


REPORT



A time for healing

Volume II

VOLUME 2
APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

The Terms of Reference of the Truth and Reconciliation are as follows:

TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. Within six (6) months from the date of the first sitting of the Commission, or within a reasonable period thereafter, to inquire into and record certain political events which occurred in Grenada during the period of 1st January, 1976 to 31st December, 1991, with particular reference to the following:
 - (a) the events leading up to and including those of 13th March, 1979 and repercussions;
 - (b) the shooting deaths of various persons at Plains, Mount Rose and Mount Rich in St. Patrick's during the period 13th March, 1979 to 31st December, 1983;
 - (c) the events leading up to and including those of 19th October 1983 with particular reference to the following:
 - (i) the root causes of the general political turmoil in the State;
 - (ii) the circumstances surrounding the deaths of various persons including the Prime Minister and other Ministers of Government, on what was then referred to as Fort Rupert (now Fort George).
 - (iii) to ascertain as far as it is practicable the identities and total number of persons who lost their lives on Fort Rupert;
 - (iv) the disposal of the bodies of those who lost their lives on Fort Rupert;
 - (d) foreign intervention by armed forces of the United States and the Caribbean in October, 1983.
2. To recommend indemnity to various persons who give what is considered to be truthful evidence at the inquiry
3. Within three (3) months from the date of the last sitting of the Commission for the hearing of evidence or within a reasonable period thereafter, to report and make recommendations on matters relating to the above with particular attention being given to the following objectives:
 - (a) to seek to uncover the truth behind certain political events which occurred in Grenada during the period 1st January 1976 to 31st December, 1991;

- (b) to provide the nation with a proper and comprehensive understanding of those political events as referred to above, so that any mistakes made in the past may not be repeated;
- (c) to provide the nation with an opportunity to become genuinely reconciled and be permanently healed;
- (d) generally to make such recommendations as the Commission may find fit in all the circumstances.

The Chairman of the Commission is Hon. Donald A.B. Trotman, retired High Court Judge.

The other Commissioners are Bishop Schon Goodridge, Anglican Bishop of the Windward Islands and Fr. Mark Haynes, Local Roman Catholic Priest.

The Secretary of the Commission is Ms. Claudette Joseph, Attorney at Law.

The Inquiry shall be held in public, however, the Commissioners shall be entitled to exclude any particular person or persons for the preservation of order for the due conduct of the inquiry or for any other reason.

The Commission urges all persons who may have information relevant to events which took place during the periods under consideration to come forward and to share this information.

The Commission also wishes to advise that persons may submit written memoranda outlining any relevant evidence which such persons might have.

Memoranda must be addressed to the Chairman, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Scott Street, St. George's or may be delivered at the said address at any time between the hours of 8:30 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. Monday to Friday.

Phone numbers are: 435-2962 or 2963

Fax: 435-2964

majority of the members of the TRC were duly put on notice about the difficulties that the Grenada 17 were facing with regard to the TRC process.

Moreover, it must have been obvious to anyone that any *bona fide* TRC Process would require the full co-operation and participation of the Grenada 17. Yet at no time prior to January 31st 2002 did the TRC commissioners or their staff reach out to the Grenada 17 so as to facilitate their participation and hence to make the process complete and meaningful.

Additionally, under the Commission of Inquiry's Act (under which law the TRC was established), the Grenada 17 were entitled to be represented by legal counsel from the very outset. As aforementioned, the Grenada 17 expressed their desire from an early date to be represented before the TRC by legal counsel so as to assist the Commission and to protect their legal interests. So once again the TRC or a clear majority of its members were fully aware of the position of the Grenada 17 with regard to legal representation.

Further, given the nature of the events which took place in Grenada and the well known difficulty of genuine fact finding, in particular with regard to events a generation ago, which stirred up (and still stirs up) so much emotion, a commission charged with the responsibility of discovering the truth was duty bound to ensure that natural justice was fully adhered to at every stage of the process. The Grenada 17 were not and are not free persons who can decide to attend sessions of the TRC at will so as to protect their interest. They faced special difficulties and problems. But no attempt at obtaining practical and reasonable solutions to their difficulties and problems, so as to facilitate the work of the commission, was ever made.

In 2002 the TRC embarked on a series of outreach programmes which involved visiting different communities around Grenada. *Prima facie* this is a laudable idea. But obviously such activities, given that they were held at night, ruled out the participation of the Grenada 17. Again this issue was never addressed. No attempt was made at finding a reasonable and practical solution so that all sides could be put and heard at these various gatherings.

AT LAST: THE TRC RECOGNISES EXISTENCE OF GRENADA 17

It took approximately two years after the Grenada 17 first engaged the TRC process by way of their letter of February 5th 2000 to the two-man committee, and two-thirds of the way through its scheduled six months of hearings, before the TRC first recognised their existence and contacted them.

That contact came on February 4th 2002, via an oral communication, through the Commissioner of Prisons, in which he informed the Grenada 17 that the TRC Commissioners would be visiting the prisons within a matter of hours to take evidence from them. He went on to say that the TRC would like to get volunteers, up to seven volunteers; but that if they did not get volunteers, then they would issue subpoenas.

At best, this was a very unfortunate communication which greatly aggrieved the Grenada 17. And yet the Grenada 17 immediately responded in writing to the Commissioner of Prisons informing him that he should inform the TRC that the Grenada 17 request that any further communication on the matter

of the TRC should be forwarded to their Counsel, Mr Keith Scotland. This letter is herein attached as **Appendix 19**.

It took a further 2½ months or thereabout before the TRC contacted Mr Scotland. In the meantime, the TRC proceedings continued full speed ahead including the continuation of the community outreach programme.

And yet, against this background the Grenada 17 have been reliably informed that at a public forum at Norton's Hall on April 25th 2002, the Chairman of the TRC gave a wholly misleading view of the attitude of the Grenada 17. The Chairman was asked whether any effort had been made by the TRC to involve the Grenada 17 in the process. The Chairman responded that such efforts had indeed been made but that they had proven futile because of the uncooperative attitude of the Grenada 17.

The Grenada 17 have also been informed that at the said Norton Hall forum the Chairman of the TRC was also asked whether the Grenada 17 had ever sent any documents or correspondences to the TRC. The Chairman said that he was unaware of any such documents or correspondences. This sadly brings into issue the very *bona fides* of the TRC personnel. It is incomprehensible that the Chairman of the TRC could, on April 25th 2002, be unaware of the existence of the plenitude of correspondences to the TRC emanating from the Grenada 17. If indeed he was unaware, then, at the very least, that would be an indictment of the competence of his fellow commissioners and/or the quality of their communication with him.

COURT ORDER TO FREE THREE GRENADA 17 MEMBERS AND THE HYSTERICAL RESPONSE OF PRIME MINISTER MITCHELL

On February 14th 2002, based on the aforementioned motion filed on June 28th 2001, the High Court of Justice ordered the release forthwith of three of the Grenada 17 on the grounds that their continued detention was illegal and unconstitutional.

In response to the decision of the High Court the state used administrative means to block the 'forthwith' release of the three and thereafter it obtained a stay of execution from the Court of Appeal.

Within days, the sponsor of the TRC process, P.M. Keith Mitchell, launched a series of vicious attacks against the judiciary for the decision to free the prisoners, and against counsel for taking legal action. The Prime Minister left no one in doubt that his government had no intention of ever freeing any of the prisoners. Indeed, the Prime Minister's tirades could be reasonably interpreted as indicating that his government is prepared to defy the court so as to prevent the Grenada 17 prisoners from regaining their freedom. Before that, during the period that the TRC was in progress, the Prime Minister was in the custom of making negative speeches about the period of the Grenada Revolution, which it is part of the TRC's terms of reference to review; but his conduct following the court's decision was really 'a horse of a different colour'. A document containing excerpts from two of the Prime Minister's speeches from that period and analyses of those statements are attached herein as **Appendix 20**.

The conduct of the sponsor of the TRC confirmed in the minds of many that the TRC was never intended to be a *bona fide* effort to discover the truth and to bring about reconciliation. It confirmed what many had long suspected: that the setting up of the TRC was just a cynical abuse of a laudable and honourable concept with the pure and simple objective of deceiving people.

However, despite the cynicism of the government in its approach to the TRC, it was still possible for something meaningful to come out of the TRC process. This, however, would have required *inter alia* that the TRC deal fairly and reasonably with the concerns of the Grenada 17 and that it ensured that natural justice was adhered to at all times. Instead, the TRC, in practice, dealt with the Grenada 17 prisoners in the same contemptuous manner in which they were dealt with by the two-man committee. They basically ignored the existence of the Grenada 17, dealing with them as 'mere things' only to be called upon as leftovers after others had had their fill. And as demonstrated by the comments of the Chairman of the TRC referred to in paragraphs 47 and 48 above: in the face of all the evidence to the contrary, even before their work has been completed, the TRC has already publicly embarked on a path of blaming the Grenada 17 for the fatal consequences of the extraordinary omission of not involving them in the TRC process from the very outset. This is absurd, and as aforementioned, it brings into issue the very *bona fides* of the TRC.

In light of all the above, one is now forced to ask: What purpose would be served by the Grenada 17 giving evidence literally at the end of the process after months of testimony behind their backs and without them having been represented by counsel so as to test the credibility and veracity of such evidence and to generally assist in uncovering relevant facts?

SOUTH AFRICAN STYLE TRC? ONLY IN NAME

It has been said, first by the government, and also by the TRC itself, that this is a South African style TRC. The only similarity between the two is in name. In South Africa the TRC process was transparent at every step of the way. Even the process of choosing the commissioners was thoroughly transparent. The post of Commissioner was advertised. There were literally thousands of applicants. The applicants were then put through a process during which they were subjected to questioning from a panel so as to test their fitness for the job. And this was done in the full glare of publicity. It was only after that the commissioners were finally chosen. It was therefore in this manner that Archbishop Desmond Tutu became Chairman of the South Africa TRC.

In South Africa the TRC took place on a level playing field. All the principal participants were freed and came from their homes to provide evidence and then they returned to their homes thereafter. In Grenada the government made it clear that with regard to the TRC there would be no such level playing field.

In South Africa the Commission had the power to grant immunities and pardons. In Grenada the Commission is invested with no such power.

THE GRENADA 17 PROPOSE

Having said all of the above it should be clearly stated that the consensus among the Grenada 17 prisoners is that they remain prepared to fully participate in a genuine TRC process, including giving evidence on oath and subjecting themselves to cross-examination. However, this cannot be a substitute for their legal actions both pending in the court and soon to be filed. They therefore propose that the TRC suspend its proceedings and await the completion of the legal process in which the Grenada 17 are engaged. Once this process is concluded the TRC should recommence from scratch. However, the process of recommencing should include the addressing of the concerns of the Grenada 17, in particular their request for state assistance to obtain legal counsel to represent them throughout the entire process, and the recusal of Father Mark Haynes.

The Grenada 17 recognise that there are practical problems related to their proposal. However, they cannot be blamed for this. From the very commencement of the process they have gone the extra mile to ensure that the minimum necessary conditions for the effective functioning of the TRC were brought into existence. They were made to believe that they had a vested interest in the TRC being done properly because the Prime Minister had linked their very liberty to the TRC process. That was one of the main reasons why they went to the lengths that they went in making representations concerning the TRC process; to ensure that the thing was done properly. Their efforts in this regard are borne out by the body of correspondences annexed to this submission. However, the Grenada 17 were contemptuously dismissed or disregarded at every juncture. They therefore cannot now be faulted for insisting that what should have been done from the very beginning should now be done as corrective measures so as to ensure that a fair and meaningful TRC capable of fulfilling its mandate is executed.

Should the TRC for whatever reason reject the proposal herein to suspend and later recommence from scratch, the Grenada 17 request that this submission and all the attachments hereto be included as part of its Final Report. This is without prejudice to any remedy open to the Grenada 17 with regard to the current defective process.

APPENDIX 1

February 5, 2000

Senator Lawrence Joseph,
Attorney General and Minister of Labour,
Father Mark Haynes, Roman Catholic Priest,
Committee Responsible for Organising
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
St. George's.

Dear Sirs,

SUBMISSION TO TWO-MAN COMMITTEE
RESPONSIBLE FOR ORGANISING
THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

1. We, the undersigned, wish to record our support for the setting up and operation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission so as to discover the truth of what happened in October 1983, and to put those events in their correct perspective.
2. We wish to point out that members of the Grenada 17 were the very first to call for a Commission of Inquiry into the tragic events of October 19th 1983. Indeed, in the period October 19-25 1983, concrete steps were taken in this regard. The Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago during that six day period (and for some years thereafter), the late Prime Minister George Chambers, is on record in the Trinidad & Tobago parliament, describing the discussions between the authorities in Trinidad & Tobago and those in Grenada at that time (namely, some members of the Grenada 17), regarding getting a Commission of Inquiry set up in the shortest possible time. The authorities of both countries were keen on getting the Secretary General of the Commonwealth to select the Commissioners for such an Inquiry, and hopefully to head it up himself. Prime Minister Chambers, in his statement to the Trinidad & Tobago parliament, both lamented and condemned the fact that the U.S. Invasion of Grenada brought to an end the efforts to establish a credible, independent, and internationally composed Commission of Inquiry into the events of October 1983.
Additionally, after the Invasion, we communicated our view through our lawyers to those in charge of Grenada in 1984 that a Commission of Inquiry should proceed before the laying of charges against anyone; and that out of the Inquiry should come the decision as to whether anyone should be charged, or not. This, unfortunately, was rejected.
3. We wish to state that we stand willing and ready to fully participate in the proceedings of a 'Truth and Reconciliation Commission', including giving full evidence and facing cross-examination, once it is clear that truth and reconciliation are indeed the objectives of the exercise.
4. We are of the view that if truth and reconciliation are really the objectives behind the exercise, then everyone involved in the setting up of the Commission and its operation should be united in the task of creating the most favourable conditions possible to ensure that truth emerges and reconciliation is achieved.

5. We submit to you that the probability of truth emerging would be adversely affected if the Commission were to operate in a context in which we are behind bars.

We so submit for the following reasons:

- a) It is notorious fact that the events of October 1983, 16½ years later, still stir up tremendous passion amongst our people. Many, including people from outside Grenada, have noted that Grenadians discuss the events of 1983 as if they took place last week. This was particularly evident in October-November 1999, immediately following the televised broadcast of the Interview that Mr. Leslie Pierre conducted with four members of the Grenada 17.
We submit that the fundamental reason for such currency and immediacy and passion is that, in the minds of the overwhelming majority of the people, decisions and debate about the events are firmly linked to the issue as to whether we should or should not be freed.
Therefore, once we remain behind bars while the Commission is in operation, no matter what the intentions of the government, or your committee, or the commissioners of the TRC itself, inevitably the focus of the inquiry would be: should they, or should they not be freed? Are they, or are they not guilty? etc.
- b) Once that is the focus of the Inquiry, battle lines would be drawn inside and outside of the Inquiry. Those who have for years been campaigning to have the Grenada 17 remain locked up will go all out in the newspapers, on radio and television etc., to stir up emotions and get across their views that we should remain locked up. No need pretending we don't know about that. The fall-out from the interview last October-November is a good indicator as to what would happen. This is clearly not the atmosphere for discussing truth.
- c) If the Grenada 17 remain locked up, that in itself would also provide a very powerful incentive for people who are committed to seeing the Grenada 17 remain behind bars, to come forward and lie. Their principal concern is to have the Grenada 17 remain behind bars, not truth. The tragi-comedy which has been playing out over the whereabouts of the remains of Bishop et al. is a case in point. As it now appears, for 16 years the US government, leading officials in Grenada and several prominent citizens knew that the Grenada 17 were not responsible for the whereabouts of the remains since they were recovered from Calivigny. Facts on this matter were also adduced at our 'trial'. Yet, all those in the know kept quiet and allowed the lie that we were somehow still aware of the whereabouts of the remains to be perpetuated. They allowed this to go on because it was convenient. It helped to keep us locked up. During this time the relatives of the deceased suffered immense pain. But keeping the Grenada 17 locked up was more important than releasing the relatives from their pain and giving them peace.
If the Grenada 17 are released then that powerful incentive to lie, namely the desire to keep them behind bars, would be removed, and the probability of truth emerging from the exercise would be improved.
- d) A big obstacle to the discovery of truth, whenever the Inquiry is held, would be the question of overcoming fear. There is still a lot of fear in our society. In our minds, this is the single greatest obstacle to a TRC really and truly uncovering ALL the facts, all the truth of what happened *leading up to, and on the 19th October 1983 itself, and in the immediate aftermath of that supremely tragic day.*

Several issues will have to be addressed, and obstacles overcome, in this regard:

- *There is the troubling question of how to get dozens and dozens of people to testify; people who know various crucial aspects of what occurred; who are indispensable to the truth emerging, but who see themselves presently as having everything to lose from testifying.*

Clearly, we are not talking of the many who will come and give one side of the story — many truthfully; others exaggeratedly; and yet others fancifully and lyingly. *We are referring to those who can testify truthfully as to the whereabouts and actions of EACH and every member of the Grenada 17 on that day (and before, and after), as also the whereabouts and actions of other key 'players' in the events; and also of their own personal roles, if any, in some of these events. WITHOUT THE PARTICIPATION OF THESE PEOPLE, NOTHING APPROACHING THE TRUTH WILL EMERGE FROM THE EXERCISE.*

Why, then, have these persons remained silent for all these years? Why did none come forward — or offer to do so — for our 'Trial'? Why will they either refuse to testify, or lie and say they know nothing, they weren't there, etc., if they are forced by subpoena to appear? [So many presently live outside the country, that, in any case, subpoenas wouldn't work. Indeed, we suspect that this was one of their considerations in fleeing the country as soon as they could, following the invasion — and *none* have returned.] We must now examine this in some detail, if we are to knock heads and find some way of overcoming this huge obstacle, for we **MUST** overcome it, if at all possible.

Even after so many years, there is *fear* of just being identified as 'supporting' the Grenada 17 *in any way* (let alone going out on a limb to testify on their behalf) Let us give a few different kinds of examples of *the social ostracism and pressure* to which many have found themselves subjected:

- *There is the case of a senior member of the Roman Catholic Clergy in Grenada.* This clergyman is on record — in church services broadcast on radio and TV — as condemning the Grenada Revolution, and stating that the US Invasion of Grenada was God-sent. He is far from being any 'supporter' of the Grenada 17. But he is also a Christian. He believes in reconciliation. So he invited eleven prisoners, including three members of the Grenada 17, to his church six years ago (i.e., ten years after the October '83 events) to sing and pray with his congregation. The three members of the Grenada 17 who went (Cornwall, Stroude and Strachan) were warmly embraced — literally — by the congregation.

However, at the time key people in Grenadian society were so offended (e.g., the local High Court Judge, certain government ministers, certain newspapers, and certain sections of the population at large), that he received a storm of hysterical protest. This clergyman had to temporarily flee Grenada for his homeland 'until things cooled down'. He has never invited any of us since.

- *There is the case of Glen St. Louis.* He was one of the callers on a local radio call-in programme (GBN-Radio's 'To The Point'), three years ago, on the issue of whether or not Grenadians supported the call by the Grenada Council of Churches for the freeing of Phyllis Coard and Kamau Mc Barnette on medical/humanitarian grounds. Like all other callers, he did not give his name. All callers are anonymous: this is the policy generally

followed on these programmes. He was an executive member of the opposition NDC party. Within 24 hours his party executive met in his absence and took a decision to publicly condemn him for supporting *the Council of Churches' call* (even though he made it clear on the programme that he was expressing a personal opinion), and called on him to resign or face expulsion. Normally, that party took (and takes) *months* to summon its disciplinary committee to take action against executive members who have committed far more serious 'breaches' (if one can describe what St. Louis did as a 'breach' of party rules).

- *Then there is the case of Leslie Pierre*, the Editor of *The Grenadian Voice* newspaper. Never *popular* amongst Grenadians, but always *respected*. A man of courage; independent-minded; always speaks his mind, even if or when it gets him in jail — as it did during the Revolution. When he recently (last October) did the interview with the four of us, and especially after he stated that we had not received a free and fair trial, suddenly, people who had always extolled his integrity started saying publicly that 'the Coard family bribed him to say this', and then dismissed his views out of hand. Others taking a similar view have been similarly abused and dismissed. Of course, this hasn't stopped Leslie Pierre one bit — but it has stopped others. When they see people like him abused and vilified publicly, they stay silent; they are afraid to come forward. In fact Leslie Pierre has often lamented, in his newspaper column, the fact that many people tell him privately that they agree with what he is saying re the Grenada 17, but are not prepared to air their views publicly; not even anonymously on the radio (in case someone recognises their voice, we guess).
- *Then there is the case of Teddy Victor.* Another political detainee of the revolution; another one highly respected in Grenada for standing for his convictions and taking jail under the Revolution. When he appears on the Sunday radio and TV live call-in programme in early October (last) with Leslie Pierre, supporting the call for our freedom: within 72 hours the NDC executive meets and publicly condemns him for so doing. As a result, he resigns from the executive. **NO ONE** condemns the NDC executive or supports Teddy — at least, not publicly. Many grumble about it — including some other members of the executive — but all are afraid to speak out. They all remain silent.
- *There is a young woman dismissed the next day from her job* for speaking on one of the radio call-in programmes in favour of the Grenada 17 being freed. Her boss recognised her voice on the radio, and that was that.
- *There are about one thousand people in the society who were either members of the NJM party or members of the People's Revolutionary Army (PRA).* Many of them are in a position, from personal knowledge, to refute many of the lies told about members of the Grenada 17 and about various key aspects of the events which unfolded on October 19th, 1983. *Less than one dozen* of these one thousand-odd persons have **EVER** rung up a radio station, or written letters to the newspapers, or taken any public position, in defence of or support for us. These are people who are far from hostile to us. Many have helped our children; have helped with money, food, clothes, payments for medical, dental and ophthalmological services for members of the Grenada 17. *But they will do NOTHING which will jeopardize their hard-won positions in present day Grenadian*

society. All those who speak out for us these days, openly distribute pamphlets and stick up posters, and so on, are either people who are presently under thirty years of age (the vast majority) — most of them unemployed youths, secondary school students, and young self-employed persons — or those who were (a) out of the country in 1983 AND (b) are presently self-employed within Grenada (and therefore in no danger of losing their jobs, source of income, etc.). While the numbers of those openly speaking for us and working actively on our behalf amongst the people is steadily growing, none of them is of any use for purposes of testifying as to the truth of what happened in October 1983, as they were too young to have been in the party or army then, or were out of the country studying and/or working, as pointed out earlier. However, it has proven extraordinarily difficult to get more than a very few of the former Party and Army Comrades to simply come forward and testify honestly about what they saw and know. Or to even provide sworn affidavits. It is vital to understand why.

All members of the NJM and of the PRA experienced enormous social ostracism for years following the October 19th catastrophe. It took most of them over 10 years to 'rebuild' their standing in their communities (i.e., by getting people to 'forget' that they were NJM or PRA as the case may be). Very few of them are prepared to endanger this painfully won process of societal 'rehabilitation'. They are ALL, all too aware of what it would do to their current lifestyles and careers. They are nearly all now married, with children, a house, mortgage, car, good jobs and income, regained respect, and so on. Doing ANYTHING, PUBLICLY, that even smells like open support for the Grenada 17, would endanger all the above. [After all, look at the examples given above of people who were the Grenada 17's political enemies, but who have spoken publicly in their favour!] They will help us in all ways they can — secretly; quietly — but NO public manifestations of support! They will NOT sign affidavits; they will NOT testify in court; even less will they do so in a high profile TRC exercise. [We want you to note the Grenadians working at the Medical School who were involved in examining the remains of Bishop and others in November 1983. They made it clear on TV that they were afraid to say all they knew. Even an American doctor who was involved has said he'll only talk if his employers give him permission!]

So even if the Inquiry takes place after we have been freed and things have cooled out, there would be fear. If the inquiry takes place while we are still behind bars the fear will be compounded 1000 times. Anyone who is courageous enough to come forward to provide facts favourable to the Grenada 17 and which are decisive to the truth would be accused of 'saying those things to get their comrades out'. And certainly very, very few will come forward. If people are afraid to call in on the radio in a context of anonymity, would they be prepared to come forward in a public inquiry and testify?

We submit that all the above facts and arguments conclusively establish that the staging of a TRC while the Grenada 17 remain locked up has very little chance of obtaining truth. Hence, if truth is really the objective, the exercise would be futile in a context in which we are still in prison; it would be a waste of time and resources; it would descend into an acrimonious spectacle with the focus as, aforementioned, inevitably being whether we should be freed or not freed. This is simply not the atmosphere in which anything resembling truth can be discovered. A 'truth' Commission in this context would simply amount to a rehashing of old propaganda.

We wish to note that in the much alluded to South African precedent of a TRC under the chairmanship of the distinguished and Nobel Prize winning Archbishop Desmond Tutu, all the leading participants in the TRC exercise came from their homes to the TRC to testify and returned to their homes thereafter.

6. Therefore, we, with all the force we can muster, submit that your committee recommends that a precondition for the Inquiry must be the freeing of the Grenada 17.
7. If the government feels unable to utilise Sections 73-74 of the Constitution to bring about this precondition then we submit that we should be allowed to take our case before the Privy Council. Currently there is a law, Act 19 of 1991, that blocks us from so doing. We submit that as an alternative to utilising Sections 73-74 to freeing us, the government could amend Act 19 of 1991 since we are convinced that given the nature of the case the Privy Council would quash the convictions and free us. In this regard, we wish to put you on notice that we intend to challenge the constitutionality of Act 19 of 1991 in the courts so as to clear the way for taking our criminal appeals before the Privy Council. If the government were to amend Act 19 of 1991 this would greatly speed up the process.

If the process is accelerated by the amendment of Act 19 of 1991, and if the state cooperates, then it is possible for the matter to be resolved by the Privy Council in a matter of months. This would then clear the way for the staging of the TRC in a short period thereafter. Indeed, even while our appeal is being determined by the PC, preparations for the TRC could continue so that as little time as possible is lost between the two events.

8. We submit further, that to hold a TRC while we remain behind bars and before allowing us our rights under the Constitution to take our case before the Privy Council, would be unfair to us.
9. We wish to point out that if reconciliation is truly the objective of the contemplated Inquiry then it would be very odd, to put it mildly, to start off the process by adding another grievance to those on one side. Many among the Grenada 17 are demonstrably innocent of the charges brought against them; i.e. even the Prosecution's evidence, carefully analysed, establishes their innocence. We have insisted on this over and over again. To us it would be grossly unfair to put us through yet another public trial while we remain locked up in prison at this time with the status of 'convicted murderers', and without allowing us our constitutional right of appealing our convictions to the Privy Council. This issue must be seriously addressed.
10. Without prejudice to the above submissions or any of them, we submit that if it is the intention to proceed with a TRC while we remain behind bars, and before our matter is allowed to be heard by the Privy Council, then the TRC must at a very minimum satisfy the following conditions:
 - (i) The TRC should be comprised of people of undoubted independence, character and eminence. In other words, people who cannot remotely be considered as being bought and who would not be perceived by anyone as doing the bidding of any side. [The payment of over one million E.C. dollars to each of the Appeal Court Judges in our case, combined with their failure to produce the written judgement eight-and-a-half years later, in violation of Section 8 of the Constitution, has lent credence in many minds to this concern.] This is of IMMENSE importance. *If the entire membership of the TRC is not comprised of internationally renowned persons of unimpeachable*

reputation (and with no links whatsoever to regional politicians), then neither the Grenada 17 nor many other objective and fair minded people will have the necessary confidence in such a body.

Such a body would need, ideally, to have, as part of its composition, *a highly respected clerical figure* — someone of the stature of Archbishop Desmond Tutu; *a highly respected jurist from outside the Caribbean region*, someone of the stature of Lord Justice Scarman of Great Britain (for reasons intimated below); and a *senior military man, also from outside the Caribbean region* (also, for reasons mentioned below).

We cannot stress too much the point that too many people in the authority structures of virtually all CARICOM countries were involved, in one way or another, to one degree or another, in the revolutionary process (i.e. either supporting, or more usually, vehemently opposing), in the Invasion and Occupation and detention of the Grenada 17, in the trial process of the Grenada 17, and in the general propaganda wars arising out of all the above. Too many are therefore tainted, in one direction or the other, by the above. Remember the involvement of nearly all regional governments in the Invasion and Occupation, and the involvement of every OECS government in denying us access to the Courts of the Grenada Constitution for eight years after the rest of the Constitution was restored [See P.M. John Compton's letter of March 22nd, 1988].

We therefore submit that commissioners should be chosen from the (British) Commonwealth of Nations outside of the English speaking Caribbean. This we submit can be done with the help of the Commonwealth Secretary General. This way, NO ONE, FROM ANY 'CAMP' can say that the Commissioners are 'biased', or picked only 'by one side', and so on.

- (ii) The state to meet the cost of retaining a team of competent lawyers of our choice to represent us at the Inquiry. [This is to be able to effectively cross-examine witnesses who appear before the TRC and lie, and to be in a position to effectively expose these lies; to examine-in-chief witnesses whom we can persuade to come and testify as to what really occurred; and generally to protect our legal interests before such a tribunal.]

After all, we and our families have been *literally bankrupted* by having to provide legal representation for a *Preliminary Inquiry (held in March–August 1984)*. Some had to pay their own legal counsel for the *'Trial' (March–December 1986)*, the *'Appeal' (March 1988–July 1991)* and for several Constitutional Motions arising from this process.

Having effectively gone through three major 'trial' processes — all in unconstitutional courts — the Grenada 17's financial resources are presently non-existent. It would be totally unfair to expect us to have to find funds to pay lawyers for what would be effectively *another 'trial process'*, and one not of our choosing. AT THIS TIME we want to raise whatever funds we can to take our matter — for the first time ever — *before Grenada's highest (and only) independent court of Law: the Privy Council*. This is only fair and reasonable.

APPENDIX 2

c/o Augustine & Augustine,
Attorneys-at-Law,
Chambers,
Green Street,
St. George's,
Grenada.
April 20, 2000

The Chairman and Members of
The Truth & Reconciliation Commission:
Justice Carl Rattray, Q.C.,
Bishop Sehon Goodridge,
Father Mark Haynes.

Sirs,

Enclosed please find eight (8) documents numbered 1 to 8. They are, respectively:

1. Submission To Two-Man Committee Responsible For Organising The Truth And Reconciliation Commission;
2. Statement From Members Of The Grenada 17 (Written In Response To Press Release From The Prime Minister's Office of March 23rd 2000);
3. Reflections And Apologies To All Detainees Of The PRG From Some Former Leaders Of The NJM;
4. Apology To The Families Of The Victims Of The October 1983 Crisis. And To The Grenadian People by Bernard Coard;
5. Statement To The Media (Given At The October 1999 Televised Interview With Leslie Pierre) By Ewart Layne. Former Day-To-Day Commander Of The Peoples Revolutionary Army;
6. Fact Sheet On The Case Of The Grenada 17;
7. A Travesty Of Justice: How 10 NJM Leaders Of The Grenada Revolution Were Convicted By One Lie by Ewart Layne;
8. Genesis And Development Of The Unconstitutional Court System (And The Jury Selection Procedures) Used To Try The Grenada 17.

Documents numbers 1 and 2 provide a detailed exposition and the rationale for our position on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC). Documents numbers 3, 4, and 5 comprise three of the apologies given by various members of the Grenada 17 to the Grenadian public. Finally, documents numbers 6, 7, and 8 provide core information on the evidence and legal process to which the Grenada 17 were subjected, from October 1983 to August 1991. We consider these eight documents vital to understanding our current position on all matters relating to our case and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, and this is why we take the liberty of providing them to you even before your first official sitting.

- (iii) The question of the fairness of the legal process or lack thereof through which the Grenada 17 were put must be one of the matters the Commission should look into. What happened re the legal process is an issue of truth as well as an issue of our legal rights. After all, reconciliation is a two-way process. How can one side become reconciled after being put through an obscenely unjust and corrupt judicial process leading to life imprisonment, with a special law passed to permanently deny that side justice by an independent court process? This would require that the Commission have at least one but preferably three jurists as part of its panel;
- (iv) The Commission must have the power to make binding orders in particular with regard to our continued incarceration. In our view, if — despite all that we have submitted — it is decided that the Inquiry would proceed with us in prison and before we are allowed to take our matter before the Privy Council, then the commissioners must have the power to make orders concerning our incarceration based on their view of the validity of the legal process. It would be totally unacceptable to us for the Commission to find that, based on the law, our detention is illegal and yet only have the power to make recommendations and hence leave the final decision as to our freedom to a political directorate which does not feel politically able to deal with the issue and has so stated, publicly on several occasions. Indeed, the denial to the Commission of the power to make binding orders would be construed by objective observers as intended to ensure that the issue of the liberty of the Grenada 17 is not to be determined on the basis of law but on the basis of political fiat and/or political fears.

We note again that in the much celebrated and successful South African precedent, the TRC was invested with legal powers to grant pardons as it saw fit, and this was indeed exercised in many instances.

In addition to the above four stated minimum conditions, *there is the question of the time frame for the setting up of a serious TRC, the determining of a fixed period for the hearings, and a fixed period within which the TRC must submit its findings, orders, and formal Report.* This is self-evident. The country cannot afford, either financially or emotionally, to have an open-ended process. *Neither would it help the country's healing process to do a rush-job just for the sake of going through the motions of saying that you had a TRC. This would be an awful waste of time, money and of people's expectations. WHATEVER IS BEING DONE, IT MUST BE DONE PROPERLY, OR DON'T BOTHER TO DO IT AT ALL: THIS IS OUR POSITION.*


Finally, we the undersigned are of the view that the period to be inquired into should be October 1983. However, since the events of October 1983 did not take place in a vacuum we consider that contextual matters going back as far as 1973 — if necessary — should be part of the terms of reference. We see this as important in the interest of time and expense. What people really want to know about is October '83, what happened and why it happened (context comes in here). The main effort should therefore be expended on this.

We therefore humbly submit the following Draft Terms of Reference for your consideration:


'To enquire into the pertinent (and contextual) events leading up to and on the 19th of October 1983 itself, and in its immediate aftermath; as also into the entire judicial and related processes, from the moment of initial detention up to August 15, 1991, of those persons generally referred to as the Grenada 17;

'And to issue binding orders, submit findings, and make recommendations as the Commission sees appropriate, in all the circumstances.'

Yours Respectfully,



Ewart Layne



Selwyn Strachan



Liam James

We welcome in principle the establishment of the TRC by the government of Grenada. We would like to participate and generally cooperate with it fully. We consider such cooperation on our part to be decisively important both to uncovering truth and in starting the reconciliation process. This we say not out of immodesty or any inflated sense of our own importance, but simply because of the objective reality of our central role in making and building the 1979-1983 Grenada Revolution, and, unfortunately, in the crisis, tragedy and catastrophe of October 1983.

We recognise that many different groupings of Grenadians have felt hurt and have legitimate grievances arising out of some or all of the various events under review: Gairy supporters, ex-political detainees and others who suffered during the Revolution, the families of the NJM leaders and civilians who lost their lives on October 19th 1983, the families and soldier-comrades of the soldiers who were killed also on the 19th October 1983, and of those killed during the U.S. Invasion from October 25th onwards, among others. To each of these groupings of aggrieved citizens we have apologised, publicly, on radio, T.V., and in the newspapers.

In this connection, however, the legitimate grievances of various members of the Grenada 17 are generally ignored—or not even contemplated—by most people. We refer not only to the judicial process to which we were subjected (including unprecedented, massive, adverse pre-trial publicity, extensive tortures and beatings, and denial of all avenues of legal redress through the constitutional court system) but also to the (continued) detention for 16 ½ years of certain members of the Grenada 17 KNOWN TO BE DEMONSTRABLY INNOCENT EVEN ON THE BASIS OF FABRICATED PROSECUTION EVIDENCE.

We have certain fundamental concerns which we consider stand in the way of the TRC seriously fulfilling its mandate. We must frankly confess that, given the totality of our experience over the last 16 ½ years, we are deeply fearful of its likely outcome. [Indeed, the very latest in a litany of unfulfilled promises and legitimate expectations was played out in recent months. In the second half of 1999, the government of Grenada, through the Prime Minister, announced publicly the setting up, in accordance with existing Law and Prison Rules, of a five-person Sentence Review Board headed by a Cabinet Minister. This Board, it was announced, would interview all those who had already served in excess of 15 years in prison (including all members of the Grenada 17) with a view to recommending their release to the Mercy Committee (the latter set up under Sections 72-74 of Grenada's Constitution) for the purpose of pardoning, reducing or replacing sentences, etc.). This Sentence Review Board under the Honourable Minister of Social Security, Tourism, Civil Aviation and Women's Affairs, Mrs Brenda Hood, and including a Consultant Psychiatrist, the National Security Advisor (a man with many years of experience in the Jamaican military and in the Grenada Police Service), a distinguished Attorney-at-Law (who also is in evangelical work for many religious denominations) and the Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Health, met with all but two of the Grenada 17 over a period of several months. Each one was asked detailed questions, including about the events of October 1983, their individual role(s) in the events, and their current attitude to these events. Towards the very end of this process, we were suddenly told that these structures—the Sentence Review Board followed by the Mercy Committee—would no longer be used as the route to our freedom, but instead we would have to go through a TRC process, at the end of which the TRC might recommend our release.]

While our concerns alluded to above are outlined in detail in documents numbers 1 and 2, we wish to particularly single out for your urgent attention and consideration the following:

1. Our continued incarceration while Hearings take place, compounded by the fact of our continued denial of access to the Privy Council, the highest court of Grenada's Constitution, by means of a discriminatory law. [See documents #s 1 and 2 for specifics.]
2. The failure to include specifically in the terms of reference of the TRC an inquiry into all aspects of the Judicial process to which we were subjected. In light of the PM's address to the nation on Friday 7th April last, where he stated that the government has now decided to include the "trial, pre-trial and post-trial period" as part of the terms of reference, it may well be that this concern of ours has now been addressed. However, we are not sure whether this is a correct interpretation of what the PM said; and so we still need clarification on this point.
3. The apparent failure to provide the TRC with powers to grant amnesties or pardons to those already imprisoned, in stark contrast to its powers to grant immunity to persons coming off the street to testify. [This point is fully developed in document #2.] We are however puzzled by a statement in the PM's nation-wide broadcast (referred to above) where he spoke of the TRC being "a legally binding body". We are not clear if this means that the recommendations of the Commission with regard to the issue of amnesties, for example, would be legally binding, giving rise to a legal obligation on the part of the government to implement them. We also believe that this is a matter which needs clarification given its critical importance.
4. Connected with the amnesty issue is our deep concern over the issue of the burden of proof placed upon us by the terms of reference to convince the Commission that we are speaking the truth. Based on our understanding of the terms of reference, we cannot be recommended by the TRC for amnesty simply by speaking the truth. We have to convince the Commissioners that we have spoken the truth. This in the following contexts:
 - (a) All our preparation of evidence, mobilisation of detailed documentation, etc., must be done from prison cells (unlike all other participants in the process);
 - (b) All the minutes of key Political Bureau, Central Committee and General Meetings of the NJM; military documents including Duty Officer Diaries (which would record the comings and goings and times of political and military figures central to the investigation); written and tape recorded confessions by Cletus St. Paul regarding his part in spreading the rumour of October 12th 1983 [see document #7 for the centrality of St. Paul in the entire case], and other documentation, continue to be held by the U.S. Government, which steadfastly refuses to hand them over, even after 16 ½ years. [We have initiated legal action in the U.S. Federal Court to retrieve these documents (through a friend). We won at the first instance, but the US Government continues to stall by means of appeals and other devices.];
 - (c) Massive pre-trial publicity over many years which has resulted in many fixed positions and attitudes regarding the facts of the events and the role(s) of various specific individuals among the Grenada 17, in them. Altogether, the US Government spent US\$18 million to achieve this objective, according to US Congressional Records;
 - (d) The atmosphere of passion and hate that this massive campaign against us, coming on top of the horrific events themselves, has stirred up amongst the general population. This has resulted in the fear (of social ostracism and in some cases even of jobs and careers) on the part of the vast majority of persons who are in possession of critical

information. Hence such persons would be highly unlikely to come forward and give testimony which could be interpreted as being in favour of some or all of the Grenada 17. [See document #1 for detailed data re this point.]

- (e) On the other hand, this same atmosphere of passion and hate would be a strong motivating factor or incentive to come forward and lie, given that the perception of those hostile to us would be that our continued incarceration or release hangs on the evidence presented to the Commission.
5. The failure to address the issue of legal representation of our choice to protect our interests before the Commission. The detailed reasons why this is so fundamental are provided in documents numbers 1 and 2.

We hope that our sincerely held, fundamental concerns will be given due consideration and meaningfully addressed.

Thank you for your attention.

Yours sincerely,

Signed: Bernard Coard
Bernard Coard

Signed: Selwyn Strachan
Selwyn Strachan

Signed: Ewart Layne
Ewart Layne

Signed: Liam James
Liam James

Signed: Leon Cornwall
Leon Cornwall

Statement From Members Of The Grenada 17

[Written in response to Press Release
From the Prime Minister's Office of 23rd March, 2000]

Members of the Grenada 17 wish to reiterate that we welcome the decision of the Grenada Government to finally hold an inquiry into the events of October 1983. As we have previously stated such an inquiry should have been held since 1984 before any charges were laid. This is a classic case of having put the cart before the horse. But then again, better late than never.

We note that the Two-man-Committee that was mandated by Cabinet to organise the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) has rejected a request by three of us to be given a hearing regarding issues relating to the setting up of the Commission. This rejection is particularly significant given the fact that it was publicly announced that the committee would be carrying out consultations with interested parties; given the fact that the 17 must be central to the inquiry; and given the fact that the three members made a written submission to the two-man committee, the receipt of which has been confirmed.

We have become aware that terms of reference for the TRC were issued in a press release put out by the Prime Minister's office and dated March 23rd 2000. It is evident from that release that the contents of the submission made by the members of the 17 have been ignored and this is in a context in which they were not given a hearing.

We however wish to comment on these terms of reference so that our views can be unambiguously clear to all concerned.

1. We agree with the time frame for the operation of the TRC i.e. six months to take evidence and a further three months to issue a report.
2. We suggested the following terms of reference: 'To inquire into the pertinent (and contextual) events leading up to and on the 19 October 1983 itself, and in its immediate aftermath; as also into the entire judicial and related processes, from the moment of initial detention up to August 15, 1991, of those persons generally referred to as the Grenada 17.' For us, inclusion of the Judicial Process, in all of its aspects, to which we were subjected is absolutely fundamental.

We note that one of the terms of reference for the TRC is for evidence to be taken so as to discover the truth of the 'circumstances surrounding the deaths of PM Bishop...' This is a clear and unambiguous admission by those in authority that the truth about the deaths of Bishop et al has not been discovered after a legal process lasting 7 ½ years; and yet 17 persons have been imprisoned for 17 years in connection with the matter. Clearly this is a matter that in and of itself requires inquiring into.

We note that the March 23rd press release states that the commission will be comprised of three persons. No names have been given. We are very strongly of the view that the commission should be

APPENDIX 3

comprised of people of undoubted independence, character and eminence: people who cannot remotely be considered as being bought or who would not be perceived by anyone as doing the bidding of any side. This is a grave concern of ours given the experience with the judges of the defunct Court of Appeal. Each of those judges was contracted for over \$1million. They upheld the convictions and sentences against the 17 yet to this day they have not produced a written judgement, in violation of Section 8 of the Grenada constitution. We are of the view that the commissioners should come from within the Commonwealth but from outside the Caribbean. Our reasons for this were set forth in our submission to the two-man committee referred to earlier.

We view with great concern the obvious intention to proceed with the TRC while we remain behind bars and before allowing us the right now available to other Grenadians to take their matter before the Privy Council. Strong reasons were articulated in the submission to the two-man committee as to why such a course of action will definitely not result in the truth emerging. It was pointed out in that submission that once we are behind bars the TRC would inevitably descend into an acrimonious debate over the issue of whether we should be freed or not freed; and the truth would definitely not emerge in that atmosphere. In this regard it is highly significant that the mere publication of the terms of reference has already sparked off the debate. The *Grenada Today* newspaper of March 31, has already published an editorial and lead story both taking the view that the inquiry is an attempt to free the 'Coard Gang' etc., etc.

We note that several persons who committed atrocities in the time frame under consideration are free and have been free for the last 17 years. Hence these persons will be coming before the TRC, if at all, from their homes. In this regard we note that:

- The persons who were convicted for the killings of June 19th 1980 in the bombing at Queens Park as well as those charged for the killing of four people in Plains St. Patrick's in November 1980 were freed in November 1983 despite the fact that the appeals of the first group, and the trial of the second group were still pending before the court.
- The persons responsible for the killings of soldiers on Fort Rupert on October 19th 1983 have never been charged.

All of the above persons would be coming from their homes to give evidence before the commission.

On the other hand we have already spent the equivalent of a 25 year sentence behind bars, this on the basis of a highly dubious legal process and in a context in which we have been denied access to the highest court under Grenada's constitution to test the validity of our imprisonment. Yet we have to remain locked up. We would have to come from prison to give evidence to the commission and then return to prison. And the only thing in the exercise for us is a hope that:

- (a) the commissioners would recommend our freedom and then that
- (b) the government, which has admitted on several occasions in words and by actions that it is politically unable to deal with the matter of our release, would implement the recommendation.

We note that while the commission has the power to grant indemnities to certain persons who testify, with regard to the 17 it can only recommend amnesties. Again the disparity in treatment

evident. People who have not spent a single day in prison are provided with protection in exchange for testifying. Such protection is not left up to the politicians. The commission has the power to grant such protection. No conditions are attached. However in the case of us, who have already been subjected to a 25-year term of imprisonment, the commission can only recommend. After that it is up to the politicians to decide. There is no guarantee that the recommendations of the commission will be implemented. A time frame has been given for the commission to sit and report. But no time frame has been given for the implementation of the recommendations of the commission.

We note that the commission has the power 'to recommend a general amnesty to certain persons who in the opinion of the commission have given truthful information during the hearing of evidence'. The construction of this clause is puzzling. However it can be reasonably regarded as referring to the 17. And it raises the issue as to how the commissioners are to arrive at their opinions as to whether evidence provided is truthful or not. The obvious answer is through assessing all the evidence before them, the demeanour of the various witnesses and the assessment of their characters. This has certain implications:

- (a) We are placed at a structural disadvantage in that we have to appear before the commission as convicted murderers despite the fact that we have not been allowed to have our matter reviewed and finally determined by Grenada's highest appeal court, the Privy Council;
- (b) It must require that all persons appearing before the commission be very clear that they are subject to prosecution for perjury if they are discovered to have deliberately lied. This would prevent the rehashing of blatant lies and half-truths some persons have said over the radio, in papers, in the streets, and even in books over the years. This would enhance the probability of the commissioners having to assess and analyse only evidence that those giving it honestly believe to be true;
- (c) It also requires that we must be represented throughout by legal counsel so as to enable us to examine and cross-examine all witnesses who come forward. This is fundamental since we have a tangible interest in every aspect of the proceedings since our freedom could depend on it.
- (d) This raises the further issue of the cost of the exercise. For example who will pay the legal cost incurred by the Grenada 17?

We wish to once again point out that our legal matter was dealt with in a nakedly political manner. We were specifically targeted by the political directorates of Grenada and other OECS islands to be tried in a kangaroo court. Proof of this can be found in the John Compton (then Prime Minister of St. Lucia) letter of March 22nd 1988 informing the government of Grenada that the constitutional court of Grenada would not be allowed to resume operation in Grenada until the Maurice Bishop Murder trial was disposed of. Since that was a decision of the OECS Authority and such decisions have to be unanimous it followed that the government of Grenada concurred in that decision. Such concurrence was in direct breach of an undertaking given by the government of Grenada to the Court of Appeal to return the constitutional court to Grenada from 1 January 1987. By way of that device the unconstitutional court was kept in operation up until August 1991 until our matter was finally dealt with and it was dissolved immediately thereafter. And a law was passed in the Grenada Parliament blocking the Grenada 17 from taking their case to the Privy Council, the highest court of appeal under Grenada's constitution.

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We are convinced that if our matter were allowed to go before the Privy Council we would be released instantaneously. Many respected lawyers in the Caribbean share our view. The failure of the defunct Court of Appeal, in violation of our rights under the Constitution, to issue a written judgement 9 ½ years after the completion of arguments in our case is construed by us as an admission on the part of the judges that no reasons in law can be given for upholding the verdicts against us and hence for our continued incarceration.

Given all that has been said above, given the contents of the submission made to the two-man organising committee by three of us, given the long record of statements by the government about its desire to reconcile the nation and its equally long record of explanations as to why it is unable to free us we find it difficult to understand the following:

- The insistence by the government that we remain locked up in prison while the TRC proceeds.
- The continued refusal by the government to amend Act 19 of 1991 so as to allow us the right now afforded to other Grenadians to take our case before the Privy Council so that it can be finally determined according to law.
- The failure of the government to specifically include as part of the terms of reference an inquiry into the legal process through which we were put.
- The apparent refusal by the government to give the Commission the power to make binding orders regarding our freedom.
- The insistence by the government that the issue of our freedom must not be decided on the basis of law but that it and it alone must have the power to determine that issue: not the Privy Council; not even, apparently, the TRC that it is setting up.

APPENDIX 4

REFLECTIONS AND APOLOGIES
TO: ALL EX-DETAINEES OF THE PRG
FROM: SOME FORMER LEADERS OF THE NJM

[Published in *The Grenadian Voice* of February 8, 1997, on the front page and several inside pages.]

Dear Fellow Grenadians:

This letter was written over a period of several weeks; a joint project of many months of contemplation, and thirteen years of reflections. It was written prior to the October 2nd [1996] interview at the Richmond Hill Prisons. However, we have felt it fit to make a few changes and additions to the original draft of the letter, bearing in mind the interview and subsequent developments.

As you may well imagine we have had to ponder long and hard over the content of this letter. We are fully conscious of the fact that in writing we may be approaching a veritable minefield of emotions. In the final analysis we have come to the conclusion that we should just speak from the heart. This is not to say that there are no differences of opinion and of degrees of emphasis among us on this and that. That is only natural. Thus, even more, we do not expect you to agree with us in all we say and believe. But be assured we speak with conviction.

Although addressed to the ex-detainees, we felt the need to address certain other matters, which though going beyond the detainee question are more than tangentially related to you. We crave your indulgence in this regard.

WE RECOGNIZE AND APOLOGIZE FOR YOUR SUFFERING

Over the last several years we have become acutely conscious of the suffering you political detainees experienced during the 4 ½ years of Revolution.

We have heard some of you complain that to this day many people do not recognize your suffering; pretend that you never suffered during the years of the Revolution; that the Revolution did no wrong; or that you only got what you deserved. We can well understand the agony such expressions and perceptions cause even today.

One of the reasons why we are moved to write this letter is because we feel that we have a moral duty to recognize the fact that you suffered and suffered unjustly during the years of the Revolution.

We fully appreciate and recognize the hardship and sufferings you experienced on account of the denial of your freedom over varying periods up to four and a half years; the separation from your families; the suffering inflicted on family members and relatives on account of your plight; the break up of your families in some cases; the psychological damage to your children and spouses; the loss of property; loss of earnings; psychological pressure arising from the uncertainty as to the length of detention; and the psychological and physical hardship and deprivations generally attendant to prison life.

We believe and recognize that those of us who were leaders during the years of the Revolution were, as part of the leadership, collectively responsible for your sufferings and must fully accept such

responsibility. Thus we feel that the least that we can do is to express to you our profound regrets and embarrassment and offer you our sincere and unreserved apologies as a minimal form of atonement. The truth is that we have wanted to do this several years now. But as you would appreciate, saying sorry does not come easily in our West Indian culture. Still, some of us who were earmarked for execution in July 1991 made efforts to record our regrets and apologies during what we believed to be our last hours. In that way we obtained the comfort of knowing that we had, even though as a last testament, taken steps to discharge our moral responsibility.

YOUR SUPPORT IN OUR DARKEST HOURS

It is now over thirteen years since we have been behind bars. And as you may well know and imagine it has not been easy for us. However, these years have not only been a litany of woes. They have also amounted to a period of growth: emotionally, intellectually and spiritually. None of us has been untouched by this process of growth. We believe that we can honestly say that we are much more mature and much wiser than 13 years ago.

This maturity and wisdom has come about on account of the deep reflection and introspection we have been able to do. Reflection on our individual lives; on decisions and choices we made in the past; on our country; on the 1979-1983 revolutionary process; and on the events in October 1983.

We have discovered through reflection and also through contact with some of you, that adversity and suffering can bring the very best out of many of us. We have been not only amazed but touched and humbled by the fact that many of you who have real cause to hate us, having suffered during the reign of the Revolution, are the ones who are prepared to forgive and indeed empathize with us.

We will forever remember that in the very difficult days of July-August 1991, when frantic moves were afoot to execute some of us, people like Mr. Leslie Pierre and Mr. Lloyd Noel were very vocal against the impending hangings. Their efforts, we are convinced, played a decisive role in overpowering the hanging party, inside and outside the government, in facilitating the courageous actions of Sir Nicholas Brathwaite, Mrs. Joan Purcell and others. We are also aware of the public positions in opposition to the hangings taken by Mr. Maurice Patterson and also Mr. Errol Maitland. During that period, and in the years since, we experienced the humanity of Commissioner of Prisons, Mr. Winston Courtney, a man who we regard as a remarkable Grenadian. We have heard Mr. Winston Whyte publicly pronounce his willingness to forgive and reconcile. We have been surprised and touched by the public statement by Mr. Clem Langdon calling for forgiveness and amnesty in relation to us. Mr. Teddy Victor has been a regular visitor of ours, bringing words of encouragement and support. And we have been deeply touched by his attitude. We have also come into contact with Mr. Raymond De Souza and Mr. Osbert James. We have been touched by their empathy. And we have come across Kennedy Budhlall, Ras Nang Nang, Reginald Phillip, Kade Layne and many more; and their lack of bitterness has impressed us. On a number of occasions Mr. Jerry Romain has accompanied Bishop Sidney Charles on New Year's Day to fellowship with prisoners, including us.

OUR COMMON BOND

This remarkable attitude of forgiveness and empathy has served as a great example and guide to us and has enabled us to better respond to and put in perspective the wrongs which we ourselves have suffered over the 13 years of incarceration.

We are also conscious that prison has bonded us in many other ways. We have been living for the past 13 years in the same cells which you occupied. Some of the graffiti inscribed by some of you is still with us. We share many of the utensils and other facilities you shared. We shared Father Leavy as a spiritual guide. We have both been inspired by his humanity, optimism, honesty, understanding and wisdom. We shared the book, *Man's Search For Meaning*, the one written by the psychiatrist, Dr. Frankel, about his experience in a Nazi concentration camp, and tips on how he coped. Teddy sent us that book in 1991. He told us that it was widely read within the detainee community and that it proved a source of great strength. For many of us it was a virtual life line, providing strength, courage and hope in the face of immense odds. Also, Teddy always says whenever he visits the prison to fellowship, that being within the walls is a special experience. Lloyd also spoke of that same special feeling, several months ago on a visit to participate in a religious service. In fact both Teddy and Lloyd have said to those visiting along with them, that only those who have experienced the walls from the inside could truly understand the feeling. The truth is that those walls reflect a spiritual bond between us. They breathe your spirit every day. And they will breathe ours together with yours for the next hundred years.

Through all our reflection we have come to see you as individuals with names, with families and relatives and even idiosyncrasies, instead of as 'counters', 'destabilizers,' etc. It was Martin Luther King Jr. who in modern times most eloquently emphasized the predominant importance of character. We have truly come to appreciate that, ultimately, it matters little the political label or outlook a person may carry at a particular time. What matters most is the "contents of the character" of the individual.

And so we have had to seek answers; to ask ourselves why? Why did we take the course of imprisoning you during the days of the Revolution? We think there were reasons though not excuses.

THE CONTEXT OF YOUR UNJUST TREATMENT

A: THE MANNER OF TAKING POWER

In the first place, the fact that we were forced to take power by unconstitutional means shaped many of our actions and decisions in the first 6 months of the Revolution.

We believed in and were guided by the view expressed in the preamble to the 1776 American Declaration of Independence that when a people are left with no alternative it is their God-given and inalienable right to forcibly remove their oppressors. It was this right which, in our view, was exercised by the NJM and Grenadian masses in 1979.

Still, we venture to say that, with greater maturity, we recognize that it is always a misfortune for a country when its people are left with no alternative but to resort to force to change their government. Such a course of action is bound to result in dislocations: in hardships for many people, including some wholly innocent ones; in the suspension of constitutional rights; in arrest, injury and loss of life. And such a situation is pregnant with the possibility for abuse. The responsibility falls on those who have assumed power in the name of the people to display the wisdom and exercise the necessary restraint to minimize the dislocation and abuse. We did not always measure up to this challenge.

B: THE COLD WAR

Secondly and more importantly, we believe that the existence of the Cold War at the time distorted the politics of our country as it did that of many others. This was the background against which the Revolution unfolded.

I:

ACHIEVEMENTS OF THE REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

No one can seriously deny the enormous social and economic achievements recorded by the Revolution in just 4 ½ years. The House Repair, Low Income Housing, Community Centers and Medical Clinics, construction programs; the Primary Health Care, Milk Feeding, School Books and Uniforms; Free Secondary Education and, through massive scholarships awards, to Universities; NISTEP and CPE Programs; establishing NCB, GBC, NIS, MNIB, GRC, NTS, Agro-Industries: Fruit and vegetable, coffee, and fish processing; the Eastern Main Road (Phase 1), Farm and Feeder Roads, Sandino, Stone Crushing and Asphalt Mixing Plant Facilities; Electricity Expansion in Grenada and Carriacou and the Electrification of Petite Martinique; and Maternity, Trade Union Recognition, and other social legislation, are all examples.

Indeed, by 1983, the PRG was engaged in 164 construction projects simultaneously. All these programs greatly contributed to the massive reduction in unemployment. This does not include the scores of other micro-projects undertaken by the people voluntarily at a community level. Grenada has never seen anything like this before or since. The building of the International Airport was simply the Jewel in the Crown.

All these achievements and successes caused our people to glow with pride, dignity, and a sense of purpose as the revolution captured their imagination and that of large sections of the Caribbean people. At the same time the triumph of the Revolution instilled and reinforced in us, as leaders, that sense of purpose and mission we carried with us when we risked our lives on March 13, 1979.

II:

THE US ATTITUDE AND OUR RESPONSE

At the same time, however, there was the US. It is an indisputable fact that the government of the US, for ideological reasons, wanted to overthrow the Grenada Revolution from its inception. Grenada was seen by the US government as a mere piece on the Cold War chess board. The US government obviously had its great power concerns and fears. And admittedly the leadership of the Revolution was immature and unrealistic in our reaction to the attitude of the US government.

But we as young revolutionaries, on a mission of transforming our country, a mission supported by the overwhelming majority of the Grenadian people, were not prepared to allow any foreign power to dictate to us in any way; to hold us back.

We perceived that the US would attempt to organize internal resistance backed up by the external threats to achieve the objective of overthrowing the Revolution. And for this view we had the Iranian (1954), Guatemalan (1950), Guyanese (1964), Chilean (1973) and Jamaican (1976 and 1980) precedents. In this context we were morbidly afraid of internal opposition: seeing the hand and mind of the US government and its agencies in and behind every manifestation of internal dissent. This state of mind which quickly spread to virtually the entire population resulted in an atmosphere of permanent combat alarm or state of emergency - in a siege mentality. The siege mentality was fed by provocations taking violent forms by some political detainees such as the Queens Park bombing of June 19, 1980. In this siege atmosphere the civil and human rights of those who opposed or even disagreed with us, sadly, counted for little. We just did not have the maturity and wisdom at the time to recognize that many who dissented did not do so because they were stooges of the US government, CIA agents or unpatriotic Grenadians; but because of their concerns about the non-existence of checks and balances; and because they felt, correctly so, that as citizens they had a right to freedom of expression, and to participate in the political process.

We just did not have it at the time to recognize that if the Revolution were to succeed in the medium and long term, if it were to retain its liberating and spiritual power, then we had to find a way to combine Revolution with democracy; to combine the undoubted social and economic gains with political democracy. Not sham political democracy, but genuine political democracy, entailing respect for the civil rights and liberties of the citizens, and free elections in a genuinely free atmosphere. There was no way the Revolution could have truly and ultimately established its right to reign as of right. No other way it could have evolved from being a fleeting experiment into a permanent feature of the Grenadian political and constitutional landscape, particularly given the limitations of size, resources, and the external threat. But to have successfully combined revolution with political democracy in the years of the Cold War would have required a level of maturity and wisdom that was beyond us at the time. Arguably, no country has successfully achieved this combination in the 20th Century.

THE SIEGE ATMOSPHERE AND THE OCTOBER 1983 EVENTS

Though you were undoubted victims of the siege atmosphere and siege mentality we have referred to, ultimately, we the revolutionaries and all Grenada were victims.

The truth is that the October 1983 events which finally led to the downfall of the Revolution, cannot be divorced from the siege atmosphere which developed and existed over most of the 4 ½ years. Sadly, many in their eagerness to find heroes and villains, saints and devils, to lay blame and point fingers, thirteen years later, have not come to appreciate that.

Outside of that environment the political differences which emerged within the NJM would not have ended in a violent confrontation and such terrible tragedy. At the very worst such differences would have resulted in a split in the NJM in the same way the NNP split when PM Blaize broke off and formed the TNP after losing the leadership of the NNP to Dr. Keith Mitchell. It is a part of the normal democratic process for parties all over the world to occasionally decide, by vote of its membership or delegates, to change its leaders or its leadership structure. Unfortunately this sometimes results in splits. However, in a democratic and normal environment, these differences never spill over into violent confrontations. It is just not conceivable that outside of the context of that siege atmosphere that Fort Rupert (Fort George) would have been overrun and seized by the civilian crowd on October 19, 1983. After all, in 1973-74,

for example, the Grenadian masses spearheaded by the NJM, marched in the streets day after day, for months, in an effort to bring down the Gairy Government; yet not even a small out-district police station was ever entered.

The more we reflect on it, the more we realize that on that fateful day, some of us were destined to die. If things had unfolded differently and the armed crowd at Fort Rupert had gained the upper-hand, there is no doubt in our minds that some or all of us now presently in prison would have been killed. We are not saying that Maurice would have ordered that. That would have happened despite and in spite of him. Things had just gone too far out of hand.

WE APOLOGIZE TO THE ENTIRE GRENADIAN PEOPLE

But this belief in no way mitigates the pain and grief we feel as we reflect on those tragic events. We are clear in our minds that those of us who were leaders and survived have to accept full political and moral responsibility for the deaths of Maurice and all those who died on October 19, 1983. As part of the collective leadership of the revolution we were responsible for creating the atmosphere in which the crisis unfolded in the manner in which it unfolded and climaxed. Thus we have to bear the blame. Those soldiers who were actually involved in the tragic events, not to mention those who have been framed, were all victims. Their misfortune was that they were the ones on spot (and some of those framed were not even on spot). The leaders of the Revolution were the ones really at fault.

We were the ones who created the political and psychological climate and framework outside of which there could and would have been no October tragedy. It was our decisions and choices, strategy and tactics over four and a half years, which created the siege atmosphere. And it was this atmosphere which provided the fertile ground upon which political differences giving rise to a political problem and crisis could so quickly and catastrophically degenerate into a military situation, placing the country on the brink of a civil war.

In the particular case of Bernard Coard, as he has already stated publicly, he is of the view that as one of the two top leaders of the Revolution around whom the leadership dispute was centered, over and beyond the responsibility he bears as a member of the collective leadership, ultimate and full personal responsibility for the October Tragedy lies on his shoulders. This is a heavy burden which Bernard has stated that he has borne for the last 13 years and will bear for the rest of his life.

We know that the demise of the Revolution has dashed many dreams. Thus we understand the frustration and anger of the Grenadian people arising out of these dashed expectations and feeling of betrayal on account of the tragedy and defeat of the Revolution. While we believe that all the Leaders of the Revolution were collectively at fault and contributed to its demise; we fully appreciate and accept that those who survived must bear the cross. This is why we have borne for the past 13 years while imprisoned, and shall always bear, the enormous burden of feeling responsible, morally responsible, for all the events which took place in October 1983. And it is also on this basis that we most profoundly apologize, to all the victims and sufferers and their families, to the families of all those who died and to the entire Grenadian people, including members of the NJM itself, the members of the PRA, Militia, Youth, Women's, Farmers and Workers' organizations (all who believed in us and relied on us to positively transform Grenada economically and socially).

7

MORAL RESPONSIBILITY
VERSUS
CRIMINAL LIABILITY

However, while we accept full moral and political responsibility, criminal liability is something completely different.

Some people have genuine difficulty understanding the difference between moral responsibility for something and criminal liability for it. Let us look, not at a parallel situation but at an analogy: let us suppose that we as parents neglect our children, show no love; in some cases physically and psychologically abuse them, and even throw them out on the streets. When our children turn to a life of crime, we cannot be accused of either committing the crimes or ordering our children to commit them. Although unwittingly, we created the climate, the context, the environment, the conditions for such crimes to be committed. We are, therefore, responsible in the most profound of senses: we are morally responsible for the committal of those crimes by our children. It would, however, be an obscenity for prosecutors to manufacture evidence in order to claim that we committed the crimes or ordered our children to commit those crimes and in that way convict us for them; so as to have an excuse for imposing the sanctions of criminal law, be it imprisonment or death by hanging.

THERE WAS NO CONSPIRACY TO KILL ANYONE

In the specific case of the October 1983 events, criminal liability would entail that the Central Committee conspired or otherwise agreed that Maurice et al must be killed; and that those who actually pulled the triggers were acting as agents of the Central Committee in so doing.

The fact that the NJM CC may have (a) unwittingly sparked the political crisis by the Joint Leadership proposal and then (b) mishandled it, resulting in things getting out of hand, to the point of erupting into a military situation, is not sufficient to ground criminal liability. The criminal law and criminal liability require more. In the specific case it requires the existence of a criminal conspiracy i.e., a conspiracy to kill. We categorically deny that there was any such conspiracy. The events on Fort Rupert were not planned. Things developed spontaneously because the situation got out of hand.

THAT'S WHY THERE IS NO EVIDENCE
TO PROVE A CONSPIRACY

But there is an additional point here. We deny that there was any conspiracy. And that is the truth. Others, including the prosecutors in our case, say there was a conspiracy; and that on that basis we are criminally liable. They are clearly entitled to their opinions. However, to move from (a) the stage of being entitled to a political opinion, to (b) the stage of justification of the application of the sanctions of the criminal law – death or imprisonment – it is not sufficient that those with a contrary view simply insist.

We assert that, to this day, there is not one shred of credible evidence to show that as leaders we conspired to kill anyone or that the Central Committee of the NJM ordered the killing of anyone. Not one shred! This despite the fact that there was a court process lasting over seven years and costing tens of millions of dollars. The reason for this omission is very simple: there is no evidence of any conspiracy because there was no conspiracy.

8

WE HAVE NOT RECEIVED
A FAIR HEARING

Yet, despite the lack of evidence, we were sentenced to death; and we have been denied our liberties for all of 13 years.

It's well established under the law and constitution of Grenada, that the state is under an obligation to provide everyone facing criminal charges with a fair hearing. It is also well established under the law that it is for the state to prove its charges beyond a reasonable doubt. And there are well established and indeed sacrosanct procedures with regard to admissibility of evidence, etc., for proving guilt.

But to this day we have not been provided with even the semblance not to mention the substance of a fair hearing. Instead we were condemned and convicted long before we were tried in court. Convicted and condemned by the press; by way of the most vicious propaganda campaign ever unleashed in the English Speaking Caribbean.

Once the damage had been done, after the population had been saturated with prejudice against us, making it impossible to find a jury to take an objective view of the facts, there followed a trial. One replete with errors of natural justice, law and constitution, as even some of you have pointed out.

Then came the appeal process which normally should have corrected the errors of the trial. But this process was subverted by the payment of over \$3 million EC to the justices of appeal as borne out by the answer to a question in the Senate from Mr. Derek Knight Q.C. That sum carried the unmistakable stench of a bribe. No wonder that, to this day, more than five years after the Court of Appeal upheld the decisions of the court of trial, despite repeated requests from our counsel, the judges have not yet delivered a written judgement stating their reasons for upholding the convictions. They are not fools. They know exactly what they did. They know only too well that they cannot provide any reasons in law upholding the convictions. They know that they just did a job on us. And that a written judgement cannot stand up to scrutiny.

And finally, to complete the "legal plot" against us, there have been various manoeuvres, including the passage of a law, aimed at debarring us from having our case re-opened, to be fairly determined, so as to obtain justice according to law.

WE THANK THOSE OF YOU WHO
HAVE CALLED FOR OUR FREEDOM

And yet such has been the success of the propaganda campaign against us that some people speak as though it is a mortal sin to mention the idea of freeing the seventeen political prisoners. Sadly, even some who shouted "Revolution" together with us have been cowed and appear to be afflicted by this perception. Amidst all this we cannot fail to note the public positions taken by Lloyd Noel, Leslie Pierre, and Clem Langdon. We are thankful to them for this. They have advocated that the seventeen be freed on grounds of reconciliation. We also thank the many of you who have made private appeals for our freedom to those in authority.

APPENDIX 5

APOLOGY TO THE FAMILIES OF THE VICTIMS OF THE OCTOBER 1983 CRISIS, AND TO THE GRENADIAN PEOPLE

Two years ago the former (imprisoned) leaders of the NJM and the PRG issued a public apology to the political detainees of the Revolution, to the families of those who died in October 1983, and to the Grenadian people as a whole. Our apology, titled, "Reflections and Apologies by Bernard Coard and his colleagues," was published in the *Grenadian Voice* of 8 February 1997.

It is our impression that most of the former political detainees did read that apology; but that many other Grenadians never saw it and therefore believe up to today that we have never apologized to those hurt by our actions in 1983.

* We therefore wish to repeat, to the relatives of the victims of the October 1983 crisis, as well as to the entire Grenadian people, that we fully and unreservedly accept responsibility for the tragedy which occurred in October 1983.

In particular, we wish to extend our deepest apologies to the families of those whose lives were lost. We fully appreciate the pain, suffering, and deep sense of loss you have experienced; and we express our profound sorrow and apologies for our part in causing your suffering.

We fully appreciate that no amount of words from us can heal your pain: only God's loving embrace can gradually bring you peace. Yet we hope that this unreserved public apology will bring you some small comfort.

We want to express to you too, our deep sorrow and apology for our failure to ensure that the bodies of your loved ones were handed over to you during the 5 ½ day period after the October 19 tragedy and before the invasion. We want you to know that we do appreciate the tremendous additional grief and pain caused to you by this failure of ours. We also recognize your pain caused by the fact that to this day the remains of your loved ones have not been handed over to you for a proper Christian burial.

* We want you all to know that we did cooperate fully in the effort to locate the remains, including by disclosing to the authorities, in 1983 and again in 1996, all the information ever in the possession of members of the Grenada 17 on this matter. We ask you to believe that if we had any knowledge at all, as to the present whereabouts of your relatives' remains, we would disclose it to you without a moment's hesitation. However, we simply do not know where their remains are, because, to * our knowledge, the American military took possession of the bodies of your relatives shortly after the invasion.

You may remember that in early November 1983, a Captain Forde of the US Forces here, announced to the press that they had found the bodies of Maurice and others at Camp Fedon, Calivigny. Then, at the 1986 'Maurice Bishop Murder Trial', the prosecution presented evidence confirming the recovery of the bodies. In particular, they presented items of jewellery which foreign military and police witnesses testified were recovered with the bodies; and some members of the families of the deceased identified these in court as belonging to and worn by their loved ones on October 19, 1983. We are therefore as mystified as everyone else by the failure of those who took possession of the remains after the invasion to hand them over to their families at any time during the last fifteen and more years. It is our deepest and prayerful hope that these remains will finally be restored to you.

We also wish to take this opportunity to repeat our apology to all those who on account of our actions suffered in any way whatsoever during the period of the Grenada Revolution. And we once more apologize to all the Grenadian people for the pain and trauma caused them by the tragic events.


We wish to express our gratitude to all those who have found it in their hearts to forgive us for the wrongs they suffered. You have touched our lives in profound ways.

We thank those who have given us moral and spiritual support over the last fifteen and a half years, including under the most trying circumstances. We will never forget this.

We also thank those who have prayed and continue to pray for us. We feel blessed by your prayers.

We and our families have also suffered a great ordeal over the last 15 ½ years: a fact which makes us more sensitive to the pain and suffering of others. But we wish to unequivocally declare that we hold no grudges, bitterness nor hatred whatsoever towards anyone.

Once more, to each and everyone who has suffered pain, hurt and trauma arising from our actions, we sincerely, profoundly and unreservedly express our sorrow and apologies.



Bernard Coe
On behalf of imprisoned
Former NJM and PRG leaders
and the Grenadian people

APPENDIX 6

STATEMENT TO THE MEDIA BY EWART LAYNE
FORMER DAY-TO-DAY COMMANDER OF
THE PEOPLES REVOLUTIONARY ARMY

On October 19th 1983, as the day-to-day commander of the Peoples Revolutionary Army, it fell upon my young shoulders to make certain decisions in the context of the serious political and military situation which developed in our country. At that time, in 1983, as I was discharging what I honestly perceived to be my duty, I could not imagine the catastrophic consequences which would flow from my actions.

I had always been deeply committed to the Grenadian Revolution. In my early teenage years I accepted as an ideal the necessity of the revolutionary transformation of Grenada and I worked tirelessly towards that. I was one of a few dozen Grenadians who in the early hours of March 13th 1979 risked everything to herald the Revolution. I was due to leave Grenada with my family on April 7th 1979, three-and-a-half weeks into the Revolution, to migrate to the USA to live and study. To the dismay and incomprehension of my family, hours before our scheduled departure, I turned my back on this opportunity. The only explanation I have ever given my parents for this action, which broke their hearts, is that duty demanded that I stay. In fact on the morning on which I was due to depart I was called upon by the leadership of the Revolution, and by Prime Minister Maurice Bishop personally, to remain at home and help consolidate and build the revolution which I had contributed to making. I say all of the above to make the point that there is no way that I, Ewart Joseph Layne, would have done anything which I believed could hurt the Revolution, not to mention destroy it. Of course I was young and immature, and above all I'm human, and therefore I was fully capable of making blunders. But I think my state of mind and motives at the time were beyond reproach.

What happened on October 19th 1983 was in no way planned. I awoke on that tragic day very hopeful that a solution to the political crisis was at hand. There was no way that the thought crossed my mind or could have crossed my mind that in just a few hours the greatest tragedy imaginable would descend on our country and that in a few days the Grenadian Revolution would be no more.

Reflections of the day even 16 years later have the feel of a very bad dream. First, I remember the crowds gathering in the streets; then their appearance at the entrance to Mt. Wheldale; then the breaking into the compound and the taking away of Maurice. Next thing I knew hundreds had overrun and seized Fort Rupert, the headquarters of the army. Then alarming reports as to what was taking place at Fort Rupert and as to the declared intentions of those there, started to come in: the Operations Room had been occupied; members of the General Staff were under arrest; the soldiers had been disarmed; the armoury had been seized; weapons had been distributed to civilians; units were being formed to move to seize the Radio Station, and Army logistics base where all the reserve weaponry of the army were held. Civil war was evidently at the door.

Faced with this alarming situation, efforts were made to contact those assumed to be in charge of Fort Rupert with a view to resolving the situation peacefully. But all of these efforts were rejected out of hand with the demand to surrender or face the consequences. It was in this context that I gave the order to a military unit to proceed to Fort Rupert and retake the headquarters.

I honestly believe that any objective observer who is aware of all the material facts would recognise that October 19th was a spontaneous situation, which got terribly out of control.

But I do not consider this an excuse. My perspective is that those who were leaders must accept responsibility for what happened. I was the one who ordered the troops to go to Fort Rupert and to use military means to recapture the Headquarters. Therefore, from the military standpoint, I must unreservedly accept responsibility for what happened. I so do. It is a very heavy responsibility given the magnitude of the events and given my youthfulness and immaturity at the time. But it is one I must bear.

I know it is terribly difficult for many Grenadians to forgive what happened, and particularly so for those who lost loved ones. Indeed, it is only in the last 36 months that I have finally been able to forgive myself, and this with a lot of help from my family, some dear friends and several spiritual leaders. But still, I seek the understanding of all Grenadians as to the extremely, almost impossibly difficult situation which I as a 25-year-old Lieutenant Colonel had to face up to in 1983.

Once again I express my profound regrets and apologies for the consequences of my actions.

September 1999

APPENDIX 7

**FACT SHEET
ON THE CASE
OF**

THE GRENADA 17

DO YOU KNOW:

1. That the Seventeen Political Prisoners did NOT receive a free and fair trial? In civilised societies/countries that are based on the principles of natural justice, a person is innocent until proven guilty **beyond reasonable doubt, in an impartial court of law.** Section 8 of Grenada's constitution (the highest law) entitles every citizen to a fair hearing.
2. That after the Registrar of the Grenada High Court, Mr Christian "Brim" St. Louis had selected a panel of Jurors from which the 12-member Jury was to be chosen for their trial, he was **fired and, within 24 hours, immediately replaced by** a person (Ms Denise Campbell) who, the day before, was a member of the team of PROSECUTION lawyers for the case?

And that the Judge dismissed the Jury Panel selected by Mr St. Louis?

And that Ms Campbell then chose her own Jury Panel? How can someone who is PAID TO PROSECUTE YOU, CHOOSE THE JURY TO TRY YOU?! Can that be FAIR?!

3. That in open court on 11 April 1986, the new Panel of Jurors selected by Ms Campbell shouted at the 17 Political Prisoners "you are murderers and criminals!"?

And the Judge chose the final 12-member Jury from those same persons who had convicted the Political Prisoners (by calling them "murderers") before they had heard one word of evidence? Can this be fair? Is it therefore surprising that this same Jury brought them "guilty"?

Fact Sheet on Case of The Grenada 17

8. That the reason stated in the Compton letter is wholly unacceptable and dangerous, and highlights this case as having been singled out consciously by the then leading politicians of the OECS for special treatment. It is further open to the suggestion that only an unconstitutional court of no permanence and whose judges had no security of tenure could have, in those politicians' view, dealt with this particular case. This view is reinforced by the subsequent passage of the law referred to in #11 below. The effect of all these political machinations by those in power at the time was to prevent The 17 access to the highest court under the Grenada Constitution – the Privy Council. This is a clear and unmitigated case of denial of due process.
9. That the Appeal Court Judges were EACH PAID \$1 MILLION DOLLARS to deliver a **written judgement** (as is required by Law) FOR ONE CASE ALONE (the Case of The 17)? Something that had never before happened in Grenada's history and since? Does this sound right?
10. That the Appeal Court, however, gave a VERBAL RULING (instead of the promised written one), in July 1991, upholding the 'murder convictions'.
11. That immediately after the Appeal Court's verbal ruling, clauses in a special law (Act #19 of 1991) were passed by the then Government in July 1991 to prevent The 17 from taking their case to the highest court in Grenada, the Privy Council. Is that fair? Was the Government afraid that their 'convictions' would be quashed because there was in fact no evidence to convict them and that they did not get a fair trial? Would the Government

4. And that one week AFTER THE 'TRIAL' of The 17 ENDED on 4 December 1986, MR CHRISTIAN ST. LOUIS WAS REAPPOINTED AS HIGH COURT REGISTRAR!? Isn't it clear that he was ONLY REMOVED FOR THE 'TRIAL' OF THE 17 so that the Prosecution could choose the Jury they wanted? Is that FAIRNESS?
 5. That Documents (seized by the US military forces in 1983) which could prove that the testimony of several prosecution witnesses were false, and thus prove the innocence of some of The 17, were denied to them? Is that fairness?
 6. That these and scores of other irregularities took place at their 'trial' causing the International Commission of Jurists, members of the US Congress, Members of the British and European Parliaments, Human Rights, Church, Trade Union and many other organisations and individuals in the world (like former US Attorney General Ramsey Clarke) to describe their 'trial' as a "travesty of justice" and a "Kangaroo Trial"?
 7. That the Prime Ministers of the Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) who had participated with the Reagan Administration of the US in the Invasion of Grenada met and decided and communicated in the form of a formal letter from then Prime Minister John Compton of St. Lucia, then head of the OECS Authority, to then Prime Minister H.A. Blaize of Grenada, on March 22, 1988 that the OECS Prime Ministers had decided to withhold the return of the OECS Court to Grenada (the Court of the Grenada Constitution) until the "Maurice Bishop Murder Case" (and that case specifically so named – the case of the Grenada 17) had been disposed of.
- Fact Sheet on Case of The Grenada 17
- have passed these special discriminatory clauses in the law against The 17 if they were sure they really had a case against them?
12. That today – OVER 8½ YEARS AFTER THE APPEAL COURT JUDGES (headed by Sir Frederick Smith of Barbados) GAVE THEIR VERBAL RULING upholding the 'murder' 'convictions', and after the Govt. paid them \$1 million dollars each – they have continued to refuse to hand over to The 17 and their lawyers the Written Judgement in their case, as is required by Law? No one has ever seen the judgement. Have they destroyed it, knowing that it CANNOT stand the scrutiny of a higher and impartial court?
 13. That NINE (9) different laws were passed by the Grenada Governments PRINCIPALLY for the 17's case? For example, there were 3 Jury laws passed for their case.
 14. That the sole material evidence against nine (9) of The 17 (i.e. the Leaders of the ruling party of the Grenada Revolution) in the 'trial' is that one witness (Cletus St. Paul) saw them huddled together in an open yard, talking and nodding their heads – even though he admitted he could not hear what they were saying?
 15. That this same Prosecution witness gave five (5) different statements about what he claimed he saw (3 different statements to the foreign (Barbadian) police, one at the Magistrate's Court and the other at the 'trial'), and this caused the late former President of the Appeal Court (respected Guyanese and Caribbean Jurist Goff Haynes) to summon St. Paul (and, also, another Prosecution witness) to the Appeal Court hearings to be questioned be-

cause he (Justice Haynes) could not believe that the same person had given these 5 different statements)? But before this could be done, Justice Haynes died. It should be noted that, despite the vigorous and continued protest of the defendants that that evidence was a fabrication from A to Z, none of these statements were made available to the defendants prior to the trial or since; and that their existence only came to light when Justice Haynes commented on them. And since his death the matter was swept under the carpet. All of a sudden the other Appeal Court Judges, led by Sir Frederick Smith of Barbados, refused to call the witness. Doesn't something seem wrong here? Isn't something smelling? Is that fairness?

16. That virtually all of The 17, including Mrs Phyllis Coard, the lone female, were tortured by the US- led invasion forces; specifically, a specially selected team of Barbadian police? And that some of the foreign soldiers guarding the 17 were horrified by this and protested to their superiors but were overruled at very high levels?
17. That the US government while claiming in a formal statement to the Organisation of American States' Human Rights Commission that it had not been involved in the tortures admitted that its agents - to wit, the US Military - had denied (despite repeated requests) all of the 17 access to legal counsel for the first six weeks that they had been detained and held as Prisoners of War and then 'Political Detainees' by the US occupation forces?

23. That Grenadians who are hostile to them are still saying that they don't know what really happened on Oct 19, 1983 and are calling for a Commission of Inquiry into the events? If The 17 received a fair trial, shouldn't that 'trial' - IF IT WERE FAIR - have revealed what had happened?

OURS IS A CHRISTIAN SOCIETY.
IT'S TIME TO FORGIVE,
HEAL THE WOUNDS AND
PUT THE PAST BEHIND US.

18. That all those tortured during that six week period were made to sign 'confessions' dictated by the invasion force; 'confessions' later used in their 'trial' against them?
19. That The 17 have spent more than 16 years in prison — the equivalent of a prison term of over 24 years — which is longer than the normal definition of a 'life sentence' in many countries. For many of them that represents the majority of their adult lives.
20. That 10 of the 17 Political Prisoners put their lives at risk and directly participated in the making of the Grenada Revolution on March 13 1979?
21. That The 17 have made much sacrifice for the development of Grenada? That the NIS, MNIB, International Airport, NISTEP, CPE, NCB, GBC, NTS, House Repair Programme, Agro Industries (and other programmes of the Revolution), and the scores of poor people's children who are today qualified as doctors, engineers and in other professional areas, and who are seriously contributing to the country, are also part of the serious contributions of The 17 to Grenada's Development? Several of them selflessly gave up their young lives, sacrificing opportunities that were available to them for personal development, so as to make a contribution to Grenada.
22. That The 17 have publicly acknowledged that they made mistakes, and have publicly apologised to the people of Grenada, and to all those who were hurt as a result of their errors/mistakes? [See the Open Letter in *The Grenadian Voice* newspaper of February 8, 1997, front page and several inside pages, and Televised Interview with Leslie Pierre, October, 1999.]

A Travesty of Justice:
How 10 NJM Leaders
Of The Grenada Revolution
Were Convicted By One Lie

by

Ewart Layne

Ewart Layne

A Travesty of Justice:
How 10 NJM Leaders
Of The Grenada Revolution
Were Convicted By One Lie

- * We of the Grenada 17 and our supporters have been saying for 8 years now that the legal process which we were put through was unfair.
- * We want to make it abundantly clear that our complaint is not just about legal niceties. It is a fundamental complaint, in that we are saying that the verdicts returned against us at the trial and upheld on appeal were bad in law. That is why we say with all the conviction we can muster that justice according to law demands that we be freed. This is an entirely different issue from that of political and moral responsibility for the events, including the October 19th tragedy which we have publicly and unequivocally accepted.
- * This article focuses on the case against the former leaders of the NJM, collectively described as the NJM Central committee. It is not motivated by any feelings of anger or recrimination or any desire to hit back; we have long passed that stage. The article is an effort to address and lay bare a critical aspect of the legal process, the significance of which has been buried under a mountain of propaganda.

A Travesty of Justice: How Ten Leaders
of the Grenada Revolution Were Convicted by One Lie
International Edition

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A Travesty of Justice

The entire analysis which follows is based on the case presented by the prosecution; on evidence from prosecution witnesses.

- * It would be recalled that the Grenada 17 refused to recognise the court or participate in the trial except to make indicative defence statements from the dock. There was therefore no cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses nor were there any witnesses for the defence. In other words, basically only one side of the story was presented. Yet it would be established herein that even on the basis of this one side of the story if the case was fairly put to an impartial jury there could have been no convictions.

Evidence of Cletus St. Paul: It's Importance

- * At the trial the prosecution relied on the evidence of Cletus St. Paul to convict all those who were executive members of the NJM and hence leaders of the Revolution. His was the sole evidence against the leaders. This was made clear by the trial judge when he was explaining to the jury the importance of St. Paul's evidence. Without his evidence there could have been no convictions. Therefore, if his evidence is bad then the convictions are by that very fact bad.
- * Cletus St. Paul was the former chief bodyguard of PM Bishop. He was arrested on October 12th 1983, according to him on the orders of the NJM CC. He was locked up at Camp Fedon in Calivigny from October 12th 1983 to October 19th 1983.

J. O. F Haynes and St. Paul's Evidence

- * It should be noted that at the outset of the appeal then President of the Court of Appeal J. O. F. Haynes made it clear that he considered the convictions of the NJM leaders suspect because to him St. Paul's evidence lacked credibility.
- * Justice Haynes also expressed his grave misgivings at the fact that St. Paul had given five (5) different Statements: three (3) to the police; one at the preliminary inquiry; and his testimony at the trial. He could not understand how the same person could give such different statements.
- * On account of his concern Justice Haynes ruled that he was going to call Cletus St. Paul before the court so that he could question him himself.
- * However, Justice Haynes died suddenly before he could question St. Paul. A new Court of Appeal was constituted. The decision to call St. Paul was shelved. The police statements of St. Paul have never been provided to the defence. And of course, all the convictions were upheld.

Untruth

- * The untruthfulness of the evidence of Cletus St. Paul is demonstrated by the fact of its inconsistency with that given by all other prosecution witnesses.
- * At the end of this document are two tables which address the critical issue of time.

* Table One shows the time which some of the critical

Ewart Layne

- * Indeed, when the 11:00 a.m. time for the arrival of the crowd at Fort Rupert, which other witnesses gave, is combined with the 1:15 p.m. time for the start of the shooting at Fort Rupert given by the Sandhurst-trained military man, we get a 2¼ hours time gap between the two events.
- * As aforementioned, the only key witness whose evidence is inconsistent was Cletus St. Paul. Although St. Paul was very careful to avoid giving any times for any event at the trial, something which is itself suspect; what is clear is that his story is radically inconsistent with a two hour time gap for the two critical events, namely, the seizure of Fort Rupert and the arrival of the APC's.

**Bernard Coard and Others Arrived
at Fort Frederick - Minutes After Crowd
Seized Fort Rupert**

- * In assessing the significance of the evidence of Cletus St. Paul it is important to establish that only a few minutes elapsed between the time the crowd arrived at Fort Rupert and the time that Bernard Coard et al arrived at Fort Frederick. Both tables 1 and 2 assert this but it is so important that it should be examined.
- * From the evidence of the prosecution Bernard Coard and some other members of the Central Committee were at the home of the Coard's at the Mt. Wheldale compound when the demonstrators broke in.
- * From the Mt. Wheldale compound Fort Rupert could be clearly seen. This is notorious fact and it was also attested to at the trial.

events took place. The final column to the right shows the time elapse or time gap between the various events. Table Two which follows is an expanded version of Table One and explains the movements of Cletus St. Paul on October 19th.

- * What emerged from the trial was a remarkable level of consistency between witnesses at different locations with regard to time. One witness was located at Old Fort; another one was located at the Mental Hospital near to Fort Frederick; another was at the Fire Station on the Carenage; yet another was at Richmond Hill Prison. Some were part of the crowd which went to Mt. Wheldale. And some were on Fort Rupert.
- * *All the key witnesses on this issue except one, (Cletus St. Paul) based on the time they gave and the activities they described, were agreed that at least 2 hours elapsed between the time Fort Rupert was over taken by the civilian crowd and the time the tragedy started to unfold on Fort Rupert, i.e. when the armoured Personnel carriers (APC's) arrived up there and the shooting started.*
- * One witness, a Sandhurst-trained military man was located at Old Fort overlooking St. George's. He said that the APC's arrived at Fort Rupert and the shooting started at 1:15 p.m. Given that witness' background his estimate of time is likely to be highly accurate. This 1:15 p.m. estimate also corresponds to the 1:39 p.m. time officially recorded by the Fire Station Chief for the fire alarm caused by the fire at Fort Rupert immediately following the approximately 15 minutes shootout at the Fort when the APC's arrived.

A Travesty of Justice

- * The clear inference from the prosecution evidence at the trial was that, on seeing the crowd that left Mt. Wheldale with Bishop entering the Army HQ at Fort Rupert, the members of the Central Committee panicked and bolted for Fort Frederick.
- * Indeed, the aforementioned Sandhurst trained officer testified that he was monitoring the activities at Coard's home from his vantage point, through a binoculars. He said that as he saw the crowd entering Fort Rupert he shifted his focus to the army headquarters for a short while. And that when he returned focus to Coard's home, everyone who were there had gone.
- * With the haste in which the Central Committee members left Coard's home, they would have arrived at Fort Frederick, five minutes drive away from Mt. Wheldale, within minutes. Indeed one witness, a worker at the mental hospital, which adjoins Fort Frederick, said at the trial that from there he saw the crowd going up to Fort Rupert and about the same time he saw cars with Bernard Coard and others speed pass in front of him and entered Fort Frederick. Bernard Coard and others therefore clearly arrived at Fort Frederick at approximately 11:05 a.m. while the crowd was still in the process of seizing Fort Rupert. (At the Preliminary Inquiry St. Bernard said that he saw the car pass about half hour after he saw the crowd arrive at Fort Rupert. It would mean that at worst, Coard et al would have arrived at Fort Frederick at approximately 11:30 a.m.)
- * The conclusion from all the above is therefore this: there is no significant time gap between when the civilian crowd seized Fort Rupert and when Bernard

Coard et al entered Fort Frederick. Cletus St. Paul's evidence must be analysed with this important conclusion in mind.

St. Paul's Story

- St. Paul's story is that he was standing at the entrance of Fort Frederick on October 19th 1983 when he saw Bernard Coard and other members of the Central Committee arrive in a state of great urgency. That immediately upon their arrival they huddled together for a brief moment right there at the entrance, only half dozen yards from him. That he saw them shaking their heads and moving their hands though he could not hear what they were saying. That shortly after in the presence of the others, one of the CC members, Cornwall, made a very short statement to soldiers who were gathered at Fort Frederick that Bishop and others had taken over the Fort and that they must be liquidated. That immediately after Cornwall's statement Coard and the rest of the CC members left for the top level of Fort Frederick. But that Ewart Layne stayed back and spoke to some of the army commanders. And shortly thereafter, those commanders together with a contingent of troops on APC's left Fort Frederick. And that, 10-15 minutes later, he heard shooting from Fort Rupert.

Missing 2 Hours

- On St. Paul's version, no more than 15 to 20 minutes would have elapsed between the seizure of Fort Rupert (approx. 11.00 a.m., on the basis of the rest of the prosecution case) and the arrival of the APC's (approx.

Ewart Layne

gether with the unit led by Conrad Mayers. He arrived there in handcuffs, since on his own admission he was a prisoner at Calivigny since October 12th 1983. There are dozens of soldiers in our community who were at Fort Frederick or who arrived from Calivigny together with St. Paul can verify when he, St. Paul, arrived. They would have been too fearful to go public. But anyone interested in the truth can get that from them.

- As a footnote: it would also be observed that at the Preliminary Inquiry in 1984, only a few months after the tragic events, St. Paul says nothing about seeing anything at Fort Frederick which could pass as a Central Committee meeting. However, at the trial 2 1/4 years after the events he recalls seeing the Central Committee members huddled together and shaking their heads — the prosecution's evidence of a Central Committee meeting. This is not a minor detail because in law the mere presence of the Central Committee members at Fort Frederick, based on St. Paul's Preliminary Inquiry evidence, would not have been sufficient to secure convictions against all of them. Some form of participation in the making of a decision had to be established. The huddle and the shaking of heads and moving of hands is how the prosecution decided to achieve that. It was a neat legal manoeuvre which shows the presence of a legal mind.

The Problem the Prosecution Had

- The problem the prosecution faced is that they could obtain no truthful evidence to convict the members of the Central Committee. Yet the conviction of the surviving leaders was so important for those who

1.15 p.m. on the basis of the rest of the prosecution evidence). Two hours would go missing.

- On St. Paul's version, some of the people who died on Fort Rupert could not have died there. They would not have been there because they arrived there over one hour after the Fort was seized. If St. Paul is speaking the truth then it must be that those people are alive somewhere. They were not at Fort Rupert.
- On St. Paul's version, some of the people who said they were in the Operations Room at Fort Rupert and who described their experience in graphic details would be lying. They could not have been there because they went to the Fort a long time after it was seized. Some close to two hours after. No one would seriously suggest that these people lied. But that is the irresistible logic of Cletus St. Paul's evidence. If he is speaking the truth then they are lying. And if they are speaking the truth St. Paul is lying. It is as simple as that.

The Truth

- Table Two below lays out the truth as to St. Paul's whereabouts on October 19th 1983. The truth is that Cletus St. Paul did not see a single member of the CC arrive at Fort Frederick on October 19th 1983.
- He could not have seen that because at the time the CC members were arriving at Fort Frederick Cletus St. Paul would have been at Camp Fedon in Calivigny.
- Cletus St. Paul arrived at Fort Frederick a whole 1 1/2 hours after Bernard Coard et al. He arrived there to-

had seized Grenada that they were prepared to manufacture evidence to achieve that. Because the Grenadian people were already angered by the death of Bishop in particular and the loss of the Revolution and given the job the invaders did in demonizing the surviving leaders, they were confident that Grenadians would go along. So they manufactured evidence.

- It is instructive that in 1983 or early 1984, in answer to questions from the regional media as to the reason for the delay in laying charges against the former leaders, Sir Nicholas Braithwaite, then head of the interim government, told the Caribbean media that there was no evidence to charge anyone. Clearly, Sir Nicholas being a man of high Christian values must have been greatly disturbed by the fact that at one time there was no evidence but then later evidence of a highly dubious nature appeared. We suspect that this doubt must have played a role in Sir Nicholas and Mrs. Purcell taking the courageous decision to commute the death sentences in 1991.

A Further Problem

- In using St. Paul to manufacture the evidence which nearly sent the former NJM leaders to the gallows, the prosecution had a further problem. The only other witness who gave testimony with regard to Fort Frederick stated that he was standing outside of the gate of Fort Frederick when Bernard Coard, Selwyn Strachan and others arrived in haste. He said that as they jumped out of their cars they shouted Forward Ever! Backward Never! And they immediately departed for the top level of the Fort about 100 yards away.

- * St. Paul therefore could not testify that the CC members remained down in the bottom yard in front of him for any length of time. It had to be a brief time span so that it could be argued that the other witness standing far away missed the brief delay. The other witness had previously stated that he did not know Layne so St. Paul could safely have him stay back to 'Give the orders'. It was a neat operation and that is why we are convinced, though we cannot prove, that St. Paul did not fabricate this on his own, but that a legal mind was behind this manufacture.

St. Paul's Evidence: How It Was 'Backed Up'

- * Throughout the legal process everything was done to ensure that St. Paul's piece of fabrication could be effectively used.
- * Mention has already been made of the fact that his three different police statements were never handed over to the defence.
- * Mention has also been made of the shelving of the decision to call St. Paul before the court to question him. Once President J. O. F. Haynes died suddenly, this decision was swept aside.

Additionally:

- * At the preliminary inquiry another prosecution witness, Errol George, gave evidence which gives the lie to Cletus St. Paul's evidence that he was there standing at Fort Frederick when members of the CC arrived. The prosecution refused to call that witness at the trial. And the court, despite the call of the undefended accused to do so, also refused.

- * Not just that the self-declared unconstitutional court was kept in place because of our case and our case alone. [This was openly admitted in an official letter from the then O.E.C.S. Prime Ministers, submitted to the Appeal Court.]
- * Not just that a prosecution lawyer was the one who selected the array from which the final panel of jurors was drawn.
- * Not just the fact that the array was selected in a highly irregular manner.
- * Not just that the summoned array was highly biased, and demonstrated this by shouting at The 17 in open court, *two weeks before the first witness was called*, that we were 'Criminals and Murderers'.
- * Not just that nothing was done by the judge to screen the panel so as to neutralise or mitigate the effect of the massive prejudice dished out by the media against the Seventeen for over 2½ years before the commencement of the trial.
- * Not just that the judge took the unprecedented step of metaphorically putting a gun to the head of the jury by giving them a verdict sheet which each of them had to sign and return showing how they voted on each count. Even in general elections people vote secret ballots. The issue of the secrecy of the jury process in the Commonwealth is as fundamental to the judicial process as secret balloting is to fair elections. The judge's action amounted to duress and naked coercion of the jury. After the 2½ years and millions of dollars spent in propaganda to poison the minds of Grenadians, which juror would have signed a paper saying that he/she voted to acquit Bernard Coard, for example?

- * There is a duty officer diary which was kept at Fort Frederick. This diary would have a record of persons who entered Fort Frederick on October 19th. It would show that Bernard Coard and others arrived at around 11:00 a.m. and that the unit from Calivigny along with a prisoner, Cletus St. Paul, arrived there at 12:30 p.m. Since this is an official document it can be used in evidence. The Americans seized this diary in 1983 and despite the appeals by The 17 to have it returned to assist them in their defence, the Americans have refused to hand it over.
- * At the trial the judge spent several days summing up the case and giving directions to the jury. His summing up runs into hundreds of pages. Yet, over all these days not even on one single occasion did the judge draw to the attention of the jury the fact that St. Paul's evidence does not fit with that of the other prosecution witnesses. There is not even a hint of that. The jury would therefore have retired completely oblivious of the fact that St. Paul's evidence was at odds with that of the other witnesses, and the implication of that. This failure by the judge, this non-direction, is fatal to the convictions. Any appeal court with even a modicum of integrity would quash the convictions on this ground alone not to mention scores of other grounds.

Not Just Legal Niceties

- * So when we say that the trial was unfair we are not just speaking of legal niceties.
- * Not just about the fact that nine (9) separate laws were passed to deal with our case.

- * So our complaint about the lack of a fair trial is not just about the fact that the Appeal Court, following the death of J. O. F. Haynes, refused to call St. Paul to be questioned at the appeal.
- * It is not just about the failure of the Court of Appeal, indeed the refusal of the court of Appeal, to hand over a written judgement, up to this day, in open violation of Section 8 of the Grenada Constitution.

What we are saying is that, outside of all the above, the convictions over our heads would have been impossible. In a fair trial the verdicts would have been not guilty. In a fair appeal the guilty verdicts would have been quashed. That is what we mean when we say that justice according to law demands that we be freed.

No to Constitutional Court And No To Privy Council

Moreover, those who mounted the case against us were themselves well aware that convictions could not be secured in an independent and impartial court. Those who controlled power therefore decided that come what may the case of the Grenada 17 would be dealt with in a special unconstitutional court; and that there would be no appeal to the Privy Council, Grenada's highest court.

Thus the self-declared unconstitutional Grenada Supreme Court was kept in existence until 1991 even though all other sections of Grenada's constitution were brought back into full effect since 1984. Once the court of appeal of that unconstitutional set-up had upheld the convictions against us, an Act of parliament to facilitate the return of the OECS court, the court of the Grenada constitution was passed. Together with the return of the OECS court, the jurisdiction of the Privy Council was restored to Grenada.

However, the very Act 19 of 1991 which brought back the OECS court and Privy Council to Grenada contained a provision — S7 (4) — preventing any case finally determined by the unconstitutional appeal court from being taken to the Privy Council. Put in simple terms, the case of the Grenada 17 was to go no further!

There can be absolutely no doubt that S7 (4) of Act 19 of 1991 was aimed at stopping the Grenada 17 from getting an independent review of their matter. Indeed, in March 1988 the OECS Heads in a letter signed by then-chairman, PM Compton of St. Lucia to the government of Grenada, stated that the OECS Supreme Court, which is the court of the Grenada constitution, would not be allowed to resume function in Grenada until the *Maurice Bishop Murder Trial (actually named) was disposed of*. This letter was read into the record of the appeal proceedings and amazingly it was used as the 'jurisprudential' basis for the continued existence of the unconstitutional court. In other words, the politicians of the various OECS islands were openly declaring that they, and not the judges of the OECS court, would determine if and when the court of the Grenada constitution would be permitted to exercise its legal jurisdiction in Grenada. It was one thing for the politicians to so declare; it was another thing for the judges who had the power of life and death over citizens to concede this authority to the politicians. The question therefore of the legal validity of the unconstitutional court previously premised on the operation of the doctrine of state necessity, was no longer to be determined by accepted principles of law. It was now to be determined by political fiat. Everything was wrong with that. More naked political interference in the judicial process is hardly imaginable! But that was not the end of the matter.

Act 19 of 1991 was due to take effect on August 1st 1991. Five of the 17, among them former Deputy Prime Min-

Political and Moral Responsibility and 16 Years Imprisonment

This is not to say that we are bitter about the 16 years imprisonment. We have accepted it among other reasons because we view it as the price we have had to pay for being responsible in a profound sense for the disaster of October 19, 1983, for the demise of the Grenada Revolution, for the pain and suffering inflicted upon many Grenadians during the Revolution and for the pain so many have suffered since. We think that the acceptance of this punishment with dignity is the honourable thing. And that is why any fear or concern that we would seek compensation for the 16 years or seek revenge against others is totally without basis.

Grenada would soon have to face up to a new millennium. The world has to face it. We believe it is time to look forward. From our standpoint, we think it's time to bring an end to our ordeal. We just want to get on with our lives; to care for our children and families. We just want to move on.

Cletus St. Paul, We Have Forgiven You

Finally, we say to Cletus St. Paul: We have forgiven you. Of course we were bitter and angry for years. But we have let go of the anger and the bitterness. We know you were committed to the Revolution. We know that you loved Maurice immensely. We are clear that the desire for revenge is what motivated you to do what you did. We pray that it would be possible to forgive yourself for something that the better side of you must tell you was wrong. We pray that with the help of God you will be able to find inner peace.

ister Bernard Coard, were scheduled to be hanged on July 30th 1991. The date for the hangings was postponed following an international outcry. On July 29th lawyers for the 17 filed an action to be heard by the OECS Court of Appeal. It would have meant that under the provisions of Act 19 of 1991, to wit S7 (3), this motion would have had to be heard by the OECS Court of Appeal since, it would be pending in the defunct Court of Appeal on August 1st. With this the 17 would get into the constitutional stream and be able to take their matter to the Privy Council.

The government reacted to this situation swiftly and in a most dubiously lawful manner. By executive action the date for the return of the constitutional court was pushed back. The unconstitutional court was hurriedly reconvened. The matter was heard and swiftly dismissed by this unconstitutional court. And shortly thereafter the constitutional court was allowed back into Grenada.

This determination to prevent the Grenada 17 from having their matter heard and/or reviewed by an independent court (in this case the Privy Council) is a clear admission by those in power that the case cannot stand up to scrutiny. That the only way they could achieve their political objective of convicting the 17 for murder was in a kangaroo court. [And, as noted earlier, this Kangaroo court to this very day, is afraid of ANYONE reading its written judgement and exposing, consequently, its bankruptcy. Thus, eight years later — and counting — no written judgement has seen the light of day.]

So once again it is clear that justice according to law is on the side of the Grenada 17; and those who were in power in, the post-invasion Grenada were fully aware of that. But politics was more important than justice!

TABLE 1

TABLE OF TIME SOME OF THE MAIN EVENTS OCCURRED ON OCTOBER 19TH 1983

No.	Time	Event	Time Elapse
1.	Approx. 0800 - 0900 hrs	Crowds start to gather in the streets of St. George's.	
2.	Approx. 1000 hrs	Sizeable crowd reaches the entrance of Mt. Wheldale (the compound which housed the homes of PM Bishop and Bernard Coard).	1-2 hours
3.	Approx. 1030 hrs	Crowd breaks into the compound of Mt. Wheldale. Bishop leaves with them.	30 minutes
4.	Approx. 1100 hrs	(a) Crowd enters Fort Rupert (b) Those members of the Central Committee who were at the home of Bernard Coard depart for Fort Frederick.	30 minutes
5.	Approx. 1105 hrs	Bernard Coard et al arrive at Fort Frederick	5 minutes
6.	Approx. 1300 hrs	Troops leave Fort Frederick for Fort Rupert	2 hours
7.	Approx. 1315 hrs	Troops arrive at Fort Rupert. Shooting begins.	10-15 minutes

Note the 2 hours + time gap between events #4 and 5 on the one hand, and #7 on the other.

TABLE 2

**EXPANDED TABLE OF TIME
OF SOME OF THE MAIN EVENTS
ON OCTOBER 19TH 1983**

No.	Time	Event	Time Elapse
1.	Approx. 0600 hrs	Unit at Calivigny rises. Cletus St. Paul is at that time a prisoner at Calivigny.	
2.	Approx. 0800 - 0900 hrs	Crowds start to gather in the streets of St. George's.	2 - 3 hours
3.	Approx. 1000 hrs	Sizeable crowd reaches the entrance of Mt. Wheldale.	1 hour
4.	Approx. 1030 hrs	Crowd breaks into the compound of Mt. Wheldale. Bishop leaves with them.	30 minutes
5.	Approx. 1050 hrs	Combat alarm is sounded in Calivigny.	20 minutes
6.	Approx. 1100 hrs	(a) Crowd enters Fort Rupert (b) Those members of the Central Committee who were at the home of Bernard Coard depart for Fort Frederick.	10 minutes
7.	Approx. 1105 hrs	Bernard Coard et al arrive at Fort Frederick	5 minutes
8.	Approx. 1230 hrs	Unit from Calivigny arrives at Fort Frederick. C. St. Paul arrives together with unit as a prisoner.	1½ hours

Ewart Layne was a Lt. Colonel in the People's Revolutionary Army, and Day to Day Commander of the Army at the time of October 19, 1983. In 1996 he was awarded an LLB (Honours) degree by London University. In August 1999 he wrote the final exam for an LLM with the same London University and has been awarded an LLM with merit, in Commercial and Corporate Law.

Prior to the Grenada Revolution (March 1979—October 1983), Layne taught Economics and Mathematics up to A Level at the St. David's R. C. Secondary School. A record-breaking athlete in his own right, while a student at Presentation Boys College (as well as playing Youth Cricket at the National Level), he was also the School's Games Master (1978) when the School's girls achieved their first ever victory over all Secondary Schools at Intercol (athletic) Games.

