Heidegger's Craving: Being-on-Schelling
Author(s): David L. Clark
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HEIDEGGER'S CRAVING
BEING-ON-SCHELLING

DAVID L. CLARK

What we call spirit *exists* by virtue of itself, *a flame that fuels itself. However, because as something existing, it is opposed by Being, the spirit is consequently nothing but an addiction to such Being, just as the flame is addicted to matter. The most base form of the spirit is therefore an addiction, a desire, a lust.*

—Friedrich Schelling, *Stuttgart Private Lectures*

1. Just Say No

How *not* to speak of addiction? We know from Derrida that in talking this way we are always asking two overlapping questions,[1] both of which remind us that what is still confusedly called "addiction"—and with it, a host of related concepts ranging from "drugs" and "toxicity" to "dependence" and "simulation"—is perhaps best held open *as* a question or, rather, in the strange space *between* two questions, quite possibly more. First, an interrogative: a query that calls for a certain vigilance and responsibility when it comes to thinking about addiction, and that draws attention to the ways in which addiction is figured, the rhetorics or tropologies as well as the knowledges of addiction. Like mourning and longing, Schellingian philosophemes to which it is closely related and to which I will return in this essay, addiction is among other things a *figure of understanding*, to use Tilottama Rajan's evocative phrase.[2] *As* a figure, so the first question goes, "addiction" deserves to be written and to be read slowly, not only for what might be called "political" reasons, which is to say, reasons having to do with the normalizing efficiency that comes of speaking the word too quickly, of claiming to know "who" the addict is as such and "what" it means to be addicted, but also because when it comes to addiction—again, like mourning and longing—we are dealing with a term that is irreducibly allegorical in nature, a term that inevitably says more than it says. One could *almost* say that "how *not* to speak of addiction" means "let us try to speak well or properly of addiction, even and especially if this means speaking properly of addiction's multiple improprieties." One could *almost* say this, if "addiction," understood as a fundamental structure of desire that "holds valid for all possible contents of the world" [Slawney 42], were not precisely that which displaces and disorganizes firm oppositional limits between

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1. Derrida asks, for example, "Today, how can we not speak of the university?" ["Principle of Reason" 3]. As he makes clear in another context, to pose the question in this fashion means, generally, "how if one speaks of it, to avoid speaking of it? How not to speak of it? How is it necessary to speak of it? How to avoid speaking of it without rhyme or reason? What precautions must be taken to avoid errors, that is inadequate, insufficient, simplistic assertions?" ["How to Avoid Speaking" 83].

2. I am thinking here of Rajan's The Supplement of Reading: Figures of Understanding in Romantic Theory and Practice.

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propriety and impropriety, as it does between responsibility and irresponsibility, voluntarity and compulsion, delinquency and productivity, sickness and health, the very limits that the medical, juridical, and criminal discourses of addiction often seem most in the service of inscribing and enforcing. But of course the inability unequivocally to speak well (or, for that matter, unwell) of "addiction" in no way suggests that we have nothing to say about it—the collection of papers of which this one forms a small part is proof of that—and this goes to the heart of my second question, not interrogative but rhetorical in kind. "How *not* to speak of addiction?" also means that there is no way *not* to speak of it; insofar as addiction names a structure that precedes and exceeds the knowing subject (and is thus "older" than it), that subject is *always* "speaking" of it, as if answering and answerable to an imperious law, the law of addiction that amounts to an addiction to the law. *Addiction there is*: that is the strange, anonymous, and always anterior logic of craving, a craving no longer necessarily in thrall to the thought of self-possession and sobriety that Schelling scandalously evokes and explores, and that Heidegger directly pursues in his lectures on Schelling. More: where the human is, so too is "the deepest self-craving [*der tiefsten Eigensucht*]" [Heidegger, *ST* 140; 42, 244].[3] Under these maximally habituated conditions, "how *not* to speak of addiction?" means that we are not unwilling but incapable of just saying no to a form of radical intoxication. Instead we find ourselves, *as* ourselves, whether speaking specifically about addiction or not, responding in a kind of passive affirmative to an originary craving, saying yes to addiction even when, in the name of an imagined pure sobriety or abstemiousness or willfulness, we may in fact choose to say no. This "yes" would be of the kind that Derrida describes as an "affirmation that is not addressed first of all to a subject" ["Eating Well" 274]. Before the undeniable aegis of this question, the "not" in "how not to speak of addiction?" marks the trace of a resistance that prevents us from simply saying what we mean and meaning what we say when addiction is the subject; there is no speaking about addiction as such, but for this very reason there is no *not* speaking about it, either. If addiction *is* originary, if it is constitutive of the subject, including, incredibly, the absolute subject of God—as Schelling argues—then there is no metalanguage *on* addiction that is not itself already fundamentally "addicted."

Although I refer to a range of works in this paper, the target texts are F. W. J. Schelling's *Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom and Related Matters* (*Philosophische Untersuchungen über das Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit und die damit zusammenhängenden Gegenstände*) (1809) and Martin Heidegger's *Schelling's Treatise on the Essence of Human Freedom* (*Schelling: Vom Wesen der Menschlichen Freiheit*) (1936). There is a third text always under consideration, too, and that is the hybrid or perhaps virtual text produced by the close interaction of the other two, a text that is neither Heideggerian nor Schellingian but both at once. What interests me here is not only the differing and complementary ways in which Heidegger and Schelling explicitly employ "addiction" as a figure of understanding. I want also to pursue the "rhetoric of drugs" (Derrida) and the notion of "being-on-drugs" (Ronell) that appears inevitably to accompany the question of addiction. Both Schelling and Heidegger suggest that craving is *infectious* (Heidegger: "a sickness which strives to spread itself" [*ST* 125]);

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3. All parenthetical references to Heidegger and Schelling are keyed to the English translation and the German original respectively, separated by a semicolon. For abbreviations for individual works, see Works Cited. Unless indicated otherwise, for Schelling and Heidegger I cite the Sämmtliche Werke *and the* Gesamtausgabe, *respectively (volume number, followed by page number).*

Although for the most part I have used Gutmann's translation of Schelling's Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom *(entitled* Of Human Freedom*), I have in some cases adopted elements from two additional sources: Priscilla Hayden-Roy's more recent translation and passages translated in David Farrell Krell's ground-breaking essay on Schelling's treatise ["Crisis"].*

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one working premise of this paper is that philosophical narratives about addiction have a habit of becoming evocatively pharmaceutical, that is, of getting caught up in everything that modernity associates with habituation and drugs. These include, very briefly: the "pleasure taken in an experience without truth"; "the asymmetrical experience of the other (of being-given-over-to-the-other, of the being prey to the other, of quasi-possession)"; the ingestion, idealization, and incorporation of "substances" that obey the logic of the supplement and the *pharmakon* (that is, these "substances" play ambiguous roles in the texts that evoke them and turn out to be both essential and additive, useful and poisonous vis-à-vis the bodies of those texts); the work of mourning (including the work of an impossible mourning) which addiction—never unrelated to the question of loss and renunciation—seems always in some way to incur; the patterns of dependency and parasitization that develop between a powerful commentary and its pre-text; and the simulations and fictions, the phenomenon of being-carried-away or carried-across that brings addiction and figurality together.[4] The philosophical narratives that I examine here are often weirdly implicated in their own addictive subject; yet in reading Schelling and Heidegger under such a potentially generalizing rubric as "addiction" I risk the hermeneutical equivalent of looking for contraband and finding it everywhere—of planting drugs. Derrida warns us that "to conflate . . . differences [among texts about being-on-drugs] in a homogeneous series would be delirious, indeed narcoticizing" ["Rhetoric" 237]. But, then, how not to speak of addiction?[5]

2. Hooked on Schelling

There may be no master narratives about addiction—and yet there is so much to say where addiction is concerned; like deconstruction, addiction is remarkably text-productive. Nietzsche asks: "Who will ever relate the whole history of narcotica?—It is almost the history of 'culture,' of our so-called higher culture" [¶86]. (Derrida responds: "A history is required, and a culture, conventions, evaluations, norms, an entire network of intertwined discourses, a rhetoric, whether explicit or elliptical" ["Rhetoric" 229].) Among the paradigmatic texts and nodal points making up that history would certainly be the sections of *Being and Time* that Avital Ronell has discussed so well. Here Heidegger defines "care" (*Sorge*) as the being of Dasein, the structural totality that gathers together the ways—the "existentials"—in which Dasein always finds itself habituated to and concerned with entities in the world. Oddly enough, Heidegger devotes the greater part of his effort toward describing not care but care's proximate others, the inappropriate propensities that

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4. Derrida discusses these and other aspects of the rhetoric of drugs (which he describes as "a metaphysical burden and a history which we must never stop questioning") throughout "Rhetoric." For the specific references cited above, see 236, 238, and 234, respectively.

