission laments the fact that the President of the Court chose to give deference to precedents from contexts that bore little relation to Sierra Leone. Judge Robertson made no reference to the available examples of TRCs in action, such as the South African precedent or even that of the detainees in Pademba Road Prison.¹⁴⁵ Judge Robertson instead preferred to highlight the experience of the Hutton Inquiry¹⁴⁶ and made comparative remarks on the case of John Stonehouse.¹⁴⁷

153. The Judge turned to the question of the TRC Report and revealed that he had resolved some of the temporal problems in his own mind based on assumption:

“I had always assumed that the report would be published before the trials started [to serve] as a useful tool of judicial notice.”

He enquired from Mr. Johnson when the Prosecution expected to commence the trials. Mr. Johnson replied that he was “foreseeing early next year [2004]; February or March.”

154. Judge Robertson then wished to know whether the Commission would “make a determination on the guilt or innocence of certain individuals”:

“Has the Commission addressed the issue of making judgements on people? Would the TRC make judgements?”

Mr. Varney explained the nature of findings that truth commissions make and reminded the Judge that “the TRC is not a court”. Judge Robertson indicated that it would be preferable if the Commission refrained from making pronouncements on the roles and responsibilities of the indictees held by the Special Court.

155. The Judge advised that the Court would have to “deal with the public expectations and the way those play out on witnesses.” He added that “finding the historical truth of what happened may overlap with the [Special Court’s] investigations.” Turning back to the question of media coverage Judge Robertson stated:

“Visions come to me of Goering at the German TRC of 1946 – giving radio and TV performances of his version of the war... It makes me feel uncomfortable.”

¹⁴⁵ Awaiting trial prisoners in South Africa appeared before the Human Rights Violations Committee of the South African TRC on a routine basis. The Sierra Leone TRC had extensive contact with awaiting trial prisoners at Pademba Road, including the holding of a public hearing.

¹⁴⁶ The Hutton Inquiry was set up by United Kingdom Government in 2003 to investigate the circumstances surrounding the death of the government scientist Dr. David Kelly. Geoffrey Robertson participated in a preliminary legal tussle over the right to screen the proceedings of the Hutton Inquiry on television.

¹⁴⁷ John Stonehouse (1926 - 1988) was a British politician and cabinet minister under Prime Minister Harold Wilson. Stonehouse achieved notoriety for faking his own death.

156. At this point Mr. Johnson on behalf of the Prosecution said that there were “ongoing efforts to intimidate and scare witnesses right now”. He added:
- “I would hate to see this being used in some effort to promulgate that. I can provide documents to you, but not other parties around the table. The concerns of July apply now, and in fact possibly apply more so.”
157. The Judge and the Prosecution then engaged in a discussion on Hinga Norman and the potential volatility of his supporters:
- Judge Robertson: He was the head of a military unit? An armed force that was fighting, perhaps too vigorously, in support of the Government?
- Mr. Johnson: Certainly fighting in support of the Government. His force [was] sometimes sanctioned by the Government.
- Judge Robertson: Have they laid down arms?
- Mr. Johnson: Some of them have done.
158. When the Commission and Defence lawyers attempted to direct Justice Robertson back towards the question of rights he responded:
- “I’ve made the Court’s view clear. Rights are amenable to dilution.”
159. Now firm in his view that a public hearing before the Commission would be tantamount to giving Hinga Norman a chance for a “party political broadcast”, Justice Robertson came up with his proposal:
- “The TRC has apparently never thought to take a statement from him... Hinga Norman is entitled to send his account of the conflict in the form of a book; a written version which could be carefully considered by his lawyers... There would be minimum risk to him; [it would be of] great help to you; [it] would not measurably damage the integrity of the Special Court.... What about a written submission with Commissioners invited to go and ask questions [on the written submission]?”
160. The Judge then commented on the wisdom of having two institutions such as the Special Court and the Commission in operation at the same time:
- “It may be that our hope of working together and at the same time may not be possible.”
- He suggested that the best resolution would be for the Commission to suspend the issuance of its report until all the trials at the Special Court were complete. This would deal with the concerns of the Prosecution; the Commission would be able to glean useful materials from the trials and more importantly the Commission could then arrange all the hearings it wished to hold with the detainees, who would by then be convicted prisoners, or perhaps acquitted.
161. Mr. Varney pointed out to Judge Robertson that there was no prospect of securing a suspension of the Commission’s proceedings. He also advised that it had always been open to the TRC to obtain Chief Norman’s testimony by way of a written submission. No approval or intervention by the Special Court was ever required to obtain written testimony.

162. Judge Robertson concluded the Bintumani Appeal with an invitation to all parties for further representations. When reminded by Mr. Varney of the Commission's time constraints he advised that his decision would be issued within one week. In fact, it took the President of the Court more than three weeks to issue his decision.
163. The appeal, in the manner conducted by Judge Robertson, served to limit and close down argument on the key issues of substance. The "discussion" approach could in theory have provided a forum for debate between members of collegial international institutions. However, continual interjections and changes in the topics under discussion prevented any meaningful debate from taking place. The parties were unable to present and develop legal argument.¹⁴⁸

AFTER THE BINTUMANI APPEAL

164. Following the appeal at the Bintumani Hotel, the Commission felt it necessary to write to Judge Robertson to caution him against pursuing the ideas he raised in the latter stages of the "discussion":

"It would be impractical and indeed unlawful for the TRC to suspend its operations and reconstitute itself in two years' time or whenever the trials were concluded. There will be no extension of the TRC's mandate beyond the statutory six months already granted by President Kabbah. We urge you to exclude this suggestion from your considerations."¹⁴⁹

165. On 12 November 2003, only two days before Judge Robertson's ruling was expected to be issued, the Commission received copies of written submissions from the Prosecutor¹⁵⁰ that had been transmitted to the President of the Court. The submissions endeavoured to back up the claim that the public hearing with Hinga Norman could be used as a forum by Kamajors and former CDF members to threaten the security of the Special Court and destabilise the entire country. The Commission responded as follows in a further letter to the President of the Court:

"We submit that it is highly improper for Mr. Crane to make such submissions some two days before a ruling is due on our appeal. The TRC can hardly be expected to investigate and assess claims made by the Prosecution at this late stage.

The vague statements based on hearsay as set out in paragraph 5 of Enclosure Two (dated 20 October 2003), such as those that portray Kamajors in Bo allegedly "boasting ...that they were still in control" – whatever that is supposed to mean – could have been investigated had they been raised prior to the hearing before Judge Thompson. A reading of the enclosures reveals that there is absolutely no reason why such information could not have been disclosed timeously.

¹⁴⁸ The approach taken was contrary to the information provided by the Court beforehand, namely that each party would have 15 minutes to present argument, as was the case in the trial chamber.

¹⁴⁹ See the Letter from the Honourable Justice Laura Marcus-Jones, Deputy Chairperson of the TRC, to the President of the Special Court, Judge Geoffrey Robertson, dated 7 November 2003.

¹⁵⁰ See the Supplementary Submissions from the Prosecutor of the Special Court in the Appeal before the President of the Court dated 11 November 2003.

The 7 November 2003 memorandum authored by Mr. Robert Parnell, Chief of Security for the Special Court, adds little to the UN FSCO Security update of 23 October 2003. This curious one-and-a-half page memorandum does not even disclose the identity of the former CDF leader apparently arrested in connection with so-called "Operation Free Hinga Norman." Nor does it disclose the nature of any charge or charges preferred against this individual, if indeed the matter was taken this far.

The memorandum contains claims with regard to the potentially "destabilising influence" of the former CDF in Bo, which we are led to believe arises from the Government's inability to improve economic conditions in the country. It ends in any case with the conclusion that the CDF is incapable of mounting insurrection, or for that matter of attacking the Special Court. In short, the memorandum does not appear to support Mr. Crane's view that the "fragile equilibrium which exists today in Sierra Leone" is at stake.

To underscore the baseless claims of the Prosecution, the UN FSCO security update for the very week in which the alleged "Free Hinga Norman" meeting took place concludes that the "security situation in the country continues to remain stable". Indeed "stable" has been the assessment for the last several months and continues to be the security assessment for the present week.¹⁵¹ Little or no weight can be attached to Mr. Parnell's memorandum.

While claiming merely to reiterate its "position as previously submitted before Judge Thompson", the Prosecution's submission impermissibly attempts to introduce matters of substance, which it could have introduced at the initial hearing, or indeed could have applied for leave to introduce at the appeal hearing."¹⁵²

166. An independent assessment carried out by the International Crisis Group in the second half of 2003 suggested that the Kamajors were in no position to destabilise the country:

"While one leader claimed that the CDF could mobilise if necessary within 24-48 hours, Kamajor ability to achieve mass destabilisation depends on two things: man-power and weaponry. It appears the Kamajors would have difficulty assembling enough of either. The rank and file are increasingly unhappy with their leadership, who they claim have kept most reintegration benefits to themselves. Many joined the CDF to defend the country and the government, not to avenge any specific leader, so there appears to be little willingness to mobilise because of Special Court indictments. Furthermore, there appear to be distinct groups within the Kamajors, each with their own leaders, financiers, and loyalties that may work against unified action. While the Kamajors could cause local disruptions, there is little evidence they could destabilise the country."¹⁵³

¹⁵¹ Confirmed in a telephone conversation between Mr. Varney and the Duty Officer at the Security Unit of UNFSCO at 4.15 p.m. on 13 November 2003.

¹⁵² See the Letter dated 13 November 2003 from Howard Varney, Head of Investigations, to the President of the Special Court.

¹⁵³ See International Crisis Group, *Sierra Leone: The State of Security and Governance*, ICG Africa Report No. 67, 2 September 2003 at page 13.

THE DECISION OF JUDGE GEOFFREY ROBERTSON

167. The decision of Judge Robertson was finally issued on 28 November 2003. It purported to overturn the decision of Judge Thompson. In reality, it offered little more to the detainees and to the Commission than what was possible in the wake of the Thompson decision. Judge Robertson refused to permit Hinga Norman to testify in person. The Judge ruled that Hinga Norman should transmit information to the Commission only "in writing" and stated:

"There shall be no public hearing of the kind requested or any other kind prior to the conclusion of the trial."¹⁵⁴

168. The decision was made available barely four weeks before the Commission closed its doors on all formal activities. The late issuance of the decision was notwithstanding the Commission's case for special urgency and the Judge's own undertaking to return his ruling within one week. Indeed by 28 November 2003 the decision of Judge Robertson had become academic.

169. The reference in the decision that Hinga Norman might be allowed to meet with the Commissioners "if they apply for that purpose" or that he and the Commission may "meet for a confidential session if a joint application is made" was, in the view of the Commission, irrelevant. The Special Court's own Practice Direction did not permit confidential interviews, even after its revision.¹⁵⁵ The Commission had already declined to apply to speak to detainees on a "confidential" basis because the Commission could never guarantee the confidentiality of the information supplied under the conditions imposed by the Court. The Commission's position in this regard had been stated clearly and consistently throughout.¹⁵⁶

170. Moreover with the Commission winding up its formal activities on 31 December 2003, the procedures involved in applying afresh to the Special Court stood no chance of being completed.¹⁵⁷

171. Nonetheless, the Special Court's media release¹⁵⁸ described the Robertson decision as having opened the way for Hinga Norman to "testify before the TRC". Several newspapers carried stories that reported the decision in this light. The fact that the scope for Hinga Norman's testimony had in fact been confined to a written submission was lost in the fine print.

¹⁵⁴ See the Decision of Justice Robertson on Appeal, 28 November 2003, at paragraph 41.

¹⁵⁵ See the Revised Practice Direction of 4 October 2003, at paragraphs 4(b), 4(c) and 7. As noted earlier in this chapter, the Revised Practice Direction specifically required each meeting between the TRC and a detainee to be monitored by a "legal officer" and tape recorded by the Registry. The Trial Judge had the power subsequently to order the transcript of any meeting to be disclosed at the trial of the detainee. There was accordingly no possibility of a confidential interview under the Revised Practice Direction.

¹⁵⁶ See the letter of 8 October 2003 from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission to Robin Vincent, Registrar of the Special Court; letter entitled: "Objections of the TRC to the Revised Practice Direction".

¹⁵⁷ Reference to the exchange of correspondence between the Registrar of the Special Court and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission on 4 and 5 December 2003. In his letter of 4 December 2003, the Registrar stated that a meeting with Hinga Norman could be arranged by way of "written notification". In its reply of 5 December 2003, the Commission pointed out that paragraph 41 of the Robertson Decision stated unambiguously that an "application" was required.

¹⁵⁸ See the Special Court for Sierra Leone Press and Public Affairs Office, Media Release entitled "Sam Hinga Norman May Testify before TRC", dated 28 November 2003.

172. The Commission corrected this misconception in a press statement released on 1 December 2003. The Commission advised that there would be no hearings with Chief Hinga Norman or any of the other detainees. The rights of the detainees to participate in the truth and reconciliation process in an open and transparent manner had been effectively extinguished. Extracts from the Commission's media statement of 1 December 2003 read as follows:

*"PRESS RELEASE BY THE TRC
Freetown, Sierra Leone, 1 December 2003*

**SPECIAL COURT DENIES HINGA NORMAN'S RIGHT
(AND THAT OF THE OTHER DETAINEES) TO APPEAR
PUBLICLY BEFORE THE TRC**

... The Court's press statement has created expectations in the minds of the public both locally and internationally that a TRC hearing with Hinga Norman is imminent.

The press statement is however misleading. The President of the Special Court in fact ruled that Chief Hinga Norman may not appear in a public hearing before the Commission. The Judge decided that Chief Hinga Norman may provide only a sworn written statement to the Commission.

The ruling, in the view of the TRC, has dealt a serious blow to the cause of truth and reconciliation in Sierra Leone. As a citizen of Sierra Leone and as a key role-player in Sierra Leone's recent history, Chief Hinga Norman has a right to appear before the TRC to tell his story. All equivalent role-players have appeared before the TRC, including prisoners awaiting trial at Pademba Road Prison. ...

... The restriction of Chief Hinga Norman's testimony to a written statement has denied him the opportunity to speak with the TRC in an open and transparent manner.

There will be only one TRC in Sierra Leone and the Special Court has closed the door on any meaningful participation in that process by all the detainees in its custody. In effect the decision of the President of the Special Court has:

- o rejected the right of the detainees to testify before the TRC;
- o denied the freedom of expression of the detainees to appear openly and publicly before the TRC;
- o denied the right of the Sierra Leonean people to see the process of truth and reconciliation done in relation to the detainees; ...

Sierra Leone had the opportunity to offer the world a unique framework in moving from conflict to peace. Sadly, this opportunity was not seized. The causes of truth, reconciliation and transitional justice have not been served by the decision of the Special Court.

The Commission wishes to advise the public that there will be no hearings with Chief Hinga Norman or any of the other detainees as the ruling by the Special Court forecloses such a possibility."

173. In an effort to contain the growing tide of publicity that was adverse to the Special Court, the Court's Press and Public Affairs Office arranged a talk show on Radio UNAMSIL. The guests were Special Court Registrar, Robin Vincent, and TRC Executive Secretary, Franklyn Kargbo. On the basis of this talk show, the Court's Press and Public Affairs Office crafted another press release¹⁵⁹ in which it claimed that the Commission had corrected "certain inaccuracies" in its 1 December 2003 media statement. The wording of the Special Court release was highly misleading. It forced the Commission to issue a statement denying that it had made any such retraction:

*"PRESS RELEASE BY THE TRC
Freetown, Sierra Leone, 3 December 2003*

TRC STANDS BY ITS STATEMENT ON HINGA NORMAN

The Special Court issued a statement on 3 December 2003 claiming that the TRC had corrected "certain inaccuracies" in its 1 December 2003 press release on the Special Court's decision to deny the right of Chief Sam Hinga Norman to appear before the TRC.

The TRC has done no such thing. The TRC rejects the attempt by the Special Court's media office to mislead the public in this regard.

The TRC stands by its statement issued on 1 December 2003 in relation to Hinga Norman. Hinga Norman has been denied his freedom of expression and his statutory right to appear before the TRC to tell his story. The people of Sierra Leone have been denied the opportunity of hearing from Hinga Norman in an open and transparent manner. As a result the causes of truth, reconciliation and that of addressing impunity have been seriously undermined.

Mr. Franklyn Kargbo, the Executive Secretary of the TRC, did state in his interview with Radio UNAMSIL that, notwithstanding the setback of the Court's decision, the TRC will still issue a credible and impartial historical record of the conflict in its final report.

Mr. Kargbo's statement must not be interpreted to mean that the TRC is retracting or correcting its earlier press release...

One point is clear amidst the exchange of press statements. The TRC has been effectively blocked by the Special Court from holding any hearings or meetings with the detainees."

¹⁵⁹ See the Special Court for Sierra Leone Press and Public Affairs Office, Media Release entitled "The Special Court Responds to TRC Statement", dated 3 December 2003.

174. On 11 December 2003, J. B. Jenkins-Johnston and Sulaiman B. Tejan-Sie, legal representatives for Chief Hinga Norman, issued a press statement “for and on behalf of” Chief Hinga Norman:

“... So even though the Judge conceded that Chief Norman had a right to testify upon condition that he had been warned, and clearly stated that he was satisfied that Chief Norman had been “expertly” warned, he still refused to allow him to testify. It would seem to us on the Chief’s legal team that the position taken by both the Trial Chamber and the President of the Court is full of conflicts, inconsistencies and contradictions, all leading to one final result – to stop Chief Sam Hinga Norman from testifying before the TRC. That goal has been achieved, albeit for reasons which are not clear to us, and which certainly do not augur well for whatever the Special Court sees itself as having been mandated to do.

Chief Sam Hinga Norman entertains no doubt that he has been unfairly treated, unnecessarily targeted and unjustly deprived of his legal and constitutional rights, by reason of which he now seriously doubts whether he will get real Justice from this Special Court. He further believes that this unfortunate episode of a head-on clash between the TRC and the Special Court has done much to obstruct the course of peace and reconciliation in Sierra Leone, and has clearly demonstrated the short-sightedness and skewed thinking behind the policy of setting up both the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court at the same time.

The President [of the Special Court]’s ruling is regarded by Chief Sam Hinga Norman not only as an unwarranted attempt to silence him but also as a challenge to the very Act creating the TRC, which was ratified by [the] Sierra Leone Parliament in 2000.

Finally, Chief Sam Hinga Norman wishes to say to the people of Sierra Leone that notwithstanding the treatment he has received at the hands of the Special Court, and the unduly belligerent, provocative and intimidatory utterances of the Prosecutor himself, he still believes in the rule of Law and to this end will continue to advise his people to remain law-abiding and be patient, as he knows that at the end of the day he will be vindicated and will walk free from this nightmare.

May God continue to bless our beloved Country Sierra Leone.”¹⁶⁰

175. The Commission did invite Chief Hinga Norman and the other detainees to make written representations in order to supply their versions of the conflict. Sadly, none of the detainees responded to the requests. The Commission finds this to be highly regrettable. The Commission, however, acknowledges that the preference of the detainees was for public hearings and, by the time this option was finally shut down in December 2003, there was little time left to prepare and finalise written submissions.

¹⁶⁰ See: Press Statement issued for and on behalf of Chief Sam Hinga Norman, on the Refusal of the Special Court to grant him a Public Hearing before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission; signed by J. B. Jenkins-Johnston and Sulaiman B. Tejan-Sie, Counsel for Chief Sam Hinga Norman, dated 11 December 2003.

THE ROBERTSON DECISION ANALYSED

176. Judge Robertson wrote that the question before him was one that was “novel and difficult”.¹⁶¹ However, the question was far from novel. The immediate and local precedents were part of the written records before Judge Robertson, namely the numerous instances in which the Commission had interviewed or held hearings in public with detainees facing multiple-count criminal indictments before the Sierra Leone courts.
177. Moreover, the most publicised Commission in the world, the South African TRC, worked side by side with a criminal process that saw awaiting-trial and convicted prisoners appearing publicly in the TRC hearings on a routine basis.¹⁶² It may be added that fair trial protections are just as jealously guarded by the South African judiciary as they are by the Special Court for Sierra Leone.
178. In the Sierra Leonean and South African precedents overlooked by Judge Robertson, the elaborate concerns and travesties of justice as postulated by the Special Court simply did not arise.
179. One of the distinguishing factors is that the justice bodies referred to in these examples were national bodies; whereas the Special Court is better described as a hybrid creature, an amalgam of both national and international legal systems. It is implied in the thinking of the Special Court – and in the decision of Judge Bankole Thompson it was stated explicitly – that the international character of the Court poses special problems that justify its stance. In reality, though, the practical considerations and legal issues entailed in the administration of justice are no different, whether the body in question is national, international or quasi-international.

Primacy over the TRC

180. In providing his “historical background,” Judge Robertson made the point that the Special Court possesses “primacy” over the Commission:
- “The Special Court was given, by Article 8 of its Statute, a primacy over national courts of Sierra Leone (and, by implication, over national bodies like the TRC).”¹⁶³
181. In fact, Article 8 of the Statute of the Special Court provides no support at all for the popular contention that the Special Court has primacy over the TRC. It reads:
- Article 8: Concurrent jurisdiction
- “The Special Court and the national courts of Sierra Leone shall have concurrent jurisdiction. The Special Court shall have primacy over the national courts of Sierra Leone. At any stage of the proceedings, the Special Court may formally require a national court to defer to its competence in accordance with the present Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence.”

¹⁶¹ See the Decision of Judge Robertson on Appeal, 28 November 2003, at paragraph 2.

¹⁶² Particular reference is made here to the Human Rights Violations Committee of the South African TRC. The workings of this Committee, through its hearings and accompanying investigations, closely approximated the mode of operation of the Sierra Leone TRC.

¹⁶³ See the Decision of Judge Robertson on Appeal, 28 November 2003, at paragraph 4.

182. It is clear from the title of Article 8 that the “primacy” bestowed on the Special Court is limited to cases of “concurrent jurisdiction” between courts. The Commission is not a court. It is equally trite to point out that the Commission does not have any criminal proceedings before it. The provision merely requires deference from the national courts in instances where both the Special Court and the national courts wish to lead prosecutions against the same individual, or on the same matter. This means that following a formal application by the Special Court, a national court is obliged to halt its own criminal proceedings in respect of an Accused that the Special Court wishes to act against.¹⁶⁴
183. Notwithstanding the clear meaning of Article 8, the provision was invoked by Court spokespersons and other commentators to assert “superiority” over the Commission.

The “Spectacle” of a TRC Hearing

184. The Commission has already expressed its consternation at Judge Bankole Thompson’s misconstruction of the institutional character of the TRC as a court of law. Such misconstruction led Judge Thompson to erroneous conclusions. Judge Robertson viewed the Commission in similar terms. Judge Robertson feared that the Commission would set itself up as a mock court performing the “special duty” assigned to the Special Court. He seemed particularly affronted that the proposed hearing would happen in a courtroom within the Special Court’s own precinct. Judge Robertson characterised the request of the Commission as an unwarranted straying onto Special Court territory:

“But the TRC has not, significantly, given any undertaking to suspend judgement on individuals awaiting trial in this court.”¹⁶⁵

“... I have been given no assurance that indictees awaiting or undergoing trial will not be “judged” guilty or innocent by the Commissioners (who are not qualified judges) ...”¹⁶⁶

“The spectacle of the TRC sitting in court may set up a public expectation that it will indeed pass judgement on indictees thus confronted and questioned, whose guilt or innocence it is the special duty of the Special Court to determine.”¹⁶⁷

“I cannot believe that the Nuremberg Tribunal would have allowed its prisoners to participate in such a spectacle, had there been a TRC in Germany after the war ...”¹⁶⁸

Underline added

¹⁶⁴ The most recent example was the case of Santigie Borbor Kanu (alias “Five Five”), who was one of the Accused in a treason trial before Freetown High Court No. 2 at the time of his indictment by the Special Court. The treason trial in question was *The State v. Corporal Daniel Sandy and 17 Others*. For a report on the irregularities in the transfer alleged by the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), Mr. Brima Kebbie, see the following news article: “Five Five Indicted... as Treason held up”; *Awoko* newspaper, Freetown, 18 September 2003. The article quotes the DPP as saying: “I was not informed about the arrest, which is why I am in court for the trial this morning. The treason trial will not continue in the absence of one of the accused persons. It is the responsibility of the Special Court to inform my office so I can enter a *nolle prosequi* (non prosecution) for Santigie Kanu. This could be done in a day provided the Special Court informs us on time.”

¹⁶⁵ See the Decision of Judge Robertson on Appeal, 28 November 2003, at paragraph 7.

¹⁶⁶ See the Decision of Judge Robertson on Appeal, 28 November 2003, at paragraph 15.

¹⁶⁷ See the Decision of Judge Robertson on Appeal, 28 November 2003, at paragraph 30.

¹⁶⁸ See the Decision of Judge Robertson on Appeal, 28 November 2003, at paragraph 31.

185. In building his argument that the Commission ought to have refrained from proceeding with its requests to hear the detainees publicly, Judge Robertson relied on an opinion that was no longer held by its authors:

“The initial expectation in this respect of informed persons well-disposed to both processes was expressed in an illuminating report by the International Centre for Transitional Justice (“ICTJ”):

*In the case of persons indicted by the Special Court, the TRC should decline to interview them altogether until the proceedings against them are concluded.*¹⁶⁹

This absolute position (which the ICTJ authors no longer maintain) at least gave full force to the universal value that nothing should be done to endanger fair trial. The TRC, by this application, wishes to go towards the other extreme: it seeks not only to interview indictees, but to do so in public, in a courtroom over several days, in a form that will permit them to broadcast live to the nation, and then face sustained questioning shortly before their trial¹⁷⁰

186. Not only did the ICTJ change its view on this matter; it said as much in the very submission that Judge Robertson himself invited the organisation to make. The Commission was later informed that “the ICTJ authors” had outlined their new position explicitly in a submission to Judge Robertson in November 2003:

“ICTJ, in communications to both the Court and the TRC, subsequently took the view that it would indeed be possible to hold a public hearing of the TRC without violating the fundamental rights of the Accused or the integrity of proceedings before the Special Court, provided certain conditions were met, namely:

(1) defence counsel would be present to advise the Accused (who would be participating on a voluntary basis) before and during the public hearing; and

(2) there would be a delayed transmission, to allow any threats to witnesses or to general security to be deleted from public broadcasts.