During the over 16 years Layne has been a political prisoner at Richmond Hill Prison, he has taught Mathematics (at all levels, from Basic Numeracy upwards), Statistics (at first year university level), and Law (at university level) even while pursuing his own studies in Law and holding down a full-time job in the Prison Industries.

By means of a special, discriminatory law passed in July 1991, Layne, along with the other members of the Grenada 17, continues to be denied access to Grenada's highest (and only independent) court, the Privy Council; an access which all other Grenadians, in practice, have.

APPENDIX B

Conference of Churches Grenada

Officers:

Chairman: Rev. Andrew Baker

Vice Chairman: Canon Leopold Friday

Executive Secretary: Rev. Arthur Yorke

Treasurer: Mr. Robert Robinson

Address:

Knox House

P.O. Box 1886

St. George's

Grenada W. I.

Telephone: (473) 440 9766 Fax: (473) 440 2436

26th May, 2000

Fr. Mark Haynes

The Presbytery

Beaulieu R.C. Church

Beaulieu

ST. GEORGE'S

Dear Fr. Haynes,

Greetings to you in the name of Jesus Christ.

Please find enclosed the Statement on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission from the Conference of Churches Grenada.

Yours sincerely,

Andrew Baker

Andrew Baker

CHAIRMAN

A Truth and Reconciliation Commission – for the healing of the nation.

Reflections from the Conference of Churches.

The Conference of Churches recognises the significance of the year AD 2000 and welcomes the opportunity to seize the year of jubilee as the time to heal our wounded nation through the path of truth and reconciliation. We are ready to cooperate with genuine attempts to walk this road, noting the need for integrity and urgency in the process.

Having shared in discussions with the former Minister of Justice in South Africa, it is evident that the process of disclosing truth and effecting reconciliation – from the selection of the commission to the giving of evidence – in his wounded nation was always very open. All parties who were to be reconciled were involved. It was very helpful for us to have direct conversations with a key person from South Africa and to understand something of the process in which they are involved.

It is important for us to ascertain from the outset what truth needs to be disclosed and which parties need to be reconciled. Truth and reconciliation cannot be spoken about in isolation from the needs of hurting men and women. What stands in the way of genuine reconciliation needs to be overcome; this will involve the disclosure of the truth about the involvement of persons in the history of Grenada.

The South African model can offer us some guidance as we seek to repair the divisions in Grenada. We must ensure that the process is open and that the public is clear about the purpose of the commission and is kept informed about its activities.

The commission should be (and be seen to be) independent of the government and given the authority to pass judgement without government ratification. This is important in order to establish the seriousness, with which we are embarking on this process and to distance the process from the interests of any political party. The commission is accountable to the nation as a whole and could report directly to the Governor General.

We welcome the opportunity to comment on the terms of reference for the commission, which were published in the media recently. One area, in which there seems to be an inconsistency, is in the question of indemnity (see article 2 of the terms of reference) and amnesty (see article 3(d) of the terms of reference). It is stated that the commission may grant indemnity to persons who disclose truths about the period under consideration (but this indemnity is not guaranteed). If persons are to be encouraged to disclose the truth, they need to know what the grounds are, for which indemnity is to be granted. The

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commission can only make recommendations with respect to the granting of amnesty. It is not clear to whom these recommendations would be made, nor why there should be a difference between the authority to grant indemnity and only to recommend amnesty. In the South African process, persons were invited to submit their disclosure through the amnesty committee of the commission. The commission was given the authority to grant amnesty on condition that there had been full disclosure and that the transgression of the law had been politically motivated. Persons already in prison were given the opportunity to appear before this amnesty commission first. This gives clear guidelines to the commission and a message to the nation about the serious desire for truth and reconciliation and their part in it.

The trial and subsequent appeal, which followed the intervention in 1983, are also shrouded in mystery, and confusion about their constitutionality remains in the minds of the public. We are of the opinion that an investigation into the trial and appeal should be included in the commission's remit in order to make the process complete. A truth and reconciliation commission's task cannot, by definition, be repeated, so that we must ensure that all aspects of the nation's pain are exposed to the healing process.

Our final concern is with the urgency of the process. It is not clear how the process is to be propelled forward, especially as two members of the commission are from outside the state of Grenada. The public needs to be kept informed as to the practical steps which have been taken towards the establishing of a secretariat and the time frame for the beginning of the hearing of evidence. If the nation is convinced that this is the path to healing, then let it be pursued with integrity, zeal and commitment. As a Conference of Churches, we recognise that there is much hurt and misunderstanding in the nation and a need for reconciliation between persons and between groups. This cannot be allowed to continue to fester and so we seek to find a way forward, which will yield genuine healing.

To: Prime Minister, Dr. Keith Mitchell
Members of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Grenada
President of South Africa, Mr. Thabo Mbeki
Media houses in Grenada
Heads of Churches

STATEMENT TO THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
PRESENTED BY DR. TERENCE A MARRYSHOW.
11th April 2002

Mr Chairman,
Distinguished Members of the Commission,

It gives me great pride and honour to address you and to thank you for the opportunity to have this audience with you. While tremendous criticism has been levelled at the Commission from certain circles within the society, the Commission to my mind remains relevant in seeking the truth about many events that transpired in our recent past, and hopefully, as the saying goes, once we arrive at that truth, the truth shall set us free.

Since 1983, following the collapse of the Grenada Revolution and the U.S led invasion of Grenada, our party the Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement (M.B.P.M) has been engaged in a struggle for the restoration of many of the programmes of the Revolution which benefited the poor and working people of our country. It would be fair to say that over the last 18 years we have indeed championed the cause of the poor, the oppressed and the dispossessed in our society and have been the conscience of the nation but our calls have fallen on deaf ears. The revolution which sought to address many of the social, political and economic injustices in our society brought about by years of colonialism and domination, made tremendous strides in only four and a half years. The foundation that it laid giving Grenadians ownership of two commercial banks, the electricity and telephones companies, an agroindustrial complex, a brand new international airport, a national insurance scheme, hundreds of trained professionals, a new work ethic, a new-found national pride and patriotism is a legacy that can never be denied and unequivocally demonstrates that the Bishop Government was clearly committed to qualitatively changing the life of each and every Grenadian. It is for these palpable and tangible reasons that I remain and will remain to the end of my days a die-hard supporter of the Peoples Revolutionary Government led by Maurice Bishop because it was the first time in our history that I had ever seen a Government so committed to social justice and equality by striving to eliminate the prejudices and inequalities of the past in such a short space of time.

The events of October 1983 which culminated with the brutal assassination of Maurice Bishop and several of his cabinet colleagues, still remain one of the if not the darkest days in our entire history and this was followed by the criminal invasion of our country under the guise of rescue mission, an intervention and the restoration of democracy. The events leading up to the decision to place Prime Minister Bishop under house arrest following his successful trip to Hungary in 1983 must be seen as one of the most critical decisions that eventually led to an escalation of the internal crisis and ultimately his untimely demise. It would be interesting to find out who gave the order and who had the

authority to place the Prime Minister under House arrest. It would also be instructive to know how the decision to put Maurice Bishop and others against a wall in Fort Rupert and assassinate them in cold blood was arrived at.

Since 1983, our party has been engaged in the painful and arduous process of trying to recollect information that would eventually lead to the recuperation of the remains of those who lost their lives on Fort Rupert on that fateful day so that they could be given a decent burial. We have also tried unsuccessfully to fully authenticate the number of lives that were lost on October 19th and then on October 25th following the US invasion of Grenada.

This is and still remains a pressing demand not only for our party but for the Grenadian people who would like to bring closure to this sad chapter in our history. It is our view that this period must be properly investigated and these nebulous issues be cleared up once and for all before our people can truly move forward again as a united people.

In keeping with the traditions of many countries around the world in honouring their heroes and martyrs by naming important landmarks after them, our party has sought to give proper recognition to Bishop by campaigning for the Point Salines airport to be named the Maurice Bishop International Airport. For 18 years this has been a popular cry of our people and we believe that Bishop is deserving of that tribute and recognition because of the outstanding contribution that he has made not only to making the international airport a reality but for putting Grenada on the map as proud, resourceful and defiant country that made its mark in the 20th Century on world affairs and history.

Mr Chairman, our party is still committed to seeking the truth as far as these issues are concerned and we know that there are many people who can shed light on these events. People have been reluctant over the years to come forward for fear of victimization or reprisal and perhaps because so many years have passed by without any form of investigation, they now feel that their information is irrelevant and without worth.

I personally and my party hope that the commission through its mandate will be instrumental in answering many of these lingering questions and that your deliberations would yield the kind of information that will help us as Grenadians to bury the past once and for all and move forward again with unity and with pride.

Mr Chairman,

I would like to move on to a matter of a more personal nature. When I returned to Grenada in 1986 together with nine of my medical colleagues after we had completed our training in Cuba, we encountered fierce opposition and stiff resistance from the NNP Government of Herbert Blaize to getting registration and licences to practice our profession in Grenada.

After the events of October 1983, the Grenada Embassy in Cuba was closed and the students were left without any representation or leadership. At a general meeting of the

Marryshow left in the cold



ONE CUBAN-TRAINED Doctor is still 'out in the cold' and has not been absorbed in the two-year Internship programme laid down by the Registration Board and the Government.

Dr. Terry Marryshow - a 34 year old grandson of the late T. Albert Marryshow - told *Grenadian Voice* that government, in a letter dated June 30, told him that "Cabinet, at its meeting of 15th June, 1987, withdrew its approval for you to be absorbed into the pre-registration programme as an intern, because of recent developments".

Seven of the ten doctors who returned to the island a year ago, claiming immediate registration are currently attached to the Ministry of Health as

interns. One - Dr. Sonia Phillip - was taken by St. Vincent and Dr. Sonia Nixon went to Jamaica under a private arrangement.

Marryshow said that he was not prepared to go to any other island as he had been away from Grenada for 14 years - seven in the United States of America and seven in

Cuba. He said he was not in the island when clearance came for him to be absorbed. When he returned, in May, he reported to the Ministry and was told that he

would be taken on from June 1. He said he needed to pay a visit to America to maintain his residential status and he made the trip in

May to be available for June 1. When he returned he was told by Medical Superintendent, Dr. Lloyd Alexis, that

Doctors would be switching rotations on July 1 and it would be better for him to wait until then. He accepted this but, following a trip he made to Cuba, he received the letter notifying him that the approval had been withdrawn.

The doctor told *Grenadian Voice* that he is Secretary of the Maurice Bishop Youth Movement and, in that capacity he had made trips to many parts of the world. This was not done secretly but openly and he did not think that this should present a problem. He said he has a son aged 13 years (in America) and a

daughter aged three (who is with his Cuban wife in Cuba) and he needs to earn a living. If the government is not going to put him in the programme he feels he should be granted registration so that he could practice his profession.

Asked to comment on the matter, Minister of Health Danny Williams, confirmed the information supplied by Marryshow. He said that Marryshow was the last of the Cuban-trained Doctors to signify willingness to participate in the pre-registration programme but arrangements were finally made for him to be absorbed, as were the other seven, although funds for them had not been budgeted and were very hard to come by.

Williams said that

when his turn arrived Marryshow was not in the island and could not be contacted. After arrangements were finally made, however, it was brought to the attention of the cabinet that, during his last visit to the United States, Marryshow had addressed meetings in which he was extremely critical of government. It was felt that the hostility he displayed towards the government was not consistent with the attitude of someone wishing to work with the same government and who would be subject to the rules governing all public officers. For these reasons, the Minister said, the decision was taken to withdraw the approval for him to be absorbed into the pre-registration programme.

Wage increases for workers

Employees at Seecram Brothers Construction Company have received an average of 15-20% increase in wages, which took effect last Friday.

Negotiations between Seecram Brothers Industrial Relations Officer from Trinidad, Mr. Vernon Guendoo and Technical and Allied Workers Union (TAWU) Executive Secretary, Mr. Chester Humphrey resumed last Thursday, when the main areas of differences, which include wages, were settled.

Two weeks ago, workers went on a two-day strike to force the company to resume negotiations for better wages and conditions of work.

The week's good thought from

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1984
Grenadian students in Cuba, I was elected as the Leader of the Grenadian students in Cuba. I was therefore entrusted with the responsibility of handling many of the bureaucratic problems facing the students in Cuba and also representing youth and students at many international meetings all over the world. I had in fact become an unofficial ambassador for youth and students from Grenada especially at a time when Youth within Grenada were unable to travel to represent Grenada abroad.

Following the tragic events which led to the collapse of the revolution, I wrote to the Chairman of the Interim Advisory Council headed by Nicholas Brathwaite, indicating our willingness and desire to remain in Cuba to complete our studies despite a call for us to return home by the Council. Prior to our graduation in 1986, I again wrote to the Blaize administration, informing them of our imminent return to Grenada and pledging our services to our country and people. We asked for jobs to be provided to us as had been guaranteed by the P.R.G who was the government responsible for sending us to Cuba.

On our return to Grenada in 1986, all imaginable obstacles were placed in our way. We were told that no funds were available to absorb us into the system and we should probably look for other opportunities elsewhere. This led to one of our graduates going to Jamaica and another to St. Vincent. They then said that they were going to absorb only five and the rest would have to look for opportunities elsewhere. This I found totally unacceptable and I called on the government to give us licences and registration so that those who could not be absorbed could then go into private practice if they so desired. The government refused this offer and instead demanded that we all do two more years of internship at the general Hospital before receiving the right to practice. We had already completed internship before returning to Grenada and no other Grenadian graduating from other universities were required to undergo such stringent measures. I indicated to the government at the time that I will be the last to enter the programme since I would have no choice after some of my colleagues decided to accept their demand.

When my turn came to be absorbed into the pre-registration internship programme in June 1987, I was given the run-around by the Ministry of Health and then finally, I received a letter from the government signed by the permanent secretary in the Ministry of Health, Mrs Pamela Steele, informing me that decision was taken to withdraw my entry into the programme. I sought clarification from the then Minister Mr Daniel Williams our present Governor-General who failed to provide any answers. It was not until I took my case to the press and then the Editor of the Grenadian Voice newspaper interviewed the Minister to get the other side of the story, that he was informed about the true reason. The reason was that I had addressed a meeting in the United States at which I was extremely critical of government and that hostility that I displayed towards the government was not consistent with the attitude of someone wishing to work with the same government and who would be subject to the rules governing all public officers. From September 1986 until September 1990 I was denied my right to work, a fundamental right enshrined in the Constitution. The only crime I committed was to utilize my god-given right to speak and express my opinions and for that reason, my right to work and four of the best years of my professional life were taken away from me. Over

the years I have written to successive governments to address the issue of compensation for those years of deprivation but these have fallen on deaf ears.

It is my hope that in the same way the revolution as put under scrutiny and many who felt they were wronged and victimized by the revolution were entitled to some level of compensation, I too feel that I am entitled to some form of compensation for the four years I was deprived of my right to work. I was a victim and a scapegoat, having been granted the distinction of being the only Grenadian graduate from Cuba who has been singled out for such treatment. During that time, my family and in particular my wife and children and my mother suffered tremendously as I was not able to contribute financially to their upkeep and well-being but instead depended on them. The psychological pressure put on me during those years was overwhelming but I have survived them and have seen many of the things that I fought for during those years now becoming a reality. Students are not only going to Cuba again but they receive moral and financial assistance from the Government and on their return are all accepted with open arms as citizens who have a role to play in the development of our country.

Mr Chairmain, distinguished Commisioners, I thank you.

440-9047

The Rosary Priory,
P.O.Box 1950,
St. George's;
8th April 2002


The Chairman,
Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
Scott Street,
St. George's.

Dear Sir,

I herein enclose my personal impression of the period under the consideration of the Commission. My belief is a account of the emotions of these times is as significant as a record of events. Our feelings of elation and of despair were stretched to extremes, leaving us very confused. It is at this level that the pain remains and needs to be healed.

I would like to think that these reflections will be of some assistance to the Commission. I remain available should you should wish to interview me.

Yours faithfully,



(Fr.) Peter Clarke, O.P.

Personal Reflections on the Pre-Revolution and Revolution Period
For the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Grenada April 2002
From Fr. Peter Clarke, O.P. Phone 440-9047

When Yahweh brought back Zion's captives we lived in a dream, then our mouths filled with laughter and our lips with song. (Ps. 126). ^{over} ^K

To my mind, there have been two such dream-like experiences during my association with Grenada since 1958. These were times when the Nation was seemingly in bondage and was given a reprieve. These were 1) the March 1979 Revolution and 2) the 1983 Intervention, when the 'Dream' ^{led} became a 'Nightmare.' My purpose is not to give a precise account of historical events but a description of what it was like for me, an English priest of the Dominican Order, working in Grenville during these years.

Before the Revolution

Eric Gairy, a charismatic with his large following, leader, had the potential and the opportunity to lead Grenada to some level of greatness. Regrettably, with his self-understanding of being a divinely appointed, his obsession with personal aggrandisement, he became paranoid in his suspicion of any criticism or opposition.

Consequently, restrictions were placed on freedom of speech, between small groups. Members of the Police Force/Security Forces used gun-violence against suspected dissenters. It was expedient to be visibly a supporter of Gairy, compromising to be openly critical of him. There was a sense of oppressive intimidation. Throughout this period there was an under-current of discontent and resentment.

Most significantly, society at every level - family, community, even church, became increasingly polarized. Unintentionally, but inescapably, church ministers of the Conference of Churches contributed to this polarization. Such ministers, I was one of them, felt they could not be true to their calling without their denouncing violations of, and promotion of, human rights.

Typical was the comment made to me that they were now be presented with a 'new Church' - no longer one that offered comfort and consolation but one that dabbled in politics. I would say that the churches must take considerable blame for not educating their congregations that the promotion of social justice and human rights is intrinsic to the authentic proclamation of the Gospel. The people were not prepared for ministers of religion taking principled stands. In fact, from the 1970s until now most people are inclined to act from expediency and personal advantage rather than from principle. Political loyalty has long been stronger than loyalty to the Word of God or to the voice of a church.

This leads me to suggest that throughout the whole of this time the churches were going through a 'Mission-Identity Crisis' - how to be authentic in the circumstances of the moment? This is illustrated by an exchange at a meeting of Catholic priests. One claimed that our duty was to ensure that our traditional pastoral ministry should not be jeopardized by controversial sermons. When he was reminded that, in imitation of Christ, we should bear witness to the truth and be prepared to take the consequences, his response was that this was theology and had nothing to do with real life! How could one blame the laity for being bewildered and pained that they found themselves rejecting the church that they loved?

However, it was the same ministers of religion who were counted as subversive by both Eric Gairy and Maurice Bishop for their preaching the same message of human rights. Such preachers could never be comfortable with the knowledge that their sermons were tape-recorded or reported to the authorities. Nor that people walked out of church in protest at the sermons. Others preferred the less obtrusive approach of conveying their concerns to the leadership of both regimes. They were criticized for their apparent lack of concern.

To give an impression of what it was like for a minister of religion in the Gairy days I refer to two incidents that involved me personally.

I was officiating at the country funeral of Gairy supporter who had been killed in a shoot-out at a time when the churches were being blamed for kindling the unrest in Grenada. At the grave-side a man with a broken bottle rushed me from the crowd. Fortunately, Gairy supporters/church members restrained him. People said I was lucky to come out alive. For some time afterwards I knew what it was to tremble with fear.

In the late 1970s the New Jewel Movement was attracting support. It was suspected that caches of weapons were secreted throughout the island. Properties were searched, including the residence of the Dominican priests outside Grenville. Recently a bush had been transplanted - leaving a mound of disturbed earth. I stood by while police armed with rifles and sticks probed the ground. Their leader told me I should not think that my white skin would save, nor that my prayers would be heard. He would cut me down at the altar. No idle threat!

A sad note to the search of the house was the unfriendliness of the young men with their guns and sticks who scoured the room of a gentle, elderly, priest. He had taught them religion with the utmost kindness and generosity. His shock that they could have shown him such hostility caused him to collapse. He had to be taken to hospital as a frightened, heart-broken man. His recovery did not take long. This single incident highlights how much a totalitarian regime could ensnare and pervert the minds of its adherents.

ASSEMBLY '78

It is no exaggeration to assert that Assembly '78 was the most significant, most exciting, event in living memory for the Catholic Church in Grenada. In this the Church sought to evaluate its actual situation

and to charter its path for the future. Every aspect of its life was discussed by groups throughout the Nation. The climax was several days of General Assembly at which Resolutions were submitted, debated, and voted upon. The end-product was a Diocesan Pastoral Plan - as had been intended.

Among the topics discussed were Family Life, Worship and, of necessity, the Just Society that the local Church should promote and defend. It should be borne in mind that this was at a time when dissatisfaction with Gairyism was wide-spread and the New Jewel Movement was gaining popular support. There was no overt political militancy in these discussions but certainly there was intensity of feeling and commitment. Here the concerns of the Church and the New Jewel Movement coincided. Some have claimed - I believe wrongly - that the Assembly was hijacked by the N.J.M.

Early in 1979 there was the sentiment that the N.J.M. and Gairy were on a collision course and it was believed that Gairy was about to act decisively to ensure that he prevailed. Fear was tangible at that time. This was the 'Nightmare' that preceded the 'Dream-like' reprieve, of the Revolutionary coup of 13th March 1979.

The Revolution

That day it seemed like a dream. Enthusiasm for what had happened was wide-spread. As was determination that all measures should be taken to secure what had been gained. Ranking Gairy supporters were put into Security Detention. The Constitution was suspended. The Nation was to be administered by Revolutionary Law.

Such was the euphoria and optimism of those early days, as well as the sense of vulnerability to international opinion and reaction, especially from the United States, that the Revolution was granted considerable latitude in the decisions it saw fit to make. As the years passed a siege mentality became increasingly pronounced. This can be attributed to the suspicion/anxiety of Caribbean and other democracies over the fact that the Revolution had the support of Marxist Cuba and Russia. Revolutionary patriotism was manipulated to the full.

However, the churches, while promising to lend support to the de facto government, of the Revolution made it known that they would be vigilant in monitoring respect for human rights. The new regime deserved to be given a chance to prove its worth. I remember a theology being produced that justified the overthrow of tyrants (i.e. Gairy)

Many good things happened through the Revolution. Many, especially the youth, were given a sense of self-worth and significance to their lives. Frequent mass rallies generated unity and co-operation such as had not been seen before. Agriculture prospered, as did initiatives in minor industries, and in adult literacy education. Many young people were given the opportunity for tertiary education in Cuba and elsewhere.

Gradually disillusion set in, for a number of reasons. Any dissent was regarded as subversion that had to be dealt with 'heavy manners.' Time in detention without been charged for any offence. It was seemingly arbitrary. The numbers of inmates increased as accusations were made, even by members of one's own family or circle of friends. Perhaps the

greatest casualty was the breakdown of trust and the insecurity this produced. With such a small population in Grenada everyone had a friend or relative in detention and feared when their turn would come to join the crowd behind bars. I submit that this fear was deliberately created to produce unquestioning submission.

A recurrent theme was the threat of an American invasion to overthrow the Revolution with its Marxist affiliations and its policy of indoctrinating the population in Communist theory. The fear-reaction was the militarization of the Nation, with even youngsters carrying rifles.

Thus the Revolution established itself as the sole authority to be obeyed, the arbiter of what was right and wrong according to its thinking. On an absurd occasion the Minister of Education advised a group of Catholic teachers that their church should be 'biophilic' (loving life as understood by the Revolution), not 'necrophilic' (loving death - i.e. opposing the Revolution).

Thus the very structures of authority - family, school, church - that undergird society were constantly undermined. The little boy with the big gun and access to the ear of Maurice Bishop was the boss-man to be heeded. Today, we are feeling effect of this demise of respect for authority.

Grenadians are basically Christian. While many subjugated this to the Revolutionary cause there were those who were determined to hang on to their Christian ideals and practice. From the early 1970s many of all ages found courage and solace in the prayer-meetings of the Charismatic Renewal. Pilgrimages to the Shrine outside Grenville regularly attracted large crowds who sought Christian solidarity in the midst of what they perceived to be a godless environment. The Dominican priests made their residence in La Digue available for those who wished to deepen and strengthen the Faith lest they be sucked into the mentality of the Revolution. In addition to these, there was an ongoing residential course for training lay leaders.

All these activities were regarded with the greatest suspicion, but freedom of religion was never denied. However, a provocative Editorial caused the Catholic monthly paper, Catholic Focus, to be closed down. At a time when the introduction of People's Courts that would decide cases by public acclamation was a possibility, the paper asserted that the voice of the people is not necessarily the voice of God. The people had shouted, "Crucify Him." Such were the risks that some priests took in their public utterances. They did not win for themselves many friends.

Recognition must be given to those teachers in schools who taught pupils traditional standards of Christian morality. Such was their influence that a number of them were removed from the classroom to administrative jobs in the Public Service. In other walks of life people displayed personal integrity at considerable cost to themselves. At the very least, they lived under the threat of being victimized and ostracized.

In the circumstances of Grenada it was always necessary for the preacher to be circumspect in what he chose to say, how to say it, and what not to say. He had the responsibility of not wantonly making a bad situation worse, while at the same time he owed it to people to proclaim the truth that would set them free. Often we discussed together how best to respond to the 'signs of the times.'

THE 'DEAR JONATHAN' LETTER

This preamble is needed to explain the consequences of an ill-considered initiative that was deeply compromising to the Dominican priests working in Grenada. I refer to the Dear Jonathan Letter - Fr. Jonathan Fleetwood being their Provincial Superior in England. One of our priests, teaching at the Regional Seminary in Trinidad. In his own hand he wrote a letter to Fr. Jonathan suggesting that priests engaged in the Marxist-Christian dialogue in Europe should come to Grenada for a similar dialogue. He asked one of our Grenadian students, an ardent supporter of the Revolution to type the letter.

The student sent a copy of the letter to Maurice Bishop, who, in a radio broadcast, furiously accused the foreign priests of planning to destabilize the Revolution. We priests were totally discredited, without a word to say in our defence. At no point had we been consulted or informed about the proposed initiative. Though no action was taken against us, our Mission in Grenada was rendered far more difficult. We had lost the trust of the people.

To conclude this section, it is noted that the common view, that the Grenada Revolution would be as enduring as that in Cuba. It came as a complete surprise to most that the Revolution should implode upon itself.

The Demise of the Revolution

Who can say when the populace began to become disaffected with living in a fortress/prison environment of suspicion, mistrust and personal insecurity? Probably there were two causes of the Revolution turning upon itself - personality and ideological differences between Bishop and Coard. Everyone was shocked at the house-arrest of Bishop. It was the youth in Grenville who staged the first demonstration in favour of Bishop. This was followed by a mass-demonstration in St. George's which liberated Bishop and took him to the city and to the Fort.

It was while I was visiting the village of Muncih in St. Andrew's that news came through of guns being turned on people at the Fort, of some leaping over the high walls to safety, of the execution of Maurice Bishop and some of his Cabinet colleagues. Someone remarked to me, 'This is the end of Grenada. There is no hope for Grenada.' Total despair. The People's Revolution had turned against the very ones who had supported it and believed in it. Nothing remained to defend. Nothing was there to look to for governance. Those who formed the Revolutionary Military Council were demonized, loathed and feared. Maurice Bishop, the popular charismatic leader was elevated to the status of the heroic martyr. It was conveniently overlooked that Bishop was the

architect of oppression. If people were to believe in the dreams that had inspired them they had to have someone, Bishop, in whom they believed in and were proud to have followed. One can only understand present-day Grenada in terms of a self-imposed denial of several years of nightmarist oppression.

Perhaps the periods of curfew, with the suspension of all social activity ~~was~~ therapeutic to a people deeply in shock. It gave them a respite in which they could 'catch themselves.' There was no opportunity for wildcat gestures of anger or revenge that would have produced further distress and instability. But there was deep apprehension about what the future would hold, with no perceived possibilities that offered hope. Clearly, the Revolutionary Military Council would only be able to function through duress and intimidation. It would never inspire popular loyalty and affection.

For many this was a time of intense prayer - placing trust in God without daring to guess what he might have to offer. Great were the inconveniences of not being able to leave one's home to visit neighbours, purchase foodstuff, seek medical attention, tend animals. It was a sobering thought that this was the first time public acts of Sunday worship were forbidden throughout the land. Yet again, a Grenadian nightmare.

Surprised jubilation greeted the news that armed forces had come to rescue Grenada. Prayers were being answered. The nightmare was giving way to the unfolding of a dream of glorious possibilities. Regardless of the high-minded protests of outside commentators against an alleged invasion of National Sovereignty, for those who were there in Grenada this was Humanitarian Intervention, a Rescue Mission, that was welcomed with gratitude. At that time sovereignty was a meaningless concept. Actual survival was the issue of the moment.

To me it is irrelevant that the motives of the Americans, as the chief component of the Armed Forces, were possibly of self-interest - bringing home their students at the St. George's University School of Medicine, suppressing a Marxist regime in its 'Caribbean backyard.' For Grenadians the important thing was they were given the opportunity to return to the normalcy of a free democracy. Whatever the mistakes and short-comings of subsequent years we must count ourselves as being truly blessed.

In conclusion, undoubtedly there is much residual pain and anger in the hearts of individuals and of specific groups. To my mind, insufficient attention has been given to the fact of this being a Nation collectively living with a shattered dream. Almost universally at the beginning there were high hopes and expectations of the Revolution. In the early days it achieved much and promised more. Gradually, as has been stated, this dream was tarnished. Eventually it was smashed to pieces. I believe the older generation is experiencing the pain of loss and massive disappointment. The younger generation, not having lived through these difficult times, doesn't know and doesn't want to know. This also applies to those Grenadians who lived abroad during the Revolution. They have no 'feel' for our recent history. This point is exemplified by the handling of Thanksgiving Day 25th October. Originally it had a specific historical theme related to the Rescue Mission. In recent years the thanksgiving has been so generalized that it could be applied to any place in the Caribbean or beyond. It would contribute to the healing of the Nation if it could be discerned why there is this evasion of remembrance of the past.

John Hope, SP

To: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Scott St., St. George's.

From: Fr. Sean Doggett, Cathedral Presbytery, St. George's
2nd November 2001

Tuesday, 25th October 1983, I was in the Catholic Presbytery at Grand Roy, St. John's. At about 8.00 a.m. a lorry went south towards St. George's preceded by a blue Diahatsu. About an hour later about six vehicles went down with local boys from Grand Roy who were militia members. Not very long after that after a blue Pajero (393) came back up to Grand Roy from the direction of St. George's. The two men in it told people the vehicles with the militia members from Grand Roy had been ambushed at Beau Sejours and that some of the boys had been killed and others injured.

I celebrated Mass in Grand Roy at 6.30 a.m. on the morning of Thursday 27th. After Mass people were talking heatedly about the situation in the village. Some of the militia members had returned home and reported that the bodies of some of the boys killed in the ambush were still at Beau Sejours. I went to see two of my parishioners, Denise McEwen whose son Godwin (Bossio) was said to have been killed and Veronica Baptiste whose son Michael had not returned home.

After some discussion it was decided that I would drive to St. George's with a group of the parents or other relatives of those who were missing. At Beau Sejours we found four bodies badly decomposed. Two were in the sugar cane field opposite the radio station and two were inside the radio station building. Two were identified as "Papa" and "Colours" from Grand Roy. There was also the body of a P.R.A. soldier from Gouyave called "Kung Fu". We did not at that time identify the bodies in the building. Denise McEwen thought one was her son Godwin but could not be sure. Later her daughter Pamela positively identified one of the bodies as that of her brother Godwin.

We continued to St. George's to look for three boys who had still not been accounted for. I was informed by an American officer at Queen's Park that the Americans had not taken any prisoners and that the boys would probably be found at the hospital. We did indeed find them there.

Michael Baptiste had been shot in the back and was paralysed.

Derek Benjamin had sustained the following injuries: gunshot to the face just below the eye; exit wound in the roof of his mouth; a broken jaw and a broken pelvis.

Julien "Clari" (whose surname I have forgotten) had superficial shrapnel injuries to his hands and face.

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I spoke to the officer at Queen's Park, a Col. Smith, about the need to bury the bodies that had been lying at Beau Sejours for two days. He said he could not help but assured me some units of the U.S. army would have responsibility for such matters and would see to it that the bodies would be properly taken care of.

On Sunday 30th October I went to Brizan for Mass. I was told that the bodies had still not been buried but that the men of Brizan would do so that day. That afternoon some of the men did dig four shallow graves but were afraid to touch the bodies without some protective clothing etc.

Later that same day at the General Hospital I met another officer who told me he had responsibility for public health. He assured me that since graves were dug he would see to it that the bodies were buried. They were in fact buried on Tuesday 1st November.

I later came to understand that the bodies were subsequently exhumed and taken to Cuba for identification. The Cuban authorities identified any bodies that were not wearing khaki or camouflage as their nationals and any that were as Grenadians. I understand that these bodies were brought back to Grenada in coffins and buried by Otways Funeral Undertakers at the Centre Cemetery in St. George's. To the best of my knowledge no information was ever passed to any of the relatives nor was any attempt made to find them.

I suggest the site of these graves be marked with the names of those deceased who are known and a Religious Service be held for them. I further suggest that some form of compensation be given to those who were injured and possibly to dependant relatives of those who were killed.

This Religious Service could be part of a National Service of Remembrance for all who were killed in the events of 19th - 26th October 1983.

Signed: Sean Doggett
Fr. Sean Doggett

Date: 2nd November 2001

MEMORANDUM

FROM: MR. E.A. HEYLIGER, Q.C. LL.B

TO: COMMISSION - TRUTH AND RECONCILATION

SUBJECT: INJUSTICE TO JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT

In 1944 I was practising my profession in Guyana and in December of that year I was recruited in the service of the Windward and Leeward Islands and accepted the post of Registrar, St. Lucia. In 1948 I was appointed Magistrate in Grenada.

I was later appointed as Attorney General of Grenada. In 1961 I was sent to act Judge in St. Kitts. See letter dated 29th December 1965. I was never paid my subsistence allowance.

In 1963 I applied for ten and a half months leave which was not granted due to the exigencies of the service. In 1964 I again applied for twelve months leave to which I was entitled. Field C.J. was very cold towards me and said I never heard of anybody going on twelve months leave. I told him Jackson C.J. went on twelve

Months leave and even recently Cenac, the Crown Attorney of St. Lucia went on twelve months leave. Field C.J. said 'I shall recommend six months leave for you' which was granted by the Secretary of State.

On the day I was supposed to set sail the Government refused to pay my passage to the united Kingdom, claiming that I was a designated officer and only was entitled to a passage to Guyana. That was totally incorrect. If I were a designated officer to Grenada, as I believe I should have been, my pension from the United Kingdom would have included all my service in Grenada. Please see unsigned draft letter dated 4th October 1977 marked 'X'.

In 1967 the Windward and Leeward Islands Supreme Court was abolished and the West Indies Associated States Supreme Court established. I was not appointed to the new court neither was Chief Justice Field. I went into private practice and some years later the Government asked me to return to the service as Legal Advisor and Legal Draftsman to the Government.

Some years later Mr. Eric Gairy (later Sir Eric Gairy Prime Minister of Grenada) showed me some confidential secret files at Government House. I was shocked at what I read for the remarks were highly defamatory and without any statement of fact. The statement was simply the opinion of the writers.

I refer now to a Report made to Sir Arthur Grattan Bellew by Chief Justice Field headed "Confidential - Mr. Justice Heyliger". In that report three serious allegations were made against me -

1. I had an affair with a policeman's wife and when Accosted by him drew a gun on him;
2. When I was Attorney General in Grenada I improperly drew \$50.40 Counsel's fee, which I had arranged with my staff to draw the money and pay it into my personal account;
3. I unlawfully obtained land at Old Fort by means of a Fraud.

All these allegations were made by the Chief Justice totally unknown to me, made behind my back in secret and each one was found to be totally false.

Those allegations were made with the knowledge and consent of Governor Turbott (see attachment 'A'). I submit there was a calculated conspiracy to destroy me.

I now attach a Secret and Personal Report dated 25th October 1965, written by Administrator Ian Turbott to Mr. Douglas Williams who was a very senior officer in the Colonial Office. That Report

shows that the police could find no evidence of my affairs with a policeman's wife and they were now looking for evidence of my fraudulent acquisition of land. The source of their information in this respect was an allegation by the Chief Justice's Secretary and it is clear that the Chief Justice was championing her cause.

What amazes me was that nobody ever asked the Chief Justice who had given him that information that I had an affair with a policeman's wife and my drawing the Counsel's fee of ten guineas, in the manner stated. It should be noted that no previous Chief Justice ever raised the question of counsel's fee with me. This had happened years before and they must have known the position. Letter marked 'B' attached from Administrator Turbott to Mr. Douglas Williams.

I respectfully submit that the conduct of Administrator Turbott and Field C.J. shows express malice.

The suggestions in this letter again accuse me of fraudulent behaviour and then comes his ^{imagination} personal opinion "It seems to me that Mr. Heyliger maneuvered his case to get the Administrator and Executive Council to be favourably disposed". All I can say is that his ways are not my ways nor my thought his thoughts. The conspiracy is fully developed.

I now come to when I was first informed of any allegations against me by letter dated 3rd December 1965. This letter is attached and marked 'C'. I made a detailed reply and hoped that they would understand what inter-colonial accounting meant. In other words the expenditure of the court is not attached to any one island, it serves all the islands. When I realized that unknown to me my office staff in the Attorney General's Chambers in Grenada, had drawn my salary as Attorney General and banked it to my account my only comment was 'God moves in a mysterious way his wonders to perform'; for when the Government owes you money it is very difficult, almost impossible to get them to pay you. The Privy Council has recently given a very learned judgment on that matter.

I claimed a set-off which is a proper and legal claim in law and sent the Government \$3,152.84 which was the amount I was legally owing them. Please see attachment 'D'.

It is interesting to note a letter dated 4th December 1965 attached and marked 'Y' from Administrator Turbott to Mr. Douglas Williams. It seems to me Mr. Berridge, the Attorney General was something of a sneak.

Governor Turbott replied by letter dated 23rd November 1966, and casually says, "As far as the item of \$50.40 is concerned, I have to inform you that it is not proposed to pursue this aspect of the matter". See attached marked 'E'. I replied by letter dated 23rd December 1966, and asked for an apology. See letter attached marked 'F'. He refused to apologise. I received letter dated 2nd March 1967, in which paragraph 4 reads as follows:-

"The Attorney General will be asked to institute legal proceedings against you for recovery of the sum of \$4,202, if you do not pay that sum to the Government of Grenada within 14 days of date of this letter."

On receipt of this letter I had a feeling of relief. I felt that at last I could expose the conspiracy against me. My reply was short. I replied as follows:-

"6th March 1967

Sir,

I acknowledge receipt of your letter of 2nd March 1967.

In the circumstances, I suggest that you proceed as indicated in paragraph

4 of your letter without further delay.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant

Puisne Judge.

His Excellency the Governor

Government House

St. George's".

The conspirators who had strong opinions about me in secret were afraid to come into the open court. I heard nothing further from them.

I am prepared to appear before the Commission and give further details and answer to any question they may choose to ask.

On retirement I was paid forty thousand dollars (\$40,000.00) by the Colonial Office for loss of career and got a pension of a little over six hundred dollars (\$600.00) per month from the Government of Grenada and a little over six hundred pounds from the United Kingdom. However, the damage done to my character and career by Administrator Turbott and Field C.J. was great. I suffered. ~~Had~~

Had I known these facts I would have taken up the matter with the Colonial

Office.

In conclusion, I attach the copy of a letter dated 11th December 1963 written to me by Sir Kenneth Roberts-Wray, Head of the Legal Department of the Colonial Office.


.....
MR. E.A. HEYLIGER

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GOVERNMENT OF GRENADA

MEMORANDUM

TO : PERMANENT SECRETARY, PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE

FROM : PERMANENT SECRETARY - MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

REF. NO. : FA 166 / 01

DATE : MAY 14, 2002

SUBJECT : REQUEST FOR RETURN OF CONFISCATED DOCUMENTS

Your memorandum of May 03, 2002 regarding the stated subject refers.

Please find attached a copy of Note No. 373 / 02 which was forwarded to the U.S. Department of State, through the Embassy of the U.S.A. in St. George's, requesting the return of the documents.

Also forwarded, herewith, is a copy of the covering note sent to the U.S. Embassy, as well as, the memorandum to our Washington, D.C. Mission regarding the subject.


Joseph Charter
PERMANENT SECRETARY

AH/ah

Ref. No. FA 166 / 01
In replying the above
Number and date of this
letter should be quoted.



MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MINISTERIAL COMPLEX
BOTANICAL GARDENS
ST. GEORGE'S
GRENADA, W.I.

Tel: 440-2640/2712/2255
Fax: 440-4184
E-mail: faffgnd@caribsurf.com

NOTE NO. 373 / 02

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Grenada presents its compliments to the Department of State of the United States of America in Washington, D.C. and has the honour to refer to the period following the military intervention into Grenada by forces of the United States of America and Caribbean countries on October 25, 1983.

The Ministry has the further honour to refer to the extensive collection of Grenadian documents that were removed from Grenada during the said period by officials of the Government of the United States of America, and to request, on behalf of the Government of Grenada, that the Department of State arrange for the entire collection of material to be returned to the custody of the Government of Grenada at the earliest possible convenience. The Ministry has no doubt that the Department of State would appreciate that the documents constitute a very valuable national asset which remains the property of Grenada.

In this context, therefore, the Government of Grenada looks forward to the kind cooperation of the Department of State in communicating the former's request to the Government of the United States of America.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Grenada avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of State of the United States of America in Washington, D.C. the assurances of its highest consideration.

RECEIVED
PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE
15 MAY 2002

St. George's, May 06, 2002



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authority to place the Prime Minister under House arrest. It would also be instructive to know how the decision to put Maurice Bishop and others against a wall in Fort Rupert and assassinate them in cold blood was arrived at.

Since 1983, our party has been engaged in the painful and arduous process of trying to recollect information that would eventually lead to the recuperation of the remains of those who lost their lives on Fort Rupert on that fateful day so that they could be given a decent burial. We have also tried unsuccessfully to fully authenticate the number of lives that were lost on October 19th and then on October 25th following the US invasion of Grenada.

This is and still remains a pressing demand not only for our party but for the Grenadian people who would like to bring closure to this sad chapter in our history. It is our view that this period must be properly investigated and these nebulous issues be cleared up once and for all before our people can truly move forward again as a united people.

In keeping with the traditions of many countries around the world in honouring their heroes and martyrs by naming important landmarks after them, our party has sought to give proper recognition to Bishop by campaigning for the Point Salines airport to be named the Maurice Bishop International Airport. For 18 years this has been a popular cry of our people and we believe that Bishop is deserving of that tribute and recognition because of the outstanding contribution that he has made not only to making the international airport a reality but for putting Grenada on the map as proud, resourceful and defiant country that made its mark in the 20th Century on world affairs and history.

Mr Chairman, our party is still committed to seeking the truth as far as these issues are concerned and we know that there are many people who can shed light on these events. People have been reluctant over the years to come forward for fear of victimization or reprisal and perhaps because so many years have passed by without any form of investigation, they now feel that their information is irrelevant and without worth.

I personally and my party hope that the commission through its mandate will be instrumental in answering many of these lingering questions and that your deliberations would yield the kind of information that will help us as Grenadians to bury the past once and for all and move forward again with unity and with pride.

Mr Chairman,

I would like to move on to a matter of a more personal nature. When I returned to Grenada in 1986 together with nine of my medical colleagues after we had completed our training in Cuba, we encountered fierce opposition and stiff resistance from the JNP Government of Herbert Blaize to getting registration and licences to practice our profession in Grenada.

After the events of October 1983, the Grenada Embassy in Cuba was closed and the students were left without any representation or leadership. At a general meeting of the

Marryshow left in the cold

Wage increases for workers

Employees at Seacream Brothers Construction Company have received an average of 15-20% increase in wages, which took effect last Friday.

Negotiations between Seacream Brothers Industrial Relations Officer from Trinidad, Mr Vernon Guendoo and Technical and Allied Workers Union (TAWU) Executive Secretary, Mr. Chester Humphrey resumed last Thursday, when the main areas of differences which include wages were settled.

Two weeks ago, workers went on a two-day strike to force the company to resume negotiations for better wages and conditions of work.

ONE CUBAN-TRAINED Doctor is still 'out in the cold' and has not been absorbed in the two-year Internship programme laid down by the Registration Board and the Government.

Dr. Terry Marryshow - a 34 year old grandson of the late T. Albert Marryshow - told *Grenadian Voice* that government, in a letter dated June 30, told him that "Cabinet, at its meeting of 15th June, 1987, withdrew its approval for you to be absorbed into the pre-registration programme as an intern, because of recent developments".

Seven of the ten doctors who returned to the island a year ago, claiming immediate registration are currently attached to the Ministry of Health as



interns. One - Dr. Sonia Phillip - was taken by St. Vincent and Dr. Sonia Nixon went to Jamaica under a private arrangement.

Marryshow said that he was not prepared to go to any other island as he had been away from Grenada for 14 years - seven in the United States of America and seven in

Cuba. He said he was not in the island when clearance came for him to be absorbed. When he returned, in May, he reported to the Ministry and was told that he

would be taken on from June 1. He said he needed to pay a visit to America to maintain his residential status and he made the trip in

May to be available for June 1. When he returned he was told by Medical Superintendent, Dr. Lloyd Alexis, that

Doctors would be switching rotations on July 1 and it would be better for him to wait until then. He accepted this but, following a trip he made to Cuba, he received the letter notifying him that the approval had been withdrawn.

The doctor told *Grenadian Voice* that he is Secretary of the Maurice Bishop Youth Movement and, in that capacity he had made trips to many parts of the world. This was not done secretly but openly and he did not think that this should present a problem. He said he has a son aged 13 years (in America) and a

daughter aged three (who is with his Cuban wife in Cuba) and he needs to earn a living. If the government is not going to put him in the programme he feels he should be granted registration so that he could practice his profession.

Asked to comment on the matter, Minister of Health Danny Williams, confirmed the information supplied by Marryshow. He said that Marryshow was the last of the Cuban-trained Doctors to signify willingness to participate in the pre-registration programme but arrangements were finally made for him to be absorbed, as were the other seven, although funds for them had not been budgeted and were very hard to come by.

Williams said that

when his turn arrived Marryshow was not in the island and could not be contacted. After arrangements were finally made, however, it was brought to the attention of the cabinet that, during his last visit to the United States, Marryshow had addressed meetings in which he was extremely critical of government. It was felt that the hostility he displayed towards the government was not consistent with the attitude of someone wishing to work with the same government and who would be subject to the rules governing all public officers. For these reasons, the Minister said, the decision was taken to withdraw the approval for him to be absorbed into the pre-registration programme.

The week's good thought from:

and will never call us to a task,
then abandon us

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SAT July 31 1987

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1984
Grenadian students in Cuba, I was elected as the Leader of the Grenadian students in Cuba. I was therefore entrusted with the responsibility of handling many of the bureaucratic problems facing the students in Cuba and also representing youth and students at many international meetings all over the world. I had in fact become an unofficial ambassador for youth and students from Grenada especially at a time when Youth within Grenada were unable to travel to represent Grenada abroad.

Following the tragic events which led to the collapse of the revolution, I wrote to the Chairman of the Interim Advisory Council headed by Nicholas Brathwaite, indicating our willingness and desire to remain in Cuba to complete our studies despite a call for us to return home by the Council. Prior to our graduation in 1986, I again wrote to the Blaize administration, informing them of our imminent return to Grenada and pledging our services to our country and people. We asked for jobs to be provided to us as had been guaranteed by the P.R.G who was the government responsible for sending us to Cuba.

On our return to Grenada in 1986, all imaginable obstacles were placed in our way. We were told that no funds were available to absorb us into the system and we should probably look for other opportunities elsewhere. This led to one of our graduates going to Jamaica and another to St. Vincent. They then said that they were going to absorb only five and the rest would have to look for opportunities elsewhere. This I found totally unacceptable and I called on the government to give us licences and registration so that those who could not be absorbed could then go into private practice if they so desired. The government refused this offer and instead demanded that we all do two more years of internship at the general Hospital before receiving the right to practice. We had already completed internship before returning to Grenada and no other Grenadian graduating from other universities were required to undergo such stringent measures. I indicated to the government at the time that I will be the last to enter the programme since I would have no choice after some of my colleagues decided to accept their demand.

When my turn came to be absorbed into the pre-registration internship programme in June 1987, I was given the run-around by the Ministry of Health and then finally, I received a letter from the government signed by the permanent secretary in the Ministry of Health Mrs Pamela Steele, informing me that decision was taken to withdraw my entry into the programme. I sought clarification from the then Minister Mr Daniel Williams our present Governor-General who failed to provide any answers. It was not until I took my case to the press and then the Editor of the Grenadian Voice newspaper interviewed the Minister to get the other side of the story, that he was informed about the true reason. The reason was that I had addressed a meeting in the United States at which I was extremely critical of government and that hostility that I displayed towards the government was not consistent with the attitude of someone wishing to work with the same government and who would be subject to the rules governing all public officers. From September 1986 until September 1990 I was denied my right to work, a fundamental right enshrined in the Constitution. The only crime I committed was to utilize my god-given right to speak and express my opinions and for that reason, my right to work and four of the best years of my professional life were taken away from me. Over

the years I have written to successive governments to address the issue of compensation for those years of deprivation but these have fallen on deaf ears.

It is my hope that in the same way the revolution as put under scrutiny and many who felt they were wronged and victimized by the revolution were entitled to some level of compensation, I too feel that I am entitled to some form of compensation for the four years I was deprived of my right to work. I was a victim and a scapegoat, having been granted the distinction of being the only Grenadian graduate from Cuba who has been singled out for such treatment. During that time, my family and in particular my wife and children and my mother suffered tremendously as I was not able to contribute financially to their upkeep and well-being but instead depended on them. The psychological pressure put on me during those years was overwhelming but I have survived them and have seen many of the things that I fought for during those years now becoming a reality. Students are not only going to Cuba again but they receive moral and financial assistance from the Government and on their return are all accepted with open arms as citizens who have a role to play in the development of our country.

Mr Chairmain, distinguished Commisioners, I thank you.

440-9047

The Rosary Priory,
P.O.Box 1950,
St. George's;
8th April 2002


The Chairman,
Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
Scott Street.
St. George's.

Dear Sir,

I herein enclose my personal impression of the period under the consideration of the Commission. My belief is a account of the emotions of these times is as significant as a record of events. Our feelings of elation and of despair were stretched to extremes, leaving us very confused. It is at this level that the pain remains and needs to be healed.

I would like to think that these reflections will be of some assistance to the Commission. I remain available should you should wish to interview me.

Yours faithfully,



(Fr.) Peter Clarke, O.P.

Personal Reflections on the Pre-Revolution and Revolution Period

For the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Grenada April 2002

From Fr. Peter Clarke, O.P. Phone 440-9047

.....

When Yahweh brought back Zion's captives we lived in a dream, then our mouths filled with laughter and our lips with song. (Ps. 126). ^{over} ^K

To my mind, there have been two such dream-like experiences during my association with Grenada since 1958. These were times when the Nation was seemingly in bondage and ~~was~~ given a reprieve. These were 1) the March 1979 Revolution and 2) the 1983 Intervention, when the 'Dream' ^{had} become a 'Nightmare.' My purpose is not to give a precise account of historical events but a description of what it was like for me, an English priest of the Dominican Order, working in Grenville during these years.

Before the Revolution

Eric Gairy, a charismatic with his large following, leader, had the potential and the opportunity to lead Grenada to some level of greatness. Regrettably, with his self-understanding of being a divinely appointed, his obsession with personal aggrandisement, he became paranoid in his suspicion of any criticism or opposition.

Consequently, restrictions were placed on freedom of speech between small groups. Members of the Police Force/Security Forces used gun-violence against suspected dissenters. It was expedient to be visibly a supporter of Gairy, compromising to be openly critical of him. There was a sense of oppressive intimidation. Throughout this period there was an under-current of discontent and resentment.

Most significantly, society at every level - family, community, even church, became increasingly polarized. Unintentionally, but inescapably, church ministers of the Conference of Churches contributed to this polarization. Such ministers, I was one of them, felt they could not be true to their calling without their denouncing violations of, and promotion of, human rights.

Typical was the comment made to me that they were now be presented with a 'new Church' - no longer one that offered comfort and consolation but one that dabbled in politics. I would say that the churches must take considerable blame for not educating their congregations that the promotion of social justice and human rights is intrinsic to the authentic proclamation of the Gospel. The people were not prepared for ministers of religion taking principled stands. In fact, from the 1970s until now most people are inclined to act from expediency and personal advantage rather than from principle. Political loyalty has long been stronger than loyalty to the Word of God or to the voice of a church.

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This leads me to suggest that throughout the whole of this time the churches were going through a 'Mission-Identity Crisis' - how to be authentic in the circumstances of the moment? This is illustrated by an exchange at a meeting of Catholic priests. One claimed that our duty was to ensure that our traditional pastoral ministry should not be jeopardized by controversial sermons. When he was reminded that, in imitation of Christ, we should bear witness to the truth and be prepared to take the consequences, his response was that this was theology and had nothing to do with real life! How could one blame the laity for being bewildered and pained that they found themselves rejecting the church that they loved?

However, it was the same ministers of religion who were counted as subversive by both Eric Gairy and Maurice Bishop for their preaching the same message of human rights. Such preachers could never be comfortable with the knowledge that their sermons were tape-recorded or reported to the authorities. Nor that people walked out of church in protest at the sermons. Others preferred the less obtrusive approach of conveying their concerns to the leadership of both regimes. They were criticized for their apparent lack of concern.

To give an impression of what it was like for a minister of religion in the Gairy days I refer to two incidents that involved me personally.

I was officiating at the country funeral of Gairy supporter who had been killed in a shoot-out at a time when the churches were being blamed for kindling the unrest in Grenada. At the grave-side a man with a broken bottle rushed me from the crowd. Fortunately, Gairy supporters/church members restrained him. People said I was lucky to come out alive. For some time afterwards I knew what it was to tremble with fear.

In the late 1970s the New Jewel Movement was attracting support. It was suspected that caches of weapons ^{were} secreted throughout the island. Properties were searched, including the residence of the Dominican priests outside Grenville. Recently a bush had been transplanted - leaving a mound of disturbed earth. I stood by while police armed with rifles and sticks probed the ground. Their leader told me I should not think that my white skin would save, nor that my prayers would be heard. He would cut me down at the altar. No idle threat!

A sad note to the search of the house was the unfriendliness of the young men with their guns and sticks who scoured the room of a gentle, elderly, priest. He had taught them religion with the utmost kindness and generosity. His shock that they could have shown him such hostility caused him to collapse. He had to be taken to hospital as a frightened, heart-broken man. His recovery did not take long. This single incident highlights how much a totalitarian regime could ensnare and pervert the minds of its adherents.

ASSEMBLY '78

It is no exaggeration to assert that Assembly '78 was the most significant, most exciting, event in living memory for the Catholic Church in Grenada. In this the Church sought to evaluate its actual situation

and to charter its path for the future. Every aspect of its life was discussed by groups throughout the Nation. The climax was several days of General Assembly at which Resolutions were submitted, debated, and voted upon. The end-product was a Diocesan Pastoral Plan - as had been intended.

Among the topics discussed were Family Life, Worship and, of necessity, the Just Society that the local Church should promote and defend. It should be borne in mind that this was at a time when dissatisfaction with Gairyism was wide-spread and the New Jewel Movement was gaining popular support. There was no overt political militancy in these discussions but certainly there was intensity of feeling and commitment. Here the concerns of the Church and the New Jewel Movement coincided. Some have claimed - I believe wrongly - that the Assembly was hijacked by the N.J.M.

Early in 1979 there was the sentiment that the N.J.M. and Gairy were on a collision course and it was believed that Gairy was about to act decisively to ensure that he prevailed. Fear was tangible at that time. This was the 'Nightmare' that preceded the 'Dream-like' reprieve of the Revolutionary coup of 13th March 1979.

The Revolution

That day it seemed like a dream. Enthusiasm for what had happened was wide-spread. As was determination that all measures should be taken to secure what had been gained. Ranking Gairy supporters were put into Security Detention. The Constitution was suspended. The Nation was to be administered by Revolutionary Law.

Such was the euphoria and optimism of those early days, as well as the sense of vulnerability to international opinion and reaction, especially from the United States, that the Revolution was granted considerable latitude in the decisions it saw fit to make. As the years passed a siege mentality became increasingly pronounced. This can be attributed to the suspicion/anxiety of Caribbean and other democracies over the fact that the Revolution had the support of Marxist Cuba and Russia. Revolutionary patriotism was manipulated to the full.

However, the churches, while promising to lend ^{their} support to the de facto government, of the Revolution made it known that ~~they~~ they would be vigilant in monitoring respect for human rights. The new regime deserved to be given a chance to prove its worth. I remember a theology being produced that justified the overthrow of tyrants (i.e. Gairy)

Many good things happened through the Revolution. Many, especially the youth, were given a sense of self-worth and significance to their lives. Frequent mass rallies generated unity and co-operation such as had not been seen before. Agriculture prospered, as did initiatives in minor industries, and in adult literacy education. Many young people were given the opportunity for tertiary education in Cuba and elsewhere.

Gradually disillusion set in, for a number of reasons. Any dissent was regarded as subversion that had to be dealt with 'heavy manners!' Time in detention without, been charged for any offence. It was seemingly arbitrary. The numbers of inmates increased as accusations were made, even by members of one's own family or circle of friends. Perhaps the

greatest casualty was the breakdown of trust and the insecurity this produced. With such a small population in Grenada everyone had a friend or relative in detention and feared when their turn would come to join the crowd behind bars. I submit that this fear was deliberately created to produce unquestioning submission.

A recurrent theme was the threat of an American invasion to overthrow the Revolution with its Marxist affiliations and its policy of indoctrinating the population in Communist theory. The fear-reaction was the militarization of the Nation, with even youngsters carrying rifles.

Thus the Revolution established itself as the sole authority to be obeyed, the arbiter of what was right and wrong according to its thinking. On an absurd occasion the Minister of Education advised a group of Catholic teachers that their church should be 'biophilic' (loving life as understood by the Revolution), not 'necrophilic' (loving death - i.e. opposing the Revolution).

Thus the very structures of authority - family, school, church - that undergird society were constantly undermined. The little boy with the big gun and access to the ear of Maurice Bishop was the boss-man to be heeded. Today, we are feeling effect of this demise of respect for authority.

Grenadians are basically Christian. While many subjugated this to the Revolutionary cause there were those who were determined to hang on to their Christian ideals and practice. From the early 1970s many of all ages found courage and solace in the prayer-meetings of the Charismatic Renewal. Pilgrimages to the Shrine outside Grenville regularly attracted large crowds who sought Christian solidarity in the midst of what they perceived to be a godless environment. The Dominican priests made their residence in La Digue available for those who wished to deepen and strengthen the Faith lest they be sucked into the mentality of the Revolution. In addition to these, there was an ongoing residential course for training lay leaders.

All these activities were regarded with the greatest suspicion, but freedom of religion was never denied. However, a provocative Editorial caused the Catholic monthly paper, Catholic Focus, to be closed down. At a time when the introduction of People's Courts that would decide cases by public acclamation was a possibility, the paper asserted that the voice of the people is not necessarily the voice of God. The people ^{had} shouted, "Crucify Him." Such were the risks that some priests took in their public utterances. They did not win for themselves many friends.

Recognition must be given to those teachers in schools who taught pupils traditional standards of Christian morality. Such was their influence that a number of them were removed from the classroom to administrative jobs in the Public Service. In other walks of life people displayed personal integrity at considerable cost to themselves. At the very least, they lived under the threat of being victimized and ostracized.

In the circumstances of Grenada it was always necessary for the preacher to be circumspect in what he chose to say, how to say it, and what not to say. He had the responsibility of not wantonly making a bad situation worse, while at the same time he owed it to people to proclaim the truth that would set them free. Often we discussed together how best to respond to the 'signs of the times.'

THE 'DEAR JONATHAN' LETTER

This preamble is needed to explain the consequences of an ill-considered initiative that was deeply compromising to the Dominican priests working in Grenada. I refer to the Dear Jonathan Letter - Fr. Jonathan Fleetwood being their Provincial Superior in England. One of our priests, teaching at the Regional Seminary in Trinidad. In his own hand he wrote a letter to Fr. Jonathan suggesting that priests engaged in the Marxist-Christian dialogue in Europe should come to Grenada for a similar dialogue. He asked one of our Grenadian students, an ardent supporter of the Revolution to type the letter.

The student sent a copy of the letter to Maurice Bishop, who, in a radio broadcast, furiously accused the foreign priests of planning to destabilize the Revolution. We priests were totally discredited, without a word to say in our defence. At no point had we been consulted or informed about the proposed initiative. Though no action was taken against us, our Mission in Grenada was rendered far more difficult. We had lost the trust of the people.

To conclude this section, it is noted that the common view ^{was} that the Grenada Revolution would be as enduring as that in Cuba. It came as a complete surprise to most that the Revolution should implode upon itself.

The Demise of the Revolution

Who can say when the populace began to become disaffected with living in a fortress/prison environment of suspicion, mistrust and personal insecurity? Probably there were two causes of the Revolution turning upon itself - personality and ideological differences between Bishop and Coard. Everyone was shocked at the house-arrest of Bishop. It was the youth in Grenville who staged the first demonstration in favour of Bishop. This was followed by a mass-demonstration in St. George's which liberated Bishop and took him to the city and to the Fort.

It was while I was visiting the village of Muncih in St. Andrew's that news came through of guns being turned on people at the Fort, of some leaping over the high walls to safety, of the execution of Maurice Bishop and some of his Cabinet colleagues. Someone remarked to me, 'This is the end of Grenada. There is no hope for Grenada.' Total despair. The People's Revolution had turned against the very ones who had supported it and believed in it. Nothing remained to defend. Nothing was there to look to for governance. Those who formed the Revolutionary Military Council were demonized, loathed and feared. Maurice Bishop, the popular charismatic leader was elevated to the status of the heroic martyr. It was conveniently overlooked that Bishop was the

architect of oppression. If people were to believe in the dreams that had inspired them they had to have someone, Bishop, in whom they believed in and were proud to have followed. One can only understand present-day Grenada in terms of a self-imposed denial of several years of nightmarist oppression.

W.V.U. LIBRARIES

Perhaps the periods of curfew, with the suspension of all social activity was therapeutic to a people deeply in shock. It gave them a respite in which they could 'catch themselves.' There was no opportunity for wildcat gestures of anger or revenge that would have produced further distress and instability. But there was deep apprehension about what the future would hold, with no perceived possibilities that offered hope. Clearly, the Revolutionary Military Council would only be able to function through duress and intimidation. It would never inspire popular loyalty and affection.

For many this was a time of intense prayer - placing trust in God without daring to guess what he might have to offer. Great were the inconveniences of not being able to leave one's home to visit neighbours, purchase foodstuff, seek medical attention, tend animals. It was a sobering thought that this was the first time public acts of Sunday worship were forbidden throughout the land. Yet again, a Grenadian nightmare.

Surprised jubilation greeted the news that armed forces had come to rescue Grenada. Prayers were being answered. The nightmare was giving way to the unfolding of a dream of glorious possibilities. Regardless of the high-minded protests of outside commentators against an alleged invasion of National Sovereignty, for those who were there in Grenada this was Humanitarian Intervention, a Rescue Mission, that was welcomed with gratitude. At that time sovereignty was a meaningless concept. Actual survival was the issue of the moment.

To me it is irrelevant that the motives of the Americans, as the chief component of the Armed Forces, were possibly of self-interest - bringing home their students at the St. George's University School of Medicine, suppressing a Marxist regime in its 'Caribbean backyard.' For Grenadians the important thing was they were given the opportunity to return to the normalcy of a free democracy. Whatever the mistakes and short-comings of subsequent years we must count ourselves as being truly blessed.

In conclusion, undoubtedly there is much residual pain and anger in the hearts of individuals and of specific groups. To my mind, insufficient attention has been given to the fact of this 'being a Nation collectively living with a shattered dream. Almost universally at the beginning there were high hopes and expectations of the Revolution. In the early days it achieved much and promised more. Gradually, as has been stated, this dream was tarnished. Eventually it was smashed to pieces. I believe the older generation is experiencing the pain of loss and massive disappointment. The younger generation, not having lived through these difficult times, doesn't know and doesn't want to know. This also applies to those Grenadians who lived abroad during the Revolution. They have no 'feel' for our recent history. This point is exemplified by the handling of Thanksgiving Day 25th October. Originally it had a specific historical theme related to the Rescue Mission. In recent years the thanksgiving has been so generalized that it could be applied to any place in the Caribbean or beyond. It would contribute to the healing of the Nation if, could be discerned why there is this evasion of remembrance of the past.

To: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Scott St., St. George's.

From: Fr. Sean Doggett, Cathedral Presbytery, St. George's
2nd November 2001

Tuesday, 25th October 1983, I was in the Catholic Presbytery at Grand Roy, St. John's. At about 8.00 a.m. a lorry went south towards St. George's preceded by a blue Diahatsu. About an hour later about six vehicles went down with local boys from Grand Roy who were militia members. Not very long after that after a blue Pajero (393) came back up to Grand Roy from the direction of St. George's. The two men in it told people the vehicles with the militia members from Grand Roy had been ambushed at Beau Sejours and that some of the boys had been killed and others injured.

I celebrated Mass in Grand Roy at 6.30 a.m. on the morning of Thursday 27th. After Mass people were talking heatedly about the situation in the village. Some of the militia members had returned home and reported that the bodies of some of the boys killed in the ambush were still at Beau Sejours. I went to see two of my parishioners, Denise McEwen whose son Godwin (Bossio) was said to have been killed and Veronica Baptiste whose son Michael had not returned home.

After some discussion it was decided that I would drive to St. George's with a group of the parents or other relatives of those who were missing. At Beau Sejours we found four bodies badly decomposed. Two were in the sugar cane field opposite the radio station and two were inside the radio station building. Two were identified as "Papa" and "Colours" from Grand Roy. There was also the body of a P.R.A. soldier from Gouyave called "Kung Fu". We did not at that time identify the bodies in the building. Denise McEwen thought one was her son Godwin but could not be sure. Later her daughter Pamela positively identified one of the bodies as that of her brother Godwin.

We continued to St. George's to look for three boys who had still not been accounted for. I was informed by an American officer at Queen's Park that the Americans had not taken any prisoners and that the boys would probably be found at the hospital. We did indeed find them there.

Michael Baptiste had been shot in the back and was paralysed.

Derek Benjamin had sustained the following injuries: gunshot to the face just below the eye; exit wound in the roof of his mouth; a broken jaw and a broken pelvis.

Julien "Clari" (whose surname I have forgotten) had superficial shrapnel injuries to his hands and face.

Fr. Sean Doggett

I spoke to the officer at Queen's Park, a Col. Smith, about the need to bury the bodies that had been lying at Beau Sejours for two days. He said he could not help but assured me some units of the U.S. army would have responsibility for such matters and would see to it that the bodies would be properly taken care of.

On Sunday 30th October I went to Brizan for Mass. I was told that the bodies had still not been buried but that the men of Brizan would do so that day. That afternoon some of the men did dig four shallow graves but were afraid to touch the bodies without some protective clothing etc.

Later that same day at the General Hospital I met another officer who told me he had responsibility for public health. He assured me that since graves were dug he would see to it that the bodies were buried. They were in fact buried on Tuesday 1st November.

I later came to understand that the bodies were subsequently exhumed and taken to Cuba for identification. The Cuban authorities identified any bodies that were not wearing khaki or camouflage as their nationals and any that were as Grenadians. I understand that these bodies were brought back to Grenada in coffins and buried by Otways Funeral Undertakers at the Centre Cemetery in St. George's. To the best of my knowledge no information was ever passed to any of the relatives nor was any attempt made to find them.

I suggest the site of these graves be marked with the names of those deceased who are known and a Religious Service be held for them. I further suggest that some form of compensation be given to those who were injured and possibly to dependant relatives of those who were killed.

This Religious Service could be part of a National Service of Remembrance for all who were killed in the events of 19th - 26th October 1983.

Signed: Sean Doggett
Fr. Sean Doggett

Date: 2nd November 2001

DT
MEMORANDUM

FROM: MR. E.A. HEYLIGER, Q.C. LL.B
TO: COMMISSION - TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
SUBJECT: INJUSTICE TO JUSTICE OF THE HIGH COURT

In 1944 I was practising my profession in Guyana and in December of that year I was recruited in the service of the Windward and Leeward Islands and accepted the post of Registrar, St. Lucia. In 1948 I was appointed Magistrate in Grenada.

I was later appointed as Attorney General of Grenada. In 1961 I was sent to act Judge in St. Kitts. See letter dated 29th December 1965. I was never paid my subsistence allowance.

In 1963 I applied for ten and a half months leave which was not granted due to the exigencies of the service. In 1964 I again applied for twelve months leave to which I was entitled. Field C.J. was very cold towards me and said I never heard of anybody going on twelve months leave. I told him Jackson C.J. went on twelve

IN Y.U. LIBRARIES

Months leave and even recently Cenac, the Crown Attorney of St. Lucia went on twelve months leave. Field C.J. said 'I shall recommend six months leave for you' which was granted by the Secretary of State.

On the day I was supposed to set sail the Government refused to pay my passage to the united Kingdom, claiming that I was a designated officer and only was entitled to a passage to Guyana. That was totally incorrect. If I were a designated officer to Grenada, as I believe I should have been, my pension from the United Kingdom would have included all my service in Grenada. Please see unsigned draft letter dated 4th October 1977 marked 'X'.

In 1967 the Windward and Leeward Islands Supreme Court was abolished and the West Indies Associated States Supreme Court established. I was not appointed to the new court neither was Chief Justice Field. I went into private practice and some years later the Government asked me to return to the service as Legal Advisor and Legal Draftsman to the Government.

Some years later Mr. Eric Gairy (later Sir Eric Gairy Prime Minister of Grenada) showed me some confidential secret files at Government House. I was shocked at what I read for the remarks were highly defamatory and without any statement of fact. The statement was simply the opinion of the writers.

I refer now to a Report made to Sir Arthur Grattan Bellew by Chief Justice Field headed "Confidential - Mr. Justice Heyliger".

In that report three serious allegations were made against me -

1. I had an affair with a policeman's wife and when Accosted by him drew a gun on him;
2. When I was Attorney General in Grenada I improperly drew \$50.40 Counsel's fee, which I had arranged with my staff to draw the money and pay it into my personal account;
3. I unlawfully obtained land at Old Fort by means of a Fraud.

All these allegations were made by the Chief Justice totally unknown to me, made behind my back in secret and each one was found to be totally false.

Those allegations were made with the knowledge and consent of Governor Turbott (see attachment 'A'). I submit there was a calculated conspiracy to destroy me.

I now attach a Secret and Personal Report dated 25th October 1965, written by Administrator Ian Turbott to Mr. Douglas Williams who was a very senior officer in the Colonial Office. That Report

shows that the police could find no evidence of my affairs with a policeman's wife and they were now looking for evidence of my fraudulent acquisition of land. The source of their information in this respect was an allegation by the Chief Justice's Secretary and it is clear that the Chief Justice was championing her cause.

What amazes me was that nobody ever asked the Chief Justice who had given him that information that I had an affair with a policeman's wife and my drawing the Counsel's fee of ten guineas, in the manner stated. It should be noted that no previous Chief Justice ever raised the question of counsel's fee with me. This had happened years before and they must have known the position. Letter marked 'B' attached from Administrator Turbott to Mr. Douglas Williams.

I respectfully submit that the conduct of Administrator Turbott and Field C.J. shows express malice.

The suggestions in this letter again accuse me of fraudulent behaviour and then comes his ^{imagination} ~~personal opinion~~ "It seems to me that Mr. Heyliger maneuvered his case to get the Administrator and Executive Council to be favourably disposed". All I can say is that his ways are not my ways nor my thought his thoughts. The conspiracy is fully developed.

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I now come to when I was first informed of any allegations against me by letter dated 3rd December 1965. This letter is attached and marked 'C'. I made a detailed reply and hoped that they would understand what inter-colonial accounting meant. In other words the expenditure of the court is not attached to any one island, it serves all the islands. When I realized that unknown to me my office staff in the Attorney General's Chambers in Grenada, had drawn my salary as Attorney General and banked it to my account my only comment was 'God moves in a mysterious way his wonders to perform'; for when the Government owes you money it is very difficult, almost impossible to get them to pay you. The Privy Council has recently given a very learned judgment on that matter.

I claimed a set-off which is a proper and legal claim in law and sent the Government \$3,152.84 which was the amount I was legally owing them. Please see attachment 'D'.

It is interesting to note a letter dated 4th December 1965 attached and marked 'Y' from Administrator Turbott to Mr. Douglas Williams. It seems to me Mr. Berridge, the Attorney General was something of a sneak.

Governor Turbott replied by letter dated 23rd November 1966, and casually says, "As far as the item of \$50.40 is concerned, I have to inform you that it is not proposed to pursue this aspect of the matter". See attached marked 'E'. I replied by letter dated 23rd December 1966, and asked for an apology. See letter attached marked 'F'. He refused to apologise. I received letter dated 2nd March 1967, in which paragraph 4 reads as follows:-

"The Attorney General will be asked to institute legal proceedings against you for recovery of the sum of \$4,202, if you do not pay that sum to the Government of Grenada within 14 days of date of this letter."

On receipt of this letter I had a feeling of relief. I felt that at last I could expose the conspiracy against me. My reply was short. I replied as follows:-

"6th March 1967

Sir,

I acknowledge receipt of your letter of 2nd March 1967.

In the circumstances, I suggest that you proceed as indicated in paragraph

4 of your letter without further delay.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant

Puisne Judge.

His Excellency the Governor

Government House

St. George's".

The conspirators who had strong opinions about me in secret were afraid to come into the open court. I heard nothing further from them.

I am prepared to appear before the Commission and give further details and answer to any question they may choose to ask.

On retirement I was paid forty thousand dollars (\$40,000.00) by the Colonial Office for loss of career and got a pension of a little over six hundred dollars (\$600.00) per month from the Government of Grenada and a little over six hundred pounds from the United Kingdom. However, the damage done to my character and career by Administrator Turbott and Field C.J. was great. I suffered. ~~Had I~~

Had I known these facts I would have taken up the matter with the Colonial Office.

In conclusion, I attach the copy of a letter dated 11th December 1963 written to me by Sir Kenneth Roberts-Wray, Head of the Legal Department of the Colonial Office.


.....
MR. E.A. HEYLIGER

TO: His Excellency, The Governor General,
Sir Paul Scoon

FROM: Christopher Williams, Member of Advisory Council

DATE: May 14, 1984

SUBJECT: Statement by Winston Simon of Tivoli, St. Andrew

About 10.30 on the morning of June 18, 1980, Randy Bobb of the PRA came to my home and told me that Captain Layne wanted to talk to me. I accompanied Bobb to a car and I was taken to Pearls airport. On arrival I was handcuffed by Lester Redhead (goat). Layne put his arm around me and told me let us walk. He asked me if I knew him, I told him I did and he told me he was Captain Layne otherwise known as "Headache", he continued "They said me up here to clean the mess we are not down." unless we are finished cleaning the mess we are not down.

I told him I did not know what mess he was talking about and asked him to explain the mess to me, he told me I would know. We continued walking towards an outside cell at the PRA camp at the airport. At the camp was a number of armed PRA soldiers. While in the yard near the cell Lester Redhead put a pair of handcuffs on my feet. he then moved some distance from me, took a speed

while on the ground. The soldiers include Brathwaite, Elton and John. Two others whom I recognized were present but they did not hit me. Carl Mason or Moya and Tony Spider of Levera. Layne, Redhead and Randy Bobb were present while the beating was going on. After a while Layne picked me up and led me inside the small cell in the yard. Two soldiers brought a block each, placed them standing on their edges and put a board on them. A piece of engine iron provided centre support for the board. I heard Lester Redhead ask to bring him the rope.

In the meantime, Layne ordered Redhead to remove the handcuffs and take off my shirt. This he did, replacing the handcuffs after the shirt was removed. Randy Bobb

ordered that the .../2

- 2 -

ordered that the handcuffs should be put as tight as possible. Redhead repeated similar exercise for my feet removing my pants and underpants. Redhead then took the rope and tied me around my waist and gave the loose end to Randy Bobb. Layne put me to sit on the board and Randy Bobb tied me on the board in a sitting position.

Layne then asked for a packet of razor blades, the bucket of salt water and the bucket of pepper water. A PRA soldier brought the blades and the bucket as ordered. Layne then ask me, "You know how they does butcher pig?" I told him I think so and he said he will use the same method on me. He asked, "You know what they use on pig to cut the balls?" I told him a razor blade and some salt water. He asked me if they do not put pepper water on it. I told him I did not know that. He told me he will use the pepper water on me too. I asked him if he would pour the pepper water on my back. He told me no and said that after he cut my balls and cut off my private he will pour the pepper and salt water on them and if I did not die if I go out I won't be able to take woman again. I said, "Go ahead."

Layne then opened the blades while Randy Bobb stood on my left side and Lester Redhead on my right side. Brathwaite and another soldier crowded the cell, several others were close by outside. Layne then stooped down in front of me. Brathwaite stood on my handcuffed feet and held my right leg pulling it open. The other soldier held my left leg pulling it open. Randy Bobb held my handcuffed hands pulling them to him. Redhead grabbed my long hair and pulled me to him. Another soldier came with a five-pound bowl and poured water and bowl of yellow and red pepper. he also had a knife and he had gloves on his hand. he began cutting up peppers and putting them in the five-pound bowl. Redhead then took the knife from him and pointed it at me saying, "So you see this knife we killing you with it today." I told him, "as you feel". He then let off my hair and took whole peppers from the bowl burst them on the floor with his boots and put them in the water, after he was finished he held my hair again.

Layne then held on to my balls took a razor blade and began slicing them. While he was cutting me up Redhead was pouring pepper water on the cuts. Salt water was also poured on the cuts. Apart from cutting the balls the foreskin of the penis was cut and slight cuts on the penis were also made. Salt water and pepper water were poured on the penis. While this exercise was going on Randy Bobb was continually beating my head with the butt of his pistol. My head was bursted in six or seven places as a result. There was much blood in the cell. They then put me outside the cell.

Redhead called one..../3

Redhead called one of the men and asked him to bring the hot cutlass. When he got the cutlass he hit me on several parts of my body branding me. Several marks are still visible. After this Redhead picked up a piece of 2 x 2 wood and hit me two hard blows on my left shoulder. Randy Bobb repeated the exercise and Brathwaite gave me some blows on my head with his gun butt. Other soldiers started kicking me up again. Layne then lifted me and stopped them from beating me because I was bleeding too much. He instructed Redhead to put me back inside the cell.

As Redhead held me to put me in the cell I saw Cornwall and Schoolboy coming to my direction. They assisted Redhead in holding me up and brought me to the cell.

In the late afternoon, maybe about 5.00 p.m., a few of them came to the cell. Randy Bobb said "Broco how you so f.....g bad", I asked him what I did he said, "You go no what you do", as he said this he hit me about 3 or 4 cuffs in my back, then he hit me some more blows with the butt of his gun. Then another group appeared, I saw Layne, Schoolboy, Cornwall and Owsu. Redhead took a gun from his waist and started pounding my chest with it. Owsu then said "Ah you Tivoli people to f.....g bad", and he started tramping my chest with his boots. As he was doing this he said, "Ah you doh do the man nothing ah you doh see the man full ah life in him still", then he kicked me. Randy Bobb also kicked me while I was on the ground. Then they all left me and went away.

Later on Redhead, Cornwall and Randy Bobb came back picked me up and brought me near a drum of old oil. They lifted me up and pushed my head down in the old oil just the part of my head that was covered with hair was pushed under the oil. Then Redhead heaved me on a pile of sand nearby. Randy Bobb held my hands and Cornwall my feet and attempted to pull me apart. This was night-time. Then Redhead took a spade and started covering me with sand. He began with my feet and stopped at my neck then they placed about eight concrete blocks on the sand on my chest and left. Shortly afterwards, someone said "look at the fella dying here", they came back, took away the blocks and sand and brought me to the yard. They put me to lie down. They took off the handcuffs from my hands and feet, while Layne and Owsu sat nearby they stretched me out lying on my belly and tied my hands and feet to four pickets in the yard. Then Layne ordered the hot cutlass and iron. He pushed the iron in my bottom and Redhead branded me with the hot cutlass.

They then took me up...../4

They then took me up and brought me outside the gate, put me under a pipe and a PRA soldier took a coconut broom and rubbed the cut and burns on my back. They brought me back and tied me to the picket where I remained for the night. I remained in pearls for three weeks and was on and off the picket for four days.

At one stage Redhead kicked me in my mouth and I lost four teeth.

GRENADA, CARRIACOU AND PETIT MARTINIQUE

DETENTION ORDER

MADE BY THE MINISTER RESPONSIBLE FOR MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC
SAFETY AND PUBLIC ORDER UNDER REGULATIONS 2(1) AND
3(1) OF PEOPLE'S LAW NO. 21 OF 1979 (AS AMENDED)
AND ALL OTHER POWERS ENABLING HIM IN THAT BEHALF.

WHEREAS I am satisfied with respect to WINSTON SIMON

of Tivoli, St. Andrew's that to

prevent him acting in a manner prejudicial to public safety, public
order or the defence of Grenada, or with a view to subverting or
sabotaging the People's Revolutionary Government it is necessary to
provide for his preventive detention.

NOW THEREFORE I, Minister responsible for maintenance of public
safety and public order, DO ORDER that the said WINSTON SIMON
of Tivoli, St. Andrew's BE DETAINED in such place and under

REASONS FOR DETENTION

That the said WINSTON SIMON on the
day of 18th June 1980 is reasonably suspected of
counselling and conspiring with other persons to take action of such a
nature that was likely to endanger public safety, public order or the
defence of Grenada or to subvert or sabotage the People's Revolutionary
Government.

Dated this 18th day of June 1980.

CHEQUE NO: 00126804

PAYEE: WINSTON SIMON

DATE	VOUCHER NUMBER	DESCRIPTION	ACCOUNT CODE	AMOUNT
18/12/97	109 78/97	COMPENSATION 22/6/80-25/10/83	4200170131	4,000.00
				4,000.00

FORM GT 22

(1) My name is Teddy Victor and I was a Founder/Member of the JEWEL Organisation, 1972, the precursor Organisation of the New Jewel Movement (NJM) and served as its Editor for the entire duration of that Organisation's life.

(2) I was a Founder/Member of the NJM and held various positions on its Bureau (Executive) from its birth in 1973 until 1976.

(3) I partook in the overthrow of the Government of Sir Eric in 1979 and was defacto Commander of the St. David's region.

(4) In late March 1979, I was accused of Masterminding a plot to liquidate the leadership of the NJM/PRG and was removed from the Armed Forces.

(5) On October 15, 1979, I was hoodwinked from my home, lured into a well conceived trap, ambushed and dumped into prison. The news at dawn placed me at the head of a plot, caught red-handed at that, to overthrow the Peoples' Revolutionary Government.

(6) Thus I became one of the 3112, (ONLY ONE), persons detained by the PRG during the period March 13, 1979 to October 25, 1983. And I speak for that Organisation (those dead and those alive) that the PRG had inadvertently brought into being.

(7) I was held in Political Detention from October 15, 1979 to October 25, 1983 - 4 years and 10 days.

(8) I was charged under the PRG's Peoples Terrorist, Retro-Active Laws; tried and convicted in their vile, Barbarian Court, specially convened to deal with political Activists that did not share the dangerous and erroneous philosophies of the NJM/PRG.

(9) I served a 2 year prison sentence within my four (4) years of Political Prison's Solitary Confinement.

(10) I was Re-Detained at the expiration of my prison sentence.

(11) I was FREED (only) by the Intervention Forces on October 25, 1983.

Forgive me if I am wrong, but I feel strongly that my evidence can very well turn out to be 'Klassic', and I am ready to testify before this Commission. However, I ~~have the indulgence of~~ this Commission that it will endeavour to pursue, meticulously, the following areas of grave and painful concern to many, many of us, the victims and discarded human trash of the Grenada Revolution.

(1) Endeavour to find and Bring to the stand the men who received the instructions from Sir Eric Gairy (R.I.P.) to liquidate the leadership of the NJM, for that was the reason advanced for the justification of the Coup of 1979.

(11) Endeavour to bring to the stand the then Governor General to explain how he was able to exact the ALCHEMIC FEAT of retaining his position as the Representative of Her Majesty, the Queen, albeit, at the head of the Revolution that overthrew the said Majesty's Government and the very constitution that empowered him. What concretely did he do in the face of unprecedented atrocities in the Nation of which he was retained as the regaliaed Head of State?

(111) Endeavour to have brought to the stand the then Captain of the Grenada Defence Force to explain how he was able, in months, to be whisked-out of Grenada to safety, care and security

(HE WAS CAPTAIN), while the poor and destitute Corporals and privates of the said Force, who were just eking out a living, had to remain for years in Detention for 'Security Reasons'; and who upon release had apartheid, South-African-like restrictions imposed on them in what was then, or was supposed to have been, a 'FREE GRENADA'.

(1V) Endeavour to have the Commissioners of Police of The PRG era explain their involvement in the proffering of charges (Summary and Indictable) against persons already in custody for over 2 years when they were being charged.

(V) Endeavour to establish that there was in fact an illegal shipment of arms, in barrels of grease, into Grenada in February/March 1979, and to establish who were involved in this shipment and what it was they were planning for.

(V1) Endeavour to establish once and for all whether the event of March 13, 1979 was (Executed) to pre-empt the liquidation of the NJM leadership (that was eventually liquidated) or whether it was to pre-empt the consequences of the investigation into the illegal importation of arms into Grenada during the first quarter of 1979.

(V11) Endeavour to have the Catholic Church's Assembly 78 focussed upon and authorities of the Church called to explain why the Church's Anti-Gairy Ally - NJM - had within months of its Revolution deemed the very church to be the NO. 1 enemy of its Revolution.

Once I am given the assurance that these areas of concern will not be over looked, you to can be assured that I and hundreds of others are well prepared to come forward to tell our sad and epic stories of the deceptions and atrocities perpetrated by the NJM/PRG during their operative years.

Finally, coming from the deepest recesses of my heart are my deepest cravings to help establish once and for all, that the event of October 19, 1983, was not an isolated event and for which 17 Grenadians are being asked to pay, but the culmination of a process for which all Grenadians must take responsibility: A case of what went around coming around: A Frankenstein that worked wonders in the past returning to wreak havoc on its creators.

I am all for genuine Reconciliation.

However, if ~~the Commission~~, then I might as well liken my coming before this Commission to that of a pretty girl; with beautiful FALSE teeth, smiling before a camera to advertise tooth paste.

Teddy Victor

GOVERNMENT OF GRENADA

MEMORANDUM

TO : PERMANENT SECRETARY, PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE

FROM : PERMANENT SECRETARY - MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

REF. NO. : FA 166 / 01

DATE : MAY 14, 2002

SUBJECT : REQUEST FOR RETURN OF CONFISCATED DOCUMENTS

Your memorandum of May 03, 2002 regarding the stated subject refers.

Please find attached a copy of Note No. 373 / 02 which was forwarded to the U.S. Department of State, through the Embassy of the U.S.A. in St. George's, requesting the return of the documents.

Also forwarded, herewith, is a copy of the covering note sent to the U.S. Embassy, as well as, the memorandum to our Washington, D.C. Mission regarding the subject.


Joseph Charter
PERMANENT SECRETARY

AH/ah

RECEIVED
PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE
15 MAY 2002

Ref. No. FA 166 / 01
In replying the above
Number and date of this
letter should be quoted.



MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MINISTERIAL COMPLEX
BOTANICAL GARDENS
ST. GEORGE'S
GRENADA, W.I.

Tel: 440-2640/2712/2255
Fax: 440-4184
E-mail: faffgnd@caribsurf.com

NOTE NO. 373 / 02

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Grenada presents its compliments to the Department of State of the United States of America in Washington, D.C. and has the honour to refer to the period following the military intervention into Grenada by forces of the United States of America and Caribbean countries on October 25, 1983.

The Ministry has the further honour to refer to the extensive collection of Grenadian documents that were removed from Grenada during the said period by officials of the Government of the United States of America, and to request, on behalf of the Government of Grenada, that the Department of State arrange for the entire collection of material to be returned to the custody of the Government of Grenada at the earliest possible convenience. The Ministry has no doubt that the Department of State would appreciate that the documents constitute a very valuable national asset which remains the property of Grenada.

In this context, therefore, the Government of Grenada looks forward to the kind cooperation of the Department of State in communicating the former's request to the Government of the United States of America.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Grenada avails itself of this opportunity to renew to the Department of State of the United States of America in Washington, D.C. the assurances of its highest consideration.

St. George's, May 06, 2002



Ref. No. FA 166/01
In replying the above
Number and date of this
letter should be quoted.



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MINISTERIAL COMPLEX
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NOTE NO. 374 / 02

see 21st
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Grenada presents its compliments to the Embassy of the United States of America in St. George's and has the honour to request the transmission of the attached note No. 373 / 02 to the Department of State of the United States of America in Washington, D.C. at the earliest convenience.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Trade of Grenada, while thanking the Embassy of the United States of America in St. George's in anticipation of their kind cooperation in this matter, avails itself of this opportunity to renew the assurances of its highest consideration.

St. George's, May 06, 2002



FROM: Dr. E. Reginald Buckmire, M.B.E.
TO: Chairman, Truth and Reconciliation Commission
MEMORANDUM: Pre-Revo, Revo and Post-Revo
DATE: May 5, 2002

INTRODUCTION

Let me congratulate the powers that be for setting up this (TRC) Truth and Reconciliation Commission. This TRC was long overdue. Let's hope that it does not suffer the fate of other Commissions of enquiry which were ignored.

It is unfortunate therefore, that we did not learn from South Africa although we adopted their name. For if we learnt anything we may have adapted their model in the choice of the Commissioners and in setting up the Commission. Perhaps, then more interest would have been generated and the people would feel to be more a part of this enquiry. If I am not mistaken, I was under the impression that we received technical assistance from South Africa.

I must hasten to state that the views expressed herein does not represent the views of the Grenada Civil Awareness Organization of which I am President of the other (4) four organizations of which I am associated.

In this memo I shall cover the period before the Grenada Revolution (Pre-Revo), the period of the revolution (Revo) and the period after the Grenada Revolution (Post - Revo).

Therefore it is sad to see that no serious effort was made to provide Amnesty to those who may want to testify truthfully about some of the excesses or otherwise which may have been afflicted on us before the revolution or during the revolution. We must always remember that true reconciliation or forgiveness can occur only after genuine confession of what or how one may have hurt another and a request for forgiveness. This is particularly important when you consider that immediately after colonialism there have been excesses meted out to us from the highest level. The effects of some these excesses still linger among us and may have influenced the experience Grenada has gone through since then.

DETAILS.

PRE-REVO PERIOD

It is my view that Grenada was not prepared for Independence and what happened at Independence and immediate after Independence reflects this view point. Perhaps it may be instructive for the members of the TRC to review the Dufus Commission's report.

I should point out also that I left Grenada because of what I saw as the loss of respect for professionals and professionalism during that period. It was an open secret that our leaders at the highest level (politicians and Ministers) gave us, the impression that knew agronomy and engineering and economics although they were never schooled in those areas. This resulted in constant conflict between the politicians and the technical staff. Even more significant were the decisions of politicians to dismantle most of the systems and in some cases the infrastructure which were set up for checks and balances in the community and society.

There were constant demands to employ persons as patronage appointments when they were not needed. There were programs called "Land for the Landless" which dismantled large parcels of lands called Estates with no recourse to introduce any new system to replace this productive economic machinery. There were even attempts to dismantle the Grenada Cooperative Nutmeg Association.

The blatant attack on personal rights became prevalent with no recourse to the rule of law. But even more important was the corruption and reported request for bribes for favors which became prevalent. Most of these were perpetuated by our leaders.

THE REVO PERIOD

During the revo period I would come into Grenada to assist with Agro Industrial Development and would interact with the leadership and ordinary persons on a daily basis.

At that time I came to realize that most of the leaders did not wish to have any structured opposition. They were under the impression that they were the repository of information both technical and non-technical. I recall trying to develop a cocoa drink similar to "milo" and the resistance I received in even ordering ingredients and coming up with the name for this product. In the end out of frustration I abandoned this project.

I recall trying to introduce a semblance of distillation skills to develop spice oils and oledresins and the conflict it created.

I recall going to a meeting and hearing the turmoil in the society as the youths developed an attitude that those who toiled and achieved had exploited their fellow men. It was a period of turmoil with no outlet which must inevitably end with an implosion rather than an explosion. The concept of Blockorama (later) known as the "Blocko" for

fund raising evolved during the revolution while the concept maybe good it had led to indiscriminate noise pollution.

Post Revolution

Since the demise of the revolution Grenada has been trying to evolve a new Democracy with little success. Our organization The Grenada Civic Awareness Organization, Ltd. (GCAD) was formed to develop and strengthen Democracy and civic minded responsibility. Today however there still has not been developed any respect for opposition which gives an alternate view. Once an opposing view is expressed, the originator of this opposing view is immediately marked and loses his/her opportunity for road work or otherwise.

Similarly there has been a growing tendency for vandalism and to lose respect for other persons property. This occurs at all levels and at a bigger level in government. Hence the deterioration in our social fabric and the tearing down of constructive ideas. This is way Grenada seems to be going backwards rather than "forward ever, backward never."

These tendencies together with the paternalism in part four (4) politics have led to a virtual loss of interest in any in-depth professional approach to problem solving. As a result professionalism leads to frustration. But this same policy may lead to an opportunity for a repeat of 1979.

A PRESENTATION TO THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

From : E.P.Friday, Richmond Hill, St. George's, Grenada.

Tel. 440 - 0425 (Home) 440 - 2346 (Office) FAX 440 - 6604

I have lived at Richmond Hill since 1971. My property abuts the grounds of the Richmond Hill Prisons on one side, and, on another, the road leading into the Prisons. After the Intervention of 1983, a gate was installed for the purpose of blocking off free access on that road into the Prisons. That gate was erected by the side of my own gate, at the entrance into my own premises. Where my property abuts the Prison road, there is a high retaining wall, which is my property. The foot of that wall lies along the Prison road. The foot of the wall lies on my property.

In addition to the gate mentioned above, the Prison Authorities installed concertina barbed wire along the whole length of the top edge of my retaining wall. As a result of the presence of the Prison gate and the concertina barbed wire, I have been effectively denied access to a part of my property; namely, the land along the road at the foot of the retaining wall. I have not been able to approach my retaining wall even for the purpose of inspecting.

I was not asked (nor did I give) permission to set up barbed wire at the top of my retaining wall. In the interest of National security, I simply left it. However, I have asked different Government Administrations about some compensation for the use of my property, and for their denying me access to a part of my property. No compensation has been forthcoming. Indeed, I have never received a response.

After the Intervention, there arose a dire need of accommodation and facilities to service a Tourism Industry ravaged under the preceding Revolutionary Government. The Government of the day was looking for properties which could be quickly transformed into Tourism - related facilities. My property at Richmond Hill was approved by the Grenada Development Bank for such development. I was encouraged to proceed with the conversion by both the Development Bank and the Grenada Industrial Development Corporation. The Development Bank loaned me money to proceed with the conversion of my home and Clinic into a small hotel, Hotel Balisier. In order to access the financing it was necessary to establish a Company. I, therefore, set up a Company named NORTHPOINT Corporation for the proposed development. I was the principal shareholder.

The Balisier was a 15 - room hotel with an excellent restaurant. Because of the unique panoramic view, the restaurant attracted a large number of patrons, especially foreigners. It was, in fact, a thriving business, operated by my wife now deceased. With the tightening of security at Richmond Hill, before, during and after the Trials related to the Maurice Bishop killing, we encountered a number of serious problems. For example, Security personnel were more in evidence at the Prison gate. This impacted on persons approaching the gate to the Balisier (to the hotel

and the restaurant). The restaurant was patronized mainly at night when harassment to guests was greatest. It was also, unfortunately, the time when it would be least acceptable to guests. This situation was aggravated by two other measures adopted by the Commissioner of Prisons, who at the time was a Mr. Maloney:

(1) He ordered the removal of a street light which had been placed close to the gate of the Balisier, on the grounds that it was shining too brightly on the Prisons' gate, manned by security personnel.

(2) He set up a NO PARKING zone from the main road to Morne Jaloux down to the gates (of Balisier and Prisons), which stand side by side.

As patronage diminished we became very concerned. In attempting to get answers, we interviewed a number of foreign persons, who informed us that the Balisier was experiencing a negative rating because of the security at the Prisons.

The main elements causing the negative attitude were: that the prisons housed dangerous political prisoners; that there was a frightening exhibition of concertina barbed wire on the retaining wall of the BALISIER (installed by the prisons); that they were obliged to park at a distance from Balisier, because of the NO PARKING zone on the road to Balisier (enforced by the Commissioner of Prisons); that because there was no street light (removed on instruction from the Commissioner of Prisons) foreigners were not likely to walk to a restaurant in the dark, in a maximum security area. Nor would they stay at a hotel where concertina barbed wire was considered an absolutely necessary precaution in a maximum security facility just next door.

From being a prosperous establishment, the Balisier slumped into being a non-profitable one, by 1989. We had spent a tremendous lot of money to get the hotel going. We had based our projections on the expertise of the Development Bank, who had advised on the feasibility of the project, and made loans available for the purpose. We had reasonably assumed that the state of things at the prisons would be only temporary. In fact, the concertina barbed wire is still hooked up on my retaining wall.

We were obliged to close the Balisier Hotel because of the negative publicity caused by security measures at the prisons. We had no control over those measures; nor do we know whether they were absolutely necessary. The security at the prisons was intensified to this point only after, and because of, the events of October 1983. As a consequence of all the changes at the Richmond Hill Prisons I was personally affected. My property was utilized without any form of compensation. Hotel Balisier, instituted as part of the national effort to assist Tourism, failed because of security measures at the Prisons. My property was offered as security for the Balisier. The Development Bank has threatened to sell that property, in which I have lived since April 1971.


I am submitting to the Commissioners that my business (Hotel Balisier) underwent much hardship occasioned by the events of October 1983 and after, because of the specific security measures at Richmond Hill. Indeed, those measures (exhibition of concertina barbed wire, removal of street light, institution of a no parking zone) were directly responsible for the demise of Hotel Balisier. The use of my personal property for those security measures at the Prisons still continues.

When Hotel Balisier folded up, it was no longer possible to meet the required repayments on the loan which was used to develop that hotel. However, the property has been my personal home since 1971, and I had submitted the deed for it to the Development Bank as security for the loan in question. Notwithstanding the circumstances, however, I have attempted to make payments on the interest. Last year, the Development Bank advised me that they were prepared to sell the property to repay the loan plus interests due. Prior to this notification, I had, in fact, asked the Development Bank to consider a relief on the loan, since the default on repayments was due to the demise of a business caught up in Government's plans to secure special prisoners at Richmond Hill Prisons; and to maintain order during the special Court hearings at Richmond Hill. The relief I sought from the Bank was a waiver of interests on the loan. Further, I am asking that interests already paid be deducted from the Principal sum borrowed.

As regards compensation for the use of my property by Government, and the concomitant denial to me of access to parts of that property, I am proposing monetary compensation cumulative from January 1, 1984 to the present. In practical terms, the use of the property for the security of the prisons is likely to be indefinite. Some years ago I had requested compensation in this same matter. I had no response.

I wish the commissioners to be appreciative of the difficulties encountered at Richmond Hill, situated as I am right next to the Prisons, during the period under consideration. Prior to October 1983, the access road to the prisons was not blocked; nor was there any exhibition of wire fences and security personnel. My own property was used in devising these measures. And we suffered as a result of them. I would like the Commissioners to intercede on my behalf with the Grenada Development Bank and with Government.

Sincerely,


E.P. Friday

October 8, 2001

TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION

truth and Reconciliation
Healing for the Nation
Balm for the Wounds
Restless souls to calm

Truth and Reconciliation
Cannot hurt this Nation
But instead will be the tool
which we will use to forge ahead

Truth and Reconciliation
an end to speculation
an end to the Contention
an end to the Malady plaguing
t his Nation

Truth and Reconciliation
An end to the Mystery
A light for all to see
No casting Aspersions
an end to Delusions

Truth and Reconciliation
dealing with the facts
A clear Separation from
Myths and Opinions

Truth and Reconciliation
easing the yoke of this generation
placing it safely at Jesus's feet
Love and forgiveness there
we will meet .


Only the Truth will set us free
to live our lives withh dignity
Only Reconciliation
will build this Nation
Can

written by Val Harford
WPC attached to the
Central Police Station

MS VAN HARFORD (WPC)
ST-60
Central Police Station
435-1639..

Home 435-1427 1.30A

**SUBMISSION TO THE TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (TRC)
ON BEHALF OF MEMBERS OF THE GRENADA 17**



**SUBMITTED BY
KEITH SCOTLAND
ATTORNEY-AT-LAW.**

20th. May, 2002.

Table of Contents

CONTENTS

pg. REFERENCE

1. <i>Definitions</i>	<i>ii</i>
2. <i>BACKGROUND TO THE TRC</i>	<i>1-2</i>
3. <i>ESTABLISHMENT OF TWO-MAN COMMITTEE</i>	<i>2</i>
4. <i>ANNOUNCEMENT OF TRC MEMBERSHIP</i>	<i>3-4</i>
5. <i>DENIAL OF ACCESS TO LEGAL COUNSEL</i>	<i>4-6</i>
6. <i>NEW OFFER OF FREEDOM</i>	<i>6</i>
7. <i>COMMENCEMENT OF LEGAL ACTION</i>	<i>6-7</i>
8. <i>TRC RECOGNIZES EXISTENCE OF GRENADA 17</i>	<i>7-8</i>
9. <i>COURT ORDER</i>	<i>8-9</i>
10. <i>SOUTH AFRICAN STYLE TRC</i>	<i>9</i>
11. <i>PROPOSAL</i>	<i>10</i>

DEFINITIONS

<u>TRUTH:</u>	<i>QUALITY OR STATE OF BEING TRUE</i>
<u>TRUE:</u>	<i>IN ACCORDANCE WITH FACT OR REALITY; GENUINE; ACCURATE</i>
<u>RECONCILIATION:</u>	<i>MAKING FRIENDLY AGAIN AFTER ESTRANGEMENT; SETTLE; HARMONIZE</i>

N.B. All definitions taken from the Oxford Dictionary.

THE BACKGROUND TO THE TRC AND THE FREEDOM OF THE GRENADA 17

The idea of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) to look into the events of October 1983 *inter alia* was first raised by the NNP government of Dr Keith Mitchell in March 1997. That was in the immediate aftermath of the decision by the Mercy Committee to not accede to a request from the Conference of Churches to release two of the Grenada 17 political prisoners, namely Phyllis Coard and Kamau McBarnette, on medical grounds. Speaking from Trinidad, Prime Minister Keith Mitchell announced that the setting up of a TRC manned by prominent persons to look into the tragic events and to make the necessary recommendations was the way forward to the goal of bringing about healing and closure to that tragic period of Grenada's history.

However, after the Prime Minister's announcement, several months passed without any movement towards the establishment of the TRC. Subsequently, at a press conference, Prime Minister Mitchell was asked about the TRC. He responded by saying that his government had been advised that the time for such a TRC had passed and, further, that such a TRC was not feasible within the framework of Grenadian law.

In the period leading to the new millennium the Grenadian Prime Minister led the way in beating the drum of reconciliation and forgiveness. The Prime Minister went on record over and over again saying that reconciliation was the cornerstone of his government and that the country cannot and would not be allowed to go into the new millennium with the baggage of the 1980's.

The Prime Minister was clearly understood by the Grenada 17, their families and supporters and by the population at large to mean that the Grenada 17 prisoners would be released prior to 1st January 2000.

This view was strengthened when the Grenada Government set up the Prison Sentence Review Board. The Sentence Review Board is provided for under the Prison Act. It is charged with the responsibility of reviewing the sentences of long-term prisoners with a view to recommending early release. The Board had not been in existence since 1983. Its resurrection at that time was therefore viewed as significant.

The setting up of the Sentence Review Board took on further significance when Prime Minister Keith Mitchell, in response to a question, at one of his Face to Face meetings, concerning alleged plans by the government to release the Grenada 17, said that the release of the prisoners is a process, that the process involves the Sentence Review Board and that the process was ongoing.

Between June 1999 and March 2000, or thereabout, the Sentence Review Board process took place. All the Grenada 17 prisoners save and except two appeared before the Board. They were subjected to exhaustive questioning, including on matters that formed the basis of the indictment against them.

At the end of the process no one was released. Instead, the Grenada 17 prisoners were told that the issue of freedom was to be decided by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

In the wee hours of January 1st 2000, in a national broadcast to mark the advent of the new millennium, Prime Minister Mitchell said that his government would soon set up a process to allow

persons imprisoned as a result of past political events 'to free themselves'. Prime Minister Mitchell was therefore unmistakably linking the freedom of the Grenada 17 with the process which would be soon set up. The Grenada 17 gathered from this that they had a vested interest in ensuring that the TRC process was fairly and properly executed.

ESTABLISHMENT OF TWO-MAN COMMITTEE TO ORGANISE TRC: GRENADA 17 APPROACH TO COMMITTEE IGNORED

In the first half of January 2000 or thereabout Prime Minister Mitchell announced in parliament that a TRC process would be set up. He announced the names of a two-man committee which was charged with the responsibility of setting up the TRC. The committee comprised, Cabinet Minister, Honourable Lawrence Joseph and Catholic priest Father Mark Haynes. It was announced that the two-man committee would meet with interested parties and the public was invited to contact the committee with any ideas and proposals.

On February 5th 2000, some members of the Grenada 17 took the step of writing to the two-man committee. A copy of that letter is herein attached as Appendix 1.

In that letter the Grenada 17 members stated *inter alia*:

"We, the undersigned, wish to record our support for the setting up and operation of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission so as to discover the truth of what happened in October 1983, and to put those events in their correct perspective... We wish to state that we stand willing and ready to fully participate in the proceedings of a 'Truth and Reconciliation Commission', including giving full evidence and facing cross-examination, once it is clear that truth and reconciliation are indeed the objectives of the exercise... We are of the view that if truth and reconciliation are really the objectives behind the exercise, then everyone involved in the setting up of the Commission and its operation should be united in the task of creating the most favourable conditions possible to ensure that truth emerges and reconciliation is achieved."

They thereafter raised certain concerns and difficulties and made concrete suggestions as to how these concerns and difficulties could be addressed.

The two-man committee, however, treated this initiative by the Grenada 17 prisoners with complete disregard. They did not even do the courtesy of confirming receipt of the letter – a letter which it is certain that they received, since it was hand-delivered.

to take our matter — for the first time ever — before Grenada's highest (and only) independent court of Law: the Privy Council. This is only fair and reasonable." There was no response to this proposal, not then, not since.

DENIAL OF ACCESS TO LEGAL COUNSEL

Having received no reply from the two-man committee, having heard the Prime Minister announce that the TRC would soon be commencing, having written to the TRC and also receiving no reply, the Grenada 17 began efforts to try and get the *pro bono* services of counsel. The lawyers who they asked to visit them requested to do so. However, the relevant officers at the prison informed those lawyers that they would not be allowed to see the Grenada 17 without a request emanating from the prisoners themselves. This was an unprecedented development.

In consequence of what was conveyed to counsel, on August 7th 2000, Sewlyn Strachan and Ewart Layne wrote the Commissioner of Prisons on behalf of themselves and their colleagues, requesting permission to see counsel in relation to the TRC and other legal matters. This letter is hereby attached as Appendix 11.

The Grenada 17 received no formal response to their request. Their constant verbal inquiries were met with the response that their request had been forwarded to the Ministry, [of National Security] for consideration and no response had been received as yet. It is to be noted that under Prison Rule 344 [Statutory Rules and Orders (S.R.O.) #14 of 1980, made under the Prisons Act, Chapter 254 of the Laws of Grenada, 1990] it is for the Superintendent of Prisons to handle the issue of access to legal counsel.

In September 2000 members of the Grenada 17 submitted a number of other documents to the TRC. A total of 6 documents in all (including Appendix 11) were submitted in September 2000. Among them were documents suggesting witnesses the TRC may be interested in interviewing and documents which they should consult. Members of the Grenada 17 had control of or access to some of these documents and they undertook to make them available for the TRC.

Other of the September 2000 correspondences related to problems which the Grenada 17 were encountering. One of these documents was titled: RE: Access to Legal Counsel by Members of the 'Grenada 17' for, inter alia, arrangements for Participation in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Therein, the Grenada 17 members outlined the problem that they were having with access to legal counsel.