*5. Eve Sedgwick argues that the nineteenth-century invention of a "pathologized addict identity" is part of a larger historical process in which concepts of "will" and "compulsion" simultaneously emerge as each other's other [135]. We have witnessed "the supervention in this century," she argues, "of addiction and the other glamorizing paradigms oriented around absolutes of compulsion/voluntarity" [139]. Where did this absolutization begin? Sedgwick points to Nietzsche, but we might recall how, at the start of the nineteenth century, it was Schelling who scandalously announced that "Will is original being [*Wollen ist Ursehn*], and to it alone all predicates of being apply: groundlessness, eternality, independence of time, self-affirmation" [PI 24; 4, 242]. What makes this claim more extraordinary is that Schelling instantly complicates his own position by arguing that "will" is not, strictly speaking, "original," but shares its primordiality with a primal dependency or addiction. This peculiar divisibility of spirit into volition and dependency marks Schelling as one of the first philosophers of finitude. If modernity suffers from an "epidemic of will" that is indissociable from an "epidemic of addiction and addiction attribution" [135], as Sedgwick cogently argues, then patient zero is Friedrich Schelling.*

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impersonate and threaten to usurp care: *wollen*, *wünschen*, *Hang*, and *Drang* (willing, wishing, addiction, and urge). As Ronell demonstrates, Heidegger's interpretation of the relationship between care and these desirous cognates is extremely ambivalent. On the one hand, he insists that the care structure is ontologically primordial, the already-there that is irreducible to the compulsions and hankerings of everyday life. On the other hand, Heidegger recognizes that *Hang* and *Drang* are more than merely "psychological" or "biological" phenomena; they are fundamentally rooted in care, the dangerous supplements that can always threaten to deflect Dasein from its primary way of being, its true course of resolute openness to *Angst*. For Ronell, addiction and urge in particular function like "accelerators" and "artificial additives" [44]—that is, as pharmaceuticals, uppers—that "display the problematic powers of being ontologically constitutive in certain cases" [40], thereby collapsing the oppositional limit that Heidegger compulsively inscribes and reinscribes between being-in-the-world and being-on-drugs. The origins of Heidegger's argument about addiction, including the self-complication that Ronell describes, are in fact clearly evident in *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena* (*Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*), the lecture course that Heidegger delivered in the summer semester of 1925 at the University of Marburg. Already, Heidegger is insisting on the parasitical nature of *Hang* and *Drang*, their unstable "location" both within and without the boundary dividing the interiority of *Sorge* from the exteriority of its mirror forms: "Care is . . . not a phenomenon composed of addiction [*Hang*] and urge," he argues; yet only a few sentences later he concedes that "along with care[,] addiction as well as urge are constitutive of every Dasein" [*HT* 297]. As in *Being and Time*, addiction functions suspiciously like a "narcotic," alluring and dangerous, spoiling Heidegger's axiomatic claims that the essence of Dasein's "desires" is nothing vulgarly desirous. For who could tell the difference between being-in-the-world and being-on-drugs? In Ronell's hands, Dasein pretends to designate a drug crisis when it is, in fact, itself the crisis to which it refers.

Ronell's "narcoanalysis" focuses on section 41 of *Being and Time*, but this is not the only place—nor is it the only way—that addiction is discussed in Heidegger's work. Significantly, when he returns to the concept almost a decade later it has undergone a sea-change in his thinking. It goes without saying that a great deal has happened to Heidegger, intellectually, since the mid-1920s, but in terms of his interpretation of the meaning of a general concept of addiction, that change can be summed up quickly here in one word: *Schelling*. In *Being and Time* addiction complexly mimics Dasein, making it a phenomenon to be respected but avoided; under Schelling's influence, however, its status changes dramatically, suddenly becoming *the* philosopheme with which radically to think the essence of human freedom and the origins of evil, and, beyond that, vicariously and supplementally to displace the "doctrine of Being which understands all beings in a thinglike way and takes the merely stufflike object of nature as the decisive being" [*ST* 94]. That is, Schelling's notion of addiction evokes for Heidegger *die Seynsfrage* (the question of Being) [*ST* 146; 42, 253]. If addiction is a "prohibited substance" for the Heidegger of the 1920s—as Ronell suggests—then "Schelling" is the means by which he declassifies (or perhaps more accurately, *re*classifies) that "drug" in the 1930s. Significant though unacknowledged *use* is made of Schelling throughout *An Introduction to Metaphysics* (1935), but it is not until the following year that Heidegger devotes an entire summer semester explicitly to the idealist philosopher's work. Then, as before, the text that principally interests him is Schelling's *Philosophical Investigations into the Essence of Human Freedom and Related Matters*, where Schelling unabashedly argues that the Absolute, and all the creatures that are patterned after it, is primordially structured like craving (*die Sucht*) and like longing (*die Sehnsucht*). To say that Heidegger reads Schelling's text closely is not to say enough, for his appropriation of the freedom essay is *itself* ferociously parasitical, a strange case of dependency, repetition, and "being-

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given-over-to-the-other" that can be usefully described in Derridean terms as part of "the rhetoric of drugs." The result of this self-abandonment is curious indeed; as any reader who has set the two texts side by side knows, where Heidegger stops and Schelling begins is often extremely difficult to determine, the former's text is so *consumed* with—by?—the essay on freedom. Jean-Luc Nancy captures the unique nature of Heidegger's appropriation of Schelling's text when he suggests that the 1936 lectures offer "nothing other than a kind of continuous harmonic composition, where Heidegger's own discourse . . . create[s] an incessant counterpoint to Schelling's, without making the matter explicit on its own, and without the latter's discourse being given a clear interpretation by that of the former" [36]. During the course of the lectures, Heidegger *hangs* on to Schelling's every word in an attempt to make legible the traces of a radical thinking that had remained invisible to his contemporaries (Hegel chief amongst them); this, while at the same time subjecting Schelling to a strong reading that is not without "its own peculiar violence" [Sallis 155]. We might say that Heidegger *is using* (Schelling), parasitizing him and ventriloquizing him in a manner that presumably involves all of the ambiguities attendant upon similar acts of incorporation (idealization, internalization, mourning, and so forth) in which the "consumed" object is neither "outside" nor "inside" but both at once. Yet he writes *with* him in such a way that it reads as if he, Heidegger, had fallen prey to a kind of quasi-possession by the German idealist.

Only a year prior to the lectures, in *An Introduction to Metaphysics*—a text that is haunted by the thoughts and words of Schelling's essay—Heidegger had in fact spoken of the task of radical questioning as a form of giving-over-to-the-other, a surrendering at the hands of the exemplary few who, like Schelling, promise "a new beginning" [*IM* 39; *ST* 3]; authentic thinking is equivalent to being-on-philosophy: "granted that *we* cannot do anything with philosophy, might not philosophy, if we concern ourselves with it, do something *with us?*" [*IM* 12]. Yet Heidegger's parasitical dependency upon Schelling's thoughts is troped as a strange form of hermeneutical codependency, for he introduces his lectures by informing his listeners that the true significance of the essay on freedom awaits the touch of the existential analytic; that is, Schelling needs Heidegger as much as Heidegger needs Schelling. Operating as a philosophical supplement, Schelling is foreign and exotic, "the last great representative of anthropomorphic, pre-scientific theosophy" [Žižek 7], but he is also an uncannily welcome guest in the Heideggerian corpus, not to say deeply familiar to "the German spirit" whose "shape" he is said to have helped form, and is helping still. Schelling's work itself is characterized as the commendable failure whose "questioning thinking" [*ST* 166] ultimately proved toxic to his philosophical project, leaving him, as Heidegger rather melodramatically says, "stranded" within it and "shattered" upon it [*ST* 160]. The essay on freedom is a spectacular instance of blindness and insight: its author represents "the acme of the metaphysics of German idealism" [*ST* 165]—an "idealism preventing him from coming up with the idea of *Dasein*," as Peter Fenves aptly puts it [xxviii]—this, in a text that "is the sign of the advent of something completely different, the heat lightning of a new beginning" [*ST* 3]. At the precise hour of the "world-darkening" (*Weltverdüsterung*), when the German spirit falters, "debilitated" and held back from *within* by "the demonic" (*das Dämonische*) [*IM* 62; 40, 48, 50], Schelling is there as a kind of antidote, first to be taken in small doses (in 1935) and then all at once (in 1936). Although he goes unnamed, in *An Introduction to Metaphysics* he has given Heidegger the very language with which to think about the radicality of evil and to censure spirit's self-destitution (*Entmachtung des Geistes*) [*IM* 45; 40, 48]; as Derrida notes, "[s]ome of Heidegger's formulations here are literally Schellingian" [*Of Spirit* 63]. (Such literalism calls for analysis, for what is the status of a citation within a text, especially an unacknowledged citation? Particles of "Schelling" that are incorporated or perhaps introjected intact into the tissue of Heidegger's argument, an inoculation of "Schelling" . . . against what?) And in the subsequent lectures on the freedom essay,

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Heidegger points explicitly to Schelling's "thoughtful life"—a life *full* of thinking—and to the exemplary instance of a philosopher who in his own time was unafraid of "the historical spirit of the Germans as they themselves sought a gestalt" [*ST* 7]. He, Schelling, will be the potent if volatile supplement, a man's drink, so to speak, that will lift and invigorate that spirit once more . . . assuming, of course, that "the age is ready and strong enough for it [*ein Zeitalter dafür bereit und stark genug ist*]" [*ST* 4; 42, 7]. The subject of seminars and lecture courses in 1927–28, and then again in 1936 and 1941,[6] Schelling proves to be a very hard habit to break, even when Heidegger in effect tells us—as he does, for example, in the 1941 lectures—that he has done precisely that. (In the end it is not the weakened German spirit that fails to have the stomach for Schelling, or at least for a certain Schelling, but Heidegger!) For although during the wartime lectures Heidegger "abandons" Schelling when the philosopheme of "human freedom" no longer proves useful and efficacious to him,[7] the German idealist has an astonishingly persistent afterlife in Heidegger's work. Turns of thought and phrases, some of them drawn word for word from the lectures on the freedom essay, survive in Heidegger's work, like the residue of an unmetabolized drug, through to the late lectures on Trakl (1953), where, as Derrida suggests, they are both "natural and troubling" [*Of Spirit* 127]. Natural *and* troubling: where Heidegger is concerned, Schelling is always such strange "stuff": *familiar* and *native* because he registers the continuity of a certain "metaphysics of evil" in Heidegger, yet *foreign* and *dangerous* to the body of his thinking precisely because this link back to German Idealism, back to the thought of *Geist* that we find there, threatens and disrupts the epochality of Heidegger's history of being [*Of Spirit* 102–03], "Schelling" is for Heidegger the exemplary *pharmakon*.[8]

3. Being Addicted

What, then, is it about Schelling and specifically his addictive rhetoric that attracts Heidegger's attention, gets him hooked? It is clear from the lectures that Heidegger is drawn to—among other things—Schelling's daring thesis that finitude and dependency go down to the very ground of God. For human freedom to be more than an abstraction or illusion (and, indeed, for any existing entity to possess the qualities of particularity and individuality), Schelling surmises, it must be rooted primordially in God's agonistic struggle to be free from "himself," or rather, free from that obscure, resistant, and perdurable element within himself against which he can continually posit his independence.