If these conditions were met, ICTJ was of the view that a public hearing would not hinder a fair trial for the Accused, nor would it pose an additional substantial risk to witnesses or security.

[...] ICTJ stressed the importance of distinguishing a public hearing by the TRC from a Court hearing; for instance, if the hearing were to be held in a courtroom, the Commissioners should not sit where the judges would sit...

¹⁶⁹ Marieke Wierda, Priscilla Hayner and Paul Van Zyl, “Exploring the Relationship between the Special Court and the TRC of Sierra Leone”, ICTJ, New York, 24 June 2002, at page 18.

¹⁷⁰ See the Decision of Judge Robertson on Appeal, 28 November 2003, at paragraph 31.

[...] Furthermore, ICTJ took the position that such a hearing would assist the TRC in its truth-seeking function, enabling it to better fulfil its mandate of preparing a historical record and giving recommendations for future change. (At the time that ICTJ made its intervention, the possibility of a private hearing of the accused did not appear to be a viable option).

[...] Moreover, ICTJ was of the opinion that if the Special Court was seen to be responsive to the local context and the operations of the TRC by taking an innovative approach, that this could also benefit public confidence in the Special Court.¹⁷¹

The revised position of the International Centre for Transitional Justice, reflected in the above passages, was not conveyed in Judge Robertson's written decision.

187. The Judge's contention that the Commission wished to go to the "other extreme" reflects his rigid views of a post-conflict institution that falls outside of traditional legal process. There was nothing extremist about the request of the Commission. As has been pointed out, what was being requested by the Commission had already taken place in Sierra Leone. Similar hearings have taken place in South Africa.¹⁷² As far as the Commission is aware, nobody has levelled claims of "going to extremes" against the South African TRC or for that matter against the Sierra Leone TRC for its interactions with the Pademba Road prisoners. In this regard Judge Robertson is out of step with current notions of transitional justice.
188. The Judge makes much of the fact that the proposed hearing would take place in the Special Court courtroom. The implication is that this facet of the Commission's request was part of a design engineered by the Commission to imitate or take over the role of the Court. In fact, the courtroom at the Special Court precinct – where the detention facility is situated – was the only suitable venue available for the proposed hearing. The Commission would have been more than happy to relocate the hearing elsewhere if the Court had consented.

¹⁷¹ Marieke Wierda, on behalf of the International Centre for Transitional Justice; e-mail correspondence reflecting the ICTJ position with regard to the Appeal before Judge Robertson, dated 10 March 2004.

¹⁷² South African TRC hearings enjoyed extensive television coverage and at times live radio broadcasts. In some countries such as the United States and the Czech Republic even criminal courts are covered by live radio and TV broadcasts, which have not endangered their legal processes.

Encroaching on Special Court Functions

189. In assessing the functions of the Commission, Judge Robertson came to the conclusion that these could impinge on the Special Court's own functions:

"The TRC functions may broadly be divided, in accordance with its title, into those of providing an historical record ("truth") and those of assisting victims to come to terms with their perpetrators ("reconciliation"). The "truth" functions ... could be interpreted as permitting findings about individual responsibility- the prime function of the Special Court. The "reconciliation" functions ... are not so problematic, so long as they invite victims to reconcile with perpetrators who do not bear great responsibility and are not Special Court indictees."¹⁷³

Underline added

190. The learned Judge appeared to be concerned with what he referred to as the "truth" and the "reconciliation" aspects of the Commission's functions, namely the two core functions of the Commission. He seemed particularly troubled that the fact-finding elements of establishing the truth might lead to "findings about individual responsibility". The delivery of such findings, he declared, formed the "prime function" of the Special Court. Judge Robertson was less opposed to the "reconciliation" aspect of the Commission, so long as the Commission only invited victims to reconcile with lesser perpetrators, namely those who did "not bear great responsibility and are not Special Court indictees".
191. The Commission cannot imagine that such territorial concerns on the part of the Special Court could ever be taken seriously. Commissions, not to mention Truth Commissions, routinely make findings about individual responsibility. Indeed, that is what commissions are essentially established to do. Judge Robertson's suggestion that the Commission should confine its reconciliation activities to lesser perpetrators "who do not bear great responsibility" was equally unreasonable. If such a notion were to have been entertained, it would have required the Commission not to approach the "worst" of the perpetrators for fear that they may be on the Special Court's suspect list. The learned Judge was, in effect, suggesting that the Commission should suspend its operations pending the completion of the Special Court's tasks. The implication may sound outlandish, yet that is exactly what Judge Robertson suggested to the Commission's legal representatives at the end of the Bintumani appeal.
192. The Judge's choice of words to describe the Commission's original approach to the detainees was unfortunate:

"When the TRC first approached a number of indictees, earlier in the year, they all declined a chalice that they were doubtless advised was poisoned."¹⁷⁴

The publication of such a theatrical metaphor in a decision under the hand of the President of the Court inferred that there was something poisonous about the agenda of the TRC, supposedly a "complementary" organisation.

¹⁷³ See the Decision of Judge Robertson on Appeal, 28 November 2003, at paragraph 13.

¹⁷⁴ See the Decision of Judge Robertson on Appeal, 28 November 2003, at paragraph 13.

From a Confidential Interview to a “Full-scale Public Hearing Broadcast”

193. Judge Robertson holds much store in his claim that the Commission declined to pursue with its original request to conduct private or confidential interviews with Hinga Norman in favour of a public hearing:

“It is also surprising that it [the Commission] has shifted its request from a two-day private interview with investigators to a full-scale public hearing broadcast “live” to the nation.”¹⁷⁵

[and]

“It has never explained why it has shifted first from its initial request for a two-day private interview – a request which might well have been granted – to a request for permission for a confidential interview (which might also have been granted) to an application for the televised spectacle described above.”¹⁷⁶

The suggestion that the Judge is really making is that the TRC could have gone for the quiet option but chose instead the unseemly route of a “televised spectacle”. The Judge cast the TRC’s decision in this regard as being eminently unreasonable. Yet the Judge denied the reader of his Decision the full benefit of the preceding history of negotiations between the TRC and the Special Court.

194. Judge Robertson gave no prior indication to the Commission that he was surprised by its modified approach to the application. If non-explanation of the Commission’s changed approach was really such a startling omission, as Judge Robertson made it out to be in his Decision, then it is equally disturbing that the Judge neglected to raise it during the Bintumani appeal. Had the question been raised, Judge Robertson would have been referred to the extensive correspondence between the Commission and the Registrar, which amply illustrated the extent to which the Commission struggled to persuade the Court to permit confidential interviews with its detainees.¹⁷⁷ Indeed the Commission held back its applications for nearly a month (between 9 September and 4 October 2003) in the hope that the Court would permit confidential interviews. As it turned out, the Revised Practice Direction excluded confidentiality, let alone privacy, as a facet of interviews for which the Commission might apply.

¹⁷⁵ See the Decision of Judge Robertson on Appeal, 28 November 2003, at paragraph 21.

¹⁷⁶ See the Decision of Judge Robertson on Appeal, 28 November 2003, at paragraph 32.

¹⁷⁷ The Commission is satisfied that Judge Robertson had sight of all correspondence between the TRC and the Registrar, since it was confirmed by the Registrar that the TRC’s various submissions on the topic were forwarded to the President of the Court for his consideration. Indeed much of the original delay in the process was attributed to the difficulties in obtaining feedback from Judge Robertson due to the fact that he spent most of his time in London.

195. It was only after the Commission had exhausted all its avenues in this regard that it advised the Registrar that it would not jeopardise the rights of the detainees to a fair trial by engaging in interviews in which it could not guarantee confidentiality. It seems that the President of the Court was prepared to adopt a somewhat generous view of “confidentiality”. According to the Judge, the Revised Practice Direction provided “for a confidential process of receiving information.”¹⁷⁸ In fact it provided for an official from the Registrar’s office to monitor the interview within earshot.¹⁷⁹ In addition, the monitoring officer had authority to intervene should the questions stray off the approved subject areas. In effect it was envisaged that a Court representative would sit at the interview table. The entire interview would be tape recorded and lodged at the Registrar’s office. Parties to the proceedings could thereafter apply to the trial judge for the disclosure of the transcript “in the interests of justice”.¹⁸⁰ The view of Judge Robertson that these conditions made for a “confidential” interview was not shared by the Commission, nor by the detainees who had approached the TRC and their legal counsel.¹⁸¹
196. The Judge himself was not in fact wedded to his viewpoint – he conceded the lack of confidentiality some fourteen paragraphs later in his decision.¹⁸² The Judge was advised that perpetrators were more likely to make confessions in private sessions than public hearings. For this reason, in the Judge’s view, the content of private or confidential interviews between detainees and the Commission may very well have warranted attention from the prosecution:
- “... I am informed that it is rare for perpetrators, whether alleged or convicted, to use public hearings to make confessions: these are more likely to be forthcoming in private hearings. For that very reason, of course, private hearings cannot be fully immunised from prosecution scrutiny: the compromise adopted by this court is found in Practice Direction paragraph 4(c).”¹⁸³
197. Detainees were, on the face of it, offered the opportunity to talk freely and confidentially to the Commission. Indeed the Commission was urged to proceed with “confidential interviews”.¹⁸⁴ Judge Robertson, twice in his Decision, raised his consternation at the failure of the Commission to proceed down this road. What was not disclosed in advance was that any inkling of a frank conversation between the detainee and the Commission, especially one that entailed “confessing”, would result in “prosecution scrutiny”. If ever there was a “chalice” that was doubtlessly “poisoned”¹⁸⁵ it lay in the Special Court’s claim that it offered “confidential” interviews.

¹⁷⁸ See the Decision of Judge Robertson on Appeal, 28 November 2003, at paragraph 23.

¹⁷⁹ See the Revised Practice Direction of 4 October 2003, at paragraph 7.

¹⁸⁰ See the Revised Practice Direction of 4 October 2003, at paragraphs 4(b) and 4(c). As noted above, the original version of the Practice Direction had provided for the immediate transmission of every interview transcript to the Prosecutor for use at trial.

¹⁸¹ Indeed legal counsel for Issa Sesay suggested a legal challenge on this very point.

¹⁸² See the Decision of Judge Robertson on Appeal, 28 November 2003, at paragraph 37.

¹⁸³ See the Decision of Judge Robertson on Appeal, 28 November 2003, at paragraph 37.

¹⁸⁴ See the letter of the Registrar dated 17 October 2003 in which he expressed disappointment at the TRC’s decision not to make use of the Practice Direction for purposes of confidential hearings.

¹⁸⁵ See the reference to the ‘poisoned chalice’ by Judge Robertson at paragraph 17 of his Decision.

198. The Commission's undertaking, in consultation with legal counsel of the three detainees, not to employ the Practice Direction for the purposes of confidential interviews has been amply vindicated by the Robertson Decision.

Security Concerns

199. The learned Judge went to great lengths to highlight an apparent admission by the TRC legal team that a denial of Hinga Norman's right to testify before the Commission may "unleash powerful emotions" against the Special Court. Judge Robertson seized on this statement, suggesting that it "indicates that the prosecution concerns [on the security situation] may have some foundation".¹⁸⁶ Building on his extrapolation of the statement, Judge Robertson suggested that, in the circumstances, to allow "any accused to testify live-to-air, for several days in an uncontrolled environment, may be asking for unpredictable trouble".¹⁸⁷
200. Yet, the Judge proceeded in the very next paragraph of his Decision to contradict the alarmist conclusion he had just reached. Referring to written submissions he received from the Prosecutor after the Bintumani appeal, which dealt with the security situation and witness intimidation,¹⁸⁸ and which he "carefully considered", Judge Robertson stated:

"The prosecution again draws attention to the "fragile equilibrium" in the country and to the potential for destabilisation where the forces which the indictee commanded are still in active association and interested in securing his freedom, although there is no evidence that they intend doing so by unlawful means, much less that Chief Hinga Norman is likely to encourage such a course."¹⁸⁹

Underline added

The Bao Legal Team's Conditions

201. The Judge "had to remind" himself of the interests of the other detainees who were not represented at the hearing. Judge Robertson referred to several conditions put up by the legal representatives of Augustine Ato Bao, the other Special Court detainee whose application to appear before the Commission was heard by the Court:

"What strikes me is the extent and detail of the conditions upon which his [Mr. Bao's] testimony was offered to and apparently accepted by the TRC."¹⁹⁰

The conditions put up by the Bao legal team were prepared and submitted on a unilateral basis. The Bao legal team, in its appeal papers, attempted to limit the damage by averring that Judge Thompson had "erred in placing undue and misplaced emphasis" on the conditions in question.¹⁹¹ The Commission had at no point accepted, nor even "apparently accepted," the said conditions.

¹⁸⁶ See the Decision of Judge Robertson on Appeal, 28 November 2003, at paragraph 26.

¹⁸⁷ See the Decision of Judge Robertson on Appeal, 28 November 2003, at paragraph 26.

¹⁸⁸ See the Supplementary Submissions from the Prosecutor of the Special Court in the Appeal before the President of the Court; rendered in the form of a collection of memoranda, accompanied by a letter signed by the Prosecutor, David M. Crane, dated 11 November 2003.

¹⁸⁹ See the Decision of Judge Robertson on Appeal, 28 November 2003, at paragraph 27.

¹⁹⁰ See the Decision of Judge Robertson on Appeal, 28 November 2003, at paragraph 28.

¹⁹¹ *Grounds of Appeal by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Sierra Leone and Augustine Ato Bao against the Decision of His Lordship Judge Bankole Thompson delivered on 29 October 2003 to deny the TRC's Request to Conduct a Public Hearing with Augustine Ato Bao*; before Judge Geoffrey Robertson, The President of the Special Court, filed on 5 November 2003, at paragraph 5.

202. Judge Robertson made much of the conditions filed by the Bao legal team. He suggested that the prospects of litigation arising out of a TRC “hearing before the Bishop in the Special Court building” would be “endless.”¹⁹² He painted a picture of a litany of potentially damaging legal ramifications:

“This could lead to an application for an injunction in the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone, or an application before the Special Court for protective measures. Suppose counsel for Mr. Gbao takes exception to passages in the draft TRC report: will he apply on the basis of this agreement with the TRC to injunct it in the national courts, or seek a right to refute it, or apply for protective measures before the Trial Chamber? The prospects of litigation – and consequent diversions and delays to Special Court trial – are endless.”¹⁹³

203. Judge Robertson’s concerns were speculative and repetitive.¹⁹⁴ In South Africa and in Sierra Leone where detainees appeared before the Commission’s process on a voluntary basis there were no such legal consequences.¹⁹⁵

Judge Robertson’s “Discussion”

204. Under the “Discussion” section of his judgement, the Judge permitted himself a certain journalistic license in his characterisation of the proposed TRC hearing with Hinga Norman:

“A man in custody awaiting trial on very serious charges is to be paraded, in the very court where that trial will shortly be held, before a Bishop rather than a presiding judge... The event will have the appearance of a trial, at least the appearance of a sort of trial familiar with centuries past...”¹⁹⁶

Underline added

205. The Judge was hereby attempting to remind the reader that Bishops dispensed so-called “justice” in the most brutal manner in “centuries past”. By drawing the comparison, however, Judge Robertson contrives a highly inappropriate image that is diametrically opposed to the mode of proceedings before the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
206. Other aspects of the Judge’s discussion lacked nuance and, in some instances, were simply wrong. For example, Judge Robertson suggested that unlike the South African TRC, the Commission:

“had to operate in a society where some major players in the war are indicted in the Special Court.”¹⁹⁷

¹⁹² See the Decision of Judge Robertson on Appeal, 28 November 2003, at paragraph 29.

¹⁹³ *Ibid.* Although Mr Bao is referred to as “Gbao” in Special Court papers, in his letter to the TRC dated 16 September 2003, signed under his hand, he reflected his name as “Augustine Ato Bao”.

¹⁹⁴ In respect of the injunction (before the national courts) and the protective measures (before Special Court) the Judge repeated himself on both points in the space of a paragraph.

¹⁹⁵ In South Africa the TRC experienced a great deal of litigation against it, but none of the kind imagined by Judge Robertson (in circumstances arising from the voluntary appearance of detainees before the TRC).

¹⁹⁶ See the Decision of Judge Robertson on Appeal, 28 November 2003, at paragraph 30.

¹⁹⁷ See the Decision of Judge Robertson on Appeal, 28 November 2003, at paragraph 35.

On the contrary, the South African TRC also operated in a society in which significant criminal trials were underway. Although these were trials conducted by national courts, certain of these trials involved players in the conflict who were more senior in rank and stature than those currently facing trial before Special Court.¹⁹⁸ These experiences ought to have provided a rich source of assistance for Judge Robertson.

The Thompson and Robertson Rulings Contrasted

207. The President of the Special Court described the ruling of Judge Bankole Thompson as a “carefully considered decision”, although he was at pains to point out that he was not “judicially reviewing” the reasoning of Judge Thompson. While paying due deference to the Trial Chamber Judge, it was clear from Judge Robertson’s brief assessment of the Thompson Decision that he saw himself as departing from it.¹⁹⁹ Nevertheless, Judge Robertson appeared to be at one with Judge Thompson’s central finding that the ambit of the Commission’s work could not extend to an indictee who has pleaded not guilty. Judge Thompson’s view was that the Commission was statutorily confined to dealing with perpetrators who were “willing to confess their guilt”. Upon this foundation, Judge Thompson ruled that since all the indictees had pleaded not guilty, they all fell outside of the ambit of the TRC Act.²⁰⁰
208. Judge Robertson view was slightly more nuanced. He maintained that the Thompson principle applied with particular reference to the Commission’s reconciliation activities.²⁰¹ Judge Robertson appeared to view reconciliation as little more than acts of confession and forgiveness between perpetrator and victim. His argument followed that an indictee who had pleaded not guilty could not confess; therefore the reconciliation process could not apply to the indictees – as all had pleaded not guilty. It appears that the learned Judge saw Commission hearings as having been devised largely in order to induce confessions, as opposed to being truth-telling exercises.²⁰² In justifying his sworn testimony “solution”, he stated:

“All that it [the Commission] is denied is a public hearing, an event more conducive to its reconciliation work (which cannot apply to indictees who plead not guilty) than its business of constructing an historical record.”²⁰³

There is some irony in the Judge’s assertion that “all that is denied is a public hearing”. That is all that the Commission asked for. The Commission does not share the learned Judge’s notions of reconciliation, nor his views on what TRC hearings are designed to achieve.

¹⁹⁸ In one trial, *S v Msane and 20 Others*, (Durban & Coastal Division, 1996) the former Minister of Defence, Magnus Malan, and the entire hierarchy of the South African military from the 1980s, including three Generals and a Vice-Admiral, faced charges of murder and conspiracy to murder arising from a massacre committed by a military-supported Inkatha Freedom Party hit squad.

¹⁹⁹ See the Decision of Judge Robertson on Appeal, 28 November 2003, at paragraphs 9 to 11.

²⁰⁰ Thompson Decision on the Hinga Norman Request, at paragraph 12.

²⁰¹ See the Decision of Judge Robertson on Appeal, 28 November 2003, at paragraphs 39 and 42.

²⁰² See the Decision of Judge Robertson on Appeal, 28 November 2003, at paragraph 37.

²⁰³ See the Decision of Judge Robertson on Appeal, 28 November 2003, at paragraph 42.

Judge Robertson's Justification for Refusing the Request

209. In the end, it was not the security risks;²⁰⁴ it was not the possibility that Hinga Norman would implicate himself or others;²⁰⁵ it was not the fact that Hinga Norman was an indictee; it was not the apparently unpredictable impact of a TRC hearing; nor was it the giving of evidence, which, in the view of Judge Robertson risked the integrity of the Court's process.²⁰⁶ It was rather the much-vaunted public character of the proposed hearing. To put it in Judge Robertson's words – it was the potential "spectacle" of the indictee being paraded before a Bishop. This spectacle would, according to Judge Robertson, appear as if it were convened to mete out justice. Moreover, it would look like it was administering that "justice" by reaching findings of fact: which was, according to Judge Robertson, the "special duty" of the Special Court.
210. It was upon little more than this misconstrued territorial concern that Justice Robertson denied Hinga Norman his right of self-expression and the right of the people of Sierra Leone to hear him in a public and transparent hearing.
211. The decisions handed down by Judge Bankole Thompson and Judge Geoffrey Robertson do not stand up to serious analysis. The Commission does not regard them as persuasive. The rulings constitute poor contributions to the development of transitional justice arrangements in post-conflict societies.

JUSTICE AND RECONCILIATION

212. Notwithstanding the ad-hoc manner in which the two institutions came into being they were expected to work side by side in order to unmask the truth. Judge Geoffrey Robertson, President of the Special Court, said as much when he presented his view of the task ahead in a Special Court publicity pamphlet. He also articulated his view that the Special Court has a primary role to play in achieving reconciliation, as it alone has the power to deliver justice, which is a prerequisite for reconciliation:

"Within the fallible parameters of human justice, with its fundamentals of due process, transparency and defence rights, we are charged to do our best to end the impunity that powerful perpetrators would otherwise enjoy. This much is owed to the memory of murdered victims, to maimed survivors and to those who grieve for them. It is a duty we share with another body, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission set up by the Sierra Leone government. We shall work together to uncover the truth, although the Court alone has the power to deliver the justice that is a prerequisite for reconciliation."²⁰⁷

²⁰⁴ The potential security risks were dismissed by Judge Robertson at paragraph 27 of his Decision.

²⁰⁵ If the possibility of a detainee incriminating himself had been a real concern, the Judge would not have permitted the detainees to give any testimony to the TRC, even in writing.

²⁰⁶ See Neil Boister; *Failing to get to the Heart of the Matter in Sierra Leone*; paper circulated in February 2004, publication pending at the time of writing.

²⁰⁷ See the Introduction to the brochure entitled *Special Court for Sierra Leone*, published by the Special Court in March 2003.

213. The achievement of “justice” may very well advance the cause of reconciliation. Whether it brings reconciliation in itself is debatable. Whether the kind of justice referred to by the Judge, namely the retributive justice pursued by the Special Court, is capable of producing national reconciliation is equally debatable. Confining the achievement of justice to retributive justice is a narrow interpretation of what justice has come to mean in recent times.
214. These debates aside, the Commission finds it somewhat incongruous that one complementary post-conflict body sets itself up as the primary body to achieve the stated aim of the other post-conflict body, namely the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. It is also incongruous to assert that the prerequisite for achieving reconciliation is to carry out a function that the other complementary body is not empowered to do; namely to prosecute offenders in a court of law.
215. If Justice Robertson’s proposition is correct then the achievement of reconciliation is presumably dependent on the “successful” outcome of the prosecutions before the Special Court.²⁰⁸ However, achieving justice and addressing impunity are difficult enough tasks. There are huge uncertainties inherent in criminal trials. Prosecutions fail as often as they succeed. To rest reconciliation on the successful outcome of a legal process is a risky endeavour. This point was made forcefully in a unanimous decision of the South African Constitutional Court in 1996. The applicants in the matter contested the denial of their rights to judicial redress under the amnesty provision of the truth and reconciliation process:

“Every decent human being must feel grave discomfort in living with a consequence which might allow the perpetrators of evil acts to walk the streets of this land with impunity, protected in their freedom by an amnesty immune from constitutional attack; but the circumstances in support of this course require carefully to be appreciated. Most of the acts of brutality and torture [that] have taken place have occurred during an era in which neither the laws which permitted the incarceration of persons or the investigation of crimes, nor the methods and the culture which informed such investigations, were easily open to public investigation, verification and correction. Much of what transpired in this shameful period is shrouded in secrecy and not easily capable of objective demonstration and proof. Loved ones have disappeared, sometimes mysteriously and most of them no longer survive to tell their tales. Others have had their freedom invaded, their dignity assaulted or their reputations tarnished by grossly unfair imputations hurled in the fire and the cross-fire of a deep and wounding conflict. The wicked and the innocent have often both been victims.

Secrecy and authoritarianism have concealed the truth in little crevices of obscurity in our history. Records are not easily accessible; witnesses are often unknown, dead, unavailable or unwilling. All that often effectively remains is the truth of wounded memories of loved ones sharing instinctive suspicions, deep and traumatising to the survivors but otherwise incapable of translating themselves into objective and corroborative evidence which could survive the rigours of the law.

²⁰⁸ It is unclear whether Judge Robertson’s proposition applies in respect of acquittals. Presumably it would apply so long as the outcome was “just”. Whether or not acquittals would lead to reconciliation is equally speculative.

The Act [that created the Truth and Reconciliation Commission] seeks to address this massive problem.

[...] The alternative to the grant of immunity from criminal prosecution of offenders is to keep intact the abstract right to such a prosecution for particular persons without the evidence to sustain the prosecution successfully, to continue to keep the dependants of such victims in many cases substantially ignorant about what precisely happened to their loved ones; to leave their yearning for the truth effectively unassuaged; to perpetuate their legitimate sense of resentment and grief...²⁰⁹

216. The difficulties in preparing successful criminal prosecutions in the circumstances described by the late Deputy President of the South African Constitutional Court are not that dissimilar to those prevailing in post-conflict Sierra Leone.
217. Judge Robertson's assertion of the power of the Court does not exclude other means of pursuing reconciliation, but his notion does not leave room for a lasting reconciliation to be built without resorting to criminal trials. Based on the practice of other countries, it does not appear to be accurate to say that criminal trials are a prerequisite for reconciliation. Mozambique, which experienced one of the bloodiest civil wars²¹⁰ in the second half of the twentieth century, enjoys a measure of reconciliation even though there were no criminal trials, or for that matter a truth and reconciliation commission. South Africa, which deprived many victims of judicial redress, through its "truth for amnesty" formula, also enjoys a measure of reconciliation notwithstanding its bitter and divided past.
218. Even assuming a 100% success rate in the Special Court's delivery of "justice", it remains an open question as to whether the Special Court's form of justice is capable of providing a basis for meaningful reconciliation. While the conviction and imprisonment of those ten odd individuals who are alleged to bear the greatest responsibility will go a long way in addressing impunity it is unclear whether it will be sufficient to give rise to national reconciliation.
219. The Commission, during the course of its mandate, deliberated extensively on the necessary ingredients for meaningful reconciliation. The Commission decided to place no preconditions for the realisation of reconciliation. The Commission did not even prescribe the telling of the truth as a prerequisite for reconciliation. Reconciliation is too precious a commodity for Sierra Leone. Reconciliation is an ongoing process that demands action and commitment on many different fronts.²¹¹

²⁰⁹ Judgement of Mahomed DP in *Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) and others v. President of the Republic of South Africa and others*; (CCT17/96) 1996 (8) BCLR 1015; 1996 (4) SA 672; [1996] ZACC 16 (25 July 1996), at paragraphs 17 and 18.