Another of the September 2000 correspondences was titled: RE: Suggested Recusal of One Member of the Commission. Therein, the members of the Grenada 17 raised the issue of Father Mark Haynes recusing himself as a member of the TRC on account of information in their possession that he had certain firmly held and publicly expressed highly negative positions against them.

To this date, the Grenada 17 members have not received a reply to any of the September 2000 correspondences. These correspondences are hereby attached as Appendices Nos 12-17.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF TRC MEMBERSHIP AND OF IMPENDING COMMENCEMENT OF PROCESS: GRENADA 17 APPROACH TO TRC IGNORED

In April 2000 Prime Minister Mitchell in a national broadcast announced the names of the commissioners. They were: The Honourable Justice Carl Rattray, of Jamaica; Bishop Sehon Goodridge; and the aforementioned Father Mark Haynes. He further announced that the commissioners would start sitting within a matter of weeks.

The Grenada 17 took the immediate step of writing to the TRC Commissioners announced by the Prime Minister. In their letter of April 20th, the members of the Grenada 17 stated that,

"We welcome in principle the establishment of the TRC by the government of Grenada. We would like to participate and generally cooperate with it fully. We consider such cooperation on our part to be decisively important both to uncovering truth and in starting the reconciliation process. This we say not out of immodesty or any inflated sense of our own importance, but simply because of the objective reality of our central role in making and building the 1979-1983 Grenada Revolution, and, unfortunately, in the crisis, tragedy and catastrophe of October 1983."

Eight documents were attached to that letter. Among them was the aforementioned letter to the two-man committee. A package containing the letter and attachments were sent to each member of the TRC. No reply was ever received to that letter though Justice Rattray confirmed receipt of the letter and attachments in writing. The April 20th 2000 letter and the additional attachments are hereby annexed to this submission as Appendices Nos. 2-10.

In light of the impending TRC the Grenada 17 were obviously concerned about and interested in legal representation. Indeed, that was one of the issues that was raised with the two-man committee in the above-mentioned letter. Therein, the Grenada 17 members pleaded for state assistance in retaining legal counsel. They had requested that the state

"meet the cost of retaining a team of competent lawyers of our choice to represent us at the Inquiry. [This is to be able to effectively cross-examine witnesses who appear before the TRC and lie, and to be in a position to effectively expose these lies; to examine-in-chief witnesses whom we can persuade to come and testify as to what really occurred; and generally to protect our legal interests before such a tribunal.]...After all, we and our families have been literally bankrupted by having to provide legal representation for a Preliminary Inquiry (held in March-August 1984). Some had to pay their own legal counsel for the 'Trial' (March-December 1986), the 'Appeal' (March 1988-July 1991) and for several Constitutional Motions arising from this process... Having effectively gone through three major 'trial' processes — all in unconstitutional courts — the Grenada 17's financial resources are presently non-existent. It would be totally unfair to expect us to have to find funds to pay lawyers for what would be effectively another 'trial process', and one not of our choosing. AT THIS TIME we want to raise whatever funds we can

By November 2000, there was still no commencement of the TRC deliberations. In the meantime the Prime Minister gave many different reasons for the failure to get the TRC off the ground. In a national broadcast on the night of Friday March 9th, 2001 he said that a TRC required an atmosphere of peace and tranquillity and that there could be no TRC while there was industrial unrest.

"We cannot expect the Commission to function effectively if the Country is experiencing disruptions because of the actions of a few individuals. The process of truth and reconciliation requires an atmosphere of peace and love, rather than attempts by some to close down ports, or prevent people from travelling, thereby reviving painful memories of the past."

Although this statement was made in March 2001, it crystallized the various excuses that the Prime Minister and other NNP officials had for several months been providing for the failure to commence the TRC.

Given the explanation for the failure to get the TRC off the ground, and given all that had taken place since 1999, the Grenada 17 finally came to the conclusion that the NNP government was insincere and had no intention to free them despite intimations to the contrary. They therefore decided that they would place no further reliance on the TRC process as a way of obtaining their freedom; and that, instead, they would seek redress for their continued illegal detention through the courts. In consequence of this conclusion, in November 2000, the Grenada 17 retained Mr. Keith Scotland out of the jurisdiction of Trinidad to challenge the legality of their continued detention.

On November 29th 2000, Sewlyn Strachan and Ewart Layne wrote a letter to the Commissioner of Prisons as a follow up to their letter of August 7th 2000. In that letter they informed the Commissioner of the visit to Grenada of their legal counsel and they sought permission to see him. That letter is hereby attached as Appendix 18.

The Grenada 17 again received no response to their request. They were again told, when they inquired, that their request had been forwarded to the Ministry and that it was under consideration.

On December 6th 2000 the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of National Security visited the prison. A direct inquiry regarding the issue of access to legal counsel was made to him. In particular, he was asked about the status of the request to see Mr. Scotland. The Permanent Secretary confirmed that the letter of request was forwarded and received by him. He added that it was for the Prime Minister to decide and he had forwarded the request to him.

On December 19th 2000 Mr. Scotland visited Grenada with the view of visiting his clients. He was denied permission.

In March 2001 Mr. Scotland again visited Grenada with a view to seeing his clients. Once again he was refused permission.

On April 5th 2001, or thereabout, Mr. Scotland again returned to Grenada. Once again he requested to see his clients. And once again he was refused.

On April 11th 2001, Mr. Scotland sought leave from the High Court to apply for judicial review redress so as to compel the state to allow him access to his clients.

When the motion came up for hearing, on April 27th, the state represented by the Attorney General conceded that there was no legal basis upon which Mr. Scotland could be denied access. And the judge so ruled.

NEW OFFER OF FREEDOM THROUGH TRC

Sometime after the hearing of the motion it was intimated that the G-17 not proceed to take legal action against the state on the issue of their freedom because the TRC would be soon set up for the purpose of freeing them.

As was counsel's duty he put the offer of the ^{office} Attorney General to the Grenada 17. The Grenada 17 took the view that firstly, the TRC seemed to be a dead idea but secondly, they now seriously doubted the *bona fides* of a TRC sponsored by the NNP government. They took the view that the TRC appeared to be a trick; a trick of dangling their freedom before them while doing nothing to bring it about and while at the same time blocking them from taking legal action to secure it. The Grenada 17 viewed the offer coming from the Attorney General as a device to get them to voluntarily hold off legal action, the state's effort to prevent them from pursuing such action having been defeated. The Grenada 17 therefore took the view that while they would maintain an open mind to the TRC, they would place no reliance on it as a vehicle for regaining their liberty, and that they would therefore pursue independent legal action to secure their freedom.

COMMENCEMENT OF LEGAL ACTION TO SECURE FREEDOM OF GRENADA 17: COMMENCEMENT OF TRC AND DISREGARD FOR NATURAL JUSTICE

On June 28th 2001 Mr. Keith Scotland filed a motion in the High Court of Justice on behalf of three of the Grenada 17 seeking their freedom forthwith. That was nearly 18 months after the announcement of the TRC and 15 months after the Commissioners were named and yet the TRC had not yet begun hearings. When the motion came up on July 12th Mr Scotland put the state on notice that he would be filing other matters on behalf of all his other clients.

In the latter half of August 2001 it was announced in the parliament of Grenada that the TRC would be launched within a matter of days. It was also announced that Justice Carl Rattray had withdrawn due to illness and that the Chairman of the TRC would now be Justice Donald Trotman out of Guyana.

The TRC was indeed launched on September 4th 2001. Several sessions of the TRC were held in the period from September 2001 to January 31st 2002. At no time was the Grenada 17 contacted or in any other way communicated to regarding their participation in the TRC. This despite the long record of communication with the TRC personnel as borne out by the attachments to this letter. It should be reemphasized here that one of the TRC commissioners was also a member of the two-man committee which helped set to set up the TRC. One other commissioner was announced as a member of the TRC as far back as April 2000. Many, if not all, of the attachments to this submission were delivered to those two. Therefore then, as far back as a year before the actual commencement of the TRC, a

APPENDIX 9

GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNCONSTITUTIONAL COURT SYSTEM (AND THE JURY SELECTION PROCEDURES) USED TO TRY THE GRENADA 17

Preamble

On December 3rd 1986, fourteen (14) former government and military officials of the Grenada Revolution were convicted of murder by a Grenadian court and sentenced to hang. Three other soldiers of the People's Revolutionary Army of the Revolution were convicted of manslaughter and given long prison sentences.

The trial of the group, now referred to as the Grenada 17, was by its very nature a high profile event. Indeed it was the most high profile trial in the history of the English speaking Caribbean. On trial were former leaders of a government, including a deputy Prime Minister; they stood in the dock charged with killing other members of the former government, including the Prime Minister.

The background against which the alleged murders took place elevated the profile of the trial.

On March 13th, 1979, tiny Grenada, a tri-island state of 133sq miles (340 km²) and 100,000 people exploded in the English speaking Caribbean's first successful revolution.

The radical New Jewel Movement (NJM) spearheaded the revolution. The government of Eric Gairy was overthrown. The overthrow of the Gairy government followed years of abuse of power in the decade leading up to 1979. Some of these abuses were catalogued in the Report of the Duffus Commission which looked into the breakdown of the rule of law in Grenada in the period 1973-74. Not surprisingly, then, the overthrow of the Eric Gairy government and the triumph of the Revolution had the widespread support of the Grenadian people.

With the advent of the Revolution, Maurice Bishop became Prime Minister of the People's Revolutionary Government (PRG). Bernard Coard was his deputy.

The People's Revolutionary Government ruled Grenada from March 13th 1979 up to October 1983. During the period of its reign it had to contend with intense political pressure from outside Grenada, in particular from the USA whose President, Ronald Reagan, had publicly pronounced his ambition and intention to land troops in Grenada to put an end to the revolutionary process.

The intense political pressure and military threat from outside Grenada compounded the difficulties inherent in developing and guiding the revolution, an entirely new experiment in the English speaking Caribbean. This also exacerbated the differences, which are bound to arise in the context of any human endeavour involving power, particularly of a state political power character.

In consequence, in October 1983, differences that were simmering within the New Jewel Movement broke out into the open: And the revolutionary party which, united, took power on March 13th 1979, split into two main factions.

Despite efforts to mend these differences the conflict heightened, and on October 19th 1983 the then Prime Minister of Grenada and others died during circumstances of civil disorder. Prior to those tragic events several members of the government had resigned and at least one was absent from the island. Thereafter, in the vacuum created by the non-functioning of the government, a Revolutionary Military Council was formed to restore peace, stability and good order.

Arrest, Detention And Torturing Of The Grenada Seventeen

On October 25th 1983, despite the fact that calm had returned to Grenada (there had been no other acts of violence or armed confrontation since October 19th) and that no American or foreign citizens or foreign owned property was in any danger, or had suffered any injury or damage, the United States' armed forces together with small contingents of forces from eight (8) Caribbean countries invaded Grenada and overwhelmed the small local army with superior forces.

This armed intervention into Grenada was roundly condemned by the United Nations General Assembly as an illegal act.

During the invasion the members of the Grenada 17, several of whom were leaders of the (NJM) New Jewel Movement, were captured. They were first held as prisoners of war (POW's). Later their official status was changed to that of Political Detainees. Later still they were charged with the murders of Maurice Bishop and seven (7) others.

During the period when they were prisoners of war and/or political detainees several of the Grenada 17 were taken away from the prisoner-of-war camps and other detention centres to interrogation centres manned by members of the invading forces now turned occupation forces. In each case they were denied access to legal counsel, and forced to sign 'confessions' after several hours of torture.

In all, confessions were extracted from seven (7) of the Grenada 17 between November 1st and November 22nd. During that period there were 10,000 foreign troops in and around Grenada. At no time did any of the seven (7) applicants have access to counsel despite requests for such access. And indeed the government of the US has conceded that such requests for access to counsel were made and denied, and that the Grenada 17 were only granted access to legal counsel in December 1983. Despite these facts during their trial in 1986 the trial judge ruled that all the alleged 'confessions' were freely and voluntarily given and could be used as evidence in the trial.¹

Propaganda War Against The Grenada 17 By US Psychological Warfare Battalion

A significant fact is that, as part of the invading forces, the U.S. landed a psychological warfare battalion in Grenada. That battalion quickly got to work. They took full advantage of the traumatized and vulnerable state in which the Grenadian people were caught. And they completely and totally poisoned the minds of the Grenadian people against the Grenada 17 with the most vicious propaganda campaign ever unleashed in these parts. They thoroughly, systematically and comprehensively embedded into the minds of Grenadians the view that the 17 were fully responsible for the deaths of the widely beloved Prime Minister, Maurice Bishop. That they 'conspired' to kill him. That they were 'power hungry' 'criminals' and 'murderers'.²

At the end of 1983 (early 1984) the Reagan Administration provided a further \$8 million US to be spent in Grenada for the purpose of justifying the invasion to the Grenadian people.

With this injection of capital and riding on the wave of the job already done by the Psy-ops battalion, the propaganda war against the Grenadian 17 was sustained for a period of eight years.

At the time of the commencement of the trial in 1986, the adverse publicity against the 17 was at a crescendo.

In the context, the seventeen were therefore extremely concerned and worried as to whether they would receive a fair trial. Their concerns centred on the issues of:

- (a) Whether they would be tried by an independent court; one that was free of the influence of those who assumed power in Grenada and which was not vulnerable to their manipulation; and
- (b) Whether a jury could be found to impartially decide the facts in issue.

From March to December 1986 (the period of the trial) there was a battle inside and outside the court around these issues. The trial itself descended into a farce. The Seventeen instructed their lawyers to withdraw from the trial. Upon the lawyers announcing their intention to withdraw there was an uproar of disapproval from the assembled array of jurors then present in court. These potential jurors, clearly under the influence of the propaganda onslaught carried on in every division of the media, turned their wrath on the Seventeen. Before one word of evidence was heard in the case, they shouted at the Seventeen that they were 'criminals' and 'murderers' and 'that we go get all you'.

The issue of the court in which the Seventeen would be tried was a live issue because in theory there were two different court systems with jurisdiction in Grenada in March 1986. There was the OECS Supreme Court which was the court provided for under the constitution; and there was the Grenada Supreme Court which was set up in 1979 following the revolution.

The Seventeen desired to be tried by the court of the constitution because that system provided for a final appeal to the Privy Council. The Seventeen were convinced that given all the politics in which their matter was enmeshed, and given the necessity of securing convictions against them to justify the invasion of Grenada, they could only be assured of justice from a court completely independent of local and regional politicians.

Genesis of the OECS Supreme Court

On 22nd February 1967, Her Majesty in Council made the Grenada Constitution Order 1967, Statutory Instrument No. 227 of 1967. This order came into operation on the 3rd day of March 1967. By virtue of this Order, Grenada received a new Constitution which conferred upon the state internal self-government.

On February 22nd Her Majesty also made two other Orders. The first of these was the 'West Indies Associated States Supreme Court Order 1967 No. 223 herein after referred to as the Courts Order'. The second of these Orders was the 'West Indies Associated States (Appeals to the Privy Council) Order 1967 Statutory Instruments 1967 No. 244'. Both of these Orders came into operation on 27th February 1967. By the Courts Order, was established a Supreme Court for the West Indies Associated States Supreme Court. This court was established as a superior court of record and consisted of a Court of Appeal and a High Court of Justice. The West Indies Associated States (Appeals to Privy Council) Order 1967 conferred a right of appeal to Her Majesty in Council from decisions of the Court of Appeal established by the Court's Order, in such cases as may be prescribed by or in pursuance of the constitution of a state.

By the 3rd March 1967, Grenada had acquired a new political status under the West Indies Act 1967, a new constitution under the Grenada Constitution Order 1967 and a new judicial system under the Courts Order.

The Constitution that Grenada received on March 3rd 1967 was based on the Westminster model. Under it there was separation of powers between the Legislature, the Executive and Judicature. The Judicature was established by the Courts Order which was made a part of the Constitution. The Constitution also provided for the Protection of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms and their enforcement.

The Supreme Court established by the Courts Order was the Constitutional Court of Grenada. It was the only Supreme Court that the Constitution recognised as having or being capable of having any jurisdiction in and over Grenada.

Various entrenched provisions in the new Constitution protected the existence of this Court.

The Courts Order did not set the details of the jurisdiction of the new Supreme Court which it created. Section 9 (1) of the Court's Order provides that the High Court shall have such 'jurisdiction and powers as may be conferred on it by the Constitution or any other law of the state'.

At the time when the constitution came into force on the 3rd March 1967, the general jurisdiction of the Supreme Court was based on the Supreme Court Ordinance Chapter 289 of the laws of Grenada.

On the 16th of April 1971 the West Indies Associated States Supreme Court (Grenada) Act 1971 Act No. 17 of 1971 came into operation. It repealed Chapter 289 but vested the repealed jurisdiction in the Supreme Court of Grenada established by the Courts Order.

On the 16th April 1971, the position was that there was a special jurisdiction vested in the courts by the Constitution, namely Section 16 (Enforcement of Protection Provisions), Section 37 (Determination of Questions as to Membership of the Legislature) and Section 103 (6) (Appeals). And in addition thereto there was the general jurisdiction vested in the courts by virtue of Act No 17 of 1971.

The existence of the Supreme Court established by the Courts Order, the Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court conferred by Sections 16 and 37 of the Constitution and certain parts of the Courts Order were all fully entrenched and protected by the Constitution.

On February 7th 1974, Grenada's status of association with the United Kingdom was terminated. This was effected by the Grenada Termination of Association Order 1973, which was made by Her Majesty in Council on the 19th day of December 1973.

On the said February 7th a new Constitution came into force in Grenada. This was by virtue of the Grenada Constitution Order 1973 that was passed by Her Majesty in Council on the 19th day of December 1973.

This new Constitution involved very few changes from the 1967 Constitution. The Supreme Court established by the Courts Order remained fully protected by means of entrenched provisions. And the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court created by Sections 16 and 37 of the Constitution also remained fully protected.

Genesis of the Grenada Supreme Court

Although the majority of Grenadians welcomed the Grenada Revolution, Grenada's neighbours including those with whom Grenada shared the W.I. Associated States Supreme Court were opposed to it. And from a very early date they adopted a hostile stance.

In response to the Revolution the leaders of the other states with whom Grenada shared the West Indies Associated States Supreme Court ordered the court to withdraw its services from Grenada. That this is how that court was rendered inoperable in Grenada was confirmed by Justice Archibald Nedd, who was the resident judge in Grenada at the time of the Revolution, during his judgement in Suit No. 303 of 1984.

As a result of the withdrawal of the West Indies Associated States Supreme Court Grenada was put out in the cold judicially. It had no judicial system.

It was against this background that the new government, the People's Revolutionary Government, set up, by way of People's Laws Nos. 4 and 14 of 1979, the Grenada Supreme Court.

Under People's Law No. 14 the judges of the Grenada Supreme Court were to be appointed by the Governor General (which the Revolution retained both in terms of office and personnel) acting on the advice of the Prime Minister.

It should be noted that one of the effects of the withdrawal of the West Indies Associated States Supreme Court was that Grenada was *ipso facto* deprived of the services of the Privy Council since by virtue of the West Indies Associated States (Appeals to the Privy Council) Order 1967 Statutory Instrument 1967 No. 224, appeals to the Privy Council were to be from decisions of the Court of Appeal established by the Courts Order.

However, later in 1979, by virtue of Peoples Law No. 84 of 1979 the PRG in recognition of the reality that Grenada was deprived of the services of the Privy Council, for the avoidance of doubt and obviously for other tactical reasons, enacted that no appeals to the Privy Council would be from Grenada.

Post October 1983 Machinations by the New Powers To Keep Out The Court Of The Constitution; Efforts By The Seventeen To Secure Its Restoration

Once the Revolution had been defeated and the foreign troops had gained dominance, they set out to establish and consolidate their rule. In pursuit of this objective the Governor General, His Excellency Sir Paul Scoon, was co-opted by the invading forces. Backed by the military might of the invading forces he formally assumed power. On October 31st 1983 by proclamation he invoked Section 57 (2) of the Grenada Constitution Order 1973. Section 57 (2) provides.

Subject to the provisions of this Constitution, the executive authority of Grenada may be exercised on behalf of Her Majesty by the Governor General either directly or through officers subordinated to him.

The Governor General proclaimed that

Until a government is duly elected under the provisions of the constitution of Grenada set out in schedule 1 to the Grenada Constitution Order 1973 and pursuant to subsection(s) of section 57 of the said Constitution I shall exercise the executive authority on behalf of her Majesty in consultation with Advisory Council...

The Governor General therefore formally assumed power in the name of the Constitution. This exercise of power was, according to the Governor General, to be temporary and facilitative of Grenada's return to constitutional rule and in accordance with the Grenada Constitution Order 1973.

Between October 31st and November 12th 1983, the Governor General issued several other proclamations which inter alia had the effect of keeping in place the Grenada Supreme Court set up under the People's Laws Nos. 4 and 14 of 1979.

Once it became clear that the Grenada 17 would be charged and tried for murder arising out of the events of October 19th 1983, the issue of which legal system would try them became of critical importance.

The new powers in Grenada were bent on trying the 17 in the Grenada Supreme Court.

This despite their pronouncements that they were politically and philosophically committed to a full return to constitutional rule under the independence constitution, which has the Court's Order as one of its entrenched provisions:

The 17 were convinced that in the new political reality any trial under the Grenada Supreme Court system would be nothing but a show trial. The Grenada Supreme Court system, it would be remembered, was set up in response to the withdrawal of the West Indies Associated States Supreme Court from Grenada. It was therefore set up as an act of political expediency and necessity, to fill the judicial vacuum left by the withdrawal from Grenada of the court set up by the Court's order. It is true, as Nedd C.J. said in his judgement in Suit 303 of 1984, that the PRG manifested an intention and desire to 'maintain as far as possible a judicial system approximating as closely as possible in practice and procedure and in the appointment of officers of the court and the like to what obtained in Grenada by virtue of the West Indies Associated States Supreme Court Order and the Grenada Act No. 17 of 1971'. However, the court system set up under People's Laws Nos. 4 and 14 was still vulnerable to misuse and abuse because.

- The judges had no security of tenure and were politically appointed, and on top of that
- There was no mechanism or provision in place for appeals from, or review of the decisions of, that court.

Given the glaring vulnerability of the Grenada Supreme Court, the significance of the intention of the post-invasion powers to try them under the Grenada Supreme Court system, while at the same time paying lip service to the desire and necessity of restoring full constitutional rule to Grenada, was not lost on the 17.

It was evident that the new powers in Grenada did not face the kind of problem which forced the PRG into setting up the Grenada Supreme Court. In March 1979, within days of the Revolution, the political leaders of the other states with which Grenada shared the West Indies Associated States Court, had ordered the court to withdraw its services from Grenada. This was clearly aimed at expressing their displeasure at the advent of the revolution and to create difficulties for the revolutionaries as a way of pressuring them. But it is not a fact that the very countries which ordered the withdrawal of the services of the court from Grenada in 1979 were participants in the invasion along with the United States, waving the banner of the 1973 Constitution of which the Courts Order is a deeply entrenched part.

It therefore seemed striking in the extreme that the new powers in Grenada preferred to keep in place the Grenada Supreme Court rather than immediately restore the court of the Courts Order with all its checks and balances. The inference seemed irresistible: that there was an ulterior motive involved here; that this was an act of political expediency; that those who controlled power were not interested in justice but solely in verdicts of a particular nature; and that they were convinced, not without good cause, that their only guarantee of obtaining the verdicts they favoured, in particular against the former revolutionary leaders, was to try them in a court vulnerable to manipulation and whose decisions were not subject to review by any independent body.

On December 3rd 1984 elections were held in Grenada and a new parliament was elected.

Prior to the December 3rd elections, namely on November 9th 1984, the Governor General promulgated the Constitution of Grenada Order 1984 published in the Official Gazette on 9th November 1984. In effect it set out that the Constitution Order 1973 was fully in force save and except the provisions relating to the Courts Order.

In February 1985 the new parliament passed an Act cited as: People's Laws, Interim Government Proclamations and Ordinances Confirmation of Validity Act, 1985, herein after referred to as Act 1 of 1985.

7

Act 1 of 1985 provides that:

For the avoidance of doubt it is hereby enacted that the following laws, rules and proclamations are in force, and shall remain in force until otherwise enacted:

1. Laws and rules made by the People's Revolutionary Government;
2. Proclamations made by the Governor General during the period of Interim Government, namely the period between the military intervention and the appointment of the Prime Minister on the 4th day of December, 1984;
3. Laws and rules made by the Governor General on the advice of the Advisory Council established by him in advisory council proclamation, 1983.

Act 1 of 1985, therefore, inter alia, purported to validate the continued suspension of the provisions of the Constitution relating to the Courts Order.

As was naturally the case, given their conviction that it was impossible to get a fair hearing under the Grenada Supreme Court System in the post-invasion political reality, the 17 sought at every turn to challenge the validity of the court to hear their matter.

In 1984 they filed Suit No. 303 of 1984, in which they sought inter alia a Declaration that the Grenada Supreme Court is unconstitutional and invalid and an Order that all further proceedings on their matter be stayed until the indictments which they face can be heard and determined by the court established by the Courts Order.

After hearing arguments Nedd C.J. dismissed Suit 303 of 1984 on the grounds that the PRG had by 1983 attained de jure status and therefore all its laws including People's Laws Nos. 4 and 14 were de jure valid: thus the Grenada Supreme Court was constitutional not by virtue of the 1973 Constitution Order but in a Kelsenian sense, and hence could validly try the 17.

On appeal, however, the Court of Appeal by a majority reversed Nedd C.J. The Court of Appeal held that there was no evidence before the court upon which the court could make a finding that the PRG had achieved de jure status. It was pressed upon the court in argument that the PRG had only suspended the Constitution Order 1973; and that the PRG had pledged in the Declaration of the revolution:

"... to return to constitutional rule at an early opportunity and to appoint a Consultative Assembly to consult with all the people for the purpose of the establishment of a new Constitution which will reflect the wishes and aspirations of all the people of Grenada. The new Constitution will be submitted for popular approval in a referendum. All classes and strata will be involved;"

and that by October 1983 there was a Constitutional Commission in place and in the process of drafting the new constitution: thus even then the Grenada Constitution Order 1973 still remained the Constitution of Grenada albeit suspended.

Since the Court of Appeal held that the PRG had not achieved de jure status it also held that the independence Constitution was always in existence even though suspended, i.e. it was never abolished.

8

The Court of Appeal next looked to see whether the action of the Governor General to keep the Courts Order in suspension was constitutional.

The Court of Appeal held that suspension of the Courts Order and its purported replacement by the Grenada Supreme Court amounted to a purported alteration of the Constitution within the meaning of Section 39 of the Constitution; and that for such an alteration to be constitutional it must comply with the provisions of Section 39 which require the concurrence of a 2/3rd majority of the House of Representatives and of 2/3rd of the votes validly cast in a referendum duly summoned.

The Court of Appeal however went on to hold that though unconstitutional Act 1 of 1985 was legally valid when passed on the basis of the law of necessity and therefore the Grenada Supreme Court was temporarily valid.

But valid for how long? To this question the President of the Court of Appeal J.O.F. Haynes in his lucid judgement replied:

"Until either effective steps shall have been taken to resume the state's representation in the pre-revolution Supreme Court or constitutional legislation shall have been passed in compliance with Section 39 of the Constitution to establish another Supreme Court in its place."

President Haynes then said:

"Of course it is to be assumed the government will act with reasonable dispatch."

The ruling of the Court of Appeal was challenged by the 17 before the Privy Council. The 17 were dissatisfied with the granting of temporary validity to the court since that meant that the temporary court could proceed on the indictments pending against them.

The Privy Council declined to hear the appeal of the 17 on the ground that the Grenada Parliament could validly approve the abolition of appeals to the Privy Council provided for under Section 104 of the constitution. Since the repeal of that clause did not require the holding of a referendum it was sufficient that 2/3rd of both Houses approved the Bill. The Privy Council also held that in any case it never had jurisdiction to hear appeals from the Grenada Supreme Court, but only from the Court of Appeal established by the Courts Order. The way therefore seemed clear for the commencement of the trial on the indictments.

By May 1986, the prolongation of the temporary jurisdiction of the Grenada Supreme Court was becoming a source of embarrassment. In that month the Court of Appeal expressed dissatisfaction with the failure of the Government to restore constitutionality to the court system as the said Court of Appeal in its judgement more than 1 1/4 years before had directed should be done expeditiously. The Court of Appeal ordered the government in the person of the Attorney-General to appear before it so as to inform the court of the government's timetable for returning to a constitutional court system. In compliance with the order of the court the government informed the Court of Appeal that the OECS Supreme Court would be operational in Grenada again from 1st January 1987.

Thus while the 17 were disappointed that the Court of Appeal had condoned the trial in the unconstitutional court system, there was a clear and legitimate expectation based on the government's promise that their appeal(s) would be allowed to go forward within the constitutional court system. This however was not to be.

March 1988: The Compton Letter

In the period 1st January 1987 to March 1988, as far as the Seventeen were then-aware, no steps had been taken by the government of Grenada to return Grenada to the Constitutional Court System. The Appeal Court of Necessity remained operational even though the conditions of necessity giving temporary sanction to the said court had long expired. The 17 therefore had no alternative but to take their appeals before the unconstitutional court.

When the Appeal commenced in March of 1988 the Seventeen and their counsel learned that a new basis was put forward to justify the continued existence of the unconstitutional court. It was not a basis in law but politics.

In March 1988, the OECS Heads in a letter signed by then-chairman, PM Compton of St. Lucia, to the government of Grenada, stated that the OECS Supreme Court, which is the court of the Grenada Constitution, would not be allowed to resume function in Grenada *until the Maurice Bishop Murder Trial (actually named) was disposed of*. This letter was read into the record of the appeal proceedings and amazingly it was used as the 'jurisprudential' basis for the continued existence of the unconstitutional court. In other words, the politicians of the various OECS islands were openly declaring that they, and not the judges of the OECS Court, would determine if and when the Court of the Grenada Constitution would be permitted to exercise its legal jurisdiction in Grenada.³ It was one thing for the politicians to so declare; it was another thing for the judges who had the power of life and death over citizens to concede this authority to the politicians. The question therefore of the legal validity of the unconstitutional court previously premised on the operation of the doctrine of state necessity, was no longer to be determined by accepted principles of law. It was now to be determined by political fiat. Everything was wrong with that. More naked political interference in the judicial process is hardly imaginable! But that was not the end of the matter.

Appeals Nos. 4-20 were proceeded with before the unconstitutional court. Several months after the commencement of the appeals the President of the Court of Appeal died after a short illness. The appeals had to recommence under a newly constituted court. This court heard arguments until September 1990. The court promised a judgement within three months.

However, after the expiry of three months no judgement was forthcoming. The explanation given was that the court was delayed because it had decided to produce a full written judgement.

In the period during which the judgement of the court was being awaited information was revealed in the Parliament, in answer to a question from an opposition senator, which showed that the judges of the Appeal Court were paid approximately \$3 million EC for their services with regard to the case of the 17.

Shortly before the Court of Appeal handed down its ruling in July 1991, the Grenada parliament passed the Constitutional Judicature (Restoration) Act 1991, Act No. 19 of 1991. The Act was assented to by the Governor General on July 19, 1991.

This Act facilitated the return of the OECS Supreme Court and also restored the jurisdiction of the Privy Council to Grenada.

However, the very Act 19 of 1991 that brought back the OECS Court and Privy Council to Grenada contained a provision—Section 7 (4)—preventing any case finally determined by the unconstitutional appeal court from being taken to the Privy Council. Put in simple terms, the case of the Grenada 17 was to go no further!

There is obviously no doubt that S7 (4) of Act 19 of 1991 was aimed at stopping the Grenada 17 from getting an independent review of their matter. When this section is taken against the background of the aforementioned Compton letter of March 1988 that much is clear.

The issue was put beyond doubt by events which unfolded at the end of July-early August 1991. Act 19 of 1991 was due to take effect on August 1st 1991. Five of the 17, among them former Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard, were scheduled to be hanged on July 30th 1991. The date for the hangings was postponed following an international outcry. On July 29th lawyers for the 17 filed an action before the unconstitutional Court of Appeal for a re-hearing of the appeals. It would have meant that under the provisions of Act 19 of 1991, to wit S7 (3), this motion would have had to be heard by the OECS Court of Appeal since it would be pending in the defunct Court of Appeal on August 1st. With this the 17 would get into the constitutional stream and be able to take their matter to the Privy Council.

The government reacted to this situation swiftly and in a most dubiously lawful manner. By executive action the date for the return of the constitutional court was pushed back. The unconstitutional court was hurriedly reconvened. The matter was heard and swiftly dismissed by this unconstitutional court. And shortly thereafter the constitutional court was allowed back into Grenada.

This determination to prevent the Grenada 17 from having their matter heard and/or reviewed by an independent court (in this case the Privy Council) is a clear admission by those in power that the case cannot stand up to scrutiny. That the only way they could achieve their political objective of convicting the 17 for murder and having those convictions upheld was in a kangaroo court system.

It is therefore not surprising that to this day, almost 9 years after upholding the convictions for murder and the sentences of death, the judges of the court of the defunct court of appeal have not submitted a written judgement. For very 'good' reason they are afraid of anyone reading their judgement(s) and exposing their bankruptcy.

The Jury

In addition to the issue of the independence of the court the issue of an impartial jury was fundamental to a fair hearing. As aforementioned the Seventeen were extremely concerned and doubtful as to whether it was at all possible to empanel an impartial jury given the massive and all pervasive nature of the propaganda to which they were subjected over a period of 2 1/3 years by the time of the trial.

As such the Seventeen and their lawyers filed a matter in court alleging that by virtue of the deliberate and massive pre-trial publicity it was impossible for them to get a fair trial in Grenada; and they requested relief for this violation of their rights.

This motion was however instituted within the unconstitutional court system. Counsel for the Seventeen were however of the view that being a constitutional issue, by virtue of S16 of Grenada's Constitution, the Constitutional Court was the proper court to hear and determine that issue, and that the Grenada Supreme Court, was under an obligation to refer the issue to the Constitutional Court.

The court of trial however rejected the preliminary arguments of counsel seeking referral and ruled that it had the power to try, hear and determine the matter.

Whereupon counsel for the Seventeen applied for a stay of proceedings to allow them to appeal the decision of the court refusing to refer the matter. The court refused the stay and ordered that the matter be proceeded with.

The Seventeen saw the refusal of the stay as part of the plot by the state to railroad them into a trial within the unconstitutional court system. This development combined with a previous ominous

development forced their hands. They decided that they were not going down like lambs. They instructed their lawyers to withdraw from the trial and concentrate on taking the appeal.

When the lawyers for the Seventeen, through the leader of the defense team, informed the court of their instructions, and applied for leave of the court to withdraw, such leave was angrily denied by the judge. He not only denied the leave, he also threatened to cite all the lawyers for contempt of court. And he immediately adjourned for fifteen minutes.

This dramatic development sparked off an uproar in the court amongst the over 100 potential jurors who had been summoned. As the court rose, the array of potential jurors clearly agitated by developments in the court turned their attention on the 17 and in an unprecedented display of anger, hurled abuses at them calling them 'criminals' and 'murderers' and vowing that 'we go get all you'. Not one word of evidence had been as yet adduced but already the jurors had convicted the Seventeen.

This drama confirmed the worst fears in the minds of the 17 and the ominous development aforesaid, came to the fore.

Prosecution Lawyer/Registrar

On March 3rd 1986, the trial of the Seventeen had opened. On that day as was to be expected, an array of jurors was present in court. That array of jurors was drawn up by the person who held the post of Registrar.

On March 4th after a few preliminary matters had been dispensed with, the prosecution complained that the array of jurors was not drawn up in accordance with the provisions of the Jury Act. On this basis they applied for the array to be dismissed.

The Registrar was brought before the court to explain. He insisted that the array was drawn up according to law and that any apparent discrepancy could be easily explained.

The Seventeen would later learn that the real bone of contention was the refusal of the Registrar to co-operate with the prosecution. The prosecution wanted the Registrar to provide them with a list of jurors' weeks before so that they could do background checks. The Registrar refused, as he was entitled to do under the law.

Despite the insistence of the Registrar that the array was properly drawn up, the trial judge dismissed the array and ordered that a new array be struck.

Later the very March day, the Registrar was dismissed from his post. A new Registrar was appointed within 24 hours.

Who was the new Registrar? A member of the prosecution team! A person who had appeared for the prosecution in several preliminary motions and who sat as a member of the prosecution team at the opening of the trial on March 3rd.⁴

This whole development with the dismissal of the array, the sacking of the Registrar and the speedy appointment of a prosecution lawyer to fill the position sent one clear, frightening message to the Seventeen: The prosecution wanted to control the jury selection machinery. That this was clearly the case was later confirmed by the fact that as soon as the trial of the Seventeen was completed, the prosecution lawyer resigned as Registrar and Mr. St. Louis was reinstated.

So on April 11th 1986, the date the defense lawyers informed the court of their intention to withdraw from the trial, it was the new array of jurors selected by the prosecution lawyer which was involved in hurling abuses at the Seventeen, and calling them murderers and criminals.⁵

Ironically, it would be later revealed to the court that the prosecution lawyer violated the law in the drawing up of the array of jurors - the very reason given for dismissing the original array selected by the original Registrar.

Grenadian law lays down a method for choosing prospective jurors so that no jury could be 'fixed'. The emphasis is on random selection. There was not even an attempt by the prosecution lawyer/registrar to follow the procedure set out in the law. Based on the law on jury selection, 11 of the 12 who found the Seventeen guilty, were illegally selected by the prosecution lawyer/Registrar. When all of this was clearly demonstrated to the judge he still refused to dismiss the jury. He had dismissed the panel of the former Registrar on relatively minor grounds based on the same Jury Act. However the proof of overwhelming irregularities could not move him.⁶

Selection And Empanellment Of Jury Behind Backs Of Defendants

The defense lawyers finally withdrew from the trial on April 15th 1986. The court had refused leave for the lawyers to withdraw on April the 11th. Whereupon there was a short adjournment and the aforementioned uproar in court. When the court resumed the judge decided that he was going to adjourn for a few days to give everyone time to reconsider.

On April 15th the judge ascertained from each defendant that it was their instructions for the lawyers to withdraw.

After the withdrawal of the lawyers the Seventeen made it clear to the judge that they were not going to submit to the jurisdiction of the court or co-operate with the trial. They therefore embarked on a course of protest action in the face of the court.

On 18th April 1986, the Seventeen continued their protest. The court was, however, bent on proceeding. The trial judge therefore took what can only be described as an amazing course of action:

- (a) He cited the Seventeen for contempt of court;
- (b) He tried them on the spot and sentenced them to weekend prison terms; and then
- (c) In the enforced absence of the Seventeen, he allowed the prosecution team to effectively install a jury.

The third aspect of the three-part course of action was truly astounding. For having cited and convicted the Seventeen for contempt, and having sentenced them to weekend terms, the judge did not allow them to serve the sentences, or give them time to reconsider, to cool off, to recognize the gravity of their actions, and to purge themselves of their contempt; he immediately allowed the prosecution team to hand-pick a jury.

This hasty course of action must be compared and contrasted with the conduct of the judge when he was informed by the lawyers of the instructions they had received to withdraw from the case. His immediate reaction was to threaten to cite the lawyers for contempt. However he later adjourned the court for a weekend and a Monday to allow the lawyers and the Seventeen time to reconsider. Later in open court he sought and received confirmation from each member of the Seventeen that they had instructed the lawyers to withdraw.

Now, when faced with the even more essential issue of the selection of a jury, the judge was prepared to allow the prosecution team to select that jury by themselves, without giving the defendants any time to reconsider or to cool off or to 'come to their senses'.

Moreover, the absence of the Seventeen from court was at the time of the selection of the jury not due to any misconduct on their part. When they were brought back before the court one by one, to be

tried for contempt, except in two cases, there was no misconduct from them. The trials for contempt took place and they were peacefully led away from court after sentences.

Thus when the Seventeen returned to court on Monday 21st April, the jury was in place and ready to proceed. Even at that time the judge did not see it fit or necessary to allow the Seventeen an opportunity to challenge the jury. Under the law, the 18 defendants, as they were then, would have been entitled cumulatively to 72 peremptory challenges, plus challenges for cause.

Hand-picking of the Jury

It was stated above that the judge allowed the prosecution to hand-pick the jury. Prima facie the term may appear to be too strong. But this is exactly what happened.

The process of handpicking was facilitated by a law which was passed clearly for the purpose of the Maurice Bishop Murder Trial. The law gave the prosecution the 'right to standby' jurors. And this right was used in a very vulgar and abusive manner by the prosecution.

The selection of each juror is done by balloting. All the names are put in a box then a dipping process much like the lotto is carried out. However, in the case of the Grenada 17, each time a name came up which the prosecution was not satisfied with, clearly based on intelligence reports, they would simply have the person 'standby'. In the selection of the jury, there were 66 dippings. Five persons asked to be and were excused mostly because they stated that they were opposed to the death penalty and would have difficulties deciding the case impartially as a result. Eighteen were accepted to form the panel of jurors (12 jurors and 6 reserve jurors). And the prosecution exercised the right to standby 43 times!⁷

While the prosecution was hand-picking the 18 jurors in this way, (from an array, it should be recalled, drawn up by a prosecution lawyer) the judge did not see it fit to question the 18 selected so as to be satisfied that they were not biased, and therefore fit to try the case.

At the appeal the lawyers for the Seventeen submitted that the judge should have taken that course, because the court was on notice by way of the interlocutory motion which was not argued, that there existed widespread all pervasive prejudice in the community against the Seventeen. Indeed, the defense lawyers argued that such screening by the court should have taken place even if all the defendants and their lawyers were in court. The fact that they were not in court compounded the error of omission 1000 times.

Indeed, the court was not only on notice by way of the motion filed before it. A few days after the selection of the jury, one juror had to be dismissed because it was discovered by the prosecution, that he was the father of someone who had died in the October 19th Tragedy, the very event from which the charges against the 17 arose. Even after this discovery the judge still did not see it as prudent to carry out some kind of screening with a view to determining impartiality.⁸

In the face of this development of selection of the jury behind their backs, coming on top of all that went before, the Seventeen decided to continue their protest in the face of the court. The protest also took the form of their refusal to cross-examine any witness.

However, within days of the commencement of the trial, the Seventeen indicated to the court that they were minded to change their stance, and would co-operate with the court if the process was restarted. They therefore moved the court to declare what had taken place so far a mistrial and restart the process *ab initio* (from the beginning). The prosecution objected very strongly to this motion on the ground that the defendants were trying to get 'a second bite of the cherry'. The judge declined to terminate the trial, then in its early stages, as a mistrial.⁹ The most he was prepared to offer was to

recall those witnesses the defendants had previously refused to cross examine so as to allow them to do so. He was not prepared to dismiss the jury and select a new one.

In the context the Seventeen felt locked in. They felt their backs were up against the wall and they had to hold their ground. They decided to continue their protest and effectively they took no part in the trial. They did not cross-examine any of the witnesses presented by the prosecution. However, some of the Seventeen made unsworn statements from the dock, which they termed indicative defense statements.

The Jury Shaken

Over a period of several weeks those of the Seventeen who addressed the court, demolished the prosecution case. They unravelled it thread by thread, and laid it bare as a tissue of lies, contradictions and inconsistencies. The jury that was installed by the prosecution and came to court, hostile, was shaken. The chemistry of their interaction with the defendants underwent a sea-change in a matter of those weeks. The impact was obvious to anyone. People in court started to whisper and then speak what would have been unthinkable a few months before: the Seventeen would be freed.

When defendants are unrepresented before a court, it is the practice for the prosecution to refrain from making a final address to the jury. And this is whether or not the defendant exercises his right to a final address.

Not so in the case of the Grenada 17. When informed of their right to a final address to the jury, the Seventeen declined. They then argued that the prosecution should not make or not be allowed to make a final address, given that they were unrepresented; that the judge should move to summing up the case and then hand the matter over to the jury.

However, the court allowed the prosecution a final address. The chief prosecutor spent 3 weeks addressing the jury to try to piece their case back together. Then the judge summed up. This summing-up was heavily criticised by defense lawyers at the appeal, as being unfair. Some described it as a prosecution summing up.

The Jury Intimidated

One day before the jury was to retire, in a public display, hundreds of foreign troops, helicopters, and all, were brought back into Grenada. It was a clear act of intimidation.

But the intimidation did not end there. As the jury was about to retire, the judge pulled out what some have termed the masterstroke to finally nail the 17. The jury was handed a verdict sheet. Each juror had to state on the sheet the verdict he came to on each of the 164 counts and sign his/her name next to it. This was like putting a gun to the heads of the jurors to ensure they did what those in power wanted them to do.¹⁰ Never before in the hundreds of years of jury trial and in the millions of such trials in the British Commonwealth had such a jury sheet been used. It meant that anyone who wished to find the defendants 'not guilty' would be known by name. This smashed totally the confidentiality of the jury deliberation and decision process. Everyone would know who voted for whom to be found guilty or not guilty. This guaranteed for the foreign invaders and occupiers of the country the placing of the trial verdicts beyond doubt: they would achieve victory in stage one of the plan for the judicial murder of the Grenada 17. They would get the guilty verdicts they needed.

Notes

¹ The OAS Inter-American Commission for Human Rights has ruled that the United States violated the rights of the Grenada 17 when they detained them and held them incommunicado following the invasion. The United States claimed that they were responsible for holding members of the Grenada 17 only for a period of nine (9) days or so and thereafter they were handed over to local authorities. This is untrue because several of the prisoners were held in a U.S. run Prisoner of War camp at Point Salines in St. George's, near Grenada's airport, up until November 14th 1983.

In a response to questions from the ICHR asking for comments on the allegation of the Grenada 17 that they were denied access to lawyers, despite repeated requests for such access, for a period of six weeks following their detention, the U.S. conceded that the Grenada 17 were denied access to lawyers but justified such denial on the grounds that it was unreasonable for such access to be granted during the 6 weeks period when there were still serious security implications. Yet it was during those same six weeks that all of the 'confessions', which were used against the Grenada 17, were obtained.

cf: Organisation of American States Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Report No. 14/94 of February 7, 1994; Report No. 13/95 of September 21, 1995; and Report No. 109/99 of CASE 10.951 COARD ET AL. vs UNITED STATES, September 29, 1999.

² A sample of propaganda material used against the Grenada 17 listing posters, pamphlets, newspaper articles, songs, etc., was presented to the court along with supporting affidavits from several Grenadians, in support of an interlocutory motion which was filed before the court of trial.

³ Based on the OECS Treaty, decisions of the Authority require unanimous agreement. So it must have meant that the government of Grenada concurred in the decision to keep the court out despite having previously undertaken to return the court to Grenada by 1st January 1987.

⁴ The trial record reveals that Ms. Denise Campbell appeared in Court on March 3rd, 4th, and 5th, 1986 as a member of the Prosecution team of lawyers. [Ms Campbell's appointment as Registrar was gazetted on March 5th 1986. She was, therefore, both a prosecution lawyer and Registrar on March 5th, a point which was made by defense counsel Mr Howard Hamilton Q.C. during the appeal hearings.] On March 6th 1986 the court was informed that she no longer appeared for the Crown. On March 11th 1986 Ms. Campbell turns up in court as the newly appointed Registrar and subsequently selects the panel from which the final jury was drawn. cf: pp 1, 6, 10, 24, and 25, Trial Record, Vol. 1, Part 1.

⁵ This incident was attested to by five lawyers, two of them Queens Counsel. A third of the five is currently the Attorney-General of Jamaica. These lawyers all issued affidavits detailing what they witnessed on that April 11th 1986, day. Subsequently they gave evidence and faced cross-examination during the hearing of Civil Suit 191 of 1986. Yet, the Kangaroo Court rejected their clear and uncontroverted evidence and held that no prejudice had resulted to the Grenada 17. This judgement was upheld by the Kangaroo Court of Appeal during the last days of its existence.

⁶ cf: pp 84-129, Trial Record, Vol. 2, Part 1. The arguments contained in that section of the Court Record were extended on by the defence lawyers on appeal. No one knows what response the Court of Appeal had to those arguments since to this date no written judgement has been issued.

⁷ cf: pp 243-247, Trial Record, Vol. 1, Part 2.

⁸ cf: p 248, Trial Record, Vol. 1, Part 2

⁹ cf: pp 541-547, Trial Record, Vol. 1, Part 3

¹⁰ cf: p 5487, Trial Record, Vol. 4, Part 4.

APPENDIX 10

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

THE GRENADA 17 AND THE TRC: YET ANOTHER 'BROKEN PROMISE' IN THE MAKING?

THE CONTEXT

We the members of the Grenada 17 are aware that the impending government-instituted Truth and Reconciliation Commission is being touted in some quarters of the Grenada media as a move by the government of Grenada to free us. The fact that the commission appears to be authorised to recommend amnesty to the Grenada 17 is being interpreted by that sector of the media as a promise of freedom if we provide truthful information to the Commission.

We wish to make it abundantly clear that we have no such interpretation of the situation. Several of us have stated that we have no problem with a South African style TRC in Grenada though others of us believe that the time for that has long passed and that such a process now would be of no benefit to Grenada or to us and that in fact it would just reopen old wounds and result in more pain and suffering for our people.

However, it is clear to all of us that the TRC being set up in Grenada is similar to that in South Africa in name only.

In South Africa the TRC took place on a level playing field. All the principal participants were freed and came from their homes to provide evidence and then they returned to their homes thereafter. In Grenada the government has made it clear that with regard to the TRC there will be no such level playing field.

In South Africa the Commission had the power to grant immunities and pardons. In Grenada the Commission is invested with discriminatory powers. It can grant immunities to people coming off the streets regardless of what offense(s) they may have committed and regardless as to whether they spent time in prison or not. But with regard to the 17 the Commission can only recommend amnesty. The final decision as regards if and when the recommendations are implemented would be left up to the government.

This refusal to provide the Commission with the power to grant amnesties we find deeply worrying. We view it against the background of the refusal of the government to amend the discriminatory law which prohibits us from taking our case before the Privy Council so that it can be decided according to law.

The government of Grenada has stated over and over again that it would like to resolve the matter of the seventeen but that it feels politically unable to act given the controversial and divisive nature of the issue. Yet it continues to refuse to allow Grenada's highest court to decide the issue according to principles of law. And it refuses to provide the TRC with the power to decide the issue. It continues to insist in practice that it, and it alone, must decide even though it has stated over and over again that it is unable to decide.

OUR EFFORTS AT NATIONAL RECONCILIATION IN RECENT YEARS

For some considerable time we were of the view that the government was serious about its oft expressed desire to reconcile Grenadians. We took the government at its word and by our deeds demonstrated our willingness to participate in this process. The record of our efforts in this regard is clear to see. In October 1996, without prior notice, we participated in an interview within the prison walls in which we bared our souls. Months later we published in the press an apology to the detainees of the Revolution and to all those who suffered on account of the actions of the Revolution and our

2
selves during the 4 ½ year process. In September 1999 four of us bared our souls on national radio and TV and apologised to the relatives of those who lost their lives in the October 1983 Tragedy and to all the Grenadian people. During the period we also refrained from taking actions in the court to secure our rights, preferring to give the government the full opportunity to deal with our matter in the spirit of reconciliation which would allow our people to leave the past behind and go into the new millennium on the road to being fully reconciled.

THE VIEW OF OTHERS WE RESPECT...

All along many people, including persons who had supported us for the entire period we have been behind bars, kept saying to us that the government was not serious about reconciliation, that we were being taken for a ride and that the government had absolutely no intention of ever freeing us.

Given all that has taken place and what we now see, we can no longer disregard the opinion of those who now say to us that the TRC has nothing to do with Truth and Reconciliation but it is an expensive device to mamaguy the world while stalling on the issue of allowing our case to go before the Privy Council so that we can obtain justice according to law. Those who hold that opinion say to us that the government is fully aware that the 'TRC' process will open up a lot of old wounds, would leave our people even more divided than they are now and hence at the end of it the government would be left with the perfect excuse as to why it is politically unable to implement any recommendation the Commission may make regarding our freedom.

A LITANY OF BROKEN PROMISES AND DASHED EXPECTATIONS...

However, our profound distrust of the government's position is not just based on our analysis. It is based on the bitter experience of 16 ½ years: the bitter experience of broken promises; of the dashing of legitimate expectations, and of our matter being handled in a nakedly political and discriminatory manner at every twist and turn. Our experiences go back all the way to 1984 and as recently as March 2000.

RESTORATION OF FULL CONSTITUTIONAL RULE...

(1) Following the US invasion of Grenada in October 1983, executive power was assumed by the Governor General, Sir Paul Scoon. In a series of statements and proclamations the GG made it clear that it was intended to return Grenada to full constitutional rule. This promise was kept save and except as it related to us. All aspects of the Independence Constitution were restored by November 1984 except those sections dealing with the Courts Order. The Court's Order was kept suspended so as to allow the Grenada 17 to be tried in a court other than the constitutional court; in a special court which was highly vulnerable to political control and manipulation. [See *Genesis And Development Of The Unconstitutional Court System (And The Jury Selection Procedures) Used To Try The Grenada 17.*]

RETURN OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURT #1...

(2) In 1985 the Court of Appeal ruled that the special court was unconstitutional and only temporarily valid. The Court of Appeal declared that it expected the government of Grenada to act with reasonable dispatch to return to a constitutional court system. That was May 1985. This created the legitimate expectation on our part that despite the plans of the politicians we would be tried by the constitutional court. However, our expectation was dashed. In March 1986, nine months after the ruling of the Court of Appeal, the trial of the Grenada 17 commenced in the unconstitutional court.

RETURN OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURT #2...

(3) In 1986 the Court of Appeal again called on the government to restore the constitutional court to Grenada. In response the government gave an undertaking to the Court of Appeal that the constitutional court would be restored to Grenada from 1st January 1987. Based on this promise the Grenada 17 again harboured the expectation that our appeal would be heard and decided by the constitutional court. Yet once again our legitimate expectation was dashed.

Instead of honouring the 1st January promise, in 1988 the government of Grenada connived with the other governments of the OECS, and the OECS heads decided that the constitutional court would not be allowed to operate in Grenada until the "Maurice Bishop Murder Case" (the case of the Grenada 17) was disposed with. [Note carefully: They made disposal of the case of the Grenada 17 in the Unconstitutional Court (where they could hand-pick and control the judges) A PRECONDITION for permitting the return of the Constitutional Court to Grenada. *Ibid.* See also P.M. Compton's letter to PM Blaize of March 22nd, 1988, entered into the Appeal Court record in April 1988.]

A GENUINE APPEAL COURT PROCESS...

(4) In March 1988, at the beginning of arguments in the appeal, then President of the Court of Appeals, J.O.F. Haynes, decided that he would summon the three key witnesses who testified against us at the trial so that he could question them himself. President Haynes expressed serious disquiet about the evidence that those witnesses gave at the trial. He was especially concerned about the evidence given by one witness, Cletus St. Paul, whose evidence was the sole evidence used to convict the 10 NJM leaders among the 17 defendants. President Haynes said that he could not understand how the same person could have given the five different statements that St. Paul gave, given the material differences in them; and he ordered that St. Paul's three police statements be produced and made part of the court's record. What Haynes' ruling did was to create in us the expectation that our lawyers would get the opportunity to demonstrate to the court the fabricated nature of the evidence used to secure our convictions. Once again our legitimate expectation was dashed.

In December 1988 President Haynes died. The appeal proceeded. The three witnesses were not questioned by the court; and St. Paul's police statements were not produced. Indeed, the newly constituted (unconstitutional) court rejected a request from our legal counsel that they be produced for both the defendants and the Court itself.

THE RETURN OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT #3...

(5) In July 1991 this newly constituted (unconstitutional) Court of Appeal upheld the convictions against us. In that same month the government passed a law to restore the OECS Court to Grenada. The 1st of August 1991 was set as the date of return. In late July 1991 the Grenada 17 filed an action in court with the expectation that that action would be transferred to the constitutional court in keeping with the provisions of Act No. 19 of 1991. That was not to be. Once again the government acted to dash our legitimate expectations. The date for return of the court was hastily revoked so as to allow the kangaroo court to hear and of course dismiss our motion.

A WRITTEN JUDGEMENT IN THREE MONTHS — NO, SEVEN MONTHS — NO, TEN YEARS — NO...

(6) In August 1990 arguments in the appeal of the Grenada 17 were completed. The Court of Appeal promised that it would give judgement within three months. Three months passed and no judgement was given.

The Court of Appeal then promised that it would give a written judgement by March 1991. March 1991 came and went. No written judgement.

In July 1991 the court gave an oral judgement. Up to this day, close to 10 years after the completion of arguments, the Grenada 17 are still awaiting the written judgement so as to see what reasons the Court of Appeal could have had for upholding the convictions and to enable us to challenge them.

RESTORATION OF THE PRIVY COUNCIL — FOR ALL EXCEPT...

(7) In July 1991 the jurisdiction of the OECS Court and that of the Privy Council were restored to Grenada. Given the public importance of our case, and given the promise of those who had assumed authority in Grenada to establish the rule of law, it was reasonable to expect that the case of the Grenada 17 would be one of the cases which the Privy Council, Grenada's highest court, would be called on to determine authoritatively and once and for all. This was not to be. The government included two discriminatory clauses in the law restoring the Privy Council so as to ensure that the Grenada 17 could never have access to the Privy Council.

FREEING TWO OF THE GRENADA 17 ON THE BASIS OF INDEPENDENT MEDICAL EVIDENCE...

(8) In 1995 the NNP government came to power promising to reconcile the people of Grenada.

In January 1997 the Grenada Conference of Churches requested the government of Grenada to free two of the 17 on health and humanitarian grounds. The application was backed up by independent medical evidence establishing the precarious health situation of the two. In one case, in addition to local medical experts, one of the Caribbean's leading Urologists had been brought up from Trinidad by the government of Grenada to examine the individual, and in the other case, three Psychiatrists from three different continents, two of them government-appointed, independently of each other arrived at the same diagnosis and recommendation. The government nevertheless thought it wise to put the issue of the freedom of the two to a national debate; to in essence allow the issue of clemency on medical grounds for the prisoners to be decided on radio call-in programmes. At the end of the exercise on March 11, 1997, the Mercy Committee, clearly swayed by adverse sentiments as expressed on the call-in programmes, rejected the appeal of the GCC.

FREEDOM THROUGH A TRC #1...

(9) Responding two days after his government's Mercy Committee's unmerciful decision, Prime Minister Mitchell expressed regret at the unforgiving nature of our people and he threw out the idea of setting up a TRC as the process through which to both reconcile the nation and make it possible to free the Grenada 17. However, this idea of a TRC was not implemented. The PM would later explain that his government had been advised that it was too late for a TRC and that it would give rise to lots of legal problems.

FREEDOM THROUGH SENTENCE REVIEW BOARD/MERCY COMMITTEE PROCESS..

(10) Throughout 1999 the government made numerous statements about the need to reconcile and about the government's determination to ensure that the country did not go into the new millennium carrying the baggage of the 1979-83 period.

In the latter half of 1999 we were led to believe that the government was giving serious consideration to our matter. In June of 1999 the government set up the Prison Sentence Review Board. The Board is provided for in the Prison Rules (SRO 14 of 1980). The Board is charged with the task of periodically reviewing the sentences of the long-term and young prisoners with a view to recommending their freedom. The Board had never been set up before. Later in 1999, in speaking on the issue of freeing the Grenada 17, the Prime Minister said that the issue of freeing the 17 required a process involving the Sentence Review Board and the Mercy Committee. Based on all appearances the process was on. The level of personnel Cabinet selected for the board was read by us as a signal that the matter was being taken seriously. The board was headed by Cabinet Minister, Mrs Brenda Hood. And the other members were: Colonel Nestor Ogilvie, National Security Advisor; Ms Lana Mc Phail, Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Health; Dr Obikoya, Consultant Psychiatrist to the Government of Grenada; and Mr Dhan Lalsee, an evangelist, who is also an experienced lawyer. Not only was this Board set up, but written interviews with all of us were also done by prison officials for forwarding to the Board. After that, each of us (except one) was individually summoned before the Board to be interviewed. During those interviews, in some cases lasting up to several hours, we were asked a range of questions, including sensitive questions surrounding the events of October 19th 1983.

At the end of this heartrending process our expectations have been dashed once again. Now we are hearing that all along the process was irrelevant and that it requires yet another process, the TRC, to deal with the question of making recommendations regarding our freedom.

FREEDOM THROUGH A TRC #2...

(11) Given all our experiences, how can we in all conscience buy the talk of 'TRC' when already we see a back-peddalling from some of the promises made and expectations aroused regarding this? Over and over again it was said that the Commission would be a South Africa style one. Yet when it comes to us the Commission is deprived of the South Africa-style powers. It can grant relief to everyone except the 17. The granting of relief for The 17 is to remain the preserve of the political directorate.

UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE FOR ONE OF THE GRENADA 17 WITH TERMINAL ILLNESS...

(12) Recently we had a very good example of the kind of relief the government feels able to grant to the 17. Three years after the government rejected the appeal of the Grenada Conference of Churches to grant clemency to Mrs Coard on health grounds, Mrs Coard was diagnosed as suffering from a life threatening situation, to wit cancer, which had already spread. There is in Grenada a well established practice of unconditionally releasing prisoners suffering from life threatening illnesses. There are several precedents of such releases being ordered in the last few years, including by the present government. Indeed, in one case, an inmate on a Death Sentence was unconditionally released when he was diagnosed with cancer. It would have been logical, therefore, for Mrs Coard and her family to expect her unconditional release, to spend whatever time remained of her life with her children. However, in the case of Mrs Coard, despite the fact that she had already served a prison term of approximately 25 years, and disregarding the established practice and precedents, the only relief the government felt able to grant Mrs Coard was six months respite from her term of imprisonment. After that she is to return to prison unless an extension is granted.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE ABOVE, QUESTIONS WE ARE FORCED TO ASK:

- What relief would a government which feels unable to free an ailing woman be capable of providing the other 16 of us?
- If the government is unable to provide relief, why is it refusing to allow the case of the Grenada 17 to be decided by the Privy Council according to law?
- Why is it refusing to invest its own appointed Commission with the power to grant the relief it, the government, is clearly unable to grant?
- What guarantee do we have that any recommendations made by the TRC would be carried out?
- Given our experience with the aborting of the legal process by blocking any appeal to the Privy Council, and given our recent experience with the aborting of the Sentence Review Board process, What guarantee is there that the TRC process would be allowed to go to its logical conclusion?
- What guarantee is there that the TRC process would not just give rise to yet another process, say for example, the appointment of a cabinet committee to study the issue of the implementation of the recommendations of the TRC, with this cabinet committee after several months recommending that yet another process, a referendum, be held? [After all, the Prime Minister is on record as saying repeatedly — including once recently, subsequent to his setting up the TRC — that not he as PM, not even his entire Cabinet, can decide on the freedom of the Grenada 17. Only the people as a whole can decide the issue. He can always say, after the TRC has completed its work, that he always warned that only the Grenadian people as a whole could decide the issue. The TRC began the process, he could say, or paved the way, for national reconciliation. The process must now be completed by holding a referendum on the issue!]

CONCLUSION AND COMPROMISE PROPOSAL

Given all of the above, we simply do not and cannot trust the government's dangled promise of freedom through the TRC as it is presently structured. We call upon the Grenada government to allow us to take our case before Grenada's highest court, the Privy Council, so the issue of our freedom or continued incarceration can be decided once and for all according to law. Every other Grenadian is entitled to that. We are prepared to accept the decision of the Privy Council on this matter as final.

Such a determination of our matter is not inconsistent with the holding of a TRC. Indeed, as we have argued elsewhere, it would pave the way for a genuine TRC process since everyone would be able to address the period without the issue 'to free or not to free the Grenada 17' taking centre stage and distorting the process.

We therefore concretely propose that the government amend Act #19 of 1991 so as to allow us to take our case (i.e. our criminal appeal) to the Privy Council. If the process is accelerated by this amendment, and if the state cooperates, then it is possible for the matter to be resolved by the Privy Council in a matter of months. This would then clear the way for the staging of the TRC in a short period thereafter. Indeed, even while our appeal is being determined by the Privy Council, preparations for the TRC could continue so that as little time as possible is lost between the two events.

APPENDIX 11

Richmond Hill Prison
St. George's
7 August, 00

Mr. Roy Raymond
Commissioner of Prisons
St. George's

Dear Commissioner Raymond,


We crave your indulgence to raise the following matters with you:


1. We would like to make a request for permission to meet and hold consultations with a representative, or representatives, of the legal firm of Augustine & Augustine, as well as other legal representatives within and without this jurisdiction, on a periodic basis.
2. The purpose of these consultations would be:
 - (a) To discuss some broad preliminary legal and constitutional issues relative to the case of the Grenada 17; and
 - (b) To discuss legal and constitutional issues, and legal representation, in relation to the upcoming Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).
3. Although we make this request in our own right, we would be grateful if permission could be extended to other members of the Grenada 17, who may wish to participate in the above.

We trust that you would use your good office to give due consideration to this important request.

Thanks for your understanding and cooperation.

Yours respectfully,


Selwyn H. Strachan


Ewart J. Layne

APPENDIX 12

c/o Mr. Ruggles Ferguson,
Augustine & Augustine,
Chambers,
Green Street,
St. George's,
Grenada.
September 12, 2000.

The Commissioners,
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
c/o The Chairman,
Justice Carl Rattray, QC.

Dear Sirs,

Re: Suggested List of Witnesses And Documents, *inter alia*,
To Be Subpoenaed/Examined/Obtained By The Truth And Reconciliation Commission
In Order To Facilitate The Commission In The Carrying Out Of Its Mandate

Please find enclosed a list of witnesses and documents which we the undersigned would like you to subpoena and/or otherwise seek to have access to once hearings of your Commission commence. We attach a narrative to each witness and document explaining the nature and importance of the information to be obtained from each source.

We do recognise that there would be certain difficulties in gaining access to some of the witnesses and documents. However, we are of the view that the Commission should seek the diplomatic and other assistance from the state to facilitate the examination of the various witnesses and documents. We make this submission since, in our view, the lack of availability of the aforementioned sources of information could seriously affect our ability to discharge our burden of proving that we have given truthful information to the Commission. We also note that unavailability of the sources would make it virtually impossible for the commission to fulfil its mandate particularly under Para. 4 (a), (b) and (c) of the Terms of Reference.

It may require, as part of such diplomatic 'negotiations', the willingness (and resource capability) of the Commission to go to the US, UK, Jamaica, St. Lucia and Dominica to take evidence and examine relevant documents.


We wish to inform you that as far back as October 1996 (long before any talk of a TRC was in the air) persons in the US, acting with our concurrence, have been seeking to obtain all of the documents to which we refer in this communication. In this regard, legal action was instituted in the Courts of the United States under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) to have the documents released. A court order was granted instructing various US government agencies to co-operate with the request for the documents. However, the US agencies have invoked a range of exemptions under the FOIA and they have been able to employ a range of devices to ensure that the process is slow and costly.

Even so, the documents so far obtained, and the various responses to the request, establish beyond reasonable doubt that the US government and its agencies were deeply involved in the various events in Grenada from 1979 onwards, up to and including the appeal process which upheld the death sentences against us.


We undertake to have delivered to you the official US government documents so far in the possession of our supporters, within fourteen (14) days of commencement of hearings of your Commission.

Yours sincerely,


Signed:


Bernard Coard


Signed:


Selwyn Strachan


Signed:


Ewart Layne

Signed:


Liam James

Signed:


Leon Cornwall

LIST OF WITNESSES AND DOCUMENTS

	Witnesses/Documents and Relevance	Narrative
I	Relevant to Terms of Reference Para. 2 (c) and 4 (a), (b) and (c).	
(1)	<p>▪ <u>US Officials</u></p> <p>(a) George Shultz (Former Secretary of State)</p> <p>(b) Admiral John Pointdexter (Former National Security Advisor)</p> <p>(c) Col. Oliver North (Former officer in the NSC)</p> <p>(d) Casper Weinberger (Former Secretary of Defence)</p> <p>(e) George Bush (Vice-President, Jan. 1981-Jan. 1985)</p> <p>▪ Documents held by the U.S. Administration concerning the Invasion of Grenada.</p>	These witnesses and documents can provide information which would show that the U.S. always wanted to invade Grenada to put an end to the revolutionary process, and that the Invasion on October 25, 1983 had more to do with U.S. strategic objectives and little to do with any perceived threat to the lives of U.S. citizens.
(2)	<p>▪ <u>Caribbean Leaders</u></p> <p>(a) Ms. Eugenia Charles</p> <p>(b) Mr. Edward Seaga</p> <p>(c) Sir John Compton</p>	These witnesses could provide information relating to the decision of some CARICOM countries to join the U.S. in the Invasion. This would also address allegations that the U.S. Administration actually bribed the head of one regional government to obtain the support of that head for the invasion. [See Edward Woodward, <i>Veil: The Secret Wars of The CIA...</i>]
(3)	Sir Paul Scoon	He can provide information on the efforts of the PRA leaders to resolve the situation peacefully between October 19 and October 25, 1983. Specifically, he can outline discussions with PRA leaders, the Trinidad & Tobago government and the Commonwealth Secretary General, etc., re this. He can also address the issue as to whether he invited the U.S. Administration to invade (and if so, exactly <u>when</u>) and if any pressure was put on him following the U.S. Invasion to adopt that position.

(4)	Mrs. Margaret Thatcher and U.K. representative in Grenada in October 1983.	They would confirm the fact that no U.S. or any other foreign citizens were in any danger between October 19 and October 25, 1983. They would also confirm the UK Government's opposition to the Invasion and the reasons for such, and therefore the deliberate failure of the U.S. Administration to inform their closest ally, the UK government, of its intention to invade.
(5)	Dr. Geoffrey Bourne, then Vice-Chancellor of the St. George's University School of Medicine.	<p>He could provide information re:</p> <p>(a) assurances given him by PRA Officers between October 19-25, 1983; his assessment then, and that of his students, re any threat to them from PRA/RMC.</p> <p>(b) discussions with U.S. officials pressuring him to claim that his students were in danger so as to provide the basis for the Invasion; and</p> <p>(c) his University's handling of the bodies of Maurice Bishop, et al.</p>
(6)	Transcripts of messages exchanged between:	These documents would establish that the military leaders in Grenada were willing to seek out a peaceful and just resolution to the October '83 crisis; That they were prepared to allow into the country an international commission to investigate the events of October 19, 1983.
	<p>(a) the government of Trinidad & Tobago and the military leaders in Grenada via Sir Paul Scoon (between October 19-25, 1983) aimed at resolving the situation peacefully. (See also, <i>Hansard</i> of the T&T parliament for PM George Chambers' speech on all of this);</p> <p>(b) Sir Paul Scoon and the Queen & Her aides (between October 19-25, 1983);</p> <p>(c) Sir Paul Scoon and Commonwealth Secretariat re a Commission of Inquiry into the October 19, 1983 events.</p> <p>(d) the late PM Cato (and one of his Ministers, Burns Bonadie, acting on his behalf) of St. Vincent and General Hudson Austin (or "Military Leaders in Grenada") in the period October 19-25, 1983 [aimed at instituting a Commission of Inquiry of reputable figures from outside Grenada].</p>	

II	Relevant to Para. 1 (c), 4 (a), (b) & (c)	
1)	<p>Members of the leadership of the Grenada Democratic Movement (GDM) during the period 1979-1983</p> <p>(a) Dr. Francis Alexis - Barbados based.</p> <p>(b) Dr. Keith Mitchell - Washington, D.C., U.S.A. based</p> <p>(c) Ms. Denise Campbell - Trinidad & Tobago based</p> <p>(d) Mr. Reynold Benjamin - Trinidad & Tobago based</p>	<p>The GDM was an organisation of Grenadians based outside of Grenada which was reportedly bent on bringing about the downfall of the Revolution by violence. The GDM had close links with the CIA and worked together with the CIA in pursuit of its objectives.</p> <p>GDM/Barrette activities throughout the 1979-83 period.</p>
2)	Mr. Leonard Barrette	He was the CIA case officer based in the U.S. embassy in Trinidad who co-ordinated with the GDM members based in Trinidad (during the 1979-1983 Grenada Revolution).
3)	<p>CIA documents dealing with the CIA relations with the GDM, and with regard to US covert activities within Grenada during 1979-1983, and outside Grenada but, directed at the Grenada government, the state and its personnel.</p> <p>The data so far listed under this heading would also provide the evidential basis for the concerns of both the PRG (throughout the revolution) and the Military Leaders in the October 19-25, 1983 period <i>re externally-based destabilisation fears</i>, and its effects/role in driving/escalating the internal crisis in the Revolutionary Process.</p>	
4)	<p><u>Cuban Officials</u></p> <p>(a) Fidel Castro (Cuba's President)</p> <p>(b) Mr. Julian Rizo (Cuba's Ambassador to Grenada, 1979-1983)</p> <p>(c) Mr. Gaston Diaz (Deputy Ambassador at the Cuban Embassy in Grenada, 1979-1983)</p>	<p>There is evidence that the government of Cuba became directly involved in the October 1983 crisis from as early as October 8, 1983. President Castro is on public record as acknowledging that PM Bishop requested Cuban military intervention in Grenada on October 19, 1983 from his location at Fort Rupert, upon taking over the Fort with a civilian crowd. It is our submission that the events of October 1983 cannot be understood without an insight into the Cuban activities.</p>

III	Relevant to Para. 2 (b) and 4 (a), (b) & (c)	
1)	<p>(a) Capt. Forde of the U.S. Military;</p> <p>(b) Former Cpl. Earl Browne of the JDF;</p> <p>(c) Sir Paul-Scoon;</p> <p>(d) Dr. Geoffrey Bourne;</p>	
2)	Records of the St. George's University Medical School and the U.S. Military relating to the recovery and disposal of bodies in Grenada;	Each of these [#1 (a), (b), (c), (d)] played some role, and/or possessed important information with regard to the recovery and disposal of the remains of Maurice Bishop and others.
3)	Records of all US agencies related to the recovery and disposal of the bodies of Maurice Bishop and any other bodies recovered together with his;	
4)	Also, the St. George's University Professor/Doctor (Dr. Jordan) who examined the bodies on behalf of the U.S. Military;	
5)	Also, the two Grenadians who assisted in that process: Anita Parke and one Mr. Belgrave;	
6)	Clinton Bailey, the Undertaker;	
7)	Bro. Robert Fanovich and the <i>PBC Young Leaders</i> who investigated the entire matter AND all the documents they collected and the report they wrote. Their extensive research is also relevant to paragraph #2 (a) of the Terms of Reference.	

[v]	Relevant to the Legal Process and to Para. 4 (a), (b), (c) & (d)	
(1)	Investigation of events of Oct. 19, 1983 (a) Jasper Watson (B'dos) (b) Ashford Jones (B'dos) (c) Colin Brathwaite (B'dos) (d) Courcey Holder (B'dos) (e) Darryl Weeks (B'dos) (f) Phillip Isaacs (Antigua)	This is the team of foreign police which carried out the investigation which led to the prosecution of the Grenada 17. Several members of the 17 were tortured and forced to sign 'confessions' by this team of policemen.
()	Inspector John of the Police Force of Dominica.	After complaints of torture were made by members of the Grenada 17, he was mandated to carry out an investigation.
()	Col. Nester Ogilvie	He was in charge of the Caribbean Peace Keeping Forces when the second round of tortures took place in February/March 1984. Complaints were made to him. He was also warned that Mrs. Phyllis Coard was to be taken out to be tortured since the foreign police were boasting about it in advance. He refused to intervene despite the fact that the police team fell under his command.
()	Then Capt. Saunders of the JDF	Some of the complaints of torture were made to him at the time. His actions in response need to be recorded.
(5)	The rank-and-file JDF soldiers with circumstantial evidence of the tortures. There was one of East Indian background who, having regard to the earlier round of tortures (in November, 1983) refused to leave General Austin with the above listed personnel [#1 (a)-(f)] unless he could see (though not hear) what was going on. The foreign police refused to question General Austin under this arrangement, and the interview with him was then aborted. They went to 'higher authority', as they put it, and won the right to question members of the Grenada 17 outside of both the sight and hearing of the soldiers guarding them. That's when the second round of tortures resumed and continued, resulting in most members of the NJM Central Committee being tortured. This man, and the others, would need to be tracked down, with the help of the JDF.	

(6)	Prosecutors (a) Ms. Velma Hylton (b) Mr. Karl Hudson-Phillips (c) Mr. Michael Andrews	It is the submission of the Grenada 17 that evidence was fabricated to secure convictions against us. In particular, fabricated evidence was given by Beverly Ann Charles, Fabian Gabriel and Cletus St. Paul. It is a very reasonable presumption that the first two named prosecutors must have been aware of the fabricated evidence.
		What was Hudson-Phillips' role in recruiting <u>Time Kendall</u> to replace J. O. F. Haynes as a member of the Appeal Court, following the latter's death? In light of recent declassified US government documents, what were all the discussions that these two (separately and together) had with US officials about the Grenada 17 case - and with the Trial and Appeal Court Judges - while the Grenada 17 case was being heard?
(7)	Ms. Denise Campbell	She was the Registrar/Prosecution lawyer who drew up the Jury panel in clear violation of the law. [Note also her role referred to in II (1) (c) above.] She as well as Judge Denis Byron and Velma Hylton will need to be questioned re a possible conspiracy on their part to dismiss the Registrar Mr. St. Louis and appoint her as Registrar (in the period 1 st - 6 th March, 1986). Re also asking St. Louis weeks in advance for his list of selected Jurors, etc.
(8)	Judges (a) Justice Dennis Byron (b) Sir Frederick Smith (c) Mr. Rex McKay	The judges who dealt with the matter of the Grenada 17 all did so on special appointment and all received special emoluments for so doing. It is the submission of the Grenada 17 that the judges should be questioned as to the size of the emoluments, the negotiations which took place with regard to them and the disputes which arose over payment so as to assess the propriety of such payments and whether the fact of these payments was in breach of the principle that 'justice must not only be done but manifestly be seen to be done'.
		They would also need to be questioned with regard to all discussions they may have held with US officials while they were trying the Case of the Grenada 17. [This, in light of recently declassified US government documents re the US' involvement in the judicial process of the Grenada 17. Indeed, some of these documents - the ones so far declassified - specifically refer to such discussions with some of the judges while our case was in progress.]

(9)	Mrs. Celia Clyne-Edwards	<p>Re the chief prosecutors: this Attorney-at-Law played a role in the recruitment of Fabian Gabriel to give testimony (which turned out to be suborned) in exchange for his not being tried for murder.</p> <p>She would need to be questioned to ascertain her precise role: how much she did or did not know; who gave her her instructions to take a statement from Gabriel for the Prosecution to use; etc.</p>
(10)	Mr. Odel Adams (currently Justice Odel Adams)	<p>He questioned Beverly Ann Charles at the P.I. On completing his examination-in-chief, Karl Hudson-Phillips and Velma Hylton expressed their displeasure at her answers, and demanded that Magistrate St. Paul let them examine her again, in a few days' time (after the weekend). They did, and only then did she come with the horrific fabricated story about Redhead and cutting the throat and finger of Maurice Bishop, etc. <u>Adams may have something to say about what happened within the Prosecution team re this and other issues, and re statement(s) given to him by Beverly Ann Charles.</u> He would have to also be questioned as to whether his departure from the prosecution shortly after was related to any perception of prosecutorial misconduct.</p>
(11)	Mr. Ben Jones	<p>He was the Attorney General during the period when the emoluments for the judges were negotiated and worked out. He also provided the answer to a question in the Senate from Senator Derek Knights QC, regarding the emoluments paid to the judges (amounting, when tabulated, to nearly one million EC dollars each).</p> <p>He would also need to be questioned re his negotiations with a former chancellor of the Judiciary in Guyana, and a former Chief Justice of Jamaica, re getting one of them to be the trial judge in the case of the Grenada 17.</p> <p>Also, re his role - and Karl Hudson-Phillips' - in contracting Judge Byron to be the trial judge. [Hudson-Phillips went to Antigua personally, to recruit Byron for the Grenada Government.] What were all the 'understandings'/agreements/terms and conditions entered into (or attempted) with these various people?? [Should government ministers have been properly playing any role re the Grenada 17 trial?? And should the Chief Prosecutor for the case have been the chief recruiter for the Judges to hear the case at various levels??]</p>

(12)	Police statements of Beverly Ann Charles and Cletus St. Paul, Chris Linton, Errol George.	All three statements given by Cletus St. Paul to the Police need to be examined, in conjunction with his sworn testimony, at the P.I. and at the 'Trial'; especially in light of President Haynes' statement in open court on March 8, 1988, wondering how one person could have given five (5) different statements of this kind, and ordering him to appear before the Appeal Court to be questioned. These statements would also need to be compared with that of Errol George and Chris Linton.
(13)	<p>Witnesses</p> <p>(a) Cletus St. Paul</p> <p>(b) Beverly Ann Charles</p> <p>(c) Fabian Gabriel</p> <p>(d) Walter Charles</p> <p>(e) Errol George</p> <p>(f) Chris Linton</p> <p>(g) Keith Roberts</p>	
(14)	Brigadier Lewis of the Barbados Defense Force	Secret US government documents reveal that he was involved in discussions with US Embassy officials as to which of the 14 condemned prisoners of the Grenada 17 should hang. Such discussions took place in 1988, three years before the completion of the appeal hearings. He would also need to be questioned as to his role/relationship to the Judges hearing the case of the Grenada 17 and/or the Prosecutors in the case and/or the Government of Grenada, given the detailed, 'decision-making' character of the discussions recorded in these official US documents. His testimony could, in other words, shed light on precisely who was making both judicial and executive decisions with respect to the Grenada 17.
(15)	<p>Letter of 22nd March, 1988 from PM John Compton of St. Lucia to PM H.A. Blaize of Grenada re the return of the Constitutional Court to Grenada in the context of the case of the Grenada 17.</p> <p>Also, other correspondence between Grenadian and other OECS Leaders, between January 1984 and August 1991, re the Grenada 17 and re the return of the Constitutional Court system.</p>	This letter from the then Head of the OECS Authority to the then PM of Grenada makes clear the political nature of the decision re the return of the Constitutional Court to Grenada, and that its return was being consciously and deliberately timed to prevent the Grenada 17 having their case go before the Constitutional Court system - with its right of appeal to the Privy Council.

*Attachment to Letter of September 12, 2000 to the Commissioners of the TRC,
from Bernard Coard and Others, re List of Witnesses and Documents*


(16)	Dr. Richard Gibson of Wayne State University, Michigan, U.S.A.	<p>He is the chief person who has been making efforts in the US to obtain documents related to the Grenada events.</p> <p>He spent approximately nine months in Grenada in 1996 as a Fulbright Scholar. He did research as to the psychological effect and impact of the work of the US Psychological Warfare Battalion which participated in the US Invasion and occupation of Grenada. He can be an expert witness.</p>
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APPENDIX 13

The Commissioners,
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
c/o The Chairman,
Justice Carl Rattray, Q.C.

Sirs,

I wish to draw to your attention a number of documents, manuscripts, books, and articles which I wish to humbly suggest can be of considerable value in the carrying out of your mandate to discover the truth of certain events. For each item listed below, I indicate briefly the character and value of the information it contains, and a possible source, or more than one in some cases, where it can be obtained. In the few cases where we are ourselves seeking to locate and have the document sent to you by friends outside of prison (and often outside of Grenada), this is so indicated in the attached list of twenty five (25) documents.

Sincerely,

Bernard Coard

c/o Mr. Ruggles Ferguson,
Augustine & Augustine,
Chambers,
Green Street,
St. George's,
Grenada.
September 11, 2000.

Attached List of Documentation re Letter of September 11, 2000 to TRC Commissioners, from Bernard Coard

	Documents, Manuscripts, Books, Articles, etc.	The Significance of the Information for the TRC's Mandate	Source(s) of Obtaining the Documents/Items
1.	<i>The Duffus Commission Report Into The Breakdown Of Law And Order In Grenada, 1973-1974</i> , Government of Grenada, St. George's, 1974.	Although it describes events which occurred before 1976, this definitive and thoroughly objective and impartial report is <u>indispensable for an understanding of what led to the events described in the next document, and the basis for the March 13th 1979 Grenada Revolution</u> .	Governor General's Office; Government Printery; Public Library.
2.	<i>The Making Of The Grenada Revolution</i> , by Ewart Layne, unpublished Manuscript, 1988.	Written by Lt. Col. Ewart Layne, it is an eyewitness 'insiders' account into: (a) the circumstances leading to and the actual process of the overthrow of the Gairy regime; (b) the defacto genesis of Joint Leadership within the New Jewel Movement (NJM); (c) the manner in which the single most important decision ever taken by the Party, NJM, was taken (involving as it did life and death): the decision to overthrow Gairy by armed means; (d) the roles of various persons central (on both sides) to the October 1983 crisis in the making of the 1979 Grenada Revolution; and (e) the roots of the future conflict with some elements: Strachan Phillip, the Budlhall brothers' grouping, including Youssef, Habib Ali and Ayub (the ones who died at Mt. Rich in 1980).	We will endeavour to have someone deliver a copy to the Commission.
3.	The Minutes of all meetings of the Central Committee, Political Bureau, Economic Bureau, Organising Committee, and General Meetings of the New Jewel Movement, from March 1979 to October 1983. Particularly important are: (a) 5 th April, 1981 CC Meeting (b) October 1982 CC Meeting	These are records taken by fulltime Party Secretaries while these meetings were in progress, and circulated and approved at the following meetings. A careful study of them will help answer many questions: (a) Was there an ideological split in the leadership of NJM? (b) Was there a genuine crisis in the Party and Revolution, or simply a personal power struggle? (c) Was there a conspiracy by a small clique in the leadership aimed at removing P.M. Bishop from power and replacing him with Deputy P.M. Bernard Coard? These documents would also reveal the following:	<u>United States government</u>

8. <i>In Nobody's Backyard: Maurice Bishop's speeches, 1979-1983</i> , Chris Searle (ed.), Zed Books, London, 1984.	(a) its political detentions, militarisation, constant state of alert psychology; indeed, paranoia; (b) the fact that four-fifths of all members of the Leadership (PB and CC) were in illhealth (many hospitalised for brief periods on and off) and		
7. <i>October 1983: The Missing Link</i> , Booklet by John 'Chalky' Ventour, December 1989.	(a) The reasons for the (catastrophically wrong) decision to put P.M. Bishop under 'House Arrest'; (b) Why the system of defacto Joint Leadership within the NJM broke down; (c) The 'deal' struck by Cuba and the US between October 19 and October 25, 1983 to facilitate the US Invasion. The speeches taken as a totality, but especially the ones expressing the PRG's fears, concerns, etc., over foreign (i.e. US) interference and even preparations for invasion, capture the authentic context of the outside pressure the PRG felt it was operating under throughout its 4½ years of existence. This is the context of: (a) its political detentions, militarisation, constant state of alert psychology; indeed, paranoia; (b) the fact that four-fifths of all members of the Leadership (PB and CC) were in illhealth (many hospitalised for brief periods on and off) and		The Publishers
The U.S. Invasion Of Grenada In The Context Of Cuba-Grenada Relations, 1979-1983, unpublished Manuscript by Lt. Col. Ewart Layne, 1989.	(a) The Cuban role in the October 1983 crisis and Tragedy. It gives a detailed insider's account of the totality of Cuba-Grenada relations, from before March 13, 1979, to the arrival of the first Cubans in Grenada following March 13, 1979, to the nature and extent of the military and political links established and developed over the 4½ years, to the events leading up to and including the crisis and tragedy of October 1983; and the secret negotiations between the Cuban and US Governments in the days before the landing of US troops; (b) The Cuban role in the days just before and during the US Invasion of Grenada. This paper focusses on the Cuban role in the internal Party and national crisis in October 1983. It was written originally as a confidential letter to a friend, and later published without authorisation, by an American academic who had been given a copy. This document sheds critical light on: (a) The reasons for the (catastrophically wrong) decision to put P.M. Bishop under 'House Arrest'; (b) Why the system of defacto Joint Leadership within the NJM broke down; (c) The 'deal' struck by Cuba and the US between October 19 and October 25, 1983 to facilitate the US Invasion.		Copy enclosed. Dr. Brian Meeks, Department of Government, U.W.I., Mona Campus, Kingston, Jamaica.

Attached List of Documentation re Letter of September 11, 2000 to TRC Commissioners, from Bernard Coard

Attached List of Documentation re Letter of September 11, 2000 to TRC Commissioners, from Bernard Coard

(c) September 12-14, 1981 CC Meeting	Phyllis Coard was voted to be on the PRG, in the first 96 hours after March 13 th 1979, by secret Ballot of the NJM membership [Party members had to write on slips of paper the names of the eight members they each wished to be members of the PRG], at a General Meeting specially held to elect members to the PRG, at Radio Free Grenada, in Morne Rouge, St. George's. SHE DECLINED, and as a result, someone else, Ms. Claudette Pirt, was elected onto the PRG in her place. [As a result, Phyllis Coard was at no point a member of the PRG];		United States government
(d) September 17, 1983 CC Meeting with Bernard Coard	Phyllis Coard was proposed by all CC members at the October 1982 meeting to be the new Study Guide of the Leadership. She declined, and as a result, George Louison was elected to this prestigious position.		We will endeavour to obtain a copy and have it delivered to the Commission.
(e) September 25, 1983 General Meeting	Phyllis Coard was proposed, twice, at the October 1982 CC Meeting for membership of the Political Bureau. On the first occasion by 13-2; on the second occasion, by 15-0. She declined both times.		This speech, and the discussions and unanimous approval of its contents at the August '27, 1982 CC Meeting of NJM, puts the nail in the coffin of the widespread propaganda by the US and its agents and followers within the Caribbean and inside Grenada, that Maurice Bishop was 'a wishy-washy socialist', while Bernard Coard was 'a hard-line Communist'.
(f) October 12, 1983 Political Bureau Meeting	Bernard Coard proposed at the April 5, 1981 CC Meeting, unanimously accepted, that all the members of the Political Bureau who were ministers of government, except for PM Bishop, find and groom understudies to take over their respective ministries within 5 years; i.e. by April 1986, so that PB members would permanently focus on mass work and mass organisations. This proposal was reaffirmed at a CC meeting in April-May, 1982. [In other words, after April 1986, ALL PB Members, except Bishop would cease to hold ANY state office.]		This document of approximately 60 pages quotes extensively from the Minutes of NJM internal Party meetings, and interviews with Party and army personnel involved in the crisis. It is extraordinarily well documented, with a total of two hundred and twenty-one footnote references to Party and other documents and interviews.
(g) October 12, 1983 CC Meeting	P.M. Bishop's Line of March Speech to Party members, September 13, 1982.		By 'Whose Struggle For Power? By Grenadians For the Truth About October 1983', London, and New York, 1985
(h) October 13, 1983 General Meeting			

12.	<p><u>'Trial' record: 34 Volumes</u> (March 3, 1986-December 4, 1986)</p>	<p>A careful study of this record exposes the extraordinary number of irregularities in the conduct of the 'Trial'. It is also useful for comparative purposes with the P.I. Record, and with the Minutes and other documents of the NJM and the U.S. Government.</p> <p>Supreme Court Registry</p>
<p>(c) witnesses who changed in fundamental ways their testimony at the 'Trial' compared with what they swore to at the P.I.</p> <p>In the above regard, look especially for the testimony of:</p> <p>(i) Chris Stanislaus, who saw over twenty five (25) civilians at Fort Rupert with automatic rifles and submachine guns BEFORE the Armoured Cars arrived [P.I. Record, page 147];</p> <p>(ii) Sylvia Belmar who spoke of the need to have the telephone at Fort Rupert reconnected (as it was disconnected earlier in the day) [mentioned in both the P.I. and the 'Trial'], AND of Radio Free Grenada being off the air when the demonstrators reached Fort Rupert [P.I. Record, page 22; but NOT mentioned in the 'Trial']. [These two bits of data are important in understanding the actions of Lt. Col. Layne and Colville McBarrette, respectively, that day.]</p> <p>(iii) Cletus St. Paul:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> who, in the P.I. saw no meeting of the CC take place in front of him (or anywhere else), [see P.I. Record, pages 235-236] but, two years later, describes graphically such a mythical meeting, which is THE evidence used to convict all ten (10) leaders of the NJM; who swears at the P.I. that he saw the CC members arrive at Fort Frederick between 12 and 12:30 p.m. [P.I. Record, page 238] but conveniently leaves this out at the 'Trial'. [This would mean that the CC members who went to Fort Frederick arrived there one to one and a half hours AFTER they did in fact arrive, based on the rest of the prosecution witnesses. That's why this had to be left out at the 'Trial'.] 	<p>Attached List of Documentation re Letter of September 11, 2000 to TRC Commissioners, from Bernard Coard</p>	

Attached List of Documentation re Letter of September 11, 2000 to TRC Commissioners, from Bernard Coard

	<p>chronically exhausted, physically and mentally, by the time of September-October, 1983. [All of the above comes out of a combination of studying some of the key speeches in this book, plus several of the minutes of Party meetings at all levels of the Party.]</p>	
9.	<p><u>Ronald Reagan's Speech of March 10, 1983, and the speeches of the other US Administration officials (Defence and State Department, etc.) in the weeks before and after that speech.</u></p> <p>In this and the other speeches preceding and following it (aimed at preparing the American public for an invasion of Grenada later in the year) <u>Reagan declares to the US nation on Radio and TV that 'Grenada is a threat to the National Security of the United States'.</u></p> <p><u>These speeches are also important in considering that sense of enormous external pressure and threat that the PRG felt under, in 1983.</u></p>	<p><u>The Washington Post and The New York Times</u> of March 11, 1983, and other issues of these papers for the period January to August, 1983.</p>
10.	<p><u>'The Invasion of Grenada: A Pre and Post-Mortem' by Robert Pastor, in The Caribbean After Grenada: Revolution, Conflict and Democracy, edited by Scott B. McDonald, Herald M. Sandstrom, and Paul B. Goodwin, JR., Praeger, New York, 1988</u></p> <p>No friend of the Grenada Revolution, the author of this article was the head of the Latin American & Caribbean Section of the National Security Council (NSC) under President Carter, and one of his closest Security Advisors, when the Grenada Revolution occurred on March 13, 1979. He remained in this position for the first 22½ months, or over forty percent of the life of the Grenada Revolution. He later headed (until recently) the Carter Centre, and was Carter's chief negotiator for political settlements in Haiti, Guyana, Indonesia, Sudan-Uganda (border problems), and many other parts of the world. He has had full access to U.S. documents on Grenada, and to all of the PRG's and NJM's documents seized and still held by the US. The author examines with the help of all the relevant documentation, each and every one of the arguments put forward by the Reagan Administration (and others) for the Invasion of Grenada, and critically assesses each.</p>	<p><u>This Article is enclosed.</u></p>
11.	<p><u>The Preliminary Inquiry (P.I.) Court Record (March-August, 1984)</u></p> <p>This court record contains the sworn testimony of witnesses:</p> <p>(a) not called by the Prosecution at the 'Trial' because their testimony would have been embarrassing to its case;</p> <p>(b) witnesses who provided vital information in their testimony at the P.I. but did not repeat this information at the 'Trial';</p>	<p>Supreme Court Registry</p>

13	<u>The Case Of The Missing Two Hours</u> , by Ewart Layne	This is a 40-odd page detailed analysis and comparison of the evidence of Cletus St. Paul and that of all the other Prosecution witnesses who testify about the times and activities that he covers in his testimony. It establishes, using exclusively Prosecution evidence, beyond any reasonable doubt that St. Paul could not possibly have seen what he testified he saw and heard, since he was nowhere around at the time in question, and indeed arrived at the relevant location between approximately one and two hours AFTER the time in question!	We will endeavour to locate a copy and have it delivered to the Commission.
14	<u>Duty Officer's Diaries for Fort Rupert and Fort Frederick for October 19, 1983.</u>	The Duty Officer's Diary for Fort Frederick for October 19, 1983, for example, will have recorded exactly when, and whom, and in what vehicle (s) each of those members of the CC (and Army) who went to Fort Frederick arrived, and left there, etc. It will also show that Cletus St. Paul arrived there nearly two (2) hours after those members of the CC who went there.	<p><u>United States government</u></p> <p>[For reasons linked to ensuring our conviction and permanent incarceration, the US government has continued to refuse to hand over ANY of our documents, including this vital one.]</p> <p>[In case you have any doubts about the US Role in our 'Trial' and 'Appeal', etc., these will shortly be dispelled as we arrange for you to receive secret US documents recently declassified as a result of a court order within the US</p>

Attached List of Documentation re Letter of September 11, 2000 to TRC Commissioners, from Bernard Coard

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15	Cletus St. Paul's:	These are vital documents for understanding the personal role and contribution of Maurice Bishop to the crisis, and of Cletus St. Paul in facilitating matters. It also establishes the pejorative nature of his P.I. and 'Trial' testimony on the question of the rumour and his role in it.		<p><u>United States government</u></p> <p>[They seized copies of these from the homes of PRG Security officials and police files.]</p>
				<p>courts, and presently in the possession of associates in the US.]</p>
16	Cletus St. Paul: His three (3) different Police Statements on the events of October 1983.	On March 8, 1988, President of the Grenada Court of Appeal, Geoff Haynes, stated that, over the previous four months he had studied all 34 volumes of the Court Record. He informed the court that he found Cletus St. Paul's evidence (among others) 'fishy', 'too pat'. Because of this, he had requested St. Paul's Police statement, only to discover then that St. Paul gave three (3) to the Police. Upon studying them, he found each different from the others in important ways, and from his sworn P.I. and 'Trial' testimony. He could not understand how one person could have given five (5) different statements on the same matter. He ordered St. Paul's appearance before his Court to be questioned. Soon after, President Haynes died. Sir Frederick Smith was made President, the order cancelled, and all requests by the defence to see these three statements rejected.	<p>• Karl Hudson-Phillips, QC, Velma Hyton, QC,</p> <p>• Office of the DPP, Grenada, Police HQ, Grenada, United States Government</p> <p>ALL THE ABOVE SHOULD HAVE COPIES.</p>	<p>(a) Signed Confession, in his own handwriting, to his and Maurice Bishop's role in spreading the Rumour of October 12, 1983 (which turned an internal Party crisis into a national crisis and led ultimately to the tragedy);</p> <p>(b) Handwritten letter of apology to the Party Leadership regarding the same matter;</p> <p>(c) Tape-recorded confession regarding the same matter.</p>

23.	<p>The Compton Letter: Letter of P.M. Compton to P.M. Blaize, of March 22, 1988.</p> <p>OAS Inter-American Commission No. 10,951: Coard et al versus United States);</p> <p>(a) No. 14/94 of Feb. 7, 1994;</p> <p>(b) No. 13/95 of Sept. 21, 1995;</p> <p>(c) No. 109/99 of Sept. 29, 1999</p>	<p>These contain the allegations of the Grenada 17 against the US government, and the findings of the OAS Commission on Human Rights with regard to them.</p> <p>U.S.A.</p> <p>OAS Headquarters, Washington, D.C.,</p>	<p>■ GBN TV, Mr. Leslie Pierre, ■ Grenadian Voice newspaper.</p>
24.	<p>OAS Inter-American Commission No. 10,951: Coard et al versus United States);</p> <p>(a) No. 14/94 of Feb. 7, 1994;</p> <p>(b) No. 13/95 of Sept. 21, 1995;</p> <p>(c) No. 109/99 of Sept. 29, 1999</p>	<p>These contain the allegations of the Grenada 17 against the US government, and the findings of the OAS Commission on Human Rights with regard to them.</p> <p>U.S.A.</p> <p>OAS Headquarters, Washington, D.C.,</p>	<p>■ GBN TV, Mr. Leslie Pierre, ■ Grenadian Voice newspaper.</p>
25.	<p>Television Interview (GBN TV) with Bernard Coard, Selwyn Strachan, Ewart Layne and Leon Cornwall, conducted in September 1999, broadcast in October 1999.</p>	<p>Covering the events of October 1983, reflections on the 1979-1983 Revolution as a whole, and the underlying causes of the Crisis and tragedy. It also contains one formal apology by Bernard Coard, and an opening statement by Ewart Layne.</p>	<p>■ GBN TV, Mr. Leslie Pierre, ■ Grenadian Voice newspaper.</p>

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17.	<p>Affidavits of Errol George, Keith Roberts, and some others who were at Fort Frederick at the time of the CC members, on October 19, 1983.</p> <p>Sworn to in 1991-1992.</p>	<p>These are eyewitnesses to the activities of those NJM CC members who were at Fort Frederick on October 19, 1983. They contrast with the perjured testimony of the 'star' prosecution witness, Cletus St. Paul.</p>	<p>We will seek to get these from lawyers in the United Kingdom and Canada, and have them delivered to the Commission.</p>
18.	<p>Fidel Castro, <i>Nothing Can Stop the Course Of History</i>, Interview with Jeffrey M. Elliot and Mervyn Dymally, Pathfinder, New York, 1986.</p>	<p>Here, Castro reveals that Maurice Bishop contacted him from Fort Rupert (after taking it over with the civilian crowd) on October 19, 1983, through the Cuban ambassador in Grenada, Julian Rizo, to ask for Cuba's Military intervention to crush the NJM CC and the PRG's Army. The implications of this, had it occurred, are mindboggling.</p>	<p>The Publishers</p>
19.	<p><u>The Thirty-Eight (38) Grounds of Appeal of the Grenada 17 from the 'Trial'</u></p>	<p>This provides a condensed examination of the major irregularities of the 'Trial'.</p>	<p>Mr. Ian Ramsay, QC, Chambers, Kingston, Jamaica.</p>
20.	<p>Prime Minister Chambers' statements to the Trinidad and Tobago Parliament on negotiations between the Trinidad government and the RMC in Grenada, between October 19 and 25, 1983.</p>	<p>This would reveal the attitude of General Austin and the others to a Commission of Inquiry (appointed by the Secretary General of the Commonwealth and/or by CARICOM) into the October 19th Events. See also the Article by Bob Pastor (referred to earlier: # 10) on this matter.</p>	<p>Trinidad and Tobago Parliament's Hansard.</p>
21.	<p><u>The Written Judgement of the Grenada Court of Appeal (March 1988-July 1991)</u></p>	<p>Hopefully, the TRC Commissioners will have greater luck in extracting this document from the Judges, than the Appellants and their Lawyers!!!</p>	<p>Sir Frederick Smith, President of this defunct court.</p>
22.	<p><u>Presentation Boys' College (PBC) Young Leaders Project Report on the disposal of the bodies of those who died at Fort Rupert on October 19, 1983.</u></p>	<p>This Report, laboriously compiled over many months, and involving interviews with several key persons and the examination of pertinent documents, covers the following:</p>	<p>Brother Robert Fanovich, PBC, St. George's.</p>

APPENDIX 14

October 1983:
The Missing Link

by
John 'Chalky' Ventour

OCTOBER 1983: The Missing Link

The enclosed document was written by me in September 1988, as part of a letter to a close friend in an attempt to explain to her some aspects of what happened in the NJM and Grenada Revolution in October 1983 which are completely unknown outside of those intimately involved in that crisis.

This was motivated by the fact that after 5 years of US propaganda, and even after a 9 month kangaroo Show Trial which pronounced me and the 'Grenada 17' "guilty of murder," the majority of Grenadian people are still confused: they do not understand *how* and *why* October 19, 1983 occurred in Grenada. And to add to their confusion has been Fidel Castro's loud protestations of Cuba's "honourable role [in the Grenada events]" and his vehement, virulent and hysterical attacks on the surviving Leadership of NJM and the Grenada Revolution; his calls for "exemplary punishment" for us Grenadian Revolutionaries. As some persons have told me, at times Cuba's *propaganda against us* appears to be indistinguishable from that of the US Reagan Administration; that it sometimes seems as though Fidel wants us dead more than US Imperialism. They are not far from the truth. But they don't know why.

I know, too, that many fraternal, trade unionists, etc. who have been engaged in solidarity work on my (and the 'Grenada 17') behalf are also confused. As one Grenadian patriot and MBPM member has told me: "Chalky, there is something wrong. I don't believe this [October 19th Tragedy] could just occur so. There is something else. But I can't find the missing link."

October 1983: The Missing Link

This "Missing Link" *none of us* have ever publicly exposed, notwithstanding our very strong feelings over Cuba's interference in our internal affairs, and our predicament — that we are facing death. We do not want to give US Imperialism any ammunition to use against the Cuban Revolutionary Process, Party and Government; given the overall tremendous role Cuba has played within the World Progressive and Revolutionary Movement. Also, we do not want to be accused of using this information to save our lives (or to give *anyone any* excuse to say so).

I'd requested my friend not to even reveal to *anyone* the fact that Fidel played a decisive role in causing the October 1983 Tragedy. And she has respected my confidence. We — surviving NJM Leaders — had instructed others that in the event we are dead — murdered under the guise of the Judicial process — all (the full) *details* of Cuba's relationship to the NJM and Grenada Revolution over the 4½ years should be made public. [This is, of course, contained in a far larger, more detailed, indeed comprehensive document on Cuba-Grenada Relations.] We felt that such information should only be exposed — *and in the correct fora*, only among Revolutionary, Progressive, fraternal friends — at a time when there would be no personal motive to be gained from so doing, but that of *establishing the TRUTH*, for the historical record. So that this could be lessons for the future, that National Liberation Movements and Revolutionary/Progressive Parties would be aware of what had transpired, and would be on guard against making similar (and possibly fatal) errors.

Only a few months ago I was able to read, for the first time, an interview Fidel held (sometime in 1986, I believe) with US Congressman, Mervyn M. Dymally, Chairman of the Congressional Black Caucus in the USA. It is

John 'Chalky' Ventour

contained in a booklet *Nothing Can Stop The Course Of History*.

Then only recently I have become aware of a "mind-blowing" act: Cuba's efforts — through the Head of the Americas and Caribbean Department of the World Federation of Trade Unions, who is a Cuban — to block assistance to me, *a trade unionist*, to help me in my struggle to expose the Kangaroo Show Trial through which I was railroaded by the US Reagan Administration and its local puppets, and for my human and constitutional right to receive a free and fair trial. And more than that: six years after their interference which greatly contributed to the Great Tragedy they still continue their "Isle of Youth" policy towards Grenada; not only blocking W.F.T.U. assistance to me, but also to the two largest Trade Unions in Grenada on the ground that they "need a clean bill of health." They want to now decide for the workers of Grenada *who* should be their Trade Union leaders?! It is clear that they have learned nothing from the Grenada Tragedy of 1983, nor even from the profound changes unfolding not only inside the Soviet Union but, just as significantly, in the qualitative development in the Soviet Union's relations with other fraternal parties and countries, in recent years.

This has convinced me that the position of not revealing to our friends "*The Missing Link*," before the final outcome of our ('The Grenada 17') case, is no longer correct.

This document, therefore, is for your personal information. It is NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

(signed)

John Anthony Ventour

December 21st, 1989

I am convinced, Wendy, that there's no way people, particularly the Grenadian People, would be able to *really understand* — to come to grips with — what happened in October 1983 without their knowledge of the decisive role Fidel played in the crisis. Notwithstanding the US role in spurring on the crisis and manipulating the October 19th 1983 demonstration, using their agent provocateurs, I am also convinced, Wendy, that without FC's interference in our party's affairs the dark clouds of tragedy which descended over and engulfed our country on October 19, 1983, would not have occurred. The Grenada Revolution would probably be alive today.

Many people have said, Wendy, that they just cannot understand how one or two differences among comrades who were always so united, who experienced so much adversities together, could rapidly lead to such an enormous Tragedy in one week! Why — and how could Maurice lead a mob of people to overrun and seize the Army's H.Q.? This isn't done anywhere in the World. [In the entire history of our Party's struggle against the Gairy Dictatorship, *never* once did we ever encourage the people to march on even a small police station in an outlying rural area, much less the Army H.Q. Many persons left the demonstration on October 19, when they realised that it had been diverted from the route to the Market Square and was heading to Fort Rupert.]

Notwithstanding the role that George Louison, Cletus St. Paul, Shahiba Strong, Don Rojas, etc. played in manipulating Maurice, surrounding and saturating him with "conspiracy" theories and gossip, etc. (while in Eastern Europe) to get him to reverse his support for *Joint Leadership of the Party*, I believe that *Maurice would not have violated such a Party decision* (he never did before), or

6

catastrophic dimensions would occur? That the Leader of the Grenada Revolution would be dead? Eh, Wendy, who could?

On September 26, 1983, a General Meeting of Candidate members of the P also supported and endorsed the P membership's decision on JL of the P, and on the weekend of Friday Sept. 30th — Sunday October 2nd, a special Party Conference of all levels of the P membership — full members, Candidate members and Applicants — discussed and decided on the implementation (of JL and) of a number of other reorganisational measures designed to pull the Party out of its crisis.