> *In order to be divided from God, they [existing entities] must come to be in a ground that is different from him. But since nothing can have being outside God [*außer Gott*; there is no* außer Gott*] this contradiction can be resolved only thus: the things [existing entities] have their ground in whatever in God is not* He Himself, *i.e., in that which is the ground of his existence.* [*PI* 33; 4, 359]

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6. A record of the 1927–28 seminar on Schelling can be found in the "Verzeichnis der Vorlesungen und Übungen von Martin Heidegger" in Richardson. The 1941 lectures appear as Die Metaphysik des deutschen Idealismus *(vol. 49 of the* Gesamtausgabe*).*

7. Nancy makes this point in The Experience of Freedom *[40].*

8. And, apparently, one to which it is hard to say no, for Derrida dedicates Of Spirit*—his book, of course, on Heidegger—precisely to the "memory of 'Schelling'" [*Of Spirit *117n3]. But what does it mean to mourn Schelling through Heidegger? What is the nature of the "Schelling" (which Derrida isolates within quotation marks) that survives, lives on,* after *Heidegger? What does it mean for "Heidegger" to deliver "Schelling" over to Derrida? (We could say that according to the rhetoric of drugs, Heidegger* is sharing *"Schelling").*

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Schelling sometimes characterizes this "ground" as an underlying substance awaiting its "transfiguration" into "spirit and understanding" [*PI* 39]. But more often he speaks of it in most *ungrund*like terms, as a kind of nothingness or absence that has never been (and will never be) fully present, yet whose traces haunt the universe of existing things like so much dark matter or background radiation. "This is the incomprehensible basis of reality in things," Schelling states, "the indivisible remainder, that which with the greatest exertion cannot be resolved in the understanding, but rather remains eternally in the ground" [*PI* 34]. The ground's nature is to cling to itself and to contract itself (to itself); this "attraction of the ground," which never ceases, "call[s] forth distinctiveness and contrast" [*PI* 52], thereby constituting the most primitive level of God's positing of himself *as* himself. God's being "is" this "self-seeing" of himself in the obscurity of his ground. Under these conditions, neither the light of understanding nor the darkness of the ground exists as something punctually present, since they are their difference from each other in a "nexus" or reciprocal relation. In Heidegger's terms, the being of Schelling's God is thus precisely *not* "some gigantic, objectively present thing," but a gathering of ground and existence whose topology is closer to a fold or seam: *die Seynsfuge* (the jointure of being) [*ST* 122, 106; 42, 212, 185].

What words, what figures could one summon to describe the alterity that God himself can neither evade nor comprehend, and that appears always—"eternally"—to have disappeared from the light of understanding precisely because it is the condition of that light's possibility? In the beginning, there is "the first stirring of divine existence [*die erste Regung göttlichen Daseins*]" [*PI* 35; 4, 252], an anonymous condition of "self"-administered stimulation whose chief effect is to "arouse" the ground to grasp itself (but without an "itself" as such to grasp, this striving and yearning remains unavoidably obscure and chaotic). Because of his inchoate genesis, God is always already *beside himself*, an inexhaustible condition of agitation and ravenousness; he is constitutively a hunger to become himself, an abyss of loss and lack for which a perfectly compensatory act of mourning is, strictly speaking, impossible (and, we shall see, *undesirable*). Unappeasable grief is the mood of the universe; as Schelling says, "the veil of despondency [*der Schleier der Schwermut*] [is] spread over all of nature ["in God, too," Schelling insists, afraid we will flinch from the strangeness and the sadness of his point], the deep, indestructible melancholy of all life [*die tiefe unzerstörliche Melancholie alles Lebens*]" [*PI* 79; 4, 291]. As Schelling circles warily about this languorous primal bestirring (for *who* or *what* would God be if he is othered by the object of his own hunger and melancholy? How *not* to speak of this autochthonic event, the very opening of thought and things?), as Schelling approaches the bizarre question of a dependency that is older than God, his text is practically overrun with anthropomorphizing figures—womb, khōra, anagram, billowing sea, gravity (*Schwere*), feeling, the ruleless (*das Regellose*), the glorious mother of knowledge, the darkness of nonunderstanding—in a manner that recalls a similar rhetorical unfurling in Plato's *Timaeus*.[9] Schelling twice signals the need to speak anthropomorphically about the ground of God's existence (I will come back to the question of figurality), but these gestures of accommodation hardly prepare us for the affectively charged (and theosophically informed) tropes upon which he finally settles—and which form the rhetorical framework for the remainder of the essay:

> *If we wish to speak of this being in terms more accessible to man, then we can say: it is the longing [*die Sehnsucht*] felt by the eternal One to give birth to itself. This longing is not the One itself, yet it is co-eternal with it. It wants to give birth to God, that is, the ungroundable unity; but to that extent unity is not yet in it*

9. *For an analysis of Schelling's figures (including those figures that allude to* Timaeus*), see my "'The Necessary Heritage of Darkness': Tropics of Negativity in Schelling, Derrida, and de Man."*

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*itself. . . . [W]e must represent primal longing [*die ursprüngliche Sehnsucht*] in this manner: it directs itself toward the understanding, which it yet does not know, . . . and it moves presentiently like an undulating, surging sea, similar to Plato's matter, following a dark, uncertain law, incapable of forming something lasting by itself.* [*PI* 35; 4, 252]

With the deployment of this complex analogy, Schelling's narrative fills up with a rhetoric of proclivities and searching desires, a rhetoric that Heidegger immediately diagnoses as infectious (as well he might, since it spreads throughout his own commentary on the freedom essay): *Sehnsucht, Lust, Wollen, Streben, Hang, Drang.* Yearning hungers for a knowledge about which it knows nothing; before there was the Word or *Logos*, there was the hunger for the Word, the inarticulate condition of articulation that Schelling is canny enough to say is structured "materially" like language.[10] In a modulation of his own rhetoric that will capture Heidegger's eye, Schelling refers to this unseeing and incomprehensible striving as "mere craving or desire [*bloß Sucht oder Begierde*]" [*PI* 38; 4, 255].

No doubt it was writing like this that caused Hegel to wince with disappointment over what had become of his erstwhile colleague, for from his eagle-eyed and philosophically sober perspective, Schelling's thinking seems at moments like these to deteriorate into delirious *Schwärmere.* As if he were on drugs, or, at the very least, high (on) "Romanticism." But Schelling openly concedes that *die Sehnsucht*, like the Platonic matter to which it is compared, cannot be comprehended or conceptualized *except* through a hallucinatory experience, or what he calls "falsche Imagination" [4, 282] (here citing Plato's very phrase, in *Timaeus*, for the unavoidably *trancelike* and *spurious* way in which the "third nature," or khōra, is to be thought and described). How can he not speak of addiction? Who was it that opened the doors of perception for Schelling? From Jacob Boehme's *Forty Questions Concerning the Soul*, arguably the major theosophical pretext for the treatise on human freedom, Schelling had learned of God's ferocious beginnings in a fiery chaos of introjected and unquenchable yearning, a condition he describes as "the craving to draw into itself [*die Sucht, in sich zu ziehen*]" [qtd. in Beach 72]. Schelling finds historical confirmation of this addictive an-arche in his subsequent study of the mystery cult associated with the deities of Samothrace, a study that in effect gives him an archaeological rhetoric with which to think the habituated ground of creation. Because these obscure deities, known collectively as "the Cabiri," form the most ancient mythological strata underlying the beliefs of ancient Greece, they constitute a matrix in which to glimpse the fundamental structures of reality. Among "the Cabiri," Schelling argues, the "first being, commencing all," is the potency known as Axieros, whose name is derived from Phoenician roots meaning "'hunger,' 'poverty,' and in consequence 'yearning,' [and] 'addiction' [*die Sucht*]" [*DS* 18; 4, 727]. "Before" anything *is*, "beneath which there is nothing further," Schelling surmises, there is "a nature which is not in so far as it merely strives to be" [*DS* 19]. That "first nature, whose whole essence is desire and addiction, appears in the consuming fire which so to speak is itself nothing, is in essence only a hunger drawing everything into itself [*ein alles in sich ziehender Hunger*]" [*Deities* 18; 4, 728].[11]

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10. As Schelling says, the Logos *appears mysteriously and precipitously out of this longing like a word out of the random lettering of an anagram, the latter a figure for the meaningless, differential markings that form the condition of the possibility of language. (It is as if God were always already hooked on phonics.) For a discussion of this "materiality" of language in the essay on freedom, see Clark.*

*11. Schelling: "But what is the essence of night, if not lack, need, and longing? For the night is not darkness, not the enemy of light, but it is the nature looking forward to the light, the night longing for it, eager to receive it" [*DS *18]. Is Schelling not here responding to Hegel's infamous criticism of the obscurity of Schelling's Absolute, as "the night in which all cows are black"?*

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From these obscure prehistorical and theosophical texts, Schelling adapts a phenomenological rhetoric of embodiment with which to reread and revise the violently idealistic and derealizing impulse he believed governed modern European philosophy. For Schelling, this philosophy was little better than a cult of *Geist*—"a dreary and fanatic enthusiasm which breaks forth in self-mutilation" [*PI* 31], he calls it—that had violently *cut itself* off from the vital if chaotic origins of thought and being.[12] Primal craving is an important part of a more extensive rhetoric of affective states and borderline conditions (including melancholy)—in other words, a body language of "flesh and blood [*Fleisch und Blut*]" [*PI* 30; 4, 248]—that Schelling mobilizes against the repressive effects of what he eventually calls "negative philosophy." Hegel will come to stand paradigmatically for this philosophy, whose masterful and disembodying system transforms actuality into essence, form, category, and idea. In ways that I can only touch on in this essay, Schelling takes up the overlapping figures of *die Sehnsucht* and *die Sucht* as part of a more extensive attempt to describe and to insist upon the irreducible reality of humankind's exposure to an array of irrational and other-than-rational forces: to irreducible loss and radical evil (that is, evil that is not simply the absence of good but something possessing a "positive" presence), to the uncanny and the accidental, and, finally, to the future, to what *happens* (and to the happening of what happens). "What we call the world, which is so *completely contingent* both as a whole and in its parts," Schelling will argue in his old age, "cannot possibly be the impression of something which has arisen by the *necessity of reason*. It contains a *preponderant* mass of *unreason*" [qtd. in Bowie, *Schelling* 35]. The essay on freedom, written almost thirty years earlier, makes a similar case: "Order and form nowhere appear to have been original; [instead] it seems as though what had initially been unruly had been brought to order" [*PI* 34].