²¹⁰ In 1988, the US Deputy Secretary of State for African Affairs accused RENAMO of carrying out "one of the most brutal holocausts against human beings since World War II". (Reported in the *Natal Mercury*, 28 April 1988). A report published in 1988 by the US State Department's Bureau for Refugee Programmes held RENAMO responsible for the deaths of some 100, 000 civilians in Mozambique.

²¹¹ The Commission's understanding of reconciliation and the activities it has taken in pursuit thereof are presented in the chapter on Reconciliation later in Volume Three B of this report.

CONCLUSION

220. The TRC and the Special Court will undoubtedly make significant contributions towards peace and justice in Sierra Leone. Their contributions could have been immeasurably stronger had the two institutions shared something of a common vision of the basic goals of post-conflict transitional justice.
221. The two bodies were not created out of some concerted and coherent plan. Rather, they arose from two different initiatives that were themselves contradictory. The TRC grew out of the amnesty in the Lomé Peace Agreement, while the Special Court emerged subsequently out of the decision to withdraw the amnesty, at least with respect to a limited number of persons.
222. Prior to the commencement of operations of the two bodies, there were attempts to anticipate and address issues of co-operation and potential conflict, although the issue that ultimately led to major difficulties in the relationship between the two bodies, namely the appearance of detainees before the Commission, was never really anticipated.
223. The establishment of these transitional bodies working in parallel did not work optimally. The two institutions had little contact and when they intersected at the operational level, the relationship was a troubled one.²¹²

Harmonisation of Objectives

224. It is the view of the Commission that the practical problems that afflicted the “dual accountability” model stemmed from the creation of the two institutions separately from each another. These problems were compounded by the subsequent and mutual failure of the institutions to harmonise their objectives.
225. Having outlined the problems involved with the parallel operation of the two institutions the Commission does not hold that justice and truth bodies should never work simultaneously in the future. Indeed there may be good reason to have two such bodies working in tandem. However there is clearly a need for greater thinking and planning before such a strategy is adopted.
226. Much of the difficulty lies in the fact that the two mechanisms represent different approaches to addressing impunity. Operational difficulties are likely given that they also share many objectives: both seek truth about a conflict, although in different forms; both attempt to assign responsibilities for atrocities; both work with similar bodies of law; and both are aimed at establishing peace and preventing future conflict.
227. Ultimately where there is no harmonisation of objectives a criminal justice body will have largely punitive and retributive aims, whereas a truth and reconciliation body will have largely restorative and healing objectives. Where the two bodies operate simultaneously in an ad-hoc fashion, conflict between such objectives is likely. Confusion in the minds of the public is inevitable.

²¹² For the full findings of the Commission in relation to the different roles of the TRC and the Special Court see the Findings Chapter in Volume Two of this report.

228. Harmonisation of objectives means that neither body can operate in a manner that is oblivious of the other. It is highly incongruous for one body to engage in intensive truth seeking and reconciliation exercises involving former participants in the conflict, while another body is independently pursuing punitive actions against the same individuals. Harmonisation requires the developing of an operational model that permits the different objectives to be reached in a symbiotic manner.
229. Examples of where post-conflict societies have attempted to harmonise the objectives of post-conflict institutions include South Africa, East Timor and Peru. Different and nuanced operational models can be developed to suit particular circumstances.

Looking Ahead

230. It is likely that in the future there will be more truth commissions that work alongside international judicial bodies. This will particularly be the case as the International Criminal Court commences operations in different post-conflict countries. Future experiences of joint operations need not be troubled ones. Indeed the Commission is encouraged by the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court, which make provision for communications in the context of a class of "other confidential relationships" which are not subject to disclosure.²¹³ The confidential communications provided for in the TRC Act would most probably have been covered by this protection. Such a provision in the Sierra Leone context may very well have prevented much of the discord that emerged.
231. In future post-conflict societies there may be compelling reasons to justify the establishment of a body to bring truth and reconciliation. Alternatively there may be strong grounds to support the creation of a body to address impunity and bring retributive justice. There may even be good cause to have both such bodies working side by side.
232. The Commission makes no recommendation on which particular model ought to be adopted. This will naturally depend on the prevailing circumstances and a range of other factors. There ought however to be recognition from the outset that there is a primary objective shared by both organisations, namely that the processes of both institutions must ultimately lead to the goal of building lasting peace and stability. In the pursuit of this objective both bodies are equal partners. The Commission does make specific recommendations to apply in the event that the parallel option is employed and these are set out in the Recommendations chapter.²¹⁴

²¹³ See the International Criminal Court, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.1 (2000), at Rule 73(2), "Privileged communications and information".

²¹⁴ The Recommendations chapter can be found in Volume Two of this report.

A Right to Justice and a Right to Know the Truth

233. In the light of developments in post-conflict societies in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries in dealing with past human rights violations, there exists on the part of victims a right to know the truth. Truth Commissions have been established in several countries around the world to meet this recognised obligation. The Commission finds that there is considerable weight to the argument that establishing the “truth” is an essential component of the universally recognised “right to an effective remedy”.
234. The Commission also recognises that victims have a right to justice and to pursue this right through legal means. The reaching of justice is not always possible in societies devastated by years of civil strife. Most post-conflict societies do not have the capacity to deliver justice on war crimes or serious violations of human rights, let alone the capacity to attend to daily justice needs. In future post-conflict transitional justice arrangements the international community and national governments should seriously consider a major investment in the national justice systems of such societies. Such investment may take place in addition to or in the alternative to establishing international tribunals to investigate and prosecute violations of human rights. This option would be better suited to strengthening domestic skills and capacity. It would have a potentially lasting impact on local justice institutions.

Reaching the Truth and Addressing Impunity

235. Truth and Reconciliation Commissions represent one of the most viable means of securing a sustainable peace. Such commissions can strengthen the peace through the establishment of an impartial historical record of the conflict and the creation of a public understanding of the past that draws upon broad based participation.
233. It is only when the full truth (or as close to the full truth as possible) is placed squarely before the public that society can examine itself honestly and robustly. It is this cathartic exercise on the part of the nation that permits it to take genuine measures to prevent the repetition of the horrors of the past.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Reconciliation

TRC

**Truth for
Understanding.
Reconciliation
for our Future.**

Produced by the TRC Steering Committee with support
from the International Human Rights Law Group

CHAPTER SEVEN

Reconciliation

Introduction

1. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (“TRC” or “the Commission”) was guided by various provisions of the Truth and Reconciliation Act 2000 (“the TRC Act”) in addressing the question of reconciliation.
2. Section 6 (1) of the TRC Act states that the Commission should strive, among its functions, “to respond to the needs of the victims... [and] to promote healing and reconciliation.”
3. Section 6 (2) of the TRC Act further states that the TRC must “work to help to restore the human dignity of victims and promote reconciliation by providing an opportunity for victims to give an account of the violations and abuses suffered”. The TRC should equally provide an opportunity “for perpetrators to relate their experiences”. In the same vein, it should try to create “a climate which fosters constructive interchange between victims and perpetrators, giving special attention to the subject of sexual abuses and to the experiences of children within the armed conflict”.
4. Section 7 (2) of the TRC Act provides that “the Commission may seek assistance from traditional and religious leaders to facilitate its public sessions and in resolving local conflicts arising from past violations or abuses, in support of healing and reconciliation”.
5. This chapter will focus on the Commission’s activities to promote reconciliation and to create a space for dialogue between communities divided by the experiences of the war. The narrative will draw upon excerpts from hearings to illustrate how the different parties were encouraged to reconcile with one another in the course of the Commission’s work. These excerpts reflect the themes that underpin the TRC’s approach to reconciliation, which includes the acknowledgment of past wrongdoings and a programme of reparations.

Concepts

Reconciliation

6. The Commission began its work on the premise that there is no universal model of reconciliation that can apply to all countries. Reconciliation is not a concept that can be imported to a country from abroad. It has to emerge from within the society and be owned by that society. Bearing this in mind, the Commission recognises that the term “reconciliation” is a fluid concept which is not easily defined. In the paragraphs that follow, the Commission offers a conceptual framework of how it understood reconciliation and endeavoured to foster it through the processes it facilitated.

7. The Commission recognises that the notion of restorative justice offers the potential for reconciliation. Restorative justice is different from retributive justice in that a retributive system of justice seeks to punish perpetrators for the crimes they have committed, while it is accepted that restorative justice focuses on restoring relations, as far as possible, between victims and perpetrators and between perpetrators and the community to which they belong.¹
8. A restorative system of justice includes accountability, truth telling, acknowledgement, and reparations. Accountability requires that the perpetrator acknowledge the harm done to the victims and takes action to repair that harm.² Acknowledging harm may lead to an apology offered by the perpetrator. Apologies may be offered not only by the perpetrator, but by all those who bear command responsibility for such actions. Included in this category are those who pursued policies or actions that eventually led to a violation, those who failed to prevent the commission of a violation and those who knew about a violation and failed to take action against it. While the victim may voluntarily choose to forgive, the Commission is of the opinion that forgiveness by a victim is not a necessary element in this process and cannot be forced. The Commission also notes that an admission of remorse by the perpetrator cannot be forced. Remorse, while desirable, is not necessary for reconciliation to obtain.
9. The Commission focused on reparations as another element of restorative justice, which can be provided either in material or symbolic forms to redress the harm suffered by victims as a consequence of the violation and abuses they endured. The Commission took the view that the implementation of a reparations programme in Sierra Leone would be vital to the reconciliation process because it has the potential to assist those victims whose lives have been most devastated. The implementation of a reparations programme also helps to facilitate relations between victims and perpetrators.
10. Scores of victims voiced their concerns to the TRC at the fact that many perpetrators have been beneficiaries of government initiatives such as the Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (DDR) programme, whereas there have been fewer programmes available to assist victims. A reparations programme has the potential to reduce the perception that the state has taken better care of perpetrators than of victims, which is important if victims and perpetrators are to reconcile with each other. The Commission feels strongly that a commitment by the government to the reparations programme will help to restore relations between the government and the victims of the conflict.
11. The fundamental aims of all of these measures must be, minimally: to give recognition to victims; to help create a culture of co-existence where victims and perpetrators reach a shared understanding of the future; and to promote relationships of civic trust between citizens themselves and between citizens and their institutions. Reconciliation furthers social solidarity and is essentially about finding the mechanisms and the space to live together peacefully and with tolerance of diversity.

¹ See Galaway, B. and Hudson, J.; "Restorative Justice: International Perspectives," at pages 2 - 3. See also Eisnaugle, C. J. N.; "*An International 'Truth Commission': Utilising Restorative Justice as an Alternative to Retribution*", in *Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law*, January 2003 (hereinafter "Eisnaugle, *Restorative Justice as an Alternative to Retribution*"), at page 2.

² See Eisnaugle, *Restorative Justice as an Alternative to Retribution*, at page 3.

12. The manner in which reconciliation should be facilitated has been the subject of much discourse throughout the TRC process. The Commission took the view that reconciliation has many components: national reconciliation; community reconciliation; and reconciliation between individuals, such as between victims and perpetrators at an inter-personal level. The Commission felt strongly that national reconciliation is a political process that begins with the negotiation of a cessation of hostilities and then leads to a peace process. A decisive move away from war is an important first step in the reconciliation process. Instituting measures that lead to democracy, establishing democratic institutions, building a culture of human rights and re-establishing the rule of law constitute steps that facilitate and deepen reconciliation at a political and national level. National reconciliation creates a context within which community reconciliation and individual reconciliation flourish.
13. The Commission felt strongly that it should support and pursue efforts to foster a climate of national reconciliation, as it creates potential conditions in which local actors can pursue reconciliation.³ At the same time, the Commission is of the opinion that, while the process should be launched at the national level, implementation needs to occur at the local level. Local actors should eventually take control of the process.⁴ If victims do not have any sense of what they can expect from the process or if they feel marginalised from the process, reconciliation will be difficult to foster.⁵ The Commission's mandate also required the assistance of local leaders to support the process of reconciliation. The Commission endorsed the view that national reconciliation must also be pursued in a complementary fashion at local level.
14. The Commission did not subscribe to any formula as to which level of reconciliation should first be pursued. The Commission believed strongly that for reconciliation to succeed at the national level, it is essential that the government and the President of the country own the process of reconciliation and create the structural conditions in which reconciliation is to occur. The government must play a key role in fostering and promoting dialogue among the various actors involved in the conflict as well as promoting a culture of tolerance. Efforts should be made for reconciliation processes to be inclusive of both victims and perpetrators, as both groups are integral parts of any long-term solution.

³ See the Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA), "Reconciliation After Violent Conflict – A Hand Book", at page 25.

⁴ See Van der Merwe, H.; "The Truth and Reconciliation Commission and Community Reconciliation: An Analysis of Competing Strategies and Conceptualisations," published by the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, South Africa (hereinafter "Van der Merwe, *Competing Strategies and Conceptualisations*"), at page 9.

⁵ See Van der Merwe, *Competing Strategies and Conceptualisations*, at page 8.

National reconciliation

15. The cessation of hostilities and the return of the country to peace is the first step in the process of reconciliation. National reconciliation must be explored in this context. Truth Commissions in the last ten years have had to grapple with reconciliation in the context of negotiated transitions. In the past, there has usually been a victor who has been able to impose victor's justice. In recent conflicts, particularly those in modern times, there are no victors, as the case of Sierra Leone illustrates. Parties negotiate the end of a conflict, which usually involves a negotiated transfer of power, a government of national unity, and often an amnesty deal. Once the fighting stops, reconciliation entails a political compromise between former enemies who have to find ways of governing the country together and building a stable economy, which in turn facilitates political and socio-economic development.
16. Reconciliation in this national context must be translated meaningfully for the population. It requires that the leaders of the nation develop a common understanding of the diverse reasons for the conflict recognising that there is no single truth, but a many-sided truth. In most instances, particularly in recent times, truth commissions have been established to construct a historical truth of the conflict that all sides can live with.
17. National reconciliation also requires that the state and other stakeholders work towards ensuring the prevention of new conflict. Ensuring non-repetition of conflict requires eliminating those issues that have the potential to lead to conflict. It requires the restoration of the rule of law and democracy, the establishment of an independent judiciary, good governance, institutional reform and the opportunity to pursue the means to a decent livelihood. Political tolerance by the major political actors in Sierra Leone is another necessary ingredient. Political actors must learn to be aggressive about social and political change rather than towards each other. By doing so, they will help the country move one step forward along the path of national reconciliation.
18. National reconciliation is a long-term nation-building project, which the Commission facilitates but which ultimately must be owned by the nation. The TRC in Sierra Leone has acted as a catalyst in the process of national reconciliation by organising thematic hearings during which national stakeholders were invited to come to discuss the causes of the war and their particular roles. The Commission also organised workshops on national reconciliation and offered the opportunity to civil society, political parties, the legal sector and individuals to make recommendations that informed the content of the Commission's final report. The Commission is fully aware of fact that it may take many years to achieve fulfilment of all of its recommendations.
19. The Commission regrets that the leadership of Sierra Leone has not taken the opportunity to do more to promote reconciliation at the national level. Once the Commission completes its work, it dissolves and the baton passes on to the President who, as the leader of the nation, must take responsibility for this national project. It would be helpful if the President were to make a symbolic acknowledgement of the wrongs done to all the people of Sierra Leone and then commit himself as the father of the nation to ensuring the success of the reconciliation project. It is the Commission's view that the government will make a significant contribution towards fostering reconciliation at the national level as well as setting the stage for reconciliation to be carried out at community level if it ensures that the recommendations made by the Commission are carried out speedily and with integrity.

Community reconciliation

20. At the community level, reconciliation is fostered or facilitated by understanding and sharing experiences and by creating the conditions for community acceptance of wrongdoing. Return to the community by perpetrators involves accountability on the part of those perpetrators. The community, represented by the elders, religious leaders and Chiefs, acknowledge the wrongdoing symbolically on behalf of all in the community, thus allowing for the entry of the perpetrator back into the community. It is important to note that the community cannot forgive in the name of the individual wronged; it can only acknowledge the harm done to the community. The acknowledgement of wrongdoing helps pave the way for the victim and perpetrator to live together. The approval and support of the community in such a reconciliation process is necessary in order to make reconciliation sustainable.
21. Community reconciliation can occur on many levels, including individual-group level, intra-group level and inter-group level. At the individual-group level, individuals need to reconcile with the group they belong to or used to belong to or wish to belong to after the war. Reconciliation at this level can go beyond the immediate community to include family, the home community, the community where the individual has settled down after the conflict, the church community or peer groups. The Commission has actively encouraged this level of reconciliation, more specifically during the reconciliation ceremonies at the end of each of its district hearings. Many of these ceremonies focused on reconciliation between ex-combatants and the communities they currently live in. Others focussed on the reunification of abducted children with their families and communities, or on the reunification of a "bush wife" with her family, or that of a chief with the community that he or she had abandoned during the war. While reconciliation is about relationships between individuals, it must be emphasised that, in most instances, relationships are also defined and influenced by the communities to which individuals belong.
22. At the intra-group level, reconciliation is within a group and amongst the members of a group. While members of different fighting factions may try to reconcile with one another, there is also a need for combatants to reconcile with members of the same faction. For example, some members of a faction may feel betrayed by their commanders. Other examples of groups in which this level of reconciliation can take place are political parties, the military, the police, the judiciary and even ethnic groups.
23. Such intra-group reconciliation may also need to take place within groups where there are strong views that one or the other may have contributed indirectly to the war, or that not enough was done to prevent or stop the conflict. Different views on these roles may exist within the same group and need to be sorted out before reconciliation can take place. If reconciliation at this level fails, groups may split and even become sources of new conflict or a threat to the peace process. The Commission heard examples, both past and present, of such intra-group conflict during its thematic hearings. It is apparent that many groups, such as ex-combatants, have not dealt with their internal conflicts and have not begun to work on reconciliation. In this regard, a lot of important work remains to be done.

24. At the inter-group level, reconciliation is essentially between different, often opposing groups. An example is the integration of members of each of the various former armed factions into the reformed Sierra Leone Army. It may also involve reconciliation between specific groups of ex-combatants and victims, for instance, between amputees and the fighting faction that committed most of the amputations, or between the Army and civilians. It may also entail reconciliation between two neighbouring communities that collaborated with different factions during the war. This Commission has not completed its work in this area.
25. Community reconciliation, like national reconciliation, is a long-term nation-building project. The Commission was surprised by the number of complaints about the violations committed by many of the Chiefs during the conflict, for which they neither as a group nor individually expressed remorse or offered any explanation to their communities. In reality, while the Commission had to rely on the Chiefs as leaders of their communities and had to work closely with them, the Commission was cognisant of the fact that many chiefs have been discredited by their failure to explain the roles they played during the war. It is for this reason that the Commission has not felt entirely comfortable relying on traditional structures to help foster reconciliation. The reconciliation process must continue and traditional leadership will play an important role in this process. However, the Commission has recommended that the role of Chiefs and the manner in which they have been manipulated by successive governments must be placed on the national agenda for discussion, as it has huge potential for further conflict in the future.

Individual reconciliation

26. At the inter-personal level, reconciliation is between two individuals. The most obvious example is reconciliation between a victim and a perpetrator. The Commission has encouraged reconciliation efforts between victims and perpetrators both during and since its hearings. While war was fought between the various armed factions, civilians became the main casualties of the conflict. Many civilians were also compelled to turn perpetrators, unwillingly at first but later becoming complicit in the violence. The Commission also heard testimony that many civilians used the war to settle old conflicts with neighbours, business colleagues or other rivals.
27. At an individual level, victim and perpetrator meet. While some forgive, others don't. It is important to note that forgiveness cannot be forced upon anyone and that only the individual can forgive. No government or chief can forgive on behalf of the individual. Individual reconciliation is reflected on the inter-personal and intra-personal levels.
28. At the intra-personal level, reconciliation is deeply personal and involves coming to terms with the past and the consequences of the conflict. Reconciliation at this level is closely related to trauma healing. The Commission has defined trauma healing as a process that improves the psychological health of the individual following extensive violent conflict. The Commission is of the opinion that reconciling with oneself may help a victim or a perpetrator regain confidence and trust in other people again.

29. All of these levels of reconciliation are equally important and inter-related. Reconciliation at one level can facilitate reconciliation at another level. Conversely, the lack of reconciliation at one level can hamper reconciliation at another. The need for multi-layered reconciliation is a reality in Sierra Leone. In many instances, members of an armed faction do not agree amongst each other about acknowledgment of responsibility for violations and abuses committed by some of them. Such disagreement hampers reconciliation between the perpetrators of these violations and their victims. Many so-called “victim-perpetrators”, such as the children abducted to become child soldiers, block out the violations committed by them during the conflict period because they cannot deal with the trauma. Many remain in denial unless assisted by trained practitioners to deal with it. Inability to reconcile with oneself can make reconciliation with victims very difficult and, in some cases, almost impossible.
30. A huge problem for many victims is that their perpetrators remain nameless and faceless. Equally, many perpetrators do not know who their victims are. The mass-based nature of the conflict has the consequence that many violations remain “anonymous”. These situations make inter-personal healing very difficult and make the reconciliation processes that take place at the community level even more important. While many organisations and groups within Sierra Leone civil society have contributed to this process and continue to do so, achieving reconciliation will require a concerted effort from all.

TRC Policy on reconciliation

31. The Commission's policy on reconciliation is based on two central principles: first, the process of reconciliation should be based on the country's own culture, traditions and value system, which requires that traditional and religious leaders play a role in the process; second, existing structures need to be utilised as much as possible so as not to “reinvent the wheel”.

Traditional values and methods informing reconciliation

32. During the Interim phase of the Commission, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) contracted a local organisation, Manifesto 99, to conduct research on traditional methods of conflict resolution and reconciliation in Sierra Leone. While the report did not address all the issues the TRC had to deal with, it nonetheless provided a basis for the Commission's reconciliation policy. It covered the views of four ethnic groups on traditional practices on how to deal with conflict and reconciliation in relation to murder, burglary, arson, land, marital conflict, assault and injury.
33. The report confirmed that most Sierra Leoneans, irrespective of whether they follow the Muslim or Christian faith, still cling to traditional animist beliefs. It also confirmed that most of the ethnic groups have belief systems that promote truth telling and reconciliation. Truth telling, swearing or curse casting (or the threat of it) are essential elements of spiritual justice to encourage voluntary confession. The perpetrator can undergo cleansing or purification, or benefit directly from a pardon by society and thus be in peace with himself and with the community.
34. All of the various ethnic groups have their own traditional mechanisms of conflict resolution, which can be used to deal with many of the violations committed during the conflict. Of course, amputations and abductions were rarely heard of before the war. The nature and gravity of the conflict and the particular violations usually dictates the chosen method of conflict resolution.

However, in some instances, the mechanisms in place are in conflict with a culture of human rights and perpetuate a culture of violence. For instance, in the case of robbery, groups like the Mende, Kono, and Sherbro will dress the perpetrator in rags, molest him or her and compel the person to dance around the village. The perpetrator is often beaten up. However respectful of tradition the TRC wishes to be, the use of violence cannot be condoned or encouraged.

35. Where children are concerned, traditional mechanisms such as national cleansing ceremonies can be applied. Some traditions, however, are applied with less rigour.⁶ An example of how traditional methods could be used on the children was exhibited during the district workshop in Kabala. It was explained that children's bodies were covered with mud and ashes, after which they were taken to the river to be symbolically washed from their past.
36. Many aspects of traditional conflict resolution, such as mediation, purification, token appeasement and the willingness to show remorse, are in harmony with the objectives of the TRC policy and have been sustained by the Commission during its hearings and beyond.
37. Other violations, such as abductions, amputations, murder and arson, which are rare in the traditional context, are normally referred to the police, through the Paramount Chief or District Office. However, given the amnesty established by the Lomé Agreement, traditional methods can be adjusted and applied to those violations too, as a condition for the reintegration of ex-combatants.⁷ Reunification ceremonies all over the country testify that such methods are already being widely applied. Caritas Makeni used such methods during reunification ceremonies for abducted children, as recounted below:

“When Caritas Makeni reunified child ex-combatants with their families, the latter sought to “change the hearts” of their children through a combination of care, support and ritual action. Usually, the eldest member of the family prayed over a cup of water and rubbed it over the child's body (especially the head, feet, and chest), asking God and the ancestors to give the child a “cool heart,” a state of reconciliation and stability in which the child is settled in the home, has a proper relationship with family and community and is not troubled by nightmares and bad memories... Some parents then drank the consecrated water that had washed their child. The consecrated water now becomes the new physical bond between parent and child... some parents also offered kola nuts... Some parents, in addition, followed this up with liquid Quranic slate water... Others again made a “fol sara” to thank the ancestors and God, either dedicating a chicken and caring for it thereafter, or slaughtering and cooking it with rice as an offering to poor people, or to a Muslim ritual specialist to eat.”⁸

⁶ See Manifesto '99, *Traditional Methods of Conflict Management and Resolution*, study report submitted to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in support of the preparatory phase of the TRC, July 2002 (hereinafter “Manifesto '99, *Traditional Methods of Conflict Management and Resolution*”), at page 66. The research quoted here was taken from the following study: Shaw, R.; *Remembering to Forget* – “Report on local techniques of Healing and Reconciliation for Child Ex-combatants in Northern Sierra Leone”, Tufts University, USA, October 2002 (hereinafter “Shaw, *Remembering to Forget*”), at page 9.

⁷ See Manifesto '99, *Traditional Methods of Conflict Management and Resolution*, at page 62.

⁸ See Shaw, *Remembering to Forget*, at page 7.