Now, Maurice and the P and State Delegation to Czechoslovakia and Hungary were scheduled to return to Grenada via London; that was their travel plan. Obviously, therefore, we were all very surprised to learn that on the night of October 7th Cletus St. Paul telephoned his chief of Personal Security (P.S.), Lt. Ashley 'Ram' Folkes, *from Cuba*. Normally, Wendy, whenever Maurice went on a state visit abroad he would (as is expected) establish contact home — with Bernard and/or Selwyn Strachan — to let them know where he was (phone no., etc.), how the visit was progressing, and also to be apprised of things at home. Very surprisingly, and unprecedentedly, Wendy, during the entire Eastern European trip abroad — from the time Maurice left and returned home — no such contact was made. No one knew where he was at various stages of the trip.

Wendy, several party members and members of the P.S. unit were part of the delegation to Eastern Europe. They were, therefore, not present at the September 25th P General Meeting or the weekend Party Conference. Based on their accounts, given at the *October 13th Extraordinary*

spread the October 12th grave rumour (which brought the Party Crisis into the open and sparked off the National political crisis), *were it not for the interference of FC in our Party's internal affairs*. If, for whatever reason, Maurice no longer felt that Joint Leadership was correct he would have sought dialogue (as usual) rather than do what he did.

[Joint Leadership (JL), as part of a number of reorganisational measures, was a purely *internal Party matter* aimed at pulling the Party (P) out of its crisis (and eventually to strengthen the P). *It did not affect* — had nothing to do with — any *State positions* as Prime Minister, etc.; Maurice would still have been PM, and Bernard — Deputy P.M.]

Wendy, when Maurice left Grenada on Monday September 26, 1983, for Eastern Europe, there was *total* agreement among all of us (except George Louison who was out of Grenada and who, incidentally, was the *ONLY* member of the Central Committee (CC) of the P to vote against the JL proposal at the Extraordinary NJM CC Meeting, September 14-16, 1983). At the *end* of the *15-hour Extraordinary General Meeting of the P*, held the previous day, *Sunday September 25, 1983*, the entire full Party membership (including Maurice and the rest of the CC) voted for JL of the Party. That is *when JL was decided on*, Wendy, and *NOT* by "a clique" (as George Louison, Rojas et al have peddled to the world) but by the *entire* P membership. I'll never forget the great joy that suffused all of us, Wendy — all comrades singing and embracing one another (every P member embraced Maurice and Bernard at about 12:00 midnight). Who could then expect and foresee that in the next 3 weeks our country would be plunged into a National/Political crisis? Who could by the greatest stretch of the imagination, Wendy, ever think that in 24 days a Tragedy of

7

General Meeting of all levels of the P's membership, held to discuss the new P crisis and political crisis in our country, George Louison was engaged in all kinds of scurrilous attacks on Bernard Coard and other NJM CC members. While in Hungary, he held a meeting of all P members (excluding Maurice), told them that Maurice did not support JL of the P, and words to the effect that the CC's vote for JL was a conspiracy against Maurice, etc., etc., etc.; attempting to get those P members to go against the entire P membership's decision. At no time, Wendy, did Louison tell that meeting the truth; that Maurice, at the September 25th General Meeting, voted together with the P members for JL of the P.

Wendy, I can only speculate (reasonably so) that George Louison (aided by the influence of Shahiba Strong, Don Rojas and Cletus St. Paul) and *possibly* Unison Whiteman, persuaded Maurice to raise the JL decision with FC and hence return to Grenada via Cuba.

Maurice spent an entire day (October 7th) *with FC* in Cuba, and returned home on the evening of October 8th.

Now, Wendy, you should know that FC had *great* love for Maurice. The first time he met Maurice, in September 1979, at the UN, I was told FC touched him under the heart after embracing him. And I understand, as the legend goes, whenever FC does that to someone — touches him/her under the heart — it means that he has totally accepted that person as someone to protect. So, in practice, he adopted Maurice as his "son."

Therefore, Wendy, given Maurice's closeness with FC, and all that transpired in Eastern Europe (the decision to return via Cuba, etc.), it is inconceivable that he would not have raised (and did not raise) the JL issue with FC. In any

event, after their return, from October 9th, George Louison began telling P members living in the West Coast of the island (St. John, St. Mark and St. Patrick) that "FC is supporting us" and that Maurice should "take the issue to the masses."

The JL of the P issue was indeed taken to the masses via the fateful rumour on October 12th (which Maurice gave to two (2) members of the P.S. unit — Cletus St. Paul and Errol George — to go and spread) that "Phyllis Coard and Bernard Coard want to kill Maurice Bishop."

On June 28, 1984, at the Preliminary Inquiry into the deaths of Maurice et al, Errol George, the Deputy Chief of Maurice's personal security unit, was the first prosecution witness to testify. He told Prosecuting Counsel that on October 12th 1983 he had a conversation with Cletus St. Paul, the Chief of Maurice's P.S. unit and that

During that conversation he [St. Paul] gave me a pen and a piece of paper. On that paper I wrote people's names. After writing the names I and Cletus St. Paul went to Maurice Bishop's room, there a conversation took place.

After that conversation I went to one Theresa who is Maurice Bishop's cook. After Theresa I went to the chief of security who was Ashley Folkes and made a report to him...

He said that the next day he went to Butler House and spoke at a meeting at which full members of the NJM and Central Committee members, including Maurice Bishop, were present.

October 1983: The Missing Link

This rumour, Wendy, plunged the entire country into a state of deep crisis and confusion — rumours were running wild (and George Louison, Kendrick Radix, Don Rojas et al did their best to fuel them and sow more confusion among our people) — sparking off a fateful chain of events which led to the grave tragedy.

Now, Wendy, I'm not saying that the issue could not — or should not — have been taken to the masses. What I am saying most distressfully — what is wrong — is the deceitful, dishonourable and unprincipled manner the masses were manipulated on the basis of deliberately false information — a rumour. In the case where the issue of Joint Leadership of the Party *could not be* satisfactorily settled in the P, the masses, as organised in the organs of Popular Democracy — Workers' Parish Councils, and Zonal Councils throughout the country — should have been consulted, presented with all the facts, hear all sides, all arguments, debate it, then decide. Isn't this real and genuine participatory democracy? Many of the so-called "experts" on the 1983 Grenada crisis are quite loud with their allegations and charges that we were against the masses' involvement in deciding the JL (of the Party) issue, and that Maurice was for their involvement. How far is this from the truth! Wendy, if Maurice wished for the peoples' involvement why didn't he propose it or take the issue to the Organs of Popular Democracy? He knew that he was immensely popular among the masses — that they would support him, so why didn't he? Is manipulating the masses by a rumour, which is maliciously fabricated, the thing that is becoming of a revolutionary? Or does democracy entail bringing the facts in a structured way to the masses? Just in passing, Wendy, you would be interested to know that Maurice, Uni (Whiteman) and George Louison all voted against a Resolution to give the minutes of the Extraordinary NJM CC Sept. 14-16

I spoke about the rumour that was given to me to go and tell some people. I told the meeting what the rumour was.

The rumour was Phyllis Coard and Bernard Coard want to kill Maurice Bishop.

PRELIMINARY INQUIRY DEPOSITION:

Under cross-examination by Defence Counsel, Mr. Howard Hamilton QC, Errol George said:

I remember speaking of a rumour. When it was given to me it was given to me as a rumour. I was told I had a rumour to spread. No one told me it was not true. Prior to St. Paul giving me that rumour I had never heard it before. I was also given a list of names of the persons to whom those (sic) rumour should go to. There were about fifteen (15) names on the list.

Errol George further said

At the conversation in Maurice Bishop's bedroom on 12th October, 1983, Bishop gave me instructions about the rumour. He told me I must remember to say Phyllis Coard first and then Bernard Coard. [Emphasis added]

[P.I. DEPOSITION: Page 13, Lines 444-80]

11

John 'Chalky' Ventour

Meeting to the party members so that they could see *all* the discussion re that meeting and the CC members' reasons for the JL Proposal.

After the rumour had been spread I held several meetings with workers on different workplaces, on October 13, 14, 15, 17 and 18th (including a large meeting with representatives of many workplaces and companies, on the evening of Friday October 14) trying to explain to them the nature of the political crisis — the rumour — and what the JL of the Party really entailed. However, Wendy, because of the hysterical, virulent propaganda campaign unleashed by the US in the media, and by George Louison, Kendrick Radix, Don Rojas, etc., on the ground in Grenada, coming on the heels of the rumour, passions and emotions were inflamed and only a minority of workers fully grasped — really understood — the issue.

In addition, Wendy, there are several other incidents which occurred to support — and lead one to reasonably conclude — that there were discussions on our P internal affairs with FC, who you may know, is a *very* emotional man; and rather than be impartial he probably decided to "protect his son" from the "JL Conspiracy" (or whatever he was told), and certain decisions were made. Among these incidents:

(i) The Cuban Ambassador, Julian Rizo, who was in Cuba while Maurice was there returned on the same flight with Maurice, George Louison, Uni, Don Rojas, et al. He (Rizo) immediately went *to live permanently* (up to the Invasion) in the Cuban Embassy (where he could be in 24-hour daily direct contact with Cuba) instead of his residence. Unexpectedly and unprecedentedly (because PRA soldiers guarded the Embassy, like Cuban soldiers guard Grenada's

Embassy in Havana, Cuba) about thirty (30) Cubans were armed and placed to guard the Cuban Embassy, in addition to the Grenadian soldiers there. Grenadian Security Forces were advised by Cubans and trained in Cuba; they could therefore interpret such action. So, Wendy, *from the night of October 8th* Rizo set up a command post with 30 armed Cubans at the Cuban Embassy. What was all of this for? What was being planned? Was this preparation for an armed conflict to resolve the internal Party differences?

(ii) Then, Wendy, on the night of October 18th when discussions were held between Maurice and four (4) other CC members, aimed at resolving the Crisis, he organised to meet with the Cuban Ambassador on the following morning — October 19th — *before* discussions continued that day. Why was this necessary, Wendy? Ambassador Rizo was not a Grenadian much less a member of the NJM. *This was also unprecedented.* [The meeting, however, failed to come off before the crowd reached Maurice's residence at Mt. Wheldale and took him away.]

(iii) I understand, Wendy, that on October 19th, immediately after the seizure of Fort Rupert by the crowd, Maurice et al were trying to get in contact with the Cuban Embassy, and also directly with Cuba. For what?

(iv) Cuban Military Advisors, without any explanation, failed to report to work at the different PRA camps, from around October 14th, and the Cuban Military Battalion based at Point Salines, which comprised Cuban Army officers and airport constructions workers, were placed *on alert* from around October 13-14, 1983.

(v) And Cuban construction workers at Point Salines, doctors, teachers, etc. *went on strike* (in practice) in Grenada

14

(i) FC and Cuba had absolutely no role in making the Grenada Revolution. Indeed, they did not provide any assistance in making the Revolution, despite requests for assistance by our P, and despite pre-1979 visits to Cuba by Maurice and Unison on one occasion, Bernard on another, and Selwyn Strachan in 1979. Basically, they did not believe our claims about being in a position to remove the neo-fascist Gairy. They were obviously wary of us and our claims since they knew little or nothing about our P. So FC and Cuba were as surprised as the rest of the world when the Grenada Revolution was made on March 13, 1979. After that they came forward with massive assistance, and a hot love-relationship developed between Grenada and Cuba.

(ii) From the very early days of the Revolution Cuba attempted to influence our Process in Grenada by getting involved into matters they ought not to have been involved in. Consistently, throughout the 4½ years, they tried to, in improper ways, influence the placement and changing of personnel in the PRA, for example. This began as early as 1980. Then, to the annoyance of many in our P Leadership, including many Grenadian Army officers, Ambassador Rizo used to impose himself on meetings of Maurice and the High Command of the Army. It was a disgusting form of interference.

I remember a personal experience in September 1981. I had arrived in Cuba on a brief (4-day) visit re co-ordination of a Caribbean Trade Union Conference which was to be held in Grenada two months later — in November that same year. Just weeks prior to my visit the NJM CC had *unanimously* removed Cde. Vince Noel from the Party Leadership. For almost one year before, Vince, who was also a member of the Political Bureau of the Central Committee at the time, had been criticised on several occasions

from around October 17th. They actually *agitated* Grenadian workers at the International Airport Project, etc. to go on strike and to demonstrate. They also provided transport for Grenadians to go and demonstrate. Cuban teachers, too, agitated students to leave school to join demonstrations. Would the Cubans in Grenada have done all that if they did not have official support?

Why was Cuba so central in all of this, Wendy?

[One piece of significant information I completely forgot when I wrote the letter to my friend in 1988, and which I was only reminded of recently — years later: When Cletus St. Paul telephoned Ram Folkes *from Cuba* on the night of October 7, 1983 (see *The Missing Link* P.4), he told him, "Ah hear all yuh trying to fuck up the Chief, but *blood goin' flow*".

Was this a 'wild' statement by St. Paul on his own? Or, was he aware of such plans in Cuba for 'blood to flow'? And did he unwittingly let it out?

And, was Cuban Ambassador Rizo's action, on his return to Grenada, linked to St. Paul's statement?]

There is another critical/key aspect of Cuba's relationship to the NJM and the Grenada Revolution, which, in my view, Wendy, reflects what I would call their petty hegemonic aspirations/designs re our process and attempts to make us very *dependent* on them.

I think it is also necessary to give and share with you some background information on FC's and Cuba's relationship to our P and the Grenada Revolution.

15

for serious short-comings re his work — failure to carry out Party tasks, etc. Rank and file P members were now openly complaining about his poor work performance and questioning his leadership. It had indeed become very embarrassing to the NJM Leadership. As a result, George Louison tabled a resolution to remove Vince. It was supported by all in the CC, including Maurice, Uni and Kendrick Radix. As was normal protocol, the Cuban and other fraternal parties had been informed of this development.

Now, here I was in the José Martí International Airport's VIP lounge, having arrived only minutes before, in discussion with a Cuban official who came to meet me. After I had politely answered some of his questions — explaining our P Leadership's rationale/reasons for Vince's removal, the official of the Cuban Communist Party had the gall to tell me that they (the Cuban Party) "did not agree!"

(iii) In very improper ways, also, Wendy, they tried to change the way in which decisions were historically made by our P Leadership. Our P had always, from its inception, Wendy, stressed Collective Leadership, with Maurice being the first among equals. In that context the strength of all our leaders came to bear; and the weakness of Maurice in making decisions, in strategy and tactics, and in guiding and supervising the work of the P, and later the Revolution, were overcome. [Maurice himself, on more than one occasion, openly admitted to all these weaknesses.] In that context (of our Collective Leadership), while Maurice was clearly perceived as the Leader, the first among equals, Bernard, because of his particular strengths in the areas in which Maurice was weak was looked toward for leadership, and in practice, therefore, it was Bernard who led the P in those areas, before and during the Revolution. So it was an informal arrangement; one based on the years of experience in our struggle; and an arrangement which led our P to glory.

subjective factors, and with the objective difficulties inherent in the task of transforming a poor backward underdeveloped country, and especially having to do so in the face of the most hawkish US Administration since the gun-boat diplomacy days of President Theodore Roosevelt, led to a profound internal crisis in the P and Revolution by August-September, 1983.

(x) The JL decision (which as I stated before was part of a package of measures to overcome our P crisis), however, went against the form of leadership Cuba had tried to promote and impose on us for the better part of 4 ½ years. And they were hell-bent on quashing it, Wendy.

(xi) So Maurice, obviously convinced by those around him that the JL decision was some kind of "conspiracy" to ultimately remove him as leader, was therefore in the correct psychological state to make a complete break with the historically based collective leadership, and to place himself above the Leadership and *General Meeting of the Party's decision*. Outside of Cuba's interference, Wendy, there was absolutely no way he would have done that. Given his personality he would have taken that step only under strong encouragement. Indeed, even if he wanted to, the balance of forces within the P and the Revolution would not have permitted it — he would have recognised that the P and its organs were decisive for the future of the Revolution. But with Cuba's backing and, indeed, encouragement, he had an alternative manpower and material resource base *outside of our P* to fall back on.

There is another critical/key aspect of Cuba's relationship to the NJM and Grenada Revolution — and how it directly affected the October '83 crisis — that I should share with you, Wendy.

19

October 1983: The Missing Link

In 1981 Cuba requested and received permission from the Party and People's Revolutionary Government to organise their construction workers at the Point Salines International Airport project into a reserve military battalion. Over fifty (50) officers from the Cuban Armed forces (FAR) arrived in Grenada to lead them. Our P Leadership was only too happy to accede to this request because we were informed that this reserve battalion would assist our young PRA in the defence of Grenada, in the event of any invasion.

Months later, quite accidentally, while working together with Cuban Military Advisers, preparing defence plans for our country to be able to repel any military aggression, Lt. Col. Layne — the day to day Commander of the PRA — was told by the leader of the Cuban military mission in Grenada that the Cuban battalion would *only respond* to a request for assistance from the Commander-in-Chief (a position they imposed on us in 1981); not the P Leadership, not the PRG; but *one man*! However, it was only years later, when the crisis unfolded, that the significance of this statement was fully realised.

Cuba's interference in NJM and Grenada's internal affairs is not unique. I have heard of several instances of their interference in the internal affairs of other Revolutionary Parties and Countries. Among them:

(1) In the 1960's the Algerian Party removed Ben Bela as leader of their party. I don't know the reasons or the details; but I understand that Cuba objected to this and interfered, and this led to a strain in relations between the Algerian and Cuban Parties/Revolutionaries.

(2) In the 1960's, also, Wendy, there was a debate on The

(iv) In Cuba, however, the form leadership takes in their P is obviously different. Their circumstances are different; their history is different; and FC is FC. In Cuba, FC is the Maximum Leader in *all* areas. And this seems to have always been the case in their struggle. It is their history.

(v) In short, Wendy, Leadership in Cuba was always more personalised, more individualistic, it appears, and to a great extent this is due to the incredible ability of FC. But in Grenada, Leadership had always been more collective. This was due to the tremendous qualities of Maurice and Bernard in different areas; and also due to their specific weaknesses. So the emphasis on collective leadership was based on our history, and rooted in our history. It developed and took root on the anti-Gairy battlefields, and in the unforgettable days in laying the basis for the Revolution, planning the Revolution, and then its glorious execution.

(vi) But that history, Wendy, (our history) Cuba did not know of because they did not know our P in any real way until after March 13, 1979.

(vii) Yet from 1979 and onwards, with ever-greater intensity, they attempted to influence Maurice into adopting FC's style of leadership; into becoming an FC. But Maurice was never, and could never have been, FC. They were different persons, Wendy.

(viii) That interference by Cuba, again in many improper ways, for example FC sending down persons to Grenada to tell Maurice that certain decisions are his prerogative; and that the NJM CC could not take certain decisions, etc., etc., made for and naturally did lead to friction.

(ix) This friction and its by-products, combined with other

18

John 'Chalky' Ventour

Way Forward in the Venezuelan Communist Party. I understand that debate was centred around the issue of whether or not the party should pursue the path of armed struggle. FC publicly condemned the leadership of the PCV, accusing them of "sitting on their doorstep watching the corpse of Imperialism pass by [rather than take up arms and make the Revolution]."

(3) In the mid-late 1970's, I also understand that the Ethiopian Leader, Mengistu, threatened to expel Cuba's Ambassador to Ethiopia if Cuba did not withdraw him. The Ambassador was accused of interference in the Ethiopian party and country's affairs.

(4) Then, Wendy, there is Angola. In 1976 or 77, I remember hearing and reading news reports that the number two leader of the MPLA (the Ruling Revolutionary Party in Angola) was killed because he was a CIA agent, and also because of some counter-revolutionary plot.

Several years later I learnt that a problem had arisen within the MPLA Leadership and the Cuban Military Forces in Angola intervened on behalf of the then, late MPLA Leader, Agostino Neto, crushing a "rebellion" against him. As a result, Neto Alvis, the number two person in the Angolan Leadership, together with many of the MPLA members, several Angolan Army leaders and soldiers, had been killed by the Cubans.

Wendy, *I don't know the details of any of these incidents*. And I am not concerned here with which side was wrong or right. Whatever, that did not give FC, or anybody else for that matter, any right of interfere in other People's/Party's affairs.

So with this history, on the night of October 14, 1983, Bernard Coard and Selwyn Strachan held a meeting with Cuba's Ambassador Julian Rizo and 1st Secretary Gaston Diaz. In the meeting, I understand, they asked Rizo and Diaz for clarification re the Angolan situation in 1976/77. All Rizo would say was that Cuban Forces intervened in Angola "upon a request from the Angolan Commander-in-Chief." When asked how would Cuba respond if a similar request were to be made by Grenada's "Commander-in-Chief," Rizo refused to answer. An answer though was forthcoming.

Two days later, Wendy, the NJM CC received a reply — from FC. He complained (in that letter) that we were impugning the integrity of Cuba, etc. When Ambassador Rizo delivered FC's letter he refused to shake hands, as was normal, with the CC Comrades present. I was not present. However, I understand that when he finished reading the letter Rizo informed the CC Comrades that he had instructions from FC to give a copy to George Louison "for him to use in whatever way" he wished! Can you imagine that, Wendy? The Cuban Party was informed of his expulsion from the NJM CC. But here was FC refusing to recognise it. So that letter addressed to the NJM CC was given to George Louison — someone who was no longer a member of the NJM Leadership.

But that is not all, Wendy. That letter from FC to the NJM CC was signed: "Commander-in-Chief"! Highly significant, eh? Not 1st Secretary of the PCC. Not as President of the Republic of Cuba. Not as Prime Minister of Cuba. Not even as Commander-in-Chief of the Cuban Revolution; but just CIC! Commander-in-Chief of Grenada? Anyone in the circumstances, then, would naturally have seen this as a deliberate insult to NJM and Grenada and, also, *as a warning.*

22

October 1983: The Missing Link

Meeting at Butler House. It was a *very sad* one. I chaired it. Maurice sat next to me on the podium. When he arrived the entire hall of Members, Candidate members and Applicants, and CC members present, etc., stood in ovation, as usual, clapping — welcoming him.

The same happened when he rose to address the meeting. He did so for about 45 minutes. He accepted responsibility for the political crisis in the P and country but stated categorically that he knew nothing of the origin of the October 12th Rumour — he could not accept responsibility for it, he said. At the end of his speech he stated that he would speak later on in the meeting. [He did not know at the time that Errol George, his deputy P.S. Chief, who was also a Candidate member of NJM, would also speak at the meeting.]

Wendy, I'll never forget how Maurice's countenance changed when, at the end of his address, as the applause from the ovation died down, Errol George entered the hall following my announcement that he would now address the meeting.

A thunderous silence pervaded the large, packed hall. One could hear a pin drop as Errol George vividly recounted how he was given the rumour by Maurice and Cletus St. Paul in Maurice's bedroom on the previous morning; how Maurice told him to remember to call Phyllis Coard's name first; how a list of 15 or so names of persons who were to be given the rumour to spread, was drawn up. Maurice kept his head down, writing — taking detailed notes — in his notebook throughout Errol George's testimony. A sad stillness permeated the air. When Errol George left the hall, I (as chairman) turned to Maurice and asked him if he wanted to speak now. He said no. It was indeed sad, Wendy. Comrades — students, young-workers, women, teachers, etc.,

24

So, Wendy, given this background, and Cuba's interference in our P affairs: FC's support and active assistance to Maurice; Ambassador Rizo's movement of 30 Cubans to guard the Cuban Embassy; the placing of their Military Advisors and their workers at Point Salines airport site "on alert" from around October 13th [the workers comprised their Reserve Military Battalion; and "alert", in the military lexicon, is the first stage before a *call* to action]; their continuing to recognise George Louison as a member of the NJM Leadership, even *after he was expelled from the Party Leadership by the CC and the October 13th Extraordinary NJM General Meeting*; our Security Forces were naturally *gravely* concerned about Cuba's intentions.

The *combination* of this *and* Maurice's role in *originating* and organising the spreading of the Rumour, and the consequent near-violence of the rumour that same night (October 12th) at a Militia Station in St. Paul's (a suburb in St. George's) *was discussed by the Security Forces with Maurice* in a frank manner on October 14 *thereabouts*; and he was *strongly advised to stay home for a few days and let things calm down* in the country, and return to normal, while attempts were being made to resolve the crisis. The objective also, I understand, was to deny Maurice access to the Cubans (*until after we had resolved our internal crisis*), about whom the Grenada Security Forces were obviously very concerned. Maurice's *moral position*, Wendy, was extremely weak for at the October 13th Extraordinary P General Meeting at which he and Errol George (deputy chief of his P.S. unit) and other spoke, he was exposed *red-handed by the entire P membership present*, as the person behind the fateful rumour that "Phyllis Coard and Bernard Coard [were] planning to kill Maurice Bishop."

Wendy, I can *never* forget that October 13th General

23

John 'Chalky' Ventour

etc. — cried at the meeting.

During the break, about 9:00 p.m. — the meeting began at 5:00 p.m. and ended after midnight — several P members checked Maurice asking him to speak again, to defend himself. Later on I also asked him again. He never did. He sat throughout listening to member after member speak.

So, Wendy, Maurice was morally on the defensive inside the party. That is why he went along with the Security and Defence Committee's recommendation. *Otherwise*, had he decided not to, there is little that could really have been done by security to stop him.

Bernard was given the *same* advice, I understand, and also did not leave his home until *after* the crowd overran Mt. Wheldale and took Maurice away on October 19th. This act was translated to the world as "House Arrest" and a "Palace Coup" by George Louison, Kendrick Radix, etc. (and further magnified by the US orchestrated propaganda) and raised the crises to a new plane. One can easily see in retrospect how what happened could have been so interpreted (i.e. as "House Arrest") to the outside world.

Wendy, I believe that FC and Cuba's attempts to impose their form of leadership on us: (a) is a reflection of their genuinely held view that FC-type of leadership is the best — at least the best for this region; and (b) in their view, provided the best mechanism for Cuba to wield influence and, indeed, control over the Grenada process. With FC adopting Maurice as his "son," and with Cuba's form of leadership, Cuba's control over the Grenada Revolution would have been complete.

Wendy, I and all others here have the *greatest re-*

25

spect and admiration for the man FC, as a Leader, and for the immense unquestionable contribution he (and his Party and Country) has made to the World Revolutionary Process. Tremendous advances have been made under his great leadership for the people of Cuba. However, I would not be human if I don't feel angered — to put it mildly — over what I will describe as Cuba's *act of great treachery* of the Grenada Revolution. After all these years, Wendy, honestly, I want to sound dispassionate; but I'm sure you know that there are some things in life that one cannot forgive or forget. Despite its catastrophic consequences, it is still possible for me to forgive (but *not forget*) FC for his interference in our affairs. After all, one may argue that he thought he was doing the best thing and his decisions were based on incorrect information of the situation in our Party, etc., etc., etc. But let me tell you; I try to avoid thinking (and speaking) about this for it *really hurts*; I become passionately furious then! How could one ever forgive this, Wendy? Can you imagine that while the Cuban Ambassador and Military Advisors were discussing with PRA Officers and reviewing Military plans for the defence of our country against the imminent US Invasion, *at the same time*, in Cuba, the Cuban Government was privately telling and assuring the US Interests Section in Havana that the US could send forces into Grenada (come into Grenada) to evacuate its citizens, and that the Cuban forces in Grenada would *only* fire on them if fired upon? Can you imagine that, Wendy?? As if they owned Grenada — as if Grenada were a province of Cuba?! As if Grenada were an Isle of Youth?!

The People's Revolutionary Army (PRA) was very small — only 500 strong, but notwithstanding the Army Command wanted to locate PRA soldiers at Point Salines to defend the International Airport site. Its Military logic told them that the Airport would be the first target (or "beach-

Our officers said: Well, if that scenario turns out to be true and the Americans began landing in Point Salines unimpeded by Cuban Forces, then the Grenadian Army would have a responsibility to resist the enemy with force — with fire.

Ambassador Rizo then responded that if this happened Cuban forces would be placed in danger. The Grenadian officers insisted that they would have the responsibility to resist the invading force.

At that point, Wendy, Cuba — through Ambassador Rizo — played the card of blackmail. Rizo then said that if this were to be the case, his Government's instructions were that they would have to evacuate all their personnel onto a boat they had in St George's harbour *before* the (imminent) invasion commenced, *starting immediately*. That was it.

In the face of this, Wendy, the Grenadian Army had to back down. The implications of maintaining their position were too dire: both from the military standpoint if the invasion did come; and if for some reason it did not come, then from the economic standpoint. The US, the Grenadian Army Leaders felt (not knowing of the secret agreement) would hesitate re invasion and landing of their troops, because they would not be sure whether or not Cuban Forces would fight and kill many of their "boys", etc. It was clear that if Cuba withdrew their personnel to a boat in the harbour they would not have remained there; they would have returned to Cuba, and FC would have blamed the "intransigence" of the Grenadian side for the collapse in relations.

Cuba, therefore, imposed an agreement on the Grenada Revolution, forcing the PRA troops to remain behind a certain line, out of effective firing range of the US soldiers at their point of disembark — at their "most vulnerable moment".

head") of the Invaders. In defence plans drawn up with the Cuban Advisors before 1983, the critical importance of the Airport to site was noted. The PRA had held many military exercises in that area to repulse any enemy attempt to seize the Airport. And the understanding, as stipulated in our country's Defence Plans, was that the Defence of the Airport would be in conjunction with the Cuban Reserve Military Battalion.

However, Wendy, the Cuban Military Advisors (and Ambassador Rizo) basically blackmailed our country's Armed Forces into allowing them *alone* to maintain their (Cuban) Forces on the Airport site. The Cubans tried to get our Army Command to agree that their forces would remain in Point Salines but that they would only resist if the Americans fired on them. Our officers objected to this on the grounds that Point Salines was likely to be a principal sector for the Invaders (as outlined in Defence Plans which they had advised) and it would be madness to have located in a principal sector, troops who were not prepared to give unconditional resistance to any attempts by the enemy to land there. The Cubans knew that such a position was unacceptable. Further, the Grenadian Officers (unaware that Cuba had already communicated their position to the Reagan Administration that they would not resist if not fired upon) said to the Cuban Officials in Grenada: Suppose the US had intercepted communications from Cuba to them in Grenada, instructing them along lines they proposed, then the enemy would know that they had free access — free way into Grenada through the International Airport.

To this Ambassador Rizo responded by saying that the scenario raised by the Grenadian Officers was "purely hypothetical" and, therefore, decisions could not be made on that basis.

Wendy, I wonder if you can imagine the rage of our soldiers on the early morning of October 25, 1983 when they saw US troops freely paratrooping over Point Salines?

The landing of paratroopers at Point Salines was a very risky adventure. The US Military Specialists must have been aware of that. They must have had their concerns. And it is not beyond probability that the knowledge that they were to act in a certain way would mean lack of resistance at their most vulnerable moment, could have tipped the scale in favour of such an action. If serious resistance was offered to the paratroopers then, it is more than possible — almost certain that — they would have been repulsed. The whole form the invasion took would have had to be different; and while this *may* not have made a difference to the final outcome, given the American's overwhelming superiority in men and equipment, the price paid by Reagan for his outrage would have been much higher; and this may have had consequences for history.

The Cubans allowed paratroopers of the US 82nd Airborne Division to seize the International Airport. The Yankees would not have been in a position to land unobstructed at the International Airport, scores of Military Transport aircrafts with tons of military equipment and thousands of troops in several hours on October 25th if PRA soldiers were located at Point Salines. How could one forget this, Wendy?

On the afternoon of October 25th Ambassador Rizo called our Wartime Command H.Q. requesting assistance from the Army's APC's (Armoured Cars) for the Cuban Forces at Point Salines. The US superior technology had jammed the PRA's communication equipment so there was no precise knowledge of what was happening at/on the

front, near Point Salines. Because of this lack of communication, the Wartime Command thought that the Cubans were now fighting. Two (2) APC's had to be taken from another Defence point and sent to Point Salines. They drove into an ambush there leading to the destruction of the APC's and the deaths of several young soldiers.

Then to crown it all, on October 25th a formal request was made to the Cuban Government for military assistance to repel the invading forces. FC replied that this was "unthinkable" and "[we] should all fight to the last man!" We should all die so that no one would ever know the truth?! FC's message, Wendy, *devastated* some of Grenada's most selfless Army commanders. To hear that it was "morally impossible" for a "friend" to come to your assistance when Imperialist Forces overwhelmed one's side, was a bit too much for them. "Practically impossible" — yes, Wendy, that was understood, but "morally impossible" when the understanding was that they would come to the assistance of the Grenada Revolution — not a particular individual — in her hour of need? Too much, Wendy!

How do you think our soldiers and the Grenadian youth and women in the People's Militia felt (and still feel) about all this (*especially* those who were located in Grand Anse — near to Point Salines — and *on their own* pinned down the US Forces at Point Salines for a couple of days) when the world has the *impression* that it was Cuba's Forces in Grenada which resisted the US Invaders, defending Grenada's Independence and sovereignty? I (and all the others here), however, must pay tribute to the memory of those Cubans who (acting in accordance with FC's instructions had no choice but to allow US forces to freely land and capture Point Salines) died resisting the Yankees after they were directly attacked in their camp sites at Point Salines.

30

overwhelmingly, by standing ovation, to endorse his removal from the party leadership — that the only reason why he voted against Joint Leadership of the party was because he knew that Maurice would not agree with it (!). But having lost out, politically, inside the party, George Louison decided to go "for broke" — a military/violent solution.]

It is not surprising, Wendy, that after 5 years George Louison, Kendrick Radix and co. in the MBPM (who have opportunistically used Maurice's name to try and win the support of our people) have not been able to get NJM members, much less the people, to support them. That is reality as opposed to wishful thinking. They have not been able to translate the overwhelming support and yearning of the masses for the Revolution into support for their organisation. They have no organised party machinery. They have gone from bad to worse since 1984. No wonder that George Louison and Kendrick Radix have resigned from the top leadership of the MBPM. They miscalculated greatly: They thought that we would have been killed long ago and that they would get away with their lies and slander against us. But as our peoples' emotions (and the effects of their great trauma) wane, their (George Louison et al) roles will be exposed. The overwhelming majority of the NJM membership and soldiers of the PRA have shunned them (the MBPM) and continue to firmly support the Party and Army Leadership behind bars; for they know what happened in September-October 1983; of the key role George Louison, in particular, played in intensifying the party and national crisis.

September, 1988

How can anyone ever forgive, much less forget, this immense act of betrayal of the Grenada Revolution, Wendy? True, it was our (Grenada) responsibility to defend Grenada. But a *vital* element of the defence plans the Cuban Military Advisors had drawn up for our Armed Forces, to repel any invasion, was the assistance of the Cuban Reserve Military Battalion. So, isn't that *betrayal* when those you have to *rely on* — *who have made you rely on them*; who have promised, and who you expect to assist you — do not honour their agreement? Isn't that *treachery* when they blackmailed us into not locating any PRA forces at Point Salines and then allowed the Yankees to seize the International Airport?

I'm sure that you can empathise with me, Wendy. I hope that I have succeeded in trying to give you a much better appreciation for the reasons for FC's vehement and hysterical attacks on us in October/November 1983, and subsequently Cuba's propaganda against us which they have disseminated within the World Revolutionary Movement. Fortunately, several Revolutionary Parties and Governments in the "Third World" have had their own experiences of Cuba's interference in their internal affairs and, therefore, have never believed Cuba's propaganda lines on us.

Wendy, I have no doubt that *privately* FC is filled with *remorse*; he certainly must deeply regret his interference in our affairs, which led to the death of the Grenada Revolution. I also believe that George Louison, too, deeply regrets his *opportunist* and *divisive* role in September-October 1983. [I'll never forget him telling comrades during the break at the October 13th party General Meeting — *after* he was exposed by Party members for his dishonest and divisive conduct, and when he realised that his appeal against his expulsion from the CC (on the previous day) was rejected by the Party membership, the meeting having voted

31

Footnote to September 1988

Wendy, notwithstanding that the US already had agent provocateurs in the demonstration on October 19th 1983, who would have been intent on manipulating the demonstration for violent confrontations, I have only recently arrived at the conclusion — based on new information — that the October 19th military/violent confrontation was *preconceived*/planned by FC, George Louison, Maurice et al.

Only a few days ago we were discussing the trial of Cuban hero, General Ochoa, and others in Cuba. This sparked off some discussion, once again, on Cuba's role in the October '83 crisis and tragedy. Chris (Major Stroude) was making a certain point, speculating on the intentions of the Cuban Military Advisors when they had turned up to work at Fort Rupert on the morning (around 9.00 am) of October 19th. Chris was assuming that we knew this and told us he turned them away, telling them that there would be no work on that day. That was news to me (and *most* of us). Why did the Cuban Military Advisors suddenly turn up "to work" at the Fort Rupert Army HQ when they had not done so (or visited any Army Camp) from October 14th? Was it part of the plan to be on hand, *in advance*, knowing that Maurice et al would attempt to seize Fort Rupert, and hence be able to assist them by "neutralising" officers at the Army's HQ? Or, was it purely an "intelligence" function?

These, Wendy, cannot be wild and crazy questions because it is only a few months ago I learnt about a certain article in a *Barbados Nation*, December 1986 Special Issue on *The Maurice Bishop Murder Trial*. I'm yet to see that paper and article. I'm sure you've seen it. I understand that the article reported on a meeting FC held with some US

Congressmen after the US Invasion. I (we) had never known before that Maurice had *actually contacted* FC/Cuba on October 19th. FC apparently said that a request for assistance [*Translate*: use of Cuba's Reserve Military Battalion at Point Salines à-la-Angola, 1976] from Maurice *did reach* Cuba, but by then the Fort Rupert Tragedy had already occurred. He, however, added: in any event Cuba would not have acceded to the request (!).

But, Wendy, that was clearly *not* Maurice's calculation. And Maurice was nobody's fool, Wendy. If he had *any doubts* as to whether Cuba would intervene militarily; if he did not have a firm *guarantee/assurance* that Cuba would intervene on his behalf he would have told the crowd which burst into the Mt. Wheldale Security compound on October 19: "Look, wait a while, me and the fellas having a meeting to settle this thing." He would have continued the discussions, as agreed, from the previous night, with a view to arriving at a compromise solution. Or, he would have given the people his side of the story, then lead them through the streets, call a general strike, cripple the country and force the Party and Armed Forces to capitulate. Instead, he chose *none* of these. When one recalls George Louison's 2-hour meeting with him on the morning of October 19th, and Louison and Unison Whiteman's meeting the afternoon before with Ambassador Rizo, etc. it is clear that George Louison told Maurice that Cuba would respond positively to his "request for assistance."

So Maurice chose a (path of) military solution to the crisis which provoked the *greatest tragedy* in the history of the Caribbean, and paved the way for the defeat of the Grenada Revolution.

August 25, 1990

34

About The Author

John 'Chalky' Ventour was the General Secretary of the Grenada Commercial & Industrial Workers' Union (CIWU) from August 1977 to August 1982, and its President from August 1982 up to the US Invasion in October 1983. From August 1977, he was also an executive member of Grenada's trade union umbrella organisation, the Trade Union Council (TUC). He was elected its General Secretary in March of 1980, a position which he also held at the time of the US Invasion.

As a direct consequence of his being the Party's leading member within the trade union movement, John Ventour became a member of the Central Committee of the New Jewel Movement (NJM) — which led Grenada from March 1979 to the October 1983 US Invasion. It is also the reason for his detention and Kangaroo Trial & conviction by the US Invaders and their Regional puppets.

Ventour has spent the past more-than-16 years in prison along with his sixteen fellow political prisoners. By means of a special, discriminatory law passed in July 1991, he, along with the other members of the Grenada 17, continues to be denied access to Grenada's highest (and only independent) court, the Privy Council; an access which all other Grenadians, in practice, have.

35

The Caribbean After Grenada

REVOLUTION, CONFLICT, AND DEMOCRACY

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88 PASTOR

International Law

On October 31, 1983, shortly after U.S. troops landed in Grenada, Ambassador Sol M. Linowitz posed what he called the "threshold" question: Is there a sound legal basis for U.S. action?

While the Reagan administration was correct in its assumption that none of the mini-states in the Eastern Caribbean were signatories to the Rio Pact (the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance signed in Rio, August 15–September 2, 1947), the United States was a party to that agreement, and U.S. action appeared to have violated the nonintervention principle (Articles 15 and 17), which is the heart of that treaty as well as the charters of the United Nations and Organization of American States. The administration based its action in part on the request for assistance from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States, but article 8 of the 1981 Treaty establishing that organization required that collective action only be undertaken by unanimous decision of all seven parties and only in response to external aggression against one of the member states. Neither condition was met. Only four countries (Dominica, St. Vincent, St. Lucia, and Antigua) voted to request intervention; St. Kitts–Nevis and Montserrat abstained, and of course Grenada did not participate. Moreover, the United States was not a party to the treaty, and indeed, the Treaty itself was not registered with the United Nations, which would have given it the status of international law.

There remains the question as to whether the request for assistance by Grenada's governor-general, Sir Paul Scoon preceded or followed the decision to invade Grenada? Why did President Reagan not refer to the request in his address on October twenty-seventh, even though Dominica's Prime Minister Eugenia Charles had already mentioned it and Sir Paul Scoon was already safe? The confusion concerning this point deepened when in March 1984, the British House of Commons released a report which included an analysis of Scoon's alleged request. According to the report, "Both the timing and the nature of the request, which is said by the U.S. government to have been a critical factor in providing a legal justification for their decision to act, remain shrouded in some mystery, and it is evidently the intention of the parties directly involved that the mystery should not be displaced." The written request was obtained after the invasion; the only question that remains is whether an oral request preceded it.

Safety of U.S. Citizens

Even if the legal grounds were tenuous, the action might be justified if there were extenuating circumstances. Were U.S. citizens in danger on the island of Grenada?

5

The Invasion of Grenada: A Pre- and Post-Mortem Robert A. Pastor

INTRODUCTION

The invasion of Grenada by the United States and six Caribbean governments on October 25, 1983 raised numerous significant questions. Was the action legal? Were U.S. medical students in Grenada in danger after the murder of Prime Minister Bishop? Were there alternatives to intervention, and were these seriously considered by the United States? Did the Grenadan revolutionary government constitute a strategic threat—"a Soviet beachhead"—to U.S. interests? These questions surfaced at the beginning of the invasion, but like a submarine after it spotted a destroyer, the questions descended again to the depths.

The administration answered these questions either openly or in background briefings to the press, but there was little information at the time to judge whether their answers were accurate. Nonetheless, nine days after the invasion, the House Foreign Affairs Committee asked me to judge the credibility of the administration's answers. With the information available, I concluded tentatively that the administration's answers were either misleading or wrong.¹

During the invasion, U.S. troops captured and sent to Washington roughly 35,000 pounds of documents of the New Jewel Movement (NJM) and the People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada.² These documents and other information permit firmer answers to the central questions about the justification for the invasion, and the principal purpose of this chapter is to reexamine those questions. At the end of the chapter, I will also evaluate the costs and the benefits of the invasion, and assess whether the benefits might have been attainable at less cost.

THE INVASION OF GRENADA 89

In his speech to the nation on October 27, 1983, President Reagan stated that his "overriding" and "paramount" concern was "to protect innocent lives, including up to 1,000 Americans." Prior to his decision on Sunday, October twenty-third, the president said that he had "received reports that a large number of our citizens were seeking to escape the island, thereby exposing themselves to great danger." In his press conference on October twenty-fifth, the day of the invasion, Secretary of State George Shultz said that the president had made a "tentative decision" that previous Sunday night (October twenty-third) because of a "violent situation threatening our citizens." On November second, Deputy Secretary Kenneth Dam confirmed an earlier State Department report that the administration's concern over the safety of U.S. citizens was due in part to its belief that the Grenadan airport was closed.

Thirty hours after the invasion, some of the Americans said that they were frightened. However, there was considerable evidence that the vast majority of the Americans were not fearful before the invasion, and that they were not at risk. The only regular contact between U.S. citizens on the island and the United States was a telex at the Medical School, but many students also communicated with their parents by telephone. That Sunday evening when the president indicated his concern about the safety of the Americans, parents of five hundred students were meeting in New York. Though the meeting had been scheduled months before for another reason, the discussion shifted to the recent events in Grenada—the murder of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and several other Cabinet officials and the takeover of the government by the Revolutionary Military Council (RMC). The group heard from parents who had been in touch with their children, and they discussed a telex, which had just arrived, summarizing a meeting that day at the school where only 10 percent of the students expressed a desire to leave.³ The parents then sent a cable to President Reagan informing him that their children were safe and asking him "not to move too quickly or to take any precipitous actions at this time."⁴ Did the president receive this cable, part of which was published in the *New York Times* the next day, and did he weigh it against other evidence?

Before the meeting, Charles Modica, the chancellor of the university, had received a phone call from U.S. Ambassador to Barbados Milan Bish, as well as from others in the State Department. The call was designed to elicit a statement from him that the students were in danger. Based on his own contacts, he knew this was not the case, and he refused to make the statement. Were these calls aimed at obtaining pretext for intervention?

What led the United States to believe that its citizens were in special danger? In answer to questions from the U.S. House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee on November 2, 1983, Deputy Secretary of

State Kenneth Dam admitted that he had "no information" that any Americans were harmed or threatened after the murder of Maurice Bishop. (Later, the State Department confirmed that no American was harmed or threatened by the Grenadan military government.)

During the emergency, the Grenadan government went out of its way to assure both the U.S. citizens and the U.S. government. Two U.S. diplomats flew in and out during the weekend, and there were four or five flights (which included several Americans) on Monday, October twenty-fourth. Moreover, both the British and the Canadians had arranged evacuation flights, which were prevented not by the Grenadan authorities but by the other Caribbean governments. Moreover, General Hudson Austin himself called Geoffrey Bourne, vice chancellor of the Medical School, offering jeeps and transportation and arranging to have the supermarket open just for the students. He also sent one of his officers to check that everything was in order and gave Bourne his home number if there were any problems.⁷

One of the most effective points made by Secretary of State Shultz in his press conference on October twenty-fifth, the day of the invasion, was that one of the concerns of the administration was to anticipate and preclude a hostage-taking situation like that of Iran. The U.S. government later suggested that it had obtained secret documents purporting to show that the Grenadan government considered taking U.S. citizens as hostages. That evidence was never provided. None of the Grenadan documents captured by the U.S. government after the invasion provide any substantiation of the charge the Grenadians were planning to take hostages at that time. Common sense would suggest that the Grenadan government knew that the United States was eager to find a pretext for an invasion, and taking hostages would have provided a reason, not a pretext.

The Grenadan government would be more likely to take hostages if there was an imminent or probable invasion than if the U.S. government was in direct contact trying to gain assurances of safety for U.S. citizens. In that sense, an invasion would have endangered the lives of U.S. citizens rather than have protected them. Actually, the Grenadan government and the Cubans had literally hundreds of opportunities to take U.S. citizens hostage after the Marines landed, and especially during the fighting at the Medical School; this never happened. Of course, hostages could have been taken—just as it is possible in El Salvador by either leftist or rightist thugs, Iran, Turkey, Colombia, and a dozen other countries.

Was there an "atmosphere of violent uncertainty" much different from other countries experiencing a violent change in government? If one looks at military takeovers in Latin America over the last two decades, the Grenadan coup was not nearly as violent, uncertain, or dangerous

to U.S. citizens as most others. The military coup in Chile and the revolution in Nicaragua were much more violent, and indeed Americans were killed in both. Moreover, as of November 2, 1983, Deputy Secretary Dam still did not know whether anybody—Grenadians or Americans—had been shot or killed in the period after the murder of Bishop on October nineteenth and before the invasion. There were none.

If events were so uncertain, why then did the United States not try to seek out General Hudson Austin and others on the RMC to find out what was happening and to further increase the safety of U.S. citizens? Two administrators of the Medical School, Dr. Geoffrey Bourne and Gary Solin, both agreed at the time and in retrospect that the safety of the medical students, in Solin's words, "was never in danger." In Bourne's words, "From the point of view of saving our students, the invasion was unnecessary."⁸ Indeed, with the fighting near the Medical School, and the fear that hostages could be taken, one could argue that their safety was endangered, not protected, by the invasion. And, of course, as a result of the invasion, eighteen Americans did die and 116 were wounded; 24 Cubans were killed and 59 were wounded; and 45 Grenadians were killed and 337 were wounded.

It almost appears as if the United States did not want to receive any information about the students from their parents, or from the Grenadan government unless that information reinforced their own assessment that they were in danger. The U.S. government, incredibly, did not seek assurances from the RMC that the safety of U.S. citizens would be protected.

If the invasion had occurred a day later, British and Canadian citizens would probably have been evacuated. Is it possible that the "Marines got there just in time," in President Reagan's phrase, before the new Grenadan government could prove to the international community that it was a government, and that it could assure the safety of U.S. citizens?

Unquestionably, there were some U.S. citizens on the island who were afraid, and others who were not. But the question for U.S. policymakers was whether the "atmosphere of violent uncertainty" in Grenada from October nineteenth was worse than in El Salvador during the last decade, or in Guatemala in 1981, or in Bolivia for two-thirds of the last decades? Did U.S. citizens have more or less to fear from the Grenadan government than they had from an invasion? The available evidence suggests that U.S. citizens had less to fear from the RMC than from the invasion.

U.S. consular officials did try to negotiate an evacuation of the students and initially received some cooperation from the Grenadians for evacuating several hundred medical students by commercial aircraft. However, over the weekend before the invasion, Barbadian radio reports were received in Grenada about the possibility of an invasion. These

heightened fears among the medical students, and a much larger number requested evacuation. At the same time, the Caribbean governments decided to stop commercial flights into Grenada.

When the consular officials approached the Grenadians again to ask to evacuate 2000 Americans by U.S. military aircraft, the Grenadians changed their tone, fearing that the U.S. Air Force flights were intended to bring in Marines rather than take out medical students. They therefore stalled, and tried to get the Americans to talk about fewer numbers and commercial rather than military flights. The consular officers, seemingly unaware of the preparations by the United States, viewed the Grenadan response as uncooperative, whether for a specific purpose or not.

The congressional delegation that flew to Grenada after the intervention was told of the stalling by the Revolutionary Military Council, but not the reason why. Without the entire story, several congressmen concluded that the lack of cooperation by the RMC was deliberate, that it put the U.S. students in danger, and that it justified the action.

First Option or Last Resort?

If one considers military intervention a grave act with considerable human and political risks and costs, then the presumption ought to be that all other alternatives should be explored and exhausted before turning to the military option as a last resort. Was military intervention a first option or a last resort? What was the nature of the relationship between the Reagan administration and the OECS governments? Did the United States stimulate a request from these governments or respond to one?

Two points seem pertinent. A New York Times report on October 30, 1983, indicated that the OECS request was drafted in Washington and conveyed to the Caribbean leaders by special U.S. emissaries. Secondly, U.S. ships were diverted to the region on October twentieth, even before the Caribbean leaders met. The administration said that it was a "precautionary measure," and Prime Minister Tom Adams of Barbados said that he had already had conversations with the United States about the possibility of intervention.

In considering these questions, it is important to recognize that the nations of the Eastern Caribbean are democracies with strong and articulate leaders. They are no one's "puppets." All of the governments were unsettled by the Bishop coup in March 1979, but they were prepared to live with that government provided Bishop did not interfere in their internal affairs. After that coup, the leaders of these nations met in Barbados, and after obtaining assurances from Bishop that he would hold early elections, they recognized his government. Over time, as it became clear that he did not intend to fulfill his initial pledge, the governments in-

creased their pressure on Bishop, and it may be that these countries were the most important source of influence on Grenada.

The murders on October nineteenth horrified the entire English-speaking Caribbean, and several of the OECS governments met in emergency session to condemn the killing and break relations. The leaders probably came to an independent judgment that a Marxist military government in the Eastern Caribbean was unacceptable. It would appear that the United States had come to that judgment long before, but had recognized that it could not take action without the acquiescence or support of the Eastern Caribbean nations. *The massacre in Grenada on October nineteenth led to a convergence of thinking.* It is unlikely that the United States forced the OECS to make the request, but the diversion of the U.S. fleet provided a dramatic demonstration of U.S. seriousness and of the availability of a military option.

Did the United States discourage consideration of other options? Right after the establishment of the RMC, Milton Cato, the prime minister of St. Vincent, offered to meet with Hudson Austin, and Austin immediately accepted, but the meeting was never held. Cato was discouraged from holding the meeting with Austin by almost everyone—by Vincentians primarily, by his Caribbean colleagues secondly, and lastly, by the United States. His constituents had the greatest influence on him.⁹

What were the other alternatives, and did they stand a chance of restoring peace to Grenada? The killing of Bishop left the RMC weakened, divided, and totally isolated from the rest of the Caribbean. In an unprecedented move, both the OECS and CARICOM decided during the weekend before the invasion to condemn the new government, break relations, suspend Grenada from CARICOM, and impose trade sanctions. Even Fidel Castro issued a strong condemnation of the regime, and Michael Manley pledged publicly to seek the expulsion of the New Jewel Movement from the Socialist International. The Grenadan regime was totally isolated.

CARICOM also decided to contact Grenada's governor-general in order to have him: (1) establish a broadly based civilian government of national reconciliation which would hold elections "at the earliest possible date"; (2) receive "a factfinding mission comprising eminent citizens of CARICOM states"; (3) put in place evacuation measures for foreign nationals; and (4) accept the deployment in Grenada of a peace-keeping force from Caribbean countries. According to George Chambers, the prime minister of Trinidad and Tobago, who summarized the results of the CARICOM meeting, there was complete agreement on these measures; the only differences within CARICOM were when and how to use force if the Grenadan regime rejected these steps.¹⁰

The Grenadan leadership realized that it was in an impossible position and tried through a number of channels to find an exit. Austin spoke

with Geoffrey Bourne from the Medical School, who, in Bourne's words, "looked as though he wanted" advice. Bourne spoke with his son, Dr. Peter Bourne, who was an adviser on health issues to President Carter. Peter Bourne (who consulted briefly with the author and several others) suggested that an approach to Austin should be premised on skepticism and should aim to test Austin's sincerity. Bishop had promised elections, but reneged. Austin should break with the past and announce his intention to serve as a transition figure toward reestablishing parliamentary democracy. But even those steps would not be sufficient. In order to regain the confidence of CARICOM, he would have to prove his sincerity with clear actions.

More importantly, Austin called Trinidad's president, Ellis Clarke on Friday before the CARICOM meeting to say that his government was prepared to accept a visit by an international group from CARICOM to discuss elections and other items. Clarke informed Prime Minister Chambers, who then began contacting senior statesmen in the region.¹² The CARICOM decisions listed above would have provided such a test of Austin's intentions.

It is not known whether Austin was sincerely seeking an exit or just trying to buy time, because the Marines landed before Bourne even received the message from his son let alone conveyed it to Austin. The Marines also landed before the CARICOM decisions could be implemented.

If one believes that the killing of Bishop was a premeditated effort to seize control by an extreme leftist group tied even more tightly than Bishop to the Soviets and Cubans, then one would properly judge Austin's effort as a ploy, and conclude he was not worth dealing with. If, on the other hand, the events surrounding the murder of Bishop were not premeditated, that Bishop forced the hand of the military by going to Fort Rupert with his supporters, and that the military reacted with fear as well as anger, then one might conclude that events had overtaken the RMC. If this latter scenario is more probable, then one might conclude that the quick reaction by CARICOM must have shocked the RMC, and that they might seek some exit.

The evidence is by no means clear on which of these two scenarios is more probable, but if it is the latter, that the killings were not planned and events overtook the Grenadan government, then it is possible that Austin was seeking an exit, and, at the least, his purported interest should have been tested. It is worth noting that the Trinidadian government opposed military action before the Grenadan regime would have an opportunity to respond to CARICOM.

Was the invasion an attempt to forestall further violence or an attempt to dislodge a group that might be prepared to consider alternatives? Did the U.S. forces arrive "just in time" before negotiations between CAR-

ICOM and the Austin regime might have produced a peaceful, negotiated outcome? It seems clear that alternatives to military action were quickly ruled out, if they were even considered.

The Grenadan documents reveal significant divisions within the New Jewel Movement, but there is nothing at all that suggests that the Coard faction was planning to kill Bishop or the others. Indeed, the weight of the evidence thus far confirms the author's second scenario, that the Austin regime was overtaken by events. The documents show a high level of tension and confusion among the NJM leadership in the days preceding the killing. In the words of one of the leaders, "the Central Committee was suffering from an overdose of paranoia."¹³

Strategic Threat

President Reagan said on October 25, 1983, that "we got there just in time" as Grenada was "a Soviet-Cuban colony being readied as a major military bastion." While the U.S. government did not publicly use this strategic concern as a justification for the invasion, it clearly played a central role in its view of Grenada from the beginning. In 1982, President Reagan publicly accused Grenada of attempting "to spread the [Communist] virus among its neighbors." On March 10 and 23, 1983, he displayed aerial reconnaissance photographs of the construction of Grenada's new airfield and said it represented "the Soviet-Cuban militarization of Grenada" which "can only be seen as a power projection into the region."

At the time of the invasion, the administration claimed it had documents proving that the Soviets and Cubans were in the process of taking over the country and converting it into a base for subversion. But the documents that it later released do not prove either assertion. To the contrary, the documents show that the Cubans and the Soviets were at least as confused and upset by the events of October 1983 as the United States. Indeed, in a letter to the Central Committee of the NJM on October 15, 1983, the day after the house arrest of Bishop, Fidel Castro himself admitted that "everything which happened [the divisions within the Grenadan government and the arrest of Bishop] was for us a surprise and disagreeable."¹⁴ The documents also show that Castro tried hard to preclude, not promote the coup against Bishop, whom he later described as having "very close and affectionate links with our [Cuban Communist] party's leadership."¹⁵ It was a considerable embarrassment for Castro to admit that he was so uninformed about such critical developments in the affairs of such a close friend, but all available evidence suggests that his admission was accurate.

On the other hand, the documents do make clear that the NJM leadership held the Soviet Union and Cuba in the highest regard and en-

deavored to prove their revolutionary credentials and solidarity with both. The Cubans were clearly more helpful and closer to the Grenadians. The Embassy of Grenada in Moscow reported that "the Caribbean—as they [the Soviets] repeatedly state... is very distant from them. It is quite frankly, not one of their priorities."¹⁶ The NJM considered themselves a Communist party, and it tried hard to impress the Soviets and Cubans. Indeed, the vote by Grenada to support the Soviet Union on Afghanistan is one indication of this. (Even the Sandinistas abstained.)

In summary, the direction of influence appears the opposite of what President Reagan alleged. Instead of the Soviets and Cubans trying to take over Grenada covertly, the problem—for the United States—was that the Grenadan regime invited the Soviets and Cubans to play a larger role in helping them to transform Grenada. Ironically, the Soviets were reluctant to do that.

The Airport. Grenada's 9000-foot airfield is not large by Caribbean standards. Antigua, Aruba, the Bahamas, Curaçao, the Dominican Republic, Guadeloupe, Jamaica, Martinique, Puerto Rico, St. Lucia, Trinidad, and Barbados all have airports that are about the same size or larger. There is little question that Grenada needed a new airport for tourism as the other was old, run-down, and small. The project was supported by many countries, including Venezuela, Canada, and the Europeans, and the British government guaranteed a loan for the project. If it were intended for military use, according to the British contractor, it would have had protected fuel dumps, anti-aircraft defenses, and hardened shelter for warplanes, which was not the case. The airport was open for viewing, and Canada reportedly intended to build a sixteen million dollar hotel within sight of it.

Though the airport's principal purpose was for tourism, that does not mean that it could not have been used for military purposes as well. In a conversation with Bishop in October 1982, this writer asked whether the Grenadan government would permit Soviet or Cuban military planes to land on the airfield, whether it would be used for transit of Cubans to Africa, or to bring in military equipment. The Grenadan leader said that it would not be used for any of those purposes, because to do so would jeopardize it for tourism. This information was conveyed to a high-level official of the State Department. Whether or not Bishop was telling the truth, it would have made sense for our diplomats to confirm these points privately and then try to elicit a public statement to that effect. Such statements could not guarantee that Bishop was not lying or would not change his mind, but it would make it more costly for him to do so. The State Department did not follow up any of these points.

If one did not want to negotiate a serious security concern like the use of Grenada's airfield, what were the alternatives for the United States—other than military force? Since the airfield is so open, verifying

Bishop's assurance did not appear an insurmountable obstacle. What should one conclude from his failure to pursue this serious security concern by conversations or negotiations?

After the invasion, the U.S. government discovered the airport's importance to tourism and pledged \$21 million to its completion. The airport was open one year after the invasion and a week or so before the 1984 presidential elections in the United States.

Although the documents disclosed a number of military agreements with the Soviet Union and Cuba, there are no references in those documents to possible military use of the airport. A barely legible, handwritten page from the notebook of Liam James, a member of the Political Bureau, indicated: "The Revu has been able to crush counter-revolution internationally. Airport will be used for Cuban and Soviet military."¹⁷ This note, however, is not confirmed in any of the secret military agreements between Grenada and the Soviet Union or Cuba, or in any of the minutes of the Political Bureau or the Central Committee. However, the minutes of a Political Bureau meeting on December 19, 1982, in which Bishop, Austin, and a number of other leaders were present, discussed a specific request from Cuba for special refueling concessions to be granted after the completion of the airport. The decision was to tell the Cubans that "the request is to be studied." No further response was given to the Cubans.¹⁸

In short, there is substantial evidence that the Grenadan regime wanted to use the airport for tourist purposes, and a single, comparatively weak and questionable suggestion to the contrary. More importantly, if the Grenadan regime had already secretly arranged for the Soviets and Cubans to use the airport for military purposes, it is impossible to explain why they would put off the Cuban request, and secondly, why they would permit a Canadian company to build a hotel adjacent to the airport where U.S. agents could have monitored the air traffic.

The Size of the Cuban Presence. U.S. estimates of the size of the Cuban presence varied enormously. U.S. Navy Admiral McDonald first stated that captured documents showed there were more than 1100 Cubans and that they were preparing a massive buildup. Subsequently, the number was revised to 1000. Later, State Department officials said that they would not quarrel with Cuba's own number of 784, having accused them of being completely untrustworthy a few days before.

It was subsequently confirmed by the U.S. government, and by the documents themselves, that the Cuban numbers were accurate; there were about 784 Cubans in Grenada, of which more than 600 were construction workers. A military agreement between Cuba and Grenada provided for a maximum of 42 Cuban military advisors to go to Grenada to train and organize the military, of which twelve or thirteen would be

stationed for a two or four month period, and 29 would be stationed for longer periods.¹⁹ None of the documents released suggests that these advisers were either "occupying the country" or intending to occupy it. Nor is there any evidence that these advisers gave instructions to the Grenadan government.

These are large numbers for such a small country as Grenada, and a legitimate source of concern for the United States and the neighboring states in the Eastern Caribbean. The Cubans, of course, export labor abroad, and this was their principal contribution to the construction of the airport—an ironic form of aid in a country of such high unemployment. But the fact that the Grenadan regime needed over 150 Cuban military advisers—more than all U.S. military advisers in South America and the Caribbean—is an indication perhaps that they were not as popular as they repeatedly claimed they were.

Platform for Insurgency. The various military agreements with the Soviet Union, Cuba, North Korea, and Czechoslovakia indicate that Grenada would have received by 1986 a very large quantity of military hardware, including approximately 10,000 rifles, 4500 machine guns, and 15,000 hand grenades. The U.S. Defense Department estimated that this arsenal could equip a fighting force of roughly 10,000 men.²⁰ Alternatively, it could represent a five-year or longer stockpile for an armed force of about 2000–3000.

None of the documents released since the intervention show any evidence that the Grenadians, the Soviets, or the Cubans intended that any part of this arsenal would be transferred to subversives in a third country. Quite the opposite. The secret military agreements between Grenada, Cuba, and the Soviet Union, which the Defense and State Departments repeatedly cited to justify the invasion, explicitly prohibited any arms transfers to third countries or to groups outside of Grenada. There is no evidence that any of the arms were sent outside of Grenada. There is substantial evidence of contacts with Communists and "progressives" from throughout the world for purposes of solidarity, and consultation, but nothing between Grenada and guerrilla groups, with one ironic exception. The M-19 guerrilla group from Colombia wrote to the New Jewel Movement expressing greetings and a desire to establish links with the party. However, the Political Bureau of the NJM decided not to reply to the request.²¹

Instead of a source of "infection," Grenada had proved to be the opposite, inoculating the region to Marxism. Since the revolution in 1979, democratic institutions in the English-speaking Caribbean grew stronger; moderates won in almost a dozen elections.²² Grenada's capacity to influence, let alone subvert its neighbors, declined during the revolution's four years. After the death of Bishop, it turned negative.

During the short duration of New Jewel Movement's revolution, the

rest of the Caribbean was on guard to find any evidence of Grenadan support for subversion. If any evidence were found, it would have provoked collective action, which would have been legal and justifiable. And the United States would have been on much firmer footing in responding to a request to counter aggression or subversion than it was in undertaking a preemptive strike. Bishop understood this, and was sensitive to it. He told the writer that after the incident in 1980 involving the training of bodyguards of George Oldum, who was then deputy prime minister of St. Lucia, he would never again permit any training of Caribbean security officials in Grenada without the express permission of the appropriate head of state.²³ Bishop also quickly extradited Bumba Charles, the leader of a group that had tried to seize neighboring Union Island (St. Vincent), but fled to Grenada after he failed.

The United States knew that the Soviets were supplying arms. There were grounds for concern about the ties of Grenada to the Soviet Union and Cuba. The U.S. government knew within one month of the coup of March 1979 that Cuban advisers and arms had arrived in Grenada, although there is still no evidence of Cuban involvement in the 1979 coup.²⁴ Since 1979, the rest of the Caribbean was very wary of Grenada, and any sign that the Grenadians were trying to subvert their neighbors would have brought a quick response.

After Bishop's murder, the Grenadan government lost all credibility in the Caribbean. Rather than being a threat to the region, it had become a threat only to itself. Indeed, the armed forces, which Bishop created, devoured him in the end. That is really the Cuban-Soviet legacy in the Third World—militarized revolution—and that point is clearly understood in the region.

Why did the Grenadan regime need so many arms and such a large armed force? In a region where most nations did not have defense forces, and police forces were quite small, Grenada's was disproportionately large. Of course, as the invasion demonstrated, the Grenadan regime may have had more reason to fear its neighbors than the other way around. But it is unlikely that the Grenadan Armed Forces were large either to attack or to defend their revolution. The armed forces in Grenada—as in Cuba, Nicaragua, and other Marxist or quasi-Marxist states—is one of the principal instruments for political mobilization—for education and convincing the youth of the legitimacy of the revolution. Its second purpose is internal political coercion. The regimes build up their armies to make their revolutions and to preclude any political alternative in the country.

The question for U.S. policy was whether to intervene because of fears rather than facts that Grenada was subverting its neighbors. The distinction between fears and facts is everything. International law permits collective action after aggression, not before. If the United States sanc-

tioned preemptive strikes, it would become prisoner to its worst fears; it would draw up worst case scenarios and then implement them.

This is, of course, the line of reasoning that brought U.S. forces into Grenada.

A Question of Intelligence

How good was the collection and analysis of political intelligence on Grenada during the 1980s and especially during the weeks before and after the invasion?

An analysis of U.S. background briefings to the press during the time of the invasion would suggest that the United States interpreted events in the following way: the Soviets and Cubans manipulated Bernard Coard and several other extreme Marxist-Leninists to launch a coup against Bishop, who was too moderate for their taste. One of the reasons suggested by U.S. government sources as to why Bishop was overthrown was because he was interested in better relations with the United States.

There is considerable evidence that would impugn this interpretation. Rather than trying to overthrow Bishop, Cuban Ambassador Julian Torres Rizo was instructed to meet with Coard and express Castro's strong views that Bishop should be released from confinement. Coard, who was supposed to be close to Cuba, refused to see Torres. Although Coard was perceived to be more communist than Bishop, he had actually been criticized a few months before by many, reportedly including Bishop, for drawing too liberal a code for foreign investment. Though the Cubans were alleged to be behind the coup against Bishop, they took the unprecedented step of condemning it in the strongest terms. Finally, the entire Grenadian leadership wanted—or rather said it wanted—good relations with the United States; the question was, on what terms? No evidence has been presented that Bishop and Coard differed on the answer to the question.

Based on conversations with Bishop and Coard, this writer does not believe that there were any important differences ideologically between them. However, they differed greatly in style, and Coard was jealous of Bishop's popularity and power. As a rule, attempts to impose ideological prisms on petty personality politics in the Caribbean obscures more than it illuminates, and the case of the Bishop-Coard rivalry seems to fit the rule. It is conceivable that there were differences between the Cuban and Soviet strategies, but that also remains to be proven.

This is just one of many examples of where the administration's ideology forced disparate information into an ill-fitting compartment in order to try to justify the invasion. The administration's assertions suggested a massive intelligence failure at the analytic level, or alternatively, a deliberate effort to misinform the American people. The Reagan

administration contended that their problem was the lack of CIA operatives in the region, and they blamed previous administrations for reducing assets. However, this transparent attempt to shift the blame is wrong on two counts. First, President Reagan's statements about Grenada in 1981 and 1982 suggest that the administration gave the highest strategic priority to the island. Why, nearly three years later, had intelligence capabilities not been increased? Secondly, the administration's response reflects a bias toward covert action, which is inappropriate and frankly unnecessary in the Caribbean, which is remarkably open. Simple, open conversation can achieve what operatives cannot. The administration did not know anything about Coard when the conflict started simply because it had never bothered to talk to him; officials probably read intelligence reports with a host of labels that missed the man and the point. This was the cost of the administration's policy not to communicate with the Grenadan regime.

CONCLUSION

Benefits and Costs

Advocates of the intervention have tended to underestimate or not see the costs, while opponents naturally tend to stress the costs and downplay the benefits. Any judgment of the invasion requires a systematic and dispassionate evaluation of both the costs and the benefits.

On the benefits, Grenada restored democracy and elections were held in November 1984. Second, the Eastern Caribbean returned to being a group of democratic states. Third, the United States demonstrated that it was responsive to a serious request by them. Fourth, the use of force by the United States lent credibility to U.S. threats. Fifth, Cuba lost a Marxist ally in the Caribbean and found itself more isolated from the rest of the Caribbean. These benefits are significant.

What of the costs, and is there any evidence they were weighed carefully? First, the human cost—eighteen Americans killed and 116 wounded; 45 Grenadians dead and 337 wounded; and 24 Cubans killed and 59 wounded. The U.S. bombing of the mental hospital was particularly tragic. Secondly, there were heavy international political costs. The day after the invasion, fifteen O.A.S. members joined Grenada for a severe condemnation of the United States. The United States had to veto (11–1) a UN Security Council resolution condemning the action. The UN General Assembly also condemned the United States by a vote of 108–9—declaring the action "a flagrant violation of international law." Finally, Cuba gained a powerful talking point about "U.S. imperialism" and a temporary alliance with many Latin American governments.

The United States' closest friends and allies not only criticized the

action, but questioned the judgment of the United States for taking it. The deployment of missiles in Europe was made more difficult by this action and the lack of consultation. The United States had, once again, helped its adversaries in Western Europe by giving them good arguments for why Europe should not trust the United States.

To Latin America, the invasion connoted a return to the Big Stick, harming efforts to demonstrate that U.S. interventionism was a thing of the past, not the present, or the future. It is not just that Cubans and leftists condemn U.S. imperialism and intervention, but that some of Latin America's youth would find their arguments compelling. This makes it harder for the United States to gain the cooperation of its friends in the region.

When the United States acts with scant legal basis it reduces the credibility of the rule of law internationally. Ambassador Sol Linowitz put it so well: "The United States is not just a superpower; it is also a democracy that must hold itself up to higher standards than the Soviet Union."

Finally, there was a large economic cost of rebuilding Grenada and helping to develop the rest of the Caribbean. In effect, the United States replaced the British in the region, and this meant a larger economic obligation than the United States had shouldered before.

In assessing the costs and benefits, the key question from the U.S. perspective is not whether they sum to a net benefit or a net cost; that will depend on the values attached to each of the costs or benefits. The key questions are, first, whether there is agreement on the list of what constitutes costs and benefits, and secondly, whether the benefits might have been attainable with a less costly strategy.

With the important exception of those who died as a result of the invasion, most of the costs are intangible. Were these costs weighed in making the decision? On "Meet the Press" on October 30, 1983, then U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane Kirkpatrick said: "I'm telling you that I don't think there's any moral cost to that action." This insensitivity to international public opinion—especially when so many of the United States' closest friends condemned the action—is ill-suited to the United States.

In comparison to the almost casual way U.S. leaders dismissed international criticism, the late Prime Minister Tom Adams of Barbados, with much more at stake in the invasion, described the views of the world with much more detachment and perceptiveness. In a debate in the Barbados House of Assembly, Adams figuratively toured the world, trying to explain the positions of various countries that opposed the action. Pausing at Latin America, he said:

Geography brings us together, and we are partners in many international institutions. But we in the English-speaking Caribbean are a different people,

with a different history and different traditions.... The English-speaking Caribbean has never been threatened by the military power of the U.S. There has never been any occasion where the U.S. has had a military occupation against our will in an English-speaking island.... We have never had any historical reason to fear the U.S. This is not so in Latin America and, therefore, I understand their vote (condemning the invasion).²⁴

What are the lessons of the action in Grenada? It should be stressed that the available evidence still does not permit a definitive conclusion, but here are some tentative conclusions. First, there is good reason to question whether there is any legal basis for the action. Second, the safety of U.S. citizens was endangered more by the invasion than by the political situation that preceded it. Third, the administration turned to the military option as a first step rather than a last resort. It showed no inclination to negotiate or even communicate with members of the new Revolutionary Military Council.

The Eastern Caribbean leaders came to a similar, though independent judgment. The United States chose to respond to the request for military action by the OECS rather than to the diplomatic-political strategy agreed to by the larger, thirteen-nation CARICOM. Since the United States would bear the more significant military cost, it was wholly appropriate for it to question whether military action was the only or the most appropriate means for dealing with the new political situation in Grenada. Instead of asking such a question, the U.S. government seemed delighted with the opportunity to change the Grenadan government by force.

There were good reasons to be concerned with the Grenadan relationship with the Soviet Union and Cuba, but the Grenadan capacity to influence developments in the rest of the Caribbean had been reduced in the four years since the coup, and indeed; the rest of the Caribbean had apparently increased its influence on Grenada. After Bishop's murder, Cuban, Soviet, and Grenadan influence sank to an unprecedented low level in the region; under those circumstances, it was hard to conceive of Grenada as a Soviet-Cuban platform for insurgency. Any effort at subversion by the Grenadians would have easily elicited a collective security response, which would have been clearer in its legality and justification than the "preemptive action" that occurred. The United States would have been on much firmer ground responding to such a request than to the one that led to the invasion.

If U.S. citizens had been put in danger by the new government, if the legal basis for intervention had existed, if Grenada was a "Soviet-Cuban colony" and a "bastion" of arms to be used to subvert or overrun democracies in the area, and if other alternatives were explored or the administration could make a convincing case why they were not, then

the action would have been justified. But none of these conditions existed.

An important factor arguing for help—though not necessarily, the Marines—is the regional community of the OECS; this is indeed a unique community of nations, which requires support. Ironically, the Reagan administration had pursued a strategy from 1981–1983 of undermining that unity, thus undermining one of its alleged reasons for intervention. Nonetheless, supporting those small, vulnerable democracies is an important U.S. interest.

In examining the action and its relationship with the rest of the administration's foreign policy, what was most disturbing was its apparent proclivity to think and act in military or covert terms. The administration left no room for diplomacy—for negotiations—for pursuing U.S. interests in anything but a military or clandestine manner. In this case, as in many others, the administration never pursued its interests through sincere negotiations. Ideological barriers based on twin premises that the Cubans and Soviets are behind all the instability in the region and that Marxists are inherently untrustworthy, prevented the United States from seeing opportunities or reducing uncertainties to its citizens or its interests. This left the United States in a position where there was no alternative but to send in the Marines.

There were other alternatives.

NOTES

1. For my original testimony, see House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Hearings: U.S. Military Actions in Grenada: Implications for U.S. Policy in the Eastern Caribbean*, November 2, 3, and 16, 1983, pp. 72–102 [henceforth, *Hearings*]. This chapter represents an update of that original testimony.
2. For the documents, see The Department of State and the Department of Defense, *Grenada: A Preliminary Report* (Washington, DC: December 16, 1983); The Department of State and the Department of Defense, *Grenada Documents: An Overview and Selection* (Washington, DC: September 1984) [henceforth "State/Defense"]; and Paul Seabury and Walter A. McDougall, *The Grenada Papers* (San Francisco: Institute for Contemporary Studies, 1984) [henceforth Seabury and McDougall].
3. *Washington Post*, October 31, 1983, p. A1.
4. *New York Times*, October 24, 1983, p. A1.
5. *New York Times*, October 24, 1983, p. A1. Geoffrey Bourne, the head of the Medical School, later confirmed in testimony to Congress that only 10 percent of the medical students wanted to leave the island during the crisis. Only after students heard an outside broadcast "saying that the CARICOM countries were going to invade," a couple of days before the actual invasion, did the students become afraid. A vote after that broadcast showed 50 percent of the students wanting to leave. *Hearings*, p. 193.

6. In several conversations at the time Modica told me of his talks with Bishop, and he suspected that the purpose was to elicit an excuse for intervention.
7. See *Hearings*, pp. 188–93.
8. Interview with State Department official on Caribbean desk, July 1, 1985. The official confirmed that no Americans were threatened or harmed during the period from the murder of Bishop to the invasion, and that the State Department had not approached Austin directly.
9. Cited in Edward Cooley, "Medical School Director Says He Backs Invasion," *Washington Post*, November 1, 1983, p. A23. Bourne said he supported the invasion for political reasons, but in this interview, he acknowledged it wasn't necessary to rescue the students.
10. Author's interview with Hon. Milton Cato and others on St. Vincent, February 1984.
11. The CARICOM decisions and a statement by Prime Minister George Chambers can be found in Appendix 2 of *Hearings*, pp. 218–30.
12. Author's interview with one of the statesmen who were contacted by Chambers, January 28, 1987, Atlanta, Georgia.
13. Seabury and McDougall, *The Grenada Papers*, p. 333.
14. Seabury and McDougall, p. 327.
15. "Farewell Address to the Funeral of the 24 Cubans Killed in Grenada," November 14, 1983. Published by the Center for Cuban Studies, *Cuba Update*.
16. Seabury and McDougall, *The Grenada Papers*, pp. 198–216.
17. The Department of State and of Defense, *Grenada Documents* #23.
18. *Grenada Documents* #87–4.
19. *Grenada Documents* #16.
20. *Grenada Documents* #16, p. 6.
21. *Grenada Documents* #87–3.
22. For further discussion, see chapter I on the Eastern Caribbean by Sally Shelton-Colly and Chapter 10, "Heading Toward a New Instability in the Caribbean's Eastern Tier?" by Scott B. MacDonald, Erik Kopp and Victor Bonilla.
23. Author's interview with Maurice Bishop, St. George's, Grenada, October 25–27, 1982. Bishop also publicly signed a CARICOM Communiqué in November 1982 which noted that "where any member state considers that its nationals are being trained without its consent for the purpose of pursuing acts of aggression or destabilization against it, it may consult with other member states with a view to deciding what coordinated diplomatic action may be taken by them." (Text of CARICOM 16–18 November 1982 Summit Communiqué, Ocho Rios, Jamaica, reprinted in Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, Caribbean, November 22, 1982, p. S3.)
24. For a discussion of this period and U.S.–Grenadian relations, see Robert Pastor, "Does the United States Push Revolutions to Cuba? The Case of Grenada," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* (Spring 1986): 1–34.
25. Barbados, *House of Assembly Debate*, November 15, 1983, pp. 56–57, cited in Robert Pastor, "The Impact of Grenada on the Caribbean: Ripples from a Revolution," in Jack W. Hopkins (ed.) *Latin America and the Caribbean Contemporary Record*, Vol. III, 1983–84. (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1985). This chapter analyses the short-, medium-, and longer-term impact of Grenada on the wider Caribbean area. It was written in July 1984.

APPENDIX 16

NEW YORK LIBRARIES

c/o Mr. Ruggles Ferguson,
Augustine & Augustine,
Chambers,
Green Street,
St. George's,
Grenada.
September 13, 2000.

The Commissioners,
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
c/o The Chairman,
Justice Carl Rattray, Q.C.

Sirs,

RE: Access to Legal Counsel by Members of the 'Grenada 17' for, inter alia,
arrangements for Participation in the Truth and Reconciliation Commission

1. Several weeks ago different ones of us received reports from family members of requests by lawyers to come and see us to discuss a number of legal matters, being turned down by the prison authorities. They were reportedly told by the prison authorities that any request to see any of us must come from us, not from them. The reports we received mentioned lawyers who have previously seen various ones of us without difficulty.
2. At no stage were we told by any official of the prison (a) that any lawyer was trying to see us and (b) that we should therefore make a request to see him, since this was the new procedure being adopted by the prison.
3. We wish to emphasize that we cannot evaluate the accuracy of the reports we received, as, by definition, we were not hearing from the lawyers themselves or even necessarily from the person(s) they allegedly spoke to directly. In other words, our information was (and is) at best second hand, and sometimes third hand. Life experience has taught us that second and third hand information is the breeding ground for inaccuracies and misunderstandings.
4. Because of this, and because we had some time ago asked certain lawyers to undertake certain work for us in relation to two matters [i.e. (i) our pending constitutional motion in the High Court in relation to our case (referred to in paragraph 7 of page 6 of our letter to the Two-Man Committee responsible for organising the TRC, dated 5th February 2000) and (ii) the Truth and Reconciliation Commission] – and had not received any replies from them, we decided to write the prison authorities.
5. On August 7th, two of us wrote to the Commissioner of Prisons seeking permission 'to meet and hold consultations with a representative, or representatives, of the legal firm of Augustine and Augustine, as well as other legal representatives within and without this jurisdiction, on a periodic basis.' The letter then went on to indicate the two broad areas which we planned to discuss with these lawyers, the second being 'to discuss legal and constitutional issues, and legal representation, in

relation to the upcoming Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)'. A copy of the full text of the letter is attached as an appendix to this letter.

6. Perhaps at this stage we should just indicate:

(a) that lawyers from the firm of Augustine and Augustine were retained by us, over the past four years, to research and then prepare a draft Constitutional Motion in respect to our case. Recently, based on their work and with the help of two other counsel, we retained a top civil and constitutional lawyer from Jamaica to evaluate this work and prepare the final draft of the Motion for filing. [We are still seeking to raise the funds to retain legal counsel to actually argue the Motion before the Court.] We have also, with the help of another local law firm (who are the ones with the necessary links), established contact with a well known firm of solicitors in Britain who might be willing, on a *pro bono* basis, to help with the case if and when it reaches the Privy Council. This approach has been forced upon us because our family's financial resources have been fully exhausted over the past 17 years of legal battles, first to save our lives and then to win our freedom;

(b) with respect to the TRC, we have asked the firm of Augustine and Augustine to assist us with securing a wide range of documents vital for our fullest possible participation in the TRC. These documents are to be found inside Grenada, in the U.S., Canada, Britain, and in some fellow-CARICOM countries. This is work which we simply cannot do ourselves, from behind bars. We have also asked them to assist us in locating witnesses, many of whom are scattered as widely as the documents referred to above. Finally, we are seeking their help, as also that of the Jamaican legal firm which represented us at our Preliminary Inquiry, 'Trial', and 'Appeal', in recruiting our legal representation for the TRC, subject to the state paying their fees and expenses [see paragraph 10 (ii) on pages 6 & 7 of our letter of 5th February, 2000, to the Two-Man Committee; and paragraph 5 of page 4 of our letter to you of April 20th, 2000.]

7. About a week after submitting the letter of August 7th (referred to above) to the Commissioner of Prisons, we raised with him, in person, his response, when he visited our section of the prison. He replied, saying that he was 'still studying' our request. After a further ten or so days had passed without a reply from him, we again raised the matter with him when he toured our section of the prison. He responded this time by saying that he had passed along our request to the Ministry of National Security with his recommendations, and was awaiting their decision.

8. *Prison Rules* with respect to inmates' access to legal counsel state as follows:

Rule 344 (1): *Reasonable facilities shall be allowed for the legal advisor of a prisoner who is party to legal proceedings, civil or criminal to interview the prisoner with reference to those proceedings in the sight but not the hearing of a prison officer.*

(2): *The legal advisor of a prisoner may, with the permission of the Superintendent, interview the prisoner with reference to any other legal business in the sight and hearing of a prison officer.*

9. In light of the above, we are mystified – and more than a little frustrated – by the present situation which we face with respect to access to legal counsel to pursue our legitimate legal interests. It has thrown back our preparations for the TRC by two months – and counting. We recognise that you have no jurisdiction or authority in this matter. We are simply informing you of the situation, since it has a direct bearing on both the quality and timing of our participation in the TRC proceedings.

10. We are, however, becoming concerned that the cumulative effect of a number of developments are working towards the frustration of our meaningful participation in the TRC. We say this, in light of the following:

(a) Our failure to receive any formal acknowledgement from the Two-Man Committee of our hand-delivered letter to them of 5th February, 2000 with its concrete proposals for the setting up of the TRC:

- Their refusal to meet with a three-person delegation from the Grenada 17 so that our concerns as well as specific proposals could be elaborated on;
- Their decision, and that of Cabinet, to ignore our concerns and proposals, in the formulation of the TRC's terms of reference and in the composition of the TRC itself.

Given the publicly stated objectives of the TRC, and given the centrality of the role(s) of several members of the Grenada 17 to several of the matters to be investigated, and to the very process of seeking to achieve reconciliation, this above-stated response to our initiatives is, to say the least, bewildering;

(b) A few months ago, the government of Grenada invited the Minister of Transport of South Africa (who was the Minister of Justice at the time of South Africa's TRC) Mr. Dullah Omar, to visit Grenada and speak to and with all interested parties regarding the setting up of the TRC. He met with church leaders, trade unionists, government officials, and so on. At almost every group he spoke with, he was advised to arrange to see members of the Grenada 17. As it turned out, he had decided to do so independently of such entreaties. Indeed, on a particular morning, officials of the prison came around to our cells to inform us that Minister Omar would be visiting the prison at 9.00 a.m. that morning, and that he wished to meet with us. [The prison authorities had actually begun a general cleaning up of the compound and, preparing a special room for the meeting, from the day before.] Nine a.m. came and there was no sign of Minister Omar. By the end of that day, and for the rest of his brief stay in Grenada, there was no sign of him at the prison. We later discovered that his itinerary was changed for him (not by him) at the last moment, on a pathetic pretext;

(c) And now, in the two months leading up to the start of the TRC – and continuing – we find ourselves *for the first time since 1986* (when similar tactics were used to adversely affect our trial preparations) unable to see ANY lawyer for ANY purpose, including for the purpose of preparing for the TRC.

We frankly find it difficult to believe that all the above 'happenings' are purely 'accidental' or coincidental. However, we remain determined to do our best to ensure our meaningful participation in the TRC.

We remain,

Yours sincerely,

Signed: Bernard Coard
Bernard Coard

Signed: Ewart Layne
Ewart Layne

Signed: Leon Cornwall
Leon Cornwall

Signed: Selwyn Strachan
Selwyn Strachan

Signed: Liam James
Liam James

RECEIVED

c/o Mr. Ruggles Ferguson,
Augustine & Augustine,
Chambers,
Green Street,
St. George's,
Grenada.
September 14, 2000.

The Commissioners,
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
c/o The Chairman,
Justice Carl Rattray, Q.C.

APPENDIX 17

Sirs,

RE: Suggested Recusal of One Member of the Commission

1. In recent times it has been drawn to our attention that a member of your Commission, Father Mark Haynes, has publicly expressed great hostility to the 'Grenada 17'; even to the point of reportedly saying that we 'should all rot in prison', or words similar to these and to this effect.
2. What forced us to take this matter seriously was the initial source of the information: someone who said he was present when this was said, and whom we consider of unimpeachable reputation, who also happens to be very hostile to us. Indeed, this person was one of several whose voice was heard on radio stations opposing the release of Mr. Kamau Mc Barnette and Mrs. Phyllis Coard, three years ago, on medical and humanitarian grounds. This individual's sense of fair play, according to him, could not see him permit, without questioning it, someone so decidedly biased be a member of an impartial Commission which would be examining, *inter alia*, the actions of some members of the Grenada 17, and which was charged with deciding whether to make any recommendations with respect to their release.
3. Further to the above, we have been reliably informed that Father Mark has repeated his position of extreme hostility to the 'Grenada 17' in very recent times; indeed, since having been appointed a Commissioner of the TRC.
4. For the avoidance of misunderstanding, we wish to make it clear that we do *not* challenge Father Mark's right to hold *any* views he wishes about us. What we *are* challenging is his membership of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, given the *rationale* behind such a body's establishment, and given its *mandate* and *powers* under the law.
5. Sirs, we would prefer not to have to take affidavits and take the matter into court, and so on. We desire to embarrass no one. We would rather the individual, acting in accordance with the dictates of his conscience, quietly recuse himself without fanfare or publicity. Our objective is to achieve fairness, not to embarrass anyone.

We deeply regret having to raise this unpleasant matter with you, but I am sure you would appreciate that, in the light of the information in our possession, we had no alternative.

We remain,

Yours sincerely,

Signed: Bernard Coard
Bernard Coard

Signed: Selwyn Strachan
Selwyn Strachan

Signed: Ewart Layne
Ewart Layne

Signed: Liam James
Liam James

Signed: Leon Cornwall
Leon Cornwall

APPENDIX 18

Richmond Hill Prison
St. George's
29 November, 2000

Mr. Roy Raymond
Commissioner of Prisons
St. George's

Dear Commissioner,

As you are aware, we submitted a formal application (dated 7 August 2000) to you requesting permission to meet and consult with legal counsel re the case of the Grenada 17. We have not yet received an official response to application/request. As you have stated, in response to our verbal inquiries, a decision is yet to be made and communicated to you by the Office of the Prime Minister.


Notwithstanding the above reference, we are taking this opportunity to inform you that Mr. Keith Scotland, an Attorney-at-Law in the jurisdiction of Trinidad & Tobago, would be coming to this jurisdiction during the period December 18-22, 2000, specifically to deal with legal and constitutional matters related to our case. Mr. Scotland has indicated that he would need to consult with the Grenada 17 as often as possible for the duration of his stay in Grenada.


In the circumstances, therefore, we would greatly appreciate the cooperation of the prison authorities in granting Mr. Scotland the necessary facilities to meet with the Grenada 17, in accordance with the issue outlined in paragraph 2 above.

Please permit us to emphasise the enormous importance of Mr. Scotland's visit to Grenada, and his legal consultations with us. Our families and friends have made, and are making, tremendous financial sacrifices to ensure that Mr. Scotland's trip is successful.

Thanks for your assistance.

Yours truly,


Selwyn H. Strachan


Ewart J. Layne

APPENDIX 19

Monday 4th February, 2002

Mr. Roy Raymond,
Commissioner of Prisons,
Her Majesty's Prisons,
St. George's.

Dear Sir,

In light of your verbal communication to us this morning, purportedly from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), we wish to advise you that our lawyer is **Mr. Keith Scotland**, Attorney-at-Law of the jurisdiction of Trinidad and Tobago, and we request that any and all further communication on this matter be directed to him. Mr. Scotland's address is: 112-114 Duke Street, Port of Spain, Trinidad & Tobago; Tel/fax: (868) 625-1911.

We ask you to please use your good offices to advise the TRC accordingly.

Signed:

Andy Mitchell

ANDY MITCHELL

Vincent Joseph

VINCENT JOSEPH

Callistus Bernard

CALLISTUS BERNARD

Cosmus Richardson

COSMUS RICHARDSON

Lester Redhead

LESTER REDHEAD

Christopher Stroude

CHRISTOPHER STROUDE

Hudson Austin

HUDSON AUSTIN

Bernard Coard

BERNARD COARD

Liam James

LIAM JAMES

Leon Cornwall

LEON CORNWALL

John Anthony Ventour

JOHN ANTHONY VENTOUR

Dave Bartholomew

DAVE BARTHOLOMEW

Ewart Layne

EWART LAYNE

Colville McBarnette

COLVILLE MCBARNETTE

Selwyn Strachan

SELWYN STRACHAN

Cecil Prime

CECIL PRIME

APPENDIX 20

ANALYSIS

THE PRIME MINISTER OF GRENADA SPEAKS—AGAIN—ABOUT THE FREEING OF THE GRENADA 17.

When you take the two recent speeches of the Prime Minister, Dr. Keith Mitchell, together, the following things stand out:

1. The Prime Minister is expressing his views, not once but twice, on a matter which is still before the courts for determination. In other words, the matter is still *Sub Judice*, but that does not deter the Prime Minister. His speeches on this matter have been aired repeatedly on Radio and TV, and printed in the press.
2. The Prime Minister is clearly aiming to intimidate the judiciary: 'I repeat... the judiciary cannot operate against the interest of the society. And it cannot find excuses in law to destroy the society.' The Prime Minister, in Mugabe-style, uses the carrot and the stick approach to the judiciary. He praises those judges who rule the way he wishes them to rule, and publicly attacks those who don't, hinting that he will only obey those orders that he agrees with.
3. He repeats the position he has expressed several times in recent times: the freeing of any or all members of the Grenada 17 'Is a decision to be made by the Grenadian people.'
4. In other words, not the courts, not the law, but 'The people as a whole' — i.e., a referendum, will decide the question of the freedom of the Grenada 17 political prisoners. This is a very strange doctrine in an alleged democracy, governed allegedly by THE RULE OR LAW!!
5. What the Prime Minister's repeated interventions in a matter before the courts (i.e. the freedom of the Grenada 17 by the courts) demonstrates conclusively, for the few who still had any doubts, IS THAT THE DETENTION—AND CONTINUED DETENTION—OF THE GRENADA 17, IS A POLITICAL, NOT LEGAL, QUESTION. THAT THE GRENADA 17 ARE POLITICAL PRISONERS!!

EXCERPT FROM PRIME MINISTER MITCHELL'S ADDRESS AT THE GENERAL COUNCIL OF THE NEW NATIONAL PARTY (NNP) HELD IN GOUYAVE, ST. JOHN'S, ON FEBRUARY 24th 2002

Carried on the Grenada Broadcasting Network (GBN) radio
On 1st March 2002 on the 12 noon and 6:00 p.m. news broadcasts,
and on GBN TV at 7:00 p.m.
Anchor: Tony Julien.

... And the Prime Minister was very firm when he spoke about the freeing of [the Grenada 17] inmates from the Richmond Hill Prison. He says this is a decision to be made by the Grenadian people.

... so the people must be involved in any serious decision that you make that involves the future of the country; particularly when it is an issue involving national security it becomes even more important... You cannot have forgiveness if you do not learn to mend your ways and learn to behave yourselves. [This part was carried on both GBN TV and MTV as part of an NPR programme on the General Council Meeting.]

"... we did not go to the people for vote to make decisions against the interest of the people. Let me repeat that... I don't take it on myself to release anybody. This a decision for the Grenadian people, Sisters and Brothers. The Grenadian people would have to be satisfied that whatever happens in that particular area [freeing the Grenada 17] has to be in their interests. And it is only then, sisters and Brothers, that I would do what the people say. Let us be very clear that no man, no smart men, no bright boys, no godless men who refuse to stand up and pray to the Lord in Parliament, no smart men, would be able to force the hand of this government [re freeing the Grenada 17].

"I want to make it clear, the constitution is clear, that there are two branches of government. There is the Executive; there is also the Judicial [sic]. No one is supposed to impose its will on the other one without—without due reason. I repeat, the ju... the judiciary cannot operate against the interest of the society. And it cannot find excuses in law to destroy the society. Because the society is... is import... is important pillar of the constitution. So no smart man can use the judiciary to destroy the society. Ah speaking in tongues. I am not saying Peter, I am not saying Paul. Who could understand, understand."

THE KEITH MITCHELL GOVERNMENT AND THE COURT ORDER TO FREE "FORTHWITH" THREE MEMBERS OF THE GRENADA 17

Below, you will read a newsbroadcast from a pro-government radio station, WEE/FM. You will observe the unprofessionalism of the broadcasters, referring to the Grenada Seventeen as the 'Coard Gang' twice in the news item; and to the three ordered released by the High Court as 'The October 1983 Three-Member Firing Squad' based solely on a Kangaroo trial with demonstratively cooked-up evidence and statements signed under extreme torture.

However, our focus is on the implications of some of what Prime Minister Mitchell said, which was broadcast (in his own voice) on WEE/FM's noon and 5:45 p.m. newscasts on February 21st, 2002.

Note, firstly, the Prime Minister's praise for the action of the Eastern Caribbean (OECS) Appeal Court in staying the execution of the High Court's order to immediately free the three men. That this action by the Appeal Court Judges was patently illegal can be appreciated by reading the 'Statement from Bernard Coard' of 18/02/02; and the Letter from Bernard Coard to Prime Minister Anthony of St. Lucia of 19th February, 2002; both dealing with this matter in some detail. [Both of which you can read right after the WEE/FM broadcast transcript.]

Note, secondly, that Prime Minister Mitchell not only praises the illegal stay granted by two Appeal Court Judges of the Eastern Caribbean (OECS) Supreme Court, but goes on to publicly attack (without calling names but with everyone clear as to the target) the High Court Judge, Justice Brian Alleyne, who gave the order to free the men after eight months of the exchange of written arguments by both sides and the consideration of all evidence submitted by both sides plus studying the relevant precedents or case law.

Let us focus on the Prime Minister's own words with respect to both the above points:

'...thank God we have the OECS Supreme Court still there functioning effectively. So no one person can make decisions that could affect the whole country and not be concerned about that particular decision.'

Note, thirdly, that P.M. Mitchell's ire is aimed at the High Court Judge for (implicitly) ruling on the basis of Grenadian Law and the Constitution, rather than ruling, as the P.M. thought he ought to (and as he got the Appeal Court Judges to do, in open violation of the law!) on the basis of political considerations.

He accused Justice Brian Alleyne of making a decision to free the three members of the Grenada Seventeen; a decision 'that could affect the whole country and not be concerned about that particular decision'!!

In other words, the judge should have gone outside the law and taken public reaction and the political impact of freeing the men into consideration, and on that basis not order their liberty!!!

Finally, readers can appreciate for themselves the fact that P.M. Mitchell's concerns are entirely political, and aimed at the outcome of the next general election, and not really his excuse of "National Security" and "Stability of the Country". This can be seen from how he links the freeing of the three men by the High Court Judge to a certain (unnamed) political party competing for office against him in the upcoming general election. Read again the last paragraph of WEE/FM's broadcast-transcript, where the actual words of P.M. Mitchell re this are recorded. Note carefully that he does not accuse any of the people referred to as 'the plotters for the freedom of the Coard Gang' as seeking to overthrow his government by illegal or unconstitutional means, but rather of (implicitly) seeking to oust him at the upcoming general elections. Thus, he tells his supporters at the public gathering: 'I hope you ready to deal with their heads with your votes when the time comes.'

Thus he feels that High Court Judge, Justice Brian Alleyne, owed a duty to his (Mitchell's) reelection chances of refusing to free the three members of the Grenada 17— regardless of what Grenada's Law and Constitution have to say. At the same time, he expresses satisfaction that he can still rely on the Appeal Court judges to do his political bidding. What a sad day for the Rule of Law in Grenada! Let us now read the WEE/FM broadcast-transcript.

Prime Minister Mitchell's Response

Re: Court's order to free three of the "Grenada 17"

Place: Grand Roy, St. John's, during the government's "Face to Face" Programme

Date: 21st February 2002

Carried on WEE/FM Radio (93.3 FM)

Anchor: Calistra Farrier

'Grenada's Prime Minister and National Security Minister has reacted strongly to suggestions that his government may be linked to current moves to free the Coard Gang. Dr. Mitchell says the people of the country will have to be involved in such a major decision, especially since it involves a security risk.

WEEFM News caught up with the Prime Minister in the village of Grand Roy at a 'Face to Face' Wednesday night, following the Appeal Court decision earlier in the day to continue the stay of execution of the judge's order to release the October 1983 three-member firing squad.

Dr. Mitchell says his government will not support a situation that threatens the national security and stability of Grenada. He says there are individuals using the situation to try and discredit his government by linking it to such an unpopular idea that could throw the country into an uproar.

"...all games that have been played and you heard all kinds of nonsense being said by some people how the government is doing this, and the government is doing this, the government has done nothing so far that has undermined the security of this country".

While the state did not defend the action brought in the High Court to free Andy Mitchell, Cosmus Richardson and Vincent Joseph, Dr. Mitchell says the fact that an appeal has been filed by the state is a clear indication of where his government and the state stands on the issue.

"It moved to have stay of execution of any order to release anybody at this time. And clearly, that must be the government's position. If it wasn't the government position you would not have seen that. So I think that is sufficient (*applause*). If the state had not wanted to do this then clearly you would not have seen it, because the order was given. The state had to move to counter that order. And thank God we have the OECS Supreme Court still there functioning effectively. So no one person can make decisions that could affect the whole country and not be concerned about that particular decision. So then it is the judicial system and I am not supposed to make comments on judicial actions. But I think I have said enough to send a message to where this government stands. Nothing that affects the stability of this country will be done by this government".

The state is appealing on the grounds that Justice Brian Alleyne's interpretation of the law under Section 80 of the Criminal Code is wrong and that the men had already appealed against their sentencing and conviction for manslaughter in the 1983 Fort Rupert tragedy.

In 1988 [sic] the OECS Appeal Court [sic] upheld the conviction and sentencing of the 1984 [sic] trial judge of 30 and 45 year jail sentences for the three former PRA soldiers.

Trinidad and Tobago attorney Keith Scotland says his clients will take their matter to the Privy Council if it becomes necessary.

Dr. Mitchell is suggesting that the public look to another political party, which he did not name, for the plotters for the freedom of the Coard Gang.

"The Revolution came, people spent their time in destroying even what they say that they believe in. That's what happened. And don't forget the same people are still around. Some of them may forget that some of the same people who destroyed what they supposed to believe around. Don't forget the thing about the

Gairy ticket; don't forget. The people who did printed that ticket in the name of Eric Gairy is still around and they are part of a serious political party today—of a certain part ...I shouldn't say serious, I made a mistake, forgive me. They are part of a certain political party, not a serious political party. They are there and some of them are emerging now in top positions. They have hijacked a party and they are involved in top positions in a political organization. Now they want real political power now. They not behind the scene anymore; they have surfaced. All their heads are above water now, today. But I hope you ready to deal with their heads with your votes when the time comes. That is how you have to deal with their heads. You don't want to do like them to execute people."

APPENDIX C

Weekly address by Prime Minister Keith Mitchell
April 7, 2000

Fellow Grenadians, this evening I would like to bear my spiritual self to you and ask you to join me in preparing for an act of purification of ourselves — as a people and as a Nation.

The process of reconciliation, with respect to the experiences of the period 1976 to 1991 is not merely an exercise in politics. Nor is it solely an exercise in the attainment of justice.

There are many among us who continue to be deeply hurt, deeply confused and mystified by the absence of clarity and knowledge of the events of that period. Many people continue to suffer in silence. Many yearn for reconciliation.

Grenada needs to purify its spiritual self. Sisters and brothers, the process of unity and reconciliation is the best way of purging pent-up emotions and repressed thoughts.

I, as a Grenadian and as your Prime Minister, am part of this process. I, too, need to be involved at the deepest level of my consciousness.

I am asking everyone — no matter what your political persuasion, no matter what your religious beliefs, to join in this spiritual exercise. We will need prayers at the personal and national level, we will need deep meditation and we will need the goodwill of everyone in order to be successful in this undertaking.

Fellow Grenadians, unity and reconciliation have been the cornerstone of the New National Party Government for the past five years. We have been unwavering in our commitment to this noble cause. Indeed, we have endeavoured to be guided by this process in all that we say and, more importantly, in all that we do.

Further, we have encouraged you, the citizens of this beloved Nation, to embrace unity and reconciliation in your daily lives.

In this regard, I believe that the majority of our citizens have accepted unity and reconciliation as an ideal — something to aspire to in your workplace, at home, at school and in the community in general. Naturally, many of us have fallen short on occasion; however I am convinced we are on the correct path to genuine unity and reconciliation.

You may recall that when I attended the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in South Africa last October, I met with President Thabo Mbeki to seek advice on the establishment of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission for Grenada. This proved to be a most fruitful meeting. In addition to the impending State visit to Grenada by President Mbeki, the former Justice Minister in the Nelson Mandela administration, the Hon. Dullar Omar, is scheduled to arrive in Grenada later this month. He will meet with church groups, human rights organisations and lawyers, non governmental organisations and Government officials, among others, to offer advice and guidance as we embark on this important phase of the reconciliation process.

As you are aware, South Africa has first hand experience with the process of Truth and Reconciliation through its own Commission. We are most fortunate to be able to share in this learning process with our South African brothers and sisters.

A two-person committee comprising Attorney General Senator Lawrence Joseph and Father Mark Haynes was appointed late last year to conduct consultations regarding the Terms of Reference for our proposed Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

These Terms were subsequently presented to Cabinet, and it was agreed that a three person Commission will be appointed. Before I announce the identity of the Commissioners, I would like to deal with the details of the Terms that will guide the Commission, which is a legally binding body.

Firstly, the Commission will operate within a time frame of six months from the date of its first sitting. If necessary, this six-month period could be extended; however we felt that a time frame should be specified to serve as a guide, as well as limit the financial costs of operating the Commission.

The Commission will inquire into and record certain political events between the period January 1st, 1976 and December 31st, 1991. Initially the time frame was limited to 1976; however it was felt that the pre-trial, trial and post-trial periods should be included. The Commission, in addressing this 15-year period in our Nation's political history, is mandated to deal with the following:

1. The events leading up to and including those of March 13, 1979 and the repercussions of these events. Ladies and gentlemen, if we are to reconcile ourselves to the events of March 13, 1979, we need to address the reasons why those events happened in the first place and what occurred during that time.
2. The shooting deaths of people at Plains, Mount Rose and Mount Rich in St. Patrick's and in St. Paul's. This will cover the period March 13, 1979 to December 31, 1983. There are many unanswered questions about these deaths and it is our sincere hope that the truth will prevail.
3. The events leading up to and including those of October 19, 1983. Sisters and brothers, this aspect encompasses a number of issues and that have never been fully understood or examined. These include:
 - (a) The root causes of the general political turmoil in the State;
 - (b) The circumstances surrounding the deaths of various persons, including the late Prime Minister and other Ministers of Government at Fort George, or as it was referred to then Fort Rupert;
 - (c) To ascertain, as far as possible, the identities and total number of persons who died at the Fort and other locations; and
 - (d) The disposal of the bodies of those who lost their lives. I realise that this process will be a painful one for many Grenadian families; however, I firmly believe that in seeking the truth, we shall all find peace.

The fourth area that the Commission will address is that of military intervention by the armed forces of the United States and the Caribbean in October, 1983.

I want to make it perfectly clear, sisters and brothers, that anyone who gives evidence to the Commission will be granted indemnity from prosecution. We are not seeking to punish anyone. We are seeking the truth. We are seeking reconciliation. This will not be accomplished if people have any fears whatsoever about negative repercussions from their testimony to the Commission.

Fellow Grenadians, after the Commissioners have heard all the testimonies and evidence, they will have three months to report and make recommendations to Government. Again, if a longer period is required, this will be considered.

The Terms of Reference have identified the following objectives for the Commission with respect to the final outcome of the exercise:

1. To seek to uncover the truth behind the events that occurred between January 1, 1976 and December 31, 1991;
2. To provide the Nation with a proper and comprehensive understanding of those events. I consider this to be extremely important. The key word here is "understanding".

In other words, sisters and brothers, if we fail to understand why, then we will not be able to reconcile ourselves - as individuals and as a Nation - to the events that took place between 1976 and 1991. This leads me to the third objective, namely:

3. To provide the Nation with an opportunity to become genuinely reconciled and be permanently healed.

The key word here, ladies and gentlemen, is "healed". With healing comes peace - peace of mind for all of us.

Our history, as you know, is our own. We cannot change it, nor can we continue to ignore it or distort it. What we can do, is understand our history and learn from it. Yes, learn from it and look ahead to the future, a future with much hope.

4. The fourth objective of the Commission, as identified in the Terms of Reference, deals with amnesty. The Commission has the mandate to recommend general amnesty to certain persons who, in the opinion of the Commission, present truthful information during the hearing of evidence.

Ladies and gentlemen, if we are to achieve reconciliation and unity, then forgiveness must be part of the process. Otherwise, the entire exercise will have been in vain.