Primal craving not only gives a name and a desirous face to this mysterious unlawfulness; it also constitutes a nascent psychoanalysis of the work of spirit, a grounding of its labors in what Žižek calls "the drive whose true aim is the endless reproduction of its own circular movement" [87]. Spirit is the displacement of the energies of addiction into the ever more refined rays of the light of understanding; in Heidegger's words, "The ground thus wants to be more and more ground, and at the same time it can only will this by willing what is clearer and thus striving *against itself* as what is dark. Thus it strives for the opposite of itself and produces a separation in itself" [*ST* 136]. Schelling points to the dynamic process by which the ground's addictive self-seeking differentiates (and thus distances) itself from itself; the distinction that obtains is as sharp as that between the darkest night and the brightest day. Yet the very force of this process's segregating strenuousness remembers the impossibility of complete separation. There is a great deal in Schelling's argument to suggest that this process of deflection and scission is inherently open-ended. In Heidegger's terms, the Absolute, precisely because it "exists," "has eternally taken over the ground and thus affirmed longing as eternal. Thus, it is and remains the continual consumption of itself which never devours itself, but precisely burns toward what is inextinguishable in order to maintain the light placed in it in its innermost darkness" [*ST* 127]. As the craving *for* the ground, primal longing is "itself" abyssal, *groundless*, and thus not an archaic "past" of an existing entity (whether divine, human, or animal) but more accurately its *un*known future, the opening of that future as that which is always about-to-be extinguished. The existent cannot burn this dark ground "off," as it were, in a final blaze of light; this "inextinguishability" comes about

12. Schelling's dominant figure for the philosophers of spirit (i.e., the philosophers who negate the negative) is the cult of Cybele, a cult whose (male) members castrate themselves in frenzied homage to the goddess. Ironically, Hegel will compare German philosophy's task of protecting "spirit" with the cult of Samothrace, which, as we have seen, Schelling evokes in order to critique the derealizing tendencies of German philosophy [see Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy *1–2].*

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not because of the "depth" or "breadth" of the dark ground, but rather because of its abyssal character. As "eternal," the addiction to the ground knows no absolute satiation; yet there is everywhere the *desire* for this imagined end, for becoming clean and sober, as it were, through the expenditure or consumption (without reserve) of the ground's impulsive self-seeking. About this closure, Schelling's text points in two contradictory directions. On the one hand, in the essay's concluding pages, Schelling does imagine a "final, total decision [*endlichen gänzlichen Scheidung*]" [*PI* 89; 4, 300] in which the ground's energies "finally" exhaust themselves and become so distanced from themselves that they sunder the bond altogether. Heidegger suggests that it is here that we see "the keenness of [Schelling's] metaphysical questioning diminish[ing]" [*ST* 159], succumbing as the thinker does to the residue of Christian theodicy in his philosophy [*ST* 146]. On the other hand, the weight of Schelling's argument contradicts or at least disrupts this apocalyptic fantasy of the end of "man." Indeed, the attempt totally to incorporate the ground is for Schelling the paradigmatic structure of the "evil" act. Schelling (and Heidegger after him) is scrupulous in his insistence that primal craving is not in itself malevolent, and therefore that its darkness bears no morally negative connotations. *Die Sucht* does not poison the light of existence; it is the light of existence, in its rageful attempt to dissolve the dark ground and become its own basis, that contaminates *die Sucht*, transforming the urge for particularity and individuality into a parody of itself—the urge for absolute domination over *all* particulars and *all* individuals. For this reason, Schelling argues that evil, properly understood, is *of spirit*. As Heidegger remarks, citing Schelling's Stuttgart seminars, "For evil itself is spiritual, yes, 'in a certain regard the most pure spiritual thing, for it wages the most violent war against all *Being*, yes, it would like to incorporate the ground of creation'" [*ST* 118]. Inasmuch as thinkers as diverse as Spinoza, Fichte, and Hegel are committed, in Schelling's eyes, to spiriting away the radical precedence and exorbitance of primal craving, they have transformed modern European philosophy into a gigantic war-on-drugs.

As "the essence of longing regarded in and of itself" [*PI* 34], irresistible and inexhaustible hankering has no object but itself, and, as such, resembles what Ronell has called a "pure instance of Being-on-drugs: it is only about producing a need for itself" [25]. In lectures designed to clarify the details of the freedom essay, Schelling is explicit and indeed almost compulsive in his insistence that *Geist*'s (sub)version lies in a self-sustaining vortex of habituated desire—"a flame that fuels itself":

> *The spirit is consequently nothing but an addiction to Being [*die Sucht zum Sehn*]. . . . The base form of the spirit is therefore an addiction, a desire, a lust [*Sucht, Begierde, Lust*]. Whoever wishes to grasp the concept of spirit at its most profound roots must therefore become fully acquainted with the nature of* desire *. . . for [desire] is a hunger for Being, and being satiated only gives it renewed strength, i.e., a more vehement hunger.* [*SS* 230; 4, 358]

For Schelling, "man" and "animals" each come into their own, albeit in radically different ways, because of this self-contracting hunger. "The will of the ground is to particularize everything or to make it creaturely," Schelling argues; "It wants differentiation alone [*Er will die Ungliechheit allein*]" [*PI* 58; 4, 273]. (By translating *Er* as "it" rather than as "he," as Gutmann recommends, we retain something of the anonymous precedence of primal longing, its sheer alterity vis-à-vis both God and "man.") Existing life *as* life is neediness; more sharply and more melancholically, it is craving that recoils upon itself and, in recoiling upon itself, compounds and concentrates itself, forming the basis for the egoity, individuality, and particularity of all existing creatures. Out of a certain squeamishness, perhaps, Schelling tends to say that where God *longs*, the creatures *crave*; but this ontotheological distinction is hardly established before it becomes clear that the creatures

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come by their addictive creatureliness honestly, and that for God to be alive, he too is *at heart* anchored in *die Sucht*. (For his part, Heidegger finds no meaningful distinction between the yearnings of God or "man"; "*Eigensucht*"—or self-craving—subjects the Absolute, just as it does all the creatures in whose habituated wake they stir into life.)

God's addiction arouses in "man" and "animal" an irresistible hankering to be particular and, paradoxically, independent: it "awakens in the creature a lust for the creaturely [*erwacht in ihr die Lust zum Creatürlichen*], just as a mysterious voice seemingly calls a man seized by dizziness on a high and precipitous pinnacle to plunge down, or as in the ancient myth the irresistible song of the sirens rang out from the depths [not unlike the "billowing ocean" named elsewhere] in order to draw mariners sailing through down into the whirlpool" [*PI* 59; 4, 273]. Much could be made of the philosopher's delirious rhetoric of an originary abandonment to the voice of the other, evoking as it does a host of questions concerning the fundamental nature of response, co-respondence, and responsibility (for Schelling mobilizes these figures in the midst of a discussion of the origins of evil). Moreover, we might note how the tenor of Schelling's comparison, primal craving's reviving influence on the life of the creatures, is perfectly at odds with the compelling and fatal violence of its vehicle, which is all about dying. Suffice it to say that Schelling—a voyager on strange seas of thought who knew something about peering into the abyss—resorts here to two curiously elaborate analogies, as if momentarily carried away by figures of the being-transported of being. In this small dilatory gesture, I would argue, Schelling finds himself in the strange position of *calling out*, through his anthropomorphizing figures, to the absolute alterity to which, *as* a creature, he has invariably pledged his allegiance; better, he *listens* for the abyssal summons that his own tropes put always before him and beyond him. Addiction—described, precisely, as a "mysterious" and overpoweringly seductive *language* (a *geheime Stimme* and a *Sirenengesang*)—is *already* speaking to us and creatures like us (divine, human, animal), in advance of whatever figures we conjure up to simulate its radical anteriority [4, 273]. Like an arche-stimulant or growth hormone (for who can say that glandular "instructions" are not a language?), originary appetite in-forms (Schelling: "*Ein-bildung*" [4, 254]) the creature, commanding it with a deeply ambiguous imperative to come into its own: Live life (as an addict)! The command, *as* a command from elsewhere—elsewhere even than God—dispossesses the creature in the same gesture that "awakens" it into life. Or rather, as Schelling says, this craving arouses in the creature the lust for being-creaturely. Which comes "first," then, the lust for creatureliness or the creature, the declaration of independence or the independence "itself"? A fantastic logic—to which I want to return in my concluding remarks—structures desirous life: primal longing excites in "man" and "animal" a craving for that which they already need to be in order to respond to its call: namely, creatures. "It"—primal longing—somehow triggers in the creature a desire to become what it in fact *is*. The creature surges up, stirs into life, but this upsurgence and stirring must always, in some minimal way, have *already* happened and thus is *always* happening—an originary event that beckons from the "future" because it recedes into a "past" that could never be present as such.