38. Traditional methods of conflict resolution are not static. They are dynamic and are capable of being adapted to deal with the kinds of violations committed during the war in Sierra Leone.
39. Since reconciliation in Sierra Leone involves traditional values and beliefs, the reconciliation process cannot move forward without the participation of the religious and traditional leaders. Article 7(2) of the TRC Act explicitly refers to the assistance from traditional and religious leaders in facilitating reconciliation. The inter-faith community in Sierra Leone has played an important role in the negotiations for peace and is still one of the strongest support networks for people affected by the war. In view of the limited mandate of the TRC, partnerships with religious and traditional leaders have become all the more important. The dialogue that has started between various groups and the community can continue with the presence of these leaders. Traditional and religious leaders can help make reconciliation more sustainable.
40. Traditional and religious leaders were involved in all the activities of the Commission, including truth telling and conflict resolution sessions, sensitisation activities, statement taking, the hearings and the reconciliation initiatives. They were consulted as to where monuments and memorials should be established. Community members assisted in identifying the sites of mass graves and torture chambers. They will continue the follow-up exercise with witnesses and implement the reconciliation programme funded by the UNDP.

The Reliance on Existing Structures

41. The TRC Act envisaged a partnership between the Commission and other bodies in promoting reconciliation. The Commission relied on existing structures that were already involved in reconciliation activities. The TRC has been a catalyst in reconciliation by creating partnerships with key stakeholders within Sierra Leone civil society, including religious and traditional leaders, NGOs, victims, ex-combatants, official bodies such as the National Commission for Social Action (NaCSA), the Army and the police.
42. In many parts of the country, activities were undertaken by the Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) developed by NCDDR and NGOs helping communities come together and rebuild. UNICEF also played an instrumental role in reintegrating child combatants.
43. Many faith groups became entry points for the return of ex-combatants to their communities. While these efforts were not co-ordinated on a countrywide basis, it was necessary to build on the foundation they provided. The Commission sees itself as having opened a space for dialogue between divided groups and communities. It now behoves civil society, the government and other stakeholders to sustain the momentum created by the TRC process.
44. The Commission did not expect to reconcile the whole nation and has not been able to develop reconciliation activities in every village. To realise its mandate, it needed to ensure the sustainability as well as the national character of the reconciliation process. The Commission chose to develop joint reconciliation activities with various partners in order to allow civil society to continue the reconciliation process beyond the Commission's lifespan.

OVERVIEW OF TRC ACTIVITIES TOWARDS RECONCILIATION

45. The Commission's major efforts in respect of reconciliation centred on restoring relationships between various stakeholders. The Commission's efforts have mostly concentrated on facilitating the reconciliation process between:
a) victims and perpetrators, with each other and with the community; and
b) perpetrators with the community.
46. During the statement-taking phase, efforts were focussed on the sensitisation activities necessary to inform the public about the work of the Commission. TRC activities also targeted specific groups of victims and perpetrators for participation in the statement-taking process, as a prelude to reconciliation activities that might take place later on.
47. The district hearings provided the platform to address the issues affecting reconciliation in the each particular district. The hearings took place in the district headquarter towns and lasted for one week in each location. During the hearings, two kinds of reconciliation ceremonies were performed: those in which victims and perpetrators were brought together; and those in which only perpetrators begged the community for forgiveness. The ceremonies were the first step in the healing process rather than an achievement of reconciliation. Other activities during the hearings included the naming of victims who died during the conflict and the establishment of monuments and memorials in the town where the hearing was held, or at the site of a mass grave in the district.
48. The Commission organised a National Reconciliation Procession on 6 August 2003 to mark the end of its nationwide hearings. Participants included members from various political parties, the police, the Army, victim organisations, students and members of civil society. Representatives of the political parties and from the security services offered apologies for the roles their members played during the conflict. Other apologies were made during the thematic hearings held by the Commission.
48. Further work on reconciliation continued through workshops and consultations with civil society. These workshops and consultations brought together various stakeholders at both national and local levels to discuss the conditions necessary for reconciliation and the roles of the respective actors.
49. Lastly, careful provision was made for the continuation of reconciliation activities. District Reconciliation Committees were established in partnership with the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone, in order to prolong and build upon the work of the Commission on reconciliation.

TRC



In an example of the first steps in the healing process at community level, former RUF Commander Abdulai Sesay appeals for forgiveness and reconciliation at a TRC public hearing in Tonkolili District.

PROCEDURAL GUIDELINES FOR RECONCILIATION ACTIVITIES

50. The TRC's reconciliation procedures began with the following step: the Commission encouraged chiefs, chiefdom committees and other local structures to hold community and other consultations before, during and after the public activities of the Commission. The Commission recommended that these consultations begin and that it did not necessarily require that people make statements before it. It was important that these consultations should identify the impediments to reconciliation in the community or district and the roles of various actors to move the process forward. The Commission was prepared to assist in furthering dialogue and to mediate in resolving whatever issues existed in the communities. The Commission recommended that the consultations at the local and other levels should culminate with perpetrators being encouraged, both by the chiefs and other community members, to acknowledge responsibility or guilt. It was the view of the Commission that the acknowledgment of past wrongdoing could foster reintegration. Finally, the Commission encouraged and organised reconciliation ceremonies with local and religious leaders officiating over the reintegration of perpetrators. The reconciliation ceremonies were the beginning of the journey to reconciliation. The dialogue that has started needs to be sustained until full reconciliation is achieved in the communities.

Support provided to TRC witnesses during the various reconciliation activities

51. The Commission established a set of guidelines for assisting witnesses who provided testimony before it. Assistance was provided to witnesses before, during and after the hearings, in the form of the following measures:

Witness support during the statement-taking phase:

- a. All statement-takers received training on gender-based violence, child development, human rights, trauma and the symptoms of trauma, as well as training on how to take statements from vulnerable groups such as victims of torture, victims of sexual violence and children. Statement-takers were also trained on how to interview ex-combatants and perpetrators without being judgmental.
- b. Statement takers were selected, among other criteria, for their ability to speak local languages, thus allowing the witnesses to speak in their own languages. The statement takers were all originally from the districts in which they worked.
- c. Witnesses were informed of the possibility of providing a confidential statement. The witness could ask that his or her name not be used in the report. In addition, each witness was asked whether he or she would wish to appear in a public or closed hearing.
- d. Female victims were interviewed by female statement-takers, in order for them to feel more comfortable and to speak more freely, especially if they were victims of sexual violence.

- e. Children were interviewed according to the Memorandum of Understanding worked out by the TRC with UNICEF and the Child Protection Agencies (CPAs). Measures included a vulnerability assessment of each child by a CPA representative before the interview took place.
- f. Interviews were conducted on a one-to-one basis. During sensitisation, people were informed where they could come and give a statement later, if they did not want to do so immediately after a sensitisation session.
- g. Regular review meetings were organised with the statement-takers, during which additional training was given. The statement-takers gave feedback on problems they had while interviewing particular categories of witnesses such as women, children and perpetrators.

Briefing of witnesses before the hearings:

- h. All witnesses received counselling by TRC staff prior to providing testimony before the Commission.
- i. Often the willingness of a perpetrator to confess was a result of one or more sessions with a counsellor. When a perpetrator refused to confess or gave erroneous information to the Commission, an additional session with counsellors and other staff, or a meeting with the community leaders, would sometimes lead to more genuine confessions as well as participation in the reconciliation ceremonies.
- j. Special attention was paid to the briefing of children and the victims of sexual violence.

Witness support during the hearings:

- k. Before the beginning of the hearings phase, Commissioners and staff received training on trauma and the symptoms of trauma and on interview techniques.
- l. A counsellor sat next to every witness during his or her testimony, to encourage or console the witness and to provide any other support needed.
- m. All witnesses were permitted to come with a family member or friend, albeit that only a few witnesses used this opportunity.
- n. All children were heard during closed hearings, according to a Memorandum of Understanding, as mentioned previously, with UNICEF and Child Protection Agencies. On some occasions, children were accompanied by a representative of a CPA, or by a parent.
- o. Victims of sexual violence were given the choice between a public hearing or a closed hearing with only female Commissioners and staff. They were properly briefed about the possible consequences of a public hearing. Depending on the district, most women preferred a closed hearing, but in some locations, women insisted on giving a public statement. Some were even accompanied by their husbands.

- p. All victims testifying during closed hearings were filmed in a way that concealed their identity. Some of these testimonies were used in a compilation of testimonies that was shown during the thematic hearings on women and children.
- q. All witnesses were allowed to talk in their language of preference and were provided with interpreters who spoke their language.
- r. During all of the hearings, Red Cross volunteers and a nurse from the government hospital were present to assist witnesses and members of the public, based on a Memorandum of Understanding agreed upon with the Red Cross and the Ministry of Health.
- s. All witnesses were debriefed immediately after the hearings and before going home.

Referral to NGOs:

- t. The Commission tried to create an atmosphere and conditions under which witnesses would not only be encouraged to speak freely, but also to feel liberated after the hearings. If a witness required urgent assistance to address their needs as a consequence of a violation committed during the war, the Commission established a referral system with a number of NGOs in Freetown and in the provinces.
- u. On many occasions, referrals were made for medical care, skills training, education, micro-credit, psychosocial counselling, provision of artificial limbs, etc. Witnesses received a referral letter and were, wherever possible, accompanied by a TRC staff member or volunteer for their first visit.
- v. For some victims of sexual violence who continued to suffer from serious physical consequences, transport to the nearest town or even to Freetown was organised so that they could seek medical treatment. Medication was purchased for some of the most needy victims.

Follow-up on witnesses after hearings:

- w. After the hearings, the Commission organised follow-up visits to the witnesses in order to evaluate the impact of their participation in reconciliation activities. The Commission ensured that, where possible, the visits were undertaken by the same counsellors who had assisted the witnesses during the hearings, in order to preserve the relationship of confidence that had already been developed.
- x. The TRC counsellors received important assistance from the traditional and religious leaders during their follow-up visits.
- y. A questionnaire was provided to check if the hearing had a positive or negative impact on the witness, his or her family, and the community, or if he or she received any threats. This exercise commenced on 17 June 2003 and continued for one month in the Western Area, and from 14 October to 2 December 2003 in the districts. Although 403 witnesses testified during the hearings, follow-up visits were conducted with 266 victims. Reasons for not reaching some witnesses included bad road conditions, the death of witnesses, time constraints and the inability to locate witnesses because they had moved.

TRC



TRC Commissioners Sylvanus Torto (left), Bishop J. C. Humper (centre) and Professor John Kamara (right) attend a ceremony at Freetown Central Mosque to pray for reconciliation and the success of the Commission after their inauguration on 5 July 2002.

Sensitisation activities

52. During the preparatory phase, the TRC promoted the idea of reconciliation and truth telling through sensitisation activities in Freetown and in the districts. The Commission made extensive use of media outlets such as the radio and television and conducted grassroots activities in order to explain the work of the Commission and to promote the concepts of truth-telling and reconciliation. All of these sensitisation activities continued during the statement-taking phase of the Commission. Every visit to a chiefdom started with a meeting with local and religious leaders as well as a sensitisation session with the local population.

Emphasising the participation of specific groups

53. The Commission recognised that the reconciliation process could not take place without the participation of important stakeholders such as perpetrators and victims. Therefore, special efforts were made by the Commission to reach out to those stakeholders who were initially reluctant to cooperate with the Commission. The Amputee and War Wounded Associations were amongst those stakeholders initially refusing to participate in the TRC process.
54. In a press statement issued by the Amputees and the War Wounded Associations, it was clear that the victims belonging to either one of these two groups would not provide statements to the Commission unless the government acknowledged their plight and took proactive steps to improve their well-being. As the press statement indicated:

“...We want to draw the attention of those concerned and the Government of Sierra Leone, that a bill be passed which could be accepted as law for better care for amputees. Otherwise, we are not prepared to talk to the TRC.”

Following a list of demands that included free housing, a monthly allowance, free education for their children and medical treatment, the statement ended:

“Finally, if these problems are not addressed, no amputee will appear before the Commission.”

55. To address the problem, several meetings were facilitated between the Amputee Association, senior staff members of the Commission, by Mr. John Caulker, the Coordinator of the Truth and Reconciliation Working Group. At the meetings, the Commission explained that it did not have a budget of its own to fulfil any of the demands made by the amputees but that the mandate calls upon it to make recommendations on reparations. It was also explained to the amputees that their participation in the TRC process would give them a forum to explain their plight, which would assist the Commission in formulating recommendations on reparations.
56. The meetings resulted in a full agreement between the Amputee Association and the Commission on 15 March 2003 to participate in all of the Commission's processes. Statement-taking took place at the amputee camp in Freetown on 19 March 2003 and a joint sensitisation campaign by the TRC and representatives of the Amputee Association took place from 3 to 6 April 2003 in Bo, Kenema, Kono, Makeni and Masiaka.

57. During the sensitisation campaign, many issues were raised by the amputees and war wounded. Aside from their requests for assistance in the area of social services, some participants expressed concerns about their safety. Many feared retaliation by perpetrators who lived in their community or by members of the Republic of Sierra Leone Army (SLA) if they accused them in their testimony to the Commission.
58. In the end, the Amputee and the War-Wounded Associations participated in the thematic hearings on reparations and reconciliation. Both sets of organisations actively participated in other TRC-organised activities such as the National Reconciliation Procession on 6 August 2003, the district workshops on reconciliation, and the workshop on National Reconciliation.
59. The Commission also recognised the important role that ex-combatants played in the reconciliation process and, therefore, made a concerted effort to involve them in the activities of the Commission. In the initial stages of the statement-taking phase, the Commission took notice of the fact that very few statements were being provided by perpetrators. To increase their participation, the Commission worked with the Post Conflict Reintegration Initiative for Development and Empowerment (PRIDE), an NGO that sensitises ex-combatants on the workings of the TRC and the Special Court. The initial reluctance of the ex-combatants to cooperate with the TRC stemmed from the fact that many of them were afraid that the TRC would pass on information to the Special Court. Following the sensitisation, many ex-combatants came to testify at several of the Commission hearings in the district. In addition, the RUF, the political party that is considered to be the successor of the RUF, actively participated in the thematic hearings as well as other reconciliation activities such as the National Reconciliation Procession and the workshop on National Reconciliation.
60. To address the low level of participation in the Commission process by members of the Republic of Sierra Leone Army, the Commission in collaboration with the Campaign for Good Governance (CGG) organised awareness raising campaigns in March 2003 in various military formations across the country. Various media outlets such as the radio were also used to reach those in the army in hopes that they would provide statements to the Commission. Although the Commission obtained the full cooperation of the RSL Army authorities, the number of statements by the military remained small. However, some members of the military testified during the hearings phase, either as victims or as perpetrators, and some were reconciled with their victims following their testimony. Additionally, the members of the military actively participated in the thematic hearings of the Commission as well as in the National Reconciliation Procession.

RECONCILIATION BETWEEN VICTIMS AND PERPETRATORS

61. The Commission made a concerted effort to bring together those victims and perpetrators who were willing to participate in the process of reconciliation. If a witness confessed during the hearing that he had committed a violation, or if a victim named the alleged perpetrator, efforts were made to find the other party. Based on the information provided by the victims, the Commission invited alleged perpetrators to respond to the allegations made against them. Where a perpetrator was named and he or she was present at the hearings, the Commission allowed them to present their own sides of the story during the same hearings. In other cases, victims and perpetrators were brought together at their own request. Based on a random sampling of 300 statements from the Commission's database, it was determined that 88% of victims were willing to meet with their perpetrators. With regard to perpetrators, approximately 81% were willing to meet with their victims.
62. If a perpetrator asked for forgiveness and the victim accepted, this was publicly confirmed by both of them and a traditional reconciliation ceremony organised by the Commission. Based on the same sampling of statements from the Commission's database, many perpetrators were willing to acknowledge the wrongs they had committed against their victims. Approximately 31% of the statement-givers responded that they would be willing to accept responsibility and offer an apology and 20% of the statement-givers responded that they would be willing to participate in rebuilding their communities. None of the statement-givers, however, was willing to pay reparations to his or her victims.

Reconciliation Ceremonies

63. Many reconciliation ceremonies were organised during the course of TRC hearings. The ceremonies took place with the consent of the victims and perpetrators and with the full participation of traditional and religious leaders, as well as their respective communities.

Hearing in Moyamba District – 13 June 2003

64. The following incident took place at a TRC public hearing in Moyamba District on 13 June 2003. Alpha Mohamed related to the Commission how his son, who was a member of the Kamajors, had been killed by the RUF rebels. Mr. Mohamed claimed that the death of his son was the result of a retaliatory act committed by M'Balu Boryawah (also referred to as Mamie M'Balu), a woman who claims she was mistreated by the Kamajors. Mr. Mohamed explained in his testimony that when his son was shot, Mamie M'Balu saw him and promised to inform his colleagues about his predicament. Instead, she led the RUF rebels to him and he was subsequently killed by the rebels. Mamie M'Balu initially denied the role she had played in the death of Mr. Mohamed's son. She then had a change of heart and begged Mr. Mohamed for his forgiveness and even offered him money as a sign of her remorse. The offer of money was refused by Mr. Mohamed. The Commission then inquired into Mr. Mohamed's willingness to reconcile with Mamie M'Balu. The Commission succeeded in finding Mamie M'Balu and bringing her to the hearing. An excerpt from the hearing is reproduced on the opposite page:

Leader of Evidence: I want to ask if you are willing to reconcile with the witness that is about to come.

Alpha Mohamed: I cannot say I will not agree because the Lord said that if you do not forgive, He - the Lord - will not forgive your deeds. If she gives me money, it would not be equivalent to my son's live. Therefore, I have no alternative but to accept reconciliation.

Comm. Marcus-Jones: During the war so many unforeseen things happened. People take up different causes and they believe in what they are doing. The Kamajors had one opinion and the other parties had a different opinion. That is war and innocent people like you suffer, but I am happy that you believe in God and for the progress of country you are ready to reconcile. We will not say more now until we come to the ceremony to make peace, we want you to wait. We would like to hear Mrs. M'Balu herself.

65. The previous day, the Commission had heard another witness, John Bullie, also accused Mamie M'Balu of collaborating with the RUF rebels and providing them with the plans of the Kamajors. Mr. Bullie was also asked by the Commission if he wanted to reconcile with Mamie M'Balu:

Commissioner Torto: This lady you mentioned, whom you said you saw with the rebels, if we should talk to her family will you be willing to reconcile with them?

John Bullie: Yes, I am willing to do so.

66. The Commission then invited Mamie M'Balu to testify. She explained that she suffered because of the Kamajors and that her husband had been killed. She also denied being responsible for the death of Mr. Mohamed's son and having asked him for forgiveness. Commissioner Marcus-Jones then responded:

Comm. Marcus-Jones: Each of you suffered during the war. There must have been some misunderstanding somewhere. The two witnesses that testified immediately before you are blaming you for their misfortunes. We have heard all your stories and one thing that is clear is that you all suffered. You lost close relatives; you are carrying scars on your body because of what you went through. The Commission is not ordering or commanding you, but having heard your testimonies, the Commission is saying that you - for the good of the country - reconcile and put the past behind you. The two other witnesses we listened to - Mohamed and Bullie - are ready to reconcile. We have to go through time and years. We want to know whether you are ready to reconcile.

Mamie M'Balu: I agree that the Commission facilitates reconciliation between and among us.

67. The Commission subsequently organised a reconciliation ceremony for all the parties involved in the Moyamba hearing, which consisted of several symbolic acts. The three participants were first asked to write down their grievances on a piece of paper. They then had to tear this piece of paper. The act of tearing symbolised the fact that they had put behind them whatever grievances they had towards each other and that they were willing to live together. Those pieces of paper were later burnt on the floor. Later a kola-nut was shared among them, as a symbol of unity and of peaceful co-existence. A paramount chief then gave them a glass of water that all three had to drink from. The rest of the water was poured onto the floor and later rubbed onto people's chests. In the end, there were handshakes and the ceremony was concluded with a big, collective hug. This ceremony was watched over by three hundred people. The family members of the three people, community youths, women groups, and elders all participated in the ceremony. The Commission was honoured all throughout Moyamba for this particular reconciliation ceremony.
68. During the witness follow-up visit to Mr. Alpha Mohamed on 24 October 2003, approximately four months after the original reconciliation ceremony, Mr. Mohamed expressed his gratitude that the Commission had convinced Mamie M'Balu to apologise to him. He mentioned that they now have a cordial friendship and that they have since become friends.
69. Upon a separate follow-up visit to John Bullie, he mentioned that his relationship with Mamie M'Balu had improved significantly and that she even pays him visits from time to time. He did, however, mention his disappointment at the fact that the Kamajors did not receive the acknowledgement they deserved for their contribution in helping to stop the war.
70. On a follow-up visit to Mamie M'Balu, she expressed her satisfaction with the results of the reconciliation ceremony. Nonetheless, she expressed a desire to receive financial assistance since her husband had been killed and she had no other means to support herself and her family.

Reconciliation meeting in Freetown – 4 November 2003

71. In many cases, victims expressed the desire to meet with their perpetrators. One such "reconciliation meeting" took place in Freetown on 4 November 2003.
72. Gibrill Sesay, Shekuba Kuyateh, Ibrahim Fofanah, Mohamed Bah III, Alpha Kanu and Mohamed S. Kamara all had one or more of their limbs amputated in 1998 in the Kono District. They accused a certain sergeant in the Sierra Leone Armed Forces by the name of Alhaji Baryoh, alias Staff Alhaji, of orchestrating the amputations. The paramount concern of the amputees was that the sergeant acknowledged the wrong that was done to them. The Commission's staff, with the co-operation of the Sierra Leone Army, organised several meetings with both the victims and the alleged perpetrator. At first the meetings were held separately, but then the victims and perpetrator met together. The meetings eventually led to a half-hearted apology by the perpetrator, followed by a reconciliation ceremony. An excerpt from the encounter is reproduced on the opposite page:

Sergeant Alhaji Baryoh: My name is Sgt. Alhaji, good day Sir, good day Madam. My brothers said my men during the war did this amputation to them, so they have been finding a way for us to sit and discuss. So today we are here and have asked them for forgiveness, so that's all Sir.

Gibril Sesay (victim): ... On behalf of the amputees, I want to express my thanks to the TRC for bringing our perpetrator, who is Sergeant Alhaji Baryoh, to make peace between him and ourselves, and we say thanks to God that he was brave to accept. On behalf of the amputees wronged by this man, we have reflected and concluded that he is our brother; we are unable to push him too far. For the sake of peace so that this will never occur again in Sierra Leone, we have forgiven him so that he will be able to get a freedom of movement, so that his conscience will be clear. The TRC has been able to bring us together for the sake of reconciliation between him and us. We thank the TRC for bringing him forward to reconcile with us, we cannot throw him away, he is our brother, as he has said he is sorry, that is what the TRC is here to do, to ensure that two brothers are brought back together. Let the man still continue to play a big role to ensure that our hearts continue to be pleased with him. Although now we are satisfied today, we say thanks to him for coming forward and answering for his wrongs, we say thanks to the Commission and the country entirely.

Comm. Marcus-Jones: We have heard about Staff Alhaji in the statements made to us and we are pleased about what he said just now. He said his men were supposed to have committed violations, I don't know what he is saying about himself, how much he is involved and whether the violations were done under his orders. Maybe he would want to say a little more about it, and I am going to give him the opportunity to say something.

Sergeant Alhaji Baryoh: I don't have anything to say more. I am still begging pardon to them.

Comm. Marcus-Jones: You have apologised to them.

Sergeant Alhaji Baryoh: Yes, Madam.

Comm. Marcus-Jones: From what he has said, you've accepted his apology? And are ready to go on?

Victims: If he accepts that he did it to some of us.

Sergeant Alhaji Baryoh: I gave the orders to my boys to do the amputation. Since we are here, I'm still begging for forgiveness.

Comm. Marcus-Jones: Ah! That is very clear; you have acknowledged your violation. Now that you are brought back and reintegrated, I am sure that you will turn a new page and be ready to work together in peace.

Sergeant Alhaji Baryoh: Yes, Madam.

Hearing in Freetown – 14 April 2003

73. In some cases, the Commission heard testimonies from victims who were willing to forgive their perpetrator without wanting to meet with their perpetrator. The following example is drawn from the testimony of Tamba Finnoh, who testified at a public hearing in Freetown on 14 April 2003.
74. In the testimony provided by Mr. Finnoh during the public hearing, he described his experiences in the Kono District. He recounted to the Commission how he and others were lined up and had their hands amputated one by one. According to Mr. Finnoh, his right hand was “chopped off” by a child combatant who was between the ages of fourteen and seventeen. He further described the difficulties he had encountered in trying to seek medical help. Mr. Finnoh finally reached an ECOMOG base where he was put on a helicopter flight to Freetown and, upon arrival, he was taken to Connaught Hospital for treatment. Unfortunately nothing could be done to save his right hand. Immediately after his testimony, the Chairman of the Commission, Bishop Humper, engaged in the following exchange with Tamba Finnoh:

Chairman: Do you know anything about the perpetrator and would you be ready to meet with him and reconcile?

Tamba Finnoh: the individual is in Kono and the last time I was in Kono, my nephew told me that they had wanted to attack him but I told him not to. I am a pastor and the word of God tells me that vengeance is the Lord's, not me, so I told them to leave him alone. He is still there.

Chairman: Would you want to invite him so that the two of you can meet together?

Tamba Finnoh: ...Actually, no... the cardinal principle of my religion is forgiveness, because I myself am a sinner, everyday, by thought, by words, and by actions... we forgive people who ask for forgiveness but that is for their own good, we also forgive those who have offended us even when they do not ask for forgiveness from us for our own good. With me, I have put that behind my back... But in terms of reconciling with that man, except that he is afraid of me, I don't have any problem with him.

Potential for Reparations to Foster Reconciliation between Victims and Perpetrators

75. Victims often expressed their discontent over the implementation of government-led initiatives, such as the DDR programme, for offering inordinate levels of reintegration assistance to perpetrators. As a result of human rights violations committed against victims, many are in urgent need of assistance. Reparations for these victims would serve as the catalyst to help restore the relationship between victims and perpetrators. It would contribute to the sustainability of reconciliation between victims and perpetrators.

Hearing in Freetown – 25 April 2003

76. The testimony of Kadiatu Fofanah at a TRC public hearing in Freetown on 25 April 2003 was pertinent to this point. Kadiatu Fofanah testified about the rebel attack on Freetown and how they amputated her legs. Her husband left her and her house was burnt down. She received help from several international organisations and now she lives as an amputee in the Murray Town Camp. She has engaged in petty trading as a means of generating a modest livelihood. An excerpt from her testimony is reproduced below:

Kadiatu Fofanah: I have now got my house, my toilet, some people are helping my children and that is why I say I am ready to forgive.