Fellow Grenadians, the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, as we enter the twenty-first century, is very timely indeed. We cannot leave the unanswered questions of the last century in limbo. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission has the potential to close this chapter in the Grenadian history book with an acceptable degree of certainty, provided you - the people of Grenada, Carriacou and Petit Martinique - come forward and speak the truth without fear or favour.

In other words, the success of the exercise depends solely on you. Government is doing its part to provide the vehicle by which the process of reconciliation can be facilitated, but your genuine participation is absolutely essential.

Finally, I am, indeed, honoured to announce this evening the three highly respected individuals who will comprise the Commission. They are:

- Father Mark Haynes, a Roman Catholic Priest from the parish area of Beaulieu, and member of the Committee appointed to formulate the Terms of Reference;
- Anglican Bishop Sehon Goodridge of the Windward Islands, who is stationed in St. Vincent and the Grenadines and who, at one time, taught at the Grenada Boys Secondary School.
- and the Chairman of the Commission - the esteemed Carl Rattray, retired President of the Court of Appeal of Jamaica.

With the appointment of the Commissioners now completed, it will only be a matter of weeks before further details about the schedule and locations of hearings will be made available.

In this regard, I urge all Grenadians to take this exercise very seriously. Let us look back in order that we can look forward.

As I stated earlier, the future holds so much for Grenada, Carriacou and Petit Martinique.

Sisters and brothers, permit me to turn to one of the very bright spots in our future - our National Stadium. I encourage all Grenadians to support the three day match this weekend when Zimbabwe plays the West Indies Board XI at the National Stadium, as well as the Triangular Series when Pakistan plays Zimbabwe on April 15 and West Indies plays Pakistan on April 16.

Grenada is, indeed, honoured to host these three matches. I encourage all our cricket fans to give the teams a warm Grenadian welcome and demonstrate our love for the game with enthusiasm and sportsmanship.

Additionally, I am very happy to make special mention of our young West Indies player Camilus Alexander of St. Andrew's, who played for the West Indies Under 19 Team in the Youth World Cup in Sri Lanka earlier this year and who will be playing in the match this weekend.

In closing, on behalf of the Government and on my own behalf, I also take this opportunity to extend best wishes to all the members of our National Youth Team as you prepare for the Windward Islands Under 19 Tournament in St. Vincent and the Grenadines next week.

We are very pleased with the National Youth Team and trust that you will make us all proud in the championships as you strive for excellence.

Thank you and good night.

ADDRESS GIVEN BY SEN. THE HON. LAWRENCE A. JOSEPH, MINISTER FOR LABOUR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AT THE FORMAL LAUNCHING OF THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION AT GOVERNMENT HOUSE, ST. GEORGE'S ON TUESDAY 4TH SEPTEMBER 2001.

His Excellency, the Governor General, Sir Daniel Williams, has just (officially) appointed the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. We are gathered here now, to officially launch the Commission and to wish God's speed to the members as they take their leave to fulfil their mandate.

The Commission is expected to inquire and record ^{why?} certain political events which occurred in Grenada during the period 1st January 1976 to 31st December 1991 and make recommendations.

Since the discovery (or should I say so-called discovery) of Grenada by the European, Christopher Columbus in 1498, Grenada has had its checkered history of conflicts. The French and British fought battle after battle in order to gain hegemony over this tiny state.

It was only by the Treaty of Versailles which was executed by those countries in 1763, that Grenada was finally ceded by the French to the British. During this time, the use of slave labour was the main engine of production for sugar, tobacco and other tropical products which were prepared for the European Markets.

The Slave Trade from West Africa to the West Indies was the source of labour supply until the abolition of slavery in 1838.

Even as we are gathered here today, 4th September 2001, a major conference on Racism is taking place in South Africa where one of the items that is being considered is the proposal to have substantial compensation payable to the descendants of slaves from the slave trade.

In the early 20th Century, Grenada had the status of being a Crown Colony, then it became an Associated State and eventually became an Independent State on 7th February 1974.

Just prior to Independence in 1974, a significant section of the populace expressed serious concerns over the proposal for Grenada to become independent at that time especially under the leadership of Eric Gairy.

As a result of those concerns, turmoil ensued which gave rise to civil strife, looting and general chaos. The political tension in the state remained and ultimately surfaced in what some considered to be a Revolution, and yet others say was a coup d'état on March 13th 1979.

From that period the Peoples' Revolutionary Government ruled the country under the leadership of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop until 1983. On 19th October 1983, a sad day was created in Grenada's history when the Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, other Cabinet colleagues and many civilian lost their lives on what was then referred to as Fort Rupert, (now Fort George).

No one seems to know exactly how many people altogether who died on that fateful day. Many of those dead bodies were never seen by relatives or friends. The trauma of that horrific period is deeply implanted on the minds of many of us. It was a period when brother fought against brother, sister against sister, friend against friend.

Many questions pertaining to that period 1979 to 1983 still remain unanswered. It is hoped that the Commission will be able to find some answers to those questions. Careful note must be taken of the main objectives of the proposed exercise of the Commission.

The Commissioners are being mandated to:

- (a) seek to uncover the truth
- (b) to provide the nation with a proper and comprehensive understanding of those political events so that any mistakes made in the past may not be repeated
- (c) to provide the nation with an opportunity to become genuinely reconciled and be permanently healed.

This seemingly Herculean Task has been entrusted to three illustrious individuals:

- Fr. Mark Haynes, parish priest of the Roman Catholic Church, based in the village of Beaulieu here in Grenada; a highly respected, firm and responsible son of the soil.
- His Lordship, Bishop Sehon Goodridge, Bishop of the Windward Islands Anglican Diocese, based in St. Vincent; yet another of the Holy Cloth, who is also highly respected and an intellectual in his own right.
- Hon. Donald A. B. Trotman, retired Judge of Guyana, now a legal consultant. Hon. Donald Trotman, had been the Attorney General and acted as Governor General in the British Virgin Islands and Solicitor General and Director of Public Prosecutions in St. Vincent and the Grenadines.

He is a United National Human Rights Fellow and was Chairman of the Human Rights Section of World Peace through Law Centre and was President of the Caribbean Human Rights Institute.

In Grenada Hon. Donald A. B. Trotman conducted three significant assignments:

1. On behalf of the Bustamante Institute of Public and International Affairs based in Jamaica, he conducted a survey of Political and Civil Rights in Grenada during the period 1970 - 1983.

2. As executive Director of the Caribbean Institute of Human Rights, he organised a Human Rights Symposium in Grenada to mark the 10th Anniversary of the American Convention on Human Rights on behalf of the Organisation of American States.

It was at this convention on 18th July 1988 that Grenada took the historic initiative to ratify the relevant instruments to launch the Inter American Convention on Human Rights.

3. Hon. Trotman was also Chairman of the Cargo Handling Investigative Committee established by the Government of Grenada in 1989 to investigate and report on Cargo Handling operations on the St. George's Pier.

As can be seen, Hon. Donald Trotman is highly suited to be a member and be the Chairman of this most important Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

Hon. Carl Rattray of Jamaica, also a retired Judge was yet another noble candidate to be Chairman of the Commission but he was forced to decline the appointment for health reasons. I take the opportunity to wish Hon. Carl Rattray, all the best for the future.

Ladies and Gentlemen, the world today is vastly different from the world of just 20 years ago. The phenomenon of globalisation, by way of trade liberalisation, technological advancement and the integration of financial markets, has had a tremendous influence on the world economic order.

Gone are the days when small under developed and developing countries like ours, can rely on any significant protected markets, grants and technical assistance from developed countries.

As a result of this change in the world economic order, most of our economies have become stagnated. We therefore have to rely heavily on our human resource for greater efficiency in order to become more competitive. If the attention of our human resource is diverted towards civil insurrection and political turmoil, then opportunities are lost for enhancing our productive effort.

Over the years we have seen civil insurrection and political turmoil from Jamaica at the upper end of the Caribbean Chain to Guyana to the South. There is no doubt that more economic and social progress could have been made in all of those countries, had it not been for these unnecessary distractions. We now have an opportunity today to make an assessment of our recent history, comprehend the events of that period, so that any mistakes which had been made in the past may not be repeated.

I now take the opportunity, on behalf of the Government and people of Grenada to officially launch the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and wish its members God's speed in their deliberations. I thank you.

Maurice Bishop murder and others (PBC Young Leaders Project 1999-2000)

Extracts from newspapers
Trinidad Express

Thursday, Nov 10th 1983

Army soldiers carry a body from a mass grave here. Three badly burned bodies were removed from a former PRA camp. Officials suspect it may be the body of the former Prime Minister, Maurice Bishop may be in the mass grave stemming from the massacre.

Cana Reuter

A U.S Official said today that the remains of three males and one female appeared to be in a grave...

Wed Nov 9th 1983
Trinidad Express

The body of slain Prime Minister Maurice Bishop may be among four corpses unearthed today in a common grave in Grenada. US troops on a tip from a man who reported seeing 4 bodies, one of them Bishop's buried by Grenadian soldiers in a shallow pit at a military camp near St. George's, the officials said. The recovered bodies could not be immediately identified, but Bishop's dental records will be matched against them, and the results should be known within a few days they said. US army captain, Henry Fore, Head of the Army Graves Registration team in Grenada, told reporters that a cook who used to work at camp Calivigny reported seeing Grenadian troops drag 4 bodies to a trash pit at the rear of the camp which was the main ammunition storage depot for the Grenadian Peoples Revolutionary Army (PRA). According to the cook, the soldiers first tried to burn the bodies then filled the pit with earth. Ferris told reporters it was important to the Grenadian people that Bishop's body be found.

Excerpt from "Urgent Fury" by Mark Adkin. Page 81.

The job was not completed until around midday on October 20th. Abdullah worked alone and was short of wood and old tires, which he used to line the grave. The only known witness was a camp cook, Private Christopher Bowen, who described seeing the bodies, including those of Bishop, Whiteman, Creft, and both Bains, "frying as if you frying eggs in a frying pan."

Thursday, Nov 10th 1983
Trinidad Express

US army soldiers carry a body from a mass grave here. 3 to 4 badly burned bodies were removed near a former PRA military camp. Officials suspect that the remains of former Prime Minister Maurice Bishop may be in the mass grave stemming from the massacre.

Thursday, November 10th 1983
Trinidad Express

A US official said today the remains of 3 males and 1 female appear to be in a grave on Grenada where other officials have said former Prime Minister Maurice Bishop may have been buried. State Department spokesman Allan Rumberg said forensic evidence would be required for any positive identification. Officials in Grenada said yesterday the grave may contain the remains of Bishop who was killed in a military takeover on October 19th along with 3 of his Ministers.

Tuesday, Oct 2nd 1984
Trinidad Express

Grenadian Magistrate Jerome Forde, today began hearing in a preliminary enquiry, into charges brought against former Police Commissioner Ian St. Bernard in connection with political unrest here, nearly a year ago. St. Bernard, a leading member of the left wing NJM is charged with other unnamed persons with preparing by the show of armed forced to procure an alteration in Government of Grenada last October. The charge is related to the overthrow of the PRG formed by the NJM by a radical faction in a bloody military coup in which Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and several others were killed. At today's court sitting, the prosecution, which is led by Jamaican Queen's Council, Velma Hilton called Robert Evans, a cousin of the late Prime Minister, as the first witness to give evidence. Evans the former Project Coordinator at the International Airport at Point Salines in the south of the island, was among those detained by the military during the October events.

Thursday Oct 4th 1984
Cana Reuter

A leftist political party, dedicated to the ideals of slain Grenadian Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, has called on the authorities to state the "true facts" concerning the whereabouts of the remains of the late revolutionary leader and colleagues killed with him, in last year's bloody coup. The MBPM in a statement, also claimed, that the US Government among others was withholding information on the matter. Bishop and three Government Ministers were gunned down in the coup that climaxed fierce fighting between moderate and hardline factions of his ousted administration. A US invasion followed. The party said it is calling on Caribbean Governments and heads of International Organisations including the UN to assist in this fundamental human rights matter so that the families of the deceased and our whole nation will have the chance to bury the remains of our heroes in keeping with our national tradition. MBPM said it was in possession of a sworn affidavit by a person who said he led US forces to a spot where he saw Bishop and his colleagues burned and buried shortly after they were killed. The party said the remains were recovered from a pit in the Calivigny military camp Southern Grenada by US forces on or about Oct 26th last year. The Grenada authorities have denied knowledge of where the bodies are.

Saturday Oct 6th 1984

Grenadian magistrate Jerome Forde has begun an inquiry into torture related charges brought against 4 former officials of the PRG which was deposed last October. The 4 are former commissioner of prisons, Justin Roberts, ex army lieutenant colonel Liam James, Victor Husbands, the general secretary of the Grenadian Peace Council, and Trade Unionist, John Ventour. Roberts, Husbands and James have been charged by the Police of causing grievous harm and Ventour in causing harm to a number of persons held as political prisoners by the PRG during its 1979-83 rule. At yesterday's court sitting, the only witness called by the defense, was Roland Budhlall a former political detainee. Budhlall, along with two brothers and two others, was sentenced in 1982 to be hanged in connection with a bomb blast at a Government rally two years earlier, in which three persons were killed. The five appealed against the sentence, were given a pardon by Governor General Sir Paul Scoon after last October's US led invasion.

Wednesday Oct 10th 1984

The prosecution team retains the five member team led by former Attorney General Karl Hudson Phillips. The others are Jamaican Queen's Council Velma Hilton, Attorneys Odel Adams and Doodnauth Singh of Guyana and Ulric Dougan of Trinidad and Tobago.

Tuesday October 16th 1984

Grenada Trial starts today.

Authorities mount rigid security. Grenadian authorities were mounting one the biggest security operations ever seen here as 19 army and political leaders of the former leftist administration prepared to go on trial for the murder of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, in a bloody coup a year ago.

Wednesday, Oct 17th 1984

The 19 accused in the Maurice Bishop murder trial which began in a specially arranged chamber of the Supreme Court of Grenada yesterday refused to plead on any of the 11 counts of murder of which they were charged. "I will not recognize this court" said Andy Mitchell, the first named accused in the trial for the Murder of former Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, 3 cabinet Ministers, 2 top trade unionists and five other people on October 19th 1983.

The 19 accused are:

Hudson Austin
Bernard Coard
Phyllis Coard
Lester Redhead
Leon Cornwall
Colville McBarnette
Dave Bartholomew
John Ventour
Liam James
Ewart Layne

Andy Mitchell - jailed for 30 years
Vincent Joseph- jailed for 45 years
Callistus Bernard
Cosmos Richardson - jailed for 45 years - freed
Christopher Stroude
Fabian Gabriel turned state witness and acquitted
Raeburn Nelson - turned state witness and acquitted
Cecil Prime

They are accused of murdering, Maurice Bishop, Jacklene Creft, Unison Whiteman, Norris Bain, Fitzroy Bain, Keith Hayling, Evelyn Grant Bullen, Evelyn Maitland, Avis Ferguson, Vincent Noel and Gemma Belmar.

Wednesday October, 24th 1984

A Grenadian worker finishes the base of a bronze monument, erected at the St. George's school of medicine campus. The memorial inscribed with the names of the 19 US servicemen killed in the 1983 invasion will be unveiled later this week.

Saturday Oct 27th 1984

The lone left wing political party contesting the December 3rd general elections in Grenada used the first anniversary of the US led invasion of the Caribbean island to condemn those who took part in the act. Kendrick Radix of the MBPM described the invasion to topple a Marxist junta that had seized power in a bloody coup killing Maurice Bishop and several others, as a savage American attack. The ex-PRG Minister, also lashed out at Governor General Sir Paul Scoon and his American advisors accusing them of trying to hide the spot where Bishop and three cabinet colleagues, killed in the coup were allegedly buried. Bishop's body has never been found.

He was addressing about 50 people attending a graveside ceremony to pay respect to 13 soldiers of the now disbanded killed in combat, against US troops. Radix who served as Industrialization Minister in Bishop's PRG, said that if Bishop had not died in such a brutal manner, the Americans would have met another Vietnam on their arrival because the men, women and children would have resisted the enemy.

Maurice Bishop trial officially opens.

Thursday, April 24th 1986

Chief Prosecution Karl Hudson Phillips today formally opened the much delayed Maurice Bishop murder trial with a lengthy speech to the High court. He told the court that the prosecution planned to call in more than 30 witnesses to give evidence against the defendants who are without council after instructing their lawyers nearly two weeks ago to withdraw from the case.

In a typical incident, an Irish priest, Father Sean Doggett, discovered the bodies of three young militiamen who had died defending the RFG transmission station and been left to rot in the building for six days. Having dug a grave but finding no protective clothing with which to make the burial, Father Doggett approached a US colonel for assistance. The officer replied that he and his men had come to kill the enemy, not to bury them. Such a response meant that a great many bodies were finally interred by the civilian population after they had been located by the smell. At the end of the year, the State department announced that 45 Grenadians had been killed and 337 wounded. These figures were not immediately ratified by local sources, some of which remarked upon the cursory manner in which the US forces searched the rubble of Richmond Hill hospital before having it bulldozed in.

Name of Deceased	Place and Date of Death	Does Family know of Burial Site?
Maurice Bishop	Fort Rupert 19 th Oct, 1983	No
Jacqueline Creft	Fort Rupert 19 th Oct, 1983	No
Unison Whiteman	Fort Rupert 19 th Oct, 1983	No
Fitzroy Bain	Fort Rupert 19 th Oct, 1983	No
Norris Bain	Fort Rupert 19 th Oct, 1983	No
Keith Hayling	Fort Rupert 19 th Oct, 1983	No
Evelyn Maitland	Fort Rupert 19 th Oct, 1983	No
Simon Alexander	Fort Rupert 19 th Oct, 1983	No
Evelyn Bullen	Fort Rupert 19 th Oct, 1983	No
Andy Sebastian Alexander	Fort Rupert 19 th Oct, 1983	No
Gemma Belmar	Fort Rupert 19 th Oct, 1983	
Eric Dumont	Fort Rupert 19 th Oct, 1983	No
Avis Ferguson	Fort Rupert 19 th Oct, 1983	Yes
Vince Noel	Fort Rupert 19 th Oct, 1983	No
Alleyne Romain	Fort Rupert 19 th Oct, 1983	Yes
Raphael Mason	Fort Rupert 19 th Oct, 1983	Not sure, Check Mr and Mrs. Victor 444-6273
Franklyn James	Fort Rupert 19 th Oct, 1983	Not sure. Check Joe at Pablo
Nelson Steele	Fort Rupert 19 th Oct, 1983	Not sure, Check Gary Paul for DJ Rocky who might also know of Raphael Mason.
O. Cadet Conrad Mayers WO.2 Raphael Dawson Sergeant Dorset Peters Lieutenant Corporal Martin Simon	Fort Rupert 19 th Oct, 1983	Yes. They were all soldiers. Confirm this with Raeburn Nelson. Is Raphael Dawson same as Raphael Mason?
Godwin McQueen	Beausejour October 25 th 1983	Not sure. In book Urgent Fury, five PRM soldiers

		were ambushed heading south in an armoured car. 444-8612
Daniel Holder	Beausejour October 25 th 1983	Not sure.
Cleveland Phillip	Beausejour October 25 th 1983	Not sure
A	Beausejour October 25 th 1983	Not sure In book Urgent Fury, five PRM soldiers were ambushed heading south in an armoured car. Hence B,C,D,E
B	Beausejour October 25 th 1983	Not sure
C	Beausejour October 25 th 1983	Not sure
D	Beausejour October 25 th 1983	Not sure
E	Beausejour October 25 th 1983	Not sure
Blondel Church	Morne Rouge Oct 25 th 1983	Not sure

Interview with Gravedigger Mr. Andre Andall 440 6225.

Mr. Andall is the gate man at the hospital and also a part time gravedigger. He worked together with two others in October and November 1983 collecting bodies, Cubans and Grenadians, and burying them on the spot. When the Cubans demanded the return of their dead, the bodies were hastily dug up. All of them were shipped to Cuba for identification and separation. The 13 Grenadian soldiers were sent back in wooden coffins lined with tin.

He made the following points:

1. Leslie Bailey (now deceased) told Andre that two disaster pouches they received from the medical school(confirm this) were body parts found at the Fort in drums. They were not under the impression that they might have contained the remains of Maurice Bishop. When Nadia Bishop came over, a Back hoe was employed to assist with the search for these pouches. Since they were deemed insignificant at the time, the site of burial could not be found. Also, fresh graves were either built on or around the site, making exhuming tricky if not impossible.

2. After the Americans went to Calivigny and took out the bodies, the following was found.

- a) A set of mandibles (with 4 teeth)
- b) Rings
- c) A lady's purse
- d) 2 set of key rings (for a Volkswagen)

In picking up the bodies in Beausejour, two were found in the canefield and two were found in the house. (Try to get from reports who was in the house and who was in the canefield) They were buried in Beausejour and then in the cemetery. This does not agree with Father Sean's account of three being found in the house.

e) Andre does not think that all the bodies came on the same day. He believes that the thirteen who I shall call the unnamed soldiers, were all who were unaccounted for.

f) Two mass graves were dug for the mental patients.

The following soldiers died at Beausejour. Only nicknames known.

Name	Nickname	Location of body when found
Eugene Roberts		
	Peck La	
	Peckyman	

The following died in St. George's

Nickname	Name	Where did he die?
	Noel	Government House. Oliver La Crete, working in Breweries can confirm this.
	Gittens	In Morne Rouge while trying to launch a grenade.
Jackson		He was from Pomme Rose in St. David's. Died in Tanteen. Was decapitated.

Soldiers who died in South

Nickname of Soldier	Name of Soldier	Details
Saltfish		
Inculcate		

Interview with Galbo (grave digger)

He remembers putting four brown body bags in hole. This is different from Andre's story, because he mentioned two body bags. He remembered Mr. Clinton Bailey asking him to bury them.

Bus driver Natural Mystic, Nevel Marryshow was in armoured car in south. Used to drive a BTR when two men died.

Yesterday, murder charges were conditionally dropped against one of the 19 defendants Fabian Gabriel when he agreed to turn in state evidence. The court he said, would hear how Bishop was gunned down, then had his throat slashed to make sure he was dead and also how his finger was cut off so that a ring could be removed. Among key prosecution witnesses would be George Louison, the former Agriculture Minister in Bishop's PRG, Cletus St. Paul, a former body guard to the late Prime Minister, and soldier Fabian Gabriel, who defected yesterday from the ranks of the defendants to become a state witness. Ex soldier Beverly and Walter Charles would also appear for the prosecution.

Sunday April 27th 1986

Leslie Pierre

Jacqueline Creft, former Education Minister, pleaded with her slayers for her life, telling them she was pregnant, but was told, "No f...ing problems now, before being murdered on the afternoon of October 19th 1983. In his opening presentation, chief prosecutor Karl Hudson Phillips, told the jury witnesses would relate how one Avis Ferguson has her buttocks shot off and her body cut in two by gun fire, how Education Minister Jacqueline Creft pleaded for mercy as she was pregnant and was told, "No f...ing problems now" and how Captain Lester Redhead cut a ring off the finger of Maurice Bishop and slit his throat with a knife after he was shot.

Friday April 25th 1986

St. George's General Hospital Matron, Agnes Grant, spoke of a frightening experience, when in the company of Bishop and others, a room at Army Headquarters at Fort Rupert, came under fire. Grant was the first prosecution witness to give evidence in the trial of 18 former Government and Military officers charged with murdering Bishop and 10 associates including 3 Ministers. Grant indicated that as soon as the first volley of shots hit the building, the late Prime Minister ordered all the occupants to lay flat on the floor. She said however, that before the building came under attack, Whiteman complained of not feeling well and she gave him a small bottle of smelling salts to sniff. The matron said at least one woman had her buttocks blown off, Bain was bleeding from an apparent wound on the shoulder and Gemma Belmar who died weeks after in the Hospital, was lying on the table in the room, bleeding from a wound on her head after the firing had totally died down. She said the Prime Minister ordered everyone to leave the room, with the children leading the way, followed by the women and then the male occupants. The prosecution is contending that after Bishop emerged from the room, he and 8 colleagues were taken to the top square at Fort Rupert and executed on the orders of the Central Committee of the then ruling Marxist oriented NJM.

Saturday April 26th 1986

For the third straight day, the Maurice Bishop murder trial was disrupted by chanting defendants, seventeen of whom were sentenced to two weeks in jail for contempt of court. Mrs. Lynn Creft, Pamela Bullen Cherubin whose father died during the coup, told the court about the injuries and deaths resulting from the heavy hail of automatic gun fire which ripped through a building at army headquarters at Fort Rupert in which Bishop and supporters had sought refuge after they had freed him from house arrest.

Creft said she saw one woman whom she identified as Avis Ferguson having her buttocks and intestines blown away by gunfire. Bullen Cherubin, a nurse, also reported seeing school girl Gemma Belmar with a hole in her head inside the room as soldiers pounded the building for several minutes, before the late Prime Minister surrendered. Creft told the court that she witnessed her daughter being taken away at gun point by a soldier she identified only as "goat" when the two of them tried to leave the fort after it was taken over by soldiers loyal to Bishop's opponents of the PRG. "When we, Mrs. Creft and Jacqueline, one of the officers pointed the gun at her and he said, stand up there with your hands up and I just looked at her and she said, Mammy go on." She told the court. The mother of the slain Education Minister said that that was the last time she saw her daughter alive.

Both Bullen Cherubin and Creft stated that as soon as the building at Fort Rupert came under fire, its occupants were ordered by Bishop to lie flat to the ground. The former said during the siege the late Prime Minister asked one of the soldiers in the room for a gun, but Bishop was told he could not fire from inside the building because there was no window and everyone inside would get hurt. She spoke of someone in the room shouting out, "We surrender" after the firing had ceased and that the reply from outside the building was that they should all come out with their hands in the air. She said the women were carrying the injured schoolgirl and on reaching the verandah of the building, there were three bodies that looked dead and in the yard trucks and cars were on fire.

Wednesday, April 30th 1986
Day 5 of the trial

Mrs. Annie Bain, widow of Norris Bain, who was slain along with Maurice Bishop on October 19th 1983, broke down in tears twice yesterday as she gave evidence in the Maurice Bishop murder trial in Grenada. Norris Bain was Minister of Housing in the PRG and Mrs. Bain spent an hour in the witness box telling the court her version of the killings which have been described as the Fort Rupert massacre. She told the judge that when the shooting stopped and she left the room, she looked back and saw her husband being marched out alive in a line with others with their hands in the air. She told of not being aware that she had herself received a bullet wound in her right arm and had a bullet lodged in her right hip which is still there until a nurse drew her attention to her condition. She also identified a ring which was broken and had obviously been burnt as the one her husband was wearing when she last saw him. It was when she was identifying the ring with the compass square of the mechanics lodge that Mrs. Bain broke down in tears for the second time.

Thursday May 1st 1986

An eighteen year old Grenadian student who lost her left leg during the bloody 1983 coup here today told the High Court of her ordeal and the army slaying of the people who supported the ex-Prime Minister Maurice Bishop. Anne Neptune was one of two prosecution witnesses giving evidence in the long delayed trial of 18 former army and Government officials charged with the murdering Bishop and some members of his Cabinet during the palace coup. Neptune hobbled into court on crutches to take the witness stand after former PRA nurse, Merlin Rulow had told the court of seeing Bishop, foreign Minister Unison Whiteman, Education Minister Jacqueline Creft, Housing Minister Norris Bain, and Trade Unionist Fitzroy Bain, lying on the ground at Fort Rupert, looking dead.

Lieutenant Abdullah who asked him for some board and tyres and he told him he had none. Abdullah drove away in a brown jeep and returned again and he talked about wanting to put the bodies in a large hole near the training school toilet. I asked him why, said Bowen and he said they line them up the major staff to kill them and he will line up their ass to bury them. Hudson Phillips then asked, "After he made those remarks to you, what happened?" Bowen: After he made those remarks to me, he took up a spade and started putting the bodies in the hole. After he put the bodies in the hole, I asked Lieutenant Abdullah why he throw the bodies in the hole, and he turned and told me you cannot question any military things.

Hudson Phillips: After he spoke like that to you, what did you do?

Bowen: I left and went to the barracks, crying.

Hudson Phillips: Why were you crying?

Bowen: Because my leader dead.

Hudson Phillips: You went back to the barracks. What else did you do?

Bowen: I took a kerchief from my pocket wiping my face with it, and while wiping my face I looked up from the training school toilet and I saw smoke coming from the hole.

Hudson Phillips: After you saw the smoke, what else did you see?

Bowen: I saw Lieutenant Abdullah coming from the bushes by the fire.

Charles, who was in the witness box when the court was adjourned on Monday, told the court that she saw when Bishop and six others were shot and fell to the ground. She also saw Lester Redhead cut a finger with a ring off the hand of Maurice Bishop and slit his throat with a knife. She also helped to carry Bishop's body away in a blanket. Charles under questioning by DPP Velma Hilton said the following:

"I saw Lester Redhead leave where he was. He went across to Maurice Bishop took a knife from his pocket and cut a finger off of Maurice's hand and also his neck. Charles went on to say that she saw a ring on the finger which Redhead cut off but she did not see what became of the ring. At about 3:00pm Charles said she saw Lieutenant Abdullah put his rifle to the temple of Vincent Noel but Lieutenant Raeburn Nelson called out and told him to stop. Later at about 9:00 p.m she saw soldiers loading the seven bodies into a public works truck with tyres and buckets containing something and they drove away. She also saw Lieutenant Abdullah drive away in a brown jeep about half an hour later.

Friday 9th May, 1986

Acting Chief Justice, Byron agreed to a request from the prosecution, for presentation of a deposition arising out of the 1984 preliminary inquiry into the case. The deposition was from Jamaican soldier Errol Brown who said PRA member, Christopher Bowen took him to a hole where Bishop's and other bodies were burnt. According to the deposition read out by registrar Raphael Baptiste, the Jamaican soldier said that he saw pieces of bones, flesh and flies on his first visit to the site.

Saturday May, 10th 1986

Eric La Qua, undertaker told the court through Karl Hudson Phillips that as a result of a telephone he received at about 10:00pm on October, 19th he went to Fort Rupert led by a Daihatsu van with soldiers in it. There he collected five dead bodies, some of which were dressed in soldiers uniform. About 45 minutes after returning to the funeral agency, he got another call to return to the fort, again led by the Daihatsu van.

Neptune said she was shot near the entrance to Fort Rupert. It happened while she was trying to elude approaching armoured cars which stormed Fort Rupert where Bishop and his colleagues had taken refuge.

"I saw the armoured cars coming up towards the fort and hear gun shots coming from the direction of the armoured cars. I started to run towards the building but fell. Before I fell, my left leg was painning she told the court. While I was on the ground and couldn't move, many people were running all about and a boy came and pulled me away to the corner of the building she added.

Saturday May 3rd 1986

Former soldier and PRA yesterday told the special court in Richmond Hill, he saw Lieutenant Abdullah shoot Prime Minister Maurice Bishop on October 19th 1983. He then issued the orders to corporal Joe and Richardson to shoot the other Ministers who were lined up against the wall. Lieutenant Abdullah has already been identified as Callistus Bernard and the witness Walter Charles said he also knew corporal Joe as Vincent. Bernard, Vincent Joseph, Cosmo Richardson, and fifteen others including former deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard, his wife Phyllis and former Brigadier Hudson Austin are on trial before acting chief judge Dennis Byron, charged with the murder of Maurice Bishop, three of his Ministers and seven other persons.

Tuesday May 6th 1986

Policeman Errol Agard told the Maurice Bishop murder trial today he saw about 60 bodies at Army Headquarters, Fort Rupert after it was stormed in an October 1983 coup by soldiers using armoured cars. Agard was the ninth prosecution witness to give evidence against 18 leftist accused of murdering Maurice Bishop Prime Minister of the ill fated PRG and 10 associates at the fort. He said he saw the bodies lying on the ground or in a public works truck in the yard of the fort when he arrived there on a fire appliance called in to clean up the area in the aftermath of the massacre. Agard said the bodies were being loaded unto the truck which he said was about three quarters filled by two soldiers, including one he named as Elton Thomas. Thomas is not on trial

Thursday, May, 8th 1986

Day 10 of the Maurice Bishop trial

A former cook at the Calivigny army camp testified yesterday that the bodies of Maurice Bishop and others and four others were burnt. Christopher Bowen told the court that he saw five bodies, including Bishop's were burnt and that he cried. Bowen followed Beverley Ann Marie Charles to the witness stand as the case against the 18 former members of the PRG for the murder of Maurice Bishop and others continued in the Richmond Hill court yesterday. He is questioned by lead prosecutor Karl Hudson Phillips. He said that he was a cook in the PRA forces that was stationed at the camp at Calivigny, known as camp Fedon. On the morning of October 19th 1983, he saw Officer Cadet Myers who was in charge of the camp handing out civilian clothes to the soldiers at about 9:00 p.m. Later he saw the soldiers drive away in a truck. Coming almost to the morning of the next day, he was awakened by a youngster named Kent, the son of Lieutenant Francis who was in Cuba who spoke to him. As a result he went to the training school toilet and saw some bodies lying there.

There were five bodies; those of Maurice Bishop, Jacqueline Creft, Unison Whiteman, Norris Bain and Fitzroy Bain. There appeared to be well shot up and cut up. He also saw

This time he collected three bodies, and he recognized one of them to be Miss Ferguson. He said he did not know the driver of the Daihatsu van or any of the other persons he saw and dealt with at the fort which was dark that night. He testified that he buried the bodies.

Wednesday 14th May, 1986

Day 14 of the Maurice Bishop murder trial

The bodies of Maurice Bishop and other Cabinet Ministers were sprinkled with gas and set afire. Former PRA sergeant Vernon Gabriel told the Richmond Hill Court that yesterday, that the bodies were put in a hole and Lieutenant Abdullah gave some soldiers a white plastic bucket with gas to sprinkle the bodies, after putting wood and some old crates and old tyres and then Abdullah lit a match and set the bodies on fire. After that, he gave instructions for the men to be returned to base while he remained and watch the bodies burn.

Tuesday, May 27th 1986

The following is an excerpt from a statement made by Callistus Abdullah Bernard.

Whilst at Fort Rupert, after the crowd had dispersed, I heard Captain Redhead say halt and I looked and saw Maurice Bishop, Jacqueline Creft, Unison Whiteman and Norris Bain walking away from Fort Rupert. They halted and went and told them to march with their hands up onto the square. They marched onto the square. Maurice had his hands behind his back. I lined them up facing the wall. Major Stroude and Captain Redhead were behind me and we all had weapons. Captain Redhead then told Brat Bullen and Maitland to go and join Maurice and the others and they went. I then told Fitzroy Bain to go and join the others on the square and he went and lined up facing the wall. Some person also sent Keith Hayling and he joined them. I told them about turn and they all turned around. Major Stroude was there with me, Captain Redhead was also there and a machine gunner who I don't know by name and another soldier who had an AK. There were also two machine gunners on the top of the wall of the square. I told Maurice Bishop and the rest of the people with him, that the Central Committee had decided that they should be executed by fire. I told them about turn. I gave the command, soldiers prepare to fire and fire. On or about the time I was giving the command, Jacqueline Creft was saying Comrade wait, wait, hold on. The machine gunner on the square with me and the soldier with the AK on the square with me and I all fired together. The bodies fell backward, some fell down slow and some fell down fast.

Fitzroy Bain's body was moving and after we stopped firing, Officer Gabriel fired one shot in his head of Fitzroy Bain and the body stopped moving. I then went and examined the bodies and made sure they were dead. I told Gabriel to get some blankets, wrap up the bodies and put them on a truck until further instructions. I then left the square and went to join a meeting that was in progress in the mess hall at Fort Rupert chaired by Major Stroude. About 100 people attended that meeting and at the end of the meeting I said, "Long live the revolution, long live Socialism." I then left and along with the other personnel of my armoured car, went back to Fort Frederick on the armoured car. I went back to Fort Rupert on the night of 19th October, around 11:00pm and the bodies were on a truck. I drove my van there and then the truck driven by a man whom I don't know and about 7 soldiers on it left for Camp Fedon, Calivigny, with the bodies to be buried. I drove my van and followed them. When they reached a road in Calivigny, the truck stuck, so I had to transport the bodies in my van.

When we reached Camp Fedon, a grave was already dug, so we put in the bodies, poured gasoline, lit it and let them burn until the next day and then I covered the grave. When I covered the grave, only bones, little pieces of skull, and stuff was in the grave.

Interview with Callistus Bernard. How come only five bodies were burnt. How come when the grave was excavated by the Americans only 4 skeletal remains were found? The cook said that he saw five bodies yet you say that on your instructions, Gabriel loaded the eight bodies onto the truck. What happened to the rest?

Saturday May 24th 1986

A sworn declaration given to Barbados Police Sergeant Ronald Bowen who was in the invasion said the following:

It said that Fabian Gabriel and fellow soldiers Richardson and Andy Mitchell finished off those persons who apparently survived the first hail of bullets from the firing squad on the orders from Lieutenant Callistus Abdullah Bernard.

Richardson, Mitchell, Bernard and fifteen other former army members and Government officials are charged with murdering Bishop and ten associates.

Joseph said Abdullah ordered him and another soldier P.C Noel who is believed to have died in the invasion, to cock their weapons and fire on the late Prime Minister.

Wednesday, 11th June, 1986

Barbadian Police Inspector Jasper Watson, today gave the High Court hearing of the Maurice Bishop murder trial a description of the grave in which the late Grenadian leader was buried after he was executed in the 1983 Palace coup. Watson, who headed the team of officers who investigated the crime, said the grave located at Camp Fedon, in southern Grenada was 20 feet long, eight feet wide and some five feet at its deepest point. The hole was stink, there were particles, burnt matter and cloth inside and outside the hole, the court was told.

Wednesday May 14th 1986.

Daily Nation (Barbadian newspaper)

Early the following day about 1:30am Gabriel said he went to Camp Fedon on Grenada's south coast in a jeep with Bernard where he saw a truck with the bodies of Bishop and his colleagues stuck in mud. He said Bernard ordered he and nine other soldiers to remove the bodies. Following which they were taken to a large hole at the army headquarters. He said the bodies gave off an awful stench and the case of disinfectant had to be used. A number of wooden crates and truck tyres were then placed in the hole with the bodies before Bernard threw a bucket of gasoline on them and set the hole on fire with a match.

Barbadian Newspapers

Daily Nation

May 9th and 10th 1986

The court heard yesterday how the charred remains of Maurice Bishop and those killed with him were dug up after the United States led intervention.

The evidence was related from the deposition of a Jamaican soldier which was toughly resisted by the accused through a spokesman Ewart Layne who objected to its admittance. However acting chief Judge, Dennis Byron ruled it admissible after two prosecution witnesses, court clerk Denise Garcia and immigration officer Lasley Williams gave evidence in support of the deposition. Garcia said she was the clerk in charge when the soldier Earl Browne gave evidence in the preliminary inquiry while Williams testified seeing him board a flight out of Pearls Airport on August 1st 1984. The deposition related how Brown and other members of the Peace Keeping Force accompanied PRA cook Christopher Bowen to a hole at Calivigny. It said gravediggers later went to the site and discovered wallets, billfolds, coins, a burnt ring, pieces of human bones and some fragments of burnt flesh.

Trinidad Guardian

Monday, October 7th 1996

Court: You are not saying you are sorry for what you have done, you are saying you are sorry that you were part of the system," said Noel who was attorney General under the PRG prior to the October crisis. If they want to be pardoned, they have to show that they are in fact sorry and repentant. Unless that happens, I cannot see how they can be entitled to some form of mercy," Noel said.

This was in response to a statement by Bernard Coard who said he would accept moral and political responsibility for the killings which came at the tail end of an internal party split. Attorney Lloyd Noel was the one making the statements.

Excerpts from the book Urgent Fury by Mark Adkin

Page 308.

The sledgehammer had crushed the nut. At what cost? The Cubans had 24 killed in combat, another 59 wounded, and 602 unwounded prisoners repatriated to Cuba over a period of 4 days, starting on November 4th. The Grenadians suffered the most. Their military casualties have never been separated accurately from civilian ones. An estimated 67 died, including 17 in the bombing of the mental hospital and another boy accidentally shot by a U.S serviceman with his pistol sometime later. It was announced that 18 U.S servicemen had been killed one way or another, but this was increased to 19 with the death of Luketina in hospital. The two Ranger pathfinders' deaths, when their parachutes failed to open, have never been officially acknowledged.

Page 315

After hostilities ceased, there was a lot of wrangling among the U.S authorities, the Cubans and the International Red Cross concerning the repatriation of Cuban personnel and dead bodies. With American prompting, Sir Paul Scoon announced that all Cuban diplomatic staff must leave Grenada within 24 hours. Their embassy was surrounded by U.S troops on the evening of November 1st, with nobody permitted to enter or leave. At a meeting on the following morning between Rizo (Torres Rizo was the Cuban Ambassador in Grenada under Bishop and at the time of Urgent Fury) and Gillespie, who had been designated the U.S Ambassador on the island, the Cubans refused to leave until the repatriation of all their citizens had been completed - a not unreasonable attitude. Their note stated that the only way the United States could get them out was with the use of force. They also sought information on the number of prisoners, wounded, and dead.

Rizo wanted to visit captives together with the graves of those killed for identification purposes. At this stage, the U.S officials were unwilling or unable to answer the queries, and they were permitted no visits.

Questions and Exercises

One of the problems was that the Cubans killed in the fighting had been buried hastily in a makeshift grave with no proper registration or attempt at identification. Some bodies were put in plastic bags and some were not, and they shared the grave with a number of PRA dead. It was not until November 10th that exhumation began in the presence of the Red Cross and a Cuban official. The task was most unpleasant; more than two weeks had passed since they had died. The Cubans were not allowed to make identifications in Grenada. As the corpses were brought up, the Cuban representative protested that several bodies were in PRA olive green uniforms and therefore must be Grenadians because the Cubans had fought in civilian clothes. It made no difference; all thirty-seven were flown to Barbados the next day. Arrangements that had been made to carry out proper identification in Barbados fell through when the Government there refused permission. A Cuban plane took them home the next day.

A decree announcing five days of national mourning was issued from the Palace of the Revolution on November 13th. This was for the Cuban dead, who were to be given full military honours, including a lying in state of the coffins in Havana. Flags were at half-mast; all public entertainment was suspended. Before any ceremonies could begin, however, the Cubans had to be identified and separated from the Grenadians. To permit this, the flight bringing the 37 bodies landed at the city of Holguin, not Havana. There, 13 Grenadians were identified, and General Raul Castro made a lengthy speech in their honour. They were provided with coffins, draped in the Grenadian flag, and placed under guard for the public to see before arrangements were made to return them to their own country.

Page 372

3d/325th battalion was under the command of lieutenant colonel John Raines. During the day, a PRA informant told Raines that Bishop had been buried at Calivigny. A team was later guided to the spot and excavations carried out. There was not much left to put in the black plastic bags; Abdullah had done his gruesome task thoroughly. Charred bones, some tissue, clothing associated with Creft, and personal effects of the Bains and Maitland were sifted from the soil. Of Bishop, nothing could be identified; indeed the investigators claimed that none of the remains was consistent with a man well over six feet tall. More mysterious still, no traces of heads or hands could be found, and there appeared to have been only five bodies in the pit, not nine.

The suggested disappearance of Bishop's body is an intriguing mystery. It was said at the time that the U.S authorities had removed his remains to the United States, not just for identification but to ensure that he could not be buried in Grenada, with his grave becoming a national shrine. The story of no heads or hands, and nothing being discovered pertaining to Bishop, was allegedly just a cover put out by the United States to justify their not returning his remains. Although I have no specific evidence, this story has a ring of truth about it. Certainly no Grenadian witness to the execution or burial ever claimed that hands or heads were cut off before burning. If they had been, somebody would assuredly have mentioned it during the following months or at the trial. Abdullah had no reason to do so; he was convinced that burning the bodies thoroughly was more than sufficient.

Fore said the report that led his grave's registration unit to the site came from a Grenadian civilian who had cooked for the Grenadian and Cuban troops who used the site as a training camp. The army captain said the witness had recognized Bishop's body as it was burnt with three others at the camp.

As reporters watched, a U.S army Graves Registration team began digging this afternoon in a 3 foot deep pit. Skeletal remains were visible, which Captain Henry Fore said were definitely human.

"We are not certain that the remains are those of Bishop's," Fore said. The one body we are looking at now is basically skeletal remains. We are relatively sure these are the remains of Bishop, but we wouldn't be sure until we get the forensic team to look at them, Fore said. A temporary morgue was set up to store the bodies. Fore said the identification process would take 2 or 3 days.

General Jack Farris who commands the U.S troops here said, "I think it is kind of important to find the body. He was a hero to some people here."

Trinidad Guardian

Thursday November 10th 1983

U.S army soldiers carry a body from a mass burial grave in Calivigny, Grenada on Tuesday, November 8th 1983. Four badly burned bodies were removed from a former PRA military camp. Officials suspect that the remains of former Prime Minister Maurice Bishop may be in the mass grave, stemming from the October 19th massacre. (UPI photo)

Daily Nation Wednesday, November 4th 1983

The remains of 4 bodies suspected to be those of slain Prime Minister, Maurice Bishop and three Cabinet Colleagues were found in a pit about 4½ feet deep, on the site of the PRA camp at Calivigny yesterday. The bodies, one positively identified as that of a woman were taken from a shallow grave in a decomposed state by a Grave Registration team of the U.S army. The leader of the team Captain Henry Fore told pressmen on the site that the lead to search the area had come from a civilian who claimed to be on the site during the burial and who had passed on the information to a member of the Caribbean Peace Keeping forces. However he stressed that it had not been confirmed that Bishop's body was among the corpses, it was only suspected he said. Fore said that the grave was in fact a pit which had been dug by the prior occupant of the compound to dispose of refuse. He said the walls of the grave had been burnt, which would indicate that the bodies were burnt after they were put into the pit. Along with the remains, there were a few rings, watches, and wallet as well as charred bits of clothing and papers which appeared to be receipts. The bodies were removed to a temporary mortuary and will be given over for identification to a forensic team expected to arrive on the island today. Bishop's dentist will also be called in.

Taken from the book, "Grenada, whose freedom?" by the Latin American Bureau
Page 92

...For over a week, no serious effort was made by the invasion force to locate, count or bury the bodies of local people.

When the Americans excavated the grave, no Grenadian or Caribbean Peacekeeping Force representatives were allowed near, the plastic bags were filled and flown out immediately. Until somebody who was actually involved reveals what happened, the probability is that the United States deliberately kept Bishop's remains and put out the story to explain their not handing them back to Grenada or Bishop's relatives, who clamoured for them for a long time afterward.

Casualties were inflicted on both sides at the Beausejour action, but it has proved difficult to obtain precise details. Including the ambush, at least five or six PRA soldiers, and possibly more died. Twelve or so were wounded, which included some of the PRA captives in the transmitter building when it came under fire from the APC. Fear of repercussions prevented former PRA participants from being more forthright in their accounts to me. It is quite possible that there were no US deaths at Beausejour. (page 369)

Photocopy pages 63 to 81(Battle at Fort Rupert)
Photocopy pages 181 to 183

Trinidad Guardian
Saturday, Nov 19th 1983

U.S Unable To Name Bodies
(Washington, Friday Cana Reuter)

U.S specialists have not been able to identify 4 bodies thought possibly to include that of former Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, found in a common grave on Grenada an official said today.

"Our forensic team had to give up," said the U.S official who asked not to be named. There was nothing to work with," he said. The state department said last week, the remains of 3 males and 1 female were found buried near the Calivigny military base on Grenada's south coast. There had been reports that witnesses saw the bodies of Bishop and other leaders buried there after they were killed in a military takeover on October 19th. There were reports in Grenada that the bodies were burnt and then buried, but the official from Washington had few details today other than that a U.S forensic team had been unable to identify the bodies.


Wednesday, Nov 9th 1983
Trinidad Guardian

U. S soldiers today found burnt and decomposed bodies of 3 people including what may be the skeleton remains of slain Prime Minister, Maurice Bishop. An army official said the soldiers dug up the bones in a garbage pit after receiving a report that Bishop's body had been dumped and burnt there with three others.

Army Captain Henry Fore said one of the scorched skeletal remains was that of a woman. Fore said the remains were burnt and decomposed beyond recognition. He said forensic experts and Bishop's dentist would be called in to try to identify them. Badly scorched rings and watches were found along with the bones. Despite efforts to clean them up, no identifying marks were immediately found.

Consultation Report

Identification of Remains Grenada, West Indies



ADDENDUM

1. Thank you for providing us updated information on the circumstances surrounding the events of 19 October 1983 in Grenada. This addendum clarifies the background for the investigation. This elaboration of background detail in no way influences the substance or conclusions of the report.

2. Most of our initial information on the events of 19 October 1983 came from sources who didn't have first hand knowledge of the executions. We now understand that a Grenadian witness of the execution and burial of several persons, possibly including Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, provided detailed background information, and that U.S. Army Graves Registration personnel and representatives of the Caribbean Peace Forces (CPF) recovered commingled remains from a gravesite near the Cuban Military Installation at Pt. Calivigny on 9 November 1983. This recovery of unidentified remains prompted the Governor General to request on 9 November 1983 assistance in identifying the remains.

3. According to the officer in charge of the Army Graves Registration team, the remains were in a garbage pit at a depth of approximately 7-8 feet. Conditions at the site, especially the fact that the bodies were burned in the grave pit, complicated recovery work. The officer in charge is satisfied that the Graves Registration team did a thorough search at the grave and recovered as many remains and personal effects as possible under the circumstances. No photographic documentation of the recovery was obtained.

4. U.S. Army Graves Registration personnel maintained custody of the remains and reportedly sent the remains to O'Way's Funeral Home in St. Georges upon completion of our examination.

5. Please let us know if you discover additional records that might assist in identification of the remaining body parts or additional information about the circumstances of the execution.



ARMED FORCES INSTITUTE OF PATHOLOGY WASHINGTON, D.C. 20304

ADDRESS REPLY TO THE DIRECTOR
ATTN: AFIP

12 December 1983

Consultation Report on the Identification of Remains Grenada, West Indies

BACKGROUND:

United States authorities suspect that a sixteen-member military council seized control of the government of Grenada, West Indies and killed Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, three of his Cabinet members, and two union leaders on 19 October 1983. U.S. Army Graves Registration personnel recovered commingled remains, believed to be the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, from a shallow grave near Fort Rupert, Grenada, placed them in four body bags, and stored them in a temporary morgue facility without refrigeration.

The Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J-4) forwarded a State Department request to Armed Forces Institute of Pathology (AFIP) on 9 November 1983 for assistance in identifying the remains in Grenada. AFIP deployed a team of five to Grenada that evening. The team included two forensic pathologists, two forensic dentists, and a forensic photographer (LABA). The team chief coordinated the team's activities through the U.S. Mission, Grenada.

DISCUSSION:

The Graves Registration team recovered the remains prior to the AFIP team's arrival. The recovery process was not documented and no photographs were available. Local commanders indicated that the AFIP team would not be able to inspect the recovery site because the Fort Rupert area was not secure.

The commingled remains contained in four body bags consisted of charred, fragmented tissue in a state of advanced decomposition. The commingling of fragmented bodies and personal effects precluded accurate association of body parts or personal effects with specific remains. For this reason, this report refers to remains and personal effects according to body bag number (GR-1 through GR-4). We placed associated bony parts into approximate anatomic relationships, measured all major bones and bone fragments, listed all parenchymous organ fragments which we identified, radiographed all specimens, and collected tissue for toxicological examination.

Consultation Report on the Identification of Remains, Grenada (Continued):

The remains represent bodies of at least five people. The four body bags contain five lumbar spines and extremity parts consistent with five individuals.

Estimates of stature based upon examination of various long bones range from 65 inches to 73 inches. Stature estimates for the tallest skeleton range from 68 inches to 73 inches, significantly below the reported stature of Prime Minister Bishop, believed to about 75 inches tall.

Anthropologic studies of the three intact pelvis indicate they are male adults aged 30 to 50 years, one with caucasoid and two with negroid characteristics. Perimortem trauma is present on all three pelvis.

Skeletal trauma appears to be of the crushing type, and no evidence of cutting, stabbing, or chopping wounds is present. These findings are compatible with the history of being overrun by vehicles or falling from a height.

Autopsy reports indicate that five people at Ft. Rupert were fatally shot. But the examining pathologist claims that the Ft. Rupert autopsy reports were fabricated and that he did not actually see the bodies of the Prime Minister and others who allegedly died at Fort Rupert. He alleges that he was told only the names and how they died. Nevertheless, we believe the autopsy reports may be reasonably accurate, and the reports of gunshot wounds and blunt trauma are consistent with our observations.

The tissues of GR-2 and GR-4 contained two bullet cores identified as 7.62 x 39 mm (M43) Russian armor-piercing cartridges (TAB B). Although the (GR-1) pelvis had injuries suggestive of missile trauma, we could not associate particular wounds with these specific missiles.

Personal effects contained items of female attire, including some reportedly belonging to Jacqueline Creft, but we found no identifiable anatomic evidence of female remains. A lumbar radiograph allegedly of Jacqueline Creft showed a bifid lumbar spine, but thorough examination of the bodies failed to disclose this distinctive abnormality.

Personal effects also contained items associated with Fitzroy Bain and Evelyn Maitland, both of whom the autopsy descriptions list among the dead from Fort Rupert. No antemortem records were available on either of them to allow identification from the available remains.

Consultation Report on the Identification of Remains, Grenada (Continued):

The only available antemortem records were dental records from Jacqueline Creft and Unison Whiteman; lumbar spinal radiographs from Jacqueline Creft; skull radiographs from Prime Minister Bishop; photographs of Prime Minister Bishop and abbreviated autopsy reports of questionable authenticity. This limited availability of antemortem medical, dental, or other records from the Prime Minister, his Cabinet, and other missing persons severely compromised our ability to identify the remains.

Except for dentition, small fragments of skull bones, fragments of brain tissue, and a fragment of skin with black chin hair, the remains are not from heads and necks. The chin hair is not consistent with Prime Minister Bishop whose photographs show significant gray hair, and his beard hair was longer.

We compared recovered dentition to available records and compared other body fragments to available radiographs and autopsy reports. Only one set of teeth was present in all of the examined material, but an isolated jaw fragment contained another tooth. Antemortem dental records on Jacqueline Creft and Unison Whiteman do not match either of the dental remains, and the dentition seen in the skull series on Prime Minister Bishop does not match the available dentition. Unique crown and bridge work present in the complete set of teeth may permit identification at a later date if additional records become available (TAB C).

Fingerprint identification was not possible. No fingerprint records were available, and no hands or portions of hands were present in the material examined.

Toxicology results revealed small amounts of alcohol and the presence of acetaldehyde. These findings are indicative of putrefaction. No evidence of medication or of drugs of abuse was present.

SUMMARY:

The material available for examination and the records available for comparison are insufficient to establish the identity of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, members of his Cabinet, or other persons who allegedly died at Fort Rupert, Grenada, on 19 October 1983. The remains are commingled, and documentation of their recovery is poor due to the hazardous conditions at the time of recovery.

The remains consist of at least five individuals of whom three are definitely males from the 35 to 50 year age range and with mixed caucasoid and negroid characteristics.

Consultation Report on the Identification of Remains, Grenada (Continued):

Examination of available dentition, long bones, and hair provides no characteristics to suggest that Prime Minister Bishop is among these remains. This does not preclude the possibility that small parts of his remains are among the fragments without unique features.

The observed injuries and the reported events associated with these remains indicate that the manner of death is homicide in which gunshot injury and blunt trauma constitute the apparent cause.

CONCLUSIONS:

1. The remains consist of commingled body parts in a state of advanced decomposition.
2. The remains represent at least five individuals people.
3. Remains representing three males are definitely present, but we cannot state that any of the remains are female.
4. Stature estimates range from a minimum of 65 inches to a maximum of 73 inches.
5. Maximum stature estimated from any of the available long bones examined is 73 inches, significantly less than the reported stature of Prime Minister Bishop.
6. Of the three intact pelvis, one has caucasoid characteristics and two have negroid characteristics.
7. Age estimates based upon examination of three pubic symphyses range from 35 to 50 years.
8. The dentition available for examination does not match the available records from Jacqueline Creft or Unison Whiteman.
9. The dentition available for examination is inconsistent with the dentition seen in skull radiographs of Prime Minister Bishop.
10. A radiograph of a lumbar spine reported to be from Jacqueline Creft did not match available specimens.
11. The only evidence of a female casualty among these remains is the presence of female clothing.
12. Bullet identification indicates that ammunition associated with the remains represents 7.62 x 39 mm Russian armor piercing type.
13. Receipts present in the personal effects contain the names of Fitzroy Bain and Evelyn Maitland.

TAB A
IDENTIFICATION TEAM MEMBERS

TAB A

AFIP Team Members

Colonel Robert R. McMeekin, MC, USA
Deputy Director, AFIP

Colonel William M. Morlang, USAF, DC
Command Dental Surgeon, HQ AFIC
Forensic Dentistry Consultant

Lt Col Charles J. Riehle, USAF, MC
Chief, Division of Aerospace Pathology, AFIP

Lt Col Paul A. Edwards, USAF, DC
Oral Pathologist, AFIP


MSGT Richard D. Moats, USAF
Forensic Photographer, AFIP

TAB B

PHOTOGRAPHS

BULLET FRAGMENTS RECOVERED FROM GR-2 and GR-4

3100011A-5



TAB C
PHOTOGRAPHS

COMPLETE SET OF DENTITION WITH UNIQUE CROWN AND BRIDGE WORK

Have The Grenada Documents Been Returned to Grenada?

by Ann Wilder

"The original Grenada documents have been returned to the Grenadan (sic) government."

News of this nature roused the interest again of my efforts since 1983 to wage a campaign to have the original documents of the People's Revolutionary Army returned to Grenada in an environmentally-controlled building [donated by the US Government] with multiple microfiche films and readers. The details of how this news was revealed is detailed at the end of this article.

On my recent visit to St. George's, following the receipt of this information about the documents being returned to Grenada, I had on my mind something similar to a brief passage from Chris Searle's book **Grenada Morning**. Searle commented in this way about Maurice Bishop:

"I remember him once saying to me when I was trying to convince him to set up some kind of archive of the revolution because so much historic material was being lost:

"You know, Bernard only thinks of one thing, and that is the revolution. His mind is so much on the problems of the economy that he doesn't keep or file anything. I'm trying to get the comrades to hold on to important things so we can keep them, otherwise in a few years time we'll have nothing to build our history with. You know Bernard even have one single copy of his own book from the days in London? I keep it for us, like I try to keep safe all our things."

"Then he left the room and came back with a large cardboard box of photographs and mementos, all mixed up, family, friends, comrades, England, N.J.M., anti-Gairy struggles - this was his archive. Amongst them was a set of snaps of he and Fidel drinking and talking together in Cuba, and another of him as a young man in London with sideburns and what looked almost like teddy boy gear."

It is ironic how these things unfold.

Herbert Romerstein, one editor of the 1984 US Government publication **The Grenada Documents**, wrote that "tens of thousands documents" from Grenada were taken to the United States; 38,000 pounds. Mark D. Hill, staff reporter of **The Berkeley Review**, Volume 3, Issue 13 of October 31, 1984, summed it up:

"Most of the 35,000 documents captured (over 5 tons in weight) were recovered from the home of the Prime Minister of Grenada, Maurice C. Bishop."

The archivist, Maurice Bishop.

I discovered later in a conversation with a Grenadian historian that military equipment was brought back to the US, including one of the 3 armored personnel carriers that went to Fort Rupert from Fort Frederick. This BTR60 is currently in the State of Maryland in the US. My concern, though, is centered on paper documentation of the Peoples Revolutionary Government.

Who has the original documents?

I wrote letters on August 21st to Leslie Pierre, Editor, of **The Grenadian Voice**; to Beverley Steele, Resident Tutor/Senior Lecturer and Grenada bibliographical specialist at the University of the West Indies Extension Campus, Grenada; Meg Conlon, special assistant to Mary King, St. George's University Deputy Director of the Institute for Caribbean and International Studies; Grenada Public Library Librarian Deon David following up on my meetings with them when I was in Grenada. I sent the NARA report with my letter.

I copied Lucifer who first found the National Archives site. He is a young, intelligent Grenadian living in the United States. He is a fellow of strong opinion and passion who visited Talkshop for a spate of time.

The letter was also copied to Dr. Honorable Prime Minister Keith Mitchell.

It is doubtful the original documents are in Grenada, nor do the people I interviewed believe this either. The originals could possibly be in the Ministerial Complex in Grenada. The NARA information may be in error. I left it with the recipients of my letter to help solve this mystery. As the Caribbean Newsletter goes to press there has been no response to inquiries.

Details: On July 13, a fellow nicknamed Lucifer on <http://www.spiceisle.com/messages/59732.htm>, posted the above quotation from the site of Records of the Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA] at <http://www.nara.gov/guide.rg373.html>.

The quotation came from a Table of Contents for a publication titled **"Guide to Federal Records in the National Archives of the United States."** Under 373.2 General Records, 1920-50, 1984, 50 lin. ft. is the subsection -

"Related Records: The original Grenada documents have been returned to the Grenadan (sic) government."

There is a bibliographic note: "Web version based on **"Guide to Federal Records in the National Archives of the United States."** Compiled by Robert B. Matchette et al. Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Administration, 1995." There is ordering information for this title and this note: "This Web version is updated from time to time to include records processed since 1995." And another note at the bottom "Last modified [meaning the Web page] on December 6, 1999."

September 16, 2001

Vincent Roberts
P.O. Box 1477
Grand Anse
St. George's, Grenada
West Indies

Dear Vincent -

I will run through the sequence of my research, in general. I include document copies for most of each of these numbers:

1. A fellow [Lucifer] on Grenada's SpiceIsle Talkshop posted a U.S. National Archives page that said the original Grenada documents were returned to Grenada.
2. I went to Grenada in August 2000 and met with SGU Founder's Library people (Meg Conlon and the brand new librarian), the National Archives Librarian at the Grenada Public Library (Deon David), the Grenadian Voice editor Leslie Pierre and the Marryshow House Library's Beverley Steele. I asked them if they had or knew of the location of the original Grenada Documents in Grenada. The answer was no. I wrote each of them a letter when I returned home thanking them for meeting with me and sending them the original National Archives notice that the document had been returned. I also copied the Prime Minister. None of those people have contacted me.
3. I submitted the information up to this time to Caribbean Newsletter where it was published.
4. I emailed a contact staff person at the National Archives in College Park, MD.
5. He researched the situation. He, Eric Chaskes, did a lot of work. He suggested I contact the National Archives in Grenada (which I had just done) and gave me a name at the Defense Intelligence Agency. DIA had received the documents first.
6. I wrote a letter to the Defense Intelligence Agency person. She did not respond.
7. I mailed a second registered return receipt letter to the DIA person.
8. She emailed me, saying the original Grenada Documents were at the National Archives and perhaps I should speak with another researcher.
9. I emailed Eric Chaskes at the National Archives and attached the DIA response.

10. He [staffperson at NARA] did not respond.

11. He [staffperson at NARA] emailed me back with apology for the delay saying any correspondence by writing should go to his supervisor, if I so wish. He said "... the accession dossier states the documents were returned to Granada (sic) before they came into NARA's legal custody, then NARA does not and cannot have any information about their current location." He said he could only remind me that he provided me with a contact for the National Library in Grenada, Ruth John.

12. I emailed the Head Librarian [Ruth John] of the Grenada Library. She did not respond.

13. I emailed a reminder to Head Librarian [Ruth John] of the Grenada Library a month later. She did not respond.

14. I followed up that email two days later with a letter to Head Librarian [Ruth John] of the Grenada Library copied to the National Archives contact and his supervisor. I did not receive any response from anyone.

15. I prefer not to close the doors to the Grenada Public Library so that I can do further research there. Because of fear of becoming *persona non grata*, I am willing to have someone else take over the story to lessen my real name in the matter. My aim is not to be known. And here I turned to Caldwell Taylor for (1) advice and (2) possible action.

16. Caldwell Taylor responded with the difficulty of drawing people to the cause of the returned documents. He wrote about how any Grenadian newspaper story was not going to do much. He wrote about a possibility of legal action in Grenada, but this would take funds and on-the-scene action.

17. I sent Davon Baker [Kawika from Carriacou] an overview, shorter, but similar, to this page. He was going to present the matter to Keith Mitchell while he was at MSU in May of 2000. Davon never did thank me nor did he give me any feedback on the meeting. I will not forget this.

18. I dropped the matter. I didn't have the extra funds to come to Grenada, the summer of 2001.

I had waited a month for a response from Ruth John, Head Librarian, Grenada Public Library, from my letter. My next plan was to send mail, like registered mail, where the recipient signs a receipt and the notice is returned to me. I suppose this can also be

done with International Federal Express or something. I felt this gets into an area of overkill. I could have also sent the request to the Minister of Education, Augustine John. I did neither of these things.

My purpose is to find those original Grenada Documents and to help campaign for those original Grenada documents [plus, Lordy, all the other original documents I WAS ABLE TO FINGER in the Grenada Public Library] to be placed in a secure, environmentally safe place in Grenada for all to read, including a complete microfiche set and reader.

I know about libraries in the U.S. I am a former Children's Librarian at the 125th St. NYPL Branch and the old Countee Cullen Branch attached to the Schomburg Collection. It was beyond me how the Grenada Public Library, even with limited funding, could be so inhospitable and put important documents at risk. I won't go into this matter, which is a potential project for a Grenadian crusader to work on.

I want to write into my will where all these research materials I have are going to go when I die. I would like them to be shipped to Grenada. From what I saw, Marryshow House looks to be the best bet.

There are others in the US who have been following on Grenada – they are fed up with Talkshop and busy with other things – and they, I am sure, would like to know what their heirs can do with their paperwork. Some of us have discussed this matter. Sure, we can send it to the great Schomburg Collection or Moreland-Spingarn or University of Texas at Austin or wherever, but once again, like Grenada Colonial material being in UK and French archives, Grenada's history is dispersed all over the world. Maybe that is OK what with the Internet and travel, but I do think it is a sad commentary. Another issue to be worked on.

Looks like I need an investigator in Grenada to actually find these documents. I have not checked Tanteen University (anything air-conditioned there? is this a place?) or the Ministerial Complex. The documents could be just thrown in some basement room – like at the library, if it has a basement.

I want to let you know that I place myself outside a finely drawn division between opposites in reference to the Grenada Revolution. I am on the periphery, in the US, of people on both sides, as it were, in order to collect documents.

As you know, there is a so-tight knot of people trying to get 'missing' documents in relation to the case of the prisoners up the hill. I am not an insider in this network. In fact, Vince, I am sure Peter David is angry with me because I fired back when he attacked Maurice Paterson on Talkshop.

I had, at one time [before it became hopeless between Maurice and myself], been in letter contact with Maurice after I met him in Grenada the summer of 2000. Maurice was/is a touchy personal matter with me and I want to leave it alone. I can see his weaknesses, but I have an intense loyalty and respect for him. I could see, though, that if I fed Maurice any information, and I did about the documents, he would run with it – kind of like a loose cannon. I held back on it after he got a little information and something published. Maurice and I are no longer in communication. The sweet rescuer of this genius was defeated by fearful pride. I tried. I was compelled by my gut feeling. I had to set boundaries for my own preservation and it did not work.


I was the archivist and collector of information when I began my obsession with the Grenada Revolution in those first days of 1980 with the Boston Grenada Solidarity Committee. I kept away from the Socialist Worker Party aspect of it and the group was dissolving when strong feelings came towards support of the MBPM.

I remain obsessed with archiving and collecting information on the Grenada Revolution, but now I am processing information from all over into one place; hopefully a book. I see myself, in my arrogant moments, with a goal to have a volume, or several volumes, on the Grenada Revolution similar to the ones written about the Civil Rights Movement with so many details as to make a grand summary. I think of it more as 'administrative history,' i.e. gathering together all these attributed sources into a kind of order in one place. I fully realize my shortcoming of not being Grenadian.

Because of this obsession with documents on this matter, I am especially keen on being in the pipeline for information relating to the defense of those on the hill and with the Truth and Reconciliation operation. If there is any way you can be of help in this, please drop my business card [some are enclosed] with the appropriate people.

I sign off with my real name. I trust you will keep confidences so that those who don't have all their brain cylinders firing in some sort of coordination will not come and attack me. Speaking as someone of the generation before yours and on the periphery of the Grenada Revolution during the time of October, 1983, I observe[d] enough fear, grief and hatred to keep me always wary of potentialities.

Ann Wilder
29 Austin Avenue
Asheville, NC 28801-1309
Home: (828) 254-1379
email: annew@buncombe.main.nc.us



NARA Grenada Documents Collection – June/July 1988

Rick Blondo, User Services – rick.blondo@arch2.nara.gov

242.24 GRENADAN RECORDS

1979-83

4 lin. ft. and 13,220 microfiche

Textual Records:

Seized by U.S. Army and Marine Corps units during military operations on the Caribbean island of Grenada (October 1983), documenting activities of Grenadan government ministries, the New Jewel Movement (Communist Party), and prominent political and military leaders, 1979-83; with name and subject index, on paper, prepared by the Defense Intelligence Agency prior to transfer of records.

Finding aids:

Original machine-readable index used to prepare paper copy described above in RG 373, Records of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Seized motion picture from the Soviet Embassy in Grenada in RG 306, Records of the United States Information Agency. SEE ALSO Michael Ledeen and Herbert Romerstein, comp., *Grenada Documents: An Overview and Selection* (Washington, DC: Department of State and Department of Defense, Sept. 1984).

Subject Access Terms: Bishop, Maurice; Coard, Bernard.

Self-service microfiche available during hours Monday through Saturday

Can order microfiche copies once you arrive.

$\$2.10 \times 13,220 = \$27,762$

Paper copies

$\$1.75 \times 13,220 = \$23,135$

If you'd like to purchase copies of all the microfiche without coming in person I have forwarded your message to a staff specialist, Niels Cordes, who will notify you what the cost will be. [never notified Ann Wilder]. Should there be a problem with the e-mail his voice number is 301.713.6785

NARA Grenada Documents Collection – June/July 1988

Eric Chaskes, Archivist, National Archives, College Park – echaskes@arch2.nara.gov

The Grenada Documents Collection (T1280)

12,000 (approximately) microfiche card

Cost of $\$2.10/\text{card}$ duplication $\times 12,000 = \$25,250$

Hours and location at www.nara.gov

Fiche available self-service

Photo to get new research card

Fiche arrange in numerical order – no finding aids

Military reference (301-713-7250) may be able to give more information about the collection

To order documents, you would need to provide the specific number of the fiche card

21 August 2000

29 Austin Avenue
Asheville, NC 28801-1309
Tele: (828) 254-1379
email: annew@buncombe.main.nc.us

Meg Conlon
St. George's University
Founder's Library, True Blue
St. George's, Grenada

Deon C. David, Librarian
Sheila Buckmire Memorial Library
St. George's, Grenada

Leslie Pierre
The Grenadian Voice
P.O. Box 633
St. George's, Grenada

Beverley Steele
Marryshow House/UWI
P.O. Box 439
St. George's, Grenada

Dear Grenada Document-Related People:

Good of all of you to have met with me. I appreciate our visit.

Enclosed is the information I said I would send you about the Grenada Documents being returned to Grenada.

Perhaps this is a mystery we can solve. Perhaps the information is not correct; note that the NARA information is a Web version of a guide published in 1995. Certainly it seems reflective of a serious question: If the documents are returned to Grenada, where could they safely be stored?

Kind regards,

Ann Elizabeth Wilder

c: Prime Minister Honorable Keith Mitchell
Lucifer (email)

October 10, 2000 [email copy]

Dear Eric Chaskes:

I visited Grenada pre-Carnival this year to discover the location of the original Grenada documents as referenced below. I checked out the National Archives, Marryshow/UWI Library, the new St. George's University Founder's Library and the Grenadian Voice newspaper. None of these references had seen or heard about the return of these documents.

Below is the National Archives posting with the information that the Grenadian Documents had been returned to Grenada (see the third paragraph down).

From the site of Records of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) at <http://www.nara.guide.rg373.html>. The quotation came from a Table of Contents for a publication titled "**Guide to Federal Records in the National Archives of the United States**." Under 373.2 General Records, 1920-50, 1984, 50 lin. ft. is the subsection -

"Related Records: The original Grenada documents have been returned to the Grenadan (sic) government."

A bibliographic note: "Web version based on "**Guide to Federal Records in the National Archives of the United States**." Compiled by Robert B. Matchette et al. Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Administration, 1995." Ordering information for this title is provided and this note: "This Web version is updated from time to time to include records processed since 1995." And another note at the bottom "Last modified [meaning the Web page] on December 6, 1999."

Would you please let me know the location of the original (not the microfiche) Grenada documents seized by the U.S. Government in 1983. If you wish to do this formally in writing, please mail to:
Ann Elizabeth Wilder

29 Austin Avenue
Asheville, NC 28801-1309

Thank you.

Ann Wilder

"If the Gods had meant us to vote,
They would have given us candidates."
Jim Hightower

October 11, 2000

Ann Wilder
29 Austin Avenue
Asheville, NC 28801-1309
Home: (828) 254-1379
email: annew@buncombe.main.nc.us

Melissa L. Folz
Department of Defense
Defense Intelligence Agency
ATTN:SV-1
Washington, DC 20340-3299

Dear Ms. Folz:

Please read the response from NARA about the return of the Grenada Documents and my original email. What is the answer to this question -

Where are the original Grenada Documents?

[START EMAIL QUOTE] Wednesday, October 11, 2000 5:23 PM

Dear Ann Wilder,

After looking at the reference in our Guide to the National Archives and the set of documents published by the State Department (Michael Ledeen and Herbert Romerstein, comps., Grenada Documents: An Overview and Selection, Washington, DC: Department of State and Department of Defense, 1984), I suspected that NARA had never had the original documents in our custody, only the copies. This was confirmed by a staff member who was able to check the paperwork ("accession dossier") we created when we received the microfiche. I will quote directly from her email to me:

"The accession dossier (NC3-373-84-2) shows that NARA accessioned the microfiche copy of the documents from the Defense Intelligence Agency. NARA had nothing to do with the return of the originals to Grenadan custody, and there is no information in the dossier showing who returned the documents—DIA? State?—or to whom in the Grenadan Government."

Here is what probably happened. After the documents were captured and assembled by the military, they were given to the Defense Intelligence Agency for analysis. The State Department was also allowed to come in and examine the documents. This possibly took place at a building we operate in Suitland, Maryland. Records in this building, however, remain in the legal custody of the agency, even if they are in our physical custody. This is why the State Department publication mentioned above would say they were "in" the National Archives. The State Department reviewers were probably in our building, but did not understand the distinction between legal and physical custody of the records.

In other words, the National Archives may have temporarily stored the documents but had no other control over them. The originals were then returned by DIA to Grenada before the microfiche copies were formally accessioned into our holdings. As you can see from the above, the accession dossier has no information on what had happened to the originals other than that they were returned to Grenada.

Would you please let me know the location of the original (not the microfiche) Grenada documents seized by the U.S. Government in 1983. If you wish to do this formally in writing, please mail to:

Ann Elizabeth Wilder
29 Austin Avenue
Asheville, NC 28801-1309

Thank you.

Ann Wilder

[END EMAIL QUOTE]

I would appreciate hearing from you as soon as possible. In anticipation of a response, I am thanking you for looking into this matter for me.

Sincerely,

Ann Wilder

As far as I can tell, the Granada Public Library serves as their National Archives (source: 1997 World of Learning). They can be reached at:

Grenada Public Library
Librarian: Ruth John
Carenage, St. Georges, Grenada
Tel 473-440-2506 ; Fax 473-440-6650
e-mail: pls@caribsurf.com

The records officer for the DIA is:

Melissa L. Folz
Department of Defense
Defense Intelligence Agency
ATTN: SV-1
Washington DC 20340-3299
202-231-4291

That office may be able to provide more information.

Sincerely,
Eric Chaskes
Archivist
National Archives at College Park

>>> "Ann Wilder" <annew@buncombe.main.nc.us> 10/10 8:44 PM >>>

Dear Eric Chaskes:

I visited Grenada pre-Carnival this year to discover the location of the original Grenada documents as referenced below. I checked out the National Archives, Marryshow/UWI Library, the new St. George's University Founder's Library and the Grenadian Voice newspaper. None of these references had seen or heard about the return of these documents.

Below is the National Archives posting with the information that the Grenadian Documents had been returned to Grenada (see the third paragraph down).

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<http://www.nara.gov/guide/rg373.html>.

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November 11, 2000

Ann Wilder
29 Austin Avenue
Asheville, NC 28801-1309
Home: (828) 254-1379
email: annew@buncombe.main.nc.us

Melissa L. Folz
Department of Defense
Defense Intelligence Agency
ATTN:SV-1
Washington, DC 20340-3299

Dear Ms. Folz:

Since I have not received any response or acknowledgment of receipt of my letter of inquiry of October 11, I am, one month later, sending you the original letter and enclosures via USPS First Class Certified Mail - Return Receipt requested as of November 13, 2000.

Please inform me about this matter ASAP.

Sincerely,

Ann Wilder

Encl:

Hard copy of letter to Melissa Folz of 10/11/00
Hard copy of <http://www.nara.gov/guide/rg373.html>

11/21/2000 [email copy]

Ms. Wilder,

Hello. This is in response to your request for the location of original documents from Grenada...upon doing some research I have discovered that the original documents from Grenada and the microfiche were, in fact, accessioned permanently to the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) in May 1984 by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). Thus, these documents no longer remain in the custody of DIA and are, therefore, in the permanent custody of NARA. Upon their accession to NARA in 1984, DIA no longer has any control of these records or their whereabouts. I'm sure this must be a frustrating situation, but I would recommend contacting NARA again, speaking with another archivist. I'm sorry I could not be of more service to you.

Melissa Folz
Records Management Officer
Defense Intelligence Agency

11/21/00 [email copy]

Dear Eric Chaskes -

I finally got a response to my letter of October 11, 2000 to Ms. Folz at DIA. I have attached that correspondence to her to this email. She responded to me today after having to send a certified return receipt letter on November 13, 2000.

I do indeed feel frustrated. NARA is a repository of the original Grenadian documents which have been filmed on microfiche. The microfiche are available to the public in the College Park facility. Here is a situation where your WEBSITE states the original Grenadian documents have been returned to Grenada. The archivist Grenada Public Library Librarian Deon David (the Sheila Buckmire Memorial Library in St. George's) said she knew nothing about the return of the original documents when I visited there July/August 2000.

I email you and you kindly email me back with your report of the research you have done. You refer me to DIA's Ms. Folz. And then she returns the email of today, November 21, 2000, referring me back to 'another archivist'. What do you make of that?

I am going to keep pushing until I get to the bottom of this. Will you help me with this effort?

Sincerely,

Ann Wilder

----- Original Message -----

From: "Melissa L. Folz" <AFfolz@dia.osis.gov>
To: <annew@buncombe.main.nc.us>
Sent: Tuesday, November 21, 2000 11:23 AM
Subject: Documents from Grenada

> Ms. Wilder,

>

> Hello. This is in response to your request for the location of
> original documents from Grenada...upon doing some research I have
> discovered that the original documents from Grenada and the microfiche
> were, in fact, accessioned permanently to the National Archives and
> Records Administration (NARA) in May 1984 by the Defense Intelligence
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> records or their whereabouts. I'm sure this must be a frustrating
> situation, but I would recommend contacting NARA again, speaking with
> another archivist. I'm sorry I could not be of more service to you.

>

> Melissa Folz
> Records Management Officer

12/07/00 [email copy]

Eric -

Do you have no response to the email below? Or, I hope, you are checking into it further.

Please let me know. I am serious about finding the location of the 'original Grenada documents.' I hope you can find something about this matter by the new year.

I don't like the way the buck was passed from DIA back to NARA. As a citizen, my government has no stand in making it difficult for me to discover information. My next step will be to contact my local congressional representative, but I am hoping you, or your supervisor, can sort this out.

Please let me know - even acknowledgement you have received my email of today, December 7, 2000, and November 21, 2000, would be helpful. Thanks.

Ann Wilder

----- Original Message -----

From: "Ann Wilder" <annew@buncombe.main.nc.us>

To: <echaskes@arch2.nara.gov>

Sent: Tuesday, November 21, 2000 2:08 PM

Subject: Fw: Original Documents from Grenada

> Dear Eric Chaskes -

>

> I finally got a response to my letter of October 11, 2000 to Ms. Folz at

> DIA. I have attached that correspondence to her to this email. She responded

> to me today after having to send a certified return receipt letter on

> November 13, 2000.

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help

> me with this effort?

>

> Sincerely,

>

>

> Ann Wilder

>

>

>

> ----- Original Message -----

> From: "Melissa L. Folz" <AFfolml@dia.osis.gov>

> To: <annew@buncombe.main.nc.us>

> Sent: Tuesday, November 21, 2000 11:23 AM

> Subject: Documents from Grenada

>

>

>> Ms. Wilder,

>>

>> Hello. This is in response to your request for the location of

>> original documents from Grenada...upon doing some research I have

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>> were, in fact, accessioned permanently to the National Archives and

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>> records or their whereabouts. I'm sure this must be a frustrating

>> situation, but I would recommend contacting NARA again, speaking with

>> another archivist. I'm sorry I could not be of more service to you.

>>

>> Melissa Folz

>> Records Management Officer

>> Defense Intelligence Agency

>>

>>

>>

>>

>>

>>

12/08/00 [email copy]

To Ann Wilder

I apologize for not replying to your earlier email. It was not intentional. I was unexpectedly out for more than a week following the holiday.

I did check with my supervisor the same day I received your email. He agreed with me that if the accession dossier states the documents were returned to Granada before they came into NARA's legal custody, then NARA does not and cannot have any information about their current location.

If you would like to contact my supervisor, it is best to do so in a letter:

Robert Coren, Chief NWCC2
8601 Adelphi Rd
College Park, MD 20740

I am sorry that NARA cannot help you further in this matter. I can only remind you that I provided you with the contact for the National Library in Grenada.

Sincerely,

Eric Chaskes
Archivist
National Archives at College Park

>>> "Ann Wilder" <annew@buncombe.main.nc.us> 12/07/00 07:53PM >>>
Eric -

Do you have no response to the email below? Or, I hope, you are checking into it further.

Please let me know. I am serious about finding the location of the 'original Grenada documents.' I hope you can find something about this matter by the new year.

I don't like the way the buck was passed from DIA back to NARA. As a citizen, my government has no stand in making it difficult for me to discover information. My next step will be to contact my local congressional representative, but I am hoping you, or your supervisor, can sort this out.

Please let me know - even acknowledgement you have received my email of today, December 7, 2000, and November 21, 2000, would be helpful. Thanks.

Ann Wilder

----- Original Message -----
From: "Ann Wilder" <annew@buncombe.main.nc.us>
To: <echaskes@arch2.nara.gov>
Sent: Tuesday, November 21, 2000 2:08 PM
Subject: Fw: Original Documents from Grenada

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> me with this effort?
>
> Sincerely,
>
>
> Ann Wilder
>
>
>
> ----- Original Message -----
> From: "Melissa L. Folz" <AFFolm1@dia.osis.gov>
> To: <annew@buncombe.main.nc.us>
> Sent: Tuesday, November 21, 2000 11:23 AM
> Subject: Documents from Grenada
>
>
>> Ms. Wilder,
>>
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>> original documents from Grenada...upon doing some research I have
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>> accession to NARA in 1984, DIA no longer has any control of these
>> records or their whereabouts. I'm sure this must be a frustrating
>> situation, but I would recommend contacting NARA again, speaking with
>> another archivist. I'm sorry I could not be of more service to you.
>>

01/06/01 [email copy]

Dear Ms. John:

Since I have not received a reply from you and the email below was not bounced back and the holidays are over, I am resending my email of 08 December 2000 for your consideration.

I am also mailing a letter, dated 08 January 01, and copying it to the NARA people who referred me to you.

I hope to receive a response. Thank you.

Ann Wilder

----- Original Message ----- From: Ann Wilder To: gls@caribsurf.com Sent: Friday, December 08, 2000 2:38 PM Subject: Original Grenada Documents

Dear Head Librarian Ruth John:

All my research about the current location of the original Grenada Documents, taken out of Grenada in 1983, points to their return to Grenada.

When I was in Grenada this summer and talked with Librarian Deon David, she said she knew nothing about the return of these documents.

I followed this question up with a letter dated August 21, 2000 of which one of the recipients was Ms. David. I have received no response to that letter.

I have the documentation of this search from the US National Archives, the Defense Intelligence Agency and my Grenadian contacts. If you need this material, I can send you that.

Needless to say, this search is frustrating, but I aim to get to the bottom of it. I will be out of the country from December 13 through December 27 if, per chance, you need a response from me during that period.

I am hoping you will be so kind as to give me a response, even if you don't know the location of these documents.

Thank you.

Ann Wilder

08 January 2001

Head Librarian Ruth John
Sheila Buckmire Memorial Library
Grenada National Archives
The Carenage
St George's, Grenada
West Indies

Ann Wilder
29 Austin Avenue
Asheville, NC 28801-1309
Home: (828) 254-1379
email: annew@buncombe.main.nc.us

Dear Ms. John:

Following my emails to you of 08 December 2000 and 06 January 01, I am writing this confirming letter. Since I had not received a reply from you from my initial email of 08 December 2000 and it was not bounced back and the holidays are over, I resent the original on 06 January 01 for your consideration. The text of the original message is as below:

----- Original Message ----- From: Ann Wilder To: gls@caribsurf.com Sent: Friday, December 08, 2000 2:38 PM Subject: Original Grenada Documents

Dear Head Librarian Ruth John:

All my research about the current location of the original Grenada Documents, taken out of Grenada in 1983, points to their return to Grenada.

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I am hoping you will be so kind as to give me a response, even if you don't know the location of these documents.

Thank you.

Ann Wilder

Researcher Eric Chaskes and his supervisor Robert Coren who are copied on this letter referred you to me.

Kind regards,

Ann Wilder

- c: Eric Chaskes, National Archives, 8601 Adelphi Road, College Park, MD 20740-6001
- c: Robert Coren, Chief NWCC2, 8601 Adelphi Road, College Park, MD 20740-6001

APPENDIX D

List of Public Outreach Meetings

VENUE	PLACE	DATE
Norton's Hall #1 St. George's	Norton's Hall	Thursday 13 th Dec. 2001
Gouyave St. John's	St. Rose Modern Secondary School	Thursday 17 th January, 2002
Mt. Rich St. Patrick's	Mt. Rich Community Centre	Tuesday 26 th February, 2002
Tivoli St. Andrew's	Tivoli R.C. School	Tuesday 12 th March, 2002
Grenville St. Andrew's	Grenville Secondary School	Tuesday 9 th April, 2002
St. David's	St. David's R.C. School	Thursday 11 th April, 2002
St. Paul's St. George's	St. Paul's Government School	Tuesday 23 rd April, 2002
Norton's Hall #2 St. George's	Norton's Hall	Thursday 25 th April, 2002
Hillsborough Carriacou	Hillsborough Community Centre	Friday 30 th August, 2002

APPENDIX E

Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) Questionnaire

The TRC has been mandated to inquire into and report on certain political events that occurred in Grenada during the period 1st January 1976 to 31st December 1991. The goal of the TRC is to find out as far as possible the truth about these events so as to aid in the process of national healing and reconciliation.

We invite you to participate by filling out this *Questionnaire*.

1. Do you think a TRC is needed in Grenada? Yes ☐ No ☐

2. How do you think the TRC should function?

.....
.....
.....

3. Do you have any information for the TRC? Yes ☐ No ☐

4. If yes, you can share this information with the TRC:

(a) By personal appearance (b) By telephone

(c) In writing by way of fax or mail (Please tick off your choice).

5. What are some of the things that you feel should be done to bring about reconciliation in Grenada?

.....
.....
.....

6. Do you think it is possible to get (a) The truth (b) Reconciliation?

Yes ☐ No ☐

7. Please tick off your age group.

15-20 yrs. ☐ 21-30 ☐ 31-40 ☐ 41 and over ☐

SUMMARY

Questionnaire Analysis

Amount questioned 111
Amount agreeing with formation of Commission: 91
Amount disagreeing with formation of Commission: 20

0 Breakdown of those against the Commission's formation:

Age Group	Number corresponding to age
21-30	4
31-40	7
41 and over	6

Note well: there were three persons whose ages were not identified.

Amount with information offer the TRC: 12
Amount not sure: 1

Note well: one person re-directed the TRC to Mr. Paul Scoon.

Summary:

In general, the Grenadian population appears very much in favour of the work and direction of the Truth and Reconciliation Council. However, it must be noted that there are still those who do not see the point of having such a commission. These individuals believe the commission to be a waste of taxpayers money, that it's doing too little too late, is a political puppet and that it should simply forget the past and move on.

As it relates to question two, that is, "how do you believe the TRC should function?" The general public seems to demand that the Commission in carrying out its duties, act confidentially and independently, free from bias and political affiliation as well as fear or favour.

There is also a desire for the TRC to act as social body, encouraging worthwhile discussions on the relevant issues. It is recommended that this be done by holding meetings with: those directly involved such as the PRG, families of victims, the seventeen, old soldiers and village-folk throughout the entire state. "One on one" interviews are also encouraged.

From a legal standpoint, there seems to be a desire for the TRC to retrieve and search the documentary records of the then authority in the hope of retrieving any relevant information. A request has also been made for security to be granted to those who have information as well as immunity for those who possess such information that may be incriminating to their person.

Even further, there is a request for the identification of oppressors, both past and present as well as their promoters.

More than anything else though, there seems to be a call for greater publicity and media involvement. Call-in programmes and Television interviews as well as panel discussions are strongly encouraged.

Of course, there are those that wish the TRC to be dissolved. However, these individuals amass the minority opinion, which when compared to the majority, falls sharply in comparison.

Question five of the questionnaire, "what things should be done to bring about reconciliation?" Solicited quite a number of useful, interesting responses. Most prominent of these is the need for discussions without fear of victimization not just between common folk but also with the seventeen and those from opposing standpoints. These discussions it is believed, should be publicly done.

Also too, is the suggestion of paying homage and proper tribute to those who suffered throughout the period under review. Many think that institutions and places should be named in both Bishop and Gairy's memory. One such suggestion is that the Point Saline's International Airport be renamed "Maurice Bishop International Airport." Furthermore, there is also a request for a week of awareness as well as a war museum or memorial built in commemoration. This museum it is suggested, should be built in pearls, St. Andrew. But more than the museum, is the belief that reconciliation cannot be achieved without proper recovery and burial of the bodies or at least of the remains of those who perished.

From a political viewpoint, the general public it appears, seems to believe that there first needs to be closer association between the Government and the Opposition and the general public. Parties must be encouraged to reconcile and must begin to function in an honest manner. Even still, there's a request for the refocusing of attention from politicians and politics to what's considered truly important -- that is -- the issues of those affected.

In order to move on, there is also a call for public apologies. It is requested that the seventeen, as well as the present administration and the previous three, apologize to the families of those who were victimized. There needs to be acknowledgement that mistakes were made and acceptance by wrongdoers of their wrong doings.

There also seems to be a request that proper compensation be given to the families of the victims, especially since some have suffered dearly since the time.

In order to assist the process of reconciliation further, there also seems to be a belief that the help of Psychologists should be enlisted. It is believed that these professionals might be able to help those affected come to terms with their loss and reach closer to reconciliation.

Legally, there seems to be a request that the constitution be revisited and redone. In addition, there is a further request for new laws to help govern the state.

Of course, there is the belief that the state will never reconcile without the help of God. As such, there is a call for greater prayers and ecumenical church services. The people, it is suggested, must learn to live with one another. Those affected must give forgiveness in order for there to be closure.

There are those who believe that the past should be forgotten and left alone. However, as with everything there are two sides. Similarly, there are those who strongly believe that the issue should not be allowed to die but should be dredged up continuously until it is understood and the truth is known. Attitudes need to be changed. There is need for redemption.

Finally, many Grenadians, seem to believe that in order for there ever to be some sort of reconciliation in the country, the seventeen, including Phyllis Coard, must be made to confess. As to whether or not they should be released, the answer is still divided, with the majority siding against the notion.

APPENDIX F

Press Release from the Secretariat of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission has commenced sittings at its Scott Street Secretariat. The first sittings of the Commission took place from October 8th - 11th, 2001.

The second scheduled sittings of the Commission will take place at the Secretariat from 29th October 2001 to 2nd November 2001.

The Terms of Reference of the Truth and Reconciliation are as follows:

TERMS OF REFERENCE

1. Within six (6) months from the date of the first sitting of the Commission, or within a reasonable period thereafter, to inquire into and record certain political events which occurred in Grenada during the period of 1st January, 1976 to 31st December, 1991 with particular reference to the following:
 - (a) the events leading up to and including those of 13th March, 1979 and repercussions;
 - (b) the shooting deaths of various persons at Plains, Mount Rose and Mount Rich in St. Patrick's during the period 13th March, 1979 to 31st December, 1983;
 - (c) the events leading up to and including those of 19th October 1983 with particular reference to the following:
 - (i) the root causes of the general political turmoil in the State;
 - (ii) the circumstances surrounding the deaths of various persons including the Prime Minister and other Ministers of Government, on what was then referred to as Fort Rupert (now Fort George).
 - (iii) to ascertain as far as it is practicable the identities and total number of persons who lost their lives on Fort Rupert;
 - (iv) the disposal of the bodies of those who lost their lives on Fort Rupert;
 - (d) foreign intervention by armed forces of the United States and the Caribbean in October, 1983.
2. To recommend indemnity to various persons who give what is considered to be truthful evidence at the inquiry.

3. Within three (3) months from the date of the last sitting of the Commission for the hearing of evidence or within a reasonable period thereafter, to report and make recommendations on matters relating to the above with particular attention being given to the following objectives:
- (a) to seek to uncover the truth behind certain political events which occurred in Grenada during the period 1st January 1976 to 31st December, 1991;
 - (b) to provide the nation with a proper and comprehensive understanding of those political events as referred to above, so that any mistakes made in the past may not be repeated;
 - (c) to provide the nation with an opportunity to become genuinely reconciled and be permanently healed;
 - (d) generally to make such recommendations as the Commission may find fit in all the circumstances.

The Chairman of the Commission is Hon. Donald A.B. Trotman, retired High Court Judge.

The other Commissioners are Bishop Schon Goodridge, Anglican Bishop of the Windward Islands and Fr. Mark Haynes, Local Roman Catholic Priest.

The Secretary of the Commission is Ms. Claudette Joseph, Attorney at Law.

The Inquiry shall be held in public, however, the Commissioners shall be entitled to exclude any particular person or persons for the preservation of order for the due conduct of the inquiry or for any other reason.

The Commission urges all persons who may have information relevant to events which took place during the periods under consideration to come forward and to share this information.

The Commission also wishes to advise that persons may submit written memoranda outlining any relevant evidence which such persons might have.

Memoranda must be addressed to the Chairman, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Scott Street, St. George's or may be delivered at the said address at any time between the hours of 8:30 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. Monday to Friday.

Phone numbers are: 435-2962 or 2963
Fax: 435-2964

Dated the 12th day of October 2001.

Date?

PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT

FROM THE SECRETARIAT OF THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

The Chairman and the Commissioners of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission invite the public to the first of a series of public symposium organized by the Commission.

Date: Thursday 13th December 2001

Venue: Norton Hall, Cathedral House

Time: 6:30pm - 8:30pm

Moderator: Rev. Fr. Peter Clarke

The public is invited to attend and to make comments and give statements on events that occurred during the period under consideration by the Commission.

(The period under consideration is January 1st 1976 to December 31st 1991).

Date?

NEWS RELEASE

FROM THE SECRETARIAT OF THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

The second in a series of Public Symposia hosted by the Commissioners of the Truth & Reconciliation takes place on Thursday 17th, January 2002, in Gouyave, St. John's at the St. Rose Modern Secondary School.

These Public Symposia organised by the TRC are aimed at enhancing public interest in the Commission and its work. It is the view of the TRC that for Grenadians to become truly reconciled and permanently healed there must be full public participation in the process. As such the event will give the members of the St. John's community and surrounding areas, an opportunity to air their views on the importance and work of the Commission. Also, persons attending will be given the opportunity to make statements on various political events that occurred during the period under consideration by the Commission (January 1st 1976 to December 31st 1991.)

The event starts at 6.30p.m, and the moderator will be Mr. Carlyle Glean.

Date?

Truth and Reconciliation Commission - Press Release

Interest is definitely picking up in the work of the TRC as over a hundred people turned out at the Mt. Rich Community Centre Tuesday 26th February. It was another outreach programme where the Commission goes to the people to give them the opportunity to interact with the Chairman and the Commissioners as they find out more about its mandate.

A cross section of people turned out giving information mostly about their experience during the revolutionary period, and in one case the anger and emotions just could not be controlled.

March 12 is the date set for the next Outreach Programme at the Roman Catholic school at Tivoli in St. Andrew's. This is organized as a result of a special request made by the people of that area.

However the TRC hopes to cover the entire state including Carriacou and Petit Martinique.

The next Sitting is scheduled for 11th to 14th March.

Anyone having information about political events that took place in Grenada 1st January 1976 - 31st December 1991, is invited to seek an appointment with the TRC. The Secretariat is located at Scott Street in St. George's. They can also be contacted by telephone 435 2962 or 435 2963.

STATEMENT FROM THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

We the members of the Truth and Reconciliation reaffirm our commitment to pursue the mandate of our Terms of Reference "to inquire into and record certain political events which occurred in Grenada during the period of 1st January, 1976 to 31st December 1991.

The Commission wishes to express regret on the interpretation given in two commentaries published in the Grenadian Voice Newspaper on February 14th 2002 and February 23rd 2002 respectively, to certain statements made by members on "To The Point" programme aired on GBN radio on 6th February 2002.

The Commission wishes to reassure the public that it continues to maintain its independence, impartially and objectivity in the interest of national healing and reconciliation.

Dated the 26th day of February 2002.

Justice Donald A.B Trotman
Chairman
Truth and Reconciliation Commission

Date?

The People of St. Andrew's and St. David's will be given a chance to become more acquainted with the work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).

Dates set for other public meetings in the outreach programme are Tuesday 9th April at the Grenville Secondary School at 6pm and Thursday 11th April at 6pm. The Chairman Justice Donald Trotman along with the Commissioners Rev. Bishop Sehon Goodridge and Father Mark Haynes will be on hand to answer any questions and explain the TRC's mandate.

So far public meetings were held in St. George's, Gouyave, Mt. Rich and Tivoli. Over a hundred people turned out at the Mt. Rich Community Centre all with great interest in the work of the TRC. At the Tivoli R.C. School the highlight was a delivery from Kennedy Budhlal who spoke a little on his experience during the Revolution.

The Commission will be sitting at the Scott Street office from April 9. People having valid information about political events that occurred here between 1st January 1976 - 31st December 1991 are encouraged to call the Secretariat at 435 2962/2963. For people outside of Grenada information can be sent via fax 435 2964 or by mail to the Scott Street office.

Date?

NOTICE

From the Secretariat of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission shall be sitting from the 22nd to 26th April 2002. Sittings will take place at the Secretariat of the Commission commencing 9am daily.

Persons having relevant evidence concerning political events that occurred during the period under consideration (January 1st 1976 to December 31st 1991) are invited to appear before the Commission and to render such evidence or such persons may submit written memoranda to: The Chairman, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Scott Street, St. George's.

The Secretariat is opened Monday to Friday from 8:30am to 4:30pm.

Phone numbers - 435-2962/2963
Fax - 435-2964

Claudette Joseph

From: Josephine Mc Guire <jojmc@caribsurf.com>
To: <claudjo@caribsurf.com>
Sent: Monday, February 18, 2002 2:54 PM
Subject: TRC press release

Truth and reconciliation Commission-Press Release

In keeping with it's mandate to inquire into and report on certain political events that occurred in Grenada between the period 1st January 1976 and 31st December 1991, the TRC has set 25th. Feb.-1st. March as the date for the next sitting. The public is invited to seek appointments to make their contribution and also to witness the hearings at the Scott Street office in St. Georges.

Over thirty people have given evidence to date touching on Police brutality and beatings and disappearances during the Gairy period, the death of Innocent Belmar, deaths and disposal of the bodies during the 1983 unrest, compensation for victims, and other interesting events prior to the revolution. All these persons have expressed the view that they believe the Commission to be worthwhile and relevant to the process of national healing and reconciliation.

It is hoped that the information given will help to determine the root causes of those events so as to ensure that past mistakes will not be repeated. Speaking on GBN's 'To the point' program Wednesday 6th. February Chairman Hon. Justice Donald Trotman said he gained a lot from the meeting with visiting members of the South African TRC held here recently. Secretary Claudette Joseph who accompanied him on the program, explained that contrary to popular belief, the TRC is not on a witch hunt. She also hopes that one day the fallen members of the PRG will get the much needed official recognition, as they were killed in their line of duty.

The TRC has started a public outreach program where the members travel around the country holding discussions with people giving them a better chance to understand the work of the Commission.

The next public discussion is scheduled for 26th. Feb. at Mt Rich community centre starting at 6pm.

Date?

PUBLIC ANNOUNCEMENT

FROM THE SECRETARIAT OF THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

The Chairman and the Commissioners of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission invite the public to the seventh of a series of public forums organized by the Commission.

Date: Tuesday 23rd April 2002

Venue: St. Paul's Government School

Time: 6:00pm - 8:30pm

Moderator:

The public is invited to attend and to make comments and give statements on events that occurred during the period under consideration by the Commission.

(The period under consideration is January 1st 1976 to December 31st 1991).

NOTICE

From the Secretariat of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission

TAKE NOTICE THAT The Chairman, Hon. Mr. Justice Donald A.B. Trotman and the Commissioners of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, invite persons who may have been injured and families of persons who may have been injured or who may have died during any event that occurred in Grenada as a result of political unrest during the period 1st January 1976 to 31st December 1983, to appear before the Commission with any information which they may have regarding the event or events that resulted in the injury of them or their loved ones, or in the death of their loved ones.

Phone numbers: 435-2962/2963

Fax number: 435-2964

APPENDIX G

To The Point morning programme

February Wednesday 6, 2002

Lou Smith: The TRC was established on the September 4th last year and the Commission comprises Justice Donald A.B. Trotman as Chairman, the Reverend Bishop Sehon Goodridge and the Reverend Father Mark Haynes the Commissioners and Miss Claudette Joseph as the Secretary and is mandated to enquire into and record certain political events that occurred in Grenada during the period of 1st January, 1976 and 31st December, 1991 and to determine the root causes of those events so as to ensure past mistakes will not be repeated. This morning I am pleased to have in the studio with me Justice Trotman, the Chairman of the Commission as well as Miss Joseph, the Secretary.
Good morning.

Judge Trotman: Good morning.

Claudette Joseph: Good morning.

Lou Smith: It's nice meeting with you again, Mr. Trotman.

Judge Trotman: It is always nice meeting with you. You help us to help me to formulate my thinking more clearly. *(all laugh)*

Lou Smith: I'm glad to hear that. Probably we could begin. The Commission we said earlier on was established on the 1st of January, correction, sorry, was established in September. Could you tell us what's the status of things? I know you have been holding a number of sessions, generally speaking.

Judge Trotman: Yes, well we've had a number of sessions between October and now. This week for instance we are having about four more full sessions. We've so far interviewed or heard evidence from about 30 persons and we have had informal discourses with other persons who may not wish to give evidence but have made themselves available for these informal discussions which are proving to be very helpful, so supplementing the formal hearing sessions, these informal discourses are helping us very much to move on with our task.

Lou Smith: Like everything else you will always have for and against. Generally speaking, people have been responding, yes you did state early but —

Judge Trotman: --- well, what we can say, the individual responses which have not so far been more than thirty we would like to see and would have liked to see many more of those individual responses but seeing that there is some reluctance by many other persons who have not come forward, we have embarked upon an outreach programme where we can meet more people together in public, for instance we've gone to, we've had a public session at Norton Hall in December, last month we had a public session in Gouyave and next month, end of this month we are having one in Mt. Rich at the Community Center on the 26th so what we're doing is to step up the hearing rate as it is by having those who may be reluctant to come forward as individuals to us by us going out to meet more people together in the parishes and the villages and we hope to spread this around Grenada, Carriacou and Petite Martinique.

Claudette Joseph: In addition to what Justice Trotman has said I must point out of the persons who have come to the Commission so far these people have been very positive and they believe that we need a Truth and Reconciliation Commission in Grenada and also they have been those persons who have not come but have express that they will come and that they believe that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission is a necessary and good thing so it is not that we have had an overwhelming amount of negativity towards the Commission we have quite a number of persons including key persons, persons who we consider key who would have key information have expressed that they are going to come to the Commission and that they think it's necessary.

Lou Smith: You have anything any body coming and saying look this commission doesn't make sense?

Claudette Joseph: Yes we have actually had a few people even some people who come to testify while they would have testified they said they think to testify is the correct thing to do but that they have their own reservations, not that it doesn't make sense but they have their reservations for instance as to the motive for the establishment of the Commission and things like that. So we have had persons who have expressed those sentiments but by and large the persons who have come think that we need a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

Lou Smith: This moving into the community, you all intend to go to Carriacou and Petite Martinique as well, would that be part of the outreach programme?

Judge Trotman: Yes, this is very much integral to our outreach programme because this is for the people of Grenada, not just for a few persons, not just for the Commission's knowing and for authorities which have set up and established the Commission. We want to get the truth from the people of Grenada and we also have to get the truth to the people of Grenada and I think it is more the latter aspect that we are seeking to getting the truth which we may find out from others to the people of Grenada even though we do want the truth to come from the people themselves. It's a two-way journey, an action, and we feel that this going out to meet the people is going to be very, very important. As a matter of fact we are seeking, we're hoping and we expect, by putting it more positively, that this going out would be greatly enhanced by the recent bringing on stream a P.R. team comprised of the P.R.O. - Miss Josephine McGuire ---

Claudette Joseph: ---and two Field Officers - Mrs. Eleanor Glasgow, she is from the St. Patrick's area and Mr. Julius St. Clair from the Golf Course area. These people had prior training in field work and Miss McGuire's experience in Public Relations preceeds her, so I need not say more about that. So we hope that this P.R. team would help to bring forth the objectives of the Commission and to educate people more on what the Commission is doing, to bring the population on board with the work of the Commission.

Lou Smith: Let's see if we can talk about the Commission itself now for as many people to state what you are, what is the Commission, what it is and what it is not, if you might do that.

Judge Trotman: The Commission, I think Lou, let's say first of all what it is not because in order to meet some of the skeptics who seem to think very wrongly but I believe innocently in many cases what the Commission is. The Commission is not a court that's the first thing. We are not out, it's neither a court of trial nor a court of appeal.

We are not here to try anybody, to convict anybody or to condemn anybody and we not here of course to disturb any findings made by any court be it a trial court or a court of appeal. We are not sitting to revise or to upset or to set aside judgments of a court. We are not empowered that way and we do not of course hope to usurp the functions of court and to exceed our Terms of Reference and mandating our powers. Our powers of course are confined within the framework of the Terms of Reference which you have indicated early in the programme and of course they're further circumscribed within the terms, the provisions of the Commission of Enquiries Act and so we are well within the law and we have no intentions of exceeding our powers and our mandate and so having said what we're not, I think it is now appropriate to say what we are. We are a fact-finding body, we are an advisory body. We will record what we hear from persons coming before us both individually and in the public sessions, in the outreach programmes, we will create a report which we will submit to the Government of Grenada at the end, giving our findings and making our recommendations and of course these recommendations which will be advisory will not be to us to implement. We can't implement. We advise, we recommend, we put up the facts, we say what we observed of course and hope that our advise and our findings will be such that actions will be taken, positive, appropriate and beneficial action will be taken upon them and that is really what we are and what we are not.

Claudette Joseph: We're also not on a witch hunt, a lot of people are talking about that, but the Commission is not concerned about that, about hunting any body or getting back at any body and digging up dirt on any body the Commission is not on a witch hunt, we're not concerned with that at all.

Lou Smith: There will be no recommendation against any one based on what have been said to the Commission or any thing like that, no action is going to be taken that is what you're saying?

Judge Trotman: People must feel, that is a very important question Lou because we want people to know up front now that we are not going to use the information they give us whether in private, informally or at public hearings, we are not going to use that in order to have them condemned or prosecuted to be more positive and outright and we want to dispel all fears and concerns that people must feel free and able to come either in private or public to disgorge their inner thoughts and their inner feelings without any kind of expectation of fear of victimization or penalties or punishment.