Under these inaugural conditions, creaturely life (which includes God's life, even if Schelling often prefers to shift the scene to humans and animals) founds itself in a radically unfounded manner, grasping *at* and referring *to* an always prior genesis. Schelling's notion of an addictive craving that is its own object, "a flame that fuels itself," captures the structure of this paradox exactly. "Life" is not simply the object of primal lust's command; it is its essence to be a command, a declaration of individuated life that is always in excess of that individuation and that makes that independence (im)possible. After Derrida, we could say that *die Lust zum Creatürlichen* evokes "the indispensable confusion" between performative and constative utterances that is created when a speech act—a declaration of independence, for example—claims to bring into existence the very

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thing that it requires to be brought into existence ["Declarations" 11]. Whence comes this confusion? What are the conditions of its occurrence? As we have seen, a strange compulsion, always from *elsewhere*, propels life into its queer relationship with itself. Again, Schelling's anthropomorphizing rhetoric tells us a great deal, for what is benignly called a mere "awakening," a reviving of life, is figured forth in precisely opposite terms, as violent and impulsive death: drowning in a whirlpool, falling into an abyss. The fact that tropes of *dying* so handily replace tropes of *living*, drowning for rousing, points to the sheer substitutive violence of life's primal scene, where what is only lusted after, namely, *life*, summarily replaces the lust "itself"—this, so that there might always be more longing for life. "Creatureliness," "autonomy," "particularity": these and other, related words are figures and simulations that cover for the twist in thinking that Schelling's primal craving demands of us, figures and simulations that fill in the space or breach in logic that this twist opens up. The originary craving (the "outside" that is "inside" God) that triggers this process remains permanently *elsewhere*; the voice to which Schelling twice compares this craving is abyssal because *radically un*locatable, "the irreducible remainder" or excess in which the performative and constative utterances of life gather into their vexed nexus. The creatures' relationship to the commanding voice of the law of life thus ensures that their autonomy is never absolute; their dependency is not only an addiction to what comes logically or temporally "before" their existence; more subtly, life remembers—it is in the memory *of*—the trace of an anteriority *within itself*, that, strictly speaking, can be called neither dead nor alive. Creatures in and as their lust for life are always caught *possessing*, but what that "substance" is and where it comes from is "mysterious" indeed.

4. Heidegger's Craving

Reproducing and parasitizing Schelling's argument in ways that I can only briefly evoke here, Heidegger paints a remarkably dynamic, not to say compulsive and agonistic, picture of life on earth, in which each creature, human and nonhuman, hungers principally for itself and, in hungering for itself, simultaneously posits and produces its individuality and particularity. In the lectures on theoretical biology delivered in 1929–30, Heidegger had cited Paul's remark (in 8 Romans 19) about "the creatures' and all creation's longing gaze" [qtd. in Krell, *Daimon Life* 130–31], but it is not until he has read Schelling closely that he grasps the radical pervasiveness of this yearning, its unique manifestations in the creature called "man." From Schelling (who was no doubt remembering Paul, and reading him through Boehme), Heidegger learns that *Eigensucht*—self-craving—forms the charged basis for corporeal existence as such, for *standing out* "as an individual this" [*ST* 140] through a redoubled, languorous, and infectious motion he describes as a "striving away from itself to spread itself, and yet precisely back to itself" [*ST* 125]. In God, this urging is epidemic; longing stirs divinity into a certain minimal visibility, which in turn triggers a ravenous hunger for more and more of himself: "longing becomes clearer in the self-seeing of God in his ground, but that means precisely all the more aroused and addicted [*so wird im Sich-erblicken des Gottes in seinem Grunde die Sehnsucht lichter, aber das heißt gerade, um so erregter und süchtiger*]" [*ST* 136; 42, 236]. (God's appetite for voyeurism is always bigger than his eyes.) Heidegger deems the coils and recoils of this addicted life to be worthy of a substantial visual representation [see *ST* 136; 42, 236]. The ever-expanding coils of the mesmerizing arabesque that makes up this curious illustration (an illustration that is not without its own counterpart in the footnotes of Schelling's treatise [see *PI* 42–43n1; 4, 258–59n1]) in effect gives us a glimpse of what this escalating "self-seeing" *looks* like from the "inside"—the image is dizzying and oddly clarifying at the same time—even if it also spatializes the fundamentally temporal and temporalizing nature of the rhythms of *Hang und Drang*.

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"Man" and "animal" share a desirous origin in addiction, an irresolvable dependency on themselves—or rather, *as* themselves—which uncannily repeats an always prior dependency on the craving that originarily dispossesses God. Heidegger: "The heightened particular will in nature's beings is a return, eternally craving [*süchtige*] but never attainable by nature itself, to the deepest ground—a searching [*ein Suchen*] of God" [*ST* 141; 42, 244]. (Although he has told us earlier that *die Sucht* "has nothing etymologically to do with searching [*Suchen*]" [*ST* 125; 42, 216], Heidegger remains beguiled by the euphony of the terms, and to the accidental semantic connections—the momentary, if illusory "fix"—that such euphony provides.) Both thinkers agree that in the midst of this universe of desire, loss, and *Schwermut*, "man," properly grasped, stands alone. Only "man" attains complete particularity and individuality because in him—*as* spirit—there is at once the most ferocious addiction—"the deepest self-craving of the longing of the ground [*der tiefsten Eigensucht der Sehnsucht des Grundes*]" [*ST* 141; 42, 244]—*and* the free opportunity to elevate that craving "to the broadest clearing of pure understanding" [*ST* 141]. "Man" occupies the infinitely fragile point of decision (*Scheidung*), not between the ground's longing and the light of existence, but between differing configurations of spirit that gather the darkness and the light into an irremediably unstable whole. Shall I preserve primal craving as the always abstential ground against which the light of understanding clarifies itself? Or shall I attempt to break the addiction to the ground (what Heidegger calls "the addiction of longing [*die Sucht des Sehnens*]" [*ST* 125; 42, 217]), and transfigure dependency, the inclination toward selfhood and particularity, into a selfish dominating will that is its own ground? Shall I co-respond with the "mysterious voice" that calls me into creatureliness, or shall I appropriate that voice as my own? "Man" *is* decisiveness; "he" is the one for whom these fundamental questions *are* questions. Heidegger treats Schelling's essay as an opportunity to think beyond good and evil *as* ontic choices made by individuals, and argues instead that true decisiveness comes from a still more archaic decision *for good and evil*; that is, *for* a beginning that remains resolutely open to a redoubled structure of possibilities. This arch-decision has always already been made; as Schelling says, it "cannot occur in consciousness, since this act precedes it as it precedes being and indeed produces it" [*PI* 64]. How or "when" it happens, Schelling will not even surmise: this, even though he has spent the better part of his essay talking in detail about the ontological structures of the origin. Schelling prefers instead to describe its occurrence in hyperbolically fantastic terms—"in One magic stroke [*alles in Einem magischen Schlage*]" [*PI* 35; 4, 279]—terms that deliberately efface the question of agency (this is not "God's stroke") in order to bring out its radical precipitousness, anteriority, anonymity, groundlessness, and irrationality. The striking but always prior decision for decisiveness that sets human life on its perilous way is not strictly speaking, human, but we could be forgiven at this point for describing the ensuing melancholy project as one in which the human goes from one "fix" to the next, each ontic act a renewed negotiation with the antecedent decision *for* primal addiction (which is to say, *for* the groundlessness of the *Seynsfuge*, *for* the churning instability of impulsive self-seeking continually distanced from itself, and *for* the sustained divisibility of spirit). Heidegger: "We find such a becoming in creatures only in man, better yet: as man" [*ST* 141].

"Where [then] does the inclination to evil in man come from?" [*ST* 149]. Schelling argues, as we have seen, that "the general possibility of evil . . . consists in the fact that, instead of keeping his selfhood as the ground or the instrument, man can strive to elevate it to be the ruling or universal will, and, on the contrary, try to make what is spiritual in him into a means" [*PI* 68]. This malignant striving leads to an alarming escalation of indigence that ends, predictably enough, given the rhetoric of addiction with which Schelling works, in violent intoxication:

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> *For the feeling remains in the man who has moved out of the center that he has been all things, that he was in and with God. For this reason he strives to return there. Hence the hunger of selfishness* [der Hunger der Selbstsucht] *arises, which, to the extent that it dissociates itself from the whole and from unity, becomes ever needier and poorer, and for this very reason increasingly desirous, hungry, and poisonous* [begieriger, hungriger, giftiger]. [*PI* 69; 4, 282]

The being-wicked of wickedness is an overdose. The drug? The yearning to come into one's own. Whether or to what degree one could ever determine the precise point at which primal craving, which is the basis of life, finds itself transformed into its over-going, which is death, is never clear in Schelling's work. It is the constitutive exposure to the danger and the possibility of that indeterminacy (which is the indeterminacy of the *pharmakon*) that matters, and is but one way in which Schelling marks his distance from the pieties of Enlightenment humanism. Heidegger is of course largely sympathetic: "Man is not to be understood as that familiar being gifted with reason who hangs around on a planet and can be dissected into his components, but as that being who is himself the 'deepest abyss' of Being *and at the same time* 'the highest heaven'" [*ST* 135].

The familiar beings who *do* "hang around" the planet are the ones who *hang on* to it, hankering and hungering obsessively *after* it in a manner that empties them of true freedom. These creatures do not "have" an addiction; rather, the addiction "has" the creature. In *Being and Time*, Dasein was susceptible to precisely this radical form of passivity, to being "'lived' by the world in which it actually is" [182]. In the Schelling lectures, "animals" occupy the same habituated space. What is revealing is that both Heidegger and Schelling find it impossible to speak of a generalized self-craving without quickly establishing an oppositional limit dividing "man's" way of being-addicted from the craving that fundamentally characterizes all other life-forms, summarily herded together under the rubric "animals." As Krell has fully demonstrated (in *Daimon Life*), Heidegger's desire to retrieve Dasein from human being is often expressed in an axiomatic attempt to isolate what is imagined to be the essence of the human from the essence of animality. In *Being and Time* Heidegger had labored to distinguish care from its proximates—addiction and compulsion. In the Schellingian context of the lectures, having conceded that addiction is fundamental to "the movement of becoming . . . of created beings" [*ST* 133] *in general*, he shifts his efforts toward distinguishing between human and animal, not between Dasein and "psychological" and "biological" phenomena that are merely human.