At the end of her testimony, Commissioner Kamara asked her whether she had any recommendations to make to the Commission:

Commissioner Kamara: We are happy about the successes you have made unlike some of your colleagues. I would like to ask you any questions or make recommendations to this Commission.

Kadiatu Fofanah: I want to ask a question on behalf of the amputees. What should we do to cater out hospital and medical needs? We would not like you to leave the entire burden to use for taking care of our children. Ibrahim (her youngest son) always said that he will retaliate in the future. We are appealing to the government not to neglect the children of the amputees. We, who are sitting on wheel chairs, must be supplied proper wheel chairs; we have seen wheel chairs in Europe which can take you to a long distance without being pushed. We have requested for a bus but they refused to give us... So you please help us, so that we can forgive with all our hearts.

Reconciling victims, perpetrators and their communities in Bonthe District – 9 July 2003

77. While the TRC supported reconciliation meetings between victims and perpetrators, it endeavoured to ensure that the reconciliation process was supported and accepted by the community. Since reconciliation is a process, participation in a ceremony is just a first step. The community's support is required to make it sustainable. The example below is drawn from the hearings that took place in the Bonthe District from 6 to 9 July 2003. The Commission facilitated reconciliation between an elderly victim, Alhaji Noah Abdul Wahab (known as Mr. Noah), who was accused of trying to imitate the amulets of the Kamajor fighters, and his perpetrator, Lamin Sadiki, a member of the Kamajors. During his testimony, Mr. Noah recounted the story of how he was beaten up by the Kamajors and had his ear nearly cut off by Mr. Sadiki. At the request of the TRC, Mr. Sadiki appeared at the hearing and told his side of the story.

78. Mr. Sadiki recalled how he was summoned by his Commander to a meeting at which they had invited Mr. Noah to come and explain his actions and why he was trying to imitate the amulets of the Kamajors:

Lamin Sidiki:

While I was there, Abdul Noah denied the thing, he said, "Well, I wouldn't do such a thing". He [the Commander] said, "well, I believe it is your doing, don't deny it." Then he started flogging Mr. Noah. While he was flogging the man... I had a knife in my hand and cut part of his ear... When he prayed that brief prayer in Allah, calling Allah's name... it made me feel bad and I left. It took me two days, I couldn't go back to Mosande because of that act that I did... I am begging that Pa Noah forgives me.

79. Mr. Sadiki begged Mr. Noah for his forgiveness by lying down on the floor. Mr. Noah stated that the accusations made against him were false but he accepted the apology by putting his hand on Mr. Sadiki's head. The Commissioners then invited the community elders to respond and Mr. Minnoh, a traditional leader, reacted on their behalf:

Mr. Minnoh:

This is what we have been looking out for. All the assembly of people here from different parts of the district, coming here to listen, this is what we have been seeking. God, who has created all of us, this is what He looks forward to. When you do wrong to anybody, don't go to any Juju man, don't go to any medicine man. The person whom you have wronged, go straight to him. This is what God requires of us. If you have wronged God, you go straight to God, God will accept you but if you wrong your fellow human being and you leave him and go to God, God will not accept you. What this man has done between him and Kamor, I believe God would answer him... because he has spoken the truth, God will set him free. I am thanking the Commissioners very, very much because you know how to investigate matters. Many God help you to continue. I thank you all.

TRC



In an example of its efforts to encourage healing on an inter-personal level, the Commission facilitated reconciliation between Kosseh Hindowa (right), a former CDF Administrator in Bo District, and one of the families who had suffered violations at the hands of the CDF in the district.

RECONCILIATION BETWEEN PERPETRATORS AND THEIR COMMUNITIES

80. When a perpetrator confessed to violations committed elsewhere or when the victim could not be found, the reconciliation ceremonies organised by the Commission focused on reconciliation between the perpetrator and his community. In many districts, the community had rejected perceived perpetrators because of their membership of armed factions, even though they had not committed any violations in that community. In these instances the perpetrators would ask the community to forgive them and to accept them back as full members of the community. Traditional and religious leaders would usually grant reintegration into the community. The participation of women representatives in some cases was particularly important when the perpetrator confessed to having committed acts of sexual violence.

Hearing in Moyamba District – 10 June 2003

81. The following example is drawn from the district hearings that took place in Moyamba District on 10 June 2003.
82. Samuel George, a teacher at Bauya, recounted his story of how he was abducted by the RUF rebels. While travelling with the rebels for almost three years, he confessed to having killed, attacked villages, looted from civilians, taken drugs and committed raped. He claimed that his actions were committed under duress. At the end of his testimony, Samuel George asked the Commission and his community for forgiveness:

Samuel George: All what I did was not my doing... all is the wish of God. I ask the Paramount Chief to forgive me and accept me into the community. I was not a bad man when I taught for twenty years. I ask the Commission to forgive me.

83. The Commission then proceeded to a reconciliation ceremony, which was attended by religious and traditional leaders, the principal and pupils of the schools in the township and local authorities, all of whom made a contribution. Excerpts of various contributions to the TRC reconciliation ceremony involving Samuel George are reproduced below:

Comm. Marcus-Jones: He is an educated man, and a teacher. He tried to be reintegrated. He is traumatised and he needs people to accept him back so that he'll be useful in the community. We appreciate the fact that you are here. Let them accept him again in the society.

[Interlude for communal prayers]

Paramount Chief: Thank you for what you have done. We have heard it... we'll tell our people. Nobody in his right mind will do such things... It was your life-saving matter. You went through a lot. God said we should forgive each other. For peace to be established we need things like this...

Chief of Police: You have been blessed and we empathised with you... It will be nice if you stand by your repentance. As from today you are free in conscience. I advise that you continue to be clean... if you would do it again, we would not tolerate it. The law would take its course. As from now on, I ask that you do nothing again.

Principal of School: I talk as a teacher and a woman. We suffered a lot. Some of you have gang-raped. We gave birth to you but when you did this you did not think of it. The day of reckoning will come and it's here. I am happy that you confess to rape even if you don't know the number... You are a man and have children. I pray that you don't do it again... This is a noble profession. Because of the war, teachers are not coming to teach in the provinces. I pray that with what has happened, the Sierra Leonean community will know that the war is over. On behalf of the teachers of Moyamba, I accept your apologies and we pray you will join us.

Samuel George: Paramount Chiefs, Commissioners, Religious Leaders, My People, School-Going Children, I have done wrong against my wish. I have burnt... I have killed. I have done so many wrong things that are against the nation through force, I didn't do it willingly. I did it against my wish. I raped, under duress. So, I am begging you for mercy. Accept me once again in your community as your son.

Representative of Elders: ... When war has come, it has come. There was no sense in us, no power in us. If you fell and you are captured, you will do things that they want you to do. He has done so many things that a human being cannot do under normal circumstances... It was the war; now the war has ended.

The traditional and religious leaders then placed their hands over Samuel George's head, symbolising his acceptance back into the community.

84. During a follow-up visit by a TRC counsellor on 23 October 2003, Samuel George expressed his satisfaction over the outcome of the hearing and declared that people have begun to accept him back into the community.

Hearing in Bonthe District – 10 July 2003

85. The following example is drawn from the hearings in the Bonthe District on 10 July 2003. Ansu Koroma testified before the Commission that he had been abducted by the RUF when he was a young boy and held for approximately eight years. He recounted in detail all the violations that he had committed:

Ansu Koroma:

Even when I joined, I did not do it out of my own free will... I was abducted. When they came here, they did a lot of destruction here. Even when they took me along, I did not know the amount of destruction they did here in my absence... but I have come to talk to you my father, my mother, brothers and sisters, all of you. I want you to forgive me please. I am a boy... I am just a child. Well, I was only working on instructions and if I had not taken those instructions, I was going to be killed. That was why I was behaving that way but I am begging and asking for forgiveness from all of you today, my fathers, my mothers, my brothers and my sisters and all of you gathered here, to forgive me to have mercy on me. I am pleading, please. I did not do it out of my own free will. It is because of war. When we were here, we never knew the rebels were going to reach here, so please as parents, forgive me. So please Paramount Chief. I thank you all... Please, that's my plea.

Ansu Koroma then knelt down before the traditional and religious leaders in a gesture of remorse. The Paramount Chief responded on behalf of the community:

Paramount Chief:

All of us have heard what Ansu Koroma has confessed. Today, Ansu has confessed publicly before all of us that in those days when the rebels came to this place, they abducted him forcefully. When they took him along, he had to join their course and then they have done a lot of destructions in the country but, as he has come before us this evening and he has confessed all what he did, I want to join him to plead to all of us my brothers and sisters and to show mercy and show forgiveness to Ansu. Let us accept him back into our community... let us not look at him the other way. What is passed is passed. Let us unite and fight the way forward and that's what I want to tell you my people.

The Paramount Chief went on to lay his hand on Ansu Koroma's head as a sign of forgiveness and acceptance. The following exchanges involved other community representatives as they responded to Ansu Koroma's statement:

Religious leader: Who would want forgiveness from God if you commit a sin here amongst all of us here? All of us need forgiveness from God is that not so? That was why God said we too also should forgive our brothers and sisters when they have wronged us. I feel very pleased when somebody confesses before me and I will become very happy to forgive that person. That is what that person wants. So my brothers and sisters, if we too are praying for forgiveness from God and we do confess and God forgave us, therefore, it is incumbent on all of us here to forgive Ansu Koroma. Let us become his advisers as from today let him too become an adviser to his colleagues so that we can develop this land. I believe all of us here will forgive him and that the only thing I will like to tell you Ansu, I want you to accept Christ as your Saviour. If you do that, I know you will receive the Kingdom of God. Are you prepared for that?

Ansu Koroma: Yes.

Women's representative: "Ansu Koroma, this evening you have shown that you have confessed all the bad things you did but what you have done now, it will be difficult for somebody to stand publicly and talk about what you did and as you have told us, me as a woman and we women do labour for people, we know the pains in child bearing, I am talking on behalf of the women in the town to say we have forgiven you and that we will remain to stay here as one for the development of Sierra Leone."

These statements were followed by prayers and the members of the community laid their hands on Ansu Koroma's head as a symbol of collective forgiveness.

Hearing in Pujehun District – July 2003

86. The next excerpt, taken from a hearing in the Pujehun District, illustrates the willingness of a perpetrator to reconcile with the community even though the perpetrator joined the fighting forces of his own free will to fight what he considered to be a “just cause”.
87. Lamin Koroma explained to the Commission that he had decided to join forces with the Kamajors to protect his community and to avenge the death of his father, who had been killed by the rebels. In his testimony, Lamin Koroma acknowledged that the Kamajors committed violations and wanted to offer an apology for any misdeeds on their behalf. The following excerpts reveal his exchanges with the Chairman, Bishop Humper, and the Leader of Evidence:

Lamin Koroma: We did not join in the war to do wrong... Whether we the Kamajors had wronged you, whether we had done the right thing, God has brought peace... We did not win the war, we were at the bottom when peace came, which means we, God and President Kabbah have saved you the civilians... Therefore today, I... as a Kamajor... I'm talking on behalf of my brothers, to let the Commission talk to our people to forgive us.

Chairman: I want you to know Lamin... that some civilians, a good number of civilians in this country are contending that the Kamajors are not doing any better than the rebels in terms of their treatment of civilians in the later stages of the conflict and if they should have any grudge against Kamajors, it was only because the Kamajors themselves became rebels in terms of dealing with people in this country. I want you to understand that.

Lamin Koroma: Yes. It may be like that. We only need to plead... but there were some civilians who were collaborators... but all I'm saying is that I'm still begging on behalf of my men.

Leader of Evidence: In the last while, since the war ended, have you seen any of your former victims?

Lamin Koroma: Many of them.

Leader of Evidence: What do you tell them when you see them?

Lamin Koroma: I met one Mr. Kallon and we have spoken over that.

Leader of Evidence: What was the outcome of your meeting?

Lamin Koroma: He said that I am one of his children. He did that because he wanted the soldiers to safeguard him and if so, let bygones be bygones.

Leader of Evidence: So if you see any of your former victims now what will you be telling them? If they appear before you now, what will you say to them?

Lamin Koroma: I will apologise to them.

Leader of Evidence: So even if they are not here, are you willing to apologise to them through the Commission?

Lamin Koroma: Yes.

Leader of Evidence: Would you like to do so now?

Lamin Koroma: Yes. My people, we were fighting the war to bring peace. Sometimes, you become frustrated or traumatised when you are in a new gathering, especially taking up arms. Sometimes, if you have never killed or wounded somebody, when you do so, it will go a long way, especially when you shoot at somebody... Having shot at somebody, definitely you will become a bit mad, the sound of the gun makes you go mad... especially when both of you are shooting at each other. If we have done so and our primary aim is to bring peace and peace has come, I'm appealing to you my people, forgive us... there were mistakes... let those mistakes be forgotten... we did not make them on purpose. I am begging you to forgive us. I am talking to the Commission to help me plead with these people. I am begging on behalf of the soldiers, the atrocities the soldiers might have committed, the Kamajors and the rebels. I'm talking to the Commission to talk to government so that there will be an assistance rendered to all victims. ... That is what I'm asking but I'm still talking to the Commission to talk to the government and I'm still talking to my people to forgive me and forgive us.

Perpetrators who refused to acknowledge responsibility

88. While the above examples clearly show the willingness of some perpetrators to acknowledge their actions during the conflict and to seek forgiveness from their communities, there were many others who were not so willing to acknowledge their wrongdoing. Perpetrators who were reluctant to acknowledge their actions simply blamed the war or even said: "God has wanted the war."

Hearing in Kailahun District – 14 May 2003

89. The next example is drawn from a closed hearing in Kailahun on 14 May 2003. Mustapha Sam Koroma was with the RUF vanguards in Kailahun District. He was a "security commander", although he claimed he did not make any decisions while in command. He also claimed he never went to the war front, which he subsequently contradicted. Due to the significance of the role he seemed to have played with the RUF in Kailahun, he was not welcome in the area. Excerpts from Mustapha Koroma's exchanges with the Commission are reproduced overleaf:

Mustapha Koroma: I am appealing to the Commission: the war was not made by human beings... it was made by God. God knows those who caused the atrocities. I am appealing to the Commission to plead to the people of Kailahun for them to have mercy on me.

Leader of Evidence: Are you ready to take any step to beg them for forgiveness? Begging for forgiveness is the beginning. But don't expect people to forgive you when you refuse to accept what you have done. What can also help is if you yourself say you are willing to reconcile.

Commissioner Kamara: If you say you were going to apologise, people will ask apologise for what?

Mustapha Koroma: I am apologising for what the war did.

Commissioner Kamara: What kind of crime do you accept to have caused?

Mustapha Koroma: I apologise for what the war has caused and, as a member of the RUF, I apologise for what the RUF did during the war. I am appealing to the government to assist us with education. As you can see there is no electricity in Kailahun. There is no good road to Kailahun and no health centres. I am appealing to the government to assist us with all of these in Kailahun.

90. During the reconciliation ceremony, Mustapha Koroma made the following statement, in which he admitted that he was involved in the commission of certain violations:

Mustapha Koroma: My name is Mustapha Koroma. I stand before all of you. That whatsoever that happened in this war... it was all of us that caused it. So please, you are my people. Forgive us. Be it burning of houses, be it beating of people, we are all involved. Please forgive us.

After his statement, Mustapha Koroma knelt down and the traditional leaders put their hands on his head as a sign of acceptance and forgiveness. The ceremony was followed by the pouring of libation and the breaking of kola nuts.

Hearing in Kono District – 26 June 2003

91. A man named Abdul Razak Kamara testified about the four years he spent with the RUF. He explained that his main purpose was to contribute to the peace process. Nevertheless, he insisted on apologising before the traditional leaders. He narrated that he was based at Mile 91 and Magburaka and that he had returned to Kono District during the peace process:

Abdul Razak Kamara: ... I also ask the Commissioners to allow me to bow before the Kono chiefs for me to beg them to forgive me for all what has happened. I ask if there was anybody I have offended during the conflict, so that the person can come forward before the Commission so that I could beg that person. I beg the Commissioners to please allow me to bow before the people of Kono to ask for forgiveness for anything I could have done.

The Commission then tried to determine what he was actually apologising for.

Commissioner Schabas: Did the RUF commit war crimes?

Abdul Razak Kamara: Yes.

Commissioner Schabas: Can you describe what they were? Describe them?

Abdul Razak Kamara: One by flogging people, by shooting people... but I never witnessed where they amputated somebody's hands. I have heard of an incident where they used to put people in a place called a container. They used to beat them severely before putting them there. So all that I believe are crimes against humanity.

Commissioner Schabas: Do you have any personal responsibility for those crimes?

Abdul Razak Kamara: As I have been saying, I was not a commander... I was assigned to help in implementing the peace process, which I did perfectly.

Commissioner Schabas: Mr. Kamara, I appreciate the detailed testimony you've given us. But why, if all you did was implementing the peace process, do you have to ask for forgiveness of anybody? What did you do to mean that you should ask for forgiveness?

Abdul Razak Kamara: During the course of my trying to implement the peace, there were many things that happened... so I don't know, maybe there are people that might feel I have wronged them. This is why I am begging the whole nation to forgive me if ever they feel I have wronged them in any way or the other.

Comm. Marcus-Jones: Well why should you be apologising if you were a peace ambassador?

Abdul Razak Kamara: Well, I want to believe that in talking to your people you have to apologise for the mere fact that I was at the side of the RUF... so I have to apologise.

Comm. Marcus-Jones: But you were four years with the RUF, were you not?

Abdul Razak Kamara: Yes.

Comm. Marcus-Jones: And during that period of four years, were you only trying to be a peace ambassador? Didn't you commit atrocities yourself?

Abdul Razak Kamara: I have never shot at somebody... I have never taken away anybody's property... I have never raped... I have never done bad to somebody.

Hearings in Tonkolili District – June 2003

92. The most striking examples of ambiguous half-hearted confessions were the hearings in the Tonkolili District in June 2003, when several ex-combatants came to testify but tried to minimise the role they played, notwithstanding extensive questioning by the Commission. Many in the community were unhappy with the events that played out during the hearings in the district. A meeting was held on the eve of the last day, before the reconciliation ceremony, in which community leaders announced that they would not participate in the closing ceremony and they would not accept the perpetrators back into the community if they did not apologise. This was of great importance given the fact that many ex-RUF combatants reside in the district, many of them being employed in an agricultural project led by Sheriff Parker, a former child combatant known as "Base Marine". TRC commissioners and staff had to mediate with and counsel the ex-combatants to secure their participation in a reconciliation ceremony. Several witnesses, along with the religious and traditional leaders of the community, made statements at the ceremony.
93. The local Chief began the reconciliation ceremony with a statement of encouragement to his fellow traditional leaders:

Chief Bai Yossor: I'm also appealing to the Section Chiefs, traditional rulers, the sound of people and all the people of Tonkolili to forgive these people because they are our children. We should accept them because we have nowhere to take them...

Excerpts from the individual statements made subsequently by several of the ex-combatants are reproduced on the following pages:

Sheriff Parker:

... It's me Sheriff Parker, talking to my people in this country today. I am here to apologise for what had been happening. We had done wrong to this country and now the war is over. We don't have anywhere to go and our only alternative is to stay with people in the community. We had been living in communities with our fathers and mothers before. Today, I am pleading with the people of Tonkolili District and the country as a whole to please forgive me. I am their son and I promise that nobody shall ever influence me to doing wrong any longer. My experiences in the war have revealed to me that war is not anything good. It's not good to offend people and go without apologising to them. Therefore, on behalf of all of us, I must take the responsibility to apologise to all those we have offended. Please forgive us... Chief, I'm your son please forgive me.

Morie Nabieu:

...I am Morie Nabieu. I was a very little boy when the war started in this country. We have fought this war and committed many atrocities. We have looted properties, we have taken people's women from them. I am standing here confessing these things and asking the people of this community through the Paramount Chief to please forgive me. I'm kindly requesting the Paramount Chief to join me in talking to Mr J.C. Kabbia so that he can forgive me. I'm proceeding to beg... Paramount Chief, I have wronged these people, please forgive me.

Ahmed One:

I'm kindly making an appeal to all of you to be forgiven for what had happened during the war. Crimes we had committed against humanity... using women for sexual slavery, looting properties, burning of houses and many others... we did not initially plan it. I am taking responsibility and I am taking the name of the Lord, asking for forgiveness. I am kindly asking you to forgive us; this is my plea to you in this community. I am pleading, please forgive me and talk to my people to forgive me.

Joseph S. Bangura:

We are convinced that what we did in this country was not good for humanity. Some of us didn't do it by any will... There is not a "bad bush to cast away a bad child". We are committed within ourselves that what we did was not good. If we have a reverse of what happened, if we were civilians and you were the combatant, we will never feel good of what you would do to us. However, we are kindly asking that you forgive us and receive us as your children and let's live as we used to live before. All of the evil that we have done in this country, I'm kindly asking that you pardon us. We are your children especially those of us who are natives of this district... Please Chief, please forgive us for all we have done to you, your people and the country as a whole. We will never do it any more.

Victor John:

...When some of us are speaking, a good number of you are surprised at us. When we had the guns in our possession, we never knew there will be an opportunity for us to come back to apologise to people. It is a clear indication from the Lord trying to manifest that He lives. When God raises you, you will think you will never come down again. As far as we are concerned, the Lord has humbled us. When we had the guns, we controlled you and today the Lord has turned the baton. Instead of us controlling you, we are under your control... I'm standing here in the presence of you all. I've done so many evils and atrocities in this country... It was not of my own will. Today, I'm standing here to apologise to all of you sitting here. Even those who are not present here, I want to assume that my voice will reach them wherever they are. If there is anyone in this hall that I had offended or even if not here, I am pleading to be forgiven.

94. During the hearings, only those witnesses who publicly acknowledged their actions and wished to reconcile with their communities or with their victims participated in the reconciliation ceremonies. Many of the apologies were half-hearted, however. Some of the perpetrators did not make a full admission of their roles.
95. The reconciliation ceremonies were meant to support and encourage the difficult dialogues that would ensue in the communities in which they took place. Without the return and acceptance of the ex-combatants into the communities, the dialogues would have had no chance of success. The reconciliation ceremonies were envisaged to confer a form of social acceptance on the ex-combatants, which would hopefully lead to peace in the community and create a platform for joint action in rebuilding the community.
96. All the witnesses, both victims and perpetrators, acknowledged that the journey to reconciliation is long and arduous. The chiefs, along with community and religious leaders, will have to continue to facilitate the dialogues between victims and perpetrators and between perpetrators and their communities well into the future. Full reconciliation and forgiveness might come later on, depending on how well the perpetrators work towards a positive relationship with their victims and with their communities.

TRC



A former RUF Commander kneels before the people of Magburaka to appeal for forgiveness at a TRC public hearing in Tonkolili District. Participation of ex-combatants in such symbolic reconciliation ceremonies is seen by the Commission as an important step in encouraging community reintegration.

OUTCOMES OF FOLLOW-UP MEETINGS WITH WITNESSES AFTER THE HEARINGS PROCESS

97. TRC counsellors paid follow-up visits to 266 of the witnesses who appeared before the Commission's public or closed hearings. Upon visiting these witnesses, the counsellors made an assessment of the impact on people's lives that had resulted from their testifying at the hearings. Excerpts of the questionnaire used by the counsellors for this purpose, along with a selection of responses gathered from witnesses, are reproduced over the following pages:

A) How did the witnesses perceive their testimony during the hearing?

One hundred percent (266) of the witnesses perceived their testimonies as having been good in some way – a positive move, necessary, timely or satisfying.

B) What was considered positive during the hearings?

All of the witnesses saw the hearings as an open forum to speak about the past atrocities that still haunt their lives. They saw it as an opportunity for the public and the international community to become fully aware of what happened to them during the war.

The ex-combatants saw the hearing as an opportunity to apologise and ask for forgiveness. Some even admitted that apologising before the Commission's hearings would have been difficult since they were uncertain as to how their victims would react. They mentioned that the Commission created an enabling atmosphere for them to discuss the past, to explain what they did against their people and why. They felt that asking for forgiveness and partaking in a reconciliation ceremony gave them the confidence to move freely within their communities.

Many of the witnesses expressed great satisfaction over the counselling provided to them, the patience on the part of the Commissioners to listen to them, and the efforts made by the Commission to invite people who were implicated in testimonies so that they could offer their own side of the story in hopes of reconciling differences.

C) What was considered negative during the hearings?

Out of the 266 witnesses visited, only three people found the experience a negative one. One amputee who testified in Makeni mentioned that amputees and the war wounded were not targeted enough by the Commission to provide testimony. Another witness who testified in Makeni expressed discontent over the fact that he had not been told that his testimony would be broadcasted live nationwide. One witness who testified in Kailahun said he felt like he was interrogated as if he were in a court of law.

D) What were the feelings of witnesses after they had testified?

Approximately 20% of the witnesses felt very bad or sad after they testified. They felt that their testimony brought them fresh and unwanted memories of the past. The remaining 80% either felt good, happy, or relieved or satisfied. To some of them, especially those victims who were sexually abused, it was the first time they had relayed their experiences to anyone, breaking the culture of silence.

E) What expectations did the witnesses have prior to giving testimony and were those expectations met?

About 99% expected immediate assistance and support from the TRC varying from micro-credit financing, educational support and assistance, rebuilding of homes and medical care. Virtually all respondents expected immediate benefits from the TRC.

About 30% feared that providing testimony to the TRC would result in them being prosecuted by the Special Court. In Magburaka, for example, Sheriff Parker (alias "Base Marine") was very concerned about the TRC and Special Court personnel visiting him on the same day and at the same time. The counselor told him that it was a coincidence, that the two institutions are not exchanging information in anyway, and that the Special Court has its own method of gathering information.

A few respondents had hoped that the TRC would punish the perpetrators for all that they did.

F) What was the reaction of the families and communities after the witnesses had provided testimony to the Commission?

On the whole, both community and family members reacted positively towards the witnesses. They were happy to receive them back home after their testimonies. Some were commended, and some sympathised with them, and some even had given assistance to the witness.

About 90% of the witnesses did not experience any change in their relationship with their families and or their communities. For 10% of the witnesses, there was a positive change after their testimony.