Lou Smith: There are a number of Grenadians who would have been here during the period which concerns you most and would have been now living overseas, is there anyway these people can submit

Claudette Joseph: Yes, yes, actually the Commission also accepts written memoranda from members of the public. We have in the past issued invitations for memoranda, we have received so far about five of those, if maybe persons who are in Grenada as well and are not inclined to come personally and testify they can write down what they have to say in a memorandum and submit it to the Commission so we have done so we also intend shortly to set up a web site whereby we can receive written memoranda by e-mail from persons overseas, because we have quite a lot of people overseas as you said who would have relevant information so that is also within the Commission's mandate.

Lou Smith: You of course would be hoping that whoever appears before you or writes any memorandum/memoranda would be speaking the truth.

Judge Trotman: Yes.

Claudette Joseph: Yes, what we do as well, like for instance in one case we received a written memoranda you may after receiving the written memorandum invite the writer especially if the person is injured, invite the writer to come in (and we have done that in a number of cases) and talk to the Commission we may find that there is something we need to know further so we either invite them to write an expansion or to come in so we can ask them some questions on what they have written.

Judge Trotman: And also the pitch of the level of the truth Lou as I know that is important because we want to emphasize again this is not a court of law and while of course we would want to have the same level of truth which a court demands that is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.

Lou Smith: I wanted to use that term but seeming as you said you're not a court *(all laugh)*

Judge Trotman: I think because even that conceptual framework of what the truth should be in courts as very many of us know is not attained because truth is not an answer. It's relative and what maybe the whole truth to you may not be the same to me or to Miss Joseph and to many people so we feel that the truth we want to get at would be once people purge their consciences and say what they feel is enough to be said in order to purge their consciences and to give a good measure of indication of how they feel and how they want that, the content of that purging to be used in a helpful way for the Commission and for it's results that is really what we intend so we don't again want to pin people down to say I'm not coming before the Commission because I know something but I don't want to tell all, come and say how much you want to say while we would want you to say all but you come and say how much you want to say and we can use that sufficient part of it and accept it as the truth.

Lou Smith: I bring it up because somewhere along the line you always find that you may have conflicting views one event seen by two different people may not go the same way. On Monday evening we had a television program On the road to independence and we had two persons from the program which was saying some of the events —

Judge Trotman: — well of course Miss Joseph will tell you, you can have two witnesses both of them come, they're eye witnesses. They're not lying saying that I was there when I was not there both of them were there you're satisfied and you asked how was the man dressed one would say he had a white shirt he had a blue pants, he had on a cap the other one who was there and is truthful in saying he or she was there will tell you the man was wearing a red cap and a blue shirt and a white pants, on the day in question and this event could of happened say a year ago or even three months ago and yet both of them are there speaking about the same man they saw but describing him differently.

Claudette Joseph: But Lou another thing is that the Chairman of the Commission is a retired judge so I guest what you getting at is where people would come and blatantly distort what happened or so but Mr. Trotman, Justice Trotman is a man of experience in these things being former DPP in St. Vincent and all of that, so he is very well experience and would together with the other Commissioners His Lordship Bishop Goodridge and Fr. Mark Haynes

would be able to decipher generally because the witnesses are usually questioned by the Commission so they are experienced enough to be able to decipher whether somebody is blatantly distorting what he or she knows ---

Judge Trotman: --- and putting it more again to there again Lou. Once coming back to the man being described differently by two persons once you know it is the same man they're talking about the fact that each is saying, giving a different description doesn't make them a liar, one could be colour blind one could have a different memory but once you're satisfied look they are speaking about the same man or the same woman they're telling the truth and you don't hold it against them by calling them, deeming them liars and you can't believe them merely because they're giving different colours of the man.

Lou Smith: To me you're a good experience of the court and I guess rather Fr. Mark would be accustomed to people coming to him and to telling him things.

Judge Trotman: Oh yes, even probably confessing things in front of him they never did (*all laugh*)

Lou Smith: We'll take a short break here and we'll come back in a moment and when we come back we'll talk more about the terms of reference of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission which is in session right now.

B R E A K

Lou Smith: We'll go over the Terms of Reference but before that we know that the South African Government also had a Truth and Reconciliation Commission and sometimes we refer to ours as a South African style Truth and Reconciliation (TRC) I understand you had a meeting with these people recently is that true?

Judge Trotman: Just last week we met with some members of the South African TRC team was here led by Minister Omar who was a former Minister of Justice in the South African Government and who was very actively promotional of the TRC South African and he had been here before and had discussions with the Grenada Government and I think it was on the basis of his discussions that this TRC Grenada was established. They gained quite a lot from the experience with the South Africans and they of course as you know have finished much of their work in South Africa and last week they came to discuss with us and to compare notes on what they have done and what we have done so far and to give some very helpful advise, for which we were very glad.

Judge Trotman: Oh yes, we for instance, we knew of course theirs is a much wider fielded thing. It's probably like they're playing on a field like lords and we're playing here in Grenada ---

Lou Smith: --- bigger country, bigger population and I guess ---

Judge Trotman: --- of course we'll be playing a test here so that even on smaller grounds. So what has happen we look upon the Grenada TRC as a microcosm really of the South African experienced environment even though they maybe one or two differences in detail but we have learnt quite a lot from the basic approaches. They have looked at amnesty, human

rights and reparation and rehabilitation in essence. We are looking generally at those things too but of course reparation is not one of our direct concerns even though quite a lot of the testimonies which we have been receiving so far as Miss Joseph well tell you do relate to reparation but in Grenada as you know there has been a Claims Commission which has dealt with reparations though some people who come before us feel that it has not done, dealt with that aspect sufficiently.

Claudette Joseph: Not the Claims Commission itself but the implementation of the recommendations which the Commission made has not been dealt with.

Lou Smith: You're sure they're saying, what we need more money?

Claudette Joseph: Recommendations have been made for instance for them to get a certain amount of money, in some instances they got none of it, in some instances they got some and cannot be told when they would get the balance or if they would get the balance, that kind of thing.

Lou Smith: Oh, but, you can't handle that.

Judge Trotman: Well to the extent to which we don't want, as I said because we're not even going to review the Claims Commission findings, but to the extent to which people are not satisfied then, they have received their due, to that extent we are prepared to listen to them and to make recommendations, even if is to say look let those people who the Claims Commission found should have been given money let them be given the rest of the money or all the money that the Commission recommended, rather than have them dissatisfied and say well we don't know the Commission did recommend but we haven't got the money or we only got some, this is part of the dissatisfaction and we have to deal with it within the terms of our mandate of people becoming reconciled.

Claudette Joseph: Exactly, that is what I was about to say. It's all part of the process of Reconciliation and when you have unhappy, dissatisfied persons because, well the Commission say I should get \$30,000.00 and I only get \$5,000.00, how could we really have reconciliation in those circumstances, so to that extent I think this Commission would have to make some recommendation because after all we have quite a number of persons coming on the question of reparation and you can't ignore those persons, so I think this Commission would have to say something about that.

Lou Smith: Let's talk about the Terms of Reference of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Claudette you want to take it.

Judge Trotman: Yes, Claudette will take it.

Claudette Joseph: Okay the Terms of Reference, broadly speaking mandates the Commission to within six months from the date of its establishment, conduct an enquiry into certain political events that occurred in Grenada between January 1st 1976 and December 31st 1991 and to determine their root causes so that mistakes made in the past would not be repeated. The Terms of Reference particularizes certain events which include events leading up to and including those of 13th March 1979 and the repercussions, we all know what happened on 13th March 1979.

Also it particularizes the shooting deaths of various persons at Plains, Mt. Rose and Mt. Rich in St. Patrick's, that is during the period 13th March 1979 to 31st December 1983 and also the events leading up to and including what happened on Fort Rupert on 19th October 1983 in particular the root causes of the general political turmoil in the state, the circumstances surrounding the deaths of various persons including Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and other Ministers of Government and also other persons who lost their lives on Fort Rupert and the Commission must ascertain as far as it is practicable the identities and the total number of persons who lost their lives on Fort Rupert. You know that is a question even 20 years or so after people are still asking how many died on Fort Rupert, how many of those people who were not given funeral, we have never been able to get an official count of how many died and the ticklish, the most burning question for most Grenadians, the disposal of the bodies of those persons, because some had funerals but quite a number of those persons, their bodies were never recovered and I think if the Commission could assist in some way saying what happened, finding out the truth as to the disposal of the bodies, I think a lot of families would have achieved some peace of mind, because a lot of families are still in pain and suffering because in Grenada we're a Christian society and the burial of your loved one is a very important thing so and basically also to recommend indemnity or amnesty to persons who the Commission considers to have given truthful evidence at the enquiry so these recommendations could be made and within 3 months after the last hearing to report on the findings and that is basically it. The overall objective is so that the nation could become genuinely reconciled not a surface thing and permanently healed because we have for instance persons coming before the Commission saying, for instance, political detainees, ex-political detainees coming and saying well I have reconciled, I have forgiven the guys on the hill, but in the process of giving their testimony the amount of anger that comes out you really wonder whether they are serious or whether they know what reconciliation really is, whether they are serious about having been reconciled so the Commission is going to attempt to give the nation an opportunity to become genuinely reconciled and permanently healed, that's basically what the Terms of Reference are.

Lou Smith: Is there any fear that something or things may come out which could get someone who didn't know that before if they know it now could develop something, a great anger or something like that?

Judge Trotman: That of course is always to be considered possible. We hope again and we look very much to the South African situation there. We hope for that sort of reaction we would recommend that there be some well organized counseling programmes established by government authorities, we can't ourselves implement that but that seems to be because some of the, some of what you have pointed out Lou has arisen, much of it, that both people who are actually grieved by not knowing now and people who maybe traumatized when they know, some of these things which they do not now know and we, counseling and the South African experience tells us that they've had a special counseling program to deal with that kind of reaction because it is necessary as part of the healing

Just setting up Commissions and making findings and paying money out as reparations could not be enough in this situation, much of it is emotional and that has to be done with psychiatric approaches, counseling and making people healed in that way.

Lou Smith: You would know here in Grenada we've had, if it's the Claims Commission or whatever Commission but they were supposed to look and try to find out how many people

who would have lost their lives. I'm not asking to give me any numbers but the testament you're getting does that lead into the direction as to getting an idea, all sorts of things were called.

.....SECTION TRUNCATED.....

Claudette Joseph: On the Fort whatever ideology these people maybe have had at the time and whatever, some people may feel about it the bottom-line is that these people felt that they were fighting in defense of their country and I think those soldiers who died during the invasion we should properly respect them as Grenadian service men and we should get a proper count so these are some of the things.

Lou Smith: Well I do sincerely hope we will one day get that. Sometimes I wonder, you know you listen to the news and you hear fighting taking place and they always tell you quickly how many people died and I would say how you know that.

Judge Trotman: Things were revealed 2,500 something and they said that's the final count, they think they've got the final count now.

Claudette Joseph: We really, that is part of the Commission work, we really need to handle that.

Judge Trotman: But of course Lou, just coming on, on what you initiated and on what Claudette said, we also want to put the numbers and the persons who have disappeared and the deaths or the uncounted deaths into the wider period in which we're dealing. We're dealing with 1976 - 1991, it's not just, it is true there is a lot of emotional concentration on October 19th and 19th to 25th but our Terms of Reference is a wider picture, 1976 - 1991 and of course some people feel, some in the Commission sometimes feel that we should even go a little beyond 1976, say from 1973 because people were known to have disappeared or died and no account has been given so--

Lou Smith: --- so we know all of 1974 January 21st.

Claudette Joseph: Yes, that one come up a lot before the Commission, unfortunately the Commission was not necessarily involved in the drafting of the Terms of Reference.

Judge Trotman: So we want to look at that wider picture and we want others also to look at that wider picture and it seems and we come back again to the earlier reference to Grenada being a Christian society which it is and one of the things looking at this wider picture between 1973 and 1991, is that it is becoming noticeable to the Commission that the Church ought to be saying more to the Commission about some of these things and we're not pointing it, we're only saying the church include the ecumenical environment of the church is to be placed and described.

Lou Smith: Why you say that?

Judge Trotman: Well, we feel that it seems from some of the testimonies we have been getting from individuals that there are certain matters which are now unknown, which may have been within the knowledge of the church between the period 1973 to 1991, let us put it

into a wider context so as not to specify or give undue concentration or undue burden on the churches *(all laugh)*. The church in general, we feel, and even the whole process of healing is a Christian thing, it's not just for lay Commissioners or judicial Commission and political authorities. The church knows more this is how it appears, it is beginning to appear to us, that the church knows more than the church has so far revealed and we feel that if the church could be a little more confessional, to use one of their own terms, it will be of much benefit to this whole process of truth and reconciliation and healing.

Lou Smith: So you have had some evidence from the church, church people have come to you.

Claudette Joseph: Yes, yes.

Lou Smith: The churches as a body ---

Judge Trotman: --- they have not said enough or let us put it, let us put it they could say more.

Lou Smith: A number of times they have been accused of being too quiet, now is the time.

Claudette Joseph: Well yes, yes.

Lou Smith: The church is not as vocal today say as it was, even before 1974 the church is also known for the Committee of Twenty two, it is very vocal.

Judge Trotman: They must stand up like Christian soldiers, stand up, stand up for Jesus and stand up for the truth.

Lou Smith: You listen to a lot of these preaching, you know you---

Judge Trotman: --- Well I'm a Christian myself *(laughs)*

Lou Smith: The way you say it you know this is also not only a Christian who is staying home and read. You know one of the things I really like and I hoping that the Commission, you mentioned earlier on the Terms of Reference, you know, I am sure that there are people who know about the disposal of the bodies.

Claudette Joseph: Oh yes, oh yes. We believe that, somebody must know and I think that, you see one of the reasons why I think that we still have all this pain and anger and I think that Grenadians are as you say we are Christian people and we are generally willing to forgive and all of that but you will hardly get forgiveness if people cannot be told, even if they can't recover the bodies, but people need to be told what happened to the bodies. For instance in South Africa, coming out of the meeting we had, what we were told by a member of the delegation is that there were instances where people said that there would never forgive, and you now there are the atrocities that went on in South Africa on that part cannot be compared with what happened in Grenada and there are those victims who said they would never forgive these people for what they did, and when the perpetrators came before the Commission and testified they, and open up, we found this guy, we did this, we burnt him, then we throw his body in this river and that kind of thing and people at that stage, they forgave, because what one of the persons on the delegation said is that some people just

needed to identify a spot for instance where they can go annually and place a flower, or something like that so we would not get forgiveness if families are not told what happened to their loved ones and I think it's as simple as that and you know.

Lou Smith: Earlier on I was talking about if you did any preaching before, but I remember now that you have with you, the Bishop and you have Father. *(all laugh)*

Judge Trotman: Yes, yes we are twice blessed. *(all laugh)*

B R E A K

Lou Smith: We'll take a break here and when we come back we'll invite your calls 435-2041 or 435-2768, this is To The Point once again. Okay welcome back we have 13 and a half minutes before the hour of ten o'clock and already there is one caller and just get ready to put on the headsets, I think we have one from the back Claudette, and Justice Trotman you put on you headphones so you can hear what the caller is saying. Hello, good morning.

Caller #1: Hello good morning Lou and good morning to you guests.

Lou Smith: Good morning.

Caller #1: The Truth and Reconciliation, first of all I want to say South Africa events and the Grenada events is two different. In South Africa we had a racial apartheid system dah we had, we didn't have no apartheid system in Grenada here. Now the Truth and Reconciliation Commission is an exercise in futility, a waste of scarce resources. What truth do we want, we already know the truth that Bernard Coard and he gang massacre Grenadians on the Fort and dey bury dem, we know dat already so we doh ha to know nothing else again, we know dat already. Ah first this thing going ahead dey have PRO now, more waste money. I find that is a shame in a time of when dey say belt tightening and thing in this country, we have all this money wasting for nothing. In the first instant the Commission is, well as far as the Commission is a trap, the advisory body, what dat mean? If you go and give any, any statement or any information in this Commission, in de first place no matter what evidence you give dem, they can't do nothing to it because dey already give a blanket, a blanket amnesty to everybody already so you get a blanket amnesty already.

Lou Smith: Yea, because the idea is to get at the truth.

Caller #1: So --

Lou Smith: We are sure to take any action against the public.

Caller #1: Well you see now, that is a waste of time because we know the truth already so why wasting millions ah dollars going all in Africa.

Lou Smith: You may know the truth but that doesn't say everybody else knows the truth.

Caller #1: The amount of Grenadians who were in Grenada know the truth because, Lou, you wasn't in Grenada but we who was in Grenada will know the truth.

Lou Smith: Ok so I wouldn't know the truth because I wasn't in Grenada.

Caller #1: We who was in Grenada was on the firing point, we know what happen so ah mean we know the truth already, so why wasting this money to go to all in Africa for advice all kind ah thing. The lady say about the Chairman is a retired Judge and all kind ah thing, we know all dat, but right now even them Judge nowadays they making some kind ah judgment you does wonder what kind ah judgment they making so dat ain't mean nothing and he say dat they want Grenada to be truly reconciled, this Truth and Reconciliation Commission could get Grenada to reconcile? The kind ah pain we have inside of we guts here, this waste of pappy show thing going around the country and having meeting, this thing could get Grenada reconciled? As far as I see all you getting Grenadians more uptight and this whole thing, I don't know who give this, this Commission this authority to talk about amnesty, recommend amnesty, where all you going out with that, just behave all you self with dat for me please.

Lou Smith: Ok caller thank you very much for your contribution there. Care to respond?

Judge Trotman: Yes well, I think of course, I know the caller seems to be quite, to be very interested in the situation and I think we're glad to hear from him and others like him, even if they think is a waste of time I think well at least he is being truthful, that he thinks is a waste of time and that's the kind of spirit we need but I think if he comes to discuss with us and we would want to invite the gentleman to come and speak with us and we maybe able to, he maybe able to persuade us or we maybe able to persuade him differently so we invite him to come to us, he is free to come to us and we will be very, very happy just come to the Secretariat in Scott Street or phone in and make an appointment and please lets talk to one another man, not let's talk against one another and in absence, let us sit down and work this thing out together.

Claudette Joseph: He said he know the truth.

Judge Trotman: He have a lot in him, it would be very helpful to us.

Lou Smith: And there is also the saying you know that (*laugh*) we say oh I've been in Grenada at the time so I know everything, but there are those who say you are outside of Grenada, people know more than those in Grenada. Anyhow lets take another caller. Good morning, welcome.

Caller #2: Good morning Lou, and good morning to you guest

Commissioners: Morning

Caller #2: You know I beg to differ with your first caller actually but I know in life we do have negative people really oh I just wanted a couple of points actually. First of all now something he said and which has being banded about, about I think it actually came from the administration that over two million dollars is been paid for this process and I just want you to make it quite clear that the judges are not been paid any substantial sum as such you know because I was told so before it's just that expenses and so forth and secondly we are talking about the truth really I would think that it is necessary, as the old saying goes the truth shall set you free, why is it so many people are against hearing the truth and thirdly I wonder really at the end of it, how sincere the people who set up the Commission is really about following the advise of and when given to the administration, is it a genuine process or is just an

exercise really and at the end of it you're going to say well the people doesn't want this and doesn't want that to happen, you don't hide behind that blanket? In closing I would say I do appreciate the attempt which is been made by the Commission to get to the truth of the period, we need it, to close the period, it's the only healing process we can have.

Lou Smith: Alright, thank you very much.

Judge Trotman: Yes, that's a very constructive view, and we will hope that even before we submit our findings and make recommendations that those findings and recommendations will have been served and will have been helped to be formulated by many a wide representation of individuals and organizations. For instance we want and we would like to see all political parties take part in this process, Trade Unions, NGO's, we would like them to, we would like to receive either memoranda from them or to appear before the Commission so that our finds and our recommendations will not been seen just as four persons on the Commission giving their opinions and findings but we'll be an arm and arm of the combined or, and the essence of the combined views and opinions of this wide representational cross section of the Grenadian people, individual and organizations so that the Government to whom maybe making these, submitting these findings will have not just as I said before the findings of four people, but the thoughts and opinions of structural representational persons and organizations of the Grenadian society.

Lou Smith: Another caller, hello good morning.

Caller #3: Good morning, good morning to the Commissioners.

Commissioners: Good morning.

Caller #3: Would the Commission consider or recommend in view of the fact that the bodies of the people who died on October 19th on Fort Rupert, Fort George were never identified or found, would you recommend that some sort of monument be erected, giving the names, just stating the names who helped without status or regard, Grenadians there are, all how many of them whatever number is finally decided, give their names and have it as a prominent place in the St. George's Cemetery where those who wish to consider them as heroes may go on whatever day they may want to worship their heroes and those who consider them as villains regard them as villains because there are two sides and there would always be two sides it seems and that is for the people who died at Fort Rupert so we may lay that to rest. We can have a Christian ceremony and that sort of thing to when you are establishing or unveiling this monument. The other side of the coin is that misguided as though they may well have been, some number unknown of young Grenadian men pitted their strength against the mighty American forces, the most powerful nation in the world. They went out there to fight against them. I think they deserve to be honoured for their bravery at least and there should be some monument somewhere when and if we can discover their names, listing their names or if they don't know their names, just in the memory of the brave Grenadians who pitted their strength against the mighty America. Would the Commissioners think of recommending something like this?

Judge Trotman: Well Sir, it is good to hear from persons like you. Those are words of, many words of much wisdom and the Commission has given thought to some of what you have said, you have of course given us more to think about and we certainly would take them on

stream and certainly as I said they are wise and the Commission is of course wise and useful and the Commission will be, will find it very relevant to have such proposals included in their recommendations.

Lou Smith: Well, thank you. A number of people have been mentioning particularly as you have on Grenadian soil a plaque in honour of the Americans who were here, irrespective of the guys who were there I mean there were Grenadians.

Judge Trotman: They must be commemorated.

Lou Smith: I don't think that should come from the Commission I think that is something that should have been done a long time ago.

Claudette Joseph: that should have been done a long time ago.

Judge Trotman: Of course we are hoping that things could be done even before it submits its findings because the process of healing and reconciliation should be a gradual thing. We don't want of course to wait until the Commission's findings have been submitted and then the next day 'cause this is not an overnight thing, it should be a concurrent process and we could start doing some of the things even now, before we have completed our report.

Lou Smith: There's a minute remaining, any closing comments, Claudette you first, I leave the last words for Justice.

Claudette Joseph: Ok, I would like to thank you very much for having us on this programme and we hope that we have, some what dispelled some of the misconceptions that persons may have about the Commission, we hope that persons would come before the Commission with the information that they have relevant information, we have to keep in mind our young people as well. We have a group of young people, a generation, who know almost nothing about that period in our history. The 17 is right up, and this is our history. Grenada, I always say has the most colourful history in the Caribbean perhaps apart from Haiti and what we see as young people we don't even get the Grenada Revolution on the CXC syllabus and the Commission would also play a role in writing the history truthfully about Grenada so we would really like Grenadians to cooperate with this Commission. We are not concerned with whatever political motivation there is, what ever the Commission is not interested in that and not concerned. I am convinced that the Commissioners are men of integrity and they should be seen as such by the public, so thank you very much.

Judge Trotman: Yes Lou I am just trying to end in on the note that you said that the truth shall make you free. Now that is what we hope will happen. Those who learn and know about the truth, they will be free. They will feel that they have got something that would help them to be satisfied even more, content and those who speak the truth will again purge their consciences and they will be free and we hope that this entire process will culminate not only in making the people of Grenada feel free but also it will become a model for the rest of the Caribbean because many of our territories in the Caribbean do need this finding the truth, this reconciliation and healing process. Thank you.

Lou Smith: Thank you very much, you have been speaking with the Chairman of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Justice Donald Trotman, and the Secretary to the

Commission, Claudette Joseph. Once again, thank you very much and this completes our programme for today.

TO THE POINT WEDNESDAY 6TH FEBRUARY 2002

Text of what Ms. Joseph said:

"... what ever ideology these people may have had at the time and whatever some people may feel about it, the bottom line is that they were fighting in defence of their country and I think those soldiers who died during the invasion we should properly respect them as Grenadian service men ... so we should get a proper count..."

APPENDIX H

**NOTES OF MEETING BETWEEN THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION
COMMISSION AND SOUTH AFRICAN DELEGATION HELD TUESDAY 29TH
JANUARY AT SPICE ISLAND INN CONFERENCE ROOM**

Present were: Justice Donald AB Trotman – Chairman, TRC Grenada
Father Mark Haynes – Commissioner, TRC Grenada
Ms. Claudette Joseph – Secretary, TRC Grenada

Also present was a South African delegation comprising:

Hon. Dullah Omar, Minister of Transport and former Minister of Justice
Prof. M.R. Rwelamira – Special Advisor to Minister of Transport
His Excellency Thanduyise Henry Chiliza – South African High
Commissioner to Grenada
Mr. Shoppe –
Ms. Matse Ch.

Members of the South African delegation introduced themselves as did members of the Grenada TRC.

The Honourable Minister informed the meeting that Professor Rwelamira was largely responsible for drafting the legislation for the South African TRC and was instrumental in its establishment.

Minister Omar visited Grenada in April 2000 when he was sent by President Mbeki. This visit was as a result of interaction between Prime Minister Mitchell and President Mbeki. At that time the Minister was asked to give an idea as to what happened with the South African TRC. He had meetings with various persons including Prime Minister Mitchell and with different organisations. He then reported back to President Mbeki. Even though he is no longer the Justice Minister, the Minister continues to serve on various groups and committees dealing with TRC. This is a follow up visit to the April 2000 visit.

The South African TRC's initial report was published in five volumes in 1998. The TRC is now in the process of finalizing its report. This will be done in March this year. The report will then go to cabinet and then to Parliament for debate. The recommendations have helped in many ways with the healing of the nation. A number of recommendations have been implemented one of which is reparation for victims.

The Minister also indicated that he met with 16 of the 17 persons at prison had lengthy meeting with them.

He would like to find out if there is anything that can be done to help the Grenadian TRC. He suggested for instance, that the TRC ask the Government to allow its members to visit South Africa to meet with various persons involved in the TRC there, and to visit the office there which is still operational. He pointed out the following:

1. We need a sound administrative machinery.
2. We need marketing and public relations campaign because the nation must be brought on board.

He inquired as to what steps are/were taken to ensure this is done, and if we would like to tell how the TRC here has been going so far.

Mr. Trotman expressed that he was not here first time around (when a South African delegation visited.) He said that he was very happy to meet with the delegation and has made every effort to be present. His frank opinion was that we are not on track, for instance in the areas of public relations and counseling. He pointed out that we have certain constraints here, for example, we cannot have extensive administrative machinery as in South Africa.

In Grenada we have the problem of amnesty because of the legislation under which we were appointed. The TRC is not in a position to grant amnesty, unlike South Africa where the act seems to be much clearer. He however noted that there was an aspect of

1 the South African legislation that said that persons responsible for serious crimes should not expect amnesty. This he said we will have to see how it works in South Africa and hopefully, learn from it.

He also expressed that we in Grenada would wish to learn a little more about the South African approach to outreach visits so that we could get out of sitting at the office too often for hearings.

Also, as regards informal conversations, Justice Trotman inquired of the Minister as to whether and how these are to be used in the final report.

Justice Trotman requested summaries of the South African report and information on what has been done so far, particularly the aspects of the report on amnesty.

Father Mark expressed that one of his great concerns is that there are some very serious misconceptions about the TRC. One of the most popular ones being that this is an instrument of the Government to free those in prison, the public sees us as a political tool.

Also, people have to be sure that when they come they will be granted amnesty

Minister Omar was of the view that these issues must be discussed, but first he said, the South African TRC was different from others in that the amnesty task was combined with the other tasks. Grenada should not necessarily follow suit. He opined that the Grenada TRC should not be burdened with the onerous task of dealing with amnesty. If there is some way this TRC can carry on its work of finding out the truth and not deal with the issue of amnesty, then that should be considered. The amnesty Committee in South Africa operated much like a court. It may be that the 17 is a matter for the executive and not the TRC. If in the case of Grenada the TRC is going to include amnesty, then there should be some clear rules. At the very least he said the Commission should have the authority to say that nothing which the Commission receives as evidence during its hearings can be used as evidence in subsequent proceedings. It may very well be that the

legislation will have to be revisited, but then there would be the danger of highlighting the issue.

The question was asked of the Minister whether or not perspective witnesses were still deterred from coming before the Commission even with the provision in legislation.

The dominant experience in South Africa was that once persons gave truthful evidence, victims were willing to forgive. Before the Commission commenced its work, a number of persons who were in prison for political crimes were released. So there was an indemnity process before hand. There was no independent judiciary in the past so that the South African TRC had to make sure of this before its work began.

The hearings were in public and that helped to create transparency and therefore helped to boost confidence in the TRC.

As regards the question of the use of information gotten during informal conversations, this information was used in the report. The Commission was not over technical as to how information was brought before it.

1 On the question of the documents in the possession of the United States State Department, and whether the Minister had any idea on how the TRC may retrieve these. The Minister opined that this is a Government to Government matter and should be dealt with as such.

One of the recommendations of the South African TRC is that some memorials can be erected. The Government is thinking of building several peace parks.

There was also a process for interim reparations. The position of the South Africa TRC is to move away from the concept of compensation in favour of reparation which was more all-inclusive. There was a special fund set up for this. Some of the funds came from donations.

The South African TRC made recommendations which the Government did not always agree but the Commission were allowed to do its work and to make its recommendations. There were sometimes legal challenges to the recommendations, sometimes the TRC won and sometimes it lost. The TRC did not use state lawyers it retained its own.

As regards field officers, they were used to secure statements from persons. Prior to going out into the field, they were trained on how to approach, how to listen with dignity, how to assure persons on the impartiality of the Commission.

The TRC also videotaped some of the proceedings.

✓ It is important that the TRC should have its own budget.

There are instances where the TRC had special investigators to investigate certain cases:

* Government here will be making a big mistake if it does not empower the Commission to do its work. There are a number of things the Government must do. For one thing, the **Government should not burden the Commission with the issue of the 17.**

✓ Another point on public relations is that the Commission had a daily bulletin that sent out news releases etc.

A status report on the Grenada TRC was presented to the visiting delegation.

Professor Rwelamira offered to assist and asked for the following: copy of our terms of reference, copy of Grenada Constitution, appointing instruments for the TRC and any regulations, Commission of Inquiry Act.

APPENDIX I

Meeting with delegation from the Conference of Churches Grenada

Wednesday December 12, 2001

Delegation: Canon Leopold Friday - Chairman
Fr. Sean Doggett - Catholic Priest
Fr. Peter Clarke - Catholic Priest
Cpt. Robert Ewart - Salvation Army

Before: Hon. Judge Donald A.B. Trotman - Chairman
Bishop Sehon Goodridge - Commissioner
Fr. Mark Haynes - Commissioner
Miss Claudette Joseph - Secretary

Time begun: 8:59am

Hon. Judge Donald Trotman reads Terms of Reference.

Fr. Peter Clarke: I have a very strong gut feeling about the Commission that it is going to be treated with any real feeling a future exercise about this particular period to what is happening in our society and what I think is lacking is a sense of reconciliation. I think it will be a serious issue if people are not living reconciliation in their home or in their society. We have had many confrontations and people are not behaving as if they believe in it. Unless we act as if we believe in it we would not make any sense. That is what I find is happening at this moment. I am also thinking of different levels of society from the domestic to the political. We have lost the will and the ability to settle things peacefully.

Bishop Goodridge: Would you say Father that in all this below the surface of things there are deep-seated wounds in present situation, as there are some constraining factors. What the Commission is trying to do is find if there are any underlying cases.

Fr. Peter Clarke: I would say with people under who the first loyalty is put under, Grenada is a politically polarized society. First allegiance has been towards political persuasions and the church has had a difficult time to break through. The Church plays strong role in a matter of justice and truth in the way they live. I do not know whether it is irrelevant or too relevant, it is the political party it is not the Church and this is being passed on. Children are really forced to accept political allegiances of their parents. When someone in political positions are in trouble children are finding it out unless it becomes a national attitude we cannot get truth and reconciliation. It is not the Commission to produce truth and reconciliation it is the people of Grenada.

Canon Leopold Friday: I think perhaps to a larger extent the people of Grenada have been involved in the whole process of truth and reconciliation. If we give them a sense of openness to come forward the whole process of truth and reconciliation could be very painful. I do not know if there is any thing in place to help persons who are in pain.

Fr. Mark Haynes: I am seeing two things here. One is we have specific dates at which we have to look at. Of course I am hearing there is need for healing of the Grenadian mentality and to me it is kind of an important thing to deal with. We can never do so much in a particular time frame so we would have to straighten out our thinking on that. We are here to create an atmosphere for people to be reconciled and healed. We have to be realistic in terms of the Terms of Reference of the Commission. This seems to go way back but we only have six months. The question is could we do this?

Fr. Sean Doggett: I recalled when the South African Justice Leader visited there was a certain excitement and a certain expectation that this Commission today would help in the healing of wounds. He said the lack of knowledge and the suspicion for example some people who had felt deep hurt would have the opportunity to be healed. The subsequent delay in getting the Commission off the ground caused that expectancy to be dumped to the ground. The impression that is around is that this is used to refer back to events of the past and the Terms of Reference are in a sense too broad. There is no way the Commission can produce that sense of reconciliation. It is too vast. I agree with Father Peter.

What is uppermost in the minds of people is the political difference and the hurts that are still very deep a sort of tools and weapons that can also be used against people as to who said this and that. My hope is that the Commission is not too exhausted in doing its work but that the Commission can make recommendations if not national healing. I wonder since the Commission has been set up I have read very little as to the work of the Commission. Talking to people I get the impression that people are thinking that the Commission is having sittings in a little room somewhere and some would come and some would not come out. For the work of the Commission to be successful I believe that the Commission be proactive to go out and look and find information from other sources. Barbados, Radio Antilles and Trinidad newspapers were reporting. There is a book which was published in Cuba giving an account of the events from the Cuban perspective. There must be questions and I do not know whether the Commission can find extracts of them or not. As concerning the bodies found there are others who were killed and those bodies were not accounted for and I am quite certain there are Grenadians who are grieving. Perhaps some information can be received from the undertakers. What I would like to say is the outcome with regards to the Commemoration of those who died. If you take for example the American soldiers who died, in St. George's University and at the airport there are monuments with the names of the soldiers and the Grenadians, they are forgotten. We may not agree with the course of action that they took but we must remember they are human beings. Places or monuments should be identified where families can go to mourn. I remember Mr. Dollar from Africa saying that religiously it is important.

Bishop Sehon Goodridge: On the last point is there something that the Conference can take on their own?

Fr. Sean Doggett: I think it would make sense only if a lot of underlying work has been done.

Fr. Peter Clarke: Maurice Bishop Patriotic Movement (MBPM) has taken up the cause of the victims by going up to the Fort and mourn. They have some kind of service with those who are in sympathy of that cause and it is a very small number in fact who actually go there. They do something significantly; they are remembering the day. They have taken over that sentiment. We have Thanksgiving but not a day when the church could take that initiative.

Fr. Mark Haynes: One of the things worth considering, should October 19 be declared a national holiday? What is the thinking of the church on that level, should a recommendation be made that the day take on a more national flavour because a Prime Minister was slain that day, members of Cabinet were slain?

Fr. Sean Doggett: I think it is premature and a lot of work has to be done and a lot of information to be brought out. Take for example the events on the Fort on October 19th, we that certain people were killed, we know others were arrested, a trial has taken place, people have been convicted, is the Commission looking into, is the Commission examining the documents at the trial, the preliminary investigation, the evidence given, the prosecution evidence, particularly the prosecution evidence because there are a lot of things I think the defense lawyers did not go through but the evidence of those given at the enquiry and the evidence of those same witnesses in the actual trial and then at the appeal. I don't know if any people have come forward and talked to the Commission but this is a matter of records, the records are there. The Commission should first look at those record of the trial and examine them. We know a lot of people have been killed and a lot of lives taken. Other people died on that day apart from the Government Ministers and they did not die by accident, they were killed. The emphasis is all on those who were killed on the Fort and there are others who probably might have died on the way to the Fort but I have never heard any questions about prosecuting anybody on that side. Is there any research or any attempt to find about these other deaths?

Bishop Goodridge: I think you're identifying the need for a Commission, trying to get some of this out. We have had some people here who have been trying to help us and they have been very helpful.

Fr. Peter Clarke: But to answer the question as to whether there should be a national day, I say yes if the church initiates it and they are responsible for having a day of prayer and no if the Government in any way or whatever Government or party initiates it. It is very important that it is disassociated with any party. It is very important if it sets out all the political divisions.

If it something to bringing people together, then it should be something only the church does and invite the nation and that includes all political parties.

Judge Trotman: On the day that Bishop died, the Americans have a ceremonial commemoration, what takes place, what is the common thing that happens?

Fr. Sean Doggett: On the 25th of October there is a church service organized by the Conference or by other parties involved in such action in the morning and what happened up until two years ago there would be something in the night. In years previous to that it was only to commemorate the American soldiers who died and I think it was last year Dr. Warden was the one who specifically mentioned that it would be appropriate to have something to commemorate the Grenadians or I think he made reference to the Grenadians who died.

Judge Trotman: Is there a continuing unveiling of the plaque at the Airport?

Fr. Sean Doggett: No, nothing takes place there. That was only put there but I do not think anything takes place there.

Bishop Goodridge: In relation to this we also should thank God the American's intervention.

Fr. Peter Clarke: I think there are a lot of contradiction to this big celebration.

Judge Trotman: Is that seen in general as having an official sanctioning of the American intervention? How does the public generally see that?

Fr. Sean Doggett: You find some people saying that is good for America. I do not know how the public would deal with that.

Fr. Mark Haynes: One of the things we would have to deal with is the fact that different persons died under different circumstances, everybody did not die on the Fort. This is something I think we need to deal with because people died in Beausejour, people died in Plains so we have to deal with that before we could ever say anything else. Certainly when the Americans have their thing they are speaking in terms of their men who died on or after the 25th, then this has nothing to do with October 19th. They believed their men died trying to liberate Grenada so we have to see the difference, we have to pay attention to that.

Bishop Goodridge: This is a contradiction because all this is happening within a country not America. It's happening in a country which does not commemorate its own dead. To me that's a major contradiction.

Judge Trotman: Does any significant section of the society at that time when this was happening resent the American presence by the Americans commemorating?

Fr. Sean Doggett: There is no public demonstration but there is definitely a feeling of resentment by portions of the population.

Fr. Peter Clarke: The very language that the British use is significant - 'invasion', 'intervention', it's all intensified ideologies.

Judge Trotman: The annual commemoration does not help this? It's provocative, annually, just continuing like this, putting it more would it be a good thing in the interest of healing and reconciliation that their particular event were to continue as an annual event?

Fr. Peter Clarke: Thanksgiving Day has lost its veracity. Originally, it was Thanksgiving for a particular event; now, it has reached ear which is skeptical that there is no thanksgiving for all God's blessings. Over the years within the Conference of Churches, some thought we must put this behind us instead of bringing it up again and let that rest just thanking God. Some insist that we have a historical date for October 1983 and others they just want it be a Thanksgiving day. Grenadians have been very ambiguous about this thing.

Bishop Goodridge: In the last service I heard a statement from the American Embassy from the Prime Minister and I think your question is very relevant as to why we are continuing to celebrate as to the focus of what is going on, I need help.

Fr. Sean Doggett: Some of the problems is that it is part of the political reality.

Fr. Mark Haynes: One of the things we must be more focussed on whether things to be done must be in the interest of Grenadians not just a particular period or a particular party. It must be of national interest because in all that we must recognize that Grenada is to be first.

Fr. Sean Doggett: That brings us right back to the Terms of Reference of the Commission. I presume that, my understanding is that the Commission would make its recommendations to the Government so ultimately whatever problems that may occur at that time, what to do or what not to do and we're still back to square one with regards to what that Government considers informative.

Judge Trotman: We should hope to make our recommendations public and the Government alone should not be the sole arbiter of the findings.

Bishop Goodridge: We may have to bring the Government before the Commission. I am interested Mr. Chairman in the present political situation which concerns a lot of things and we must not be seen to be going over the grounds of any political party.

Fr. Peter Clarke: I would say polarization.

Judge Trotman: We have here Captain Robert, now we would like to hear some of your views. Could we hear separately or specifically now?

Cpt. Layne: With regards to the TRC I must honestly say I do not know much about it and I would prefer to listen rather than speak. I am in a learning process.

Judge Trotman: One of the things we want to get back to now is that we have frank and open views. The church has found it difficult to get people to think objectively about truth and reconciliation and so having said, has the church got any positive plan of dealing with that difficulty or to reduce that difficulty rather than saying it is a difficult thing?

Fr. Sean Doggett: The Christian Prison Ministry Council planned a series of reconciliation services. We had one in the Cathedral and one in the Methodist Church during the years 1999-2000.

Judge Trotman: What nature did that take?

Fr. Sean Doggett: It was part of a rally for the Catholic church which tried to address the issues to an extent.

Fr. Peter Clarke: A book was signed by persons who want to make reconciliation and a card was given. The first two names were the Governor General and the Prime Minister. The book was taken to the prisons and they signed it. The heart of the hurt and the division on the one hand released who were grieving loved ones who were killed, bodies were not found. There is no real explanation that those people died. They are grieving. Families and individuals who had loved ones that is something very real and still very raw and it has never been addressed. It has manifested itself when the Conference of Churches appealed for the release of two of the prisoners which included Phyllis Coard on the grounds of medical purposes and while the Mercy Committee was meeting, a demonstration was taking place out in the streets and people demonstrated against the release and what motivated them to come out into the streets and demonstrate was the pain that they are feeling, the pain that has not been addressed and that's on one side. On the other side, there is a fact that 17 are imprisoned for over 18 years and there is a deep feeling that their trial was not just and that they are not given the recourse to go through all the legal processes. Others who have been convicted of similar offenses would have according to the Legal Constitution appealed to the Privy Council.

Judge Trotman: That is what I call a sore or technical difficulty in the sense that they could not appeal to them because the appeal had been removed so that they could not sit. That is why I say it is a sore and technical difficulty because there ought to have been some way of addressing that difficulty in order to manifest that an appeal was not given. I myself however find that it looks like if they did not approach the Inter-American Court to which I believe there is recourse if all other remedies have been used up. I don't know if that had been done. Did they move to the Inter-American Court?

Miss Joseph: Not as far as I know.

Judge Trotman: Grenada has access to that so if they had gone ahead and bridged out then they could have approached the Inter-American Court.

Fr. Sean Doggett: I have intended on pursuing that this evening. You mentioned that the recourse to the Privy Council has been removed to what were you referring, the Revolution or the intervention? I am understanding that a law was passed in Parliament in Grenada in 1991 preventing anybody convicted of a capital offence from appealing to the Privy Council so that includes not only the 17 that has been convicted but also 10 others who have been convicted of murder before. Now if any of those 10 had been prominent people with access to prominent lawyers and publicity, I am quite certain an issue would have been made about it but the fact that none of them are of that stature, none of them would have gone through that process, none of them would have that recourse, none of them would even have the capacity to take up the issue and fight from the support of the outside or their family whatever.

Judge Trotman: All of those 10 are still in prison?

Answer: All of them.

Judge Trotman: The other thing I am concerned about is the objective we may wish to feel as why have them in prison without carrying out a sentence which is temporary imprisonment.

Fr. Sean Doggett: They were sentenced to death and that sentence was commuted.

Judge Trotman: For all of them?

Fr. Sean Doggett: For all.

Judge Trotman: Not just the 10, the 18 of them?

Fr. Sean Doggett: Yes. All 27 in August of 1991 Prime Minister Nicholas Brathwaite commuted all outstanding death sentence to life imprisonment.

Bishop Goodridge: Since they are now the 17, are they likely to feel that they may have an appeal?

Fr. Peter Clarke: Yes, the issue is in the final report as regards to the 17 their appeal was never submitted in writing and credibility of the process at stake until the final report comes out. Internationally I think Grenada's presence is out of the question precisely because of that its previous incident of a report that we have. It is a matter of denial of justice to the people concerned who are in prison because their remaining there will depend on only if a recourse was granted and the reason why their appeal is denied is not in writing and is a matter of grave concern internationally and I feel an appall of injustice might have been done and it would be satisfying to be able to see the actual text and that concerns other people as well, internationally and regionally. This is other prospect of an appall of injustice been done because the case was not handled properly.

Fr. Mark Haynes: Who will be the ones privy to the text of the trial, the Government, the Court of Appeal? Suppose we were to pursue that to who should we go?

Fr. Sean Doggett: I think the court should have that.

Judge Trotman: There was a decision that the appeal was allowed to them.

Miss Joseph: There was never a judgement.

Judge Trotman: My understanding of what I heard is that they didn't actually write their reasons. One has to try to appeal even if that is to be made public; one has to distinguish between whether they wrote their reason or they did write their reasons but these reasons are not yet out and I think it would help if either one of them were known. It is the understanding among legal circles that the reasons were not written so they are not available.

Fr. Sean Doggett: The popular assumption is that they were not paid.

Judge Trotman: I heard about that. The one to the Privy Council as I said was a sore and difficult point because to the Privy Council as I said was technically right in saying that they could not hear the appeal because the appeal to them was a repeal.

Miss Joseph: Before the Act of 1991, the 17 represented by Andy Mitchell had gone to the Privy Council on a constitutional motion which the Privy Council dismissed on the grounds that they had no jurisdiction.

Fr. Sean Doggett: The question of the withdrawal of Grenada from the Court of Appeal, the Revolutionary Government withdrew, expelled, whatever took the initiative for Grenada to come out from the Eastern Caribbean. Those in prison would say that it was not their wish, that in fact, the system was withdrawn in Grenada, again that would be a matter of records.

Judge Trotman: If the constitution was suspended wouldn't all the appeals to the both the Eastern Caribbean Court and the Privy Council gone in at the same time? I know particularly of the Privy Council but I can't say with any certainty about the appeal to the Eastern Caribbean Court on any sure grounds but if that was so, how did it get to the Eastern Caribbean Court?

Miss Joseph: Their case was tried under the system for which all cases were tried. We had the Grenada Supreme Court because we were no longer under the Eastern Caribbean system.

Judge Trotman: Under the PRG system where did the appeals go?

Miss Joseph: To the Grenada Supreme Court which was the final Court of Appeal.

Canon Friday: If the constitution was suspended in the Revolution was it restored?

Miss Joseph: Not automatically Grenada remained under the system set up by the P.R.G. for a couple of years well after. It was only in 1991 Grenada came back under the court system. They were restored in 1984 but not the court system. The Act of 1991 brought Grenada back into the court system but there are some who interpret it as a deliberate attempt to keep —

Fr. Sean Doggett: — it prohibited those convicted for bringing their appeals to the Privy Council.

Bishop Goodridge: How far do you make it legally right or morally wrong?

Judge Trotman: Our perception should be if at all to look more at its ways in the interest and legality of it.

Fr. Peter Clarke: We still got the attitude of people being very cautious of speaking their minds because of the consequences so there might be quite a lot of feelings deep down inside but they don't want to come out with it in the open for very obvious reasons.

Canon Friday: Why restore the constitution but not the judicial system?

Miss Joseph: Well they had to in order to have elections and return to Parliamentary democracy, I suppose.

Canon Friday: They restored the Constitution but they did not believe in it.

Miss Joseph: But remember the court system was a more elaborate procedure. If they had not gone back it would be a question of a validity of all these laws which were passed during the Revolution.

Fr. Sean Doggett: Were they considered valid laws? When the Constitution was restored, what happened to all those Peoples' laws?

Miss Joseph: There was a validation Act in early 1985 which validated all the Peoples' Laws.

Judge Trotman: They had to be legally recognised. That is where the technicality came into the Privy Council. The very fact that these People's Laws themselves were subsequently validated by law, including the Peoples' Law which abolished its appeal to the Privy Council so that itself as it was, was revalidated.

Fr. Sean Doggett: I do not know the fact and I would like to know, in 1979 was it the PRG which withdrew Grenada from the Eastern Caribbean legal system or not?

Judge Trotman: Did Grenada withdraw, apart from the legal side of it, from the O.E.C.S or were they suspended?

Miss Joseph: Grenada is part of the O.E.C.S in the areas of sports, etc.

Canon Leopold Friday: The Terms of Reference mentions "looking into events leading up to and including those of 13th March, 1979 and repercussions." I think part of the hurt is being felt goes back to 1976 and 1979 with persons who felt they have been treated unfairly by the Commission then because they made their report and nothing happened. Leading to the Revolution and onwards people felt that they were treated unfairly. Many persons have mentioned that to me. Some supported the Revolution and said this was necessary and others of the society said the Revolution was bad and that is a conflict.

Bishop Goodridge: If the churches have a day of commemoration would it involve gathering a list so we can document something and help in the process and have a day of mourning?

Fr. Sean Doggett: I think it would be very premature so to speak. They feel that they have been forgotten so the Commission could make an approach to them.

Judge Trotman: We would take that into view and make our own proactive approach. How could we get to know the names of who to go to?

I think we have faired considerably with the information we have gotten from you.

Time ended: 10:25am

APPENDIX J

APPENDIX - J

NAMES OF ORGANISATIONS AND GROUPS invited to meet with the T.R.C.

ORGANISATIONS/GROUPS	ADDRESSES
YWCA	Mrs. Jacqueline Cornwall President YWCA
GNOW	Mrs. Jacqueline Cornwall President Grenada National Organisation of Women
GRENCODA	Mrs. Judy Williams-Modeste General Secretary GRENCODA
GRENEC	Mrs. Winifred Teague Acting Executive Director GRENEC
ART	Ms. Sandra Ferguson Secretary General Agency for Rural Transformation
NPTA	Mr. Solomon Stafford President National Parent Teachers Association
GCIC	Mr. Christopher De Riggs Executive Director Grenada Chamber of Industry and Commerce
IPE	Mr. Peter Antoine President Institute for People's Enlightenment
Grenada Trade Union Council	Mr. Rae Roberts General Secretary Grenada Trade Union Council
LAGDO	The President LAGDO C/o Agency for Rural Transformation Marrast Hill, St. George's

Methodist Youth Group	The President St. George's Methodist Church Youth Group
Cathedral Youth Group	The President Cathedral Church Youth Group
GCC	Canon L. Friday Grenada Conference of Churches C/o Anglican Rectory Church Street, St. George's
GBA	Mr. Ruggles Ferguson President Grenada Bar Association C/o Ciboney Chambers H.A. Blaize street, St. George's
GMA	The President Grenada Medical Association P.O. Box 1959 St. George's
St. George's Anglican Youth Group	The President St. George's Anglican Youth Group St. George's
Presbyterian Youth Group	The President Presbyterian Youth Group Grand Etang Road St. George's
Otway Funeral Home	Mr. Clinton Bailey Director Otway Bailey Funeral Home The Carenage, St. George's
La Qua & Sons Funeral Home	Mr. Thomas La Qua Director La Qua & Sons Funeral Home Melville Street, St. George's
Evangelistic Centre Youth Group	The President Evangelistic Centre Youth Group Market Hill, St. George's
The New National Party	Rt. Hon. Keith Mitchell The Leader The New National Party Lucas Street, St. George's
Grenada United Labour Party	Mrs. Gloria Payne-Banfield The Leader Grenada United Labour Party Springs, St. George's
National Youth Council	Mr. Cecil Greenidge President National Youth Council

National Parent-Teachers Association	National Youth Council The President National Parent Teachers Association
The National Democratic Congress	Hon. Tillman Thomas Leader of the Opposition The National Democratic Congress Old Fort Road, St. George's
People's Labour Movement	Mr. Francis Alexis The Leader People's Labour Movement
Grenada National Council for the Disabled	The President Grenada National Council for the Disabled Scott Street St. George's
Leo Club of St. George	The President Leo Club of St. George
Church of God of Prophecy	The Pastor and Members Church of God of Prophecy Belmont, St. George's
P.T.A. St. Patrick's	The President P.T.A. St. Patrick's Multi-Purpose Centre St. Patrick's
The People's Church	Pastor Karl Hood The People's Church St. Paul's, St. George's
Catholic Church	Roxborough Catholic Church St. Paul's, St. George's
Living Word, World Outreach	The Pastor Living Word, World Outreach Mt. Airy, St. Paul's St. George's
Pentecostal Assemblies of W.I.	The Pastor Pentecostal Assemblies of W.I. St. Paul's, St. George's
P & M Investment Retails	The President P & M Investment Retails Maidgras, St. Paul's St. George's
De La Grenade Industries	The Manager De La Grenade Industries St. Paul's, St. George's

St. Augustine's Medical Services	The President St. Augustine's Medical Services St. Paul's, St. George's
Gittens Agency Ltd.	The Manager Gittens Agency Ltd. St. Paul's, St. George's
St. Patrick's Anglican Church	Fr. Christian Glasgow St. Patrick's Anglican Church St. Patrick's
The "Grenada 17" incarcerated in H.M. Prisons	Jan 23, 2002 - through the Minister of National Security April 15, 2002 - through Commissioner of Prisons April 15, 2002 - by letter April 24, 2002 - by letter Feb. 04, 2004 through Attorney Keith Scotland

APPENDIX K

APPENDIX K

Names of persons and organisations who came before the Commission, and of those who sent memoranda.

	NAME	NATURE OF EVIDENCE	PERIOD OF TESTIMONY	DATE OF TESTIMONY	REQUEST OF COMMISSION
1	Terrie Registe	Ill treatment at prisons	1979-1983	9/10/01	Compensation
2	Winston Courtney	Knowledge of the Revolution and was a victim	1976-1991	10/10/01	Compensation
3	David Coomansingh	Unlawful imprisonment, ill treatment and shortage of salary	1979-1991	29/10/01	Compensation
4	Kennedy Jawahir	Events leading to situations on the Fort and financial losses	1979-1983	29/10/01	Compensation
5	Alexis Simon	Enquiry of Compensation for victims	1979-1983	30/10/01	Compensation
6	Milton Coy	Statement from the G.H.R.O on the process		31/10/01	Contribution to Commission's work
7	Alec Lewis	Teachings about Jesus Christ and U.F.O	1976-1991	31/10/01	Contribution to Commission's work
8	Anthony Jones	Time at Fort Rupert during the years of the Revolution	1979-1983	12/11/01	Compensation
9	Claudius Coutain	Treatment during the Revolution	1979-1983	13/11/01	Compensation

10	Robert Fanovich	Events on the Fort, disposal of bodies, whereabouts of remains of Maurice Bishop and others	1979-1983	13/11/01	Contribution to Commission's work
11	Nicole Phillip	Research conducted on the Period	1979-1983	14/11/01	Contribution to Commission's work
12	Dolores Oroivi (Submitted memorandum)	Mother was a victim of the invasion	1979 - 1983	26/11/01	
13	Francis Daniel (Submitted memorandum)	Victim of the Revolution	1979 - 1983	27/11/01	
14	Conference of Churches Grenada	Contributions for reconciliation and healing for Grenadians	1976 - 1983	12/12/01	Contribution to Commission's work
15	Evlyn Gresham	Period leading up to the Revolution	1979 - 1983	12/12/01	Contribution to Commission's work
16	Fr. Sean Doggett	Deaths and disposal of bodies of various persons	1979 - 1983	12/12/01	Contribution to Commission's work
17	Louisa Johnson	Time spent during the Revolution and migration after the Revolution	1979-1983 1984-1991	13/12/01	Compensation
18	George Cherubim	Period immediately leading up to and including October 1983 and after	1979 - 1983	13/12/01	Contribution to Commission's work

19	Prince Nna Nna	Rastas and the Revolution	1979 - 1983	13/12/01	Contribution to Commission's work
20	E.P Friday	Occupation of property by Prison Authority, effect of occupation without compensation on Hotel Balisier	1984 - 1991	08/10/01 (Submitted memorandum) 14/12/01	Compensation
21	Dawne Patrice	Ill treatment of P.R.A	1979 - 1983	14/12/01	Compensation
22	Raleigh Date (Submitted memorandum)		1976 - 1983	06/01/02	Contribution to Commission's work
23	Margaret Dubissette	Killing of children's father and daughter's injury	1979 - 1983	14/01/02	Compensation
24	Thelma Phillips	Broken leg	1979 - 1983	15/01/02	Compensation
25	Yero Jabbar	The detention period	1979 - 1983	16/01/02	Compensation
26	Thomas Gilbert	1979 Revolution Claims Commission and Results	1979 - 1991	17/01/02	Compensation
27	Teddy Victor	Birth of Jewel/NJM, Revolution	1976 - 1991	17/01/02	Compensation
28	Alec Lewis	On globalism and to conclude revelation	1976-1978 1979-1983 1984-1991	04/02/02	Contribution to Commission's work
29	David Stanislaus	Detention and procedures of getting money from the Claims Commission	1979-1983	04/02/02	Compensation

30	Miriam Bedeau	Husband's disappearance on March 9-10, 1981	1979-1983	05/02/02	Resumption of the inquest
31	Theresa Braveboy	Taking away of a car during 1981	1979-1983	06/02/02	Compensation
32	Winston Simon	The detention period	1979-1983	08/02/02	Compensation
33	Onrad Nelson	The detention period, treatment while imprisoned, leg injury	1979-1983	25/02/02	Compensation
34	Lidj Tafari	The reasonable abduction and indefinite imprisonment	1979-1983	26/02/02	Compensation
35	Mary Theresa Jerome	Observations from an outsider's point of view	1979-1983	26/02/02	Contribution to Commission's work
36	Claude Regis	Wrongful dismissal	1976-1978 1979-1983	27/02/02	Compensation
37	Simon St. Bernard	Wrongful dismissal	1979-1983	27/02/02	Compensation
38	Jeffery Marryshow	Violation of rights	1979-1983	28/02/02	Compensation
39	E. A Heyleiger (Submitted memorandum)	Injustice of the Justice of the High Court	1976-1991	28/02/02	Compensation
40	Kade Layne	Imprisonment for 2 years and 8 months	1979-1983	28/02/02	Compensation

41	Michael Kenneth Andrews	Detention by the PRG	1979-1983	28/02/02	Compensation Unsettled property matter
42	Theresa Beckles on behalf of husband Raphael Beckles	Dismissal from work at Her Majesty's Prison	1979-1983	01/03/02	Compensation for husband's time served
43	Lester DeSouza and on behalf of Raymond DeSouza and Norman DeSouza		1979-1983	11/03/02	Compensation
44	Stafford Moore	Wrongful dismissal as a prison officer	1976-1978 1979-1983	12/03/02	Compensation
45	Godwin Charles	Imprisonment	1979-1983	12/03/02	Compensation
46	Benedict Henry	Time of imprisonment and health	1979-1983	12/03/02	Compensation Medical treatment
47	Michael Mark	Time of detention	1979-1983	13/03/02	Compensation
48	Lloyd Noel			13/03/02	
49	Floyd Bishop (Submitted memorandum)	Inquiry into father's disappearance on or about December 17, 1978	1976-1978	13/03/02	Help to bring closure to family Compensation
50	Goldfinger Joseph			13/03/02	Compensation
51	Rodney Garraway		1979-1983	14/03/02	Compensation

52	Edwin Frank		1979-1983	03/04/02	
53	Peggy Nesfield	The period before and of the Revolution	1976-1978 1979-1983	10/04/02	Contribution to Commission's work
54	Theresa Edwards	Where to go from here	1979-1983 1984-1991	11/04/02	Compensation - unemployment benefits
55	Dr. Terrence Marryshow	Events leading to the house arrest, assassination of Maurice Bishop, evidence leading to the recovery of remains	1979-1983 1984-1991	11/04/02	Contribution to Commission's work
56	Dr. Robert Jordan	Medical school activities Oct 14 th - Nov 16 th 1983	1979-1983	11/04/02	Contribution to Commission's work
57	Rita Bailey			11/04/02	Compensation
58	Dr. Jordon			11/04/02	Contribution to Commission's Work
59	Neville James	Events on the Fort which led to some physical injuries	1979-1983	12/04/02	Compensation
60	Michael Francis	Wrongful dismissal as a prison officer	1976-1978 1979-1983	24/04/02	Compensation
61	Wilston Collins	Wrongful dismissal as a prison officer	1976-1978 1979-1983	24/04/02	Compensation

62	Bently Samuel	Wrongful dismissal as a prison officer	1976-1978 1979-1983	24/04/02	Compensation
63	Reginald Phillip	Imprisonment under the PRG.	1979-1983	25/04/02	Compensation
64	Samuel Bonaparte	Time of detention during the Revolution	1979-1983	26/04/02	Compensation
65	Rita Bailey			26/04/02	Compensation
66	Keith Scotland Attorney at law for the 17			22/05/02	Contribution to Commission's work
67	Anthony Romain	Father of October 19 th Victim		26/08/02	Contribution to Commission's work
68	Dr. Reginald Buckmire (Submitted Memorandum)				
69	NNP Representatives	Before, during and after Revolution	1974 - 1991	26/02/04	Contribution to Commission's work
70	GULP Representatives	Before, during and after Revolution	1974 - 1991	27/02/04	Contribution to Commission's work

APPENDIX L

Appendix L -

Persons on whom the T.R.C. made Courtesy Calls.

NAME	DATE
His Excellency Sir Daniel Williams	Friday Jan/18/02
Sir Paul Scoon	Tuesday Feb/5/02
His Lordship Bishop Sydney Charles	Monday Feb/25/02
Mr. George Brizan	Wednesday Feb/27/02
Mr. Lloyd Noel	Tuesday March/12/02
Mr. Allister Hughes	Thursday March/14/02
Mr. Leslie Pierre	Friday April/12/02
Conference of Churches Grenada	Tuesday April/23/02
Sir Nicholas Brathwaite	Tuesday April/23/02
Senator Elvin Nimrod	Tuesday April/23/02
Dr. Jenson Otway	Wednesday April/24/02
Mr. Derek Knight	Wednesday April/24/02
Ms. Gertrude and Martin Isaac	Tuesday August/27/02
Ms. Bernadette Gittens	Tuesday August/27/02
Ms. Dorothy Maitland	Wednesday August/28/02
Mrs. Annie and Patrick Bain	Thursday August/29/02
Mrs. Alimenta and Ann Bishop	Saturday August/31/02
Mr. Edward Kent (Carriacou)	Wednesday August/28/02
Ms. Lynn Creft	Saturday August/31/02

APPENDIX M

APPENDIX M

It is estimated that over one hundred persons were treated for injuries following the tragedy of October 19, 1983 at Fort Rupert; the following is a list of some of those who sustained serious injuries.

List of known injured persons

	NAME	AGE AT TIME OF INCIDENT	INJURIES SUSTAINED
1	Robert Boca	30	Gunshot wound to the chest
2	Lionel Fletcher	30	Superficial wound of left arm
3	Stephen Davis	12	Head Injuries
4	Claudius Panchoo	41	Superficial gunshot wound of leg
5	Leonard Ogiste	32	Multiple leg fractures
6	Alexis Simon	17	Gunshot wound of the shoulder
7	Clenrick Barry	17	Multiple shoulder injuries
8	Adrian Phillip	21	Gunshot wound resulting in multiple injuries to leg
9	Lewis Morain	39	Gunshot wound to right leg
10	Neville James	40	Gunshot wounds
11	Raymond St. Louis	34	Gunshot wounds to right leg
12	Byron Cameron	27	Gunshot wounds to leg
13	Dexter Lalgee	15	Gunshot wound to armpit
14	Martin Simon	20	Gunshot wound to chest
15	Hewman Robinson	51	Gunshot wound to chest
16	Michael Calliste	18	Gunshot wound to right arm
17	Emmanuel Hazzard	26	Eye injury
18	Junior Adolphous	24	Arm injury
19	Einstein Louison	26	Spinal injury
20	Von Grimes	21	Multiple injuries
21	Julien Scott	15	Head injury
22	Lorna Jacob	19	Spinal injury
23	Decima Bowen	18	Injury to ankle bone
24	Patricia Roberts	18	Leg injuries
25	Helen Brown	14	Head injury
26	Sherryl Bruno	21	Dislocation of right shoulder
27	Debra Alexander	16	Gunshot wound, head and right ankle injury

28	Sonia Lessey	27	Hip injury
29	Jacinta Francis	23	Multiple arm injuries
30	Cheryl Taitt	26	Injury to right arm
31	Celia Juerkhan	21	Unconsciousness
32	Ruth Robertts	17	Concussion
33	Lynette Brown	17	Head injuries
34	Ann Neptune	15	Multiple right leg injuries
35	Jeanetha Calliste	29	Gunshot wound to right shoulder
36	Doreen Telesford	26	Gunshot wound to right arm

APPENDIX N

**Persons who made contributions at Public Symposia of the
T.R.C.**

**Public Symposium, Norton's Hall Cathedral House # 1
Thursday December 13th, 2001**

- ❖ Salimbi Gill
- ❖ Thomas Gilbert
- ❖ Gordon St. Bernard
- ❖ Peter Carlton Antoine
- ❖ Lawrence Joseph
- ❖ Teddy Victor
- ❖ Glen St. Louis
- ❖ Dr. Terrence Marryshow
- ❖ Brian Lindsay of MBPM
- ❖ Milton Williams
- ❖ Peter Antoine

**Public Symposium, St. Rose Modern Secondary School
Thursday January 17th, 2002**

- ❖ Mary Theresa Jerome

**Public Symposium, Mt. Rich Community Centre
Tuesday February 26th, 2002**

- ❖ Mr. Adrian Alexis
- ❖ Raphael Phillip
- ❖ Speaker N0.3 [Tape inaudible]
- ❖ Roland Budhlal
- ❖ Kathy-Ann Williams
- ❖ Adrian Alexis

- ❖ Michael Mark
- ❖ Kiem Cato
- ❖ Catherine Flemming
- ❖ Lennox Mc Leish
- ❖ Anthony Jones
- ❖ Parris Lewis
- ❖ Joachim St. John
- ❖ Mathew Flemming
- ❖ Matthias Joseph
- ❖ Steve Richardson
- ❖ Teddy Victor

**Public Symposium, Tivoli R.C. School
Tuesday March 12th, 2002**

- ❖ Roland Budhlal
- ❖ Hayling Charles
- ❖ Steven Lewis
- ❖ Emmanuel Toussaint
- ❖ Kennedy Budhlal

**Public Symposium, Grenville Secondary School
Tuesday April 9th, 2002.**

- ❖ Jacqueline Smith
- ❖ Dr. Reginald Buckmire
- ❖ Mrs. Roberts
- ❖ Pastor Samuel Niles
- ❖ Kenny Bhola
- ❖ Christian Glasgow

**Public Symposium, St. David's R.C. School,
Tuesday April 11th, 2002**

- ❖ Arthur Ferguson
- ❖ Samuel Joseph
- ❖ Gertude Isaac
- ❖ Martin Isaac
- ❖ Lydia Whiteman
- ❖ Irene Livingston
- ❖ Teddy Victor
- ❖ Joslyn Whiteman

**Public Symposium, St. Paul's Government School
Tuesday April 23rd, 2002**

- ❖ Fr. Clive Thomas
- ❖ Nathaniel Gilbert
- ❖ Alice Pierre
- ❖ Merille Lord
- ❖ Harold Quash
- ❖ Eleanor Glasgow, Field Officer/TRC
- ❖ Josephine McGuire, PRO/TRC

**Public Symposium, Norton's Hall Cathedral House #2,
Thursday April 25th, 2002**

- ❖ Pauline Waldron
- ❖ Fr. Peter Clarke
- ❖ Reverend Cato
- ❖ Denis Noel
- ❖ Keith Banfield
- ❖ Mrs. Thomas
- ❖ Mathew Dopwell

- ❖ Fr. Sean Dogget
- ❖ Glenn St. Louis
- ❖ Miss Josephine Mc Quire (PRO/TRC)
- ❖ Osbert James
- ❖ Anna Antoine
- ❖ Christian Glasgow
- ❖ Eleanor Glasgow (Field Officer/TRC)

**Public Symposium, Hillsborough Community Centre
Friday August 30th, 2002**

- ❖ Amie Alexis
- ❖ Winston Fleary
- ❖ Mitchell McKenzie
- ❖ Neville Caton
- ❖ Williams Guadeloupe
- ❖ Alma Lambert
- ❖ Peter Morris
- ❖ McKenly McKenzie
- ❖ Hector Lambert
- ❖ Eleanor Glasgow (Field Officer/TRC)
- ❖ Dr. Curtis McIntosh

APPENDIX O

TRUTH & RECONCILIATION COMMISSION (TRC)

Field Officer's Report

Review Period: 10 Feb. 2002 – 10 April 2002

Overview

The period of fieldwork under review was an extremely challenging experience. It was evident from the outset that the Nation was not "ready" for a T & R Commission. Widespread ignorance of the purpose, intent and mission of the Commission manifested itself in the various communities with which the Field Officers interacted.

An unprecedented level of suspicion and distrust was directed towards the current political administration. Almost without exception, every individual approached prefaced his/her verbal response to the Commission's work by asking: "is this political?" In most cases, the community mobilization process was slowed down in having to spend time in lengthy discussion explaining the mandate of the TRC and, in some cases, defending the integrity of the Commission and staff who were perceived as "doing Keith Mitchell's dirty work".

Some persons bluntly refused to afford the Field Officer a moment to present a flyer or engage in any discussion. Others were more cordial in their hasty dismissal of the Field Officer. Those who entertained discussion preferred not to be recorded. Approximately 60% of such persons did have some story to tell but would chat only on a superficial level. In many instances, their statements were prefaced with the comment: "I wasn't really involved but..." This left the Field Officer with the impression that people are extremely cautious and fearful about coming forward with evidence about the pre-Revolution and Revolution period in Grenada.

It must be noted also that the majority of persons interviewed steered the conversation away from the events of 1976-1983 but preferred to discuss the present political climate. At every juncture, interviewees leveled verbal attacks on the 'Keith Mitchell Government' rather than address the issue being investigated.

February

Parish of St. Patrick

Area: Mt. Rich/Mt. Reuill/Hermitage/Belmont/Pointzfield/Mt. Rose/
Plains/RiverSallee/Morne Fendue/Snell Hall/La Fortune/
Sauteurs/Mt. Craven.

Public Forum: Mt. Rich community Centre, Tues. 26 February 2002
[Attendance: Approx. 150 persons]

Community response:

Residents of the Mt. Rich community were generally accommodating. However, there were strong anti-government sentiments expressed. There were small pockets of hostility initially as some residents viewed the Field workers as 'Claims Committee people' who were coming "to fool Mt. Rich people again".

News of the impending release of 3 ex-PRG members from prison created a serious setback in the mobilization work in this area. The eventual large turnout to the forum was due mainly to residents' curiosity. Several individuals who were directly affected by the abuses of 1979-1983 period vented their anger to the Officers but declined the invitation to meet with the TRC.

No. of individual interviews:

Mt. Rich/Mt. Reuill	= 12
Hermitage	= 2
Belmont	= 1
La Fortune/Madeys	= [informal group discussions + PTA meeting]
Sauteurs	= [informal group discussions]

N.B: Time did not allow for in-depth one-to-one interview in these communities as the emphasis was on preparation for the impending public forum. Lack of public education on the work of the Commission showed itself as a real obstacle to the Fieldwork in these communities.

March

Parish of St. Andrew's:

Area: Tivoli/Conference/Moyah/Pearls/Belair

Public Forum: Tivoli R.C. School Tues. 12 March 2002
[Attendance: 64 persons]

Community response:

The residents were largely accommodating and responsive to the Field Officers. Many gave definite assurances to attend the forum. However, there was a sense of unspoken suspicion about the TRC mission. One woman indicated a desire for a private sitting with the Commission. In recalling her plight to the Field Officers, she was reduced to tears and some on-the-spot counseling had to be done.

The Tivoli district appears to be very much under the influence of the infamous 'Budhlal brothers'. On one occasion, TRC Field workers were openly accosted by Mr. Roland Budhlal who seemed to be opposed to the mobilization work being done in the area.

April

Parish of St. Andrew's:

Area: Paradise/Grenville Town/Soubise/Marquis/Gladstone Rd./Grand Bras/
Telescope/La Digue

Public Forum: Grenville Secondary School Tues. 9th April 2002
[Attendance: 18 persons]

Community response:

This area was perhaps the most difficult to infiltrate. Residents were extremely vocal engaging the TRC Officer in lengthy debate on the mandate of the TRC. Strong political views characterized the discussions. A wave of anti-Keith Mitchell sentiments was prevalent. Much hostility and distrust reeked in the Grenville, Telescope and Marquis districts. The residents interviewed felt strongly that the TRC is a "political" exercise designed to test the pulse of the people in preparation for upcoming elections which they saw as imminent. This leg of Fieldwork was very challenging having to interface with the prevailing strong political undertones. The 1976-1991 issue was summarily dismissed as persons preferred to lash out at the Government.

A combination of heavy rains and a political climate of distrust may have been responsible for the extremely low turn-out to the symposium at the Grenville Secondary School 10th April.

TRC Questionnaire

To date approximately 100 copies of the questionnaire have been distributed. Respondents were randomly selected as follows:

St. Patrick's = Staff of 2 schools
= 10 individuals

St. Andrew's = Rotary Club East Grenada
= Telephone responses [Church & secular]

St. Paul's = Telephone responses [Church & secular]

St. George's = Credit Union staff
= Insurance Company staff
= School Principal
= Construction Company Staff
= Church
= Businessmen, Police Officers

General Comments:

The general feel from the questionnaire responses was that a TRC is necessary in Grenada but public preparedness for such a Commission was not in place resulting in widespread ignorance of the TRC and its purpose. Concerns about damage control following the TRC exercise were raised. The question is asked: "Is the Grenadian public mature and educated enough to handle what may be unearthed?"

Several respondents felt that the TRC should "function as an independent body free of political influence." Some felt that 'the 17 on the hill' should be released; while others felt that they should pay for their crimes. Responses leaned more to the former than the latter. Not many persons indicated having information to share with the TRC or were interested in meeting with the TRC. In regards to unearthing the 'truth' and effecting national

reconciliation, respondents felt that there are many persons now holding prominent positions in society [namely government ministers and lawyers etc.] who hold the key to 'the truth' and should come forward with the evidence. Several respondents felt that the Church should do more in terms of preaching forgiveness and reconciliation.

Operational difficulties

1. Attempts to conduct indepth family interviews proved unsuccessful. Persons seemed guarded and extremely cautious in releasing information. In some cases, memories of the family lost appeared too painful to recall. Some families approached displayed avoidance tactics by promising to get back to the Field Officer but never found the time to do so. Mrs. Annie Bain and family [Grenville, St. Andrew's] were referred to Fr. Mark Haynes [TRC] for counseling.
2. Families in the Mt. Rich area were not open to discussion. This could be as a result of ignorance and mistrust of the TRC. These families are to be revisited.
3. It would appear that generally people would prefer not to have this life chapter re-opened. In some instances, the names of lost family members are not mentioned in the homes.
4. TRS Staff Relations:

In-house staff grievances need urgent attention. Presently, the staff function very much as an aggregate of individuals rather than a cohesive productive unit.

Regular weekly staff meetings and a free flow of information rather than an apparent need-to-know method of communication would go a long way in eliminating staff frustration and uncertainty. Too much pertinent information is assumed to have been relayed and is rarely conveyed as intended.

Recommendations

1. There is URGENT need for public education to reduce current anti-TRC climate.
2. The media should be more forceful in the process of public education.
3. More legislative 'teeth' should be given to the TRC to ameliorate current negative public perception of the TRC.
4. Religious denominations must be encouraged to come on board in the process of reconciliation and healing. The church must see itself as an integral part of this process.
5. Schools should be incorporated in this important historic educational process.
6. Public suspicion and fear of recrimination as a result of 'political tribalism' must be eradicated. Political parties and, politicians in particular, have a large role to play in this regard and should desist from using the work of the TRC as a 'political football'.
7. The life of the TRC should be extended by approximately six (6) months as the Nation is now beginning to get a feel and to appreciate the TRC. *Places visited earlier (Gonyave + Mt. Rich) are asking for the TRC to revisit.*

Prepared by: *E. Glasgow*
Eleanor C. Glasgow
(TRS Field Officer)

Submitted: *11 April 2012*

P.S: METHODOLOGY USED

Popular education of TRC through distribution of
flyers promoting Public Fora; individual + group
discussions; telephone interviews.

APPENDIX P

Members sworn in for new



Anglican Bishop Sehon Goodridge signing the book after being presented with the Oath

Governor General Sir Daniel Williams on Tuesday officially administered the oath of office to the three member commissioners of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission during a ceremony held at his residence on Lucas Street, St. George's.

The Commission which was set up by the ruling New National Party (NNP) administration of Prime Minister Dr. Keith Mitchell will look into Grenada's tumultuous past from January 1, 1976 to December 31, 1983 with special emphasis on the period of the Grenada Revolution from March 13, 1979 to October 19, 1983.

The body is expected to finish hearing evidence within a 6 month period. Thereafter another three months will be used to

compile and prepare a report for presentation to government.

Retired high court judge Donald Trotman of Guyana will chair the Commission which comprise Roman Catholic Priest Fr. Mark Haynes as well as Anglican Bishop of the Windward Island, Sehon Goodridge.

Also sworn in was former Deputy Register and Attorney-at-Law Claudette Joseph as the Secretary to the Commission.


Speaking at the ceremony, Minister for Local Government and Labour Senator Lawrence Joseph disclosed that the Commissioners have been mandated to seek to uncover the truth and to provide the nation with a comprehensive understanding of the political events that took

place during the Grenada Revolutionary of the People's Revolutionary Government of the late Maurice Bishop.

The four-and-a-half years of left-wing rule came to an end with the slaying on Fort George (Rupert) of Prime Minister Bishop, three cabinet colleagues (Norris Bain, Unison Whiteman and Jacqueline Crefit) by soldiers of the People's Revolutionary Army (PRA).

The slaying followed a bitter leadership feud among moderates and radicals for control of the New Jewel Movement (NJM) led People's Revolution.

Seventeen former government and army officials including ex-deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard, his Jamaican-born wife Phyllis, and Mobilisation



Roman Catholic Priest Fr. Mark Haynes being presented with his Instrument of Appointment from Governor General Sir. Daniel Williams

LOCAL NEWS

GRENADA TODAY Fri. September 7, 2001 Page 21

commission of inquiry

Minister Selwyn Strachan were convicted for the murder of Bishop and others. Sen. Joseph said that it is the hope of the

Mitchell administration that when the inquiry is concluded that the mistakes of the past will not be repeated in the future. He stated that the Commission is geared toward providing the nation with an opportunity to become

(Continues on pg 31)

• FROM PAGE 21

genuinely reconciled and permanently healed.

He pointed out that no one seems to know exactly how many people died on Fort George during the bloody October 1983 events and that many of the bodies were never seen by relatives or friends.

"The trauma of that horrific period is deeply implanted on the minds of many of us. It was a period when brother fought brother, sister against sister and friend against friend", he said.

"Many questions pertaining to that period 1979-83 still remain unanswered. It is hoped that the Commission will find some answers", he added.

Attorney-General Raymond Anthony who spoke at the ceremony indicated that to date there has not been any inquiry or a comprehensive report in regards to the number of persons who suffered or lost their lives and that

there are people today who are still hurt by those events.

"This process is meant to clear the soul and get at the truth", he remarked.

The Attorney General disclosed that Grenadians from all works of life including those residing overseas


will get the chance to give evidence and contribute to the Commission.

Sen. Anthony appealed to the public to give the Commission their fullest support by giving truthful evidence and that at the end of the day those who give evidence will be granted indemnity from prosecution.

He stressed that the Commission is not a court and that no one will be forced to give evidence but that Grenadians should do so voluntarily.

Secretary to the

Members sworn in for new commission of inquiry



Chairman of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission retired judge from Guyana Donald Trotman being administered the Oath

Commission Claudette Joseph also voiced her support for the exercise saying that Grenadians have been calling for such an inquiry for a long time so that the events of the past can be put to rest.

Government officials have remained tight-lipped on how much the Commission will cost the country when it complete its investigation which is expected to run into the new year.

The first sitting of the Commission is expected to take place later in the month.

People in Mt Rich unburden to the T&RC

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission heard of innocent bloodshed and unnecessary physical abuse as being part of Grenada's Revolution, last week Tuesday in Mt Rich.

The commission, which was set up to inquire into and record certain political events which occurred in Grenada during the period of 01 January, 1976 to 31 December, 1991 held a meeting in the Mt Rich Community Centre to hear from the people about their experiences during the revolution. The Chairman of the Commission, Hon Donald A B. Trotman, and Commissioners Bishop Goodridge, Anglican Bishop of the Windward Islands, and Fr Mark Haynes, as well as Secretary of the Commission Ms Claudette Joseph who is an Attorney-at-Law, were at the meeting.

It began at 6:30 pm and the people immediately plunged into the heart-breaking details of the events of the revolution.

A resident of the area said that as far as he was concerned the committee was a waste of time. The Commission responded that regardless of what people think they are performing a very important function. He said that there must be someone who knows about the killings and hope that the individual has the conscience to come forward. He reminded the people that a Truth and Reconciliation Commission has operated in many countries and used the example of Africa when there was the fall of apartheid.

Cathy Williams, a young woman who has represented Grenada in netball competitions, told the commission that she understands what they are trying to do and that she thinks people should learn to forgive. However she insisted that those who do wrong must pay the consequences for their actions. Others who said that if the 17 persons imprisoned for the revolution are reconciled then the whole prison should be reconciled as well supported her.

Most of the other people who spoke gave their experiences during the revolution. One individual told the Commission that on the morning of the revolution, he was sleeping in a house in True Blue close to the SSU camp. He said that he was awakened to a loud noise around 4:30 am and saw fire in the sky when he looked out. Proceeding outside, he saw some soldiers together and heard a few shouting, "Kill them". At the same time he saw a car approaching the camp. The soldiers stopped the car and one of them asked for the driver to identify themselves. He heard the person call out "Brizan" and then to his dismay, he saw soldiers shoot the man. He also saw a policeman being killed for no apparent reason and fearing for his life "took cover".

At about 6:30 he heard the words "this is a peaceful revolution, no blood has been shed" over the radio. That statement according to the person was not true for he said that he walked from True Blue to Belmont and saw blood all along the route. Michael Mark who said he was on the Fort at the time of the revolution, claimed he was arrested and was given lashes on his fingers, which broke many of the bones. His two insteps were shot and he was taken to the hospital for treatment but got none. He said that only tape and dettol was used on the wounds while he was in jail.

Many other voices were heard which said that the period of the revolution was a frightening one.

The people also asked questions. They wanted to know what would be done for the people who did not get an education and one person asked if it was too late to press charges. The person who asked the question said he did so because he knows that some of the people who abused others during the revolution are now offering themselves as political candidates. He mentioned that the General Secretary of a political party had advantaged him on the Fort. The actions of the churches during the period 1 January, 1976 to 31 December and the issue of the money paid for losses to those detained during the revolution were also discussed.

At the end of the session it was evident that the people had greatly suffered and some were still healing. The Commission promised to do every thing it can to deal with the issues pointed out and said that their final documents should be made available to the public so they can know the recommendations that were made. The next meeting will be in Tivoli, St Andrew.

NOTICE

From the Secretariat of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission shall be sitting from the 11th to 14th March 2002. Sitzings will take place at the Secretariat of the Commission commencing 9 am daily. Persons having relevant evidence concerning political events that occurred during the period under consideration (January 1st 1976 to December 31st 1991) are invited to appear before the Commission and to render such evidence or such persons may submit written memoranda to: *The Chairman, Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Scott Street, St George's.*

The Secretariat is opened Monday to Friday from 8:30am to

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Truth and Reconciliation

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THE FORMER

FEARLESS WEEKLY THAT TELLS IT AS IT IS

FRIDAY, MAY 25, 1990

KELETON MISST

can really be the enemy and the best friend to some. be referred to as the healer hence the reason why old e always say "If you have patience you will see and e Years have passed since Frankie Bedeau, former telor of B.B.C. Night Club now called Fantazia 2001 peared.

nie had interesting tendencies, one of which may contributed to his mysterious disappearance. ver, according to information, we have he left ave for St. George's after telling some of his friends at f the local shops, but never reached.

that faithful his Maibu a Wagon was vered wrecked iff but gave the sion that his car if the road and ed into the sea. ody was never believed that he quite friendly a young female e said area and oung lady, with pro-revo- onary tendencies was stationed in aid building now od N E W L O re the skeletons e found recently. There was an investigation into his death after his wife plied with the au- thorities to assist into the findings: the late- tect of the olution came up i Frankie did not port it. As we all w, Mr. Bedeau s no revolutionary, was an entrepreneur, epting and came he thought his fam- home and hoped to eop what he had n in England in years passed well. Granada.

any inquiry. The truth must come to light. Some concerned are still in T. b.

It is also said that only two of the ing were remains of what he saw he also stated that it happened on Tuesday and not on

Justice Bristol

enough and we learned of the unco- ering of human bones found in a hole dug while attempting to remove the home of N.W.L.O. formerly known as Pope Paul's Camp which is the same place where Frankie was known to have last visited be-

renewed calls on the new Chief Justice to reopen the inquiry, so that the family of the late Mr. Bedeau would be able to know for a fact what really happened. There is a young indi- vidual who came into the Fearless last Friday to report being on spot when a skeleton were seen while digging a hole on the grounds of N.W.L.O. The indi- vidual complained by saying that the skeleton include hands and legs with a centre piece somewhat mashed up the man concluded quite convincingly, that what the Police saw on their arrival were remains of what he saw he also stated that it happened on Tuesday and not on

representatives of the Computer to indicate merger.

XEROX/HUGGINS MI

to be an- ance sento the f rest rem skel hole seen L. know the NE est up- shal -ke- ur- the bat- yes

Wednesday, he said that there was no head on the skeleton wh he calling on every member of N.W.L.O.

Hole where skeleton was seen

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Then, in our editorial, we dedicated ourselves to fight relentlessly for the return to

By the grace of God and our friends Democracy lives once more in our homeland.

Now, in our rebirth, we re-dedicate ourselves. For we have been bequeathed the most precious gift man can have after life the gift of FREEDOM.

Our history of the last few years have shown that, as a people, we have not husbanded that gift with diligence and scrupulous care.


Never again in history must we allow our freedom to go untended.

We of the "New Grenadian" commit ourselves to guard that FREEDOM; to ensure that GRENADA shall remain forever FREE.

In Guarding that freedom it is necessary to expose fully the CRIMES of the Bishop regime and the COARD-AUSTIN junta.

For they must never grace our country again.

BRUTALITY EXPOSED!



PAINFUL STORY OF GRENADIAN DETAINEE WINSTON SIMON 'ALIAS BROKO' OF TRIVOLI, ST. ANDREWS WAS DETAINED ON THE 20TH JUNE 1980 UNDER THE REGIME OF MAURICE BISHOP. HE TELLS HIS STORY TO TODAY'S "NEW GRENADIAN"

I am thirty-eight years of age, with a wife and four children. I work my land and fish sometimes.

On the 20th June 1980, I was liming in the Trivoli Junction with my regular friends, when I received a message that soldiers of the People's Revolution Army had surrounded my house and were asking for me.

On my arrival at home I was approached by a soldier called RONNIE BOBB, who told me that they wanted to ask me some questions. I agreed and went into their transport which took me to the army barracks at the airport in Pearls.

When I arrived at the airport the then Captain EWART LAYNE came and opened the door of the car. Another officer called LESTER REDHEAD

"alias" GOAT stood alongside the car with two handcuffs in his hands. As soon as the door was opened, I was handcuffed. Captain LAYNE then put his hand around my shoulder and told me "lets walk". We walked until we reached a small hut full of soldiers. I was told to halt after GOAT put cuffs on my feet. As he stood up he kicked me in the back capsizing me in front of the door. Then he, LAYNE and RONNIE BOBB, LEON CORNWALL alias BOGO and one nicknamed SCHOOLBOY, among others, started beating me.

This was the beginning of three weeks of torture at the barracks. I was left in the yard for four days and four nights tied to a picket and beaten mercilessly.

After three weeks on the airport I was transferred to Fort Rupert and placed in a small cell where I remained for six months

(Continued Page 6)

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 1

Then a nurse called GITTENS attended to my wounds. But the worse torture I received on the airport was when Captain LAYNE came one day, looked at me and then asked Goat to fetch the razor blades and pepper water for him. He then asked me if I knew how they "altered" pig. I told him that I knew. He then said that I was in for the same experience. RONNIE BOBB then jammed me in the corner while they stripped me naked. LAYNE reached for my balls and gave me four slices while GOAT threw the pepper water on them. With my feet also tied, LAYNE then sliced my penis while GOAT

and CORNWALL kept beating me on my body. LAYNE then brought me outside bleeding all over, and reached for a hot cutlass and started scarring me all over the body. I fell to the ground and GOAT kicked me in the mouth causing me to lose three teeth.

I did not see my family until the fourth month in jail, but BISHOP and AUSTIN kept passing all the time. Fifteen months later they brought me into St. George's and charged me for withholding information. But it took one whole year to get the case called as the prosecutor was always not ready. The Magistrate eventually threw the case out of

court claiming that there was no evidence against me. The soldiers still brought me back to Richmond Hill Prisons where I remained until the rescue mission last year October.

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 5

There must be reason for concern over the "thinking" of the CCC when Dr. Leslie Lett, its coordinator, in expounding what he calls "Third World theology," says "there is need to examine carefully the historical nature of atheism if the Church is to be saved from apostasy".

SANTA MARIA TO RISE FROM THE ASHES?

Plans are afoot for the rebuilding of the Santa Maria Hotel into a 250 bedroom, four storey, luxury hotel that will be the envy of Caribbean Hoteliers.

The forty (40) year old hotel sited on an elevated promontory, guarding the entrance to picturesque St. Georges Harbour, was destroyed by fire during the October military engagement of the Island forces by U.S. forces.

Like the fabled Phoenix the Santa Maria is to rise again from the ash. And, as an historical irony, two of the principal architects of this resurrection are Grenadian entrepreneurs Nigel and Paul Slinger, of the legendary Slinger clan. For it was the Slinger brothers, father and uncle of Nigel and Paul, who together with Captain Earl Hughes built the Santa Maria in the early forties.

As a business venture the hotel has never had the success which the promoters hoped for when the project was conceived in the

early forties. The thriving pre-war winter tourist trade which they hoped to capitalise on never materialised in peace time. And by 1949, when the hotel was opened, the industry had slumped. Then followed the unrest of the early fifties; and hurricane JANET in 1956 which left Grenada in Shambles. By the early sixties the hotel, still not viable, was in the hands of Dudley-M. Slinger (of supply stores) and T.N. Noble Smith. It was sold to DENIS LOVE of the Grenada Yacht Services who renamed it "The Islander".

The Hotel was acquired by the Island government in the early seventies, then following the overthrow of the elected government in 1979, the Bishop regime renamed it "Butler House" and converted the building into offices for their Prime Minister.

Nigel and Paul are excited over the project which they see as bringing immediate employment to the Island in a major step towards its economic rehabilitation.

The hotel which is being designed to fit into the natural contour of the hillside in terraces looking down into the harbour will, when complete, foster the restoration of the now ailing tourist industry providing luxury accommodation for the visitors who it is hoped will be attracted with the completion of the airport.

Involved in the project are Fort Landerdale Florida team of Mc Kiraham & Adache Architects and Fort Landerdale Attorney Robert A. Dressler who is also the City Mayor.

Although agreement has not yet been reached on the terms for lease of the site and conditions for the running of the new hotel the investors are anxious to have the project launched.

It is projects like the new "Santa Maria" that will get the Island moving again providing relief from chronic unemployment and economic debility which has plagued the Island over the last decade.

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APPENDIX Q

THE BISHOP KILLERS



Why they did it
and what
happened to them



Life and times of
members of the
New Jewel Movement

MAURICE
BISHOP
TRIAL



TRIAL REPORT

Happy and stable lays in Grenada



THE SMILES on three faces indicate happiness as Salvett, Orlan and Bernard share a joyous moment with these supporters at a function.

BERNARD COARD'S brother, Etan, and his picture of solidarity.



THE BEGINNING: A family picture of the Coards featuring Bernard, the baby of the bunch, in happier times. Bernard and his wife, Phyllis, share a joke on the beach.

NATION

... faces behind this edition



TIM JARVIS, editor



TIMOTHY ELMER, reporter



CHARLES HACKETT, photo-grapher





MARK HOLINGSWORTH, layout

Many thanks also to fellow staff: Chief, Harold Hayle and Senior Editor, for direction; Patrick Reere and Aron, artists; Sheldene Scantlebury and Mary, typewriters; Neville Soher and Keith, lithographers; and the Caribbean News reproduction of the article on Fidel Castro.

THE 18 ACCUSED

INALLY 20 persons were
with the murder of late
Minister Minister Bishop
others on October 10.
those accused on this
murder indictment
former Commissioner of
Central Commission
led Sir Bernard, and his
Revolutionary Army
Police Division
during the investiga-



THE VERDICTS

AURICÉ
SHOP
RIAL

	DE	FMA	JAC	DUN	NOR	PIT	LIN	KEN	LEV	LEV	AVG	GEM	Verdict
caused													
THOMAS COARD (Deputy Prime Minister)	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	A		Sentenced to hang
VON ABSTIN (General Army)	B	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G		Sentenced to hang
MET LAYNE (Lt Colonel Army)	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G		Sentenced to hang
JAMES (Lt Colonel Army)	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G		Sentenced to hang
JOHN STRACHAN (Publication Minister)	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	H		Sentenced to hang
RICHMOND WALKER (Ambassador to Cuba)	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G		Sentenced to hang
DR BARTHOLOMEW (Major Army)	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G		Sentenced to hang
CATHERINE STROUD (Major Army)	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G		Sentenced to hang
MR REMUEAL (Captain)	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G		Sentenced to hang
ELIZABETH McBRIDE (Junior Minister)	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G		Sentenced to hang
FRANKIE (Lt Army)	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	NO		Sentenced to hang
GEORGE BERNARD (Lt Army)	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G		Sentenced to hang
BURN NELSON (Lt Army)	NG	NG	NG	NG	NG	NG	NG	NG	NG	NG	NG		Fined
WIN VENTOUR (Trade Unionist)	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G		Sentenced to hang
MISS GRADY (Director Women's Affairs)	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G	G		Sentenced to hang
JOHN JOSEPH (Corporal Army)	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M		Sentenced to 15 years
MISS RICHARDSON (Private Army)	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M		Sentenced to 45 years
MR MITCHELL (Private Army)	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	M	NO	NO		Sentenced to 30 years

Non-Voting Members Central Committee	D - Denotes DUE	N - Not Called	M - Mandatory
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FROM START TO FINISH SEE CENTRE PAGES

All faith in the Scriptures

**MÁURICÉ
BISHOP
TRIAL**

A FULL REPORT

Not guilty' man plans to share new-found life

Nelson purchased his in-
 herence of the witness and said he
 could have preferred to face
 court martial rather than em-
 bark on any mission to Braz-
 ilian coast.
 Last Thursday he was se-
 cured to his modest home in
 St. George's by his rela-
 tives, and many friends
 crowded the sleeping porch to
 come to embrace him - as he
 they were glad to have him
 back. But leaving those who
 he met in the dock with be-
 lieving and moment Nelson
 flitted on.
 "I feel rather sad to find
 that my fellow comrades of
 freedom, especially Joseph
 Richardson and Mitchell, go-
 ing long periods behind bars,"
 he said. He also expressed re-
 gret that Cecil Payne, who
 went to him in the dock, was
 found guilty of the murder.
 But the feeling for Payne
 would have pulled through.
 Nelson's immediate an-
 swer is to "be useful in the new
 era" and he hopes to get his
 old job as a ground swim-
 mer in Port of Spain. He is in
 awaiting a reply. "I hope the
 present regime shows a
 stretching me because I was
 part of the Revolution and as
 result told me back from sev-
 eral years giving me a job,"
 which.
 And what did Nelson say
 could do on his last night
 joined with his four-year
 rain, smother and other re-
 fuge. "I will pray for God to
 do it. Him thanks," he said.

He also told the court that the book of Isaiah, which related the captivity of a people, was very inspiring to him. It was at this point Nelson began crying as he was about to tell of what a woman said to him one day as he was being brought to the court. "But he never completed the story. His voice choked, he wept openly and held his head down for about three minutes.

However, after composing himself, but with a grief and a sniffing, this young man then decided he would not relate what the woman had told him.

Nelson the last of the 18 accused to put forward a defence from the dock said that a small group of the accused in the prison had kept themselves together and apart from the others.

He also made reference to an earlier position adopted by other accused of not participating in the trial proceedings. Nelson said he did not take part because it was his character as a person to obey those who were put in authority over him. He also spoke about the Bible story of St. Paul being charged by fellow Jews and governors and said the prosecution only told the court their side of the story.

"I stand before you today not in any strength but in an expectation of what life has to offer."

MINUTES Nelson Bishop and others were excused. These people with hands unshackled, were ordered from Fort Rupert by gun-toting soldiers. (Picture immediate right)

FREE Rainbow Nelson sharing a happy moment with his four-year old son. (Picture top right)

MAURICE BISHOP TRIAL

A FULL REPORT

14 TO HANG

Three guilty of manslaughter and one freed

FOURTEEN WILL HANG in Grenada for the October 19, 1983, slayings of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and ten others.

This was part of the verdict passed in the Grenada High Court, at the end of the marathon, eight-month long trial of 19 former People's Revolutionary Government and military personnel.

Of the other four who had been charged, one was set free and three found guilty of manslaughter.

Two were sentenced to serve 45 years and one to 20 in prison.

Former Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard, his wife, Phyllis, and ex-army commander, Hudson Austin, are among the 14.

Others sentenced to die for the 11 counts of murder include former Ambassador to Cuba, Leon Cornwall, trade unionist John Ventour, ex-junior minister, Colville St. Bernard, and former Minister of Mobilisation, Lester B. St. John.

The officers for the 1983 are former army officers, Lester Redhead, Christopher St. John, Callistus Bernard, John James, Dave Bartholomew, Ewart Layne, and Cecil Prime.

The 12-member jury, which deliberated for three hours, acquitted Raeburn Nelson, a former junior officer in the People's Revolutionary Army (PRA).

The manslaughter verdicts

were returned against three former junior soldiers who took an active part in the execution of Bishop and his colleagues.

Andy Mitchell, Vincent Joseph and Cosmo Richardson, were given a total of 450 years' imprisonment but Mitchell, who was acquitted on three of the 11 charges, will spend 30 years.

Joseph and Richardson were found guilty on all 11 counts and each will serve 45 years.

Most of the condemned charged they had been framed with the crimes by the United States in an effort to liquidate the remaining faction of the former leftist party, the New Jewel Movement.

Acting Chief Justice Denis Byron, in passing sentence, told Mitchell, Joseph and Richardson they had been convicted of very serious manslaughter crimes. He, however, singled out the death of former Minister of Education, Jacqueline Creft, and imposed a consecutive 15 year term on Mitchell for his part.

Mr. Byron, in addition to imposing similar terms on Richardson and Joseph for their role in that killing, sentenced each to a further 15 years for the killing of housewife, Avis Fergusson.

The three soldiers were part of the firing squad that executed Bishop, Fergusson, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Unison Whiteman, Minister of Housing, Norris Bain, trade unionists, Fitzroy Bain and Vincent Noel, businessmen, Keith Hawling, Evelyn Bullen, and Evelyn Mailand, and housewife, Gemma Belmar, at Port Rupert on the date in question.



Bernard Coard being led away

HUDSON AUSTIN is hustled away from the court

Innocence protested throughout hearing

How the accused reacted to verdicts

THE DROP of a pin could have been heard as the jury, which included five women, returned to the packed court-house in Grenada.

Before Kittitian-born Acting Chief Justice Denis Byron passed the death sentence on Bernard Coard, the former Deputy Prime Minister, in a brief statement, said the court had deliberately withheld evidence that would have proven his innocence.

Dressed in a gray jersey, with black stripes, and light blue trousers, Coard fidgeted with his spectacles when the judge asked if he had anything to say before sentence was passed.

He replied: "A man who is innocent of a crime cannot be made guilty of a crime he has not committed by an unconstitutional court, run by paid mercenaries. The court deliberately withheld evidence in this so-called trial that would conclusively prove my innocence."

"This did not happen by accident. But I am confident that international bodies and groups and Grenadian people will mount a serious investigation into this trial and the conduct of the judiciary at

this time."

Coard, who had contended during the trial that the United States had framed him and others with the murder charges, held his hands behind his back and breathed heavily while the Acting Chief Justice read out the death sentence.

Wearing an aquamarine dress and matching ribbon, Coard's wife, Phyllis, commented that a verdict of guilty in a weak trial could not alter her innocence.

Before she was sentenced to die for her role in plotting the death of the late Prime Minister, she told the court: "I stand here confident that history will confirm my innocence and condemn this kangaroo trial."

While being whisked away from the courtroom she shouted that officials had accepted bribes to condemn her to death. "History will condemn you," she snarled at Mr. Byron.

Hudson Austin, who flashed a faint smile while the foreman of the jury told the court's marshal that he was among the 14 found guilty of murder, said the bank of justice in Grenada was bankrupt.

Declaring his inno-

cence, a position he had maintained throughout the trial, Austin said: "The future will reveal the truth and some will have to bow their heads in shame for travesty of justice. No man could say I committed a crime. The future will be a shining light and a beacon path for the truth I will die with grace for a crime I did not commit."

The former army chief grinned as the Acting Chief Justice passed the death sentence on him.

Raeburn Nelson appeared stunned as Mr. Byron told him he could leave the courtroom after his acquittal.

Uncertain about what to do, the former junior army officer hesitated and then walked to the middle of the courtroom behind the dock where he embraced his mother and they both wept.

Before leaving the specially built Richmond Hill High Court, Nelson gave his former fellow defendants a clenched fist and thumbs up solidarity sign. He also shook the hands of Cecil Prime, who had sat beside him in the dock throughout the entire trial.

But the emotions were reversed for others. For-

mer army major Callistus Bernard, who had maintained the death sentence was pronounced. She had not assisted by his crying who left shortly after incident.

Callistus Bernard, who had maintained the death sentence was pronounced. She had not assisted by his crying who left shortly after incident.

"How much you dollars you get to die," he asked, adding: "I die fighting. Let there be on record. All those frame me up, let I know that."

After the convicted led away from the courtroom, leader of the prosecution team, Karl Hudson-Phillips, complimented Mr. E for conducting a most court trial. He said judge's patience was bled to Caribbean justice conduct, an error which he hoped it would emulate.

The Acting Chief Justice, in turn, praised who had participated in the proceedings and an order excusing all jury from future ne for the next ten year

5, December 1986, BISHOP TRIAL REPORT



IAN RAMSAY (left) and Howard Hamilton (right), two key defence lawyers in the Maurice Bishop Murder Trial.

Byron adjudged the most tolerable

GRANADA'S Acting Chief Justice Denis Byron has been acclaimed by some as the most tolerable judge to be found anywhere.

In fact, during his address to the jury, prosecution leader and former Trinidad and Tobago Attorney General, Karl Hudson-Phillips, showered the Chief Justice with praise for his handling of the Maurice Bishop murder trial.

He told the court: "In my 30 years at the Bar, I have never participated in a court that has granted the liberties which Your Lordship has granted. On the facts and circumstances of this case, what took place on October 19 was a far cry from the licences and liberties which have been the hallmark of these proceedings."

Born in St. Kitts on July 4, 1943, Chief Justice Byron was educated at the St. Kitts/Nevis Grammar School. He later left and studied law in Britain at Fitzwilliam College of Cambridge University, where he got his post-graduate degree in 1966.

He also led the Bar examination the year before and was called to the Bar that same year at the Inner Temple.

Following his qualification, he did a six month

pupillage at the Francis Taylor Building in the Inner Temple, attached to one of England's senior law firms, Francis Hebley.

He returned to St. Kitts in 1966 and entered private practice with his uncle, Cecil Byron, who had his own chambers. The Chief Justice also had chambers in Nevis and Anguilla and made appearances in Montserrat and the British Virgin Islands' courts.

In December 1981, the Judicial and Legal Services Commission of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court invited Byron to accept appointment as a puisne judge from February, 1982. However, he was unable to accept the appointment from that date, and joined the Bench from April 1, 1982. He was assigned to Antigua.

It was while at that post, following the request of the Grenada government on the retirement of then Chief Justice Sir Archibald Nedd, that he was seconded to act as Grenada's Chief Justice from February 1, 1986.

During the trial, he was subjected to a number of attacks by the accused, who called for his withdrawal and claimed he was prejudiced.

Jamaican champ for the defence

Although, defence lawyers formally withdrew from the Bishop murder trial, they still communicated with the 19 and actively represented them in a number of constitutional motions throughout the entire hearing.

A team of Jamaican attorneys, headed by Queen's Counsel, Howard Hamilton, appeared for the accused during the preliminary enquiry, which lasted from February 22 to August 8, 1984. The 19 were committed to stand trial at the October, 1984 Criminal Assizes.

After several delays, the trial finally got started almost two years later on March 3, 1986.

Bernard Coard and his wife, Phyllis, however, retained the services of top Jamaican criminal lawyer, Ian Ramsay, for their personal representation and it was agreed that he would be in charge of the entire defence team.

But their appearance in the trial before the Kittitian-born Acting Chief Justice Denis Byron was short-lived; and on April 15, 1986, following the written instructions of all the accused, the complete defence team withdrew from the case.

Ramsay, however, kept a vigilant watch on the entire proceedings and from time to time following consultations with the accused in their cells, he lodged a number of motions challenging the court's proceedings.

The Jamaican lawyer, believed to be the youngest attorney ever appointed a Queen's Counsel, was born on June 2, 1930 and had part of his elementary education at a school run by his father.

He later attended Munro College and a private boarding school in Jamaica, before being awarded a very special scholarship — the Jamaica Centenary Scholarship.

Profile of prosecution leader

FORMER Trinidad and Tobago's Attorney-General, Karl Hudson-Phillips, was leader of the prosecution team in the Maurice Bishop murder trial.

Known for his flamboyancy both in his attire and speech, Hudson-Phillips was born in Trinidad in 1933. He was the son of a lawyer who was also the mayor of Port of Spain for two years; and attended Queen's Royal College before leaving to study in Britain.

There he received the MA and LLB degrees before returning to his homeland in 1959 to practice law.

He was elected chairman of the ruling PNM party to submit comments

Who's who of lawyers

MOST of the lawyers who took part in the Maurice Bishop murder trial are non-Grenadians. In fact, there were only three Grenadian attorneys, who at some stage took an active part in the trial or in related proceedings.

These were prosecutors, Michael Andrews, president of the Grenada Bar Society, Keith Friday, of the Director of Public Prosecution's (DPP's) Office and Denise Campbell. Ms. Campbell, however, left the prosecution team on March 5, 1986 to take up an appointment as Acting Registrar of the Supreme Court.

Former Trinidad and Tobago Attorney General Karl Hudson-Phillips led the prosecution team along with

Velina Hylton, Grenada's Acting DPP, on secondment from the Jamaica Legal Service.

The team also included Senior Lawyer, Doodnauth Singh, a well known Guyanese defence lawyer and Trinidadian attorney, Uric Doogan.

The defence team was: Ian Ramsay; Maurice Fenn; Enos Grant; Carlton Williams; Clarence Hughes; Howard Hamilton, QC; Marina Linton; Earle Witter; Glen Cruickshank; Arnold Nicholson; Delano Harrison; Maurice Frankson; Jacqueline Samuels-Brown.

With the exception of Hughes, who is Guyanese, the remainder all hail from Jamaica.


In 1959, Ramsay attended Cambridge University in England and studied law over for five years. He gained a Bachelor of Arts and a Bachelor of Laws degrees, following which he went on to Gray's Inn where he was admitted to the Bar.

On his return to his homeland, Ramsay worked as a deputy clerk of courts before opening his own chambers later. Today, he has a complement of 12 lawyers attached to his chambers.

He was made a Queen's

Counsel in 1965, but returned the commission four years later as a mark of protest against what he termed to be the proper administration of justice in Jamaica.

He is married and has three children.



LEADER of the prosecution team, Karl Hudson-Phillips.

introduce a Public Order Act Grenada, Hudson-Phillips bill which was subsequently withdrawn. He led the prosecution team along with other Caribbean lawyers.

Their final words

The '17' comment before sentences are passed

MAURICE BISHOP TRIAL



A FULL REPORT

ON THURSDAY, December 4, 1986, the 12-member jury returned their verdict in the Maurice Bishop murder trial, convicting 14 for the murder of the late Prime Minister and his Cabinet colleagues and loyalists.

Three soldiers, Andy Mitchell, Vincent Joseph and Cosmo Richardson, were also convicted of manslaughter for their part in the October 19, 1983 slayings while a lone person, Raeburn Nelson, was freed.

There was, however, mixed reactions to the verdicts after the 17 were asked by Acting Chief Justice Denis Byron if they had anything to say before sentence was passed.

Here are a few of the answers taken from the lips of those convicted:

Andy Mitchell — "(stammering) I... I have nothing to say, Sir."

Vincent Joseph — "I have nothing to say."