What distinguishes human beings from all other creatures—"so far as we know" [142], Heidegger adds, as if quickly looking over his shoulder at all the animals looking longingly at him—is that only for "man" does being-on-drugs matter. Unlike human beings, animals lack the *logos* with which to speak, know, and modify themselves as the addicted jointure of ground and existence; in Schelling's terms, terms which Heidegger endorses and reproduces, animals are without *spirit*. (It could be argued that Heidegger opportunistically uses "Schelling," exploits the unique theosophical-idealistic space opened up by the treatise on freedom, in order to continue to speak at length and with a certain freedom about spirit—a philosopheme, as Derrida argues,[13] that Heidegger had otherwise ambivalently renounced after the *Rectorship Address* (1933) and *An Introduction to Metaphysics* (1935): that is, "Schelling" lets Heidegger experiment with "spirit," without running the risk of inclining toward its merely subjective determinations, its associations with a philosophical tradition that lacks the rigor and sobriety of the existential analytic. In the company of Schelling, Heidegger gets to smoke spirit, but not

13. See especially chapter 5 of Of Spirit.

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inhale it. Without the know-how of concernful Dasein, the animal unthinkingly dedicates its self-seeking impulses to "the species" rather than the individual.) For this reason, pronounced with an authority that is nothing if not panicked, animals are most themselves when they are most like others like themselves; "the animal never comes to itself, in spite of its craving" [*ST* 140]. In effect, animals are junkies who are radically *un*conscious of their addictive constitution. (Schelling's cows, as Hegel had said, really are in the dark. We might also recall Nietzsche's cows, who forget their "happiness," and then forget that they have forgotten.) Here, as at so many other places, Heidegger faithfully reproduces Schelling's anthropocentric move *against* animals, moves that Derrida would say are "all the more peremptory and authoritarian for having to hide a discomfiture" [*Of Spirit* 11]. In this case, the anxious difficulty driving Schelling's and Heidegger's polemical claims is presumably that all this talk about craving and desiring inadvertently closes the gap between the animal's urge to live and Dasein's more refined compulsions: this, when the express purpose of Schelling's treatise, and the single subject that interests Heidegger most, is, precisely, "the *essence* of *human* freedom" (an "essence," it is worth emphasizing, that is never merely "human" for Heidegger).

This "discomfiture" is especially evident when Heidegger attempts to distinguish between the origin of evil in animalistic urges and evil itself, which for Schelling is properly and essentially human. Evil is a possibility for human beings precisely because only human beings live in a world of "possibility." Žižek's account of this *Möglichkeit* is useful: "an unfree entity simply is, it coincides with its positive actuality, whereas (as Schelling asserts, announcing thereby the existentialist problematic) a free being can never be reduced to what it is, to its actual positive presence—its 'project,' the undecidable opening of what it might do or become, its 'want-to-be,' is the kernel of its very existence" [20]. Where the animals are immured in their creatureliness, locked within the bond of their own species, the human uniquely possesses the "faculty" or "capability" (*Vermögen*) of "being able to relate itself to a possibility of itself" [*ST* 148; 42, 257]. But Heidegger is quick to ward off the opinion that this "possibility-potentiality of being [*sein können*]" [42, 256] means that freedom is "a mere explosion of an act out of emptiness into emptiness, pure chance" [*ST* 149]: "The possibilities of faculty are not arbitrary for it, but they are nothing compulsive [*nicht Zwingendes*]" [*ST* 149; 42, 257]. Nothing compulsive because, of course, that would be to reduce human freedom to the "choices" that animals appear to make, "choices" which remain in essence the self-protective behaviors that are impelled by the "urge to live"—and thus not choices at all. Human possibilities are not compulsive but not arbitrary, either; operating with this double negative and, so to speak, hemmed in by animals, Heidegger attempts to isolate a space or "faculty" for Dasein that is radically free without being accidental, and habitual without being addicted. "In order to be itself," a faculty "must cling [*hängen*] to its possibilities. Oriented in its attraction to these possibilities, it must incline toward them. An inclination to its possibilities always belongs to a faculty. Inclination [*der Hang*] is a certain anticipatory aptitude for striving for what can be done" [*ST* 148; 42, 257]. A great deal could be said here about Heidegger's rhetoric: the sudden flurry of synonyms for "tendency"—striving, anticipating, clinging, inclining, and orienting; the imperatives—*must* [*muß*]—that amplify some of these tendencies, almost without seeming to, into something more irresistible; the rhetoric of *leaning-toward* that inclines Dasein toward its inclinations even while Heidegger insists that its resoluteness is not compulsive. I might only remark how, in naming whatever it is that Dasein is doing when it faces its possibilities, Heidegger resorts to the very term—*der Hang*—that elsewhere in his work is unambiguously associated with addiction and compulsion. (An addiction that is without compulsiveness? That would mean that the psychological equivalent to Dasein's tendencies is the addict who says: "I can quit anytime.")

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Heidegger's highly generalized maneuvering around the question of proclivity and noncompelling compulsion sets the stage for a discussion of the more pressing question, namely the human "faculty" specifically for evil. And again, Heidegger's logic is curious; he borrows the language of inclination, of *leaning-toward*, but modifies and qualifies it in such a way that it both *is* and *is not* compulsive in nature. Evil acts, like the acts of any free creature, cannot simply happen; but also like any act, they cannot be fully predetermined and remain a free act. *Eigensucht* is not inherently evil; yet its addictive energies form the mysterious opening out of which evil can emerge. What the nature of that opening is, Heidegger describes in a way that has the curious effect of bringing primal craving and evil into the closest proximity while making the actual "contact" between the two things more and more subtle. "The ground does not arouse evil itself. It also does not arouse to evil, it only arouses the possible principle to evil" [*ST* 151; 42, 262–63]. As Heidegger states, there must be a preexisting "inclination to evil [*der Hang zum Bösen*]," a hunger *for* evil that is not itself evil, in order that evil might take place at all. Looking out across the sea and air and land of the planet, Heidegger sees evidence of this *Hang* at every turn; "evil in general" is "evil's ubiquitous wanting to become real urging everywhere in creatures [*durchgängiges, überall im Geschaffenen drängendes Wirklichwerdenwollen des Bösen*]" [*ST* 149; 42, 258]. The inclination to evil, the urging, innocent as such, that urges evil, once again evokes the logic of the *pharmakon*: for what is the difference, exactly, between urging and the supplementally malevolent urging that comes from this urging? Is inclination *almost* made simultaneously to bear opposed valuations here, evil and nonevil? That the "creatures" that Heidegger evokes are by implication *animals* seems perfectly appropriate, since they must play the role of *pharmakeus* for him. The animal is the scapegoat that most vividly embodies the urge to live, and so provides him with an instance of the irreducibility of a certain inclination; but precisely *because* these creatures are animals, they cannot commit evil acts or think evil thoughts, and so also prove useful for forcefully inscribing the line between an inclination and another inclination that is exemplarily human. "The inclination to evil is not a compulsion," Heidegger insists, "but has its own necessity [*Der Hang zum Bösen ist aber kein Zwang, sondern von eigener Notwendigkeit*]" [*ST* 152; 42, 263].

The *Hang* is not a *Zwang*, yet remains, in a manner that Heidegger leaves unexplained, *irresistible* in a way that he describes (citing Schelling) as "'the attraction of the ground [*Anziehen des Grundes*]'" [*ST* 151; 42, 261]. About this "attraction" (a term whose polyvalence in Schelling Heidegger briefly discusses), Heidegger's language is very odd. In the presence of this *Anziehen*—but not directly solicited by it—the faculty for evil reacts as if it were a kind of body into which had been injected a strange preparatory stimulant: "The faculty contracts, stiffens, becomes tense, and the tension toward . . . still at rest is the inclination to evil" [*ST* 151]. The ellipsis here is Heidegger's, a means by which he evades altogether an attempt to describe the infinitesimally subtle point of transition that divides the solicitation of the ground from the inclination to evil, the contraction-condensation of the self to itself from the egotism of wickedness. By repeatedly bringing addiction, compulsion, and solicitation into such conflicted proximity (all of this deserves much more discussion here), Heidegger manages a duplicity that is fundamental to his attempt to retrieve Dasein from Schelling's "man": he must separate the inclination to evil from the compulsive self-seeking of the creatures in such a manner that does not put the human out of reach of that compulsiveness.[14] Another way of saying this would be that "the attraction of the ground" must be both irresistible and negotiable,

14. I borrow and modify Krell's insight into Heidegger's vexed view of animal life: "Unfortunately, the clear division of ontic from ontological, and biological from existential, depends upon a scission in being that ostensibly would divide Dasein from just-plain-life without making such life absolutely inaccessible to it" [Daimon Life *94*].

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so that "the human" becomes what it already is, namely the vexed site where that attraction is interpreted for good or ill.