In some cases, the community came together and offered sacrifices to their ancestors and asked for forgiveness on behalf of their sons who were perpetrators, such as the case of CO Lamin of Nyandehun village in Malen Chieftdom, Pujehun district.

For some of the witnesses, especially those who came to a closed hearing, the families and communities were unaware of the fact that they testified before the Commission.

G) Did providing testimony affect the lives of witnesses in any way?

About 120 of the 266 witnesses have not been affected in any way. However, 146 of them have experienced positive changes in their lives. After provided their testimony, many felt much more relaxed and satisfied with a peace of mind. They are now hopeful something good will happen as a result of their encounter with the TRC.

H) Did the witnesses suffer any security threat, any provocation, or mockery since the hearing?

Five of the witnesses suffered security threats. The chiefs of their village were informed on time and the matters were resolved.

Eight witnesses noted that they were the subject of provocative remarks such as: "What will the TRC do after all?"; or "you can go again to the TRC and explain if you feel like it"; or "the TRC only used you to get information and at the end they will submit your name to the Special Court"; or "you will not be given any reparation or benefits".

I) Do the witnesses show any signs of trauma and did these symptoms increase or decrease since the hearing? Did they receive any trauma counselling since the hearing?

Approximately 90% of the witnesses are showing signs of symptoms such as nightmares, flashbacks, psychosomatic symptoms, sleeplessness, bad appetite, nervousness, and depression. Where possible, these witnesses have been referred to the appropriate NGOs. There has been no formal counselling for any of the witnesses, other than what was given at the TRC by the counsellors.

A good number of respondents were happy with the counselling that they had received by the Commission's staff but are in need of more counselling.

J) In cases where the TRC organised a meeting between the victim and the perpetrator, has the relationship between the two of them improved?

The Commission had performed general reconciliation ceremonies where the perpetrators accepted their wrongdoings and asked for forgiveness, and the victims were also encouraged to accept and to gradually work towards forgiveness and reconciliation. Some witnesses say it is no longer necessary to organise another reconciliation session, since their victimisers have acknowledged their actions and have tried to reconcile with them. However, four people said they would like to have another meeting with their perpetrators, involving the religious and traditional leaders.

The counsellors were also able to visit some of those involved in reconciliation ceremonies after TRC hearings. Examples of their experiences are as follows:

- The RUF ex-combatants in Magburaka, located in Tonkolili district, had been key actors in the conflict. They were notorious for their activities and for the atrocities they committed. They testified at the TRC hearings, after which they pleaded for forgiveness. During the follow-up visit they confirmed that their relationship with the community had improved since the TRC hearings and the reconciliation process and that there is no cause to complain. They are living happily, without any disturbances, and have free movement within their community. Among this group of ex-combatants were Sheriff Parker (alias “Base Marine”), Joseph Sallu Bangura, Sheku Konteh (alias “Kolo”), Martyn Weah Wolo (alias “Tactical”) and Peter John Kamanda.
- In Pujehun district, a visit was made to the Kamajor ex-combatants who had apologised to the victims and the community during the hearing. The Kamajor ex-combatants testified at the hearings after which they pleaded to the people for forgiveness. Among them were Lamin Koroma (alias C.O. Lamin), Sunny Tucker, Hassan Jalloh, etc. The counsellor met with some of them during the follow-up meeting. Lamin Koroma informed the counsellor that after the reconciliation ceremony with the TRC, his people offered sacrifices on behalf of all their sons and daughters who were involved in the fighting, after which a cleansing ceremony was performed to cleanse them. Sunny Tucker, who had been reconciled with Hassan Jalloh, whose father he had killed during the war, said that his relationship with the Jalloh’s and the entire community was very good now.
- In Bo district, Mr. James Legg had implicated Mr. Kosseh Hindowa, a former CDF (Kamajor) authority for the death of his sister during the war. The Commission had invited Mr. Hindowa to the hearing and the two were reconciled. Mr. Hindowa stated that after the reconciliation session organised by the TRC, Mr. Legg’s family decided to observe a formal funeral-rite for his late sister, and Mr. Hindowa gave the family some amount of money for that purpose and it was accepted and appreciated by Mr. Legg.
- The reconciliation process in Kailahun was mainly between the community and the RUF ex-combatants, who also happen to be natives of Kailahun. The counselor contacted some of the ex-combatants like Mustapha Sam Koroma, Joe Fatorma, Morie Feika, Alex Jusu Allieu, Eric Koi Senesi, Jemba N’gobeh, Saffa Kpulon N’gobeh, and the child ex-combatants. These people have been fully re-integrated into their community, and even take part in various activities to run the affairs of the community. Susan Kulagbanda, who during the hearings complained of being harassed by some perpetrators, said during the follow-up visit that her relationship with them had greatly improved after the intervention of TRC, and that they now live together as one.

The counsellors finally met some ex-combatants in Kambia who testified before the TRC, including “Boulah”, Kennie Massaquoi, “Kaitibie”, Anthony Thollo and Brima Vandi. “Boulah”, an ex-RUF commander, told the counsellors that before the hearings, he was well known for being a commander but very few people were aware of the fact that he had made attempts to disarm ex-combatants. He mentioned during his follow-up visit that he has now won more sympathy and respect from the community after testifying. The other ex-combatants were recipients of skills training programmes and were waiting for their tools so that they could go back to their home communities.

Most of the victims in the districts requested that the TRC should continue its hearings so that they could come and expose all that had happened to them during the war.

SYMBOLIC ACTS OF RESPECT TO THE DEAD

98. At the end of each day of hearings, a list of the names of all the deceased persons mentioned by witnesses on that day was read out aloud and a minute of silence was observed as a mark of respect to the dead.
99. The excerpt reproduced below is an example of such a “Mark of Respect to the Dead” after the hearing on Thursday 10 July 2003 in the Bonthe District.

“The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission has today heard testimony as to the tragic loss of many human lives in the conflict that ravaged our country.

As a mark of respect to the deceased and their families, and as a symbol of our compassion and our solidarity, we ask that you please be upstanding in observance of a minute’s silence for the following victims:

-
- *Joe Kai*
 - *Joe Boisy and 9 other men in Gbaniga village*
 - *Yamusa Jobai*
 - *Maada Demby Sandi*
 - *Tommy Sandi*
 - *Pa Yokie*
 - *A man called ‘government’*
 - *600 people killed in Tihun town*
 - *Maaheh,*
 - *Nabie*
 - *Tiangay*
 - *Junisa*
 - *Amie*
 - *Muna*
 - *Mukah*
 - *Morie Yauguber*
 - *Maria Fatu Yauguber*
 - *700 people killed at Bawohah junction*
 - *Philip Musa, and his wife and sun*
 - *Pa Sallu*
 - *Maimat Sata Momoh*

- *Many people in Senehun village*
- *Tommy Brewa*
- *Momoh Lugbu*
- *Abu Memo*
- *Abu Memu*
- *Pa Sallu*
- *The father of Alusine Foday*
- *Abu Musa*
- *Tommy Konneh*
- *Moiwo Musa*

FOLLOWED BY ONE MINUTE OF SILENCE

which the Presiding Chairperson closes with the words:

“May the souls of the departed rest in perfect peace.”

100. The minute of silence was observed after each hearing because many of the dead were never identified by their families or loved ones, as many victims were killed outside of their communities. It was an act of healing for the families – a symbol that their loved ones did not die in vain and that their deaths are formally acknowledged by an official institution, operating with the support of the government.

MONUMENTS AND MEMORIALS

101. In several districts, the Commission, in consultation with the communities, established monuments or memorials in the town where the hearing was held or at the site of a mass gravesite in the district. Traditional reconciliation ceremonies were organised, such as the pouring of libation and cleansing, together with religious ceremonies such as common prayers at locals where massacres took place during the conflict. These activities are extremely important for the communities because they serve as recognition of the suffering of victims as well as the collective memory of the past.
102. The following examples of TRC activities relate to monuments and memorials:
- a. Bo Town: A road intersection where, during the war, RUF fighters and government forces had engaged in combat was known as “Soja Kill Rebel Junction” on account of the acts that had taken place there. The Commission held a ceremony at the junction on the closing day of its hearings in Bo and renamed the intersection “Peace Junction.” A signboard was erected commemorating the TRC ceremony and indicating the new name of the junction.
 - b. Port Loko District: The Commission visited Manarma village, where 73 people had been locked together in a house and burnt alive. A mass grave was located in the middle of the village. The Commission held prayers and asked the community to bury the bones properly and to preserve the site by putting a fence around it.

- c. Kailahun District: The closing ceremony took place near the notorious “Slaughter House” where people were brutally murdered during the war. Libation was poured in commemoration of all those killed in the slaughter house and in the Kailahun District during the conflict. There is likely to be a bigger reconciliation programme in due course organised by the Kailahun community. The Commission also visited the site of a mass grave behind the Kailahun police station where prayers were offered in memory of the dead.
- d. Kenema Town: The Commission identified a roundabout in Kenema town where a lot of civilians had been killed during the war and inaugurated a memorial sign in their honour.
- e. Kambia Town: For the closing ceremony, everyone converged around a roundabout near the Town Council Hall. During the war, a man had been shot in the full view of the township. That roundabout was renamed “Peace Square.” Traditional leaders and other chiefdom elders poured libation for reconciliation and peace to prevail in Sierra Leone.
- f. Pujehun District: The Commission visited several mass grave sites. In Sahn Malen, which is about fourteen miles from Pujehun town, there was a grave where thirty-five men had been buried. In Bendu Malen, which is about seventeen miles from Pujehun town, the RUF/AFRC forces killed over two hundred and seventy five people. The Commission visited two graves, where bones and skulls were found. A five-year-old boy who survived the attack had been made the Chief of the village by the RUF. Candles were lit at the graves and prayers were offered in the memory of the dead.
- g. Bonthe Island: The Commission visited the town of Tihun where several hundred civilians had been killed by the RUF. The community still suffers a great deal from the trauma caused by this massacre. At the closing ceremony, there was pouring of libation. At the site of one of the mass graves, prayers were offered and candles were lit. This visit of the Commission was important to the community. It signified recognition of the suffering and the mourning the community had gone through and the beginning of their healing. Tihun was the hometown of Julius Maada Bio, former NPRC Head of State, and was attacked by the RUF as a sign of their repugnance to his leadership.
- h. Freetown: A National Reconciliation Procession was organised in Freetown on 6 August 2003, after which local and national stakeholders were involved in the unveiling of a memorial at the Congo Cross Bridge, which was renamed “Peace Bridge”. Congo Cross Bridge was the point at which the combined forces of ECOMOG and the CDF had stopped the RUF advance on Freetown during the January 1999 attack on the capital city.

TRC



A monument to peace and reconciliation, constructed by the Pakistani contingent of UNAMSIL, stands in the centre of Koidu Town, Kono District. The TRC attempted to mark its reconciliation activities across Sierra Leone by erecting similar monuments and memorials at significant sites.

IDENTIFICATION OF MASS GRAVES

103. The Commission also made a concerted effort to identify the sites of mass graves. Mass graves were identified at different locations all over the country. The Commission has not developed an exhaustive inventory of all the mass graves since it didn't have the time or the resources to do so. The Commission hopes that other efforts will assist in identifying the remaining mass graves in the country.⁹
104. For the purposes of reconciliation, the Commission sought the opinion of the communities on what should be done with the mass graves. The outcome of these consultations include the following:
- a. Bonthe District: Different suggestions were made for the commemoration of the sites. All villages asked for the creation of "monuments" that serve the community. In Tihun town, people expressed their desire for a park. In Bauya village, the erection of a market building was proposed. In Talia and Matru, people requested a barray, a place where people can gather and discuss local issues.
 - b. Moyamba District: Recommendations made by the different communities include the building of a hospital (Magbenka), a community centre or barray (Yoyema, Mosongo, Mokbanji, and Jaihun), a town hall (Kwellu), a monument (Moyolo), and a tomb/memorial (Mosenessie).
 - c. Kenema District: Many respondents were concerned over the preservation of mass gravesites and many felt that relocation was necessary due to the construction of houses in the vicinity of these sites. Various communities also suggested symbolic reparations as a way to respect the dead. The erection of monuments in remembrance of these sites was considered vital.
 - d. Kailahun District: As in the Kenema district, respondents requested symbolic reparations and the erection of monuments to honour the dead.
 - e. Koinadugu District: The different villages made recommendations as to how their friends and family can best be remembered. The residents of Falaba requested the construction of a market place in remembrance of their relatives that were killed by the rebels. The residents of Lengekoro recommended the construction of a barray. In Koinadugu, people requested the construction of a school. In Katombo 11, the respondents requested the construction of a store to keep their agricultural produce.
 - f. Bombali District: The community representatives recommended the construction of a monument.

⁹ More detail on the Commission's efforts with regard to identifying and documenting mass graves can be found in the Mass Graves Report produced as an Appendix to this report.

- g. Bo District: The communities suggested the erection of shrines in the form of shrines on the mass graves sites. Tikonko requested a monument in the form of a tomb with a tablet containing the names of the victims.
 - h. Pujehun District: The communities suggested the erection of shrines on the mass gravesites. Sahn Malen requested that a bridge be built before a shrine is erected because the site where mass graves are located is near a stream.
 - i. Western Area and Port Loko: The residents attached a lot of importance to the preservation of mass gravesites. They requested the erection of monuments on the various sites. Their suggestions included a hospital to care for the relatives left behind by the victims and a mosque for prayers that can be said on a daily basis in remembrance of the departed ones.
 - j. Kono and Tonkolili Districts: In both districts, the chiefs planned on conducting a meeting at the chiefdom level in order to make a unanimous decision.
105. The outcomes of this exercise have confirmed that most people in Sierra Leone want to remember the dead, not by emphasising all the harm and sorrow caused during the war, but by looking forward and turning it into something positive through the establishment of a useful facility at the site of a massacre.
106. Memorials and commemoration activities are not only important for the victims who want to remember the people they lost, but also for the perpetrators and for the community as a whole. Memorials can create a public space where people can come together in hopes of establishing open and lasting dialogue. Such symbolic acts of coming together can contribute significantly towards the process of reconciliation.

THE TRC NATIONAL RECONCILIATION PROCESSION AND OFFERS OF APOLOGIES BY NATIONAL BODIES

107. The final theme on which witnesses were heard during TRC Thematic Hearings was “Reconciliation, National Reintegration and Reparations.” The Commission chose this theme in order to draw attention to the challenges ahead in the hope that all Sierra Leoneans could be mobilised for this project. A TRC National Reconciliation Procession was conceived to mark the end of hearings, to send a message to all Sierra Leoneans that rebuilding the community and learning to live together again is important for common survival. The procession wound its way through the streets of central Freetown on 6 August 2003, culminating in a large gathering at the National Stadium.
108. Those who participated in the procession included civil society organisations, schools, the police, the Army, political parties and victims’ associations. The procession set out from Victoria Park in the heart of the city. For several hours, all the main streets of Freetown were awash with marchers, dancers, drummers, musicians and other revellers making their way towards the National Stadium. Residents hung out of their windows to observe the procession and join in the spirit of the occasion. Imaginative banners bearing slogans of reconciliation were carried by many groups and draped along the roadside. In the afternoon, having reached the stadium, representatives of several groups and institutions, including the Army, the police, the main political parties, victims’ associations and civic organisations made statements to the crowd. This historic day of activities was concluded with the unveiling of a memorial in honour of the victims of the war at the Congo Cross Bridge, which was symbolically renamed “Peace Bridge”.
109. Several national bodies offered their apologies for the violations they committed during the war, or for the role they played in the period leading to it. These apologies are seen as valuable contributions to the reconciliation process.
110. Apologies can be made by those responsible for violations and abuses, but also by those who bear a moral responsibility for what happened, that is, those individuals who displayed indifference and passivity at times when intervention and positive action could have made a difference.
111. Apologies offered by officials or national bodies, such as security services and political parties, can serve as an incentive for ordinary citizens who committed violations to show remorse and apologise. Apologies also serve as an important recognition of the suffering of the victims.
112. Excerpts from statements by the following persons, including several noteworthy apologies, are reproduced over the following pages:
 - a) Representative of the Sierra Leone Army, Brigadier Nelson Williams;
 - b) Representative of the Inspector General of Police;
 - c) Representative of the RUFP, Jonathan Kposowa;
 - d) Representative of the SLPP, Dr. Sama Banya;
 - e) Leader of the Opposition / APC, Ernest Bai Koroma; and
 - f) President of Sierra Leone, H.E. Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah.

TRC



A large crowd listens to apologies offered by national bodies after the TRC National Reconciliation Procession on 6 August 2003. Participants included youth, interfaith leaders and women's groups. At the front (right) is Alhaji Lamin Jusu Jakka, Chairman of the War Affected Amputees' Association.

A) Representative of the Sierra Leone Army – Brigadier Nelson-Williams

“Today, as we gathered here to rededicate our land’s future we are not only looking at this ceremony as a first leg in the process towards our land’s future... We see this ceremony as the pathway on the military land map to reconciling Sierra Leoneans. Sierra Leoneans including the Sierra Leone armed forces must come out here to accept the God Almighty’s message in the Lord’s Prayer, which says “and forgive us our trespasses or debts, as we forgive our trespassers or debtors.

As the Republic of Sierra Leone Armed Forces went out to fight, a lot of atrocities and crimes against humanity were committed against Sierra Leoneans... does this make sense? The answer confronts us, beleaguering our hearts, besieging our minds... Let us try to transform cruelty with kindness, insult with forbearance and patience... injustice with magnanimity and hatred with love. It is only with the presence of God that one can reconcile with such a situation that does not appear on one’s wish list.

Let me reiterate in aid of emphasis... that we beseech you to forgive the RSLAF. Forgive your fallen and living children. Forgiveness starts with reconciling with God yourself, before reconciling with your fellow human beings. It is only the Prince of Peace who can give us true peace, forgiveness and reconciliation: Jesus Christ our Lord and Saviour who died on the cross for the propitiation of our sins and forgiveness, when he said: “Father forgive them for they know not what they do”.

Therefore let us all ask God Almighty for lasting forgiveness, which is the first instrument in the preservation of the national reconciliation that Sierra Leoneans need. Let us march forward with determination, commitment, fortitude and indomitable courage with no turning back and the mindset for this fellowship of purpose.

The RSLAF owes this nation a large debt. Let us resolve to pay up with interest, not only by giving democracy a chance, but also by standing in the vanguard of peace protection. The consolidation of democracy will continue to be our major preoccupation... this is our sacred duty and we cannot afford to fail again...

Finally, I want to conclude on this note: we cannot make peace, or reconcile our pains without recourse to adopting the practice of forgiveness forever and ever. As Sierra Leoneans, there is so much more in us that unites us than divides us. We must recognise this fact, and learn to live with each other. I stand here today on behalf of the RSLAF to promise that the Army has taken a human face. You labelled the police as a force for good; now we want you to label the Army as a force for good. Peace and peace to all, I thank you all.”

B) Representative of the Inspector General of Police – Francis Munu

“We on our part... we as police officers who are involved in the process of delivering justice... served both as perpetrators and victims of the decade-long civil conflict... I’m here again this afternoon to reiterate the point and to emphasise the point that we are also prepared to reconcile with all sectors of society to ensure that lasting peace remains in Sierra Leone. During the TRC’s work, you were able to carry out an environmental scanning looking at the political, economic, social, cultural and legal considerations so that the firm foundation for lasting peace could be laid in our country Sierra Leone.

I also wish on behalf of the members of the Sierra Leone Police Force, whom we have accepted *inter alia* to have been both perpetrators and victims, to express remorse for all the wrongdoings, which we and our personnel did both before and during the war... and to genuinely apologise for all such wrongdoing with a promise that such will never be repeated in the course of our history. As we strive to be a force for good, we do hope that all people within Sierra Leone and beyond who have paid so dearly a price for our past mistakes will continue to help us... so we will forge ahead and be part of the framework to establish a new Sierra Leone, a Sierra Leone which all of us will be proud of, a Sierra Leone which our children will be proud of, a Sierra Leone to which people from all over the world can come and feel safe, can come and work and can come and enjoy themselves...”

C) Representative of the RUF – Jonathan Kposowa

“Ladies and gentlemen, with all the destruction and atrocities committed by the RUF and whosoever fought the war... those attitudes were all mankind, man-made ventures... and therefore at this time in the name of the Lord Almighty God, I raise my hands to say to Sierra Leoneans that all of us are the same... whatsoever might have been injected into us to have caused atrocities, to have formed whatsoever, to have raped, to have done whatsoever chaos activities that the war might have done... I am saying that you should have pardon on us. We are your children! We are sorry! We are sorry that the episode that we have formed was not really from the brains of some us. So at this time, we are all creatively captured and we have come at this stage to say pardon, we are therefore pleading for mercy and reconciliation. May God bless us all, may God bless the continent, may God bless Africa. I thank you.

D) Representative of the SLPP – Dr. Sama Banyo

“I represent a party that ruled this country in the years immediately after independence; we may have made our own mistakes. Perhaps we should have stood up to be counted, instead of acquiescing or capitulating. We thank God for the inspiration he has given us to acknowledge and confess our wrongdoings. More importantly, for giving us the grace to forgive those who wronged us. We thank those who have counselled us, that is the members of the TRC and those who enabled us to forgive each other publicly. It may be difficult to forget, but time, the healer of pain and suffering, will help to soften our hearts as we continue to embrace each other in brotherly love.”

**E) Leader of the Opposition / Chairman of the APC – Ernest Bai Koroma
TRC Thematic Hearing on Reconciliation, 5 August 2003**

“No doubts we made mistakes as a Government, as a party in Government, I have accepted that. We have to confront our past. We should not be ashamed of that. I have accepted the responsibilities for the mistakes made by the APC, for which I have asked for forgiveness from all of you. To members of the public and everybody, mistakes were made by the APC and we are sorry for these mistakes.”

**F) President of Sierra Leone, H.E. Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah
TRC Thematic Hearing on Reconciliation, 5 August 2003**

The last witness to testify to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission during the Thematic Hearings on “Reconciliation, National Reintegration and Reparations” was the current President of Sierra Leone, H.E. Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. After his statement, some specific questions were addressed to the President on the issue of reconciliation. An excerpt from the exchanges between the President and the Commission is reproduced below:

Leader of Evidence:

...Your Excellency my final point would be to maybe rephrase my colleague’s point on reconciliation. Today is the final day of hearings by the Commission and it was deliberately chosen so that while all issues have been interrogated, in the context of other issues, today should mark the day we begin to look at the way forward... Is Your Excellency prepared to use the platform that is provided today by the Commission, thinking about reconciliation and national reintegration... thinking about tomorrow... a National Day of Reconciliation... Would Your Excellency want to use this platform to make a whole unifying statement of intent that brings all the parties together and acknowledges that some violations may have been committed by different factors in the war, but by the fact that there is a government which is a succession... that government then owes a responsibility to acknowledge the wrongs that may have been done by each predecessor or who acted in its name and perhaps some apology to the people? It takes someone willing to acknowledge that both those who acted to support the government and previous governments committed gross violations of rights and so this is the government of this country, an acknowledgment by this government and Your Excellency about this point... so that people can feel that they need to have closure and begin to think about tomorrow.

H.E. Dr. Tejan Kabbah: Now, I think what you are asking me to do is this: to apologise to people for wrongdoing... Of what use is that? I have mentioned this again in the record [of my testimony]... I don't know, maybe it's a bit long and you haven't read it all... but I said this: that I went round this country telling people, please I beg you, wrongs that have been done one way or the other, accept what it is, just forget about the past... Let's live together; let's work together and rebuild our country. I said that many, many times before this TRC was set up. It's there in that report; but I made sure that I did that. Like the former Vice President, I asked him, I said please, this is your role, go around the country, telling people these problems. Not only that but there were some of the Ministries here, who I put together with the RUF to go to these communities and explain to these people. Now I just cannot understand what more I'm expected to do...

Leader of Evidence: Your Excellency, the Leader of APC this morning, before the Commission, apologised for all the mistakes his party had made. He had done that before, he did that again today and he used the platform of the Commission in fulfilment of all the efforts of Your Excellency in this regard. Would Your Excellency want to send a direct message to the people of Sierra Leone on reconciling the differences that did exist, and possibly do exist? That was my question Sir.

H.E. Dr. Tejan Kabbah: If you want to say... I will give you ok... I want peace. I want reconciliation. I would repeat it as many times as ever you want! Please all Sierra Leoneans, all of us, let's work together, let's forget about the past... those that have to face the court, let them face the fact that they have to face the court and go on... if they have justification, it depends, let them go ahead and do it. Now, those who have done something wrong to others, please go and apologise to them; and if they don't listen to you, go to the Vice President, come to me, we will go to your communities to get things organised.

113. The recognition and symbolic acknowledgement of the Head of State regarding the violations committed by all sides during the conflict in Sierra Leone and the recognition of the suffering of all victims at this TRC hearing would have been a huge step forward in the pursuit of national reconciliation. It would have set a positive example, which individual citizens could have followed. By offering an apology, the Head of State could have taken a symbolic lead role in pursuit of reconciliation. The Commission regrets that the President, as the Father of the Nation, missed a prime opportunity to fulfil this role.

WORKSHOPS AND CONSULTATIONS WITH CIVIL SOCIETY

Consultations with civil society organisations

114. The Commission organised consultative workshops with a broad group of civil society organisations in order to gather their opinions and views on the issue of reconciliation. These workshops took place on 3 July 2003 and 24 July 2003. In addition, the Commission also sent out more than 150 questionnaires to local organisations and other stakeholders.
115. The organisations consulted included: women's and youth groups; religious bodies; NGOs working in the fields of humanitarian assistance, peace building, and conflict resolution; and NGOs working with victims and ex-combatants.