Callistus Bernard — "First of all, I wish to reserve at this stage my very true feelings. This is a kangaroo. I didn't expect nothing else to happen. It is only clear that a kangaroo has one conclusion. How much Yankee dollars you get to do that. I will die fighting. Let them put it on record. All those who frame me up, let them know that."

Cosmo Richardson — "I have nothing to say."

Lester Redhead — "My position from the outset of these trial proceedings remained the same. I still will not participate because of the irregularities."

These irregularities that took place during these proceedings, Your Lordship did nothing to protect my constitu-



A BUSLOAD of killers.

tional rights. I still say I am an innocent man framed in this kangaroo by the American administration and its stooges."

Christopher Stroude — "This court knows very well that I have been framed for political reasons. This said verdict is a corruption of the Judiciary. These proceedings are a farce and a kangaroo."

Hudson Austin — "There is not a single man in Grenada who could say that I, Hudson Austin, committed a crime. I know it is the truth. Today convinces

me more that the bank of justice in this country is bankrupt."

The future will reveal the truth and some will have to bow their heads in shame for this travesty of justice. No man could say I committed a crime. The future will be a shining light and a beacon path for the truth. I will die with grace for a crime I did not commit."

Bernard Coard — "A man who is innocent of a crime cannot be made guilty of a crime he has not committed by an unconstitutional court, run by paid mercenaries. This court deliberately withheld evidence in this

so-called trial that would conclusively prove my innocence."

This did not happen by accident. But I am confident that international bodies and the Grenadian people will mount a serious investigation into this trial and the conduct of the Judiciary at this time."

Liam James — "I have been framed because of my political outlook. There are many people out there who know I can prove my innocence. The said prosecution witness, Errol George, could prove that."

The said American government has run this show from behind the

scenes using black-faced guards. For others, this trial has come to an end, but for us and for history the trial has just begun."

Leon Cornwall — "I am an innocent man. I stand here an innocent person despite what the jury has said. I have been framed for political reasons. But the struggle for justice will continue. The truth will come out and the truth will be victorious."

Phyllis Coard — A verdict of guilty cannot make an innocent person guilty. A verdict of guilt in a weak trial cannot alter one's innocence. I stand here confident that history will confirm my innocence and condemn this kangaroo trial."

Cecil Prime — "I have no ill feelings towards the jury. I stand here an innocent man."

United States government and used as a scapegoat. When Grenadians leave here, this verdict will haunt them. Time and history will be the judge."

Dave Bartholomew — "My heart is clean, my conscience is clear. That's all I have to say."

Ewart Layne — "My entire life to this country has been dedicated to the Grenada Revolution making it and defending it. That's the reason stand here awaiting to be condemned."

Colville McBurnette — "I am completely innocent of these charges. I am positive and confident that the truth of October 19 will one day be known."

Selwyn Strachan — "I have never committed crime in my entire life. Nothing will change the fact. The decision has been advanced is totally wrong. I am not guilty of any crime whatsoever."

Phyllis Coard — A verdict of guilty cannot make an innocent person guilty. A verdict of guilt in a weak trial cannot alter one's innocence. I stand here confident that history will confirm my innocence and condemn this kangaroo trial."

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The 'chosen' few

FOLLOWING the murder of Maurice Bishop and the disappearance of the heir apparent, Bernard Coard, from view, General Hudson Austin emerged as the chairman of the 16-member Revolutionary Military Council of Grenada. His partners in destruction were mostly drawn from the ranks of the army of which he had been Chief

of Staff. Those named to the council were:

Hudson Austin, Liam James, Ewart Layne, Leon Cornwall, Tan Bartholomew, Ian St. Bernard, Chris Stroude, Keith Roberts, Basil Cahagen, Lester Redhead, Hughie Romain, Cecil Prime, Rudolph Ogilvie, Imam Abdullah, Kenrick

Fraser and Raeburn Nelson.

Apart from their military backgrounds, council members were similar in their ideological outlook, having been posed to Marxist philosophy through study groups started

INTERVIEW

Hudson Austin

MAURICE BISHOP TRIAL



STATEMENT OF: Hudson Austin

RESIDING AT: St Paul's, St. George's

AGE: 45

OCCUPATION: Ex-Minister of Construction and Public Utilities Grenada

TAKEN AT: Fort George, Grenada

DATE: March 2, 1984

TIME STARTED: 9:15 a.m.

TIME CONCLUDED: 11 a.m.

BY: J. Watson, Inspector

A FULL REPORT

HUDSON AUSTIN, I wish to put some questions to you about the offence of murder with which you may be prosecuted. You are not obliged to answer any of these questions, but if you do, the questions and answers will be taken down in writing and may be given in evidence.

Q: Marital Status?

A: Married

Q: Are you a Grenadian?

A: I am a Grenadian by birth.

Q: What office did you hold in the People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada, which seized power on March 13, 1979?

A: Minister of Construction and Public Utilities.

Q: Were you a soldier in the People's Revolutionary Army of Grenada? If yes, give your rank and period of service.

A: Yes, I was general of the armed forces from 1981 late or 1982.

Q: Where did you obtain military training? (State place and period).

A: Grenada, Guyana, Trinidad.

Q: Was the victim, Maurice Bishop, known to you? Were you closely associated with him?

A: I was closely associated with him.

Q: Were you a member of the Central Committee in Grenada?

A: Yes, I was a member of the Central Committee on or until October 19, 1983.

Q: Were you a member of the Central Committee in Grenada?

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Grenada October 19, 1983?

A: Yes, I was.

Q: Were you a member of the Political Bureau in Grenada?

A: I was from 1979 until 1983.

Q: Were you a member of the New Jewel Movement in Grenada?

A: Yes, from the very inception.

Q: On October 12, 1983 did you attend a Central Committee meeting in Grenada?

A: Yes, the meeting was held here at Fort Rupert.

Q: Where was the meeting held?

A: In the conference room at Fort Rupert.

Q: Who was present at this meeting?

A: Maurice Bishop, Selwyn Strachan, Tan Bartholomew, Phyllis Coard, Bernard Coard, Fitzroy Bain, George Louison, Union Whiteman, Colville McBurnette, Liam James, Ewart Layne, John Ventour.

Q: What was discussed?

A: We discussed the re-organisation of the party and the rumour that Bernard Coard and Phyllis Coard were planning to kill Maurice Bishop.

Q: Was Cletus St. Paul questioned?

A: Yes, he denied any knowledge of the rumour.

Q: Why was he questioned?

A: It was alleged that he was the person spreading the rumour.

Q: Was Cletus St. Paul put under arrest?

A: Yes, I understand he was taken to Camp Fedon at Caligny.

Q: Do you know why he was arrested?

A: He was arrested pending investigation of the rumour.

Q: Was Bishop put under house arrest on October 12, 1983?

A: Yes.

Q: Do you know why he was put under arrest?

A: I do not know.

A: The report from the security forces was that Bishop was the one who spread the rumour and the Central Committee agreed that he should be arrested.

Q: On Wednesday, October 19, 1983, where were you? (Give details from 6 a.m.)

A: I was at my house; I went on a sick leave from October 14, 1983. I left home about 3:30 p.m. and I went to Fort Rupert and I met soldiers there. Also, there were several members of the Central Committee: Colonel Layne, Ian St. Bernard, Liam James, and army officers, Basil Cahagen, Cecil Prime and Lieutenant Nelson.

Q: Did you go to the residence of Bernard Coard on October 19, 1983?

A: I was in front of the house on the premises around 9:15 a.m.

Q: Who was there at Coard's residence?

A: Ewart Layne, Liam James, Bernard Coard and Phyllis Coard.

Q: Why did you go to Coard's residence?

A: Following a meeting with Maurice Bishop on October 18, another meeting was arranged for the next day.

Q: When did you leave your residence on October 19?

A: The meeting did not come off because of the demonstrations and I left there around 10 a.m. and returned to my home.

Q: Where did you go afterwards?

A: I went to my home.

Q: Did you go to Fort Frederick on October 19, 1983?

A: Yes, I went there at 3:30 p.m.

Q: Who accompanied you to Fort Frederick on October 19, 1983?

A: I drove there alone.

Q: What time did you reach Fort Frederick on October 19, 1983?

A: 2:30 p.m.

Q: State fully what transpired at Fort Frederick on October 19, 1983.

A: On arrival, I called Colonel Layne, Major Cahagen, Captain Stroude and Nelson, Ian St. Bernard, Lieutenant Prime, Lieutenant Andrews, Captain Redhead and asked them about the situation that existed and for a full explanation of why I had not been informed.

Colonel Layne told me that he had received a report that demonstrators had taken over Fort Rupert and so, he had to send men to relieve the situation at Fort Rupert and a number of people and soldiers got killed.

Q: Who were the Central Committee members at Fort Frederick on October 19, 1983?

A: Liam James, Ian St. Bernard, Colville McBurnette and Ewart Layne. I heard that Bernard Coard, Phyllis Coard and Selwyn Strachan had left there.

Q: Did the Central Committee members conduct a meeting at Fort Frederick on October 19, 1983?

A: If there was a meeting, I was not told or invited to it.

Q: What was the outcome of this meeting?

A: I do not know.

Q: Was a decision arrived at on the conclusion of this Central Committee meeting at Fort Frederick on October 19, 1983?

A: I do not know.

Q: Give names of Central Committee members who came to the agreement or decision.

A: I do not know.

Q: Was the agreement verbal or in writing?

A: I do not know.

Q: Did you sign to the agreement?

A: No.

Q: Do you know if the agreement was carried out?

A: I do not know.

Q: When did you leave Fort Frederick?

A: I left around 5 p.m. and I returned around 5:30 p.m.

Q: Did you go to Fort Rupert at any time on, or after

October 19, 1983?

A: I do not know.

Q: Which members of the Central Committee voted to

execute Maurice Bishop?

A: I am not aware of such a vote.

Q: If there was a meeting, was the agreement or written? If written, who wrote it?

A: I am not aware.

Q: Who signed it?

A: I am not aware.

Q: In whose possession was this document? (If written, who wrote it?)

A: I am not aware.

Q: To whom were instructions given to execute Maurice Bishop?

A: I do not know. I gave Colonel Layne or son any instructions, but any executions at Fort Rupert on October 19, 1983.

Q: Were instructions given to anyone at Fort Frederick on October 19, 1983? State fully.

A: I told Major Stroude to give me a full report in 48 hours. He gave me a short report on the persons who were killed. There were 17 persons who were killed.

Q: Who stated that Bishop would kill Central Committee members?

A: I am not aware of such a report.

Q: I heard of the execution after my arrival at 3 p.m. on October 19, 1983. This statement has been told that I can alter or add anything. This statement is true made it of my own free will.

CERTIFICATE: I, the above statement, have been told that I can alter or add anything. This statement is true made it of my own free will.

Hudson Austin.

October 19, 1983?

A: I went to Fort Rupert after 9 p.m. going on to 10 p.m. on October 19, 1983.

Q: Why did you go there?

A: Because I understood that Maurice Bishop and several others had been killed.

Q: What did you see there?

A: I saw Layne taking away corpses. I was told Bishop's body was in the ops room, but I did not go there.

Q: With whom did you speak?

A: Corporal Elton.

Q: Were instructions given to anyone verbal or written at Fort Rupert at any time on October 19, 1983?

A: I told Corporal Elton to make a check of the amount of dead bodies and give me a report. Major Stroude reported that there were 17.

Q: Were instructions given to anyone at Fort Frederick on October 19, 1983? State fully.

A: I told Major Stroude to give me a full report in 48 hours. He gave me a short report on the persons who were killed. There were 17 persons who were killed.

Q: Who stated that Bishop would kill Central Committee members?

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Hudson Austin.

October 19, 1983?

Laws of Grenada are questioned

DURING the entire Bishop murder hearing, the Grenada Constitution came under some scrutiny by defence lawyers.

Several unsuccessful attempts were made challenging the legality of the Supreme Court to conduct the murder trial of the 18 former military and government officials.

There were varying arguments lodged by defence lawyers.

In some cases, it was contended that the only courts validly recognised by the Grenada Constitution - suspended by the Bishop government, but since reinstated, at least partially - were those set up when the country was granted independence from Britain on February 7, 1971.

Seen as an attempt to have the London-based Privy Council hear a motion challenging the court's legality was turned down on the grounds that the council had no jurisdiction to hear the matter. Grenada's Court of Appeal also made a similar ruling, saying the laws passed during the New Jewel Movement's (NJM) rule outlawed Privy Council intervention.

The Supreme Court of Grenada was set up by People's Law No. 4 of 1979, promulgated by Bishop's left-wing People's Revolutionary Government (PRG). The law stipulated that the jurisdiction which was formerly exercised by the West Indies Associated States Supreme Court, was now vested in the Supreme Court of Grenada consisting of a High Court and a Court of Appeal. Under the current law, those convicted of the murders only have a right of appeal to the Grenada Court of Appeal.

In one ruling by former Chief Justice Sir Archibald Nedd, it was pointed out there was no doubt that the overthrow of the Eric Gairy regime by force of arms in 1979 by the Bishop-led revolution was a popular one welcomed by the people.

Additionally, he said after the toppling of the regime, Grenada was left



GOVERNOR-GENERAL Sir Paul Scoon.

A FULL REPORT

MAURICE BISHOP TRIAL



without a court because the West Indies Supreme Court decided to remove itself from the island. "It is in my view that when the Supreme Court was removed from Grenada, then those in power in Grenada were entitled to take the necessary steps to ensure that there remained a functioning judiciary in Grenada," he commented.

However, one of the major challenges by lawyers was whether the existing High Court had temporary legality as opposed to temporary constitutionality. Just after a year following the United States-led intervention of Grenada, Governor-General Sir Paul Scoon signed an order restoring several provisions of Grenada's 1974 Constitution.

However, he did not reinstate any sections relating to the court's system, whose validity has been challenged from the inception of the trial. Sir Paul, in his order, only restored parts of the Constitution relating to the position of the Governor-General, Parliament, the executive, finance, the Civil Service, citizenship and the protection of detained persons.

In another Court of Ap-



THE FIRST JUDGE to sit in the Maurice Bishop murder trial was retired Chief Justice Sir Archibald Nedd.

peal declaration of a defence motion it was that the held that the confirmation of a Validity Act, 1985, validating the High Court was unconstitutional and ineffective. The Court of Appeal, however, ruled that the High Court retained temporary validity on the doctrine of necessity.

It also hoped that the Grenadian government would "act with reasonable dispatch to restore the legal system to full constitutionality." But no change has been made in this direction. In fact, lawyers have submitted that the doctrine of necessity did not, and could not, bind for all times in the future. One attorney contended that if it were possible to rely on doctrine, then all manner of wrong could be done under the disguise of necessity.

The defence also unsuccessfully called on the court to set the matters right. "It is Your Lordship that can say whatever executive or legislative has delayed or has failed unreasonably to put matters right," an attorney told a High Court judge. Another matter that has taken up the keen interest by legal brains is a ruling by Court of Appeal president, Mr. Justice Joseph Haynes, who said that a stand taken earlier in the hearing did not have any effect on its progress.

In the early stages of the trial, the 18 had taken a stand not to cooperate with the proceedings, stomping their feet and chanting slogans like: "We do not recognise this unconstitutional court." As a result, Acting Chief Justice Denis Byron ordered them put out of the court, while the evidence was conducted in their ab-

sence.

Defence lawyer contended that the nullification of the trial absence of the a was a contravention of hearing guaranteed by the Grenada Constitution. They said a provision Section 8 made it that where an offence could not be tried in absence.

The section states: "Provided that such circumstances may be prescribed in the trial may take place in the absence of the charged so long as punishment of death, imprisonment (other than imprisonment in a place of payment of a fine awarded in the conviction)." But the judge said a section of the Constitution cited by the defence been erroneously interpreted. He said the visa meant that a person could not be sentenced in his absence.

The Court of Appeal president contended he found it impossible to believe that the framers of the Constitution that you couldn't try a person in their absence even though he had himself in a manner that rendered the proceedings impossible. Judge also said of question on the legal Bishop trial, the rejected the court referred to as a constitutional necessity. "There such judicial animal found anywhere, court became a law following the trine of necessity," Mr. Justice Haynes added. "The High Court of Grenada is a court of not of necessity. The has the same status as former High Court."

INTERVIEW

Bernard Coard

MAURICE BISHOP TRIAL



STATEMENT OF: Winston Bernard Coard
RESIDING AT: Mt. Wheldale, St. George's, Grenada
AGE: 39
OCCUPATION: Former Deputy Prime Minister and Economist
TAKEN AT: Fort George
DATE: March 3, 1984
TIME STARTED: 10 a.m.
TIME CONCLUDED: 11:10 a.m.
BY: J. Watson, Insp.

A FULL REPORT

then from September, 1983.

Q: Were you a member of the New Jewel Movement in Grenada?

A: Yes, from its inception in March, 1973.

Q: On October 12, 1983, did you attend a Central Committee meeting in Grenada?

A: I was not present at that meeting, I was at a meeting of the Bureau in the morning.

Q: Where was the meeting held?

A: The meeting of the Bureau was held at Fort Rupert.

Q: Who was present at this meeting of the Bureau?

A: I was there, also Maurice Bishop, Hudson Austin, Ewart Layne, Selwyn Strachan.

Q: What was discussed?

A: (i) Maurice Bishop's visit to Czechoslovakia and Hungary. (ii) A complaint about George Louison's conduct.

Q: Was Cletus St. Paul questioned?

A: I was not present during any questioning of Cletus St. Paul.

Q: Why was he questioned?

A: I was not present.

Q: Was Cletus St. Paul put under arrest?

A: I found out after it had taken place.

Q: Do you know why he was arrested?

A: I heard that he had speed a rumour that my wife, Phyllis, was having an affair with a man named Gordon.

Q: Was Maurice Bishop put under house arrest on October 12, 1983?

A: I found out about it after he was arrested.

Q: Do you know why Maurice Bishop was put under house arrest?

A: I heard that he was arrested because of the said rumour which nearly led to acts of violence in St. Paul's.

Q: On Wednesday, October 18, 1983, where were you? (Give details from 8 a.m.)

A: I was at home at 8 a.m. along with my wife. Around the middle of the morning I was visited by Central Committee members, Hudson Austin, Selwyn Strachan, Ian St. Bernard, Colville McBurnette and Ewart Layne. No meeting was held at my house that morning.

Q: Were you a member of the Central Committee in Grenada?

A: Yes, I was.

Q: Were you a member of the Political Bureau in Grenada?

A: Up to October, 1982 and

Q: Did you go to the residence of Bernard Coard on October 19, 1983?

A: There was no meeting.

Q: Was the agreement verbal or in writing?

A: I am aware of no agreement.

Q: Did you sign to the agreement?

A: I did not.

Q: Do you know if the agreement was carried out?

A: I am not aware.

Q: When did you leave Fort Frederick?

A: I left there days after because of the threat of invasion.

Q: Did you go to Fort Rupert on October 19, 1983?

A: I did not go there on October 19 or after October 19.

Q: Why did you go there?

A: I did not go there.

Q: What did you see there?

A: I did not see anything.

Q: With whom did you speak?

A: I did not speak to anyone.

Q: Were instructions given to anyone at Fort Frederick on October 19, 1983?

A: I do not know of any instructions.

Q: Were instructions given to anyone at Fort Frederick on October 19, 1983?

A: I do not know of any instructions.

Q: Who were the Central Committee members at Fort Frederick on October 19, 1983?

A: I do not know.

Q: Which members of the Central Committee voted to execute Maurice Bishop (and others), Jacqueline Craft, Ursula Whitman, Norris Bain, Fitzroy Bain, Bratt Bullen and Keith Hayline?

A: I did not, nor do I know of any.

Q: Was the agreement oral or written; if written, who wrote it?

A: I do not know of any agreement.

Q: Who signed it?

A: I did not, I do not know if any was signed.

Q: By whom was the agreement devised?

A: I do not know.

Q: Give names of Central Committee members who came to the agreement or decision.

A: I do not know.



Q: In whose possession was this document? (if written).

A: I am not aware.

Q: To whom were the instructions given to execute?

A: I do not know.

Q: Who gave these instructions?


A: I do not know. I found out that Maurice Bishop had died

sometime in the late afternoon of October 19, 1983. I that they were killed in the capture of Fort Rupert. I have the matter investigated. I have the above statement and been told that I can alter or add anything I like. This statement is true.

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SECURITY was the hallmark as soldiers discuss last minute strategy and take up positions for the first public appearance of Bishop's murder accused in the Magistrates' Courts.

A government in shambles

Chief Justice sums up 8-month trial

ACTING CHIEF JUSTICE DENIS BYRON, in his address to the jury, painted a picture that the People's Revolutionary Government was in complete disarray during the fateful October month of 1983.

In his 12-day summation, he said a joint leadership proposal between late Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and ex-Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard had provided the stage for open confrontation in the New Jewel Movement.

He said on one side of the dispute were ten of the convicted accused, who were supported by the army, while Bishop and his loyalists were on the other side of the fence.

He said testimony to this was the fact that the day preceding the murders, Bishop was already under house arrest along with former Minister of Education, Jacqueline Creff, and former Minister of Agriculture, George Louison, and ex-Minister of Legal Affairs, Kenneth Radin.

The judge said the evidence clearly showed there was growing tension in the island.

Dealing with another aspect of the case relating to the prosecution's allegation that the Central Committee gave the orders for the execution of Bishop and his colleagues, the Chief Justice urged the jury to acquit the Central Committee members if there was no evidence to suggest that the executioners were issued instructions to use force. He said this was regardless of the fate they (jury) decided for the actual murderers.

A FULL REPORT

He also mentioned the unsworn statement given by Stuart Layne, who said he singlehandedly sent troops to restore order at Fort Rupert after a crowd had illegally assembled there. Layne, a former lieutenant colonel in the army and Central Committee member, told the court he was legally entitled to send troops but denied giving any orders to kill.

But the judge said under Grenadian law, an army officer could make a proclamation calling upon persons illegally assembled at any army headquarters to disperse. However, he said such a declaration could only be made after the officer allowed one hour to elapse before taking any action. Chief Justice Byron said under the same law if there was any resistance from the crowd, it could be overcome and the officer involved granted immunity if there was any result of death.

He told the jurors, in reaching their decision,

they should review the evidence of Layne alongside that given by the prosecution witnesses, who said they saw Bishop and others being led away at gunpoint to a certain area of the fort where they were later executed.

"If you found that they had orders to restore order at Fort Rupert, then if the orders did not include the use of force, then Layne and the Central Committee members would not be guilty of any offence."

"If the orders from the start were to go to Fort Rupert and liquidate Maurice Bishop and others, it would not matter at all if in the course of so doing they were shot upon, because they would all be guilty of murder," he added.

In relation to the defence of former Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard, the judge told the jury to consider why Coard said nothing about the disposal of the bodies of Bishop and others during his unsworn statement, in which he (Coard)

declared having no motive to kill the late leader.

He also urged them to examine cautiously the evidence of former accused, Fabian Gabriel, who was granted a conditional pardon. Chief Justice Byron said they would have to decide if Gabriel was an accomplice; since from the evidence, it appeared he discharged his firearm and took part in the disposal of the bodies.

Concerning statements given to the police by some of the 18, he reminded the jury that one statement of one person could not be used against another.



QUEEN'S PARK 1980: Bishop addressing rally which included heads of government from Dominica and St. Lucia.

He, however, told them taken from the accused by the police, as well as the contents of the statements, in determining how much the statements were reliable to place on them.

MAURICE BISHOP TRIAL



Disorder in the court

ONE OF THE CHARACTERISTICS of the Bishop murder trial was the chanting and subsequent disruption of court proceedings by those accused of the murder of the late Prime Minister and others.

When the first witness, Agnes Grant, matron of the local hospital, was called to the stand on April 24, with the exception of Rayburn Nelson, who later also became the only person to be acquitted of the 11-count murder indictment, the courtroom was suddenly transformed into a scene of loud chanting, clapping and stamping of feet.

Probably for the first time in the history of the Caribbean Judiciary that the courts were confronted with such behaviour. Acting Chief Justice Denis Byron found himself in an awkward position and was forced to order the 17 removed from the courtroom for a major part of the eight month trial.

This stand taken from the trial's inception, days after defence lawyers

were instructed to withdraw from the case, was the 17's way of showing their disapproval with the proceedings.

Among the claims were that they were not having a free and fair trial; not having proper conditions to prepare their defence; and allegations that documents vital to prove their innocence were deliberately withheld.

The 17's resentment was obviously well rehearsed and orchestrated, as they sang their grievances in unison to the chorus, We Will Not Recognise This Unconstitutional Court. Among the several lines were:

"You can jail us;
You can beat us;
Deny us doctors;
Seize our pens;
Seize our documents;
Shave our heads;
Shave our beards;
You can cite us;
Brutalise us;
Deny us fresh air;
Bust our heads."

They also changed their chorus at times to:

"Let us hear the evidence in a constitutional

MAURICE BISHOP TRIAL



EXCLUSIVE REPORT

Let us hear the evidence in a free and fair trial. We are more determined to fight this Yankee court."

Not only did the 17 interrupt the proceedings when a prosecution witness was called to the stand, but when returned to the court in accordance with the law to question witnesses, instead they took the opportunity to air their grievances.

One highlighted grievance was a call on the court to secure the return of "valuable" documents they said were seized by the United States during the 1983 intervention.

Spokesmen for the 17

varied; but principally, former Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard or ex-Minister of Mobilisation, Selwyn Strachan, dominated the rostrum.

But early morning on April 28, the court was faced with a serious allegation by some of the accused. Pointing to a swollen eye, the ex-Cabinet minister charged he and seven others were brutalised by policemen after they were led away from court the previous Friday.

Strachan said he was handcuffed to the back and beaten after he and others were taken away following their protest to the "unconstitutional"

trial. Others who claimed they were beaten as well were Coard; former Ambassador to Cuba, Leon Cornwall; trade unionist, John Ventour; former junior minister, Colville McBarrett; and soldiers, Callistus Bernard, Cosme Richardson and Vincent Joseph.

The trial, however, continued after Chief Justice Byron ordered an investigation into the matter. The 17 maintained their stand throughout of not hearing or cross-examination; but later took actual participation when they all made lengthy unsworn statements from the dock in their defence.

They, however, forfeited their right to address the jury and after weeks of addressing the jury by chief prosecutor, Karl Hudson-Phillips, the stage was set for the Rikiltian-born High Court judge to commence his summation.

It was the end of a trial in which the foreman and a sitting alternate juror

was discharged from court after they both took ill, the foreman suffering from a mild heart attack.

Judgment Day, Thursday, December 6, saw the 18 with grim faces as they were led into court to await the foreman's announcement of his findings. It was a complete transformation of the handclapping, foot-stomping and chanting that was so evident in the early stages.

When 14 of the 18 were convicted to die for the 11 murders, there was a drastic change of atmosphere. As the marshal of the court summoned all to stand while the death sentences were pronounced on respective accused, there were mild proclamations of innocence.

Layne hung his head to one side; Bernard Coard breathed heavily; Austin flashed a faint smile; and Cecil Prime folded his arms. These and more were some of the reactions that signalled the end of a trial, by far the most historic in the Caribbean.

Nedd steps down

RETIRED Chief Justice of Grenada, Sir Archibald Nedd, was the first trial judge in the Maurice Bishop murder trial.

The 70-year-old jurist bade farewell to the Bench a year ago, after 47 years of service. During his later years, Sir Archibald presided over the Bishop trial, but retired after an extended sabbatical period requested by the government.

A former Island Scholar, he was appointed in 1980 as the first Chief Justice of the controversial Grenada Supreme Court established by the late People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) to replace the court comprising several other Eastern Caribbean islands.

He was admitted to the

Bar in 1930, served in several Caribbean islands and in Nigeria, before returning to the region in the 1970s to take up an appointment as a judge of

the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court. Recently, Sir Archibald sat on the Grenada Court of Appeal while the president, Mr. Justice Joseph Haynes, was ill.

DRIVING DRUNK

KILLS

The Christmas spirit does not come in a bottle

DRIVING DRUNK

KILLS

The Christmas spirit does not come in a bottle

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
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MAURICE BISHOP TRIAL

A FULL REPORT

Security tighter than ever

IT WAS the tightest security probably ever mounted for a criminal trial anywhere in the region.

From as early as sunrise, a Berlin Wall-styled security ring was mounted at Richmond Hill Prison, the location of the eight-month long Bishop murder trial. A vigorous tooth and nail check was implemented from the entrance, where hundreds craved the early morning sun in an effort to get a last glimpse of those charged with the murder of Bishop and others.

Members of the Special Services Unit kept vigilant guard with their automatic weapons as the 18 were taken to and from the court.


Every available vantage point was sealed off, and members of the public and reporters were subjected to thorough searches by uniformed police, with the assistance of an electronic scanner.

As the death sentences were pronounced, those

convicted were whisked away in an army jeep under heavy guard to await their penalty in another secured prison area.



ARMED with sub-machine weapons, these soldiers kept a watchful eye outside the entrance to the St. George's Magistrate's Court.



BARRIERS had to be erected to prevent the large crowd from entering the Magistrate's Court on the first day of their appearance before Magistrate Lyne St.



A JEEP full of soldiers blocked the entrance to the St. George's Courts



A SECTION of the large crowd which hurled stones and insults at the accused (in bus) on their way to the murder charges.

STATEMENTS OF THE ACCUSED

No compromise, so the army takes over

MAKE this statement of my own free will. I have been told that I need not say anything unless I wish to do so and that whatever I say may be given in evidence.

CHRISTOPHER STROUDE

I was a major in the People's Revolutionary Armed Forces of Grenada, stationed at Fort Rupert, now called Fort George.

On October 18, 1983 at around 10.30 p.m. a party

A FULL REPORT

ately. Members present told Abdullah that he was crazy because the soldiers would not be able to take on this task since they were not trained for that and also that they were enough of them. This would lead to desertion and then the Revolution will collapse.

The meeting was chaired by Comrade John Coutant, a member of the Political Bureau of the New Jewel Movement (NJM) and also included Comrade John Yatt. The purpose of the meeting was to explain that at the present moment a meeting was being held with Comrade Maurice to reach a compromise since Maurice no longer agreed with having joint leadership in the NJM. The compromise entailed the following:

(1) That Comrade Maurice Bishop accept joint leadership of the party.
(2) That Comrade Bishop explain to the people that the Central Committee was the highest organ in the party.
(3) That Comrade Maurice accept responsibility for the spreading of the rumours — that Bernard Coard and Phyllis Coard were plotting to kill him.
(4) That Comrade Maurice Bishop should remain as Prime Minister and a member of the party.
(5) That the Revolution continue along the path it is going with the same officers.

However, it was pointed out by the chairman that the compromise failed when they would have to resort to martial law which according to him was the hard way. Most party members were present and Comrade Abdullah was very strong on forgetting the compromise and having martial law immediately.

Members who held strong positions on reaching a compromise were Peter David and Wayne Sandiford. Before the meeting ended Comrade John Yatt informed all party members who were not military men to report to Fort Rupert at 0700 hours on October 19, 1983.

On the morning of October 19, I went down to the parade square to meet the party members who had to report to Fort Rupert. A total of around 12 members, including Richard Duncan, Wendy Crawford, Ruggles Ferguson, Janice Hamilton and Charlie Johnson arrived between 7 a.m. and 9 a.m.

At around 9 a.m. I went up to the area above the flag poles looking out for demonstration. When the demonstrations began, Captain Redhead and Lieutenant Andrews left Fort Rupert with a jeep followed by a truck to pick up the leaders of the demonstrations to see if that would crush it. That failed because the demonstrators prevented it.

The demonstrations built up to about 5,000-6,000. The majority went up to Comrade Bishop's home. As the people were going up the road to Maurice's house, three armoured vehicles coming from the Fort Frederick direction went through the crowd.

Sometime later, when the people began pushing past the armoured vehicles, these vehicles opened a burst of automatic fire in the crowd. The person responsible for leading the soldiers at that time was Major George Chetani, who was in contact with Fort Frederick and that is, with General Austin.

The crowd went to the gates to prevent anyone from coming up. When I came down and I saw the crowd, some even on the steps leading from the car park which was being controlled by Officer David Francis and two soldiers. I ordered the soldiers to put their weapons down and to let the crowd go.

Before the meeting had ended a soldier reported that the crowd led by Bishop had already arrived at the car park and

MAURICE BISHOP TRIAL



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
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MAJOR COMRADE STROUDE

I then returned to the my Bath who told me that Bishop wanted to see me. When I arrived in the operation room, I presented the party, he told me that Maurice Bishop would continue as the head of the party, but that he had nothing personal against me, but that I should hand over the party to him.

Maurice then called other officers who were in the room. He said that the army would be a new type of army. When I asked about the party, he told me that it would continue as the party, but that he had nothing personal against me, but that I should hand over the party to him.

He then asked me for the keys to the Ministry. I told him that I had the keys to the Ministry. He then asked me for the keys to the Ministry. I told him that I had the keys to the Ministry.

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Continued on page

Breakdown in talks led to army takeover

From page 14
I told Bain that we were now unarmed and defenceless and that if anything happened to the soldiers he would be responsible. We then went back to the operations room where Bishop was.

Soon afterwards Major Einstein Louison came to meet Bishop in the operations room. Maurice then informed us that Major Louison would be the chief of staff and the commander of the army.

Bishop then gave the keys to the armoury to Major Louison. Both Major Louison and myself went up to the armoury. He checked it and then gave Jeremy Cumming the order to issue weapons. I told Warrant Officer Gabriel that he should take down the names and serial numbers of the weapons when issued.

I left them at the armoury and went down alone. As I was going down the steps to the car park I met Bratt Bullen, "Pump-head" and "Big Dog" Bullen coming up. I continued down.

As I entered the building near the car park and was climbing the steps on the inside of the building I heard a burst of automatic fire coming from above me.

Seconds afterwards, I heard more gunshots coming towards the building, a rocket launcher was fired and the rifle and guns from the armoured vehicles continued firing for a long time. I remained there throughout the firing. Vincent Noel was also on the step with me and was asking what was going on.

Present also were Private Chris Stanislaus, Corporal Allan Alexander, First Warrant Officer Leslie Noel and Sergeant Chris Harper.

After the shooting, Lieutenant Abdullah who was commanding the armoured personnel carriers which earlier on had shot off hands and legs — told everyone to come out with their hands up. I told the civilians to do so. They left, then soldiers followed and I last.

I then checked the car



CHRISTOPHER STROUDE heard "is bullet for you."



A FULL REPORT

park, then went to the top of the steps leading from there. At the top, I saw Fitzroy Bain with his hands in the air surrounded by two machine-guns, Corporal Vincent Joseph and Keith Noel. Bain when he saw me called out to save his life. I replied that this is a decision for the Central Committee of the party to take.

Around the same time Captain Redhead was leading Maurice Bishop, Norris Bain, Jacqueline Creft, Unison Whiteman and Evelyn Maitland up the steps with their hands in the air and was stating "is execution time" I responded "cool" knowing that it is only the Central Committee that can take that decision and that he was in contact with them the same morning.

Captain Redhead and Lieutenant Abdullah then placed them facing the wall, that is, Maurice, Unison, Jacqueline, Bain and Maitland. Captain Redhead then looked for "Brat" Bullen and "Pump-head" and also put them facing the wall under the

basketball ring. Lieutenant Abdullah, who was sent by the Central Committee to carry out the mission on Fort Rupert, read a document to the people who were against the wall. This document stated that by an unanimous decision of the Central Committee all of them were to die.

Sister Creft said that she was three months pregnant, but Vincent Joseph responded, with some terrible remarks such as "what the f... you doing up here" and "is bullet for you".

Captain Redhead then gave the order to open fire and he, Lieutenant Abdullah and Vincent Joseph, using machine-guns in turn, shot them in cold blood against the wall on the parade square.


I then went to the car park and saw Vincent Noel still alive. This a Barbadian corporal in the Fire Service pointed out to me. A few minutes later Captain Redhead gave Warrant Officer Vernon Gabriel the task to kill him. After the shooting of Maurice, I called all the

soldiers on Fort Rupert who were not yet in the mess hall. I then went on to say the following things:

That this morning we had to put down our guns because the right opportunist elements who were led by Maurice Bishop stormed the fort using the people as a shield. But thanks to the motorised unit and its quick action, we have now re-established control of Fort Rupert.

I further pointed out to them that we should never allow elements like those to turn back the revolution and the gains that it brought. I further stated that since Maurice was killed we would have to establish martial law since the people would protest against the killing.

I finally called on them to be vigilant and disciplined since the fate of the Revolution rested on their shoulders, since it was times like these that the enemy would choose to invade our country. I ended with, "long live the NJM. Onward Ever, Backward



AN ARTIST'S impression of the fall of the Grenada revolution.


Never. When I left the mess hall, Fitzroy Bain was not yet dead and Warrant Officer Vernon Gabriel shot him in the head, killing him.

Afterward Warrant Officer Vernon Gabriel was supervising the covering up and removal of the bodies. For this purpose he used soldiers who brought them to the car park and then put them on the truck — PWD 1.

General Austin then spoke to Captain Redhead from Fort Frederick, ordering him to get the bodies of those killed to be buried in Camp Fedon in one grave. Captain Redhead then gave Warrant Officer Vernon Gabriel and Lieutenant Abdullah the task to take two other soldiers and bury the bodies at Camp Fedon.

I also reported to General Austin on the situation — he was very happy.

At the car park at Fort



16 December 1986, BISHOP TRIAL REPORT

STATEMENTS OF THE ACCUSED

No knowledge of committee meeting

I, SELWYN STRACHAN, wish to make a statement. I want someone to write down what I say. I have been told that I need not say anything unless I wish to do so and that whatever I say may be given in evidence.

I joined the New Jewel Movement party in 1973 as a party organiser and was paid as a full time politician by the party. During that time forming youth and women's groups among other things. In 1979, I was editor of the party newspaper, "The New Jewel", and still party organiser.

When the party came to power in the said 1979, I was made Minister of Communication, Works and Labour. In 1981, I was made Minister of Mobilisation, and Labour in 1983. Information was added to my portfolio.

I was never a member of the army. I had no military training. I was a member of the Central Committee from 1979 and was still a member of that committee on October 19, 1983. I was a member of the Political Bureau from 1973 when the party started. The Prime Minister, Mr. Maurice Bishop was the head of the Political Bureau.

On October 12, 1983, I attended a meeting of the Central Committee of the New Jewel Movement at the Prime Minister's official residence. All members of the committee who were in the country at the time were present. I do not remember who they were. The state of the party and the country was discussed and the meeting was chaired by the Prime Minister. Re-conformation of the Prime Minister's stand on the proposal for joint leadership in the party was discussed. At a previous meeting, he accepted the proposal but at this meeting, he did not.

I do not know if Clotus Paul was questioned. I heard he was in detention. I do not know for what purpose. I know the Prime Minister was put under house arrest on October 19, 1983 by the security forces around, like soldiers. I heard about a rumour to kill Prime Minister Bishop and the security thought it would be good to keep him safe at home. That was what I heard. On October 19, 1983, I left my home at True Blue, St. George's, in my motor-car registration number, 686, driven by Alias Jonesie. This was about 8:15 a.m. I got to work at my Lucas Street office about 8:45 a.m.

While there, I saw crowds of people demonstrating all around and I watched for a while. I heard people in the crowd saying that the demonstration was heading for the Prime Minister's residence. I left my office about 10 a.m. in my motor-car driven by Alias Jonesie and went to the Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. Bernard Coard's residence at Mt. Wheldale. This is next door to the Prime Minister's residence. When I arrived there, Mr. Coard was at home. There were no demonstrators at that time in the Prime Minister's yard. I did not go into the Prime Minister's yard or residence. Mr. Coard and I made comments about the demonstration. I did not go into Mr. Coard's house that day. I went to Mr. Coard's house because I heard that the demonstration was heading that way. I did not see the Prime Minister that day but I heard that the crowd took him from his home. I stayed in Mr. Coard's yard until I saw the demonstration went on to Fort Rupert at about 11:30 a.m. About midday, after staying around and talking, I left Mr. Coard's residence and went back to my office.

MAURICE BISHOP TRIAL

A FULL REPORT

I saw Lieutenant Colonel Ewart Layne in the yard at Fort Frederick. He was dressed in military uniform. He then told me that a unit was sent to Fort Rupert to recapture the fort because the fort was taken over by the mass of people led by the Prime Minister. Sometime after 3 p.m., I left Fort Frederick and went back to my office. I stayed there for a short while, left and was driven home by Jonesie. I got home about 5 p.m. About 6:30 p.m., I left home and went back to Fort Frederick, where I saw Bernard Coard. On October 18, 1983, about 5:30 p.m. there was a meeting of the Central Committee at Mr. Coard's residence at Mt. Wheldale. The purpose of this meeting was to work out a further compromise to present to the Prime Minister.

The members present at that meeting were General Austin, Lieutenant Colonel Layne, Lieutenant Colonel James, Ian Bartholomew, Bernard Coard, Phyllis Coard, Leon Cornwall, Ian St. Bernard, Colville McBarrett, John Ventour, and I. Chris DeRiggs was out of the island at the time.

Some of the proposals were that Mr. Bishop should continue as Prime Minister and that he should broadcast to the nation telling them about the rumour and state that was existing in the country at the time. At the time the Prime Minister was under house arrest. After the meeting, a delegation of four present at the meeting took these proposals to the Prime Minister. The names of the four members of the delegation were General Hudson Austin, Lieutenant Colonel Ewart Layne,

Lieutenant Colonel Liam James and Ian Bartholomew.

I understand that the Prime Minister said he needed to study the proposals, and that he would meet with Unison Whiteman and George Louison on October 19, 1983, and give an answer the same day.

The Prime Minister met with George Louison on the morning of the 19th as his request to the proposals, but he did not meet with Whiteman because of the demonstration. I did not attend any meeting at Bernard Coard's house on the morning of October 19, 1983, and I did not see any member of the Central Committee there that morning except Bernard Coard.

I did not see any armoured cars, at Fort Frederick on October 19, 1983; nor did I see Imam Abdullah, Captain Redhead, Lieutenant Cecil Prime. I am not aware of any instructions given to execute Prime Minister

Maurice Bishop, Jacqueline Creft, Unison Whiteman, Fitzroy Bain, Norris Bain, Keith Huyling, Cecil Maitland and Bratt Bullen.

I am not aware of any agreement made by the central committee to execute those persons mentioned. I did not order any executions of the said persons. I know that the

forementioned persons were shot at Fort Rupert on October 19, 1983 based on reports I received. I did not go to Fort Rupert at all on that day. On October 19, 1983, while at Fort Frederick, I did not attend any meeting of the Central

Committee; nor was I aware of any meeting of the Committee being held there on that day. It is not possible for a meeting of the Central Committee to be held and members of that Committee not informed as long as they are in the country. — SELWYN STRACHAN.

I have read the above statement and I have been told that I can correct, alter or add anything I wish. The statement is true. I have made it of my own free will.

Selwyn Strachan

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STATEMENTS OF THE ACCUSED

Orders of committee carried out

I, Colville McBarnette, wish to make a statement. I want someone to write down what I say. I have been told that I need not say anything unless I wish to do so and that whatever I say may be put in evidence.

Sgt. COLVILLE MCBARNETTE

I AM a member of the New Jewel Movement in Grenada. I am also a Central Committee member. I was Secretary for Information in the Bishop government. I am 27 years old.

On Wednesday, October 12, 1983, I attended the Central Committee meeting at Fort Rupert.

This was concerned with Comrade Maurice Bishop refusing to accept the decisions of the party. There were also discussions surrounding Comrade George Louison. The final decision was that Louison should be expelled from the Central Committee.

MAURICE BISHOP TRIAL



A FULL REPORT

This meeting was held from about 9 a.m. We broke for lunch and resumed about 2:30 p.m. During the lunch break, we heard of a rumour that was circulating that Bernard Coard and Phyllis Coard were planning to kill Comrade Maurice Bishop.

Lieutenant Colonel Liam James, when meeting resumed, read out a signed statement from one of Comrade Bishop's security men saying that he was instructed by Bishop to help spread the rumour. Bishop denied any knowledge of the rumour.

His chief security man, Cletus St. Paul, who was in the yard at the time and was implicated in the signed statement by the security man called "Nigger", was called into the meeting and was asked whether he knew anything about the rumour and he said, No. He then left the meeting.

The Committee then decided to detain Cletus St. Paul for further questioning. He was detained. The Committee further decided that Comrade Bishop should make a statement on radio saying that the rumour was untrue. That was done.

The Committee also decided to hold a meeting of the entire party the following day at Butler House. The following day, October 13, I attended the Central Committee meeting at Comrade Coard's house around 9 a.m. and it

was there that I learnt that Comrade Bishop had been put under house arrest. He was not present at the meeting.

At the meeting, it was held that with the unstable situation in the country, if Bishop was allowed to go out there, the situation would get worse. And also, how we could stop the rumour from spreading.

We were told that there would be a series of meetings between Comrades Coard, Selwyn Strachan, Unison Whiteman and George Louison, and that we would be kept in touch with the outcome. The Committee members were sent out to different centres to inform the masses.

On Thursday, October 13, I saw Comrade Bishop at Butler's House where there was a meeting of the entire party around 4:30 p.m. At the meeting, the members were informed of the rumours and also matters relating to George Louison.

Comrade Bishop spoke and he denied knowledge about the rumours; most of the members condemned him for failing to accept the decision of the party. The Central Committee met every morning afterwards at Comrade Coard's home.

At those meetings, most of the time was spent looking at development in Grenada; and looking at ways to resolve the situa-

tion, because George Louison and Unison Whiteman were asking that the affairs in the country continue as they were previously; that would have meant Comrade Bishop would have had his own way if that were so.

On the night of October 18, a delegation was sent to Comrade Bishop. The members were Comrade Layne, James, Bartholomew and General Austin, they were sent to put forward the proposals of the Central Committee that Bishop should remain as Prime Minister. The feedback was that he would think about it.

On October 18, I left my house for Comrade Coard's home around 9 a.m. There were demonstrations taking place; schools were closed; businesses in town were closed.

I entered the demonstrations from Comrade Coard's yard. They released Comrade Bishop although the soldiers tried to prevent it. The crowd went to Fort Rupert and the Central Committee member decided to leave and go to Fort Frederick. It was felt that Comrade Bishop would try to execute us and we went to Fort Frederick for our own protection.

The Committee members who went to Fort Frederick were General Austin, Major Ian St. Bernard, Bernard Coard, Phyllis



FORMER Junior Information Minister, Colville McBarnette.

Coard, Ewart Layne, Selwyn Strachan, Liam James, Leon Cornwall, John Ventour and I.

We had a meeting at Fort Frederick. It was decided to contact Comrade Bishop at Fort Rupert to see if there were means of resolving the problems peacefully. Ian St. Bernard called Fort Rupert on the phone and Unison Whiteman spoke to St. Bernard and told him to go to a police station and surrender.

At the meeting, the Committee decided that the army should retake Fort Rupert. The armoured cars left and about 25 minutes later Iman Abdullah returned to Fort Frederick and spoke to

Ewart Layne. The Central Committee then held a meeting there and it was agreed by all the members there that Comrade Bishop and his clique must be executed.

All of the army officers, Ewart Layne and Leon Cornwall left the room. I do not know to whom they spoke. Iman Abdullah left also.

I next heard that Comrade Bishop, Jacqueline Cress, Unison Whiteman, Fitzroy Bain, Norris Bain, Vincent Noel were executed.

I went to the radio station to make sure that all of the equipment there was all right, because General Austin was to

make a radio announcement later that night. I and other Committee members remained at Fort Frederick.

October 19, General Austin made an announcement on Radio Free Grenada. The executives were carried out in accordance with the agreement of the Central Committee of which Comrade Coard was the chairman.

Signed COLVILLE MCBARNETTE

I have read the statement and I have told that I can correct or add anything I wish. This statement is true. I have made it of my free will.

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STATEMENTS OF THE ACCUSED

Mission: secure Fort Rupert

I, RAYMOND VINCENT JOSEPH, wish to make a statement. I want someone to write down what I say. I have been told that I need not say anything unless I wish to do so and that whatever I say may be given in evidence.

On Wednesday, October 19, this year (1983), I was at camp at Caligny, in St. George's, about 11:40 a.m. when O.C. Mayers called all the soldiers together and told them to prepare to move. We left and went to Fort Frederick in St. George's.

At Fort Frederick, I met Lieutenant Abdullah and other soldiers there. O.C. Mayers told us to wait, then he picked some men from his unit, including me. The O.C. then told us to board three armoured cars, and that we were going to Fort Rupert.

PFC Keith Noel, Lance Corporal Andy Mitchell, PFC Cosmos Richardson, Lance Corporal Winston Butler, Ray Antoine and I went and got on the second armoured car. Abdullah, Noel and I were sitting near together. It was 12:45 a.m. We reached Fort Rupert about 1:15 p.m. When we arrived there, I saw a lot of people.

The first armoured car stopped on top of the hill, and the second armoured car which I was on, stopped about four feet from the first car. We drove through the people to get to the top of the hill. As I waited on top of the armoured car, I heard a shot, but I cannot say who fired it.

I jumped off the car with my AK machine-gun onto the ground; and on instruction of Abdullah, Keith Noel and I ran towards the building on Fort Rupert where the canteen is situated.

When I was going up the steps to get to the back of the building, I fired off shots in the air from my gun. People in the yard in front of the building were running in all directions. Noel and I petrolled the back of the building and I fired shots into the back of the building.

I heard another soldier say that the Prime Minister was in the building and stopped firing. I saw some people coming through a tunnel, and one was Fitzroy Bain. They looked afraid. I told them to get out the fort.

I saw Christopher Stroud coming up the steps, and I heard Fitzroy Bain ask Stroud to save his life. Stroud told him that he could not do so. Just then, I saw a man new as Maitland, Comrade Maurice Bishop, the

Prime Minister, Jacqueline Cress, Unison Whiteman, Norris Bain, Brat Bullen and other people coming up the steps with their hands in the air, and behind their heads. Behind them was Abdullah, Lance Corporal Mitchell and PFC Richardson.

Comrade Bishop and the line of people went through the tunnel and onto the top square where a basketball court is situated. Noel and I went up some more steps and looked down on the square.

I saw standing in a line about 40 feet from the line of people in which Comrade Bishop stood. I saw Sister Cress look back at Abdullah and say some-



EX-ARMY Corporal Raymond Joseph is escorted to a waiting police vehicle after appearing before Magistrate Lyle St. Paul on 11 counts of murder.

A FULL REPORT

MAURICE BISHOP TRIAL



thing to him. I did not hear what it was, but Comrade Bishop said something to her and she looked back towards the wall again.

Abdullah left and came back shortly afterwards carrying a gun, a M-3 machine-gun. He told Comrade Bishop and the others in the line to face him and they did. He told them something which I did not hear very well; but he was saying something about the Central Committee and that they were to be executed.

He then told them to face the wall again and they faced the wall again. Abdullah looked towards Noel and me and told us to cock our weapons and prepare to fire. Standing near to Abdullah were Cosmos Richardson and Andy Mitchell. They also cocked their weapons.

Noel and I were standing about 30 feet from Abdullah, Richardson and Mitchell; and about 45 feet from the line of people in which Comrade Bishop

Rumour starts tragic events

INVESTIGATIONS have shown that the events leading up to the October 19, 1983 tragic events took its worst turn from as early as October 11, 1983 when Prime Minister Maurice Bishop's bodyguard, Cletus St. Paul, was arrested and detained for allegedly spreading the rumour that convicted murderers, Coard and his wife were plotting the assassination of the late leader.

Here is a sequence of events following St. Paul's apprehension.

October 12, 1983 (Wednesday) — Prime Minister Maurice Bishop placed under house arrest; Callistus Bernard responsible for his custody.

October 14, 1983 (Friday) — Minister of Education, Jacqueline Cress, placed under house arrest following her visit to Prime Minister's house.

October 15, 1983 (Saturday) — Party meeting of the New Jewel Movement (NJM) at Butler House — chaired by Liam James. Militia meeting at Butler House chaired by Lieutenant Colonel Ewart Layne to discuss Bishop. Hudson Austin attended.

October 19, 1983 (Wednesday) — 10:30 a.m. — (a) Minister of Foreign Affairs, Unison Whiteman and trade unionist, Vincent Noel, led a crowd of people to Bishop's home and freed him and Cress and took them to Fort Rupert.

(b) Bernard left Bishop's home and drove a car to Fort Frederick where he held discussions with Officer Cadet Conrad "Connie" Mayers.

(c) Central Committee members arrived at Fort Frederick for emergency meeting. Attending Hudson Austin, Bernard Coard, Phyllis Coard, Ewart Layne, Dave Bartholomew, Selwyn Strachan, Liam James, Leon Cornwall, John Ventour and Colville McBarnette.

(d) Noel relayed message from Bishop to crowd at Fort Frederick.

(e) Central Committee took decision to execute Bishop and others.

(f) Three armoured cars left Fort Frederick for Fort Rupert, under command of Mayers, Bernard and Nelson, and on arrival commenced shooting.

(g) Bishop and others executed by Bernard, Andy Mitchell, Vincent Joseph and Cosmos Richardson.

(h) Bodies loaded and taken to Camp Fedon. October 20, 1983 — 5 a.m. Bodies dumped in an open hole and burnt and buried by Bernard and others.

stood. I had obeyed the order to cock my weapon and I heard Abdullah say, "Fire."

I aimed my gun at the line of people in which Prime Minister Comrade Bishop stood and fired. The people in the line in which Comrade Bishop stood, fell to the ground. Blood was running all about there. After about four to five minutes, Abdullah shouted, "Cease fire." I stopped firing.

Just then, I noticed Warrant Officer Gabriel come onto the square, and I heard Abdullah tell Gabriel, Richardson and Mitchell to finish off those that were not dead. He pointed to where Comrade Bishop, Jacqueline Cress, Unison Whiteman, Norris Bain, Fitzroy Bain, Mait-

land, Brat Bullen, who was also in the line in which Comrade Bishop had stood, and the others had fallen to the ground. The warrant officer, Mitchell and Richardson then sprayed the bodies of the people with bullets. It was now about 3 a.m. and the rain began to fall. I took cover and went to the canteen and drank a Coke. Noel and I then went and got back on the second armoured car and went back to Fort Frederick.

On October 19, 1983, I have read the above statement and I have been told that I can correct, alter or add anything I wish. This statement is true. I have made it of my own free will. — VINCENT JOSEPH.

STATEMENTS OF THE ACCUSED



A BUXOM Phyllis Coard sits in a cell at Richmond Hill Prison following her capture in October 1983.



WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? seems to be the thoughts of the Coards three children, Abby (left), Shéa (centre) only boy Neto, at the Grenley Adams International Airport, enroute to their new homeland, Jamaica.

Coard plan to leave Grenada is aborted

DURING the murder trial, Phyllis Coard stated that shortly before Maurice Bishop died, she and her husband had completed their plans to leave Grenada.

She is the only woman among the 18 persons accused of murdering Bishop and ten others. These included her husband, Bernard, the Deputy Prime Minister under Bishop.

She said, following a massive demonstration in front of their home, when a large crowd took away the Prime Minister who had been placed under house arrest, her husband made a decision to leave Grenada.

"That day (October 19, 1983), after the demonstration, my husband decided that since he was being used as a scapegoat, we should leave Grenada. He asked me to pack some suitcases for our children and ourselves and I did so.

"But because of the large number of demonstrators that day, we decided, after being advised by our personal guards, that it would be unsafe to proceed to Pearls Airport. So, we took their advice for our own safety and went to Fort Frederick."

The bespectacled woman said, shortly after arriving at Fort Frederick, the army's headquarters, they received the news of Bishop's death at Fort Rupert, a short distance away.

Describing the incident as a nightmare where one had no control, she said: "It was a feeling of disbelief when we got the news that Comrade Bishop and many others had died. It was unreal. I simply could not move.

She said the feeling got worse when she learnt that a number of other Cabinet ministers had also died. "For several hours I was unable to do anything. I was in a state of shock."

Coard denied allegations she and other members of the former New Jewel Movement's Central Committee had reached a decision early that morning to execute Bishop and several of his colleagues. She said because of the sudden development, such a meeting was totally impossible.

Describing Bishop as a close family friend whom she and her husband had known since 1968 in England, the woman told the court, "One of the greatest cruelties which the American government has inflicted, is on children of

the deceased in that their parents' friends killed them.

"I am personally confident that the truth will come out. But, I often ask myself, what would be the view of those children at this time," she added.

The woman, who since then has been condemned to be hanged for being involved in the murders, said after hearing of the unfortunate tragedy at Fort Rupert and later being informed that American warships had been diverted from Lebanon to Grenada, she and her husband took a decision not to leave the country until things stabilised.

"We agreed then it would have been cowardly and unpatriotic to leave the country at such a time," she added. "I do not regret our decision for having remained in Grenada, despite this rigged trial and frame-up, because I honestly believe that part of the responsibility of any revolutionary is to set an example of courage and patriotism for future revolutionaries to follow."

Coard said, one consoling thing about the October crisis was that her children knew their parents were innocent of the murder charges, since

they were present when the decision was taken to leave Grenada.

"I am innocent of any crime of murder and at no time in my life did I ever take a decision on anyone's life."

She discredited prosecution witness, Cletus St. Paul, Bishop's former bodyguard. She said he was responsible for spreading a rumour that she and her husband had planned to kill Bishop.

She said the evidence produced by the prosecution was an extension of the propaganda campaign launched by the United States after the October, 1983 intervention.

And also, she accused the prosecution of deliberately taking part in the rigging of the jury. She claimed they were selected in violation of the conditions set out by law.

In a two-hour unsworn statement, Phyllis Coard said, because of her poor health, the result of being deliberately underfed by prison wardens, she was not able to present as lengthy a defence as she would have liked.

She also told the court one of her major crimes was being the wife of Bernard Coard

MAURICE BISHOP TRIAL



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STATEMENTS OF THE ACCUSED

ONE OF THE HIGHLIGHTS of the Bishop trial was a six-day marathon statement by Grenada's former Deputy Prime Minister, Bernard Coard.

Like the other defendants, Coard, who elected to give unsworn testimony from the dock, told a packed courthouse that he was stunned when he got the news of Bishop's death.

In fact, he said, it was after he and his wife scurried to safety in Fort Frederick army headquarters on the morning of October 19, 1983, following the advice of security officers, that he learnt of the tragic happenings at Fort Rupert.

Coard, who the prosecution successfully claimed chaired a Central Committee meeting which issued the orders for the executions of Bishop and his Cabinet colleagues and loyalists said he had no reason whatsoever to kill the late Prime Minister.

He said Bishop was a close friend from school-days, one who had unequalled and unparalleled qualities in harmonising people. "There was no motive to murder Comrade Maurice Bishop. The opposite is the case. In fact, the entire leadership of the New Jewel Movement was absolutely clear that there could be no solution to the crisis in the party and Revolution without Comrade Maurice Bishop," he said.

The ex-deputy leader, however, stressed that contrary to beliefs, there was never any ideological differences between he and Bishop. He said that despite massive propaganda portraying him as a hardliner Marxist and power-hungry, he was directly responsible for proposing that Grenada should hold general elections and return to normal constitutionality.

Coard also said that the much publicised visit to the United States by Bishop shortly before his death was his proposal; according to him, the United States had embarked on an aggression against Grenada since the People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) came to power in 1979.

"I spent several months in this (Bishop's) home planning that trip. We saw that trip as vital because we saw a pattern of aggression by the United States."

He said the Deputy Prime Minister referred to the trial as a kangaroo hearing and speculated that in the distant future, the truth surrounding the October events would be revealed.

"Grenadians and people throughout the world will then be able to tell for themselves and not based on a packed of lies masquerading as so-called evidence in a kangaroo trial."

"Sometime in the future, all that was said by these same prosecution witnesses in the trial, and what they said at the preliminary enquiry under oath will get published so Grenadians can compare what they said under oath

A FULL REPORT

No motive to kill Bishop

Impossible for there to have been any Central Committee meeting and any Central Committee decision to murder Maurice Bishop or anybody, they know that.

Referring to the witness claim by St. Paul that he and other members of the Central Committee held a meeting and took a decision to murder Bishop as foolishness.

Referring to the witness claim by St. Paul that he and other members of the Central Committee held a meeting and took a decision to murder Bishop as foolishness.

"You see, real life, real life the way it eventually unfolded on October 19 created enormous difficulties for the Americans and their stooges who have brought the charges against us using their black face cards and their attempted frame-up of the leadership of the party and army, the Grenada Revolution, totally unexpected to us in the dock and all Grenadians except the handful who actually organised what took place on October 19."

"The totally unexpected nature of the events on that day, the speed with which these events unfolded, the fact that nobody had a clue at any one moment of what was going on; what was happening next, the nature of the crowd, the nature of any large crowd that is excited and in a high state of emotion in any part of the world, the nature of crowd psychology in that context and therefore, sudden turns and shifts of activity by such a crowd in such a context."

"The enemy knows that all of this makes it totally impossible for there to have been any Central Committee meeting and any Central Committee decision to murder Maurice Bishop or anybody, they know that."

MAURICE BISHOP TRIAL



BERNARD COARD — "There was no meeting."

in the preliminary enquiry with what they said also under oath at the trial and come to their conclusions and make up their own minds.

"The medical records of all those in the dock who were ruthlessly and mercilessly tortured by the Barbadian policemen who then masqueraded as prosecution witnesses in this case, the medical records will one day get published for Grenadians to see for themselves the physical damage done to people in this dock at the time of taking the so-called voluntary statements from them, statements which the court accepted as given voluntarily and is part of the evidence against us in this trial. Those medical records will get published one day and Grenadians will make up their own minds."

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Plan to restore order at Fort Rupert

I AM a single man, I am a Grenadian citizen, and I had all my education except the military one, in Grenada. My education was elementary or primary and secondary. I had my elementary education at the St. George's Roman Catholic Boys' School, and I had one year of secondary education at the St. David's Secondary School.

My father's name is Lucky Bernard, and my mother's name is Ruby Bernard. I have five brothers and four sisters, and their names are as follows: Michael, 28; Angel, 19; Petros, 16; Andy, 13; Patrick, 11. Sisters: Joy, 33; Antonia, 27; Cornelia, 26; and Letra, 21.

They are all Bernards but I do not know their present addresses, as all of them left the island and I believe that they are in the United States with my mother. I do not really have any hobbies, but I play a little football or sometimes a game of dominoes. I have a lot of things to do and I concentrate on my work.

I have been a member of the Revolution since March 13, 1979, when the Revolution came to power. About a week after the Revolution, the army started formation and I went into the army from then. I got my initial training at the radio station, from Radio Grenada, which was renamed Radio Free Grenada.

During my training there, I got shot accidentally with a hand gun, which was being used by one of the army personnel.

I was hospitalised for seven days. That did not stop me from being a soldier, but during the time that I was in hospital, the platoon that I was in, moved to Camp Butler. So, when I came out of the hospital, I went and rejoined them at Camp Butler.

About three weeks after, I was taken to a unit in St. Andrew's where I had advanced training with an AK-47. This training lasted for about two months and then I was assigned for duty as security at Pearlys Airport.

I started receiving a salary of \$200 a month and I



CALLISTUS BERNARD - the man who gave the command "Fire".

worked at that airport for about two months.

After that, I was sent to Cuba on that training. I went with a group of 30 men and we had our training at the Granma Academy, Havana. My training involved the aspects of commanding units, camouflage, engineering, planting mines, making bombs, shooting all kinds of guns and anti-aircraft guns, organising combat troops, and general commanding of troops.

We all spent 14 months in Cuba on that training. On my return to Grenada in 1981, I, along with all the other members that went to Cuba, were promoted to O.C. and I was assigned to Carriacou. I had a platoon of 23 men, and some other officers brought the total to 32.

I was in charge of Carriacou, and my region was Region 4. But sometimes, I would have to come to Grenada, either for meetings, for salary or for an exercise. There was no stipulated time for my coming to Grenada, but as the occasion merited it, I

would come to Grenada. Sometimes, I would have to bring some of my men from Carriacou to Grenada; but the most of them that I would bring, would be about 12 at any one time, and this would have to be for an exercise. The last time that I brought any of my men to Grenada for an exercise was in September, 1982.

For this year, 1983, I visited Grenada numerous times, and I spent as long as one week on some of those visits. I did not visit Grenada as many times last year as this year, because there were not as many meetings last year.

For the month of October, 1983, I visited Grenada twice; the first time was early last month, and I spent about a week. I was called by Radio Contact from Carriacou. That week, I attended meetings held for full party members, and the Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, along with General Austin and other persons were present. Joint leadership was the question, and it was

A FULL REPORT

discussed. The Prime Minister agreed to joint leadership and he and Coard embraced one another, after which Maurice Bishop left.

I also attended a meeting held by the Armed Forces. This meeting discussed the aspect of joint leadership and we sanctioned the decision of joint leadership. I then left for Carriacou. I think that that date was October 12, 1983.

On the morning of October 13, 1983, I received a radio call instructing me to return to Grenada. I told them that I had a problem arranging a flight, and they decided they would send the Coast Guard boat for me.

The boat came and I left Carriacou, leaving Warrant Officer II Humphrey Corain, in charge of my platoon. I reached Grenada about 1 p.m.

I reported to the duty officer who was Warrant Officer II Elton. He told me that Maurice Bishop was to be placed under house arrest, and that I was to go to his house and take charge of the platoon there.

So, I went and met P.J. who was originally in charge of the platoon there. I told him that I was taking charge of the operation, and that I wanted to speak to all of the personnel.

The Prime Minister was at home. About an hour after I got there, he left with security men to attend a meeting at Butler's House. I then briefed the men who were members of the platoon.

I told them of the problem facing the country; that it was not between Bishop and Coard, but one of how the Revolution was going. I instructed them to be more vigilant, and not to allow any person to come to see Bishop unless they consulted me; and that I would be always around.

Maurice and the security men came back around 10 p.m. and the security took him into his house,

MAURICE BISHOP TRIAL



while I remained in the verandah. I got a message from Keith Roberts (Major) that I should allow Jacqueline Creft to visit Maurice. Jacqueline soon arrived and I let her enter the house.

I told her if she went in, she could not come back out. She decided to go in. They remained in there from October 13, 1983 until October 19, 1983. During that time, I allowed Bishop's mother to visit him on two occasions and his sister, on one.

Jacqueline Creft's mother came on two occasions to visit her daughter, but I did not allow her to see her. Those days passed normally and no crowds turned up there.

On the morning of October 19, 1983, about 8 a.m., a large crowd of people came to the gates. I fired some live rounds in the air from my M-3 submachine gun, and the crowds started booing. Two armoured cars arrived and fired some shots in the air. The crowd continued booing, saying, "Shoot us."

They then burst into Maurice's house and brought him out, holding him high in the air and went down the road with him. The armoured cars then left and went back to Fort Frederick.

Soon after, I got a telephone call from the duty officer at Fort Frederick, and he told me to report there. I gathered my belongings and I drove a car to the fort, where I met O.C. Mayers at the gate.

I had a conversation with him for about 15 minutes. During that conversation, I looked and saw a crowd of people at Fort Rupert.

Rupert Mayers and I discussed plans and strategies to be used as we were planning to go to Fort Rupert and restore order. O.C. Mayers told me that we would be using three armoured cars; that he would be in charge of one; I would be in charge of the second; and Lieutenant Nelson would be in charge of the third.

Each car had either seven or eight men on it. I

did not know any of the drivers of the armoured cars, because I was not familiar with the men.

We left Fort Frederick with the three armoured cars. The B.T.R. O.C. Mayers was in charge of, was the first to arrive at Fort Rupert. I was in charge of the second B.T.R. to arrive and Lieutenant Nelson, the third.

As soon as we reached the bottom of the hill to go to Fort Rupert, some civilian opened fire from the direction of the fort and shot and killed one of the soldiers on the armoured car which O.C. Mayers was in charge of.

Immediately a rocket was fired from O.C. Mayers' armoured car, and the machine-guns opened fire towards the crowd. I jumped off my car and fired some rounds. The men on my car fired some rounds, but the men on Lieutenant Nelson's car did not fire any rounds.

We advanced towards Fort Rupert and the crowds started dispersing. Vehicles started burning; this was caused by the rocket launcher. I then took a walk down by the hospital and came back. I saw some dead bodies on the ground and some pieces of hands here and a piece of hand there.

I told Major Stroude to take charge of the fort and restore order; call the Fire Brigade and give back the soldiers their weapons.

I saw about five persons dead. The firing lasted about ten minutes. O.C. Mayers got shot and he died later in the evening. I remained at Fort Rupert because we had instructions that Maurice Bishop and the other members of the party with him were to be executed by gunfire.

I knew that they were to be executed before I left Fort Frederick, as we had planned the way we intended carrying out the execution. But, after a soldier and O.C. Mayers got shot, that made a change

STATEMENTS OF THE ACCUSED

Ex-sergeant gives account of murders

ONE OF THE KEY WITNESSES in the Maurice Bishop murder trial was former accused, Fabian Vernon Gabriel.

His sudden departure from the dock to testify against fellow defendants and former comrades of the Maurice Bishop regime was even likened to the famous "Malik" murder case in Trinidad. In that trial, an alleged accomplice, one "Parras" turned state witness resulting in the subsequent hanging of "Malik".

In fact, one Grenadian calypsonian during carnival celebrations in a social commentary on the island referred to Gabriel as "the Farmasar" of the trial. And ironically, former Trinidad and Tobago Attorney-General, Karl Hudson-Phillips, was the chief prosecutor in both cases.

Gabriel's evidence pictured the most gruesome account of the Fort Rupert executions of October 19, 1983. Granted a pardon on condition that he testified in the trial, the short, bespectacled Gabriel who was a sergeant in the former People's Revolutionary Army (PRA) said the executions left pieces of human flesh stuck all over the fort's wall after about ten minutes of heavy machine-gunfire by at least three accused.

Then in charge of logistics at the fort, Gabriel said Prime Minister Maurice Bishop's back, chest and head "was burst up". He said as a result of the executions, blood flowed through the army headquarters' top square.

He told the court of seeing Bishop and his Cabinet colleagues with hands on their head being led to the top square by Lester "Gos" Redhead, Callistus "Man" Abdullah Bernard, Andy Mitchell, Vincent Joseph and Cosmas Richardson.

He said the soldiers were all carrying heavy duty weapons and later Redhead and Bernard ordered Bishop and the others to line up against a wall on the top square and remove their shirts. Gabriel said during this same time, two of Bishop's loyalists, businessmen Evelyn Maitland and Keith Hayling were also ordered

MAURICE BISHOP TRIAL

A FULL REPORT

against the wall.

In a court drama that brought sighs from the public gallery, Gabriel spoke of being asked by Bishop for matches to light a cigarette; but he said when he attempted to do so, Mitchell prevented him. "I told Mitchell it was the Prime Minister who wanted a light, but he said, 'No... Prime Minister in this time.'"

The ex-sergeant said while in his office preparing a memo for the follow-



ing day, he saw Bernard take a piece of white paper from his pocket and began to read it to Bishop and the others.

According to him, Bernard told them the Central Committee had given an order that they should be executed by fire. He also spoke of hearing Creft tell Mitchell that she was seven months' pregnant, but that the soldier replied: "No... comrades in this time."

Gabriel then spoke of

how Bernard told Mitchell, Joseph and Richardson to prepare to fire and counted to three.

"I then witnessed rapid gunfire upon the bodies that were against the wall. The firing went on for at least ten minutes and after the bodies fell on the concrete there was rapid firing again on them."

He said that following the executions, during a meeting of soldiers in the fort's mess hall, former army chief, Hudson Austin and ex-army officer, Christopher Stroude, denounced Bishop as a traitor to the Revolution.

Originally accused of taking an active part in the executions of the late Prime Minister and others, Gabriel said the only time he used a gun that day was when he shot the already dead body of deceased trade unionist,



FABIAN GABRIEL, accused turned witness

Fitzroy Bain. He said having been ordered to do so by Bernard, he was afraid of losing his life if he refused.

"I was afraid they might kill me, so I had to do what he (Bernard) said. It is very important to make this point to Grenadians. That is the only time on

October 19 that I, Fabian Vernon Gabriel, ever held any weapon in my hand. No time else," he declared.

Gabriel also told the court of seeing Bernard set afire the bodies of Bishop and others in a hole at Camp Fiddon, army headquarters, Caligny.

STATEMENTS OF THE ACCUSED

From Page 21

in the plan; because O.C. Mayers and the soldier that got shot were to storm the room where Bishop and the others were, and carry out the execution.

When I was at Fort Frederick, I knew that the Central Committee had met; and Lieutenant Colonel "Headache" Bayne told me that the decision was to execute Bishop and the people with him.

While at Fort Rupert after the crowd had dispersed, I heard Captain Redhead say, "Halt," and I looked and saw Maurice Bishop, Jacqueline Creft, Union Whiteman and Norris Bain walking away from Fort Rupert. They halted and I went and told them to march one behind the other into the square.

They marched onto the square. Maurice had his hand behind his neck. I lined them up facing the wall. Major Stroude and Captain Redhead were behind me and we all had weapons. Stroude and Redhead had AKs and I had an M-3 submachine gun.

Captain Redhead then told Brat Bullen and Maitland to go and join Maurice and the others and they went. I then told



CALLISTUS 'MAN' ABDULLAH BERNARD

Fitzroy Bain to go and join the others on the square, and they all turned around. Major Stroude was in the square with me. Captain Redhead was there also. A machine gunner whose name I do not

know, and another soldier who had an AK. There were also two machine-guns on top of the wall of the square.

I told Maurice Bishop and the rest of people with him that the Central Committee had decided that they should be executed by fire. I told them to about turn. I gave the commands, "Soldiers, prepare to fire," and "Fire."

On or about the time I was giving the command, Jacqueline Creft was saying, "Comrade, wait; wait, hold on." The machine-gunner on the square with me and the soldier with the AK on the square with me and I fired together. The bodies fell backward. Some fell down slow and some fell down fast.

At this stage, I was told by Sergeant Jones in the presence of Sergeant Weekes, that I was not obliged to say anything further unless I wished to do so; but what I say may be put into writing and given in evidence.

Fitzroy Bain's body was moving; and after we stop firing, Warrant Officer I Gabriel fired one shot in the head of Fitzroy Bain, and the body stopped moving. I then went and examined

the bodies and made sure they were dead. I told Warrant Officer Gabriel to get some blankets, wrap up the bodies and put them on a truck until further instructions.

I then left the square and joined a meeting that was in progress in the Mess Hall at Fort Rupert, and chaired by Major Stroude. About 100 people attended the meeting and at the end of the meeting, I said, "Long Live the Revolution, long live socialism." I then left and along with the other personnel of my armoured car, we went back to Fort Frederick on the car.

I went back to Fort Rupert on the night of October 19, 1983 about 11 p.m. and the bodies were on a truck I drove up there, and then the truck driven by a man whom I don't know, and about seven soldiers on it, left for Camp Fiddon, Caligny, with the bodies to be buried.

I drove my van and followed them. When we reached a road in Caligny, the truck stopped. I had to transport the bodies in my van. When we reached Camp Fiddon, a grave was already dug. So, we put in the bodies, poured gasoline on them and lit them. The bodies burned until the next day when I covered the grave.

When I covered the grave only bones, little pieces of skull and stuff was in the grave.

I have read the above statement and I have been told that I can correct, alter or add anything I wish. This statement is true. I have made it of my own free will. — Callistus Bernard

Callistus Bernard

START
Series of
events
in the
Spice
Isle

**MAURICE
BISHOP
TRIAL**



GRENADA: FROM CRISIS TO CHAOS

**WE ARE
BURDENED
BY
GAIKYISA**

A MESSAGE from pre-independence times.



Regional leaders meet to discuss the situation.

4 a.m., Tuesday, March 13, 1979.

A blanket of deep, tropical sleep covers the island of Grenada, from the cloud-covered, forested mountain tops to the populated and cultivated valleys below.

The only noises in this quiet, star-lit predawn hour, are the natural noises — the mass choir of crickets singing falsetto in the grasses and trees and frogs croaking baritone in waterways and ponds; the braying of a donkey echoing off a hillside in the distance; the contagious barking of dogs, from house to house; the exuberant crowing of cocks from many a backyard perch.

But this plateau of serenity is as deceptive as the sudden appearance of an oasis to the eye of a desert weary



TANKS rumble towards Fort Rupert.

traveller. The darkness of night is but a cloak that conceals a dagger about to be thrust into the heart of an oppressive adversary.

There is one spot in, near the True Blue headquarters of the Grenada Defence Force, where the noises are not the natural noises of night but the hushed ones of sweat-covered men whispering instructions and breathing deep and sharp to calm anxious nerves.

Their resolve is as old as

man himself, for although they are a new set of actors the stage is the same, the play the same, the act the same and the scene the same as that played out time and time again throughout the ages, in the name of freedom. Within recent centuries the stages in the Caribbean had included Haiti and, more recently, Cuba.

This morning it is Grenada and the principal actor is a 35-year-old lawyer, Maurice Bishop, who, huddled in the

shadows of night with his band of select followers, waits for the appointed time.

Bishop's mind is a rushing flood of memories of yesterday and dreams of tomorrow. The memories are of years of painful, agonising struggle against the oppressive regime of Eric Gairy and the dreaded, brutal MongOOSE Gang.

They are of the countless demonstrations preceding and following the merger that gave birth to the New



THE U.S. MARINES IN.



P.R.A. supporter is captured.



U.S. soldiers help the displaced Grenadians.



SEARCHING the hills for rebel soldiers.



U.S. soldiers help the displaced Grenadians.

STATEMENTS OF THE ACCUSED

The call to duty

I, COSMOS RICHARDSON, wish to make a statement. I want someone to write down what I say. I have been told that I need not say anything unless I wish to do so and that whatever I say may be given in evidence. — COSMOS RICHARDSON.

**MAURICE
BISHOP
TRIAL**



A FULL REPORT

On the morning of October 19, 1983 about 8 a.m., Lieutenant Cornwall came to Camp Fenton in Calivigny and spoke to O.C. Mayers who was then officer in charge. Shortly afterwards, O.C. Mayers called all the soldiers, including me, together.

Then the lieutenant told the soldiers that Comrade Bishop and some civilians were causing disturbance in the town and had gone up to Fort Rupert. Also, he said Comrade Bishop had captured the soldiers at the fort and locked up the weapons; and that Comrade Bishop was trying to turn back the Revolution, which was dangerous.

Lieutenant Cornwall then told us to prepare for full combat because we could get a call anytime from then. O.C. Mayers was present when Lieutenant Cornwall spoke to us. He then told us that we should go and retake Fort Rupert.

O.C. Mayers asked the soldiers if they were ready to fight for their country and we chanted, "Yes," and we said some had to die for some to survive; and that right then, every soldier should have blood in his eyes.

At that stage, Lieutenant Cornwall left the camp and O.C. Mayers led the chant, "Forward ever, backward never," and we joined him. O.C. Mayers then gave us instructions to go to the barracks and get dressed in full combat, and we did so.

About 11:30 a.m., O.C. Mayers gave us further instructions to get aboard the trucks and go to Fort Frederick. About 50 soldiers, dressed in full combat, got on two trucks and we went to Fort Frederick. Whilst there, O.C. Mayers and the soldiers had a discussion with the members of the Central Committee

which included General Hudson Austin, Major Ian St. Bernard, Comrade Bernard Coard, Lieutenant Colonel Layne, Lieutenant Colonel Leon Cornwall and other big chiefs.

Lieutenant Colonel Layne said that Comrade Bishop and others had captured Fort Rupert, and to pass on instructions to O.C. Mayers, Lt. Abdullah, and Lt. Nelson to go and recapture Fort Rupert and carry out executions of Comrade Bishop and others immediately after.

Then armoured cars with soldiers dressed in full combat left Fort Frederick. O.C. Mayers was in command of the first armoured car; Lt. Abdullah of the second; and Lt. Nelson, the third. I was standing on the outside of the second with a PKM machine gun; Keith Noel was sitting close to me with an AK gun, and Lt. Abdullah was inside the armoured car.

We arrived at Fort Rupert about 1:20 p.m. and met a large crowd on the bottom square of the fort. When the first armoured car got to the top of the hill, firing started from the crowd; and the first armoured car opened fire on the crowd and on the operations room of the fort. I saw soldiers jumping out from the first armoured car and people started running all about.

Lt. Abdullah, Keith Noel and Vincent Joseph jumped over from the armoured car which I was on and ran towards the fort. The firing lasted for about 15 to 20 minutes and I fired bullets from my gun. I then went to the top square of the fort and I saw Keith Noel and Vincent Joseph on one side of the high wall of the square, and Andy Mitchell who had an AK gun was

standing on another high wall of the square.

I saw a big chief, Lester Redhead, who I also know as "Goat," come out from the building on the above side of the square with an AK gun and said, "Bishop playing bad. I going for his mother **** now."

We went down through the tunnel and came back soon after with Maurice Bishop, Jacqueline Craft, Unison Whiteman, Narria Bain and about four other civilians. They had their hands in the air. "Goat" was walking behind them with an AK gun and Lt. Abdullah was walking behind "Goat" with a sub-machine gun when Comrade Bishop and the others reached the square.

Lt. Abdullah gave them the order to line up and face the wall on the side of the square near to the basketball pole. The people lined up and we told them to take off their shirts. All of the people in the line with the exception of Jacqueline Craft took off their shirts.

Lt. Abdullah was standing about 55 to 60 feet away from the people in the line and I was standing on the right of him. Lt. Abdullah called Andy Mitchell to stand on his left. He then told the people in the line to turn and face him, and they did so.

He told them that he had received an order from the Central Committee that they should be executed immediately and he told them to turn back and face the wall and they did so.

When they turned back and faced the wall, some of them whispered something but I could not hear what they said. Lt. Abdullah told Andy Mitchell and me when he counted to three, we should open fire.



JAIL FOR 3

Three former soldiers received jail terms totalling 450 years. Murder verdicts were returned against Andy Mitchell (top right) — 80 years; Vincent Joseph (bottom) — 45 years; and Cosmos Richardson, 45 years.



on the people in the line. He counted to three and said, "Open fire!"

Keith Noel and Vincent Joseph opened fire from the high wall; and Lt. Abdullah, Andy Mitchell and I opened fire from in the square on the people in the line. Some of them fell backward and some fell sideways. The firing lasted for about three minutes before Lt. Abdullah

gave the command to cease fire.

The bodies were lying in pools of blood and they were burst up Fitzroy Bain's body was still gasping, and "Goat" told Andy Mitchell to finish it off and Mitchell let go a shot in his head. I then went up to the high wall of the square and I saw three soldiers whose names I don't remember wrapping

the bodies in blankets. I left Fort Rupert about 2:30 p.m. and returned to Fort Frederick. — COSMOS RICHARDSON.

I have read the above statement and I have been told that I can correct, alter or add anything I wish. This statement is true. I have made it of my own free will. —

— Cosmos Richardson

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
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BISHOP TAKES OVER

TROUBLE AGAIN



A Gairy supporter is taken in.



MONGOOSE GANG member (extreme left) and others in protective custody.



VICTIM of the bomb blast at Queen's Park, Grenada.



SUPPORT for the new government.

Jewel Movement (NJM), of beatings, of arrests of jail cells and then "Bloody Sunday."

That was November 18, 1973, the climax of the administration's brutal reaction to the popular, reactionary mood in the country. That day saw Bishop and several demonstrators being beaten into unconsciousness in the Grenville police station.

Suffering serious injury, including a dislocated jaw, he like the others, was subjected to the added indignity of having his head shaved with pieces of broken glass while being denied medical attention.

The memories are of Barbados days later and undergoing extensive surgery at the then St. Joseph Hospital.

The memories are of "Bloody Monday", January 21, 1974. Hardly recovered from the injuries, Bishop suffered the trauma of seeing his father, Rupert, gunned down and killed while blocking a doorway of a building where women and children had fled

to escape the violence in the streets.

They are the memories of the continuation of the struggle against the seemingly insurmountable odds in an attempt to end the tyranny and the unabated conflict between the NJM and the Gairy administration right into the general elections of 1976.

The brutality, the broken bones of men, women and children, the deaths, the repressive acts and the evidence of election fraud served to steel, rather than break, the spirits of the NJM and the people of Grenada.

The memories are of the days just passed when Bishop and other members of the NJM leadership, now dubbed communists by Gairy, had gone into hiding as government forces carried out extensive searches of their homes, supposedly for firearms.

They are of the day before when Gairy flew out to Barbados reportedly leaving orders behind for the elimination

of the opposition leadership.

Now, only minutes draw a thin line between the pain of the memories and the joys that could be, in dream for the future.

These dreams are of the creation of new political state in the Caribbean with the ramifications of a Castro's Cuba or a Nyerere's Tanzania.

Bishop himself had always been an admirer of President Julius Nyerere and an advocate of the political system popularized by the Tanzanians.

He had long propagated this system of people's politics for Grenada and insisted Grenadians were ready for a new direction.

FRIDAY, October 14, 1983.

The memories have been supplanted by the dream for five years during which Grenada has been a mirror in the Caribbean, reflecting the revolutionary, socialist dogma of the Kremlin and Havana.

But something has gone

wrong. Today, there is a crack in the mirror as Bishop languishes half-dressed, in a daze. The soles of his feet smarting from the burn of cigarette butts, he is under house arrest and his deputy, Bernard Coard, has been announced as the new leader of the Revolution.

WEDNESDAY, October 19, 1983.

Yet another familiar scene from the same familiar act of the same familiar play is unfolding on the same familiar stage. But, unlike the first scene, there is no tranquility of night here.

The harsh afternoon sun bites into the bruised skin of Bishop as he and another group of followers wait for the minutes to pass.

Their ears ring from the loud explosions caused by ar-

moured cars and the incessant, staccato spewing of machine gun fire; their eyes and noses burn with the gunpowder and dust that's thick in the air around Fort Rupert.

Somewhere, the memories and the dreams rush madly together in one confused nightmare. The shadow of the grim reaper blots out the sun and light suddenly becomes darkness as the bullets tear their frail bodies to pieces. It has ended.

5:30 a.m. Tuesday, October 25.

The savor is lost by the roar of aircraft of the United States military over Grenada, their bellies bursting with American marines and army rangers sandwiched between troops from the six Caribbean nations of Anti-

gua and Barbados, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, St. John, Barbados, Dominica, Jamaica.

The time has come to Eagle to pick the eyes the head of the big Bear; erase both the rises and the dream from the minds of Grenadian who in a new era I troubled too I.

December 3, 1984.

The new era dawns bright, sunny morning Grenadians turn out in nation's first general elections since 1976 and the United People's Party into office under the ship of Herbert Blaize, are fresh memories new dream.



JUBILANT after election results.

26, December 1986, BISHOP TRIAL REPORT

STATEMENTS OF THE ACCUSED

Vain attempt to continue negotiations

I MAKE this statement of my own free will. I have been told that I need not say anything unless I wish to do so and that whatever I say may be given in evidence.

On the night of October 18, the Central Committee of the New Jewel Movement (NJM) decided that in order to solve the crisis in the country over party matters and over Maurice being kept under house arrest, the committee was going to hold reconciliation talks with Maurice.

Basically, the position of the committee was to agree for Maurice to remain leader of the entire process; but all he had to do, was to accept that he made an error in spreading the rumour and putting the country on the brink of violence.

I was to be on the delegation responsible for going to help the negotiations with Maurice. The other members were General Austin and Lieutenant Colonel James. We went and held the meeting with Maurice. He, Maurice, stated that he needed to reflect overnight on the issue and a 50 to speak to George Louison. The meeting finished at 1 a.m. and was to continue the following morning.

On the following morning, we gathered at Comrade Coard's house to brief the Central Committee on how the discussion with Maurice went. Present at the meeting were Comrade Coard, Lieutenant Colonel James, General Austin, Major Cornwall and Major St. Bernard.

While we were there, we saw a crowd of about 300 strong come up to Comrade Bishop's yard demanding the release of Maurice from house arrest. When that happened, I called Fort Frederick and ordered three APCs to come to Comrade Bishop's home. This was so, because I was of the opinion that if the APCs were brought there, the very presence of them would be able to control the scene.

The APCs occupied their positions at Maurice's yard, but then the crowd there was joined by a larger crowd of possibly a thousand strong. This crowd of people, however, were clearly intent on breaking through into Comrade Bishop's yard.

On that occasion, General Austin and I discussed the situation. The position was that the crowd should not be fired on; and that I should go to Maurice's yard and speak to Comrade Bishop asking him to speak to the people. Also, I was to ask him for us to immediately continue negotiations.

However, by the time I reached Maurice's yard, the crowd had already broken through the front gate and was about to break through the second gate.

On seeing this, I gave the order to the APCs in Maurice's yard to fire in the air. This they did.

At first, some people responded; but once they realised that the firing was in the air, a large part of the crowd surged forward and moved to enter Maurice's yard. This they did and moved and released Maurice from house arrest.

My immediate position was that we should all move to Fort Frederick for refuge and from there contact Maurice asking him to continue the negotiations. I went ahead first in order to create proper conditions for refuge for the members of the Central Committee and soldiers who were at Maurice's yard.

This I did. While there, the said comrades arrived. Also while there, O.C. Mayers arrived with about a platoon of men from

Caligny. From Fort Frederick, I observed that a crowd had moved to take over Fort Rupert.

I contacted the comrades at Fort Rupert by telephone and spoke to Major Chris Stroud, who explained to me what had happened — that a crowd had come up to Fort Rupert. The soldiers were given orders not to fire.

The crowd, led by Maurice, had disarmed them all, taken over the operations room; destroyed military documents and abused the female soldiers. That the situation was one of total chaos and that they were afraid for their lives.

I asked the operator then to speak to Unison Whiteman. He came to the phone. I asked him to leave the fort and let us continue negotiations. He said, "No negotiations with any people like you."

I went and raised the situation with the comrades of the Central Committee; but by this time, the situation with the committee members was one of total paralysis. I could see the comrades felt the situation was totally out of hand.

While there, we received a message. Weapons were being distributed at Fort Rupert and orders were being issued by Maurice and Vince Noel to eliminate the whole Central Committee; in particular, General Austin, Comrade Coard and me.

Further, we heard that Major Louison had orders to eliminate all party members who were at Fort Rupert and that the whole

general staff was to be taken hostage and put in front of an assault on the logistic base. After that, there were going to arm the crowd and move to seize Fort Frederick.

It was at this point that I called General Austin outside and put it to him that the only way to save the Revolution and the party was to move to recapture Fort Rupert. And, also for the military to take control for a short period.

I raised it with the general as a military man; because by that time, I realised that it was now a military matter and the Central Committee was totally ineffective.

General Austin, however, was in disagreement, firmly so, as I saw it at the time, fearing firm measures. However, I will say that he allowed me to have my way, recognising the tremendous respect I have amongst the men and that even he was paralysed in this situation. It was from there on I could say that I took over the situation completely. I did so conscious of the responsibility of upholding the Revolution and saving the lives of the soldiers and party members who were at Fort Rupert.

I called O.C. Mayers and gave him instructions as the man to lead the mission; that he and his men had to move to recapture army headquarters. That if there was no resistance, one rocket was to be fired in order to create shock effect; but if, however, there was resistance then there were to battle it out and the leaders were to be

liquidated. Other commanders on the mission were Abdullah, who had the mission to rescue the soldiers and some party comrades in Fort Rupert; and Nelson, the third commander, who was to give general support and to evacuate wounded soldiers.

My understanding is that when the units arrived at Fort Rupert, they were fired on and a battle took place in which four soldiers were killed and quite a number were wounded. Abdullah reported the kill and stated that Maurice and Whiteman were taken. I then told him that he should liquidate them. Later, he reported to me that


the mission had been accomplished.

I reported the situation to General Austin and again stated that the only hope was for the army to take power for a brief period in order to control the situation. It was at this time that I would say he reluctantly agreed to go along.

The members of the Central Committee when told all that had happened, were generally up-

set.

After that, I immediately began to work on a plan for the establishment of the roadblock system and for the general defence of the country.



EWART LAYNE

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FINISH

Louison: Party rift led to murder plot

MAURICE BISHOP TRIAL



A FULL REPORT



GEORGE LOUISON
ACCORDING TO THE prosecution's case, a joint leadership proposal of the New Jewel Movement (NJM) party in September 1983 between late Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and his Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard, was the beginning of the plot to kill Bishop.

Former minister in the Bishop government, George Louison, told the court the late leader was chairman of the party's Central Committee until September of that year until Coard was introduced. He said Central Committee meetings were held at Bishop's home; but after September, were shifted to Fort Rupert, the army headquarters.

He said the first sign of the changes began in August of that year, after Coard and former Deputy Minister of Security, Lieutenant Colonel in the army and Liam James returned from a trip to Suriname.

"On their return, a Central Committee meeting was held from September 13 to 16 to discuss the political situation in Grenada. It was being said that the Revolution was losing support among the masses; that there was growing protest inside of the party and that generally if some immediate and tough measures were not taken, that the Revolution stood chance of collapsing in six months," he said.

Louison said the lieutenant colonel then proposed joint leadership, which he, himself, opposed while other Committee members blamed Bishop for the situation. He said as a result, Coard, who had earlier resigned from the Committee was recalled and instituted the following day as joint leader and to take over as chairman of the Committee.



MEMORIES of comradeship plotting the death of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop (right); and centre the late leader's personal bodyguard Oletus St. Paul who gave vital testimony in the murder hearing.

He pointed out that Bishop did not attend that meeting. The witness then spoke of his visit with Bishop to a number of east European countries and of their return to the island on October 8. He said a new development began at a meeting held on October 12, where it was said that Bishop was spreading a rumour that Coard and his wife, Phyllis, were plotting to kill him. It was stated that

Bishop's personal bodyguard, Oletus St. Paul, was instructed by the late Prime Minister to spread the rumour. Louison said the following day, October 13, former Minister of Mobilisation, Selwyn Strachan, at a party membership meeting, announced that Bishop had been placed under house arrest. He recalled hearing former Lieutenant-Colonel Ewart Layne saying at the meeting that Bishop should be

court-martialed. "Layne spoke essentially on the rumour and what he referred to as Bishop's treachery. I can recall him saying that history had already condemned Maurice Bishop and that he was relieved as leader of the country and leader of the party and that the only thing that was left was whether to court-martial him," he added.

Louison also told the court that six days before Bishop was killed, Coard suggested that the late Prime Minister should probably go to Cuba "and cool it for a few years". He said Coard made the proposal at a special three-day meeting, October 14-16, aimed at solving the boiling crisis while Bishop was kept under house arrest. He said as soon as the meeting began, Lieutenant-Colonel James arrived and spoke of a demonstration being

6 days before Bishop was killed Coard suggested the late prime minister should probably go to Cuba to cool it off

organised by decent trade unionists. Fitz Bain, Coard became frantic at the announcement and said in summary, if there was any such demonstration, that chance for an outlet would have been lost, cause many people have to be locked up."

He noted Unison Whiteman, who was subsequently executed along with Bishop, attended that meeting also; that Strachan was tempting to influence along with Whiteman the position taken by Central Committee place Bishop under house arrest was correct.

Coard also proposed other reasons and said had the support of party and military and for some time, the masses would accept the position taken as correct.

However, Louison said he and Whiteman pointed out to Coard that this had worsened since Bishop's arrest; and that the international community resented Bishop's house arrest. He said Coard responded that the masses demonstrated after some time, it would be forced to work order to get money for food and so on.

The witness told court of trying seven times later to reach Co to hear of his decision, that Coard kept hanging up the phone.

He said on the day before Bishop's execution was arrested by soldier his home and kept in until October 26, the day after the United States intervention to place, when he escaped



BARBADIAN BORN "no nonsense" Commissioner of Prisons, Lionel Maloney

Discipline is Warden Maloney's watchword

ONE PERSON who has been the focal point of controversy throughout the Maurice Bishop murder trial in Barbadian-born Commissioner of Prisons in Grenada, Lionel Maloney.

There has been numerous calls for his removal from the Spice Isle and even in one instance, defence lawyers filed a motion for his imprisonment for allegedly breaching a consent order issued by the Grenada High Court. The 61-year-old prison chief has also been subjected to hostile attacks from those convicted to hang for murdering Bishop and his colleagues.

At one court hearing, former Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard referred to him as a criminal; while others called him a czar only answerable to himself.

But Maloney is unmoved by such charges. Holstered with a gun in one pocket and a copy of the island's prison rules in the other, he says it is the result of the strict disciplinary measures implemented by him at the prison since taking up the assignment almost three years ago. His prime ambition, however, is to continue carrying out his duties in accordance with the prison rules. Having joined the Barbados Prison Service in 1948, Maloney is no stranger to the towering grey walls like those at Richmond Hill Prison. Denouncing the allegations of torture, and of degrading and inhuman treatment of prisoners, he said: "I did not come to crucify any person; my reason for coming to Richmond Hill Prison was to develop it. When I came here the place was in an awful state; a very bad state; just like a brothel. Everyone was doing as he pleased; you couldn't tell the difference between the prison officer and the prisoner — everybody dressed the same way. Prisoners were using indecent language to prison officers and prison officers were afraid to talk to them." A strict disciplinarian, today Maloney is proud about the progress he has made since taking over command of the prison following the 1983 United States-led intervention. Smart uniforms, well-organised programmes and a security cordon that has stood the test of time, the former bodybuilder and weightlifting enthusiast considers his acceptance of the top post as a mission from God.

EXCLUSIVE REPORT

MAURICE BISHOP TRIAL



Torture claims against Bajan policemen formally dismissed

THIS LETTER was sent to the Commissioner of Police of Barbados from the Director of Public Prosecutions, in St. George's, Grenada, on July 3, 1986.

It exonerates the Barbadian detectives sent to investigate the Bishop murder of mal-conduct. The allegations of torture were also dismissed after the accused were examined by a doctor.

Regina vs Andy Mitchell and Others for murder of Maurice Bishop and Others

I AM SURE you are aware that I have no standing at the Bar of Barbados, but I wish, nevertheless, to comment on the investigations in respect of the above mentioned case which was conducted by a team of investigators headed by Inspector Jasper Watson of the Royal Barbados Police Force.

It is a matter of record that I arrived in Grenada on March 15, 1984, (five and-a-half months after Inspector Watson and the rest of the Barbadian police officers and by then, they had completed most of their investigations, recording in excess of 200 statements of witnesses and had interviewed all of

the accused person who were charged for the murders.

Of the 30 persons charged for the several murders, only one was dismissed at the end of the preliminary enquiry and he has since then been committed to stand trial for the offence of plotting the overthrow of the government by armed force (as a result of the same investigations).

During the instant trial — every statement under caution taken by the team led by Inspector Watson that the prosecution endeavoured to have admitted into evidence — both written and oral — has been held to be admissible by the presiding judge, His Lordship, Mr. Justice Denis Byron, the Acting Chief Justice; and every allegation of torture has been dismissed as being totally unsupported by the doctor whom the accused persons alleged attended to them.

In addition to the foregoing, it is my opinion that it should also be known that on only one occasion, and in respect of only one witness, did I consider it necessary to have a personal interview before examining her on oath — and that single instance was due to no fault of the investigators but because the file was tampered with by some unknown person after it was delivered to me by Sergeant Colin Braithwaite who acted as Liaison Officer, at all times, between the investigators and the prosecutors. (My colleagues interviewed two other "key witnesses".)

Having dealt with the extreme competence with which the investigations were handled — I feel obliged also to comment upon the manner in which the officers conducted themselves in the witness box and I therefore say it is expected that when one reaches the rank of sergeant, he ought to be totally at ease in the box as those from your Police Force are.

But in my time at the Bar, I have never seen any other officer of the rank of constable conduct himself as creditably as Police Constable 668, Courcy Holder; whereas Police Constable 177, Peter Boyce, is commended for his forthright answer to the presiding judge when asked to comment on the allegations of the accused that they were tortured.

In conclusion, the highest tribute I can pay to Inspector Jasper Watson and his team is to say that I shall be eternally thankful that they were on our side and that the withdrawal of the defence team may, in part, be due to the hopelessness of their task when viewed in



POLICE INSPECTOR JASPER WATSON: he led the investigations into the murders.

the light of the "all inclusive" investigations that Velma L. Hyllton, QC, were conducted by Inspector Watson and his team. Yours sincerely, Velma L. Hyllton, QC, Director of Public Prosecutions (Acting)



THE NATION was there first when Maurice Bishop led the coup in Grenada.



THE NATION was there first when hurricane David devastated Dominica.

THE NATION was there first when Soufriere erupted in St. Vincent.

A FULL REPORT

Former bodyguard tells of meeting

An evening with the Central Committee

AS THE SAYING GOES, Calistus St. Paul was like Maurice Bishop's shadow. Wherever the late Prime Minister went, be it business or pleasure, his bodyguard was there.

Now a taxi driver plying trade from the island's Point Saline International Airport, St. Paul was Bishop's personal bodyguard up to the time he was murdered at Fort Rupert on October 19, 1983.

At the time of the late Prime Minister's death the former bodyguard was under arrest at Fort Frederick army headquarters after he was accused of being involved in spreading a rumour that former Deputy Prime Minister Bernard Coard and his wife were involved in a plot to kill Bishop.

He told the court that while he was in the fort, members of the Central Committee gathered there. St. Paul said those at the fort included Coard, his wife Phyllis, former army commander, General Hudson Austin, ex-Minister of Mobilisation Selwyn Strachan, and former junior ministers, Lofelia McBarrett and Dave Bartholomew.

Others at were former Ambassador to Cuba, Major Leon Cornwall, trade unionist John Ventour and Lieutenant Colonel Ewart Layne and Liam James.

He said he saw Coard with a pistol strapped to his side and a knife in his hand shortly after he and his wife arrived to attend the Committee meeting. And, that following the meeting, Major Cornwall left the group and went over to address some soldiers who were dressed in battle uniform.

"He (Cornwall) told the soldiers that because of a vicious rumour spread by Maurice

Bishop, counter-revolutionaries and big businessmen seized the opportunity to create trouble, and free Maurice Bishop from house arrest. And as a result, these elements must be liquidated," St. Paul added.

The ex-bodyguard also mentioned having conversations with Ventour and army officer, Cecil Prime, following the recapture of the fort by soldiers. According to him, Ventour responded saying: "Communists do not surrender."

He also spoke of hearing Ventour make reference to the Afghanistan situation, saying the late leader should have remembered it. This was in an apparent reference to the 1979 split in the governing communist party in Afghanistan when radicals toppled moderates in a bloody coup which was followed by a Soviet invasion.

St. Paul said, however, discussions between him and Prime were slightly different. He said when he asked Prime about what occurred at the fort, the ex-army officer said trade unionist, Vincent Noel and Bishop were killed after the army stormed the fort.

"I said to him, 'Prime do you mean that you all kill Maurice Bishop?' He said, 'Yes, it is a Central Committee order,' and he said, 'We had to cut his throat.'"

The witness told the court of seeing a yellow flare over Fort Rupert after the executions and that as soon as the flare became visible, ex-General Austin, who was standing near to him, shouted in a commanding voice that the mission had been accomplished.

NJM a combined force to tackle 'Gairicism'

THE NEW JEWEL MOVEMENT (NJM), formed on March 11, 1973, was born out of a general belief by two young Grenadians that they jointly could provide the necessary security for the masses against the oppression of the Gairy administration.

The coalition worked beautifully, and the leaders, Unison Whiteman and Maurice Bishop, were in become inseparable friends, even up to their executions at Fort Rupert army headquarters.

In 1972, after losing to the Eric Gairy regime in the general elections, Whiteman, who campaigned unsuccessfully, decided the time was right for a more vibrant organisation to tackle Gairicism, thus forming the Jewel Movement (Joint En-

deavour for Welfare, Education and Liberation) The launching of the new party under Whiteman's leadership was held in the rural St. David's parish.

However, around that same time, similar plans were well on their way in the island's capital, St. George's. With Maurice Bishop as leader and including Kendrick Radix, Grenada had another new political party, Movement for Assembly of People (MAP).

One year later, after consultation and accepting that both parties had similar objectives, Bishop and Whiteman became joint co-ordinating secretaries of Grenada's newest political faction, the New Jewel Movement.



IN THE BEGINNING of the New Jewel Movement — their fortunes to vary. (Back row, left to right) Kendrick Radix (survived), Maurice Bishop (murdered), Fitzroy Bain (murdered), Noris Bain (murdered), Unison Whiteman (murdered), Selwyn Strachan (convicted). Sitting in front row, George Louison (survived) and Jacqueline Cress (murdered).

Murder on the square

ONE of the most gruesome accounts of the October 19 killings was told by former woman soldier in the People's Revolutionary Army, Beverley Ann Charles.

She said she saw Lester Redhead slit Maurice Bishop's throat with a knife after he was gunned down by machine-gun fire.

She also told the court of witnessing the same Redhead cut off one of Bishop's fingers to remove a ring. Charles said she was peeping through louvers from an area reserved as barracks for ranked officers when the executions took place at Fort Rupert's army headquarters.

The witness who had only joined the army months before the October killings, spoke of being ordered along with other soldiers to enter a tunnel leading to the fort's top

square. She said on emerging from the tunnel, she saw Bishop and others all facing a wall with their hands in the air.

The young soldier recalled seeing Andy Mitchell, Fabian Gabriel and Cosmes Richardson standing on the square and that on one instance, Mitchell searched deceased Keith Hayling and found a pistol in his waist. Then pointing to the wall where Bishop and the others were, he told Hayling "go and join the criminals."

Charles said following the executions she was ordered to assist with the wrapping of the dead bodies. She spoke of wrapping Bishop's body in a blanket on the top square. Charles said she noticed bullet holes in the waist and one in the back. Also the throat was cut. She also recognised trade unionist, Vincent Noel's body among a pile of corpses where Bishop's body was placed.

The witness also told the court of seeing Hudson Austin, crying the day before the executions. According to her, during a meeting at the fort's mess hall, Austin cried and said: "Maurice make me shame. I am not the man chauffeur. I sure like you all used to see me driving 'go in rally'."

She said also attending the meeting was Leon Cornwall, who told the soldiers that Bishop did not want to accept joint leadership with Bernard Coard; and that George Louison was influencing him not to accept because the people of Grenada would suffer.

Charles said she recognised an uneasiness that day and noticed that a huge picture of Bishop had been removed from the fort.

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MAURICE BISHOP TRIAL



MAURICE BISHOP TRIAL

A FULL REPORT


Eyewitness account of the slayings

WALTER CHARLES, a former security soldier, who was stationed at Fort Rupert on October 19, 1983, said he saw Calistus Bernard personally machine-gun Prime Minister Maurice Bishop to death.



"Abdullah (Bernard) shoot Maurice Bishop in his head with a machine-gun. Maurice fell and was rolling; then Abdullah concentrate fire on him again," he told the court.

He also testified of hearing former Minister of Education, Jacqueline Cress, pleading for her life and saying she was pregnant. But according to him, Cosmes Richardson replied: "No **** pregnant woman in these times."

Charles, who also referred to Vincent Joseph as "Corporal Joe," said Richardson and Joseph, each with mounted machine-guns then pro-



THE TOP SQUARE where Bishop and others were executed by gunfire. At right is the tunnel where the late leader and others made their exit under gunpoint.



A PANORAMIC view of the Richmond Hill Prison.



THE MASS GRAVE where the bodies of Bishop and others were burnt and buried.

ceeded to murder Cress, armed cars arrived from the soldiers to defeat the soldiers."

Suddenly, Charles said, Calistus Bernard appeared on the top square and shouted, "The execution begins. Start." He said Bishop, who was in front of a line of other persons, was the first to be murdered; followed by others who were gunned down by Joseph and Richardson.

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CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING: 1

State of deep crisis

THESE are the edited minutes of an extraordinary meeting of the Central Committee of the New Jewel Movement held on 14-16 September, 1983. Present were Maurice Bishop, Selwyn Strachan, George Louison, Unison Whiteman, Liam James, Chalkie Ventour, Ewart Layne, Phyllis Coard, Leon Cornwall, Kamanu McBurnette, Tan Bartholomew, Fitzroy Bain and Chris DeRiggs.

Those absent were General Hudson Austin, who was out of the country and Commissioner of Police, Major Ian St. Bernard on the sick list.

COMRADE STRACHAN said that the party was then ten years and six months old, yet although they had met on several occasions to look at the work, the problem was that there had been a constant struggle to get the work done. He did not know how long this thing would continue for.

The situation the party faced was even at the level of applicants. It was clear that a rebellion had started. He said it could burst out if it was not solved in a serious way. This was because the Central Committee had not lived up to expectations.

There was a lot of confusion and unclarity, comrades were complaining that a large percentage of the party was not working, comrades were complaining of being over-burdened. The party did not give any attention to the economic and social problem of its members.

Comrades had not internalised the channels for communications and use them even when some of their problems were solved the party did not doublecheck to ensure.

There was no system to assess the performance of the Central Committee members. The Central Committee was very far from the general membership and the D.C. was not playing its role. It helped to demoralise comrades. A hard look must be taken as to how the D.C. must function.