5. Figuring Addiction

For Schelling, Heidegger maintains, addiction is the figure par excellence for "*the movement of any living being in general*" [*ST* 137]. But the "urge to life [*Lebensdrang*]" [*ST* 137; 42, 237] that this "movement" embodies is for Heidegger in essence nothing merely "biological." For what *appears* as life is a form of delusion, one that confuses "what has been ascertained as objectively present" with "what is real" [*ST* 137–38]. Natural scientists, as well as those who succumb to their views, are hallucinating the object of their analyses—that is, "life"—as long as they fail to grasp "that there is something inexplicable in living beings." This "inexplicability" does not await a more accurate or penetrating investigation, but remains irreducibly out of mind. All of "living nature" "is only what has become rigidified of a past stirring of that becoming viewed metaphysically, a rest [*eine Ruhe*] behind which lies the unruliness of the ground; just as if it could erupt again, unruliness not just being the lack and indeterminacy of the rule" [*ST* 139; 42, 240]. This radical lawlessness we have of course met before; it is, as Heidegger is careful to point out, not a disorder-about-to-be-ordered, but irreducibly chaotic, the "real" that is "beyond" or "before" *both* the law and the lack of the law. As the groundless ground, the "real" can itself only be glimpsed transversally through the anthropomorphizing figures with which we populate the "objectively" known universe and that grant it—and presumably *us*—some measure of peace (*eine Ruhe*). Seething beyond that repose is a lawlessness of *die Sehnsucht* and *die Sucht*, themselves, of course, figures, too, that humanize the "real." But these are not two figures among many, for there is an underlying affinity between the Absolute (or "God" in Schelling) and its languorous and languishing human representations. Just thinking of this affinity, Heidegger gets excited:

> *The essence of ground in God is longing? We can scarcely restrain the objection that this statement projects a human condition onto God—. Ah, yes! But it could also be otherwise. For who has ever verified the supposition that longing is something merely human? And who has ever refuted thoroughly and with sufficient reason the possibility that what we call longing, which is where we are, in the end is something other than we ourselves? Does not longing conceal something that denies us any grounds for limiting it to humankind, something that would sooner give us cause to grasp it as that in which we human beings are unfettered* out beyond ourselves *[über uns weg* entschränkt*]? Is it not precisely longing that proves the human being to be Other, other than a mere human being?* [*ST* 124; 42, 216; trans. modified]

Heidegger's questions form an important part of his response to "the anthropomorphic objection" [*ST* 125], and I want to return to it in a moment. For now, though, what bears emphasis is that Heidegger himself appears to ask them only to move on to more pressing matters, telling us that he must postpone a more extensive discussion until a later point—a promise he will make several times in the lectures, and one that he fulfills only in their last paragraphs. That the concluding pages of the analysis of Schelling's treatise are taken up with the meaning of Schelling's decision to describe the Absolute in such human, all-too-human terms, is itself a measure of both how worrisome and how engrossing the charge—ventriloquized, we should remember, by Heidegger against "Schelling"—is to Heidegger. For now, however, other pressures abruptly urge the

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narrative of his lectures on; he commands his readers "to put aside all sentimentality," and to face primal *Sehnsucht*, and thus "the essence of the [Absolute's] ruling metaphysical animatedness," for what it "truly" is: namely, "*Die 'Sucht'*" [*ST* 125; 42, 217]. Not *Hang*, whose connotations of "inclination" and "propensity" and "hankering" somewhat neutralize the meaning of Dasein's addiction in his account of the care structure in *Being and Time*; neither *Hang* nor *Drang*, although both terms are of course crucially part of the general "atmospherics" of compulsion that characterize Schelling's text and Heidegger's interpretation of it; not *Hang*, but *Sucht*: in essence, to long is to be a "junkie," with all the morbidly craven connotations that the term inevitably evokes, connotations that Heidegger both embraces—*Sucht*, he says right away, "primordially means sickness which strives to spread itself; sickly, disease" [*ST* 125]—and repels, finally appropriating the term in the same way that he does other ethically charged concepts, that is, as terms that claim neutrally to describe the ontology of Dasein's dilemma.[15]

Heidegger's move faithfully reproduces a similar strategy in Schelling's text, where longing is often troped in more compulsive and compelling terms, as "craving." But there is also a certain brinksmanship going on here. Heidegger's lectures "culminate," as Krell argues, at the point where "he considers Schelling's daring thesis that the essence of ground in God is longing" ["Crisis" 133]; but then, as if *stirred* by his own rhetorical questions—Heidegger will go on to describe longing as a motion of *Regung*—he dares his readers to consider not only *die Sehnsucht*, but *die Sucht. Die Sucht*: there, I've said it, Heidegger in effect says, abruptly beginning a new paragraph with these words, and isolating that word from the rest of the sentence with an elaborate parenthesis.[16] The fact that *die Sucht* only substitutes one conspicuously affective anthropomorphism for another (*die Sehnsucht*) of course escapes no one's eye, and puts to us in the boldest possible way that for Heidegger's purposes answering "the anthropomorphic objection" is never a question naively of adopting a nonanthropomorphic language—one of the last things that Heidegger says in his lectures is that this is not possible [see *ST* 163]—but rather of speaking anthropomorphically *in a certain fashion* and with a certain vigilance. How not to speak of addiction? The figures of addiction are complexly symptomatic of an "addiction" to figures. This chiasmus may well inform Heidegger's faintly paranoid remark, made at the conclusion of his lectures, informing us how being-on-Schelling had all along meant that "we were constantly pursued [*verfolgte*] [by whom, exactly?] by that reservation which can be called 'anthropomorphic'" [*ST* 163; 42, 282]. As if unconsciously embarrassed to be found with Schelling, or rather, with the sorts of materials Schelling is handling, Heidegger is always looking over his shoulder for the police. Heidegger's scare quotes delicately hold the object of this "reservation" away at the same time that he concedes its nagging proximity. Because Schelling resorts to human analogies of longing and craving, he claims, it would be all too easy to mistake his treatise for a kind of rarefied amusement that borders on self-hallucination, that is, "a genial game of thought which . . . is unproductive for 'objective' cognition, and is only seductive" [*ST* 163]. Intoxicating, pleasurable, artificial, and *unergiebiges*: improperly used anthropomorphisms would appear to be little better than (recreational) drugs. But Schelling does not talk about God's addiction as if he were on drugs, Heidegger assures us, irresponsibly indulging in theosophically induced simulations when he should be working productively like a clear-headed philosopher. On Schelling's behalf, then, Heidegger just says No to

*15. As Žižek argues, "Heidegger is in the habit of taking a category whose 'ethical' connotation in our common language is indelible (guilt [*Shuld*], the opposition of 'authentic' and 'unauthentic' existence) and then depriving it of this connotation, i.e. offering it as a neutral description of man's ontological predicament" [88–89n76].*

16. Schelling's sentence reads thus: "Die 'Sucht'—was dem Wortsdamm nach nichts zu tun hat mit Suchen—meint ursprünglich und heute noch die Krankheit, die sich auszubreiten strebt; siech—Seuche" [42, 217].

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that kind of anthropomorphism, summoning his readers instead to remain resolutely sober and without *Sentimentalität* in their response to the "stimulus" (*Anregung*) [*ST* 163; 42, 282] that Schelling's analogies of primordial stirring can provide—that is, if taken correctly, and under Doktor Heidegger's care.

When Heidegger lectures on Schelling again in 1941, as Bowie points out, he is dispensing quite different advice, having determined that his "anthropomorphisms . . . are merely anthropomorphisms, and are consequently evidence of Schelling as, in the last analysis, merely another part of the process of subjectification which is Western metaphysics" [*Schelling* 93]. But in 1936, Schelling's figural language means something altogether different. In bringing the Absolute "'humanly closer to us'" through his figures, Schelling

> *only expresses what we have probably already had on the tip of our tongue [*das Wort . . . auf der Zunge liegt*] for a long time with regard to the procedure of thought accomplished here: the whole project of divine Being and Being in general is accomplished by man. God is an elevated form of man. The* morphe *of the* anthropos *is transformed, and what is transformed is asserted to be something else. In scholarly terms, this is called "anthropomorphism."* [*ST* 117; 42, 204. Greek is untransliterated in original text.]

Schelling *spits out* what Heidegger claims he has all along been holding back (but what is a thought, what is *this* thought, such that it has for so long gone unspoken or rather *almost* spoken?). Those who criticize Schelling for sentimentally anthropomorphizing the unruly origin in his addictive figures do so under the mistaken assumption that they already know *what* the human is. "What is insidious about anthropomorphism is not that it gauges according to the form of man, but that it thinks this criterion is self-evident and believes its closer determination and formulation to be superfluous" [*ST* 163]. Schelling's notion of primal addiction explodes the smugness of the scholars who have not set the humanitas of the human high enough. (But Heidegger's Greek is presumably there partly to prompt them into thinking more primordially about what being human "is.") Who are we to know what we do or what we are when we long and crave? "Is it not precisely longing that proves the human being to be Other, other than a mere human being?" [*ST* 124].[17] These are the sorts of questions that the "scholars" who have policed Schelling's work for its figural excess have failed to ask, and have failed to notice that Schelling is asking. "How not to speak of longing and addiction?" is in Heidegger's terms indistinguishable from another question: "How not to speak of Dasein?" The only way in which primal addiction can be dismissed as a pathetic, anthropomorphizing figure is if one has an impoverished conception of both figurality and humanity to begin with. Schelling's tropes urge us to think more essentially about the *anthropos;* they do not obscure and sentimentalize but disclose and clarify. For Heidegger, this means that Schelling's figures are in the service of "the analysis of a *Dasein* that is not yet determined as human . . . as subject, ego, conscience, person, soul, body" [Derrida, *Aporias* 44]. Far from humanizing God, Schelling "divinizes" the human, raising it to the importance that it properly and uniquely possesses: as the *there* of the occurrence of being, as the place where the human stands in being and reveals the decision in being. Schelling's tropological accommodation of

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*17. But what are we to make of Heidegger's stone-cold phrase, "a mere human being [*nur so ein Mensch*]"? Under what conditions is human being* ever *insignificantly human? What are the possible politics—this, in 1936—that spring from speaking for the "Other" whose nearness shrinks and trivializes human being into such mereness? As Ned Lukacher argues, with reference to Derrida, "Heidegger's sacrifice to the Other lends itself too readily to a calculated sacrifice of the others [i.e., the 'merely human'] who do not appear to share the experience of essential thinking" [18].*

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

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God's alterity to "man" is therefore a trope for "man's" concernful accommodation to and convocation with being. And it is more than a trope; rather than committing an indignity to the metaphysical status of God, Schelling's anthropomorphisms re-turn thinking to finitude, to being-resolved to the question of being. On Heidegger's reading, these tropes *perform* the turn or inclination to the Other that is the essential *morphe* of the *anthropos*.