TRC Workshop on National Reconciliation

116. From 27 to 29 November 2003, the TRC organised a workshop on national reconciliation. Issues discussed during the workshop included such diverse themes as the proper management of state resources, anti-corruption and poverty reduction strategies. The workshop intended to work out a plan to address these issues and develop a roadmap towards national reconciliation. At the end of the three-day workshop, the Commission had hoped that the participants of the Conference, the key stakeholders of national reconciliation, would commit themselves to this roadmap.
117. Although national reconciliation was addressed during the thematic hearings, the workshop was the last in a series of efforts by the Commission to foster reconciliation before the publication of the final TRC report, through which the Commission obviously hopes to contribute to national reconciliation.
118. The workshop was organised in collaboration with the Campaign for Good Governance (CGG) and the Inter-Religious Council. These organisations have committed themselves to continue the process of reconciliation after the Commission winds up. The South African Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) and the International Centre for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) supported the workshop through the provision of experts in reconciliation.¹⁰
119. Since the workshop focused on national reconciliation, those invited to attend included national stakeholders such as the President's Office, various line ministries, national bodies such as the Anti-Corruption Commission, the Government Gold and Diamond Office, political parties, representatives of Parliament and the judiciary, members of civil society and the media. Among those present were the Minister of Works, the Deputy Minister of Social Welfare, Gender and Children's Affairs, and representatives from the police, Defence Headquarters, Prisons, NCDDR, NCDHR, APC, PLP and RUFF. Given the low level of participation and the absence of key national stakeholders, developing a roadmap that would lead to national reconciliation seemed impractical. Nevertheless, the contributions by participants at the workshop are reflected in this report.

¹⁰ These experts include: Charles Villa-Vicencio, Director of the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, South Africa; Mr. Letlapa Mphahlele, former field commander in APLA (Azanian People's Liberation Army), the military wing of the PAC (Pan-African Congress) of South Africa; General Andrew Masondo (South Africa); Felix Reategui and Eduardo Gonzalez of the Peruvian Truth Commission; and Hugo Fernandes of the East Timorese Truth Commission.

Overview of the outcome of consultations and workshops on national reconciliation

120. As a result of the workshops and consultations on reconciliation, many of the participants and respondents have identified the challenges that impede reconciliation as well as the conditions that are necessary in order to foster reconciliation. These challenges and conditions will be addressed under the nine themes that have surfaced during the consultations and workshops. These themes are: a) disarmament; b) the role of perpetrators; c) the role of victims; d) the role of citizens and the community in general; e) the role of religion and tradition; f) the role of civil society, oversight institutions, and the role of the media; g) good governance; h) the role of government in the reconciliation process; and i) external actors. The following paragraphs discuss how these different themes relate to the reconciliation process:

A) Disarmament:

Disarmament was considered to be one of the pre-conditions to reconciliation in Sierra Leone. However, many stakeholders have expressed their concerns over the fact that weapons and ammunition were hidden during the disarmament process. This could potentially serve as a threat to security in the future, especially in Kenema and Kailahun Districts, as well as impeding the reconciliation process.

B) The Role of Perpetrators:

In order for reconciliation to occur between a) perpetrators and victims and b) perpetrators with their communities, perpetrators are encouraged to acknowledge their actions during the conflict and to seek forgiveness. However, some perpetrators are not willing to participate in the reconciliation process. The unwillingness of perpetrators to participate in the process appears to stem from some of the following factors:

- Dissatisfaction with the NCDDR programme: A number of ex-combatants say that they have not benefited from the NCDDR reintegration and skills training initiatives.
- Dissatisfaction with the Government: Some former combatants, especially those associated with the CDF, are disgruntled over the inability of the government to deliver on the promises that were made to them in the way of post-conflict assistance.
- Confusion between the TRC and the Special Court: Some perpetrators have been reluctant to talk about their involvement in the conflict out of fear of being prosecuted in the Special Court, or being called as a witness against their former commanders. In addition, many members of the CDF are disgruntled over the arrest of their former leader, Chief Hinga Norman.
- The high incidence of drug use among some perpetrators impedes their ability to become proactive members of the reconciliation process.

C) The Role of Victims:

One of the major concerns addressed in the workshops and consultations was that the needs of the victims of the conflict have not been addressed by the government, whereas numerous programmes have been established to assist former combatants and perceived perpetrators. The following response was provided by the Women's Forum in its completed TRC questionnaire:

"Reconciliation should not be one-sided, especially in terms of satisfying the needs of perpetrators at the expense of victims. Government should take a decisive action to ensure that all parties' needs are met."

Most of the consulted organisations and participants in the workshops strongly emphasised the need for reparations to help put victims in positions conducive to reconciliation. As a result of the violations committed against victims, many are in need of assistance. According to the respondents, the needs of the victims include: medical treatment, psychiatric help, psycho-social therapy, skills-training, micro-credit, education, resettlement, compensation, creation of employment, shelter and help for displaced persons and refugees to return home. The following response was given by the Sierra Leone Consumer Protection Council in its questionnaire:

"Provide food for the victims, without which nobody can stand to reconcile with another if he/she is hungry."

The Evangelical Fellowship of Sierra Leone stated in its questionnaire responses:

"Put the victims in the right frame of mind through psychosocial counselling and healing."

Other organisations stressed the fact that the Special Fund for War Victims needs to be established in order to assist those victims in need, as mandated by the Lomé Peace Agreement. Care International stated in its response to the questionnaire:

"For reconciliation to be durable, the TRC itself should ensure that a sustainable package of compensation is developed and implemented while it lasts, and the Special Fund is strengthened to support those who have been crippled out. The Government should seek funding to rebuild the worst areas of the country."

It was also mentioned in the consultations that in order to involve as many victims in the process as possible, the TRC should have conducted a grassroots campaign and organised hearings in every village. The short lifespan of the Commission and the various constraints imposed on the Commission did not allow it to reach all those victims it would have liked to reach.

D) The Role of Citizens and the Community at Large:

The main stakeholder in the reconciliation process is considered to be the average Sierra Leonean citizen. It is the responsibility of every citizen to make the process a nationally-owned process and to realise the importance of their contributions and participation, regardless of how insignificant it may seem to them. As stated by the Sierra Leonean Red Cross Society in its responses to the questionnaire: "The public will for reconciliation needs to be there."

Reintegration of ex-combatants and victims into communities is an integral part of reconciliation. Some ex-combatants and victims of abduction such as the "bush wives" cannot return to their communities for fear of being rejected, stigmatised, or punished either by individuals or by the community. This was mentioned as a particular problem in the Kailahun District. Reconciliation requires that the atmosphere for the reintegration and acceptance of such persons be created.

Additionally, respondents felt that the government, NGOs and other agencies currently engaged in reconciliation have failed to decentralise the process. There is a general feeling that "Freetown is not Sierra Leone and Sierra Leone is not Freetown." This phrase is used because most interventions only focus on the capital of Freetown and have not been extended to other parts of the country. It is imperative that the coverage of reconciliation projects widens.

There is an urgent need to embark on nationwide sensitisation and public information / education campaigns in order to get more people interested and involved in the reconciliation process. Grassroots consultations should be held with communities and their traditional and religious leaders, various groups and organisations, children, etc. in order to raise awareness. By bringing these stakeholders together, an open forum would be created whereby people can exchange their thoughts on how they want to proceed with the reconciliation process.

Many respondents also indicated the need for agents of reconciliation and conflict resolution in every community not only to settle conflicts but also to identify early warning signs of new conflict and to ensure that they are addressed properly.

E) The Role of Religion and Tradition:

The religious leaders in Sierra Leone have played a major role in the restoration of peace. However, it was noted during the consultations and workshops that in certain districts, conflicts exist amongst the religious leaders themselves. These leaders must learn to live and work together for the sake of reconciliation. As indicated by the Women's Forum in its response: "There is need for greater interaction between religious leaders of all faiths so that concerted action can be taken on issues." Obtaining the continuous commitment of the religious leaders to the reconciliation process is widely recognised as a prerequisite for its success.

Traditional leaders should be encouraged to become major stakeholders in the reconciliation process, since tradition still plays an important role in the lives of most people in Sierra Leone.

Reconciliation activities should be initiated and implemented at the community level by the government and other major stakeholders such as international and local NGOs. However, these activities should build upon local religious and traditional practices so as not to duplicate existing efforts or seem to “reinvent the wheel”.

F) The Role of Civil Society, Oversight Institutions and Media:

The reconciliation process cannot be a success without the support and participation of Sierra Leone civil society. Major civil society groups such as women’s organisations, youth groups, etc. should step up their involvement and be the force that helps to drive the process.

However, the answers to the questionnaires and the outcomes of the workshops reveal the lack of a very strong coalition of NGOs to promote, protect and “own” the peace and reconciliation process. This lack of cohesion and co-ordination is seen as a significant obstacle to reconciliation. Reasons were also offered as to why civil society is not functioning on the level that it should be functioning. These reasons include weak capacity-building initiatives, lack of transparency and accountability, as well as a lack of understanding among the public about the role of civil society. As the Network on Collaborative Peace Building Sierra Leone mentioned in its responses: “Efforts at peace building and reconciliation must be co-ordinated to avoid duplication of efforts and resource wastage.”

Many oversight institutions are considered to be ineffective and public confidence in these institutions is very low. Efforts should be made to ensure the accountability and transparency of institutions such as the Anti-Corruption Commission, the NCDHR and the Office of the Ombudsman.

Regarding the media, the freedom of expression and press is fairly limited and constitutional change is needed. In addition, public confidence in the media is fairly low. Many see the media as being biased. One way to improve confidence is for the media to engage the public on important national issues.

G) Good Governance:

In the process of reconciling the various individuals, groups, communities, government, etc., it is important continuously to promote a culture of good governance. This includes: respect for the principles of human rights; regular free and fair elections; freedom of expression; the fight against corruption; decentralisation; equitable distribution of facilities and resources; and a well functioning judiciary. These issues have been listed by most of the consulted organisations and stakeholders as some of the major antecedents and factors responsible for the conflict in Sierra Leone. Today, bad governance is still perceived as an obstacle to reconciliation.

As the Evangelical Fellowship of Sierra Leone stated in its response to the questionnaire:

“A combination of bad governance, corruption, and injustice is preventing the conditions for lasting reconciliation and sustainable development to be satisfied.”

Several aspects of good governance have been discussed during the consultations and workshops on reconciliation held by the Commission. Many of these were also discussed during the Thematic Hearings of the Commission. These aspects of governance include: 1) the separation of powers; 2) the inclusion of civilians; 3) the management of resources; and 4) the role of the security forces.

1) *Separation of Powers:*

The collapse of governmental institutions is one of the factors that led to the civil war. There has been a serious erosion of constitutional authority and independence, which calls for the redefinition of roles for the various organs of government, Parliament, the executive and the judiciary.

Overall, many participants in the workshops singled out the need for more transparency, the need for a stronger and more organised opposition, the centralisation of power and the lack of qualified personnel. As mentioned in the responses from Care International: “At village/community levels, let the people get justice. Let there be transparency and accountability. Let chiefs and government functionaries be sincere and honest. Remove all the man-made obstacles that will obstruct the flow of justice.”

2) *Inclusion of Civilians:*

The marginalisation of women and youth in politics and in the decision-making process, sectionalism, tribalism, nepotism, and the marginalisation of rural areas are all perceived as obstacles to reconciliation. Regarding women, particular attention was drawn to customary law and practices that limit the role of the women in society. Regarding youth, attention was drawn to the high unemployment rate. A similar affirmative action policy recommended for women should also be adopted for youth. Another problem facing youth is their lack of willingness to engage in politics. To address this problem, political parties and political institutions should accommodate greater participation for youth and women, including the occupation of key positions by these groups.

Rural areas have been forgotten and neglected for generations by the government. People in remote areas often relate more to neighbouring countries than to Sierra Leone. Reconciliation among people living in these areas will be difficult if there is a lingering feeling of neglect. As mentioned previously, there is a strong need for the decentralisation of state services.

The lack of engagement in the political process is a problem that plagues all sectors of society. It was also noted that there is a lack of political will to broaden it. Continuous public education nationwide on the tenets of democracy and civic responsibility is necessary. Citizens should also be encouraged to contest presidential, parliamentary, and local elections.

3) *Management of Resources:*

The poor socio-economic living conditions of most Sierra Leoneans are perceived as a serious obstacle to reconciliation. These conditions include a lack of basic infrastructure such as electricity, clean water supply, health care, schools, roads, housing, sanitation, income generating facilities, etc. This is generally linked to the bad management of resources, minerals and others.

More control and accountability mechanisms need to be put into place and existing mechanisms need to be reinforced and made more transparent.

The fight against corruption needs to be intensified and corrupt practices need to be exposed fearlessly and vigorously.

4) *The Role and Perception of the Security Forces*

In order for reconciliation to be fostered at the national level, the public must have confidence in the security forces. In the eyes of some people, the Army and police are seen as those who betrayed the nation and the people. The relations between civilians and the military must be addressed and improved from the national level downwards.

H) The Role of the Government:

The lack of commitment on the part of the government and politicians to reconciliation activities is seen as an obstacle to the process. The responsibility of the government to ensure the existence of peace and stability for her people and the entire nation requires its active participation and contribution to the process of reconciliation. Since the government is seen as the primary stakeholder in the reconciliation process, one of its major responsibilities is to ensure the provision of funds and other logistical support.

I) External factors:

In a somewhat shorter discussion than those that ensued around other themes, it became clear that the war in Liberia and the instability in the wider West African sub-region are also perceived as obstacles to reconciliation in Sierra Leone.

TRC



Members of the Warrior Dance Group, comprising combatants from all the factions in the war, perform at the TRC National Reconciliation Ceremony on 6 August 2003. The performances of the dance group embody the positive spirit of reconciliation that is required throughout Sierra Leone.

COMMUNITY-BASED RECONCILIATION

121. Community-based reconciliation is one of the central focuses of the Commission's activities on reconciliation. As witnessed in the extracts from hearings on reconciliation provided earlier in this chapter, in order for reconciliation to be sustainable between a victim and a perpetrator the ongoing support of the community is necessary.
122. The Commission is of the opinion that the organisation of reconciliation ceremonies at the end of the hearings, the daily marks of respect for the dead, the establishment of monuments and the organisation of common prayers at mass graves were not only important for the individuals concerned, but also for the entire communities in which they took place. These TRC initiatives laid the foundation for future reconciliation activities.
123. In this light and also considering that reconciliation is a long-term process, the Commission has started a nationwide programme on community-based reconciliation. The programme will continue after the end of the mandate of the TRC. The Commission has partnered with the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone, comprising of both Christian and Muslim groups. The Commission is grateful to the UNDP Country Office in Sierra Leone and to the UNDP Bureau for Conflict Prevention and Recovery for the funding of this programme. At the time of writing it is projected to last for nine months, having started in October 2003. The Commission was careful not to repeat the mistakes made during the preparatory phase with the setting up of the District Support Committees.
124. The new programme allows all chiefdoms in the country to organise reconciliation activities according to the wishes and the needs of the people. The programme comprises three steps, the first two steps having been put in place by the Commission with the Inter-Religious Council and UNDP. The implementation of the last step is left to the Inter-Religious Council and UNDP.

Step 1: Training of Trainers

The Commission selected 14 of its former statement-takers to become district reconciliation officers, while the Inter-Religious Council selected one co-ordinator per district. These 28 representatives received training on several reconciliation issues during a three-day workshop in Freetown from 14 to 16 October 2003. Training was given on the concepts of reconciliation; the role of religion and tradition; the role of women and children; comparative perspectives from other countries; lessons learnt from work with ex-combatants; the trauma of victims and perpetrators; and challenges to the reconciliation process.

Step 2: District Workshops on Reconciliation

The next step in the programme was the organisation of workshops on reconciliation in every district and in the Western Area, which brought together representatives of all the chiefdoms, religious leaders, representatives from NGOs and CBOs, as well as victims' and ex-combatants' organisations. All the workshops took place between 10 and 20 November 2003. The choice of participants respected gender balance. This was, however, unsuccessful in some districts, where women were under-represented. The requirement for balance between the two main religions was more or less respected.

The participants were invited to reflect on what reconciliation means to them; the nature of the main conditions and challenges to reconciliation; the problems affecting some particular chiefdoms; and the kind of reconciliation activities that should be developed in the chiefdoms. The outcome of these workshops will be described below.

Step 3: District Support Committees

Every workshop resulted in the election of members of a District Support Committee that will implement the programme under the guidance of the Inter-Religious Council's district co-ordinators. The Committees are composed of one representative per chiefdom, as well as representatives of NGOs and victims' organisations.

These Committees will receive a modest Reconciliation Fund, which will allow them to support reconciliation activities in every chiefdom and community on the basis of the needs and wishes of the people. The Committees will start with sensitisation in the chiefdoms. They will launch appeals for proposals on reconciliation activities and meet once a month to select successful proposals. They will also participate in the implementation of the selected proposals.

125. During the workshops, many ideas were proposed on which kinds of activities should be developed in order to promote reconciliation. These suggestions will guide the District Support Committees in their future work. The suggestions can be divided into the following eight categories: 1) traditional activities; 2) religious activities; 3) commemoration/symbolic activities; 4) sports; 5) cultural/artistic activities; 6) other social activities; 7) joint economic activities; and 8) activities that promote truth telling and reconciliation, specifically:

- 1) **Traditional Activities:** traditional secret society rituals and dances; cleansing ceremonies; and pouring of libation, etc.
- 2) **Religious Activities:** religious gatherings of Muslims and Christians; religious lectures; open air prayers; fasting; building places of worship.
- 3) **Commemoration / Symbolic Activities:** holding memorial services; exhumations; and erecting monuments, etc.
- 4) **Sporting Activities:** games and inter-area sports with the amalgamated chiefdoms, etc.
- 5) **Cultural/Artistic Activities:** film shows; concerts; storytelling; song and drama; and cultural festivities, etc.
- 6) **Other Social Activities:** feasting; reciprocal community visits; gatherings; inter marriages; and the formation of women's groups, etc.
- 7) **Joint Economic Activities:** establishment of market and skills training centres in various chiefdoms; repairing/brushing of feeder roads; communal farm activities; and formation of co-operative societies ("commonly known as osusus").
- 8) **Activities to Promote Truth Telling and Reconciliation:** establishment of reconciliation committees in the various districts, sensitisation on various topics including drug use and sexual violence; and panel discussions.

126. The District Support Committees finally worked out guidelines for the reconciliation activities that should be developed in the chiefdoms. The guidelines can be summarised in four simple points, as follows:
- a. Sensitisation activities on reconciliation and the TRC - IRC/SL programme need to take place in all chiefdoms and sections and involve all stakeholders.
 - b. Since activities should be based on the culture and tradition of the people, traditional and religious leaders need to play a prominent and active role in this process.
 - c. The reconciliation activities should consider the specific problems of victims and ex-combatants. Accordingly, all activities should be geared to reducing stigma, promoting joint activities, including women and children who have suffered from the greatest of atrocities, etc.
 - d. Reconciliation activities should be decentralised to the greatest possible extent. There should be activities designed by and tailored to each village, section and chiefdom of the country.


CONCLUSION

127. Reconciliation is unfinished business in Sierra Leone. The Commission has consolidated the foundations laid by the NGOs and community-based groups whose important work facilitated the original return of so many children and ex-combatants to their home communities. The Commission has also created momentum towards reconciliation by creating space for dialogue between divided communities and facilitating encounters between victims and perpetrators. Several important initiatives have been described in this chapter.
128. Other stakeholders now need to move the process even further forward. The major catalyst for reconciliation ought to be the government. In particular, the Government of Sierra Leone should not let up in its efforts to improve the material conditions of victims and their communities all over the country. As witnesses repeatedly and rhetorically asked the TRC during its public hearings: "what is the value of reconciliation on an empty stomach?" Only with enhanced efforts towards crucial human development goals will the government begin to satisfy the appetite of all stakeholders in Sierra Leone to see sustainable reconciliation.

CHAPTER EIGHT

National Vision for Sierra Leone

TRC




Stamp design by Mohamed Bockarie, submitted to the National Vision for Sierra Leone, a project of the TRC.

CHAPTER EIGHT

National Vision for Sierra Leone

Introduction

1. Truth and Reconciliation Commissions look to the lessons of the turbulent past in order to build a peaceful future. Only by doing so can such commissions develop recommendations to address the problems that cause conflicts. The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) decided that looking to the past was not enough to enable it to make recommendations that were relevant, robust and would capture the imagination of Sierra Leoneans. The future society that the recommendations are designed to achieve has to be properly understood and described; in short, it has to be “envisioned”. This future society or “vision for a future Sierra Leone” is the prescription. It is the kind of society we wish to build here in Sierra Leone. It is set out in this unique chapter of the TRC report in the form of the National Vision for Sierra Leone. The recommendations in this report aim to help translate the vision into reality.



Mohamed Bockarie, a youth in his late 20s, is a stamp-maker by trade. He created this stamp for the National Vision for Sierra Leone, proclaiming the message: “IT’S TRUE THE WAR IS OVER – WELCOME TO NEW SIERRA LEONE”. Inside the map of the country is a crowd of men, women and children cheering together. They are following a figure who is striding forwards, bearing the national flag.

Extract from **"My Sierra Leone"**
By the RUF Prisoners at Pademba Road Prison

MY SIERRA LEONE, a new chapter and era has opened
With awareness at every door
We must not let go
Because we've known the causes of our woes
It keeps us conscious and awake at all times
The past must remain the past
With the past we know the present
And combined we make the future
Now is the time to move forward, ever but only with oneness
Our mistakes have opened the doors of discoveries
And our discoveries must lead to recoveries

BACKGROUND TO THE NATIONAL VISION

2. Early in its mandate, the TRC decided to facilitate the construction of a "vision" that would act as a "roadmap" to work towards the needs of post-conflict Sierra Leone. The question that gave rise to the National Vision project was: What does the TRC envisage for Sierra Leone after 11 years of war?



Patrick Sinnah, an artist in his 30s, submitted this painting of 13 faces looking to the future: a bright new day, good roads and shining streetlamps, flourishing natural resources and education for all. The faces represent the twelve districts and Freetown, while the green, white and blue colours of the national flag signify strength in unity and pride in being Sierra Leonean.

3. In particular the TRC set out to gauge the expectations of Sierra Leoneans in the context of existing initiatives being undertaken by the Government and the international community. The TRC would then be in a position to assess whether such initiatives could fulfil the hopes of the people of Sierra Leone.
4. This strategy required the Commission to get a sense of the expectations, hopes and aspirations of the people of Sierra Leone. The TRC would need to reach out to individuals in all spheres of society – hence the requirement for a national campaign to gather inputs and contributions towards a national vision. The TRC would then compare and contrast these inputs with what was realisable under current plans and initiatives. Ideally the TRC recommendations would address the lacunas and fill the gaps.

THE CALL FOR CONTRIBUTIONS

5. The TRC decided to provide a platform for individual Sierra Leoneans to express their expectations and aspirations. The Commission saw the creation of a National Vision as an inspirational project in which all Sierra Leoneans, young and old from all different backgrounds, could participate. One means soliciting input was a call to the public for their ideas and contributions.
6. Judge Laura Marcus-Jones, the Deputy Chairperson of the TRC, launched the “Call for Contributions to the National Vision for Sierra Leone” at a press conference at TRC Headquarters on 17 September 2003. On behalf of the Commission, Judge Marcus-Jones invited Sierra Leoneans to set out their hopes for a future conflict-free Sierra Leone.
7. The TRC did not limit the form or scope of contributions. The public were invited to make their contributions in any form they wished, including by way of essays, poems, slogans, songs, drama, paintings or photographs. The TRC suggested that contributions may:
 - o Describe the kind of society the contributor would like to live in;
 - o Suggest how to make Sierra Leone a better place to live in;
 - o Set out the contributor’s hopes and aspirations for Sierra Leone;
 - o Describe where the contributor would like to see Sierra Leone in five or ten years; or
 - o Provide anything creative that inspires peace and unity – and pride in being Sierra Leonean.
8. The TRC advertised its campaign in newspapers, on the radio and in leaflets distributed around Freetown and in the provinces. It was also announced that selected contributions might be included in the final report of the TRC, displayed nationally and internationally in an exhibition, or published as part of a collection in a separate book.

A NATIONAL VISION FOR SIERRA LEONE



A CALL FOR CONTRIBUTIONS BY THE TRC

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) seeks contributions from members of the public to assist the TRC to build a National Vision for Sierra Leone. Contributions may:

- DESCRIBE THE KIND OF SOCIETY THE CONTRIBUTOR WOULD LIKE TO LIVE IN.
- SUGGEST HOW TO MAKE SIERRA LEONE A BETTER PLACE TO LIVE IN.
- SET OUT THE CONTRIBUTOR'S HOPES AND ASPIRATIONS FOR SIERRA LEONE.
- DESCRIBE WHERE THE CONTRIBUTOR WOULD LIKE TO SEE SIERRA LEONE IN 5 OR 10 YEARS.
- DEVISE SLOGANS FOR A NATIONAL VISION.
- SUPPLY POEMS, SONGS, PAINTINGS OR PHOTOGRAPHS THAT SYMBOLISE THE NEW SIERRA LEONE.
- PROVIDE ANYTHING CREATIVE THAT INSPIRES PEACE AND UNITY - AND PRIDE IN BEING SIERRA LEONEAN.

Selected and creative contributions will be used in the **Report** of the TRC and the author/ creator will be accredited. Selected contributions may also form part of a larger collection that may be published in a separate **book**. Contributions may also be used in an **exhibition** that will be put on display throughout Sierra Leone and around the world.

Contributions must reach the TRC by Friday **12 November 2003** and may be **delivered** or **posted** to:

The National Vision Project, TRC, Brookfields Hotel, Jomo Kenyatta Rd, New England, Freetown, Sierra Leone.

Contributions may also be **emailed** or **faxed** to the TRC.
The contributions may be collected from the TRC on 28 November
2003

YOUR VISION. YOUR FUTURE.


RESPONSE TO THE CALL FOR CONTRIBUTIONS

9. Over the course of two months, the TRC received over 250 contributions representing the efforts of over 300 individuals. The TRC and its Commissioners were overwhelmed by the effort, time and resources that so many Sierra Leoneans devoted to preparing their contributions. Among the contributors are men and women of all ages, backgrounds, religions and regions, including adults and children; artists and laymen; amputees, ex-combatants and prisoners. The contributions include written and recorded essays, slogans, plays and poems; paintings, etchings and drawings; sculptures, wood carvings and installations.



Kabie Farama, a youth injured in the war, submitted this powerful, colourful two-part vision of reconciliation in action. In the upper half of the sketch, a perpetrator shoots at a victim. In the lower half, the victim joins hands and dances together with the perpetrator, who has given up his gun.

This picture is an inspirational invitation to all Sierra Leoneans who were affected by the war to take part in the process of reconciliation.