The weekend seminars had shown that there was potential for building a serious Marxist-Leninist party. The seminars brought out both the positive and negative sides of comrades. However, the negative sides were given too much weight. The last rounds of the seminar showed a qualitative difference in comrades discipline. There was an incredible level of thought and participation; these things were happening at the same time when complaints were coming up.

The level of attention to internal party development was not given as needed. They accepted this in principle, but in practice they had been different. The problem they faced was in the style and method of their work. He said that a very high level of complicity existed at the level of the Central Committee. He pointed to the October crisis when the Central Committee met and took a number of decisions to take the party out of the rut. Comrades began to attend studies on time, prepared and attended meetings on time. However, the fundamental issues were placed aside.

Central Committee com-

rades had not been taking a global look at the work, instead they only emphasised their narrow area of work. He said that they were maintaining the revolution and not leading it. Their style of work showed a tendency to platformism as opposed to doing the hard slogging work.

He also referred to the points made in the Fedon group seminar to characterise the party. Busy, busy action, temporisation and vacillation in taking hard decisions was evident in the Central Committee and more to Political Bureau.

He said that in his view a great majority of comrades loved the party and expressed a willingness to work in the party but were not aware of what they should do.

He said that the Central Committee had not tried to appreciate the problems that comrades experienced from time to time. He said that comrades had used the rules as a form of resistance — referring to the number of holiday leaves, excuse from community work and so on.

He said that if they agreed that the role of the party was to build the Revolution and if they believed that a Marxist-Leninist party could build what they wanted then they had to put the party on a Marxist-Leninist footing. He questioned whether they wanted to build socialism or just chant slogans. "Do we have a vision of the future?" he asked.

MAURICE BISHOP TRIAL



EXCLUSIVE REPORT

Broad conclusions proposed by Comrade Maurice Bishop

- (1) There is a state of deep crisis in the party and Revolution;
- (2) The main reason for these weaknesses is the functioning of the Central Committee;
- (3) The crisis has also become a major contributing factor to the crisis in the country and Revolution and the low mood of the masses; and
- (4) The crisis has also been compounded by the weaknesses in the material base, electrical blackouts, bad roads, retrenchments and job as an issue.

To correct this situation the following must be done:

- (1) Find methods of improving the work and individual and collective leadership of the Central Committee;
- (2) The need to develop a perspective based on Marxist-Leninist criteria to guide the work in the coming period;
- (3) Urgently find creative ways of deepening the links with and work among the masses;
- (4) To establish meaningful channels of communications between the leadership and the membership and to formally rationalise the work

among party comrades, bearing in mind the groundswell of complaints of overwork and lack of inner party democracy; and

(5) The Central Committee to develop structures for accountability, bearing in mind that comrades are now demanding accounts from the party.

COMRADE LIAM JAMES, leading off, said that this was the last chance for the Central Committee to pull the party out of the crisis and onto a firm Marxist-Leninist path. This crisis was not only among the masses but in the party membership as well, he said.

Within the Central Committee there were many problems. All comrades must be criticised for the levels of disorganisation, low ideological level and failure to put the party on a firm Marxist-Leninist footing. These weaknesses were so evident that party comrades were saying that certain comrades must be chopped from the Central Committee. It was clear that party comrades had lost their level of respect for the Central Committee.

The removal of comrades from the Central Committee would in no way solve the problem, in his view. All the comrades of the Central Commit-

tee were by far the best comrades in the party. What was needed, he said, was firm Leninism.

He pointed out that the most fundamental problem was the quality of leadership of the Central Committee and the party provided by Comrade Maurice Bishop. In this view, the comrade had great strength, his ability to inspire and develop comrades, his ability to raise the regional and international respect for the party and Revolution; he had the charisma to build the confidence of the people both in and out of the country, and to put forward clearly the positions of the party.

Today, these strengths alone could not put the party any further in this period. The qualities he lacked that were needed to push the Revolution forward at this time were:

- (1) A Leninist level of organisation and discipline;
- (2) Great depth in ideological clarity; and
- (3) Brilliance in strategy and tactics. These qualities which were essential for Marxist-Leninist leadership had proved to be lacking in the comrade at this time.

COMRADE LAYNE said that based on all analysis, discussions and on conclusions, it was quite clear that the Central Committee had not been able to give ideological leadership to the process. If they were to be honest and frank throughout the crisis (they were going through) more and more comrades (were) coming to realise that they faced a real possibility of the Revolution being turned back.

It was clear that Comrade Bishop lacked these qualities put forward by Comrade James. Despite his strengths, the strengths that he lacked were vitally needed to steer the Revolution off the dangers and to come out of the crisis. The salvation of the Revolution cal-

led for them to take a mature proletarian decision to save and carry the Revolution forward.

COMRADE VENTOUR agreed with the two comrades that the type of leadership that was necessary to pull them out of the crisis was lacking in the Comrade Leader. These criticisms were made to him on more than one occasion which he accepted. He showed that he did not have the quality to put the party on a firm Marxist-Leninist footing.

He also criticised the Central Committee for not criticising the Comrade for areas of work, for example armed forces and propaganda. However, he thought that the main fetter was that the comrade did not have these qualities.

COMRADE CORNWELL agreed with all the comrades who had spoken so far. He agreed that the root cause was the Central Committee. For quite some time, they had been seeing the problem. The chairmanship and leadership of the Central Committee appeared very weak. He said that there were great strengths in the Comrade Leader that had carried the process; but as the complexities grew these qualities alone were proving inadequate.

He also added that the Comrade Leader's ability to supervise and stay on top of the work was also lacking. These weaknesses created a fetter on how they organised to carry the work forward. Instead they moved from one crisis to another and the frequency of crises becoming more and more.

If they failed to transform the party they would lose state power, lives would be lost. History had placed a great responsibility on their shoulders which they must seek to haul with in the correct and scientific way, he said.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING: 2

'More indepth studies needed'

COMRADE DeRIGGS said that he had been giving the work some deep thought over the past months. He agreed that the situation was favourable for counter-revolution at that time, state power could be easily overthrown. The low mood of the party and the masses was also very clear to him. He said that the Central Committee had failed to match up ideologically to the situation. The removal of any comrade on the Central Committee would not help this situation.

The main problem was the question of leadership, he said. There was immediate need for the reorganisation of the Central Committee in order to rebuild the confidence of the membership and masses in the party in solving this problem. The interest of the party and Revolution must be taken first. He pointed out that he agreed with all the points made by Comrade James.

COMRADE BARTHOLOMEW agreed with what he called very frank and open analysis by the comrades. He said that he had never realised any criticism of the Central Committee and leadership though he was dissatisfied with the quality of the leadership.

He agreed with all the points made on the strengths of the Comrade Leader. He continued to say that his weaknesses were known all the while, but comrades were hesitant to raise them. Though he had accepted earlier criticisms of this, he had never fulfilled them in practice. The quality of the Central Committee had deteriorated very badly. There was too much vacillation by the Comrade Leader.

COMRADE KAMAU said that since the last Central Committee meeting, he had been giving deep thought to the work of the Central Committee. Overall the Central Committee was very weak, disorganised and haphazard in its approach to the work. His personal work was still disorganised and weak; which was true to say of most Central Committee comrades. There was also a serious absence of deep thought and study. He said that the Comrade Leader had shown great strengths and remained in the positive qualities mentioned by Comrade James.

However, the main problem remained the role of Comrade Bishop as the leader of the Central Committee. He said that the Central Committee continued to be loose and disorganised and unfocused. He said that the Comrade Leader lacked the quality to lead the Central Committee as spelled out by Comrade James. He agreed that removal of comrades from the Central Committee could not solve the problem until they dealt with the question of leadership of the Central Committee.

SISTER PHYLIS COARD commented that when she read the minutes of the Central Committee in July she was very shocked. From the beginning of the year, she had begun to prepare herself more for study though she had not been doing broad reading. However, she felt that the Central Committee could not move forward unless it was involved in more in-depth studies. As things began to get more complex, the Central Committee had not met seriously to deal with the fundamental problems and in the absence of the Central Committee, the Political Bureau had not done any better.

She said that neither the Political Bureau nor the Central Committee had analysed these fundamental questions that was why these problems existed to that day, and even when it was done it was limited and vacillation followed.

She agreed that the leaders of the party had failed to provide the necessary leadership to the party. She commented that the main problem of the Central Committee was idealism, voluntarism, failure to face up to hard decisions, illness as a result of psychological pressures. In this context, the Comrade Leader had not taken the responsibility, nor given the necessary guidance. Even in areas where he was directly in charge of the guidance he was not adequate.

He was disorganised very often, avoided responsibility for dealing with critical areas of work. She criticised the Central Committee for not criticising him in the past. Some time ago he pointed out that he was not capable, but the Central Committee ignored him. Some comrades were scared to criticise him because he had been hostile to criticism.

They also needed to consider whether the Central Committee would be stronger or weaker if comrades were chopped. In her view, it would be weaker. She agreed to changes in the composition of the Central Committee. She concluded that the Central Committee would have to take the hard decisions that would improve the quality and levels of the Central Committee in terms of ideological and organisational directions.

COMRADE BAIN said that the analysis was difficult for him in the given circumstances, of problems in work, health and a number of comrades being out of the country. The ideological levels of the Central Committee was definitely a great concern.

FORMER Minister of Foreign Affairs, Unison Whiteman.

He said that another feature was that they came up with hasty decisions as a result of premature thinking. He agreed with the points made by Comrade James and added that it was greater demanding the leader to give more guidance to the process at that time.

COMRADE LOUISON said that the one problem was the quality of leadership given the process by Comrade Bishop. He lost focus and spent too much time on details. The points made by Comrade James and Cornwall had really crystallised the problem which they had to find ways and means of solving. He said though that the Central Committee had not been able to assist the comrade in developing these strengths.

COMRADE STRACHAN said that one of the most striking things was that he never heard any member of the Central Committee ask for a report from the Political Bureau on its week-to-week functioning. The Political Bureau was a committee of the Central Committee and at no time was a report submitted. The Central Committee comrades did not get any minutes or report from the Political Bureau. This was very serious, because the Political Bureau was left to do their own thing.

they now had to take the responsibility of demanding higher qualities from the Comrade Leader. The comrades should have dealt with him every time he slipped in the past. He recognised Bishop's brilliance but agreed that this was not enough to carry the process forward and to build a serious Marxist-Leninist party.

COMRADE UNISON WHITEMAN said the weaknesses mentioned of the Comrade Leader were correct. Since October, there had been some improvements in scheduling and study but those improvements were not fundamental enough. He said that the Comrade Leader had not set enough time to the fundamental, but they had to be careful that they did not shift too much blame from the Central Committee collectively. They needed to have a commitment on the Central Committee to new norms, prioritisation, greater reflection, better style of work. We have to build up comrades, for example, Comrade Leader. They had to insist on higher standards from him which he was capable of.

COMRADE LEADER thanked the comrades for their frankness in their criticisms. He said that comrades in the past had given serious thought to the question of leadership and failed to raise it for diplomatic reasons which was not good. He was dissatisfied over the fact that Central Committee comrades had not raised these points before with him frankly, though a couple non-Central Committee (members) had done it.

He picked up an overwhelming sentiment that the qualities required were not possessed in him. He agreed that the points were correct, especially correct application of strategy and tactics which could not be achieved except the other qualities are fulfilled. He had found difficulties finding relevant material to study the questions of the functioning of the Political Bureau and Central Committee which reflected a weakness. He didn't think that he had given adequate leadership to bodies.

He had several problems over the years, especially the style that entailed consensus and unity at all costs, which could result in blunting class struggle. He had tried to keep a certain kind of relationship with comrades even though it was not what it used to be before.

He also questioned his approach as regards to collective leadership, he said that there was not enough participation and discussions. Too many decisions were taken by smaller and smaller organs which affected collective leadership.

On the question of crisis and problems, it was correct as the maximum leader to take the full responsibilities. He needed time to think of his own role and to give a more precise response to the problem addressed which he thought was a correct approach.

The role of the Central Committee

COMRADE BISHOP said that on many occasions they had tried to look at the role of the Central Committee. He referred to the documents of June '81 and subsequent minutes of the Central Committee that dealt with its role.

He proposed that the Central Committee move to meetings once per month and to have three wholistic plenaries each year. He said that the monthly meetings must be seen as a

MAURICE BISHOP TRIAL



EXCLUSIVE REPORT

medium of analysis, exchanging information of various sections, and preschedules should cover special areas of party and state work.

Also getting to the party guidelines on major issues, ensuring conclusion and solutions were drawn up after their deliberation and be circulated to the membership.

To develop and maintain links with the masses the leadership must personally get on the ground among the people, step up participation in zonal and parish councils, visits school, monitor and push production.

The role of the Central Committee must be worked out in this regard; develop mechanisms for accountability, and to review constant feedback from the membership and to ensure channels of communications with them.

The Central Committee must do a constant evaluation of the progress made by members, receive reports from the Central Committee on their rationalisation of the work, prioritise the work of comrades on the Central Committee and set targets to be achieved on a weekly, monthly and yearly basis.

COMRADE KAMAU MCBARNETTE said that the Central Committee needed to explain the criterion for membership on the Central Committee and by what mechanism the comrades' work on the Central Committee was judged; ensure the right atmosphere for free and frank discussions. The party must be honest and frank with its members and for the last time, it should explain the truth about Comrade Radio.

COMRADE LEON CORNWALL said that the Central Committee must have a perspective on its role. They needed to work out the framework for the kind of party they would like to build so when comrades were recruited, they would know what structure they must put them in.

They also needed to start working on a party constitution in a concrete way. They must develop commission for different areas of work. These were concepts that they needed to start. The work on how they were going to build people's power. A conference should be set up to look at this submission from the commissions to make decisions and develop the line of march.

CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING: 3

Roles of leaders defined

COMRADE LAYNE said that he shared the views of Comrade Cornwall. He said that the crisis could not be solved immediately. There were a number of fundamental questions that the party needed to look at over a period of time.

The party had a very unscientific approach to the work. We rushed to do things without deep analysis which further push us into problems.

He said that the struggle for socialism was won, lost or divided in the army. The party must now be organised in the workplaces. Comrades with state posts must be prepared to carry out the lines of the party in the workplaces.

We had experience in mobilising the masses; but we did not know how to build the party. We had to lay the basis for taking a strategic approach for the building of a Marxist-Leninist party, learning from the experiences of other parties.

COMRADE JAMES agreed

Continued on page 33

two comrades.
Comrade Maurice Bishop
(i) Direct work among the masses, focus on production and propaganda;
(ii) Particular attention to the organs of popular democracy, working class, youth masses, visits to urban and rural workplaces;
(iii) Militia mobilisation;
(iv) Regional and international work.
Comrade Bernard Coard
(i) Party organisation work;
(ii) Chairman of the O.C.
(iii) Party organisational development and formulation of comrades.
(iv) Strategy and tactics.
The Central Committee must make decisions sought by the masses.
The Political Bureau should be chaired by Comrade Coard. Both comrades would be quarterly reports to the Central Committee for review. A membership must be told this decision.
COMRADE DERIGGS commended on the brilliance of the contributions of Comrades Coard, James and Cornwall. He supported their position. He proposed that:
(1) Comrade George

Louison be placed to head the St. Andrew's work while maintaining the teachers, farmers and the Ministry of Agriculture work.
(2) Comrade Strachan to head C.P.E. and propaganda work.
(3) Comrade Bartholomew responsible for youth and St. Patrick's.
(4) Comrade Austin — Construction.
(5) Comrade Layne — Chief of the Armed Forces, with Comrade Cornwall chief of political and academic work.
(6) Comrade Whitman, Foreign Affairs and Chief of IRD of the party.
(7) Fitzroy Bain — Rural workers' work.
(8) Comrade Chalkie Ventour — Urban working class.
(9) Sister Phyllis Coard, St. George's and PCB and NWO.
(10) Comrade St. Bernard, West Coast and Carriacou.
(11) Comrade McBarrette, St. David's PCB.
(12) Comrade DeRiggs — Health.
(13) Comrade Liam James — Ministry of Interior.
COMRADE VENTOUR agreed with Comrade Coard's position on the Central Committee. He proposed that Comrade Strachan remain as deputy chairman of the O.C. He did not agree with the position on Hudson Austin, because he felt that there was great admiration and respect for the comrade in the armed forces. However, he should also retain his position in construction.
COMRADE MCBARNETTE agreed with the positions of the comrades, he complimented Comrades Cornwall, Layne and James for the depth of their contribution. He took the opportunity to put out his interest in propaganda work.
COMRADE LAYNE agreed with the position of Comrade Coard's return to the Central Committee and Political Bureau. He said that Comrade Bishop's qualities were still necessary, but as Comrade James said, these qualities could not push the process forward.
The only comrade who had these qualities was Comrade Bernard Coard; and if one looked at the situation in practice, he had been giving ideological and organisational leadership, and elaborating strategy and tactics even outside of the Central Committee.
The reason why these qualities were lacking on the Central Committee and Political Bureau was because Comrade Coard had been out of the party's leadership. He sees Comrade James model as the best hope of pulling the party out of the crisis. He also felt that Comrade Austin should remain in the army because of his qualities and prestige there.
COMRADE JAMES said that his proposals in first of all to deal with the problem that we faced. His view was that the fullest proletarian-type support of the Central Committee could help the Comrade Leader in developing these qualities.
Comrade Bernard was the only comrade that had the necessary qualities to merge with the Comrade Leader's strength for leading the process at that time.
Comrade Layne and Cornwall, we all agreed that the army was in a state of rut and demoralisation, along with a serious ideological drift. The army needs at this time Leninist leadership in the Comrade Layne and the political and academic work in that of Comrade Cornwall.
COMRADE BARTHOLOMEW said that he was very frightened of the level of ideological drift in the army. Comrades were saying that we were talking of imperialism too much, when there were so much problems in the camps. Ministers were buying new cars when soldiers could not get food to eat. They were also saying that the army was a bourgeois army.
He also agreed that Comrade Louison should be sent to do political work in St. Andrew's because of the problems in the parish and the importance of having a political bureau there. He should remain in NYO and St. Patrick's. He said that he is not capable of handling CPE.
He agreed that Comrade Coard should be back on the Central Committee and Political Bureau in a process of joint leadership.
He expressed his concern on the Ministry of Interior. He said that area was very critical in this period. Comrade James as leader should not be allowed to travel because of the need to sit on top of the work.
This excessive travelling does not allow him to effectively supervise the work. Political Bureau should be circulated to the Central Committee because the Central Committee was overall responsible for the work.
Comrade Cornwall said that we have two outstanding comrades in our party, Comrades Bishop and Coard. We have suffered because of the absence of Comrade Coard in the leadership, what is proposed is joint leadership with specific responsibilities and tasks.
He had no problem with the points raised by Comrade George but not as reasons to solve the fundamental problem in the party, therefore he strongly supported the points made by Comrade James.
He would need to give this more thought.
He was in agreement that the Central Committee and Political Bureau had suffered from the absence of Comrade Coard. He also was apprehensive as to how Comrade Coard was going to accept the formula. He said that some structures should be put in place to allow Comrade Layne to complete his course.
He was willing to move forward.
He agreed that the minutes must be brought to full membership. He pointed out that the criticisms had not shattered his confidence in the Comrade Leader. He said that we need to ensure what this type of criticism was applied to everyone of the Central Committee. If the idea of no confidence in Bishop gained credence, it would degenerate the Central Committee.
TAN BARTHOLOMEW said that it took a lot of guts for him to make his points. He thought that the Central Committee had very great respect for Comrade Bishop, there was no doubt that the Comrade would remain Prime Minister in the country. He agreed that the minutes should be studied by the membership. They could not convey the impression that there was a leadership problem. The most important thing was how the comrades got along.
COMRADE VENTOUR agreed with the view that joint leadership could work and would work. It was important to give the minutes to the membership because they had accused the Central Committee of being dishonest. He agreed with points made by comrades on the vote of no confidence, both the comrade's strength and weakness were pointed out, and pointed to a great way forward. He pointed out that Tan and Kamau spoke openly for the first time, commenting that such an attitude could make them become timid once again.
SISTER PHYLIS suggested two separate meetings to announce to the membership, one for M's and C.M's and one for applicants.
COMRADE LOUISON said that the more the discussions were stretched out at theoretical and tactical levels the more he became worried. He said that comrades of the party were analysed into three sections — those who could be moulded into communists; those who have to further develop and those who are weak. On this basis, he could not see the minutes into the hands of all cross-sections of the party. He proposed that a summary of the main points should be brought to the first two questions: (1) How are we willing to accept our own weaknesses and deal with them? (2) How much

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CENTRAL COMMITTEE MEETING: 4

Call for tactical strategy

SISTER PHYLIS COARD expressed her agreement with Comrade DeRiggs except on the point of Comrade Austin, Comrade Coard as Deputy Chief of the O.C. and responsible for CPE — was happy to that Comrade Coard had considerable health as a result of political work because health was a social programme out which the masses could be mobilised.
She predicted that when the international airport was not there would be serious demoralisation and counter-revolution in St. Andrew's as a result.
She supported the idea of Comrade Louison being placed to in the parish. She also pointed to the split in the PPU office in order to emphasise this need and the fact that the nation was built on the alliance of workers and peasants. She said that there were no comrades in the party who could do it. Comrade Louison was capable of it in St. Andrew's.
She also agreed that both Comrades Layne and Cornwall should begin to function immediately in the army. It was clear the soldiers were disaffected. The party should be blamed that had happened to Comrade Pogo in Cuba.
She suggested that measures should be taken to limit Central Committee comrades' travelling. Comrades who could adequately represent the party should be identified for the purpose.
COMRADE LOUISON said that the decision regarding Comrades Layne and Cornwall would be hard to sell to the masses, they would not be convinced and it would give a note of instability. On Cuba, he felt it was a mistake that would be strain relations between the two countries.
He didn't see joint leadership as a solution to the fundamental problem. He could not see the theoretical basis for it, was not sufficiently convinced that it could work and would help to develop the strengths in the Comrade Leader.
If they were convinced that he was not developing despite attempts to help him, then they would have to remove him from his best efforts and his best intentions.
COMRADE WHITEMAN addressing the army problems that they had to find a moderate increase of salary for the army and a food aid package at the end of every month for the army. He believed that no amount of political work could



ST. BERNARD

move them without the material aid.
COMRADE DEIRIGGS, reflecting on the points made by Comrade Louison, said that St. Andrew's represented a multiplicity of problems. All programmes there were the weakest in the country. It was possible that the people of St. Andrew's could be a constant resistance to the revolution. The extent of the rule was deep, pointing to the problems of youth and marijuana smoking in the parish.
He was not arguing that the state enterprises' work was more important than St. Andrew's, but at that point in time it was critical and urgent for the party to resume control of the situation.
The proposal of joint leadership was to solve the problem that existed. The collective management and the Comrade Leader's personal efforts would solve his problem. Collective leadership was important and critical.
COMRADE LIAM JAMES, for the purpose of Comrade Hudson Austin who attended the meeting on the 15th because of flight problems, went on to explain all his reasons for his proposals on joint leadership basically making all the points he had made earlier in the meeting. He said that if they failed to take these measures they would be guilty of right opportunism. He did not see why Central Committee members should run away from reality.
On the question of joint leadership he also remained very firm because of the situation that they faced. He referred to Nicaragua, saying that a situation of joint leadership came about because of the objective situation they faced. Their own

MAURICE BISHOP TRIAL

EXCLUSIVE REPORT

situation required tactical objective strategy.
He also addressed the Cuban ambassador's problems saying that because of the problem they face they must explain their problems to their fraternal parties because they already knew the problems being experienced. If they did not, they would see them as jokers. The problem of their fraternal parties' accusing them of instability would be solved if they explained things to these comrades.
COMRADE LAYNE highlighted Sister Phyllis' point on the problems that would develop in St. Andrew's after the International Airport was completed.
The work in this parish was a strategic action from all points of view. He went on to say that all the problems in this country could not be solved immediately.
The strength of their country was in the economy. Their international prestige was because of their economic performance. Therefore, St. Andrew's work was both strategic and immediate because, according to Sister Phyllis, they would face a problem of counter-revolution any time.
On the question of joint leadership, he said that the start point was the concrete situation they faced. They did not have a Marxist-Leninist party or a Leninist Central Committee. The situation existed when Comrade Coard led in strategy, organisation and strategy and tactics for years.
All parties must be able to work out the political line. This was absent in their party because of the absence of Comrade Coard. The had to be able to organise the party and masses in order to develop a political line.
Comrade Bishop was the best person to inspire the masses on the line of the party. In this situation the Central Committee was called upon to accept what was the reality.
COMRADE BISHOP complimented Comrades Layne and Cornwall for their contributions which reflected ideological growth. He said his honest view was that the party must utilise all strengths and talents of comrades in the party. The great strength of comrades, the greater responsibility that would be given to them. Leadership, power, authority and prestige that goes with leadership goes with rights.
He had never had any problem with shared power, or even shared attitude to criticisms. He had worked with Comrade Bernard over the years from school days. They shared a lot of

Continued on page 34

From page 33

policy decisions, they both wrote the manifesto, the peoples congress indictment of Carty.
He referred to 1977 when Comrade Bernard was accused for aggressiveness and wanting to grab power, he had defended him. His position was that he or anybody had the right to be leader for life. He favoured cooperation over competition.
He felt that Bernard could come back to the Political Bureau because of his skills and intelligence. Comrade James' breakdown of responsibility was very useful. However, his concern was the operationalisation of strategy and tactics.
His own idea of his role fell into what Comrade James had outlined. He felt that school visits should have been included under his responsibilities.
He would like to know what was Comrade Bernard's view of the situation and his response. If he did not agree what would be the views of the Central Committee? He needed to get some answers on the operationalisation.
They had to decide how they would articulate this to the party and masses, of which a clear position must be drawn up. His personal concerns were: image of leadership, power struggle, imminent collapse of the Revolution.
The formation of comrades' criticisms had indicated a clear note of no confidence. He said that there was a two-way flow. He could not inspire the masses when he had to look over his back or feel that he did not have the full confidence of the comrades.
He agreed that Comrade Louison should go to St. Andrew's then to experiment in the State Enterprise Ministry. Comrade Austin must be a main in the army. He agreed with Comrade

Bishop's 'position' on leadership

Central Committee meeting

AT A SPECIAL MEETING of the Central Committee Maurice Bishop was bitterly criticised by a majority of those in attendance.

He sought to explain his position and admitted that his style of leadership had led to vacillation and indecision.

He made the point that his style of leadership called for consensus and that may have been an error.

Here are edited extracts from his speech taken from minutes of a meeting held on Sunday, September 25, 1983.

COMRADE BISHOP, in response, said that he assumed that the Central Committee would explain his position to the general meeting. He added that the discussions in the Central Committee (CC) plenary had raised concerns to him.

When stripped bare and until he has completed his reflections, then he can face the meeting with a clear conscience. He is now relatively confused and emotional. There are several things that concern him and thus require a lot of mature reflection.

He said that he shared the basic CC conclusion on the crisis in the country, and party and that the source of the crisis lies in the CC. He added that he firmly believes that the

MAURICE BISHOP TRIAL

A FULL REPORT

more authority and power one has, then the greater the responsibility for failures belongs to that person.

He pointed out that the concept of joint leadership does not bother him because of the history of the struggle, especially from the 1973 merger which gave rise to NJM.

He said that many comrades had criticised him in relation to his acceptance of joint leadership in the past in the form of joint coordinating secretaries.

However, the masses have their own conception and perception that may not necessarily be like ours, who study the science.

Our history shows that the masses build up a personality cult around a single individual. He admitted that his style of leadership has led to vacillation and indecisiveness in many cases.

He confessed that maybe his conception of


leadership is idealistic because of the historical abuse of power and one-man leadership. He and his contemporaries have distaste for one-man leadership and he has a strong position on this.

He further pointed out that his style of leadership is an error since it calls for consensus, unity at all costs and this causes vacillation. And he is not sure that he has overcome this.

Secondly, he said that he feels strongly that the party must have a clear position on areas of demarcation of responsibility and systems of accountability. He is of the view that some comrades held strong reservations and they should have raised them in an open and principled way. He said that if they held them for long and then suddenly sprung them then there must be need for reflection.

He informed the G.M. that in the July CC plenary there was assessment

MAURICE BISHOP



held and many points now being made about him that were not made then. He stated that he is always open to criticism but he should have been approached first before the meeting so he would be able to work out a clear and cogent response.

He went on to say that there is a fine line separating a petit bourgeois and a scientific response. He felt that if he had those conclusions on a member he would have consulted them before, although this may not be a scientific position.

He also said that he is concerned about the minutes being given to the meeting. If minutes are given which show what each member of the CC has said, it can develop ideas of grouping and factions and vacillations in the CC.

He was afraid that it would eventually reach the masses and reaction would thus undermine the revolution and give rise to suspicion and a power struggle in the CC.

He said that if we are to rebuild links with the masses, then by solving the problems, by being frank, it would undermine the confidence of the leadership. He said this clearly and does not understand why other CC members cannot see this.

He pointed out that in the past the CC has de-

cided on not communicating sensitive matters of defence. He said that at the emergency CC meeting a large part of the meeting was spent discussing whether Comrade Valdon Boldeau, the CC recording secretary, should be present at the extra-ordinary CC plenary.

At the emergency CC meeting some comrades had apprehension but now two weeks later, they have no apprehension in giving the minutes to the G.M.

He then said that he is concerned about what is the real meeting of the CC's position. He is having horrors. It is what he is thinking of, then he does not see himself as being on the CC or on the CC as a leader.

He said that the CC pointed out that his strengths were the ability to agitate the masses, to articulate the position of the party and government to the masses and to hold high the banner of the revolution in the region and internationally; and his weaknesses were lack of Leninist level of organisation and discipline, brilliance in strategy and tactics and all that has been said.

But the CC said that precisely these qualities he lacks are those required to carry the revolution forward because

these he has can't take further. Thus his strengths and two corners are to be muddled together. He is suspicious that comrades have concluded that the party must be transformed into a Marxist-Leninist party and thus he the wrong person for leadership.

He can't accept the compromise, it is unprincipled. He explained that for him to put out his strengths it must be as result of a deep conviction for the poor as working people and out a feeling of confidence from the CC.

He is not satisfied because the totality of pain made is putting him in direction he is trying to run from. It is not leadership but a compromise in the interim.

"What is the genuine substantial preference the comrades?" he asked Comrade Bishop went on to say that only he can solve the problem he now facing because an assistance and talk about this not being a case of no confidence, will be seen by him as tactical. He further said that he is considering the option of withdrawal from the P.B. and CC but has not yet resolved this.

Therefore, the CC as the vanguard of the party has a duty to meet in his absence and come up with clear conclusions on how to come out of the crisis. He stated that the CC should not wait for him because supposing after his reflection he decides to withdraw, then many vital weeks would have been lost.

His only concern he stated is about certain areas in the report that concerns him about his role in the future, but the CC should go ahead and meet and whatever line is taken can be communicated to him.

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A FULL REPORT

MAURICE BISHOP TRIAL



NORRIS BAIN — Age 53 — Minister of Housing. Has been civil servant since 1956, specialising in agriculture and forestry.

Well-known and respected especially in the parish of St. Andrew's, he was known as someone who assisted the underprivileged and as a businessman, sponsored numerous cultural and sporting events.

He had belonged to the Grenada National Party, a conservative styled party, Washington, United States. Whitehead served for two years as Minister of Agriculture and Tourism before being made Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1978. Bain joined Bishop's then opposition party. He first served as Minister of Health and Housing and later was named as Minister of Housing alone.



UNISON WHITEMAN — Age 43 — Minister of Foreign Affairs. He belonged with Maurice Bishop and Kenneth Redix, helped to form the New Jewel Movement in 1979.

Born in the rural parish of St. David's, he studied at the University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad. He served as Minister of Agriculture and Tourism before being made Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1978. Bain joined Bishop's then opposition party. He first served as Minister of Health and Housing and later was named as Minister of Housing alone.

NJM members who paid with their lives



JACQUELINE CREFT — Age 36 — Minister of Education. Born in November 1947, after receiving her early education in Barbados, she attended the University of the West Indies, St. Augustine, Trinidad.

During the revolution, she was actively involved in the struggle for social and economic change. She was a member of the Barbados Workers' Union and was first vice president of the Barbados United Front.



VINCENT NOBLE — Age 40 — Minister of Industries, Commerce and Labour. He was a prominent member of the Barbados Workers' Union and was first vice president of the Barbados United Front.

During the revolution, he was actively involved in the struggle for social and economic change. He was a member of the Barbados Workers' Union and was first vice president of the Barbados United Front.



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Missing persons

THESE WERE the Missing Persons listed in the Grenadian Voice on December 3, 1983: **Joseph Desnoish**, 38, PRA soldier, last seen on October 25, 1983; **Simon Alexander**, 15, student, last seen on October 19, 1983; **Ellen**, 27, PRA, last seen on October 19, 1983; **Thomas**, 27, PRA, last seen on October 19, 1983; **Smith**, 80, unemployed, last seen on October 24, 1983; **Joy Mitchell**, 22, PRA soldier, last seen at the Richmond Hotel, last seen on October 25, 1983; **Anthony Jeremiah**, 26, employed at the Mirabeau Farm, last seen on October 25, 1983; **Keith Hayling**, 31, manager of the Marketing Pensions, last seen in 1981; **Robert**, last seen in 1981; **Bugane**, last seen in 1981; **Cadet**, 22, soldier at Cally, last seen in 1981; **William**, 24, unemployed, last seen in 1983; **Raphael**, 24, unemployed, last seen in 1983; **Michael Charles**, 22, PRA soldier, last seen in 1983; **John Joseph**, 60, two weeks before the death of Maurice Bishop, last seen on October 19, 1983; **Sebastian Alexander**, 19, October 15, 1983.

... And what others thought about it

AT THE TIME when a decision was taken to have joint leadership in the People's Revolutionary Government, several members of the Central Committee were critical of Maurice Bishop.

The following excerpts taken from the minutes of the Central Committee indicate the level of criticism made against Bishop.

KEITH ROBERTS: Bishop must accept criticism as a principle. It is his duty.

tion, Bishop had shown great mistrust in the comrades around him and an unbelievable level of individualism.

VALDON BOLDEAU: The criticism made of Bishop was honest and made from the standpoint of genuine respect and to pull the party out of the crisis. He wanted to see Bishop stand firm with decisions of the Central Committee.

KEITH STROUDE: He was a good person.

that Bishop was trying to hide the truth from the members by withholding the minutes from the general body of the party.

He saw nothing wrong with referring to Bishop's attitude as opportunistic. When someone is taking a counter-revolutionary position, it is a counter-revolutionary position. If opportunism is not struggle against, it would stifle the party.

BASIL CAHAGAN: Bishop was a good person.

low ideological level and understanding.

LESTER REDHEAD: I am dissatisfied with Bishop's position. He lacks leadership qualities which Coard has, therefore I support joint leadership. Bishop has not taken the criticism of him in a frank, wholehearted manner; and if we are to build a Marxist-Leninist party, it must be based on all the Leninist principles of party-building.

PHREY: Bishop's attitude to criticism is one in which you say you accept the criticism but you don't do anything to change. Bishop's attitude is petit bourgeois and individualistic.

KEITH VENIQUER: Bishop has a petit bourgeois attitude to the revolution.

MOSES JEFFREY: Bishop's position is based on deep jolted emotions, lack of confidence in the policy of the party to as-

sist him as a non-acceptance of the practical application of democratic centralism. He hopes that Bishop has learnt the lesson that there are no untouchables in the party.

GELLINEAU JAMES: Bishop has no alternative but to show that he is capable of accepting criticism and moving forward.

FAYE TUCKER: The education of Bishop is expected to be a success.

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Central Committee meeting

The question of NJM joint leadership



EXCLUSIVE REPORT

THE FOLLOWING represents minutes of a meeting of the Central Committee held on September 17, 1983 at which the matter of joint leadership was discussed for the People's Revolutionary Government of Grenada.

The minutes are edited because of length.
Saturday, September 17, 1983

Comrades present — Selwyn Strachan, Hudson Austin, Liam James, Ewart Layne, Chalkie Ventour, Phyllis Coard, Kenneth McFarlane, Chris DeRiggs, Leon Cornwall.

Comrades absent — Maurice Bishop — out of country
George Louison — out of country
Unison Whiteman — out of country
Ian Bartholomew — sick
Pitney Bain — sick
Ian St. Bernard — sick

The meeting started 1:30 p.m. Comrade Bernard Coard attended. Comrade Strachan addressing Comrade Coard said that the Central Committee (CC) has been meeting to look at the state of the party and revolution and to look at the way the process has been developing over the past four years. It is quite clear that there are great concerns from this general meeting of the party.

Following the emergency CC all CC members were called in to discuss ways and means of pulling ourselves out of this rut.

The revolution is in deep crisis; it faces the dangers of being turned back, while the CC is not operating in a Marxist-Leninist way. In identifying the root of the problem it was found that the CC is not leading the process and has to take the full blame. The reason is the weak leadership exercised by Comrade Maurice Bishop.

In trying to find concrete ways of rectifying the situation and to put the party on a firm Marxist-Leninist base, it was pointed out that while these fundamental weaknesses exist the Comrade has tremendous strengths.

The qualities that are missing are decisive qualities to put us on a correct path. Pointing to the four points referred to by Comrades James and Cornwall and agreeing that these qualities exist in Comrade Bernard Coard the CC felt that Comrade Coard was the only Comrade who had demonstrated these qualities over the years.

As a result a proposal for merging these two strengths through joint leadership between Comrades Bishop and Coard was put forward by Comrade James and supported by the majority of Comrades. The areas of responsibility were outlined for the two roles.

All CC meetings will be chaired by Comrade Bishop and Political Bureau will be chaired by Comrade Coard. CC



A PICTURE of togetherness in the early days of the revolution, Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and his deputy, Bernard Coard.

meetings will resume monthly. Comrades felt that this model can help Comrade Bishop in building the qualities missing. This proposal was voted with a majority in favour.

Comrade Strachan said that it is the first time he has seen a Marxist-Leninist position being put forward by the comrades consistently and supported by the majority.

Comrade Bernard Coard raised four points being:

1. He would like to see the minutes of the meeting.
2. The position of those opposing or abstaining and what are the reasons.
3. Were other options examined, what were these options and why were they rejected.
4. Why was not this meeting scheduled so that Comrade Bishop could be present.

Comrade Austin said it was only right that he abstain because he arrived late in the meeting. When he arrived he asked for the agenda.

Comrade Louison told him that it is:

- (1) analysis of the state of the party and revolution
- (2) feedback from the membership and
- (3) the way forward. He pointed out that Comrade Bishop said that he had no problem with joint leadership. Therefore he could not understand why members who were

here for the whole meeting and could not have taken a position on this or why it is that members should vote against. He would like to know what were their arguments for this.

Comrade DeRiggs said that Comrade Louison had problems with the theoretical and operational aspects of joint leadership. He felt these weaknesses could not be solved by a model of joint leadership.

He supported the idea of tapping the strength of Comrades Bernard Coard, but felt that the joint leadership cannot strengthen Comrade Maurice Bishop's weaknesses; this is not done in any Marxist-Leninist party.

Comrade Layne said that Comrade Louison said that in some parties one person heads the state and the other heads the party, but the head of state is subordinate to the head of the party.

Comrade Strachan said that Comrade Louison said that if we agree that the quality missing in the Comrade Leader is possessed in another Comrade why not take the Marxist-Leninist line and change the Comrade.

Comrade James recalled his proposals saying that we need to find the scientific solution to get us out of the crisis to put us on the way forward. The scientific solution is based on the objective situation that exists.

The nine man directorate of Nicaragua was also mentioned because of the heated debate.

Comrade Bishop had abstained from voting, though in his presentation he agreed to joint leadership. He placed his concern that he needed clarity on before the vote. He also needed a feedback from Comrade Bernard and some time to reflect on the issue.

Comrade Bernard Coard asked whether Comrade Bishop had agreed in principle.

Comrade Austin said that he gathered from Comrade Maurice that he was conscious of the crisis and that he did not have the necessary qualities. He also pointed out that NJM had joint coordination and made references to the historic working relation with himself and Comrade Bernard. He said he could not understand how two senior comrades in the party opposed and abstained from this decision.

Comrade Strachan said that this was the first time that Comrade Coard spoke so frankly, which must be encouraged. If Comrade Bishop was to see it as a vote of no confidence it would intimidate comrades and harm the Leninist advancement of the comrades in the party.

Comrade Cornwall said that his feelings of the present situation are that within six months the party will disintegrate totally unless a fundamental

even agreed with the proposed responsibilities; however, when he came to the point of no confidence he placed it out of the hands of the CC by saying that he alone could solve this problem.

Four options for leadership were identified in the earliest proceedings:

- (1) Remove Comrade Bishop
- (2) Joint leadership
- (3) Have the deputy to play the role that is required.
- (4) Remove comrades from the CC

On option three, Comrade DeRiggs said that his own reading is that Comrade George put forward in a general way is that he does not oppose the return of Comrade Coard to the PB and CC, though it was not discussed. It was put forward weakly by Comrade Whiteman as part of the response; it was not done as a concrete proposal. He made it as a response to the fundamental proposal.

Comrade James said that these qualities took years to develop in a Comrade therefore, the Comrade Leader would not be able to lead in this area. Comrade Coard had been leading in this area over the years. We are now recognising it formally and that failure to accept will be right opportunity.

We will not be Marxist-Leninist if we have joint leadership in practice and pretend that we have something else.

On point four, Comrade Strachan said that the view was expressed that we should take decisions on the proposals and call in Comrade Coard.

Comrade Bishop said that given that he needed time to reflect and that he needed a position from Comrade Coard he would not be able to participate. He was prepared to do so later. He felt that the meeting should go ahead in his absence.

Comrades did not agree with the position; they felt that both comrades should be present in the meeting. The October '82 crisis was also discussed in this light.

Comrade Austin said one of Comrade Bishop's concerns was that he would like to know what is Comrade Bernard's disposition on the issue and whether anyone had spoken to Comrade Bernard on the issue before.

Comrade Strachan said that this meeting should give an indication of Comrade Bernard's position which would be key for reflection.

Comrade Layne said that another key issue Comrade Bishop opposes is that of the minutes going to the membership.

Comrade Coard said that his feelings of the present situation are that within six months the party will disintegrate totally unless a fundamental

package of measures is done. He had thought it would take 12 months given the level of disgust, the disintegration of the party masses, that the loss of state power is only a few months away.

This is happening at a time when the militia is disintegrating, the army is demoralised, and we don't have the capacity of defending the revolution.

The party has never had such weak links and low contact with the masses. The image of the party has deteriorated in the eyes of the masses.

The mood of the party comrades is at its lowest. He used the example of the number of comrades sick.

He was seriously affected by the accusation of wanting to undermine the leadership so he resigned from the CC. He said the Comrade Leader found himself vacillating between the Marxist-Leninist trend and the petit bourgeois trend in the party.

He said that the party and revolution would disintegrate within 24 months. It had reached a stage where he realised that this ability to influence the process was no longer possible.

The Bureau took a thousand easy decisions that the CC had to implement and failed to take hard decisions. For some period of time the PB was not functioning, no agenda, no recording of decisions. He found that he could not take these long meetings for no reason at all.

Comrade Bernard proposed that for the next six months the Bureau should meet as a Bureau with all members of the CC as alternate Bureau members so that the monthly meetings will be to take stock. The Bureau meeting will meet to take decisions on the daily organisation of the work. The Bureau should meet three hours once a week.

Comrade Coard continued to question whether the points taken on operationalisation will satisfy the Comrade Leader concern. Whether he sees the criticism as a vote of no confidence of the joint leadership. If on this basis he refused to accept the decision of the CC on these models what will be the decision of the CC?

Comrade DeRiggs said that the only way forward is Comrade Bernard's membership on the CC. We must take no action to sacrifice the revolution. If joint leadership is decided and one Comrade Leader does not want to comply, the leadership will be decided. Comrades have to be firm and resolute.

Comrade Phyllis Coard suggested that Comrade Bishop be informed of the meetings that he could join but he should come on Friday in put forward his position.



FAMILY members of the accused make their way in the court early in the proceedings in April this year.

Coard's dilemma hard on the family

• THIS INTERVIEW was conducted during proceedings in the Maurice Bishop murder trial. However, because of its prejudicial content it could not be published before.

NOW THAT A VERDICT has been passed in the Bishop murder trial, there has been numerous opinions about its outcome.

Some are fully supportive of the 12-member jury's decision, while others questioned the island's judiciary system.

However, the Coard family is worried about whether Bernard Coard, the island's former Deputy Prime Minister, and his wife Phyllis got a free and fair trial. The couple were among 14 persons condemned to die for the murder of Bishop and others on October 19, 1983.

"Bernard says he is innocent and we feel he can substantiate it. We particularly want to know the truth," charge his brother Errol and mother Flora, adding, "The truth seems to be deliberately manipulated."

In a letter to his family,



A FULL REPORT

Bernard wrote: "The evidence against us is totally unmanufactured (the boldness and crassness of this just blow my mind — they don't even pretend anything remotely resembling the truth!)" and they have launched the most expensive and professionally-orchestrated campaign worldwide and locally (to reach all jurors) so as to discredit us and character assassinate us."

Errol, a computer specialist and sideline tennis coach, has been the family's "go-between", frequently travelling from Boston in the United States to Grenada to secure updated information about his brother's welfare.

He, however, complains that this is not the easiest of tasks since he has encountered numerous problems in gaining access to Bernard and his wife at Richmond Hill Prison.

He reflects on one particular confrontation with Barbadian-born Commissioner of Prisons, Lionel Maloney, who he said granted him permission to see the imprisoned couple, but according to him purposefully refused his mother entry. "This was clear evidence of a psychological tactic he used on our family, since my mother has a heart condition and would worry tremendously about Bernard," he says.

Bernard is the youngest in the Coard family of six boys and a girl. He is a graduate in economics. The Coard family is not sure when Bernard took to Marxism but believes it

happened after he graduated with a bachelor's degree in England.

Although there were many differences between Bernard and especially his brothers, his capture and subsequent imprisonment have brought the whole family link together. In a letter he expressed gratitude for his family's swift, decisive and overwhelming assistance. "Without it," he wrote, "Phyl and I would long ago have been killed by Ronald Reagan and his regional and local stooges."

Flora, 80, reflects upon her son's upbringing in a small concrete house which sits several feet below the Richmond Hill Prison. Her husband Frederick, who died in 1978 at age 86, was a religious and

conservative man who banned liquor from the household and set aside a period daily for Bernard and his brothers to study.

"As a boy, he (Bernard) said he wanted to study abroad and then come home and help the island," she remembers. Flora was on holiday in Hawaii with one of her sons when she got the news of the United States-led intervention and the subsequent arrest of Bernard and his wife. Since this, she has moved to Boston with Errol, returning to Grenada at least three times a year to see Bernard and his wife.

She has expressed concern about the couple's physical and mental condition, noting that since their imprisonment they have suffered tremendous weight loss. "To me they

both look haggard and drained," she said.

According to her, besides maintaining their innocence of the October tragic events, the couple were terribly worried about the welfare of their three children, whom they only saw once in the past three years.

The children, Shola 16, Abby 14 and Nato 6 have been staying with friends in Jamaica since the 1983 intervention.

Flora thinks there is more evidence than what has been produced during the trial proceedings. "I might be subconsciously biased, but I would like to hear the truth come out. Regardless of the outcome we would like to know the truth."

If Bernard and Phyllis are guilty, then fine, we would then in turn seek leniency," Errol says.



Bernard Coard's brother, Errol and mother, Flora, at their home.

MAURICE BISHOP TRIAL



A FULL REPORT

Castro: Cuban assistance 'out of the question'

LATE Grenadian Prime Minister Maurice Bishop sought Cuban intervention to put down the military-led uprising that caused his death and paved the way for the American invasion of Grenada three years ago, President Fidel Castro of Cuba has disclosed.

Dr. Castro's disclosure was made in an interview with American Congressman Mervyn Dymally and political scientist, Dr. Jeffrey M. Elliott.

The interview, spread over nine days in Havana in the spring of 1986, has just been published under the title, *Nothing Can Stop The Course Of History*, by Pathfinder Press.

Dr. Castro discussed events in Grenada at length, and ruled out any Cuban intervention in the island during the conflict between Bishop and radicals led by his deputy, Bernard Coard.

He disclosed that shortly after Bishop was freed from house arrest by thousands of supporters on October 19, 1983, the late Grenadian leader dispatched one of his comrades to the Cuban Embassy in Grenada seeking support from the armed Cuban personnel in the construction brigade which was at the time engaged in building the Point Salines International Airport.

"Frankly, it would have been a serious political mistake to have authorised the Cuban personnel to become involved in the Grenadian revolutionaries' domestic troubles," Dr. Castro said.

"Bloody combat would have ensued... I would never, under any circumstances, have authorised the Cuban personnel to have become involved. Of

that you can be sure. Our answer would have been no," the Cuban leader emphasised.

Bishop, most of his Cabinet supporters and as many as 100 civilians died when the now disbanded People's Revolutionary Army crushed the pro-Bishop uprising.

Coard and most of the ring leaders were sentenced to death last Thursday for their role in the killing of Bishop and ten others.

President Castro denounced Coard and pointed a picture of him as an ambitious individual, who quietly gained control of the state apparatus in Grenada before moving to oust Bishop in the summer of 1983.

"Coard worked with great subtlety. He did not work openly. Very quietly, and gradually, he placed his sworn followers in key positions in the army, as political instructors, in the Ministry of Security, and in some positions in the party," the president stated.

He added that gradually, Coard gained a majority on the Central Committee of the then ruling New Jewel Movement (NJM), "very subtly, very quietly."

But the president rejected the notion that political extremism was at the root of the uprising against Bishop. "I don't believe it was an extremist policy on Coard's part. Rather, I think personal ambition was Coard's basic motivation," he said.

He said Coard developed an image of himself as "an apostle of the party of ideas". But he said, in contrast, the Deputy Prime Minister projected Bishop as "a vacillating reformist".

"Thus, he confused many people of good faith in the revolutionary ranks," Dr. Castro added.

While Bishop enjoyed mass support and popularity, Coard worked among a small group of NJM members, undermining Bishop's authority, the Cuban leader asserted.

President Castro said he tried to dissuade the Coard faction from committing any atrocity.

"I had urged them not to make the stupid mistake of killing Bishop. But when the people's uprising occurred, they became so frightened and confused, that they fired upon the people, and shortly thereafter, killed Bishop and a group of valuable aides," he said.

He described Bishop's arrest and the shooting of many unarmed civilians by the military as senseless and mad.

He said there was no question of Cuban support for the Revolutionary Military Council which was installed after Bishop's murder. "We wouldn't have offered any support to that government after it murdered Bishop and fired on the people."

"After we had assumed that attitude, it would have been difficult for any other socialist or progressive country to support that group," he added.

"As soon as we had finished the airport, we would have left Grenada. We could not leave the airport unfinished as it was a project we had donated to the people of Grenada — one that was useful to them," he continued, although Cuban doctors would have been allowed to remain behind "for strictly humanitarian reasons". (CANA)



CUBAN President Fidel Castro welcomes Cuban workers home following their capture and release by United States armed forces in the 1983 October intervention of Grenada.



CAPTURED Cubans and People's Revolutionary Army (PRA) soldiers under the careful watch of United States soldiers at Point Salines International Airport.

Maurice remembered

by Rickey Singh

THE 13 days in October, 1983 that shook the Caribbean and captured the world's attention through the unprecedented bloody political events in Grenada, revolved over the fate of a charismatic politician and the future of a revolutionary process of which he was its most outstanding symbol — Maurice Bishop.

Constrained by both time and space to meet deadlines for this Keep-Sake issue, I have chosen to merely reflect on the Bishop I remember, by recalling aspects of his life and the challenges he faced from those close to him and those more distant.

I shall endeavour to keep this at a personal level, venturing occasionally into some general observations. I am aware that this article and this special publication have resulted directly from last week's verdict in St. George's to hang 13 men and one woman for the brutal murder of Bishop and ten of his colleagues of a revolution that lost its way.

"Brothers and sisters, this is Maurice Bishop speaking. At 4:30 a.m. this morning, the People's Revolutionary Army seized control of the army barracks at True Blue. The barracks were burned to the ground. After a half-hour struggle, the forces of the People's Revolutionary Army were completely defeated, and surrendered."

It was March 13, 1979. The New Jewel Movement (NJM) of which he was the popularly accepted leader, had just taken power.

Coard as his respected deputy had come to power in Grenada at the point of a gun.

"People of Grenada," he assured, "this revolution is for work, for food, for decent housing and health services, and for a bright future for our children and great grandchildren."

Not only the United States political establishment had other ideas about this People's Revolutionary Government (PRG) set up by the then 35-year-old Bishop. As events were to tragically establish some four-and-a-half years later, some of his very loyal "comrades" also had ideas of their own about the course of the revolution.

For some of these "comrades", Bishop was not properly schooled in Marxism-Leninism. He was the populist figure of the revolution. In their wisdom, the tough militant guys of the NJM's Central Committee felt that two were better than one. So they demanded dual leadership.

How it all ended in blood at the old British fort in St. George's was to become the story of the history-making court case known as the "Maurice Bishop Murder Trial".

The only son of Alimenta Bishop, whose husband, Rupert, became a political murder victim while Gairy governed Grenada, Bishop is best remembered for his humanity.

Dr. Fidel Castro, who has disclosed having denied Bishop's request for assistance on the day he was rescued by the Grenadian masses from house arrest, is on record with his own assessment of Bishop and his bold social experiment.

It was an assessment made within 36 hours of the execution of the then 39-year-old Prime Minister and the creation of a short-lived Revolutionary Military Council (RMC), under the command of General Hudson Austin, a friend of longstanding of, as he used to say, "Comrade Maurice".

"Bishop," said Castro, "was not an extremist. Rather, he was a true revolutionary... conscientious and honest. Far from disagreeing with his intelligent and realistic policy, we fully sympathised with it, since it was rigorously adapted to his country's specific conditions and possibilities."

Castro said that Bishop's death and that of his comrades need to be clarified, and if they were executed in cold blood, those guilty deserve to be exemplarily sanctioned.

Angela Bishop, widow of Maurice, had travelled to Grenada more than a year ago, from Canada, where she is now living with her two children, John (19) and Nadia (17), to find out from Hudson Austin who killed her husband.

As he was to relate to a sister of the murdered Prime Minister, Angela wanted to meet alone with the former commander of the revolutionary armed forces of the PRG, "to look



MAURICE BISHOP TRIAL

A FULL REPORT



him straight in the eye and ask, 'Who killed Maurice?'"

The widow had good reasons for so doing. She knew the extent of the personal friendship between her husband and Austin.

Maurice himself had felt, according to surviving comrades, that when the final battle was to be waged, "Hudson would be standing with us." It did not happen that way.

Sitting as a prisoner on Richmond Hill, Austin could not say who killed Maurice, because he did not know.

His regret, as he reportedly expressed it, was that shortly before the shocking developments of October 19, he had received two letters from the Prime Minister. They were for his wife and two children.

They represented his final written communication to the two children he dearly loved. But the letters were in Austin's briefcase taken away or destroyed by the invading United States military.

Like Coard, Selwyn Strachan, Liam James and other leading and once very loyal comrades of Bishop, Austin was to

officers who would respectfully respond to the Prime Minister's request "Headache" was Lieutenant Colonel Ewart Layne; and "Goat", Captain Lester Redhead.

I have seen him sharing his modest evening meal with some of these very comrades, who, painfully for him, were on the "other side" on that fateful day on October 12, 1983 when he was placed under "house arrest" and, as it turned out, the PRG's revolutionary process itself was effectively arrested.

I remember Maurice Bishop as a mobile human rights lawyer, working with other West Indian lawyers like Dominica's Brian Alleyne, Guyana's Miles Fitzpatrick, Jamaica's Richard Small and Trinidad and Tobago's Frank Solomon and Allan Alexander, even as he continued to labour in his own country to put an end to long nights of political terror and electoral malpractices associated with Gairyism of that period.

I recall Bishop saying, as he came under mounting pressures to hold promised general elections, that he would prefer "to have no elections, rather than a Burnham-type election in Grenada."

This was a response to some of his cynical advisers who felt that since so many CARICOM governments and that of the United States itself had come to live with crooked elections in Guyana, it would be better to hold such elections and put an end to the pressures he faced.

Interestingly enough, Bishop never accepted the late Forbes Burnham's invitation to join the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) because he always sided Coard. He said, "Bernard understands Burnham."

Like so many issues of the time, the significance of this observation was allowed to pass. But on all of my visits to Grenada during the period of the PRG, I could not help wondering why Bishop was so anxious to have "Bernard" (Comrade Coard) present for interviews and discussions.

On one such visit, I had to take issue with him and his revolution dead, and children continue to wonder, "Whatever became of his mutilated body?"

One thing Alimenta Bishop is clear about, "Maurice died with dignity."

and articles written in Caribbean Contact, about his government's failure to hold elections and of its attitude on the question of Press freedom.

He encouraged dialogue without rancour, and would plead for "time" and "understanding" because, as he used to say, "the complexity of our situation and the powerful forces we are up against."

I was able to later report to Alister Hughes at his home the nature of my conversation with Bishop and of his assurances to return the car, "after it was properly repaired", and to have the telephone reconnected.

Subsequently, I learnt that he had to face some very strong criticisms for so doing, from leading figures of the NJM's Central Committee. There is no point in calling their names at this stage.

He used to speak very fondly of the Barbadian people, recalling how he received medical treatment in Barbados after being viciously mauled, along with Unison Whiteman and Selwyn Strachan and others, by the then powerful Mongoose Gang of Grenada.

But he would at the same time teasingly remark "that them Bajans have right in their midst, the CIA's station chief for the Eastern Caribbean." One day, he publicly named this American as Ashley Wills, of the United States Embassy in Bridgetown.

I remember an angry Wills telephoning me to ask if "you accept that rubbish your friend Bishop has been saying about me." I told him that I did not, and that this was part of the United States-Grenada war.

When the United States-led invasion of Grenada took place on October 25, 1983, Ashley Wills was on board a United States warship, explaining to journalists that he had been asked to undertake a special assignment because of his "special knowledge" of Grenada.

With Maurice Bishop and his revolution dead, his mother, widow and children continue to wonder, "Whatever became of his mutilated body?"

One thing Alimenta Bishop is clear about, "Maurice died with dignity."

EXCLUSIVE REPORT

MAURICE
BISHOP
TRIAL

A mother's lament

Son's death follows that of husband

IT'S NOT EASY to deal with death, especially when one loses a loved one.

But in the case of Mrs. Amentha Bishop, the untimely departure of her husband Rupert in 1974, followed nine years later by her son, Prime Minister Maurice Bishop, is a heavy burden.

The circumstances are of similar design, Rupert falling victim to Sir Eric Gairy's Mongoose Gang during a demonstration led by his son, and later Maurice himself executed by traitors with whom he once shared a revolutionary government.

It has been a sad experience for Mrs. Bishop. "It's terrible. I was just getting over Rupert's when this happened (referring to the execution of the late leader on October 19, 1983). Maurice's death is even worse than my husband's, because we had his body and had a big funeral for him. This one, we haven't seen or heard anything about Maurice's body."

But according to Mrs. Bishop, her son knew death was inevitable. "He knew he was going to be killed, and he told me that if he had to go as his father before him, so be it." He said, "I can't live with myself and be compromised," she recalled a conversation she had with the late leader while he was under house arrest.

She spoke sadly of when she last saw her son alive, after she secured permission to visit him two days before his death from convicted murderer, Selwyn Strachan.

"He was wearing a short pants and a jersey, but I

noticed he wasn't sitting up straight," Mrs. Bishop said she noticed what appeared like a cigarette burn on one of his cheeks, and noted her son avoided certain questions about his physical and mental condition. She described

the late leader as one who did not like to shoulder others with his own problems.

Error to this, Mrs. Bishop had appealed for the release of her son from under house arrest and for him to be freed to address

FATHERLY LOVE: Maurice and daughter, Nadia, and wife Angela at bottom

the Grenadian people on the political crisis in the island.

"I feel that it is time for him to be given the opportunity to be free to also tell the Grenadian people who love him, what is really the problem. . . I feel they

should quickly settle their differences for the sake of our people," one report quoted her as saying.

Despite the trauma Mrs. Bishop has had to live with in the past three years, there is still some consolation that her son's

death was not a dishonourable departure. Her reaction recently to the condemning of 14 persons for the October 19, 1983 murders was that there was still happiness that her son was not among the convicted.

The noose: Angela's hope for justice

DESPITE the conviction recently of 14 persons for the murder of her husband and several others, Mrs. Angela Bishop, widow of slain Grenada's late Prime Minister Maurice Bishop says justice would only be served when the convicted are placed in the hangman's noose.

Mrs. Bishop, who separated from her husband "for personal reasons" over five years ago, and set up home in Canada, has attributed her strength and qualities as a woman to him.

"He made me realise that each one of us is not singular and that each one depends on the other, and that it is the duty of each person who is in a position to help to lend a helping hand, to lift someone from whatever state he may be in. We are duty bound to help."

"Maurice made me strong, in that he made me realise that there are things that we have to understand without question; that we have to understand that there are people who are involved in particular walks of life

and we have to have a basic trust of these people because we can get nowhere without that basic trust."

He made me into a strong woman in that he made me realise that life is not for you alone. Life encompasses more than you. Life is bigger than you. That's how he made me strong."

Her first reaction when she got the tragic news of her husband's death was that Grenada and the Caribbean had lost a very great man. A woman, who has given her husband wholehearted support for the 1979 Grenada Revolution, Mrs. Bishop says she was willing to help in bringing about changes in the island.

"I did what I was able to do and it's just a pity that things did not come through to the logical conclusion, in that the Revolution ended prematurely."

A former Junior Minister of Tourism, Mrs. Bishop said she last spoke to her husband two Mondays before he met his death. She said he did not relay any worrying stories

to her, but that she detected some concern in his voice, but refused to question him about what was bothering him.

Mrs. Bishop, however, says she had a premonition about her husband's death. She recalls warning him about possible traitors.

"I think this was something that was festering for quite a while. I think it was something that was going on. There was an undercurrent there all along. It's sad to say, but I knew about the possibility of something like this happening for a long time, because I knew the personalities involved and knew their ambitions — or should I say over-ambitions."

And, I knew that it was a very, very, real fear that this could have happened and I often tried to tell Maurice about it, but he always said that each one must prove himself before he was allowed to be condemned anybody."

She says the tragic loss of her husband had a devastating effect on her children.



FATHERLY LOVE: Maurice and daughter, Nadia, and wife Angela at bottom



Those who suffered during the conflict The injured list

MAURICE
BISHOP
TRIAL

ACCORDING to confidential statistics from Grenada's General Hospital, over 193 persons were treated for injuries following the October 19, 1983 Port Rupert killings.

Around 9 were listed as serious and were subsequently detained. These included schoolgirl, Gemma Helmar, who died days afterwards; and People's Revolutionary Army (PRA) soldier, Conrad Mayers, who was pronounced dead shortly after his arrival at the hospital.

Those who sustained serious injuries were:

Robert Bora, 30, gunshot wound of chest;

Cloned Fletcher, 30, superficial wound of left arm;

Stephen Davis, 12, head injuries;

Claudius Panchon, 41, superficial gunshot wound of left leg;

Leonard Ogiste, 33, multiple leg fractures;

Samuel Adams, 17, gunshot wound of the shoulder;

Clairiel Barry, 17, multiple shoulder injuries;

Adrian Phillip, 21, gunshot wound resulting in multiple injuries of the leg;

Lewis Morin, 39, gunshot wound to right leg;

Neville James, 40, gunshot wounds;

Raymond St Louis, 34, gunshot wounds of right leg;

Byron Cameron, 27, gunshot wound of leg;

Dexter Layke, 15, gunshot wound armpit;

Martin Simon, 20, gunshot wound chest;

Hewman Robinson, 51, gunshot wound chest;

Michael Calliste, 18, gunshot wound right arm;

Emmanuel Hazzard, 26, eye injury;

Junior Adolphus, 24, arm injury;

Einstein Lawson, 26, spinal injury;

Von Grimes, 21, multiple injuries right arm;

Julien Scott, 16, head injury;

Lorna Jacob, 19, spinal injury;

Decima Bowen, 18, injury ankle bone;

Patricia Roberts, 18, leg injuries;

Helen Brown, 14, head injury;

Sherril Bruno, 21, dislocation right shoulder;

Debra Alexander, 16, gunshot wound, head and right ankle injury;

Gonia Leeson, 27, hip injury;

Jacinta Francis, 23, multiple arm injuries;

Cheryl Tait, 26, injury to right leg;

Celia Jurekhan, 21, unconsciousness;

Ruth Roberts, 17, concussion;

Lynette Brown, 17, head injuries;

Ann Neptune, 15, multiple right leg injuries;

Jeanetha Calliste, 29, gunshot wound to right shoulder; and

Doreen Telford, 26, gunshot wound right arm.

A FULL REPORT



URGENT assistance for one of the injured following shootings at Fort Rupert on October 19, 1983.



A CASUALTY recounts the events.




ANOTHER VICTIM of the October 19, 1983 tragedy lies in hospital bed.

Coard's message to the masses

BERNARD COARD, a Marxist-Leninist, was critical of Bishop's moderate stance. The following message was read on Radio Free Grenada on Saturday, October 16, 1983:

MAURICE BISHOP TRIAL

A FULL REPORT





A PICTURE of togetherness in the early days of the revolution, Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and his deputy Bernard Coard.

Brothers and sisters of Revolutionary Free Grenada, the armed forces of Grenada recognise that it was the NJM which made our Revolution.

Comrade Maurice Bishop has been the acknowledged leader of our Revolution and has led us this far. However, our progress as it develops, is becoming more complex. Many serious decisions need to be taken daily to solve the problems still facing our people.

Recently, the NJM Central Committee leadership and the entire membership of the NJM took certain firm decisions on internal party changes which were aimed at strengthening the work of the party and Revolution.

Comrade Maurice Bishop refused to accept and implement these decisions, even though he had been present at the party's meeting and voted for the decisions.

In response to this, the Officers and NCO's of the free armed forces, who are members of the party, at Wednesday passed a resolution demanding that Comrade Maurice accept and implement the decisions of the party.

The PRA and entire armed forces wish to state once again that the NJM made this Revolution and built up this Revolution and has led our revolutionary armed forces all along.

However, we want to state firmly that in this country, which has led us all these years, there must be set standards for all. That rules must be applied to all, no matter who they are.

No one man can be the rule. No one can be above the majority. The armed forces that never in the ten half years of its existence has the NJM toler-



BURNT OUT REMAINS of Butler House, the prime minister's official office following the tragic events of October, 1983.

ated 'one-manism' in its ranks. As much as we of the PRA love and respect Comrade Bishop, we will definitely not tolerate this development in our country.

Principle is principle, and principles must be for everyone, not for some only.

The revolutionary armed forces have noted that some opportunists are seeking to fool the people by spreading lies that this is a personal struggle between two individuals.

If that is so, how come then that our entire armed forces — down to the last private — and the entire party are totally united?

The armed forces are presently investigating thoroughly the personal involvement of Comrade Bishop in the starting of vicious rumours, which were it not for the swift action of the armed forces, could have led to bloodshed on the streets of Grenada last Wednesday.

So far, a sworn statement from one of Comrade Bishop's top personal security officers directly implicates Comrade Maurice Bishop with the starting of this rumour.

We feel that principle is principle and that principle must be applied to all and the armed forces will continue with investigations to their conclusions. It must be clearly understood by all concerned, that the People's Revolutionary Army and armed forces as a whole will tolerate absolutely no manifestations whatsoever of counter-revolutions, no matter what state or form it shows itself.

Any action which aims at disturbing the peace or the normal life of our nation or which threatens the revolution will be firmly and swiftly dealt with. The peace and calm which prevails in Grenada shall be maintained.


soever of counter-revolutions, no matter what state or form it shows itself.

Any action which aims at disturbing the peace or the normal life of our nation or which threatens the revolution will be firmly and swiftly dealt with. The peace and calm which prevails in Grenada shall be maintained.

Laser Insect Killer

POWER SPRAY with super fast killing action





FORT FREDERICK army headquarters, where members of the Central Committee took a decision to execute Prime Minister Maurice Bishop and others on October 19 1983.

Bishop seen as threat to the revolution

THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT was broadcast by General Hudson Austin on Radio Free Grenada late Wednesday night, October 20, 1983:

Last night, a delegation of the Central Committee of the New Jewel Movement made a formal offer to Comrade Maurice Bishop for him to continue as Prime Minister, to continue as a member of the party and to work closely with the NJM Central Committee in running the country.

Comrade Bishop's position was that he would consider the offer but that he was not willing to talk last night.

This morning at 9.30, a crowd led by Union Whiteman, Vincent Noel and two businessmen stormed Maurice Bishop's home. The soldiers guarding the Mount Willard Road had instructions not to fire on the people. The people, therefore, broke through the barriers and stormed through the gates of the house.

Again the soldiers were instructed not to fire on the people but to fire above people's heads, not at the masses. The crowd, realising that the soldiers had instructions not to fire on the people, broke into the house. Maurice Bishop went with them and then led the crowd of innocent

EXCLUSIVE REPORT

MAURICE BISHOP TRIAL



people to seize Fort Rupert, the headquarters of the armed forces.

Instructions

Again, the soldiers had instructions not to fire on the people. Attempts were made by the armed forces to establish communication with Maurice Bishop and Union Whiteman, in order to continue negotiations for a peaceful solution and in order to persuade them to let the civilians leave the fort.

However, their response was: "No compromise, no negotiation." They then disarmed the officers of the general staff as well as the rank and file soldiers guarding Fort Rupert and began to arm the crowd.

They declared their intention to arrest and wipe out the entire Central Committee and senior

members of the party and the entire leadership of the armed forces as well as to smash the Revolutionary Armed Forces.

At that point, the Revolutionary Armed Forces sent a company of soldiers to re-establish control of Fort Rupert. Maurice Bishop and his group fired on the soldiers, killed two members of the PRA — Sgt. Dawson Peters and Warrant Officer Wilfred Masoff, wounding several others.

The Revolutionary Armed Forces then evacuated the wounded and assisted several persons in getting to hospital.

Comrades, the People's Revolutionary Armed Forces have all along stayed off the streets in the hope that it would be resolved internally by the party. However, a situation in which Maurice Bishop had


declared his intentions to wipe out the entire leadership of the party and the army is a situation in which he had linked up openly with counter-revolutionaries in order to do so. The Revolution itself would have been wiped out.

Our working people have suffered too much for too many years to allow imperialism and counter-revolutionaries to take over our people's Revolution.

The People's Revolutionary Armed Forces have as of 3 p.m. established a Revolutionary Military Council which will form the government of the country until normality is restored.

Let it be clearly understood that the Revolutionary Armed Forces will govern with absolute strictness. Anyone who seeks to demonstrate or to disturb the peace will be shot.

An all-day and all-night curfew will be established for the next four days from now until next Monday at six o'clock. No one is to leave their house. Anyone violating this curfew will be shot on sight.



GENERAL HUDSON AUSTIN in army uniform.

APPENDIX R

The following are the names of some relevant documents referred to and examined by the T.R.C. during its inquiry.

The Constitution of Grenada 1973.

Report of the Duffus Commission of Enquiry into the breakdown of Law and Order, and Police Brutality in Grenada -- February 27th 1975.

Report on Human Rights in Grenada. A survey of political and Civil Rights in Grenada during the period of 1970-1983 by Donald Trotman and Keith Friday -- April 1984.

Trial Transcripts of the Maurice Bishop Murder Trial Case 19 of 1984.

United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights -- 1948.

Organization of Eastern Caribbean States Act No. 41 of 1981.

Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. 1999.

Constitutional Judicature (RESTORATION) Grenada Act No. 19 of 1991.

Recommendations of the Claims Commission 1988.

Amnesty International Report on the trial of the Grenada 17, 2003.

Grenada Documents: An overview and selection.

Released by the Department of State and the Department of Defence, September 1984, Washington, D.C.

Grenada A Preliminary Report.

Released by the Department of State and the Department of Defence, Washington D.C. reprinted by the United States Information Agency, December 1983.

Big Sky/Little Bullet.

A Docu-Novel by Maurice Paterson, 1996.

Under the Cover of Darkness.

By the Young Leaders of Presentation Brothers College 2000 and 2002 Grenada.

Armed Forces Institute of Pathology.

Washington D.C. 12 December 1983 **Consultant Report on the identification of remains.** Grenada, West Indies.

South Africa: Truth Commission.

Document that summarized the history and key issues that confronted the Truth Commission 1996.

Report on the visit of Minister Dullah Omar and team from South Africa to discuss Truth and Reconciliation Commission (2002).

Survival For Service

By Paul Scoon, 2003.

Grenada, Island of Conflict.

By George Brizan, 1984.

Declaration of the Grenada Revolution

(People's Law Nos. 1-11), 1979.

Commissions of Inquiry Act

(Cap. 58) of the revised Laws of Grenada, 1990

Coroners Act

(Cap. 69) of the revised Laws of Grenada, 1990.

VOLUME 3
A

Ref. No.
replying the above
number and date of this
should be quoted.



GRENADA PRISON SERVICE,
ST. GEORGE'S,
GRENADA, W.I.

April 22, 2002

Secretary
Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Scott Street
ST GEORGE'S

Dear Madam,

Meeting between the 17 former leaders and officials of the PRG
and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission

I refer to your letter dated April 15, 2002 on the above subject.

On April 22, 2002 I notified the seventeen (17) on the contents of
the letter. They maintained their decision not to speak to the TRC
except through their legal council.

I refer also to their correspondence dated February 4, 2002 to
which they expressed their concerns and all signed their names.
(See attached copy).


ROY RAYMOND
ACTING COMMISSIONER OF PRISONS

Monday 4th February, 2002

Mr. Roy Raymond,
Commissioner of Prisons,
Her Majesty's Prisons,
St. George's.

Dear Sir,

In light of your verbal communication to us this morning, purportedly from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), we wish to advise you that our lawyer is **Mr. Keith Scotland**, Attorney-at-Law of the jurisdiction of Trinidad and Tobago, and we request that any and all further communication on this matter be directed to him. Mr. Scotland's address is: **112-114 Duke Street, Port of Spain, Trinidad & Tobago;** Tel/fax: (868) 625-1911.

We ask you to please use your good offices to advise the TRC accordingly.

Signed:

Andy Mitchell

ANDY MITCHELL

Vincent Joseph

VINCENT JOSEPH

Callistus Bernard

CALLISTUS BERNARD

Cosmus Richardson

COSMUS RICHARDSON

Lester Redhead

LESTER REDHEAD

Christopher Stroude

CHRISTOPHER STROUDE

Hudson Austin

HUDSON AUSTIN

Bernard Coard

BERNARD COARD

Liam James

LIAM JAMES

Leon Cornwall

LEON CORNWALL

John Anthony Ventour

JOHN ANTHONY VENTOUR

Dave Bartholomew

DAVE BARTHOLOMEW

Ewart Layne

EWART LAYNE

Colville McBarnette

COLVILLE MCBARNETTE

Selwyn Strachan

SELWYN STRACHAN

Cecil Prime

CECIL PRIME

340 Mill Rd
Apt 1711,
Etobicoke, Ontario,
M9C 1Y8
Canada.

March 13, 2002

The Chairman,
Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
Scott Street
St. George's
Grenada.

Dear Sir or Madam:

I am writing with the hope that your Commission could inquire into the disappearance of my father, Mr. Irie Bishop. He disappeared on or about the 17 December 1978.

Mr. Bishop was an Inspector of Police with the Royal Grenada Police Force, station at Central Police Station in St George's at the time of his disappearance.

I hope your Commission could help bring closure to my family, since we never had an official explanation as it regards his disappearance.

Finally, if your Commission has the authority to recommend or make judgements on compensation to the victim families, we hope that this matter will meet the criteria to award proper financial compensation.

Mr. Bishop worked as a Public Servant to the Government of Grenada for 27 years as a Teacher and a Policeman.

I look forward to your help in bringing this matter to a proper closure.

My email is comrade39@hotmail.com or 416-620-0437

Thank You.

Respectfully,

Floyd Peter Bishop
Floyd Peter Bishop

See 9.4.02

10 Humberline Drive,
Apt. #306
Etobicoke, Ontario
M9W 6J5
Canada

November 26, 2001

Hon. Mr. Justice Donald A. B. Trotman
Chairman
Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Scott Street
St. George's
Grenada, W.I.

Your Honour,

My name is Dolores Oroiwí, I am writing on behalf of mother Rose Alexander born August 18th, 1953 in Sauteurs, St. Patrick's, but later moved to Calliste St. George's.

My mother was in excellent health and a very out-going person who never had any problems with her hearing until October 1983, while residing in Frequent St. George's. Our island was invaded and all residents in the Frequent area was asked to move from their homes to the airport for safe shelter due to the heavy bombing and bomb shells. On the journey to the airport, my mother started complaining of a pain in her ear and later that said day, she said she couldn't hear very well, she had started to lose her hearing abilities.

After the invasion, my mother could not seek any medical attention because of her financial circumstances. She had lost her job due to her hearing problems and became very isolated. After seeing my mother go through these tremendous physical and psychological breakdown I decided to quit school and migrate to Canada so I can be better able to help her.

Upon my arrival, I realized it was not that easy, it took me many years to actually settle in, eventually I did. My mother was my main focus, so I brought her to Canada where she did a completed medical examination and also received treatment for her ears.

The report I'm submitting to your attention will state clearly that my mother indeed lost eight-five percent (85%) of her hearing in both ears during the October 1983 invasion. My mother is now totally deaf (my mother does not hear but read lips to understand) she now wears hearing aides.

She returned to Grenada but her condition still remained the same. I brought her back to Canada to be examined again but the doctors and audiologists said the same thing, that she will never be able to have her total hearing back and that the hearing aides were more a sense of comfort and only helps her about 5%.

*Ms. Robert
- Re. annexes circulation / copies for
the members
- Considered during February sitting
19-1-02*

Since then my mother has returned to Grenada where she now lives but her living condition had gone from bad to worst. Her home is in a very bad state, no water or electricity and some of the boards on her house are rotten and there are leaks in the roof.

I am begging your immediate attention. If there is anyway you or your organization can help it will be greatly appreciated.

Hope to hear from you soon.

Yours respectfully,

Dolores Oroiwí
Dolores Oroiwí

U.
stating the above
or and date of this
should be quoted.



MINISTRY OF LEGAL AFFAIRS,
LABOUR & LOCAL
GOVERNMENT
ST. GEORGE'S,
GRENADA, W.I.

April 19, 2002

Ms. Claudette Joseph
Secretary to the Commission
Secretariat of the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Scott Street
ST. GEORGE'S

Dear Ms. Joseph:

Re: Notes of Evidence - Maurice Bishop Murder Trial

I acknowledge receipt of your letter dated 18th April, 2002, with respect to the above subject and hereby inform that our Chambers have not located a copy of the Notes of Evidence (Volume 1 Part 1) referred to.

I suggest that the matter be pursued with the Registrar of the Supreme Court.

Yours sincerely,

Raymond Anthony
ATTORNEY GENERAL

cc Sen. the Hon. Elvin Nimrod, Minister of Legal Affairs
Sen. the Hon. Lawrence Joseph, Facilitator, TRC
Mr. Robert Branch, Registrar, Supreme Court

Conference of Churches Grenada

Officers:
Chairman:
Vice Chairman:
Executive Secretary:
Treasurer:

Canon Leopold Friday
Fr. Peter Clarke
Ms. Lanny Maloney
Mr. Robert Robinson

Address:
Knox House
P O Box 1886
St George's
Grenada

The Conference of Churches Grenada makes the following Statement:

The Chairman of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission has publicly on a 'To the Point' morning programme with Lew Smith, on GBN Radio, stated that the Churches are holding back something from the Commission.

Please note that the Conference of Churches Grenada met with the Commission at their invitation. At the end of the Session the Chairman thanked the Conference of Churches for their kind co operation. The Conference expressed their willingness to appear before the Commission again and to fully co operate with the Commission.

Consequently, the Conference of Churches Grenada would like the Chairman to let us know what it is the churches are holding back, and why the Conference of Churches was not directly informed.

The Statement made by the Chairman of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission does not further the cause of Reconciliation. The Conference of Churches Grenada willingness to reappear before the Commission and to give our fullest co operation still stands.

Telephone: 1(473) 440 - 9766
Fax: 1(473) 440 - 2436

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MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

MINISTERIAL COMPLEX
BOTANICAL GARDENS
TANTEEN
ST. GEORGE'S, GRENADA

22nd April, 2002

Ms. Claudette Joseph
Secretary
Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Scott Street
ST. GEORGE'S


Dear Ms. Joseph,

MEETING WITH THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Reference is made to your letter dated February 19, 2002 on the above-mentioned subject.

In this regard, please be advised that I shall be available to meet with the Commission on Tuesday, April 23, 2002 at 1:00 p.m. The venue for the meeting is the Ministry of Foreign Affairs & International Trade, Ministerial Complex, St. George's.

Yours sincerely,


.....
Hon. Elvin Nimrod
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
& INTERNATIONAL TRADE

Ref. No. 166/01
In replying the above
Number and date of this
letter should be quoted.



MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
MINISTERIAL COMPLEX
BOTANICAL GARDENS
ST. GEORGE'S
GRENADA, W.I.

Tel: 440-2640/2712/2255
Fax: 440-4184
E-mail: faffgnd@caribsurf.com

21 January 2002

Ms. Claudette Joseph
Secretary to the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Scott Street
St. George's

Dear Ms. Joseph,

RE: VISIT OF MINISTER DULLAH OMAR, FORMER MINISTER OF JUSTICE FOR SOUTH AFRICA TO DISCUSS TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Reference is made to telephone conversation (Alexander/Joseph) on the subject of the visit of the former Minister of Justice for South Africa and current Minister of Transportation, Hon. Dullah Omar and the need for the Minister to meet with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) between January 28 and 29. It is preferred if the appointment can be made for the **morning of Monday, 28 January 2002**.

As discussed Minister Omar is making a follow-up visit to Grenada subsequent to a visit in 2000 when he was on a fact-finding visit to establish the viability of a Truth and Reconciliation Commission for this country. The reports emanating from the first consultations are enclosed, as requested.

Minister Omar is visiting as an envoy of the South African President and he intends to discuss TRC matters. Sen. Lawrence Joseph, Facilitator for the TRC, has advised that the Minister should meet with the Commission and the Chairman.

As a matter of urgency, please confirm an appointment for the Minister with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

Sincerely


Lana Mc Phail
PERMANENT SECRETARY

No. 1
plying the above
er and date of this
should be quoted.



MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
MINISTERIAL COMPLEX
BOTANICAL GARDENS
ST. GEORGE'S
GRENADA, W.I.

Tel: 440-2640/2712/2255
Fax: 440-4184
E-mail: faff@gnd@gribsonf.com

21 January 2002

Ms. Claudette Joseph
Secretary to the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Scott Street
St. George's

Dear Ms. Joseph,

RE: VISIT OF MINISTER DULLAH OMAR, FORMER MINISTER OF JUSTICE FOR
SOUTH AFRICA TO DISCUSS TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

Reference is made to telephone conversation (Alexander/Joseph) on the subject of the visit of the former Minister of Justice for South Africa and current Minister of Transportation, Hon. Dullah Omar and the need for the Minister to meet with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) between January 28 and 29. It is preferred if the appointment can be made for the morning of Monday, 28 January 2002.

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As a matter of urgency, please confirm an appointment for the Minister with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

Sincerely

Lana McPhail
PERMANENT SECRETARY

REF: C44



GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S HOUSE

GRENADA

February 12th 2004

Dear Madam,

THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

I refer to your letter dated February 4th 2004 on the above subject and wish to inform that His Excellency the Governor-General will be pleased to meet with the members of the Commission on Friday, February 27th 2004 at 10:00 a.m.

Please be guided accordingly.

Yours faithfully,

Margaret Jawahir (Mrs.)
PERSONAL ASSISTANT TO THE
GOVERNOR-GENERAL (AG.)

Mrs. Eleanor Glasgow
Secretary
Secretariat of the Truth and
Reconciliation Commission
Financial Complex
The Carenage
ST. GEORGE'S

MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MINISTERIAL COMPLEX
BOTANICAL GARDENS
TANTEEN
ST. GEORGE'S

Telephone: 473-440/2640/2712
Fax: 473-440-4184
E-Mail: faffgnd@caribsurf.com

facsimile transmittal

To: MS. CLAUDETTE JOSEPH
SECRETARY TO TRC Fax: 473-440-2964
From: PERMANENT SECRETARY
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
& INTERNATIONAL TRADE Date: 23 01 2002
Re: MEETING WITH MINISTER OMAR Page 1, including this
CC:
☒ Urgent ☐ For Review ☐ Please
Comment ☐ Please
Reply ☐ Please
Recycle

Further to telephone conversation (Alexander/Joseph), concerning the topics that the Minister of Transportation for South Africa wishes to discuss with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, this Ministry submits, for information and guidance, an excerpt from a diplomatic correspondence from the South African High Commission as follows:

With regard to the information requested by the Chairman of the Grenada Truth and Reconciliation Commission, it is hereby advised the Minister Omar is interested in all aspects of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The Mission wish to further advise that, since Minister Omar is not updated about developments relating to the establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, he would appreciate a comprehensive briefing on the TRC process in Grenada to date.

Please do not hesitate to call if further clarification is needed.

As a matter of urgency, the Ministry requests the time of the Meeting between the TRC and Minister Omar.

S. Alexander
S. Alexander
FOR PERMANENT SECRETARY



PRESENTATION BROTHERS COLLEGE Young Leaders 2001-2002

Tel: 1 (473) 440-2470
Tel: 1-(473) 440-9067
Email: fanrob38@hotmail.com

27 February, 2002

The Secretary
Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Scott Street
St. George's

Dear Sir/Madam:

It is with great pleasure that the Young Leaders of PBC invite you to the launching of the book, "Under the cover of darkness" on Wednesday, 6th March 2002 in the Audio Visual Room at PBC.

This book represents over three years of research and was started in May 1999 by the Young Leaders of that year. We decided to continue with the project by organizing the data and continuing with the research.

The Launching commences at 2:30 p.m and will last approximately forty minutes. Light refreshments will be served afterwards.

We look forward to your presence at this brief but special occasion.

Yours sincerely

Alan Ventour
Alan Ventour
President of the Young Leaders

DRIVER LICENSE

ID: 495 531 741

DOB: 07-23-59
 CHARLES DENIS G
 748 SHEFFIELD AV AP1
 BROOKLYN NY 11207
 SEX: M EYES: BK HT: 6-02 CLASS: D
 E: R:
 ISSUED 07-30-02 EXPIRES 07-23-10

Dean Chad 50093240

Dean Chad
 731 Fithell Street
 Brooklyn NY 11208
 718 647 6786

Dean Chad
 Temple
 St George
 April 30th 2007
 011 0 11552

The President / Director
 Truth And Reconciliation Com
 26th Street
 St George

Dear Sir / Madam

Many thanks to
 you in your efforts to bring to
 closure the Chapter of the four
 years of Revolution here in Grenada.
 As you already know, many of
 us Grenadians suffered at the
 hands of the PRG and PRA.

I was located up (Detained) up
at the Richmond Hill Prison for
two years and eight months
approximately.

you would have on file two other
letters from me starting very bare
during the large government.

By the way, I even slept in my cell
in the prison and lost with a
deformed left hand. I was in prison
from March of 1980 through December
of 1982. [I was shot with Ruth Annan]

I was only released when my uncle
- Mr. Cosmin Alakali - intervened.
on my behalf.
My letter to you today is not so
much for compensation for the
years of lost but for the

damages that were inflicted on me
I would like to challenge an
operation in the USA to correct
the deformity and restore my left
hand to good physical use.

I am hereby giving Mr Eric Clark
of this address the authority to

conduct any transaction on my behalf
as it relates to any compensation.
My last letter to the current Minister
Government was received. For that
matter, they approved some funds for
us but later sent it back to the

Necessary as the month of December
came for an end. So, I never got one on
It is my hope that you will not in
good faith and release the funds after
set aside for my suffering. Sincerely,
Dennis

de Souza's Enterprises

Fax 0208 841 1708
Telephone 0208 845 7832

Email: d.e.souza.norman
30 Goshawk Gardens, Hayes,
Middlesex, UB4 8LA

25th February 2002

THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION ST GEORGES GRENADA

Dear Sir or Madam,

RE: NORMAN de SOUZA - Detainee, Peoples Revolutionary Government (PRG) 1979-1982

I write to claim compensation for the period I was incarcerated at the Richmond Hill Prison as a political detainee by the PRG and for personal items that were taken away from my house in Laborie, St Paul's.

I was detained by the PRG from the 13th March 1979 until 23rd December 1982, making a total of 3 years, 9 months and 23 days. Immediately prior to my detention, I was employed as:

1. Political and Welfare Attache' at the Grenada High Commission London, with a salary of £750.00 per month.
2. First Vice President of the Grenada Maritime Manual and Intellectual Workers Union (GMMIWU) with a salary of \$1,500.00 per month.

During the period of my detention, I experienced pain, suffering, hardship and deprivation and so did my young family. My twin daughters were only 16 days.

The PRG confiscated my car, a Datsun 1200 valued at \$20,000.00 at the time. Various household items and personal effects were taken away from my house including, tables, chairs, cutlery, crockery, fridge-freezer, crystal glasses, dinner sets, ornaments, vases, an antique vase and basin and a Zenith radio.



A silver Jubilee coin commemorating Queen Victoria and Prince Albert silver jubilee was stolen from my person at the prison by the PRG, estimated value £15,892.00.

With regard to pain, suffering, hardship and deprivation, I should be grateful if the Commission would recommend reasonable damages comparable to the duration of my imprisonment.

The total value of my **Special damages** is calculated as follows:

• Salary Attache' London	(£34,500. 00)= \$144,900.00
• Salary (GMMIWU)	\$ 68,250. 00
• Datsun Car	\$ 20,000. 00
• Silver Jubilee coin	\$ 66,750. 00
• Household Effects	\$ 23,000. 00

TOTAL	\$322,900. 00
-------	---------------

Plus interest to be calculated from 1979 to 2002.

General Damages

Pain and suffering	As the Commission thinks fit
Hardship/deprivation	As the Commission thinks fit

Plus interest.

Yours faithfully

Norman J. de Souza

de Souza's Enterprises

Fax 0208 841 1708
Telephone 0208 845 7832
Email: d.e.souza.norman
30 Goshawk Gardens, Hayes,
Middlesex, UB4 8LA

25th February 2002

**THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
ST GEORGES
GRENADA**

Dear Sir or Madam,


**RE: NORMAN de SOUZA - Detainee, Peoples Revolutionary
Government (PRG) 1979-1982**

I hereby authorise my brother Lester de Souza to act on my behalf in the presentation of my claim to the Commission regarding my detention at the Richmond Hill Prison by the PRG, from the 15th March 1979 to 23rd December 1982, making a total of 3 years, 9 months, 23 days, 25 minutes and 13 seconds.

Despite the fact that representation was made on my behalf in the past, I confirm I have never received a single penny from the Government.

I would be most grateful if the Commission would give this claim paramount consideration. I thank you in anticipation for your co-operation in this matter.

Yours faithfully



Norman J. de Souza

VOLUME 3
B



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SECRETARIAT OF THE TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
SCOTT STREET, ST. GEORGE'S
GRENADA, WEST INDIES

Tel: 1 (473) 435-2962/2963
Fax: 1 (473) 435-2964

26th April 2002

H. E. Sir Daniel C. Williams G. C. M.G, Q.C
Governor General
Government House
St. George's

Your Excellency,

Re: The Truth and Reconciliation Commission

The Members of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission fully appreciate the very important task with which we are entrusted. We believe in the need for healing and reconciliation in Grenada and are honoured to be part of the process.

Since the commencement of its work the Commission has been experiencing several administrative, financial and logistical problems which have been brought to the attention of the relevant authorities with little or no result to date.

Despite this, the Commission has been able to achieve some of its objectives in furtherance of its Terms of Reference. However, there remains much to be done which, if not undertaken, will render our work incomplete and inadequate.

This work includes:

1. Examination of various documents some of which we understand may have been removed from the country.
2. In-depth inquiry into the disposal of bodies and the whereabouts of remains.
3. Examination of the transcripts of proceedings of the Maurice Bishop Murder Trial, some of which have not been made available to us.
4. Meeting with more of the victims and families of the incidents occurring during the period under review.
5. Meeting with former leaders and officials of the PRG and PRA now incarcerated at Her Majesty's Prisons.

The Commission has taken steps towards addressing these issues but is unable to do so adequately due to the constraints mentioned.

In the circumstances, we regret to advise that we are unable to function further until the above mentioned constraints are urgently and properly addressed.

Yours very respectfully

Donald A. B. Trotman
Chairman
Truth and Reconciliation Commission

Copied to: Honourable Dr. Keith C. Mitchell, Prime Minister
Honourable Mr. Elvin Ninnrod, Minister of Legal Affairs
Senator the Honourable Mr. Raymond Anthony, Attorney General
Senator the Honourable Mr. Lawrence Joseph, Facilitator, TRC

MINISTRY OF LEGAL AFFAIRS
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission
Scott Street, St. George's
Grenada West Indies
Telephone: 1 473 435 2962/2963
Fax: 1 473 435 2964

17th October, 2001

Sen. Hon. Lawrence Joseph
Minister of Legal Affairs
Ministry of Legal Affairs
Church Street
St. George's

Dear Sir,

Re: Secretariat of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission


I am directed by the Chairman of the above captioned Commission to bring the following matters of concern to your attention:

1. Security - The Commission is extremely concerned about the absence to date of security on the premises of the Secretariat. Since at least three (3) weeks from the date of this letter, Mr. Hayes, Permanent Secretary, wrote to the Permanent Secretary Prime Minister's Office requesting security. Since then several follow-up phone calls have been made on the matter to no avail. Further, by letter of the writer's hand, dated 11th October another request for security was made. The said letter was addressed to the Personal Assistant to the Governor General and copied to the Commissioner of Police and Permanent Secretary Prime Minister's Office. Despite the reference made therein of the specific provision in the Commission of Inquiries Act which stipulates that police security must attend the Commission, to date nothing has been done.
2. The Toilet Facilities - The position of the Commission is that the current state of the toilet facilities is not such as to be considered usable as both toilets are constantly flooded. The Commission therefore requests that urgent steps be taken to rectify this problem.
3. Tape Recorder - A tape recorder is urgently needed so as to enable the Commission to adequately and fully record its proceedings. Not having a tape recorder during its first sittings was a serious handicap. Also a Bible is required so that the oath can be properly administered to witnesses.
4. The Commission also notes the lack of certain basic amenities at the Secretariat including but not limited to facilities for drinking water, tea, coffee, etc. Additionally,

certain cleaning utensils such as a broom, mop, mop buckets, hand towels, bins and floor mats have not been provided, even though these were requested sometime before the Commission's first sittings.

In the premises the Commission is of the view that it should not proceed with its next scheduled sittings (October 29th to November 2nd 2001) if the deficiencies outlined above are not rectified.

Yours respectfully


Claudette Joseph
Secretary to the Commission

Ref. No.
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SECRETARIAT OF THE TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
1ST FLOOR, #1 BUILDING
FINANCIAL COMPLEX
CARENAGE, ST. GEORGE'S
GRENADA, WEST INDIES.

Phone: (473) 435-2962/2963
Fax: (473) 435-2964

Yours faithfully

Eleanor Glasgow (Mrs.)
Secretary to the Commission

February 05, 2004

Hon. Leader of the Opposition
Mr. Tilman Thomas
National Democratic Congress
T.A.W.U. Bldg.
Green street
ST. GEORGE'S

Dear Mr. Tilman Thomas

Re: Invitation to meet with the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission.

In recognizing the value of political organizations such as yours to the national welfare of the people of Grenada, Carriacou and Petite Martinique, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission considers it important to share your views on the process of national healing and reconciliation.

To this end, the Commission extends an invitation to meet with you as leader of the National Democratic Congress or your designated representative(s). In addition, the Commission shall be pleased also to receive your views in writing.

Please note that the Commission shall convene on February 26-28, 2004. Grateful if you would communicate to the Secretary before February 16, 2004 your availability to meet with the Commission during that period.

The Commission looks forward to your favorable response.

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SECRETARIAT OF THE TRUTH AND
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GRENADA, WEST INDIES.

Phone: (473) 435-2962/2963
Fax: (473) 435-2964

Yours faithfully

Eleanor Glasgow (Mrs.)
Secretary to the Commission

February 05, 2004

Mrs. Gloria Payne Banfield
Grenada United Labour Party
Belmont
ST. GEORGE'S

Dear Mrs. Gloria Payne Banfield

Re: Invitation to meet with the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission.

In recognizing the value of political organizations such as yours to the national welfare of the people of Grenada, Carriacou and Petite Martinique, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission considers it important to share your views on the process of national healing and reconciliation.

To this end, the Commission extends an invitation to meet with you as leader of the Grenada United Labour Party or your designated representative(s). In addition, the Commission shall be pleased also to receive your views in writing.

Please note that the Commission shall convene on February 26-28, 2004. Grateful if you would communicate to the Secretary before **February 16, 2004** your availability to meet with the Commission during that period.

The Commission looks forward to your favorable response.

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CARENAGE, ST. GEORGE'S
GRENADA, WEST INDIES.

Phone: (473) 435-2962/2963
Fax: (473) 435-2964

February 05, 2004

Rt. Hon. Prime Minister
Dr. Keith Mitchell
New National Party Headquarters
P.O. Box 646
Lucas Street
ST. GEORGE'S

Dear Dr. Keith Mitchell

Re: **Invitation to meet with the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission.**

In recognizing the value of political organizations such as yours to the national welfare of the people of Grenada, Carriacou and Petite Martinique, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission considers it important to share your views on the process of national healing and reconciliation.

To this end, the Commission extends an invitation to meet with you as leader of the New National Party or your designated representative(s). In addition, the Commission shall be pleased also to receive your views in writing.

Please note that the Commission shall convene on February 26-28, 2004. Grateful if you would communicate to the Secretary before **February 16, 2004** your availability to meet with the Commission during that period.

The Commission looks forward to your favorable response.

Yours faithfully

Eleanor Glasgow (Mrs.)
Secretary to the Commission

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GRENADA, WEST INDIES.

Phone: (473) 435-2962/2963
Fax: (473) 435-2964

February 05, 2004

Dr. Francis Alexis
Peoples Labour Movement Headquarters
P.O. Box 2000
12 Lucas Street
ST. GEORGE'S

Dear Dr. Francis Alexis

Re: **Invitation to meet with the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission.**

In recognizing the value of political organizations such as yours to the national welfare of the people of Grenada, Carriacou and Petite Martinique, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission considers it important to share your views on the process of national healing and reconciliation.

To this end, the Commission extends an invitation to meet with you as leader of the Peoples Labour Movement or your designated representative(s). In addition, the Commission shall be pleased also to receive your views in writing.

Please note that the Commission shall convene on February 26-28, 2004. Grateful if you would communicate to the Secretary before **February 16, 2004** your availability to meet with the Commission during that period.

The Commission looks forward to your favorable response.

Yours faithfully

Eleanor Glasgow (Mrs.)
Secretary to the Commission

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SECRETARIAT OF THE TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
SCOTT STREET, ST. GEORGE'S
GRENADA, WEST INDIES

Tel: 1 (473) 435-2962/2963
Fax: 1 (473) 435-2964

May 9, 2002


Mr. Teddy Victor
Vincennes
St. David's

Dear Sir,

The members of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission hereby express sincere gratitude for your assistance in mobilising the community of Bellevue for our public symposium held on April 11, 2002.

Your assistance made the event a tremendous success.

Yours faithfully


Claudette Joseph
Secretary to the Commission

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RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
SCOTT STREET, ST. GEORGE'S
GRENADA, WEST INDIES

Tel: 1 (473) 435-2962/2963
Fax: 1 (473) 435-2964

May 9, 2002


Miss Anthea Peterkin
Principal
St. Paul's Government School
St. George's

Dear Madam,

The members of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission hereby express sincere gratitude for your assistance in allowing us the use of the school for our public symposium held on April 23, 2002. Many thanks also for arranging the hall as requested.

Your assistance made the event a tremendous success.

Yours faithfully


Claudette Joseph
Secretary to the Commission

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SCOTT STREET, ST. GEORGE'S
GRENADA, WEST INDIES

Tel: 1 (473) 435-2962/2963
Fax: 1 (473) 435-2964

May 9, 2002


Mr. Winston McQuilkin
Principal
St. David's R.C. School
St. David's

Dear Sir,

The members of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission hereby express sincere gratitude for your assistance as moderator and for your assistance in allowing us the use of the school for our public symposium held on April 12, 2002. Many thanks also for arranging the hall as requested.

Your contribution and assistance made the event a tremendous success.

Yours faithfully


Claudette Joseph
Secretary to the Commission

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SECRETARIAT OF THE TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
SCOTT STREET, ST. GEORGE'S
GRENADA, WEST INDIES

Tel: 1 (473) 435-2962/2963
Fax: 1 (473) 435-2964

March 27, 2002


Mr. Matthais Joseph
Tivoli
St. Andrew's

Dear Sir,

The members of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission hereby express sincere gratitude for your assistance as moderator at our public symposium held on March 12th 2002.

Your contribution made the event a tremendous success.

Yours faithfully


Claudette Joseph
Secretary to the Commission

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replying the above
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MINISTRY OF LEGAL AFFAIRS,
SECRETARIAT OF THE TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
SCOTT STREET, ST. GEORGE'S,
GRENADA, WEST INDIES

November 20, 2001

Canon Leopold Friday
Chairman
Grenada Conference of Churches
C/o Anglican Rectory
P.O. Box 101
St. George's

Dear Sir,

Re: Audience with the Truth and Reconciliation Commission


The Chairman and the other Commissioners of the above captioned Commission requests an audience with a delegation from your organization at a date and time to be agreed upon during the week of December 12th to 14th 2001.

Historically the Church has played an important role in Grenadian society, and the period under consideration by the Commission (January 1st 1976 to December 31st 1991) is no exception. Thusly, the Commission believes that the Church can make a meaningful contribution towards the attainment of truth and reconciliation in Grenada.

In this regard, the Commission would like to hear the views of the Church generally, and more particularly with respect to methods the Commission may adopt in attempting to achieve its objective of arriving at truth and reconciliation for all Grenadians.

Thanks for a positive response herein.

Yours faithfully


Claudette Joseph
Secretary to the Commission

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SECRETARIAT OF THE TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
SCOTT STREET, ST. GEORGE'S
GRENADA, WEST INDIES

Tel: 1 (473) 435-2962/2963
Fax: 1 (473) 435-2964

January 23, 2002

Dr. The Honourable Keith Mitchell
Prime Minister and Minister of National Security
Ministerial Complex
Botanical Gardens
St. George's


Dear Prime Minister,

**Re: Meeting between the 17 former leaders and officials of the PRG
and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission**

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission recognises that the 17 former leaders and officials of the PRG and PRA now at Her Majesty's Prison is important to the Commission's work within its Terms of Reference. As such, the Commission is desirous of meeting with them for hearings during the weeks of February 4th to 8th and February 25th to March 1st 2002.

The Commission shall therefore be obliged if you will use your good offices to facilitate the availability of these persons for the purpose and periods aforesaid.

Yours faithfully


Claudette Joseph
Secretary to the Commission

Copied to: The Commissioner of Prisons

No.
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SECRETARIAT OF THE TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
SCOTT STREET, ST. GEORGE'S
GRENADA, WEST INDIES

Tel: 1 (473) 435-2962/2963
Fax : 1 (473) 435-2964

Fax

To: Dr. The Honourable Keith Mitchell, Prime Minister and Minister of National Security
From: Truth and Reconciliation Secretariat
Scott Street

Fax: 440 4116

Date: January 29, 2002

Phone:

Pages: 2

Re: Meeting between 17 former leaders of the
PRG and PRA and Commissioners of
TRC

☐ Urgent ☐ For Review ☐ Please Comment ☐ Please Reply ☐ Please Recycle

Comments: Please find attached letter as regard subject of the matter.

Claudette Joseph

Secretary to the Commission



SECRETARIAT OF THE TRUTH AND
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION
SCOTT STREET, ST. GEORGE'S
GRENADA, WEST INDIES

Tel: 1 (473) 435-2962/2963
Fax : 1 (473) 435-2964

Fax

To: Mr. Roy Raymond, Acting Commissioner of Prisons
From: Truth and Reconciliation Secretariat
Scott Street

Fax: 440 7425

Date: January 29, 2002

Phone:

Pages: 2

Re: Meeting between 17 former leaders of the
PRG and PRA and Commissioners of
TRC

☐ Urgent ☐ For Review ☐ Please Comment ☐ Please Reply ☐ Please Recycle

Comments: Please find attached letter as regard subject of the matter.

Claudette Joseph

Secretary to the Commission

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SECRETARIAT OF THE TRUTH AND
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SCOTT STREET, ST. GEORGE'S
GRENADA, WEST INDIES

Tel: 1 (473) 435-2962/2963
Fax: 1 (473) 435-2964

15th April 2002

Mr. Roy Raymond
Commissioner of Prisons
Her Majesty's Prisons
Richmond Hill
St. George's

Dear Sir,

Re: Meeting between the 17 former leaders and officials of the PRG and the TRC

Reference is made to mine of 23rd January 2002 addressed to the Honourable Minister of National Security and copied to you, and to our subsequent conversations on the subject.

I shall be obliged if, in accordance with your oral undertaking, you would write and let me know the disposition of the above captioned gentlemen as regards to the Commission's request as per my said letter.

In the event that the gentlemen are now disposed to speaking with the Commission, its next sittings are scheduled for next week, April 22nd to 26th 2002.

I await a response herein.

Yours faithfully,

Claudette Joseph
Secretary to the Commission

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SECRETARIAT OF THE TRUTH AND
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SCOTT STREET, ST. GEORGE'S
GRENADA, WEST INDIES

Tel: 1 (473) 435-2962/2963
Fax: 1 (473) 435-2964

April 15, 2002

Senator the Honourable Raymond Anthony
Attorney General
Attorney General's Chambers
Church Street
St. George's

Dear Sir,

Re: Terms of Reference - Truth and Reconciliation Commission

I refer to my letter to you of 31st December 2001 and to our subsequent conversations on the above captioned subject.

The matters raised therein continue to be a major handicap to the work of the Commission as regards the gathering of evidence. I shall therefore be very much obliged if these matters can be addressed urgently.

Thanks for your assistance therein.

Yours faithfully,

Claudette Joseph
Secretary to the Commission

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SECRETARIAT OF THE TRUTH AND
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SCOTT STREET, ST. GEORGE'S
GRENADA, WEST INDIES

Tel: 1 (473) 435-2962/2963
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April 15, 2002

Dr. The Honourable Keith Mitchell
Prime Minister and Minister of National Security
Office of the Prime Minister
Ministerial Complex
Botanical Gardens
St. George's

Dear Prime Minister,

Re: Truth and Reconciliation Commission - Relevant Documents

I refer to mine of 15th October 2001 on the above subject.

I am directed by the Commission to request copies of any written or other communication that may have been made by the Government of Grenada (between October 1983 and the present time) to the Government of the United States of America regarding the return of approximately 35,000 pounds of documents allegedly taken out of Grenada by United States officials in the aftermath of the intervention in Grenada on October 25th 1983.

Additionally, the Commission requests copies of any documents now in the possession of the Government of Grenada pertaining to the period under inquiry and which may be of assistance to the Commission in the exercise of its duties under its Terms of Reference.

Grateful for your kind assistance herein.

Yours faithfully,

Claudette Joseph
Secretary to the Commission

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SECRETARIAT OF THE TRUTH AND
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SCOTT STREET, ST. GEORGE'S
GRENADA, WEST INDIES

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Fax: 1 (473) 435-2964

15th April, 2002

Canon Leopold Friday
Chairman
Conference of Churches Grenada
C/o Anglican Rectory
Church Street
St. George's

Dear Sir,

Reference is made to a news release from the Conference of Churches Grenada dated on or about 14th March 2002, regarding certain statements made by the Chairman on GBN radio "To The Point" programme:

The Commission would like to meet with a representative or representatives from the Conference during next week, April 22nd to 26th to address the matter.

Additionally, the Commission would like to discuss with the CCG its intention to hold a forum on national healing and reconciliation with all churches and religious bodies in Grenada.

In the premises, I shall be obliged if you would indicate the CCG's availability to meet with the Commission, and the date most convenient to you.

Yours faithfully,

Claudette Joseph
Secretary to the Commission