6. Performing Addiction

There may be another way to consider Schelling's anthropomorphisms, and it is to this alternative reading of his humanizing figures that I would like briefly to turn by way of concluding my remarks. Taking addictive longing as human, Schelling's anthropomorphisms take the human as given. It is this compulsive *taking* that interests me about his figures, which is to say, the positing force of the human that takes itself *as* human. According to Schelling, the essence of being-human is decision, by which he means not the ontic choices that humans make every day, but the originary choice to be human. "Man" has always already chosen himself; he is essentially *his own deed* [*PI* 63]. In Heidegger's reading, "[e]very man's own essence is each time his own eternal deed. Thence comes that uncanny and at the same time friendly feeling that we have always been what we are, that we are nothing other than the unveiling of things long ago decided" [*ST* 154–55]. What does this mean? How could "man" decide *for* "man" . . . and not in some basic sense *already be* "man"? The "attraction of the ground [*Anziehens des Grundes*]" as primal craving forms the condition of possibility for this decision; the human "contracts" and "condenses" itself to itself out of this impulsive self-seeking, in precisely the same way that God in the beginning emerges precipitously and without reason out of his own dark ground of longing. But the leap from inarticulate craving to articulate "man," or, in the case of God, from *Sehnsucht* to *Logos*, remains radically inexplicable and unlocatable. In both instances, human and divine, we might recall that among *Anziehen*'s several connotations (contraction, condensation, coming down with) is the sense of *putting on something*, that is, of assuming the face or image or appearance that is not, strictly speaking, its own. The human, I would argue, is just such a prosopopoeia in Schelling, projecting itself as the image of its own projection, coming into itself through the impulsive force of its own positing. Craving posits itself *as* human, meaning that all the anthropomorphisms that follow—including *die Sehnsucht* and *die Sucht*—are marked in advance by this originary and arbitrary "anthropomorphism," the deed by which the *anthropos* declares itself to be the *anthropos*. (It goes without saying that, like Heidegger, we must at this point put "anthropomorphism" in scare quotes, as a way of registering our suspicion of the naturalness with which "man" is assumed to be "man.") Žižek describes "this primordial act of free self-positing" in psychoanalytic terms as part of "the structure of fantasy: prior to his very being, the subject is miraculously present as a pure gaze observing his own nonexistence" [19]. But the strange "temporal loop" involved here, in which the human is always behind (or ahead) of itself, might just as usefully be described as another instance of the necessary undecidability between the constative and performative aspects of language.[18] It cannot be accidental that Heidegger describes "man's" fundamental decision to choose himself in terms of language's positing power. Only "in man is the word completely uttered. Man utters himself and becomes present in language" [*ST* 141; 42, 244]. For Heidegger, this self-utterance is a figure for the way in which the "human" simultaneously craves itself *and* comes into its own in that craving. (Yet being both the object and subject of *Eigensucht* presumably destroys all notions of "ownness."

18. My discussion here has profited from several valuable discussions of the question of the performative. In addition to Derrida ["Declarations"], these include Balfour, Bennington, and Keenan.

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The "human" can never punctually come into its "own," Schelling repeatedly says, not while it trails behind its positing. To come into its "own," the human would need to establish an illegitimate rapport between the attraction of the ground and the "face" it puts on.) Like other, more familiar kinds of performatives, this originary speech-act is fundamentally preemptory and authoritative in nature, enacting and consolidating humanity, but doing so in a way that involves a certain (rhetorical, that is, *substitutive*) violence. In a proleptic structure that is homologous to the one we encountered earlier with the creatures and the craving for creatureliness, humankind's declaration of itself presupposes the very entity that its declaration inaugurates: namely, *humanity*. The human performance thereby involves a tacit description of the condition it produces. But since there can never be a simultaneous, full coincidence between the performance and the knowledge that it makes possible, what one understands in and through the performance can only be a retrospective "glimpse" at a deed that remains, finally, unfathomable. Schelling's account of this act in *The Ages of the World* (1813) is worth citing at length, not least for the way in which it demonstrates the sheer reversibility of the anthropomorphic gesture that we saw in the essay on freedom. Here, in the slightly later text, Schelling proceeds not by bringing the Absolute "humanly closer to us" but by bringing *the human*—which is now the entity characterized by an alterity that demands the accommodation of figures—closer to us through a comparison with the Absolute.

> *For just as it is the law in man that the primordial act [*Ur-tat*], which precedes all individual actions and never ceases, by which he is really himself, recedes into unfathomable depths in comparison to the consciousness that rises above it, in order that there may be a beginning which is never to be annulled, a root of reality unattainable by anything,* so, too *[my emphasis], in its determination, that primordial act of divine life extinguishes consciousness of itself, so that what was posited in that act as ground can in the sequel be again disclosed only by a higher revelation. Only thus is there a true beginning, a beginning which does not cease being beginning. The decision which is in any way the true beginning should not appear before consciousness, it should not be recalled to mind, since this, precisely, would amount to its recall. He who . . . reserves for himself the right to drag it again to light will never accomplish the beginning.* [*AW* 204; 4, 690; trans. modified]

Humanity is perpetually in arrears vis-à-vis the languorous act of its inauguration, suffering as its instantiating circumstance an irreducible loss for which no work of mourning could ever "succeed" through a stupendous act of interiorization or incorporation. The "human" is rather a trace-effect, an after-image of the "irreducible precedence" of the alterity that sets "man" on his perilous path precisely by withdrawing from the light of consciousness. "This is the sadness which adheres to all finite life, and, inasmuch as there is even in God himself an independent condition, there is in him too, a source of sadness [*ein Quell der Traurigkeit*]" [*PI* 79; 4, 291]. With the human—as with God—then, the work of mourning has always already begun, a mourning *before* the human and before God, both of which are entities *in memory* of their "own" genesis, a beginning that is always elsewhere and at some other time. "Man's" "beginning," as Schelling describes it, *begins* compulsively, uncontrollably, as a remembering of its irremediably absent origin, a remembering that *is* "man," rather than something he actively does, and therefore not a thought, one among many, that could be "re-called" into consciousness as such. The human is unable to re-call its beginning; but because the *morphe* of the *anthropos* fills in the space, as it were, left by this originary loss, and thus appears to itself as its own substitution, the human is also unable to renounce its beginning. (We might here recall Ronell's definition of addiction "as the inability to mourn"; the addict, she says, is "a non-

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renouncer par excellence" [9].) Under these deeply melancholic conditions, as Derrida argues in another context, "the relation to the other (in itself outside myself, outside myself in myself) will never be distinguishable from a bereaved apprehension" [*Memoires* 33]. "The self appears to itself only in this bereaved allegory, in this hallucinatory prosopopoeia—and even before the death of the other *actually* happens, as we say, in 'reality'" [*Memoires* 28–29]. *Die Sucht puts on* a human face, "anthropomorphizes" itself, but what comes of this substitution is a death mask that mourns its own lively invention out of that which is faceless, in-human, and, as Heidegger remarks, "nameless" [*ST* 125]. As Schelling will subsequently argue, citing the freedom essay's characterization of the universe as inherently melancholic, "the subject can never possess itself *as* what it is, for precisely as it addresses itself [*sich Anziehen*; which also means, as Bowie points out, "putting on what one is"] it becomes another; this is the basic contradiction, the misfortune in all being."[19]

In considering "man's" decision for itself, Heidegger warns, "[w]e must not slip back into the attitude of naive curiosity which would like at this opportunity to take a look behind the secret of the workshop. This 'back then' does not exist at all, because the occurrence is eternal and that means also a nowmoment [*ein jetzt augenblickliches*]" [*ST* 131; 42, 226]. Because this "nowmoment" is never an object of thought, it is narrativized, after the fact, in various fictions about the "origin" of man: for example, the fabulous stories and phenomenologies of spirit in which humankind transforms itself "politically" from a state of amoral nature to moral culture; or ontologically from the dumb animal to articulate, questioning Dasein; or sexually from anarchic pleasures that are only about producing a need for themselves to pleasures that are normalized in their object choice. "Man utters himself and becomes present in language" [*ST* 141]. But the moment during which "man" comes into himself remains enigmatic, for in order to speak there must already have been language, the very phenomenon that Schelling attributes to the becoming human of humanity. Uttering itself *as* itself, "the human" at best gives a name and a face to an undecidability between the performative and constative functions of language, an undecidability in which, as Geoffrey Bennington observes, the performative "unavoidably . . . must take itself as constative" [237]. It is as if part of the performance must circle around behind or before "man" and take him as given for the performance to "work" and for "'man' [to] become present in language." We could then say that human language is anterior to itself, in excess of the constitutive work that humanity takes it to perform—and thus, arguably, not entirely human, and not in the possession of the human, at all. This in-human excess of the *saying* of the human over the human that gets *said*, this otherness of the longing in whose cravings the *Logos* miraculously emerges (like a word out of an anagram, as Schelling so revealingly says), this exorbitance that haunts the work of spirit (but does not necessarily lead to spirit's destitution [*Entmachtung*], as Heidegger would claim), throws into relief the arbitrary violence of the human appropriation of language and longing, and the concomitant violence of the human *taking* itself as given. As Schelling's anthropomorphisms disfigure and delegitimate themselves into so many hallucinatory prosopopoeias, and as the "friendly feeling that we have always been what we are" gives way to a certain uncanniness, we recall Heidegger's challenge: "Who has ever refuted thoroughly and with sufficient reason the possibility that what we call *longing*, which is where we are, in the end is something other than we ourselves?" If not Heidegger's answer—which finally legitimates Dasein as the privileged site where this alterity is accommodated—then at least the essence of his question bears repeating: How can we not speak of addiction? Who, *we*?

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19. Bowie cites this passage from Schelling's lectures in Munich (circa 1833–34) in Aesthetics and Subjectivity *[87]. (Bowie also notes Schelling's play with* sich Anziehen.*) The phrase, the "basic misfortune in all life," directly recalls "die tiefe unzerstörliche Melancholie alles Lebens" [4, 291].*

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