Sidikie Bangura, an unemployed carpenter in his 30s, submitted his vision for a future capital of Sierra Leone in the form of a three-dimensional model made of wood and metal. In the “Future of Freetown”, Sidikie renovates the current road system, where only 8% of the mostly pothole-ridden roads are paved and the traffic lights don’t work. Sidikie uses his imagination to supply Freetown with viable transport options in the form of overpasses and a cable car to ease congestion. He also capitalises on some of Freetown’s more successful aspects by building on the modern Sam Bangura building to create a whole central district of skyscrapers. In each of the four corners is located an important civic structure: a school, a hospital, a market and a warehouse for agricultural produce. The much-vaunted and long-awaited bridge to Lungi Airport stretches off to the north. Finally, the railway line is revitalised, bringing the innovations of the future capital to all regions of the country.

10. The TRC even received a sea-worthy boat called the "Future Boat", painted in the national colours of green, white and blue. The two creators described their contribution in the following terms:

“We built this boat as an inspiration to young people to develop themselves. This is to let the people of Sierra Leone know that they as carpenters can do something to develop Sierra Leone.”

- Ibrahim Bangura and Tejan Suma

*“If you look closely you will see the drums have been rolled out.
Drumming has actually started with the dancers in joyous mood.
This indicates the celebration of the peace
that has been achieved in Sierra Leone
with the hope of prosperity accompanying it.”*

Description of the painting “Celebration Time” by El-Denis

11. While contributors worked separately, a number of common themes and forms emerged. Although the TRC asked Sierra Leoneans to speak about the future, the majority of contributions addressed the future by making reference to the past. Many of the contributions included common motifs, such as: the map or outline of Sierra Leone; the scales of justice; the colours of the national flag; the words “peace”, “unity” and “love”; references to Sierra Leone’s natural resources; and images of houses. Some of the contributions set out prerequisites for a peaceful and prosperous Sierra Leone in the years ahead, while others point to the severe problems facing our society today. They serve as signposts for the future; signposts that we ignore at our peril.
12. Most of all, the contributions show what Sierra Leone can be. They show the enormous potential that exists in this country – potential that must be harnessed positively and productively. They point to the need for basic respect and tolerance amongst all human beings. The contributions amply demonstrate that Sierra Leone can and must reach for new heights.
13. The National Vision has provided an exciting opportunity for individual Sierra Leoneans to contribute their ideas and talent to the process of peace and reconciliation. Through the National Vision, Sierra Leoneans of all ages and backgrounds can claim their own citizenship space in the new Sierra Leone and make their contributions to the country’s cultural and national heritage.

*Crowd: “A child cannot be thrown into a house on fire
because he set that house on fire.
They are our brothers and sisters and we accept their apology.”*
- in “Reconciliation – the Way Out” by Ernest and Julius Mannah

THE LAUNCH OF THE NATIONAL VISION EXHIBIT

14. The National Vision Exhibit was launched on 10 December 2003 at the National Stadium in Freetown, Sierra Leone. The Chairperson of the TRC, Bishop Joseph Humper, officially opened the Exhibit with these words:

“The Vision should not stop with this Exhibition. In fact it must live beyond the life of the TRC. Each contributor, as indeed each Sierra Leonean, has a role to play in his or her own sphere in advancing the causes of peace and unity. Each one of you has shown your love for your country. You have demonstrated your courage and your energy to bring peace and unity to all corners of the land. Each one of you gives me enormous hope that the future of Sierra Leone is indeed a bright one... There is much work to be done to build this country. We must start this work now.”

*“The journey of a hundred years begins with a single step.
Our beloved country has been moving along the road
to total liberation since the colonial days”.*

- from “Let us Come Together with Love to Solve the Problems of Sierra Leone”, an 83-page visionary essay

By the RUF Prisoners at Pademba Road Prison

Salone Pikin By Emmanuel Bryma Momoh

I heard the cry of 'Salone pikin'
being conscripted
'Salone pikin' raped, killed
Were they not forced to drink in
human skulls?
Oh 'Salone pikin'
Where is your future?
Sweet Salone
Now I can see the future clearly
One Salone
'Salone pikin' disarmed
'Salone pikin' now a doctor
'Salone pikin' save lives
Sweet Salone

Aged in his mid-20s,
**Emmanuel Bryma
Momoh**
works as a
human rights officer
for UNAMSIL, based
in Koidu Town.
He writes poetry for a
hobby. He wrote
“Salone Pikin”,
which in Krio means
“*Sierra Leone’s Child*”,
to commemorate the
many children affected
by the violence in
Sierra Leone.

15. Over 400 individuals, many of them contributors, attended the launch. The event featured selected contributions and each contributor received a “Recognition of Contribution” certificate. When the TRC first decided to award prizes to the National Vision contributions, the TRC projected one overall winner and two runners-up, but the excellence of so many contributions in many different forms demanded that there be winners and runners-up in a variety of categories. The TRC awarded winners and runners-up in six categories and 30 certificates of Honourable Mention were issued. For a full list of contributors, winners, runners-up and recipients of honourable mention awards, please see the Appendix.

**MY NATIONAL VISION FOR SIERRA LEONE
A RENAISSANCE SIERRA LEONE
By Bishop Joseph C. Humper, TRC Chairperson**

At every stage of a country’s development, people are called upon to set out their dreams for the future of the nation. That time has come for Sierra Leone. There is the popular saying that “A people without vision the nation perish.” Now is the moment for all peace-loving citizens to make a contribution towards A NATIONAL VISION FOR SIERRA LEONE. Adults, youth and children have a singular responsibility and privilege to share with the nation and the international community their visions for this country.

I seize this opportunity to articulate my VISION FOR
A SIERRA LEONEAN RENAISSANCE.

1. I envision that a revived Sierra Leone, born out of the ashes of a reckless and senseless civil conflict, shall become active and committed to the establishment of genuine peace.
2. I long for a nation where people have trust and confidence in their nation’s leadership. The leadership must know that the trust and confidence of the people is not automatic; it is earned through honesty and lost through corruption and greed.
3. I would like to see the nation’s citizens, and particularly those vested with great responsibility, look to enrich the nation and its least privileged before they enrich themselves.
4. I envisage a nation in which the people are courageous enough to confess and forgive. Too often we blame others for our ills. It is time we looked within. Not a single Sierra Leonean can claim that there is no need for him or her to confess and forgive. We are all responsible for allowing our beloved country to slide into chaos and mayhem. Only when we have dismissed all pretence can we truly move forward.

THE NATIONAL VISION EXHIBIT AT THE NATIONAL MUSEUM

16. The National Vision Exhibit opened at the National Museum in Freetown, Sierra Leone on 15 December 2003. To satisfy the momentum that the Exhibit had generated, a voluntary National Vision Team, comprised of nationals and internationals, was established. The Team conducted guided tours of the Exhibit at the National Museum every weekday during January and February 2004. Members of the Team promoted awareness of the National Vision through leaflets, presentations, meetings and radio shows. An article published in *The Democrat* on 17 December 2003 wrote of the National Vision: "This is crucial to our quest for lasting peace and sustainable development".
17. On 22 December 2003, the President of the Republic of Sierra Leone, Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah and the Minister of Education, Dr. Alpha Wurie, undertook a televised tour of the Exhibit and publicly pledged their support for the National Vision and the prospect of a national tour. Between 20 December 2003 and early February 2004, more than 1,000 people signed their names and wrote their comments in a register of visitors to the Exhibit. Comments and excerpts from this "National Vision Guest Book" are reproduced below:

Rajiv Bendre, Director, British Council
"A moving and uplifting exhibition"

Mary Margaret Dineen, National Democratic Institute
"Inspirational representation of the positive human potential for peace, harmony and development Sierra Leone deserves. Bravo and thank you"

Honourable Chief Hindowa from Bo
"Congratulations to the Vision. I think this is what Sierra Leoneans need. I support that the vision move to the provinces so that every Sierra Leonean will include in the Vision for Sierra Leone"

Edmund Makiu, UNICEF
"This is the best Sierra Leone has ever had. Sierra Leoneans need to work hard to meet the wonderful vision"

Moisia Kawa
"I wish to see this programme included in the school curriculum of Sierra Leone in order to educate our young students about their role in the development of our beloved country"

Claudine A. E. Davies, Lemount College
"I'm amazed at the terribly exceptional talent our country possesses in people. Sierra Leone, indeed, has a bright future"

David Minah, Sierra Leone Government
"The exhibits are highly moving and they depict what we've been through. Reconciliation is the way forward and we should all join in it so that Sierra Leone can move forward to a brighter future"

Mark S. Koroma
"I really find it beyond comprehension why I was so late in partaking of such things as a Sierra Leonean. But to be justice, I am very much grateful of what I saw my brothers and sisters did and I hope to see more."

Mrs. Florence Okrap-Smart, Lemount College

"A laudable venture which needs to come to fruition with the help of everyone"

AR Hassan-King

"I congratulate the TRC and all the contributors. The nation has spoken"

18. By the end of January 2004, more than 600 school children had visited the Exhibit and taken part in group discussions on the significance of the National Vision to Sierra Leone's future. The National Vision Team also arranged tours for Members of Parliament, government officials, ex-combatants and amputees. Many UNAMSIL peacekeeping troops also visited the exhibit.

I Saw

By Mohamed Sekoya

I saw the atrocities in Sierra Leone

Yes I saw

I saw the people running for their lives from cities to towns,
towns to villages, villages to the bush

Yes I saw

I saw rebels, Sierra Leone Army and Kamajors
shooting in the streets, killing, attacking and looting

Yes I saw

I saw children crying for food

Yes I saw

I saw abomination between man and woman, man and man,
woman and woman, adults and children

Yes I saw

I saw a victim helping a victim

Yes I saw

I saw the United Nations peacekeeping forces and I was happy

Yes I saw

I saw the rebels coming home for peace

Yes I saw

I pray never to see again what I saw in my beloved Sierra Leone.


Mohamed Sekoya, a draftsman in his mid-20s, read aloud his poem "I Saw" at the launch of the National Vision Exhibit. In this piece, he uses the formula of repetition, a means of emphasis and affirmation in the Sierra Leone oral tradition.

THE NATIONAL VISION AND TRANSITIONAL SIERRA LEONE

19. The National Vision has added considerably to debates around Sierra Leone's future. The National Vision can continue to have a positive influence on the key areas of development described in the following paragraphs:

- Artistic and scholarly expression: The National Vision offers an interactive forum for traditional and contemporary expression. It encourages artistic and scholarly drive and talent through individual recognition.
- Awareness and acknowledgement of the war: The National Vision is a forum for all voices to be heard, engaged with and preserved. It emphasises that the war occurred because of specific problems in society that must be addressed for change to take place and peace to become permanent. The National Vision has made these important messages uniquely accessible to all, including vulnerable groups such as children, the illiterate and those traumatised by the war.
- Self-empowerment: By displaying individual contributions to Sierra Leoneans and the international community, the National Vision affirms and validates the voices and talents of individual Sierra Leoneans. The Vision affirms the claim expressed in the contributions that Sierra Leone is capable of moving towards a peaceful and democratic future. It reiterates the need for individual Sierra Leoneans to participate in this process.
- Unity: The National Vision unites victims, ex-combatants, prisoners and free citizens of all ages, backgrounds, religions and regions under one common purpose: to ensure a better future for Sierra Leone. In this way, the National Vision fosters a new unified pride in being Sierra Leonean.
- Healing: The National Vision provides a space for personal and communal healing for its contributors and for those engaging with the contributions, in a country where conventional forms of therapy are largely inaccessible and unfamiliar.
- Democracy-building: The National Vision is a uniquely democratic, non-partisan and interactive civic space representing individuals regardless of age, background, region or religion. It serves as forum for open and active dialogue in Sierra Leone on political and social issues of the past, present and future.
- Reconciliation: As a public space, the National Vision Exhibit physically brings together different stakeholders in the same room, thus initiating the process of reconciliation through dialogue. Many contributions serve as acts of reconciliation on the part of contributors, as they express contributors' willingness to reconcile and invite others to do the same.

- Reparation: By “memorialising” the harsh realities of the past, the National Vision serves as a form of symbolic reparation to Sierra Leoneans, to whom public forms of acknowledgement reinforce community bonds.
- Never Again: By examining the pre-conflict and conflict periods in Sierra Leone and envisioning a better future, the contributions argue publicly that one cannot look forward without looking back. They express the desire of Sierra Leoneans that the past should not be repeated and that every Sierra Leonean should participate in ensuring this culture of “never again”.



Nine Revolutionary United Front Party (RUF) detainees held at Pademba Road Prison for over four years

submitted a range of art and craftwork to the National Vision. They also jointly wrote an eighty-three page visionary statement. This painting (above left) depicts a shackled man, who is not, however, in a prison. This man could be any Sierra Leonean who for years has been shackled by poverty, bad governance and division, despite Sierra Leone’s plentiful resources, as symbolised by the blue and green background. Only when this man frees himself of these man-made shackles may he move towards the bright dawn of a better future. To do so, the prisoners write: “Let us come together in love and solve Sierra Leone’s problems”.

SIERRA LEONE VISION 2025: "SWEET SALONE"

20. "No lasting achievement is possible without a vision and no vision can become real without action and responsibility." With these words, the President of Sierra Leone, Alhaji Dr. Ahmad Tejan Kabbah, launched "Vision 2025" on 15 March 2001 in the face of the human, institutional and financial challenges that have confronted Sierra Leone after the eleven-year war. A government venture, Vision 2025 was initiated by the Ministry of Development and Economic Planning and implemented by a National Core Team of Experts including leaders from the areas of culture, tourism, industry, gender, the economy, agriculture and political science. The UN Development Programme Sierra Leone provided financial and institutional backing while Africa Futures, a regional project of UNDP, provided technical support.

"The kind of society our organisation will like to see the citizen of the Nation (Sierra Leone) live in, is where some one is some-body and no-one is no-body; where every individual is respected".

- from "Youth Movement and People's Rights Contribution to the National Vision", **Wurie Mamadu Tamba Barrie**

Extract from
"The New Sierra Leone"
By Senessie Rogers

A Sierra Leone, I hope and pray
Fervently that one fine day
Will grow plump ripe, like a fat
Placid unassuming mother
That'll breast-feed children
Of the four comers of the earth

A transparent and tolerant
mistress
That'll teach her little children
The old tradition that, any time
they sit down
To eat, they must remember that
There're others coming after them
That may be equally, if not
More hungry and thirsty
A selfless Sierra Leone
A sweet Sierra Leone

*"I dream of a Sierra Leone
that will be worthy of the
title of the Athens of West
Africa; a land flowing with
milk and honey, not one
obsessed with silk and
money; a promised land
and a land of promise,
where people will come
running to seek pastures
greener, instead of running
away from our
rotten infrastructure"*

Extract from
**"My National Vision
for Sierra Leone"**
By Chinsia E. Caesar

21. Key questions driving Vision 2025 included: What kind of nation do Sierra Leoneans want their country to be? What challenges must be confronted? What are the most appropriate policies and programs? Vision 2025's motto sums up the goals of the initiative: "United People, Progressive Nation, Attractive Country". Vision 2025 aims to replace poverty and underdevelopment with peace, stability and wealth creation in Sierra Leone. To prepare a vision for long-term development that ensures national ownership of the development agenda and promotes a democratic and participatory process, Vision 2025 engaged national and international stakeholders in consultations. A national Steering Committee, headed by the Minister for Development and Economic Planning, organised consultations with students, refugees, internally displaced persons, private institutions, members of government, combatants, paramount chiefs, the national security forces, NGOs and civil society. Methods for soliciting input included radio phone-in conversations, questionnaires, essay competitions, workshops, regional consultations and interviews.

22. The August 2003 publication of Vision 2025 included: a report on the conclusions reached among stakeholders for the way forward; a strategic diagnosis of the country's past and present situation; alternative possibilities for Sierra Leone's future; and suggestions for a national focus and individual and collective responsibility in the national vision. Vision 2025 is to be a "guidepost" for Sierra Leone's future development. Additionally, it is to be a "living document that will be continuously reviewed and adapted to changing scenarios" at home and abroad. The 2003 document proposes the creation of a national "Vision Council", made up of visionary leaders from different sectors, to ensure the implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the activities of Vision 2025.

The National Vision for Sierra Leone and its Complementarity with Vision 2025

23. The TRC's National Vision for Sierra Leone uniquely and effectively complements the Vision 2025 initiative. Vision 2025 is a government policy document that outlines implementing strategies for the development of Sierra Leone over the next 20 years. As the National Vision for Sierra Leone serves as a non-partisan, inter-generational forum for dialogue, it raises awareness around the existence of processes like the one steered by Vision 2025. Indeed, the National Vision encourages individual Sierra Leoneans, especially the youth, to contribute to the dialogue entailed in such processes. The National Vision therefore has great potential to serve as a vehicle for continuing popular input into Vision 2025.

THE WAY FORWARD FOR THE NATIONAL VISION

24. The National Vision for Sierra Leone has gathered increasing momentum nationally and internationally as a nation-building programme. It has attracted the attention of representatives from different sectors of society including human rights activists, politicians, representatives of arts and culture, government, the business community and people in the provinces. Its diverse appeal lies in the fact that it is a peoples' project, not a political project. Moreover it is not time bound.
25. The Commission is of the view that participation in the National Vision project should be expanded. The Commission accordingly recommends to government and civil society stakeholders that the National Vision should become a permanent open, interactive civic space for all stakeholders in Sierra Leone to engage in dialogue through artistic and scholarly expression on political, moral and social issues of the past, present and future.

“I wish for the day when politicians are inducted into politics not for self-aggrandisement and self-assertion, but for genuine patriotic intentions geared towards nation-building. I look forward to a society where freedom of association, speech and movement are amplified so that government is kept on its guard and compelled to be responsible”.

- from an essay by **Sahr Egbinda Juana**

26. To ensure maximum exposure for the National Vision contributions, the Commission recommends that the following activities should take place:
- Further Freetown Exhibits: In order to access as many groups as possible, the Exhibit should be put on display in diverse locations around the capital. Eventually, the National Vision Exhibit should be housed in an appropriate, permanent location that will be an active and interactive site of workshops for different interest groups (women, children, youth, political leaders, etc.) around issues addressed in the contributions.
 - A National Tour: To ensure the visible accessibility of the Exhibit to as many Sierra Leoneans as possible, the National Vision should travel outside of the capital. The National Tour should bring the Exhibit to selected cities and towns in all provinces, where workshops could be held and the continued submission of contributions could be encouraged.

- An International Tour: An international tour would raise awareness around Sierra Leone and the issues discussed in the contributions. It would encourage others to consider applying this paradigm of a National Vision to their own contexts. It would further bring international exposure to the wealth of creative talent in Sierra Leone.
- A Publication: A possible publication would be a book containing photographs of contributions, biographies of contributors and essays by different leaders on reconciliation, national healing and related topics.



Olu Francis Davies is a carpenter from Kenema.

At the centre of his wood carving lie two of the most popular themes in the National Vision: the national flag of Sierra Leone and the scales of justice. The green, white and blue of the flag constitute the only colour on the piece, which emphasises the motto at the base of the carving: “unity is strength”. The other carved words reflect desired objectives for a future Sierra Leone.

27. In order to realise the four activities described above, the Commission recommends that the National Vision fall under the wing of the TRC’s successor body, the proposed National Human Rights Commission (HRC); or alternatively that the National Vision work in close collaboration with the HRC. Pending the formation of the HRC, the Commission recommends that civil society and government commit to keep the National Vision alive and establish a provisional vehicle or structure under which its activities can continue.

28. The Commission accordingly recommends the establishment of an independent Trust to oversee the activities of the project. The National Vision Trust should have independent trustees, representative of the different sectors of society, serving on the body.
29. The Commission notes that the National Vision for Sierra Leone as a project of the TRC must remain true to the founding principles underlying the TRC. As such all future National Vision activities must:
 - serve the preservation of peace, strive for unity and promote healing and reconciliation; and
 - Remain independent and non-partisan. The National Vision should always represent the collective visions of its contributors. It should never be the vision of a particular NGO or the vision of Government or any particular interest group.
30. The Commission notes that the contributors to the National Vision project have handed their contributions to the TRC in trust. The TRC advertisement that called for contributions stated that contributors were entitled to have their contributions returned to them. However the TRC stated publicly (in the advertisement and in its public announcements) that the contributions would be taken on provincial and public tours; and that the contributions would form part of a publication. On this basis the vast majority of contributors have entrusted their works to the TRC in order that such pledges may be realised. The Commission accordingly calls on the TRC's successor body or any provisional National Vision structure to take steps to fulfil these objectives and in particular to ensure that works of the contributors to the National Vision for Sierra Leone:
 - are respected;
 - are properly preserved;
 - receive maximum public exposure and are not kept out of the public eye;
 - are used to further the causes set out in the founding principles;
 - are not used to further any political or commercial interests; and
 - become part of a permanent exhibit in Sierra Leone.



Wilfred Thomas painted his contribution in the form of an eye, underlining vision and transparency. The scales of justice again lie at the centre, as does the flag. Images of a healthy society fill the eye, including classrooms full of children, cultivation of the country's resources in the fields and at sea, paved roads and bridges, modern buildings, and different Sierra Leoneans holding hands in a gesture of reconciliation.

31. The Commission further calls on the TRC's successor body or provisional National Vision structure to strive towards the following objectives:
- promote artistic and scholarly expression in Sierra Leone and recognise artistic and scholarly drive and talent;
 - complement and support the work of like-minded bodies, in particular Vision 2025, and collaborate with such bodies in joint projects;
 - promote awareness and acknowledgement of the war by displaying Sierra Leoneans' visions for the future and encouraging audiences to engage with them and the issues they address;
 - promote unity and reconciliation by encouraging different stakeholders to gather together to discuss the contributions' themes and possible ways to address problems raised;
 - broaden discourse on how to implement, through individual and group actions, solutions to issues raised in the contributions by arranging workshops and conferences;
 - empower individual Sierra Leoneans by serving as a vehicle for individual voices to be heard and engaged with;
 - promote personal and communal healing by continuing to encourage the submission of contributions around the country;
 - ensure that the National Vision for Sierra Leone remains a democratic, non-partisan, interactive and civic space representing all individuals regardless of age, background, region and religion; and
 - encourage the National Vision to serve as a form of symbolic reparation through its status as a memorial.

Extract from
“My Country”
By Mohamed Turay

Beneath forest trees
Lay my country covered with leaves
Trampled on by decades of misrule
Shoved to the bottom of the
world’s pool
Then –

The sunbeam penetrates the earth
Excavating the man-made
unenviable wrath
As the blood-drenched land weeps
The world struggles to make it leap
My country becomes a den

But I dreamt that at dawn
Peace and love cleared the gun
Propelled by unity, focus and
forgiveness
Sierra Leone will again lie in the
garden of bliss.

Extracts from
**“My Vision, My Home,
My Sierra Leone”**
By Ustina More

There’s no place like home,
like Sierra Leone
Where in spite of the family
each struggles alone
Through the squalor of sewage
and refuse that’s prone
To put anyone off from
the place he calls home.

With the prospect of making it
all on our own
We will drag ourselves out of
this poverty zone
We will raise up our hearts and
our voices as one
And we’ll find our way forward
with some National Vision.

Ahmad Saiwo,
of Peace Links Sierra Leone,
submitted this novel “Vision”
painting. He creates the “V”
of “Vision” out of two hands
praying. The “I” is a candle of
peace, wrapped in barbed
wire. The “O” of ‘Vision’
opens up into a rainbow that
reveals the form of Sierra
Leone. People from the four
corners of the country
represent diversity. At the
centre again lie the scales of
justice. In Ahmed’s vision, as
represented by the even
scales, every Sierra Leonean
is equal before the law.



CONCLUSION

32. The TRC cannot claim to have developed a complete vision for a future Sierra Leone. Such a vision must be an ongoing project for all concerned Sierra Leoneans, to which the National Vision for Sierra Leone aims to contribute, as a developing record of the evolution of thoughts on the past and present and on vision for the future. A clear vision for the future of the country provides the objectives towards which we all must strive. It also provides the yardstick for the measurement of our progress.
33. The TRC campaign for a National Vision for Sierra Leone has produced a collection of contributions that form part of Sierra Leone's national heritage. The contributions stand as testimony to what is possible in Sierra Leone. They speak of struggle and hope. The contributions inspire and challenge all of us to rise above the past and to build a better future. Their messages must be taken seriously.

Extract from
“My National Vision for Sierra Leone”
By Chinsia E. Caesar

“I want to see a Sierra Leone in which my people come together purposefully in pursuit of a different kind of national reconciliation... I want to see meaning given to that so-called spirit of love, unity and patriotism that is supposed to keep us together as one people and one country.

I picture myself travelling between Sierra Leone's towns and villages on roads that are free of potholes... I picture myself walking through streets free of swarming dust and overflowing rubbish containers. I want to be free to fill my cup with taps that are running with safe drinking water; free to go out in the evenings under the light of functioning street lamps; free to make use of a power supply that runs for twenty-four hours a day.”



Santos Kallon, a 24-year old victim of the war, is an immensely skilled woodcarver and sculptor. He submitted a wooden statue in the person of a woman to represent his vision for Sierra Leone. On the back of the flag, Santos carved the words that his vision embodies: peaceful, as a woman represents peacetime; proud, as she stands tall with her shoulders back and head held high; patriotic, as she is wearing a cloth in the colours of the national flag; but humble, as her hands are behind her back and her eyes are gently closed. The woman's positioning indicates the wish that all Sierra Leoneans stand together: under one flag, for one Salone.



34. Perhaps most importantly, the National Vision has emphasised the significance of each individual contributor to Sierra Leone. The work of building a new and better Sierra Leone belongs to every stakeholder in Sierra Leone. The individuals who have lent their hopes and dreams for Sierra Leone to this exhibit are actors in the process – as is each visitor to the Exhibit – and as such they are all vehicles for change. The Exhibit is a catalyst and it is up to each individual to ensure that it maximises its potential to effect day-to-day change. In the words of one National Vision contributor, Wurie Mamadu Tamba Barrie:

*“The inspiration is let’s sprint; if we can’t sprint, let’s run;
if we can’t run, let’s walk; if we also can’t walk, then let’s crawl;
but in any way possible, let’s keep on moving.”*

APPENDICES

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